

**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969–1976**

Volume E–9

Part 1

**Documents on
North Africa,
1973–1976**

Editor

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the *Foreign Relations* Authorization Act, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

This statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This electronic-only volume is part of the subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important foreign policy decisions and actions during the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The advantage of this electronic-only method of presenting documentation is evident in this volume: the format enables convenient access to more key documentation on a broader range of

issues. Annotation—the value-added element of documentary editing—is still present in limited form, but not to the scale of a printed *Foreign Relations* volume. The Office of the Historian is dedicated to publishing the great majority of the volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series in print form; these are also posted in electronic form on the Department of State's website.

This volume documents U.S. relations with North Africa from 1973 to 1976, complementing several other volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series. Policy toward sub-Saharan Africa is covered in Volume E-6 Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, and policy toward Southern Africa is covered in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, 1969–1976.

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations,
1969–1976, Volume E-9, Part 1*

The Maghreb presented opportunities and challenges for both the Nixon and Ford administrations, as they sought to broker settlements to conflicts in the Middle East and to limit Soviet exploitation of tensions in the region. Stability in the Maghreb was considered vital to achieving these goals, but proved increasingly difficult to attain due to Libya's actions in the region and the destabilizing impact of Spain's withdrawal from Spanish Sahara.

Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976, covers efforts by both administrations to re-establish diplomatic relations with Algeria, and provide support and reassurance to moderate Arab allies Morocco and Tunisia. It also covers the various attempts to manage relations with Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi. Finally, the volume documents Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts to de-escalate growing tensions among Spain, Morocco, and Algeria following Spain's May 1975 announcement that it would transfer sovereignty of Spanish Sahara.

There are a limited number of documents covering bilateral relations with Algeria, which were severed in June 1967. Telegrams between Washington and the Interests Section in Algeria document the efforts that resulted in the resumption of diplomatic relations in November 1974. Additional correspondence and conversations with Algeria pertain to the Spanish Sahara and are found in that compilation.

The bilateral compilations on Morocco and Tunisia document U.S. efforts to provide continued support, largely through military assistance. Interagency memoranda along with telegrams to and from Rabat and Tunis show the strategies utilized by the Nixon and Ford administrations to fulfill these arms requests in the context of shrinking budgets. Memoranda of conversation between high-level Moroccan and Tunisian officials with President Ford, Henry Kissinger, and De-

fense officials emphasize the central role these countries played in the administration's overarching goal for stability in the region. They also detail Moroccan and Tunisian concerns over the perceived regional threat posed by Libya and Algeria. Finally, memoranda and telegrams to and from Rabat document interagency discussions regarding the disposition of U.S. bases in Morocco.

Libya presented both administrations with increasingly intractable problems. Libyan attacks on U.S. planes flying over international waters led to a series of high-level meetings, documented in meeting minutes, memoranda, and interagency communications. Memoranda between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency reflect concerns over the inadequacy of U.S. policy toward Libya developed in 1970, resulting in a new study, a Senior Review Group meeting, and a follow-on options paper (Documents 21, 22, and 25). Deteriorating relations between Egypt and Libya, and calls from Sadat for assistance to "deal with Qadhafi," are documented in memoranda and telegrams to and from Cairo. There was also growing concern over the threat Qadhafi posed to the internal security of many of Libya's Arab and African neighbors, illustrated in interagency memoranda and reports. Efforts to manage the growing diplomatic rift between Tripoli and Washington, and avoid a break in diplomatic relations are presented in telegrams and interagency memoranda.

The Spanish Sahara was another source of instability in the Maghreb. The path to sovereignty was fraught with tensions as Morocco, Mauritania and the Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, jockeyed for control of the territory. Cognizant of Morocco's strategic importance, Kissinger nevertheless needed to diffuse the situation while maintaining U.S. neutrality on the issue. Memoranda of conversation between Kissinger, Cortina, Hassan, and Boumediene reflect the significance of the region to overall policy. Kissinger's diplomatic efforts surrounding the announcement of Hassan's Green March, often conducted through cabled messages, sought to avoid conflict between Morocco and Algeria, but largely ignored Mauritania and the Polisario Front. Several intelligence reports examine the future of the Spanish Sahara and the potential for continued conflict, while cables transmit proposed strategies and guidance. Despite the efforts of Kissinger and others, instability in the region continued and the threat of conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the Spanish Sahara (renamed Western Sahara in 1976) remained a source of concern throughout the remainder of the Ford administration.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum

was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provided the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used where appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All *Foreign Relations* volumes that include materials from NARA's Nixon Presidential Materials Staff are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed

concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2007 and was completed in 2014, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 5 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 16 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward North Africa.

Acknowledgements

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the staff at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, and Melissa Heddon at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum at Yorba Linda, California. The editor also wishes to thank Geir Gunderson, Donna Lehman, and Helmi Raaska at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan for their expertise and assistance. The editor would like to acknowledge the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who arranged access to Agency Files, and to John Haynes of the Library of Congress, who was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editor was able to use the Kissinger Papers with the permission of Henry Kissinger. The editor would like to thank the staff in the Manuscript Reading Room at the Library of Congress for their assistance, and Sandy Meagher for her assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense.

Myra F. Burton collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this *Foreign Relations* volume. The volume was completed under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, former General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, former Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division, and Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Thomas I. Faith performed the copy and technical editing.

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General Editor

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The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Nixon and Ford as well as other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Ford Presidential Library, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. In the time since the research for this volume was completed, the Nixon Presidential Materials have been transferred to the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California. The Nixon Presidential Library staff and Ford Library staff are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 1

The presidential papers of the Nixon and Ford administrations are the best source of high-level decision making documentation for U.S. relations with North Africa from 1973 until 1976. At the Nixon Library, several collections from the National Security Council Files are relevant to research on U.S.-North Africa relations. The Country Files for Africa provide the NSC staff's perspective on relations with the Maghreb. The Institutional Files (H-Files) contain records on high-level meetings, requests for studies, and presidential decisions. High-level correspondence between President Nixon and foreign heads of state are contained in the Presidential Correspondence files.

Material at the Ford Library is organized into categories similar to those at the Nixon Library. The National Security Adviser file contains a number of useful collections for understanding U.S.-North Africa relations: Presidential Country Files, Memoranda of Conversation, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and South Asia, Trip Briefing books, and the Presidential Agency File. The President's Daily Diary is an invaluable resource for following the President's work schedule. The Ford Library has separate NSC Institutional (H-Files), which contain minutes and related documents for NSC and Senior Review Group meetings. Also found in this collection are the Policy Paper files containing National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMS), National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), and related documents.

At the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, the Department of State Central Files, 1970–1973, contains useful material on the countries of North Africa. Focused largely on cable traffic to and from posts, they contain analysis of events in country that have a bearing on U.S. policy. This is especially true for the collections on Libya. The Kissinger Papers at the Library of Congress contain a significant amount of duplicate material found in other repositories. However, the Geopolitical File contains documents not found elsewhere, and the Memoranda of Conversations File is remarkably comprehensive in scope. At the Department of Defense, the Official

Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs contain useful documents on U.S. relations with the North Africa. The records of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Files at the National Security Council contain valuable documentation for this volume.

Unpublished Sources

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

RG 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files, 1970–1973

POL Libya: political affairs and relations, Libya

POL 23–10 Libya

Nixon Presidential Materials Project

NSC Files

Presidential Correspondence

Country Files for Africa

Institutional (H) Files

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

National Security Adviser Files

Presidential Country Files for Africa, Europe and Canada

Memoranda of Conversation

National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and South Asia

NSSM & NSDM

National Security Council Institutional Files

Presidential Agency File

National Security Council Operations Staff

Trip Briefing Books for HAK

Central Intelligence Agency, Virginia

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Job 80M01066A

Job 80M01048A

Directorate of Intelligence Files

Job 79B01737A

National Intelligence Council Files

Job 79R01099A

Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers

Geopolitical File

Memoranda of Conversations

Department of State Memoranda

National Security Council, National Security Memoranda

National Security Council, Committees and Panels

National Security Council

Nixon Administration Intelligence Files

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-77-0054

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Subject
Decimal Files, Secret, 1974

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-78-0038

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Subject
Decimal Files, Secret, 1974-1975

OSD Files: FRC 330-78-0002

Official Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Top
Secret, 1973

OSD Files: FRC 330-78-0011

Official Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secret,
1974

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-80-0024

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
Foreign Military Rights Affairs, 1969-1978

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-80-0025

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Africa
Related Files, 1970-1978

Abbreviations and Terms

AFB, Air Force Base

AID, Agency for International Development

BP, British Petroleum

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCEUR, Commander-in-Chief, European Command

Col, colonel

CONUS, continental United States

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD, Department of Defense

DOS, Department of State

EmbOff, Embassy officer

Exdis, exclusive distribution

EXIM, Export-Import Bank

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FMS, foreign military sales

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

GEODSS, Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance

GIRM, Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

GOA, Government of Algeria

GOI, Government of Iran

GOJ, Government of Jordan

GOM, Government of Morocco

GOS, Government of Spain

GOT, Government of Tunisia

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IMF, International Monetary Fund

ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

LARG, Libyan Arab Republic Government

LAW, Light Anti-tank weapon

MAC, Military Airlift Command

XVI Abbreviations and Terms

MAP, Military Assistance Program

ME, Middle East

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MUSLO, Morocco-United States Liaison Office

NAM, non-aligned movement

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NEA/AFN, Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Nodis, no distribution

Notal, not to all

NPT, non-proliferation treaty

NPW, nuclear-powered warship

NSC, National Security Council

NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

OAU, Organization of African Unity

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization

PM, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State

Png, persona non grata

PolOff, political officer

RCC, Revolutionary Command Council, Libya

Reftel, reference telegram

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty/Talks

SAM, surface to air missiles

SDAR, Saharan Democratic Arab Republic

SecDef, Secretary of Defense

SRG, Senior Review Group

TOW, Tube-Launched Optically-Tracked Wire-Guided missile

UN, United Nations

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US, United States

USAF, United States Air Force

USG, United States Government

USN, United States Navy

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group

Persons

Anderson, Robert, U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from April 12, 1976 until October 6, 1978

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from March 1970 until March 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 1974 until April 1978

Bader, George W., Director, Africa Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

Barbour, Robert E., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State from 1975

Benhima, Ahmed T., Moroccan Foreign Minister from 1972 until 1974

Boumediene, Houari, President of Algeria from 1965 until 1978

Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, Algerian Foreign Minister from 1963 until 1979

Chatty, Habib, Tunisian Foreign Minister from 1974 until 1977

Clements, William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1973 until 1977

Colby, William E., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency from March 1973 until August 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from September 1973 until January 1976

Devlin, Lawrence, Chief of the Africa Division, Central Intelligence Agency until 1974

Eilts, Hermann F., Ambassador to Egypt from February 28, 1974 until May 20, 1979

Ellsworth, Robert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from June 6, 1974 until December 23, 1975

Fahmy (Fahmi), Ismail, Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1973 until 1977

Ford, Gerald R., Vice President of the United States from December 6, 1973 until August 9, 1974; President of the United States from August 9, 1974 until January 20, 1977

Granger, Clinton E., member, National Security Council staff from August 1974 until September 1976

Habib, Philip C., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from September 1974 until June 1976; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1976 until April 1978

Haig, Alexander M., Jr., Major General, USA; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1970 until January 1973; Army Vice Chief of Staff from February until August 1973; Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from September 1973 until August 1974

Hedda, Ali, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States from February 1, 1974

Helms, Richard, U.S. Ambassador to Iran from 1973 until 1976

Huni, Abd al-Munim al, Maj., Libyan Foreign Minister

Jalud, Abd al-Salam, Maj., Libyan Prime Minister from 1972 until 1977

Jordan, Amos A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from April until June 1974 and December 1975 until May 1976

Josif, Harold G., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to Libya from November 1972 until December 1973

Kennedy, Richard T., Colonel, USA; member, National Security Council staff; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council planning from 1973 until 1975

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 1969 until November 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973 until January 20, 1977

Lewis, Samuel W., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from December 1975 until April 1977

Maw, Carlyle E., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from November 1973 until July 1974; Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs from August 1974 until September 1976

McAuliffe, Eugene V., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from May 6, 1976 until April 1, 1977

Moorer, Thomas H., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 until 1974

Mubarek, Hosni, Egyptian Vice President from 1975 until 1981

Nelson, William E., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency from August 24, 1973 until May 14, 1976

Neumann, Robert G., U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from October 1973 until March 1976

Newsom, David D., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 1969 until January 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia from February 1974 until October 1977

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969 until August 9, 1974

Nouira, Hedi, Tunisian Prime Minister from November 1970 until April 1980

Noyes, James H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs from 1970 until 1976

Numayri, Ga'far M. (Jaafar Nimeiry, Gaafar Nimeiry), President of Sudan from 1969 until 1985

Parker, Richard B., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to Algeria from November 12, 1974 until December 18, 1974; Ambassador to Algeria from January 17, 1975 until February 12, 1977

Pickering, Thomas R., Executive Secretary of the Department of State from July 30, 1973 until January 31, 1974; U.S. Ambassador to Jordan from March 1974 until July 1978

Porter, William J., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1973 until 1974

Qadhafi, Mu'amar, Col., Chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council; Minister of Defense

Rajab, Muhammad az-Zaruq, Libyan Treasury Minister from 1972 until 1977

Ratliff, Rob Roy, member, National Security Council staff; Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee

Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council staff

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from January 22, 1969 until September 3, 1973

Rush, Kenneth, Deputy Secretary of State from February 2, 1973 until May 29, 1974; Acting Secretary of State; Secretary of State ad interim from September 3 until September 22, 1973

Rydboek, Olof, United Nations Special Representative to Western Sahara from 1976 until 1977

Sadat, Anwar, President of Egypt from October 1970 until October 1981

Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council staff until 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1974 until 1975; thereafter, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Schlesinger, James, Director of Central Intelligence from January 2, 1973, until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975

Scowcroft, Brent C., Lieutenant General, USA; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1974 until November 2, 1975; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 3, 1975 until January 20, 1977

Scranton, William W., U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from January 1976 until January 1977

Simon, William E., Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from February 1973 until May 1974; Administrator, Federal Energy Office, from December 1973 until April 1974; Secretary of the Treasury from May 1974 until January 1977

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from February 1969 until February 1974; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1974 until June 1976

Stein, Robert A., Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to Libya from December 1973 until December 1974

Stern, Thomas, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from 1973 until 1976

Sullivan, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until July 1973; Ambassador to the Philippines from July 1973 until 1977

Vest, George S., Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from 1974 until 1977

Walters, Vernon A., Lieutenant General, USA; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1972 until 1976

Weislogel, Winifred S., Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, 1973; Algeria Desk Officer, Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, Department of State from 1974 until November 1975; Director of the Office of North African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from December 1975 until May 1976

Weiss, Seymour, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State from 1973 until 1974

Wiley, Marshall W., Director of the Near East and Asia/North Africa office, Department of State

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives origi-

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955*, The Intelligence Community, Document 90.

nally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate*, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive"

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.

covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54-55, 57.

¹⁵ Public Law 93-559.

¹⁶ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976

Algeria, 1973–1976

1. **Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Nixon**¹

Washington, April 30, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I provide you with the following report of his conversations with President Boumediene.

“I have just completed almost four hours of meetings with Boumediene Monday night and Tuesday morning. Our talks were warm, friendly and constructive.

“Boumediene opened our talks by noting how much he had profited from his recent meetings with you in Washington. He spoke highly of your understanding of Middle Eastern problems and of the steadfast role he sees you playing in the progress toward a Middle East settlement. As a result, he will be an important positive influence in the Syrian negotiations.

“Boumediene reiterated his hope that our efforts will succeed in bringing about a successful Syrian-Israeli disengagement, though he noted Asad’s concern that the process on Israeli withdrawal continue after the disengagement phase. I assured him that we are committed to the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and to a just and lasting overall settlement.

“We had a good discussion about the Soviet problem. Boumediene urged me not to agree to meet with Gromyko in any Arab capital because this would be demeaning to the Arabs. I agreed, leaving open a

¹ Summary: Scowcroft provided Nixon with a report of Kissinger’s conversation with Boumediene, which included a discussion about the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, April–May 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger met with Boumediene in Algiers en route to the Middle East.

meeting at the end of the trip outside the area. He also stated his firm conviction that after a settlement in the area, the Soviets would be unable to compete with the United States in any field of endeavor in the Middle East.

“Our talks also accelerated the momentum toward resumption of diplomatic relations and a deepening of our overall economic relations. Boumediene said he wants to resume formal diplomatic relations with us after the Syrian-Israeli disengagement has been achieved and before the Geneva Conference convenes. He sees this as a matter of only weeks.

“Boumediene told me that he is anxious to encourage joint ventures with American companies, in fields such as refineries, fertilizers, truck factories and iron and steel plants. He cites the more favorable political climate between our countries and Algeria’s good credit rating as reasons the EX-IM Bank and other institutions should look favorably on Algerian projects. I agreed in principle to be helpful while at the same time pointing out that we could not guarantee favorable decisions for each project.

“In short, these talks fully reflected the marked improvement in our bilateral relations begun by your talks two weeks ago. They should establish a base for a positive role for Algeria in the disengagement agreement and in the Middle East in general.

“Finally, Boumediene told me that he hoped you would come to Algiers if you visit the area.

“I am flying to Alexandria for meetings with Sadat and will report to you from there tomorrow.”

2. Telegram 828/Secto 574 From the Interests Section in Syria to the Interests Section in Algeria¹

Damascus, May 21, 1974, 1448Z.

828. For Eagleton from the Secretary. Subject: Renewal of US-Algerian Relations. Ref: Algiers 1097, State 104906 (Tosec 827).

¹ Summary: Kissinger instructed William L. Eagleton, Jr., to not raise the issue of renewal of diplomatic relations with the Algerians.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, April–May 1974. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Washington. Syria and Algeria severed diplomatic ties with the United States on June 6, 1967. A U.S. Interests Section was established in the Italian Embassy in Damascus, and a U.S. Interests Section was established in the Swiss Embassy in Algiers. Ea-

1. I have made it abundantly clear to President Boumediene that we are prepared to [for] resumption of relations whenever he is. My judgment is that he and President Asad will coordinate question of renewing relations very closely between them and that this will depend in large measure on outcome of current disengagement negotiations, which not yet certain. Meanwhile, we should not be pressing Algerians on this, although I will of course be interested in any readings they may volunteer to you. In any case, I do not plan stop in Algiers on return trip and you should not repeat not raise this idea with Algerians.

Kissinger

gleton served as Principal Officer in Algeria from December 1969 to July 1974. Kissinger was in Damascus to negotiate a disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria.

3. Telegram 121825 From the Department of State to the Interests Section in Algeria¹

Washington, June 8, 1974, 2253Z.

121825. Subject: Message for President Boumediene. For Eagleton from the Secretary.

1. Please convey the following message from me to President Boumediene via channel you think most appropriate.

2. Begin Message:

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to give you this advance word that it has been agreed between us and the Syrian Government that we shall announce the resumption of diplomatic relations during President Nixon's visit to Syria next week. In view of our previous discussions and in keeping with my continuing desire to keep you advised of new developments in the Middle East situation, I wanted to share this information with you prior to the formal public announcement.

¹ Summary: Kissinger instructed Eagleton to convey a message to Boumediene, reporting on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria, and the desire on the part of the United States to resume diplomatic relations with Algeria.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, July–September 1974. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton in NEA; cleared by Sisco and Fry; and approved by Kissinger.

We have in the past discussed the question of a resumption of relations between our two countries, and I simply want to reaffirm to you that we remain prepared for such a step whenever your government feels that the circumstances are propitious. This is, of course, entirely a decision for you to make, Mr. President, and we shall continue to abide by your judgment in this regard.

As President Nixon has written you, the demands on his time unfortunately do not permit him to visit your country in the course of his forthcoming trip. This is a matter of particular regret to me, since it also deprives me of the pleasure of again visiting with you. I still have very warm memories of my meetings with you and of your warm hospitality at the beginning of my recent visit to the area to negotiate the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

Warm personal regards, Henry A. Kissinger

End Message.

3. FYI: Above message will serve as indirect prod and give Algerians appropriate opportunity to move forward on this matter if they wish to do so. If Algerians have not reacted by the time of President's return from Middle East trip, we will consider what further steps we might wish to take. End FYI.

Kissinger

4. Telegram 1410 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, June 29, 1974, 1050Z.

1410. Subj: Meeting with President Boumediene. Dept please pass the Secretary.

1. Summary: During farewell call on President Boumediene June 28 he stressed good U.S.-Algerian bilateral relations while mentioning serious past differences re Vietnam and Middle East. He saw U.S. policy evolving and thought U.S. was strong enough to be relaxed re

¹ Summary: Eagleton reported on his farewell call on Boumediene. Eagleton noted that Boumediene did not commit himself to a date for resumption of diplomatic relations, and saw no reason to replace the chief of the Interests Section since ambassadors would soon be exchanged.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, July–September 1974. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

third world political problems including Cuba. He mentioned specifically that momentum must not be lost in Middle East, that Israeli raids on Lebanon were unhelpful and that U.S. should use its influence with Iran to prevent trouble on “eastern front” in Kurdistan. He expressed general satisfaction re economic relations but some concern over future gas contracts with U.S. Boumediene did not commit himself to a date for resumption diplomatic relations but said matter would move forward when FonMin Bouteflika returns to Algiers from Kuala Lumpur. Meanwhile he saw no reason to replace chiefs of interests sections since Ambassadors would soon be exchanged. End summary

2. President Boumediene received me for farewell call afternoon June 28. After usual exchange for such occasions, he went over theme already known to Secretary to effect that U.S.-Algerian bilateral relations have never encountered serious problems though major differences had divided two countries in international sphere, particularly re Vietnam and Middle East. U.S., he said, was powerful enough to conduct its policies in third world without threats or use of force and without relying on person such as Lon Nol. Communist world was divided and faced many problems.

3. Boumediene referred to evolution of U.S. policy in Middle East and asked that I pass to Secretary his view that it was necessary to maintain momentum. Meanwhile he was disturbed by Israel’s raids on Lebanon which could endanger movement toward peace. He hoped USG would give full weight to Palestinian problem in months ahead.

4. (With Vice Premier of Iraq Saddam Hussein in town) Boumediene asked that I express to Secretary his concern over developments in Kurdistan and his hope that U.S. would use its influence with Iran to ensure that territorial integrity of Iraq was not threatened.

5. Re Middle East I referred to the Secretary’s recent messages to him. I observed that absence of public declarations did not mean that American leadership was neglecting Middle East, nor did it mean that we condoned Israeli raids on Lebanon. Intensive efforts would be continued throughout summer to prepare for Geneva talks. We were aware of dangers to this effort posed by clashes between Palestinians and Israelis.

6. Re Kurdistan I assured Boumediene that USG supported territorial integrity of states in area including Iraq. It would be mistake to overestimate our influence on Iranians who considered Kurdish question to be their affair and subject on which they did not appreciate outside advice. Boumediene interjected that in confidence he could tell us he had advised Iraqis to improve their relations with U.S. They were considering doing so including resumption diplomatic relations. I replied that this would be helpful as means to improve communications and remove their suspicions regarding our policies.

7. Boumediene also briefly mentioned Cuba as a country which did not have natural ties with Soviet Union and wished rather to develop ties “within its natural environment”. I replied that problem had been Cuba’s desire to export revolution and interfere in neighboring countries. He acknowledged this but thought their attitude had changed.

8. I asked whether Boumediene saw any problems on economic front. He replied in negative but asked what was delaying El Paso II and other gas projects. I replied that formulation of our own energy policy, including that related to gas prices, was one cause of delay. We would like to have assured source of Algerian gas at competitive price. He agreed that this was desirable and noted that security of gas projects would be strengthened by renewal of diplomatic relations.

9. I asked whether he had any thoughts re Secretary’s suggestion that U.S. and Algeria give structure to their economic relationship through creation of a joint commission or in any other way Algerians might suggest. Boumediene replied that this was being studied.

10. During discussion of U.S.-Algerian relations Boumediene said in measured but somewhat vague terms that resumption of diplomatic relations would occur soon and that action in this regard would be set in motion following FonMin Bouteflika’s return from Kuala Lumpur (probably next week). I reiterated Secretary’s message that this was for President Boumediene to decide. At close of conversation Boumediene agreed that there would be no reason to name a replacement Chief of USINT since Ambassadors would soon be exchanged.

Eagleton

5. Telegram 152114 From the Department of State to the Interests Section in Algeria¹

Washington, July 15, 1974, 1511Z.

152114. Subject: Message for President Boumediene. Ref: Algiers 1410. For Chargé from the Secretary. Deliver to Chargé at opening of business Saturday, July 13.

1. Please pass following oral message from me to President Boumediene.

2. Begin Message.

Secretary Kissinger has been considering question of assigning a new head of the U.S. Interests Section in Algiers. In this connection, he recalls President Boumediene's comment during Mr. Eagleton's farewell call that there would be no need to name a replacement for Mr. Eagleton since Ambassadors would soon be exchanged. At the same time, the Secretary is reluctant to have a long period pass without a senior American representative in Algiers in view of the importance he attaches to U.S.-Algerian relations and to his personal relationship with the President. The Secretary is therefore considering nominating an American representative of Ambassadorial rank as head of the Interests Section, with the thought that he could then be named as our Ambassador in Algiers at such time as diplomatic relations are restored. Before taking any action in this regard, the Secretary would appreciate knowing whether this would be agreeable to President Boumediene. End message.

Kissinger

¹ Summary: Kissinger instructed Eagleton to deliver a message to Boumediene suggesting the appointment of an American representative of ambassadorial rank to head the Interests Section until diplomatic relations were restored.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, July–September 1974. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Atherton in NEA; cleared by Director General Nathaniel Davis and Gammon; and approved by Kissinger. The original is presumably dated incorrectly, and was likely sent on July 12.

6. Telegram 3429 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, July 22, 1974, 1150Z.

3429. Subj: Algerian Ambassador on US-Algerian Diplomatic Relations.

1. During discussion mainly on other subject July 19, Algerian Amb Dellici took initiative to raise subject of US-Algerian diplomatic relations. He recounted that when former Secy Rogers had been in Rabat, Moroccans had called him to meet with Rogers privately. During meeting, Algerian had said two obstacles—Vietnam and Middle East conflict—stood between US and Algeria. Rogers had replied that Vietnam would end; but no one could make firm predictions about ME conflict. Algerian had telephoned Boumediene same night to report this conversation, and Boumediene had told him that if US could arrive at “half-solutions” for these problems which would eventually lead to full solutions, Algeria could resume diplomatic relations.

2. At present time, Algerian continued, Vietnam behind US and ME conflict half solved. It was his personal view therefore that once Geneva Conference was underway and appeared to be going well, there would be no further obstacles to diplomatic relations. After all, he noted, political and economic relationship already close, with broad range of mutually beneficial contacts.

Neumann

¹ Summary: Neumann summarized his July 19 discussion with Algerian Ambassador Dellici about obstacles to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Algeria. Dellici reported that progress made on Vietnam and the Middle East conflict would result in normalization of relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco II. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Algiers.

7. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, October 15, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger asked that you be provided with the following report of his meeting with Algerian President Boumedienne:

"I had a three-hour talk with President Boumedienne in Algiers, on the evening of Monday, October 14.

"Algeria is not directly concerned with the territorial issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but, from its history as a revolutionary Arab nationalist regime, feels deeply about the principle of justice for the Arab and particularly the Palestinian cause. Algeria has great prestige in the Arab world, if not decisive influence, and therefore it was valuable to ensure that Boumedienne had a thorough and sympathetic understanding of what we are attempting to do. Boumedienne is highly intelligent and sophisticated. He warmly recalled meeting you, and expressed interest in meeting you again at some future time. He said he would be pleased if his Foreign Minister, Bouteflika, could meet with you in Washington sometime in the first half of December.

"I reassured him of your determination to continue the American effort to produce progress. We discussed the domestic situation here and in Israel, and the particular tactical considerations we had to face before our Congressional elections. I told him I was confident that we would overcome the domestic obstacles, as we had done so far. There were uncertainties, but the process was not reversible. He wished there were greater clarity about the final objective, but he did not basically object to the step-by-step approach. He assured me that most of the Arabs trusted us, perhaps even more than they trusted their own allies.

"Boumedienne showed complete understanding of our negative vote in the UN on the PLO. The results came in while we were talking. He understood that our negative vote was essential domestically to preserve our ability to continue on course. It would make my mission easier, he commented.

¹ Summary: Kissinger summarized his October 14 discussion with Boumedienne in Algiers, which included Boumedienne's desire to restore diplomatic relations, and the decision to make a joint announcement on November 12.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books for HAK, Box 1, Middle East HAK Messages to President, October 8–13, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger was in Algiers to review the Middle East peace process with Boumedienne. In telegram 248884 to Amman, repeated to Beirut, Bern, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Rabat, Rome, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Madrid, Algiers, the mission to the UN, and Paris on November 12, the Department informed addressees of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Algeria. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, November 1974–March 1975)

“I asked for his analysis of King Hussein’s position. His view, rather disturbingly, was that King Hussein had no role to play any longer and that it was simply a matter of form how to return the West Bank to the PLO. He thought that making King Hussein the negotiator with Israel only complicated matters. It would weaken the moderate leadership of the PLO, which he thought was ultimately prepared to coexist with Israel. He thought we should deal directly with the PLO. I informed him that the U.S. would begin communicating with the PLO on a political level in late November. He was very pleased with this.

“We discussed energy prices, in which Boumediene shared surprising sympathy. Though he mentioned his position, he praised support for our objective of not having prices raised. He even asked what I had in mind for a strategy to get prices lowered and implied that a political price cut could even be discussed.

“Boumediene talked enthusiastically about bilateral U.S.-Algerian relations. He agreed on restoring diplomatic relations and asked only that we delay a few weeks until after the Arab summit. We set the date of November 12 for the joint announcement of resumption. He then waxed eloquent about the huge joint economic projects that he wanted to launch with the U.S.—billion dollar truck factories, engine factories, iron and steel complexes, as well as oil and gas. I told him I would send my new Under Secretary for Economic Affairs to Algiers in the next two to three weeks; Boumediene said he would receive him personally.

“At the end of the meeting, I conferred privately with him. He offered to transmit messages privately from us to his two revolutionary friends, Prince Sihanouk and Fidel Castro. I told him he could convey to both, in general terms, our willingness to deal with them if they were willing to act as genuinely independent and nonaligned, and not in the pocket of the Communists.

“My talk with Boumediene was warm and open. He encouraged me to speak to the press in positive terms about our relations on my departure. It is most encouraging to me that he showed understanding of our Middle East strategy. At the forthcoming Arab summit in Rabat, Algeria may perhaps use its influence in the direction of moderation.

“Today, I will stop in Rabat for a brief talk with King Hassan on my way back to Washington.”

Libya, 1973–1976

8. Telegram 51869 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, March 29, 1973, 2230Z.

51869. Foll sent action Tripoli info USCINCEUR CINCUSAFE from SecState 21 March 1973 repeated to you quote. Subject: LARG attack on US Plane.

1. Following is text of note Embassy should present forthwith to Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting the attack by LARG aircraft on US military aircraft March 21: (complimentary opening and closing purposely omitted).

2. Quote The Embassy of the United States of America wishes to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic that on the morning of March 21, 1973, an unarmed United States military transport aircraft was fired upon by military aircraft belonging to the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force in international air space over the high seas.

The United States Government protests in the strongest possible terms this provocative and irresponsible act by units of the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force. Such an attack is in clear violation of international law and could have resulted in the loss of American lives and property.

The USG will hold the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic fully accountable for any future actions which may threaten United States aircraft transiting international air space and requests an immediate investigation of the circumstances surrounding this incident. Unquote.

3. Department is calling in Libyan Chargé to present parallel note here at bureau level.

4. Press guidance will be subject septel.

5. If Ministry should justify attack on grounds aircraft was in Libyan airspace as defined by HLR 22, you should reject these points

¹ Summary: The U.S. Mission to the UN was sent a copy of telegram to Tripoli in which the Embassy was instructed to deliver a note to the Libyan Foreign Ministry protesting the March 21 attack of an unarmed U.S. military transport by the Libyan Air Force. The Department requested an immediate investigation into the incident.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret. Drafted by Warren Clark, Jr. in AF/N; cleared by Ernest Thomas Greene in IO/UNP; and approved by Clark. Sent for action to Tripoli, and repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE.

drawing on State 210803, November 12, 1972 and Tripoli 1796, November 28, 1972. Rogers. Unquote.

Rogers

9. **Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, April 5, 1973.

Dear Henry:

In accordance with our discussion at the WSAG, this letter provides you with a discussion of options available to the U.S. Government to respond to the attempted shoot-down on 21 March of a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] C-130 by the Libyan Air Force, and our recommended course of action.

In considering our actions, we must give weight to two factors:

a. Our aircraft was proceeding in international air space. The Libyan Government establishment of a restricted area within 100 n.m. of Tripoli is not recognized by the U.S. Government and we have lodged formal protest with the Libyan Government concerning their unilateral and illegal declaration of air space control. The Libyan attack on our aircraft was unprovoked and illegal and if not met by an appropriate response from the U.S. Government, it will reinforce the Libyan claim.

b. It is our objective to maintain diplomatic relations with the Libyan Government both to maintain contact with this government and to represent the some 3,000 U.S. citizens in this country and our very substantial (in excess of \$1 billion) investments in Libya.

Outlined below are four options for response with associated pros and cons.

a. *Option 1. Diplomatic Protest Only. We could make our position clear again that we do not recognize the Libyan claim and regard their attack upon*

¹ Summary: Clements provided Kissinger with four options in response to the March 21 Libyan attack on a U.S. C-130 aircraft.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya. Top Secret; Sensitive. The letter was sent to Scowcroft, April 6, under a covering memorandum from Dick Kennedy. Scowcroft wrote on the memorandum: "Action taken."

our aircraft as an illegal and unwarranted act that will certainly affect relationships between our countries. In addition, we could threaten, or act, to withhold sales of military equipment to the Libyan Government.

Pros.

(1) Presents minimum potential for open conflict, break in diplomatic relations or actions against U.S. citizens or property.

(2) The Libyan Government needs our support for U.S. military equipment. Its loss could certainly limit their utilization of this equipment; i.e., F-5 and C-130 aircraft.

Cons.

(1) We have delivered protests before on the Libyan claims on air space. A diplomatic protest would be viewed as a weak and ineffective response.

(2) Our leverage with respect to military equipment is limited. It is possible that the support required by the Libyan Government could be obtained from other sources.

(3) Denial of U.S. military equipment (spares) would increase prospects for Soviet military sales and influence in Libya.

b. Option 2. We could assert our right to fly through this air space by using a high performance combat aircraft that would have the intrinsic capability of self-defense.

Pros.

(1) This would afford us the opportunity to assert our right to fly in this air space. The aircraft transitting would, by definition, have the ability to meet and counter any Libyan reaction. [2½ lines not declassified] In those cases we elected to replace vulnerable platforms with one more appropriate to the threat.

Cons.

(1) A response with combat or high performance aircraft alone would not provide the desired parallelism between the earlier mission and our response.

c. Option 3. We could respond by sending a C-130 aircraft non-reconnaissance equipped, escorted by combat aircraft.

Pros.

(1) This option would afford the apparent parallelism between the flight challenged on 21 March and our response, i.e., a transport type aircraft. The provision of armed escort would correspond to the actions that we took in responding to the North Korean.

(2) The provision of armed escort should give us a high assurance that the mission could be completed successfully without incurring loss of aircraft.

Cons.

(1) This mission composition does place at risk a transport aircraft with little intrinsic capability for self-defense. Even with an escort there is a risk that the transport aircraft could be lost.

(2) [2 lines not declassified]

(3) Given the irrational and irresponsible nature of the Libyan leadership, we might well find the U.S. in the position of shooting down one or more Libyan fighter aircraft. The issue of U.S. legal rights would become lost in the emotional aftermath that could critically undercut moderate Arab leaders and help unify the various extremist elements of the Arab world. U.S. lives in Libya and elsewhere would be placed in increased jeopardy as the fedayeen mounted reprisals.

d. [2 lines not declassified]

Pros.

[1½ lines not declassified]

Cons.

Same as Option 3 above [*less than 1 line not declassified*] It is my recommendation that our responses be either Option 3 or Option 4. Details of these two options were forwarded to you under separate cover through my letter of 30 March, subject as above, and the amendment forwarded on 31 March 1973. Related documents have also been provided to the White House and the DIA intelligence assessment of this mission, subject "The Libyan Threat to US Reconnaissance Flights" dated 26 March 1973 and amended 31 March 1973.

W.P. Clements

10. Telegram 62911 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, April 5, 1973, 1529Z.

62911. Subject: Libya Air Space Problem. Reference: State 51869, Tripoli 385.

1. Department requests you submit note to MFA which would confirm U.S. view re distinction to be drawn in international law between “restricted area” and “danger area” which you believe LARG may not fully understand. Note should make points which Embassy has already made orally to MFA, drawing on State 210803, November 10, 1972.

2. Note should not repeat not refer to Ministry note of March 28 which we rejected here, New York, and Tripoli. It should, instead, be based on your earlier *démarches* this subject and refer to March 21 C-130 incident as evidence of urgent need for full understanding of elements of problem. Consistent with foregoing, tone of note as well as substance should be straight forward, with absence of polemic. It should avoid indication of steps USG may feel required to take in order to protect its rights while affording LARG opportunity to continue discussion if it wishes do so.

3. In presenting note you should also indicate that our investigation of C-130 incident indicates that aircraft was fired upon by Libyan Mirages at 34 05 N, 14 20 E, at a distance of 82 nautical miles from Libyan coast line. You should indicate you are providing this information in interest of establishing facts of case.

Rogers

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a note to Minister of Foreign Affairs Mansur Kikhyan, explaining the U.S. position regarding the distinction between “restricted area” and “danger area” in international law. The Embassy was also instructed to share the results of the U.S. investigation into the March 21 incident.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-780002, Box 6, Libya 452. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by James J. Blake in AF/N on April 3; cleared by Miller in S/S, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs David D. Newsom, in substance by Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph Sisco, and in substance by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline; and approved by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs William J. Porter. A notation on the document reads: “Deputy Secretary has seen.” In telegram 449 from Tripoli, April 10, the Embassy informed the Department that the note was delivered that morning. (Ibid.)

11. Telegram 460 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, April 11, 1973, 1410Z.

460. Rabat for Newsom. Subject: Policy Questions re Recon Flights Off Libya.

Summary: This message asks for more-specific assurances than received to date that certain policy considerations have been fed into decision to proceed with another [*less than 1 line not declassified*] recon flight off Libya tomorrow. End summary.

1. By separate channel I was informed April 10 that decision has been made at highest level to resume Mediterranean recon flights, and that the first one was scheduled for that day. The message added that the considerations I had raised (Tripoli 0370) had been taken fully into account but that there was an overriding need clearly to assert our rights of transit. Later I was informed that the first flight had been postponed for 48 hours. Whether this was a result of comments I made in flash reply through the same channel is not clear. My message had expressed understanding of the basic decision to proceed with the flights off Libya in order to maintain our rights of transit but had expressed hope that way could be found so that they would not aggravate ME situation or lead to end of this diplomatic mission. I observed that the flight scheduled for later that day did not appear to meet either of these criteria because of its timing and that diplomacy should be allowed to operate before we assert our rights by force. I requested a final review whether to proceed with the April 10 flight.

2. Among the questions asked in Tripoli 0370 of March 26 was: "Has consideration been given recently to alternative ways of collection, including use of satellites, while preserving the principle of freedom of navigation on and over the high seas by occasional and less obvious transit patterns." Assume that the answer to this question is "yes", and that in any case these flights, having been challenged, must proceed. I repeat that this basic decision is understandable to us here and indeed was expected, but we submit that how we resume flights is equally important. We are still concerned about the timing of the first flight in view of predictable Arab reactions to Israeli raid on Beirut

¹ Summary: Chargé Harold G. Josif questioned the wisdom and timing of the resumption of reconnaissance flights over Libya. Josif expressed concern about the impact of the flights on tensions in the Middle East, and dismay that more time for diplomatic action in Tripoli was not allowed.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–780002, Box 6, Libya 452. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Rabat.

April 9–10. Furthermore, we are concerned about some important details of the instructions given to the pilots of our fighters who are to accompany the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we are raising our questions about this matter in another channel.

3. Regarding the timing, my understanding had been that flights would not resume until situation had been studied further and time allowed for diplomatic action to take place here and have an educative effect. The action was taken, very satisfactorily, on April 10 (Tripoli 0449). Moreover, when seeing same MFA official today, on other business, EmbOff received assurance our démarche had been reported to higher authorities. Still, a recon flight tomorrow rushes things. We have had to spend many hours ourselves pouring over documents and maps to understand all aspects of USG legal position under international law. Can we reasonably expect LARG, which not noted for either its coordination or its speed, to digest what we have presented and within 48 hours reconsider its own position in the light thereof? We think not, and do not understand overriding urgency apparently attached to performing our next C-130 flight. Our differences with the rulers of Tripoli over transit rights go back to 1801, when it took four years to educate them. They have now heard from us again on the subject—but only yesterday, in writing on the complex details.

4. In any case the ME situation, of which the LAR is part and parcel, happens to be in one of its most tense phases in years. Overtones we are getting from Beirut and Cairo, as well as here, are of most extreme anti-American sentiment since June 1967 War, marked by wild but locally credible allegations of USG complicity with Israeli “aggression” if not primary responsibility therefor. Fact that we have publicly “deplored” both Israeli and fedayeen actions of last two days does help, but assume our emphasis now must be on quiet measures to calm situation. How could another recon flight and inevitable LARG knowledge of it, not to mention an interception incident, fit into this general posture we presumably wish to project? If LARG publicizes its knowledge, as quite possible in its present mode of extreme edginess, most Arabs likely to interpret flight as deliberate “protective reaction” to prevent LARG retaliation against Israeli interests in Mediterranean. We do not think that such a linkage is what we want to convey or that need to show our right to overfly Mediterranean is so urgent as to risk the connection being drawn.

5. Finally, LARG announced today that as the burials at Beirut are to be held afternoon of April 12, a popular demonstration will be held at Tripoli at same hour (1700 or 1800 local time).

6. Would appreciate an assurance such considerations are being taken into account now, and notification as early as possible of final outcome of review.

7. Have no objection to this message being distributed to other concerned agencies Washington.

Josif

12. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 12, 1973.

SUBJECT

Escorted Reconnaissance Flight off Libya

In 1972 Libya declared a “restricted area” reaching 100 miles around its capital. We protested, citing international law and custom which prevented restricting freedom of airspace over the high seas and advised Libya that we would adhere to international aviation practices. On a regular basis we have flown reconnaissance missions over international waters in the Central Mediterranean, including Libya’s “restricted area,” without incident.

On 21 March two Libyan aircraft fired at and attempted to force down a U.S. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reconnaissance aircraft which was about 82 nautical miles off Libya. We have reiterated our right to fly in international waters to Libyan civil air officials and, on 10 April, to the Libyan Foreign Ministry. The issues are complicated and Libyan officials are likely to take considerable time to study them before responding.

What is at issue is our right to freedom of air space over international waters. The Libyan attack was unprovoked and clearly illegal. If not met with an appropriate response from the U.S. Government, Libya’s claims will be reinforced. There is a consensus that we should establish our rights by resuming reconnaissance operations off Libya.

¹ Summary: Kissinger proposed the resumption of reconnaissance flights off the Libyan coast.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya. Top Secret; Outside the System. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A was not attached. A memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, April 17, informed the President of the successful completion of an escorted reconnaissance mission off the Libyan coast. (Ibid.)

Defense and the JCS propose to provide armed fighter escorts for a [less than 1 line not declassified] reconnaissance aircraft which would fly a mission similar to that of 21 March except that it would proceed point-to-point without any orbits en route and would be manned by a reduced crew. The escort would be provided by an aircraft carrier in the area. The closest point of approach to Libya would be 75 nautical miles.

The arguments *for* this proposal include:

- To establish our right to operate in international airspace.
- To confirm our refusal to accept Libya's (or any other) unilateral, illegal declaration of a "restricted area" that includes international space.
- To resume collection of intelligence information on the Middle East, including Soviet involvement in the area.
- To provide some degree of protection to our aircraft as it conducts reconnaissance.
- To prevent Libya from claiming that this is the way to deal with the United States.

The arguments *against* this proposal include:

- We may be accused of resorting to military means to assert our rights.
- Arabs will exploit any incident as "proof" of our collusion with Israel, specifically in the recent Beirut raid, but generally as well.
- Libya's reaction might be to seek ways to retaliate rather than be subdued by our show of force.
- Libya's planes are on "strip alert" and are equipped with air-to-air missiles. They are "prepared" for Israeli air attacks and might mistake our mission and attack. There are also indications Libya is looking for an opportunity to create an incident as an excuse for a total break with the U.S. In any event, our planes could be threatened. Even with an escort, there is a risk our reconnaissance aircraft could be lost.
- Middle East anti-U.S. emotions are being inflamed as an aftermath of Israel's raid on Lebanon and a U.S.-Libya incident would add fuel to the fire, possibly endangering the 3,000 Americans in Libya and the major oil investments there.

There are risks involved, but I believe we should not delay much longer the assertion of our right to operate in international airspace. To do so would only invite similar challenges elsewhere and even bolder challenges by Libya. Anti-American demonstrations in the area can be expected to lessen after today's funeral services in Lebanon for those killed in the Israeli raid and the simultaneous observances in Libya. We can monitor these sentiments over the next few days before scheduling a reconnaissance mission with armed escort. In any event, it is probably desirable to wait until Under Secretary Newsom departs Algeria on 16 April before conducting the proposed mission. In addition, Secretary Rogers recommends that we delay the flight for a few days at least (Tab A). We could further reduce the risks by notifying the Libyan Govern-

ment of our intentions in advance, which also would establish that any provocation would be at their hand, not ours.

Recommendation:

That you approve armed escort of a reconnaissance flight off Libya on 17 April, with the Libyan Government to be notified in advance.

13. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, April 16, 1973, 10:03–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Libya and Indochina

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Henry Kissinger

State

William Porter

William Sullivan

Defense

Lawrence Eagleburger

Gen. Alexander Haig

R/Adm. Daniel Murphy

JCS

Adm. Thomas Moorer

V/Adm. John Weinell

CIA

James Schlesinger

George Carver

[2 names not declassified]

NSC

B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Richard Kennedy

James Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—A working group will be organized to prepare an options paper on the Libyan situation. The group should be chaired by State and include representatives of OSD, CIA and the NSC staff. The group is to address the question of what next steps we should be prepared to take

¹ Summary: The Washington Special Actions Group met to discuss hostile Libyan actions against U.S. reconnaissance flights over international waters.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-91, WSAG Meeting Minutes, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room at the White House. At the April 17 WSAG meeting, it was decided that reconnaissance missions would resume over international waters off the coast of Libya “in the normal manner”. (Ibid.)

if another attack on U.S. aircraft is initiated by Libyan aircraft over international waters.

—There will be no leaks of WSAG discussions or agency positions on the Libyan situation.

[Omitted here are conclusions unrelated to Libya.]

Mr. Kissinger: Is Clements coming to the meeting?

Mr. Eagleburger: He'll be here as soon as he can. I'll do the best I can to substitute for him until he arrives.

Mr. Kissinger: First, I want to discuss these flights off Libya.

Mr. Porter: I understand the flight is in a go position.

Mr. Kissinger: We have received more messages from our Chargé in Libya during the past week than from our Ambassador in Cambodia, where a shooting war is going on, in a year. The Chargé has now figured out that the rules of engagement for the flight over the Mediterranean are dangerous. I must admit that our Chargé in Tripoli has a point there. If the Libyans are willing to shoot down our planes at a range of fifty miles out at sea, we have to be sure the rules of engagement are very carefully drawn. What are they, anyway?

Adm. Moorer: The rules we have imposed are so severe that the fighter pilots must be smarting about them. The admiral in command of the Task Force must declare an aircraft hostile before our fighters can attack it, and he has very strict requirements that must be met before he can declare an aircraft hostile. The approaching aircraft must move into position to attack our planes, or be vectored toward one of them, or be ordered to fire on them, [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: What is the range you are referring to?

Adm. Moorer: [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: Those rules sound fine to me. I'm just trying to be responsive to this fellow in Tripoli who is sending us these messages. What is his name?

Mr. Porter: Josif. Harold Josif.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Porter) Are you satisfied with these rules of engagement?

Mr. Porter: I'm satisfied. I would like to give the exercise some visibility and provide advance notice to the Libyans. Otherwise, the rules of engagement are in the area of technology and if Admiral Moorer is satisfied with them, they are O.K. with me.

Adm. Moorer: We couldn't make them any tighter.

Mr. Porter: How many planes will there be with the [less than 1 line not declassified]

Adm. Moorer: Two A-7's and four fighters flying cover. [2 lines not declassified] We won't get into a combat situation unless the Libyan planes get within firing range.

Mr. Porter: If they do, how do you think it will come out?

Adm. Moorer: I think ours will come out on top.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we going to let the Libyans know two hours ahead of time?

Adm. Moorer: My understanding was that we were not.

Mr. Porter: The Greeks are out. We don't plan to notify them, but I think we should inform the Libyans in advance.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer) What do you think?

Adm. Moorer: I don't think we should give them any advance notice.

Mr. Porter: If we do, how much should we tell them? Should we tell them a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is coming with a fighter cap?

Adm. Moorer: If we have to tell them anything, I would just say that a transport is flying over the open sea with fighter cover.

Mr. Porter: I think it's important that this flight have high visibility. We should tell them. We don't have to say when the flight will take place, just that a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is coming by.

Adm. Moorer: Then you will have established a precedent. Every time we want to fly over the area, we will have to notify the Libyans.

Mr. Porter: No, not every time, only under special circumstances. This is a very special situation.

Mr. Schlesinger: What is the purpose of the warning? Can it reach a high level in the Libyan Government in two hours, a high-enough level for them to make a decision about it?

Mr. Porter: I don't care whether it reaches a high level or not. We want to do it for the record. We'll do whatever we can to establish the record that we gave them advance notice. If necessary, we'll throw a rock with a note tied to it through the Foreign Office window.

Adm. Moorer: I have no problem with giving them notice for the record.

Mr. Kissinger: This would not be done in connection with any other country, would it?

Mr. Porter: No. I prefer just to tell the Libyans and to tell them only the bare fact of the flight.

Mr. Kissinger: Al (Haig), you're shaking your head, what's your objection?

Gen. Haig: If we give them a warning, it is likely to make it more of a test of manhood for the Libyans.

Mr. Porter: I understand what you are saying, but I think we should do it.

Adm. Moorer: The trouble is, a warning gives them time to get their aircraft armed with missiles and it could make it more dangerous for our planes.

Mr. Porter: I'm not saying we have to give them a lot of notice. We can just give them one or two minutes and still make the record of having notified them.

Mr. Eagleburger: If we have to notify them, why not do it just as our planes are entering their radar screens?

Mr. Porter: It would be hard to tell when that will happen.

Adm. Moorer: No it's not, it's very easy. We know exactly when that will happen, at 2 p.m. Washington time, or 9 a.m. Libya time.

Mr. Eagleburger: If you're going to give them two hours notice, you'll never find anyone in the Foreign Office at 7 a.m.

Mr. Porter: Don't worry, we'll find someone.

Mr. Carver: When it is 2 p.m. in Washington, isn't it 9 p.m. in Libya?

Adm. Moorer: No, the flyby will take place at 2 a.m. Washington time, which is 9 a.m. Libya time. Maybe I said it wrong.

Mr. Kissinger: Why not give them less than two hours notice? What about one hour?

Mr. Porter: We could do it indefinitely by just telling them that we will be passing through international air space, without saying when.

Adm. Moorer: I don't think it makes any difference what we tell them. They are going to lie about it anyway, so why not do it to suit ourselves. We don't want to do it in a way that gives them a big advantage.

Mr. Kissinger: That's right, I don't want to compromise the operation. Jim (Schlesinger) what do you think? What do you consider is the chance they will jump us?

Mr. Schlesinger: The last time, the pilots of the Libyan planes didn't get the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and as a result they were relieved and sent home [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I think the chances are high that there are standing orders to shoot the next one down.

Adm. Moorer: That is all the more reason not to give them much notice.

Mr. Porter: It's also a reason we should make a record of notification.

Mr. Schlesinger: Another factor is that they've been confusing us with the Israelis. There is less chance that will happen if we tell them in advance that we're coming through.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Schlesinger) What do you recommend?

Mr. Schlesinger: Now you're asking me for a policy judgment.

Mr. Kissinger: It's not unknown for you to make one.

Adm. Moorer: Why can't we have our cake and eat it, too, by giving them just one hour notice?

Mr. Kissinger: Where is the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Adm. Murphy: He's taking care of some stockpile matters.

Mr. Kissinger: What's the matter with his sense of priorities?

Adm. Murphy: He's making a statement on stockpiles. But I can say that Mr. Clements favors a warning to the Libyans.

Mr. Kissinger: So there are two issues involved here, (a) to warn the Libyans for the record and (b) to protect our aircraft. The two are contradictory. In the first instance, if we notify them we are coming and they know the aircraft are not Israeli planes, they may not attack; but if they are committed to attack anyway, the warning will make their attack more effective. How much notice will the Libyans have from the time the planes first enter their radar scopes?

Adm. Moorer: Not a lot. Frankly, I don't know how they can confuse our planes with the Israelis. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Schlesinger: The Libyans don't know that. [*1 line not declassified*] They have convinced themselves the Israelis are going to attack them and that we are helping the Israelis. [*1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Kennedy: Even if we do warn the Libyans, will they believe us?

Mr. Kissinger: That's a different question. If we give them two hours notice, won't it take them at least an hour to get organized and get their planes into the air?

Mr. Porter: Why tell them when we're coming? We can just say we expect to be passing through international air space at some indefinite time, adding that we are making no threat to their air space. We can pass that word to them with a minimum amount of warning time.

Mr. Kissinger: To achieve the objective of having them hold back their fighters on realizing that the planes are ours rather than the Israelis, we would have to give them time to do something after receiving our notice.

Adm. Moorer: But they may already have made the decision to attack, anyway.

Mr. Kissinger: Then there is nothing we can do, except make the record.

Adm. Moorer: You could make a strong case that you had warned them. They are not exactly imbued with integrity, but we could have our cake and eat it by warning them at the last minute.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless there is a possibility they may turn it off. If we think they will, we have to give them time to do so. On the other

hand, if we are convinced they won't, we should give them as little time as possible. Well, we'll let you know the decision in a couple of hours.

Mr. Schlesinger: I think it is important to let them know that the planes are U.S. and not Israeli.

Adm. Moorer: Then we'll have to tell them each time we fly past Libya.

Mr. Schlesinger: Maybe so.

Mr. Kissinger: What are we collecting there, anyway?

Adm. Moorer: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Mr. Kissinger: *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Adm. Moorer: Sure, they may. *[1 line not declassified]* The information *[less than 1 line not declassified]* is not that important. It's the threat to the principle of operating freely over international waters that bothers us.

Mr. Kissinger: That's the only reason the White House is interested.

Adm. Moorer: We could do without the *[less than 1 line not declassified]* but we're concerned about the principle.

Mr. Eagleburger: Mr. Clements said he wanted to discuss this morning what we should do as a next step. He thought it was important to consider what we do next if there is an attack by Libyan planes on our aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get together a joint paper on what we should do if something happens? Let's get a little group together, including State, Defense, CIA and someone from the NSC staff, to consider next steps. I have a suspicion we are building a Wagnerian drama here.

Adm. Moorer: Probably nothing at all will happen.

Mr. Kissinger: The basic question is whether we are going to let Libya turn off U.S. flights 75 miles off the coast.

Mr. Schlesinger: No, we're not.

Mr. Porter: The answer to that is no, but we think the timing is wrong to fly another flight. If we veto the Arab resolution in the United Nations and then fly an *[less than 1 line not declassified]* flight past Libya later the same day, it will look like a deliberate provocation.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there ever going to be a right time for such flights?

Mr. Porter: Probably not. We have a big gas deal with Algeria that is close to signing. They could turn that off if we get into a fight with Libya.

Mr. Kissinger: Has State ever, at any time in the last four weeks, considered the timing satisfactory for another flight?

Mr. Porter: No, you're quite right. There's never a good time, but we think this is a particularly bad one.

Mr. Kissinger: Has State ever approved flying this flight?

Mr. Porter: We have approved the principle of resuming the flights, but not the timing. If there is a veto in the U.N. and a flight the same day it will even look as though we are defying the U.N. Security Council.

Mr. Kissinger: When I brought this issue up four weeks ago the bureaucracy showed great ingenuity in finding objections to the resumption of the flights.

Mr. Porter: There is a gas shortage east of the Mississippi. We need that contract with Algeria badly and it will be a big problem if the deal falls through. The timing is never right for this kind of flight; I'll agree with that 100%.

Mr. Kissinger: The Libyans made a pass at a U.S. plane five weeks ago. For five weeks this government has sat on its hands and done nothing. We have been afraid to fly past a country of two million people. We are debating with ourselves, constructing devious arguments. Next we'll discover that no one has consulted the Greeks and we'll start worrying about them.

Mr. Porter: It's not true that we have done nothing. We have made protests to the Libyans.

Mr. Kissinger: There is something wrong with our policy process here. We are afraid to fly 75 miles offshore from a two-bit country and now you tell us that Algerian gas deals are threatened by our flying over international waters. How can the Algerians possibly consider our flights a threat to them?

Gen. Haig: If the gas deal is all that fragile, they'll find some other excuse for breaking it off.

Mr. Clements arrived at this point.

Adm. Moorer: We should keep it simple, just tell them the minimum we have to as late as possible before the flight.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, the President will make the decision. I don't want any leaks about this.

Mr. Porter: About what?

Mr. Kissinger: About these discussions and the views of the various agencies.

Mr. Porter: There won't be any leaks, and when the decision is made you can be sure we'll support it.

Mr. Kissinger: The decision to fly the flight has already been made, but I will bring your reservation about the timing to the President's attention.

Mr. Porter: Actually, we covered the timing problem in our previous comments. The only new item is the pending U.N. Security Council vote.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Libya.]

14. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 17, 1973.

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning for Libyan Flight

The Libyan reconnaissance flight went off without incident. Therefore, there is no need this morning to discuss the contingency papers prepared yesterday. However, it would be useful for you to ask that they be reviewed by an interdepartmental working group for discussion in the WSAG before another flight.

Attachment

Memorandum for Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Options for Possible [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Mission Incident, 17 April 1973

(TS) In accordance with the discussion at the WSAG on 16 April, we have examined alternatives in response to—"what do we do or say if the Libyans attack our aircraft on the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Mission of 17 April 1973?"

(TS) In considering our actions we have again given weight to the two factors set forth in the letter to Mr. Kissinger of 5 April 1973:

(a) Our aircraft will be proceeding in international air space. The Libyan Government establishment of a restricted area within 100 nautical miles of Tripoli is not recognized by the U.S. Government, and we have lodged formal protest with the Libyan Government concerning their unilateral and illegal declaration of air space control. The Libyan

¹ Summary: Saunders and Kennedy gave Kissinger the options paper on the Libyan situation requested by the Washington Special Actions Group on April 16.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya. Top Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand underlined everything after the word "however" in the last sentence of the covering memorandum, and drew two parallel lines in the margin beside it.

attack on our aircraft was unprovoked and illegal and, if not met by appropriate response from the U.S. Government, it would reinforce the Libyan claim.

(b) It is our objective to maintain diplomatic relations with the Libyan Government, both to maintain contact with this government and to represent the some 3,000 citizens in this country and our very substantial (in excess of \$1 billion) investments in Libya.

(TS) Outlined below are two non-military options available to us if our aircraft are attacked:

(a) Option 1. Diplomatic protest only. We could make our position clear again that we do not recognize the Libyan claim and regard their attack upon our aircraft as an illegal and unwarranted act that will certainly affect relationships between our countries.

Pro: Presents minimum potential for open conflict, break in diplomatic relations or actions against U.S. citizens or property.

Cons: We have delivered protests before on the Libyan claims on air space. A diplomatic protest would be viewed as a weak and ineffective response.

(b) Option 2. We could threaten, or act, to withhold sales of military equipment to the Libyan Government; specifically this would be the FMS and commercial pipeline of spares for the F-5s and C-130s of the Libyan Air Force; a contract maintenance team furnished by Lockheed for the C-130s; and a recent request to purchase additional C-130s.

Pro: The Libyan Government needs our support for U.S. military equipment. Its loss could certainly limit their utilization of this equipment.

Cons: (1) Our leverage with respect to military equipment is limited. It is possible that the support required by the Libyan Government could be obtained from other sources. (2) Denial of U.S. military equipment (spares) would increase prospects for Soviet military sales and influence in Libya.

(TS) The following actions are military oriented and in certain cases could and/or would be done in concert with the two foregoing nonmilitary options. We should reschedule additional missions with escort into HLR-22 at a rate initially of approximately one per day. Other actions which might be taken concurrently, not necessarily arranged in recommended priority of adoption, are:

a. Expand present authorities to include hot pursuit into Libyan airspace.

b. Escort aircraft on future [*less than 1 line not declassified*] missions be authorized to engage/destroy Libyan fighter aircraft upon detec-

tion/intercept regardless of whether or not hostile intent has been established.

c. Commence military air operations from a U.S. CVA inside of HLR-22, but outside 12 mile limit. Engage/destroy any Libyan fighter aircraft which approach U.S. aircraft or ships.

Pro: The advantage to the above actions would be to demonstrate our determination to exercise our right to operate in international airspace and protect our aircraft in this airspace, taking reprisal action against those interfering with our rights by acts of force.

Cons:

a. There would be strong and violent reaction throughout the Arab world, and almost certainly reprisals against U.S. oil and other commercial interests.

b. There would be a severe hazard to the lives of U.S. nationals living in Libya. There might be a severe danger in other Arab countries due to street mobs and arranged demonstrations or overt attacks against U.S. personnel and properties.

c. Sympathy for the Libyan “cause” in the world councils and in the world press would be enhanced, and corresponding damage to American prestige.

d. Relations with our allies in western Europe, who are highly dependent upon Libyan oil, would be gravely strained, and we would find some of them in strong opposition to the United States both within and without NATO.

(TS) Additionally, we are exploring Libyan flag shipping and aircraft assets operating outside Libya which might be susceptible to reprisal measures.

(S) In the event a serious incident results from the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] mission, the USG should be prepared to evacuate U.S. citizens from Libya, as they might well become targets for radical Arab attacks.

**15. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Schlesinger to the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, April 19, 1973.

Apropos of current concern over Libya, attached is a paper [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which discusses the problem of Qadhafi.

With Qadhafi setting Libya on a collision course with many U.S. interests, [*12 lines not declassified*]

James R. Schlesinger

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] LIBYA

Summary

Qadhafi is well entrenched in Libya, and no successor is in sight. His headstrong pursuit of the Arab cause puts him in direct conflict with U.S. interests in much of the Middle East. Rivalries among Arab leaders may thwart some of his aspirations to lead the "Arab Nation." [*8 lines not declassified*]

Assessment

Significant elements in the Qadhafi problem are:

—Qadhafi is firmly in charge in Libya and there is no successor in sight. He dominates the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which makes all important decisions. The army is his power base and he uses the trappings of various political organizations—such as the Arab Socialist Union—to conceal his direct rule and defuse dissent.

—Qadhafi's regime is not, however, popular. There is grumbling at home, and the march toward merger with Egypt has been resented

¹ Summary: Schlesinger summarized an Agency report of Qadhafi's impact on U.S. interests, the Arab world and Africa. [*text not declassified*]

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A, OPI 10, Box 13, Folder 8. Secret, [*text not declassified*].

by the Libyan people. But the population is by no means mutinous. Qadhafi makes the most of his leadership qualities and may, if pressed, back off the merger issue.

—One cannot ignore the possibility that Qadhafi may eventually be overthrown by the military, particularly if pressure builds up over his tendency to one-man rule or plans for merger with Egypt. Differences no doubt exist within the RCC, but Qadhafi thus far has managed them shrewdly. He now seems capable of asserting even greater personal rule at the expense of a collegiate decision by the RCC. But, if Qadhafi could no longer control the RCC or should another group of military officers seize power, a popular reaction against his ouster would be unlikely—especially if the new leadership immediately declared Qadhafi's merger plans null and void.

—The American oil companies are still operating their concessions. Although Qadhafi has advocated the use of oil money to strike at Israel and its supporters, he has thus far not convinced his neighbors, Sadat and Boumediene, to pursue such an all-out plan. And Libya's need for American oil technology has delayed Qadhafi in the unilateral resort to oil as a weapon. The long-term prospects of the American oil producing companies in Libya are not good, but they still contribute 300 million dollars per year to our balance of payments. The power to nationalize them remains a credible threat in Qadhafi's hands.

—Qadhafi, in recent months, frustrated in his efforts to get the fedayeen to carry out a successful national liberation struggle within Israel, has turned to advocacy of acts of terrorism outside of Palestine and to the subversion of regimes which do not agree with him. This has brought him into direct conflict with American interests.

—Qadhafi can invoke and manipulate ideas with strong emotional appeal to most Arabs. In any direct confrontation with the U.S., Qadhafi could probably mobilize considerable sympathy among the Arabs, including those in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula.

—Qadhafi remains relatively insensitive to outside economic and political pressures.

—The Arab world remains divided, with many of its leaders—Sadat, Boumediene and Faysal—keeping a wary eye on Qadhafi. They are suspicious of his apparent bid to leadership of the "Arab Nation."

—The British and French have adjusted their policies to try to reach an accommodation with Qadhafi.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] proposals of hit-and-run raids to punish Qadhafi would not bring him down, but would evoke an angry reaction and the closing of Arab ranks behind Qadhafi.

—With many Egyptians at all levels of the Libyan army and bureaucracy and three Egyptian commando battalions in Libya, Sadat

possesses considerable influence in Libya. Both Sadat and Boumediene seek to keep the other from gaining the upper hand in Libya.

—[1 *paragraph* (3½ *lines*) not declassified]

[3 *pages* not declassified]

16. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 20, 1973.

[Source: National Security Council, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Libya, Box 9, February 10, 1970–June 26, 1973. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

17. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Porter) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 10, 1973.

SUBJECT

US-Libyan Relations: Department Review

Our relations with Libya continue to be severely strained on a variety of issues. In a discussion with Bureau representatives on May 8 it was agreed that a prudent policy was called for on our side lest we play into Qadhafi's hands by giving him a pretext for confrontations with us and for a break in diplomatic relations which we still believe it is in our interest to preserve at least until we see the nature of the Libyan-Egyptian union scheduled for September 1. If you agree with this general approach, we shall take the actions indicated in the attachment to this memorandum on various policy problems that have recently arisen.

William J. Porter

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of Northern African Affairs

Washington, undated.

1. *Passports in Arabic*

After a sudden tightening of the regulation that all passports presented for Libyan visas must be in Arabic, the LARG has now restored the five original categories of exemptions from this requirement. Diplomats and dependents of visa applicants are not included among the exemptions. Because we do not know how the policy will work in practice, we believe we should be prepared to authorize one of our posts on a trial basis to notarize Arabic translations of the basic data in US passports for Americans desiring to enter Libya; simultaneously, we would inform other interested governments of our action. We would not

¹ Summary: Porter presented Rogers with recommendations for specific actions to address various policy problems and avoid a break in diplomatic relations with Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Libya-U.S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Director of North African Affairs James J. Blake on May 10. Rogers approved the recommendations May 11. The recommendations were sent from Eliot to Kissinger under a May 17 covering memorandum.

formally notify the Libyans until we found out whether they were admitting Americans possessing this new documentation. If this pilot procedure worked, we would require that Libyans obtain the same translation-authentication service from their government in order to obtain American visas. AF would determine when the pilot procedure should be attempted, based on the degree to which in practice the newly declared exemptions meet the needs of both the official and private community.

2. Lockheed C-130 Maintenance Contract

Lockheed wishes to renew for two years (with an option for a third year) an expired maintenance and training contract it had with the Libyans for the eight C-130's Libya bought in 1969. The contract is worth about \$4,000,000 to the company. We appreciate the company's need for funds, and we perceive some advantages in maintaining a limited contact with the Libyan Air Force. However, a two year contract might involve the transfer after September 1 of American military technology to a third party (the planned Libyan-Egyptian state) not initially authorized to receive it. Therefore, David Newsom will inform Lockheed that the company may renew the contract provided it contains a clause permitting its suspension when and if Libya merges with Egypt. This would permit the Department to reassess the situation at that time.

3. PNG of Embassy Tripoli Officer

We reviewed the question of whether we should retaliate against the Libyan Embassy here for the LARG's action in declaring our Political Officer, Charles Marthinsen, PNG. We agreed that it would not be advisable to do so. Retaliation would only prolong a confrontation we would rather leave behind us and could lead the LARG to require that we reduce our Embassy staff below its already austere level (15 now reduced to 13). In reaching this conclusion we had in mind that Qadhafi may be seeking to goad the US to break diplomatic relations before the projected union with Egypt. Because of our remaining interests in Libya we do not believe we should respond to these provocations.

4. Libyan Oil Negotiations

We agreed that discussions between the companies and the LARG over the price and participation issues had reached a sensitive stage and that there is some risk of a breakdown. Consumer government consultations may be required in the near future. In the meantime we are in close touch with the British.

5. Reconnaissance Flights

DOD has tentatively scheduled two reconnaissance flights off Libya in May. Following the March 21 confrontation between one of

our C-130s and the Libyans, I asked that the Department be provided with an evaluation of the usefulness of these flights in terms of our intelligence requirements. I have informed the Chairman of the Committee concerned with these flights that we cannot concur in future flights, including those scheduled for May, until we have received and reviewed a report on their intelligence justification. I believe this stance is consistent with the desirability of avoiding unnecessary confrontations with the LARG, particularly since we have clearly demonstrated by flights subsequent to March 21 that we will exercise at will our right to fly in international airspace.

6. *Communication with the LARG*

I have taken under advisement a suggestion by David Newsom that we explore the feasibility of a special high level contact with the Libyan regime to ascertain whether there is any way in which our differences could either be eased or set aside. I am not certain yet that such a contact would be productive, even if we could arrange it through the assistance of a friendly Arab state, such as Tunisia. However, I have asked AF to continue to re-examine the pros and cons, to endeavor to identify an individual whose acceptability to Qadhafi might enhance the prospects for any such missions, and to submit its further recommendations to me.

18. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 22, 1973.

SUBJECT

Curbing Libyan Influence in Africa

CIA asked approval to explore with President Mobutu of Zaire the possibility of his using his contacts with other African leaders to reinforce their opposition to Qadhafi's efforts to pressure African states to support Libyan policies (Tab A). *A quick vote is necessary* in order to talk to Mobutu before he leaves to attend the 10th anniversary session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa on Thursday.

While the Agency called this a "preliminary approach" to Mobutu, with whom it has a long-standing close relationship, it admitted that he may construe such a conversation as implying a commitment of funds. Based on past experience he deems it necessary to provide gifts to other Chiefs of State he approaches, and CIA estimated that this would mean up to [*dollar amount not declassified*] for each [*less than 1 line not declassified*] potential recipients [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

CIA's aim is to strengthen the resolve of African leaders to resist Qadhafi's pressures, to negate his influence in the area, block expansion of Arab terrorism and terrorist organizations, and thwart efforts to involve them in Arab-Israeli disputes.

Defense, JCS and CIA principals approved this proposal; *State voted against it*. Under Secretary Porter noted that there were others already taking an anti-Qadhafi line and therefore Mobutu's help might not be necessary to block pro-Qadhafi moves at the OAU meeting. He also expressed reservations about the possibility that Mobutu might do himself and us discredit by being exposed as a funded spokesman for the U.S.

Dick Kennedy, Hal Saunders and I subsequently reviewed this proposal in separate meetings with State and CIA representatives. We reached agreement that there is merit in enlisting Mobutu's efforts to

¹ Summary: Ratliff asked Kissinger to approve a request from the Central Intelligence Agency to enlist President Mobutu's support to curb Libyan influence in Africa.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Libya, Box 9, February 10, 1970–June 26, 1973. Secret; Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for action. Concurred in by Saunders and Kennedy (NSC Staff), Director of Central African Affairs Herman J. Cohen, Alfred E. Wellons in INR/OPS, and CIA. Scowcroft approved the recommendation May 22. A handwritten notation on the document reads: "not to be noted in minutes per RRR." The attachment is Secret.

combat any growth of PLO/Fatah/terrorism in Black Africa [*less than 1 line not declassified*] where Qadhafi has already made inroads. Mobutu would also be asked to generate an anti-PLO/Fatah/terrorism mood with other leaders, [*1 line not declassified*] Mobutu would be asked to build the anti-PLO/Fatah/terrorism mood in his associations with other Chiefs of State at the OAU meeting. We would be expected to offer funds to enable him to assert a leadership role on this subject. An estimated [*dollar amount not declassified*] would be required.

State reconsidered its negative vote. It is not opposed to Mobutu's efforts to generate anti-terrorism sentiment at the OAU among those countries [*1 line not declassified*] It is opposed to any more general effort at this time. This appears to be acceptable to all parties—it is a first step and if Mobutu demonstrates an ability to advance our aims, additional support can be considered. State believes that any financial support for this more limited effort should be not more than [*dollar amount not declassified*]

Recommendation:

That you approve CIA's immediate initiative to enlist Mobutu's support in generating anti-PLO/Fatah/terrorism sentiment and action during and subsequent to the OAU meeting [*1 line not declassified*]

Attachment

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Washington, May 19, 1973.

SUBJECT

Political Action Operation to Negate Qadhafi's Influence in Black Africa

1. CIA proposes to utilize its long standing and close relationship with President Mobutu of Zaire to explore the possibilities of mounting a political action operation designed to negate Qadhafi's influence in Black Africa, limit the expansion of Arab terrorism and terrorist organizations into Black Africa and thwart Arab efforts to embroil Black Africa in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The need for such an operation is demonstrated by Qadhafi's current efforts to pressure African states to support Libyan policies which are inimical to U.S. interests in Africa. Failure to oppose Qadhafi's political offensive will likely result in the proliferation of Palestine Liberation Organization offices, the spread of Arab terrorism and increasing opposition to U.S. interests throughout Black Africa. On several occa-

sions in the past, President Mobutu has pointed to his own limited resources to pursue common objectives, stating that the U.S. Government should work through proven friends such as himself to attain these objectives, and suggesting the funneling of funds through him to influence other African states toward these objectives. Mobutu has been discreet in the past and we foresee no security risks in this operation.

2. *A discussion with Mobutu as outlined above could be construed by him as implying a commitment of funds*, for he would likely want to provide financial gifts to other Chiefs of State. We estimate each such “gift” in the range of [dollar amount not declassified] with the potential recipients being [1½ lines not declassified]

3. Policy for this operation is contained in the 40 Committee decision on Libya taken in 1970 which [less than 1 line not declassified] which called for efforts to influence the Libyan government to adopt policies consistent with U.S. objectives and simultaneously oppose Libyan policies and leaders inimical to U.S. interests. On 20 April 1973, Dr. Kissinger orally approved a paper which reaffirmed [less than 1 line not declassified] the “use of agents of influence to alert other governments to the dangers which missions to their governments by Libyan-backed Palestinian organizations may represent.”

4. *The above political action initiative via Mobutu would substantially strengthen and support moves already underway* [1 line not declassified] *to oppose Qadhafi’s political initiatives in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which begins its tenth anniversary session in Addis Ababa on 24 May. Since many attitudes and positions will be crystallized at the OAU meeting, it is necessary to discuss this operation with Mobutu before he departs for Addis Ababa.*

5. Your approval in principle for this preliminary approach to Mobutu is requested.

W.E. Colby

19. National Security Study Memorandum 185¹

Washington, June 5, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Policy Towards Libya

The President has directed that a study be made of U.S. policy toward Libya and of the options open to the United States in the light of Libyan attitudes toward the United States, international terrorism, the Arab-Israeli problem, subversion, international airspace, and the petroleum industry.

The study should begin with a discussion of U.S. interests in Libya and the effect on them of current Libyan policies. Specifically, it should:

- Evaluate the political, economic and strategic importance of Libya to the United States.
- Describe the nature and impact of Libyan policies on U.S. interests in Libya, Africa and the Middle East.
- Assess the prospects for a change in Libyan policies affecting our interests, either under Qadhafi or other Libyan leadership and as a result of the possible Egyptian-Libyan merger.

The study should then assess U.S. options over the next year, giving particular attention to questions such as the following:

- The nature of our broad diplomatic relationship.
- The prospects for U.S. oil company operations.
- The U.S. military supply relationship with Libya.
- Libyan support for international terrorism.

This study should be conducted by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State and submitted by June 30, 1973 for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Summary: Kissinger tasked the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a study of U.S. policy toward Libya in response to Libyan involvement in international terrorism, the Arab-Israeli dispute, subversion, international airspace, and the petroleum industry.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-200, NSSM 185. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the JCS.

20. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Acting Secretary of State Rush¹

Washington, June 22, 1973.

US Passport Policy re Libya

We have up to now maintained our policy of not acceding to Libyan demands that our passports contain official translations of their basic information into Arabic. We have been concerned by the travel document precedent which acceptance of the Libyan demand could set. We have also been unwilling to appear to yield to Libyan pressures.

In recent weeks, US businessmen and their families have been generally admitted into the country without major problems, although their passports have not been in Arabic. However, the Libyan Government will not allow any US Government employees to enter Libya because of the passport language requirement. If any of our personnel leave the country presumably they will not be readmitted. Other diplomatic personnel—British, Swiss, German and Venezuelan—have experienced the same problem on attempting to enter or re-enter Libya. Thus, for all practical purposes we cannot transfer our Embassy personnel unless we are prepared to accept a further erosion of the already-reduced mission staff.

Despite the problems posed for our mission and the potential problem for our business community and dependents, we have decided to continue to oppose Libyan demands on passport issue, even though reports indicate that European governments (most recently the British and Italian, following the French) are prepared to insert Arabic into their passports in certain instances. In holding out against the Libyans we risk greater problems for our American citizens, private and official, but we think the issue is an important one and that we

¹ Summary: Newsom informed Rush about problems encountered by the Embassy and business community as a result of Libyan demands to print pertinent information in U.S. passports in both English and Arabic. Newsom advised against acceding to these demands and suggested the proposed merger with Egypt in September might resolve the issue.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–10 Libya. Confidential. Drafted by Warren Clark, Jr., in AF/N; and concurred in by Blake and Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs Elizabeth J. Harper. In telegram 976 from Tripoli, July 26, the Embassy provided an assessment of the problems associated with the anticipated September 1 unification of the Governments of Egypt and Libya. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya II)

should not change our stance at this time. If and when it is clear that the Libyans will accept simple rubber stamps in Arabic in passports and not demand that Arabic appear as one of the printed languages we must, of course, reexamine our position in the light of all factors. Another reason for not changing our position now is that we also believe Libya will admit to its territory foreigners, including Americans, it is willing to receive or whom it needs, e.g., petroleum engineers. On the other hand, it will exclude—or expel—those it does not want regardless of their passports.

We expect this problem with Libya will remain at least until September 1 when Libya is scheduled to merge with Egypt. Even though that merger may be limited in scope, it may permit issuance of a single visa for both the Libyan and Egyptian regions. If it does, our problem will have been solved and we will not have handed Libya a victory it obviously is seeking. However, we must expect to receive pressure between now and then from the American business community concerned for its operations in Libya. We are therefore continuing to follow the situation closely and have indicated that we are prepared to listen to any specific cases of hardship for our citizens resulting from our refusal to yield on the language problem.

21. Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group for Africa¹

Washington, July 6, 1973.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA

Study Pursuant to NSSM 185

Prepared and approved by the ad hoc Interdepartmental group under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

¹ Summary: This study was prepared in response to NSSM 185, which ordered a review of U.S. policy toward Libya.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-200, NSSM 185. Secret. Appendices A through G are attached but not published. All brackets were printed as footnotes in the original.

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I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to review US relations with Libya, the prospects for their improvement, and the options available to the United States to protect its interests in that country and in the region.

US relations with Libya have been severely strained since the overthrow of the Libyan Monarchy on September 1, 1969. Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Chairman Qadhafi and the rest of the Libyan leadership identify the United States with Israel, Libya's paramount foreign enemy. He also seems to genuinely fear an Israeli attack on Libya with US assistance. Our relations with Libya are currently at a low ebb as a result of Libya's militant rejection of a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli problem, the Libyan regime's attempt to shoot down an American reconnaissance plane on March 21, the nationalization on June 11 of an American oil company (Bunker Hunt), and continuing high-level Libyan denunciations of American "arrogance" and "imperialism" in the Arab world and elsewhere.

The US concern with Libya stems basically from the importance of Libyan oil, primarily to Western Europe, the size of the American investment in the Libyan oil industry, and the contribution which that investment makes to the US balance of payments, the continued presence in Libya of approximately 2,800 American citizens and the political disruptive capability of Libya in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere because of its vast financial reserves. Our freedom to take actions counter to the Libyan regime are inhibited by Europe's need for Libyan oil and the large remaining private US stake in the Libyan oil industry. The effectiveness of actions by us against Libya would be limited also by European moves to protect and pursue their own interests.

Libya's geographical position in the central and eastern Mediterranean endow it with a strategic significance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East that might require the deployment of US military resources in the Mediterranean.

Although some of the problems indicated above might be attenuated in the event of some form of merger between Libya and Egypt on September 1, this is by no means certain, given Colonel Qadhafi's assertive personality and determination to pursue his Arab and Islamic objectives in any such union. The possible implications for the United States of a Libyan-Egyptian union are therefore included in this study.

II. NATURE OF THE REGIME

The Libyan regime which came to power in September 1969 is shaped by the views of RCC Chairman Mu'ammār Qadhafī, which are generally shared by other Libyan RCC members and policy makers. Qadhafī was born in a tent in 1941 and brought up in desert surroundings. From this background he developed a strict puritanical morality, personal asceticism, plus conservative Islamic religious fervor which places the highest value on Arab and Islamic historical accomplishments and traditions. This was combined in his formative years with a strong sense of Arab and Islamic humiliation resulting from foreign, chiefly western, influence in Libya and the Arab world. The establishment of Israel and the continued existence of US and UK military bases in Libya and elsewhere were seen by Qadhafī as symbols of that humiliation. Nasser's efforts to unite other Arab states as a necessary step towards asserting Arab power and overthrowing the foreign-sponsored state of Israel inevitably made the Egyptian leader Qadhafī's hero and model. This outlook was reinforced by the shock of the 1967 war, the loss of more Arab territories to Israel, the lack of involvement by Libya then in the Arab cause, and the widespread corruption in Libya during the last years of the Monarchy.

Accordingly, after seizing power in 1969, Qadhafī immediately and successfully brought about US and UK withdrawal from Libyan bases. Since then he has vigorously pursued longer-term objectives of ridding Libya and the Arab Middle East of other forms of foreign influence. His objectives include the elimination of foreign oil concessions and even of non-Arabs from Libya; ridding the Arab world of foreign bases and alliances; the overthrow of Arab governments, such as Morocco and Jordan, which countenance foreign influence; promoting international recognition of Arabic; and supporting Muslim co-religionists around the world with money and arms.

Qadhafī sees his role as the successor of Nasser to redeem and unite the Arabs, under his own leadership if possible. He regards the planned Libyan merger with Egypt this year as the necessary first step.

Qadhafī seems prepared to sacrifice a measure of Libyan independence to achieve these goals, while retaining control over certain key areas, such as Libyan finances. Libya's weak national tradition may facilitate his task, although Libyans generally are suspicious of foreigners, including Egyptians, and they are resentful of any foreign effort to remind them of their cultural inferiority or to detach them from their newly acquired wealth.

Libya's primary objective under Qadhafī's leadership has been the mobilization of the Arabs to bring about the elimination of Israel as an independent Jewish state and the restoration of their homeland to the Palestinian Arabs. He judges the leadership of his brother Arabs, as he

does that of the United States, chiefly in terms of their attitude toward Israel. Inasmuch as the United States is seen as the chief guarantor of Israel's existence, normal US-Libyan government relations in any field becomes virtually impossible, including technical cooperation. Indicative of his depth of feeling regarding Arab rights and past Arab humiliations, are Qadhafi's pronouncements that the United States and United Kingdom and their oil companies must be punished for their exploitation of the Arab world.

III. US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

1. *Interests*

The principal US economic interest in Libya is the American-dominated oil industry which represents about 80 percent of Libya's production of 2.3 million barrels daily. The American investment in the industry has a net book value in excess of one billion dollars and a market value of well over four billion. The annual repatriated profits of the eleven American companies producing oil in Libya in recent years have averaged between \$400–500 million, a significant positive element in the deteriorating American balance of payments.

Libya has also become an important source of low-sulphur crude oil for Western Europe, particularly Germany, Italy and France whose suppliers are principally the American producers in Libya. Libyan oil exports to the United States are relatively modest. However, they could become more important because of the low-sulphur quality of Libyan crude and our pollution regulations.

Thus, in terms of oil the United States is deeply interested in Libya because of the size and earnings of the American petroleum investment in that country, the volume of Libya's production during a period of world-wide shortages, the quality of the oil, and the dependence of Western Europe on Libya as a nearby source of energy. In addition to these economic-commercial interests, the United States is also concerned with the physical security of some 2,800 Americans resident in Libya, most of whom are associated with the oil industry.

Libya's substantial earnings from the industry—about \$2 billion annually—help to finance an ambitious economic development program. This program provides a significant market for American exports of equipment, technology and managerial skills. Libya could become a much larger market for the United States if the political relations between the two countries were to improve.

The United States has an interest in the political stability and peace of the Middle East and Africa. Libya's vast financial resources endow it with the capability of disruptive political and military activities in those areas.

Finally, because of its lengthy coastline and position athwart the central and eastern Mediterranean, Libya could have a strategic significance to the United States in the event of hostilities in the area. Because of its geography, Libyan territory could be used to interdict US air and sea traffic in the region.

2. Objectives

A. Political/Strategic Objectives

The primary US political objective is to counter Libya's disruptive political activism in the Middle East, Africa and in the Mediterranean and elsewhere to encourage any possible constructive role it could play given its financial resources.

(1) With respect to the Middle East, Libya pursues an extremist policy. Libya opposes the existence of Israel, argues for its liquidation by military means, and seeks to counter a negotiated settlement in any form. Its policy has been one of strong support of the Palestinian guerrillas and terrorists by arms, money and training. No solution to the Arab-Israeli problem based on UN Security Council resolution 242 would be acceptable to Libya under Qadhafi's leadership.

(2) *Libya supports subversion or insurgency* against Morocco, Jordan, Ethiopia, Chad, the Philippines, Northern Ireland and possibly Lebanon and Sudan. Its primary motivation in each case is to undermine regimes which in its view are not sufficiently militant on the Arab-Israeli issue, are tolerant of US or Soviet influence, or are engaged in suppressing armed Palestinian or Muslim movements within their territories.

(3) *US interests in the Mediterranean have recently clashed with Libya* following Libya's declaration of a "restricted area" within a 100-mile radius of Tripoli International Airport. Libya asserts the right to control the entrance of aircraft or ships within this restricted area—a right which the United States disputes. On 21 March Libyan fighter aircraft fired at an unarmed USAF C-130 reconnaissance plane flying within the restricted zone. On subsequent flights when a similar USAF aircraft flew in international airspace within the 100-mile zone, Libyan fighters limited their patrol to within the 12 nautical mile sea frontier and did not attack the USAF aircraft. Libya has, however, publicly and repeatedly denounced such reconnaissance flights as provocative incursions of Libyan airspace and territorial waters. The United States has denied any hostile intentions toward Libya, but our attempts to engage Libyan authorities in a meaningful dialogue on the issue of airspace have been fruitless. Complicating the situation is Libyan fear of attack by Israel supported by US intelligence or armed forces in the Mediterranean, as evidenced by the laying of minefields off Tripoli harbor in June.

Libya plans to establish a Libyan Flight Information Region (FIR) over the Mediterranean adjacent to Libya, and may eventually seek to interfere with similar reconnaissance flights or other flights by exercising a right to control and restrict aircraft movements within this region. Libyan attempts to enforce unilateral extensions of control over international waters and air space, particularly in the confined area between Libya and the southern coast of Crete, could possibly pose recurring problems for planned NATO and US activities beginning in 1975 at the new air weapons training center and target range based at Tymbakion.

A major US objective, therefore, is to prevent Libya from unilaterally restricting US military movements in the Mediterranean.

(4) *We seek to establish meaningful communication with the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in pursuit of the above objectives.* The RCC has rejected all our attempts to do so. Failure to establish such communication virtually stops any resolution of differences between the two governments. Our inability to establish such communication is almost entirely due to the RCC identification of the United States with Israeli interests and objectives.

B. *Economic Objectives*

(1) *Continued Access to Libyan Oil*

A prolonged cutoff of Libyan oil production, currently about 2.3 million barrels per day, would severely strain European supplies and necessitate a draw down of European oil stocks. Since there is little surplus oil production capacity elsewhere and little spare capacity of oil tankers, continued access to Libyan short haul oil is important to the economic strength of Western Europe.

The United States imports about 200,000 barrels per day from Libya; denial of access to this low sulphur crude would interfere with air pollution requirements. More importantly, a Libyan cutoff combined with growing US oil import requirements would put us in the politically awkward position of competing with Europe and Japan for available foreign oil supplies.

(2) *Continued Role of US Companies in Libya*

We wish to assist American companies in retaining control of the oil produced from their concessions in Libya. If the concessions were expropriated, even if the oil continued to flow, the American companies would lose earnings and would have more difficulty in meeting their marketing obligations in Europe. The US balance of payments would also suffer by the amount these companies have repatriated to the United States from their Libyan operations (more than \$400 million annually).

(3) *Avoid Disruptive Effect of Libyan Oil Negotiations on Oil Agreements Elsewhere*

US oil companies are currently negotiating with Libya on “participation” in their oil concessions with Libya. A Libyan participation agreement which undermined the participation accords concluded or in the process of conclusion in the Persian Gulf could hurt both the larger US commercial interests in Gulf oil and possibly undermine conservative Arab governments in the Gulf, making them more susceptible to political pressures to use oil as a political weapon against US-Middle East policies.

(4) *Expansion of US Exports*

Libya is a potentially significant market for US exports because of Libyan development expenditures budgeted at over \$1 billion annually. A vigorous export program directed to Libya is important if American exports (\$85 million in 1972) are to cover rapidly increasing US imports of Libyan oil. Last year our trade deficit with Libya was about \$30 million.

C. *Cultural Objectives*

US political contacts at high levels of the Libyan regime are rare. Routine contacts are possible at lower official levels. The United States has been successful in maintaining some contact with the Libyan populace, chiefly through US oil industry employees in Libya and the nearly 1,000 Libyan students in the United States, about one-third of whom are at the graduate level. It is in the long-term interest of the United States to preserve this contact and, if possible, to expand it. Institutional arrangements also continue between the American Friends of the Middle East and the University of Libya.

D. *Other Objectives—Passport Policy*

Libya is seeking to force other governments to write passport information in the Arabic language. For legal, administrative, budgetary and political reasons, we seek to avoid inserting official Arabic translations or printing Arabic in US passports.

IV. IMPACT OF LIBYAN POLICIES ON US INTERESTS

1. *Foreign Intervention and Political Activism*

A. *In the Middle East*

Qadhafi has some popular appeal outside of Libya because of his efforts to restore Arab pride and by his successes in standing up to the big powers. His thinking may be too simplistic for the political or military elites in other Arab countries, but he is respected as a dynamic

leader. His Islamic fundamentalism has not struck much of a chord in the urban centers of other Arab states, and it is here that the sources of power rest. Nevertheless, because he has shown himself willing to act against foreign military bases, to challenge the great powers and oil companies and even the use of foreign languages, and because he has his country's wealth to support his convictions, other Arab leaders while deploring him privately, are careful not to appear less "Arab" or "nationalistic." His personal incorruptibility and the austerity of his personal life contrast favorably with that of many other Arab leaders.

(1) *Arab-Israel Dispute*

Libya can play a disruptive—but not a decisive—role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Libyan territory offers Egypt some strategic depth in case of new Arab-Israeli hostilities. Libyan-purchased Mirage fighter-bombers transferred to Egypt in the event of a new war would provide Egypt with a possible capability of low-altitude missions against Israel proper. Preparations have already been made for the basing of such aircraft in Egypt, and Libyan Mirages have in fact been present in Egypt in significant numbers (about 20 in recent months). However, the addition of these aircraft either to the Egyptian or their presence in the Libyan inventory does not substantially affect Israel's military superiority in the Middle East.

Despite Libyan insistence on a military solution in the Middle East, Sadat has continued to prefer political and diplomatic channels to try to effect Israeli withdrawal. It seems clear that, in the event of a merger, Sadat would not permit Qadhafi to assume a position where Qadhafi would be able to decide on a resumption of hostilities with Israel.

Qadhafi has had more success in inducing a number of sub-Saharan African states to loosen their ties with Israel than he has had in winning Egyptian support of his military approach to the Middle East problem.

(2) *Terrorism*

Libya supports terrorism by financial contributions, arms and by training facilities in Libya. Libyan "volunteers" have been deployed in support of the fedayeen in Lebanon, but only in token strength. Libya granted asylum to the escaped fedayeen responsible for the Munich massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes. Libya may have lent moral and logistical support to the Black September Organization operation in Khartoum during which two US diplomats and a Belgian diplomat were murdered. The opening of Palestinian offices in other countries in Africa with Libyan support spreads the threat of Palestinian terrorist actions farther afield. Libyan financial support is an important factor in the persistence of terrorist activity, one aim of which is to prevent the

settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute on any but the most extremist Palestinian terms—i.e., by the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state.

(3) *Subversion*

Qadhafi intervened openly against the leftist coup in the Sudan in July 1971, intercepting a British airliner with members of the coup regime aboard, and readying Libyan troops which he was reportedly prepared to send had not Numeiri staged a comeback on his own. Although Qadhafi's opposition to a communist-dominated government in the Sudan was of benefit to our own interests, the general thrust of his activities has been contrary to our interests, even in the Sudan. Although specific evidence is lacking, Libya may have been involved in some way in the murder of the two US diplomats in Khartoum. Qadhafi may now be supporting subversion against Numeiri because of Sudan's lack of militancy on Arab issues. Libya supported the fedayeen against the Governments of Lebanon and Jordan. The Libyan role has not been decisive in their cases.

B. *In Africa*

African states and regimes friendly to the US—or Israel—are prime targets for Libyan intervention, mainly by financial means, but not infrequently by military support. Qadhafi has called for the overthrow of the Moroccan Monarchy, has trained and supported Moroccan insurgents, and given Moroccan exiles radio broadcasting facilities; he has supported the Eritrean insurgents against Ethiopia with arms and money; he has airlifted Libyan troops to support Amin in Uganda; and through promises of economic assistance, he has induced Chad, Uganda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali and Niger to break relations with Israel.

C. *Activism Elsewhere*

Libya supports the insurgents in Northern Ireland and the Muslims in the Philippines. Libya supported Pakistan with F–5 fighter aircraft after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, and supported Malta's hard stand on negotiations with the United Kingdom and NATO. He has shown an interest in supporting anti-US activities in Latin America and has attempted to undermine the US position in Panama.

2. *Economic Nationalism*

A. *Oil Industry*

Libya seeks complete ownership and control over its oil industry, expelling all foreign companies and non-Arab nationals. It has made major strides in this direction, forcing increased Libyanization of oil company personnel, imposing production limitations and controls, na-

tionalizing all oil marketing operations, nationalizing BP in 1971 and nationalizing Bunker Hunt in June 1973. It now seeks further control through “participation” agreements in oil concessions.

Qadhafi has stated he is limited in achieving his goal of complete control only by the shortage of skilled Arab personnel and (at least until recently) by the ability of oil companies to block the sale of nationalized oil in consuming countries.

B. Third Country Impact

Libya has been a pace-setter within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), making demands usually beyond those made by other oil producers and setting the stage for whip-sawing expatriate firms between the Gulf and North Africa. Since the first big price increase won by Libya in September 1970, the effect has been a constant escalation of payments per barrel to oil exporting governments. The movement towards “participation” in oil concessions was also set off in part by the fear of Persian Gulf countries of appearing too accommodating towards the oil companies in the wake of achievements won by Libyan militancy.

Libya has been a consistent advocate of the use of Arab oil resources as a political weapon to undermine western and particularly US support of Israel. It has begun to lay the groundwork for an Arab boycott of oil shipments to the west in the event that Arab-Israeli hostilities were to resume.

3. Policies towards large Powers

Although Libya’s hostility towards the United States is formidable, its hostility towards the Soviet Union is almost equally so. Qadhafi’s devotion to Islam and Arab nationalism impels him to keep at arm’s length the atheistic Soviets, whom he regards as only another imperialist foreign power. Libya purchases Soviet arms, but limits technical assistance and seeks to avoid any longer-term political or military dependence on the Soviet Union.

Qadhafi looks to the Third World and to a Western Europe as increasingly independent of the United States and increasingly reliant on Arab oil as sources of political support for Libya and for the Arabs in general. France and Italy particularly have been wooed by attractive commercial and military sales opportunities. Access to their sophisticated military and civilian material is valued by Libya.

V. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

1. Outlook for the Regime

There is no significant internal threat to the Qadhafi regime. Qadhafi retains the personal loyalty of fellow members of the RCC. The

leadership is supported by the only power capable of threatening the regime—the army. Qadhafi's security is reinforced by the presence of Egyptian army and security forces. Qadhafi has repeatedly threatened to resign; any likely successor is apt to come from the present ruling group and would probably continue the general lines of Qadhafi's policies.

A. Internal Stability

The Libyan Government generally enjoys the passive support of the dour, inward-looking Libyan population which has had no meaningful experience with participation in self-government. With the exception of the demonstrations of June 1967 and February 1973, Libyans have shown little inclination for risk-taking political activism. (The Libyan populace played no significant role in the military coup of September 1969, which was engineered entirely by a small group of army officers.) The regime's policies of reducing foreign influence, closing bases, taking over foreign companies, and reducing foreign presence have been generally popular. Its militant stance towards Israel finds popular acceptance as long as it entails no self-sacrifice or personal threat to individuals. Qadhafi's personal honesty, undoubted sincerity and incorruptibility, have won support for his regime. Rising Libyan oil revenues have been distributed to broad social groups through increases in wages, greater benefits for the army, and ambitious public works projects such as housing.

Nevertheless, the regime is not without its opponents. While there has been no real challenge to Qadhafi's leadership, the RCC and "Free" officers who came to power with Qadhafi, and elements of the broader Libyan population have been divided over the planned merger with Egypt. The opposition to union has been serious, and Qadhafi's determination in this matter could prove to be a critical test of his leadership and to the continued cohesion of the ruling military collegium. A military coup cannot be ruled out, but there is no conclusive evidence of any conspiracies. Nor is there any assurance that a successor military regime would adopt a significantly less hostile attitude toward the United States.

Libyan news dispatches have mentioned the Ba'ath Party and "communist" elements as engaging the anti-regime activities. Old regime exiles have also attempted abortive actions against Qadhafi. None of these groups appears capable of mounting any effective opposition.

B. Opposition to Egyptians

Potentially, the most significant source of opposition to the regime could stem from Libya's relations with Egypt. The influx of as many as 200,000 Egyptians in Libya since 1969 has already led to numerous inci-

dents and violence between the two nationalities. Should the influx of Egyptians increase to the point where many Libyans felt their jobs or social structure threatened, or should the planned merger with Egypt go forward in areas which appeared to threaten vital interests of important groups—such as the Army—a reaction could result which would pose a threat to the regime. Opposition to political integration with Egypt is particularly strong in Cyrenaica, which has a long history of dislike of Egyptians and of governments based in Tripoli.

C. Other Sources of Discontent

Qadhafi has launched a “Cultural Revolution” aimed at shaking broad numbers of Libyans from their political lethargy. This revolution appears under control and poses no threat to the regime. Qadhafi’s Islamic fundamentalism is not supported by most Libyan city-dwellers, but it is not an issue which evokes strong opposition.

2. The Merger with Egypt

Whatever the form that the “union” initially takes, we believe both countries will proceed at the outset in their own way as before, with neither party able to dominate the other and with continued friction between them. Initially, the chief effect may be in combining Egyptian and Libyan diplomatic missions and the reduction of Embassies in Tripoli to some lower status.

To the extent a union is a strong one, it will be dominated by Egypt. Bolstered economically with Libyan oil wealth, Egypt would probably continue to pursue its quest for a favorable political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Being in a stronger economic position, Egypt might also be tempted to pursue more activist policies in inter-Arab affairs, but we do not foresee Sadat adopting the extremist Libyan approach to international politics.

Unless there were to be a significant rise in Arab-Israeli tensions, we would expect that Egyptian moderation might temper Libyan extremism in dealings with American and other foreign oil companies. At the same time, we and the companies would be dealing with a relatively cosmopolitan government in Cairo rather than trying to cope with a head-strong, inexperienced and xenophobic junta in Tripoli. Having acquired substantial oil resources, Egypt could be expected to play a more active role in international oil affairs.

A merger with Egypt might also attenuate some of the more bizarre policies espoused by the Libyans, such as the demand for the translation of foreign passports into Arabic.

3. Possible Moderation of Libyan Policies

A. Maturing of the Regime

Qadhafi’s early successes in eliminating the military bases and browbeating the oil companies seem to have made him bolder with the

passage of time. Early disappointments with federation plans involving Egypt, Syria and the Sudan have strengthened his determination to carry out a merger with Egypt. The impunity with which he found he was able to move F–5s to Pakistan in 1971, contrary to written agreements with the United States, was followed in 1973 by the deployment of Mirages and heavy artillery to Egypt, contrary to written agreement with France and Italy. Agreements with oil companies in 1970 and 1971 which were to last five years were followed in 1973 by even more extreme demands against the oil companies that went further than those of any other member of OPEC. His success in nationalizing Bunker Hunt and BP without political or other retaliation has confirmed Qadhafi in his estimate that Arab boldness can successfully challenge the West. Finally, he is in the process of winning his latest demand, that all governments include Arabic as a language in their passports or risk Libyan refusal of entry by their nationals (including their diplomats) into Libya.

At times when Qadhafi has met firm resistance—in oil negotiations or initially on the issue of recognizing only passports which include Arabic, he has backed down or not carried through on his threats, only to raise the issue again or resume the pressure from a slightly different angle. He has been willing to improvise, but has adhered to his goals with remarkable tenacity.

In view of his successes thus far, it is reasonable to assume Qadhafi will continue to pursue his long-range goals and that he will use every means at his disposal, especially oil as a political weapon against the United States, to achieve his goals.

B. Qadhafi's Health

Qadhafi's physical and mental health has sometimes been suggested as a limiting factor in his tenure in office and in ability to carry out his long-range policies. His high-strung temperament has led him at times of exhaustion to retire temporarily from public view and to threaten to retire or resign if his policies were not followed. However, we see no evidence that his physical or mental health will limit his ability or willingness to govern for an indefinite period of time in the future.

C. Successors to Qadhafi

Should Qadhafi resign or leave office, he would probably be replaced by other members of the RCC who, at least temporarily, would collectively lead the RCC and the country. They would continue his general policy lines, but lacking his zeal and puritanical bent, some of them might be more flexible on some issues.

Qadhafi's charismatic qualities have been an important force in the cohesion of the Libyan leadership. Should he disappear from the scene,

a period of instability could ensue which would divert Libya, at least temporarily, from the pursuit of foreign adventures.

4. *US Ability to Influence Libyan Actions*

A. *Oil Nationalization: Counter Measures*

Libya is inhibited from taking over complete control of US oil companies by the shortage of skilled Arab technicians and by the threat of legal action against “hot oil.” In the long run the problem of skilled manpower, Arab or other, can be solved. In the short run a host of foreign companies—including American—will be willing to help Libya produce and market nationalized oil if the terms are sufficiently attractive to run the legal risks.

There are a number of actions the United States could take to reduce the attractiveness to Libya of an early nationalization.

(1) *Boycott of Oil Sales*

The United States could pursue legal means to block third-country importation of the Bunker Hunt nationalized oil for which compensation had not been paid. The US Government might intervene in US courts or seek to have other countries intervene in their courts in support of legal action by nationalized American companies to attach oil taken from them. The United States could attempt to discourage US companies and individuals from helping to produce or market nationalized oil. European cooperation in any US efforts to boycott “hot oil” would probably not be forthcoming because of Western European dependence on Libya as a source of supply.

(2) *Inhibit Technical Training*

We could limit the training of Libyan petroleum technicians in the United States to slow down the growth of Libya’s ability to run oil operations. However, most training is done by US companies which still have oil operations in Libya and are under pressure to Libyanize their management and technical staffs. Failure to progress toward Libyanization could invite Libyan retaliation, including expulsion of senior American management. Foreign technicians are also available to fill gaps until Libyan technicians can be trained.

As a specific sign of displeasure over the Libyan nationalization of Bunker Hunt, we could discourage the private US technical training program for the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company (AGEC) which is operating and marketing BP’s and Hunt’s nationalized oil. This program is now underway with the help of the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME). On a more limited scale, we could delay visas for AGEC trainees to study in the United States, but this would probably have little effect on AGEC’s technical capabilities. Moreover, Libya in

retaliation could refuse visas to American managers and other technical staff for the oil companies in Libya.

(3) *Blockage of Funds*

Libya apparently genuinely fears that the United States and United Kingdom may block Libyan funds in case of nationalization, just as Egyptian funds in London were frozen after the Suez Canal nationalization. If the United States wished to do so, it could possibly block Libyan funds, perhaps by invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act. (The applicability of this legislation to a nationalization case is not certain.) The effect of such action on Libya would be relatively slight, since most of Libya's \$2.8 billion in reserves is held in Europe. Libya might retaliate against blockage of its funds by nationalizing all or several of the remaining US oil companies and by breaking diplomatic relations. Before taking such a drastic step, the United States would wish to consider its precedent-setting effects on international monetary transactions.

(4) *Cooperation on Anti-Trust Matters*

Independent oil companies in Libya without major alternate sources of production in the Middle East are most vulnerable to Libyan threat to expropriation. To bolster the smaller companies in their negotiations, we expressed in 1971 a lack of intent to prosecute the companies at that time under the anti-trust laws despite a Sharing Agreement concluded by the oil companies operating in Libya. Under this agreement, if a company is nationalized or has its oil production reduced by the Libyan government as a pressure tactic against it in the course of oil negotiations, the other companies will give that company crude oil at or slightly above cost from their own production, either from their own production in Libya or from crude production in the Persian Gulf. This agreement expires at the end of 1973 with respect to reductions imposed by the Libyan Government; it expires at the end of 1974 with respect to total nationalization or a total shutdown of a company's Libyan production. (Bunker Hunt, nationalized in June 1973, will therefore benefit under this agreement until the end of 1974.)

To bolster the companies' negotiating position with Libya, we might urge them to extend the Sharing Agreement for a longer period of time, and indicate our continued intention not to prosecute under the anti-trust laws as long as implementation of the agreement was required to help those companies hurt during negotiations with Libya.

B. *Possible US Leverage*

(1) *Arms Sales from the United States*

We have not tied approval of arms sales to Libya with any quid pro quo expected from Libya in return. We have been reluctant to tie

arms sales, for example, to the continued role of US companies in Libya, although the Libyans have hinted at making such a connection with us and in fact have done so with the Italians. Our view has been that once we agreed to any connection, the Libyan regime could blackmail us endlessly. Our leverage in regard to further arms sales to Libya now is, therefore, essentially negative—disapproval would show opposition to Libyan policies and might risk Libyan retaliation of some kind, but approval of arms sales is not likely to gain us any political benefits.

(a) *Additional C-130s*

Potentially, the most sensitive leverage we have against Libya is our ability to deny authorization for the export to Libya of eight additional C-130s, contracts for which were signed in 1972 between Libya and Lockheed. Deliveries are scheduled to begin this fall and Lockheed is expected to submit applications for export licenses late this summer.

When the contract was signed in the spring of 1972 we informed the Libyan Government in writing that the US Government would only decide on the licenses in the light of all the existing circumstances at the time Lockheed applied for them. We have since told Lockheed that it is unlikely the applications will be approved.

Lockheed's contract with Libya called for advance payments totalling more than \$30 million; we know that payments totalling about \$28.5 million have been made. If we do not approve the licenses, Lockheed will return Libya's deposit without interest if it is able to sell the aircraft to another customer within one year, minus any amount Lockheed receives below the price paid by Libya.

A US refusal to approve the export licenses could seriously exacerbate US relations with Libya.

(b) *F-5s*

In June 1969 the United States concluded a sales agreement with the former Libyan regime covering eight F-5s. (Ten other F-5s were delivered from the United States to Libya under an earlier contract, of which eight are still flying.) No payments were made by the old or the new regime on the 1969 order and none was requested by the United States. From time to time, the Libyans, most recently during the UN session last year, have raised the question whether the planes would be delivered. On each occasion we have replied that the matter remained "under consideration." Circumstances and relations between the United States and Libya have obviously changed in the four years since the sales contract was signed. It is doubtful that the Libyans any longer expect delivery of the planes (their fighter aircraft needs would appear to have been abundantly met by the purchase of 110 Mirages), but the

fact that the United States could and did deny the F–5s to the new regime, without ever saying so, undoubtedly rankles the RCC. Denial of delivery of the planes does not appear to have moderated LARG actions.

(c) *Military Sales from Third Countries*

We have approved the sale of major military equipment of US origin from third countries to Libya. Most of these have been from Italy, including heavy artillery, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers. Some of this equipment has reportedly been transferred to Egypt, contrary to Libya's contract with Italy. We could decide not to approve sale of any further US-controlled military equipment from third countries to Libya. Some of this equipment is probably available to Libya from other non-US sources, and it is doubtful whether our denial of future such sales would exert any meaningful restraint on Libyan policies or capabilities.

(d) *Maintenance Contracts*

Lockheed has a pending contract to continue the services of its technicians for maintenance and training of Libyans in the operation of the eight C–130s it already possesses. The Libyans also have an arrangement with Greece for maintenance of the F–5s. These contracts represent an important potential bargaining lever for us with Libya. Were we to suspend the maintenance contract for these aircraft, most probably would be inoperative in a matter of months, although Libya might be able to find limited alternate maintenance assistance from countries such as Pakistan.

(e) *Spare Parts*

The United States sells Libya spare parts for aircraft we have previously sold. This includes spares for F–5s, sold through Foreign Military Sales arrangements, and spares for C–130s which are sold by Lockheed with licenses from the Office of Munitions Control. Libya has also used Greek aircraft repair facilities. Libyan C–130s have made periodic trips to Greece to deliver, and later pick up, repairable components for F–5 aircraft and J–85 engines. Libya may also be getting F–5 spares from Greece. An embargo on the acquisition of such spares, both from the United States and third countries, probably would deny Libya the use of these F–5 and C–130 aircraft after a period of time. The F–5s are important to Libya for training pilots for the more advanced French Mirage aircraft. The C–130s are important as lift for troops and supplies in support of governments friendly to Libya, such as Uganda, or insurgents. They are also a significant logistic link between Libya and Egypt and symbols of Libya's activism abroad.

A total embargo of spare parts either for the C-130s or F-5s probably would not be felt immediately since Libya is believed to have stockpiled spares and to be searching for alternate sources of spares outside the United States.

(f) *Other Direct US Military Sales*

Export license applications have been made for the sale of a number of lesser military items from the United States to Libya, including portable military radios, navigation equipment, antennas and other electronic equipment. Some of this equipment is for the establishment of the Libyan Flight Information Region (FIR). Most of this equipment is available from other foreign manufacturers; thus, denial of these sales would have only a marginal impact on Libyan capabilities and attitudes.

(2) *Passport Policy: Leverage Against Libyan Nationals*

One of the most difficult problems in our relations with Libya stems from Libya's insistence that it will only recognize passports which contain an official translation of passport information into Arabic. Although some persons have been exempted, this requirement has been used to exclude most diplomats, tourists, and others Libyan authorities deem unnecessary to admit. USG employees, diplomats accredited and resident in Tripoli, and diplomatic couriers have been denied entry on grounds their passports were not in Arabic, even when they possessed valid Libyan visas. American Embassy personnel cannot leave Libya since replacement personnel cannot be sent. Libyan authorities can exclude at will oil company dependents as well as school teachers in the oil company school and medical personnel in the oil company clinic. Such a change would undermine oil company morale and impair the effectiveness of their operations.

Virtually all governments, including the French, British, Italian, German and Spanish, have decided to insert an Arabic rubber stamp into the passports of their nationals and thereby, hopefully, satisfy the Libyan demand. However, there is no evidence to date whether Libya will be satisfied with the rubber stamp procedure; certain of its officials have indicated that this procedure will be acceptable only temporarily and that the Libyan Government will still require that passports be printed in Arabic.

The United States has not accepted the Libyan passport requirement, contending that each government has the right to decide for itself the nature of the travel documentation for its nationals. We are also concerned over the precedent that would be set by agreeing to the Libyan demand. (The US position has been to adhere to the recommendation of a United Nations Commission in 1963 that governments issue

their passports in their own national language and either in French or English.) Also, the printing of US passports in Arabic would pose serious administrative and budgetary problems for the United States. Finally, a US concession to Libya on this point would be regarded as still another political triumph by Qadhafi.

We have responded to Libya's passport policy by temporarily delaying the issuance of visas to most categories of Libyans visiting the United States. Exceptions have been made for Libyan officials going to the United Nations, businessmen dealing with US companies, and students. By far the largest category of Libyans coming to this country are students, now numbering nearly 1,000. It has been our belief that denying students entry into the United States would have no meaningful effect on Libyan passport policies and would jeopardize whatever longterm US interest there may be in developing a cadre of US-trained Libyans.

The one area where we have some leverage with the passport problem is Libyan Government employees coming to this country for training. Libya is anxious to obtain training for its personnel in areas such as air controlling, electronic maintenance, agricultural training, and to a lesser extent in business administration. When such training is with USG agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, no loss to private US firms would be involved if we held up visas to the Libyan candidate. However, most of this training is with private US firms and is associated with contracts for the sale to Libya of equipment and services. If we held up visas to such trainees, US firms would suffer. US displeasure over Libyan policies, however, would be apparent.

(3) Influence of Other Arabs on Libya

In an effort to seek changes in Libyan policies we could consider an approach to other Arab countries, such as Tunisia and Algeria, and ask that they indicate to Libya our desire for improved relations and possibly offer to send a special emissary to Libya to see how this could be done.

VI. KEY ISSUES AND DECISIONS

1. Whether the United States Should Maintain Diplomatic Representation in Libya

This issue arises in view of strained relations between the United States and Libya, the difficulty in developing any dialogue with the RCC, the likelihood of Libya's union with Egypt, and the difficulties of operating the mission because of limitations on staff and numbers of personnel resulting from Libyan passport policy.

Pro 1. The Mission makes possible intelligence gathering and other reporting on the Libyan scene. Absence of an official presence in Libya could significantly weaken our ability to gather intelligence on Libya.

2. We still have a consular and protection function which diplomatic presence can facilitate; our departure would be a psychological blow to the resident US community and US oil companies. The US community relies on the Embassy for emergency communications and coordination of E&E planning.

3. Our presence would permit us to benefit from any change in the Libyan regime from the outset; experience has shown that it is difficult to re-establish diplomatic relations with Arab states once they are broken.

4. Should we initiate a break, we would be handing Qadhafi what he may be looking for: a way of ending the US presence in Libya.

5. Libya might retaliate to a break with a gesture of defiance such as seizure of one or more of the American oil companies or harassment of US citizens.

Con 1. Initiating a break in relations ourselves would signal our displeasure with Libyan policies, especially to other Arab countries.

2. Communications on important matters with the Libyan regime could still be made through an Interest Section or third parties.

3. Intelligence on Libya could still be gathered to some degree without our official presence in Libya.

4. Our ability to gain consular access to protect American citizens is already negligible; our departure would be little real loss to the effective consular protection afforded Americans.

5. US companies in Libya could still make their own emergency E&E arrangements without our official presence.

2. *Whether the United States Should Continue Arms Sales to Libya*

A. *Should the US Authorize Export of the Lockheed C-130s?*

This issue arises out of the impending application by Lockheed to export eight C-130s to Libya, beginning in September 1973.

Pro 1. We have never told either Lockheed or the LARG specifically that we will refuse to allow export of the aircraft;

2. Refusal to allow export of the planes would risk a major confrontation with Libya; diplomatic ties may be broken, more US oil companies may be nationalized.

3. Denial of the C-130s will not inhibit Libya from purchasing aircraft from other countries, possibly from France or the Soviet Union.

4. Such sales preserve some American contact with the Libyan armed forces.

5. The United States benefits from the exports and the company benefits from the business.

Con 1. Libya's actions toward the US have become increasingly hostile and challenging; there is no national interest requiring us to strengthen its armed forces.

2. Increased airlift augments Libya's ability to move arms and other material to the Palestinians and insurgent groups. It may also support subversive activities in countries friendly to the United States, e.g., Morocco.

3. At some point, the US Government should reply to Qadhafi with a firm "no"; all the efforts to seek an improvement in our relations have come from the American side.

4. We would not achieve any significant change in US-Libyan relations by an affirmative response; our major difference over the Middle East would remain and this is the touchstone of the US-Libyan relationship.

5. We have told Lockheed that US Government approval of the deliveries is unlikely.

6. We can expect criticism from Israel and elements of US domestic and Congressional opinion if we permit the export.

B. The F-5s

This issue is a residual one, now four years old. It may be dormant. Substantially, the same arguments exist in this case for and against delivery as in the case of the C-130s, except that the F-5s were covered by a government-to-government FMS agreement and, unlike the C-130s, there is no risk of financial loss. Our unwillingness to fulfill the contract could be regarded as improper. However, there are escape clauses in the FMS agreement which the US Government could invoke in its favor if it wished to do so, including the fact that the benefits the United States expected to receive as a result of the sale (continued use of Wheelus) are no longer available.

C. Should the United States Authorize Third-Country Sales to Libya?

This issue arises out of the requirement that USG authorization be obtained before military items or technology manufactured under an American license by another country, e.g., helicopters from Italy or F-5s from Spain, may be exported to Libya.

Pro 1. We gain political benefits in our bilateral relationship with the government of the third-country manufacturer.

2. The US firms benefit from these sales through license fees and sale of components.

3. In some cases, sales from western third countries might preempt sales from the Soviet bloc.

Con 1. The United States gains no political benefit from Libya from third-country sales.

2. Commercial benefits to the United States would be greater from direct US sales than from sales through third countries.

3. By agreeing to such sales, the United States probably increases the military capability of Egypt to which the Libyan-purchased arms would move in the event of Middle East hostilities.

4. Such sales can become open-ended; the arguments (political or social) used to justify individual sales, e.g., by Italy, are of a long-term nature and could be used for justifying future sales.

5. We can expect criticism from Israel and from elements of US Congressional and public opinion for permitting the export.

D. Should the United States Continue to Authorize Sales of Spare Parts and of non-Lethal Military Equipment, such as Communications Material?

Pro 1. The equipment in question does not by itself significantly add to the Arab military balance with Israel.

2. In view of (1) above, there is no point in risking a confrontation with Libya on the matter of military spare parts.

Con 1. Libya is an unfriendly country; there is no reason why we should continue to supply its military establishment.

2. A cut-off of spare parts and of the sale of new military equipment of any character, including communication equipment, would terminate a military supply relationship that has become increasingly incongruous.

3. The United States has never retaliated against Libya either for its actions or pronouncements; if it wished to do so, a US cut-off of military spare parts and denial of export authorization for other equipment would be one means of registering our displeasure.

3. Whether to Continue Reconnaissance Flights

Pro 1. Continuation of the reconnaissance flights shows our determination to exercise our right to fly through international airspace, non-recognition of the Libyan restricted area over the Mediterranean 100 miles from Tripoli, and our determination not to be intimidated by Qadhafi's threats and bombast against "spy flights."

2. Acceptance of a Libyan-imposed restricted area could encourage bolder moves of this kind by Qadhafi, posing difficulties for US and NATO activities and operations in the Mediterranean.

Con 1. Continuation of the flights could lead Qadhafi to take further action against US oil companies in Libya or to break relations. (Qadhafi probably fears these flights are connected with Israeli plans for attacks against Libya and regards them as highly provocative.)

2. The intelligence gathered by these flights is only marginally significant.

3. Qadhafi would not gain a propaganda victory by suspension of the flights since he does not know when or how often they are scheduled.

4. An incident resulting from the reconnaissance flights could be embarrassing in our relations with Greece, where many reconnaissance flights originate. Greece seeks not to antagonize the Arabs, and might restrict our use of Greek airfields for such flights, thus circumscribing the intelligence benefits acquired through almost daily flights to other areas.

4. Whether to Promote Cultural Cooperation and Travel

Pro 1. Issuance of visas to Libyan students and cooperation by private US groups with the University will lead to a cadre of US-trained Libyans who may better understand the United States and with whom we may be able to deal more effectively in the future than with the parochial zealots now in power.

2. Providing visas to Libyan trainees assists private US firms which are training them in connection with commercial contracts.

Con 1. It is questionable whether US training will change the outlook of Libyan students on any fundamental foreign policy issues which divide the United States and Libya.

2. By issuing visas to Libyan Government employees we eliminate any leverage we may have in changing Libyan visa policies, troublesome to US businessmen and to US officials.

3. No private US firms are hurt by denying visas to Libyan Government employees seeking training with USG agencies, such as the FAA, as distinct from private American firms.

5. Whether the United States Should Send a High-Level Emissary

Pro 1. It would show our willingness to explore the possibility of avoiding a continued deterioration in our relations. The gesture would be seen as statesman-like in other Arab countries.

2. If his mission were unsuccessful in identifying a feasible basis for improved relations, we could show we had made every effort to avoid a confrontation.

Con

To have a realistic chance for success, an emissary would have to offer concrete proposals in areas of primary policy interest to Libya, such as the Arab-Israeli problem or arms sales.

VII. POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Decisions on key issues will fall broadly within three areas: 1) actively exploring the possibility of an accommodation with the regime in

the interest of improved relations; 2) maintaining a low profile and letting events take their course in the belief there is little we can do realistically to improve relations with Libya; or 3) taking actions which will highlight areas of conflict in the belief this path will minimize the damage Libya can do to our interests. Decisions on different issues of course can fall in more than one of these areas. Consequently, although the following options are described in an ascending order toward “confrontation,” individual courses of action under each option could be combined, depending on the circumstances and objectives at any given time. Four general policy alternatives are suggested below.

1. *Explore Possibility of Improved Relations*

Send a high-level emissary to explore the possibility of identifying a basis for improved Libyan-US relations. If such a basis were found:

- approve delivery of the additional C-130s; approve export of other non-lethal military equipment for which export licenses have been made; approve continuation of the sale of spare parts and of maintenance agreements for military aircraft;

- suspend reconnaissance flights;

- relax visa procedures;

- take no diplomatic action on nationalized oil.

Pro. This would maximize the possibility we could maintain an official presence in Tripoli and might diminish Libyan suspicions of the US. It would also establish a record of seeking accommodation should we later decide on harsher steps.

Con. Unless the US is prepared to modify its Middle East policies in a way meaningful to the Libyans, such gestures would be regarded as such and would have little or no effect in Libya.

2. *Low Profile, Do Nothing Directly Against Libya*

- avoid public or private comment on Libya;

- do not respond to further Libyan provocations such as denunciations of the US in the UN;

- take no action on export license applications for C-130s; [1. DOD questions including *no action* on C-130 delivery as “low profile”; Libya has made substantial payments (\$28.5 million) to Lockheed, and the requirement for the next payment, due November 1973, is likely to precipitate a confrontation with Libya. The actual extent, however, of the Egyptian merger may provide ample ambiguity to justify delay or perhaps to preclude deliveries.] make non-committal replies to Libyan requests for information regarding status of the applications;

- not seek good offices of other Arabs;

- take no public stance re oil negotiations or nationalizations;

—continue reconnaissance flights, on infrequent basis.

Pro. We avoid open showdowns on specific issues with Libya.

Con 1. Essentially passive with the public initiatives being left to the LARG.

2. Departs by silence from established US policy on such matters as nationalization.

3. Discounts ability of Lockheed to stall Libya indefinitely on the delivery of the C–130s.

3. *Low Profile, but Signal Willingness to Counter Libyan Actions*

—send no emissary;

—inform other Arabs that Libya hurts the Arab cause;

—join oil companies in courts to block the sale of nationalized oil;

—suspend sale of spare parts;

—disapprove export license applications for C–130s;

—continue reconnaissance flights on regular basis.

Pro 1. Moderately activist in defense of US interests;

2. Reassures US companies of our support;

3. Ends an anachronistic military supply relationship.

Con 1. Could precipitate retaliation over the non-delivery of the C–130s.

2. Probably would not prevent sale of “hot” oil.

4. *Confrontation*

—highlight Libyan subversive and terrorist actions in public;

—disapprove export of C–130s, sale of spare parts, and other military equipment from the US or third countries;

—continue reconnaissance flights;

—severely restrict visa procedures for Libyans;

—initiate break in diplomatic relations.

Pro 1. These actions would publicly show our strong disapproval of the Qadhafi Government; might help to isolate it from other, more cautious Arab governments, including Egypt.

2. Several or all such actions would boost the morale of friendly, conservative Arab governments in the Persian Gulf and might reduce Qadhafi’s influence in other Arab countries and his ability to promote the use of oil as a political weapon against US-Middle East policies.

3. It would also encourage domestic Libyan opponents to Qadhafi.

Con 1. These actions would heighten the risk of vindictive Libyan actions against US oil companies and Americans in Libya, including harassment or nationalization.

2. It would further reduce our limited ability to protect US citizens in Libya, and would be a psychological blow to the American community and oil companies.

3. It would not change any of Qadhafi's basic policies towards the Middle East problem or terrorism, and might reinforce them.

4. Embassy Tripoli would be eliminated as a useful source of political reporting.

5. Libya could continue to get many of the arms it seeks from countries other than the US.

22. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 14, 1973, 3:08–3:58 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Towards Libya

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman

Henry A. Kissinger

State

William Porter

Joseph Sisco

James Blake

Anthony Ross

Defense

William Clements

Robert Hill

CIA

William Colby

[name not declassified]

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

V/Adm. John P. Weinell

Treasury

William Simon

Gerald Nensel

NSC

B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft

Richard Kennedy

Lawrence Eagleburger

William Quandt

Harold Horan

Jeanne W. Davis

¹ Summary: The Senior Review Group discussed U.S. policy towards Libya.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 71, National Security Council, Committees and Panels, Senior Review Group, August 1973–October 1975. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room at the White House. Colby's briefing is attached but is not published. In telegram 1044 from Tripoli, August 13, Josif argued against the approval of new military equipment to Libya without the United States receiving something other than money in return. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 306, NSC Committees and Panels, Senior Review Group, August 1973–April 1975)

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—State would prepare a paper on the pros and cons of the various options in dealing with Libya, including the substance of a possible approach by a U.S. emissary.

—the question of reconnaissance flights would be reviewed.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Colby) May we have your briefing?

Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.

Mr. Kissinger: (Commenting on the briefing) When you talk about the status of our representation in Libya, you're hitting the State Department where it hurts.

Mr. Colby: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Mr. Porter: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] We always like to give our younger officers a chance.

Mr. Kissinger: Did you say Qadhafi is helping the Irish Republic Army?

Mr. Colby: Yes, he has sent them something.

Mr. Porter: He offered Spain his army to push the British out of Gibraltar.

Mr. Kissinger: [*2 lines not declassified*]

I'd like to discuss first some general issues as we did in our meeting on the Persian Gulf. Then I'd like to raise some issues concerning the oil companies which we will discuss in more detail at the SRG meeting on energy on Friday. These will obviously have to be settled in terms larger than Libya. Third, I'd like to talk about a number of concrete issues which have arisen. Let's raise the oil company situation first, then defer discussion to Friday. The oil company incentives are just basically different from ours. I have yet to meet an oil company executive who is not an idiot politically. (to Mr. Clements) I make an exception, of course, for drillers and producers. The oil companies' argument that their interests are identical to the national interest should be examined. They don't seem to be able to concert their actions at all. They give in to the most outrageous demands and then just pass along the increased costs to the consumer. Once this happens in Libya, it will spread to the Persian Gulf. The companies should talk to us before they get in trouble.

I know the mythology is that any attempt by the consumer countries to get together will produce a confrontation with the producer countries. That's a shibboleth and we should consider whether it is really true. What do we mean by confrontation? What is the price? This is a dangerous process where year by year the oil companies are driven toward a solution. Libya set the pattern for Saudi Arabia. We got involved in Saudi Arabia, then the companies chickened out.

Mr. Simon: I have a tangential question in the matter of calling on the consumer nations to consult with the producer nations and that is the Japanese bilateral approach.

Mr. Kissinger: We'll have a discussion on the whole issue on Friday. I don't know whether we would want an across-the-board agreement among the consumer nations or consider what the US might do unilaterally. I assume the Occidental issue is down the drain.

Mr. Porter: Yes, and Libya cut production 50% today. Amoseas will probably fold, then Oasis will. It's an ongoing process.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's discuss the other two issues: our general strategy and how to apply it to some concrete issues.

Mr. Porter: Our tactic has been to hang in and see what happens when Libya merges with Egypt, if it does. We did what we could for Bunker Hill, but it wasn't much. Our problem is that we have a lack of contact with any high-level Libyans. We could send a high-level emissary over to try to get some assurances concerning our interests. The reason why the consumer nations are chicken is that the commodity is in relatively short supply.

Mr. Kissinger: If Libya hadn't stopped production, Qadhafi would be a miserable little shiek running around in the desert. Who needs whom more in this exercise?

Mr. Porter: The consumers need Qadhafi more than he needs them.

Mr. Kissinger: As long as they are not united.

Mr. Porter: You can't hope to get anything resembling unanimity from the consumers.

Mr. Clements: Also you must remember that, when you are talking about the European market, this is handled outside normal commercial interests. These dealings are all government-to-government.

Mr. Porter: Yes, Libya will have no problem disposing of the stuff in Europe—and to our best allies.

Mr. Clements: Right; Italy is one of the worst offenders.

Mr. Porter: We have no specific suggestions. We think the idea of the emissary is worth exploring. The Libyans want some things that they might trade off. You should know that there is not unanimity in State on the idea of an emissary. But we don't see how to proceed because we have no access.

Mr. Kissinger: We could try to create a situation in which they would want access to us.

Mr. Porter: Interesting, but how?

Mr. Colby: Their big market is Europe.

Mr. Clements: There is one outside chance, based on my experience with and knowledge of the Algerians. The Libyans are being well coached by the Algerians. Libya's technical and management capability is coming from the Algerians. I've seen this thing orchestrated over the last couple of years as various Algerians go in and out of Libya. I think you can track what's happening in Libya to the coaching they are receiving from these young Algerian revolutionary types.

Mr. Porter: But these Algerians are doing business with us.

Mr. Clements: Precisely. Our business may not be with Libya. The Algerians need us and need us badly. I'm talking about things like marketing and capacity—things that are well beyond their capabilities. If we could talk to them, that's the only access I know of.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Simon) What do you think?

Mr. Simon: I'm interested in the comments on Algeria. I worked with the Algerians on the LNG deal. It might be a possibility.

Mr. Porter: Are we on a good enough basis with the Algerians?

Mr. Simon: Some of us are with some of them.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we want the Libyans to do?

Mr. Porter: We should aim at stabilizing our interests in Libya. Our oil investment there is important. They should let our people in and out—we've taken a lot from them because we have an eye on our main interest—petroleum. I hope Bill Clements is right but I don't have the feeling that the Algerians are ready to oblige us.

Mr. Clements: I didn't say they were. They won't do anything unless there is something in it for them.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you want the Libyans to do?

Mr. Porter: Petroleum is the most important element. We can reduce our presence if our major interests are stabilized. But one by one we see our interests diminished, made unprofitable or removed from our control.

Mr. Kissinger: Are they doing it by inadvertance? We want Libya to stop subverting our oil. What's in it for them?

Mr. Porter: They want a major change in US policy in the Middle East.

Mr. Clements: The Algerians have already done this with the French.

Mr. Kissinger: We tried to drag our feet on letting El Paso in, but the oil companies were on our necks. Now they're getting the same thing done to them in Libya.

Mr. Clements: You're right.

Mr. Kissinger: Only two years ago they were driving us crazy when we held up approval on El Paso to avoid problems in the other Arab countries.

Mr. Porter: I suggest we staff out a proposal on what an emissary might offer in return for what we want.

Mr. Kissinger: It's a policy question whether the country which is most directly opposed to US interests, which constantly harasses us, rates an emissary, no matter what he says. Why not send an emissary to a friend? We have two approaches: to try to isolate and punish Libya or to buy them off. (Referring to Tripoli's 1044) I never thought I'd see a cable from our people in Tripoli that I'd agree with.

Mr. Sisco: We have three options: 1) to face up to Libya's salami tactics by trying to work out a more cooperative relationship, through an emissary and possibly a trade deal. I think this is not the time and not the right country. I doubt if we could get a trade-off worth our while.

Mr. Porter: This is Joe's view but it isn't Casey's or mine.

Mr. Sisco: 2) We could temporize and hold on by stringing it out; 3) we could really move in the direction of the Tripoli telegram and begin to apply a policy of loosening our relations with Libya, begin to take a position with regard to Qadhafi to reduce our relations and contact. We could try to get the oil companies to take a more unified, concerted posture and see what leverage we can develop to demonstrate to Qadhafi that his actions may be at the expense of his relations with the US. This only makes sense if we concert with the oil companies so that they enter into some sharing arrangement between the majors and the independents.

Mr. Kissinger: And some sharing plan with the Europeans.

Mr. Sisco: Yes; I don't know how feasible this is. But these are three broad options. I haven't looked at them in detail, and we haven't really looked at the third possibility at all.

Mr. Colby: There's a fourth option: let the Europeans worry about the place and say to hell with it.

Mr. Simon: I'd like to be tough, but I just don't see the chips. Only 3% of our imports come from Libya. That's inconsequential. But 25% of West Germany's imports and 22% of Italy's imports come from there. The Libyans could hurt us by cutting down exports to Europe which would mean a critical increase in demand.

Mr. Colby: The Europeans have a direct interest in this.

Mr. Simon: And time is on the Libyan side. They could cut them off for six months during the heating season.

Mr. Kissinger: What would we be doing that might provoke their cutting the Europeans off in the heating season?

Mr. Simon: If we took a tough stand.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean if we said we won't sell them military equipment? They might say give us 100 F-4s or we will cut off our exports to Europe.

Mr. Clements: The biggest pain would be if the oil companies yank their people out. The Libyans have no replacement cadre of trained people. They're not like the Algerians.

Mr. Kissinger: Wouldn't it be in the Europeans interest to send people in?

Mr. Clements: They don't have a large supply of that kind of technician.

Mr. Colby: They have 2800 oil company people there.

Mr. Porter: There's nothing to prevent them from getting technicians from somewhere else.

Mr. Clements: But it would hurt them temporarily. I'm thinking of the Suez Canal situation. They could pick up people in a year or so but, in the short term, it would hurt hell out of them.

Mr. Sisco: Maybe we don't have the chips, but we haven't examined the chips we have. I would hate to have the Arab world see Libyan blackmail of the US pay off. I want to be sure we don't have a few chips. The very spectre of our playing a few chips would have an effect on Sadat and Faisal. Sadats wants out of his close connection with Qadhafi.

Mr. Porter: I don't see the chips. Libya has \$3 billion in reserves. The Europeans can't last.

Mr. Kissinger: Let the Europeans play with Libya.

Mr. Porter: I'm trying to protect our investment.

Mr. Kissinger: So the most militant Arab who has subverted regimes all over Africa and as far away as Ireland and in every respect works counter to us, gets a senior American emissary.

Mr. Porter: I don't say a senior American emissary. We would have to approach it very carefully.

Mr. Kissinger: What level?

Mr. Porter: I don't know. We can take it as high as we like. Ken Rush, for example.

Mr. Kissinger: For what end?

Mr. Porter: To stabilize our interests and protect the companies. We at least should be on the record as trying.

Mr. Kissinger: Every time someone starts using American money to subvert our interests, are you going to send him an Under Secretary of State? You understand I don't underestimate the talents of Under Secretaries, or their charm.

Mr. Porter: It depends on their success. Qadhafi is not that successful. The situation is not as dangerous as implied. But oil is important and, if we can get the Europeans in too, all the better.

Mr. Kissinger: If he isn't successful, why do it? Send the Europeans an emissary.

Mr. Porter: The Europeans will fold; they will send him technicians.

Mr. Kissinger: There must be an alternate between pulling out the technicians and sending an Under Secretary. You know he wouldn't go empty-handed. Would he give them military equipment?

Mr. Porter: If it is the nature of the beast, we will bargain. If we don't get what we want, we won't play.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we want?

Mr. Porter: Some protection of the companies.

Mr. Clements: You're talking about tens of billions of barrels of oil.

Mr. Kissinger: Most of which goes to Europe.

Mr. Clements: Yes, but there is the future. It's \$4 billion now but it will be \$8 billion in a year or two.

Mr. Kissinger: But is the way to do it to give the most intransigent state the most conspicuous attention? Let's play with Faisal or Sadat and let the Libyans stew in their juice.

Mr. Clements: What do you mean?

Mr. Kissinger: Follow our present policy and our own time-table.

Mr. Sisco: It doesn't necessarily follow that Libya will cut production. It is not in the interest of Libya to get to the point where they are taking a cut in revenues.

Mr. Simon: You can do it for a short time.

Mr. Sisco: They will go ahead on their demand for 51% but that doesn't mean automatically there will be less oil for the US or for Europe. The oil companies will pass the price increases along to the consumers. In fact, they may want Qadhafi to impose it on them—to be able to say they couldn't help the price increases. One piece of leverage is that Libya wants to keep their outlets for their oil along present lines.

Mr. Clements: The governments of Europe are in on this deal. You're not talking about independent companies. It is the governments operating through their chosen-instrument oil companies. They will just keep selling in the European market.

Mr. Kissinger: Fine.

Adm. Moorer: I was in Germany when they got the people who assassinated the Israeli athletes. A high German official said then that if Qadhafi said release them or he would cut off their oil, they would have to go along. They couldn't tolerate chopping off 23% of their oil imports.

Mr. Kissinger: That may be true. You're saying whatever Qadhafi demands, they will give unless they can get together. That makes Qadhafi ruler of 20 million people. If they're willing, there is nothing we

can do. We could send six emissaries out and build up their prestige, but so far we can't even get stamps in passports.

Mr. Colby: Can we get that out of the way? Can't we give them Arab passports? So what? Is it really a point of principle?

Mr. Porter: It's the precedent we create for other nasty people. We can do it, of course, if we can get the Congress to agree.

Mr. Kissinger: Do I gather that all the items on this shopping list should wait until we decide on an emissary?

Mr. Porter: No.

Mr. Kissinger: Can Joe Sisco do a paper?

Mr. Porter: It's not his area.

Mr. Kissinger: An *Iliad* won't be written about America in the 1970s! Let whoever has the options in mind do a paper. Let Joe contribute.

Mr. Porter: We'll let him see it.

Mr. Kissinger: Let Joe write his option in detail and let the other people write their options.

Mr. Sisco: We'll staff out the three options.

Mr. Kissinger: What the package would be, what the emissary would say.

Mr. Clements: And include the fourth option.

Mr. Sisco: We might send the head of the NSC as the emissary.

Mr. Porter: He's not in the right mood.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, if you expect to rely on charm.

Mr. Clements: There's always embargo.

Mr. Kissinger: We need international cooperation for that. The trouble with the consumers' getting together is that it would lead to an Arab boycott. If the consumers could pick off one, and not multiply the outcome, but the experts say it can't be done. I would like to see the emissary option fully staffed out—what he would say and what they would get over a period of time. I'd also like to see the Sisco option.

Mr. Sisco: Options 1 and 3 are not mutually exclusive.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's do it—get all the departments involved.

Mr. Colby: Also could we look at the question of the reconnaissance flights. I'd like to avoid another *Pueblo*. These flights aren't worth it.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we were having a general review of reconnaissance flights.

Mr. Colby: There's no intelligence value in these. We're just running them to make a point.

Adm. Moorer: Yes. If we let every country draw a circle. . . .

Mr. Colby: I agree, but don't use an intelligence asset. Fly a regular plane.

Adm. Moorer: It's not a CIA asset.

Mr. Colby: I know—it's a JCS asset.

Mr. Kissinger: We'll include this in the recce review—it will be one of the first, or the first, to be considered.

Mr. Colby: We're not doing it for intelligence purposes.

Adm. Moorer: They haven't reacted. If they do, they will get bagged.

Mr. Porter: Let's put the emissary in one of those planes.

Mr. Kissinger: We will review it. If it serves no useful purpose, we will consider the political implications and might cut down on it.

23. Telegram 168661 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, August 24, 1973, 1509Z.

168661. Subject: Libyan Oil Negotiations.

1. Embassy should deliver immediately following note to highest level available in Foreign Ministry. Since delivery will be on Friday, request that official who receives note transmit it to his superiors immediately.

2. Precise text is as follows: Quote The Government of the United States has noted with deep concern reports to the effect that, if certain U.S. oil companies operating in Libya do not accept proposals of the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic for sale of a proportion of their interests to it, LARG will nationalize the operations of these companies in Libya. The United States Government wishes to urge the LARG to continue its negotiations with the companies with a view to

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a note to the Libyan Foreign Ministry concerning the nationalization of U.S. oil companies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by George M. Bensusky in EB/ORF/FSE, and Counselor on International Law Stephen M. Schwebel; cleared by Deputy Legal Adviser Mark B. Feldman, Ross, Saunders, Executive Director Council on International Economic Policy Peter Flanigan, Barnes, and Armstrong; and approved by Porter. In telegram 1091 from Tripoli, August 26, the Embassy informed the Department that the note was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs duty officer on August 24. (Ibid.)

arriving at an amicable settlement of outstanding problems. The USG supports the position of the companies that this matter should be settled in a manner consistent with the obligations of the parties.

3. The U.S. Government wishes to express the hope that the LARG will give careful consideration to proposals of the companies and that no definitive action will be taken by the LARG which may have the effect of prejudicing the interests of all parties concerned. Unquote.

4. FYI: Decision send this note made at high level White House chaired inter-departmental meeting August 23. Purpose is to show support for US oil companies at this critical juncture in their negotiations with LARG. It has been very carefully drafted so as to minimize offense or provocative opportunity to LARG. End FYI.

Rush

24. Telegram 1117 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, August 30, 1973, 1327Z.

1117. Subject: Passport Problem: Remarks by MFA Official. Ref: Tripoli 1101. Summary: LARG has decided to fill out its passports in English as well as in Arabic, Chargé told today. Clear implication of original presentation of this fact was that LARG hoped USG could reciprocate by somehow using Arabic in its passports. Chargé discouraged this idea and his MFA interlocutor later denied that he was proposing a deal. Believe we are on right track and should continue to stand fast. End summary.

1. Chargé was called down August 30 by MFA Acting Director General for Treaties and Legal Affaires, Suleiman Attiga, to discuss “passport problem”. EmbOff accompanied Chargé.

2. Contrary to our expectations, Suleiman did not focus narrowly on the current Libyan aspect of the problem, namely delays in visas for dependents of students. Rather, he made a presentation as follows: He had been asked to talk to Chargé about restrictions on travel of Amer-

¹ Summary: The Embassy informed the Department of the Libyan Government’s decision to print passports in both English and Arabic.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Cairo.

icans and Libyans in general. The Libyan Chargé in Washington Hussein Zaggar had indicated that the Department seemed inclined to show some flexibility on the subject (he did not explain precisely what was meant by this). In any case, the MFA would be interested in knowing what that flexibility might be, e.g. the insertion of a page printed in Arabic, or whatever. The LARG had made a decision to print its passports in English as well as Arabic and to fill them out in both languages. All missions would receive a circular note to this effect within a couple of days. Could Chargé state what the position of the USG was on this matter?

3. Chargé replied that the LARG's decision to print and fill out passports in English as well as Arabic was a new fact that, of course, would be reported. The USG position had remained essentially unchanged since the submission of our aide mémoire of November 15, 1972, which Chargé summarized. That position boiled down to the principle of equal treatment. Just as the USG recognizes the right of LARG to issue passports in any languages it chooses, the USG expects the LARG to recognize U.S. passports printed in our national language. Correspondingly, the USG believed that the LARG did not have the right to require the USG to print its passports in a language other than English. Colonel Qadhafi had himself stated this principle in his interview that was published in *Al-Ahram* on May 27. (Attiga simply nodded when he heard this.) Chargé also pointed out the legal and practical difficulties for the USG of following any other course. At the same time he would point out that USG too hopes for a resolution of passport problems on both sides, and that in fact there had been no difficulties in this area prior to January one.

4. Attiga returned to the theme that LARG was now interested in "solving the passport issue" with the USG. This time he urged that the U.S. adopt a rubber stamp like other countries. "I can guarantee that if you do that there will be no more problems for Americans." Chargé immediately replied that this was "incredible" as LARG had made perfectly plain, even by note, that rubber stamps were only a temporary solution and that the LARG's request was for printing passports in Arabic. Accompanying EmbOff expressed same incredulity. Attiga then said "what you are saying, then, is that there is no flexibility on your side." Chargé replied that USG had always been flexible enough if there was reciprocity, but that it was inconceivable the USG would start printing passports in any other language than English. Attiga expressed great disappointment that USG could not at least accept a rubber stamp.

5. Since in his initial presentation Attiga had seemed to link the LARG decision regarding printing passports in English as well as Arabic with a hoped-for "flexibility" on the U.S. side, Chargé summarized

Attiga's position to him making the implication explicit. Attiga denied that this implication was intended, however, and emphasized that the LARG's decision was quite independent and final. He also indicated that the Ministry had received instructions from the RCC on the whole subject of passports within the last two days, and that his talk with the Chargé was at the request of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. He said he would report to him regretfully that the American position had not changed. Chargé said that was correct.

6. In passing, Chargé briefed Attiga, who did not appear aware of the facts, on the problem of contemporary visas for dependents of eligible principals applying at the Libyan Embassy Washington, on the occasional but serious problems of denials of entry to American dependents at the airport, on the fact that the Embassy had only one consular officer, who was overworked and had instructions to give priority to other work besides visas, and on the fact that Chargé had not been granted an interview at the RCC or ministerial level since January 1, except for one appointment with ForMin Kikhya. Chargé also made clear that there was no split between the Dept and the Embassy on passport policies, that the Department made policy and the Embassy carried it out, and that if the LARG was not happy with those policies one approach would be for somebody at a high level in the LARG to discuss the matter with the Chargé.

7. Chargé took opportunity to raise several other matters including a strong demand for prompt payment of the Embassy's Balfour Day claim (septel). Also pointed out passports were a small matter compared to the US/Libyan relations in the field of petroleum. LARG had recently nationalized one American company and forced other into partial nationalization. USG urged continued talks with the remaining companies until there is an amicable solution. Instead of cooperation in this field there was constant harassment. Latest event was two-weeks' notice to president of Mobil to leave his house despite a valid lease. Similar problems had been experienced recently by other American companies with residences in that area (former Gargour estate).

8. Comment: As best we can analyze it at this time, the motive for today's interview was as follows: LARG decided for some reason, possibly an agreement with Egypt regarding standardization of passports, to start issuing passports printed not only in English as well as Arabic (as since January 1972) but filled out in English too. This decision had nothing to do with our passport policies, but at same time LARG is under heavy pressure from many students regarding visas for their families. So someone in RCC or MFA decided to try to use the LARG decision to lever the USG into accepting Arabic somehow, and thus solve the students' problem. This did not work. Believe we are on the right track and LARG now knows at a higher level that the solution to

our delaying of visas is their dropping of restrictions. Reviewing Embassy's proposed draft note (reftel para 4) in this light, it still seems appropriate to the situation as we see it.

Josif

25. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 17, 1973.

SUBJECT

NSSM 185—U.S. Policy toward Libya: Follow-on Options Paper

The National Security Council ad hoc Interdepartmental Group designated to respond to NSSM 185 has approved the attached follow-on options paper requested in the Senior Review Group meeting on August 14.

David D. Newsom

¹ Summary: Newsom, the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group, forwarded a follow-on options paper to NSSM 185 requested by the Senior Review Group on August 14.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-200, NSSM 185. Secret.

Attachment

Follow-on Options Paper to NSSM 185

Washington, undated.

NSSM 185—U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA

Follow-on Options Paper

I. Introduction

This memorandum supplements the response to NSSM 185—Libya, as requested by the Chairman of the SRG in its meeting on August 14. It describes the three policy options available to the United States with respect to Libya. These options are based on the following assumptions: a) the United States still has significant, although sharply reduced, financial interests in Libya which it should seek to preserve; b) an uninterrupted flow of Libyan oil is essential primarily to Western Europe and important to the United States; c) the Qadhafi regime is the one with which the United States will have to deal in at least the short-term future.

II. Key US Interests and Objectives in Libya

A. Petroleum

US concern with Libya stems basically from the importance of Libyan oil. In 1972, the net book value of the American investment in the Libyan oil industry was approximately one billion dollars, and this investment made a contribution of \$400–\$500 million to the US balance of payments. In that year, Libyan oil accounted for 14 percent of OECD European oil imports and about 4 percent of US oil imports. This oil is of particular importance because of its low sulphur content and would be difficult to replace at this time.

In June, Libya nationalized Bunker Hunt over the opposition of the company. In August, it forced Occidental and Oasis to yield 51 percent of their concessions on the threat of total nationalization. On September 1, it nationalized 51 percent of the remaining American oil companies (with the possible exception of Murphy Oil, a partner in a four-member consortium having only a small production). The book value of American assets in Libya was estimated before the nationalizations to be one billion dollars; since June, they have been cut therefore approximately in half.

B. Counter Libya's Extremist Foreign Policy

Libya pursues an extremist but carefully calculated foreign policy, one in which its priorities are clearly defined and supported by Libyan

economic resources and tough negotiating stances. It opposes the existence of Israel, argues for its liquidation by military means, and seeks to counter a negotiated settlement in any form. This posture, bolstered by the regime's vast financial resources, leads Libya to exert a disruptive influence in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa. Libya supports subversion, insurgency and terrorism in the Arab States and elsewhere, and advocates the use of Arab oil resources as a political weapon to undermine western and particularly US support of Israel. It supports Palestinian terrorism as a legitimate weapon in the "Arab battle" against Israel. Libya's machinations have increasingly isolated Israel diplomatically. (See Appendixes B and C to NSSM 185.)

III. *Alternative Strategies Toward Libya*

A. *Option 1: Stall*

Under this option the United States would make no special effort to improve relations with Qadhafi, but at the same time would seek to avoid reactions which could inflame the situation further. This would be fundamentally a waiting tactic on the assumption that one of two developments may occur in our favor in the next year or two: either that Qadhafi's mercurial leadership will generate enough indigenous opposition to cause his ouster; or that under an eventual Egyptian-Libyan merger some of the more extreme aspects of Qadhafi's anti-US policies will be submerged by a more moderate Egyptian approach.

In effect, this would be a continuation of our present policy. Under it, we would retain the flexibility to move to either a more punitive or more forthcoming policy if circumstances warranted. Moreover, under this option, while Qadhafi undoubtedly will go ahead on taking over more and more of the oil resources, it does not necessarily follow that the oil will be denied to the American market. Under this option the United States would make no special effort to approach the Libyan regime with the objective of seeking a basis for a less hostile relationship. Nor would the United States take actions hostile to the Libyan regime such as the termination of military sales and the supply of spare parts. In effect, our present policy would continue unchanged.

Specifically, we would:

- continue to allow the flow of spare parts and ammunition for the US military equipment already in the Libyan inventory.

- not formally turn down the Libyan request for eight C-130's, but inform Lockheed that it should tell the Libyan Government that the lack of a positive decision by the US Government forces Lockheed to seek another buyer for the aircraft in the event the decision is negative. (Libya may regard this notification by Lockheed as the equivalent of an official US turndown; if so, a confrontation between the United States

and Libya affecting the remaining US interests in Libya may become unavoidable.)

- renew the Lockheed maintenance contract every six months on an interim basis.

- not authorize sale of an air defense-radar system to Libya, but make no effort to instruct the interested companies to cease their discussions with the Libyan Government. Advise the companies, however, that sale of equipment that would compromise equipment used by the United States and its allies would not be authorized.

- work out a practical compromise on the Arabic-in-passports problem should this prove necessary to keep a modest US official presence in Libya and enable the oil companies to continue operations. If this can be worked out, we would continue to issue visas for Libyan students to come to the United States.

- continue our present policy of support for the US oil companies, including any legal efforts by them to block the sale of “hot” oil.

- continue to run periodic US military flights through Libya’s proclaimed “restricted” area if required for intelligence purposes or in support of the US right to fly over international waters. We would avoid to the maximum extent consistent with attainment of the foregoing limited objectives flight tracks which could precipitate a confrontation with Libya.

- seek to keep a small mission going in Tripoli, but do not accredit a new ambassador.

- not seek the good offices of other Arabs.

B. Option 2: Trade Off

This option would involve informing the Libyan Government that the United States is prepared to send a high-level special emissary to explore with Colonel Qadhafi and Prime Minister Jallud whether an improvement in US-Libyan relations is possible, notwithstanding our policy differences over the Middle East. The objective in sending an envoy would be to find, if possible, a way of preserving the remaining US interests in Libya, which already are sharply reduced. As those interests continue to erode, the desirability or practical usefulness of invoking this option correspondingly declines.

Libya may refuse to receive a special US emissary or use his visit as an occasion on which to castigate the US Government for its support of Israel. Nevertheless, by offering to send one, the United States would have demonstrated for the record, both at home and to other Arab countries, that it had tried to reach an accommodation before taking the negative decisions affecting Libya that now seem inevitable if the present deterioration in Libyan-US relations continue. If Libya refused

to receive the emissary or declined to engage in serious discussion with him, the United States would proceed to other options. If Libya did agree to receive him, he would state that:

—The US Government is now considering a number of matters of interest to Libya, including 1) approval for a US company to install a modern air defense radar system for Libya (sell only air defense equipment that would not compromise equipment used by the United States and its allies), 2) sale of an additional eight C-130's, 3) renewal of the C-130 maintenance and training agreement, and 4) continuation of the sale of spare parts and ammunition for military quipment previously sold to Libya.

—At the same time, we are faced with Libyan actions in a number of fields that make it difficult for us to respond positively to these requests. These actions include 1) the nationalization of American oil interests in Libya in violation of the Concession Agreements and generally recognized principles of inernational law, 2) a Libyan visa policy that makes normal Embassy operations impossible and imposes hardships on American citizens working in Libya, 3) the recent attempt to shoot down an unarmed US aircraft over international waters off the Libyan coast, and 4) repeated high-level Libyan attacks on the US Government.

—The purpose of his visit is to see if the Libyan Government is interested in reaching an accomodation on these points.

If the Libyan response were negative, the special emissary would express the disappointment of the United States and indicate that he would convey the Libyan decision to his own Government.

If the Libyan leadership stated that relations could be improved only if the United States were to withdraw its support of Israel, the current US policy on that subject would be restated.

If the Libyan response were postitive, the special emissary would propose that the Libyan Government take the following steps:

—Open discussions, before the end of 1973, for the settlement of outstanding US private claims against Libya;

—Assure the US Government that:

—the remaining American oil assets in Libya would not be further nationalized for at least five years.

—compensation agreeable to the Libyan Government and to the affected companies would be paid promptly to the latter if further nationalized after five years.

—accept American passports as valid travel documents qualifying otherwise eligible American nationals for Libyan visas (we would do the same with respect to Libyan Arabic-language passports).

To the extent that Libya indicated its willingness to take these actions, the special emissary would indicate his willingness to recom-

mend favorable consideration by his Government, subject to the usual restrictions, on the matters of interest to Libya listed above. He would not attempt to negotiate specific agreements on these questions since the purpose of his visit would be to ascertain whether a meaningful dialogue were possible, not to engage in detailed discussions.

C. Option 3: React

Under this option the United States would begin a process of measured overt retaliation against Libya for actions inimical to US interests. The decision to invoke this option could result from either of two situations: a) continued Libyan actions adversely affecting US interests in Libya or elsewhere, or b) a substantial reduction in US interests in Libya which would minimize the Libyan Government's opportunity to retaliate against the United States directly. Retaliatory bilateral actions are limited, but could include the following:

- cancel outstanding munitions control licenses and halt the flow of spare parts for American military equipment previously sold to Libya;

- inform Lockheed that the US Government will not authorize the export of the eight C-130's which Libya hopes to begin receiving in November 1973, and tell the company that the planes should be sold to another buyer since the US decision against Libya was final;

- refuse, as a matter of general policy, authorization for third-country sales of military equipment or technology to Libya;

- refuse to authorize the sale of an air defense-radar system which Libya is interested in purchasing from an American supplier; instruct the interested companies to cease all discussions with the Libyans on this subject;

- terminate Lockheed contract for C-130 maintenance and training;

- delay indefinitely the issuance of visas to Libyan students and to other Libyan travelers to the United States, unless Libya issues visas to Americans who wish to travel to Libya notwithstanding the absence of Arabic from their passports;

- take steps to discourage the travel of US citizens to Libya, thereby restricting Libyan access to American petroleum expertise;

- vigorously support US companies in their legal pursuit of "hot" oil in the United States and abroad;

- continue U.S. reconnaissance or operational flights through Libya's proclaimed "Restricted" area, HLR 22.

Under this option the United States would also begin a process through a variety of channels to try to limit Libyan influence. In doing so, it would seek the cooperation of friendly governments, including

Arab governments, in intelligence exchanges regarding Libyan activities and possibly in supporting political, media and other elements opposed to Libyan extremism. Such approaches would be based on the proposition that Qadhafi's Libya is a greater threat to other regimes, particularly in the Arab world, than it is to the United States.

Exercise of the foregoing option could result in the Libyan closure of the American Embassy in Tripoli; withdrawal of the Libyan Embassy in Washington; and possible nationalization of the remaining US oil company assets in Libya.

26. Telegram 187972 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, September 21, 1973, 0042Z.

187972. Subject: Libyan Passport Problem. Ref: Tripoli 1137.

1. Department believes reconsideration and decision on passport issue timely since Sept. 1 has come and gone and it appears that the USG will have to deal with Qadhafi/Jallud RCC for the foreseeable future. Department particularly concerned over prospect of erosion Embassy staff, especially in commo and secretarial areas resulting from normal transfer and other situations. Such erosion will inevitably detract from operating effectiveness of post, thereby vitiating rationale behind continued maintenance of Embassy (see para 2). Finally, now that every other major country represented in Libya has agreed to put Arabic in its passports in some form, we see no prospect that LARG will modify policy it has publicly announced to suit USG.

2. Since Department wishes to maintain and staff post in order to preserve essential reporting, consular and protection services, some adjustment in US passport policy applicable to Libya must be found. (Swiss note cited Tripoli 1143 is a "beau geste" but as Embassy points out even Swiss have in fact used Arabic stamp to preserve their Embassy in Tripoli.)

¹ Summary: The Embassy was informed of the decision to place a bilingual rubber stamp in passports for U.S. Government officials traveling to Libya on official business.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by George M. Lane in AF/N; cleared by Blake, Bradford (info), Newsom, Watson, and Pickering; and approved by Porter.

3. Accordingly, we propose as a test case to seek a visa from Libyan Embassy, Washington, for a communicator to replace Schauer, after placing bilingual rubber stamp in his passport. If queried by Libyan Embassy, Department would reply that this procedure will be used only for USG officials traveling to Libya on official business, in interest of preserving official relations with LARG. If LARG announces that USG “has agreed to put Arabic in its passports,” Department in reply to any queries here would state this procedure is not rpt not being generalized and will be used only on case by case basis to staff Embassy Tripoli. Simultaneously, Embassy Tripoli would be instructed to issue visas to LARG officials assigned Washington.

4. Department realizes there will be requests by US companies in Libya for Department to provide same service for dependents of its employees, although perhaps less than before nationalizations. We plan to reply exception to passport policy for US official purposes is based on national, as distinct from private commercial, interests and that if LARG wants US personnel to operate its oil industry, we assume it will permit them and their dependents to enter Libya without Arabic stamp.

5. Until definitive decision is made to proceed with Arabic stamp for Schauer replacement, Embassy Tripoli should continue request advisory opinions for all non-student Libyan visa applicants. Meantime, your comments requested on foregoing.

Rush

27. Telegram 1231 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, September 24, 1973, 1359Z.

1231. Subject: US Passports and Policy Re Libya. Ref: State 187972.

1. For management reasons, have tried in half a dozen ways to get an accurate reading on whether the continuance of this post was still a U.S. objective and if so how much we willing to pay for it. For years the post had listed its own continuation as an effective mission as the top USG objective in Libya, and this had met with no objection from Dept. On other hand it obvious that, as post squeezed down by a host govt that increasingly hostile in overt ways, the effectiveness of this mission was becoming increasingly moot. In wake of Khartoum, Dept itself indicated informally that rationale for closing the post almost compelling—but not quite. Since then we have lost two key officers, restrictions on normal life and operations are even tighter, and the case for closing out is stronger than ever. However, refTel states Dept wishes to maintain post in order to preserve essential reporting and consular and protection services—and for this is willing to pay a price in terms of our passport policies. This is a political price, because the LARG made Arabic-in-passports a political issue and we accepted the challenge by not acquiescing.

2. So far as I am aware, there is no objective reason for us to hand the LARG a political triumph at this time. Altogether to the contrary. The only reason to acquiesce is to keep this mission afloat. For how much longer? If for a period of six to eight months, acquiescence is not necessary; we can manage somehow if the objective is clear and the end is in sight for each of us here. If, however, the idea is to keep the post open indefinitely, acquiescence makes more sense, on the ground that national interests occasionally dictate loss of face. Would underline that this is involved, not only in accepting Arabic in our passports, but almost everywhere we turn here—USG property in Tripoli, U.S. private interests nationalized without compensation, and the welfare and protection of remaining Americans. Frankly our functions in these areas are largely ineffective and mostly symbolic, and will remain so for the foreseeable future unless this post is beefed up and the LARG eventually moderates its hostility to the USG. There is little reason to believe the latter will happen; rather we are the victims of salami

¹ Summary: The Embassy questioned the continuation of the U.S. Mission in Libya in light of the increasing hostility of the host government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Volume II. Confidential; Exdis.

tactics, aimed precisely at keeping us preoccupied by defensive measures, hence inoffensive and ineffective. Why, and how long, should we be willing to accept this humiliating position for the sake of other national interests? American oil interests in Libya? Their days are numbered, whether or not we maintain the post.

3. Raise these questions not because I presume to have the authoritative answers but because this is the time to ask such questions again. We are at a watershed in Tripoli. If the decision is to keep the post open temporarily, then at least we should fix some dates in order to make plans and adjustments. If the decision is to try to keep the post open indefinitely, and hopefully more effectively, then we must not only accept Arabic in passports but move fast on new personnel assignments, including additions to the staff. Has the Dept addressed the full range of consequences to its wish to keep the post open?

4. Would appreciate a response to the above before going into detailed recommendations on other matters raised reftel.

Josif

28. Telegram 1257 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, September 30, 1973, 1500Z.

1257. Subj: Future of Embassy Tripoli. Ref: State 194228.

1. Following are my best answers at this time, formulated after discussion with my four officers.

A) No, Libyan actions to date do not suggest a LARG determination to force us out, either in the sense of breaking relations or in terms of closing this Mission. Had LARG determined to achieve either of those objectives, believe they would have seized several opportunities to force the issue. (Suspect, without having proof, that RCC debated this point after Libyan airliner shot down in Sinai on February 21, and that its decision was to take full revenge against either U.S. or Israel

¹ Summary: The Embassy responded to a request from the Department for information on the future of the Embassy in Tripoli.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Volume II. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The Department asked for the Embassy's opinion on the future of the diplomatic mission in Libya in telegram 194228 to Tripoli, September 28. (Ibid.)

whatever the consequences, i.e., to accept any consequent USG decision to close this Mission, but not to force it to close by direct pressure. Reasons for this last proviso, which might be called the plateglass aspect of the post, would have been a fear of U.S. countermeasures against Libyan security or economic interests. Doubt that Libyan diplomatic interests in U.S. per se figured much—except possibly the thought that, so long as Soviets represented in Tripoli, some U.S. presence here helps preserve LAR's non-aligned image. LARG is not much interested in its Mission at Washington, partly because its Mission at NY opens a barn door to our country anyway.)

B) Yes, agreeing to put Arabic in passports probably would allow us to continue to operate this Embassy. To say "would assure us" is too strong, as we are talking about both the future and someone else's intentions. My estimate is that we could continue to operate, barring another disaster at Israeli hands like the LAA incident, or a U.S./Libyan military confrontation involving loss of life, or of course a new Arab/Israeli war. The effectiveness of our operations is another matter, and for Dept to judge, but I doubt if they could be much improved in quality, given the political environment here. The very fact of our acceptance of Arabic, if it comes to that, will reveal the hostage aspect of the post and not make its mission easier. For other reasons too I would in fact expect increasing operating difficulties—but not to the point, whatever it is, where we consider operations impossible or completely ineffectual. LARG harassment is just that, and we can continue to "operate" so long as we get fresh blood.

2. As reftel received today, have not obtained latest reading from any DPL colleagues on their estimates of LARG intentions toward continued presence of U.S. and other foreign missions. Can say from recent conversations, however, that general estimate is that unity with Egypt is off, so we are all stuck here, regrettably. On passport issue, our closest allies, if they can be called that in this context, all tend to think we have put up a magnificent but quixotic fight against the inevitable. Their present worry is that rumors come true and the next slice of the salami will be a deadline for printing foreign passports in Arabic. Few doubt that this will happen before long, in which case the USG will look less quixotic—but no more than an example to be followed than before (unless we start printing in Arabic).

Josif

29. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, November 23, 1973.

Libya: Possible Pressure Points

The evolution of US-Libyan relations over the past four years has left us with very little leverage in that country. We have no aid programs of any kind and there are no diplomatic actions which we could take which would have any significant effect on Libyan policy. Some economic or military sanctions might hurt Libya but they would be unlikely to change Libya's basic attitude or actions toward the USG or on the Middle East.

Political

1. Break diplomatic relations

The United States might break diplomatic relations with Libya and close our Embassy in that country. This would be a clear sign of our displeasure with Libyan policy but would have little effect on the present Libyan leadership. Qadhafi sets little store by diplomatic relations. Libya has been without a Foreign Minister for nearly a year. The Libyan Embassy in Washington has been headed by a junior first secretary for more than six months and high level diplomatic contacts with the Libyan regime in Tripoli are rare.

2. Political action against Qadhafi

There is considerable evidence that the majority of the Libyan population and at least some members of the RCC are opposed to Qadhafi's extremist views on a number of matters. It might be possible to work with these elements to attempt to replace him. However, there is no identifiable focus of dissidence in Libya around which any political action program could be developed. Moreover, Qadhafi's Middle East policy and his nationalist policy at home enjoy substantial support among the generally apathetic Libyan masses. A successor regime would find it difficult to change those policies.

¹ Summary: Newsom provided Kissinger with possible options for dealing with the Government of Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL Libya-U.S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Blake and Lane.

*Military**1. Deny export licenses*

The Libyan government has been seeking to purchase significant quantities of military and sophisticated electronics equipment from the US (Lockheed C-130's, Northrop Page air defense system, spare parts for F-5 aircraft, etc.). By denying export licenses for such material we could weaken but not cripple Libya's military capability since Libya can acquire the same or comparable equipment from European countries.

*Economic**1. Freeze Libyan assets in the US*

Libya is now reportedly shifting some of its reserves out of dollars but they probably still hold sizeable amounts in US banks. Any such action on our part, however, might lead the Libyans to nationalize the remaining US oil holdings in Libya which are valued at substantially more than those assets.

2. Discourage US technicians from working in Libya

There are now approximately 2,000 American citizens in Libya, most of them oil company employees and their dependents. The Libyan oil industry is operated primarily by these American technicians. The USG could discourage these men from remaining in or going to Libya. However, the USG lacks legal authority to prevent Americans from going to Libya if they insist, and European experts could probably replace them without major disruptions to Libya's oil industry.

3. Ban export of oil country goods to Libya

Libya's clout rests on the financial strength generated by its oil industry. If the US were to ban the export of spare parts and other equipment used by the Libyan oil industry, the operating efficiency of the latter would be diminished but not necessarily damaged to an excessive extent. To the extent that oil output would be reduced by such US action, the consumers of Libyan oil—chiefly Western Europe—would be affected adversely. A ban of this character could lead to complete nationalization of the remaining US oil company assets in Libya and would not necessarily diminish Libya's financial strength since the LARG could charge more for its reduced—and hence more valuable—output per barrel.

*Cultural**1. Training of Libyans*

The Libyan government now sends a number of its employees to the US for specialized training with private companies, such as United

Airlines, and with the Federal Aviation Administration. There are also approximately seven hundred Libyan students in the United States doing both graduate and undergraduate work. The USG could take steps to prevent Libyans from attending government-sponsored training courses and discourage private universities from accepting Libyan students. Neither of these actions, however, is likely to have much effect on the policy of the present Libyan government.

30. Telegram 133328 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, June 21, 1974, 1650Z.

133328. Subject: Northrop-Page Air Defense System for Libya. From the Secretary for Ambassador.

1. Request you convey orally the following message from me to Foreign Minister Fahmy at your earliest convenience.

2. Begin message. I would appreciate your taking up with President Sadat once again the subject of the pending sale by the American firm Northrop-Page of an air defense system for Libya. As you know, we have been informed that the Libyan Government has selected Page Communications, a branch of Northrop-Page Corporation, to install a 150 million dols air defense system, provided the company can obtain the required authorization from the U.S. Government. The company has told us that there is the possibility that the amounts involved will be significantly higher than this figure by the time this project is completed—to our knowledge, this is a strictly defensive and fixed system. The British and the French have also been involved in the bidding for this contract and there have been unconfirmed indications that the Libyans may have discussed an air defense system with the Soviets recently.

¹ Summary: The Embassy in Cairo was instructed to ask Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmy for their views concerning the pending sale of an air defense system to Libya.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 177, Geopolitical File, Libya 1973–76. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco on June 19; cleared by Gammon and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Sidney Sober; and approved by Kissinger. In telegram 4502 from Cairo, June 22, the Embassy reported that Sadat had no objections to the sale, but requested notification when the transaction was finalized and details about the items sold. (Ibid.)

Since this contract is basically a system of a defensive character, and is a system which the Libyans can buy, in any event, from other sources, we would like to consider going ahead on this matter and approving this sale. However, I do not want to go ahead with this project without, frankly, having the benefit of your and President Sadat's views. End message.

Kissinger

31. Telegram 811 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, July 22, 1974, 1430Z.

811. Subject: Libyan Démarche on C-130 Aircraft. Ref: Tripoli 728.

1. MFA Political Director Najib Shaybani asked to see Chargé July 22 and handed him note on LARG's C-130 aircraft in U.S. which read in brief as follows:

2. Quote. Ministry wishes to bring to Embassy's attention following points on subject of C-130 aircraft which are impounded in Lockheed company's storage area:

A) These planes have remained impounded for lengthy period as result of instructions by American authorities.

B) Continuing impoundment of these planes is costing Libyan Govt huge sums of money.

C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees no justification for impoundment of these planes by American authorities particularly since they are transport or cargo planes. Although MFA has discussed subject with Embassy previously without obtaining positive results, it hopes it will receive at earliest possible time final notification that American authorities have made necessary decision to enable Libyan officials to take possession of these planes and put an end to the matter. Unquote.

3. Shaybani noted favorably recent discussion between AFN Director Wiley and Libyan Chargé in Washington as well as Dept's ap-

¹ Summary: The Embassy transmitted a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeking the release of C-130 cargo planes purchased from Lockheed and impounded by U.S. authorities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Volume II. Confidential; Exdis.

proval of Page air defense system proposal and said he hoped there would now be something concrete on the C–130 question. He spoke vaguely of possible gradual improvement in our relations if question were resolved. Chargé asked if it were correct to report that Shaybani was seeking yes or no answer. Latter simply specified he was asking for affirmative reply. He also asked if it might be possible to have a reply in writing within week's time.

4. Presumably démarche was made on instructions of RCC which is aware all eight planes are now ready for delivery, approach could be related to Lockheed effort to obtain final decision at this time from Dept (reftel).

Stein

32. Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 1487/74¹

Washington, August 19, 1974.

The Potential Dangers in the Libyan-Egyptian Feud

Introduction

The deterioration in Libyan-Egyptian relations over the last month adds a new and potentially dangerous element to the Middle East equation. While the feud at this point is still confined to a bilateral arena, its causes stem from fundamental differences between the two sides over how to confront the Israeli enemy and in their perception of the role the superpowers should play in Middle East politics. Should either Cairo or Tripoli escalate the quarrel, events could be set in motion that would affect US interests in the area. An Egypt heavily embroiled with its neighbor would be a less energetic and convincing Arab leader in peace negotiations. More important, the Soviet Union, frustrated by President Sadat and seeking new footholds in the Middle East, might see advantages in fostering the Libyan side. Under the worst circumstances, a full-fledged vendetta could lead to the assassination of Sadat.

¹ Summary: The memorandum contained an examination of deteriorating relations between Qadhafi and Sadat, its potential impact on the Middle East, and the potential for Soviet exploitation of the situation.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Job 79B01737A, OPI 16, Box 21. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA.

We believe that practical economic and political considerations will help to restrain both sides, but in such a highly charged atmosphere, the possibility of a more serious confrontation cannot be ruled out. It is, therefore, useful to explore various scenarios that could bear directly on US interests.

Current Situation

Following a prolonged period of Libyan sniping and posturing, Tripoli now finds itself on the defensive. President Sadat has recently retaliated with a scathing public attack on President Qadhafi, the recall of the Egyptian ambassador, the withdrawal of the entire Egyptian military mission in Libya, and an implied threat of more detrimental actions. Sadat's current strategy of blaming Qadhafi personally for Libya's transgression is intended to drive a wedge between the Libyan leaders and the 10 other members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. By distinguishing Qadhafi from other "well-intentioned" Libyans, Cairo is giving an implicit blessing to any who might consider a direct challenge to Qadhafi's power. The withdrawal of Egyptian military support for Qadhafi's rule gives point to that signal and at the same time is probably designed to foment uncertainty within the Libyan armed forces, Qadhafi's major prop.

So far, the Libyan leadership has remained united in the face of Cairo's challenges, claiming that it will take no retaliatory measures. Indeed, Qadhafi and his colleagues are doing all they can to appear calm and reasonable, if only to prevent a panicky exodus of indispensable Egyptian civilian workers. Libya's uncharacteristic restraint may not hold for long, however.

Both sides have made vague insinuations of superpower involvement in their differences; Egypt opened with the suggestion that Libya has become a Soviet pawn and Qadhafi countered with accusations that Cairo is acting on Washington's behalf. Each has charged the other with both petty harassment and blatant subversion, charges that—although somewhat exaggerated—contain a strong element of truth.

Very little was accomplished during the recent meeting between Sadat and Qadhafi in Alexandria. Sadat half-heartedly offered to send an emissary to Tripoli to carry on with reconciliation talks and both sides reaffirmed their agreement to stop propaganda attacks. Neither side, however, seems prepared to compromise on areas of fundamental disagreement.

Immediate Consequences for Both Sides

Libya has far more to lose than Egypt as a result of this quarrel. Sadat's denunciation has deepened Qadhafi's isolation from the Arab mainstream and reinforced his image as a dangerous meddler in international affairs. The rift probably also has brought closer to the surface

private disagreements between Qadhafi and his colleagues, who have for some time questioned the wisdom of their leader's open antagonism toward Cairo's policies. Although the Libyan people are happy to see the hated Egyptians go, many of the well-educated have a sober appreciation of Libya's dependence on Egyptian goodwill. Should Cairo pursue the dismantlement of its once cooperative alliance with Tripoli, the Libyan government and economy could be paralyzed—at least temporarily—by the withdrawal of tens of thousands of Egyptian laborers and workers, who hold key posts throughout every public institution. Under such circumstances, Libyans would ultimately blame their own leaders for the chaos and stagnation that would follow. Qadhafi's regime would then be seriously vulnerable to divisiveness within its own ranks and to challenges from abroad.

Cairo is also paying a price for the rift with its neighbor. Although the return of its military men and equipment will reinforce defenses at home, Sadat now has little choice but to return a squadron of Libyan Mirages, integrated into the Egyptian air force for over a year. Sadat may also feel obligated by appearances to relinquish other Libyan contributions to its war machine.

Cairo would have difficulty reabsorbing returning workers and employing Egyptians who normally would seek jobs in Libya. Although the absorption could be more easily accomplished in the midst of Egypt's current reconstruction program, this problem could still be troublesome at a time of domestic restlessness and high expectations. The amount of repatriated income would also drop. Furthermore, Egypt would lose the option of turning to Libya as an alternative to Saudi Arabia's financial help.

Two Angry Men

These practical issues may not be sufficient to dissuade either Sadat or Qadhafi, both of whom can be emotional and self-righteous about their respective grievances.

President Qadhafi is an impetuous brinksman spurred on by his belief that Sadat's policy of negotiation spells the end of pan-Arabism. Qadhafi wants first and foremost a united Arab nation purged of Zionism and free from all communist and Western political and cultural influences. For him, this goal is a matter of religious conviction that brooks no compromise or hesitation.

As Libya has discovered its inability to strike Israel directly, Qadhafi has become more antagonistic toward the US which he sees as a hostile force totally aligned with Israel. His antipathy toward Washington is matched by an equally contemptuous attitude toward the USSR, which he views as a dangerous atheistic force with designs on the Arab world. These suspicions are amplified by his fears that current

peace negotiations mask part of a plan by the superpowers to divide up the world at the expense of the Arabs and other non-aligned nations. Qadhafi sees Sadat's desire for a settlement with Israel and Egypt's rapprochement with the US as evidence that the Egyptian president has either been duped or is wittingly cooperating in a dangerous scheme.

Qadhafi is willing to treat with Washington or Moscow to obtain arms and technical help and he is prepared to make some of the right gestures to get them. The conclusion of a major arms deal with Moscow and several friendly overtures toward Washington are recent examples of his willingness to bend if Libya's interests are served. Qadhafi, nevertheless, is inflexible in his fundamental views. His fears and antagonism are now focused on Sadat, who by his recent challenges to Tripoli, has provided Qadhafi with final proof of betrayal to the Arab cause.

Sadat, for his part, is fed up with his reckless and uncompromising neighbor. For months, the long suffering Sadat ignored Libya's public condemnation of Egypt's management of the war and its subsequent effort to muster Arab support for negotiations. However, evidence of Qadhafi's meddlings in Egypt's domestic politics has frightened the Egyptian leadership, which is keenly aware that Qadhafi—as self-appointed successor to Nasir—has some following among Egyptian students and military officers. Cairo is also worried that Tripoli's anti-Egyptian propaganda campaign—especially charges of siding too closely with Washington—may play into the hands of other Arabs who would like to challenge Cairo's leadership of the Arab bloc.

For Sadat, dealing with the young and mercurial Qadhafi sparks strong emotions and sometimes over-reaction. Although Sadat has been the only Arab leader capable of moderating the Libyan leader, his tolerance is now drained. Against the advice of some of his key advisors, Sadat no longer intends to coax and persuade a man he has come to view as a direct and dangerous adversary.

Soviet Attitudes Toward Egyptian-Libyan Tension

The Soviets have demonstrated an interest in recent months in improving what have been very strained ties with Libya. The most significant aspects of this development have been Jallud's May visit to Moscow and the conclusion of a major arms deal.

Moscow undoubtedly thinks Qadhafi is a useful thorn in Sadat's side. The Soviets probably take some satisfaction that the back-biting between Libya and Egypt distracts Sadat and brings his leadership of the Arab world into question. The Soviets appear to have entered into their arms deal with Tripoli partly because they calculate it will have an unsettling impact on Sadat's own military—who have been cut off from Soviet arms for over four months. In addition, Moscow would

welcome any increased Libyan dependence on it for military aid and advisors.

Moscow, however, must be wary lest its support for Libya damage its long term prospects with Egypt which it still views as the dominant Arab country. The Soviets recognize Egypt's importance at the Geneva peace talks and still hope they can influence Sadat's policies. Egypt is too important for Moscow to abandon completely, but the Soviets are in no hurry to make decision regarding Egypt since they may think Sadat's position at home to be weakening. The Soviets would not want to lose their port facilities in Alexandria which remain very useful to them or to jeopardize their future use of the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they do not want to damage their relations with other Arab States by interfering openly in an intra-Arab dispute. The Soviets have thus avoided direct criticism of Sadat in order to avoid an open break with Egypt.

The Soviets also have misgivings about Qadhafi, whom they regard as dangerously erratic. They are deeply suspicious of his Muslim fanaticism and resentful of his continuing criticism of the USSR. They would not want to commit themselves deeply in a situation over which Qadhafi would retain control.

Possible Developments

We see only faint signs that either side is serious about opening a new dialogue, thus we anticipate that the situation will gradually worsen along the following lines.

Scenario A: Both parties will probably break the propaganda truce worked out in early August and a new acrimony will creep into public exchanges. This may involve more direct charges of superpower manipulation of the quarrel.

Cairo may actively encourage the return from Libya of key categories of Egyptian civilians, who even on their own may feel compelled to go home. Tripoli might, in turn, recall its military trainees and students in Egypt. Harassment of individuals at border points would intensify, frontier guards might be reinforced, and the possibility of an incident increased.

Libya may react to Egypt's lead and recall its ambassador in Cairo. Both sides, however, may want to avoid a formal diplomatic break, if only for appearances' sake.

Both sides would probably step up efforts to foment trouble among tribes that live astride their common border.

At this stage Cairo might also quietly encourage the defection of one or more of Qadhafi's colleagues. Major Abd al-Munim al-Huni is known to be one of Cairo's favorites, although Prime Minister Salam Jallud would be a more logical choice given Cairo's ostensible rationale

that an eclipse of Qadhafi should be a “corrective action” rather than a coup.

Tripoli, for its part, might use such assets as it may have among conservative religious factions and the armed forces inside Egypt to increase disruptive incidents.

Both sides would incur some risks and disadvantages were they to pursue this course. Egypt would have to consider the possibility that its actions might:

- cause Libya to turn to the Soviets for manpower to fill vacancies in the Libyan air defense system and to seek Moscow’s moral and political support.

- tarnish Sadat’s image as a statesman capable of maintaining Arab solidarity

- give radical fedayeen elements new incentives to strike at Egypt directly

- cause those Egyptians already skeptical of Sadat’s policies to become more wary

- rally other Libyan leaders to Qadhafi’s side.

In this situation, the Soviets would probably see advantage in encouraging Libyan intransigence without appearing to challenge Sadat directly. If Moscow could overcome Qadhafi’s opposition to a substantial Soviet presence, it could quickly dispatch several hundred military advisors to fill the void left by the Egyptians. Moscow would be willing to sell and quickly deliver even more military equipment. The Soviets would also discreetly encourage the Libyans and seek to stir up criticism of the Egyptians actions as disruptive to Arab unity.

Sadat might calculate that these disadvantages would be outweighed by the possibility that Qadhafi might be silenced and cast again into isolation if Egypt were to take the measures outlined above. We believe there is some possibility that Qadhafi under this type of pressure might adopt a more conciliatory position—at least over the short run—in order to avoid internal political and economic disruptions. On the other hand, if the two sides were unable to arrive at some middle ground the situation might mushroom along the following course.

Scenario B: A formal diplomatic break might be initiated by either or both sides. Borders would be closed and all cooperation, even at the lowest levels of administration, would stop. Real or alleged violations of airspace and territorial waters would be likely causes of serious incidents.

Each side would lobby for support among other Arab and non-Arab states. Calls for emergency meetings of regional and international organizations might be issued by either side. The situation would be considered cause for an Arab summit—if not by the two ad-

versaries, perhaps by other concerned Arab governments. Mediation attempts by other Arabs would undoubtedly be undertaken.

Either party might try to drag the US or the Soviets more directly into the fray.

If—as Cairo charges—Qadhafi has assassination squads inside Egypt, Sadat and other Libyan detractors could possibly become targets. Cairo would perhaps retaliate with its own terrorist campaign but would probably concentrate its efforts on convincing other Libyan leaders or anti-Qadhafi elements in exile to move against the Libyan leader.

Such actions would be extremely risky and difficult to control. We do not believe either side wants to carry its grievances this far, but we do not rule out the possibility that the momentum of events could precipitate such a collision course. Egypt would have to weigh the following possible consequences:

- a vigorous Soviet response to Tripoli's plea for help that might include posturing of its Mediterranean fleet and the dispatch of "advisors" and weapons

- a negative reaction from other Arabs—particularly Egypt's chief allies in Saudi Arabia—who are traditionally fearful of Egyptian interventionist policies

- polarization within Palestinian ranks among pro- and anti-Libyan factions

- exploitation by Israel of Egypt's preoccupation with Libya that might include a major stall on negotiations

- a harmful impact on an international investment community wary of instability in the area.

In this situation, the Soviets would have to move carefully lest they risk an open rupture of their relations with Egypt. They might take some conspicuous action such as flying in additional arms or dispatching Mediterranean fleet units to Libyan ports to indicate political support for Libya. Moscow would be willing to provide technical and economic advisors although it could hardly replace the tens of thousands of Egyptian civilians now in Libya. The Soviets probably would not dispatch their own ground or air combat forces to Libya or engage in any blatant show of naval force since this would appear to be direct intervention in inter-Arab affairs and commit Moscow to the probable loser if war should ensue. They might, however, hint at such actions in an attempt to deter Cairo.

If the situation ever reached the point described above, we do not foresee either side backing down easily. In fact, the regime in Tripoli might be so badly shaken and divided that it could not effectively represent itself in negotiations either in Cairo or before a mediation forum. Should efforts to stabilize the situation fail, either side might venture

along a dangerous and foolhardy course that might involve the following actions.

Scenario C: Egypt might openly attempt to mount a coup against Qadhafi. Cairo's ability to select an alternative to Qadhafi and to manipulate an evolving chain of events has been greatly reduced by the withdrawal of its military units and advisors, who were Egypt's ears, eyes, and muscle in Libya. Qadhafi is the force that binds the ruling council together; he also enjoys personal loyalty from many key elements in the military. Although he is not popular among middle class Libyans, he has a charismatic hold on many Libyan people. Should Egypt succeed in overthrowing Qadhafi, its selected successor would have serious difficulty controlling the disparate elements in Libyan society. Public knowledge of Egypt's hand in a coup would trigger an outpouring of opposition to Cairo among Libyans, who universally dislike the Egyptians. Qadhafi would immediately become a national martyr.

The Libyans might seriously attempt to assassinate Sadat. Even if the attempt were cleverly disguised, most Egyptians would reflexively suspect Tripoli. Whether such an attempt succeeded or failed, the full force of the Egyptian military and political establishments would probably undertake a campaign against Tripoli as a task of national honor.

If either side tried such a move, a military clash would be a clear danger. In any such confrontation—be it limited or full scale—Libya would be completely overwhelmed.

In this situation, the Soviets would avoid any direct commitment to Libya in order to avoid being pulled into a military conflict. Moscow would encourage its Arab clients to press for a cease-fire and mediate the conflict.

To prevent a Libyan loss in such a conflict, Moscow would have to introduce substantial air and ground combat units. Such an action would put Soviet forces into direct combat with Egypt, damage seriously its position with other Arabs and severely strain détente with the US.

We consider this scenario to be only a very remote possibility. The damage to both countries—both internally and internationally—would be severe and long-lasting. Almost every Arab nation could be expected to condemn an open confrontation.

33. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Nelson) to the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff)¹

Washington, September 11, 1974.

SUBJECT

Termination of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for Covert Action in Libya

1. Notice of Rescission is hereby given for [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Covert Action in Libya. [*1½ lines not declassified*] was based on the premise that the policies of the new Libyan regime were still in a formative stage. The argument concluded that members of the Revolutionary Command Council could be receptive to moderating influences, and that covert action could convey such moderate influences to the Libyan regime in such a way as to achieve the basic U.S. objective of maintaining normal friendly diplomatic and commercial relations with Libya, including the protection of U.S. oil interests.

2. The political evolution of the Libyan regime has been definitively shaped by its leader, Mu'ammār Qadhafi, and the events [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have defined the policy of the regime towards both the Maghreb and Egypt, as well as its intentions regarding the nationalization of U.S. oil interests in Libya. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] its covert action proposal have been outdated by current political realities which include the failure of the Egyptian/Libyan merger, the nationalization of U.S. oil interests in Libya, and the continued absence of ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with the United States.

William E. Nelson

¹ Summary: The Central Intelligence Agency notified the 40 Committee that [*text not declassified*] Covert Action in Libya, was rescinded.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Libya, Box 12, September 11, 1974–July 16, 1976. Secret; Eyes Only.

34. Telegram 221657 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, October 8, 1974, 2053Z.

221657. Subject: Libyan Minister of Treasury Calls on Under Secretary Sisco.

1. Libyan Treasury Minister Muhammad Az-Zaruq Rajab took the initiative to call on Under Secretary Sisco on October 4. Rajab, in Washington as the head of the Libyan delegation to the IBRD/IMF conference, asked for a high-level meeting to discuss U.S.-Libyan relations. He said he was taking this initiative in order to begin a process which would quote bridge the gap unquote between our two countries. He stressed that the LARG not only desired better relations with the USG but was also a bulwark against communism in the Arab world. He said that his government was puzzled by quote anti-Libyan unquote actions taken by the USG. As examples he mentioned the USG action in quote pulling out unquote its Ambassador and the withholding of export permits for the eight C-130's.

2. Mr. Sisco welcomed the Minister's initiative and his stated desire to improve relations. Mr. Sisco said that we have a continuing interest in finding ways to improve our bilateral relations. He made it clear that we would like to consider the Minister's visit as a possible first step toward resumption of the dialogue between Libya and the United States. It was, nevertheless, not clear that the LARG really wanted a general improvement in relations with the U.S. Mr. Sisco stated that on the basis of past actions of the LARG, it was too soon to talk about specific issues. He stressed that the USG refuses to be kicked around and mere anti-communism is not a sufficient basis to establish a dialogue. Any framework for a productive dialogue would have to be based on mutual understanding and respect. Given the deterioration in our relations, starting with the Libyan expulsion of the United States from Wheelus Air Base, we needed to be convinced that the Libyans actually want to have good relations.

3. Mr. Sisco told the Minister that he would report his conversation to the Secretary and that he assumed the Minister would report to his government. Mr. Sisco suggested that both sides could now consider

¹ Summary: The Department reported on a meeting between Sisco and Libyan Treasury Minister Rajab. Kissinger requested the Embassy's views on Rajab's standing with Libya's Revolutionary Command Council, and suggestions on improving U.S.-Libyan relations.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 177, Geopolitical Files, Libya 1973–76. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by David L. Mack in NEA/AFN; cleared by Atherton, Moffat, and Wiley; and approved by Sisco.

how to continue this dialogue. The Minister sought a concrete gesture to show our quote good faith unquote. Mr. Sisco said there could be no preconditions and it was not appropriate to think in terms of gestures at this stage. He said that a further exchange of views would be necessary, one which would focus on the important requirement of each side trying to understand the broad objectives and thinking of the other side. Once such an understanding existed, it would be possible to address more specific questions.

4. It is not clear to what extent Rajab represented views of RCC. Request that Embassy provide any available information on Rajab's standing within LARG and his relationship to RCC. You should not make any approach or discuss above with any Libyan or other foreign official without further instructions. We are considering a possible next step on our part and what it would be. Your views and suggestions would be most welcome.

Kissinger

35. Telegram 1115 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, October 10, 1974, 1425Z.

1115. Subject: Libyan-U.S. Relations. Ref: State 221657.

1. Believe Finance Minister Rajab must have been acting on RCC instructions, probably from PriMin Jallud, in calling on Under Secretary Sisco and in raising points he did. Rajab seems to have confidence of regime leaders, but doubt that this civilian technician minister would have acted on his own in this important matter outside his field. In fact his talking points seemed to be limited and generally similar to those raised by MFA Political Director Shaybani with Chargé in May (Tripoli 518).

2. Inclined to believe main reason for approach was LARG's great desire to obtain Dept's approval on export of their C-130's. Also believe we should take at face value their expressed interest in general improvement of bilateral relations, and proceed on realistic basis stated

¹ Summary: Stein gave his assessment of Libyan Government attempts to improve diplomatic relations with the United States and suggested ways to facilitate that process.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 177, Geopolitical Files, Libya 1973–76. Secret; Nodis.

by Under Secretary, para 3 reftel. We will have to learn if Libyans agree to this basis or whether they will continue to maintain that USG should first make gesture, i.e. release C-130's. Rajab returned to Tripoli Oct 9, and we can assume Jallud will soon be briefed on talk with Under Secretary.

3. Problem any foreign representative has in policy talks with LARG is that usually only RCC members have authority to react, compromise or decide on points of importance. Further, while individual RCC members greet and talk with visiting dignitaries, they are normally not available to resident diplomats. Other officials, including civilian ministers, seem to operate within scope of brief instructions from RCC. Some improvement in this situation in foreign affairs field could come about soon, however. Reorganization of Foreign Ministry has been under consideration for months, and Ministry officials have told me new set up, possibly with RCC Major Abdul Muneim Al-Huni as FonMin, might be announced within coming week. If Al-Hune becomes a working FonMin, there would be better channel to RCC.

4. If LARG agrees to exchange of views on broad objectives of each side, perhaps we could begin by working together on identifying areas of discussion. Overriding issue separating our two govts is, of course, settlement of Middle East crisis. Aspect which concerns LARG most is satisfaction of Palestinian claims, and full exchange of views on this would seem to be central to idea of dialogue. Other major area of actual and potential differences is oil policy which leads into Libya's deep interest in economic development and regime's concerns and misconceptions about U.S. superpower domination.

5. Embassy could take up with MFA question of LARG's agreement to proceed on basis we envisage and then discuss specifics of a loose agenda. Having reached that point, suggest AFN Director Wiley or Deputy Asst Secretary Saunders make quiet visit to Tripoli to begin substantive exchanges.

Stein

36. Telegram 38 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, January 10, 1975, 1705Z.

38. Subject: Libyan Note of Protest Over Violation of Civilian Air Space by Sixth Fleet Aircraft.

1. During afternoon of January 10, MFA contacted Embassy duty officer and asked that Chargé come immediately to MFA. As Chargé was not at home, PolOff returned call, and was asked to come in Chargé's absence. Najib Shaybani Director of International Affairs at Ministry, delivered following note, in sealed envelope:

2. Begin text of Embassy translation of note: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the USA, and asks it to inform its government of the following note: On Jan. 10, 1975 at 0810 hours (local time) American aircraft carrier was located at a distance of 60 miles north of Misuratah, 60 degrees Tripoli latitude 15.5 east, and 34.30 north. A number of aircraft belonging to the carrier in question undertook three flights until they were only 10 miles distant from dry land. The aircraft in question pursued an Algerian civilian passenger aircraft which was passing through the area.

3. The violation of areas reserved for civilian aviation, and the hindrance on its movement, and the threat to its security, and the pursuit of civilian aircraft passing through it (i.e. the area), are all considered complete air piracy. The operations of approaching (i.e. the Algerian aircraft) by themselves are considered an aggressive action which American forces have committed, and for which they bear the responsibility.

4. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, which has undertaken on its part several serious and positive initiatives, might have received their counterpart, and like initiatives might have been taken on the part of the United States. If the objective of the above mentioned actions was threatening, we not the sort to accept it or to be cowed by it. If the objective of the above mentioned activities was to prepare for action of another kind, we are completely ready to face it. If the action took place by mistake, then it is incumbent on the Government of the United States to apologize and to determine who made the mistake. In all cases, the Libyan Arab Republic reserves its right to formulate and to take the actions which it deems appropriate in this regard to carry out

¹ Summary: The Embassy informed the Department of a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protesting an alleged violation of Libyan airspace by U.S. aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D 750010–1075. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

its duty and its right to protect its land and its air space and its waters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes this occasion to express to the Embassy of the USA its esteem.

5. While presenting note, which PolOff did not open, Shaybani was at great pains to soften its contents, which he summarized in moderate terms. He then elaborated point that Libya had unilaterally taken several positive steps toward U.S., of which he mentioned only the lifting of the oil embargo and “a decision to buy a Triga III reactor from General Atomic”. Other positive initiatives toward the USG would be taken in the future, Shaybani said. He hoped that the United States and Libya could put aside their differences on the “Palestine question”, and work together in other areas for mutual benefit. This was in interest of both countries. In reply, PolOff said he knew nothing of any aggressive actions by U.S. planes. PolOff said he was sure that any “positive Libyan initiatives would be given careful consideration by the USG”. He reminded Shaybani that Chargé had asked for note on lifting of oil embargo. Shaybani said that American desk officer Shaaban had informed Chargé officially that embargo was lifted, but if it would be useful, he was prepared to ask Minister of Foreign Affairs Al-Huni whether a note could be prepared. The proof that embargo had been lifted was in fact that oil shipments were now actually going to U.S. PolOff said he thought note would be useful. Shaybani was cordial throughout interview, which lasted about 20 minutes, and was conducted in Arabic.

6. Comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Sixth Fleet was to conduct routine maneuvers today, and that aircraft would observe 50 mile limit which we have unilaterally decided to observe. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] prior instructions separate flash message to military commands in area advising them of Libyan note. Libyan military aircraft continue to be active over Tripoli.

7. Strongly recommend naval unit off Libyan coast avoid any further operations which tense Libyan military might think are provocative.

Stein

37. Telegram 8469 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 14, 1975, 1606Z.

8469. Subject: Response to Libyan Protest Over Violation of Civilian Airspace. Ref: Tripoli 38.

1. Please deliver the following note at appropriate level of the Foreign Ministry at earliest opportunity.

2. Begin text. (After compliments) the Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of the note of the Libyan Arab Republic of January 10, 1975 concerning the flights of United States military aircraft on January 10 and wishes to inform the Libyan Arab Republic that these aircraft at no time approached closer than 25 nautical miles of the Libyan coast and remained at all times over international waters under positive radar control. The flight personnel were aware of the presence of civilian aircraft in the area and maintained appropriate distance from these aircraft. There was no pursuit of civilian aircraft nor were civilian aircraft in any way endangered by these flight operations. The Government of the United States wishes to assure the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic that the United States aircraft in question were on a routine mission over international waters, in keeping with the longstanding United States position on freedom of flight in such areas. Such flights in no way constitute a threat against any sovereign nation. The United States Government takes note of the reference to several serious and positive initiatives by the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic and would like to inform the Libyan Arab Republic that it is prepared to continue the dialogue begun by these initiatives in the hope of improving the state of relations between our two governments. (Complimentary close) End text.

Kissinger

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a note from Kissinger to the Foreign Ministry responding to Libya's protest over a U.S. violation of civilian airspace. Kissinger asserted that the aircraft was on a routine mission, remained in international waters at all times, and neither pursued nor endangered Libyan civilian aircraft.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 3, Libya, State Department Telegrams. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Donald L. Jameson in NEA/AFN; cleared by Arnold L. Raphel in P, Colonel Mahlberg in OSD/ISA, Gammon in S/S, and Colonel Frederic J. Flemings in PM/ISO; and approved by Atherton. In telegram 60 from Tripoli, January 15, the Embassy informed the Department that the note was delivered to the Foreign Ministry that morning. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

38. Telegram 442 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, April 15, 1975, 1020Z.

442. Subject: Libyan Govt Decision to Lift Numerical Ceiling on Embassy Personnel.

1. Deputy Undersecretary for Technical Affairs Ahmad al-Atrash called Chargé to Foreign Ministry April 14 to inform him that Libyan Govt has decided to remove the numerical ceiling on personnel of this Embassy imposed in 1972. He referred to increased number of Libyan students in U.S. (giving their number now as 1500) and economic relations as business which could require increased Embassy staff. Al-Atrash was not sure whether we had Consulate in Benghazi. When we told him it had been closed in 1972 he suggested we might want to open it again. (This seemed to be spur of the moment improvisation by Al-Atrash.)

2. In reply to Chargé's question, he said that this was RCC decision. It would not be made public, and we would not be informed in writing. Chargé asked whether British and Soviet missions, whose staffs were limited at same time ours, were included. Al-Atrash said that they probably would be, but stressed that for moment decision only applied to U.S. Chargé agreed this was a positive step, and he hoped it would be part of a trend. Al-Atrash said he hoped for his part that "ball would be kept rolling".

3. This gesture is intended to draw a reciprocal action from us. As Dept aware, Libyans would like to increase staff of their Washington Embassy, as they are doing at many of their other missions, but their intent is probably also to show good faith. We have the feeling that senior civilian officials in Foreign Ministry and elsewhere are anxious for better relations with us, and this gesture may be result of their urgings. Libyan initiative is not directly related to troublesome area between us of military supply. It tends to emphasize more suitable area of bilateral relations—growing student program, increased trade, financial links and export of American technology. We believe it would be appropriate for us to take reciprocal action. Our response will have greater effect if it follows closely on Libyan gesture.

4. However, if we do respond in kind, by lifting ceiling on Libyan Embassy personnel in Washington, as Foreign Ministry probably

¹ Summary: The Embassy informed the Department of the Libyan Government's decision to lift the numerical ceiling on personnel at the U.S. Embassy.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 177, Geopolitical Files, Libya 1973–76. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

hopes, next Libyan move may be to raise exchange of Ambassadors. In present state of relations, allowing the prospect of an exchange of Ambassadors to arise could only be embarrassing to us. We can see no sign that regime's line on Mideast is susceptible of [to] modification, and believe present level of mission is appropriate.

5. With these considerations in mind, Embassy suggests that Dept authorize Chargé to reply to Al-Atrash orally along following lines: We welcome Libyan gesture. In response we are lifting ceiling on Libyan Embassy in Washington. At same time we have no present plans to increase our staff in Tripoli, or to change nature of our representation. We are able to conduct present business with our staff of seven officers, but we are happy to know that it could be increased if need should arise.

6. Dept may also wish to consider a visit by a ranking NEA officer to further test the water.

Stein

39. Backchannel Message 176 From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Cairo, May 3, 1975, 1455Z.

1. In my meeting May 2 with Fahmy, he mentioned current Egyptian-Libyan tensions. Egypt has decided, he said, that Qadhaafi must go. Some way must be found to get rid of him. Could the USG, through CIA, not do something about this, either directly or together with Egypt. He professed to know that CIA has in past been involved in such operations and made strong pitch that it would be in our mutual interest to find a way to remove Qadhaafi. I firmly discouraged any suggestion of USG involvement in whatever GOE might have in mind. Fahmy grumbled, but commented GOE would find ways of handling the matter itself.

¹ Summary: Eilts reported on a discussion with Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Fahmy in which Fahmy stated that Egypt was looking for a way to remove Qadhafi from power. He requested U.S. assistance, either directly or in collaboration with Egypt, to "get rid of him," but Eilts discouraged it.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 25, Geopolitical File, Egypt Chronological File, January 11, 1975–November 1, 1976. Top Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.

40. Telegram 130498 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, June 4, 1975, 2142Z.

130498. Subject: US-Libyan Relations. For Ambassador.

1. Libyan Government delivered a note to the State Department on April 14 requesting agrément for Mohamed Yunis Khalifa as Ambassador to the United States. On April 15 the Libyan Government informed our Chargé in Tripoli orally that the ceiling on US Embassy personnel in Libya had been lifted. The Secretary has approved a recommendation that we accept Mr. Khalifa as Ambassador in Washington and that we inform the Libyans of our willingness to increase the ceiling on Libyan Embassy personnel in Washington on condition that both of these steps first be discussed with President Sadat and that these moves not be implemented until our Middle East reassessment is completed.

2. During your next conversation with President Sadat you should advise him of our inclination to accept Khalifa as Libyan Ambassador in Washington and of our intention to negotiate a new and higher ceiling on Libyan Embassy personnel in Washington with the Libyan Government. Both steps will take place after the completion of our Middle East reassessment. We would welcome any comments President may have.

3. If President Sadat questions you on these moves you may wish to point out that the absence of a US Ambassador in Tripoli and a Libyan Ambassador in Washington was not the result of a decision by either government to expel or not to accept an ambassador from the other. The existing situation came about when the USG decided not to replace Ambassador Palmer upon his departure at the end of his normal tour because Ambassador Palmer had not been received at levels of the Libyan Government appropriate for his rank and had been able to have very little contact with any Libyan citizens. The Libyan decision not to replace their Ambassador in Washington followed our decision not to replace Palmer with another Ambassador. The acceptance of the Libyan Ambassador therefore represents no significant change in

¹ Summary: Eilts was instructed to inform Sadat of U.S. intentions to accept Mohamed Yunis Khalifa as Libyan Ambassador to the United States, and to negotiate a higher ceiling on Libyan Embassy personnel in Washington.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 4, Egypt, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Exdis (1). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tripoli. Drafted by Marshall Wiley in NEA/AFN; cleared by Saunders, Atherton, Matthews, Sisco, and Moffat; and approved by Kissinger.

USG policy and might be a step toward better communication between our governments. The increased number of officers in the Libyan Embassy in Washington are needed primarily to take care of the large number of Libyan students studying in the US.

4. If asked, you may also tell President Sadat that we have no present intention of assigning an Ambassador to Tripoli although we would be willing to do so if there is some trend toward an improvement in relations between our two governments and if we have an indication that he would be received at appropriate levels by the Libyan Government.

5. FYI: While we are asking you to inform Sadat of our plan, we will want your judgment of his reaction before any step is taken. We do not want to put him in a position of making a decision for which we must assume responsibility, but we naturally want to take his reaction into account before moving.

Kissinger

41. Telegram 5640 From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, June 7, 1975, 1010Z.

5640. Subject: US-Libyan Relations. Ref: State 130498.

1. Since President Sadat is scheduled proceed directly from Suez to Alexandria, where he will remain for the summer, I discussed referenced subject with Fahmy. I told him of our intention to accept Khalifa as Libyan Ambassador to Washington and to negotiate a new and higher ceiling on Libyan Embassy personnel in Washington with the Libyan Govt. These steps, I pointed out, will not take place until after completion of our Middle East policy reassessment. I asked Fahmy to advise the President of the above, adding we would welcome any comments Sadat might have.

¹ Summary: Eilts summarized his conversation with Fahmy regarding Libyan representation in Washington.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750199–1071. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tripoli. In telegram 133634 to Egypt, June 7, Eilts was instructed to thank Sadat and Fahmy for their views regarding Libyan representation in Washington and to inform them that the matter had been postponed indefinitely. (Ibid.)

2. Fahmy asked about the background of this development. I therefore told him about the Libyan note of April 14 requesting agrément for Khalifa as Ambassador to the US and the April 15 action by the Libyan Govt lifting the ceiling on US Embassy personnel in Libya. I pointed out that the absence of Ambassadors in the respective capitals was not the result of a decision of either government to expell or not to accept an Ambassador from the other, but came about as a result of our decision not to replace Ambassador Palmer at the time of his departure at the end of his tour because the Libyan Govt had not received him at appropriate levels and there had been no meaningful contact. Libyans had reacted by not sending an Ambassador of their own. The acceptance of a Libyan Ambassador represents no significant change in USG policy and might be a step toward a better dialogue between our two governments. Lifting the ceiling of the Libyan Embassy in Washington enables the latter to take care of the large number of Libyan students in the US.

3. Fahmy's reaction was mixed. He viewed the Libyan initiative as an effort to balance their recent arms agreement with the Soviets. Even though the Libyan actions had taken place in April, he believed Libyan-Soviet discussions were by then already underway. While this is desirable in principle, Fahmy expressed concern that such action on our part, coming now, will be viewed in Arab world as US endorsement of Libya's recent massive arms deal with the Soviets. Fahmy expressed concern that the USG seems to minimize the Libyan-Soviet arms deal and fails to see it as a direct threat to Egypt. (I know that Sadat made same point to visiting Saudi MODA Prince Sultan a few days ago.) Apart from this aspect, Fahmy noted Qadhaafi's recent attacks on Sadat for attending the Salzburg Summit and reopening the Suez Canal have become shriller and have forced Sadat to respond. Thus, the Sadat-Qadhaafi battle of words is again the public domain. Actions such as we contemplate, if they come now, will be viewed in Egypt and in the Arab world as a slap at Sadat or at the very least indifference to his position. They would scarcely seem to be consistent with the frequently stated US policy of considering Sadat as the key Arab leader and working to strengthen his position. Fahmy stated his comments represented his personal reaction and undertook to let us have any comments the President might have.

4. Shortly after above conversation, Fahmy called to say he had discussed the matter with Sadat and President's reaction is distinctly negative. For US to take proposed action now would vitiate positive reaction of Salzburg Summit. They would be viewed in Egypt and the Arab world as a slap at Sadat and a lack of US concern about Qadhaafi's scurrilous attacks against Sadat and his subversive activities in

Egypt. While the decision must be made by USG, Sadat emphatically urged that any such steps be postponed for time being.

Eilts

42. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Cairo, June 7, 1975, 1023Z.

1. You will have seen Cairo 5640 in response to Department instructions about US-Libyan relations. I thought it best to speak generally in that telegram, but you should know that Sadat feels very strongly on the issue. On Sadat's express instructions, Fahmy asked that we postpone for six months repeat six months receiving Khalifa or increasing the two countries' respective Embassies. By that time, Fahmy said we will have gotten rid of him, meaning Qadhaafi. In the meantime, he urged that American Embassy Tripoli be instructed "to be vigilant", about developments and that we employ necessary sensitive means to monitor Libyan activities.

2. There is no question that Sadat is at the moment deeply concerned about Qadhaafi and any steps that seem to imply acceptance of Qadhaafi will be badly viewed here. Egyptians have hard evidence of a Qadhaafi-organized assassination plot against Sadat and relations between the two countries are at the moment worse than at any time in the past two years. I suspect they are likely to deteriorate even more. As a result, Egyptians have apparently made a policy decision to work actively to find ways of getting rid of Qadhaafi. In my judgment, unless the benefits accruing to US from a better dialogue with the Libyans are likely to be of a substantial nature, we will be well advised to postpone action on the Libyan initiative, especially at this sensitive time when we want Sadat's understanding and cooperation in furthering the peace process.

3. Warm regards.

Eilts

¹ Summary: Eilts informed Kissinger of Sadat's request to postpone an increase in diplomatic ties with Libya for six months.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 25, Geopolitical File, Egyptian Chronological File, January 11, 1975–November 1, 1976. Top Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.

43. Telegram 711 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, June 18, 1975, 1100Z.

711. Subject: Annual Policy Assessment for Libya. Ref: 11 FAM 212.4.

1. Summary: In the Embassy's view the principal U.S. interests in Libya are that (a) Libya not become a site for Soviet bases and area of exclusive Soviet influence, and (2) that Libya give up its opposition to an Arab-Israeli settlement. It is a fact that our power to promote these interests in present circumstances is limited. We should, however, continue to use what leverage we have. We should tell the Libyans clearly that their attitude on the Middle East is a bar to better relations, and that arms sales will be considered in light of the regime's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. We cannot compete with the Soviets as arms salesmen to Qadhafi's regime, and we should not try. We should not rely too much on the argument that Libya is a problem for the Egyptians to solve. Several structural factors are working in our favor over the long term. One bright spot in the picture is the continued eagerness of young Libyans to go to the U.S. for higher education, and the regime's willingness to finance their studies in U.S. universities. End summary.

2. I. U.S. Interests

A. In the Embassy's view, basic U.S. interests in Libya are:

(1) That Libya, with its long Mediterranean coastline, not become an area of exclusive Soviet influence or a site for Soviet military bases.

(2) That Libya stop trying to undermine the settlement process in which Egypt is engaged with Israel.

(3) That U.S.-Libyan relations improve to the point where the USG has access to Libyan policymakers.

(4) That the U.S. maintain its share of the Libyan market for goods and services.

B. In the absence of a Middle East settlement, or a change of heart by the regime with regard to the existence of the Jewish State, it is a fact that our power to promote these interests is limited, as our bilateral relations with Libya must be subordinated to our larger interests in the area.

(1) We should, nevertheless, use what leverage we have with the regime. It should be brought home clearly to the Libyans that, while we

¹ Summary: The Embassy submitted its annual policy assessment for Libya. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Exdis.

will not threaten them with subversion or invasion, they can expect no consideration from us as long as they continue to take a line on the Middle East which is directly opposed to our vital interest in peace and the continued existence of Israel. The best way to do this is not to ignore Libyan approaches to us, or to deal with them in a tentative and piecemeal way.

(2) We should not rely too much on the argument that Libya is basically a problem for the Arabs or the Egyptians to solve for us. Qadhafi has enough appeal throughout the Arab world to make it hard for our Arab friends to keep him in permanent quarantine. In the case of Egypt, it should be remembered that Libyans resent the Egyptian presence here; to some extent Egyptians have become the focus for persistent anti-foreign feeling which used to be directed against the U.S. and Britain under the monarchy. An overly pro-Egyptian regime would soon find itself in hot water, especially if its installation occurred through an Egyptian-backed coup. For this reason, it would probably not be wise to encourage any Egyptian attempt to overthrow Qadhafi. Although we are obviously sympathetic to the Egyptian position, we should not be associated with any action which could redound to our discredit in the rest of the Arab world.

C. There follows a discussion of some of the outstanding issues between the U.S. and Libya in the light of overall U.S. interests.

3. II. U.S. Arms Sales to Libya

Qadhafi's military regime is inclined to evaluate its relations with industrialized states in terms of the willingness of those states to sell Libya arms. U.S. policy in this area is based on a desire to avoid doing anything which could strengthen Libya's offensive capability or which could be read in the Arab world and elsewhere as implying approval or tolerance of Qadhafi's policies. We believe that this should be made clearer to the Libyans than it has been in the past, and that the regime should be told that future sales of military matériel under U.S. license will be considered on a case by case basis in the light of progress toward a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The Libyans must not be allowed to entertain the illusion that they can make end runs around the USG with the help of various arms sellers and the indirect exertion of commercial pressure.

In our view, little purpose is served now by keeping the Libyans on the hook in such matters as the delivery of the eight C-130's they have bought and which are awaiting an export license in the U.S., and it would be better to do away with this contentious issue once and for all.

4. III. Qadhafi and the Soviets

Qadhafi's relations with the Soviet Union are based on the willingness of the Soviets to sell him arms. They are essentially relations of expedience and convenience on the Libyan and, we presume, on the

Soviet side. We cannot compete with the Soviets in selling Libya arms. Nor can we compete with the Soviets in the acquisition of influence in Libya through covert and subversive means, and we should not try.

In the long term several factors are working in our favor. One is that, the closer the regime gets to the Soviets, the more it needs a balancing U.S. presence. We should be alert to seize the opportunities this situation may present us with in the future. Another is that the Libyans are extremely jealous of their political independence, and will not sell it cheap. The modern history of the region which is now called Libya is one of resistance to foreign intruders. Although the Soviets are walking on very soft feet at the moment, the history of their dealings with other Arab states suggests that it will not be long before a reaction against their presence will set in.

Thus, in the Embassy's view, the principal danger for U.S. interests of a Soviet military presence in Libya lies in the fact that it strengthens Qadhafi's hand in his efforts to undermine movement toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We believe that the regime's basic anti-communist orientation has not changed, and that it is not likely to change as long as Qadhafi is in power.

5. IV. Economic and Cultural Relations

A. We should try to move our contacts with the Libyans away from the area of military sales to that of economic and cultural relations, although even here we face serious obstacles. During 1974 our sales of goods and services to Libya remained at about the same level in terms of constant dollars, but fell as a proportion of total Libyan spending which rose dramatically as a result of increased oil revenues. In 1975–76 the projected sale of Boeing of three 727's and a VIP-equipped 707 should improve the picture. Our business people should be aware, however, in trading with Libya that the regime finds itself in a financial squeeze at the moment which may mean that payment for goods and services will be delayed.

B. A bright spot in the picture is the Libyan desire to educate large numbers of their young men in the U.S. Over 1500 government-supported students have already been sent, according to our latest reckoning, an increase of 50 percent over last year's total, and the flow shows no sign of slowing down. We should not try to make political capital out of this; the facts speak for themselves, and as a tactical matter we should keep our satisfaction to ourselves. At the same time, we should work hard to minimize any frictions the program may create, and do our best to smooth over the problems which may arise. If necessary, we should be ready to go out of our way to reassure the suspicious regime that its students will not be discriminated against or propagandized in any way. In particular, Libyan students should not be questioned by U.S. law enforcement agencies unless there is good

reason to believe that they are involved in illegal activity. Under no circumstances should they be questioned about the political situation in Libya.

6. V. Resources Projection

A. Positions authorized:

	FY 75		FY 76		FY 77	
	US	FSL	US	FSL	US	FSL
Executive:	3	1	2	1	2	1
Pol/Econ/Coml:	5	3	5	3	5	3
Consular:	2	3	2	2	2	2
Admin:	5	31	4	24	4	24
Totals:	15	38	13	30	13	30

B. Cost in thousands of dollars:

Salaries and						
Allowances:	352	331	325	260	335	275
Operations:	—	284	—	300	—	325
Totals:	—	615	—	560	—	600

C. Remarks: COM, GSO and 4 FSL positions withdrawn in FY 75 (State 32443). Four additional FSL positions to be withdrawn in FY 76 by realignment of functions. \$50,000 in severance payments were made to FSL's in FY 75.

Stein

44. Memorandum From Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, July 7, 1975.

SUBJECT

The Libyan Threat

There is increasing evidence that the unnatural alliance between the USSR and Libya must be taken seriously as a threat to the objectives of the United States in the Middle East and to moderate Arab Governments. Although reports on amounts appear to be exaggerated, the recent Soviet decision to give Qhadafi its blessing and supply large additional quantities of advanced weapons and a nuclear reactor appears clearly designed to increase the pressure on Arab moderates to move away from the United States and back toward the USSR. At the same time Libya has stepped up its active support of extremist groups and governments trying to undermine if not actually overthrow Sadat, Asad and the Saudi leadership in order to increase Libya's influence and derail efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East. The long-term effectiveness of Qhadafi's efforts is difficult to judge but his determination has not slackened and his disruptive actions appear to be better focussed and potentially more dangerous than in the past. Cooperation with the USSR, on the one hand, and battle-hardened "reactionists" like Habash, on the other, enhances Libya's ability to apply leverage to the more moderate Arab Governments and the PLO.

Libyan-Arab Relations

Thus far, Qhadafi has apparently not created major internal problems for the Egyptian, Syrian, Tunisian or Saudi regimes, yet all four governments feel that their stability and security are threatened to some degree by his unique mixture of religious and political fanaticism. Their ability to pursue a reasonable policy toward a Middle East settlement is also hampered, in varying degrees, by Libya's hard line propaganda and political agitation. This agitation has caused serious complications for certain operations being undertaken by the moderates in an intra-Arab context: most notably in Lebanon where Libyan-backed radicals (Lebanese as well as Palestinian) with the aid of Libyan

¹ Summary: Oakley informed Scowcroft of the potential threat posed by the Soviet-Libyan alliance to U.S. objectives in the Middle East and to moderate Arab governments.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, Box 3, Libya. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. The CIA study on the Soviet-Libyan relationship was not attached. Scowcroft initialed the document.

agents and of Libyan money were primarily responsible for the fierceness of the armed opposition to Lebanese, Egyptian, Saudi and Syrian efforts to restore calm and install a new government; and in South Yemen where Libya has stepped up its supply of arms and money to the Aden regime, thereby encouraging the latter to continue supporting the Dhofar rebellion and resist pressures from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to cease such subversion, drop all Communist ministers and adopt a moderate philosophy. Libya also continues to stir up trouble on a lesser scale in a number of other places, stretching from Northern Ireland to the Philippines, including support for Eritrean rebels.

Sadat's anger at and fear of Qhadafi has become so great that [1 line not declassified] We know that Saudi Arabia, Iran and even China are also seriously worried by Libya's unsettling impact on the Middle East.

Recent events in Lebanon have revealed the strong bond which has been forged between Libya and the Palestinian "rejectionist" groups (PFLP of Habash, PDFLP of Hawatmeh, PFLP/GD of Gibril) as well as the growing strength of the latter relative to Arafat's PLO which follows a less radical approach. The "rejectionists" still enjoy Iraqi, as well as Libyan, support and are determined to overthrow or otherwise eliminate Arafat and other PLO leaders who are considered too "soft" toward Israel. Libya has cut off its funds to the PLO (it had previously supplied about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the budget) and is channelling tens of millions of dollars to the "rejectionists." There are reports that the latter have been involved in bombings and other actions against the Asad regime in Damascus, as well as working against Syrian, Egyptian and Saudi interests in Lebanon and elsewhere. Reacting to this, Egypt has warned them that it will retaliate for "any terrorist action" against Egypt or Egyptian personnel, wherever they may be.

At present the rejectionists can still be neutralized, although not eliminated, by the combined efforts of the PLO and the three Arab Governments. However, should Syria switch from a moderate to a radical mode, the combined strength of Saiqa and the "rejectionists" would probably be enough to capture virtually all of the Palestinians, including Arafat. (One should not underestimate the intelligence, experience and determination of "rejectionist" leaders like Habash, Hawatmah, and Gibril, nor of their potential allies within the PLO like Salah Khalaf, the head of Black September.) Such a development could have serious negative effects on our peace efforts, since it would open the way to intensive guerrilla action against Israel from Lebanon, to an upsurge in international terrorism, and to stepped-up subversive and other action against moderate Arab regimes and leaders. The corrosive effects of combined Libyan-rejectionist pressures are evident in the re-

cent Jerusalem bombing, which appears to be a PLO response to these pressures as well as to Israeli intransigence on the Palestinian issue.

Libya-USSR Relations

The Soviet-Libyan relationship is a complex one, described in detail in the attached study which the CIA prepared at our request. The relationship is underpinned by several arms agreements. The magnitude of the most recent agreement—although greatly exaggerated in most accounts—raises the broader question of whether Moscow will gain a new strategic foothold along the Mediterranean. Even if the scope of deals is less [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a major expansion of the military relationship between Tripoli and Moscow appears to have taken place, involving later model jet fighters and bombers, submarines, late-model tanks, and large numbers of missiles. The total value is upwards of a billion dollars.

Political considerations—particularly Moscow's deteriorating relationship with Egypt—are almost certainly the main reason behind Kosygin's recent visit to Tripoli and Soviet willingness to provide more arms to Libya, but the opportunity to earn substantial amounts of Libyan oil money probably also plays a part. The Soviets want to sharpen President Sadat's awareness that they have alternatives to Egypt in the Middle East and they expect to gain an element of leverage on him by dealing with his antagonists in Tripoli. Libyan activities in Aden clearly serve Soviet interests—yet the USSR is not forced to take a position of open opposition to Saudi Arabia. The same is true of the "rejectionists" Palestinians, where Libya provides a conduit for Soviet arms and a degree of Soviet influence in the extremist camp while enabling the Soviets to claim that it continues to support the PLO, that it is not unhappy with Asad, and that it still wants a peaceful settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The overall effect of this Soviet strategy is to increase the pressures on the U.S. to abandon its present approach to the Middle East in favor of joint action with the USSR.

As part of the arms deals, the Soviets also appear to have won some concessions from Tripoli regarding access to Libyan port facilities. Tripoli apparently has decided to permit Moscow occasional port calls for bunkering and replenishment under tight Libyan controls. The Libyans also may be dangling the prospect of greater concessions, such as base rights, to gain Soviet help in building up Libyan naval facilities at Tobruk.

The reported Soviet decision to supply Libya with submarines as part of the new military relationship is particularly disturbing. Given Qhadafi's well-known fanaticism and obsession with controlling the Mediterranean as much as 100 miles from Libya's coast, an indigenous

submarine capability for Libya raises obvious problems for the United States and NATO. It also raises the question of Soviet control over the use and disposition of all types of armament delivered to Libya. Thus far, there is no evidence of Soviet concern over this problem.

Qhadafi also has an obsessive commitment to increase his power by the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. Libya has over the past year feverishly explored all possible sources (US, Soviet, Chinese, Western European, Indian and Pakistani) and reportedly is negotiating at present with France for an accelerator. It has already concluded in 1974 an agreement with Belgian and Swedish firms for a nuclear research center and apparently made a deal last month with the USSR for an experimental nuclear reactor. The USSR has made light of our concern over the danger of helping Libya acquire a nuclear capability, stressing that its reactor would be under IEA safeguards and that it has ratified the NPT. Moreover, Libya is estimated to be technologically 7–10 years away from a nuclear capability, even with its foreign technicians (mostly Pakistani). Nevertheless, the combination of nuclear technology and Qhadafi's fanaticism is disturbing for the future.

What to do about the Libyan Threat

Given the situation outlined above the obvious question is what can and should the United States do about it. Our present approach to Libya is essentially passive, withholding military equipment and nuclear technology and holding diplomatic representation to the Chargé level. It might be in our best interest to move to a more active approach. However, such a decision should be based on a more precise evaluation of the degree of threat Libya poses to our interests in the Middle East and to the moderate Arab Governments with whom we are cooperating.

I would therefore recommend that Mr. Colby be asked to conduct a high-priority intelligence community study on the seriousness of the Libyan threat. It might also be useful to have the appropriate body look into what actions would theoretically be open to us should a decision be made, in light of the study to move to a more active defensive approach toward Libya.

[3 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

45. Telegram 182532/Tosec 80271 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger at Helsinki¹

Washington, August 1, 1975, 2254Z.

Tosec 80271. Subject: Action Memorandum—Sadat's Views on Northrop-Page Air Defense System for Libya (S/S No. 7515602). Ref: Tosec 80182 State 179817. For Secretary from Atherton. Cairo Eyes Only for Ambassador. S/S please also pass to Saunders.

1. Problem: On 30 July we informed you that Northrop-Page had signed contract with LARG for first phase of air defense system, on basis Department's approval in June 1974 of such contractual arrangement. We recommended in reftel that Department now withdraw approval in light of changed circumstances during intervening year and for other reasons of overriding national interest. You indicated you wanted to seek Sadat's views before making final decision. Following is cable to Ambassador Eilts for your approval requesting him to discuss matter with Sadat and inquire whether GOE would object to our authorizing Northrop to proceed with project at this time.

2. Begin text: On June 26, 1974, after ascertaining that Sadat had no objection, Department approved request by Northrop-Page to enter into contract with LARG for sale of \$200 million air defense system. This would comprise fixed radar network and information handling equipment without arms. At that time we gave Northrop letter stating Department approved proposed contractual relationship and expressing intention to issue licenses for export of items necessary to carry out contract.

3. After year of negotiations between Northrop and LARG, during which Libyans unsuccessfully tried to link signing of contract with Northrop to USG's release of the eight LARG-owned C-130s, for which we are withholding export licenses, LARG, on June 24, 1975, concluded contract with firm for first phase of air defense system in amount of \$16 million. Northrop plans to bid on second and third phases and believes

¹ Summary: The Department asked for Kissinger's approval of a draft telegram requesting Sadat's views regarding an air defense system for Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. Drafted by Weislogel in NEA/AFN; cleared by Johnson in S/S, James H. Michel in L/PM, in substance by Director of Security Assistance and Sales in Politico-Military Affairs Stephen Winship, and Adams in S; and approved by Atherton. Kissinger was in Helsinki with President Ford for the signing ceremony for the Final Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Telegram Secto 811 from Helsinki, August 2, informed the Embassy in Cairo and the Department that Kissinger approved the instructions. (Ibid.)

it has good chance to win larger contracts if Libyans satisfied with its performance on first phase.

4. Since June 1974, there has been serious deterioration in Libyan-Egyptian relations and intensification of LARG's militant opposition to Middle East peace efforts. LARG also concluded arms deal with Soviets about which GOE has expressed apprehension.

5. Under munitions control regulations, Department has firm legal grounds to withhold approval of contract on basis overriding national interest. However, this will bring complaints of bad faith from Northrop and criticism from members of Congress whose constituents affected by loss of profits and jobs. Northrop also may be liable to LARG for nonperformance.

6. Before deciding whether or not to withdraw authorization for Northrop to proceed with project, I wish to solicit President Sadat's views.

7. Action requested: You should seek to ascertain Sadat's views, using following talking points (if you are able to do so before you leave, we could discuss this in Belgrade):

—Northrop-Page has informed Department that it signed contract with LARG on June 24 to furnish first phase of air defense system to Libya.

—This is first portion of the same project on which Secretary Kissinger sought your views in June 1974 and which you advised us at that time to go ahead on. If we approve this contract, and if LARG is satisfied with Northrop's performance, firm has good chance of receiving contracts for rest of system within next 12 to 18 months.

—System in question would be a fixed network of radar and information handling equipment, would be strictly defensive and would include no rpt no arms.

—Given Libyan behavior in recent months, we are inclined to withdraw our approval of this sale, but before making decision on whether or not to allow Northrop to furnish this system to Libya, Secretary Kissinger wanted me to discuss it with you. We will welcome any comments you may have about the advisability of allowing Northrop-Page to proceed with the sale in question at this time. End text.

8. FYI. If Sadat recommends approval, and we decide to approve sale, this would lead Sadat to expect approval for similar proposal for Egypt. In latter connection, you should know that ITT has formally requested munitions control license to demonstrate a concept proposal for nonlethal components of air defense system for Egypt.

9. Recommendation: That you approve the above.

10. For Cairo: You should hold off action until Secretary's approval received.

11. For S/S: Please ensure a copy of response is sent to Cairo.

Ingersoll

46. Telegram 183000/Tosec 80302 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger at Bucharest¹

Washington, August 2, 1975, 1558Z.

Tosec 80302. Fol repeat of Cairo 7613 to SecState Aug 2. Qte: Cairo 7613. Dept pass Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Action Memorandum—Sadat's Views on Northrop-Page Air Defense System for Libya. Ref: A. State 182532 (Tosec 80271) B. Secto 8111.

1. Upon receipt reftel A, I prepared a message setting forth my view that Sadat might be expected to oppose sale of Northrop-Page air defense system to Libya even though he agreed in June, 1974 to such a sale. Circumstances of June, 1974 are different from those that now obtain. Relations between Sadat and Qadhafi are currently so bad that anything USG does, directly or through approved commercial contract for any kind of weaponry for Libya, will be viewed by Sadat, by Egyptians and by other Arabs as a USG slap at Sadat. I received reftel B prior to sending my message and therefore dropped it.

2. I have been in touch with Fahmy in Alexandria about the matter and spoke to him along lines talking points set forth para 7 reftel A. Fahmy recalled Sadat had approved sale in June, 1974, but expressed concern that we should now go through with it. He hoped there was some way of calling it off. He was sure this would also be Sadat's view, but undertook to check. Gen Fahmy called back an hour later to say he had discussed the matter with the President. Sadat strongly hopes the entire sale can be "scotched completely" until such time in the future as Qadhafi behaves better.

¹ Summary: In a repeat of a telegram from Cairo, Eilts reported that Sadat was strongly opposed to the air defense system for Libya despite earlier approval. Eilts attributed the change in attitude to the deteriorating relations between Egypt and Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750267–0953. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Kissinger was in Bucharest with President Ford on an official visit.

4. Comment: The President's reaction was predictable. Eilts. Unqte.

Ingersoll

47. Telegram 925 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, August 18, 1975, 1208Z.

925. Subject: MFA Reaction to Northrop-Page Reversal. Ref: State 195216.

1. Chargé and PolOff talked August 18 with Ambassador Shaaban, Director of North American Affairs at MFA, and conveyed U.S. position on Northrop-Page contract in accordance with instructions in reftel.

2. In reply, Shaaban said it appeared that efforts to improve relations were one-sided, and that the more Libya did to improve relations, the more the U.S. rebuffed Libya's advances. Shaaban said that when Country Officer Jameson was here he had been treated with special consideration, the Ministry had organized a program for his visit, and he had been taken to meet the Ministry's Acting Undersecretary at the time, Al-Atrash. This was all evidence of Libya's keen desire to improve relations. Shaaban said he had hoped that there would be some positive response to this from the U.S., but instead the opposite had happened, and with the Northrop-Page reversal a new obstacle had been placed in the path of an improvement in relations. Shaaban pointed out that there had been no response to Libya's nomination of an Ambassador to the U.S., and no reciprocal step to Libya's removal of restrictions on the size of Embassy Tripoli. It was beginning to appear to him that the U.S. did not share Libya's desire to improve relations. And what about the C-130's?

3. In response, Chargé reaffirmed our readiness to continue and expand cultural and economic relations. It was only in the military sphere that we felt we could not cooperate, as a result of Libya's active opposition to our Mideast peace efforts.

¹ Summary: Stein summarized his discussion with Ambassador Shaaban regarding the Northrop-Page contract, and the state of U.S.-Libyan relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750284-0946. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

4. Shaaban replied that as the U.S. was always saying, our overall relations were the important thing. Cultural and commercial relations were very well, and Libya welcomed them, but they were not enough if they were not accompanied by strong political ties. We surely knew what importance Libya attached to its army. In the absence of an improvement in official relations, commercial and cultural ties might suffer. The world was a big place, Libya had good relations with France, the USSR, and other countries. Libyan students could be educated elsewhere, and Libya could satisfy its commercial requirements elsewhere if necessary. We must understand that Libya's desire to improve relations was sincere. It was not just talk. Libya knew there were many problems, and that the road would be long, but had hoped to see some concrete actions from the U.S. which would make it possible to keep moving. If the U.S. were serious about improving relations, the Dept would do well to reconsider its decision on Northrop-Page. Had we not noticed that the press had been more restrained in its treatment of the U.S. lately, and in particular that there had been no reference to the Mideast negotiations for the last week?

5. We asked whether we would be misleading our govt if we reported that the halt of propaganda attacks on President Sadat during the last week had been connected with Libya's desire to improve relations with the U.S., emphasizing that this point was of great importance. After some attempt to avoid a direct answer, Shaaban admitted that he could not say for certain what the cause of the stopping of the anti-Sadat/campaign had been. Perhaps the RCC had given an unofficial directive to this effect. Sometimes this happened when there were sensitive diplomatic conversations taking place. In any case, we could be sure that if Libyan-American relations improved, the press would not rpt not be a problem. The press sometimes made mistakes, and said one thing when it meant another, but it could be controlled, and it would naturally reflect the level of relations in its commentaries.

Stein

48. Telegram 4568 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 8, 1976, 2036Z.

4568. Subject: US–Libyan Relations: Enlarging Libyan Embassy Staff in Washington. Ref: A. Tripoli 19 B. Cairo 5640 of 5 June 1975.

1. Department has decided to lift restrictions on size Libyan Mission in Washington and will deliver following note to Embassy here on January 8: Quote: The Department of State refers to the note of September 2, 1975 from the Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic officially conveying the decision of the Libyan Arab Republic to lift the restriction on the number of U.S. diplomatic staff assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. The Government of the United States, on the basis of reciprocity, has decided to lift the restriction on the size of the diplomatic staff working at the Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic in Washington. This information is also being conveyed through the United States Chargé d’Affaires in Tripoli to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Unquote.

2. This responds to one of several Libyan démarches made in 1975 in name of “improved” relations. Dept. does not plan to respond to other outstanding requests (e.g., release of C–130s or agrément of Libyan Ambassador) given continued active opposition of LARG to our efforts in support of negotiated settlement in Middle East. This decision to remove ceiling on Libyan Mission personnel in Washington is based on USG desire to improve working level communications in such matters as consular and commercial services, and is in reciprocity for earlier Libyan removal of ceiling on U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tripoli.

3. Embassy Tripoli should inform MFA orally of Department decision conveyed by diplomatic note to its mission here.

4. For Cairo: While you should not volunteer this information to GOE, if asked you should assure Egyptians that action was simple reciprocal gesture in response to similar action by Libyans, will help alleviate Libyan Embassy’s consular workload (which is also in USG interest) and carries no policy significance. We have not granted agrément for a Libyan Ambassador and have no intention of raising level of official U.S.—Libyan relations at this time.

Kissinger

¹ Summary: The Embassy was informed of the decision to lift restrictions on the size of the Libyan mission in Washington.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Operations Staff for Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Box 18, Country File, Libya (1). Confidential; Niact Immediate. Repeated to Cairo.

49. Telegram 83386 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, April 7, 1976, 0153Z.

83386. Subject: Libyan Diplomatic Note on C-130s. Ref: Tripoli 454.

1. The following diplomatic note was presented to Department (NEA/AFN) April 1 by Libyan Second Secretary Gaddour:

Begin text

The Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to request complete details concerning commissions and bribes paid to Libyans and non-Libyans in connection with the deal of C-130's bought by the Libyan Arab Republic from Lockheed, as detailed in the report prepared by the Congressional Committee headed by Senator Frank Church.

Also, requested, assurances that the C-130's to be delivered to Egypt are not from the Libyan C-130's.

The Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic considers this request as of great urgency and importance, and thus would very much appreciate a prompt reply.

The Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

End text.

2. Dept replied that requests would be considered and official response would be forthcoming. On the surface, however, it would appear that LARG need not fear that its aircraft would be diverted to Egypt: The C-130s here are Libyan not USG property. Gaddour repeated that LARG desired official USG assurances on matter.

3. DeptOff took opportunity to refer to series of speeches being made by Chairman Qadhafi which contained highly derogatory refer-

¹ Summary: The Department transmitted the text of a diplomatic note from Libya, requesting information on the status of C-130s purchased from Lockheed. Chargé Robert Carle was informed of Department efforts to address Libyan concerns.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asian Affairs, Box 18, Country File, Libya (1). Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Cairo and Tunis. Drafted by Marguerite C. King in NEA/AFN, and James A. Rohwer in L/NEA; and approved by Wieslogel. The reference to bribes presumably refers to an investigation of Lockheed and other corporations by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in May 1975. On August 1, Lockheed acknowledged that since 1970, it had paid more than \$22 million to foreign officials and political organizations to promote business. Congress approved the sale of six C-130 transport planes for Egypt in April 1976.

ences to USG. Gaddour seemed unfamiliar with speeches or events occurring in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. DeptOff gave March 30 speech as an example.

4. FYI: Dept has not yet decided how to respond to LARG request for Lockheed information. At Department's request Justice is assisting responsible law enforcement authorities in some countries, such as Japan and Italy, to obtain information relevant to ongoing investigations in those countries. In such cases, formal judicial assistance agreement has been negotiated between Justice and its counterparts. One condition in agreements is that any information supplied by Justice be kept confidential until such time as recipient government concludes its investigation and decides use of information essential to law enforcement proceeding. Justice, however, has declined to screen raw Lockheed documents for governments (such as LARG) which have come in with vague request for any information which might exist relating to possible bribery of their nationals. In Justice's view, they should assist only in instances where foreign government already has sufficient information to commence responsible criminal investigation.

5. Given Background Of LARG Request in reftel, we do not believe it will qualify for Justice Department assistance. Possible alternative is to suggest LARG Embassy communicate directly with Church subcommittee. This option remains under consideration.

6. LARG note also requested assurance Libyan C-130's would not be transferred to Egypt. Since LARG holds title to C-130's they cannot be transferred to any other party without LARG consent (unless, conceivably, effort was made by private parties in U.S. to attach aircraft as part of lawsuit against LARG for money damages). End FYI.

Kissinger

50. Telegram 90244 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, April 14, 1976, 2241Z.

90244. Subject: Libyan Diplomatic Note on C-130's. Ref: A. State 83386, B. Tripoli 464, C. Cairo 4824.

1. Embassy is authorized to deliver following diplomatic note to the LARG Min For Affairs: Begin text: The Embassy refers to the note dated April 1, 1976, from the Embassy of the Libyan Arab Republic in Washington which requested information and assurances from the Government of the United States of America concerning the C-130 aircraft purchased from Lockheed by the Libyan Arab Republic. The Embassy wishes to assure the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic that the eight C-130 aircraft sold to that government by Lockheed which are the subject of export license application numbers 94113 and 94114 (Lockheed contract numbers GLX-221 of September 13, 1972, and GLX-230 of November 27, 1972) belong solely to the Libyan Arab Republic Government. They may not be sold or delivered to other parties without the agreement of the owner unless by order of a court of competent jurisdiction to discharge a legal obligation of the owner. The Embassy's request for other information concerning sales of these aircraft is under consideration by the Department of State.

2. Department is still exploring question of how to proceed with LARG request for information (Ref A) but agrees that reply to note should be made through Embassy Tripoli for reasons suggested Ref B. The LARG Embassy in Washington will be informed of contents of para 1 on afternoon April 15.

3. FYI: Munro of Lockheed informed DeptOff that Libyan Chargé made oral request March 29 for information similar to that in Ref A. Lockheed asked that request be made in writing and Chargé submitted

¹ Summary: The Department instructed Carle to deliver the U.S. response to the April 1 Libyan diplomatic note concerning the sale of C-130 aircraft to Huni.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Box 18, Country File, Libya (2). Confidential; Immediate. Repeated priority to Cairo. Drafted by King in NEA/AFN; cleared in substance in NEA/RA, in L/NEA, and NEA/EGY; and approved by Wieslogel. In telegram 454 from Tripoli, April 6, the Embassy briefly summarized a speech by Qadhafi, indicating RCC member Umar Muhayashi had been recruited by "international intelligence," and suggested Muhayashi had been bribed by Lockheed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Telegram 4824 from Cairo, April 12, reported on a meeting between Senator James George Abourezk (D-S.D.) and an unidentified Libyan control officer regarding Lockheed payments to Libyan officials. (Ibid.) In telegram 519 from Tripoli, April 15, the Embassy reported that the diplomatic note was delivered that morning. (Ibid.)

letter April 1 (being pouched to Embassy). Letter asked specifically for information on Muhayshi and quote Egyptian Min State for Foreign Affairs who together contacted the company unquote. (Munro said there was no such Egyptian present.) Lockheed has not yet decided how to reply to LARG Embassy request. *Washington Post* April 8 carried report that Lockheed had agreed to respond to Congressional subpoena for “full information on firm’s questionable payments overseas” (copy being pouched).

4. Munro also informed DeptOff that company had brought up possibility of sale of aircraft to Egypt in course of long presentation to LARG officials in 74/75 concerning alternate courses of action should LARG decide to abandon attempts to obtain export permission. Egypt was one of many countries mentioned as possibly interested in these aircraft. End FYI. He was provided with background on current Qadhafi/Muhayshi war of words and with copies from FBIS of Qadhafi’s speeches which refer to Lockheed.

Kissinger

51. Telegram 100366 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, April 24, 1976, 2206Z.

100366. For Chargé from Atherton. Subject: Qadhafi’s Comments on US-Libyan Relations. Ref: A. Tripoli 546 B. Tripoli 548.

1. Congratulations on your report of talks with Qadhafi and your comments thereon. It provides rare and valuable insights into Qadhafi’s view of US-Libyan relations and was handsome return on your investment in arduous desert excursion.

2. Concur in your suggestion para 4 ref A that we seize occasion to remind LARG through MFA of current barriers to our acceptance of Libyan Ambassador. You may make following points, some of them

¹ Summary: The Department praised Carle’s report on Qadhafi’s view of U.S.-Libyan relations, and offered guidance for future discussions.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asian Affairs, Box 18, Country File, Libya (2). Secret; Exdis. In telegram 546 from Tripoli, April 20, Carle gave a detailed report on his meeting with Qadhafi. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Telegram 548 from Tripoli, April 21, was an addendum to Tripoli 546. (Ibid.)

reiterating what I said to Libyan Chargé El-Gayed in Washington in conversation of July 24, 1975.

(A) US welcomes continued active and mutually beneficial relations in cultural and economic field.

(B) We fully reciprocate LARG desire for better official relations.

(C) US does not ask other countries to agree with all our policies as condition of good relations. We have important ties with many countries although we may disagree with them on policy.

(D) Better relations require common framework for dialogue. Problem is not that Libya disagrees with US policy but that it actively opposes and seeks to undermine our efforts towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and criticizes other countries in the region who are cooperating with US.

(E) LARG has nominated Ambassador to Washington. In US system, however, public policy must be acceptable to American public opinion and to Congress. We regret the tone and character of recent attacks on the US by Libyan leaders and the public media. For example, the derogatory statement about our President in the LARG's cable to 72 heads of state of countries which voted for the UN Zionism Resolution; the offensive remarks by head of Libyan delegation to the FAO meeting in Rome in November 1975; the *Al Jihad* article of March 5; and, public speeches by Libyan leaders such as those of March 12 and April 4, such incidents spoil the atmosphere and erode public acceptance, in both Libya and US, of improved bilateral relations.

(F) We reiterate that the USG attitude toward relations with Libya will depend upon LARG's actions: for example, whether it continues to undermine the search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and to give support and refuge to terrorists. In absence of conducive atmosphere we cannot take certain measures. Should we see significant signs that barriers to better relations are being removed, perhaps, we can advance on this and other LARG proposals.

Eagleburger

52. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 2, 1976, 9:18–10:00 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Libya.]

Kissinger: Sadat wants to overthrow Qadhafi. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

President: They have wanted to for a long time. What do they want from us?

Kissinger: He wants us to screen the Soviets from moving into Libya, aerial photos of Libya, and contact with the Sixth Fleet. They don't. . . .

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Libya.]

¹ Summary: Kissinger informed Ford of Sadat's desire to eliminate Qadhafi.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 283, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

53. Telegram 10936 From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, August 14, 1976, 2100Z.

10936. Eyes Only for Secretary Kissinger. Dept repeat Eyes Only General Scowcroft (White House) and Secretary Rumsfeld (DOD). Subject: GOE Intentions Toward Libya.

Summary. Qadhafi's role in Sudanese coup attempt. His suspected collusion with USSR in activities directed at Egypt and other states

¹ Summary: Eilts reported on Sadat's growing concerns about Qadhafi, and the political and military options available to remove the Libyan leader from power.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country File for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 9, Egypt, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (48), 8/14/76–8/28/76 (7). Secret; Priority; Nodis; Eyes Only.

friendly to Egypt, and his use of terrorism inside Egypt have now convinced Sadat that Qadhafi is not a “harmless clown” but a dangerous “lunatic” and that he must be eliminated. The most striking public indicators of this change in Sadat’s attitude are the massing of some 10,000 troops on Libya’s border and an unrestrained anti-Qadhafi (but not anti-Libyan) media campaign. An examination of Egyptian options leads us to believe that some direct GOE action may take place when a propitious moment presents itself. The most effective option would be to engineer Qadhafi’s assassination or an RCC coup since, in GOE view, Qadhafi enjoys little military or popular support. If GOE’s intelligence assets inside Libya do not make this possible, we think direct military action would be considered, in response to next Qadhafi outrage, real or manufactured. This would be an agonizing decision for Sadat and he would have to be assured that Soviets would not react militarily and that he had full backing of his officer corps. If he decided to move militarily, we think he would do so massively in order to avoid getting entrapped in a prolonged conflict à la Yemen or Lebanon. Other possible options probably being considered that could be employed alone or in conjunction with direct military attack or subversion probably include setting up of Libyan Government-in-exile and an even more strident propaganda campaign. Saudi support for direct action has been or would be sought before Sadat decides on a course of action. He might also wish US assurance that it would act to counter possible Soviet reaction. On other hand, Sadat probably believes elimination of Qadhafi would be widely approved both in West and among most states in region. End Summary.

1. Progressive deterioration of GOE-Libyan relations since about January 1976 has reached point where GOE policy makers may be contemplating action to overthrow Qadhafi. In this cable, we examine reasons for this change in GOE’s heretofore relatively tolerant policy toward Qadhafi; review Egyptian capabilities and options; and attempt to assess GOE intentions.

2. Change in GOE thinking, since the October War, Sadat has written off Qadhafi as irrevocably hostile to any constructive approach to ME peace settlement. When assassination squads targeted on GOE notables were first dispatched from Tripoli last summer, GOE concluded Qadhafi had also become an irrevocable and potentially dangerous enemy of the Sadat regime. Nevertheless, until early 1976, we do not believe there was any GOE plan to oust him. If there was, it proceeded at a leisurely pace. The reasons for this relatively relaxed GOE attitude were, we believe, as follows:

- A. Qadhafi was not perceived as a potent threat either to Egypt’s foreign policy or domestic security. He was a “clown.”

B. Sadat valued his reputation as a non-interferer in Arab domestic affairs, a reputation he has painstakingly fostered and which he believes made the October War Arab alliance possible. Nasser's interventionist tactics, now proudly inherited by Qadhafi, are, Sadat believed, strategically counterproductive.

C. Egyptian intelligence until recently (Tripoli 992) assessed Qadhafi's situation internally and externally as bad, but believed civilian opposition powerless and military dissidents closely and effectively surveilled. Probability of a genuine internal coup was consequently remote.

3. In last few months, however, we have been told at high levels that Qadhafi must go, and that GOE "will get him." There are supporting indications that Egyptian planning to speed his ouster are being accelerated. Several reasons for this change in GOE thinking can be adduced:

A. Bolder Libyan Subversion. While August 8 bomb attack in Cairo was only latest in series of Libyan terrorist actions and assassination plots, fact that it took place in central Cairo and was clearly directed at Egyptians rather than Libyan exiles have caused outpouring of public and official indignation (Sadat expressed his personal anger in no uncertain terms to Ambassador August 10). Suddenly, GOE is faced with apparently bolder Libyan terrorism of a kind which is notoriously difficult to prevent. LARG is now seen to be concrete threat to Egyptian national security. The "clown" is now seen as a dangerous "lunatic."

B. Subversion in Sudan. GOE officials, including Sadat, are convinced that Libya alone is not capable of having mounted such a well-organized and logistically complicated coup attempt. They strongly suspect Soviet involvement, at minimum in the planning, and Sadat said as much in Egypt's August 11 message to Arab League members (Cairo 10844). Furthermore, in Egyptian eyes, coup attempt was directed as much at Egypt as Sudan, given Numayri's strong support for Sadat and strategic importance of Sudan to Egypt. Speed with which GOE has concluded joint defense agreement with Sudan, and inclusion of Saudi Arabia in the informal tripartite entente, reflect seriousness of GOE concern. Egyptians have stressed to Saudis threat that Soviet-Qadhafi collusion pose for stability of region, including Egypt.

C. Subversion in North Africa. Qadhafi's use of arms to support Polisario (through Algeria) against Morocco and recent Libyan threats against Tunisia, both of which are close to Sadat, has angered him and impress upon GOE the clear and present nature of the Qadhafi threat.

D. Soviet Role in Libya. Soviet presence and arms build-up have long troubled GOE and Sadat has said publicly that rumored \$12 billion worth of Soviet arms for Libya far beyond its needs. MinWar Ga-

masy has stated privately that the one condition that would prompt Egypt to move militarily against Libya would be establishment of Soviet base there (Cairo 6411). Continuing arms deliveries, belief that Soviets were involved in Sudan coup attempt, and, most importantly, Sadat's conviction that Soviets' ultimate objective is to oust him have given greater immediacy to GOE concern as evidenced by Egyptian military concentrations on the western border over past six weeks.

E. The time is right—the GOE has for some time been in touch with RCC members inside and outside of Libya. Two of them, Muhayshi and Al-Huni, have, in fact, been given asylum in Cairo. Utilizing their assets in Libya, mainly the large number of Egyptian nationals employed there, GOE has tried to keep close tabs on Qadhafi's popularity. It has sought, through its propaganda machine and broadcasts by former RCC member Muhayshi, further to discredit Qadhafi. Rightly or wrongly, it is persuaded that Qadhafi's position has been seriously eroded and that most of his significant RCC colleagues (except Jallud) oppose him. If something is to be done about Qadhafi, the GOE may well have concluded that this is the time to do so.

4. GOE has detailed evidence of Libyan hand in Sudan affair and Cairo bomb attack and has exploited these incidents to stir up public indignation to new pitch. Editorial writers, acting under high-level guidance, have for first time said that Egyptian patience is exhausted and Qadhafi must go. Only note of restraint in press campaign is that Egypt will not resort to Qadhafi's methods in order to spare Libyan people (Cairo 10651). All writers have made clear distinction between "lunatic ruler" and Libyan people. Anti-Qadhafi campaign has reached stage where public now expects some counter action, and majority of Egyptians almost certainly feel it justified and even necessary in Egypt's own interest. In fact, if GOE fails to take some action to curtail Qadhafi, it risks a lessening of confidence and respect among its own people, as well as others in Arab world (an Arab "paper tiger").

5. Egyptian Capabilities.

A. Military. Senior Egyptian officials scoff at indigenous Libyan military capabilities, but are aware of Soviet, Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Pakistani advisors. Egypt has recently established a western area command at Mursa Matruh. Forces under this command are 2–3 brigades of armor and mechanized forces, some commando forces, air defense forces including SAM-2, SAM-3, and SAM-6 air defense units, two squadrons of MIG-21s, MI-8 helo detachment and an engineer group. The total force now located in the Egyptian western desert is probably in excess of 10,000 troops. This force is much stronger than required to defend against any type of military action from Libya. It is clearly strong enough to make a demonstration in force or execute a limited type of attack into Libya. However, with reinforcement from the armor

divisions of additional tanks and APCs and the necessary logistical train, we estimate the force could cross the desert to Tripoli in five days, provided Libya obtains no significant outside support and Egyptians don't stop to engage in major battles. The most serious opposition would probably be from the air force attacking the Egyptian columns; and near Tripoli it might be expected that the Libyans would establish a series of defensive positions. Presumably the Egyptians, should they elect to attack Tripoli, would start the attack with a major air strike thereby knocking out much of the Libyan Air Force. Under optimum conditions, we believe a military victory could be achieved in about seven days by a determined armor attack to the west supported by airborne commando and/or amphibious forces landing in Tripoli area.

B. Subversive. Egyptian civilian security officials claim to have few assets inside Libya to use against Qadhafi personally, given tight security and loyal troops with which he surrounds himself. However, GOE military intelligence must have extensive information on Libyan officers, many of whom they trained, and presumably maintained contact with some of them. Nature of GOE contact with Libyan military is not known by us, but if it is sufficient to mount an assassination attempt or an internal military coup against Qadhafi, this would appear to be most attractive option with least risk. While there are still an estimated 250,000 Egyptians in Libya, they are mainly workers and at best can be used for some intelligence gathering. Egypt has the capability to mount commando-type raids on Libyan installations or to engage in bomb attacks, but since these would not get at Qadhafi personally—and would risk strengthening him with Libyan people—they are unlikely to be effective. Furthermore, any such subversive actions would require a reversal of a major tenet of Sadat's Arab policy, which has been based on achievement of Arab unity against Israel through persuasion and non-interference in other's internal affairs.

C. Political. Libyan exiles in Egypt, notably former RCC members Umar Muhayshi and Abdul Munim al-Huni, provide potential leaders for an anti-Qadhafi political movement around which a government-in-exile could be created to operate either from Egypt or put into place quickly in Libya. GOE is convinced there are many anti-Qadhafi military and civilian elements in Libya that would rally around such an anti-Qadhafi movement if it had a chance of success. GOE could also step up full scale anti-Qadhafi propaganda campaign in the media and open one in international organizations. However, such Egyptian campaigns (e.g., Lebanon) have been markedly unsuccessful by themselves. We would, however, expect such a campaign to precede more substantial actions that may be contemplated. We could already be witnessing the beginning of this campaign.

6. Options.

A. Military. Even with current forces in the western desert, Egypt has a valid military option. Barring outside intervention, it could, with reinforcements, successfully mount a full scale attack as far as Tripoli under favorable conditions. Favorable conditions would include minimal Libyan Army resistance, which might result if Libyans convinced sole purpose of invasion would be to replace Qadhafi with a new Libyan Government. However, unless Qadhafi supplies GOE with plausible justification for massive military action (which Egyptians might try to provoke), it is difficult to envisage Egypt undertaking overt aggression. A factor favoring the military option is that the military forces of likely Qadhafi supporters are fully engaged elsewhere (Algeria with Morocco, Syria with Iraq in Lebanon and with each other). Libya, it would appear, could count on little concrete military support from radical Arabs who perceive that their own regimes would be endangered by Qadhafi's disappearance. There are at least two major factors which argue against the strictly military option: reaction of the USSR and attitude of Egyptian military.

(1) USSR. With its dwindling assets in the Arab world, Soviets have attempted to exploit relationship with Qadhafi for their own designs and we assume they would do everything feasible to assist Qadhafi in international forums and with propaganda. Egyptians, however, seem to believe Soviets would not react militarily. The presence of approximately 500 Soviet military technicians in Libya who could be caught up in fighting is something GOE must consider. At minimum, we would expect GOE to feel out US about our reaction before taking direct military action that risks a Soviet military reaction.

(2) Attitude of Egyptian Military. Given the suspected degradation of Egypt's military preparedness and unanimous belief that Egypt's principal enemy is Israel, Sadat would want to be very certain that any military action had full backing of his officer corps. We have already received one report of a few officers grumbling over being stationed on western as opposed to eastern front. Current anti-Qadhafi press campaign could well be aimed at convincing military (as well as public) that adequate justification already exists. The stridency of GOE reaction to future Qadhafi actions should be an important indicator of GOE intentions. Until very recently, GOE has maintained that its troop concentrations in the west are strictly for defensive purposes in response to confirmed Libyan build up near border. However, lead story in Cairo's major daily August 13, reporting reinforcement of Egyptian forces on the western and northwestern border, goes further. Troops are there "to protect Egypt's border and prevent saboteurs from infiltrating," but military spokesman warned Egypt will prepare for whatever measures necessary to protect Egypt and its people, and "also protect Libya and

Libyan people.” Qadhafi was alleged to be recruiting and training saboteurs in number of bases near the border. “Experts from a big power” (read Soviets) have been planning these operations and providing arms. Number of Libyan leaders allegedly “reject” Qadhafi policy. This is first public hint that Egyptian forces have a responsibility to protect Libyans from Qadhafi (and by implication from Soviets). Sadat interview with Kuwaiti *Al-Siyasa* published August 14 quotes him as saying “Qadhafi will not escape from my hand.” (Septel)

B. Limited Military Action. In reaction to a Libyan border incursion, real or manufactured, GOE could undertake limited military action by seizing a part of eastern Libya. This would enable it to test the reaction of the Libyan Army and people, the USSR, and its own forces. If, as GOE would hope, it led to weakening of Qadhafi through army desertions or popular demonstrations, and USSR could somehow be checked, then stage would be set for examination of further options. This option entails limited military risk, but danger of long drawn out involvement without decisive result during which radical Arab and international opinion would be brought to bear on Egypt. Given result of Syria’s partial intervention in Lebanon, it unlikely to be attractive to GOE.

Another possibility is an airborne raid on Tripoli of brigade size designed to destroy Qadhafi and his government and avoiding possible large scale battle on the border. This would, however, probably require neutralization of air defenses along the route and assumes relatively light opposition in Tripoli.

C. Political Option. GOE could set up government-in-exile headed by Muhayshi and Al-Huni and launch full scale propaganda campaign, combined with flow of Saudi funds to potential dissidents inside Libya, to encourage Libyan Army to move. There is reason to believe that formation of government-in-exile was contemplated by Egypt last May but was rejected (Cairo 7652), probably because it was thought premature and would alert Qadhafi to take draconian action against potential dissidents. Now, however, GOE may believe time is ripe for government-in-exile. This option would entail least risk of all, but alone we think it unlikely to be effective against a regime such as Qadhafi’s and GOE has probably come to same conclusion.

D. Combined Military-Political Option. GOE could seize a portion of Libyan territory in reaction to next Qadhafi outrage and remain in territory long enough to test reaction inside Libya. At same time it could move government-in-exile to Libyan territory and set it up as rallying point for anti-Qadhafi forces. While such a move contains greater risk of failure and accusations from numerous quarters of direct interference in Libya’s internal affairs, it has the attraction of encouraging a Libyan movement with military force to demonstrate its seriousness.

Unless it succeeds in toppling Qadhafi in first few days, however, it carries same danger of long involvement without decisive results.

E. Subversion. Since GOE's target is Qadhafi and not Libyan people, nor even the army or security forces, subversive activities such as bombings and harassment could risk strengthening Qadhafi more than weakening him. Furthermore, they would undercut GOE line that clearly separates Libyan people from their "lunatic" ruler. While extent of GOE assets inside Libyan military are questionable, encouragement of assassination or military coup by RCC members would, if sufficient GOE capability exists, certainly be most painless ways to oust Qadhafi. If GOE has such a capability, the question is why hasn't it made use of it earlier. A coup attempt, coupled with Egyptian military action to give courage and protection to perpetrators, would be an attractive option.

7. GOE Intentions. GOE has [for] some time been preparing contingency plans for actions against Libya, but until recently there were few indications that a decision to take direct action was near. Now some of those indications are present, notably the press campaign violently attacking Qadhafi and implicating Soviets and the angry reaction of Sadat and senior security officials to the August 8 bombings, we believe some GOE move is likely. Although GOE has publicly ignored Qadhafi's threat to sever diplomatic relations on September 1, [it] is sending its new Ambassador to Tripoli in the next few days, and People's Assembly Speaker Sayid Mar'i received new head of Libyan Relations Office Ambassador Aboul Qadir Ghoka August 12. All of these moves could be a ruse to reassure Qadhafi of continuing Egyptian passivity.

8. In all options outlined above, we think a key to Egyptian thinking must logically be the removal of Qadhafi either by arrest or assassination, preferably by a Libyan with revolutionary credentials. If this were to materialize, GOE thinks LARG would crumble. However, GOE capacity to mount either assassination or military coup is believed to be limited, and, even if it were to happen, it would probably have to be accompanied by Egyptian military-political action. Ideally, Egyptian armed forces would be invited to move in not just by Muhayshi and Al-Huni, but also by dissident RCC members and army officers now in place in Libya. Alternatively, Egyptians could move quickly to set up Al-Huni-Muhayshi "government" on Libyan territory from which they could appeal for massive Egyptian intervention. If Qadhafi was quickly disposed of, or is outside of Libya, GOE believes that it would face little opposition and a march to Tripoli would be unnecessary. If, however, coup failed, an all out military campaign as far as Tripoli would be required. In any case, we believe that if GOE decides on direct military action (and this is still a big if), it will do so on a massive scale with intention of finishing Qadhafi off within shortest possible time and enabling troops to withdraw quickly to eastern front. Libya will not be-

come Sadat's Yemen or Lebanon. A major consideration for any serious anti-Libyan action will be the support of Saudi Arabia. While we know Qadhafi threat has been discussed at highest levels of two governments, we are not privy to their content.

9. Ideal timing for Egyptian move would be when Qadhafi is abroad since, in GOE view, there would then be little opposition to his removal. However, to best of our knowledge Qadhafi not attending NAC in Colombo and he rarely leaves Libya these days.

10. Other options open to GOE are considerably less attractive, because they are unlikely to succeed in the sole objective of Egyptian strategy which is to eliminate Qadhafi. Formation of a government-in-exile and propaganda campaigns are unlikely alone or together to be effective and limited military action risks international opprobrium and a drawn out involvement on, for the Egyptian military, the wrong front.

11. Implications for US. As in past, Sadat is likely to make his decision on the basis of Egypt's strategic interests. The attraction of a friendly government in Libya and the elimination of Soviet presence there (given Sadat's perception that it is a threat to him), as well as access to Libyan oil wealth, are powerful incentives pushing Sadat toward decisive action. If these goals could be achieved, it would be very much in US interests as well as those of Western Europe. Sadat surely knows this and probably hopes he can count on US to counteract Soviet moves.

Eilts

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Washington, September 1, 1976.

QADHAFI: THE INCREASED THREAT

Summary

The evidence of Libyan involvement in several areas of the Middle East and Africa—especially Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Uganda—has increased markedly in recent months.

Qadhafi's activities demonstrate a new capability to go beyond isolated subversive or terrorist acts. The scope of Libyan support for Palestinian/leftist forces in Lebanon and the preparation of the coup attempt against Numayri suggest that the Libyan leader is no longer a fringe actor. With considerable wealth and military supplies at his disposal, Qadhafi is now in a position to exert a significant destabilizing influence on the course of events in the Middle East and Africa.

Qadhafi's position within Libya has deteriorated sharply within the past year. He is weak among the business and professional classes and has alienated the eastern Cyrenaica region, the major city of which is Benghazi. In the army there is general agreement that the Libyan patrimony is being spent lavishly in foolish foreign adventures.

In addition, Qadhafi's Arab and African neighbors are increasingly concerned over the growing Libyan threat to their internal security. Sadat has the capability to support a serious attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime, and he is furious about recent Libyan hijacking and bombings within Egypt. It is increasingly likely that the Egyptians may decide to move against Qadhafi.

Qadhafi's Objectives

Qadhafi is a complex Arab politician and a man of contradictions (devil and angel, as Sadat has said). A Bedouin, Qadhafi came to power without the softening influence of a transitional generation in contact with the modern world. His outlook remains essentially tribal, tempered only by four years at a military academy. As a Bedouin, he was

¹ Summary: This report summarized Qadhafi's increased involvement in the Middle East and Africa, and the growing concern of his Arab and African neighbors over the Libyan threat to their internal security.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Box 18, Libya (4). Secret; Noform; Nocontract. Drafted by John R. Damis in INR/RNA/NE; and approved by Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Philip H. Stoddard.

an outsider in Libyan society, and he retains the essentially confrontational outsider's view of the world.

Qadhafi fancies himself an intellectual, but while his verbal skills are high, his cultural and educational base is extremely thin. Although only 34 years old, Qadhafi has been in power for seven years. A practiced demagogue and a true believer in his naive Nasserist creed, he is a dangerous modern example of Carlyle's "terrible simplifiers."

Qadhafi's refusal to accept the established international order makes him a force for instability in the world. His political style seems to be based on an instinct to outbid his opponents in extremism. Typically his methods run heavily to subversion and terrorism.

With fanatical zeal, considerable political skill, and \$7 billion of yearly oil revenues, Qadhafi pursues the goal of Arab unity in a radicalized Arab world, both as an end in itself and as a necessary precondition for the destruction of the Israeli state. In addition, as a good Nasserist and Third Worlder, he has given high priority to extending Tripoli's influence in Africa, propagating the Islamic faith, and promoting revolutionary programs and regimes among Third World countries.

In the case of neighboring states to the south, particularly Chad and Niger, Tripoli has expansionist ambitions. With other African states in which a Muslim population is present, the Libyans believe they have a religious duty to promote Muslim political influence. Qadhafi was an important factor in bullying African states into breaking diplomatic relations with Israel, and his regime continues to demand (with some success) that its African relations take a radical, pro-Arab line at international meetings and at the UN.

Recent Libyan Activism

In the aftermath of the October war, Qadhafi found himself isolated and unpopular in the Arab world. He had sharply criticized the limited aims of Egypt and Syria during the war and then denounced their efforts to negotiate interim agreements with Israel. Qadhafi evidently decided in late 1973–early 1974 to build up Libya's independent subversive and interventionist capabilities. After unsuccessful attempts to buy arms from the US, Libya signed a \$730 million arms deal with the Soviets in the spring of 1974. This equipment, which far exceeds Libya's needs or capability to maintain or operate, is for use in continuing hostilities with Israel and in support of such "progressive" causes as the Polisario Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. In the process, it increases Qadhafi's leverage in the Middle East and Africa.

Since late 1975, Libyan-sponsored operations—long in the works—have demonstrated the seriousness of Libya's capability to use its large

financial resources and military equipment to influence the course of events in the Middle East and Africa in fundamental ways. This spring, there was a spate of subversive activity designed against each of Libya's neighbors (except for Algeria and Mali). In February and March, Qadhafi struck out at Tunisia and Egypt, which had been harboring his opponents and broadcasting anti-Qadhafi propaganda. In three maladroit operations, his commandos were caught, tried, and convicted in efforts to kidnap and/or assassinate his nominal Foreign Minister (in Rome), his former Planning Minister (in Cairo), and the Tunisian Prime Minister. Also in March and April, the Presidents of Niger and Chad accused Qadhafi of materially supporting abortive coup attempts against them.

In the past four months, Qadhafi has been active in the following areas:

Lebanon. Qadhafi has supported elements of both Lebanese leftists (Jumblatt and newer groups like the Lebanese Arab Army) and Palestinian groups in Lebanon. He has subsidized those groups whose current activities coincided with his views, and withheld supplies when he was displeased. Libya probably has contributed at least \$50 million–\$100 million to leftist and Palestinian Rejectionist forces in Lebanon in the past year. Until a few months ago, Qadhafi funneled the bulk of these supplies through Syria and Asad.

During April and May, Qadhafi was busy trying to build a rejectionist front of Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Iraq (plus the Palestinians), and his Prime Minister, Major Jalloud, was dispatched to whip together the necessary support for opening a "new front" on Israel's northern border. This dream collapsed when Syria, at odds with Iraq and in the midst of increased fighting against the Palestinians, effectively declined to join the new rejectionist front.

Jalloud was once again sent to the area, this time in an attempt to keep the Syrians from emasculating the Palestinian forces and to develop a "cease-fire." Approximately 200 Libyans were sent to Lebanon as part of the Arab League peacekeeping force. While the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that Qadhafi is critical of the role played by Jalloud, claiming that he failed to be firm with the Syrians and needed to push the Palestinian demands harder.

Libya has clearly exacerbated the Lebanese crisis by providing money and arms to the leftists/Palestinians, thereby increasing their ability to continue fighting the Syrian/Christian forces. Following the change in Syria's position, that country could no longer be used to deliver Soviet equipment going to the leftists/Palestinians. In addition to its own support, Libya may have become the conduit for transshipping Moscow's arms into Lebanon. Since the leftists/Palestinians have other sources of financial and material support, the Libyan input may not

have been a decisive factor in prolonging the war. On the other hand, Libya is the party least likely to abandon the leftists/Palestinians or to put pressure on them to compromise on vital issues, and Libyan support must have played a major role in stiffening their will to resist an accommodation.

Sudan. In early July, a major Libyan-backed coup attempt was made against the Numayri regime. The Libyans provided arms, money, and coordination to disparate groups totalling several hundred Sudanese exiles and others, who gathered in Libya and Eritrea to prepare for the attack. The effort probably took a year or more to prepare and was an uncharacteristically smooth operation.

According to the senior Egyptian diplomat in Tripoli, Qadhafi has long been adamant that he would topple Numayri, no matter how many attempts it took (this may have been the third). This source claims that Qadhafi has never forgiven Numayri's refusal in 1973 to allow Libyan planes and troops to proceed to Uganda to assist Amin.

Qadhafi's latest attempt came close to success. The outcome was very much in doubt until a key unit rallied to the regime. A major factor seems to have been the coup's initial setback in failing to kill or capture Numayri at Khartoum airport, though he only narrowly escaped assassination.

Egypt. Qadhafi has intensified his efforts to overthrow, or at least destabilize, the Sadat regime in recent months in response to Cairo's propaganda campaign utilizing former Libyan Planning Minister Muhayshi, who defected a year ago. In June, in a repetition of the unsuccessful operation in March, Libyan assassination and subversion teams were arrested in Cairo.

There was a dramatic increase in Libyan operations against Egypt during August, including the following:

- the bombing of a government building in the heart of Cairo on August 8. Egyptian security found that the saboteur who planted the two bombs was an Egyptian citizen who had been recruited and paid by Libyan intelligence while working in Libya.

- the bombing of a passenger train in Alexandria on August 14, killing 8 persons and injuring 51. While lacking positive proof, Egyptian officials assume from the type of explosive used that it was a Libyan-sponsored incident.

- the attempted hijacking of an internal Egypt Air flight from Cairo to Luxor on August 23, foiled by an effective rescue operation by Egyptian special forces. Egypt insists that the attempt was plotted by Libya and identified the three hijackers as two Palestinians and an Egyptian, all members of a Libyan sabotage operation.

- the arrest by Libyan officials on August 24 of two Egyptian security men aboard a chartered Egypt Air flight from Cairo to Tripoli, denounced by the Egyptians as an "act of air piracy."

Tunisia. Libya and Tunisia halted their propaganda war in late April as the result of Mauritanian mediation. The Tunisians were upset in June, when Qadhafi inaugurated a new airbase 19 miles from their border with a speech bragging of Libyan ability to reach all of North Africa by air. Later the same month, the Tunisians claimed that they discovered, among Tunisians being expelled from Libya, as many as 100 who had been recruited and trained by Qadhafi in his commando camps. The Libyans were reported to have made contact this spring with the Italian Mafia to assist in anti-Tunisian efforts. In the aftermath of the Sudan coup attempt, the Tunisians' anxiety rose. Intelligence reports of Libyan plans for a coup attempt against Bourguiba and/or sabotage plans for late July–early August led the Tunisians to seek and receive demonstrations of military support from the US, France, and Egypt.

It is doubtful that Libya would mount a military attack on Tunisia while its attention is focused on its border with Egypt. Although a coup attempt cannot be ruled out, it is more likely (and certainly easier) that Libyan efforts will continue to be in the nature of sabotage or terrorism.

Uganda. Qadhafi has rushed to support Idi Amin, a fellow Muslim and close ally, in the latter's current confrontation with Kenya. There are unconfirmed claims by Kenya that Libya sent 20 Mirages to Uganda. Tripoli did send radar equipment and may have sent some troops—Libyan or Palestinian—to serve as Amin's personal bodyguards. Libya has also agreed to supply Uganda with oil, though it would have great difficulty in airlifting even 10 percent of Uganda's needs—and that over intervening states which would not be likely to give overflight permission.

Other African States. There are reliable reports that the Libyan military has gotten bogged down in conflicts with the Muslim rebels in that part of northern Chad which Qadhafi has attempted to take over and administer for the past several years. Money and now materials reportedly have gone in the last two months through Mozambique for guerrilla operations against Rhodesia, and via Tanzania for operations against South Africa. In Tripoli the representatives of several African states, including Rwanda, Burundi, and Nigeria, have recently expressed growing concern about Libyan intentions in southern Africa which they consider dangerous to the stability of the area and to the regimes that they represent.

Other African states which are experiencing an influx of Libyan diplomats have indicated to US officials their concern over the possible Libyan use of their embassies for subversive activities. These are all developments which have been in the making for some time, and they reflect Qadhafi's determination to increase his political status as a Third World leader and, in some cases, to see installed more compliant

leaders, Muslim groups, or a more progressive leadership. In the case of Kenya, according to a well-placed source, the Libyans are currently engaged in full-scale planning to overturn the present Kenyan Government in favor of one more sympathetic to Libyan aims.

Terrorism and the Palestinians. Libya has for several years been training guerrillas from the PFLP and other Palestinian groups and from other Arab countries as well as its own personnel to execute terrorist operations. It has also provided funds and the use of its diplomatic facilities (e.g., passports, communications, pouch) to support these operations. The Libyan Embassy in Brussels issued the weapons for the operation last December against OPEC oil ministers, and it provides the logistical support for terrorist operations in Europe.

Qadhafi has supported the use of terrorism as part of the war against Israel. While his reputation for maintaining a broad terrorist network probably overstates his capability, he may have allocated \$100 million to Black September and \$40 million to other Palestinian groups involved in terrorism, such as the PFLP. There has been a past pattern of Libyan support for terrorist operations directed at Israeli aircraft and passengers, including the attacks at Athens in August 1973 and Rome in December 1973. Although the reports of direct Libyan involvement in the Uganda hijacking in July are not fully confirmed, the participation of the Carlos and PFLP networks, as well as the plane's landing in Libya, strongly indicate that there was Libyan involvement. More recently, the Libyans were apparently involved in the August 11 attempted hijacking of an El Al airliner at Istanbul airport.

Qadhafi has probably taken non-Libyans from his commando training camps to mount several ad hoc operations, such as those the Tunisians have complained of. His use of Libyan commandos in his three kidnap/assassination attempts in March backfired and exposed him to ridicule. Future terrorist missions—especially the hijackings—will probably use the group of international professional terrorists who carried out the operation against OPEC headquarters. (Carlos himself is believed to have established his terrorist base in Libya in December 1975 following the OPEC kidnapping.)

The Increased Libyan Threat. Qadhafi's brand of interventionist foreign policy goes back virtually to the beginning of his regime in 1969. As the result of the careful development of commando training camps and terrorist/subversive links, he is now able to pull off more ambitious and dangerous operations. His activities during the past several months demonstrate a new capability to go beyond isolated subversive or terrorist acts—the difference between a hijacking and a coup attempt. In particular, the scope of Libyan support for Palestinian/leftist forces in Lebanon and the preparation and coordination of the coup attempt against Numayri suggest that Qadhafi is no longer a fringe actor.

With considerable wealth and military supplies at his disposal, Qadhafi is now in a position to exert a significant and destabilizing influence on the course of events in the Middle East and Africa.

Sources of Opposition to Qadhafi

Qadhafi's position within Libya has deteriorated sharply in the past year. Dissatisfaction with his dictatorial ways has always been rife in his own Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and in August 1975 he cracked down on a conspiracy to unseat him. Only four RCC members are still actively in the government, while his nominal Foreign Minister and several Ambassadors remain in self-imposed exile and several others have actively engaged in plotting against him. Qadhafi is weak among the business and professional classes and has alienated the eastern Cyrenaica region, the major city of which is Benghazi.

Precise information about the loyalty of the army is lacking. The younger members are probably less critical of Qadhafi, and they are members of the socio-economic group that has benefitted markedly from the regime's economic development programs. There is, however, general criticism among both old and young officers of the amounts being spent for foreign adventurism. Qadhafi, in turn, has come to have sufficient doubts about his military officers' loyalty that he has found it necessary to entrust key positions in the army and security apparatus to tribal relatives who owe him strict personal allegiance.

Despite growing criticism of Qadhafi within Libya and his increasing isolation from his present and former colleagues among the RCC and the larger Free Officers movement, there is no sign of any organized opposition to him. He is well guarded and has obviously taken precautions against coup attempts. Because of his own security system and the lack of viable leadership alternatives, it is doubtful that internal forces are strong enough by themselves to remove Qadhafi. It is more likely that foreign agents, especially Egyptians, would hope to utilize some of these forces to stage a coup.

In addition to his domestic opponents, Qadhafi's Arab and African neighbors are increasingly concerned over the growing Libyan threat to their internal security. That threat, particularly after the Libyan role in the attempted coup against Numayri, now appears to have become more urgent to a number of Arab leaders who have the capability to support serious attempts to overthrow the Libyan regime with a combined application of internal and external pressures. It is increasingly likely that they may decide to exercise that power.

Among the external forces perceiving a threat from Qadhafi, Egypt is especially well placed and equipped to make a move against him, or, short of that, to contain his foreign adventures. Shocked by the near

success of the coup attempt against Numayri and infuriated by the recent Libyan-sponsored hijacking and bombings within Egypt, Sadat has vowed to bring the Qadhafi regime down. Egypt has moved 20,000–30,000 troops with naval and air support into combat-ready positions near the Libyan border.

This buildup of Egyptian forces appears to be designed to encourage internal opposition against Qadhafi. If this proves insufficient to cause Qadhafi's downfall, Sadat appears prepared to use whatever military force is necessary, although he probably favors a limited military operation.

In sum, Qadhafi faces serious opposition internally, and he must fear the possibility that one or more of his hostile neighbors will somehow try to exploit this. The lack of viable leadership alternatives within Libya, plus Qadhafi's own security system, has thus far prevented his internal opposition from successfully moving against him, but it is increasingly likely that foreign agents, especially Egyptians, may stage a coup.

While he remains, however, Qadhafi can be expected to continue his interventionist operations. The series of recent setbacks in the Arab world may impel him to even more desperate foreign adventures. In Lebanon, for example, if the Palestinians fail to reach an accommodation with Damascus, Qadhafi may well bolster their sagging forces with a new supply of deadlier weapons. With his military option blocked by Egypt and Tunisia, it is probable that Qadhafi will depend mainly on his terrorist and subversive capabilities to attack his foreign opponents.

55. Telegram 219041 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, September 3, 1976, 1438Z.

219041. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: Message to Fahmy on Libya. Ref: Cairo 11854. Please pass the following message from me to Fahmy.

Begin text: Dear Ismael:

Herman has conveyed to me your question about the US stance regarding Egypt and Libya. I want you to know that you and President Sadat have our fullest support, both public and diplomatic, in this situation. Please keep in touch with us and let us know what you think we should do to be helpful.

I send you and the President my warmest regards, and I look forward to seeing you on my return from the trip on which I am about to embark.

Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger.

Robinson

¹ Summary: Kissinger offered U.S. support to Sadat in response to deteriorating relations between Egypt and Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D760335–0357. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 11946 from Cairo, September 4, Eilts summarized a discussion with Fahmy regarding Egyptian plans to remove Qadhafi from power. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Egypt, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (49))

56. Backchannel Message 147 From the Ambassador to Egypt (Eilts) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Cairo, October 5, 1976, 0838Z.

1. Following is for Secretary Kissinger and you:

2. Fahmy has just passed on a request of President Sadat that we undertake an aerial photographic mission over Libya to ascertain location of any Soviet naval ships off the Libyan coast, Libyan troop and equipment dispositions in the area of the Libyan/Egyptian and Libyan/Sudanese frontiers and roads leading up to the borders. The President is particularly anxious to have any information on concentrations of tanks, heavy weapons and rockets. If we are able to set up such a mission, the President asks that we provide him with the results as quickly as possible.

3. I recall we once spoke of running an SR–71 mission over the area. Please let me know if we can lay on such a mission and, if so, when, so that I can respond to Sadat's request.

4. Warm regards.

¹ Summary: Eilts delivered a request from Sadat for the United States to monitor and report on Soviet activities in Libya.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 135, Geopolitical File, Egypt, Chronological File, October 1–31, 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Eyes Only.

57. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Mexico City, December 2, 1976, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

A. Kikhia (Libyan Permanent Representative to the United Nations)

Jock Covey, Notetaker

Kissinger: Did you want to use an interpreter?

Kikhia: No, we can do it in English. I think I can manage. You know we Libyans have a problem with languages. We were colonized by the Italians. I only started English under the British administration.

Kissinger: Do you speak Italian?

Kikhia: I understand it very well. I also speak French—and Arabic, of course.

Kissinger: How were the Italians as colonists?

Kikhia: Very bad, especially under Mussolini.

Kissinger: Very bad, you say? I did not realize . . .

Kikhia: Yes, it was a racist regime. They discriminated heavily against Arabs. There were laws that said no Arab could marry an Italian, and so on. There were two classes of citizens—national and the indigenous.

Kissinger: And the indigenous were the Arabs.

Kikhia: Yes, and all the laws were written in terms of indigenous and national people. It is for that reason that we joined the 8th Army and fought against the Italians. We were not so eager to fight against the Germans. We did not believe the stories about them. But the Italians were very bad. They exterminated 40 percent of our people. It was continuous guerrilla warfare. But now our relations with the Italians are good. After all, they are one of our neighbors.

Kissinger: And you just bought a big part of Fiat.

Kikhia: Yes. But, in general, people do not understand our Muslim background and how we feel. We did not have a chance for education under the Italians. When independence came, there were only five people in Libya who had University education. I was number four. But

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Libyan Ambassador Mansur Kikhia discussed the status of U.S.-Libyan relations.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 177, Geopolitical File, Libya 1973–76. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the American Embassy residence. Kissinger was in Mexico City to attend the inauguration of President Lopez Portillo.

now we have students everywhere. We have 2,500 students in the United States.

Kissinger: Really! Then why are our relations so complicated?

Kikhia: That is it! That is something many people do not understand. There are 5,000 Americans in Libya. There is the oil business and there are other businesses. There really are only two problems between us. The first is our Ambassadors. Last year we gave you a name but you have never accepted it. You have never responded to us. But we really need an Ambassador in Washington in order to talk.

The second problem, of course, is military equipment. You know the Libyan Air Force was created by the United States. After the revolution, we tried to keep the F–5 Squadrons. All our personnel were trained in the United States, but then the American supplies stopped so we had to liquidate it.

Kissinger: You are also buying massively from the Soviets.

Kikhia: No, not really. We have Mirages. But I am really talking about the cargo airplane.

Kissinger: The C–130.

Kikhia: Yes, the C–130. We tried for many years to accomplish this purchase. We decided not to give up and to get you to execute the contract. Last month I was told to lead a delegation to Washington to talk about this. We were told by the woman who manages your Libya Desk that there was no use in coming.

Kissinger: Were you authorized only to talk about the planes, or about general relations?

Kikhia: About the planes and about general relations.

Kissinger: I have to tell you in all honesty that there are several problems. In the first place your Government uses procedures we are not used to. I was told that you would be sending a delegation to Lockheed and wanted to stop off in Washington. I never understood the purpose of that mission. It was never clear to me that it was a serious effort.

Kikhia: But . . .

Kissinger: No. I just want to tell you how it appeared to me. And then, sometime ago, someone from the Revolutionary Council wanted to talk. He wanted me to come to New York. I said I could not, but Sisco could come to New York. Then he said o.k., I will come to Washington. We waited for him but he never came. The next thing we knew he had left. We never know why he asked for the appointment, or why he left.

Kikhia: That was Captain Muhaishi. He had some difficulty with the regime and now he is in Cairo. He is in charge of contacting Arab students to get them to work in Arab countries after they graduate. He

was here in that connection and at the same time maybe he wanted to try to do some other business.

Kissinger: I just have to tell you that this is the history—that this is the way it appears to us.

Furthermore, throughout the world, Libya has very actively and in some cases violently opposed the United States. Also in the UN you are very hostile to what we are trying to do. We could not avoid forming an opinion that many terrorists activities are financed and supported by Libya. But I am personally proud that during my period in office we have improved relations with the Arabs and I would like to improve relations with Libya.

Kikhia: Maybe these things are sometimes exaggerated in the mass media. We have a liberation movement in Libya. We cannot deny that but our role is exaggerated. Sometimes we have to act in self-defense. You know we read so much that was said against us. Even during the election campaign.

Kissinger: Especially during the campaign! (laughter)

Kikhia: There was Mondale who said that Libya must not be in the Security Council. And Javits has made a campaign against us. These things happen and you say this is only your free society. But now Mondale is the Vice President. You know that our leaders do not want to be intimidated by a big power. This you can understand. But if there is any effort toward peace we will try to help. And we hope the US will go one more important step and recognize the PLO. The United States wants to be the arbitrator between the two sides but it is very difficult for the Arabs to believe that America can change its commitment to Israel.

I think it would be a good thing in your relations with the Arabs if you would recognize the Palestinians. There is no solution without them.

Kissinger: All we want from them is that they recognize Israel's right to exist. If they do that, then there would be a new situation. We have always said that we were committed to the existence of Israel but we also say that we will do everything we can to help find a just peace in the Middle East. But a just peace does not mean the destruction of Israel.

On the other hand, we have brought about Israeli retreats in Syria and in Egypt, and next year we may be able to take another step. The Palestinian issue has a chance of resolution if they recognize Israel. After all, we have never supported the Israeli occupation of Arab territories.

Kikhia: You Americans are a big power. If you recognize the Palestinians you can talk to them and exert pressure on them. We, as Arabs, cannot betray the Palestinian cause.

Kissinger: We are not asking you to betray the Palestinian cause. We would never do that.

Kikhia: But in our bilateral relations we do not know what you expect from us.

Kissinger: We don't want you to give up supporting the PLO. That is given and we understand but those terrorists who killed 80 people in Rome came from Libya, and that is not necessary, to say the least. We want you to stop supporting these terrorists. Then we can have easier relations.

Kikhia: We have relations with many Arabs. Arabs from the left, and Arabs from the right. We cannot be responsible for the actions of all those Arabs we are supporting.

Kissinger: But we do not see why you have to support those who are known to be terrorists.

Kikhia: We support the Palestinians, of course. We know there are some inside the Palestinians who do these things and we have condemned them. In fact Qadhafi was very cruel. He wanted to apply the old Arab rules and cut the hands off of those who were in Rome. But we are a small country and it is sometimes difficult for us to defend ourselves. We have only a few aircraft ourselves and they are easily hijacked.

The other day Senator Javits said Libya was financing terrorists, and I say does he have proof? If we were doing that he should have proof. After all, you have over 5,000 Americans in Libya. You must know something of what we think and what we are doing. To accuse us of supporting terrorism is unfair.

Kissinger: You know, you should get together with Scranton in New York. He is a good friend and I have total confidence in him. You could review relations with him. You could get fresh instructions from Tripoli and then if you could present some concrete ideas, and we could come up with some concrete suggestions too.

Kikhia: Can I tell Tripoli that the problem of planes will be resolved in the context of our general relations?

Kissinger: You can certainly tell them that the problem of the Ambassadors will be handled in the context of our general relations, but I must tell you it is not sensible for the outgoing Administration to deal with the airplane question. But I would think that the new Administration could look into it on an early basis.

Kikhia: Yes. I will see Scranton.

Kissinger: Why don't you meet with him the middle of next week. By that time I will have talked to him myself.

End of Conversation

Morocco, 1973–1976

58. National Security Decision Memorandum 200¹

Washington, January 5, 1973.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Policy Toward Morocco, NSSM 160

Following the meeting of the Senior Review Group on Policy Toward Morocco November 30, 1972, the President has decided that the following views should guide our course of action in the coming months:

—Our ties with Morocco are of sufficient importance that we should be responsive to Moroccan requests that we reduce our presence at the communications facilities if this is needed to preserve our overall relationship. To this end, we should engage in negotiations with the Moroccan government at an early date concerning our continued use of communications and base facilities.

—We will continue to deal with the King as the focal point of authority and should take some steps to reassure him of continued U.S. support.

—In addition to reducing our presence and profile at the communications facilities we should make contingency preparations for transferring some communications activities outside of Morocco as early as possible.

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Summary: The memorandum lists Presidential decisions following the Senior Review Group meeting on Policy Toward Morocco, NSSM 160, November 30, 1972.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 315, National Security Council, National Security Memoranda, NSDM August 1972–March 1973. Secret. For NSSM 160 and the minutes of the November 30, 1972, Senior Review Group meeting see Documents 132 and 135 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–5, Part 2, Documents on Northern Africa, 1969–1972.

59. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, January 5, 1973.

SUBJECT

Morocco: Proposal to Send a Special Envoy to King Hassan

The reply to NSSM–160 on Morocco noted that in the months since his escape from assassination last August, King Hassan has remained shakily in power but has been unable to recover his former poise and authority. Preoccupied with continued internal and external threats to the monarchy, he has felt increasingly isolated at home and internationally. His present position has also produced two immediate problems which require our attention because of our continuing political and strategic interest in a moderate regime in Morocco.

First, the King fears that the United States may have lost confidence in him and be considering abandoning him. He harbors suspicions that we were somehow involved in, or had prior knowledge of, the August assassination attempt.

Second, in order to ease his domestic political problem, he has asked for a re-examination of the US military presence in Morocco. This is the Kenitra naval communications complex, which currently handles the bulk of US naval communications to the Mediterranean and South Atlantic areas. He apparently is not insisting on our withdrawal, but does want a substantial revision of our presence to ease his internal problems and public evidence of clearer benefits to Morocco from it. He may also be raising the issue now in order to test our intentions toward him personally.

We have recently received through intelligence channels indications that the King continues to be seriously concerned about these two problems and that he desires to receive a special envoy, who could speak on behalf of the President, to discuss them. He would also like to send a special representative of his own to Washington.

¹ Summary: Rogers informed Nixon of King Hassan's desire to receive a special envoy to examine the U.S. military presence in Morocco, and his concern over a perceived change in U.S.-Moroccan relations. Rogers suggested that Robert Murphy serve as special envoy.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 758, Presidential Correspondence, Morocco. Secret. In a letter dated January 15, Nixon informed King Hassan of Murphy's mission. (Ibid.) In telegram 12132 to Rabat, January 19, the Department instructed the Embassy to arrange a private meeting between Murphy and King Hassan. (Ibid., NSC Country Files for Africa, Box 740, Morocco, Vol. II) In telegram 13960 to Rabat, January 24, the Department provided instructions to Murphy for his meeting with King Hassan. (Ibid.)

There is no doubt that the King's position in Morocco is, at the moment, shaky. There is, however, no immediate threat apparent to his rule. The traditional political leaders are in disarray. The army, although sullen, is apparently under control. From our standpoint, there seems no visible alternative that could protect our own interests as well. The King, now, as in the past, has shown himself impervious to advice regarding his method of rule. We must accept him as he is. While weighing the disadvantages of being identified with a monarchical regime whose days could well be numbered, we have concluded that it is in our interests to take this risk and to take those feasible steps which can demonstrate our support for the King.

Following the review of NSSM-160 and prior to receiving this latest indication of the King's desires, we had been considering the possible advantages to us of sending a special envoy to the King. Alex Johnson had explored the matter with Robert Murphy, who indicated he would be willing to go to Morocco in mid-January in a private capacity to convey assurances of our continued interest and support to King Hassan. Thus, a mid-January visit by Mr. Murphy would coincide with our own desires and the King's.

In conveying assurances of our continued friendship and support to the King, Mr. Murphy could also express our willingness to explore with his government ways in which our military presence could be adjusted to ease his political problems. I enclose suggested instructions to Mr. Murphy to meet these objectives, and also a draft suggested letter from you to King Hassan, delivery of which would constitute an essential part of Mr. Murphy's mission.

This proposed action has been coordinated with the Department of Defense.

Recommendation

1. That Robert Murphy be asked to undertake a special mission to King Hassan.
2. That you approve the draft instructions to Ambassador Murphy.
3. That you sign the proposed letter to King Hassan.

William P. Rogers

60. Letter From Robert Murphy to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, February 1, 1973.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Agreeable to your instructions I visited Rabat, Morocco, on January 28 and 29, 1973, and enjoyed the hospitality of Ambassador and Mrs. Stuart Rockwell at the Embassy Residence. The Ambassador and his staff provided accommodation and access to the relevant Embassy files, together with their advice and comments regarding the political, economic, military and other aspects of the local situation. The events of 1971 and 1972 incident to the attempts on the life of King Hassan were fully explained. Information regarding the purpose of my mission was restricted to the Ambassador.

Ambassador Rockwell, on January 29, easily arranged an appointment for an informal private meeting with the King and myself as the only ones present. It was agreed that that type of *tete-a-tete* meeting would best lend itself to freer communication by the King. Moroccan protocol representatives called for me at the Embassy Chancery and conducted me to the Palace in Rabat where the King immediately received me at the entrance to the courtyard and conducted me to a reception room where no one else was present. He was effusively friendly and seemed eager for the meeting.

After an exchange of amenities and delivery to him of President Nixon's letter, accompanied by a French translation, there was a pleasant exchange of souvenirs of the days of World War II, the Anfa Conference and about his Father Mohammed V for whom I happened to have a high regard at the time. We dwelt quite a bit on a small dinner President Roosevelt at Anfa gave for the then Sultan very much to the annoyance of the French Resident General Nogues, and at which the President made it quite clear that he considered the day of the French Empire as ending and the independence of Morocco inevitable. Mr. Churchill who also attended the dinner did not seem to relish that aspect.

We talked, too, about the King's health because at this time of year he suffers from sinus infection or irritation with what seemed to me a cigarette cough as he is a chain smoker. I assumed the role of father

¹ Summary: Murphy reported on his January 29 meeting with King Hassan, during which they discussed the U.S. military presence in Morocco. Murphy gave an analysis of the discussion and suggested a higher profile for U.S.-Moroccan relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 758, Presidential Correspondence, Morocco. Secret. The report was forwarded to Nixon, February 7, under a covering memorandum from Rogers.

confessor, telling him I stopped smoking in Algiers during World War II, with benefit to my health, and all one needed to do was to take a decision. He said he would think it over.

Then the King launched into a ten minute monologue on American-Moroccan relations interlarded with many expressions of admiration for President Nixon, admiration for the latter's success in the Vietnamese question and the importance the King attached to a close Moroccan-American relationship. He asserted that at the present juncture a definition of the relationship is of urgent mutual importance, and that there is a choice of three types of relationship: (1) a system of exchange of information and points of view; (2) a situation where Morocco and the United States are close friends and allies; or (3) some form of agreed association.

He expressed the hope that after his Foreign Minister's return from his current visit to Moscow, the Minister could visit Secretary Rogers for a discussion of the problem. I said that I felt sure Secretary Rogers would be most cooperative but that I was ignorant of his immediate schedule during the coming weeks. I would inform him of the King's thought and suggestion.

This led to an opportunity to inquire whether on the King's part, incident to the two attempts on his life, he entertained any suspicion or doubt concerning American involvement in *whatever* form that might be. The King vehemently and categorically denied he had ever entertained any suspicion that Americans were involved or responsible; in fact, he is confident there was none.

At this point the King said he had decided, however, to cancel the sending of "stagiaires" (Moroccan military personnel for training and study) to the U.S. This in no sense, the King emphasized, represents any doubt regarding the American attitude; it simply means that in sending young Moroccan military personnel the majority of whom come from modest, even primitive peasant background, with very little if any knowledge of the world, they are exposed to a free society with a much higher standard of living, even opulence, which they enjoy—from the drugstore type of availability, to the home life of America with automobiles, television and the lot. After that, with stars in their eyes, they return to the often primitive condition of their parents in the Moroccan countryside. Their reactions range all the way from numb dissatisfaction to outrage and a readiness to rebel. The King said he had no doubt this feature played a role but that it is not to be construed as any witting official American attitude, and he has no suspicion whatsoever of subversion on our part.

The King said also that his feeling about the French is different. We had been talking about the former French Resident General Nogues,

and the frustration the French suffered in the postwar period, their loss of status, and the development of a rejected mistress complex. The King said there is a growing tendency on their part to influence and even dominate certain aspects, as in the educational field. Of course their investment in Morocco is about three billion dollars equivalent, and the French colony has grown again to its present ninety thousand. (The American investment, is a modest \$50 million.) While the King did not in any way specifically blame French influence for the incidents, there was a rather subtle connection in the way the King brought it up. There was no hint or suggestion of Russian involvement even though the U.S.S.R. now has about 140 officials and technicians in Rabat, Casablanca and scattered around among projects under construction, etc. Russian interest in this gateway to the Western Mediterranean is obvious, and they are no doubt fully cognizant of Moroccan venality.

After having received the King's assurance that he in no way suspected Americans, there was opportunity at three different times to inquire, which I did, whether the King had any specific suggestion for adjustments of the present situation at the U.S. Naval Communications Center at Kenitra (Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel). Each time the King avoided a direct reply and passed on to points he had in mind. For example, the King deplored that our military personnel lived apart from the Moroccan community at Kenitra, with their own Church, post office, PX and Commissary, etc.,—a sort of sovereignty within a sovereignty as he expressed it. Morocco is well off in foodstuffs, fruits and vegetables, yet our people preferred canned American products. He thinks that unfortunate. I mentioned we had had similar reactions in other countries. But the King did not ask that anything be done about it, or that there should be a reduction in official staff or dependents. He said that Moroccan opposition from time to time criticized his tolerance in this regard. This did not seem to disturb him.

The King made a reference to a retired American Marine Colonel (John Canton) residing in Morocco as the type of American who understood Moroccan ways and problems, and who inspired confidence. We should have more Americans like that living here. In that same connection the King made a complimentary reference to Ambassador Henry Tasca who, he said, always gave him a direct answer.

The King, at this point, referred to an American intelligence report relayed to him via an intelligence officer (Dlimi) in his household [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The King said that it consisted of several papers containing numerous inaccuracies and distortions regarding his own household and the internal Moroccan political situation. The King said that he was dismayed that the American Government would disseminate such false and misleading statements even though they were

made by others than Americans. I said that I was not aware of the report but would make an immediate inquiry.

[1 paragraph (28 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

Perhaps it is hasty to form a conclusion based on one conversation, but I certainly left with the distinct impression that barring some unhappy incident, we could continue quietly along at Kenitra.

About this time the King dwelt a little on the Maghreb and the good fortune of having Qadhafi of Libya out of it. The King, with a contemptuous gesture, said Qadhafi is "*un fou*" who doesn't know what to do with the large amounts of money which have poured into his country; that he doubts Qadhafi's ability to hold power. The King made no reference to the recent visit of his Foreign Minister to Moscow, and I did not refer to it. I am sure this will be explained when and if Benhima meets with Secretary Rogers.

As the conversation had continued for almost an hour and a half, I took the initiative to thank the King for the warmth of his reception, and renewed expression of our sympathetic interest in his many problems. At departure he repeated expressions of his high regard for President Nixon and Secretary Rogers.

Conclusion: While the King demonstrated confidence and assurance, with no complaint whatever for the bad luck of the attempts on his life, the problems of corruption in his entourage, or his failure to attain a broad-based government, it is clear to me, I believe, that there is a strong yearning on his part for restoration of his prestige, and a desire to be treated by us on a level with countries like Iran or Spain, for example. Perhaps he has more than an average amount of personal pride, and we should act accordingly. While I touched lightly on American policy resulting from our budgetary imbalance and huge international obligations, the deficit in our balance of trade and payments, we have a problem to stimulate adjustment of Moroccan thinking to the present situation. We should exploit every opportunity, where possible, without expenditure of funds, to reassure Hassan personally of our high regard for Morocco, and associate ourselves with appropriate problems.

The question of the Spanish Sahara did not arise.

After this conversation, Ambassador Rockwell and I dined with the King's brother, Prince Moulay Abdullah, and a half dozen officials in a very relaxed and friendly atmosphere of no especial political significance except that the host could not have acted in a more pro-American fashion. Ambassador Rockwell tells me that Moulay Abdullah, who was painfully wounded by a bullet which hit his elbow in the Skhirat assassination attempt, demonstrated at the time great

bravery and poise. Again, Moulay Abdullah also obviously entertains no suspicion of American involvement.

Respectfully yours,

Robert Murphy

**61. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Schlesinger to the President's Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)**

Washington, March 6, 1973.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A, OPI 10, Box 5. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

62. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 30, 1973, 2:30–2:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ahmed Benhima, Foreign Minister of Morocco
Badreddine Senoussi, Ambassador of Morocco
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

Foreign Minister Benhima expressed pleasure in the opportunity to meet with Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the President was very sorry that he had not been able to receive the Foreign Minister. He had had to cancel all

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Benhima discussed U.S.-Moroccan relations. Benhima expressed Morocco's desire for a greater role in the Western Mediterranean, and improved credit conditions for arms procurement. Kissinger agreed that Morocco might play a larger regional role and asked for concrete ideas on improving bilateral relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco Vol. II. Secret. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

of his appointments the previous day to prepare for his nation-wide speech marking the end of the Vietnam war and, because of his departure for San Clemente this afternoon, had had to concentrate a number of appointments in a very short period of time today.

The Foreign Minister said that he was grateful to the President for his having asked Dr. Kissinger to receive him.

Dr. Kissinger continued that the President had wanted him to see the Foreign Minister and to communicate the extreme importance which we attach to our relations with Morocco.

The Foreign Minister said that King Hassan appreciated those sentiments which had also been expressed in the President's most recent letter to His Majesty. The King had also appreciated the President sending Ambassador Robert Murphy to see him.

The Minister explained that in recent months US-Moroccan relations had "crossed" some points of "reserve", and direct contacts were valuable in providing opportunity for explaining on both sides why the relationship has reached this point. The President's invitation for the Foreign Minister to come to Washington and the Murphy visit to Rabat had given the King an opportunity to explain his view of what had happened.

The Minister said that the main point on the King's mind is to find out what will be US interests in relation to Moroccan policies in three areas—national policy, foreign relations and economic progress.

On the question of national policy, the Foreign Minister explained that the King had some time ago embarked on a policy of greater liberalism in domestic politics than existed elsewhere in the North African area. This experiment did not succeed. Some opposition leaders had used this liberalization against the government, not to move toward greater democracy as the King had intended. Referring to the two attempts on the King's life, he noted that the government had had "two bad experiences" over the last two years and also had detected Libyan-trained guerrillas infiltrating into Morocco through Spain and Algeria. The King had decided that he had to reverse the trend toward greater liberalization and concentrate on restoring authority.

Turning to foreign relations, the Foreign Minister expressed Moroccan feeling that the Western Mediterranean is a key area. Its security is important to US interests as well as for the defense of Morocco. The King would like to know how the US views its interests there and what kind of cooperation among the US, Morocco and other partners in the area might be possible in maintaining its security. Morocco feels that it can play a role, perhaps with Spain, not only in the Western Mediterranean area but perhaps also in the Western Sahara, Mauritania and Senegal.

On the question of domestic development—"prosperity," as the Minister calls it—the Minister pointed out that Morocco's needs are so significant that it is not easy to meet them with Morocco's own resources. At the same time, it is necessary to preserve armed forces which can provide national security and the defense of Morocco's borders. Sometimes US credit conditions make it difficult for Morocco to procure military equipment from the United States. Morocco is getting some of its arms from the USSR, but this is purely a "commercial choice and not a political choice." If the US could look at this aspect of Moroccan security, it would help because Morocco prefers US arms.

The Foreign Minister concluded by saying that these are the main points in the Moroccan view at this time. His Majesty is very interested in taking the first possible opportunity to see the President. However, he cannot move from the country at this point. He has assumed direct charge over his programs there. However, if the President were to travel to the area, the King would appreciate it very much if the President could stop in Morocco for a day or two. In the meantime, Dr. Kissinger would be most welcome to come to Morocco under any conditions he might choose. The King believes in direct contact.

In sum, the Minister said that Moroccans want to understand what relationship they will have with the United States. They want to know whether it will be an old friendship with relations "good but empty" or whether Morocco and the United States will be associates in some new venture.

Dr. Kissinger said that he also believed in direct contact. The President would certainly give very careful consideration to a visit to Morocco as his travel plans become firmer. Dr. Kissinger said that he also would consider a visit to Morocco.

Dr. Kissinger said that "we in this building" agree that Morocco might play a role in the Western Mediterranean such as Iran plays at the other end of the region. He noted that he had personally not been able to become deeply involved in the question of US-Moroccan relationships. He had held meetings on the question of the military bases but he felt that that was not the central issue, for that issue would fall into place.

As for his own travel, he said that he is trying at this point not to move around as much as he had in the past. However, he may go to Europe from time to time. He noted that he had always been fascinated with Morocco and at one point had even attempted to arrange a vacation there. He said that he would certainly keep very much in mind a visit to Morocco. He said that in principle he would be happy to make such a stop if he were in Europe at some point. "We can aim for this."

On the question of the US-Moroccan relationship, he said that he did not feel that the real issue is the question of legal documents or alli-

ances. The real issue is what kind of relationship we have. He said that he hoped the Moroccans would communicate any precise ideas they might have.

Dr. Kissinger asked the Foreign Minister to tell His Majesty that we greatly appreciate his sending the Foreign Minister to Washington. He hoped that the Foreign Minister would convey to His Majesty that Dr. Kissinger finds it “inconceivable” that there could have been any US connection with the coup attempts in Morocco. We in the US have always identified Moroccan stability with the King’s regime, and the US has a strong interest in Moroccan stability. He assured the Minister that the King’s government will never be under pressure from the US to adopt any particular domestic course of action, nor will he have to be concerned about the US consorting with his opposition. To reiterate, he hoped that the Minister would let us know whatever concrete ideas he might have on the question of our longer term relationship.

In parting, the Foreign Minister again thanked Dr. Kissinger and the President for his reception in the White House. He knew that King Hassan would be very pleased.

Harold H. Saunders

63. Telegram 1665 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, April 12, 1973, 1200Z.

1665. Subject: Secretary Newsom and King Hassan Discuss US-Moroccan Relations and Events in Algeria and Libya.

1. Summary. King seeks cooperation with US like that existing between US and Iran and Saudi Arabia; needs justification for US military presence which security risk for him; wants US help to expand Moroccan influence in Muslim Black Africa; discusses Moroccan relations with Algeria and Libya. End summary.

¹ Summary: The Embassy summarized the discussion between King Hassan and Newsom regarding U.S.-Moroccan relations. King Hassan sought greater economic and military assistance from the United States and expressed concerns about Algeria and Libya.

Source: Washington National Records Center, ODS Files: FRC 330–800024, Box 2, Morocco, February 1973–December 1977. Secret. Repeated to Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Paris.

2. On April 10 King Hassan received Secretary Newsom and me for cordial meeting which lasted an hour.

3. King began by expressing thanks for fine atmosphere surrounding Foreign Minister Benhima's visit to Washington. He particularly grateful for friendly attitude toward himself personally which FonMin had reported.

4. King said he sought cooperation between US and Morocco such as existed between US and Iran and US and Saudi Arabia. He thought same kind of problems existed in all three regions. Iran faced problem of subversion from Iraq and Soviet pressure; Saudi Arabia had its problems with radical Arabs and effects of Middle East conflict; Morocco faced subversion by Libya and uncertainty concerning Algeria's intentions. US had "crossroads" in Tehran and Riyadh; he would like it to have similar "crossroad" in Rabat.

5. He had told Ambassador Murphy that US and Morocco could be casual acquaintances, friends, or associates and that he greatly preferred latter. Murphy had said he had no authority but was sure President preferred latter category as well.

6. Turning to US military facilities in Morocco, King said he was not among those who say "go home" to Americans. Nonetheless he had nothing to justify to Moroccan man in street US military presence, which did not benefit Morocco directly. If this presence could be related to meaningful global aid program, man in street might even say give American more bases if they want. As it was, however, facilities were "security risk" for King.

7. King went on to say he did not wish Morocco to remain in present "narrow jacket." Moslem countries of Black Africa had religious interest in Morocco and in him personally. He would like to expand Moroccan influence in those countries to counter colonialist French influence and that of Algeria. He would like to send books, doctors and teachers. If he had forty years of peace and the money that Algeria had, he could transform Moslem Black Africa into area which would look toward Morocco, a development which he believed would be in US interest. However, he did not have resources for this enterprise and wanted US help.

8. King said he realized Executive Branch had problems with Congressional restrictions but believed President could divide total amount of funds provided by Congress for foreign assistance as he saw fit.

9. Newsom said he grateful to King for receiving him. Reception we had given Benhima in Washington and Newsom's presence here revealed our continuing support for King Hassan and our best wishes for his efforts in promoting development and stability of Morocco. Our attitude toward Morocco arose from past tradition of friendly relations,

from Morocco's strategic location, and from our general accord with the policies of King Hassan.

10. USG had sought through recent contacts, including Murphy Mission and Benhima's visit Washington, to reinforce ties and to clarify Moroccan views concerning relationship. We now understood King wanted "global" approach rather than concentration on arrangements at Kenitra. We accepted this, however we had limitations on our resources and certain major priorities such as Viet-Nam and establishment of peace in Southeast Asia. Despite this, President does not want to neglect our other friends, especially those in such important part of world as North Africa. In this context we wish to discuss how we can strengthen our cooperation with Morocco. Military assistance is a real problem, but we will do our best. We will hope to do more in context five year plan. Newsom stressed to King that Congress does make specific allocations of aid which cannot be substantially altered by Executive Branch. Nonetheless he assured King of US interest in his success, in stability of Morocco, and of our understanding of his problems.

11. King said that Morocco approved of US policy toward Algeria. "It would be easier to capitalize Algeria than to socialize Morocco." The more Algeria became concerned with economic development, the less would be its interest in adventurism. Therefore El Paso Agreement was fine, "but please don't forget Morocco."

12. King said he wished ask President Nixon to request "that madman" Qadafi of Libya to be less crazy. US should tell Qadafi it is with its money he is working and not to work against friends of US. King asserted Libya training opposition subversives for operations against Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Iran, Sudan and Jordan. He has budgeted \$40 million for this work. King was certain Libya would not nationalize US oil interests since it could not operate oil industry by itself. He said Libyans were employing Greek and French mercenaries. Libyan subversion was cause for real concern.

13. Referring to Algeria, Newsom said King helped start process of bettering US-Algerian relations three years ago when he facilitated Secretary Rogers' meeting with Algerian Ambassador in Rabat. We are seeking positive elements for effective relationship with Algeria such as Gass Agreement but have many more areas of understanding with Morocco than with Algeria. We would not forget Morocco.

14. Newsom said Libya also causes US grave concern. Problem was as King had described—returns from US private investment were being used to provide Qadafi with extraordinary power. US ability act extremely limited. He asked King whether he thought Libyan policy was personal with Qadafi or reflected sentiment of his collaborators. King said Qadafi only had support of Jallud and Haweidi—all other members of RCC wanted to return to Maghrebian cooperation. King re-

ferred to agreement to resume normal relations with Morocco which had been reached with Al Huni via Moroccan Ambassador to Rome, only to be reversed by Qadafi.

15. Newsom asked if King thought Boumediene was resisting Libyan efforts to work against Morocco. King said Boumediene had refused several Libyan requests to cooperate against Morocco but nonetheless arms had crossed Algeria into Morocco. Either Boumediene knows or he doesn't know. First instance would be grave for Algeria and Morocco; second would be graver for Algeria since arms for use against Boumediene might also be circulating. Future of Morocco's relations with Algeria uncertain. If Algeria proves sincere, border agreement signed by King will be ratified by Moroccan parliament. If Algeria proves hostile, King will sacrifice a dam and some economic development and re-arm to defend his country.

Rockwell

64. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 5, 1973, 3:45–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Morocco
Foreign Minister Benhima
Ambassador Senoussi

U.S.
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary
David Newsom
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Mrs. Sophie Porson, Interpreter

SUBJECTS

US-Moroccan bilateral relations; Maghreb regional security problems; Spanish Moroccan relations; Arab-Israeli dispute

[There was a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.]

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Benhima discussed U.S.-Moroccan relations, security in the Maghreb, and the Spanish Sahara.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 271, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, October 1973. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors.

Benhima: Mr. Secretary, I know that your time is even shorter here than it used to be in Washington. I appreciate being able to see you. I won't keep you very long. I want to convey the greetings of my Government, of His Majesty, and my own.

We know that your arrival at the Department of State is an important event for the world, and we expect the same quality of work as we saw in the post you already held.

US-Moroccan Bilateral Relations

As for relations between Morocco and the United States, since my useful meetings with you and Secretary Rogers in March, relations have been satisfactory between our two countries. Nevertheless, I understand there are certain difficulties.

Kissinger: Which? PL 480?

Benhima: It has to do with economic assistance. We understand the problem on the part of Congress. If Congress doesn't permit an increase in aid through the normal process, then we hope that the question of the leased bases on our soil will be reassessed, perhaps favorably.

Kissinger: [to Newsom:] Is that possible?

Newsom: It is possible. We have already made use of that in sustaining the levels. We're very conscious of the link between the two, and so is the Congress.

Benhima: Morocco is now in the process of a Five-Year Plan, a very ambitious one.

Newsom: We have given the Government of Morocco a figure on economic aid at the current level. The Minister of Planning is coming here. Before going to the Congress, we will be able to review the Minister's plan and do what we can.

Benhima: I ought to indicate to you that it is still possible to do other things.

Kissinger: We attach great importance to our relations with Morocco, as I told you last time. Whatever is humanly possible, we will do. We will look at it again when your Minister comes here.

Newsom: One problem is PL 480. We are short, and this is a problem for every country.

Benhima: We have been seeking grain on the open market but cannot get enough. We need about one million tons, and can only get 600,000.

Maghreb Regional Security Problems

On security, progress in our cooperation between Washington and Rabat is very good. There have been some military missions. These have enabled Morocco to consider its regional and domestic problems.

There are two small particular problems. We have a very critical situation with Algeria. We don't want to bring the US into a quarrel with our neighbor, but we think you should be informed because of our friendship. We want to call this to your attention. I will leave a detailed document with you. [Tab A] In March we stopped a group of people passing into Morocco with arms, Russian arms, from Libya carried through Algeria, to be given to subversive elements. They were Russian arms from Egypt to Libya.

His Majesty had wanted to call the attention of Boumediene to this transit of arms. Boumediene professed to desire good relations with Morocco but we could not believe they were unaware of this transit. We gave all our information to him. He promised to make an investigation. But no reply or comment was ever received. We then asked Bou-teflika to come, and told him the same information, but with the same result. The first group was captured, tried and executed. Two weeks ago, we found the same type of arms—the same bags, etc., and the same itinerary.

His Majesty wrote a letter to Algeria. He said that we had resolved the border conflict in order to help avoid big-power involvement. We didn't want a big-power confrontation. This was our sacrifice, in the interests of not making the Mediterranean a crisis area. But now the Russians are at Mers el-Kebir. We had never allowed people to pass through Morocco who were hostile to Algeria. We want to resolve problems locally, to preserve stability in the region.

We don't know what this means. Our relations had been satisfactory. But Algeria is next to Libya. There seems to be a rapprochement between Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia, without us, which may be a problem for us. We don't want you to solve it, but we want you to be informed. We don't understand why Algeria is doing this. It may be that they want to woo Qaddafi away from Egypt. But I don't see the point, because the Egyptians don't want him anyway.

Kissinger: What could we do if we wanted?

Benhima: You could perhaps speak to them. You could congratulate Morocco and Algeria for solving their local problems, and signal to Algeria that you want the region to be a region of peace. Although we don't want to compromise our economic development, we could be forced to turn to arms. If they seek arms from the East, we will seek arms from the West, and then they will seek arms, and so on, if an arms race starts.

Kissinger: Your impression is that Algeria will pay any attention to what we think?

Benhima: They'll at least pay some attention to friendly advice.

Kissinger: You say Rush is going to Morocco?

Newsom: No, but he is going to Tunisia. If we have any influence it's with Tunisia. And they're very active.

Kissinger: Why?

Newsom: Because their Foreign Minister sees prospects of encouraging Maghreb unity.

Kissinger: That has nothing to do with arms shipments.

Newsom: Right, but if we have influence, it's with them.

This last shipment was during the Algiers Non-Aligned Conference?

Benhima: No, after.

Kissinger: When did we get the information?

Benhima: It's here [in this paper]. I think your agencies have it.

Kissinger: Good.

Newsom: I spoke with Bouteflika in April. I have the impression that Algeria listens to us on economic matters but not on political.

Benhima: We'd like to go straight ahead with the Five-Year plan. We are at a serious take-off stage.

Newsom: Have you ratified the frontier accords with Algeria?

Benhima: No, not yet. They have no Parliament.

Moroccan-Spanish Relations

Another point I want to raise: We have friendly relations with Spain, and cooperation. Morocco and Spain have some problems now. We have hoped that relations would develop in the interests of global and regional security. But there are certain problems. We are preoccupied with the [Spanish] Sahara. Spain seems to be thinking now of independence for it. We ask, why should it be independent? It is a country of 45,000 people, two-thirds uneducated. It controls the sea routes. I don't want you to think that Morocco wants it for itself. We asked Spain what its intentions were. They were not clear.

Kissinger: Why do they do it?

Benhima: They are obliged to be for decolonization—because they need the support of Africans against the United Kingdom on Gibraltar. Spain is saying it should be independent. We are against all liberation movements; we fear infiltration. We would prefer the status quo, but Spain wants to act quickly. We won't participate in this liberation movement. We have told Spain that the security of the Western Mediterranean is indivisible. Spain has said to us that security in the north-west Mediterranean is separate from security in the Atlantic. I think it's in the middle of the question of the security of the region.

It is a question of whether we can concentrate on economic problems or the questions of arms. We don't want to compromise our

efforts by again placing priorities on buying arms. We don't want to be forced to change our policy.

Newsom: The problems are related. Algeria, Mauritania and Libya are pressing for liberation of the territory.

Benhima: If this goes, it will be the first place between Oslo and the Cape on the Atlantic that is not pro-West. Algeria wants access to the Atlantic. Morocco doesn't want to be isolated or encircled, as the French did against Algeria.

Kissinger: That is an interesting point.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

65. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Jordan) to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State (Weiss)¹

Washington, April 13, 1974.

Dear Sey:

(S) As a result of the re-assessment of the Africa Bureau and our Ambassador to Morocco that our planned withdrawal from Kenitra by the end of 1976 would have serious implications for our relations with King Hassan, coupled with the uncertainty of next year's base rights negotiations with Spain, Secretary Schlesinger has approved the following position:

—Plans for our withdrawal from Morocco and related upgrading of Rota should be held in abeyance until after the Spanish negotiations and that a re-evaluation of our position in both countries should be made at that time. This delay, of course, would be contingent upon King Hassan's continued favorable disposition to our military presence.

(U) If this is agreeable with the Department of State, I recommend that you inform the NSC Staff of our revised planning.

Sincerely,

Amos A. Jordan

¹ Summary: Jordan informed Weiss of Schlesinger's decision to delay plans for a military withdrawal from Morocco.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–780011, Box 68, Morocco 1974. Secret.

66. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Jordan) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements)¹

Washington, April 18, 1974.

SUBJECT

Proposed Reply to Moroccan Foreign Minister—ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) During Monday's meeting, Foreign Minister Benhima asked that we let him know by this evening our decision on the King's request for an impact shipment of M-60 tanks, air-to-air, ground-to-air and tank missiles (Memcon at Tab A).

M-60 Tanks. The King has apparently agreed to our offer of 54 M-48A1s, and they are being prepared for delivery.

Recommendation: In view of Benhima's strong recommendation against accepting alternatives to the M-60s, we plan to tell him that our decision on tanks will be communicated separately.

SIDEWINDERS. AIM-9Bs could be made available within 90 days (\$2850 each). The more advanced AIM-9Es and AIM-9Js have much longer lead-times and would necessitate modification of Morocco's 20 F-5As.

Recommendation: Agree to provide 180 AIM-9Bs within 90 days.

REDEYE. This system is too sensitive because of its possible easy use by terrorists' groups and has not been provided outside of Europe.

Recommendation: That we not provide the REDEYE.

CHAPARRAL. The system has a 24-month lead-time, or would have to be diverted from active Army assets. We diverted 12 systems to Israel in January–February. Israel wanted four more and was refused.

Recommendation: That we agree to provide CHAPPARRAL systems with 24-month lead-time.

TOW. Lead-time is 24 months and would require diversion from Israel or active Army assets. SecDef indicated to Benhima difficulties we would probably have with this and suggested LAW as a substitute.

Recommendation: That we not provide the TOW.

¹ Summary: Jordan provided Clements with recommended replies to Morocco's military requests, following an April 15 meeting between Schlesinger and Benhima.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-780011, Box 68, Morocco 1974. Secret. Prepared by George Bader, Director for the Africa Region OASD/ISA. Clements approved the recommendations on April 18. Handwritten notations by Clements on the memorandum read: "State running parallel action on this same position," and "Will be coord. prior Xmittal."

LAW. Normal 24-month lead-time but up to 200 could be diverted within 90 days from Reserve assets without serious impact. An additional 500 could be made available in 6 months. Total cost about \$50–60,000.

Recommendation: Agree to provide 200 LAWs within 90 days and 500 in 6 months.

(S) Release of the CHAPARRAL and SEIDEWINDER would necessitate a waiver by you or SecDef of our disclosure policy.

Amos A. Jordan

67. Telegram 2565 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, June 6, 1974, 2031Z.

2565. Subj: Military Assistance to Morocco.

1. Summary. Met with King today. He in somber mood over problem of reaching agreement on military assistance package. Discussions regarding which have been dragging on for some months. Moroccans concerned about (1) availabilities and lead times for equipment they want, (2) credit terms. Of the two, latter is most acute problem at present. Met with Foreign Minister this evening to explain various credit packages being offered. No decisions taken, but we have work cut out for us. We need all the help we can get.

2. In compliance with my request, I was granted audience with King at 1015 June 6. Meeting took place at Skhirat Palace south of Rabat. I began by explaining, along lines Presidential message, circumstances which had made it necessary for President Nixon to cancel his trip to North Africa. I also repeated the instructions to me, contained in the President's message to King, about resumption of discussion at an early moment regarding King's postponed State Visit to America. King

¹ Summary: The Embassy reported on King Hassan's frustration over the inability to reach agreement on a military assistance package for Morocco.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCEUR and SecDef ISA. In telegram 2566 from Morocco, June 6, the Embassy expressed growing concern over the inability to reach agreement on a Moroccan military assistance package. Neumann noted the principal problem was financing and Moroccan dissatisfaction with U.S. terms. He argued a quick resolution was necessary to avoid an adverse impact on U.S.-Moroccan relations. (Ibid.)

replied that he had been very sorry about President's change in plans. He would have liked very much to welcome him as President in contrast to his previous visits as Vice President and private citizen.

3. He also had other reasons for regretting this change of plans. He had been looking forward to a personal visit with the President in order to bring to a head the negotiations over military supplies and their financing which had been dragging over the last few months. In view of the great USG interest previously expressed in Morocco, difficulties being experienced in reaching agreement were hard to understand.

4. Morocco did not want gifts and was able to pay. But one had to bear in mind that what they were buying was the country's security, which USG has stated was of interest to it. Military supplies unfortunately are not like investments which eventually produce economic gain. In this light, demands for repayment in seven years and interest rates as high as 14 percent were just too much. The King did not wish to sound suspicious or be indelicate, especially as he was certain I was doing my best, but he was beginning to wonder what the USG's real intentions were. Slowness of response, small quantities offered, high cost, and high interest rates were not evidence of great friendship.

5. King said country was denuded of defense and needed equipment fast. Surely 80 to 100 tanks were not too much to ask of a country that gave thousands to others. (King had figures on his desk to which he pointed without specification. They were perhaps aid figures from Secretary's June 4 press conference.)

6. The King said further what he needed was M60 tanks and fast. He had to work with officers who had just come back from Syria. These officers knew very well that "others" had offered comparable equipment to be delivered immediately and under better conditions. These officers, who had worked with and seen the Soviet T64 (not clear whether King meant T62 or T54) in operation, could not understand why the King clung to hope for American equipment, and inferior equipment at that, such as the M48A3.

7. I replied that I understood His Majesty's concern, but that the delay was caused not merely by US but also by lack of Moroccan response to more favorable earlier offers made in February, immediately after General Partain's second visit. I further expressed some surprise at King's remarks about the M60's. We had looked into the M60 question and found that they would require a three year delay before delivery. I thought that when his Majesty had received General Partain and myself, he had expressed his acceptance of the M48A3. We had of course noted the King's categorical rejection of the A1.

8. The King pulled back from that point saying the A3 was acceptable if deliveries were fast and the price was right. But he has lost two

hundred million dollars in the intervention in Syria and Egypt and this imposed a burden.

9. I then gave explanation of current credit offers, separating the question of \$12 million FMS credit from the rest and pointing out that we were in danger of losing even FMS credits with their more favorable interest rate the guarantee provided if Moroccans did not respond quickly.

10. The King, after hearing of the new offer by the Ivor Clark Group on the \$12 million FMS credit (9–¼ percent fixed over 10 years) thought that this might be acceptable and instructed the Foreign Minister, who was present, to meet with me, Col. Sanders (Chief MUSLO) and our Economic Counselor today to go further into this matter.

11. I further explained our supply problem which in part was the result of role which America now playing in Middle East settlement. Everybody now wanted American equipment, while supply situation would eventually improve, for time being I had to go by the lead times which my experts gave me, although they were admittedly pessimistic. I gave it as my purely personal view that greater demands on our supply lines were creating difficulties now but would eventually result in shorter delivery times as factories geared themselves to meet those demands.

12. Met with Minister of Foreign Affairs at 1800 local, accompanied by DCM, Economic Counselor and Chief MUSLO. Foreign Minister had Secretary of State for Finance, Secretary General of Ministry of Defense (Achabar) and Director of Cabinet with him. Discussion lasting one hour devoted entirely to technical details of credit offers. We successfully separated question of \$12 million in USG guaranteed FMS credit from purely commercial offers and believe we now have GOM adequately briefed. Tone of meeting friendly, compared to somber mood of meeting with King this morning, but it clear there are several things preoccupying Moroccans:

A. Col. Achabar obviously troubled by change from direct to guaranteed FMS credits being offered this year as opposed to last. Moroccans would be much happier dealing with direct government credit than with private credit, even if guaranteed by USG. While we explained need to resort to private sector to expand credit facilities we could offer in wake extensive commitments of last fall, Achabar bemused by fact that type of credit changed just as Moroccans came to us for more help. He obviously suspects sinister motive.

B. Ministry of Finance representative and Foreign Minister quite properly concerned about rates of interest, grace periods and repayment periods. Current terms seem very stiff to them. We suspect their reaction in part due to fact they reportedly have offer on much easier

terms (6.5 percent as opposed to roughly 13.5 percent we offering) from French.

13. It was agreed that Chief MUSLO, who returning to Washington on consultation this weekend, would gather various offers and present them to Minister of Finance Abdelqadr Binslimane, who will be in Washington next week. We will try to get Moroccans pinned down by end of next week or beginning of following week as to whether they accept our \$12 million FMS offer. We are going to have hard time, however, for several reasons:

A. We are not offering the equipment originally requested by Moroccans, and, in order to meet their requirements for rapid delivery, will have to provide (we understand informally) tanks which are not even reconditioned but have been taken directly from reserve units.

B. Our credit terms will be considerably stiffer than they can get elsewhere.

C. Moroccans do not understand why we can be so generous in Middle East and not give them more.

14. Comments on situation following in Septel.

Neumann

68. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, December 7, 1974.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A, OPI 10, Box 5. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

69. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 27, 1975, 12:00–12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Deputy Secretary of Defense Meeting with King Hassan's Special Emissary (U)

PARTICIPANTS

Morocco

Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan Intelligence Chief

Abdelhadi Boutaleb, Ambassador to the U.S.

LTC Kaddour Terhzaz, Military Attaché

1LT Diane, Aide-de-Camp

U.S.

Honorable William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense

Honorable Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

LTG H.M. Fish, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

Mr. James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Mr. George W. Bader, Director, Africa Region, OASD/ISA

Colonel Arvid N. Skogerboe, Deputy Director, Africa Region, OASD/ISA

LTC P. Dawkins, Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

(C) After the amenities, Col Dlimi said that King Hassan had sent him to discuss the problems created by the long lead-times for the equipment requested for the Moroccan Armed Forces. The GOM believed that the lead-times should conform with those provided in the Partain Report and, as a manifestation of our close relationship, hoped that this could be agreed.

(C) Mr. Clements said that the U.S. shared Morocco's desire for good relations and saw no reason that they would not continue in the future. Morocco continues to give us what we want, and likewise we want to be as responsive as we can to Morocco's request.

(C) Ambassador Boutaleb said that both sides seem to agree in principle in the desire for our new expanded relationship, but there are some specific problems to be solved. The GOM has money and is asking for equipment from Washington because of our political ties. The GOM had not gone elsewhere because only Washington could pro-

¹ Summary: Clements discussed Moroccan concerns over delivery of military equipment with Boutaleb and Dlimi. Dlimi informed Clements that King Hassan had offered U.S. Air Force and Navy bases in Morocco.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–780038, Box 21, Morocco. Secret. Drafted by Bader; and approved by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert Ellsworth. The meeting took place in Clement's Pentagon office.

vide what the GOM really wanted. In reply to Mr. Clements' request for specific problems, Col Dlimi said that the GOM wanted all of the equipment delivered within 36 months. The Letters of Offer that had been provided indicated lead-times that were considerably beyond that period.

(C) Mr. Noyes suggested that we would have some happy news on some items very soon. LTG Fish said we were trying to make improvements on lead-times and was optimistic that some items could be improved. For example, we hope to provide rebuilt M-48A3s, as well as rebuilt and upgunned M-48A5s. Col Dlimi noted that Morocco already has 26 M-48A3s and that it wanted to avoid that experience by getting new equipment; consequently, they needed M60s. LTG Fish explained that M60s have a much longer lead-time, up to five years. M-48A5s were considered prime assets and interchangeable or on par with M60s. They would be completely reworked and modernized.

(C) At this point, Secretary Schlesinger came in and said to Col Dlimi that we will attempt to solve the supply problem and hoped that his best wishes would be given to King Hassan. The Secretary then left the room.

(S) In reply to Mr. Clements' query on the threat, Col Dlimi said that Morocco's military equipment is obsolete. The Soviet attempt at infiltration and influence is very great in North Africa today. Countries such as Algeria and Libya cannot use all the equipment they are obtaining from the Soviets. Morocco has problems with Spain over the Sahara, and Algeria is not supporting the Moroccan position, apparently more interested in its own aims for the Sahara. Morocco is concerned that Algeria may take some initiative and wants to be ready. The GOM is concerned that Algeria wants its own direct access to the Atlantic. The Soviets are also involved in other countries in Africa, for example, Guinea. Moroccans are, after all, Africans and want that part of the world free from Soviet intimidation and penetration. As a demonstration of the Moroccan awareness of the threat to the area and the Moroccan desire to have a U.S. commitment, the King had authorized him to extend for subsequent consideration the offer of USAF and Navy bases in Morocco.

(S) Mr. Clements said that the King's offer was most pleasing. We could have problems with our negotiations for our bases in Spain and the Moroccan offer was most helpful. There might be circumstances where such an offer might be considered.

(C) Col Dlimi then presented to Mr. Clements copies of a plan for the phased acquisition of equipment calling for all deliveries to be made within 36 months and designating annual increments for 1975, 1976, and 1977. LTC Terhzaz said that the GOM was also waiting for answers on tanks and TOW.

(C) Mr. Clements said we were optimistic that we would be able to improve some delivery times and asked LTG Fish whether this information could be developed by the end of the week. LTG Fish said the list was terribly long, but we would work out what we could with LTC Terhzaz. Ambassador Ellsworth agreed but said we would also want to send a message to our Ambassador in Rabat for his follow-on discussion, as well. LTG Fish noted that we have a new problem in that we have to notify Congress for a 20-day period on such sales, but we would be prepared to give tentative answers before then. Mr. Clements then summarized the understanding that we would provide answers by the end of the week.

70. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Marrakech, July 11, 1975, 5:30–6:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting With His Majesty, King of Morocco

MOROCCAN PARTICIPANT

His Majesty King Hassan II

UNITED STATES

US Ambassador Robert G. Neumann (served as interpreter)

Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements

Principal OASD/ISA, Amos A. Jordan

Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense, RAdm Kenneth M. Carr

After introductions and pleasantries the King stated that he was very grateful for Mr. Clements' visit and that he would be brief. He said that in the Middle East the conflict between Israel and the Arabs was in part a conflict between Eastern and Western civilizations. He assured Mr. Clements that militarily Morocco, as well as he personally, had chosen the West.

The King next commented that we don't want to arm ourselves too much but the armaments which the US has delivered so far has put Morocco in a delicate situation. Not enough parts and ammunition were delivered. This placed the King in an embarrassing situation with re-

¹ Summary: King Hassan and Clements discussed Morocco's military needs, Algeria and the Spanish Sahara.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 35, Geopolitical File, Morocco, October 1973–July 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive.

spect to his own Army. He stated “very frankly the impression of the Moroccan officers is that I made a bad choice in the source of supply.” The King said he understood our problems in supply were due to the war in Vietnam, the problems of the Army in Europe, and the Middle East supply and that compared to all these Morocco was only a small drop.

Mr. Clements interrupted and said, “but a very important drop.”

His Majesty said that on the basis of Morocco’s being the oldest country which has never broken off relations with the United States, he wanted to discuss the two nations’ friendship in utter frankness. He stated that Morocco is a mirror in the Arab world in its relations with the United States and that Morocco needed to be a better mirror.

At this point the King presented to Mr. Clements a document written in French listing military equipment for which Morocco asked the shortest possible delivery times.

Mr. Clements received the document telling him we would give it all consideration.

The King went on to discuss his meeting with the Algerian Foreign Minister which had taken place a few days before. He noted that they had been together for 48 hours with over 5 hours of solid conversation. They were two old friends who had known each other for a long time and had been lieutenants together in a friendship going back to 1958. The Minister came to tell the King that “if Spain leaves the Sahara, not one Algerian soldier will cross the frontier.” The Minister stated that never again would Algeria enter into a 1963-type situation between the two countries. He said he came as a friend to deliver this message. The King said that he thanked him and told him to thank President Boumediene.

The King said that the Algerian position was on one hand explainable by virtue but on the other hand by the imperatives of the situation. Algeria had always said they had no claim on the Sahara. Therefore, there would be no motive for Algeria to take any action. He further said that if Algeria went to war with Morocco the Arab world would have to choose between the two countries. The King said the majority would choose Morocco and that this would break the unity of the Arab world. Algeria would never want that responsibility. He said Algeria for years had sided with non-aligned countries. Also, Boumediene is the President of OPEC. The King said that Boumediene could not be an aggressor in such a position.

The King asked that Mr. Clements discreetly transmit to President Ford that the situation in Algeria was not stable. As long as Boumediene was in charge the King considered that relations with Morocco would remain quiet. He then stated that, although Boumediene is able,

if he (the King) were an insurance agent he would not issue a policy on the Algerian President.

Mr. Clements questioned the King as to the nature of the unrest in Algeria.

The King responded that the opposition was very active and thinking in terms of a coup d'état which the King considered a distinct possibility. He had come by this information from the opposition "through an intermediary, of course." He said that the question was also asked him at that time, "what would be the attitude of the United States if a coup d'état did occur in Algeria?" The King assured the questioner that he could not speak for the United States but that it would not want to get mixed up in Algerian affairs; that currently a balance exists; and if the balance were broken, not only the United States but also the entire Atlantic region would have problems.

The King then returned to the subject of Morocco's military strength and stated that while he does not have belligerent neighbors he must look into the future. He stated that, as the Admiral well knew, the military requires strength even though the civilian leaders are pushing for détente. He stated that in his country he is both civilian leader and military leader and for this reason must be concerned with both problems.

The King next turned to relationships with Spain. He pointed out that the Spanish do not want to fight, nor does Morocco want to fight. He emphasized that if Spain leaves the Sahara Morocco will not permit a vacuum and would fight against any independence movement (which he speculated might be even Chinese instigated) but not against Spain. He smiled and said there were two reasons he would not fight against Spain, the first one being that Spain was stronger and the second one that they must live as neighbors. He said there would be some border actions, no doubt, as there had been in the past, but he considered those as actions of statecraft aimed at public opinion.

The King said even though he had 50 years experience practicing subversion against France, he was not an aggressor and he hoped very much for our continued assistance. He stated that he was a man of his word, as everyone knows, and that in case of a conflict in the Middle East he would be with America, although he could not take that position publicly. US provided arms would not be used by Morocco in the Mid East.

Mr. Clements then told the King that he had spent many years in the Middle East countries and knew them quite well. He stated that he personally expected an accommodation shortly, which would stabilize the Middle East situation. He went on to say that all parties now agreed that there was no military solution possible, that it must be a political settlement. Because of this and other factors, he anticipated a signifi-

cant accommodation in the next 60 to 90 days. Not a settlement—but progress. He went on to say that there were very disturbing elements in the general region. In Iraq there was significant Russian presence. In Libya Qadhafi was stirring the pot in every direction and being very worrisome to Sadat. Mr. Clements told King Hassan that he had discussed Algeria with Ambassador Neumann that morning and had told him of his own misgivings with respect to the current regime. He was concerned with the significant Soviet presence there, both in a hardware and political sense. He believes there is a spirit of revolution in Algeria and is not sure at all about the direction that spirit might lead. He suspected it could go further left which could create a very bad situation.

Mr. Clements then observed that when he reports to Secretary Kissinger and President Ford the King's uneasiness and the possibility of a coup in Algeria, the first question will be, "What direction will the coup take?"

His Majesty replied, "You can be sure it will go to the right. Definitely. American interests with respect to gas and energy will be aided by this." The King continued, "I know what I am talking about."

Mr. Clements responded that he respected the King's judgment very much and was confident that he knew whereof he spoke.

His Majesty then remarked that the United States should cultivate the Vice President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, more. He has a new look and is not a classical Baathist. He settled the difficulties with Iran and wants to reapproach the West. This must be done slowly and carefully. Not everyone has the courage of Sadat. Iraq has for 15 years been against the United States. One needs courage to try to change that policy. Sadat on the other hand is a man of his word. He is a gentleman's agreement. You can try to get closer to Iraq through Iran and others, "not directly."

Mr. Clements commented that Prince Fahd could help.

His Majesty said that would be good, and continued that Qadhafi was not mad. He was a boy who needed to be taken in hand. He remarked that Egypt does not want him. He is dangerous. However, he pointed out that Jalud was no less dangerous. The most intelligent man in Libya he considered to be Minister of Foreign Affairs 'Abd-al-Munim-al-Huni.

The King next reflected on the Mediterranean littoral and commented that North Africa begins at the Suez. Egypt—he classes as neither red nor green but in the process of changing. Libya—he said Soviet relations were excellent with Libya; the Libyans had many Soviet technicians and arms and wanted a nuclear manufacturing center. Libya—he termed as red and becoming redder. Tunisia—he classed as green. Algeria—he termed red. He remarked that Algeria was the last of the

agrarian reform countries and that he was concerned since there were many French consultants in Algeria planting a hard Marxist doctrine. For this reason he thought the opposition had a good chance in Algeria. Morocco—he classed as green. The King next stated that it was important that the two red countries be kept from getting together otherwise the green ones of Tunisia and Morocco would be endangered.

Mr. Clements at this time returned to the discussion of the military and remarked that the US tanks had been rushed to Morocco at the express request of the Moroccan government. The King interjected that he knew we took those from our own Army, because of our desire to assist them. The Moroccan Army does not know that they came from our own Army however. It is a “staff secret”. It is better that the Moroccan Army does not know they came from your Army. The King next went briefly over the list which he had presented to Mr. Clements, emphasizing that in the future they wanted tanks with new guns and the latest capabilities.

Mr. Clements said that now that we know what you want, “I promise that I will do what I can.”

His Majesty said, “That is sufficient. I will remain quiet.”

Mr. Clements said while he was personally favorable he was but one voice, to which the King replied, “A very important voice.”

Mr. Clements said, he must talk to Dr. Kissinger and President Ford and he would do that.

The King answered that he was “calm” because they were friends of his, and then stated it would help if certain equipments could be expedited. “I know you have many orders but we would appreciate it if you could expedite this list”, to which Mr. Clements replied, “We will try.”

The King said you know this is not just a commercial affair, our prestige and presence are riding on it. It may not seem important to the United States, with the various countries in NATO or even Latin America to think about.

Mr. Clements assured the King that he wanted him to completely understand that the United States thinks Morocco is important. No South American country could compare in importance in the US view.

The King said when the Middle East problem was settled, nothing would impede Morocco’s offering bases to the United States to cover problems the US might be having with Portugal and Spain.

In an aside, he commented that he wanted Dr. Kissinger to come see him on the next trip even though it were a “technical” stop.

Mr. Clements next brought up the subject of nuclear powered ship visits to Morocco.

His Majesty stated that public opinion was crazy; the public thinks nuclear ships could explode at any moment. He suggested that, if a visit were to occur, it should start with a civilian nuclear powered ship. (He noted Morocco had forbidden German and Japanese nuclear powered ships to visit when they asked for visits to Casablanca.)

Mr. Clements replied that our nuclear powered merchant ship the Savannah was no longer operating to which His Majesty replied, "Ask the Germans to send theirs". When it called, he would have the Minister visit it and the rumors would be wiped out. He did not want to start nuclear powered visits with warships.

The meeting concluded with pleasantries and an exchange of gifts.

71. Memorandum From Clinton E. Granger of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, October 20, 1975.

SUBJECT

Moroccan Tanks

We have delivered 28 M48A3 tanks to Morocco as part of the Moroccan force modernization program. The tanks are currently located at Casablanca. Recently the Moroccans, who do not have tank transporters, requested our aid in moving the tanks to Oujda in the northeast of the country near the Algerian border. State was about to agree when the Moroccans suddenly changed the desired destination of the tanks to Ksah el-Souk, 200 km southeast of Casablanca.

In this location the tanks would not be available for use in Spanish Sahara, but would be strategically located to prevent possible Algerian incursion into Morocco. However, State feels that the strategic niceties of the situation would be lost on international opinion, and if we acceded to the Moroccan request to move the tanks south we would be

¹ Summary: Granger informed Scowcroft of the delivery of tanks to Casablanca, and Moroccan desires to have the tanks moved to another location. He noted that State planned to refuse the Moroccan request.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco (2). Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Bob Oakley of the National Security Council Staff. Scowcroft wrote on the memorandum: "How would we help anyway?"

portrayed as giving aid and encouragement to Moroccan plans to take the Spanish Sahara by force.

Accordingly, State plans to refuse the Moroccan request, but to delay refusal until after the visit of Assistant Secretary Atherton to Morocco on October 23.

72. Telegram 5961 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, December 9, 1975, 1050Z.

5961. Dept pass info SecDef for ISA. Subject: Policy; MUSLO Program. Ref: A) State 214893; B) State 284179.

1. We realize final curtain has not yet fallen on Spanish Sahara drama. Nevertheless, enough of the act has already been played out to enable us to accept King Hassan's argument that Morocco's relations with Spain are on a sound footing and even to accept as plausible his insistence that there is an affinity of interests between the two countries that will be broadened and expanded in period to come. This emergence of a friendly and cooperative relationship between two countries, both friendly to U.S., that straddle the Straits of Gibraltar is incontestably very much in the United States' regional interests. Meanwhile, relief of earlier action accompanying ongoing US-Spanish base negotiations has also helped clear the air.

2. Embassy believes it is now time for USG to set aside recent doubts and reservations and proceed, steadily and firmly, to implement the Moroccan military modernization program. We are not arguing for major new departures, but rather for going ahead during planned time frame of next three–four years with what we already

¹ Summary: The Embassy recommended the Department implement the Moroccan military modernization program despite the unsettled nature of the Sahara dispute. Neumann strongly recommended immediately moving forward with a letter of offer for F–5 aircraft.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC OPS Staff, Box 18, Morocco (1). Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Algiers and Madrid. In telegram 214893 to Rabat, September 10, Kissinger informed the Embassy that DOD had been authorized to prepare a letter of offer for the F–5 aircraft, however the letter would not be presented until further review of U.S.-Spanish base negotiations, and relations between Morocco and Spain. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

have determined to do, as well as acting upon existing Moroccan requests that are not yet approved. This program, it will be recalled, is designed not to upset strategic balance with Algeria, but rather to help toward restoring it. We firmly believe this program will contribute to regional stability in the process. Any backing off or protracted delay on our part, on the other hand, would contribute to Moroccan military weakness and could only engender power vacuum here that would tempt not only Algeria, but potentially also USSR (which has not been showing notable restraint elsewhere as regards intervention in regional disputes).

3. One outstanding case in point at this time is the pending Moroccan request for a letter of offer for F-5E/F aircraft (reftel A). We strongly recommend moving ahead on this item immediately.

4. We have taken note of Dept's general concern, e.g., as expressed in final paragraph of reftel B, that in meeting Morocco's perceived needs for modern military equipment within envisioned limits, we may be encouraging Moroccans to undertake a strain on their payment capabilities that their general resource outlook may not justify. We plan a detailed submission on this issue in near future. For the moment, wish note following key points:

A. Basic decision on priority Morocco should give arms purchases is Moroccans', not ours. We can rest assured that as long as they feel menaced by hostile neighbor their own priorities will put guns ahead of butter. Ergo, Moroccans are going to get arms somewhere, whatever the impact on developmental and other priorities. In this aspect of military supply relationship, we see our role as essentially that of advising Moroccans as to how modernization program can be most prudently and economically implemented in context of established U.S. and Moroccan interests.

B. Foreign exchange position for Morocco over next couple of years is admittedly tight (Rabat 4870, para 3). Longer term recovery of demand for phosphates and solid borrowing prospects to bridge current market softening bodes well for Moroccan solvency. We have, moreover, reason to believe that Moroccans are justified in expectations that oil-rich friendly Arab governments, notably Saudi Arabia, willing and able to foot a good bit of the bill for Moroccan military modernization program.

5. Recommendation: We therefore recommend that USG without delay proceed with implementation of military modernization program and, in particular, take immediate steps to furnish letter of offer for F-5E/F aircraft. We have been hearing from GOM that Moroccan Air Force perceives a need for these aircraft with shortest possible delivery time. Positive sign from us would be especially welcome to GOM

at this critical stage in Moroccan-Algerian tension, and would help solidify overall U.S.-Moroccan relationship.

Neumann

73. Telegram 278 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, January 19, 1976, 1655Z.

278. For the Secretary from Ambassador Neumann. Subject: U.S. Arms Delivery to Morocco: Action on Requested F-5 Aircraft. Ref: Rabat 122, Rabat 121, Rabat 123, Rabat 124.

1. However sound reasons may be for protracted holdup in Department's clearance, I fear any further delay may be interpreted by King as signal that he had best look elsewhere for support in what he sees as long-range, cold war type struggle against an Algerian rival backed by USSR. I am convinced that for many reasons, including your own efforts to bring peace in the Middle East, this would have many consequences seriously adverse to long-range as well as short-term U.S. interests.

2. While I am most reluctant to personalize this policy issue, you should know that I have received various signals from several good Moroccan sources that King was surprised by decision to change Chiefs of Mission here; and in typically oriental fashion may be construing it as possibly signaling change in U.S. policy. Naturally I wish to do whatever I can to help see that the turnover is accomplished in whatever way best supports U.S. bilateral and regional interests. I would be most distressed should the King take USG failure to act on the F-5's and pending ambassadorial change as mutually reinforcing bits of evidence to confirm his concern that he cannot count on U.S. support. While I wish to do what I can to avoid this, actions speak louder than words and nothing I could possibly say at this end would be as useful as affirmative action now on the F-5's.

Neumann

¹ Summary: Neumann expressed concern that the pending ambassadorial change in addition to the delay in clearing the F-5 aircraft for Morocco might lead King Hassan to doubt U.S. support.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840098-2129. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

74. Telegram 18890/Tosec 10259 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Madrid¹

Washington, January 24, 1976, 2351Z.

Tosec 10259. For the Secretary from Sisco. Subject: Action Memorandum—Military Sales to Morocco and Mauritania (S/S 7601543).

Background

1. In meeting with Atherton, Schaufele and Saunders we reviewed question of military sales to GOM and GIRM in light of current developments in Sahara and concerns expressed by Amembassies Rabat and Algiers about possible effects on our relations with their respective host countries of our sales policies.

2. King Hassan, in direct approaches to Amb Neumann and through his Ambassador in Washington and military channels, has requested expeditious action on following requests for arms deliveries citing Sahara situation and possibility confrontation with Algeria.

A. Immediate approval of letter of offer for purchase of 20 F–5E's and 4 F–5F's.

B. Price and availability data on 12 TOW-equipped Cobra helicopters.

C. REDEYE missiles (GOM would be satisfied with token number for display purposes).

D. Accelerated delivery of virtually all items furnished under our ongoing military supply program.

3. Action on these requests has been delayed during US-Spanish base negotiations and while it appeared there might be a conflict between Morocco and Spain. With conclusion tripartite agreement and GOS withdrawal from Sahara, we are taking fresh look at GOM requests. Embassy Rabat argues we should be forthcoming with GOM since it is part of long range program conceived in 1973 for steady upgrading of currently weak GOM military capabilities and is not designed to reverse current heavy military predominance of Algeria but to move Morocco toward something approaching parity. Embassy believes our broader interests are better served by supporting a friend than by demonstrating great concern for possible reactions of consist-

¹ Summary: The Department sought Kissinger's approval of recommendations that would allow a gradual upgrade of Morocco's military capabilities.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC OPS Staff, Box 18, Morocco (1). Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Weislogel; cleared by Atherton, Schaufele, Vest, and Ortiz; and approved by Sisco. Kissinger approved recommendations A through D and F. He wrote "wish to discuss" next to E. A handwritten notation on the first page of the telegram reads: "HAK actions below." Kissinger was in Madrid to sign a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with Spain.

ent adversary. It is also noted that initial deliveries of F–5's and TOWs not possible before mid-1977 and 1981, respectively.

4. Embassy Algiers concerned that resumption of delayed arms sales to Morocco (even if deliveries of some items not imminent) would be interpreted by GOA as support for Moroccan territorial expansion and abandonment of our proclaimed neutrality on Sahara. It also fears it will heighten GOM confidence, thereby increasing chance of armed conflict with Algeria, and may involve us in open ended commitment to GOM if its ventures lead it into difficulties. Embassy suggests that long-standing military supply commitments to GOM be honored but urges that we not take exceptional and highly visible measures to accelerate GOM buildup until Sahara situation clarifies.

5. Earlier GOM requests for the REDEYE were refused on grounds that it no longer is in production and is in short supply in our own forces. Moroccans are also aware of our concern that weapons could fall into terrorist hands, but insist there is no such threat in Morocco and that they would be satisfied with token number. We have denied REDEYE to all Mideast countries except Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan as matter of policy and feel no exception should be made for Morocco.

6. GIRM asked our Ambassador for USG assistance in obtaining 200 US-made 50 caliber machine guns and two million rounds of ammunition, stating it is prepared to purchase items commercially if grant aid not available. Mauritania is not currently eligible for grant, credit or direct USG sales. By informing Mauritians that we would approve an export license for commercial sale if they wish to make cash purchase and can find the weapons they want, we would earn some political benefit without committing ourselves to any support.

7. We agreed that Algeria, already convinced that we back the GOM, undoubtedly will be irritated by any US arms deliveries or sales commitments to Morocco. However, we believe that we should follow a deliberate policy of doing enough for Morocco to reassure the GOM that we intend to proceed with our long-term program, as conceived in late 1973, for gradually upgrading its military capabilities. At the same time, reasonable care should be taken with scheduling of deliveries to avoid intensifying Algerian apprehension by giving impression we are engaging in major escalation of pace and content of our military supplies to Morocco.

8. We seek your concurrence with following recommendations which we believe will achieve these objectives:

A. Immediately approve submission to Congress of letter of offer totalling \$135 million for the purchase by the GOM of 20 F–5E and 4F–5F aircraft (initial deliveries would be in mid-1977).

B. Provide price and availability data on 12 TOW-equipped Cobra helicopters (initial deliveries of helicopters possible in slightly over one year from order with TOW deliveries projected in 1981).

C. Since F-5A aircraft which GOM wishes are not available, authorize DOD to pursue with GOM discussions concerning possibility of furnishing rebuilt Navy F-8s to Morocco (deliveries would be possible in 12 months).

D. Refuse to sell REDEYE missile to the GOM.

E. Do not make special effort to accelerate delivery schedules for items intended for Morocco except for sample units which can be used as training models prior to arrival of the remainder of the items.

F. We also seek your concurrence in our recommendation that an export license be approved for a commercial sale of 200 heavy machine guns and ammunition to the Mauritanian Government.

Ingersoll

75. Memorandum From Clinton Granger of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, January 28, 1976.

SUBJECT

Notification to Congress of F-5 and DRAGON Missile Sale to Morocco

The Department of Defense has prepared notification to Congress of two pending sales to Morocco: the sale of 20 F-5E and four F-5F aircraft valued at \$135.0 million, and 8260 DRAGON missiles and launchers costing \$57.4 million. The State Department has asked for our decision before Secretary Kissinger's meeting with a personal emissary from King Hassan on January 29.

Although delivery of the F-5s will not begin for 22 months, and DRAGON delivery is even further in the future, these sales must be considered in light of the ongoing Sahara dispute. Algeria can be ex-

¹ Summary: Granger informed Scowcroft of decisions by the Department of Defense and Department of State to notify Congress of pending F-5 and DRAGON sales to Morocco. Granger recommended Scowcroft concur in notifying Congress following the February recess.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco (2). Confidential. Sent for action. Concurred in by Oakley and Janka. Scowcroft approved the recommendation. A January 29 memorandum of conversation in which Kissinger and Moroccan special emissary Lamrani discuss military support to Morocco is published as Document 111.

pected to be irritated and may interpret the sale—in spite of the long lead times—as a weakening of our announced policy of evenhandedness in the Sahara. We do not believe, however, that this Algerian reaction justifies imposing delays on major weapon procurement for future delivery which is a constituent element of our ongoing arms relationship with Morocco, as long as we take no extraordinary steps to expedite deliveries. Moreover, we doubt there will be substantial Congressional opposition to the sale when it is explained that deliveries are two years off. Accordingly, we recommend going ahead with notification to Congress; we would plan to ask State not to send these cases to the Hill in the period immediately preceding the February recess; this will satisfy Congressional desire for 20 days outside of recess to consider this case, and will give us the option of reconsidering notification if fighting flares in the Sahara meanwhile.

Secretary Kissinger has approved the F–5 notification. We understand the DRAGON notification will be decided at the Assistant Secretary level, with staff level recommending notification.

Recommendation

That you concur in notification to Congress of the sale of F–5s and DRAGON missiles to Morocco; following the February recess.

76. Telegram 687 From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, February 8, 1976, 1842Z.

687. Subject: Assistance to Morocco. Ref: Amman 688 (Reftel/Notal).

1. Immediately following telegram contains message from King to Secretary for delivery to President. King dictated message to me in his office evening February 8, following his conversation with secret Moroccan mission which arrived here this afternoon from Iran. Mission

¹ Summary: The Embassy reported on a meeting between Pickering and King Hussein, who discussed additional Moroccan military requirements and Syrian support for Morocco.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated priority to Jidda, Tehran, Rabat, Damascus and Madrid. Telegram 688 from Amman is published as Document 77.

headed by Chief Moroccan Air Force. Mission presented King with request for military aid and reported results conversation with SAH.

2. King is impressed with urgent need for military support in Morocco and says he believes Moroccan claims that Soviets and Libyans are pouring in weapons. Crux of King's request is to help him honor Moroccan plea for 25 F-5A's and 36 106 mm recoilless rifles. King willing to provide latter without seeking replacement. Shah says he will give 4 or 5 F-5A's on condition they appear to come from Jordan and that US gives its agreement to the transfer. King says he will cooperate. In addition he says he is willing to transfer 20 of the F-5A given him recently by the Shah to Morocco immediately. However he wants us to provide him as soon as possible with replacements in kind or some equivalent number of F-5E's. He would not transfer of course unless we gave permission which is required under the existing agreement with us concerning these aircraft.

3. Moroccans have asked for additional items of equipment which are included in a list which I will provide in a later para (para 7) of this cable. Shah has said he will also provide munitions for the F-5A he wishes to transfer "through" Jordan. Finally King asks for advise and assistance on getting aircraft to Morocco expeditiously.

4. After King dictated his letter we talked for a few minutes. I told him that my own personal reaction was that US would not have funds or aircraft to replace the F-5A he was considering sending to Morocco. Did the Moroccans indicate they could pay for them? He said he thought that was possible they would do so. King in that case would like some sort of high priority on the delivery of additional F-5E's. He was aware because I told him that one for one replacement would not be very likely because of the differences in cost. I believe he would be happy indeed to be able to convert the F-5A's into E's at something less than a one for one trade off. He also talked about seeing the Shah soon and trying to find out whether the Shah could help finance the deal. This I very much doubt since the Shah gave the aircraft to Jordan in the first place. He is thus not very likely to turn around and pay for the replacements for his gift. The King mentioned the Saudis as a possible source of help and said he might consider going through Saudi Arabia if he visits Iran. He also indicates in his letter to the Secretary that he will be in touch with the Saudis.

5. Finally, the King mentioned Syria. He said that that Asad told him last month that he would like to stay out of the middle of the Saharan problem if he could especially since he was trying to be a mediator. But if it were necessary for him to declare himself he could not turn his back on Morocco after what the Moroccans had done to help him in October 1973. King speculated that Syria would give overflight clearances to move the aircraft and that his friend Juan Carlos in Spain

would also be counted upon similarly to help Moroccans. King also asked whether there was anything we could do from our assets in Europe to help quickly. I did not leave much encouragement on that point.

6. Of the remaining items on the list King said he was either woe-fully short or completely out of the items mentioned. While I was in the office he called Chief of Staff Bin Shaker to check again that 106 mm recoilless rifles could be spared. Moroccans he said had indicated they had been in touch with US and they were trying to speed up our regular program of military aid.

7. Moroccan list (Embassy translation from French.)

1) TOW missiles launchers 24 missiles 480

2) Portable anti aircraft missiles REDEYE 200 (or more)

3) Artillery M 109A2 (155mm SP guns) 16

4) 106 mm guns 36

5) Ammunition 5.62 ATO 4,000,000 rounds

6) Artillery ammunition 12,800 155mm shells divided as follows 10 PC smoke/or phosphorous, 10 illumination, 70 PC high explosive and 10 PC training rounds

7) One squadron of F–5 25 aircraft with munitions and 2 TACANS

8. King has asked for an early reaction given Morocco's immediate need. He reports that Moroccans shortly expect to be in an area where Algerian resistance will increase and where Algerians air superiority will be felt.

Pickering

77. Telegram 688 From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, February 8, 1976, 1848Z.

688. Subject: Message to Secretary and President from King Hussein. Ref: Amman 687.

¹ Summary: The telegram transmitted a message from King Hussein to Kissinger and Ford informing them of Jordanian and Iranian military assistance to Morocco.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850107–2374. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

1. King called me to his office evening Feb 8 (reftel) and dictated following message to Secretary.

2. Begin text: Dear Mr. Secretary I hope, sir, that you will convey the following message to the President with my respects and regards. I have just received a special high-level emissary from His Majesty King Hassan the Second of Morocco, accompanied by the Moroccan Air Force Commander. They brought me the King's assessment, with which I concur, regarding the real threat which the Moroccans feel exists to their country and to the Republic of Mauritania, surrounded as they are by radical regimes. I can also appreciate the Moroccans' concern that their Algerian neighbors are playing for time during which they continue to receive military aid and financial support from the USSR and others, including Libya. It seems all the more urgent, while watching the Angolan tragedy, which is a living example of what may happen elsewhere, to look at the list of military equipment Morocco seeks to obtain "now" (King asked that this word be underlined) to thwart a developing threat before it is too late. The Moroccan delegation arrived from Tehran where his Imperial Majesty has provided all available equipment on condition that Iranian contacts with your government secure your permission for its release to Morocco and that such equipment would have to go by way of Jordan to Morocco and not appear to be provided directly by Iran. We do not mind this in the least. But I believe that Morocco and Iran also expect us to furnish some 20 F-5A aircraft originally given to us by Iran in order to make up the Moroccan requirement of 25 aircraft. In this regard, we would need a definite commitment from your government to replace these aircraft with the same type and number, or with F-5E's which are preferable, in the nearest possible future, as their loss would leave us with only one squadron of F-5A's for training while continuing the process of standardizing our Air Force on the F-5E type. Beyond that, we seek your permission to supply the 36 106mm recoilless rifles which Morocco requires. Unfortunately, there is little else we can spare at this point, as most of the other required items on the Moroccan list are either unavailable to us, or barely so. I shall be in constant touch with His Imperial Majesty while awaiting your response. And if it is favorable we will wish to determine with you the best way of conveying all of these weapons to Morocco at the earliest possible time. I intend also to advise our Saudi brethren on these developments and I hope that your government can help us all in carrying the load to meet the Moroccan requirements. With my respects, regards and best wishes to the President and your good self, Sincerely, Hussein I. End text.

2 [3]. Recommend Dept repeat to Rabat and Tehran.

Pickering

78. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, February 10, 1976.

Military Assistance for Morocco

The Problem

According to the Iranians and Jordanians, the Moroccan Government has sent a special Mission to both countries seeking rapid supply of military equipment. The types and quantities of equipment the Moroccans seek are reasonable and include nothing except REDEYES that we should have any doubts about supplying; the principal issue is the political one of visibly accelerated delivery through third-country transfers.

Both the Iranian and Jordanian Governments have told us, and presumably have told the Moroccans, that they would be prepared to transfer to Morocco from their own inventories a considerable amount of U.S.-supplied equipment. A U.S. decision is required on three aspects of such an operation: (1) whether to authorize some or all of the third-country transfers involved; (2) whether and when we could replace these items in the Iranian and Jordanian inventories, as these governments have requested; and (3) whether and how we could help move the equipment to Morocco. Involved in the question of replacement is also the complex problem of payment for any items furnished Jordan and Iran as replacements.

You will want to consider these three issues in the context of more fundamental questions: (1) on the one hand, to what extent do we want to appear to be internationalizing the Sahara dispute through visible emergency supply of U.S. equipment during the forthcoming period

¹ Summary: Atherton provided options for third party military assistance for Morocco. He also addressed the issue of equipment transport and replacement of transferred items.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC OPS Staff, Box 18, Morocco (2). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Day; and concurred in by Stern. Sent through Sisco. An unknown hand wrote "(Third Party)" under the title of the memorandum, and "HK decisions on p. 11–12" in the margin of the first page. An unknown hand wrote "in two years" next to the paragraph beginning "The Jordanians have told us". An unknown hand wrote "no", and "[When?] HK forgot" next to the paragraph beginning "We have subsequently ascertained that", and circled the words "already decided" in the text. An unknown hand wrote "option 3" next to the paragraph beginning "The Defense Department is examining". Kissinger approved recommendations 1 through 5. An unknown hand wrote "(Jordan would give as gift)" next to item 1. Kissinger wrote "why?" next to recommendations 6 and 7. The attachment is published as Document 77.

of great political sensitivity and of Arab and UN diplomatic activity to reconcile Algerian and Moroccan differences over the self-determination issue prior to the end of Spanish administration on February 28; (2) on the other hand, how do we signal to King Hassan and his supporters that we are not indifferent to the fact that Morocco is under-armed while its adversaries (Algeria and Libya) are well-armed by the Soviets.

Our interests in this situation are to see the Moroccan solution to the Sahara dispute succeed, if possible while permitting Algeria to save face if it wishes to and avoiding a confrontation with the Soviets which would escalate the cost of success to us and risk another Angola-type debate with Congress.

Background

King Hassan has sent a mission to Iran and Jordan requesting the transfer to Morocco of U.S. equipment in their inventories. The Iranian and Jordanian Governments have been sympathetic and have asked us whether we would give the necessary authorization. Hassan has painted a picture of a growing Algerian threat, backed by large-scale shipments of arms from the Soviet Union and Libya. He has claimed that the Algerians are being assisted in their Sahara operations by Cubans and North Vietnamese, and draws a parallel between the Sahara and Angola. His aim appears clearly to enlist support by presenting the Sahara problem as a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

On the basis of all the information now available to us, we are skeptical that the Sahara question has—as yet, at least—taken on this international complexion. The Algerians are being supplied with considerable quantities of military equipment by the Soviets, possibly in the neighborhood of \$400–500 million, as well as direct shipments of Soviet arms from Libya. Some of this equipment is, in turn, being used by the Algerians in backing the Polisario guerrilla forces in the Sahara, but it is far from clear that the Soviets see themselves at this point actively and specifically committed to the Algerian/Polisario position in the Sahara dispute. There is evidence, in fact, that they wish to avoid this, partly in order to maintain their modest relationship with Morocco. It is nonetheless true that Algeria is much better armed than Morocco, though its capacity to bring this superiority to bear in the Sahara is apparently limited by distances and transport problems. It is also true that the Soviets, if forced to choose, would come down on the Algerian/Polisario side.

The most marked characteristic of the Sahara dispute at this time, however, is the degree to which it is being dealt with as a regional problem, in which King Hassan has so far outwitted his adversaries and kept Arab opinion from crystallizing against him. UN Secretary

General Waldheim and several Arab countries are simultaneously engaged in mediation efforts in the Sahara. Spain, convinced that the situation would deteriorate further unless final decolonization were sanctioned internationally through the UN, called on Waldheim to initiate an appropriate follow-up on both UNGA resolutions with respect to the rights of Saharans to self-determination. Waldheim's representative, Ambassador Rydbeck, arrived in El Ayoun (capital of the Sahara) on February 7, to evaluate the situation. The GOM maintains that Rydbeck's mission is limited to fact-finding, but the Algerians, and reportedly Rydbeck himself, have indicated his mission has broader scope.

Arab peace initiatives were touched off by the first direct military encounter between Moroccan and Algerian regular troops at Amgala January 26–28. Envoys from several Arab states have visited Algiers, Rabat and Nouakchott, transmitting messages from their respective leaders. On February 3, the Egyptian semi-official press announced that Vice President Mubarek's efforts had resulted in the submission to the GOM and GOA of a three-point peace plan calling for a cease-fire, an early meeting of the Egyptian, Algerian and Moroccan Foreign Ministers, to be followed by a Summit Conference of Hassan, Boumediene and Sadat. Neither the GOA nor GOM has officially responded to Mubarek's proposal. The GOM is resisting negotiations with the GOA on the substance of the issue until Algeria agrees to withdraw all of its forces from the territory, leases the Polisario and recognizes GOM/GIRM sovereignty over the ex-Spanish Sahara. Morocco is proceeding with its military sweep but has refrained so far from attacking the Polisario stronghold of Mahbes near the Algerian frontier. The GOA also has not publicly responded to Mubarek and continues to demand a referendum while actively promoting the Polisario as Saharan spokesman and pleading its case in diplomatic approaches to Western, Soviet-bloc and non-aligned states. The consensus of intelligence sources and many observers is that the GOA has suffered significant defeats, diplomatically, by failing in its efforts to round up support for its position, especially among the Arabs, and militarily, at Amgala. Rather than engage in a full-scale war with Morocco, the GOA may be seeking a face-saving device to disengage from the Sahara with the idea of regrouping and conducting a long-term guerrilla action through the Polisario aimed at eventually undermining the Moroccan and Mauritanian regimes.

If the above-mentioned mediation attempts should fail, the status of the Sahara will be legally ambiguous when Spain definitively withdraws on February 28. The Tripartite Agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania provided for transfer of administrative jurisdiction over the territory to Morocco and Mauritania prior to February 28,

but it left unsettled the question of territorial sovereignty. Both UNGA resolutions—3458–A which called for a referendum and 3458–B, which recognized the Tripartite Agreement as the basis for eventual transfer of jurisdiction—recognized the principle of self-determination for the Saharans in the presence of UN representatives, differing only in the way this was to be accomplished. Under the Tripartite arrangement, the Saharan Assembly (Yamaa) created by the Spanish colonial authorities, was to serve as the voice of Saharan self-determination. This body reportedly disbanded in December 1975 as its members split into opposing factions declaring their loyalty to either Morocco or Algeria. The GOM has now announced that “working groups” of the Yamaa are meeting in Al Ayoun, and it appears the GOM may attempt to use a “rump” Yamaa to convince Rydbeck that its claims to the Sahara have been legitimized in consultation with the Saharans.

Moroccan Request: The Moroccans submitted the following shopping list to Iran and Jordan:

- TOW—24 launchers and 480 missiles
- 200 REDEYE hand-held anti-aircraft missiles
- Sixteen M 109A2 (probably M 109A1B) 155 mm. self-propelled howitzers
- Thirty-six 106 mm. recoilless rifles
- Four million 7.62 mm. NATO rounds small arms ammunition
- 12,800 shells for 155 mm. howitzers (10% smoke or phosphorus, 10% illuminating, 70% explosives, and 10% training)
- One squadron of F-5 aircraft: 25 planes plus munitions and two TACANS (navigational systems).

The Jordanians have told us that they wish to help the Moroccans to the extent possible. You have received a message from Hussein to this effect. (Amman 688—Attachment 1.) In particular, the King stated that he would be willing to transfer immediately 20 of the F-5A aircraft recently given him by Iran. In return, the Jordanians would hope to receive, on a one-for-one basis, the more expensive and sophisticated F-5E's that Morocco expects to receive from us (the Jordanians said 15–18 months from now, but the actual wait is closer to 20 months for the first delivery). Receiving new F-5E's for old F-5A's is very attractive to Jordan—about a 15 to 1 return as an F-5E costs over \$3 million and a used F-5A is worth about \$200,000. The Jordanians offered to provide Morocco with 106 mm. recoilless rifles free. Ambassador Pickering has raised the question of transporting this equipment from Jordan, and states that the Jordanians are likely to ask whether we could provide an airlift for this purpose.

The Iranian Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Helms February 8 that Iran would like to provide to Morocco as much of this equipment as it could and requested our agreement. The Iranians did not want to do so directly, he said, but desired to have Jordan act as

middleman. He also asked if we could replace this equipment quickly in the Iranian inventory, except for 4 or 5 F–5A's for which the Shah would not request replacements from the Moroccan order of F–5E's.

We have subsequently ascertained that, of the equipment requested by the Moroccans, the Iranians could supply all that the Jordanians have not expressed a willingness to provide except REDEYES, and you have already decided we should not further proliferate RED-EYES by providing them to Morocco.

In considering the following options, certain practical logistical and financial considerations are relevant:

—Any transfers of U.S.-supplied equipment from Jordan and Iran to Morocco must be notified to Congress. Such transfers will therefore be public knowledge, and the speed with which they can be effected will depend not only on availability, condition of equipment, and transport and financing arrangements, but also on the speed with which the legislatively-required assurances and notifications can be moved through the Moroccan, Jordanian, Iranian and U.S. bureaucracies.

—One reason for Morocco's seeking these items of equipment from Jordan and Iran is that, due to our own force requirements, other commitments and production lead-times, we cannot provide them as quickly as Morocco wishes. We therefore cannot provide rapid replacements to Jordan and Iran; their role would be precisely to absorb the delays Morocco faces in getting these items directly from us—although there are corollary political benefits in Morocco's being able to demonstrate in this way the support it has from Hussein and the Shah.

—Replacement costs will exceed the original costs to Iran and Jordan of any items transferred to Morocco, and we have no funds to absorb them.

The Options

There are three obvious general options:

Option 1 – Agree to the transfer of as much equipment as can be made available as quickly as feasible.

Option 2 – Not agree to any transfer.

Option 3 – Agree to a selective transfer operation, perhaps staged over a period of several months.

In addition, there are choices with respect to U.S. assistance in transporting any equipment being moved and with respect to replacement of transferred items.

Option 1: Agree to transfer of all the equipment that the Moroccans have requested except REDEYES, as quickly as possible.

PROS:

—There is no doubt that Morocco is very inferior in armament to Algeria and that, if the Sahara fighting escalates, this inferiority may well result in serious difficulties for Rabat.

—We have basically supported a solution for the Sahara whereby Morocco and Mauritania will take over the former colony, dividing it between them. We thus have an interest in seeing that Morocco is militarily capable of carrying out this operation against Algerian-supported opposition.

—If Algeria were to succeed in frustrating Moroccan plans, it would be seen to some degree at least as a success for Soviet-backed forces over the side supported by the U.S.

—It is at least possible that Algeria would be restrained from becoming more deeply involved if it saw active support for Morocco by the U.S.

—Hassan obviously feels exposed in the face of potential Algerian power, and any substantial assistance of this kind would have an important psychological effect for him, as well as military consequences. Not to provide any assistance, in the face of his determined efforts to acquire it, would be very discouraging to him and would lead him to question the value of his relationship with the U.S. Since the Iranians and Jordanians are also deeply involved, they would be led as well to wonder how reliable the U.S. was in this sense. The same might also be said of Sadat and Asad, both of whom lean toward Morocco on the Sahara issue and would oppose any Algerian military initiative.

CONS:

—It does not appear, as yet at least, that the Soviet Union wishes to become deeply involved in supporting an Algerian operation in the Sahara, although the Soviets have continued to provide large amounts of modern equipment to Algeria.

—Visible support from the U.S., in the form of our agreement to the transfer from our friends of substantial quantities of arms, could put the Soviets in a position where they would be obliged to be politically more partisan and more active.

—There is at least as much chance that Algeria would see our action as a provocation as there is that they would be deterred by it. Our relationship with Algeria would certainly suffer, and the Algerians might well consider it necessary to respond by making their support for the Polisario more visible and more effective.

—We very much hope that regional efforts, and the activity of the UN representative, will damp down the dispute, if not actually resolve it. For us to be involved, at this juncture, with a highly visible arms supply operation that Hassan would almost certainly publicize, could seriously embarrass both the regional and the UN efforts. It could lead the Moroccans to be much less conciliatory and could lead the Algerians to refuse cooperation.

—The official date for Spanish withdrawal and administrative turnover of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania is February 28. Particularly since the Moroccans have not complied with the provision of both UN resolutions calling for some determination of the wishes of the Saharan population, this date could be a focus of considerable political tension. Even the announcement of large supplies of military equipment to be provided in the near future, as distinct from actual shipment, could heighten this tension.

—In general, regardless of the military merits and of what specific reactions it might bring, a highly visible and rapid supply of American equipment would tend to emphasize the big-power, international aspects of the dispute and would work against any hope of keeping it largely regional in scope.

Option 2: Do not agree to any arms transfers.

The Pros and Cons are essentially those of Option 1, reversed.

Option 3: Agree to transfer of selective quantities and types of arms, perhaps stretching out the transfers over a period of time.

PROS:

—This would provide some evidence of support for Hassan and would increase his actual capacity to conduct his operation in the Sahara.

—If the quantities were limited enough, or stretched out enough in time, the initial impact would not be as disruptive on regional efforts or as likely to give a big-power cast to the Sahara problem.

—In actual fact, such a transfer operation would probably require considerable time and it would be better to make this clear in the very beginning.

—We would have time to assess the progress of regional and UN attempts at solution, to see whether the Soviets become more directly involved, and to observe the extent to which the Algerians intend to prosecute the conflict in the Sahara.

CONS:

—Hassan would be somewhat let down, since it would be difficult to prevent his knowing that it was the U.S. that restrained the Iranians and Jordanians.

—U.S. hesitancy could be interpreted in some quarters as an indication of the lack of U.S. resolve and might encourage the Algerians, with Soviet backing, to risk further military confrontations with the Moroccans.

U.S. Assistance in Transportation

Whether or not there is a real issue here depends on how much equipment we authorize for transfer, and how quickly we would like it transferred. If we want a substantial amount of matériel moved rapidly, we probably have little alternative but to provide some air lift in addition to whatever the Jordanians can provide. Otherwise the two Jordanian C-130s might suffice, particularly if any F-5A's to be transferred are themselves flown to Morocco. Other Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Iraq might also assist with an airlift.

Financing

Further study will be needed, depending on how much and what kind of equipment we permit to be transferred. Any replacement equipment we provide will certainly cost more. The difference will be particularly marked with respect to the F-5E's, if the Moroccans agree to use them to replace the F-5A's on a one-for-one basis, and if we authorize the transfer of the F-5A's. In this case, the least complicated method would seem to be to continue with the supply of the F-5E's to Morocco, with Morocco to pay as planned, and to authorize Morocco to transfer them to Jordan.

Conclusion

The Defense Department is examining the practical problems of availability and cost on an urgent basis, particularly with regard to aircraft. Meanwhile, there are too many unknowns and variables to permit a hard and fast decision to permit transfer of a specific number of items in a specific time period. In principle, however, while I believe that we will want to support Hassan by authorizing some early transfers, it would seem prudent to have the transfer of any substantial amounts spread out over a reasonable period of time (e.g., 30–90 days) to reduce the visibility and hence the political disadvantages. This is particularly true of the aircraft—the most dramatic and visible of the equipment. We believe, on the basis of initial DOD estimates, that the aircraft would take some time to put in shape for the trip, so that would be a natural delaying factor. If we did not agree to a U.S. airlift—and I would recommend against it as constituting too dramatic a U.S. involvement in the Sahara problem—that would also necessitate spaced-out delivery. I suggest, therefore, that we authorize immediate transfer of some equipment, such as the howitzers and 106 mm. recoilless rifles and ammunition, and say that we are studying the other requests urgently. Given the process for such transfers, we could probably not complete the authorization in less than three to four weeks. (Under existing legislation, we cannot approve third party transfers of MAP or FMS origin U.S. military equipment until Congress has been informed and transfer assurances obtained from the proposed recipient.) We

could then discuss with the Jordanians how long it would take to move the aircraft, how this should be done, and how the replacement would be handled (we would need to talk to the Moroccans directly about that). By that time, we should have a clearer picture of the developing Sahara problem, and would be able to decide whether and under what conditions to approve transfer of the planes.

With respect to Iran's desire to have the equipment it provides pass through Jordan, we can agree to that but should warn the Iranians that, given our procedures for reporting all transfers to Congress, the operation will be quite transparent and the Iranian role will be evident. We will have to warn the Iranians, furthermore, that early replacement of the equipment will probably not be possible, given the long lead-times involved (just as it has not been possible for us to further accelerate deliveries to Morocco directly). Finally, we will want to warn both Iran and Jordan that the transfers will certainly become public and might well attract considerable attention.

If you agree with the following recommendations, we shall draft replies to the Jordanians and Iranians for your approval.

Recommendations:

1. That we agree to the immediate transfer to Morocco from Jordan of 36 106 mm. recoilless rifles.
2. That we inquire of the Jordanians about the practical problems involved in transferring the F-5A's, including transportation, time for preparation, etc.
3. That we agree to the transfer to Morocco from Iran of 16 155 mm. howitzers and ammunition through Jordan, after warning Iran of the public nature of the transaction.
4. That we tell the Iranians we are sympathetic to their wish that the equipment be replaced in their inventory and are studying the possibilities, including the problems of financing.
5. That we tell the Jordanians and Iranians that we are continuing to consider urgently the remainder of their requests.
6. That we instruct Ambassador Neumann to take up the transfer question with the Moroccans, inquiring particularly about their reported willingness to replace Jordanian F-5A's with the more costly F-5E's.
7. That, if the Jordanians raise the subject, we say we do not believe we can make available the aircraft to transport the equipment to Morocco.

79. **Telegram 37574/Tosec 30081 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger at Aqaba¹**

Washington, February 14, 1976, 2352Z.

30081. For the Secretary from Sisco. Subject: Action Memorandum—Visit to Morocco of U.S. Nuclear-Powered Submarine (S/S 7603250).

The Problem

A visit by U.S. nuclear-powered submarine, *Bergall*, to south central Moroccan port of Safi is scheduled for February 27 to March 1. This would be first visit by a U.S. Nuclear-Powered Warship (NPW) to a Moroccan port and could attract unusual attention as it would coincide with February 28 transfer of Spanish juridical authority in Sahara, a time when Morocco will be the focus of considerable diplomatic and press activity. We need to weigh pros and cons of allowing visit to proceed on schedule and, if visit goes forward, we need also to consider advance notification of those Arab nations, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, which have been attempting to bring about solution to Sahara problem, and Algeria in order to defuse Boumediene's adverse reaction to the extent possible.

Background

1. After several months of GOM indecision, and following direct request by Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements to Moroccan Ambassador Boutaleb on December 18, GOM, on December 20, granted permission for U.S. nuclear warships to call, at our convenience, in Moroccan ports. Moroccans, most recently in January 28 meeting which I had with Ambassador Boutaleb, urged we send nuclear vessel as soon as possible as demonstration of U.S. support.

2. With approval of GOM Navy has made arrangements for call February 27–March 1. Question is whether we should allow visit to proceed or postpone it for foreign policy reasons. Mr. Clements feels

¹ Summary: The Department informed Kissinger of the pending visit of a U.S. nuclear submarine to the Moroccan port of Safi, and asked his advice on how to proceed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Escudero; cleared by Atherton and MacFarlane; and approved by Sisco. Kissinger was in Aqaba, Jordan, to brief King Hussein and Prime Minister Rifai on the Middle East peace process. In telegram 409 from Brasilia, February 21, the Embassy informed the Department of Kissinger's decision to postpone the submarine visit. Kissinger's response was "absolutely not." (Ibid., P840086–2238). In telegram 43165 to Brasilia, February 23, Clements told Kissinger that he agreed with the decision to postpone the visit. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Morocco, September 22, 1975–December 23, 1976)

strongly that visit should go forward as planned. He concerned that brief postponement might be indefinitely prolonged, and that environment for visit is much better today than it might be a month or six weeks away.

The Options

1. That you decide to postpone *Bergall* visit for brief period.

Pros

—If *Bergall* visit should coincide with final departure of Madrid's authority from Spanish Sahara, ship's presence could be widely construed and possibly publicized by both Morocco and Algeria as evidence of U.S. military support for Rabat's policies in Spanish Sahara.

—We do not want to internationalize Sahara issue, and if we send NPW in now this might counter our policy of keeping it regional issue and avoiding outside interference. It might also leave us open to later accusations that we took first steps toward internationalization of problem.

—Although there has been no move thus far for such action, Algeria or another country might call for meeting of Security Council on Sahara question to coincide with end of Spanish administration February 28. A highly publicized U.S. Navy visit at that time would lend itself to propaganda exploitation that we were seeking to influence UN deliberations and injecting superpower politics into regional dispute.

—Even if there is no SC meeting, UN and other diplomatic efforts in train may still be underway in late February. U.S. Naval visit might be seen as attempt to influence these efforts. Visit might also adversely affect mediation efforts of Egyptians and other moderate Arabs, or be perceived by them as embarrassment to their endeavors.

—Recent events in Sahara appear to suggest that Algerians may have acquiesced, at least temporarily, in the Moroccan occupation and are looking for a face-saving way out of the corner they have painted themselves into. Algiers could interpret U.S. NPW visit at such a sensitive time as public challenge, a flaunting of U.S. support for Morocco which could not go unanswered. Boumediene is bitter about our role in the Sahara dispute as he sees it, and a U.S. Naval visit to Morocco could make it more difficult to maintain a U.S.-Algerian dialogue, which remains important to our long run interests despite Algeria's opposition to us on a broad range of multilateral issues.

—More immediately, the *Bergall* visit would coincide with and possibly cast a shadow over Chuck Robinson's visit to Algeria.

—We are not suggesting that the visit be cancelled but merely postponed until the next date which the navy finds suitable for another nuclear submarine.

Cons

—Use of Moroccan ports by U.S. NPW's is of great important to our regional interests as at present only Italy, and to lesser extent Tunisia, of all Mediterranean Basin countries, will permit calls by U.S. atomic-powered warships, Mr. Clements, in particular, feels strongly that visit should not be postponed.

—As Moroccans have requested NPW visit ASAP, postponement for whatever reason, and particularly after Morocco has already agreed officially to proposed dates, would inevitably excite Moroccan concerns and could possibly result in withdrawal of permission for future NPW calls.

—Even if we disguised true reason for postponement in our explanation to GOM, Moroccans would be suspicious of our real motives and question our true intentions toward them.

—In your January 29 meeting with King's Emissary Karim Lamrani, you promised to think of ways to demonstrate our diplomatic and national interest toward Morocco. It may be that *Bergall* visit would constitute just such a demonstration.

—U.S. gesture in support of Morocco at this stage might be welcomed by some third world friends—e.g., Iran—particularly in light of their concern over Soviet activities in Angola.

—While timing of *Bergall's* visit is indeed awkward, the political situation in the Sahara remains uncertain and there are no indications that situation would not be worse by time chosen for postponed NPW visit.

—Although we may be able to accelerate deliveries or arrange for third country transfer of some military equipment to Morocco, total package will not be impressive. Though more symbolic than real, NPW call coming soon after port visit of Sixth Fleet Commander and his flagship might go far to reassure King Hassan, who has lent us needed support on Middle East question and UN issues (although Morocco has now recognized the MPLA).

Option 2

That we make no objection to visit and allow it to proceed on schedule. (Arguments for and against are obverse of those above.)

Recommendations

That you authorize Mr. Sisco to call Mr. Clements and inform him that, for reasons cited above, Department considers it not in our interest to proceed with NPW visit as scheduled and ask that visit be postponed for brief period.

Alternatively,

That we not intervene with DOD and allow visit to proceed as planned.

Sub-options

1. If you decide *Bergall* visit should take place as scheduled, that we notify Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Syria in advance to defuse to extent possible any potential adverse reaction.

Pros

—Despite lack of total success, ongoing Arab mediation efforts offer best hope of settling Sahara dispute on regional basis. In absence of advance notification, Arabs could perceive NPW visit as U.S. attempt to interfere or undercut their endeavors.

—On other hand, some Arab mediators may welcome *Bergall* call as evidence of U.S. support for Morocco and intensify their activities which stem from their own governments' pro-Moroccan positions.

—If Arabs object to NPW visit it would be better to learn this in advance so that their views could be considered prior to arrival of *Bergall* in Safi.

—Arabs will appreciate advance notification as proof of continuing U.S. intention to cooperate with them in matters of mutual regional interest.

Cons

—If Arabs object to *Bergall* visit, we would be faced with dilemma of either going ahead anyway over their objections, with added strains on our relations, or postponing visit out of deference to them, which could anger Morocco.

Recommendations

If you decide that *Bergall* should call at Safi as planned, that you authorize advance notification of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, in light of their mediation efforts, and Algeria to put visit in perspective to the extent possible.

Alternatively,

That we do not notify the Arab mediators prior to the NPW visit.

80. Telegram 37575 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, February 14, 1976, 2353Z.

37575. For Ambassador from Sisco. Subject: Assistance for Morocco. References: A—Amman 687; B—Amman 689; C—Amman 699; D—Tehran 1267; E—State 201455 (Notal).

1. Dept and DOD are giving urgent consideration to GOI proposals for possible transfer of items on GOM shopping list to Morocco. Action, however, complicated by many factors including unavailability of early replacements, inevitability of Congressional and press attention to transfers, logistical and political problems associated with transport of equipment and cost factors. These questions are addressed in detail below and you should discuss them with appropriate GOI officials in accordance with following guidelines.

2. U.S. policy is basically sympathetic to Moroccan solution to Sahara problem based on Spanish-Moroccan-Mauritanian Tripartite Agreement and UNGA Resolution recognizing that agreement for which U.S. voted in UNGA. We also support current mediation efforts by UN Secretary General Waldheim's representative and by several Arab countries seeking to reconcile GOA and GOM differences on self-determination issue. However, we recognize that military balance in area overwhelmingly in Algeria's favor, and, in view of our long-standing friendly association with Morocco and concomitant military supply relationship, we want to lend appropriate support. Our intention is to be as responsive as possible to Morocco to help in part to offset imbalance vis-à-vis Algeria while avoiding highly visible emergency supply of U.S. equipment which would make it appear USG injecting itself into dispute at time that regional and UN diplomatic efforts are in train.

3. You should inform GOI that following general considerations would apply to transfers of items mentioned Ref D.

A. Replacements for most items in Moroccan request list could not rpt not be furnished quickly because of lengthy production lead times ranging from 20 to 48 months in many cases. USG is unable to expedite these items due to firm commitments to U.S. forces and other countries.

¹ Summary: The Department informed the Embassy of complications and general considerations associated with the transfer of equipment from Iran to Morocco.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Weislogel; cleared by Atherton, Stern, Noyes, and MacFarlane; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Amman and Rabat.

B. Replacement costs on all items would exceed original costs to Iran, and USG has no rpt no funds from which to absorb added costs.

C. Responsibility for maintenance status of the equipment selected for transfer must necessarily rest with countries involved.

D. Transfers of U.S. supplied equipment from Iran whether to Jordan or direct to Morocco must be notified to Congress. You should be sure GOI fully understands that this legislative requirement makes it inevitable that transactions will come to the attention of Congress and public and might attract criticism. Transfer procedures outlined in Ref E.

E. GOI should submit diplomatic note or other written request through MFA or Ministry of Defense to Embassy formally asking authorization to effect transfers in question to Jordan, unless they wish on reflection to transfer directly to GOM. (FYI: As you are aware, we would then need to meet statutory requirements of advance notification to Congress and receipt of transfer assurances from recipient. End FYI.)

F. Transport of items, particularly aircraft, whether latter sent directly from Iran or via Jordan, poses practical difficulties. If GOI raises question of U.S. airlift, you should say you must refer question to Washington.

In this connection, you might inquire whether GOI has explored possibilities of assistance in arranging airlift from Saudis and other friendly Arab states with capability. (FYI: Transport by USAF aircraft would be very costly; rough estimate around \$3.7 million. End FYI.)

4. Specific items: Inform GOI of following:

A. 16 155 mm howitzers and ammunition—USG will approve transfer from Iran to Morocco, either via Jordan or direct as soon as US statutory requirements are met and arrangements can be made. Remind GOI that even if routed via Jordan, transfer would eventually become public information for reasons cited para 3D. Also, inform GOI that we could not replace howitzers from GOM orders until fourth quarter CY 77. One possibility for such transfer would be to divert 12 155 howitzers now in process of being shipped from US port to Iran.

B. 4 or 5 F-5As with munitions (GOI not requesting replacement). In principle we favor this transfer from Iran to Jordan to Morocco. If GOI should opt for direct shipment, what is GOI estimate of time needed to prepare planes for ferrying, or alternatively to disassemble and later reassemble them in Morocco. If planes are ferried, overflight and landing/refueling arrangements would have to be made with Saudi Arabia, Greece, Italy and Spain. USG would be prepared to support GOI or GOJ requests for overflight clearance.

C. We are in principle agreeable to transfer to Morocco of other items in Iranian inventory but must study further the problems of re-

placement availability and financing. This we are doing on urgent basis. Preliminary survey reveals Moroccan payback based on current production/delivery schedules (LOA's already signed) could be as follows for some of other items on GOM list:

TOW—launchers, missiles—4th qtr CY 76
 16 155 mm M109A2 howitzers (GOM order calls for M109A1B)—
 4th qtr CY 77
 4 million 7.62 NATO rounds—3 months general lead-time (no deliveries pending for Morocco)
 12,800 155 mm shells (10 smoke or phosphorus, 10 illuminating, 70 explosives, 10 training)—3 months general lead-time (no deliveries pending for Morocco)

5. Embassy should inform GOI immediately of proposed favorable decisions on transfer of 16 howitzers and ammo and of F-5As to GOJ or GOM. After explaining carefully conditions and ramifications outlined paras 3 and 4, Embassy should ascertain whether GOI wants to proceed with the transfers in question and advise that Dept will not rpt not initiate steps to effect transfers until it receives GOI assurances in this regard.

Ingersoll

81. Telegram 37577 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, February 14, 1976, 2355Z.

37577. For Ambassador from Sisco. Subject: Assistance for Morocco. References: A—Amman 687; B—Amman 689; C—Amman 699; D—Tehran 1267; E—State 201455 (Notal).

1. Dept and DOD are giving urgent consideration to proposals for arms and aircraft transfers to Morocco. US policy is basically sympathetic to Moroccan needs, which we want to meet to extent possible in way that does not appear to be internationalizing Sahara dispute

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to communicate decisions to the Government of Jordan regarding arms and aircraft transfers to Morocco.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Weislogel; cleared by Atherton, Stern, Noyes, and MacFarlane; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Rabat and Tehran. In telegram 37576 to Rabat, February 14, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Government of Morocco about U.S. approval for the transfer of items from Jordan pending statutory requirements. (Ibid.)

through highly visible emergency supply of US equipment, particularly during current Arab and UN diplomatic efforts to reconcile GOA and GOM differences over self-determination prior to end of Spanish administration on February 28. We recognize that Morocco under-armed vis-à-vis Algeria and want to help in part to offset the imbalance.

2. In this context Dept is prepared to immediately authorize transfer of items most readily available and easily moved and where replacement not major factor, as soon as we meet statutory requirements relating to third-party transfers as contained in section 3 (A) of Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA), as amended, i.e., advance notification of Congress and receipt of transfer assurances from GOM. Specifics discussed below. Action on other items complicated by many factors and will require further discussion with GOM, GOI and GOJ. Embassy requested communicate decisions to GOJ and discuss other aspects with Jordanians in accordance with following guidance.

3. General points you should emphasize to GOJ.

A. Replacements for most items under consideration for transfer to Morocco cannot be furnished quickly because of lengthy production lead times which may range from 20 to 48 months in some cases.

B. Replacement costs will exceed original costs to Jordan of any items transferred to Morocco and USG has no rpt no funds to absorb these added costs. We assume this is matter to be worked out between GOM and GOJ.

C. Responsibility for maintenance status of the equipment selected for transfer must necessarily rest with countries involved.

D. Any transfers of US supplied equipment from Iran and Jordan to Morocco, or from Iran via Jordan to Morocco, must be notified to Congress and will therefore be public knowledge. You should be sure GOJ fully understands inevitability of Congressional and press attention to and possible criticism of transaction. Transfer procedures are outlined in Ref E.

E. GOJ should submit diplomatic note or other written message through MFA or MinDef to Embassy formally requesting USG authority to effect transfers in question.

F. If Jordanians raise subject of U.S. airlift, you should say you must refer question to Washington. In this connection, you might inquire whether GOJ has explored possibilities of assistance in arranging airlift from Saudis and other friendly Arab states with capability. (FYI: Transport by USAF aircraft would be very costly, rough estimate around dols 3.7 million. End FYI)

4. Specific items

A. Recoilless rifles: Dept is prepared to agree to transfer to Morocco from Jordan of 36 106 mm recoilless rifles. We understand GOJ is not rpt not asking for replacements. Dept understanding is that Jordan received 106mm recoilless rifles under MAP; Morocco is not eligible for MAP matériel. Suggest that GOJ would therefore buy residual rights after which guns could be transferred to third party. (FYI: Residual value for each 106 mm RR is dols 2,704. End FYI) Beyond that transfer can be made as soon as GOJ files written request, Dept informs Congress in advance, and GOM submits diplomatic note concerning disposition of these items as required by FMSA. Suggested text being furnished Rabat by septel.

B. 20 F–5As from Jordanian Air Force: You should inform GOJ that first need is to work out practical problems of transfer with GOJ, GOI and GOM. Please convey following points to GOJ:

—Deliveries of initial F–5Es as replacements for F–5As, if Morocco agrees to this, cannot rpt not commence before late 1977 because of long production lead times. This is reason GOM seeks earlier delivery via transfers from Jordan. GOJ should understand this point before proceeding with transfer.

—USG has no funds to absorb cost of replacements to Jordan from GOM order of F–5Es which will greatly exceed value of F–5As. We assume this will be worked out between GOJ and GOM.

—Ask GOJ estimated time needed to put F–5As in condition for ferrying to Morocco. Alternatively, if they are to be disassembled for shipment and reassembled in Morocco, need estimate of when planes could be operable. Latter is complicated operation requiring jigs and substantial team at each end.

—Seek GOJ's views on most practicable means of moving these planes, reminding them of need to get overflight and landing/refueling clearances in Greece, Italy, Spain. We are prepared support GOJ requests for clearances.

C. 16 155 mm howitzers and ammo (both small arms and artillery) from Iran to Morocco via Jordan. Inform GOJ that we are prepared to agree to its transferring these items to Morocco once they are received from Iran, but that we should again have to comply with statutory provisions for advance notification of Congress and transfer assurances from recipient.

D. 4 or 5 F–5As with munitions from Iran: We have no objection to transfer of these aircraft and munitions from Iran to Jordan but same considerations discussed in Paras 3D and 4B above would apply to their onward transfer to Morocco.

E. REDEYE: Although REDEYES were not among items GOJ indicated it could provide to Morocco, they appear on GOM shopping list

and GOJ may have them under consideration. If Jordanians raise subject, inform them that we would not approve their transfer to Morocco, consistent with our policy of not rpt not further proliferating this weapon.

5. You correctly surmised that matériel would not be available from our assets in Europe (nor from US military inventories anywhere) and may confirm this if Jordanians raise it again.

6. Embassy requested inform Dept ASAP of GOJ reaction to points you raise with them and whether GOJ wants to proceed with transfers under applicable conditions. Dept will not rpt not initiate steps to effect transfers until it receives GOJ assurances in this regard.

Ingersoll

82. Telegram 45389 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, February 25, 1976, 2047Z.

45389. Subject: Accelerated Delivery of U.S. Equipment. Ref: State 37576 (Notal).

1. Following January 29 meeting between Secretary and King Hassan's special emissary Karim Lamrani, Department undertook review of US–Morocco military supply relationship to determine if additional acceleration of delivery dates would be practical. In past we have responded to GOM acceleration requests in positive fashion. We moved up delivery dates on M–48A3 and M–48A5 tanks, armored personnel carriers, AIM9B, Chaparral, LAW and TOW missiles, howitzers and recoilless rifles. The tanks, TOW's, APC's and Chaparrals (latter rejected by GOM along with howitzers as rebuilt items) were taken from our own forces. Review revealed that our present production capacity is limited and fully committed to US forces or to other prior foreign customers.

¹ Summary: The Embassy was informed of the status of accelerated arms deliveries to Morocco.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco (3). Secret. Repeated to Algiers, Nouakchott, Madrid, Amman, and Tehran. A notation at the top of the first page reads: "Direct US arms for Morocco—summary of where we stand—Feb. 25. See decision memo at A." The memorandum was not attached. A notation next to item 7 reads, "NSC and State concurred."

2. Armored personnel carriers: US forces will receive only two APC's from CY 76 production and have no existing units which could be made available to Morocco. Only possible short-term source would appear to be Jordan which is scheduled to receive 53 APC's in first quarter CY 76. Department has no objection if GOM wants to approach GOJ for some of latter's current APC production.

3. Howitzers and 106 mm recoilless rifles: We have agreed, subject to prior Congressional notification and to fulfillment of other statutory requirements, to transfer of 16 howitzers and 36 recoilless rifles from Iran and Jordan respectively. US could offer six rebuilt 106's immediately and ten more in March. First possible offering for shipment of new 106's is April 1976.

4. TOW missile: We have already expedited delivery date" for six TOW launchers and 96 missiles from US Army but see no advantage to further acceleration as no trained Moroccan personnel will be available to operate TOW until its regularly-scheduled delivery date.

5. Vulcan anti-aircraft gun: As with TOW, sufficient Moroccan personnel will not have completed operations and maintenance training prior to scheduled delivery dates, making advance delivery impractical.

6. Chaparral missile: Moroccan teams scheduled to complete Chaparral training in mid-CY 76 so delivery prior to that time would not be useful. GOM has already rejected offer of early delivery of rebuilt Chaparrals.

7. F-5's: LOA for sale of F-5E's and F-5F's went to Congress February 18 and survey team plans to arrive in Morocco shortly to begin preliminary work on basis of unsigned LOA. There are no available F-5A's in US inventory.

8. M48A3 tanks: Shipping date for ten M48A3 tanks moved forward from March 15 to March 1.

9. You may inform the GOM of foregoing, emphasizing our continuing desire to be helpful where possible.

10. FYI: This message was coordinated with DOD which also informed Moroccan Military Attaché of its contents.

Kissinger

83. Memorandum From Robert Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, February 26, 1976.

SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Morocco

The following is a review of where we stand on military supplies for Morocco, both the on-going program and urgent requests submitted in connection with the Spanish Saharan dispute.

Since the Secretary's 1973 visit to Morocco, the King has wanted us to move expeditiously on the modernization of two brigades. The major items included tanks, APC's CHAPARRALS, TOW's, VULCANS and 155 mm howitzers. DOD launched a comprehensive Army review of all Moroccan requests and this resulted in improved lead-times for several major items (notably 26 M48A5 tanks, APC's and TOW launchers).

On January 8, in the context of the increasingly heated Spanish Saharan problem, King Hassan made a major pitch to Ambassador Neumann for the expediting of US arms deliveries and particularly for one squadron of the older F-5A/B's as soon as possible, presumably in addition to the F-5E/F's which the Moroccans hoped would move quickly. [The LOA has gone to Congress but deliveries cannot be made until late 1977.] Shortly thereafter the Moroccans sent special emissaries to Tehran and Amman (following the suggestion made to the Moroccan Ambassador here by Mr. Clements) urging they immediately provide Morocco with all or any of the following: TOW's, RED-EYES, 109A2 Howitzers, 106 mm guns, 7.62 (Nato) rounds, shells for 155 mm guns, 25 F-5 aircraft. The Secretary also met with Hassan's special emissary, Lamrani, who redoubled the pitch for US arms support.

US Response: The Secretary was sent two action memoranda, prepared by NEA and PM in close collaboration with ISA, with options on what might be done in response to requests for further acceleration of direct US deliveries and for transfer from Iran and Jordan. Apart from restraints imposed by the need to protect our own inventories, the main foreign policy point was made that we want, on the one hand, to be

¹ Summary: Oakley provided a review of the U.S. response to Morocco's continuing requests for military supplies.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco (3). Secret; Exdis. Concurred in by Clint Granger. Tabs I through IV were not attached. All brackets are in the original.

supportive of Morocco, but, on the other, to avoid such a high level of aid that it would lead to internationalization and escalation of the dispute. On the basis of those arguments, the Secretary made the following decisions:

Third Party Transfer from Iran and Jordan—See Cable at Tab I

Approved

—Transfer to Morocco from Jordan of 36 106 mm recoilless rifles. (Jordan would provide as a “gift”)

—Transfer to Morocco from Iran of 16 155 mm howitzers and ammunition through Jordan. [Iran requested that Jordan be the middleman so that Iran would not act directly in an “Arab” dispute.]

—Approval in principle of the transfer of F-5A’s but inquire of Jordan about the practical problems involved.

—Tell the Iranians we will be sympathetic to replacing the transferred equipment and will study the matter; tell Jordan and Iran we are continuing to urgently consider the remainder of the Moroccan requests.

Disapproved—Transfer of REDEYES

Our posts were advised of the difficulties of the US providing equipment directly but of our willingness to see Iran and Jordan be helpful. In the latter respect, the posts were advised that the USG had *no* funds to absorb the added costs of replacement equipment; Congressional notification and other bureaucratic procedures involving transfers take time and the parties should also understand the transfer approval will become public.

The initial reaction by Morocco, Jordan and Iran to our response was positive. Subsequently, problems have arisen in the transfer of the aircraft. [Jordan planned to transfer 25 F-5A’s given it by Iran to meet the Moroccan requirement.] Rifai has insisted that Morocco replace the aging F-5A’s (used, worth \$200,000 each) with the new F-5E’s planned for Morocco (worth \$3 million each) for which we have sent LOA’s to Congress. However, the Moroccans have balked at this and the Jordanian Air Force Commander is threatening to resign because of the gap which would be created by transfer of the F-5A’s without immediate replacement. Rifai has therefore told us this week not to make any moves to inform the Hill of an impending transfer while he works on the Moroccans. We have told the interested posts that there are no F-5A’s available in our inventory.

Accelerated Delivery of US Equipment to Morocco—See Cable at Tab II
(Approved by DOD)

Approved

—That we *not* ask DOD for further withdrawals from US forces.

—APC's—No objection if GOM wants to approach GOJ for some of Jordan's current production (since Morocco did not include APC's in the list given Jordan). [We will not ask Jordan directly nor will we study the possibility of diverting part of the Israeli PAC production to Morocco.]

—CHAPARRAL—No further acceleration will be considered since Morocco has rejected our offer of 13 rebuilt units.

—TOW—No further acceleration since no trained Moroccan military personnel will be available to operate TOW until its regularly scheduled delivery date. [Also, Iran has indicated a possible willingness to provide TOW's.]

—VULCAN—No further acceleration (which would affect US inventories) since Moroccans will not have personnel trained.

—106 mm recoilless rifles and 10 more in March—inform Moroccans of immediate *availability*. (Per page 2 of this memo we have also agreed, subject to Congressional notification, to the transfer of 16 howitzers and 36 recoilless from Iran and Jordan respectively)

[—Following review of the aircraft problem, apart from LOA's going to the Hill on the F-5E/F's, Moroccans were informed February 25 that there are no available F-5A's in the US inventory.]

A brief chronology of the Moroccan arms requests dialogue is at Tab III. Further, the Secretary has decided to postpone the planned February 27–March 1 visit of the first nuclear powered warship to stop in Morocco (a move only recently approved by the King) because of the sensitivities of the Spanish Sahara situation. The telegram at Tab IV sums up the political sensitivities that the Secretary has taken into consideration in the various arms decisions.

Possibilities for Acceleration

If the Jordanian F-5 deal falls through we see little chance for stepped-up deliveries of fighter aircraft to Morocco without diversion of equipment from US stocks. In this regard, the Air Force has 21 recovered F-5E's, some of which conceivably could be loaned or given (Jordan has no funds) to Jordan immediately for twice the number of F-5A's to be delivered to Morocco. We doubt this would be acceptable to Defense and it has *not* been discussed with DOD.

Other help is more feasible. There are currently enroute to Iran 12 155 SP howitzers which could be diverted to Morocco and arrive within a week. We have suggested this to the Iranians, but have received no response. We could renew this initiative with increased urgency. In addition, we understand that 28 M48A5 tanks which the Moroccans have purchased will be ready for shipment next week. It may be as much as 60 days, however, before they can be shipped in American bottoms, as

the law requires. Waiving this requirement could reduce the time necessary to have these tanks in Moroccan hands to a few weeks.

State Defense Coordination

At the ISA–NEA–PM level, cooperation in Washington has been good, so far as can be determined by talking to them and looking at the clearances on the memos and cables produced by State. There has apparently been a problem with military commands in the field, notably CINCEUR, who have complained about not being kept informed. It may be that our military responsible for Iran and Jordan (like the Jordanian Air Force), are not keen on seeing equipment transferred to Morocco at the expense of the military establishments they are assisting. Or it may simply be that military commands are naturally dubious when civilians redistribute equipment and appear not to understand the complications involved (which in this deal have been many). However, State has been pretty good (with ISA help) in pointing out to our Embassies the sorts of logistics and shipping problems they will face. Unless we are prepared to take over the operation and use our own resources, (creating a problem of political visibility) there is really not much more we can do.

We do not recommend any further action to accelerate deliveries, at least pending the results of the parallel missions to the area of Roy Atherton (on a fact-finding, hand-holding visit to Rabat and Algiers for the Secretary) and Arab League Secretary General Riad (on a full-scale mediation mission with Arab backing). Also, the CIA is doing a special estimate for us on the broader implications of the Spanish Sahara dispute, particularly with respect to possible broadening of the confrontation to include other Arab states and eventually the US and the USSR. This will be ready by March 1.

84. Telegram 1377 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 11, 1976, 0817Z.

1377. From the Ambassador. Subject: The Potential Strategic Importance of Morocco to the United States—IV. Ref: Rabat 1154, Rabat 1346.

1. The Dept will be relieved to learn that this is the last in the series of personal reflections on U.S. interests in Morocco and the region which I am transmitting immediately prior to my departure from post.

2. In previous messages submitted over a year ago (e.g. my telegram 4467 of January 31, 1975), I urged that the USG undertake a long-range assessment of Morocco's strategic importance to the United States. Unfortunately the answer was a non-answer and wise counsellors in the Department of State suggested to me that I accept, as a given fact, that under then obtaining conditions, the USG was unable to plan in long-range terms.

3. As a single individual, on the eve of his departure from this post, I cannot hope to substitute for a major planning organization. I can only raise a few questions which the Department of State and Defense might occasionally consider.

4. To begin, my assumptions are: (A) That with the increasingly rapid growth of democratic rights in Spain, our bases there will become increasingly controversial, no matter what agreements we may have. (B) That with the strengthening of the Communist Party in Italy, with the continued inability of the Socialist and Social Democratic mini-parties to make a dent in the CP, and with the possibility, sooner or later, of a deal between at least some elements of the Christian Democrats and the Communists, the Communists may eventually achieve their objective of sharing governmental power, or at least exercising real influence thereon. The least that can be said is that such an arrangement is capable of placing our bases in Italy in jeopardy. (C) That the aftereffects of the 1974 Cyprus crisis will be long-lasting, and that it will be many years, if ever, before the USG can reestablish security relations with Greece and Turkey that are even approximately as close as what we had before. (D) That almost daily we see new evidence of growing Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean . . . it does not, therefore, re-

¹ Summary: Neumann offered his assessment of the strategic importance of Morocco to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret. Repeated to Algiers, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris (also for Ambassador-designate Anderson), Tripoli, Tunis, Casablanca, Tangier, and the Mission to the UN.

quire exercise of much imagination to envisage a scenario in which the position of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean may become untenable—and all that without a war.

5. Under these circumstances I find it astonishing, to say the least, that our government has not by now given some reasonably methodical and consistent thought to the options which Morocco presents. To be sure, Morocco does so out of self-interest, this is usual. Offers made solely out of pretended friendship are deeply suspect. Agreements to be truly valid have to serve the purposes of all parties.

6. The King has said that if the U.S. helps Morocco more on the Sahara, any kind of open or other military cooperation agreement is possible and would be supported by all Moroccans. I do not suggest that such an agreement is necessarily in the U.S. national interest, or that it could pass Congressional muster. But until we calculate what we might wish from Morocco we cannot really know what kind of a response best serves our interests.

7. A variety of facilities or rights are and remain within our grasp. What might we want? Nuclear submarine pens? Other naval installations? Port facilities? Beaches for landing exercises, simulated or real? Bombing ranges? Rights to activate former SAC bases on short notice?

8. Once again let me underline that I am not repeat not proposing that we do any of these things. But until there is a cool, long-range assessment of the possible value of the above, we cannot really judge intelligently whether political considerations outweigh them. They probably would but I should like to see this question studied seriously and not shoved under the rug on the basis of little or nothing more than a political “guesstimate.”

9. The above I have said, more or less, before. But now there are new factors:

A. The Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola has made the west coast of Africa vulnerable. How important, now, has a U.S. anchor in Morocco-Mauritania-Senegal become?

B. The world situation imperatively demands a solution of the Middle East problem. This will take years, but so does planning and implementation. Therefore the possibility of future U.S. military arrangements with Morocco ought to be viewed in part in a post-Middle East-problem light.

C. The Angola and Saharan problems have revealed fragility within the African bloc. Oil price differences have revealed weaknesses in OPEC. And a prolongation of the Sahara and other issues could weaken Arab solidarity toward the Arab-Israel conflict. In that case the moderate Government of Morocco could be a prime candidate for jumping off the bandwagon. More reason for keeping our relations with Morocco warm.

10. In sum, in Morocco we have considerable potential political and military assets. Political and/or military-technical considerations may very well suggest that these not be pursued at this time. But in view of the fragility of our positions elsewhere in Africa and in the Mediterranean region, that picture could change. It follows that it makes sense for us, not only to analyze what Moroccan strategic assets are worth to us, but to keep the Moroccan connection warm and friendly. For even if we continue to refrain from exploiting our strategic opportunities here at this time, we should keep in mind that future circumstances may force us to recalculate our priorities.

11. For the present, keeping our Moroccan connection warm and friendly is preeminently a function of our stance on the Sahara issue. We have generally favored the Moroccan position, under the guise of neutrality—and that is good. As concerns our military supply program, we have not been as forthcoming as we might have been but in view of our own matériel shortages we have, on the whole, not done badly by Morocco. Where we have been most remiss, however, has been in the way we have handled not only certain aspects of our arms program, but also other elements of our relations. All too often we have delayed or postponed decisions on actions of great importance to Morocco for reasons which sometimes could not be understood and on other occasions could be understood all too well. The six month delay in presenting the letter of offer for the F-5E squadron falls in the former category, as does the incredible 13-month delay in deciding on a Title I PL-480 program for Morocco; the postponement of the recently scheduled NPW visit falls in the latter category.

12. Perhaps I can distill the essence of the frustration I have felt in the last two and a half years, and which I have tried to spell out in this series of four telegrams, into one last Parthian shot: Gentlemen, we need to know what we want and what we are doing, if we are to deal successfully with this friendly but complex country. And if we are unable to decide what we want, let us at least try to act in a way that gives the Moroccans the impression, however misleading, that we know what we are doing.

Neumann

85. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Poor) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements)¹

Washington, August 26, 1976.

SUBJECT

Moroccan Base Closures—ACTION MEMORANDUM (C)

(U) The purpose of this paper is to establish a DoD position on future military basing in Morocco. Request your approval of the course of action listed below. If you concur, we will prepare necessary correspondence to State and the NSC Staff.

(C) *Background.*

a. The Department of the Navy plans to close its two remaining installations in Morocco. Aware of Navy plans, our Ambassador to Morocco has asked DoD to identify any future requirements for military facilities in Morocco so he may present a complete picture to King Hassan when he reveals the Navy closures. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff surveyed Service requirements in response to ISA tasking and included their recommendations in the paper at Tab A.

b. Mr. McAuliffe provided his views on the Joint Staff recommendations prior to his departure on holiday and they are indicated where applicable. We sent you a paper on this topic last week (Tab D).

(S) *Joint Staff Recommendations:*

a. *Close all Naval facilities in Morocco by 30 September 1978:*

—*Discussion:* Navy has no further need for its two communications stations at Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia and would also like to cease its housekeeping functions at Kenitra (annual Navy cost \$12.5 million), a Moroccan Air Base. The Navy responsibility at Kenitra has been a quid for keeping the communications stations in Morocco. When Navy announced its plans some months ago, Ambassador Anderson asked

¹ Summary: Poor requested Clements' approval for the Department's position on future military basing in Morocco.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–800024, Box 2, Morocco. Secret. Prepared by James P. Wooten. Tabs A through D were not attached. A stamped notation indicates that the Deputy Secretary saw it. Clements approved the first through fifth recommendations on September 10, and wrote “no” to the sixth and seventh recommendations. In a letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs McAuliffe to Under Secretary Habib, September 22, Defense suggested Anderson discuss future Naval requirements with King Hassan as a way to reassure the King and secure the arrangements. (Ibid.)

that Navy continue to operate a small communications school for Moroccan military, also a quid for the two communications stations (annual cost to Navy for school operations: \$58,000 O&M, \$198,000 for 18 US military personnel (Tab B)). Navy also agreed to give one year's notice to local national employees. We understand the Ambassador has seen and posed no objection to the Navy plan which is part of the JCS paper.

—*Recommendation*: Express strong DoD support for the Navy plan. (Mr. McAuliffe concurs.)

b. Seek Increased Access to Port and Air Facilities:

—*Discussion*: Recently King Hassan has been most forthcoming in allowing US naval ship visits, including nuclear powered ships. We assume this attitude will not change without a radical shift in the political situation. The same tacit agreement applies to overflight and landing rights. Nevertheless, it may be expedient to seek agreement in principle for increased access now while the climate is conducive. This might also reassure the King that our interest in Morocco has not waned.

—*Recommendation*: Secure King's agreement in principle to increased use of port and air facilities. (Mr. McAuliffe concurs.)

c. Seek to Utilize Moroccan Coast for SIXTHFLT Amphibious Exercises:

—*Discussion*: Amphibious training areas available to our Marine Landing Force with the Mediterranean Fleet have diminished from 26, prior to 1960, to nine today. The fleet requires 5–7 training sites for 5–10 days during each six month deployment cycle. Most of the remaining beaches have terrain limitations or host country restrictions. We recognize, however, that if King Hassan were to allow such use of Moroccan beaches he could be the target of heavy criticism by neighboring and third world countries. There is also the likelihood that the Soviet Union might use our action as a lever to gain similar rights in one of the littoral countries.

—*Recommendation*. Seek permission to utilize the beaches, initially for small scale exercises, emphasizing the mutual benefit aspect with the proviso that any use of the option would be preceded by a joint politico-military review. (Mr. McAuliffe asked what alternatives were available. The status is at Tab C.)

d. Negotiations for Installation of an Air Force Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) Site:

—*Discussion*: Morocco offers an excellent location for one of five stations in this priority worldwide space surveillance system. Ambassador Anderson prefers that the site be located on one of the two Navy facilities that are scheduled for closure. The Air Force, believing that

potential sites farther inland offer much better weather/cloud conditions (estimates range from 25–40 percent improvement), is reluctant to accept either of the Navy facilities. GEODSS would employ about 5 US military and 45 US civilians, and initially only a handful (5–10) of Moroccan personnel. It would not replace the Navy telecommunications command in terms of visibility, local employment factors, etc. While Air Force might accept one of the Navy sites we believe DoD should press for the best location.

—*Recommendation.* Secure permission in principle to install GEODSS with full explanation of size, mission, etc. and table site negotiations pending a survey and evaluation. (Mr. McAuliffe concurs.)

e. *Explore with King Hassan:*

(1) *Installation of a US Air Force Weapons Tactics Training Center.*

—*Discussion:*

Air Force presently has an air-to-ground range at Bardenas Reales and a very limited air-to-air range at Zaragoza, Spain which would continue to operate even with the Moroccan facility with little effect upon the overall US-Spanish connection. The existing Spanish fighter ranges are inadequate for air-to-air training but are suitable for air-ground training. The Moroccan base would resemble Wheelus AFB in Libya prior to its closing in 1970. It would employ approximately 350 US military, 150 US civilians, and 400–500 local nationals. We view the political risks for both the US and Morocco as significant, although King Hassan did offer such facilities in private conversations with you, Mr. Sisco, Admiral Turner, and CDR SIXTHFLT. We believe the other Arab countries and the non-aligned nations would be highly critical. We also believe that the Soviets might use the Moroccan action as a persuasive argument to seek bases in Algeria or Libya. Other problems concern funding and base rights: King Hassan could be expected to drive a hard bargain in terms of guarantees, financial as well as political; and whatever the amount of funds sought, Congress would probably require a firm basing agreement, something King Hassan has eschewed in the past.

Despite the uncertainties and political risks involved for both sides, the air training center would be a substantial asset to both the US and Moroccan defense postures. For the US, a training center in Morocco would provide the Air Force with a desperately needed place in which to conduct air combat training. The need is especially acute for the F-15s which have a primary mission of air superiority. On the Moroccan side, a US operation would show a real degree of support for the King and would enable the Moroccans to acquire training which would be of great value to their small Air Force.

I believe that DoD should firmly support exploration of this subject with the Moroccans. A training facility in Morocco would be of immediate use and would further US/NATO interests in North Africa. The training area would be a joint venture under Moroccan command, operated by the USAF, and used by both parties.

—*Recommendation:* We discuss this project with State and NSC and solicit their support. It should then be broached to King Hassan in the overall context of US-Moroccan relations. Following Hassan's agreement, we would immediately conduct site surveys and feasibility studies. (Mr. McAuliffe agrees provided we do not antagonize Madrid.)

(2) *Location of a SAC forward operating facility:*

—*Discussion:*

This facility would require a long runway, a storage area for war reserve matériel, and a hanger large enough for a B-52. It would be difficult to disguise the facility's intended use by B-52s on strike missions or sea surveillance, and for KC-135 refueling operations in support of conventional operations. There would likely be Service pressure to use the facility in peacetime for practice during large-scale NATO exercises, at least for refueling operations.

USAF does not plan to close any part of Torrejon in Spain; a facility in Morocco would be complementary. Present plans have three squadrons of B-52s striking targets in Europe from bases in CONUS. These three squadrons could operate out of a Moroccan base with significant increase in effectiveness. There would be no change in the plan for one squadron to operate from Torrejon.

SAC is relocating refueling operations from Torrejon to Zaragoza and will be limited to five KC-135s operating from Zaragoza during peacetime. AF would like to operate a tanker force of as many as 20–25 aircraft from Morocco for restricted periods of time during NATO exercises of operations in the Mediterranean. This would have minimal impact on the US-Spanish arrangement.

Despite the obvious strategic gain for the US, a SAC base in Morocco would attract widespread international attention and King Hassan, if he were to agree, would pay a heavy political price with little direct benefit to Morocco. Criticism from the non-aligned and third world would be only one aspect; the obvious threat to Eastern Europe would incur Soviet outrage and could conceivably upset future SALT negotiations.

—*Recommendation:* We not support this proposal. (Mr. McAuliffe questioned the need for a Moroccan base in addition to the Spanish capability.)

(3) *Location of a MAC staging area:*

—*Discussion:* This facility would be a small staging/refueling area located on an operational base and designed primarily for emergency humanitarian missions in Africa. It would employ 10–20 US military personnel and require a small repair parts storage area. We question the need for a Moroccan base in view of the large facility at Torrejon. Kenitra could easily accommodate the MAC facility but might raise the possibility of USAF assuming the Navy role in base operations.

—*Recommendation:* Hold this item in abeyance pending outcome of Moroccan base closure negotiations. (Mr. McAuliffe believes the price of a MAC base in Morocco would be too high as long as we have Torrejon.)

James G. Poor

86. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, November 29, 1976.

**Closure of Kenitra Complex and Establishment of
Other U.S. Military Facilities in Morocco**

The Problem

DOD wishes to make substantial changes in its operations in Morocco. Existing naval communications sites there no longer are required, and Navy seeks our approval to announce in January 1977 that those facilities will be closed by September 1978. Concurrently, Air Force seeks a December decision on the installation of a vital Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System Station

¹ Summary: Atherton made a series of recommendations dealing with the closure of the Kenitra complex, and the establishment of other U.S. military facilities in Morocco.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC OPS Staff, Box 19, Morocco (9). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Escudero, Weislogel and Churchill; and concurred in by Goodby and Austin. Sent through Habib. The letter from Under Secretary Habib to Deputy Secretary Clements, and the letter from DOD Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs McAuliffe to Under Secretary Habib were not attached. "No action taken" was written next to each recommendation. A notation on the first page reads: "Handle as Original Per Secto 32018 Sec. took no action. Wishes to discuss ASAP."

(GEODSS) in Morocco. DOD's timing on both items is keyed to budgetary factors.

In keeping with Embassy Rabat's concern that the Kenitra phaseout be planned and implemented as rationally as possible with minimum adverse impact on the local economy, and that appropriate follow-on military activities be proposed to King Hassan as part of a coordinated package, DOD has submitted to us a detailed phase-out program and has described its additional desiderata for installations and access to Morocco (Attachment 2). In ascending order of visibility and importance, DOD's desiderata are: Increased access to Moroccan port and air facilities, establishment of a GEODSS station, a Military Airlift Command staging site for emergency humanitarian missions in Africa, the use of Moroccan beaches for amphibious landing practice, a Strategic Air Command forward operating facility, and an aerial tactics training center and bombing range.

Some elements in the DOD package, including the most time-sensitive, could be presented to King Hassan at once; others which require extensive study and interagency consultation could be presented later if it were decided to do so, but such far-reaching policy decisions clearly should be deferred for the next Administration and would require advance congressional consultation. The Air Force weapons training center and SAC forward operating facility, for example, would place several hundred uniformed personnel in Morocco, would require a base agreement and might involve a substantial U.S. military assistance program as a *quid pro quo*. Ambassador Anderson has expressed strong reservations, with which I concur, about the advisability of these two programs and about amphibious landing exercises, but I believe that we could move forward with the other proposals.

Accordingly, I am seeking your approval to propose to Defense that we divide its package into two categories, allowing us to decide on time-sensitive and less controversial elements now while we go back to DOD with our reservations on the other elements.

Further, I am asking your approval for an approach to King Hassan on the first category of the Defense package, provided Defense accepts our proposal to divide its desiderata in this way.

Background/Analysis

Based on a handshake agreement between President Kennedy and King Hassan II of Morocco, the United States has maintained at Kenitra, Sidi Yahia, and Bouknadel in Morocco a major communications station for the Sixth Fleet. Satellite technology has now rendered this communications system unnecessary and both DOD and the Department agree that the complex should be phased out. The Moroccans have not yet been informed of our intentions, but Navy budgetary con-

siderations necessitate public announcement of the shutdown not later than January 1977. Embassy Rabat recommends that the closure be handled in such a way as to avoid giving the GOM the mistaken impression of lessened American interest in their country and to minimize the economic impact of the shutdown while taking account of all future U.S. requirements in Morocco. When it approved the Navy plan, DOD attached, as annexes, proposals for the establishment of new military facilities in Morocco intended to demonstrate continuing U.S. interest but which, if implemented, would result in a more visible American military presence.

It seems prudent to consider GEODSS separately as it is a small, virtually non-military operation which should ideally be located in an isolated region manned by no more than 50 Americans all or most of whom can be civilians. The Moroccan installation is vital to our plan for a five-site worldwide system which would give us for the first time a total monitoring capacity for satellites out as far as 22,500 nautical miles. It would also spin off some geophysical data for the host country.

Carrying out the projects proposed by DOD would serve a number of military purposes. According to DOD: our Marines on duty in the Mediterranean have insufficient use of beaches to maintain their amphibious landing proficiency; our already inadequate aerial training facilities in Europe will be wholly unable to meet the training requirements for the F-15 and other new generation aircraft; a SAC site would increase our B-52 and KC-135 capacity in the Middle East and South-eastern Europe. Additionally, the obvious supportive aspects of such an augmented U.S. military presence may be attractive to Moroccan King Hassan II, who feels the need for external support in face of possible conflict with Algeria and may believe that the implied support is worth the cost to his non-aligned image in the Third World. Actually, hosting the MAC humanitarian airlift site may redound to Morocco's credit, especially if relief efforts could be mounted as joint U.S.-Moroccan operations. Some of the expected international criticism could perhaps be mitigated by co-locating, where possible, U.S. facilities on existing Moroccan bases or by appearing to subordinate the U.S. activity to a Moroccan role as we now do at Kenitra.

The establishment in Morocco of facilities of this importance would solidify our relationship with the Moroccan military, likely to be the most significant element in post-Hassan Morocco.

On the other hand, implacement of these proposed facilities, particularly the air base and the SAC site, in Morocco would probably subject both governments to a storm of international criticism which would reduce Moroccan credibility, and usefulness to us, in the Third World. Such criticism at this time could also be harmful to Morocco's

hopes for Third World support for its claims of sovereignty in Western Sahara. For these reasons, a major expansion of our military role in Morocco will not come free of cost and if Hassan agreed to one or more of the DOD proposals, his price in terms of monetary assistance, arms sales and support for Morocco's Sahara policy might be greater than we are willing to pay. Moreover, it was King Hassan who claimed credit for the removal of foreign bases from Morocco in 1963 and even though he has offered the U.S. similar privileges at various times, the domestic impact of a policy reversal on the issue of foreign bases might weaken his internal position.

We need also to consider the probably adverse reaction of Congress to proposals to establish a new U.S. base presence overseas. The Congressional role will be particularly acute if, as seems likely, the Air Force insists on a formal base and status of forces agreement for the SAC and tactical training sites.

There is, in addition, the possibility that expanded and obviously combat-related U.S. military training facilities in Morocco might provoke Algeria or Libya to provide similar facilities to the Soviets. Embassy Algiers reports that the Algerian leaders are deeply concerned by our role as a major arms supplier to Morocco and have warned repeatedly that this would adversely affect our long-term economic and political interests in Algeria.

In considering the potentially most controversial elements of the package, (the SAC facility and airbase/bombing range) we might explore with DOD the possibility of seeking use of Moroccan territory (preferably an existing GOM base such as Ben Guerir) for bombing/gunnery practice by USAF personnel on periodic temporary duty in Morocco. If we offered the Moroccans air force training through joint exercises, and were prepared to field a small permanent support team of USAF maintenance and operational personnel whose services would be available to the GOM, Hassan might be receptive. Embassy Rabat suggests this as a workable alternative to a full-fledged airbase with a large American presence and accompanying support facilities (schools, PX's, commissaries, etc.) and, if it meets DOD's functional needs, it might be included in a later proposal to Hassan. We must assume, however, that whatever its form, such a facility could not be used by us for operations related to the Middle East, especially a new Arab-Israel conflict.

Although the proposed amphibious landing exercises could be of brief duration and set up as joint exercises in isolated areas, Embassy Rabat believes very strongly that we should not seek GOM permission for actual landings which are potentially too controversial within and outside of Morocco. Rather, the Embassy recommends that we propose joint *simulated* landing exercises offshore. King Hassan, in a conversa-

tion with Admiral Turner last December, displayed an interest in this possibility, and, if we decide to pursue the matter of amphibious exercises, we might present it in the context of the first category *if we confine ourselves initially to simulated landings*, preferably in isolated areas remote from the Algerian or Saharan coasts. Otherwise, we should probably take no action on this element of the DOD package now.

Proposed Strategy

The DOD proposal for realignment and expansion of facilities in Morocco includes both projects that must be—and can be—carried out promptly, and projects of more questionable feasibility that must be considered by the next Administration if they are to be further entertained at all. It seems advisable to make decisions on those measures that must be set in train before January 20 and leave the more controversial items for the next Administration.

Since Morocco now imposes no limitations on ship visits, the injection of the DOD proposal for NPW visits into the negotiating process could jeopardize a privilege we already enjoy. We propose to express continuing interest in these visits outside the negotiating package.

Category I

—Consultations with the GOM leading to the shutdown of the communications facilities.

—Retention of the U.S.-run communications school for Moroccan armed forces as a quid pro quo for U.S. access to MAC and GEODSS sites and possibly other facilities, should we later decide to request them.

—Request for GOM approval of the GEODSS facility, probably (for technical reasons) well inland from the present cluster in the Kenitra area.

—Request GOM approval of a modest MAC staging area at Kenitra or other suitable Moroccan base.

—Request the use of Moroccan offshore waters for joint simulated amphibious training exercises (provided DOD concurs in substitution of simulated for actual landings; otherwise hold this element for later consideration).

Category II

—Further consideration within the Government for amphibious landing exercises (if DOD rejects simulated landings), an Air Force weapons training center (possibly modified in accordance with Embassy Rabat suggestions) and a SAC forward operating facility, leading to a Circular 175 Memorandum.

—If it is decided to move ahead with any of these projects, then it would be necessary to consult with Congress before undertaking negotiations with Morocco.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the two-category approach by which we would propose to the Moroccans the siting in Morocco of a GEODSS station and a MAC staging area for humanitarian flights in Africa, and propose the use of Moroccan offshore waters for simulated amphibious training exercises at the same time that we notify the GOM of our intended closedown of Kenitra and that you authorize Under Secretary Habib to sign the letter at Attachment 1 which informs DOD of this decision.

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve a *modified approach* in which we would not initially propose all of the items suggested in the above recommendation but would select one or more of the following elements, with Under Secretary Habib's letter to DOD to be adjusted accordingly:

- Installation of GEODSS Station:
- MAC staging area for humanitarian flights in Africa:
- Use of Moroccan offshore waters for simulated amphibious training exercises:

ALTERNATIVELY, that you authorize us to inform the Moroccan Government of Navy's plans to close down the Kenitra complex without linking it to DOD's interest in new facilities:

2. Once we have agreement within the Government that you authorize us to draft a letter from you to King Hassan informing him of the Navy's plans for Kenitra and conveying our proposals, if any, for future military requirements in Morocco.

ALTERNATIVELY, that you authorize us to instruct Ambassador Anderson to convey this information to King Hassan.

Spanish Sahara, 1973–1976

87. Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, September 6, 1974.

SPANISH SAHARA: PAWN OF NORTHWEST AFRICA [*This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East. It was principally drafted by CIA and coordinated with State/INR.]


1. Spain is embroiled in controversy with three African countries over the future of Spanish Sahara. Unless Madrid can devise a solution to the problem that is acceptable to all four interested parties—Spain, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania—its withdrawal from the territory may lead to further instability, including the possibility of armed conflict. Although the United States has no major interests in Spanish Sahara, its primary concern is to prevent the issue from upsetting the peace of the region.

2. Spanish Sahara, located along the Atlantic coast of northwest Africa, is juridically a Spanish province and is also claimed by Morocco and Mauritania. Algeria has also gone on record as “an interested party” in the future disposition of the area. The discovery of natural resources, primarily phosphates, has made the territory even more valuable to Spain and desirable to its neighbors.

3. As one of the last vestiges of European colonialism in Africa, Spanish Sahara has been the focus of much anti-colonial rhetoric and the UN has passed a number of resolutions calling for self-determination for the area. Portugal’s recent decision to grant independence to its African territories and renewed Moroccan claims have increased pressure on Spain to relinquish the desert province. Madrid’s subsequent decision to hold a referendum in Spanish Sahara next year will generate attempts by the four interested parties to influence the outcome of the vote.

¹ Summary: The memorandum provided background on the controversy surrounding Spanish stewardship of the Spanish Sahara, Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to the territory, Algeria’s interest in the region, and the potential for conflict. The paper also examined the impact of the controversy on U.S. interests in both North Africa and Spain.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01099A, OPI 122, Box 15. Secret; [text not declassified]. The bracket in the title was printed as a footnote in the original.



General Assembly Building

Spanish Stewardship

4. Spain's contacts with the area date from 1476 when it established a fort there, but Madrid showed little interest in the territory until the mid-19th century. At the Congress of Berlin in 1885, Spain unilaterally proclaimed a protectorate over the coastal zone from Cabo Bojador to Cabo Blanco, to be administered from the Canary Islands. The present day borders of Spanish Sahara were derived from a series of Franco-Spanish conventions between 1900 and 1912 which did not consider questions of historical or ethnic unity.

5. In 1958, Madrid declared the territory an overseas province of Spain, following border incursions by armed tribesmen from Morocco. Three years later the province was given limited representation in the Spanish parliament. Political power in the province is concentrated in the hands of the Spanish governor general; he is directly responsible to an official in the office of the Prime Minister. In addition to his civilian function, he is also the commander in chief of all provincial military forces, including the police.

6. The Spanish have invested heavily in the Sahara over the last decade, both in the phosphate enterprise and in social infrastructure. They have upgraded housing, schooling, and other facilities, with attendant publicity. To protect this investment, blunt international criticism, and postpone a referendum on self-determination, the Spanish in 1967 created a general assembly (Yemaa), composed of 45 tribal chiefs and 40 elected representatives, to act as an advisory body on the prov-

ince's economic and social development. Thus far the assembly has toed the Spanish line, rejecting outside interference, calling for gradual steps toward self-determination, and reaffirming loyalty to Spain.

Moroccan Irredentism

7. Upon independence in 1956, Morocco laid claim to all of Spain's holdings in northwestern Africa. In a joint declaration and protocol signed in April 1956, Madrid gave up its protectorate zone in the north of Morocco. Spain relinquished the southern protectorate zone of Tarfaya in 1958 and the enclave of Ifni in 1969. Thus, Spain's present holdings include Spanish Sahara and five small *presidios*—the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, and three small offshore islands.


8. Morocco bases its claim to the Spanish Sahara on pre-colonial history, when Moroccan rulers intermittently exercised varying degrees of control over much of the western Sahara. From the 10th thru the 17th centuries, Moroccans looked southward, penetrating Spanish Sahara, Mauritania, southwestern Algeria, and for a short time Mali. At one time or another the nomadic peoples in the area accepted the religious supremacy of the Sultan. The successive waves of Moroccan penetration, however, alternated with periods when Morocco's interest turned northward to Spain. During these times politico-religious chieftains from present day Mauritania extended their control into Morocco, which had several dynasties of Mauritanian origin.

9. Morocco has argued that the territory it recovered from the European powers in 1956 represents only part of the Sultan's historical holdings. Indeed, it was not until 1970 that Rabat recognized the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, ten years after it became independent. Morocco's claim to part of Algeria was the cause of a brief border war in 1963. Both parties signed an agreement in 1972 demarcating their common boundary, but Rabat has not yet ratified it.

10. Rabat also has economic interests at stake in Spanish Sahara. Morocco currently is the third-largest producer and the largest exporter of phosphate rock in the world. Until 1973 when the world phosphate market began improving, Morocco viewed Spanish Saharan phosphates as a threat to its own important phosphate industry if Spain retained control. Although these fears no longer seem warranted, Rabat would stand to gain a larger source of foreign exchange and government profits if it could acquire control of the area.

Mauritania's Claim

11. Like Morocco, the area of present day Mauritania has exercised varying degrees of influence in the Sahara, especially at times when North African Arabs focused their attention on Spain. Spanish Sahara has no "natural frontiers" and shares its southern and virtually all of




Open Pit Mine near Bu Craa

its long eastern border with Mauritania. Probably as many Saharan nomads migrate to Mauritania as to Morocco. As a result, many of the tribes of the territory probably have more in common with the Moors who dominate the government in Nouakchott than with the Arabs and Arabized Berbers who rule in Rabat or Algiers. Moreover, the Hassaniya dialect spoken in much of the area is nearly identical to that spoken in Mauritania and quite different from the Maghrebi Arabic spoken in Morocco. Thus history can be used to support Mauritanian as well as Moroccan claims.

Economic Importance

12. Spanish Sahara is an almost completely arid wasteland. Fishing and livestock raising constitute the basis of the native economy. The only crop that can be grown successfully is barley, and that only occasionally in low-lying areas after rain. The discovery of a large underground lake in the Villa Cisneros area has led to some successful experimental farming.

13. The Sahara is important to Spain primarily because of large deposits of high-grade phosphate rock discovered in 1963 in Bu Craa, some 60 miles from the coast near Morocco. Reserves, estimated at 1.4 to 1.7 billion tons of minerals, are sufficient to put Spanish Sahara among the world's leading producers and exporters for many years.




Automated Conveyor Belt

14. A Spanish state mining company, FosBuCraa, is developing the deposits and is expected to ship as much as two million tons in 1974. By 1978 production may reach 6 million tons annually, an output worth around \$389 million at current prices. FosBuCraa has invested at least \$200 million to provide facilities for mining, processing, and transportation. Total investment in the mining complex, including funds from several non-Spanish sources, may run as high as \$480 million.

15. The facilities and methods for handling the phosphate ore are among the most modern in the world. The ore is extracted by open-pit mining, reduced to concentrates at the Bu Craa complex, and then transported on a completely automated belt conveyor system to ore-loading facilities in El Aaiun. Built by the Krupp Machinery and Steel Construction Company of West Germany at a cost of about \$50 million, the innovative system includes 10 six-mile-long conveyors.

16. Expanding Spanish Saharan phosphate production should find ready buyers abroad. The increasing demand for fertilizers has strengthened the world phosphate market. With assured markets in Spain and low operating and transport costs, Saharan phosphates are in a strong competitive position.

17. Other mineral assets could further increase the value of the territory. Surveys show an estimated 20 to 70 million tons of iron ore are



Saharan Family

located in the south at Agracha, but the economic feasibility of exploiting these deposits, which contain undesirable amounts of titanium, has yet to be determined. In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s the Spanish believed that the territory held sizeable petroleum deposits. Concessions for onshore exploration awarded to several foreign companies proved disappointing and were abandoned in 1969. Since then off-shore concessions have been let to several firms, including US companies, and the search continues.

Peoples of Spanish Sahara

18. Except for Europeans and some sedentary or seminomadic townsmen, most people within the Sahara's borders are pastoral nomads. There is little if any sense of national identification with the political entity known as Spanish Sahara. Indeed, for most of these illiterate nomads, the concept of loyalty does not extend beyond the tribe or clan to which they belong. More often than not, the nomad views the central government as a remote tax collector that has little relevance to or impact on his traditional way of life.

19. Spanish Sahara has an estimated population of 60,000 of which 43,000 are indigenous Africans and about 17,000 are Spaniards. Given their nomadic lifestyle, it is misleading to regard statistics for the Africans as more than approximations. The migration of tribes and clans into and out of Spanish Sahara—determined by rainfall and grazing conditions—can halve or double these figures.

20. The peoples of Spanish Sahara are of Arab, Berber, and black African ancestry. Most of the people are referred to as Moors, who both

physically and culturally reflect a historical mixture of Arab invaders and Berber nomads. The latter were probably the original inhabitants of the area. Black peoples from the south have also contributed to the present population.

21. Saharans can be divided into various classifications based on different criteria such as social or hierarchical ranks, family or ethnographic relationships, and political associations. The most definitive and probably relevant classification in anticipating the future political development of Spanish Sahara is one based primarily on ethnic origins. Using this yardstick, three groups of nomads are significant for the future of Spanish Sahara.

22. The largest group is the Tekna, a relatively peaceful herding people who live in southern Morocco and northern Spanish Sahara. Many Tekna in the Sahara speak a Berber dialect and migrate to Morocco for at least part of the year. Moroccan authorities no doubt depend heavily on Tekna nomads for information on conditions inside the Spanish territory. Since 1958, a number of Tekna who formerly lived south of the boundary have remained in Morocco, probably fearing Spanish reprisal for some assistance they gave to insurgents from Morocco.

23. The Reguibat group is probably the most powerful of the Saharan peoples in Spanish Sahara. Called the "Blue People" because the indigo dye used on their clothing rubs off on their skin, they range with their camels across wide expanses of southern Morocco, Algeria, Spanish Sahara, and Mauritania. They are known for their ferocity, pride, and ability with firearms and have dominated the eastern part of the Spanish province for a considerable period of time.

24. The allegiance of the Reguibat, who are no strangers to gun running and desert intrigue, has been greatly sought after by competing political interests in the area. To date, however, they seem to have successfully resisted these attempts. As far back as the turn of the century, German and Spanish agents helped Morocco to arm the Reguibat against French colonial expansion. The Reguibat were behind several incidents that preceded the brief Moroccan-Algerian border conflict in 1963. They also were prominently involved in anti-Spanish demonstrations in El Aaiun in 1970, in which several persons were killed and many more wounded.

25. A third group, the Ulad Delim, inhabits the southwestern portion of Spanish Sahara. Although formerly a much stronger political force, the Ulad Delim remain important in the province. They are more Arabized but less numerous than their chief rivals, the Reguibat. Large numbers of Ulad Delim and closely associated peoples live across the border in Mauritania.

*Country Positions**Spain*


26. In the face of Morocco's irredentist claims and anti-colonialist sentiment in the UN, Spain has counted more on diplomacy than military strength to retain the Sahara. Madrid has played on the mutual suspicions of the three African states that have rival interests in the area, while maintaining generally good bilateral relations with each one. In the early 1960s, taking advantage of Moroccan claims to Mauritania and western Algeria, Spain encouraged Mauritania to stake its own claim to Spanish Sahara and Algeria to assert its right, as a neighboring state, to have a voice in the disposition of the territory. There are Spanish embassies in each capital, and modest assistance programs have been undertaken in each country.

27. Madrid's control of Spanish Sahara has been the subject of a number of resolutions in the UN General Assembly. After the first such resolution in 1965 calling for decolonization of the territory, Spain announced the following year that it agreed in principle to self-determination for the people of Spanish Sahara. Until 1969 Spain regarded these resolutions as innocuous, and in fact voted for them. Madrid began to abstain, however, when criticism of Spanish delaying tactics increased, and resolutions began to refer to the "so-called" Spanish Sahara. Spain nonetheless wants to appear forthcoming because it seeks support for its position on Gibraltar in the same Committee of 24 that considers the Sahara question. Moreover, the arguments that Spain advances to support its claim to Gibraltar could easily be used against continued Spanish control of its Saharan province.

28. Last September General Franco announced that Spanish Sahara would be permitted self-government as a necessary preparation for self-determination, but he gave no timetable. In early July 1974, however, Madrid told the ambassadors of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania that it was preparing to implement a new policy of increased autonomy for its overseas province. Subsequently, on August 20, Madrid notified the UN Secretary General that a referendum to decide the political future of Spanish Sahara will be held in the first half of 1975 under UN supervision. Madrid declared that its decision was consistent with UN resolutions calling for self-determination for the peoples of the territory.


29. Although there is probably some sentiment, particularly on the part of older military officers, to hang on in the Sahara, Madrid appears determined to withdraw. Spain clearly wants to:

- head off criticism in the UN this fall;
 - avoid replacing Portugal as the focus of anti-colonial rhetoric;
- and



—maintain its assiduously cultivated good relations with the Arab states.

30. At the same time, however, the Spanish will be working to protect their economic and security interests in the area. Spain will at least want to recoup its \$200 million investment in the Bu Craa phosphate mine. Madrid may even seek to retain an interest in the increasingly profitable operation (see section on economic importance). Madrid may also try to extract from Morocco concessions relating to fishing rights in Moroccan waters or even compensation for expropriated Spanish lands.



31. Madrid views the Sahara as important to the security of the approaches to the Canary Islands, only 60 miles offshore, and has expressed concern over the possibility that an unfriendly government might establish itself in the province. Spain might insist on the retention of base rights in the northern Sahara. Although Morocco has not threatened the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which the Spanish consider an integral part of Spain, Madrid will probably seek to ensure that any concessions made to Morocco in the Sahara are accompanied by Moroccan assurances concerning the enclaves.

32. Spain desires to maintain its good relations and expanding commercial ties with Algeria, one of the interested parties, and will

seek to ensure that any agreement with Morocco is acceptable to Algiers.

Morocco

33. Morocco has been the most active claimant to Spanish Sahara and periodically has sought to intensify pressure on Madrid to honor Rabat's irredentism.

34. Hassan is convinced that Spain will not wish to remain for long as the only significant colonial power in Africa.

35. When Hassan learned in early July that Madrid was about to grant increased autonomy to its overseas province, he reacted sharply. He immediately sent a letter to General Franco warning that such a move would lead to a deterioration in relations. The King followed up with a speech on July 8 in which he emphasized that he could not permit the establishment of a puppet state in the Sahara, and implied that if discussions failed, other means would be pursued.

36. Morocco subsequently initiated a major diplomatic campaign to pressure Spain to abandon its plans for greater autonomy for its Saharan province. In late July and early August, Moroccan emissaries visited various Arab and African capitals as well as Asian and East European countries to seek international support for Rabat's position. Although the Arab and African states will back a demand that Spain leave, they are not inclined to support Morocco's territorial ambitions, especially in view of Mauritania's rival claim to the area and Algeria's insistence on a role as an interested party.

37. Eastern Arab countries, always reluctant to take sides in an inter-Arab quarrel, want to avoid any dispute that could weaken the appearance of unity on the far more important question of a Middle East peace settlement.

38. Morocco has also engaged in saber-rattling to gain advantage in its dispute with Spain. Since late July, Rabat has placed its armed forces on temporary alert, cancelled all leaves, and mobilized some reservists. Approximately one quarter of Morocco's ground forces have been deployed to southern Morocco. Additional troops have been sent near the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the north. Although these enclaves have not been an issue in the current controversy, King Hassan apparently wants to remind Madrid that the two cities are vulnerable.

39. King Hassan hopes that his campaign to reclaim Spanish Sahara will strengthen his domestic position and distract attention from his country's political and economic problems. Given the strong irredentist sentiment shared by many Moroccans, the King might be willing to use limited force to back up his claim. As it has in the past, Morocco might again send armed tribesmen across the border to pro-

voke clashes and attract international attention in order to increase pressure on Spain for a settlement favorable to Morocco. Conversely, a failure to achieve annexation of at least part of the territory might create severe domestic pressures on Hassan. He may have pushed the issue too far to retreat gracefully.

40. So far, however, Morocco has been circumspect in using military pressure tactics. King Hassan wants to create a sense of urgency, but he does not want to close the door to continuing dialogue with Madrid. The King received a letter from General Franco in late July urging bilateral talks, and the Moroccan prime minister and foreign minister visited Madrid on August 12–14 to begin negotiations. Although there was no significant movement by either side, the positive tone of the joint communique and initial Moroccan press reactions set the stage for further bilateral meetings.

41. Madrid's subsequent decision to hold a referendum in the territory in 1975 caused King Hassan to attach tough conditions to Morocco's agreement to a referendum. He insisted that any vote must occur under international control after Spanish troops and administration had been withdrawn. He further indicated that he would oppose holding the referendum if the principle of independence for Sahara were included. In the past, Rabat had implicitly accepted independence as one option, provided the 20,000–25,000 Saharans it claims live in Morocco were allowed to vote.

42. If Spain withdrew its troops prior to the referendum, Hassan might be tempted to push across the border. If a referendum went against Moroccan interests, Hassan might move to annex the territory forcibly, in the hope that Algeria would not react militarily.

43. Morocco's is the one claim that cannot be ignored. Hassan may be staking out a maximum position in his recent pronouncements, but he will need to show some gain for his efforts. He would, however, be willing to meet Spain's primary concerns. In exchange for recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, Rabat has offered to make concessions such as granting base rights for protecting the Canary Islands and a joint venture with Spain to exploit the territory's phosphate deposits. While this solution would satisfy Spanish strategic interests and Moroccan territorial claims, it would be unacceptable to Algeria and Mauritania.

Mauritania

44. Mauritania is less interested in pressing its claims than in countering Morocco's. It has not forgotten that "greater Morocco" also included Mauritania, and fears Rabat might not be satisfied with the acquisition of Spanish Sahara. Mauritania's primary concern is to avoid

sharing a common border with Morocco. A buffer state under Spanish or independent rule best serves Nouakchott's needs.

45. To date, the Mauritians have been publicly cautious in reacting to Morocco's intensified campaign to recover Spanish Sahara. They have previously relied on Algerian support to defend their interests. If Algerian backing seemed to dwindle, however, Mauritania might well undertake a diplomatic offensive on its own in Arab, OAU, and Third World circles.

46. In early August the Mauritanian foreign minister publicly supported self-determination for the peoples of Spanish Sahara even though the area was "Mauritanian territory." He later termed the Spanish referendum proposal a positive step forward. He also reiterated an earlier call for renewed consultation with Algeria and Morocco. Tripartite talks between these countries have been held occasionally since 1970, but their conflicting interests have prevented any agreement on practical steps to hasten decolonization of the Sahara.


47. In an apparent attempt to revive these consultations Mauritanian President Ould Daddah visited Algiers and Rabat during the second week of August. At the end of his visit in Algiers, the government-controlled press there published a carefully worded editorial that implicitly criticized Moroccan tactics on the Saharan question, but avoided outright rejection of Morocco's claims. In Rabat, both heads of state minimized their differences in public by agreeing to maintain contacts regarding the liquidation of colonialism, while avoiding any reference as to who gets what when the Spanish leave.

48. The military option is foreclosed to Mauritania unless it were to receive substantial support from Algeria.

Algeria

49. Algeria makes no territorial claims of its own to the Sahara, although it has steadfastly maintained that it is an interested party with political and security interests to protect. In keeping with its carefully cultivated anticolonial image, Algeria has publicly supported decolonization of the Spanish province.

50. The realities of Algeria's position are far more complex; Spanish Sahara is but one aspect of the larger problems of overall relations with Morocco and Maghreb stability. The suspicious Algerian mentality views all neighbors as potential enemies—especially Morocco, with a political system and ideology that differs radically from Algeria's. The visions of an irredentist Morocco, which in the past laid claim to part of Algeria, and memories of the 1963 border war have not faded. Rabat's failure to ratify an agreement signed in 1972 that renounced all Moroccan claims to Algerian territory remains a sticking



1973 summit meeting on Spanish Sahara in Agadir, Morocco. From left to right: Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, Algerian President Boumediene, Moroccan King Hassan.

point in relations with Algeria, which unilaterally ratified the agreement last year.

51. Thus far President Boumediene has done nothing to oppose King Hassan's current efforts to have the Saharan issue settled in his favor. The Algerian leader's preoccupation with matters such as OAPEC oil policies, the Middle East question and Palestinian rights, and various domestic issues may account for his silence. He may prefer that the Saharan issue not come to a head now, and may avoid taking a public stand for as long as possible.

52. Avoiding public involvement in the controversy does not mean that Algiers will acquiesce to Moroccan annexation. Algeria does not necessarily wish to see an extension of Moroccan sovereignty. Algeria has large deposits of iron ore in the Tindouf region near the border with Spanish Sahara and may eventually wish to export the ore through the Sahara.

53. On the other hand, Algeria may view good relations with Morocco, including Rabat's ratification of the border agreement as more

desirable than opposing Morocco's claim to Spanish Sahara. Moroccan aggrandizement in Spanish Sahara would not significantly alter the strategic economic balance between Morocco and Algeria.

54. Algeria cannot easily discount Mauritanian interests, however. The relationship between Boumediene and Ould Daddah is close. Algeria values the concept of Arab solidarity. In this arena, Mauritania matters as well as Morocco.

55. A senior Algerian official has indicated privately that Algiers continues to support UN resolutions calling for self-determination for the peoples of Spanish Sahara. He added that perhaps the best solution would be a referendum held under UN auspices leading to independence, guaranteed and supported economically by Spain and the three neighboring African states. Although Saharans would have the option to merge with Morocco, he expressed confidence that they would choose independence in any fairly conducted referendum.

56. Algeria's faith in the referendum results thus puts it against Morocco which wants a referendum only under stringent conditions that would not permit the option of independence.

57. Politically, Algeria is capable of foiling Moroccan designs for enlisting Third World support on Spanish Sahara. If pressed to take a stand, Algeria could use its considerable influence in the Arab League, the Nonaligned Movement, the OAU and the UN to mount a campaign in support of self-determination as called for under existing UN resolutions. When Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika becomes president of the UN General Assembly this fall, he will be in an ideal position to coordinate such an effort.

58. It is less clear, however, that Algeria would challenge Morocco, if Hassan, frustrated in his attempts to achieve a political solution, chose the route of military conquest. If Algerian and Moroccan forces engaged in hostilities, the outcome would be unpredictable. Algerian forces are better equipped and trained, but some Moroccan troops were recently tested in the Syrian front. Also the Moroccans would be fighting for the concept of greater Morocco, and they were the victors in the 1963 border war.

Outlook

59. Spain is searching for a compromise that will permit Madrid to appear responsive to UN resolutions calling for a referendum on self-determination and to preserve good relations with the Arab world by conciliating Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Mauritania. It also wants to maintain good relations with Morocco and protect its economic investment in Spanish Sahara, and claims it needs security guarantees to protect the approaches to the Canary Islands.

60. The proposal to hold a referendum under UN auspices meets the concern over the UN and possibly Algeria and Mauritania. An agreement acceptable to Morocco best satisfies the remaining requirements.

Referendum

61. Madrid's decision to hold a referendum in the Sahara under UN supervision next year seems to have committed Spain to this course of action. The three African parties interested in the future of the territory will disagree on the terms for such a referendum. Morocco may continue to insist on pre-conditions for a referendum, such as omission of independence as an option, that are unacceptable to Algeria and Mauritania. Even under UN auspices, it would be next to impossible to ensure an honest referendum and the results might immediately be challenged by one or another of the interested states. Moreover the Saharans, including the ones in Morocco, may be less favorably disposed to Morocco than Rabat assumes, and with Spanish encouragement may vote against union with Morocco. Rabat claims it would reject anything short of a clear vote for union with Morocco. Independence would create a power vacuum with these same states competing for influence; armed conflict would be difficult to avoid.

Guaranteed Agreement

62. Given the likelihood of instability, Madrid might seek prior agreement among the neighboring states so that all four states would have a vested interest in the new country, perhaps as guarantors of its independence, and would provide economic assistance. This would allow Spain to comply with existing UN resolutions and to shift considerable responsibility to the Africans for ensuring the viability of an independent Sahara. Algeria prefers this alternative and Mauritania would willingly accept it.

The Potential for Conflict

63. Morocco would oppose any agreement that permitted Spanish Sahara to become independent. It fears an independent Sahara would be dominated by Algeria and Mauritania; the former because it is an important political actor in Arab and Third World arenas; the latter because it shares with Spanish Sahara an ethnic and cultural identity.

64. Morocco would actively oppose this solution and might use tribesmen in southern Morocco for guerrilla activity or regular ground forces for limited commando raids. The Spanish would oppose such incursions but would probably not retaliate across the Morocco border. Spain will respond if attacked, but has little inclination to become embroiled in a conflict defending a territory it has decided to relinquish.

65. Rabat could also exert pressure on the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the north by cutting off water supplies and the flow of tourists through these points into Morocco. Without water, they would be difficult to defend and resupply would be costly. Spain might also react militarily if seriously provoked.

66. Morocco might also make a military move if Spain withdrew its troops after granting independence. Under these circumstances, Rabat would gamble against Algeria's attempting to counter its military advance. The Algerian reaction is difficult to predict. CIA believes that an Algerian-Moroccan military confrontation would be a distinct possibility, although Algiers would first exhaust all diplomatic options. State/INR believes Algeria's recent public silence on the Sahara question may well reflect an unwillingness to provoke Morocco on an issue in which it has no overriding interest. Moreover, INR finds no evidence to indicate that Algeria has yet mounted a serious diplomatic campaign to thwart Moroccan ambitions in Spanish Sahara. On balance (and admitting the paucity of information available), INR considers that Algeria is not presently contemplating hostilities with Morocco over this issue—notwithstanding some indications of Moroccan apprehensions to the contrary.

Negotiated Withdrawal

67. Failing an agreement on a referendum, Madrid may turn to direct negotiations leading to an orderly withdrawal from Spanish Sahara. Madrid might first seek a bilateral deal with Morocco. King Hassan has reiterated his belief that this would be the best solution and has suggested that such talks might be facilitated by a UN mediator.

68. In exchange for recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, Rabat has offered to make concessions such as granting base rights for protecting the Canary Islands and a joint venture with Spain to exploit the territory's phosphate deposits. While this solution would satisfy Spanish strategic interests and Moroccan territorial claims, it would be unacceptable to Algeria and Mauritania. The Algerians could be expected to use every possible diplomatic means to block such an agreement and might resort to force if they were not a party to a settlement. Mauritania would follow Algeria's lead.

Partition: A Possible Compromise

69. Faced with opposition to a bilateral settlement, Spain might draw Algeria and Mauritania along with Morocco into a series of extended negotiations. Barring a breakdown of talks, a compromise solution partitioning Spanish Sahara might emerge that would:

- give Morocco the smaller northern region with its phosphate deposits,
- guarantee Algeria transit rights for its mineral exports,

- give Mauritania the larger southern portion containing iron ore, and
- grant Spain residual base rights and participation in the exploitation of the area's mineral wealth.

Such a compromise would seem to meet the interests of Spain, Algeria, and Mauritania. Morocco wants outright annexation of all the territory, but in the end it might be forced to settle for less to avoid a conflict.

US Interests

70. Spain's importance to the US is due primarily to the strategic value of its geographic location at the western entrance to the Mediterranean. The US has four major bases in the country as well as a variety of communications facilities and reserve storage depots. There are approximately 9,500 military personnel in Spain and some 37,500 American citizens reside there. As of mid-1973, the US had provided Spain \$836 million in military aid and sales and slightly more than \$1 billion in economic assistance under a defense and economic assistance agreement first signed in 1953. American direct investment in Spain is at least \$900 million, with more than \$100 million in new investment each year. To protect these interests, the US has maintained close bilateral ties with Spain and encouraged Madrid's general pro-Western political and economic orientation, basic commitment to the defense of the West, and ultimate participation in the EC and NATO.

71. The Spanish claim a six-mile territorial sea and recognize only the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Gibraltar; in practice they have not questioned submerged submarines transiting the straits. A six-mile territorial sea measured from the Spanish mainland and the enclave of Ceuta in Morocco, together with the doctrine of innocent passage, theoretically puts Madrid in a position to control the entrance to the Mediterranean thereby rendering Gibraltar useless to the UK or NATO. In effect, the Spanish are equally interested in observing Algerian and Moroccan activities from these vantage points. Although the Spanish do not expect they would be allowed to exercise such control, they can use their position to enhance their bargaining position in a settlement of the Gibraltar dispute and membership in NATO.

72. Like Spain, Morocco's strategic importance to the US derives from its location at the western entrance to the Mediterranean. An unfriendly government in Morocco could threaten to extend its territorial waters and interpret strictly the doctrine of innocent passage to impede free passage through and over the Straits of Gibraltar. The US has no mutual defense commitments with Morocco. The US continues to operate two communications facilities near Kenitra that support the Sixth Fleet under an oral executive agreement made in 1963. There are approximately 1,100 military personnel and 1,500 private American citizens in Morocco. US military assistance, grant and sale, totaled about

\$112 million through mid-1973, and a major arms sales package is under consideration. US economic assistance for the same period totaled about \$806 million, of which more than half consisted of loans. American private investment is estimated to be \$70 million.

73. The US has only limited interests in Mauritania. Washington has no important treaties or agreements with Nouakchott. There is no fixed US investment in Mauritania, but US oil companies engaged in exploration there have already spent some \$20 million. US economic assistance through mid-1973 totaled nearly \$8 million. The total American presence there is 23.

74. Despite major policy differences on international political issues, US cooperation with Algeria has been increasing in the economic field. The primary US interest in its relations with Algeria is to insure continued access to Algeria's natural resources through long-range cooperation agreements. Algeria has the fourth largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world and produces about one million barrels per day of low sulfur crude oil. The Boumediene government is firmly committed to rapid industrialization financed by the sale of oil and gas. It sees the US as a major market for these products and as a source of capital and technology.

75. Before Algiers broke relations with the US in June 1967, the US had provided \$180 million in economic assistance, primarily grant food aid. US direct investment is small but Algeria offers an expanding market for US goods and services. The total American community is approximately 700.

Implications for the US

76. The US has no important interests in the Sahara. US Steel has not responded to a Spanish approach to invest in the phosphate mining complex. Our primary concern is the stability of the region. The US has sought to remain on good terms with all parties concerned and has expressed the hope for a peaceful settlement between Spain and Morocco that takes into account the concerns expressed by Algeria and Mauritania.

77. Nevertheless, if such a settlement cannot be achieved, and Morocco's hardening position makes it at least questionable, the Spanish Sahara issue poses certain problems for the US. The question of the referendum may well arise in the General Assembly; Morocco has also indicated that it may ignore a UN resolution to carry out the referendum if independence for Spanish Sahara is included as an option. The US may be subjected to pressures from both Madrid and Rabat.

78. As a major arms supplier to both Spain and Morocco, the US is vulnerable to charges of aiding an arms build-up in an unstable area.

79. If Morocco presses for annexation and fails, Hassan may be subjected to internal pressures that could topple him.

80. A solution that would be acceptable to both Rabat and Madrid might be in the best interests of the US, since Morocco's is the claim that will not be dismissed. Such a solution, however, might alienate Algeria and Mauritania and create problems with other Third World countries for which the option of self-determination is of the greatest importance.

88. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Torrejon, October 9, 1974, 12:45–2:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Pedro Cortina Mauri, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain
Luis Guillermo Perinat y Elio, Director General for North American and Far
Eastern Affairs, MFA
Santiago Martinez Caro, Chef de Cabinet
MFA Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Ambassador Horacio Rivero
David E. Simcox, Political Counsel
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Portugal; Spanish Sahara; Gibraltar; Base Negotiations

[Omitted here is discussion of Portugal.]

Cortina: We did talk on the subject in Washington—New York—and you expressed you had very good relations with Rabat and Madrid so you'd keep a neutral position. We did understand your position, and therefore we were very surprised when we read in the *Washington Post*

¹ Summary: Kissinger assured Cortina that the U.S. position of neutrality regarding the Spanish Sahara had not changed despite recent news reports. Kissinger also explained that his upcoming trips to Morocco and Algeria were unrelated to Spain.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, October–November 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the distinguished visitor's lounge at the Torrejon Air Force Base. Kissinger was en route to Egypt to discuss the Middle East peace process.

that it had been manifested that the U.S. was in favor of a direct understanding between Rabat and Madrid to turn over the Spanish Sahara to Morocco.

Kissinger: I never even read that article, and it's total nonsense.

Cortina: It was yesterday.

Kissinger: I never read the *Washington Post*, except the Sports Section and the Style Section. Now that I'm married I can read it [the Style Section] without fear.

Our policy is what I've told you. What the policy of our Deputy Chief of Mission there is, I don't know. In fact, I don't know what our DCM did here, but he won't do it again. The next time he does it he'll have to do it from a longer distance. If we have something to say to you about the Spanish Sahara, we'll do it directly. I don't know who he is.

Sisco: Coon.

Kissinger: What did he say?

Rivero: He gave the impression—it wasn't clear whether he was speaking for the Secretary but was giving his personal views.

Kissinger: What I've told you is our policy. We have no particular view about the future of the Spanish Sahara. I told you privately that, as a political scientist, the future of Spanish Sahara doesn't seem particularly great. I feel the same way about Guinea-Bissau, or Upper Volta. The world can survive without a Spanish Sahara; it won't be among the countries making a great contribution.

Cortina: Anyway, it should not be used against others.

Kissinger: There was a period in my life when I didn't know where the Spanish Sahara was, and I was as happy as I am today.

Cortina: Before phosphates were discovered!

Kissinger: Look, if you work out something with the King of Morocco, all right. But it's not an American concern.

Cortina: What you've expressed to me is more than enough. But I want to make clear we'll make an effort to reach agreement with Morocco. But not if our side gives 100 percent. We're prepared to do something.

Kissinger: Like what?

Cortina: This is a general way of talking. We'll have to sit around the table and talk about it.

Kissinger: Having negotiated with you, I don't think you give things so fast. That's my impression.

Cortina: As you know, I like your sense of humor.

Kissinger: First, the reason I'm going to Rabat is because of Algeria, and given the fact the Arab Summit is in Rabat, I didn't think I could go to Algeria without going there. And second, I'm going to Al-

geria because we need Boumediene to help us with Syria and the radical Arabs. So it has nothing to do with Spain. If we change our policy—which is impossible—I will let you know. We won't change our policy.
[Omitted here is discussion of Gibraltar and base negotiations.]

89. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Algiers, October 14, 1974, 8:35–11:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Houari Boumediene, President of the Revolutionary Council
Ahmed Medeghri, Member of the Revolutionary Council and Minister of Interior
Ismail Hamdani, Deputy Secretary General of Presidency
Driss al-Djazairi, Presidential Assistant (Interpreter)

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Richard Parker, Chief of U.S. Interests Section
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Alex Toumayan, State Department

SUBJECTS

Next Steps in the Middle East Negotiation; Bilateral Relations; Oil Prices; Spanish Sahara

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Spanish Sahara.]

Spanish Sahara

Boumediene: What is your view of the Sahara problem?

Kissinger: Spanish Sahara.

Boumediene: The Moroccans will raise it.

Kissinger: And the Spaniards have! You want my honest view?

Boumediene: Yes, frankly.

Kissinger: I want it to go away! I can't get excited about 40,000 people who probably don't know they're living in Spanish Sahara. I

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Boumediene discussed Algeria's position on the Spanish Sahara.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 343, Department of State Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External October–November 1974. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Presidential Palace. Kissinger was in Algeria to review the Middle East peace process with Boumediene.

hope you don't think I'm too cynical. We have no interest in Spain being there. It's not logical for Spain to be in Africa.

Boumediene: What is your view on self-determination?

Kissinger: I'm for it, but I don't think it's natural for an entity so accidentally formed. So the only question is what country exerts a dominating influence. We will not be active in the area. What is your view? I'd be interested. The Moroccans say you want to annex it.

Boumediene: To give us an outlet! So our contacts would be easier! What's your view?

Kissinger: In the long run it's inevitable—leaving Spanish Sahara aside—that Algeria will become the dominant power in the Magreb.

Boumediene: In truth, so you'll be informed, we have no such ambitions. If we had, we would proclaim our intention before the Algerian people. We are very much interested in maintaining the unity of our own people. We have agreements with Morocco, including in the oil area. So Morocco wants our support, and Mauretania. In my talks with King Hassan, I said: "Don't ask me to take an immoral position." There is an agreement between Mauretania and Morocco. The Moroccans say publicly this is Moroccan territory. There is an agreement with President Ould Daddah, and it was even mentioned by the American press. I don't know how it got the information.

Kissinger: Is it true?

Boumediene: Yes.

Kissinger: That it's Moroccan-Mauretanian territory.

Boumediene: We don't want an outlet.

We want to exploit the iron ore deposits, but we don't want it to be a point of conflict.

Kissinger: How can you exploit the ore if it's not your territory?

Parker: The mines are on Algerian territory.

Kissinger: We will take no position. Or should we? It involves no American interest.

Boumediene: The Spaniards are our friends. So the problem is between Morocco and Mauretania, not with Spain. This is for history. Disagreement between Morocco and Mauretania is postponing a solution on this. The inhabitants should decide.

Kissinger: Would they know what they are being consulted about?

Boumediene: Some inhabitants are Moroccan, some are Mauretanian, and some are nomads. There are some of them in Algeria—but this doesn't give Algeria any rights.

Kissinger: Could it be divided between Morocco and Mauretania?

Boumediene: I think the attitude is gradually evolving in the direction of division.

Kissinger: We will take no position.

Boumediene: They say it will go to the International Court, the Hague. We said we have no objection.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Spanish Sahara.]

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rabat, October 15, 1974, 1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Private Meeting Between the Secretary and King Hassan of Morocco

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
King Hassan
Mr. Toumayan, Notetaker/Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Spanish Sahara.]

Hassan: You are aware of our problem with Spain? There are already two hot spots in the Mediterranean—one in the east and one in the center with Cyprus. The United States is not interested in seeing the west also becoming a hot point. It is in fact in no one's interest. I have talked about this with Lopez-Bravo who was by far the best foreign minister Spain has had in recent years.

The Secretary: I fully agree. The present foreign minister (Cortina) is to be avoided at all costs. He has the mind of a clerk.

Hassan: I told Lopez-Bravo that I agree that Spain remains but I do not agree in the Spanish Sahara becoming independent. I prefer the Spanish presence to self-determination for 30,000 people.

The Secretary: President Boumediene asked me yesterday what I thought about that and I said self-determination for 30–40,000 people who do not even know where they live?

¹ Summary: Kissinger and King Hassan discussed Moroccan, Spanish, Algerian, and Mauritanian positions on the Spanish Sahara. King Hassan agreed to accept the decision of the International Court of Justice, but declared that he would move forces into Spanish Sahara if Spain granted it independence.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical Files, Morocco. August 20, 1973–September 19, 1975. Secret; Nodis. Kissinger was in Morocco to discuss bilateral relations and the Middle East peace process with King Hassan.

Hassan: What does Boumediene say?

The Secretary: He is for self-determination. I assumed that he wanted an outlet on the Atlantic but he said that he has absolutely no interest in the Sahara.

Hassan: This territory belonged to someone in the past, it is not *res nullus*. I seek the ICJ (International Court of Justice) decision, because I know that they will say that this land belonged to Morocco before, and I will in any event accept the ICJ decision because the evidence that I submitted to the ICJ is very, very strong.

The Secretary: Many states are an absurdity, such as Guinea-Bissau or Spanish Sahara, why are you so sure that the ICJ will rule in your favor?

Hassan: Our evidence is very, very firm. As recently as 1955 the French official register listed the cities that were administered there as being administered from the administrative centers of Morocco. So I am willing to accept the ruling of the courts and, in addition, I must gain time while Franco is there. To accept an independent state in the Spanish Sahara is, all things being equal, like the United States accepting the Soviet missiles in Cuba or like the Soviet Union accepting the Czech situation. The same imperative applies in this case.

The Secretary: If I were in Your Majesty's position, I would do exactly the same thing. But the United States Government is sometimes acting with more sentimentality and more legalism—look, for instance, at our attitude on the Cyprus matter and the Congress' actions vis-à-vis Turkey. Be assured that I will cause you no problem on this matter. I personally like the ICJ solution.

Hassan: Ask Spain not to turn down the ICJ solution. We are a small country, we have no pretensions, I am very serious because my seriousness is my major asset and capital. I lived in exile myself for three years. I know the methods used by colonialist administrations, I know what passes for a referendum and I know all about nationalism. If Spain moves to give independence to Spanish Sahara, I prefer to tell you in the most candid terms, so that you can stop supplying us with weapons, tanks, and airplanes if you wish, but if at 10 o'clock Spanish Sahara becomes independent, I shall move my forces and go in at 11 o'clock. I will not lie to you. If Spain gives independence to that territory, within two years the place will be full of Russian and Chinese revolutionaries. If Spain goes home, Morocco will be surrounded on one side by the Atlantic and on the other side by the Mediterranean and it will be surrounded by Algeria, Algeria and Algeria on the three other sides.

The Secretary: Boumediene believes that there is already an agreement between Morocco and Mauritania.

Hassan: Oh, but there is such an agreement. We have exchanged letters. With Mauritania everything is settled, there is no problem. President Ould Daddah will come to Rabat three days before the Summit and we will make the announcement then. But I asked Spain to accept the ICJ formula. In a secret letter with Ould Daddah, we have agreed on the zones of influence and Algeria has absolutely nothing to say. Why is Algeria so anxious to have a port outlet? It's because the iron ore has to transit through Morocco. Instead of concerning himself with how he can occupy Africa, Boumediene should look to his own domestic problems. His situation is not very good.

The Secretary: I understand your problem, but Your Majesty must understand very clearly that the United States Foreign Service is composed very largely of frustrated missionaries better suited to conducting Sunday school than diplomacy and if you should be lectured moralistically on the subject of the Spanish Sahara, I would want you to talk to me directly first before you jump to any conclusions. I will tell Spain about the ICJ solution. My associates tell me that Your Majesty proposes the ICJ because you consider it inappropriate to resort to force but want to use diplomatic and juridical methods. I believe that you want to gain time.

Hassan: I am sure of the outcome with the ICJ and Spain must accept that formula.

The Secretary: Can we succeed?

Hassan: I am sure your intelligence tells you what many of my own staff officers trained in Madrid and who have retained their contacts in Madrid tell me, there is not a single Spanish soldier or officer who wants to die for Spanish Sahara, particularly not after the Portuguese experience. I do not like the use of force, but if there is no other solution, I will.

The Secretary: When will this matter come to a head?

Hassan: It may come in about a week, my understanding is that on October 28 Spain begins to gather the nomads to tell them that first, they will receive internal autonomy which is a preliminary step to full independence.

The Secretary: At what point will Your Majesty move?

Hassan: It will help me very much if this occurs during the Summit.

The Secretary: Do you conceive this consultation with the nomadic tribal chiefs to be the beginning of the referendum?

Hassan: It is the beginning of the violation of Spain's pledge to the United Nations. All my friends in Spain recognize that Franco, who is senile, has a fixation on the subject.

The Secretary: I cannot say that my life will be incomplete if I do not have one more military crisis.

Hassan: I don't want to embarrass any of our friends, we will not ask anyone to make a choice between Spain and Morocco. We are aware of the large interests of the United States in Spain but after Franco passes on you must review this strategy and perhaps you will then transfer some of those interests to Morocco. There is no question of asking you to make a choice. We are not asking you to choose one side or the other. This concerns purely Spain and Morocco. Remember that the French had 180,000 soldiers in Morocco—we did not have one single rifle. The French have left. Spain will leave also. We are ready to fight.

The Secretary: I will talk to Spain about the ICJ.

Hassan: To do so would be a great service to peace.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Spanish Sahara.]

91. Telegram 113002 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, May 15, 1975, 0023Z.

113002. Subject: King Hassan's French Radio Interview on Spanish Sahara. For the Ambassador. Ref: A. Rabat 2081, B. Madrid 2970, C. State 27758, D. Rabat 2134, E. Madrid 3056, F. Rabat 2137 (Notal), G. Paris 11239.

1. Apparent renewed militance of King Hassan on Sahara issue as revealed in French radio interview April 28 (Ref A) is cause for concern in Department. As outlined in Ref C, Moroccan aggressiveness on territorial claims against Spain complicates sensitive U.S.-Spanish relations, because of responsive U.S. arms supply policy toward Morocco. Al-

¹ Summary: The Department instructed the Ambassador to meet with Foreign Minister Laraki, to express U.S. concern over Morocco's increasingly militant posture toward the Spanish Sahara. The Embassy in Spain was instructed to inform the appropriate Spanish officials of Moroccan assurances that they would avoid the use of U.S. equipment against American allies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent to Madrid, and repeated to the mission to the UN and Algiers. Drafted by Joseph V. Montville in NEA/AFN; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs L. Bruce Laingen, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Robert J. McCloskey (info), Skogerboe, Atherton, and Rewoods; and approved by Sisco.

though U.S. remains neutral on merits of Moroccan claims it cannot, because of its military relationships with both parties, remain neutral on modalities employed to resolve the territorial disputes.

2. Accordingly, you should seek appointment with Foreign Minister Laraki, to express USG concern generated by King's remarks in French radio interview that Morocco may be changing its approach in dispute with Spain from peaceful diplomatic and judicial channels, as exemplified by GOM's successful proposal to refer Sahara question to ICJ, to more militant posture. You should point out that U.S. supports peaceful resolution of territorial disputes with Spain not only to preserve stability in area, but also because U.S. military relationships with both sides could cause obvious difficulties for U.S. if other than peaceful methods are used.

3. You should also seek Laraki's view on status of ICJ adjudication of Sahara case and ask him how GOM conceives of role ICJ decision would play in final resolution of question.

4. When exchange on Sahara is completed, you should tell Laraki you have been instructed to express Department's appreciation of King Hassan's confidence expressed to you in April 30 audience (Ref F) and in "*Figaro*" interview May 2 (Ref G) that U.S. could emerge in strong position in post-Vietnam era. You should ask Laraki to reassure King that U.S. intends to continue active involvement in search for Middle East peace. Regarding King's recommendation that U.S. should move forward on Middle East in consultation with other permanent members of U.N. Security Council, you should express appreciation for advice and confidential note that as process of reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy continues, we are in touch with UNSC permanent members on bilateral basis. However, we have doubts about utility of Security Council itself as effective forum for Middle East peacemaking.

5. For Madrid: You may inform GOS at appropriate level of *dé-marche* in paras 2 and 3 above after Rabat confirms that it has been made. You should also inform Ministry of Army official quoted Ref B that U.S. is not providing Moroccan Army with any kind of insurgency or infiltration training. You may also inform any GOS officials who raise matter that USG continues to be sensitive to Spanish concerns over our military supply relationship with Morocco. The GOM is aware of this US attitude and has not given US any reason to suspect that it will depart from King's stated policy not to use US supplied equipment against friends of U.S.

Kissinger

92. Telegram 170882 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, July 19, 1975, 2328Z.

170882. Subject: Spanish Sahara: U.S. Policy. Ref.: A) Madrid 4839; B) Rabat 3412; C) USUN 3321; D) Madrid 4949.

1. Department appreciates timely reporting, analysis and recommendations on Sahara problem from various addressee posts. As seen from here issue appears to be boiling down to question of modalities of transfer of sovereignty of Sahara from Spain to Morocco and Mauritania in accordance with the partition plan the latter two have devised and Algeria publicly endorsed in Bouteflika-Hassan communiqué of July 4. Even though we have no firm details of the new Algerian position, and we can assume Algeria is capable of pursuing policies that might cause frustration to GOM, Department believes that July 4 public declaration of Algerian satisfaction with Moroccan-Mauritanian agreement on Sahara's future, Algerian publicity given to declaration, and King Hassan's stated conviction that there are no problems now with Algeria (Ref B) tip scales significantly against Spanish view that Algeria has not changed its policy (Ref D).

2. It appears to us that Spanish are pushing UN sponsored four-power conference with Algerian participation in hopes latter could be counted on to impede what GOS probably sees as complete, and perhaps humiliating victory for Morocco (and Mauritania) on Sahara issues. For their part, Morocco and Mauritania are probably pushing three-power conference with Spain precisely to nail down details of their apparent victory before UN has opportunity to perhaps make suggestions they might consider unhelpful to their position. It would be understandable if Spanish pride is a major factor in determining Sahara tactics. This could account for Madrid's failure to respond to King Hassan's temptations of economic and security arrangements if a deal is made before the ICJ and UN state their findings. Spain could and probably would respond to Moroccan/Mauritanian pressure for deal by saying, with some justice, that it has no authority to transfer sovereignty of Sahara to any country, this being the responsibility of UN.

¹ Summary: Kissinger issued instructions for the Ambassadors to the United Nations, Spain, and Algeria regarding U.S. policy on the Spanish Sahara.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent immediate to Rabat and Madrid, and repeated to Algiers, Nouakchott, and Paris. Drafted by Michael L. Durkee in EUR/WE and Joseph V. Montville in NEA/AFN; cleared by Sisco, Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James J. Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs William B. Buffum, and Johnson; and approved by Kissinger.

3. In light of the foregoing, Department sees no U.S. interests to be served by getting involved in advice to Waldheim or interested parties that could be interpreted as prejudicial to the policies or goals of any of the parties. Threat of hostilities over Sahara has been sharply reduced since Algerian-Moroccan declaration and issue seems headed for resolution, given apparent growing Arab/African support, in favor of Morocco and Mauritania. Probably best Spain can hope for is UN involvement in process of transferring sovereignty that will minimize effect on Spanish pride.

4. In regard to latter, Department does wish, however, to offer some recognition of Spanish problem even though we are not prepared to depart from our neutral policy. Action addressees should therefore carry out following instructions:

A. For USUN—Ambassador Moynihan: You should thank Waldheim for informing us and express our continuing interest in learning of UN or other efforts to resolve the Sahara dispute peacefully. You should also reaffirm to Waldheim that U.S. policy on the Sahara continues to be neutrality on the substance of the issue and this extends to requests for support by interested parties for various negotiating proposals that other parties might see as prejudicial to their positions. However, you may add that our judgement is that all parties have recognized that the UN has some role to play in view of past UN resolutions and the current ICJ proceedings. You should then say that the modalities would have to be worked out by Waldheim and the interested parties, but we would like to be kept informed.

B. For Madrid—Ambassador Stabler: You should tell Under Secretary Rovira that in appreciation of Spanish concern over the Sahara issue the U.S. is communicating to Waldheim its keen interest in seeing a peaceful resolution of the Sahara problem and asking Waldheim to inform U.S. on diplomatic developments in that regard. We are also conveying our judgement to Waldheim that all parties have recognized that the UN has some role to play in view of past UN resolutions and the current ICJ proceedings, but that the modalities would have to be worked out by him and the interested parties. However, in order not to prejudice its relations with any of the interested parties the USG has decided to continue its policy of neutrality and not to endorse specific proposals made by any of the parties.

5. For Rabat—Ambassador Neumann: For reasons cited above, we see no advantage to be had by USG offering to mediate between Spain and Morocco as proposed in Ref B. However, we take this opportunity to commend your comprehensive and expeditious reporting in Sahara dispute as seen from Morocco.

Kissinger

93. **Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, October 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

Moroccan Plans to Invade Spanish Sahara

1. We have received a report [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that King Hassan has decided to invade Spanish Sahara within the next three weeks. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] such an attack may occur as early as next Tuesday.

2. With the Spanish military still in the Sahara, a serious conflict could develop. If Morocco loses this gamble, it could ultimately lead to the downfall of the present government in Rabat. On the other side, prolonged fighting and heavy Spanish casualties could provoke a political crisis in Madrid. There is also potential for drawing Algeria into the conflict. Mauritania, which also has claims to Spanish Sahara, is likely to avoid any military involvement.

3. The attached Intelligence Alert Memorandum examines this situation and its implications in greater depth. It has been discussed at the working level with CIA, DIA, State/INR and NSA. The collection and analytical elements of the Intelligence Community have been alerted and will report further developments through normal channels or in further Alert Memoranda, as appropriate.

W.E. Colby

¹ Summary: Colby informed Kissinger of a report regarding Moroccan plans to invade the Spanish Sahara.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01066A, OPI 10, Box 9, Folder 23. Secret; [*text not declassified*].

Attachment

Intelligence Alert Memorandum

Washington, October 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

Moroccan Invasion of Spanish Sahara

1. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] King Hassan, under pressure from the military, has decided to invade Spanish Sahara within the next three weeks. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Morocco will attack in the Sahara when Ramadan ends next Tuesday. The King is reportedly confident the invasion will succeed because he believes that most of Spain's troops are poorly trained and will not fight.

2. King Hassan has pursued a high-risk policy on Spanish Sahara for some time. Last August, he reiterated his intention to acquire Spanish Sahara before the end of the year, with force if necessary. Although he promised then to await an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on Moroccan-Mauritanian claims to the territory, he may now have decided to act in a moment of what he perceives as Spanish weakness. There is also increasing anxiety in Rabat that the Court's decision may be ambiguous or unfavorable to Morocco and that the report of a fact-finding mission of the UN Committee on Decolonization will favor independence for the territory. Finally, it is possible that Hassan has concluded that armed intervention will provoke favorable international mediation. To date most Moroccans have supported Hassan's position on Spanish Sahara, but if a military gamble fails he could be in serious trouble and vulnerable to a coup.

3. Rabat expects effective resistance only from some 5,000 Spanish legionnaires in the Sahara and Spanish air force units stationed in the Canary Islands and possibly from Algerian ground forces. The Moroccans are skeptical that Algeria will intervene militarily, but Morocco reportedly is arranging for a token presence in Rabat of troops from Syria, Egypt, the PLO, and possibly Saudi Arabia as a psychological deterrent to an Algerian military reaction. We have no evidence, however, that other Arab troops are arriving in Morocco, although small contingents could arrive quickly by air without being detected. We doubt that most eastern Arabs would involve themselves in a potential inter-Arab conflict except in a mediating role, although the PLO may be an exception.

4. Morocco has kept approximately one fourth of its more than 55,000-man army in southern Morocco since mid-1974, despite considerable supply problems, and low troop morale because of the primitive

conditions. We estimate that most of the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroccan troops in the southern zone have been tactical infantry, with some armor, artillery, and air defense units. Although the army has established a command-and-support structure in the south, the Moroccans would nonetheless face considerable obstacles in launching and sustaining a major offensive against either Spanish or Algerian forces.

5. Madrid could muster sufficient strength from its own forces to defeat a Moroccan invasion. The Spanish have some 16,000 army and air force personnel in the Sahara, with an additional 20,000 located nearby in the Canary Islands. The Spanish have 51 medium tanks and 35 armored cars that could provide immediate armored support. Spanish forces are well-equipped and trained, compared to the Moroccan army. In terms of air power, Madrid has more than 60 sub-sonic fighter-bombers immediately available; two squadrons of F-5 tactical fighter-bombers and a total of four squadrons of air defense command Mirage III and F-4C interceptors are in reserve in Spain.

6. If he has decided in favor of war, we believe King Hassan has seriously misjudged the likely Spanish response to an invasion. Although Madrid does not want to remain in Spanish Sahara or fight a colonial war, Spanish troops in the Sahara would resist a forcible eviction. At the same time Madrid would call on the UN to restore peace and ask Washington for its support. The US response to this request would strongly influence Spain's attitude toward accommodating the US position in the current base negotiations. The Spanish government would expect that longstanding US-Spanish defense cooperation should justify at least US diplomatic support, particularly if the Moroccans, contrary to early assurances, employed US-made weapons in any attack. The Moroccans, on the other hand, will also look to us for at least diplomatic support and react strongly to anything we do that might be interpreted as favoring Spain. A position of strict neutralism is probably about the most that King Hassan will tolerate without serious strain in our bilateral relations.

7. Initially, an armed conflict with Morocco would unite most Spaniards and help the regime divert the public's attention away from internal problems. If the fighting dragged on, however, the war could become another issue that would divide Spaniards. Divisiveness would also appear in the military—heretofore the most stable element in Spanish society—who eventually would disagree over the merits of fighting a war for a territory the government has already announced it is prepared to give up.

8. Algeria, which favors independence for Spanish Sahara, will probably stop short of direct military intervention. It would, however, create as many problems for Morocco as possible. We would expect Algiers to support the POLISARIO Front, a pro-independence Saharan

group, in waging a sustained insurgency effort. Algiers might also move troops to Morocco's northern border to exert pressure on King Hassan and renew its support of Moroccan dissidents. The Algerians would almost certainly mount an intensive international diplomatic effort to denounce Moroccan aggression.

9. In the less likely event that Algiers did intervene with direct military force, the Moroccans might achieve some initial success because they outnumber the 4,000 to 6,000 troops estimated to be in southwestern Algeria. The Algerian air force of some 200 combat aircraft could, however, turn the tide against Morocco's 40 combat aircraft, and play a decisive role in support of Algeria's ground forces, which are about the same size as Morocco's, but better trained and equipped.

94. Telegram 237194 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 4, 1975, 0656Z.

237194. Subject: Spanish Sahara. For Chargé from Secretary.

1. You should convey following message to King Hassan from me.

2. Begin message:

Your Majesty:

As you know, we believe an important step was taken toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East when the new agreement between Egypt and Israel was signed. We have pledged our energetic efforts to maintain the momentum of diplomatic progress. We have always appreciated Your Majesty's understanding of our efforts.

There are a number of matters on which I have wanted to have an exchange with you and have been thinking, if it would be convenient,

¹ Summary: The Chargé was instructed to convey a message from Kissinger to King Hassan expressing concern over reports of imminent Moroccan military action in the Spanish Sahara. Kissinger advised against it and noted that any such action would lead Spain to appeal to the United Nations Security Council.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegram, From SecState—NODIS. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only. Repeated to Madrid. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Harold H. Saunders; cleared by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Robert E. Barbour, and Hoganson; and approved by Kissinger.

of sending a representative to Rabat in the next few weeks for this purpose.

In the meantime, I want to share with Your Majesty my concern over some reports that I have seen recently which, if true, suggest that a situation could develop in your part of this important area which would be of concern to all who are working to bring greater stability to the Mediterranean area. These reports suggest that the Government of Morocco may be contemplating imminent military action in the Spanish Sahara situation. I hope these reports are erroneous but felt I should communicate urgently with you to convey my strong advice that, should they be correct, Morocco not take such action. I think you should know of our estimate that Moroccan military operations against Spanish Sahara could lead to severe military and political disadvantages for Morocco. Among other things, we would expect Spanish to appeal to the Security Council in circumstances where many members of the Council would find it difficult to defend any such military initiative.

You know from our past conversations that we have followed the dispute over the Sahara closely and have always sought to be helpful where we could without ourselves seeking to become a party to this dispute. We will continue to do so. I shall be seeing Spanish Foreign Minister Cortina here in Washington today, and this will provide an excellent opportunity for me to speak directly to him about the situation in the hope that some mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Again, Your Majesty, I would welcome the opportunity for an exchange of views on the important issues for which we share concern. My emissary could review these with you at a mutually convenient time.

Warm regards, Henry A. Kissinger

End message.

3. FYI for Rabat: In any conversation following delivery of above message, be certain nothing is said which could give Hassan impression that U.S. is prepared to become mediator in this dispute.

4. For Madrid: The foregoing is strictly FYI and you should say nothing about this to GOS.

Kissinger

95. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 4, 1975, 4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Spanish Sahara

PARTICIPANTS

Spain

H.E. Pedro Cortina, Foreign Minister of Spain

H.E. Jaime Alba, Ambassador to the U.S.

Jose Luis Dicenta, Secretary to the Foreign Minister (notetaker)

U.S.

The Secretary

Ambassador McCloskey

Ambassador Stabler

Robert E. Barbour, EUR/WE (notetaker)

The Secretary: We have some information concerning a possible Moroccan attack in the Sahara. I want you to know that we have urged the King of Morocco not to do it, that is, not to do anything rash. We have warned him against it and have urged him to negotiate, just as I urge you to negotiate.

Cortina: We are ready to do so, and we have said that we would do so. However, it is important to maintain the form of a referendum on self-determination with guarantees to negotiate and to give satisfaction to the parties. Self-determination does not mean independence, although that is one of the options included to give it credibility, but what the people of the area will be called on to do is to show their preference either for Morocco or for Mauritania.

The Secretary: The problem is the people won't know what Morocco is, or what Mauritania is.

Cortina: Unfortunately, they have learned well from experience what those countries are and they know what all the possibilities are.

The Secretary: We are ready to use our influence for negotiations.

Cortina: According to the news we have the Moroccan attack will not be exclusively on the Sahara territory, but also against Algeria.

The Secretary: They can't be that crazy.

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Cortina discussed a possible Moroccan attack in the Spanish Sahara, and the need for all parties to resolve the issue through negotiations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2401. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Robert E. Barbour; and approved by Covey on October 20. The meeting took place in the Spanish Embassy.

Cortina: I believe that, too.

The Secretary: I sent a message to the King urging him against precipitate action.

Cortina: That is very important because, having supplied him with U.S. arms, you have a capacity for influence that others do not have. He also has arms from the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: We have not given him many arms, about \$20 million, I think. In fact, we think he might receive a bad beating.

Cortina: Facts will tell, and I would not want to anticipate, but I hope nothing happens because it would be very unfortunate.

The Secretary: Yes, it would be very unfortunate, and we are trying hard to prevent it.

Cortina: What is unfortunate is that the King has recently become very nervous, according to our information, because he wanted to resolve that problem exclusively through his own diplomatic skills and without the cooperation of the political parties or the Army, though he was trying at the same time to manipulate them. Then too, populations from Algeria and Mauritania are in the territory and that complicates the problem.

The Secretary: If he has to negotiate with you he will be lucky to keep Morocco.

Cortina: He tried very hard with me last August to have us not inform the United Nations of our decolonization plans, but I explained to him that we had to do that.

96. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1975.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Moroccan Ambassador Boutaleb

PARTICIPANTS

Morocco

Ambassador Abdelhadi Boutaleb

US

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Atherton

Sophie Porson—Interpreter

Stanley T. Escudero—Notetaker

Ambassador Boutaleb had requested the meeting in order to make a formal presentation of King Hassan's response to the Secretary's message counseling Moroccan restraint in the Spanish Sahara. The text of the message had earlier been delivered to Mr. Sisco. A verbatim account of the conversation follows:

Ambassador Boutaleb: Mr. Secretary, it is a great joy to see you; it is a great privilege to have this opportunity as I know how busy your schedule is.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, unfortunately I am going to China.

Ambassador Boutaleb: Yes, I know exactly what your schedule must be like and I realize you only have a few minutes to see me.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know I am a great admirer of your King.

Ambassador Boutaleb: Of course he feels the same admiration toward you.

Secretary Kissinger: I hope you will give him my very warm regards.

Ambassador Boutaleb: He asked me to do the same for you. I am here, Mr. Secretary to bring a message in reply to your letter of October 4. However, this is only a formality as you have already received a report on this from Mr. Sisco.

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Boutaleb discussed Morocco's position regarding the Spanish Sahara. Boutaleb delivered King Hassan's assurances that Morocco did not intend to engage Spain militarily in the Sahara.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820123–2423. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stanley T. Escudero in NEA/AFN on October 18; and approved by Covey on November 4. The non-official translation of King Hassan's letter is *ibid.*, P820123–2428.

Secretary Kissinger: I have read it.

Ambassador Boutaleb: Your question was whether Morocco was planning to launch any aggression or a military assault in the Sahara. His Majesty's response was that there was no question of that. His Majesty's speech yesterday was further evidence that Morocco does not want war with Spain. What the King has done is intended to be beneficial to the institution of a dialogue with Spain so that the two nations can cooperate toward a solution of the problem.

I do not wish to give you the historical background of the case since I have already discussed the matter at length with Messrs. Sisco, Atherton, and Hartman. I do wish to make the point, however, that the Sahara had always been recognized by Spain as being Moroccan. Over the years Spain had always asked the Moroccans to be patient and to wait a little longer. It is only in recent times, incited by the Algerians (on this point I wish to be absolutely frank), that Spain completely changed its position. We believe that this is not serving Spain's interests, but rather that Spain is serving the interests of a neighboring country which for reasons of its own is striving for the creation of a fictitious national entity.

Morocco believes that Spain must be consistent with itself. Spain cannot on the one hand refuse to recognize the existence of separatist movements among the Basques and the Canary Islands and on the other hand favor the creation of the separatist movement in the Sahara, even under the guise of a so-called liberation movement. I reiterate that Spain has to be consistent. Spain cannot very well refuse to consider self-determination for Gibraltar and seek to impose a referendum for the Sahara. Spain's positions are totally inconsistent and illogical.

Morocco believes that both the opinion of the ICJ and the report of the fact-finding mission have supported Morocco's contentions. The fact-finding team mentioned the special nature of the Sahara. It is not a colonial territory where decolonialization could take place according to the usual UN methods. This territory is not a separate entity but is actually part of another territory, and in such cases territorial unity takes precedence over other considerations.

Turning to the ICJ opinion, I point out that it declared that indeed ties and allegiances had existed between the Moroccan sovereign and the Sahara at the time of the Spanish occupation. Therefore Morocco believes that the ICJ upheld the Moroccan position on both questions put to the Court—the terra nullius issue and the existence of legal ties between Morocco and the Sahara. Morocco does not believe that one can play with distinctions between allegiance and territorial ties because there are many cases where only allegiance existed, especially in countries which had no monarchs of their own. Where monarchs did exist, in most cases allegiance was rendered to the sovereign. The fact

that the ICJ added that this issue should be resolved through self-determination was outside of the purview of the Court. The Court could resolve legal issues before it, but the rest was political and not of its concern.

Secretary Kissinger: I hear you and understand your views, but what is the hurry? Why could you not wait a few weeks to see how the results of this juridical decision could be translated into negotiations?

Ambassador Boutaleb: Spain has consented to Algeria's establishing in the Sahara an artificial movement for the purpose of occupying the territory and if we wait we will lose everything. Yesterday a Madrid news agency reported that nine Moroccans and one member of F POLISARIO had been killed in the Sahara. It is clear then that Spain is no longer administering the territory but that another element is doing so.

We do not want war with Spain, but if Spain is handing the Sahara over to dissident Moroccan elements and to outsiders, we think that we are within our rights to ask the U.S., our friend, to help Morocco, its friend, and to be actively sympathetic to Morocco's cause. It is no longer a question of choosing between Morocco and Spain, but of choosing between Morocco and outside elements that wish to usurp what is rightfully Morocco's.

Secretary Kissinger: You know our feelings of friendship for Morocco and our great admiration for the King who has always shown friendship for us. This is, of course, a very complicated time for us for a variety of reasons, including the fact that I am leaving town today and won't be available for a week, so let me reflect about this and I will have to communicate with my associates from the airplane. We hope that His Majesty could delay for some weeks until we can see what diplomatic possibilities exist.

Ambassador Boutaleb: I will transmit that advice to His Majesty but would it be possible for the U.S. to institute a *démarche* on this subject with Spain?

Secretary Kissinger: We will do that. We will be in touch and we will let you know what we will do.

Ambassador Boutaleb: (Upon departure) Your original message noted that you would be sending an emissary to Morocco to discuss matters with His Majesty.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that will be Mr. Atherton. He should be in Morocco in about a week.

97. Telegram 248532 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 19, 1975, 2223Z.

248532. Subject: Spanish Sahara. Ref: (A) Tosec 160053 (B) Secto 16044.

1. In light of ICJ advisory opinion, report of UN Commission, and subsequent developments, notably King Hassan's announcement of planned civilian march on Sahara and Spanish request for UN Security Council meeting, which has been set for 11:00 a.m. October 20, Department has decided to make simultaneous approaches to King Hassan, Foreign Minister Cortina, and UN SecGen Waldheim urging that precipitous action be avoided and diplomatic initiatives be explored with view to attaining mutually acceptable and peaceful solution in Sahara. See septels for messages to Madrid and USUN.

2. Embassy requested deliver following message from Secretary to King Hassan: Begin text: Your Majesty: His Excellency, Ambassador Boutaleb, called on me October 17 to personally deliver your response to my message of October 4 expressing my concern over the developments in the Sahara. I was gratified by your frank exposition of your government's position on the issue and by your reassurances that Morocco is not contemplating military action.

3. I am aware of Your Majesty's speech and I have noted your intention to organize a civilian march into the Sahara. Particularly in view of the ICJ opinion and the UN fact-finding mission report, I wish to restate my conviction that this is a problem which lends itself to resolution through diplomatic means. To reiterate what I said to Ambassador Boutaleb on October 17, as you consider your plans for a march, I hope you will allow a reasonable period of time to explore all opportunities for a settlement which will avoid military or political confrontation.

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to King Hassan, expressing U.S. concern over the proposed civilian march into the Spanish Sahara. Kissinger asked that King Hassan explore diplomatic measures to resolve the conflict and avoid a confrontation in the region.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to the mission to the UN, Madrid, and Tunis (Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Atherton). Drafted by Escudero; cleared by Saunders, Barbour, Buffum, Covey (by phone), and Sisco; and approved by Johnson. In telegram 248533 to Madrid, October 19, the Embassy was instructed to inform Cortina of U.S. support for Spain's request for a Security Council meeting, and a diplomatic settlement of the Spanish Sahara issue. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 206, Geopolitical Files, Sahara, October–November 1975)

4. As I informed Ambassador Boutaleb, we are making a similar approach to Madrid. My personal emissary, Assistant Secretary Atherton, will be in Morocco on October 23–24, at which time I hope he will have the opportunity to discuss this matter with Your Majesty in a frank and constructive manner. Warm regards. Henry A. Kissinger

Ingersoll

98. Telegram 254913 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

Washington, October 26, 1975, 2149Z.

254913. Subject: Message for President Boumediene. For Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. You should convey following message from me to President Boumediene.

2. Begin message:

Dear Mr. President:

I want to thank you for the time you took from your busy schedule to receive Assistant Secretary Atherton and to share your views so frankly with us. Mr. Atherton has given me a full report of his and Ambassador Parker's meeting with you, and I would like to comment in particular on several points.

I very much appreciated your full explanation of Algerian policy with respect to the situation in the Sahara. I agree with you that every effort must be made to resolve this matter by political means and that it should be dealt with within the framework of the United Nations.

In this spirit, we supported the resolution recently adopted by the Security Council asking Secretary General Waldheim to undertake consultations with the interested and concerned parties.

¹ Summary: The Ambassador was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to Boumediene, thanking the President for explaining the Algerian position on the Spanish Sahara. Kissinger reiterated the U.S. position of neutrality on the issue, emphasized the need for a negotiated settlement within the UN framework, and offered U.S. diplomatic assistance, short of mediation, to resolve the issue.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, September–December 1975. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Rabat, Madrid, Nouakchott, and the Mission to the UN. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Hoganson and Sisco; and approved by Kissinger.

As Mr. Atherton told you, the United States has taken no position on the substance of the Sahara question, and we will continue to maintain a policy of non-involvement. At the same time, given our friendly relations with all the parties, we cannot be unaffected by developments with respect to the Sahara and for this reason have long urged that a solution be found through amicable means. We remain ready to help diplomatically, if opportunities arise, in working for a solution within the framework of the United Nations that will meet the basic interests of all the parties and contribute to stability in the area. Mr. Atherton conveyed essentially this same message to the Government of Morocco during his visit there.

As you know, Mr. Atherton's long planned visit coincided, as matters developed, with a round of bilateral discussions between the Governments of Morocco and Spain in Marrakesh and Madrid. As our public statements have made clear, we are not involved in any way in those discussions and are of course playing no mediatory role. We are pleased that Secretary General Waldheim is now active at the request of the Security Council, and we support the Council's call for restraint and moderation in order to enable his mission to be undertaken in satisfactory conditions.

I also welcomed your comments to Mr. Atherton in response to the views I asked him to convey to you with respect to the Middle Eastern situation. I value the insights you have always given me and can assure you that we take seriously your advice about the importance of filling the void in the negotiating process.

Finally, Mr. President, I welcomed your positive comments about the recent preparatory conference in Paris and I am pleased that you feel that our bilateral relations are today very good. I can assure you that we fully reciprocate your assessment in both these regards.

Warm personal regards,

Henry Kissinger

End message.

Kissinger

99. Telegram 5445 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 29, 1975, 2329Z.

5445. For Secretary from Sisco. Subj: Spanish Sahara.

1. I saw Secretary General Waldheim, as you asked, and he gave me in detail the current state of play on his efforts re Spanish Sahara. He has developed a formula based on the West Irian precedent which has begun to emerge based on his detailed consultations with Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. Its success is uncertain. You will see from the description of the detailed proposal that it contains three principal elements: (A) An announcement by Spain that it would withdraw from the Spanish Sahara by 1 February 1976; (B) a Moroccan announcement abandoning the march; and (C) the establishment of a temporary UN administration whose task would be to supervise the withdrawal and work out ways to consult the people of Spanish Sahara.

2. Waldheim says he has the agreement of both Spain and Algeria. And he is awaiting the reply of Morocco and Mauritania which he expects this evening. He believes that Morocco's reaction will be influenced by two considerations: Whether Hassan has concluded that it is no longer possible to get a strictly bilateral deal with Spain, which Hassan prefers; and whether some formula regarding consulting the people can develop which the King can accept. Morocco's initial reaction was cautious. If Laraki from his talks with the Spaniards yesterday concludes no bilateral deal is possible, Waldheim believes Hassan will be tempted by his approach. I urged that intensified efforts be continued since the date of the march was getting closer.

3. At present Waldheim has a special representative, a Frenchman named Andre Lewin, who is shuttling between the parties trying to firm up a formula acceptable to all concerned. One element of flexibility was Cortina's suggestion that the Spanish Saharan people be represented in the UN administration for the temporary period involved. Waldheim had in mind that perhaps 6 to 12 members of the Spanish Saharan Assembly could be included.

¹ Summary: Sisco reported on his meeting with Waldheim regarding the Spanish Sahara. Waldheim's proposal involved three principal elements: Spanish withdrawal from the region by February 1, 1976; Moroccan abandonment of the Green March; UN administration to supervise the withdrawal and consult the Sahrawis.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency File, Box 19, USUN, DOS to SOS Nodis 10/1–12/31/75. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

4. In connection with all of the above, he described, as he did with you, the highly emotional state of Boumediene who is strongly against a bilateral deal between Spain and Morocco. Boumediene asked Waldheim to convey a direct message to you that you should intervene with Hassan promptly and tell him to call off the march. Waldheim said that Boumediene used strong language. He quotes Boumediene as saying that Hassan is playing with fire and that the march must be stopped since Algeria cannot tolerate it. According to Waldheim Boumediene also added otherwise there will be a reaction in the Middle East as well. Waldheim expressed hope that you would be able to send some kind of a message to Boumediene which would confirm that Boumediene's concerns had been conveyed to you and that we were taking them into account. While we cannot be responsive to Boumediene in ways he would consider adequate, I believe it is important that you send him a message if for no other reason than your close personal relations with him. I have discussed with Atherton the contents of such a message, and he will be drafting something for your consideration.

5. Following are the details of the Waldheim proposal. "Suggestions for compromise emerging from the consultations with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Spain

"1. Spain would unilaterally announce that it would withdraw from the territory by a specified date (the date mentioned was 1 February 1976). It would request the United Nations to assume responsibility for the decolonization of the Western Sahara as of that date and would declare that, pending its withdrawal, it would take no action to change the situation in the territory.

"2. In view of Spain's undertaking to withdraw from the territory, Morocco would announce that it had decided to abandon the march. Morocco would also undertake not to take any action until the question had been discussed by the General Assembly.

"3. Both Morocco and Mauritania have cited Principle VI of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) which provides that one of the ways whereby a non-self-governing territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government is by integration with an independent state. However, according to Principle IX of that resolution, such integration should come about as the result of the freely expressed wishes of the people, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes.

"4. If the parties agree, the United Nations could set up a temporary administration in the Western Sahara with the following functions:

- "(A) Supervise and assist the withdrawal of Spain;
- "(B) Take over the administration of the territory;
- "(C) Arrange for the return of refugees;

“(D) Negotiate the arrangements for a consultation of the people, including notably; determination of the method of consultation; determination of the questions to be voted upon; the identification of Saharans belonging to the territory;

“(E) Establish conditions of calm and freedom of expression conducive to a free and informed expression of the wishes of the people;

“5. The Government of Spain would be prepared to cooperate fully in such a solution.”

Moynihan

100. Telegram 3211 From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, October 30, 1975, 1855Z.

3211. Subj: Spanish Sahara: President Boumediene’s Views. Ref: Algiers 3210.

1. At 5:00 p.m. today received summons to go to Presidency immediately to see Boumediene. He was in grim mood and came right to the point. Said he had called me to convey urgent message to you, which was that situation in area rapidly deteriorating because of Spanish Sahara question and action by us was required to save it. Algeria had followed policy of restraint and moderation but time had come to decide whether or not that policy had been wise. Proof would be actions of U.S., which must take steps to prevent Hassan from proceeding with his march. He knew that we had maintained a position of neutrality, but for us to say at this point we were neutral would no longer wash. No one in region would believe that Hassan was going into the Sahara without our blessing.

2. I attempted to interject at this point but he waved me aside and continued, saying that Green March threatened not only stability of

¹ Summary: Boumediene expressed his concern over the Moroccan Green March, and asked Kissinger to convince King Hassan to abandon the march.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 1, Algeria, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only-Direct. In telegram 258841 to Madrid, October 31, Kissinger informed the Embassy that letters were sent to Waldheim, King Hassan and Boumediene in an attempt to delay the Moroccan March and allow more time for Waldheim’s proposals for a peaceful resolution of the Sahara dispute to gain acceptance. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 12, Spain, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Exdis)

Mahgreb but of Arab world as a whole, and if we were seriously interested, as we said we were, in stability, we would take action at this point. If something was not done problem would have ramifications far beyond simple Algerian-Moroccan dispute. Everyone's interests would suffer. He was asking Bouteflika to get in touch with you to convey same message but he wanted to be sure that you got it one way or another.

3. I said our capabilities as far as Hassan were concerned were severely limited. Hassan had opened the bottle and now could not put the genie back into it. Boumediene said problem could be solved honorably for Hassan. Spanish were prepared to get out at any time. Question was what regime took over from them. Algerians simply could not accept that this be settled by invasion. Waldheim had made some proposals which were now being discussed in Madrid. I asked if Algerians accepted Waldheim proposal. He said, yes, and they were going to announce their acceptance tomorrow. Spaniards also accepted them. Mauritians had said they would go along if unable to resolve problem through bilateral negotiations. There remained Morocco. What was required now was a little push from the U.S. to make Hassan accept the Waldheim proposal.

4. I said I would convey message to you immediately but that I must repeat that our capabilities with Hassan were limited. King had indicated to Atherton that he was on road from which it would be impossible to turn back. Boumediene said, quote then let him continue unquote, and terminated meeting.

5. Comment: As noted above, Boumediene was in grim mood. Do not know what he will do if Green March continues. His military and political options are limited. He can support guerrilla movement in Sahara and subversive activities in Morocco and can cause considerable trouble, but he is unlikely to take on Moroccan Army at this point. His frustration, however, will lead him to strike out at other targets, including us. Estimating damage he can or will inflict difficult. We think he unlikely cut private economic ties, which very important to Algerian economic development, but he will start playing spoiling role in Middle East and will sharply reverse trend of improvement in our relations. This implicit in his remarks in para 2.

6. More important in long run is fact that if Green March goes forward a number of people are going to be killed and North Africa likely be de-stabilized for some time. Situation may well get out of hand, with demands for our intervention by one side or another putting us in an increasingly embarrassing position. In other words, march is not going to settle problem, but only make it worse. I think it very much in our interest to find way out for Hassan. Algerian acceptance of Waldheim

proposal offers one possibility. It may only delay the agony, but it may also give enough time for parties to work out solution between them.

7. I therefore recommend that if, as Boumediene says, Spanish accepted Waldheim proposal, we also support that proposal in Security Council.

8. Recommend above be repeated Madrid, Nouakchott, Rabat and USUN.

Parker

101. Telegram 258216 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, October 31, 1975, 0143Z.

258216. Subject: Message for King Hassan—Spanish Sahara. For the Chargé from the Secretary.

1. Please convey following message from me for King Hassan.

2. Begin text:

Your Majesty:

I very much appreciate your courtesy in receiving Assistant Secretary Atherton last week in Marrakesh. I am grateful for your counsel and support with respect to the Middle East negotiations. I also welcomed your views on the Sahara situation, which have given us a full appreciation of Your Majesty's policy and objectives in this respect. We want to be helpful in any way we can, within the framework of the United Nations, to achieve a stable and amicable negotiated outcome, and it is in this spirit that I am writing you today.

I want to report to Your Majesty that I have received a message from President Boumediene expressing deep concern over the potential consequences if the proposed march to the Sahara goes forward.

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to King Hassan concerning the proposed Green March into the Sahara. Kissinger asked for the King's views on Waldheim's proposal for settlement of the Spanish Sahara issue and emphasized that the proposed march would increase tensions in the region.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Borg; and approved by Kissinger by telecon—Adams.

I also want to inform you that we have now discussed with Secretary General Waldheim the results of his recent mission, and he has described to us his efforts to find a formula which could provide the basis for a reasonable solution in the Spanish Sahara. After considering the formula which the Secretary General is proposing, it occurs to us that Your Majesty might find such a process acceptable. I would appreciate very much knowing what Your Majesty's views are and how Your Majesty intends to proceed in relation to this formula. Meanwhile, now that matters seem to be moving in the direction Morocco has been seeking, I am sure Your Majesty will agree that it is important for all of us to exercise continued patience and give the Secretary General all possible support in these efforts. We believe they are promising and hope that this matter can be pursued in an atmosphere of calm in your area which will be conducive to a peaceful resolution.

I hope Your Majesty will agree that action such as the proposed march to the Sahara, which would inevitably increase tension despite your best efforts to the contrary, might prove unsettling to the hopeful process now underway.

Warm Regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
End text.

Ingersoll

102. Telegram 3226 From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, October 31, 1975, 1825Z.

3226. For the Secretary from the Ambassador. Subject: Spanish Sahara: Message for Boumediene. Ref: State 258217.

¹ Summary: Parker reported on his meeting with Boumediene. Boumediene reiterated his position that responsibility for the future development of the Sahara problem rested with the United Nations and the United States. Parker responded that U.S. influence was limited, and that responsibility rested with those directly involved: Algeria, Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850012–2320. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 258217 to Algiers, October 31, the Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to Boumediene regarding the proposed Moroccan Green March. Kissinger assured Boumediene of continued U.S. support for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, and reiterated that the United States was not informed of the march in advance and had limited influence on Morocco. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical File, Algeria, September–December 1975)

1. Summary: Secretary's message of October 30 delivered to Boumediene. Latter more relaxed than he was day before, but still maintaining Hassan's march into Sahara will have to be stopped, or area stability will suffer seriously. Implies US interests at stake. Thinks Waldheim proposal offers way out for Hassan, but unwilling spell out scenario he envisages. End summary

2. Delivered message in reftel to Boumediene at 12:30 today. Found him in somewhat more relaxed and friendly mood than he was last night but his position the same. He feels responsibility for future development Sahara problem rests with United Nations and United States and that all we have to do is give a quote little push unquote to Hassan to get him to adjourn march.

3. When I had finished reading message to him Boumediene expressed appreciation for it and asked whether I thought you were really working on this problem. I said you had had a number of other pressing matters preoccupying you but that I had conveyed last night's message by special channel and was certain you had focused on it and were making a sincere effort to resolve problem. Boumediene then launched into long philosophical discussion of problem.

4. He said that Moroccan actions threatened to upset area equilibrium, an equilibrium for which Algerians largely responsible. In an earlier conversation with you he had asked what we were seeking in the area and you had said we were seeking strong, independent national governments. That was in accord with Algerian goals and for that reason he had been prepared to go along with our policies. We had experienced Ben Bella and knew what he was like. 1965 had changed all that and Algerians had followed moderate course. Problems such as Vietnam might have caused considerable irritation but had not affected basis of our relations (implication was that Sahara would). In interest good neighborliness and stability Algerians had not exploited opportunities such as those presented by coup attempts in Morocco. The balance which had been maintained was now threatened however and results could not be foreseen. If the United States wanted to maintain that balance we should get Hassan to call off his march. He was convinced that we could do so.

5. I reiterated my comments of night before to the effect that our influence was limited and said that what he was asking for was not something to be done with a little push. I noted that responsibility for the affair rested primarily with the participants: Morocco, Spain, Mauritania and Algeria. King Hassan had all of us in impasse and we gathered he thought that to withdraw from his project now would be tantamount to committing suicide. Problem was how to find graceful way out for Hassan. Did Boumediene have any suggestions?

6. Boumediene said he thought Waldheim proposal offered graceful way out. Let it be announced that Spain was turning the colony over to the United Nations as of a fixed date. This would mean the end of imperialist control and Hassan could proclaim this a victory and disband the march.

7. I asked what Boumediene envisaged as subsequent scenario. He said something would have to be worked out within UN. I said this presumably would involve self-determination and that was something Moroccans had indicated they would oppose.

8. Boumediene said these were political problems he should not have to solve. Point was that Hassan had gotten himself into impasse. There was an honorable way out. It would pose certain risks for Hassan, but the course he was planning to pursue now posed even greater risks. What was Hassan going to do after he got to El Aiun? Hassan had not thought this through. People were going to be killed and armed struggle was going to begin and the end was nowhere in sight. Algerians had avoided causing trouble for Hassan in past, but they knew how to do so.

9. I noted that in conversation with Atherton, Boumediene had said Spanish Sahara would be economically viable. Did he have any thoughts about political viability? He said again that this was not really his problem. There were decisions of the UN calling for exercise of right of self-determination. These decisions would have to be honored. This was the only possibility we had for peaceful settlement. Let Moroccans do their best to win Saharan people over to their side. They were already spending a lot of money to that end. They could continue to do so and perhaps Sahraouis would vote to be part of Morocco. Alternative was ultimately armed struggle, and soldiers could not solve anything. If Moroccans concluded they had no alternative but to go ahead with march, let them do so in full knowledge that the responsibility for what happened would lie with them. It was not in Morocco's interest to be in conflict with the Algerian revolution, but the Algerians were not afraid of such a conflict if it came to that. They were revolutionaries and they were accustomed to fighting. Boumediene had no throne to lose. If he disappeared another struggler would take his place. He was not in situation Hassan was. He did not have to export his trouble.

10. Comment: Am having trouble deciding what to make of Boumediene's remarks and attitude. Am sure he means what he says and should be taken seriously, but he is being prudent and making no direct threats and burning no bridges. This presumably reflects the limited options he has and his position may not be as strong as he would like to have us believe, particularly given support Moroccans seem to have received from other Arabs.

11. I believe tone taken in your message was just right and recommend we maintain that posture. Hope way can be found to make Waldheim proposal acceptable to Moroccans as well as others.

Parker

103. Telegram 7618 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, November 2, 1975, 1111Z.

7618. Subj: Spanish Sahara—Message for the Secretary from Foreign Minister Cortina. Ref: State 258841.

1. Cortina has just called me to request that I pass to the Secretary the following.

2. GOS has tried through all possible means to reach agreement with Morocco. When “Green March” announced, GOS had endeavored to find ways to remove this point of friction. However, Moroccans insisted that substance of Sahara problem must be resolved along lines desired by Morocco and maintained “Green March” not negotiable.

3. Moroccans have proven themselves impossible to deal with since their idea of negotiation is that other side must accept Moroccan demands or no agreement possible. GOS has exhausted its possibilities.

4. GOS has now received information which it considers accurate that amongst “Green Marchers” there are 25,000 men who are members of Royal Moroccan Army and who have their weapons concealed. This group constitutes a “Trojan Horse” and GOS is convinced that once across Saharan border these soldiers will then take up their arms and military invasion will be on.

5. GOS has already informed Security Council that Spanish armed forces in Sahara have been given orders to resist any efforts to invade the territory. Hassan is playing with his throne by using Sahara to dis-

¹ Summary: The Ambassador delivered a message from Cortina informing Kissinger of the failure of negotiations to halt the Moroccan Green March. Cortina expressed concern that soldiers would accompany marchers and attempt a military invasion of the Spanish Sahara. Cortina asked Kissinger to send a *démarche* to King Hassan advising against precipitous actions.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 12, Spain, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—NODIS (2). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

tract Moroccan public opinion from domestic problems. However, Spain does not intend to pay for Hassan's errors.

6. Cortina believes US can play a most important role in making Hassan understand that route he is following is not the one which will get him what he wants. It will only radicalize problem and produce a conflict we all want to avoid.

7. Security Council resolution, particularly one shortly to be adopted, can provide cover for *démarche* to Hassan. Perhaps US could stress again that armaments which US has provided to Hassan are for fight against common enemy, but not for a fight which will involve Western countries. Thus, while Security Council may have adopted resolutions, each country should be able to interpret to Hassan its views on how best to achieve objectives of these resolutions which, quite correctly, have not pushed Hassan to wall by condemning Morocco. He was convinced new resolution by itself would have little effect on Rabat. Cortina gave me to understand that he would also be approaching French and Italians to make representations in Rabat.

8. Cortina said grave urgency of problem lies in fact that "Green March" with its "Trojan Horse" is due to cross into Sahara on Tuesday, November 4. He appealed to Secretary to do whatever he can to avoid the tragic consequences which will be inevitable if the march proceeds. He concluded by repeating two points: A) as he had promised Secretary, GOS had made every effort to negotiate, but had now exhausted its possibilities; and B) "Green March" is nothing more than a cover to place the Moroccan Army in the Sahara and thus to invade this territory militarily.

9. I told Cortina that I would pass above immediately to Department. I also told him that I had tried unsuccessfully to reach him yesterday to pass on contents of reftel. Cortina expressed appreciation for these efforts, but repeated he placed great confidence in what Secretary might still be able to do to help at this most dangerous moment.

Stabler

104. Telegram 259602 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 2, 1975, 2355Z.

259602. Subject: Message for King Hassan—Spanish Sahara. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Please convey following message from me to King Hassan:

2. Begin text: Your Majesty: Since I last wrote to you we have received an urgent expression of concern from the Spanish Government that the proposed Green March will include military elements and that this could lead to a confrontation with tragic consequences. Our impression is that the Spaniards still desire a negotiated solution to this problem provided it is one in which the UN plays a constructive role so that Spain will be seen as having fulfilled its international responsibilities. We are encouraging the Spanish Government to continue negotiations with you. I believe the position of the Spanish Government deserves to be taken into account particularly in the light of the present difficult domestic situation which it faces. These considerations reinforce the need which I emphasized to Your Majesty in my last message, that there be a period of patience and calm during which bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts might bear fruit. In particular we would encourage you to give serious consideration to the proposals by Secretary General Waldheim. This would be consonant with and responsive to the resolutions of the UN Security Council including the resolution adopted by consensus November 2. The exercising of patience and calm on the part of your government would be an act of statesmanship of the kind that we have learned to expect from Your Majesty. Warm personal regards. Henry A. Kissinger. End text.

¹ Summary: The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to King Hassan conveying the Spanish Government's concerns about the proposed Green March, and reiterating U.S. support for a negotiated solution to the crisis.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—NODIS. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Madrid. Drafted by Weislogel; cleared by Atherton, Buffum, Rowell, Mack, and Barbian; and approved by Kissinger. Telegram 259604 (Document 106) subsequently instructed the Embassy not to show Cortina's message to King Hassan. In telegram 259601 to Madrid, November 2, the Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Kissinger to Cortina informing him of U.S. efforts to convince King Hassan to stop the Green March, and U.S. support for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 12, Spain, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—NODIS)

3. For Ambassador Neumann: You should show text of Cortina message (Madrid 7618) to Hassan saying I have asked you to do this so that he will have full flavor of Cortina's concern.

Robinson

105. Message From King Hassan to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, November 3, 1975, 0144Z.

FROM

[name not declassified]

SUBJECT

Note from King Hassan of Morocco to Secretary of State Kissinger on Developments in the Spanish Sahara

[1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

To Mr. Henry Kissinger,

My dear Mr. Secretary and friend,

"The analysis of recent developments in the problem of the Sahara at the United Nations as in other capitals has led us to the conclusion that the obstinacy and intransigence with which Algeria continues to defend a policy which is as unexpected as it is paradoxical does not correspond to a simple concern to insure the principle of self determination.

"In reality we are more and more convinced that this policy is inspired from the outside and corresponds to a collusion of interests which has shown itself notably in the course of the debates in the Security Council between Algeria and the Soviet Union.

"It seems to us that the Soviet Union is seeking to create a focus of tension in this area to try and intervene in the Western Mediterranean

¹ Summary: Message from King Hassan to Kissinger in which he expressed concern that Algerian recalcitrance on the Spanish Sahara was not about self determination, but an attempt to create tension in the region and thereby create an opportunity for Soviet intervention in the Western Mediterranean.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical Files, Morocco, September 22, 1975–December 23, 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

at a time when its influence is more and more diminished in the Middle East.

“If this analysis is correct and we have every reason to believe that it is, the problem assumes a dimension of international concern which in our opinion renders an action by the United States highly desirable.

“Please believe Mr. Secretary and my dear friend the assurance of our consideration and sincere friendship.

Hassan II
King of Morocco”

106. Telegram 259604 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, November 3, 1975, 0311Z.

259604. Subject: Message for King Hassan—Spanish Sahara. Ref: State 259602. For Ambassador from Atherton.

Upon reconsideration, it has been decided that you should disregard para 3 of reftel. You should not rpt not show Hassan the text of the Cortina message which is being repeated to you FYI only.

Robinson

¹ Summary: The Ambassador was instructed to disregard paragraph 3 of telegram 259602.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 4, Morocco, State Department Telegrams, From SecState—NODIS. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Mack; and approved by Atherton.

107. Telegram 3286 From the Embassy in Algeria to the Department of State¹

Algiers, November 6, 1975, 2035Z.

3286. Department pls pass info Immediate to CINCEUR. Subject: Spanish Sahara: Final Algerian Démarche.

1. Summary: Boumediene has delivered what sounds very much like an ultimatum for Security Council to get Moroccans out of Sahara. Makes no explicit threats but implies Algerians will take military action if something is not done. End summary

2. Ambassadors of states who are permanent members of Security Council were summoned to Presidency this afternoon to see Boumediene and be given oral démarche which seems to have followed consistent pattern for all of us. I was last to go, at 6 p.m.

3. Boumediene was courteous but grave and said he had question he was posing to permanent members of Security Council and that was what they were going to do to implement Council's decision taken this morning calling on Hassan to stop Green March. Hassan's people had crossed frontier. They had prayed. They had gathered earth to take home. Now the party was over. It was time for Hassan to take his people home, otherwise situation in area was going to deteriorate rapidly.

4. He said, quote I want you to ask the doctor where he is. Where is Doctor Kissinger? Nothing you can say to me will convince me the United States cannot stop this affair immediately. All you have to do is send a message to Hassan saying stop and he will stop unquote.

5. Boumediene said Algerians did not want armed struggle but could not accept fait accompli which would upset stability of area. Failure to stop Hassan now and send him home would mean getting off a conflagration in which everybody's interests would be affected. He was making particular appeal to United States because he felt we were the greatest of the powers and had the most influence on Hassan.

¹ Summary: The Embassy informed the Department of a meeting with Boumediene, who demanded the UN Security Council expel Moroccans from the Spanish Sahara. He warned that failure to do so would result in a "conflagration." Boumediene implied that Kissinger could send a message to King Hassan and halt the march.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 1, Algeria, Department of State Telegrams, ToSecState—EXDIS. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Mission to the UN, Madrid, Rabat, London, Moscow, Nouakchott, and Paris. The telegram is incorrectly dated 1973. In telegram 264177 to Algiers, November 7, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform Boumediene that Kissinger had received his message, that King Hassan had been informed of the U.S. position on the Spanish Sahara, and that there was little the U.S. could do to influence King Hassan on this matter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

British did not count for much. As for French, he knew very well what their role had been. They had put much pressure on Spain to give in to Morocco. He did not expect much from them. He had also heard, and it was possible that his information was incorrect, that certain circles in the United States at the beginning of the affair had also put similar pressure on the Spanish. I expressed surprise at this and he said he did not mean the Secretary or the President. He meant quote other people unquote. (I do not know what he is talking about.)

6. He then said quote ask the Moroccans how many men they have lost. There have been armed clashes between them and the rebels (*sic*) and there have been prisoners taken and officers killed. Ask them how many. They deny that anything has happened and are trying to cover up but we know that these incidents took place. This is the last time I will talk to you about the Sahara. I am not going to repeat what I said in our recent conversations but you know our position. We want an answer from you that is clear and unequivocal. We have discussed how to find a way out of the impasse for Hassan and this is the last chance to do so. He must turn his people around and send them home. Unquote

7. I said that I had impression that Moroccans were keeping to restricted area between Spanish defense lines and northern border. I also had the impression that Hassan would in a few days tell everybody to go home. Boumediene asked if I really thought Hassan was going to take the people out of the Sahara and go home in two or three days. I said I had no hard information but only an impression. Boumediene said he did not want impressions he wanted facts.

8. I said that we had urged restraint on Hassan last week and noted that we had supported the Security Council resolution. Unfortunately, Hassan's head was in the clouds and he was not listening. Boumediene said he knew what our position had been so far and he appreciated it, but it was now time for US and the other permanent members of the Security Council to do something concrete. Otherwise Council would prove that it was ineffective and the same sort of incidents would be occurring all over the region as people took the law into their own hands. He assured me again that this was the last time he was going to talk about this problem and terminated the meeting.

9. Comment: While Boumediene made no explicit threats, what he said sounded very much like a quiet ultimatum. Have compared notes with the French Ambassador and we both have impression from Boumediene's remarks that if there is no action soon to get Hassan out of the Sahara the Algerians are going to involve selves directly, i.e., militarily, in the affair. I note various SRF reports indicating that Algerians have stationed substantial forces in border areas and are in position to move against Morocco. I have no doubt now that they will do so if

Hassan does not recall his people. I think there is still time for the situation to be saved, but not a great deal.

10. It is difficult of course to deal with simplistic Algerian approach. Boumediene is unwilling to listen to any explanations we may want to give him about our inability to control Hassan. I hope however that we can somehow convince Hassan that the Algerians mean business and that he had better get his people out of the Sahara quickly unless he really wants a military confrontation with Algeria.

Parker

108. Telegram 264586 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 7, 1975, 2154Z.

264586. Subject: Spanish Sahara.

1. We have been reviewing what, if any, additional steps we might take to help defuse the increasingly volatile Sahara situation. Department still wishes to keep us out of the middle of this dispute and keep UN in forefront. Of course, we are mindful of failure of UN efforts thus far and Moroccan reluctance to follow any route other than bilateral negotiations with Spain. However, in view of latter's insistence that UN be involved, which, of course, is also an Algerian requirement, we think there may be a way of squaring the circle.

2. What we have in mind is a proposal by Waldheim that Morocco and Spain engage in bilateral negotiations under his auspices and with his participation (much along the lines of the formula followed in the Cyprus communal talks). This would permit Morocco to say that bilateral negotiations are taking place but would provide Spaniards and Al-

¹ Summary: The Department offered a proposal for Waldheim to resolve the Spanish Sahara crisis, involving bilateral negotiations between Morocco and Spain under UN auspices. Kissinger requested Waldheim not indicate this was a U.S. proposal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850011–1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Rabat, Madrid, Paris, and Algiers. Drafted by Buffum and Blake; cleared by Hartman, Ortiz, and Atherton; and approved by Kissinger. In telegram 5404 from Rabat, November 7, the Department was informed that Morocco had postponed the Green March for 24 hours to allow bilateral diplomatic efforts with Spain to continue, and that the Government of Morocco was willing to allow the UN to provide an "umbrella" for agreements reached with Spain.

gerians an element of UN involvement. For such effort to be successful, terms of reference of talks should probably not be precise.

3. We believe SYG already has enough authority under existing resolutions to make such a proposal to the parties inasmuch as he was asked in several recent resolutions to “consult with the parties concerned and interested and report to the Security Council on the results in order to enable the Council to adopt any further appropriate measures that may be necessary.” Thus, we do not think it would be necessary for him to get further specific authorization from the Council although he would, of course, report to the Council when and if he receives the parties’ consent.

4. Accordingly, request you see Waldheim urgently. You should tell him we do not want any indication given that this suggestion has originated with US. However, in reviewing the state of play we conclude that about the only possibility we see of reversing the present trend toward a conflict would be for him to take an immediate and vigorous initiative proposing that Spain and Morocco undertake negotiations under his auspices. Ideally, the Moroccans would treat this proposal for bilateral negotiations as adequate grounds for withdrawal of the marchers, which could well be *sine qua non* for containing Algerian objections to such a proposal.

5. If he asks whether US would actively support such effort you may say we would be as helpful as we can; however, he should understand that our own efforts with Hassan have been of no avail thus far, and he might consider seeking assistance from a country like France which has so far not been engaged, but which has special influence and special relations with the parties to support his proposal.

6. You may share contents of Rabat’s 5404 on confidential basis with Waldheim.

Kissinger

109. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 8, 1975.

SUBJECT

Likelihood of Hostilities over Spanish Sahara

REFERENCE

Intelligence Alert Memorandum, October 3, 1975: Moroccan Plans to Invade Spanish Sahara

1. Events of the last several days point to the increasing likelihood of serious fighting between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front that could draw in Spain and Algeria if the negotiating process now underway does not soon succeed.

—Several clashes have been reported, and some confirmed, between Moroccan irregulars and Polisario Front guerrillas in north-eastern Spanish Sahara.

—President Boumediene has warned that, unless King Hassan halts the mass march into Spanish Sahara begun on November 6 and withdraws his marchers soon, a conflagration will occur.

—Yesterday morning Colonel Dlimi, commander of Morocco's southern military zone, ordered an army intervention group, probably consisting of two battalions with supporting artillery, to proceed directly to two towns, Jdiria and Hausa, that are in north central Spanish Sahara.

—Algeria reportedly closed its border with Morocco yesterday.

—King Hassan may feel obligated to advance beyond the limited zone agreed upon with Spain as a result of the publication of their agreement. A second column of marchers reportedly has crossed the border some 50 miles east of Tah and a third column may be heading for northeastern Spanish Sahara.

2. The Spanish have some 16,000 army and air force personnel in the Sahara, an amphibious landing force off the coast near the border, and an additional 20,000 located nearby in the Canary Islands. We expect the Spanish to resist forcibly any Moroccan military units encountered; they are likely to resist efforts by the marchers to go beyond the

¹ Summary: Colby provided Kissinger with an assessment of the likelihood of a Moroccan invasion of Spanish Sahara, as well as likely Spanish and Algerian responses to an invasion.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI 23, Geopolitical File, Sahara, November 1975. Secret; *[text not declassified]*. The memorandum was sent to Kissinger as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs in error, since he left that office on November 3.

border area, although they may be becoming more flexible on this issue. Spanish forces in or near the area are capable of inflicting a severe defeat on the 15,000 man Moroccan military force deployed in the border area. Spain will also seek a UN resolution denouncing Moroccan aggression.

3. Algeria is estimated to have about 6,000 men based near Tindouf in the tri-border area. There have been reliable reports, however, that Algerian units along the Moroccan border have been reinforced over the past several weeks. Algerian forces are superior to Morocco's in virtually every category and could win any long term struggle.

4. The Algerians have two major options in responding to the Moroccan intervention in Spanish Sahara:

—Algiers can exert strong diplomatic pressure on Spain while enlisting international support in the UN and providing increased military aid to Polisario forces.

—Algiers can intervene militarily in Spanish Sahara to oppose Moroccan forces there or move across its long western border with Morocco to gain a bargaining chip for a Moroccan withdrawal from Spanish Sahara.

We believe that Algeria is more likely to opt for the former rather than direct military intervention. But if the more indirect action is not effective, the likelihood of direct intervention increases.

5. President Boumedienne is now under some domestic pressures and has put his prestige on the line. Although he has carefully avoided making public statements committing himself to specific courses of action or timetables and can, therefore, pull in his horns more easily than Hassan can, if he backs down militarily he may expose himself to internal criticism. A successful outcome for Algeria, on the other hand, would strengthen Boumedienne at home and enhance Algeria's international credentials.

6. A military confrontation with either Spain or Algeria is likely to have serious consequences for King Hassan. A military defeat would unleash strong political currents inside Morocco that would create domestic instability for some time to come and would probably lead to his overthrow.

7. Any fighting in the Sahara would present potential problems for the Spanish government. A quick and decisive Spanish victory over regular Moroccan troops would be a political windfall for Juan Carlos. On the other hand, prolonged fighting with heavy Spanish casualties would be divisive within the government and undermine his position.

8. No matter what the outcome, all three countries are likely to blame the US for not having used sufficient diplomatic pressure to avert the crisis.

9. This memorandum was drafted by CIA in consultation with the analysts of DIA, State/INR, and NSA. The collection and analytical elements of the Intelligence Community have been alerted and will report further developments through normal channels or in further Alert Memoranda, as appropriate.

W.E. Colby

110. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 17, 1975, 8:05–9:25 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
Mohamed Bedjaoui, Algerian Ambassador to France
———, Aide to Bouteflika

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Isa Sabbagh, PAO, Amembassy Jidda
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CIEC, Spanish Sahara, Angola, Middle East

[Omitted here is discussion of CIEC.]

Spanish Sahara

Kissinger: Let's talk about the Sahara. You should know we put no pressure on Spain for any particular solution. In fact, we attempted to dissuade the King [Hassan] from marching in.

Did you hear what Moynihan said? He said if the Russians took over the Sahara, there would soon be a shortage of sand. [Laughter]

We frankly want to stay out of the Sahara question. It is not a heroic posture.

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Bouteflika discussed the role of the United States in the Spanish Sahara crisis. Bouteflika asked Kissinger to become more involved, and exert greater pressure on Morocco to accept a UN referendum on the fate of the region and its inhabitants.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical Files, Algeria, September–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the American Ambassador's residence. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.

Bouteflika: I think if we want to address the problem correctly we are obliged to speak frankly, and directly. The problem of the Sahara is a precedent for the world and is a problem which is important also for the Middle East.

Kissinger: Why for the Middle East?

Bouteflika: If there is an accord between Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, do you think also that the Arab world would abandon the Palestinians? It is the same problem. You can't abandon the people of Sahara, or anymore the people of Namibia.

We have Morocco and Mauritania involved, and they try to settle it. Now there is a decision of the International Court of Justice.

Kissinger: It was ambiguous.

Bouteflika: No, it considered each side's brief in detail and came out for the one peaceful solution.

Kissinger: I don't know what self-determination means for the Sahara. I can understand it for the Palestinians, but it is a slightly different problem.

Bouteflika: The population of Qatar is no more important.

Kissinger: But they had a sheikh. They had an independent state.

Bouteflika: But they can be independent also. Have you been to Dubai?

Kissinger: No. Because our security people think my reception would be too enthusiastic. They won't let me. [Laughter]

Bouteflika: I don't think either side—those who encouraged you or those who discouraged you—have any right to do so. They are countries that are worthy of being seen.

Kissinger: What will happen in the Sahara?

Bouteflika: I would want to see if you could give your consideration to proposing a solution, because it is important.

Kissinger: What solution?

Bouteflika: There is only one kind of solution. It is a problem of principle. There could be a referendum, and Algeria would accept the results of the referendum. If they want to be with Morocco or with Mauritania, Algeria would have no problem. Or to be independent.

Kissinger: Can the referendum take place while the Moroccans are there?

Bouteflika: There would have to be guarantees. There can't be a referendum under a bayonet. They could have done it under the Spanish, because they were leaving.

Kissinger: The Mauritaniens are there too. Did they split it half and half?

Bouteflika: Maybe half and half, but there are many aspects of the problem. Fishing. There is the political problem and the economic problem and the sovereignty problem.

It is absolutely excluded that Morocco follows neither the ICJ or the UNO. The Ivory Coast can't judge right. One of the judges on the ICJ said it was a question of monarchical solidarity. He told me. In The Hague.

Kissinger: One of the few international bodies which you don't dominate.

Bouteflika: It's the same for the U.S.!

Kissinger: I repeat, we have no interest in the problem, as such.

Bouteflika: But you, yourself, should look at it.

Kissinger: Why?

Bouteflika: Because you work with great subtlety. I have to tell you frankly—perhaps it was not by you.

Kissinger: It was done by you.

Bouteflika: Your position was one of principle, it was very clear. Your press—*Newsweek*, the *New York Times*—were very objective on the problem. And we find that the U.S. could have stopped the Green March. The U.S. could have stopped it, or favored it.

Kissinger: That's not true.

Bouteflika: We think on the contrary that France played a crude role. There was no delicacy, no subtlety. Bourguiba, Senghor—they tried to use what influence remained for France. Bongo. No finesse, no research.

I don't know if this corresponds to your situation. But there are sentiments, and we were very affected because we thought it was an anti-Algerian position.

Kissinger: We don't have an anti-Algerian position. The only question was how much to invest. To prevent the Green March would have meant hurting our relations completely with Morocco, in effect an embargo.

Bouteflika: You could have done it. You could stop economic aid and military aid.

Kissinger: But that would have meant ruining our relations with Morocco completely.

Bouteflika: No. The King of Morocco would not have gone to the Soviets.

Kissinger: But we don't have that much interest in the Sahara.

Bouteflika: But you have interests in Spain, and in Morocco.

Kissinger: And in Algeria.

Bouteflika: And you favored one.

Kissinger: I don't think we favored one side. We tried to stay out of it.

Bouteflika: Your role could never be marginal or devoid of interest because obviously there was military cooperation with Morocco, so, given that, you could not be neutral between Morocco and Algeria. So I understand you had to be, or appear to be, favoring Morocco, because of that.

Kissinger: [To Sabbagh, who is interpreting] But what the Foreign Minister complains about is that we didn't favor Algeria. To take his position, we would have had to reverse positions completely.

Bouteflika: Maybe it would have been easy to take the principle of self-determination as a starting point. Now we have a neighbor which has mobile frontiers—with Mauritania, with Niger, and with Algeria. Moving frontiers. After 10 years. We have come to accept Mauritania in the region. If Morocco occupies it with a minimum of legality, it's a significant precedent. If in the region there is this precedent of broken frontiers, there is the risk of conflict. It's not too late for you to aid a path to a solution. It would have to have the maximum of guarantees of the UN for a referendum, and Algeria would accept it. Neither the ICJ nor the UN recognized the rights of Morocco or Mauritania.

Kissinger: Let me think about this and I'll contact you through our Ambassador.

When will you send us an Ambassador to Washington?

Bouteflika: Effectively your remark is pertinent. At the beginning of the year we will designate someone. I think sincerely that it is in our interest to pick someone appropriate. I will solve the problem very, very rapidly.

Kissinger: It would be helpful if we had someone in Washington.

Bouteflika: I want to find someone of enough stature to fit into that position.

Kissinger: He will be well-received in Washington.

Bouteflika: This is the way we think about it, Dr. Kissinger, and we have established such a wonderful rapport based on cooperation, and in the economic field we have established a tremendous cooperation that we will never forget. In the political field, the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger can have no complaints.

Kissinger: No, you have been very helpful.

Bouteflika: If you had a problem with Cuba or Vietnam or Cambodia, we would be very glad, discreetly. . . .

Kissinger: Our UN people don't always understand our relationship. But I agree we have had a very positive relationship, which I have valued.

Bouteflika: I repeat and emphasize we are true friends. We have nothing to hide; we don't maneuver. Just this gesture that we are here at the table as your guests indicates it. You could have said, "Let's go off into a corner somewhere."

Kissinger: Exactly. Let me look into the question of a referendum. Especially if it doesn't require withdrawal before a referendum.

Bouteflika: Yes, you said provided withdrawal is not a factor. But it must be also provided there are enough strong guarantees that the people can decide freely. You know assassinations can be rife.

We don't want any remaining problem. Genocide.

Kissinger: In the Sahara?

Bouteflika: I'm completely positive. It is a problem of interests. I don't know why Mauritania wants frontiers like that or why Algeria has to be frightened. It is not healthy. If Morocco and Mauritania partition it, it is not politics.

Kissinger: We have not played a very active role. Because we have enough problems without taking on new ones. But I will look into it and I will be in touch.

Bouteflika: Think about it.

Kissinger: I will think about it.

Bouteflika: I don't think you want a new state in the region.

Kissinger: If it had developed, we would have accepted it. Guineau-Bissau, Cape Verde, we have accepted.

Bouteflika: There is great wealth there. In 10 or 12 years, it will be the Kuwait of the region.

Kissinger: But we didn't oppose it. We had no particular interest.

Bouteflika: The equilibrium that we worked for in the region, it is important that it be maintained. I don't have the feeling that in the region your interests coincide with disorder.

Kissinger: I agree with you.

Bouteflika: I was astonished to see France and Tunisia working together as "Mediterranean powers." With the problems in the Middle East and Cyprus, with the problems existing in Maghreb, to speak of the Mediterranean is to be optimistic.

Kissinger: We were basically inactive. We were not doing a great deal on either side. We didn't help you, but not Morocco either.

Bouteflika: In the Middle East you have seen the situation of occupation of territory, and fait accompli, and everyone speaks of negotiations. If you speak with the Mauritians, there is no reason to defy the decision of the ICJ. There is no reason to distrust the decision of the ICJ. It was the Ivory Coast and others.

I would add this. Whatever elements favored Morocco were disintoxicated after the decision of the ICJ. It was a kind of mystification.

Kissinger: Let me think about what if anything can be done. I'll think about it. I never like to promise anything I cannot do.

Bouteflika: If you can.

[Omitted here is discussion of Angola and the Middle East.]

111. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 29, 1976, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Mohamed Karim Lamrani On the Saharan Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Morocco

Mohamed Karim Lamrani, Special Emissary of the King
Abdelhadi Boutaleb, Ambassador to the United States

United States

The Secretary

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary, NEA

Winifred S. Weislogel, Country Director, NEA/AFN (Notetaker)

Alec Toumayan (French Interpreter)

The Secretary: Welcome.

Mr. Lamrani: I thank you for receiving me, particularly because you are very busy under current circumstances. I am honored to make your acquaintance. His Majesty has instructed me to convey to you his greetings and assurances of his friendship.

The Secretary: I am a great admirer of His Majesty and have profited greatly from my meetings with him.

Mr. Lamrani: His Majesty holds you in high esteem and respects your efforts to maintain peace in the world. We have our normal diplomatic contacts in Rabat and Washington, but given the gravity of the

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Lamrani discussed Algerian and Soviet involvement in the Spanish Sahara. Lamrani requested military support in addition to U.S. diplomatic efforts. Kissinger agreed to examine options for either direct or indirect assistance to Morocco.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820117–0422. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Weislogel on January 30; and approved by Covey on February 13. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office.

circumstances, His Majesty asked me to deliver the following message. You know about the problem of the Sahara which has evolved over the last several years. There was the Green March, followed by the agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania which received approval in the UN by a vote in the UN General Assembly.

The Secretary: I want you to tell His Majesty for me that, as a student of crisis management, I believe that one of the ways to assure that no one can exercise pressure on you is to remove yourself far from communications. His Majesty did this when he moved to Agadir. He handled the Green March with great skill.

Mr. Lamrani: I will not fail to tell him. He also had much support. All was going along normally; the Spanish withdrawal was proceeding well, and the Moroccan forces were moving in. But the Algerians caused difficulties through the Polisario which is only an Algerian creation. The Algerians also attacked us in the press, radio; accused us of using napalm, killing civilians, and spreading many other lies which were totally unjustified. They organized guerrilla attacks in the Sahara and even in Morocco. They shot down a Moroccan F-5 over Mauritania and intervened with the regular Algerian army. Yesterday the Moroccan army captured more than 100 Algerians. The situation is generalizing. We are not talking now about Mauritanian territory (that is a separate issue), but of the generalization of the conflict directly against Morocco and His Majesty. In this situation we ask what are our means to resist. The Moroccan forces are designed to protect internal security. The Algerians have Soviet arms, planes, missiles, the most modern equipment and in great quantities. We witness the growing encirclement of Morocco. Let me make very clear that concerning the Sahara, Morocco considers the agreement to be final and will accept no compromise or back-tracking. Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal have formed a barrier in the past. The new Algerian offensive has the character of a generalized attack against all these states. The Algerian Government has no intention of accepting the international decisions adopted at the UN. It follows the Soviet line and like many other states of Africa—Mali, Guinea, Chad, Libya, Angola—is falling under Soviet influence. The Soviets appear to enjoy total freedom of action in Angola.

The Secretary: Don't remind me. It is too painful. You are absolutely right, and I agree with you. I testified three hours on this subject today before Congress.

Mr. Lamrani: I understand the problem confronting the U.S. However, the role the U.S. will play is important, and we are very sensitive to the problem of Angola. However, a foreign power is influencing Algeria and we must react. Spain and France help us a great deal. Spain is sensitive because of the Straits of Gibraltar. Senegal and Mauritania tra-

ditionally have been favorable to us, and France is helpful. However, in the overall picture, we feel the U.S. is the only country which can defend the world against this menace. What can you do to assure our defense? If we are not defended politically, diplomatically and militarily we will be handed over to the Soviets. That, Mr. Secretary, is the message I have been asked to deliver. It is not a question of months but of days or weeks. Algeria is moving fast and we fear being overcome before we have sufficient means to do anything about it.

The Secretary: That is an excellent summary of the problem. I testified this morning before Congress on Angola. (To Mr. Atherton: We should give His Excellency a copy of it so he realizes I am in agreement with him and not just being polite.) Speaking to you as a friend I say we are going through a difficult period which will be attenuated after the coming elections. We are in a period when many of our Congressmen deny the reality of power but make speeches. They remind me of the sophomores I had in my classes when I was a professor. But there is a reality. I had a Senator today who asked me why we could not tell the Soviets that we would defend Europe and Japan and forget the rest of the world. There are many members of Congress who think that way. But I think the situation is changing and they are beginning to feel a little guilty. Over a period of time we will get the upper hand because reality is more important than rhetoric. I agree with you that the United States must defend the equilibrium of freedom. The United States has a great interest in the independence and sovereignty of Morocco and the preservation of the Monarchy with which we have many links. I think we can say we did not place too many barriers in the way of Morocco in respect to the Sahara.

Mr. Lamrani: We appreciate this and the people of Morocco know what your policy has been.

The Secretary: The problem is what we can do concretely, and you have asked me for nothing concrete. I know you want us to speed up military deliveries and we will have to examine this question in all urgency. We will approach this question positively. We should like to stay diplomatically in closest contact with you and would appreciate it if you would give us as much information as possible about developments. We will do our best to discourage aggressive acts by your neighbors. We want to maintain good relations with both Morocco and Algeria but will not carry this to the point of encouraging aggressive acts. I may take a trip to Africa in March and if so I thought I might stop in Morocco on my way. But I have not yet decided definitely. I am very grateful for your explanation of your country's views. It would be helpful for all of us if we could gain time because of our domestic situation. Because of the long friendship between our countries we want to be forthcoming but as an old friend of your country and of His Majesty,

may I say that we should avoid exceedingly dramatic acts. However, if it is necessary we can take measures. This is just a general view.

Mr. Lamrani: Thank you Mr. Minister for your sentiments and those of the American people toward the Moroccan cause. All that affects Morocco affects Western Europe and in turn the rest of the free world. The best way to assure their future is for Western Europe and the U.S. to join in defending Morocco. You spoke of a Senator who asked you why you could not simply defend Europe and Japan and let the rest of the world go.

The Secretary: The man who said that was an idiot. If the whole world becomes Russian-dominated the economies of the U.S. and of all countries in Western Europe will be affected.

Mr. Lamrani: The problem is that this is a race against the clock. I fear if we wait three or four months an irreversible situation will be created and we will be unable to do anything about it. The situation in the Saharan area is changing quickly. I think there are other ways to intervene. The fact that the Soviets and Algerians know that the U.S. fleet is in the Mediterranean is a brake. However, we do not consider your military aid to be in accordance with our needs. Procedures permit deliveries over a long time but our needs are immediate. We request two actions: (1) that you take a position of firm U.S. support for Morocco and its free neighbors; (2) that you provide material aid—indirectly if direct aid is not possible. You must have the means to do this.

The Secretary: What do you have in mind?

Mr. Lamrani: The U.S. has friends who have military means, a go-between who could provide quick help. I have no specific country in mind but the U.S. has many friends through whom you might provide aid.

The Secretary: You are thinking of European countries?

Amb. Boutaleb: We receive aid from Spain and France but a demonstration of U.S. support is important.

The Secretary: That I understand. I will think up ways to demonstrate our diplomatic interest and our national interest toward Morocco.

Mr. Lamrani: Morocco understands that there is no socialist camp and no imperialist camp. There is only the free world versus the communist world which is not free. Boumediene calls on his friends—Cuba, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union. Likewise Morocco calls on *its* friends in the free world, such as the U.S. Your diplomatic and political friendship already is evident but now material support is needed. I apologize for being so direct but it is my desire to explain our feelings which leads me to speak frankly.

The Secretary: I appreciate your frankness and will reflect on our conversation. I will be in touch with His Majesty and give him my views. We will not be indifferent to Morocco's needs. Let me think over the various possibilities and be in touch with you in a few weeks.

Mr. Lamrani: I should hope that the visit of Your Excellency would take place as soon as possible. We have need of a *coup de main* right away.

The Secretary: I must do it in the context of my African visit in the second half of March.

Mr. Lamrani: Time is against us. If the trip could be made as a special trip it would focus attention on the Moroccan case and help us from becoming another Angola.

The Secretary: This we will not permit.

Mr. Lamrani: This will reassure the Moroccan people. It is not the same situation as Angola where there is an internal struggle. In Morocco all are united behind the King and they are defending the liberty of their country against an outside threat.

The Secretary: Let me look at my schedule. If I go to Europe for some reason it would be easier to visit Morocco from there. Moroccan hospitality has been so overwhelming that I would not need much encouragement. The problem is that I gain too much weight when I go to Morocco. (To Atherton) Remember the luncheon His Majesty arranged for us during Ramadan when he could not eat.

Mr. Lamrani: It is unprecedented in Islam to eat during this period. It shows we are much less bound by traditions than the other Arab countries.

The Secretary: His Majesty arranged this for me but he was not present during the meal while we ate. His Majesty on another occasion received me at the Palace and I enjoyed a Moroccan meal which we ate with our hands.

Mr. Lamrani: We are a peaceful country—we seek to live in independence and peace.

The Secretary: I appreciate your visit very much. We will be in touch. Will you please give my warm and friendly regards to His Majesty and say that I shall count on seeing him soon, and that he will have our sympathetic support.

Are we announcing this visit? (Mr. Lamrani's)

Mr. Lamrani: It is a confidential visit.

The Secretary: But it is on my calendar and we will be asked questions. Let's announce tomorrow at the press briefing that His Majesty sent a special emissary to discuss the Sahara situation. We will seize the occasion to speak of our traditional and close friendship with Morocco.

Mr. Lamrani: I again express my appreciation for this meeting and will faithfully report our conversation to His Majesty.

112. Telegram 1227 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, March 2, 1976, 2045Z.

1227. Department pass to the Secretary from Atherton. Subject: Atherton meeting with King Hassan.

1. Begin summary: Ambassador Neumann and I met March 1 at Royal Palace in Fez for two and a half hours with King Hassan. Meeting began with working dinner at 10 p.m., at which half dozen of Hassan's close advisors were present, and continued after coffee with Hassan alone on Moroccan side, at which time I made detailed presentation to him on Middle East and Sahara, following approved talking points.

2. On Middle East, Hassan expressed satisfaction that we believe there must be progress in 1976 and understanding of our position on PLO, but said it is important that our policy show results soon. Hassan was laudatory of King Hussein and urged us to encourage him in his rapprochement with Syria.

3. On Sahara, Hassan reflected determination to pursue his current policies and clearly takes satisfaction in success so far achieved. He is also clearly worried, however, about longer run, saying that events have escalated to a dangerous degree. His mistake, he said, was that he had everything worked out logically but made one basic mistake; he forgot that Morocco was in Africa where things do not go according to logic. Hassan said he will not accept prolonged guerrilla war of attrition and, if pressed, will attack Polisario bases on Algerian territory which is where Democratic Republic of the Sahara exists. It seems clear, however, that his immediate objective is to consolidate diplomatic support and prevent coalescence of support around Algeria, especially in Third World. He is encouraged by Soviet assurances that they want to avoid confrontation in North Africa and urged that USG approach So-

¹ Summary: Atherton reported on his March 1 meeting with King Hassan, in which they discussed the Sahara dispute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840105-0879. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

viets in effort to get them to persuade their friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America to cool down their support of Algeria.

4. Hassan expressed appreciation for US support and showed understanding of why we want to avoid direct involvement in Sahara dispute. At same time he urged USG not to miss opportunity to help indirectly to bring about resolution of Sahara crisis which would enable US to establish strong strategic position based on Morocco at time when future of US position in Spain and Portugal is, in his view, problematical. In response to question as to whether he had any further ideas about “elegant political solution” which he had said in October he would seek, Hassan said he would continue to search for peaceful solution that would enable Boumediene to save face as long as it did not bring into question Moroccanization of Sahara. He would not close the door to any dialogue, would not appear as an aggressor, and would do nothing to embarrass the US.

5. Overall impression of Hassan at this stage is that he feels himself in position of strength politically and militarily and is generally pleased with how he has manipulated matters. As he looks further down the road, however, he does not see how to bring situation to a solution with Boumediene, whom he profoundly distrusts and admits he does not fully understand. As result, he seems less confident about his ability to maintain his gains domestically and internationally in the long term. End summary.

6. During working dinner with advisors present, Hassan summarized his assessment of Sahara situation along following lines. New Sahara Republic will be recognized by a few countries, even though it has no territory, and then countries such as North Vietnam and North Korea will help it militarily. He has evidence, he said, that U.S. M–16 rifles procured from Vietnamese are being shipped to Algeria by North Korea. Heavy weapons will begin to appear in the Sahara and, rather than permitting his military to be killed through war of attrition, he will move against Sahraoui bases of supply in Algeria which would lead to war.

7. Asked if he thought such an evolution of events was inevitable, Hassan replied in the negative. He believes Algerians made an irreversible tactical mistake by shifting question at OAU from one of recognition of a liberation movement to one of recognition of a new state, and that Boumediene now recognizes this and is nervous. In international arena, he urged that USG can play an important role, “not in Africa but at the Summit.” Kosygin had told Prime Minister Osman that Soviets do not want confrontation in North Africa and believe that the issue should be settled politically. USG could help by persuading Moscow to convince its friends in the Third World to cool down their support for

Algeria. (Hassan indicated at this point that he would soon restore relations with East Germany.)

8. In an interesting if unsubstantiated diversion, Hassan developed interesting thesis that Polisario was not created by Algeria but by leftist Spanish officers seeking a base from which to move against Franco's regime in Spain. He accused Algerians of exerting pressure on Spain, *inter alia* by offering to be host to Spanish opposition groups now living abroad. With respect to Spain, Hassan expressed unhappiness with present Spanish position on legality of Moroccan/Mauritanian takeover and said that Spanish should remember that tripartite agreement also includes annexes giving economic advantages to Spain; if Spain does not abide by tripartite agreement, Morocco will not abide by these annexes.

9. After dinner, Hassan dismissed his advisors and asked me to convey to him my instructions from the Secretary. I said that the Secretary had sent me on this trip because situations are developing in the Middle East and North Africa which will be important to both Morocco and the US. The Secretary had asked me to review all matters of common interest with His Majesty in accordance with our practice of periodic consultations. Hassan indicated he would prefer to review Middle East situation first, and I therefore made detailed presentation of our present assessment and efforts along standard lines. At the end I expressed our appreciation for Hassan's understanding attitude toward our Middle East peace efforts, said that the Secretary had always appreciated His Majesty's views and advise and offered to convey his comments back to Washington. In brief response, Hassan expressed satisfaction that we agreed that there should be progress in 1976. Re our strategy toward PLO, he said this would pay dividends in the long run but contains dangers in the short run. He urged that we show results soon. Finally, he said he thought we should encourage King Hussein to continue playing his peace role and should "push him towards President Asad." He expressed admiration for Hussein and believed that Hussein's influence could be useful. He also foresaw growing differences between Syrians and Palestinians.

10. I concluded this portion of the discussion by emphasizing it was important for success of our efforts that voices of moderation continue to prevail in Arab world; militant steps or actions taken out of frustration, such as move to expel Israel from UN, could reverse favorable trend of recent years. I also stressed need for PLO to follow Egyptian and Syrian lead in accepting that final peace settlement must include recognition of existence of Israel. Hassan's response was that PLO would act more responsibly if they had more responsibility.

11. Turning to the Sahara question, I said that the results of various efforts to mediate the dispute have been disappointing. We fear that if

Algeria and Morocco fail to reconcile their differences, this will create regional instability which in turn could be exploited by the Soviets, Cubans or other outside elements to serve their own interests.

12. I said I had not come in the role of mediator or to press any particular solution or approach. The United States does not believe it would be helpful for the US to become involved in the substance of any negotiations among the concerned and interested parties. We believe this problem should be settled on a regional basis or within the context of the UN, and we shall continue to lend our support to such efforts.

13. I said I had come, after a stop in Tunisia, from Algeria, where I joined with Under Secretary Robinson in talks with President Boumediene on a range of economic and political issues. The Algerians, in Algiers and Washington, have conveyed to us (as they have to many other countries and to UN Secretary General Waldheim) their well-known position. In my talk with Boumediene, I explained the rationale for the policy we have followed. I pointed out the risk to Algerian interests of pursuing a militant course or of any steps to internationalize the dispute. I also made clear that we want friendly relations with Algeria, but not at the expense of our old friendship with His Majesty.

14. We were heartened, I said, by Hassan's and President Boumediene's declarations that neither of their countries will deliberately initiate hostilities over the Sahara question. However, so long as the military buildup continues on both sides and so long as guerrilla warfare persists, there is a real danger that an unplanned incident could touch off generalized hostilities. Such a conflict would cause great suffering for the peoples of the area and would divert precious resources from the respective country's development needs.

15. A prolonged confrontation, encompassing guerrilla activities and countermeasures, subversion tactics and the injection of outside elements could have equally injurious human and economic consequences and could undermine the existing balance of power in North Africa.

16. We know from Mr. Karim Lamrani's recent conversation with Secretary Kissinger, I continued, that Hassan is fully aware of the strategic implications of this situation. Of particular concern is the possibility that Algeria, frustrated in its policy, may internationalize the problem by turning to the Soviet Union, Cuba or North Vietnam for moral and material assistance.

17. We would also view with gravity any signs that Boumediene was thinking of abandoning his tacit support for a negotiated Mid East settlement and of moving into the radical Arab camp as a response to what he probably considers to be a political defeat in the Sahara. The growing rapprochement between Algeria and Libya is one disturbing indication of this.

18. I continued that, if this problem is not settled by negotiation in a manner which is at least partially responsive to the sensitivities of all concerned and interested parties, we fear events will move in the direction I had just described.

19. The principle of self-determination has wide popular appeal and Algeria will surely exploit this factor to the utmost. US public attention is beginning to focus on this aspect of the Sahara problem judging from recent inquiries received by the Congress and State Department.

20. As Secretary Kissinger had indicated to Mr. Lamrani, we want to be helpful to Morocco, and we are sympathetic to Hassan's problem in the Sahara. We are making every effort to provide Morocco with the arms it feels it needs and to facilitate the transfer of arms from other countries. It is important if tension increases that Morocco be portrayed in our Congress as the victim of aggression rather than failing to carry out the spirit and intent of the UNGA Resolution on the Sahara for which we voted.

21. For these reasons. I said I would appreciate anything His Majesty could tell me about his thoughts on how to proceed diplomatically to reduce the present tensions. I noted that His Majesty said when I saw him in October that efforts would be made to find an "elegant solution" on the political side which would make the outcome acceptable to Spain. Is there anything specific he has in mind beyond the steps already taken?

22. Hassan said we could be assured that Morocco will never be an embarrassing friend for the US but asks that we help indirectly. He believes that the NATO countries will support him. Noting that at present Tunisia provides the only ports in Southern Mediterranean where USG can resupply nuclear submarines, whereas Soviets have entire Algerian and Libyan seacoasts, he said that never before had Moroccan public opinion been as responsive as it is today to the idea of taking sides. As a result he can now accept US nuclear powered ships at Moroccan ports, which would have been impossible 8 months ago. Hassan said he did not know which way Spain and Portugal would go but he knew where Morocco was going. Saying that he was weighing his words carefully, Hassan said that if Moroccans knew that USG could solve the Sahara problem, they would send delegations to Washington asking for an alliance. This was an opportunity USG should not miss. He was only asking US to act consistent with our support for pro-Moroccan resolution in UNGA in December. Hassan emphasized that he would "spurn no offer to make peace" "I will not close the door on any dialogue—I will help Boumediene to save face because this is what the situation is all about—I will do anything except place into question again the Moroccan character of the Sahara—I will even accept that Boumediene be

the one whose good offices we use to talk to the Polisario—I will speak to the Polisario under his good offices to help him save face.”

23. Toward end of conversation Hassan said again that he would cause US no embarrassment. “I will commit no aggression, but when I have had enough I will do everything to assure that I am attacked.” In conclusion, I told Hassan this had been a useful exchange of views. I would convey this comments to the Secretary and leave with him the question I had asked earlier: Does he have anything further in mind so far as an “elegant solution” is concerned. Hassan said “I have no choice except to find an elegant solution, that is my job, that is what the state pays me to do.” As he was seeing me out, Hassan expressed warm thanks for our efforts to ensure speedy transfer of military equipment from Jordan and Iran.

Neumann

113. Telegram 84513 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

Washington, April 8, 1976, 0304Z.

84513. Inform Consuls. Subject: US Policy on Recognition of Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.

1. USG does not repeat not intend to recognize newly declared Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). SDAR does not control any territory, has not demonstrated capacity for government, not received wide international acceptance, even among established states of similar outlook.

2. Posts are not repeat not being requested to take initiative to urge host governments not to recognize SDAR but may respond along above lines on an if-asked basis.

Kissinger

¹ Summary: The Department informed all posts that the U.S. Government would not recognize the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR).

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Spanish Sahara (2). Limited Official Use. Drafted by Escudero; cleared by B. Keith Huffman, Jr. in L/NEA, Director of NSC Interdepartmental Group Raymond C. Ewing, Gleysteen in ARA/CCA, Cumming in EA, and Ford in AF; and approved by Atherton. Polisario declared the creation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic on February 28.

114. Telegram 6832 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, September 8, 1976, 1343Z.

6832. For Asst Secy Atherton from Ambs Anderson and Parker.
Subject: Madrid Consultations.

1. We have had very useful exchange of views on questions of mutual interest, and have following observations and agreed conclusions on Sahara problem which you and others such as Hal Saunders, Sam Lewis, and Phil Habib may find of interest.

2. Nature of conflict—(A) Both sides seem prepared to maintain and tolerate present level of violence in Sahara. It is hurting Moroccans more than Algerians, in terms of lives and money, but appears to be well within current Moroccan capabilities. For their part, Algerians are fighting war by proxy, and can, from strictly military and financial standpoint, probably keep it up indefinitely.

(B) We judge neither side is currently interested in escalating to open military conflict by conventional forces. Frustration of Moroccan military at continuing casualties from Polisario operations may eventually lead to reprisal raids, particularly in event scope of such operations widened. In any case, neither side is ready to take on the other in full scale war. Moroccans may opt for more mobile tactics and could eventually decide to send infiltrators into Algerian territory, but fighting will remain essentially guerrilla warfare. Such a move would almost certainly not occur until after UNGA debate at earliest and would depend on Moroccan perception of danger that it might reverse currently successful trend towards denying Polisario progress on political front.

3. Possibilities of settlement—(A) We see no current settlement. Essential pre-condition of willingness by either side to compromise is not present. Nor does either side have power to impose settlement on other.

(B) It is possible that Moroccans will eventually be able to wear down Polisario, but this seems unlikely in short run and we expect political-military stalemate to continue unless there is some new development. Lack of international acceptance of Polisario over long term might eventually force change in Boumediene's current policy, which does not enjoy great popular support in Algeria and which has caused

¹ Summary: Anderson and Parker offered their observations, assessments, and conclusions on the Sahara situation and its impact on U.S. interests in the region.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Spanish Sahara (3). Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott.

a regrettable diversion of resources from economic and social development. Such a change, however, would be unlikely in the immediate or mid term.

(C) While it is difficult for us to judge chances of success, most effective way to stop fighting would be to eliminate Polisario manpower base. Given mobility and dispersion of Polisario forces, we do not believe this would be practicable by military means. A major offensive against Polisario's principal bases on Algerian side of border would probably have few results other than provoking a major Algerian response, which the GOM does not consider it could successfully counter.

(D) More promising tactic would be for Moroccans to persuade Sahraoui refugees, who are Polisario's population base, to return to territory now controlled by Moroccans and Mauritians. This would require major propaganda and public relations effort, and sizeable expenditures of funds and energy to provide Saharans with prospect of lives so much more attractive than life in camps so as to make them return to their former homes in defiance of Polisario leaders. If successful, such an effort would change situation radically. Polisario guerrillas are mostly from refugee families, and if families left area under Algerian control it would mean men would accompany or follow. After dismal initial policy of intimidation which was responsible in large measure (but not entirely) for movement of many Saharans across border, Moroccans apparently beginning to appreciate value of gentler tactics, as evidenced by their efforts at Geneva with UNHCR and new radio program beamed at refugees, urging them to come home. This is hopeful sign and we should encourage Moroccans to make serious try to win hearts and minds of Sahraouis. Were latter to return home, Algerians would no longer be able to exploit them so easily and issue would eventually die on the vine. Indeed, a form of self-determination would have been exercised.

4. UNGA tactics—(A) Results of 1975 vote:

(I) Political-Bilateral. (A) Algeria. Our vote for pro-Moroccan resolution at last UNGA had chilling effect on our political relations with Algeria, but those relations not very warm to begin with. Principal casualty was Secretary's dialogue with Boumediene, but since that was centered on Mid-East settlement efforts which held up by Lebanese crisis in any event, net damage well within tolerable limits. (B) Morocco. This vote has brought a marked, positive change in relations, highlighted by greatly increased intelligence coordination, cooperation on terrorism, NPW visits, decisions to move on double taxation treaty, active policy of encouraging private US investments, and support for US positions on Korea and Puerto Rico.

(II) Political-Multilateral. In multilateral fora Algerian performance since last December has, if anything, been more moderate than it was before. This may have been result in large part of coincidental factors such as changing political realities of Third World, but also reflected to some extent the representations we have made to them on subjects of mutual interest. Algerians have not rejected our positions out of hand in spite of their unhappiness over our position on Sahara. (They may hope, however, that their relative moderation will have a payoff in terms of more sympathy for their Saharan policies, although they have not been talking in such terms.)

(III) Economic. Economic cooperation with Algeria has continued at a high level of activity, with some \$2 billion worth of contracts being signed in the past six months. Boumediene apparently is not going to let his political displeasure interfere with his essentially pragmatic economic decisions.

(B) The 1976 UNGA Session. We assume UNGA will be repeat of Colombo, i.e. that Algerians will not be able to garner a great deal of support for their position, and that there will be agreement by majority of NAM members to buck question back to OAU. We think this approach should be encouraged, but believe USG should maintain low profile. We assume USG will continue to support Madrid Agreement if question comes up, but do not believe we should be in forefront or engage in any impassioned defense of it. To state the obvious, we agree that we should remain consistent with our position at last year's UNGA. To do otherwise would probably have little bearing on our basic, longterm political and economic relations with Algeria, but would cause a serious estrangement in our currently positive relations with Morocco and raise serious questions about our reliability on the part of such Moroccan-US friends as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Senegal, to name a few.

5. Soviet Policy on the Sahara—As we see it, Soviet policy continues to be one of public neutrality on what Moscow considers a regional dispute best left to solution among Arab and possibly African nations without superpower involvement. While Soviets will continue to support Algeria militarily because of latter's usefulness as a cooperative, prominent Third-World leader in international fora, we do not think Soviets are interested in provoking a conflict, and would expect them to exercise restraint in arms supply relationship. This being said, there is the possibility, alluded to by Algiers in earlier messages, that the Algerians, driven to despair in a military contest which the Moroccans seemed to be winning, might decide to cede to the Soviets the use of naval or air facilities in exchange for all-out support. Were the Soviets to accept such a trade, it would lead to an immediate and dangerous polarization of the conflict, as well as affecting directly our in-

terests in the Mediterranean. We judge that the likelihood of this happening is remote, for two reasons. First, we do not visualize the military conflict taking such a path. The two parties are too evenly matched when one considers not only hardware, where the Algerians apparently are currently superior, but the ability to use it. Secondly, the Soviets evidently attach importance to their relations with Morocco because of naval visits in Morocco's Atlantic ports, lucrative fishing potential in Moroccan and Saharan waters, and ever-present hope for longterm, assured supply of Moroccan phosphates. We do not believe they would wish to jeopardize totally their relations with Morocco in return for, say, limited access to Algerian ports which would be convenient but not vital to continued Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.

6. Impact on the Middle East Peace Efforts. It is conceivable that frustrations over Sahara could lead Boumediene to join Rejectionist Front and actively to oppose our Middle East settlement efforts. There are inherent and essentially Arab inhibitions against his doing so, however, it would, for instance, alienate the Egyptians and the Saudis. It would also involve a degree of cooperation with Iraq which seems unlikely given current Algerian unhappiness with that country's position on the Lebanese crisis. The current disarray among the Palestinians, and the Algerian commitment to the PLO are other factors against such a move. For these, if for no other reasons, we suspect that Boumediene will continue his essentially neutral (and inexpensive) stance of saying he will accept whatever the Palestinians and confrontation states will accept and will not try to sabotage another US effort in the ME. We assume we could live with that. In the unlikely event, however, that the Saharan conflict were to escalate to a point at which he needed access to Qadhafi's arms stockpiles and if Qadhafi then demanded as the price of admission his adherence to the Rejectionist Front, Boumediene would probably go along.

7. Parker Caveat—Although I agree with above and see no workable alternative in short run to essentially pro-Moroccan stance implicit therein, I am concerned by the long-term implications of our arms supply relationship with Morocco. While that relationship was originally established before Sahara went critical, latter problem has apparently generated sizeable increase in Moroccan requests for equipment from the U.S. and other sources. These requests would of course be more modest if relations with Algeria were not strained over the Sahara, andizgwkmy [*and especially?*] the Algerians, who apparently receive important military help from the Soviets and to lesser extent from Libya. Be that as it may, we seem now to be operating on thesis that we, along with French and other Western Europeans, must arm Moroccans so they can defend selves against Algerians, although we have no con-

trol over Moroccan actions which may precipitate hostilities—the Green March being a case in point. You will recall the process by which we suddenly found ourselves the major supplier of arms to Israel. It seems to me that there are disturbing parallels with that situation, and that we risk finding ourselves in a similar relationship with Morocco. Perhaps we have no alternative, but before continuing along this path, we should stop and reconsider very carefully what we are doing.

8. Bob shares my concern to this extent, if the U.S. were to replace France as the number one military supplier, it could result in a client-state relationship disproportionate to our interests in Morocco and a relationship with a potential of involving us far too deeply in situations, over which, as I have noted, we might not have control. If, however, France remains the predominant Western power in, and the major supplier of military equipment to Morocco, and the U.S. continues, as he believes to be the case, to respond to Moroccan military requests in measured terms without opening the floodgates, he is not as concerned as I am.

9. We understand that Ambassador Handyside, who was absent from Nouakchott while we were meeting, may now be in Washington. You may want to have his comments on our thinking. They should be most valuable.

Eaton

115. Telegram 263793 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, October 26, 1976, 1948Z.

263793. Subject: 31st UNGA: 4th Committee: Sahara. Ref: A) USUN 4632; B) Algiers 2517; C) Katzen-Tefft Telecons.

¹ Summary: The Department provided guidance for the U.S. delegation on the Sahara issue in preparation for the General Assembly's Fourth Committee meeting.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 39, USUN (4). Confidential; Immediate; Limited Official Use. Repeated to Algiers, Rabat, and Nouakchott. The Fourth Committee met November 11 and passed a resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 1. The resolution reaffirmed a commitment to the principle of self-determination, noted the OAU session seeking a solution to the problem of Western Sahara, and postponed the question of Western Sahara until its 1977 session.

1. Should a resolution be introduced which refers to substance of the Saharan problem to the OAU or the African Group at the UN, USDEL is authorized to vote in favor.

2. Should a resolution be introduced designed to refuse permission for a Polisario appearance before the Fourth Committee and/or refer the Polisario to the OAU or African Group at the UN for a hearing there, USDEL should abstain without explanation of vote. If necessary, you may explain to Moroccans and Mauriticians that our vote reflects problem of reconciling desire to have OAU resolve Saharan problem and our well-known support for UNGA committees to hear anyone who has a contribution to make to committee's work.

3. Should a resolution be introduced which contains points in both paras 1 and 2 above, USDEL should vote in favor. However, in this case, delegation should make an explanation of vote reaffirming our support for UNGA committees granting a hearing to anyone who has a contribution to make to the committee's work.

Kissinger

116. Intelligence Report 676¹

Washington, January 6, 1977.

THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE

Summary

The Sahara continues to be the focus of deep-seated antagonism between Morocco and Algeria. While the two countries have avoided a direct military conflict, the struggle for the Western Sahara has been waged on three fronts:

—Polisario guerrillas and Moroccan regular units have engaged in a moderate level of military hostilities.

—A fierce diplomatic competition has been waged in international forums.

¹ Summary: The report examined the prospect for continued conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Middle East and South Asian Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Spanish Sahara (3). Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor Consultants. Prepared by John J. Damis in INR; and approved by P. H. Stoddard. Bracket was printed as a footnote in the original.

—Morocco and Mauritania have made steady progress to consolidate their administrative hold on the area.

Despite this activity, there will probably not be any major changes in the Saharan situation over the next few months.

—The Polisario Front will continue its hit-and-run raids, but probably at a modest level that will not cause Morocco to launch a major strike into Algeria.

—Morocco and Mauritania will continue to control the main population centers and to administer their respective areas of the Sahara.

—Neither Morocco nor Algeria shows any willingness to make the compromises needed for a settlement, but neither will try to widen the conflict.

—Algeria will seek to keep the issue of self-determination alive in international forums, but the widespread perception in the Third World that Moroccan/Mauritanian control is an accomplished fact will continue to limit support for Algeria's position largely to a number of radical and Communist states.

—The Soviets, seeking to preserve their presence in Morocco, will remain publicly neutral, despite their closer ties to Algeria.

Developments Within the Sahara

Morocco and Mauritania have made considerable progress during the last eight months in dividing up the Sahara. On April 14, in an attempt to establish formal sovereignty over the Western Sahara, Rabat and Nouakchott announced that they had agreed to partition the disputed territory: Morocco acquired the northern two-thirds of the Sahara, containing the capital of El Aaiun and the rich phosphate deposits at Bu Craa; Mauritania got the southern third, including rich marine resources, the unexploited iron ore at Agracha, and the port of Dakhla, whose harbor has an excellent potential (see map).

Moroccan Administrative Consolidation. In an effort to integrate the northern Sahara into the Moroccan "motherland," Rabat has sent personnel from several government ministries to work in the three newly acquired provinces:


—Moroccan civilian governors and lesser functionaries are now serving in the provincial capitals of El Aaiun, Semara, and Boujador, while *pashas* and *caids* have been assigned to smaller cities and towns.

—The Ministry of Agriculture has established three regional offices and staffed them with technical personnel.

—Postal, telephone, and air links have been established.

In addition, King Hassan's government launched a bond drive during the summer to raise \$230 million for development projects in the Saharan provinces over the next two years. Priority will be given to mineral development, tourism, and infrastructure projects.

On November 12, Rabat attempted to consolidate popular support by allowing the Saharans to vote in nationwide local elections.

WESTERN SAHARA

Hassan's Army Under Attack. The Moroccans have had only limited success in establishing military security in the northern Sahara. Aside from a few large-scale sweeping operations of marginal effectiveness, Moroccan forces have concentrated on maintaining control of the principal population centers and the major oases. As a result of this tactic, Polisario guerrillas have been able to mine roads and carry out numerous small ambushes and mortar attacks in both the northern Sahara and southern Morocco. The guerrillas are now able to move about far more freely than was the case a few months ago.

Polisario hit-and-run operations have killed 700–800 Moroccan soldiers since November 1975 and have wounded several times that number. Morale among the units in the Sahara varies according to location. Many Moroccan soldiers assigned to remote outposts do not like

the length of time they are required to stay, the lateness of pay, bad food, and lack of water. In more inhabited areas, on the other hand, morale among regular units is fairly good because most of the casualties have been suffered by auxiliary troops and irregulars. The major complaint among Moroccan troops throughout the northern Sahara and southern Morocco centers on their inability to strike back at Polisario safe havens inside Algeria.

Morocco probably will be able to live with the present, or even a somewhat higher, level of casualties for an extended period without feeling the necessity to attack Algeria. The Moroccans are fully convinced of the justness of their claims to the Sahara, and army units generally are willing to pay a heavy price to maintain control of this area. To boost morale, the government has sent a large number of replacements to the southern zone to permit troop rotation. In addition, the Moroccans, in an attempt to improve their military security in the northern Sahara, have begun recently to abandon their strategy of stationing large numbers of troops in a few key places. Moroccan forces are now concentrating, with some success, on the use of smaller, more mobile units transported by French-supplied helicopters to seek out and destroy roving Polisario guerrillas.

Mauritania Asserts Control. Mauritania has encountered relatively little opposition in absorbing its portion of the Sahara. Like Rabat, Nouakchott has supplied administrative personnel to fill the vacuum left by the departing Spanish. When presidential and parliamentary elections were held in August, the electoral process extended to the Mauritanian-controlled portion of the Sahara. Eight Saharan representatives now hold seats in the National Assembly. The Ould Daddah regime views the elections as an expression of approval by the Saharan people of Mauritanian annexation.

The large, sparsely populated, and weakly defended Mauritanian homeland has experienced occasional attacks by Polisario bands, notably the deep-penetration strike against Nouakchott in June. On the other hand, the Polisario has attempted very few operations in the southern Sahara because of the following factors:

- The Mauritanian Sahara is more than 500 miles from Polisario base camps in southwestern Algeria.

- The southern Saharans, who have close ethnic and linguistic ties with the Mauritians, had little difficulty accommodating themselves to their new rulers.

- Unlike the Moroccans, the Mauritanian Army did not alienate the local population by heavy use of force when it occupied the territory.

Mauritanian administration of the southern Sahara was aided by Moroccan technical personnel who maintained and operated such fa-

cilities as electric generator plants and airport control towers. At present, Moroccan military personnel are stationed in Bir Moghrein to provide armor and artillery support. Some Moroccans also serve as liaison officers with Mauritanian General Headquarters in Nouakchott, and a small number of Mauritanian soldiers are receiving training in Morocco.

Despite frictions at the working level and residual suspicion that the Moroccans intend eventually to absorb all of Mauritania, Nouakchott has become closely allied to Rabat. With the southern Sahara fully absorbed, Mauritania is far less likely now than it was a year ago to drop its policy coordination with Morocco in favor of a separate deal with the Polisario or Algeria.

Prospects for continued Mauritanian solidarity with Morocco look good over the next *six months*. Over the following year or two, however, if Polisario operations become focused against the Moroccans and Mauritania is left alone, [*At present, this scenario seems unlikely. It is more likely that the Algerians will continue to consider Mauritania as the weak link in the Saharan problem and will persist in exerting military pressure on the Ould Daddah regime (as exemplified by the raid against Nouakchott last June).] the Ould Daddah regime may be willing to accept an accommodation with the Polisario leadership and Algiers. Such a development would greatly weaken Hassan's military and political position: it would facilitate the Polisario's military access to the Sahara and undermine much of the political support of a number of African and other states for partition of the Sahara. Within Mauritania such a move would mollify a significant and disgruntled portion of the younger generation. These persons have openly questioned their government's decision not to agree to the establishment of an independent Saharan state instead of dividing the Sahara with Morocco, an act that has brought about a military confrontation between Nouakchott and the Polisario.

The Polisario Keeps on Punching. Polisario units have operated during the last eight months out of safe havens in neighboring Algeria, which has long borders with Morocco and Mauritania. The Polisario guerrillas continue to receive ample supplies and equipment from Algeria. Much of this support is of Soviet origin, and some of the weapons come from Libya. With 25,000–40,000 politicized and frustrated Saharans living in refugee camps in the Tindouf area of southwestern Algeria, the Polisario Front has a good source of manpower for its fighting forces.

By employing Land Rovers and hit-and-run tactics, small bands of guerrillas have been able to operate almost daily against elements of the 30,000 Moroccan troops in the northern Sahara and southern Morocco. While lacking sophisticated logistics and communications, the

guerrillas benefit from excellent local intelligence sources and high morale. The Polisario insurgents, numbering at least 2,000–3,000 combatants, in addition to support personnel, appear to be well equipped with small arms, ammunition, and vehicles of all makes, and they are confident of their ability to move about unchallenged by the entrenched Moroccan forces. Guerrilla operations against Moroccan forces during the past few months suggest that the Polisario military capability may be improving.

Polisario guerrillas have been able to strike at and keep immobilized the line-conveyor belt complex used to transport phosphates from Bu Craa to the port at El Aaiun. Similarly, the lack of security in the northern Sahara seriously hindered Moroccan attempts in September–October 1976 to use trucks as a substitute for the transporter belt. Nevertheless, because of the excess capacity of Moroccan phosphate mines and the current reduced world demand for phosphate, the crippling of the Bu Craa operation has not hurt the Moroccans economically.

Despite their ability to operate against Moroccan targets, the guerrillas still do not control any significant portion of Saharan territory. Nor has Polisario military action by itself accomplished political ends. The effort to gain recognition for the Polisario's self-proclaimed Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR), for example, has been notably unsuccessful thus far. Only 10 countries—nine of the more radical African states (including Algeria but not Libya) and North Korea—now recognize the SDAR.

The Diplomatic Struggle

Despite the partition agreement signed by Morocco and Mauritania in April, the legal status of the Western Sahara remains in contention. Spain, Algeria, and the UN have not accepted the assertions by Rabat and Nouakchott that adequate consultations with the Saharan population already have been held and that the Sahara question is closed.

—Spain maintains that the Tripartite Agreement (Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania) of November 1975 involved a transfer only of administrative authority and not sovereignty. Privately, however, Madrid has assured Rabat that it will be helpful on the Sahara issue, and the Spanish stand to benefit economically from cooperating with Morocco.

—Morocco and Mauritania argue that the meeting on February 26, 1976, at which the Saharan *Jemaa* (Territorial Assembly) voted to ratify the integration of the Western Sahara with Morocco and Mauritania satisfies the popular consultations called for by the pro-Moroccan resolution passed by the UNGA in December 1975. In addition, Rabat views the nationwide local elections held on November 12 and the parliamentary elections expected in the next three months as further consultations with the Saharan population.

—Algiers, on the other hand, points to the pro-Algerian resolution also passed by the UNGA in 1975 and insists on Saharan self-determination through UN-supervised popular consultations. These have not been held and cannot be held so long as a sizable part of the Saharan population remains in refugee camps outside the territory. Boumediene rejects Morocco's claim that the *Jemaa*, as a survival from the Spanish regime, represents the Saharans. Thus, for Algiers, the Sahara question remains very much open.

In addition to its material support of Polisario guerrilla activities, Algeria has sought to keep the Sahara issue alive in the international political arena. The counter-strategy of Morocco and Mauritania consists of lobbying efforts aimed at keeping the Sahara question off the agenda of international forums.

Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity. Morocco and Mauritania narrowly avoided a diplomatic setback at the OAU summit in Mauritius in July. At the ministerial meeting preceding the summit, Algeria succeeded in gaining the sympathy of most delegations for its Sahara position through hard-sell lobbying by a 66-member delegation, an energetic performance by Foreign Minister Bouteflika, and help from Libya. When a Benin resolution backing the Polisario was passed by a 30–2 margin, Morocco threatened to withdraw from the OAU. Following an extensive lobbying effort by President Ould Daddah, however, a compromise solution was reached: the OAU agreed in principle to hold an extraordinary summit to discuss the Western Sahara.

This outcome was a diplomatic victory for Algeria, which had succeeded in reopening the Sahara issue. Furthermore, the meeting enhanced somewhat the Polisario Front's image on the international scene. On the other hand, no date has been set for the extraordinary summit. Morocco and Mauritania are likely to try a variety of delaying tactics; even more Algerian diplomats doubt that the extraordinary summit will ever take place.

The Non-Aligned Conference. Jolted by the Algerian performance at the OAU summit, the Moroccans and the Mauritians carefully planned and coordinated their tactics, and then sent large and influential delegations to the Non-Aligned Conference (NAC) held in Colombo in August. Their strategy at the NAC was to argue that regional organizations (like the OAU and the Arab League) are the most appropriate forums for the discussion of "bilateral" issues. The language on the Sahara issue which emerged in the NAC Political Declaration, after considerable debate, was a platitudinous compromise that simply noted with approval the action of the OAU summit in calling for an extraordinary summit to deal with the Sahara issue.

This statement represented a Moroccan and Mauritanian diplomatic victory because it did not refer to self-determination or the Saharan people. The Tunisians, for example, considered the language a

face-saving device for Boumediene, who had to accept at Colombo far less on the Saharan question than Algiers had won at the OAU summit the previous month.

The UNGA. The UN's consideration of the Western Sahara issue this year culminated on November 12 when the Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) adopted by consensus a resolution which:

- noted the decision of the OAU to hold an extraordinary summit to consider the Sahara matter;
- noted the decision of the Non-Aligned Conference to refer the problem to the OAU; and
- postponed consideration of the Western Sahara question until the next UNGA in the fall of 1977.

The UNGA then adopted this resolution by consensus on December 2.

The UNGA resolution, like the NAC statement, was a success for the Moroccan and Mauritanian diplomatic strategy of deferring consideration of the substance of the Sahara question. Preoccupied with other pressing issues (especially southern Africa), a majority of Third World states were content at the UN to reaffirm the course of action taken on the Sahara issue at the NAC. The Algerians, unable to garner enough support for passage of a resolution favorable to their position, apparently are resigned to making their big push diplomatically at the next OAU summit in mid-1977.

Morocco and Mauritania have sent a number of high-level political emissaries to various Third World countries during the last eight months to explain their position on the Sahara. Some of these states, such as Yugoslavia, are now persuaded that the Moroccan takeover is a *fait accompli* and have no intention of becoming involved in efforts to revive the issue or of recognizing the SDAR. It is significant that, at Colombo, Algeria had to rely increasingly for support on a number of the smaller, more radical, and/or Communist states like Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea. That these states are non-African and non-Arab helped Morocco and Mauritania at the UNGA to gain support for their position.

Prospects for a Settlement

The potential for a settlement has scarcely improved during the past year. Neither Morocco nor Algeria has yet shown a willingness to back away from its basic position. While there are some indications that Boumediene has become more interested in a face-saving way out of the Sahara problem, he most probably will still insist on some form of self-determination—which the Moroccans and Mauritians oppose. Although Boumediene's approach to the Sahara issue does not enjoy widespread support in Algeria, where many think it is an unnecessary diversion of Algerian resources, his personal commitment, both public

and ideological, is likely to preclude abandonment of the Polisario cause. At the same time, however, widespread dissatisfaction with the regime's handling of the Sahara problem, extending in some cases to the top level of the government, means that an Algerian reversal on this issue cannot be excluded.

In the absence of a settlement, it is unlikely that there will be major hostilities between Algeria and Morocco during the next several months. Algeria is unlikely to take the initiative.

—The Algerian Armed Forces are not prepared to launch a major attack. The army, which has been used primarily in civic action programs for many years, will require considerable time to assimilate newly acquired Soviet weaponry.

—The leadership is preoccupied with national assembly elections aimed at legitimizing the regime.

—An unpopular war with Morocco could create problems for Boumediene at home.

Boumediene's strategy, therefore, probably is to wait for the Moroccans to attack, in order to brand them as the aggressors in international forums. Boumediene greatly prefers to fight a war by proxy through the Polisario Front. The Algerians can probably sustain such a war for a considerable time to come.

Morocco, for its part, is also unlikely to initiate major hostilities.

—The Moroccan military establishment, emasculated by Hassan following coup attempts in 1970 and 1971, is still in the process of rebuilding itself and assimilating French and American weaponry. The military feels that it will not be ready to fight a war with Algeria for another year or two.

—Hassan realizes that a humiliating military defeat could cost him his throne.

—Both the King and the army recognize that any overt military move into Algeria would undercut the increasing support and understanding that Morocco has laboriously gained in international forums from the more moderate nations.

Although the casualties inflicted by Polisario operations continue to cause considerable frustration in the Moroccan Army, we believe that Hassan is more likely to respond by sending infiltrators into Algerian territory than by launching a major attack. The Moroccans have been training and equipping their own guerrilla units to give the Algerians "a taste of their own medicine," and some guerrilla activities by Saharan soldiers led by Moroccans already may have begun.

Soviet Policy on the Sahara

There was some concern in early 1976 that the conflict over the Sahara could become "internationalized," that a polarization of forces could occur in what is essentially a regional dispute, and that a proxy

confrontation between the US and the USSR might be in the offing. It is now very doubtful that the dispute over the Sahara will follow this course, unless major hostilities broke out between the antagonists—an unlikely possibility at present.

Soviet policy toward the Sahara issue continues to be one of public neutrality. Moscow considers the problem a regional dispute whose resolution is best left to Arab and African nations, without superpower involvement. While the Soviets will continue to support Algeria militarily because of its usefulness as a cooperative, prominent Third World leader, it is doubtful that they are interested in fueling or provoking a conflict. In addition, the desire of the Soviets to preserve their presence in Morocco probably will cause them to limit their involvement in support of any Algerian military operations.

Prospects

The longer the Moroccans can tolerate Polisario guerrilla operations without attacking Algerian territory, the stronger their claim to the Sahara becomes. Each passing month makes the *de facto* annexation of the disputed territory harder for Algeria and its Third World supporters in the UN to reverse. If Hassan can continue to avoid an escalation from guerrilla to conventional warfare, the protagonists are not likely to increase their pressures on the US to take sides.

The present moderate level of Polisario operations affords Hassan and Ould Daddah time in which to finesse a negotiated solution of the Sahara problem. One possible Moroccan tactic would be a sizable public relations campaign to lure back to the Sahara a substantial number of refugees in Polisario-run camps in southwest Algeria. Conditions in these camps are poor, and the Moroccans have already begun to beam radio broadcasts at the refugees urging them to come home. The return of most of the refugees would cause the Polisario manpower problems because some of the guerrillas could be expected to leave their base camps in Algeria and follow their families back to the Sahara. In addition, such "voting with their feet" could be construed by the Moroccans (and Mauritaniens) as a form of self-determination.

Luring the refugees back home, however, will not be easy for Morocco. The Reguibat tribesmen, who provide the dominant military and political force in the Polisario, are strongly opposed to Moroccan domination. In addition to a long history of Reguibat-Moroccan hostility, the Reguibat are deeply embittered over the mistreatment of tribal members during Morocco's takeover of the northern Sahara in late 1975-early 1976.

The attitude of Algeria remains crucial to prospects for an early settlement. Boumediene has shown a willingness, in private, to moderate somewhat his position in recent months and now appears more

willing to reach an accommodation with Hassan than he was a year ago. At the same time, however, Boumediene will not agree to a settlement whose terms do not give him an honorable way out of the Saharan conflict. Moreover, Algeria has recently reiterated a hard line in public statements on the dispute, suggesting that Boumediene does not believe that this is an appropriate time to compromise.

If an accommodation over the Sahara issue is to be achieved in the next six months, it will probably require assistance from outside parties, possibly including financial inducements. In this regard, the Saudis have been heavily engaged since mid-November in an effort to mediate the dispute, including visits to the Maghreb by Crown Prince Fahd and Foreign Minister Saud. There is unconfirmed reporting that Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika and Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki met secretly in Paris in early December. They failed, however, to reach a preliminary agreement on the Western Sahara.

Optimism concerning an early solution of the problem and reports of a possible Boumediene-Hassan meeting in early 1977 appear to have been premature. Bouteflika's tough end-of-the-year message to UN Secretary-General Waldheim and other recent Algerian statements have downplayed the Saudi initiatives for a compromise. The depth of emotional commitment on both sides, despite the high cost of continued confrontation, undermines the prospects for early settlement.

Tunisia, 1973–1976

117. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 13, 1974, 3:00–3:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Tunisia

Ahmed Bennour, Secretary of State for National Defense

Ali Hedda, Ambassador to the United States

LTC Azouz Ben Aissa, Military Aide

Mr. Fayache, First Secretary and Interpreter

U.S.

Mr. James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Colonel A.N. Skogerboe, Assistant for Africa, Africa Region/ISA

(C) After the amenities, Mr. Bennour opened the conversation by saying he had a message to bring. Tunisia and the U.S. have been friends for a long time and Tunisia has the same views of freedom that the U.S. has; however, the U.S. military assistance to Tunisia is not up to expectations. Tunisia expects its defense needs over the next four years to amount to \$40 million. Bennour said Tunisia continued to be concerned over Soviet activity in the area, and although Tunisia appreciates the presence of the SIXTH FLEET, the U.S. should also be interested in strengthening Tunisia's defense capability. He said they had heard in Tunisia that the U.S. might cancel grant aid next year, but hoped this was not true. Tunisia used its assistance effectively and always takes good care of its military equipment. Tunisia is interested in economic development, but the Government is also interested in the people and their social well being.

(C) Mr. Noyes replied by reviewing U.S. appreciation for our good relations with Tunisia and the hospitality afforded SIXTH FLEET visits in Tunisian ports. The U.S. also appreciates the history of moderation of Tunisia in its foreign affairs. Although we are aware that Tunisia utilizes its military equipment effectively, the Ambassador, living in the U.S., is also aware of the problems we have with Congressional atti-

¹ Summary: Tunisian Secretary for National Defense Bennour discussed U.S. military assistance with Noyes. Bennour expressed concern over possible cancellation of grant aid, and that improved U.S. relations with Egypt might be accomplished at Tunisia's expense.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-770054, Box 22, Tunisia. Confidential. Prepared by Deputy Director, Africa Region/ISA Col. A.N. Skogerboe on May 16; and approved by Noyes. The meeting took place in the Pentagon.

tudes toward military assistance. This attitude could be considered an emotional aftermath of Vietnam and limits the flexibility of the Executive Branch. Mr. Noyes added that all military forces around the world have problems with modernization and the rising cost of arms. In response to the question on grant aid, Bennour was informed that we would hope to continue some grant aid one more year, but that this was subject to Congressional approval.

(C) Bennour said that what was worrying him was the attitude of the leaders of his party and Government because it may appear to them that the new U.S. relationship with some countries (Egypt) would be accomplished at the expense of old friends like Tunisia. Mr. Noyes replied that this new relationship was designed to establish peace in the area and avoid a confrontation with the Soviets, but does not change long-term policy with our friends. It would also be to Tunisia's advantage to lessen a requirement for arms if peace could be effectively established in the Middle-East.

(C) Referring to Libya, Mr. Bennour stated Tunisia had two theories about Qadhafi: (i) Qadhafi's power was not weakened and his concentration on ideology means subversion, especially dangerous to Tunisia; and (ii) Qadhafi's position has actually been weakened and Jallud has emerged as the strong man. Bennour said the GOT believed the first theory was more accurate.

Ambassador Hedda entered the conversation by acknowledging he was well aware of the problems with Congress on military assistance. He went on to say that he was pleased with the cooperation developing between the U.S. and countries of the Middle-East and that he was also pleased that State had placed North Africa with the Middle-East Bureau rather than Africa. He concluded by saying that Tunisia is against military spending, but since everybody around us is investing in military equipment, we have to do what we have to for our security. We are encouraged by a possible settlement in the Middle-East but, "I must stress that Tunisia must not be forgotten." Mr. Noyes agreed.

(C) Finally, in conclusion, Mr. Bennour stated that they were having delays in spare parts and equipment and that Tunisia was now looking at the possibility of buying new A-4M's rather than rehabilitated A-4C's. (We will look into the spare parts problems.)

118. Letter From the Acting Coordinator for Security Assistance of the Department of State (Vest) to the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (Peet)¹

Washington, May 14, 1974.

Dear Ray:

This is in response to your memorandum of February 21 (I-1487/74) regarding FY 1974 credit assistance to Tunisia.

The Department of State concurs in the extension of \$2.5 million in FMS direct credit to the Government of Tunisia in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the enclosed Credit Justification dated May 9, 1974. This Justification has been concurred in by representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of the Treasury believes that given the amount of credit involved and the strength of the Tunisian economy that the credit term should be no more than five years. Any significant changes in the purpose of the credit or in the terms and conditions should be submitted for similar approval.

You will note that the term of repayment has been set at eight years in contrast to the ten year period suggested in your memorandum. The eight year period has been decided upon on the basis of available economic information on Tunisia and US foreign policy interests vis-à-vis Tunisia and the Middle East in general.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget with the understanding that this letter constitutes a request to OMB to apportion the necessary funds.

Sincerely,

George S. Vest

¹ Summary: Vest informed Peet of the extension of \$2.5 million in FMS direct credit to Tunisia with a repayment period of 8 years.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-800025, Box 2, Tunisia. Confidential.

Attachment

Credit Justification

Washington, May 9, 1974.

JUSTIFICATION OF FY 1974 CREDIT

1. *Country:* Tunisia

2. *List of Major Items and Estimated Costs:*

14 rehab A–4C aircraft at an estimated cost of \$7 million. FY 1974 funding required will be \$2.5 million.

3. *Financing:*

a. In August 1973, Tunisia decided to buy and the US agreed to sell a quantity of used A–4C aircraft to replace the GOT's aging F–86's. Subsequently, the GOT informed us of its desire to use FY 74–75 credits to help finance this purchase.

b. *Concessionary Interest Rate:* None

c. *Total Amount of this Credit:* \$2.5 million

d. *Procedure:* A \$2.5 million direct FMS credit agreement will be concluded between the GOT and the USG providing for repayment of principal over an eight year period and with interest at the cost of money to the USG as of the date the agreement is signed. Repayment of principal will be 15 consecutive semi-annual installments of \$150,000 each commencing 1 January 1976 and a final payment of \$250,000. Interest will be paid each 1 January and 1 July commencing 1 July 1974 on the amount by which cumulative disbursements exceed cumulative repayments of principal. The disbursement period of the agreement ceases two years from signature.

4. *National Security and Military Justification:*

a. *Does the provision of this credit support a military requirement derived from a US-approved force goal?*

Yes. The USG has agreed that these aircraft are necessary to replace existing, obsolete aircraft.

b. *Are there other military justifications?*

This transaction will enable Tunisia to meet its legitimate security needs. Neighboring countries possess sizeable military forces with considerably more sophisticated aircraft than Tunisia. Tunisia's existing F–86's are obsolete and need to be replaced. The A–4C aircraft is a logical replacement, since it is modestly priced, subsonic, and less sophisticated than most other jet fighters. The acquisition of these aircraft

would be consistent with Tunisia's desire to maintain a modest self-defense capability.

c. If there is a grant military assistance program (MAP), does the provision of this credit complement the program? Does it take into account MAP priorities?

Grant military assistance for Tunisia is being phased out at the end of FY 75. Beginning in FY 74, Tunisia is receiving FMS credits to assist it in meeting its defense needs. The provision of this credit will therefore complement the MAP program.

d. Does the recipient country have the capability to absorb and utilize the equipment effectively?

Yes.

e. Does a major item represent an important advance in weapons sophistication?

No.

5. Foreign Policy Justification:

a. What are the relevant policy considerations affecting the provision of this credit? How does it support US objectives in the country and in the region?

Tunisia is a moderate Arab country which has long been favorably disposed towards the United States and the West. Tunisian ports are the only ones on the southern Mediterranean littoral that are open to visits by the US Sixth Fleet, and even during the recent Arab-Israeli conflict the Tunisian Government maintained a favorable posture towards the USG. Tunisia has no expansionist or aggressive policies, and is interested in peace and stability in the Middle East. It is therefore in US interests to continue to maintain friendly relations and provide reasonable security assistance to Tunisia. Provision of this credit on the terms stated above is consistent with our foreign policy objectives *vis-à-vis* Tunisia.

b. Will the provision of this credit affect the regional arms balance or contribute to an arms race?

No. Tunisia is replacing one type of aircraft with another which is only slightly more advanced, and will still have far less sophisticated fighter aircraft than its immediate neighbors.

c. Will this credit be used to provide sophisticated weapons systems within the meaning of the Conte Amendment?

The A-4C aircraft is not believed to be a sophisticated aircraft within the meaning of the Conte Amendment. This preliminary characterization will be reviewed by the IPMG.

d. Is the country run by a military dictatorship which denies social progress within the meaning of the Reuss Amendment?

No.

6. *Economic Justification:*

a. *Is there a demonstrable need for credit assistance?*

Yes. With the anticipated phasing out of grant military assistance at the end of FY 75, Tunisia is turning to the use of credits to meet its modest security needs. Credit assistance enables Tunisia to allocate its resources in a more rational manner, and is best suited to its existing financial situation.

b. *Will the provision of this credit create a repayment obligation which will place an undesirable burden on the country's foreign exchange resources, produce excessive changes on future budgets, or otherwise interfere with development?*

No. The following is a recent summary of Tunisia's economic situation based on information supplied by Embassy Tunis:

"Tunisia's crude petroleum exports are modest when compared to other Arab States and represents only 27% of total exports. Currently, Tunisia produces and exports 30 million barrels of high grade crude a year and imports about 7 million barrels a year of high sulphur crude (low grade) for its refineries. After deducting imports from exports, net foreign exchange earnings from petroleum are expected to increase from \$75 million in 1973 to \$295 million in 1974. These earnings, together with increased earnings from phosphate exports, result in an improved balance of payments; projections indicate a change in the current account balances from a deficit of \$115 million in 1973 to a surplus of \$57.5 million in 1974.

While the current economic picture is bright some compromising factors should also be noted; i.e., the boom in petroleum and phosphate prices may end in 1975; import prices for fertilizer, machinery, manufactured goods, and agricultural commodities will decline as Europe experiences overall recession; and high unemployment continues in Tunisia."

7. *Congressional Implications:*

We do not anticipate that there will be any Congressional problems over the provision of this credit.

119. Telegram 7659 From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, December 13, 1974, 1220Z.

7659. Subject: Growing Tunisian Concern with Potential Threats from Libya and Algeria.

1. Summary: President Bourguiba and Prime Minister Nouira have expressed concern with potential threats to Tunisia posed by perceived Libyan and, to lesser extent, Algerian designs. It is noted that Libya is continuing to insist on immediate unification; it is engaged in efforts at infiltrating Libyan personnel into Tunisia; and it is building up its military forces. While Tunisia wishes to continue to keep its military establishment small, it nevertheless feels obliged to upgrade it somewhat in order to develop a more effective military deterrent. Accordingly, additional USG military assistance is being requested. End summary.

2. Tunisian Government is becoming increasingly concerned with what it perceives as potential threats posed by its neighbors, Libya and Algeria. This was brought home to me in separate conversations I had with the President's son, Bibi, Jr., and Prime Minister Nouira on Dec 11 and 12, respectively.

3. Prime Minister Nouira raised the subject during a tour d'horizon we had at his office at the Prime Ministry. He stressed that he was speaking as an individual who had long abhorred things military and who, as Prime Minister, had adhered to a policy of concentrating Tunisian resources on economic development. Expenditures on Tunisian military had traditionally been kept to an absolute minimum. Now, however, the Tunisian Government is being forced to re-evaluate its military situation in the light of growing threats from both Libya and Algeria.

4. He said that Libyan Government is continuing to insist on unity with Tunisia and that Qadhafi has told the press that this will be achieved in 1975 willy nilly, if necessary by force. (We have seen no such statement and would appreciate Embassy Tripoli's comment.) Meanwhile, Soviet arms are flowing into Libya, as well as "400 technicians." Prime Minister alluded to current maneuvers being undertaken by Tunisian military in southern Tunisia and stated that when Libyan Government learned of these maneuvers it informed Tunisians of names of Libyans who would be in attendance. Tunisian Government

¹ Summary: Seelye reported on the Tunisian Government's request for additional military assistance to counter perceived threats posed by Libya and Algeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tripoli, Algiers, Rabat, and Cairo.

had replied that no Libyans were invited to maneuvers, but that if Libyan representatives wished to attend parade being staged on final day, they were welcome.

5. With regard to Algeria, Prime Minister seemed to feel threat from this direction was less imminent, but nevertheless he was concerned with Algeria's putative expansionist aspirations. He referred in critical manner to Algerian agricultural policy and seemed to feel that recent death of Algerian Minister of Interior was other than natural. He dwelled less on Algeria than on Libya.

6. Prime Minister said that he wanted U.S. as "friendly country" to be fully aware of growing Tunisian concern at threats posed by its two neighbors. He did not rpt not wish to go into details but he hoped that the USG could be helpful. Tunisia did not intend to build a large army, but it needed to upgrade its military capability in order better to deter invading forces. Additional equipment would be needed for this purpose.

7. In separate meeting Bibi, Jr. made somewhat similar presentation. At private lunch at palace last Sunday his father had told him that he was preoccupied with Libyan and Algerian threats. Re Libya, two factors in particular worried the President: (1) insistence on part of Libyan delegation which recently visited Tunisia that two countries unite now, otherwise cooperation would be hampered; and (2) introduction of large quantities of Soviet arms into Libya. Bibi, Jr. said President Bourguiba is worried that a "crackpot" might use this equipment against Tunisia, which has a very modest military force.

8. Bibi, Jr. observed that Tunisia's concern is reflected in venue chosen for current Tunisian military maneuvers—area near Libyan border. He claimed that Libyans are building airstrips on their side of border. Also rate of attempted infiltration across border has stepped up, but fortunately Tunisian security forces (aided by Tunisian villagers along border) are believed to have intercepted most of them.

9. Re Algeria; Bibi, Jr. indicated that his father is worried about Algeria's ambitions to dominate the whole Maghreb. Bibi, Jr. characterized Algerian leadership as untrustworthy and of questionable caliber. He claimed it is composed mainly of ex-fellagas. Agricultural policy in Algeria is misguided and economic trends are "expansionist." (sic).

10. President had told Bibi, Jr. that in view of these twin threats, Tunisia must upgrade its armed forces in order to be in position to delay invading forces long enough to obtain support of international community and/or the Sixth Fleet. While President acknowledged he is not rpt not conversant with military equipment, he told Bibi, Jr. that he thought Tunisia needed interceptor fighter-bombers and anti-tank weapons "ground to ground." Also, he considered that Tunisia needs fast speed boats for purpose of intercepting infiltrators who might

come by sea. Bibi, Jr. said that his father is aware of mood in Congress to cut back U.S. military assistance abroad, but Tunisia's needs in this regard are crucial and urgent.

11. In response to both foregoing presentations I confirmed that Congressional mood is indeed bearish toward continuation of U.S. military assistance abroad and that we would be lucky if current Tunisian program could be continued even at current modest level over coming years. I referred to \$40 million limit imposed by Congress on U.S. military assistance to "African countries", but noted that even if Tunisia were removed from this category, more funds for Tunisia were unlikely to be available. Total military aid package available to US worldwide is diminishing, particularly grant aid. Nevertheless, I said I would report Tunisian concerns to Washington.

12. I noted that Tunisian Ministry of Defense has already expressed a serious interest in acquiring A-4M aircraft, which should take care of first requirement cited by President. With regard to effective ground equipment, I said that we had been providing, and were continuing to provide, M48 tanks. These are excellent tanks and almost as good as more modern and more expensive M60 tanks. Re speed boats, I knew that Tunisian Government had already sent out feelers to various governments, including ours, with regard to their purchase.

13. I said that while U.S. aid funds for military purposes are limited, we of course stand ready to sell Tunisian arms on a cash basis. It should be kept in mind that there is always a question of priorities, which can sometimes result in delays. In view of improved Tunisian financial resources I wondered whether Tunisia could not rpt not afford to finance most of its new military acquisitions. I suggested to Bibi, Jr. that Tunisian Government also look to its "other friends" for help—for example, to France, Germany and Italy, who are already contributing to Tunisian military establishments. He made no comment.

14. Comment:

A. While Tunisian Government's concern with Libyan and Algerian threats is no doubt exaggerated, it is clear that this concern is growing. It was mentioned to Secretary Kissinger by Foreign Minister Chatti a few weeks ago and it has been mentioned to me by other Tunisian officials, but never before at President and Prime Minister levels. My feeling is that Tunisia has more reason to worry about Libyan subversion than it does about overt Libyan military attack despite developing Soviet military presence in Libya and supposed build-up of Libyan armed forces. I would guess that Algerian threat is considerably more remote. In any case, Tunisia does have grounds for some concern with regard to its Libyan neighbor and important point is that Tunisians are deeply concerned.

B. This concern is no doubt accentuated by Tunisian Government's realization that its military equipment is almost entirely obsolete. Most of it is World War II or Korean War vintage and as such compares unfavorably with sophisticated weapons being acquired by Tunisia's neighbors. Newly perceived threat has no doubt focussed Tunisian leadership's attention on these inadequacies, without, however, causing any basic change in Tunisia's solidly anti-military cast of thought.

C. Another element which may be inducing the GOT to press for better military equipment are recent reports that a number of Tunisian officers are complaining. Not surprisingly, they are unhappy with equipment obsolescence. As we have reported, some of the Tunisian support for the Jerba Declaration came from military officers who yearned for the shiny, new weaponry recently introduced into the inventory of the Libyan army. Secretary of State Bennour told Chuslot a few weeks ago that army morale was indeed low and that old-fashioned equipment was the principal reason. We have no evidence that army loyalty for regime has weakened, but this kind of dissatisfaction is not helpful to regime.

D. On the basis of all factors mentioned in paras A, B and C above, the Tunisians do make a good case for the need to improve their military posture, especially for deterrent purposes. They are not talking about a major augmentation of military forces, but rather the introduction of certain types of more modern military equipment. With regard needs cited by President Bourguiba, Tunisians have already made a start in direction of purchase of more sophisticated aircraft (A–4M's) costing some \$40 million. They will now presumably make an assessment of what more modern ground equipment might be desirable and obtainable to supplement existing M48 and French AMX tanks (on order). It is possible that they will consider asking for TOW missiles, and if so, we will have to tell them that line for acquisition is some five year's long. Tunisians may start thinking in terms of ground to air missiles (Hawks), but it is hard to see how they can realistically expect to incur this additional expense at this point given their apparent undertaking to buy A–4M's and their limited, albeit improved, financial resources.

E. We expect soon to receive bill of particulars from GOT re what it precisely wants. We would guess that in addition to identifying particular type of equipment desired, they will ask for as rapid as possible delivery and more financial assistance. Given the limited financial resources at our disposal, the Tunisians are of course going to have to finance the bulk of the costs of the new equipment. However, I hope that we can be as responsive as possible within our limited resources.

F. In anticipation of more specific Tunisian requests, we believe that we should start thinking in terms of following responses:

(1) Assure that level of grant and FMS assistance program projected for Tunisia in FY 1975 (\$2.2 million in MAP grant and \$1.5 million in FMS credit) not rpt not be reduced.

(2) Reconsider proposal that MAP grant assistance for Tunisia be terminated after 1975 and, as unorthodox as this may sound, give serious thought to doubling it in FY 1976—and also increase FMS assistance.

(3) Be as responsive as possible to Tunisian requests to purchase modern equipment from US, including wherever possible accelerating deliveries.

Seelye

120. Telegram 1349 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹

Tripoli, December 16, 1974, 0922Z.

1349. Subject: Tunisian Concern with Threat from Libya. Ref: Tunis 7659.

1. Re para 4 of reftel, we have certainly not seen any comment by Qadhafi in which he threatens to bring about unity with Tunisia by force in 1975. First part of Prime Minister Nouira's statement is true enough, however. Qadhafi is indeed continuing to insist Djerba Declaration be implemented. What Nouira may be talking about is following statement Qadhafi made at Libya ASU Congress November 6. "Libya has done its utmost to achieve Arab unity. But Arab unity is not at disposition of one side alone it is agreement between several countries. One side cannot do anything unless (unity) is imposed by force, and there is no question of this now".

2. When Bibi, Jr. says rate of attempted infiltration from Libya has been stepped up, we are not at all clear about what he is referring to. There have been SRF reports of Libyan propaganda teams and other Libyan backed subversives in Tunisia, and we assume Bibi, Jr. is talking

¹ Summary: Stein offered his assessment of the Libyan threat to Tunisia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country File for Africa, Box 3, Libya, State Department Telegrams (9). Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tunis, Algiers, Cairo, and Rabat. In January 1974, Libya and Tunisia signed the Djerba Treaty of Unity. Under the terms of the agreement, Tunisia would hold the Presidency and Libya would hold the Defense Ministry. Bourgiba pulled out of the agreement in February.

about these rather than military or paramilitary units which might be conjured up by word infiltration. We have no info which would confirm building of airstrips along border.

3. We agree fully with assessment that Tunisia has more to fear from potential Libyan subversion than from military attack. It is difficult to foresee circumstances under which Libya, using Soviet weapons, would invade an Arab neighbor. Some Tunisian nervousness about Libya is obviously understandable, but from Tripoli vantage point Tunisians seem to be overdoing it a bit.

Stein

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 1, 1975, 10:30–11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Hedi Nouira, Prime Minister of Tunisia

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Nouira: I bring you greetings from President Bourguiba as well as a statement of his esteem for you, Mr. President.

The President: Please express my gratitude to President Bourguiba for his good wishes, my esteem, my hope for his health and my hope that he may visit us soon. Please express to him the feeling of the American people—going back many years—of friendship and appreciation for the moderate policies of Tunisia under his leadership.

[Secretary Kissinger comes in.]

I know you are meeting with Secretary Kissinger and will announce the Joint Commission. We think this can be very useful in promoting our joint efforts and your further economic development. We are most grateful for the constructive role that your country has played

¹ Summary: Ford and Nouira discussed U.S. military training and equipment for Tunisia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 11. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

in matters relating to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. We hope you can continue to play that role in the period ahead. I would be grateful for your observations.

First, may I say that our policy is one of forward movement. We will not tolerate a stalemate and stagnation. We are emphatic in our statements to all the parties that there can be no military action as we search for ways to continue progress.

Nouira: I would like first to say that Tunisia has never been a country that favors excesses. We have a long history, and many different civilizations have been in our country, so we have always been open to the outside. We operate not from emotion but from a realistic appraisal of the situation. We are always for dialogue—even during our struggle for independence, we advocated dialogue with our occupying power. That is even more important in the world today. Force is the most abhorrent way to conduct international relations. Since we are a small country, we feel that legitimacy is the most important way to conduct affairs. It is on that that we have our policies toward the Mediterranean, the world and the societies in the world.

As we look to the situation in the Mediterranean, we see it through Tunisia's eyes, so it may not include all the data—since all events in the Mediterranean concern us directly. That refers not only to the Middle East proper but also with respect to possible differences with some of our neighbors.

With respect to the Middle East, our government stands fast regarding the legality which must prevail. All territory gains by force must cease. American policy is a positive policy, though it has not achieved great success.

The President: The policy initiated in 1973 we think was successful, and we thought another step would have been useful. But despite that, we feel that movement is essential and we hope the countries of the Middle East share our feeling that progress must continue to be made.

Nouira: It is quite so, Mr. President, and the policy of the United States is one which envisages a global solution involving all issues, and we think the problem can't be solved without including all of the parties—including the Palestinians. So we do believe in a global solution and that is how we understand the American policy. That also we think is President Sadat's policy and that of the others who may seem very reserved on this matter.

The President: We do believe a settlement must include the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and we think any agreement must take that full into consideration.

Nouira: Wouldn't it be better and more clear to involve the Palestinians immediately in the process of seeking a solution?

The President: I know this is the policy of a number of countries like yourselves, but until we see how those rights fit into the overall structure, I don't think we should commit ourselves at this time.

Secretary Kissinger: As the Prime Minister has undoubtedly noticed, we have an extreme domestic problem when we deal with the Middle East. As you must have noticed, this is the first President at least since 1956 who has publicly taken a position of some dissociation from Israel. If we now get involved with the issue of the PLO at this stage, it would undermine our efforts, because the PLO is still considered here as a terrorist organization. If we deal first with the border and territorial problems, the Palestinian problem will then fall into line. The Israeli strategy is to produce a stalemate and push the issue into our election year. The more confused the situation is, the more it facilitates that. This is why the President has emphasized that we will tolerate no stalemate.

The President: It would be very disruptive to have anything going on during an election in the United States.

Nouira: It seems to be a problem of procedure, not of substance.

The President: I wouldn't put it so simply. I think it is mandatory to keep it moving both as to time and substance. Any delay invites military activity, and we are trying to keep things moving. There are issues of substance but you can't get to them until you get negotiations going.

Nouira: This negotiating process has been started by the disengagement process. The disengagement allowed a direct dialogue with Egypt and a less direct dialogue with Syria. . . .

Kissinger: Every dialogue with Syria is direct.

Nouira: This could be considered as a continuing dialogue, and the Palestinians could be brought in somewhere along the line. They can't be ignored forever.

The President: We recognize their rights, but don't believe we can take that on at the outset, but it must evolve as other things are settled first.

Nouira: It seems to me that the Arabs have not voiced reservations about continuing the dialogue with respect to bringing in the Palestinian question.

The President: This is a matter of great significance to Israel and the refusal of the PLO to recognize Israel complicates things considerably. And it is my judgment that the issue can best be brought in in the context of a comprehensive settlement with peace being the objective.

Nouira: I realize that the ultimate goal is peace, but the matter of recognition of Israel by the PLO is more formal than real. The PLO doesn't deny the existence of Israel, but if Israel doesn't recognize the PLO, why should the PLO recognize Israel? Can't we somehow cut this Gordian knot?

The President: I can assure you we will carefully consider your thought. We hope we can complete our assessment soon and be ready to move forward, because we think movement is essential and we must have the parties avoid the resort to force.

Nouira: It is a wise and laudable policy, and I think the U.S. Government has the dimension and weight to solve the problem. I realize you can't solve it by waving a wand, but I know you will continue what you can.

The President: I know you are concerned about your security. I want you to know that despite the Congressional cuts, we will do whatever we can to assist with training and equipment. Congress has cut the grant aid badly, but we will try through sales to help you to the best of our ability.

Nouira: I appreciate your comments. Tunisia has never been fond of arms because we believe the first defense is at home. So we are trying to raise the standard of living, so we are trying to provide jobs so that young men will have something worth defending. But others are arming more than necessary and we wonder why. We would rather use your aid to raise our living standards, but we would like to be able to defend ourselves while we are developing. Our army stays in the barracks, but others don't, and that concerns us.

We attach the greatest importance to development and we want to thank you for the American efforts to help us. Since our independence, we have gotten a third of all our assistance from the United States. We have made a great effort, and now we think we are in a pre-takeoff phase. Takeoff is estimated at about 1981. When an aircraft takes off, it needs extra power, and we hope the United States will give us help in reaching cruising speed in our development.

The President: As you know, I must work with the Congress in getting authority, but I will do what I can to assist you in your takeoff. You will be speaking to Congressmen and I think you should emphasize this point to them.

Nouira: I feel encouraged by your words, and they will give me courage when I meet with the Congressmen. Tunisia has been making great efforts. In our Fourth Plan, outside aid was 40 percent; then in the Fifth it went to 24 percent and now it is at 17 percent. We don't want to break our stride, and I will stress this to the Congress.

President: I hope you will stimulate private investment. It is the best in our country, and I think it will help keep your momentum.

Nouira: That is exactly what we are doing. The contributing of the private sector has doubled over ten years—from 20 percent to 45 percent.

[The meeting ended]

122. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 29, 1975, 4:40–5:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Chatti

PARTICIPANTS

Tunisia

Foreign Minister Habib Chatti
Ambassador to the UN Driss
Ambassador the US Hedda

U.S.

The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Atherton
Robert Oakley (NSC), Notetaker
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

The Secretary: Do we have an interpreter for this meeting?

Mr. Atherton: Yes, Alec is here.

Foreign Minister Chatti: I am very happy to be here.

The Secretary: It is a pleasure for me to see you again.

Foreign Minister Chatti: Shall we discuss our bilateral relationship first and then international issues, especially the Middle East and where we go from here.

The Secretary: That is fine with me.

Foreign Minister Chatti: I would like to talk about our economic relationship first, especially the Joint Commission. It is very important for us and we are pleased that you are sending an important delegation for the first meeting which will take place in Tunis on October 20. We very much hope Assistant Secretary Atherton can come as part of your delegation.

The Secretary: Roy, are you going?

¹ Summary: Kissinger and Foreign Minister Chatti discussed U.S.-Tunisian relations. Chatti asked for greater cooperation in meeting Tunisia's economic and defense needs.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, September 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Robert Oakley; and cleared by Atherton. The meeting took place in room 35A at the Waldorf Astoria. NSDM 278 Joint Cooperation Commissions, October 22, 1974, sought guidance from the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on the terms of cooperation agreements with several countries, including Tunisia. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSSM and NSDM, Box 1, NSDM File, NSDM 278—Joint Cooperation Commission) Kissinger and Chatti announced an agreement to begin discussions on a commission between Tunisia and the United States, on November 9, 1974. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Institutional Files, Box 10, NSDM 278—Tunisia)

Mr. Atherton: I have told the Minister that I very much want to come and I will be there unless I am tied up with the Middle East negotiations. That is one reservation I have made on my attendance. In any event, Under Secretary Robinson will be there as the head of our delegation.

The Secretary: Don't show him a port. He is a fanatic on ports and if you show him one he will immediately give you a plan for rebuilding it.

Foreign Minister Chatti: We need two things from the U.S., greater cooperation in meeting our defense needs and with economic matters. The defense questions will not come up in the Joint Commission, but the economic matters will. I hope your delegation will have precise instructions so that we can discuss with them just how much assistance we will be able to get from the U.S.

The Secretary: We will be sure they are instructed to give you precise answers as to what we can do for Tunisia and that they will have the answers at the time of the Joint Committee meeting. Is that what you want?

Foreign Minister Chatti: Yes. I also wish to raise the defense questions with you. You are giving us loans but they are on commercial terms. Therefore, they are not too favorable for us and we would like to improve the conditions. Perhaps if part of the credit which you are giving us could be in the form of grant rather than loan it would enable us to lower the interest rate on the total amount and ease our problems.

The Secretary: Do we have any MAP for Tunisia?

Mr. Atherton: We have not had any for two years.

The Secretary: Why is this?

Mr. Atherton: It is due to our Congress which has been steadily cutting back the overall amount of grant military assistance available for the whole world. It has nothing to do with Tunisia, per se.

The Secretary: The idea of the Foreign Minister about our giving some part of our military assistance credits as a grant in order to reduce the overall interest rate is a good one. Can we do something about it?

Mr. Atherton: We have already been discussing this suggestion with the Tunisians and we understand it. However, it is going to be tough to get Congressional approval.

Foreign Minister Chatti: We should not go into detail on our economic relationship but our collaborators should be able to do this when the Joint Commission meets.

The Secretary: That is very good. You instruct your collaborators and we will be sure that our position is fully elaborated and that our delegation has precise instructions for the meeting in Tunis.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East.]

123. Telegram 747 From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 3, 1976, 1200Z.

747. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Dept please pass to Cairo. Subject: Fahmy's Concern re Tunisia. Ref: State 24958, State 24957, Tunis 43, State 24935.

1. Summary: Tunisian concern with Libyan/Algerian threat has grown over past eighteen months. Current Algerian anti-GOT propaganda resulting from Sahara controversy sharpens concern, perhaps especially for Chatti whom Algerians blame. But unlike some other GOT officials, Chatti has not emphasized concern to me. Tunisia is rebuilding ties with Egypt as counterpoise to hostile neighbors, and Chatti understandably confided in Fahmy in order capitalize on close U.S.-Egyptian dialogue. However, believe Chatti would also make same points with me if he deeply worried. GOT has reacted to threat by requesting increased arms purchases from us to achieve modest deterrent capability, but for mix of reasons GOT has not made major purchases. Interior Minister sees threat as political, and military. GOT tactic re Algerian propaganda attacks is to turn other cheek. Proposed USG increase in FMS credits is direct response to GOT concern and we have offered sell aircraft and SAM systems. Sixth Fleet continues satisfactory visit schedule contributing to Bourguiba's belief in fleet as his "shield." Deterrent value of Qadhafi's possible belief in USG commitment to Tunisia's defense may have weakened recently in wake of USG setbacks overseas. Continued demonstration of USG interest in Tunisian needs provides psychological reassurance to GOT regime and hopefully has deterrent value with regime's enemies. Probable resumption of PL-480 shipment, fruitful joint commission meeting, and continuing modest aid program are therefore welcome. Basically we think Libyan/Algerian threat is non-military and, while GOT has reason to improve its deterrent capability, its main focus should remain on strengthening civilian institutions and capacity to frustrate subversion. End summary.

2. Tunisia's concern with current and potential threats from both Libya and Algeria has been growing over the past year and a half. Although Tunisian Government has been proclaiming publicly that its re-

¹ Summary: Seelye informed the Department of Tunisia's growing concern with perceived threats from Libya and Algeria. Seelye noted that continued U.S. interest in Tunisian needs provided psychological reassurance to the regime, and served as a possible deterrent to Tunisia's enemies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P840105-0766. Secret; Nodis.

lations with its two neighbors continue to be cordial, certain Tunisian officials have conveyed to me confidentially their apprehension over the immediate threat to Tunisia posed by Qadhafi and the long-term hegemonic aspirations of Boumediene. Interestingly enough, one of the Tunisian officials who has touched only lightly on this subject during our frequent meetings is FonMin Chatti. However, recent vehement Algerian press attacks against Tunisia flowing from Tunisian support for Moroccan position on Sahara may be causing Chatti special concern since, as new Algerian Ambassador has confided to me, Algerians blame Chatti for having allegedly “double-crossed them” (75 Tunis 7336). They may have told him as much.

3. During my most recent meeting with Chatti on January 20, after his return from seeing Fahmy in Cairo, Chatti did not repeat not even raise the subject of the threat. I am sure he would have done so had he been deeply worried. He has taken pride in what he considers to be excellent relationship which he has established with you, and for this reason he has not hesitated in the past to ask me to relay messages to you. On other hand, it does not surprise me that Chatti took advantage of meeting with Fahmy to express his concerns. Tunisia, which warmed up to Sadat only slowly because of residual antagonisms toward Egypt flowing from Nasser days, is turning increasingly toward Egypt as a counterpoise to Tunisia’s uncongenial neighbors. In this context, Chatti could be expected to confide in the Egyptians, and, where U.S. is involved, to seek to capitalize on close and continuing U.S.-Egyptian dialogue.

4. Meanwhile, Tunisians are reacting to Libyan-Algerian threat in a number of ways. Initially, they used this threat as basis for request to us a year ago for major increase in arms purchases. While recognizing that they would never be a match for larger and better equipped Libyan and Algerian forces, they have felt the need for more of a military deterrent to delay, at least somewhat, an attacking force pending action (unspecified) by the international community on Tunisia’s behalf. As yet, however, the Tunisians have not made any major new military purchases for at least three reasons: (1) lack of funds; (2) differences of view within the Tunisian leadership as to the political and economic advisability of major military expenditures; and (3) differences of views as to how best to cope with these threats. Minister of Interior, Tahar Belkhodja, told me two weeks ago that in his view Libyan-Algerian threat is essentially political and subversive in nature, rather than military. Therefore, he continued, GOT must concentrate its energies on developing better internal security apparatus and “strengthening the society.” In this connection, and despite my explanation that USG can no longer provide assistance to police forces, he has asked that we do what we can to assist in this sphere. German Government has undertaken to provide

technical assistance in strengthening border surveillance capabilities, and GOT seems to have increased its surveillance of political opposition figures on assumption that Algerians, in particular, are giving increased aid and comfort to Tunisian opposition leaders in exile. GOT reaction to current Algerian attacks over Tunisian Spanish Sahara policy is to turn the other cheek and not rpt not to respond in kind.

5. As Department has noted in State 24935, USG is proposing increase of FMS credits for FY 76 from \$5M to \$15M. This is in direct response to Tunisian expression of concerns re Libyan-Algerian threat and request for additional USG military assistance. Our limited capacity to respond has disappointed Tunisians at a time when we have also terminated our MAP grant aid. Although we have considered sympathetically GOT's request to buy a SAM missile system, as well as interceptor aircraft, we have indirectly discouraged GOT from buying the Hawk system they want. In any case, this system is probably too expensive for them, and we have offered them Chaparral system instead. GOT has decided to defer purchase of interceptor aircraft, evidently primarily for budgetary reasons but, also, doubtless, because modern aircraft can be a double-edged weapon if they get into the hands of dissident pilots.

6. As the Department has indicated, the Sixth Fleet continues to visit Tunisian ports at the rate of 14–15 visits a year. The flagship of the fleet calls at least once a year and did so last in July 1975. A principal reason why President Bourguiba attaches importance to regular visits of the Sixth Fleet to Tunisia is his firm belief that Sixth Fleet serves as a "shield" to deter and protect him from his enemies. There have been indications, though not recently, that Qadhafi believes there is a secret Tunisian-American agreement which commits the USG to defend Tunisia. This belief, if it still exists, presumably has some deterrent value although USG setbacks in Vietnam and Angola may have raised questions concerning USG capability and resolve to act in support of its friends.

7. While obviously there is considerable doubt as to whether USG would intervene militarily on Tunisian behalf in event of Algerian or Libyan military attack, we consider it important to continue to demonstrate our interest in Tunisia's political, military and economic needs. This provides important psychological reassurance to Tunisian regime, which greatly esteems its special relationship with U.S. Hopefully, our involvement here also serves as something of a deterrent to Tunisia's potential enemies. For this reason, we are pleased at prospect that we may be able to resume PL 480, Title I shipments to Tunisia; that our first full-fledged joint commission meeting last October was fruitful; that we intend to continue FMS credit at increased level over coming years; and

that we continue to maintain economic assistance program, albeit at modest level.

8. Fundamentally, we tend to agree with Minister Belkhodja that nature of Libyan-Algerian threat is essentially political and subversive rather than military. While we think that GOT has good reason to improve somewhat its military posture, main focus of Tunisian activity in coping with outside threat should be, in our view, to accelerate its efforts to strengthen Tunisian economy and society while at same time enhancing its capability to frustrate subversion mounted against the regime.

Seelye

124. Telegram 156311 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

Washington, June 24, 1976, 0524Z.

156311. Subject: Mr. Habib's Meeting with Ambassador Hedda, June 23.

1. Mr. Habib called in Ambassador Hedda June 23 to inform him of results of review of U.S. security and economic assistance policy for Tunisia. At close of meeting, following aide-mémoire was given to Ambassador. (Memcon on meeting will be provided septel.)

Quote: Aide-Mémoire

The Department of State appreciated the frank and candid presentation of the Tunisian Government's security and development concerns which was outlined in Ambassador Hedda's meeting with Mr. Sisco on May 10.

Following this presentation, the Department initiated an in depth review of ways in which the United States Government might be helpful in aiding Tunisia in these times of need.

¹ Summary: In an aide-mémoire given to Hedda on June 23, the Department outlined the economic and military assistance that the United States would provide Tunisia.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 24, Tunisia. Confidential. Drafted by Lewis Murray in NEA/AFN; cleared by NEA, and S/S; and approved by DeFord. Telegram 157442 to Tunis, June 25, transmitted the memorandum of conversation. (Ibid.)

Interim Events

The Department of State has been informed that the Government of Tunisia intends to purchase the Chaparral and a number of other defense items.

Mr. John Reed, Director of DOD/ISA/AF, and Mr. Roy Betteley, Chief of Europe/Africa Division DOD/DSAA, have recently concluded a three-day visit to Tunis during which Tunisia's needs were discussed in detail with the Ministry of Defense.

The Department of Defense is now preparing price and availability data requested by the Tunisian Government on specific items, including a list of ammunition requirements which was submitted in early May. Some of this has already been forwarded to the Tunisian Government, and it is hoped the remainder will be ready shortly.

The Tunisian Government has requested an increase in projected FMS financing during FY 70–80 from 75 to 100 million dollars, in order to finance these acquisitions.

Results of Review

A. Security Assistance—The Department of State has examined Tunisia's requests (defense requirements and credit needs) and finds them reasonable.

The Department of State will make every effort to make these requested items available to Tunisia, at the earliest feasible date and at lowest costs permissible under U.S. laws, although delivery dates for most items will not be soon and costs may be higher than expected.

With respect to FMS financing levels, it is not possible to obtain increases over the current FY 76 amount of 13 million dollars, and Congressional authorization for Tunisia in FY 77 has already been requested at this same 15 million dollar level. Legislative action on this request is still pending.

The Department of State will seek, however, to have the FY 77 FMS level increased to 25 million dollars if funds become available, and the Department will also seek inter-agency approval to increase the FY 78, 79 and 80 planning levels to 25 million dollars each year.

The Department of State trusts that the Tunisian Government understands the U.S. wishes to be helpful but that the Department can give no firm assurances that the increase in FY 77 FMS financing can be obtained, or that any given amount of credit will be available during FY 78–80.

It is hoped that the Tunisian Government understands the Department of State cannot make such multi-year commitments, and that this decision to seek increases is the most that can be done at the moment to demonstrate the desire to be responsive to Tunisia's needs.

The U.S. Government will be pleased to receive at the appropriate time in Washington any military representatives the Tunisian Government might wish to send, and to continue ongoing conversations through the American Embassy in Tunis and the Tunisian Embassy in Washington.

A visit of Tunisian Defense officials to Grafenwoehr in the Federal Republic of Germany is now being arranged so that they may observe tank gunnery and TOW missile firings.

B. Economic Assistance—The Department of State has examined the Tunisian Government's request for an indication of projected U.S. economic assistance during the period of Tunisia's next five year development plan. Unfortunately, it is not possible to make such a projection because of the uncertainties of our system of annual appropriations.

The following areas have been identified for priority consideration and A.I.D. is actively working with the Tunisian Government in developing programs in the following fields:

- Rural development
- Agribusiness
- Health and nutrition
- Family planning
- Women in development
- Science and technology

It should be understood that the sums involved for these projects will not be large and that capital assistance will not be significant in terms of Tunisia's overall investment needs.

The U.S. development assistance program in Tunisia will be oriented to achieving transfer of technology, which in the long range can have a significant impact far beyond the level of expenditures involved.

Ambassador Mulcahy is in full agreement with this approach, and will coordinate U.S. Government assistance efforts to achieve the maximum benefits possible for Tunisia.

June 23, 1976, Department of State, Washington. End quote.

2. Embassy is authorized to inform GOT of delivery of Aide-Mémoire, and to draw from it as appropriate.

Robinson

125. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 2, 1976, 10:15–10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Special Envoy of President Bourguiba of Tunisia
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Ali Hedda, Ambassador of Tunisia

Bourguiba: I have a mission with many purposes. First, to present the best wishes of my father, who is the George Washington of his country. Just in May we celebrated our 20th anniversary and you were kind enough to send your number two man, the Vice President.

President: I want to welcome you here and thank you for the lovely bicentennial gift.

[Photographers took pictures of the gold olive tree.]

Bourguiba: It has a two-fold meaning. First, the apple tree is the symbol of peace. Then it is also the symbol of continuity.

President: It is an exquisite gift.

I was pleased to send the Vice President to your anniversary. Our relations are excellent and, so far as I know, we have no issues between us.

Bourguiba: That is true. It has not always been fashionable to be pro-American but we have been consistent.

President: We greatly appreciate that. I hope your father's health is better.

Bourguiba: It is, but he has bad periods. He is 73 years old—and has spent much time in prison. [He described President Bourguiba's imprisonment, especially during World War II when Hitler had him released in hopes of helping the effort.]

President: Are there any issues we should discuss?

Bourguiba: This was my main purpose in coming here. My talks with Marshall Mars of OPIC were very reassuring. We are now in a po-

¹ Summary: Habib Bourguiba, Jr., and Ford discussed Tunisian security assistance, and the threat posed by Libya and Algeria.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 20. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In telegram 166454 to Tunis, July 3, the Department reported on the July 2 meeting between Bourguiba, and Habib. Bourguiba expressed his concerns about Qadhafi and Boumediene and the impact defense spending might have on the Tunisian economy. (Ibid., NSC Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 27, Visits File, Tunisia, Bourguiba, Jr.)

sition to absorb technology transfer. We could cap the \$750 million the US has given us by becoming the showcase of development. Our birth rate has gone from 3.5 to 1.6. My father has a very clear project in his mind. I was pleased to see the emphasis here on agro-business. If we don't over the next five years produce enough to feed the people, the progress of the last 50 years will be wasted.

President: What is your chief crop?

Bourguiba: Cereals, olives, fruit. We are also reforesting. We have a national tree day.

Many American banks are now interested in coming to Tunisia, I am proud to say.

All this policy of the wisdom of my father is in possible jeopardy because of our neighbors. Libya is ruled by a crackpot. I have met him. He should be in a nut house. This is our short-term danger but very serious. He has acknowledged publicly that he is inciting the people of Tunisia and Egypt to overthrow their leaders.

Over the longer term the danger is Algeria. They have inherited the French sense of "grandeur". They have a concept of a super-Algeria reaching from Senegal to Egypt.

We don't want to endanger our economic development but we have to "keep a stone in our hand." Unfortunately that stone is expensive.

Our overall needs are \$1.2 billion over the next five years. I have already been to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. They are inhibited by appearing to help opponents of Libya and Algeria. I would appreciate it if you would put a little friendly pressure on them.

President: We will certainly do that. We will also look at the military and economic program and do what we can.

Bourguiba: We need, as a top priority, missiles against tanks and aircraft.

Qaddafi has developed a base right on our border—out of an old base.

President: We will do our best.

Bourguiba: We are the only practicing democracy in the Mediterranean.

[Describes from Turkey around the sea what problems are being faced.]

126. Telegram 184120/Tosec 190110 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Portland¹

Washington, July 24, 1976, 0223Z.

190110. For the Secretary from Habib. Subject: Action Memorandum: Tunisian Concern Over Libyan Intentions (S/S No. 7615858). Ref: Tunis 5177.

1. The Problem

Tunisian Foreign Minister Chatty, in lengthy meeting with Ambassador Mulcahy July 22, expressed alarm over intelligence reports that Tunisia might be Qadhafi's next target and made plea for U.S. support in possible forthcoming crisis. Mulcahy proposes four courses of action involving deployment of Sixth Fleet units, aerial reconnaissance and intelligence cooperation and requests Department's urgent response.

2. Background/Analysis

Chatty told Mulcahy that GOT had received new indications of LARG measures to increase its arms buildup at newly-opened airbase near Tunisian border. GOT suspects LARG will simultaneously stage border incidents, renew propaganda war and launch terrorist actions directed at tourist centers in order to discredit GOT. Chatty asked what advice or help the U.S. could provide to cope with this threat, and suggested that more USN ships be sent into Tunisian waters in the next few weeks. Mulcahy commented that the Tunisians seem to have concluded that Tunisia is Qadhafi's next target and their concern is amplified by the knowledge that their poorly-equipped defense forces are inadequate to the challenge they face. Alluding to your recent assurances to Bourguiba, Jr. that the U.S. would not forget its friends in difficult times, Mulcahy said that the Tunisians expect some positive gesture of our support in their hour of need. He suggested that we explore four courses of action:

¹ Summary: Kissinger was informed of Mulcahy's July 22 meeting with Chatti, and was presented a series of recommendations to address Tunisian concerns.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Weislogel and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Arthur R. Day; cleared by Deputy Director of Politico-Military Affairs Richard A. Ericson, Special Assistant of the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia George S. Harris, Otto, and Collums; and approved by Habib. In telegram 5177 from Tunis, July 23, Mulcahy summarized his meeting with Chatti on July 22, during which they discussed Tunisian concerns regarding Qadhafi's intentions and the need for more U.S. military and diplomatic support in the event of a crisis. (Ibid.) In telegram 184239 to Tunis, July 25, Kissinger informed Mulcahy of steps taken to address Tunisian concerns, and instructed him to deliver a message informing the Government of Tunisia of continued U.S. support. (Ibid.)

—Extend the Tunis port visit of the USS *Barney* and USS *Montgomery* (scheduled for July 27–August 2), or alternatively have the ships remain near the Tunisian coast utilizing their air search radar to detect Libyan aircraft incursions.

—Arrange another one or two-unit naval visit not later than August 1 to a Southern Tunisian port (Sfax, Gabes, or Djerba) by ships having air search radar capability.

—Utilize air reconnaissance by U.S. military aircraft, preferably not based in Tunisia, during the critical early August period.

—Make available to the GOT maximum intelligence from all sources concerning Libyan activities.

The Department has received no intelligence which would support Tunisia's view that a Libyan attack, clandestine or otherwise, is imminent. On the contrary, Libya according to all reports is concentrating its military buildup on the Egyptian frontier and directing its venom against Egypt and the Sudan. Reportedly the airbase near the Tunisian border is inoperative because of a lack of administrative and operational facilities. Nevertheless, the Tunisians obviously perceive a threat whether it actually exists or not and I believe we should do what we can to reassure them.

In the hope we may be able to provide the Tunisians material evidence of our concern and support, we are urgently investigating the possibility of expediting delivery to Tunisia of military equipment budgeted under the FY 1976 FMS credit program. In this connection, we have suggested that dollars 10 million in FMS credits be allocated to Tunisia for the transitional quarter and are urgently trying to obtain NSC and OMB approval. (FYI. This is part of the transitional quarter funding package submitted to you by under Secretary Maw in his July 21 memorandum.)

3. Recommendations:

We recommend that:

(1) You authorize us to approach DOD to extend the visit of the *Barney* and *Montgomery* and to work out a schedule of increased ship visits to Tunisian ports and deployments in Tunisian waters (the current fleet deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean precludes such a schedule for the time being).

(2) That you authorize us to explore with DOD the feasibility of utilizing USN ship-air search radar to assist the Tunisians in detecting Libyan aircraft and to share information obtained with the GOT.

(3) That you authorize us to discuss with appropriate intelligence agencies the feasibility of utilizing air reconnaissance by U.S. military aircraft to gather intelligence on any Libyan moves against Tunisia and to share same with the GOT.

(4) That we formally ask CIA to produce a description and assessment of Libyan intentions based on currently available information to be shared with the GOT. (On a contingency basis, INR has asked the Agency to produce such a report by July 27.)

(5) That we inform the Egyptians of the response we are planning to make to the Tunisian expressions of concern.

(6) That you approve the attached draft telegram to Tunis responding to Ambassador Mulcahy's cable (Tunis 5177, repeated septel).

Attachment

Draft Cable to Tunis

From Secretary for Ambassador. Subject: Tunisia Urges Increased U.S. Naval Presence. Ref: Tunis 5177.

1. Information available to Department from various intelligence sources does not appear to support GOT contention that military, subversive or terrorist, attack on Tunisia by Libya is imminent. However, in consideration of fact that Tunisia's leaders perceive such a threat and have requested U.S. support, we are taking following steps in response to your suggestions para 8 reftel:

2. A. Consulting with DOD on extending visit of USS *Barney* and USS *Montgomery* or alternatively redeploying other Sixth Fleet units to Tunisian ports/waters (though latter alternative may not be immediately available given current fleet deployment to Eastern Mediterranean).

B. Exploring with DOD feasibility of using USN air search radar capability to monitor Libyan aircraft.

C. Discussing with appropriate intelligence agencies utilization of air reconnaissance of Libyan targets by U.S. military aircraft and sharing of info obtained with GOT.

D. Requesting CIA to prepare report asap on Libyan terrorist, subversive and other hostile activities and an analyses of their significance for Tunisia. The report will be provided to GOT about July 30.

3. Meanwhile you should convey to Chatty from me the following message as quickly as possible:

4. Ambassador Mulcahy has reported urgently to me the concerns that you expressed to him on July 22 about Libyan intentions toward Tunisia. In particular, he told me of your request that the U.S. increase its naval presence in Tunisia during the early days of August, which you consider to be the critical period.

5. I want to assure you that, as we have told Tunisia in the past and as I recently reiterated to Habib Bourguiba, Jr., the U.S. is fully prepared to help Tunisia in every way it can. We regard your country as a close and warm friend and one whose security is of importance to us.

6. I am looking urgently into the question of naval visits to determine the best way to provide the increased presence you desire. I wanted you to know immediately, however, that we are prepared to help and that we would be in touch with you further, just as rapidly as possible, about the precise steps we will be able to take.

7. I send you and President Bourguiba my warmest regards. Henry A. Kissinger.

Robinson

127. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 22, 1976, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Tunisian Foreign Minister Chatty

PARTICIPANTS

Tunisia

Foreign Minister Habib Chatty

US

The Secretary

Alec Toumayan (Notetaker/Interpreter)

Foreign Minister Chatty: First of all I would like to describe to you the situation in Tunisia with emphasis on our economic situation. U.S. assistance has been declining for a number of years and we have not pressed you on this because we know of your worldwide responsibilities but today the situation has become much more urgent.

We have not emphasized this in the past because we had no defense plan and all of our resources went into economic development.

¹ Summary: Chatti and Kissinger discussed Tunisia's security concerns. Chatti asked for U.S. military assistance in the form of grants rather than credits.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File, October 1976. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office. Drafted by Alec G. Toumayan in OPR/LS; and approved by Collums.

But for about two years now, ever since Qadhafi tried to set up a union with Tunisia and with the Algerians having some designs of their own against Tunisia, we have been forced to make plans for our defense and to assign some of our resources to defense.

Tunisia's resources do not make it possible for us to conduct both development and defense simultaneously. Our resources in oil and phosphates are limited as are also our agricultural resources and we cannot pursue our economic plan and look after our defense as well. Between the Algerians who are ambitious and the Libyans who are crazy we can no longer afford to neglect our defense. We must have some defense and it must be adequate in scope.

We have made a study of our defense requirements and our minimum plan calls for \$500 million over the next five years. The U.S. has assisted us with the Chaparral and some military credits but these are on commercial terms, 8½ percent over seven years. These are difficult terms. We have received better terms from the French, the Italians and the Yugoslavs. We are aware that your rules require that you operate in this fashion but I am asking you today for two things.

First, to restore U.S. military assistance in the form of grants as you used to do in the past where we could always depend on \$2–\$3 million per year in grants. This would enable us to pay off the interest on some of the loans or it could be given in the form of equipment. The second thing I am asking you to do is to include Tunisia in the supporting assistance program (for security assistance) because of our strategic location. You are doing this for countries like Egypt, Syria, Portugal and you can consider that Portugal is very much like Tunisia.

Our philosophy is that the West, in the Mediterranean, begins with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and the Sudan and continues with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and that it is all one single unified front. Any break in any part of the front affects its entirety. Morocco is well equipped militarily; so is Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Iraq also, but not Tunisia who could become a victim of either Qadhafi or the Algerians. Either one of these could call in the army after promoting troubles there. It would then be too late for the U.S. to intervene. We are not seeking U.S. intervention. We seek a 48-hour breathing space until our friends in the Security Council can act. We have information that if it were not for the presence of Egyptian troops on the Libyan border, Qadhafi would have initiated action against Tunisia this year. It was on his schedule for this year. If the Libyans cause us some trouble we can offer no military resistance. We are completely exposed, we are forced to equip ourselves and we consider that we are part of the overall strategy of the U.S. We are in the same boat with Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Egypt. President Sadat agrees with me and has told me to take it up with you. He will discuss this with you himself he said. We have asked Egypt to help us

and they have agreed to lend us some equipment. From the strategic aspect we constitute the weakest link in that unified front and if anything happened to Tunisia it would then be too late. That is why I ask for inclusion of Tunisia in the support assistance program to which we are entitled to the same degree as are Portugal and Spain though not as much as entitled as Egypt. But those are countries that you are seeking to strengthen to ensure their security. I ask you to please reflect on this.

But the question of granting aid is most urgent, aid in the form of military equipment or of funds to cover the costs of the loans.

The Secretary: First of all I agree completely with the strategic concept you have outlined that starting from Morocco through Tunisia, Egypt and to Saudi Arabia it is all one unit and that Tunisia constitutes the weakest link because it has powerful neighbors and inadequate resources and that therefore Tunisia needs aid.

The problem is what we can do given Congressional restraints and that is a matter I must look into. There is considerable resistance to grants but it is not impossible to overcome it. Considering including Tunisia under support assistance is a question that I must take up with the President, with the Bureau of Budget and with Congress. I am sympathetic and would like to make this possible.

But now we must wait until after the election, assuming that we are elected we will then consider it seriously and will do so by the end of November. We will look at the situation.

Foreign Minister Chatty: President Bourguiba has asked me to convince you of the importance of this and I am pleased to hear that you are sympathetic.

The Secretary: Yes I am, and we shall do what we can. I suggest that we now go upstairs and join the others.

128. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, November 4, 1976.

SUBJECT

Presidential Determination to Authorize the Use of FMS Financing for the Provision of a Sophisticated Weapon System to Tunisia

Acting Secretary of State Robinson recommends that you make a Determination that it is important to the national security of the United States to utilize Foreign Military Sales (FMS) guaranties to finance the sale to Tunisia of a sophisticated weapon system, specifically a Chaparral air defense missile system (Tab B). Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act prohibits the use of FMS financing for the sale of sophisticated weapons systems, including missile systems, to underdeveloped countries such as Tunisia in the absence of a Presidential Determination. A proposed Determination and justification are at Tab A.

Providing Tunisia with the Chaparral system will enable that country to improve its defensive capabilities vis-à-vis Libya and Algeria. FMS financing of this sale will allow Tunisia to meet its security requirements without diverting resources currently allocated to important economic development projects. Congress was formally notified of this proposed sale on September 10, 1976, and no objection was interposed during the 30-day review period.

Max Friedersdorf and Jack Marsh concur in this recommendation, as does OMB (Tab C).

Recommendation

That you sign the Determination at Tab A.

¹ Summary: Scowcroft requested that Ford issue a determination to utilize Foreign Military Sales (FMS) guaranties to finance the sale of the Chaparral air defense system to improve Tunisia's defense capabilities against Libya and Algeria.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Country File, Box 24, Tunisia (4). Confidential. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the document indicates the President saw it. Tabs A and C are attached, but not published. Ford signed Presidential Determination 77–6 on November 5. (Ibid.)

Attachment

Justification of Presidential Determination

Washington, undated.

JUSTIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION TO PERMIT THE SALE OF A SOPHISTICATED WEAPON SYSTEM TO TUNISIA

The Problem:

Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (the Act), prohibits the use of funds authorized under the Act “to guarantee, or extend credit, or participate in an extension of credit in connection with any sale of sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, to any underdeveloped country” with certain exceptions not relevant here. For the purposes of the Act, Tunisia is an “underdeveloped” country. The Government of Tunisia wishes to finance the purchase of the Chaparral missile system with a loan guaranteed by the United States under Section 24 of the Act.

Section 4 of the Act authorizes the President to waive the prohibition described above if he determines that such financing is important to the national security of the United States and reports each such determination to the Congress within thirty days.

Justification:

Tunisia is a politically moderate Arab state with traditionally close relations with the United States. Tunisia permits port visits by US Navy ships, thereby adding to the operational effectiveness of our naval forces in the southern Mediterranean. The maintenance of an independent and moderate-oriented Tunisia is important to the US goal of regional stability in North Africa. US foreign military sales to Tunisia enable that friendly Arab government to improve its defenses against hostile neighboring states equipped with sophisticated Soviet weapons. The interference of Libya in the internal affairs of Tunisia and other countries has caused Tunisia to seek to improve her defensive capabilities.

Tunisia has requested the purchase of the Chaparral missile system to meet her air defense needs. The Executive Branch submitted to the Congress formal notification of this proposed sale under the provisions of Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, on September 10, 1976. The cost of the Chaparral missile system sale under consideration is about \$43.5 million. It would be difficult for Tunisia to acquire this needed air defense capability without foreign military

sales (FMS) financing if it is to avoid the diversion of its resources from important economic development projects. FMS financing of the Tunisian purchase of the Chaparral missile system will contribute significantly to Tunisia's ability to deter threats against its security and to continue to exercise a moderating influence in the region. Our substantial political and military interests in the southern Mediterranean would be jeopardized by a deterioration in regional stability or a diminution in the forces of moderation in North Africa. Therefore, the use of FMS guaranties under section 24 of the Arms Export Control Act to finance this sale is important to the national security of the United States.