

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1977–1980

VOLUME I

**FOUNDATIONS OF
FOREIGN POLICY**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1977–1980**

Volume I

**Foundations of
Foreign Policy**

Editor Kristin L. Ahlberg
General Editor Adam M. Howard

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government

agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversation between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to

a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2012 and was completed in 2013, resulted in the decision to withhold 0 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 0 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 1 document.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-

rial notes presented here provide an undiluted record of the intellectual foundations of the foreign policy of the Carter administration.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
October 2014

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of James E. Carter. The subseries will present a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Carter's administration. This volume documents the intellectual assumptions and themes underlying the foreign policy decisions made by the administration.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume I

Much of the documentation included in this volume was drawn from public sources. Speeches and policy statements were garnered from a number of published sources, the most important of which were the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* and the Department of State *Bulletin*. A very useful source of information on the intellectual assumptions underlying foreign policy proved to be the briefings that President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski periodically provided to the press. The background briefings can be found in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Schecter/Friendly (Press) File, Subject File, Box 1.

Among the classified sources consulted, the most useful were found in the Presidential papers and other White House records maintained by the Carter Library. A number of collections from the National Security Affairs (NSA) files are relevant to research in this area. Within the NSA file, the Brzezinski Material and Staff Material collections yield important documentation. Within the Brzezinski Material, the Subject File, Schecter/Friendly (Press) File, and Brzezinski Office File are especially useful; the Subject Chron File within the Brzezinski Office File contains copies of Brzezinski's Weekly National Security reports to the President.

Of the lot files of the Department of State, the most useful for the purposes of this compilation were the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) Director's Files. Anthony Lake's records, which are available at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), contain copies of Vance's and Muskie's speeches, Policy Planning Staff-authored studies on a variety of topics, background materials related to the Department's development of goals and objectives statements, and documentation on issues such as human rights and foreign assistance policy. The files of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance include important documen-

tation on the 1976 transition period. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher's files, also available at NARA, yield important documentation on human rights, North-South issues, foreign assistance policy, and the Department's goals and objectives statements. The Department of State's Central Foreign Policy File, consisting of D, P, and N reels, replaced the pre-1973 paper subject-numeric file. The P (Paper) reels consist of microfilmed versions of memoranda of conversation, letters, briefing papers, airgrams, and memoranda to principals.

The Mondale Papers housed at the Minnesota Historical Society include Walter F. Mondale's Senatorial and Vice Presidential Papers. The most useful collection in the Senatorial Papers is the Press Relations/Media Activities Records. Within the Vice Presidential Papers, essential documentation is located within the Foreign Policy Material From the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library files.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume I

The purpose of this volume is to document the intellectual foundations of the foreign policy of the Carter administration. This volume explores the collective mindset of Carter administration officials on foreign policy issues rather than documenting significant foreign policy decisions or diplomatic exchanges. The compilation takes as its canvas the entire record of the Carter administration. Therefore, the documents selected are necessarily a sampling chosen to illustrate policy perspectives and themes rather than a thorough record of a bilateral relationship or of a major issue. Similar to *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972* and *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973-1976*, this volume draws upon the published record of speeches, press releases, press conferences and briefings, interviews, and testimony before Congressional committees to document policy positions and the assumptions of administration officials on the foreign policy process. The documentation in this volume chronicles the perspectives of not only Carter but also Vice President Walter Mondale, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, Secretaries of State Cyrus Vance and Edmund Muskie, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and others.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ceri McCarron, Brittany Parris, and Keith Shuler of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, David Langbart and Don McIlwain of the National Archives and Records Administration, and Deborah Miller of the Minnesota Historical Society. The editor would also like to express gratitude

to Vice President Walter F. Mondale for granting permission to use documentation from his senatorial and vice presidential files at the Minnesota Historical Society, which are open to researchers.

The editor wishes to thank Paul J. Hibbeln, Adam M. Howard, Michael McCoyer, David P. Nickles, Paul M. Pitman, Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Nathaniel L. Smith, Melissa Jane Taylor, Christopher J. Tudda, and Alexander R. Wieland of the Office of the Historian for recommending documents for inclusion in the volume.

The editor conducted the research for this volume and selected and annotated the documentation under the direction of Stephen P. Randolph, Director of the Office of the Historian. Kerry Hite coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of the Chief of the Declassification Division Carl E. Ashley. Erin F. Cozens did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Kristin L. Ahlberg, Ph.D.
Historian

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Sources

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

P Reels

D Reels

N Reels

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

S/S Files: Lot 84D241

Records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Lot Files

D Files: Lot 81D113 (Entry P–14)

Records of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 1977–1980

S/P Files: Lot 82D298 (Entry P–9)

Records of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake, 1977–1981

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Chief of Staff Files

Office of the Chief of Staff

Jordan's Confidential Files

Donated Historical Materials

Brzezinski Donated Historical Material

Trilateral Commission Files

Geographic File

Herzberg Donated Historical Material

Speech Files

XVI Sources

Vice Presidential Papers

Mondale Papers

Office of the Vice President

Records of the Office of the National Security Adviser

Brzezinski Material

Agency File

Brzezinski Office File

Subject Chron File

Schechter/Friendly (Press)

Subject File

Trip File

Staff Material

Defense/Security File

Huntington Files

North-South Pastor File

Subject Files

Office File

Meetings File

Outside the System File

Presidential Advisory Board

1976-1977 Transition File (Anthony Lake)

Special Projects File

Henry Owen File

National Security Council Institutional Files

Presidential Determinations

Office of the Staff Secretary

Handwriting File

Presidential File

Plains File

Cabinet Meeting Minutes

Subject File

Presidential Materials

President's Daily Diary

Staff Office Files

Donovan Files

Vertical File

Cabinet Meeting Minutes

1976 Presidential Campaign

Issues Office

Issues Office—David Rubenstein

Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat

Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota

Walter F. Mondale Papers

 Senatorial Papers

 Press Relations/Media Activities Records

 Vice Presidential Papers

 Central Files: Trips

 Counsel and Deputy Chief of Staff Files

 Transition Files

 Foreign Policy Material From the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library

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 Speech Text Files

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- The Washington Post*.

Abbreviations and Terms

- A**, Bureau of Administration, Department of State
A/S, assistant secretary
ABC, American Broadcasting Company
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADB, Asian Development Bank
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AID, Agency for International Development
AIPAC, American Israel Public Affairs Committee
ALCOA, Aluminum Company of America
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States (treaty organization)
AP, Associated Press
ARA or ARA/LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State/Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development
ARMCO, American Rolling Mill Company
ASA, African Studies Association
ASAT, anti-satellite
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASNE, American Society of Newspaper Editors
- B-1**, American long-range bomber
B-52, American long-range bomber
Backfire, Soviet long-range bomber
- C**, Jimmy Carter
CA, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CACM, Central American Common Market
CAP, Common Agricultural Policy
CAT, conventional arms transfer
CB, Citizens' Band radio
CBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CBU, cluster bomb unit
CD, Christine Dodson
CDU, Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CENTO, Central Eastern Treaty Organization c.f., comparison
CFC, Common Fund for Commodities
CFR, Council on Foreign Relations
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEC, Conference on International Economic Cooperation
COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU, *Christlich-Soziale Union* (Christian Social Union)
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban

XX Abbreviations and Terms

CW, conventional weapons; chemical weapons
Cyber-76, mainframe class supercomputer produced by Control Data Corporation

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; Democrat
D/CT, Office for Combating Terrorism, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DA, David Aaron
DCA, Defense Cooperation Agreement
DCC, Development Coordination Committee
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DFL, Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party
DOD, Department of Defense

EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC, European Community
EC-9 or Nine, reference to the nine member states of the EC: Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
ERW, enhanced radiation weapons
ES, UN emergency session
ESF, Economic Support Fund
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

F-14, USN twin-engine, two seat fighter aircraft
F-15, USAF twin-engine, tactical fighter
F-16, USAF multirole fighter aircraft
F-18, USN/USMC twin-engine, multirole fighter aircraft
FAC, Food Aid Convention
FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLIR, forward-looking infrared
FMS, foreign military sales
FNLA, National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FPA, Foreign Policy Association
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSO, foreign service officer
FY, fiscal year

G-7, Group of 7 (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States)
G-77, Group of 77 (group of developing countries established at the conclusion of UNCTAD in 1964)
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GLCM, ground-launched cruise missiles
GNP, gross national product

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HR, House Resolution; also human rights

IADB or IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ICIDI, Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission)
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDCA, International Development Cooperation Agency
IEA, International Energy Agency
IFAD, International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFCE or INFCE, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
IFIs, international financial institutions
IGA, International Grains Arrangement or Agreement
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INM, Bureau for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOC, International Olympics Committee
IPC, Integrated Program for Commodities
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
IWA, International Wheat Agreement
IWC, International Wheat Council

J or JC, Jimmy Carter
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF, joint task force

KT, kiloton

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LASA, Latin American Studies Association
LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson
LDC, lesser developed country
LDP, Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LOS, law of the sea
LTDP, long-term defense planning

M-X, missile experimental; intercontinental ballistic missile
MBFR, mutual and balanced force reductions
MFN, most-favored nation
Misc., miscellaneous
MT, metric ton
Mtg., meeting
MTNs, multilateral trade negotiations

NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAM, Non-aligned Movement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company

XXII Abbreviations and Terms

- NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; also Nuclear Energy Agency
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIEO, New International Economic Order
NPR, National Public Radio
NPT, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSC, National Security Council
NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group
- OAS**, Organization of American States
OAU, Organization of African Unity
ODC, Overseas Development Council
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- P**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
PA, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PACOM, U.S. Pacific Command
PD, Presidential Directive
PDRY, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PER, Bureau of Personnel, Department of State
PFT, Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty
P.L., Public Law
P.L. 480, Public Law 480; Food for Peace
PLO, Palestinian Liberation Organization
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PNE, Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes
Poseidon, submarine-launched ballistic missile
PR, public relations
PRC, People's Republic of China; also, Policy Review Committee
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum
- R**, Republican
Reps., representatives
RDF, Rapid Deployment Force
Res., resolution
RG, Record Group
RI, Rick Inderfurth
RN, Richard Nixon
RO/RO, roll on/roll off
ROC, Republic of China
RP, Office of Refugee Programs, Department of State
RW, radiological weapon
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State; also Senate
SA, Saudi Arabia
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SCC, Special Coordination Committee
Secy., secretary

- SELA**, Sistema Economico Latinoamericano
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SPD, *Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party of [West] Germany)
SS-20, Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile
SSA, security supporting assistance
SSOD, UN Special Session on Disarmament
Stat., statute
STR, Office of the Special Trade Representative
SU, Soviet Union
- TL**, Tony Lake
TNF, theater nuclear forces
TP, Proletarian Tendency faction of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)
Trident II, submarine-launched ballistic missile
TTBT, Threshold Test Ban Treaty
- U-2**, single-engine, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft
UAW, United Auto Workers of America
UN, United Nations
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States Army
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USLO, United States Liaison Office
USOC, United States Olympic Committee
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- VP**, Vice President
- WC**, Warren Christopher
WCARRD, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
WO, William Odum
WR, weekly report
WTC, Wheat Trade Convention
- ZB**, Zbigniew Brzezinski

Persons

- Aaron, David L.**, senior member, National Security Council staff, until 1974; legislative assistant to Senator Walter Mondale from 1974 until 1976; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from 1977 until 1981
- Abernethy, Robert**, correspondent, NBC News
- Acheson, Dean G.**, Secretary of State from 1949 until 1953
- Amin, Hafizullah**, President of Afghanistan from September until December 1979
- Anderson, Jim**, correspondent, United Press International
- Andreotti, Giulio**, Italian Prime Minister from 1976 until 1979
- Askew, Reubin**, Governor of Florida until 1979; thereafter Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
- Atwood, J. Brian**, legislative assistant to Senator Thomas Eagleton until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Legislative Officer for Atomic Energy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Legal Adviser, from 1977 until 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, from August 3, 1979, until January 14, 1981
- Azeredo da Silveira, Antonio Francisco**, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs until March 15, 1979
- Bahr, Egon**, West German Minister for Economic Cooperation from 1974 until 1976
- Ball, George W.**, Under Secretary of State from 1961 until 1966; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations during 1968; adviser to the National Security Council on Iran during the Carter administration
- Baker, Howard H. Jr.**, Senator (R-Tennessee)
- Bartholomew, Reginald H., "Reg"** Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff; Department of State, until January 1977; Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, from January until November 1977; member, National Security Council staff, USSR/East Europe Cluster, from November 1977 until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1979, until January 21, 1981
- Bayh, Birch E.**, Senator (D-Indiana) until January 3, 1981
- Begin, Menachem**, Israeli Prime Minister from June 1977; also Minister of Defense from May 28, 1980; also Minister of Foreign Affairs from October 23, 1979, until March 10, 1980
- Bellmon, Henry L.**, Senator (R-Oklahoma) until January 3, 1981
- Bennet, Douglas J., Jr.**, Staff Director, Senate Budget Committee, until 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs from March 18, 1977 until August 2, 1979; thereafter Administrator, Agency for International Development
- Berger, Samuel R. "Sandy,"** member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 to 1979; thereafter, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff
- Bergland, Robert S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (DFL-Minnesota) until January 22, 1977; Secretary of Agriculture from January 23, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A.**, Consul at the Soviet Embassy in Washington
- Blackwill, Robert D.**, Special Assistant to Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt from 1974 until 1975; Political-Military Officer, U.S. Embassy in London from 1975 until 1978; Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv from 1978 until 1979; member, National Security Council staff, West Europe Cluster, from September 1979 until January 1981

- Blumenthal, W. Michael**, chair, Bendix International; thereafter, Secretary of the Treasury from January 23, 1977, until August 4, 1979
- Bourne, Peter**, adviser, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; President's Special Assistant for Health Issues from 1977 until July 20, 1978 and Director, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policies from June 1, 1977, until March 31, 1978
- Boyd, Aquilino E.**, Panamanian Foreign Minister from 1976 until 1977
- Brademas, John**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana) and Majority Whip until January 3, 1981
- Brandt, Willy**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1974; chair, Brandt Commission
- Brezhnev, Leonid I.**, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Bremont, Marshall**, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1974 until 1976; Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Madrid from 1977 until 1979; member, National Security Council staff, USSR/East Europe Cluster, from May 1979 until January 1981
- Brokaw, Tom**, correspondent, NBC News and anchor, *Today Show* from 1976
- Brooke, Edward W. III**, Senator (R-Massachusetts) until January 3, 1979
- Broomfield, William**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan)
- Brown, George S.**, General, USAF; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force until June 30, 1974; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1974 until June 20, 1978
- Brown, Harold**, President, California Institute of Technology, until January 1977; Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Bruce, David K.E.**, Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing until September 25, 1974; U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from October 17, 1974, until February 12, 1976
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.**, Professor, Columbia University and adviser to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 campaign; Director, Trilateral Commission, from 1973 until 1976; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Bukovsky, Vladimir**, Soviet dissident
- Bumpers, Dale**, Governor of Arkansas until 1974; Senator (D-Arkansas) from January 3, 1975
- Bundy, McGeorge**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1961 until 1966; thereafter, President, Ford Foundation
- Bunker, Ellsworth F.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1964 until 1966; Ambassador at Large from 1966 until 1967; U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam from 1967 until 1973; Ambassador-at-Large and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties from 1973 until June 30, 1978
- Burger, Warren E.**, Chief Justice of the United States
- Bush, George H.W.**, Chair, Republican National Committee, until September 16, 1974; Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from September 26, 1974, until December 7, 1975; Director of Central Intelligence from January 30, 1976, until January 20, 1977; Republican nominee for Vice President, 1980; Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1981
- Burd, Robert C.**, Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader
- Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri**, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 31, 1975, to June 21, 1977
- Callaghan, Lord James**, British Prime Minister until May 4, 1979
- Carswell, Robert**, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
- Carter, J. Hodding, III**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department spokesperson from March 23, 1977, until June 30, 1980

- Carter, James Earl, Jr. "Jimmy"**, Governor of Georgia from 1971 until 1975; Democratic nominee for President, 1976; President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Carter, Eleanor Rosalynn**, First Lady of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Case, Clifford P.**, Senator (R-New Jersey) until January 3, 1979
- Castro Ruz, Fidel**, Premier of Cuba
- Ceausescu, Nicolae**, First Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965 and President of Romania from 1967
- Chafee, John H.**, Senator (R-Rhode Island) from December 29, 1976
- Chai Zemin**, Chief of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office from March 1978 until March 1979; PRC Ambassador to the United States from March 1979
- Chancellor, John**, Director, Voice of America, from 1965 until 1967; anchor, *NBC Nightly News* from 1970
- Christopher, Warren M.**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 26, 1977, until January 16, 1981
- Church, Frank F.**, Senator (D-Idaho) until January 3, 1981; chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 3, 1979, until January 3, 1981
- Civiletti, Benjamin R.**, Deputy Attorney General from 1978 until August 1979; Attorney General from August 16, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Clark, Bob**, correspondent, ABC News; contributing host, *ABC's Issues and Answers*
- Clark, Richard C. "Dick"**, Senator from (D-Iowa) until January 3, 1979; Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, from May 1 until November 1, 1979
- Cleland, Joseph Maxwell "Max"**, Administrator, Veterans Administration, from 1977 until 1981
- Clifford, Clark M.**, White House Counsel during the Truman administration; Chair, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, from 1963 until 1968; Secretary of Defense from 1968 until 1969; President's Special Emissary to Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and India during the Carter administration
- Clift, A. Denis**, Senior Staff Member, Office of Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, National Security Council staff, from 1974 until 1977; thereafter Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Cohen, William S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Maine) until January 3, 1979; thereafter, Senator
- Connally, John**, Secretary of the Treasury from 1970 until 1972
- Constable, Peter D.**, Country Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until 1976; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Islamabad from 1976 until 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1979
- Cooper, Richard N.**, Professor, Yale University, until 1977; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 1977
- Cossiga, Francesco**, Italian Prime Minister from 1979 until 1980
- Costle, Douglas M.**, Assistant Director for Natural Resources and Commerce, Congressional Budget Office, until 1977; Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, from March 4, 1977
- Cranston, Alan**, Senator (D-California); also Democratic Whip from 1977
- Cronkite, Walter**, anchor, *CBS Evening News*
- Culver, John C.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Iowa) until January 3, 1975; Senator from January 3, 1975, until January 3, 1981
- Curtis, Carl T.**, Senator (R-Nebraska) until January 3, 1979
- Cutler, Lloyd N.**, White House Counsel from 1979 until 1981

- Danforth, John C.**, Senator (R-Missouri) from December 27, 1976
- Dean, John W.**, White House Counsel from 1970 until 1973
- de Guiringaud, Louis**, French Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1978
- Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing)**, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
- Derian, Patricia Murphy "Patt"**, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, from June 10, 1977, until August 17, 1977; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until January 19, 1981
- Desai, Morarji**, Indian Prime Minister from March 24, 1977, until July 15, 1979
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Dodson, Christine**, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary
- Dole, Robert J.**, Senator (R-Kansas)
- Domenici, Pete V.**, Senator (R-New Mexico)
- Donovan, Hedley**, Editor-in-Chief, TIME Magazine; Senior Adviser to the President, from August 1979 until August 1980
- Doty, Paul**, biochemist; founder, Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs
- Douglas, Paul**, Senator (D-Illinois) from 1949 until 1967
- Drell, Sidney**, physicist; Executive Head, Theoretical Physics, Stanford Linear Acceleration Center; consultant, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
- Drew, Elizabeth**, Washington correspondent for *The New Yorker*
- Dubs, Adolph "Spike"**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1975 until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from July 12, 1978, until his death on February 14, 1979
- Dubinsky, Melvin**, Chair, United Israel Appeal
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State from 1953 until 1959
- Duncan, Charles W.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977, until July 26, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Dunsmore, Barrie**, correspondent, ABC News
- Dyess, William J.**, Executive Director, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, from 1975 until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until August 1980; thereafter, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
- Eastland, James O.**, Senator (D-Mississippi); President pro tempore until December 27, 1978
- Ecevit, Bulent**, Turkish Prime Minister from June 21, 1977, until July 21, 1977 and from January 5, 1978, until November 12, 1979
- Ehrlich, Thomas**, President, Legal Services Corporation until 1979; Department of State consultant, 1979; thereafter Director, International Development Cooperation Agency and Chair, Development Loan Committee and Development Coordination Committee
- Ehrlichman, John**, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs from 1969 until 1973
- Eidenberg, Eugene "Gene"**, Assistant to the President for Inter-governmental Affairs and Secretary to the Cabinet from June 1980
- Eilts, Hermann F.**, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt until May 20, 1979
- Eisele, Albert A.**, author and Washington correspondent for Knight-Ridder Newspapers; Press Secretary and Assistant to Vice President Mondale from 1977 until 1981
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.**, President of the United States from 1953 to 1961
- Eizenstat, Stuart E.**, Organizer, Issues Staff, Carter-Mondale campaign, from 1974 until 1976; Director of Policy Planning for the Transition, from November 1976 until January 1977; President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the Domestic Council from January 1977 until January 1981

- Eliss, Harry**, national correspondent, *The Christian Science Monitor*; panelist, 1980 Presidential Debate
- Erb, Guy F.**, member, National Security Council staff, International Economics Cluster, from September 1977 until January 1980; thereafter Deputy Director, International Development Cooperation Agency
- Evans, Rowland**, syndicated columnist
- Fahd bin Abdul al-Aziz al-Saud**, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia; Saudi Minister of the Interior
- Fahmy (Fahmi), Ismail**, Egyptian Foreign Minister; Deputy Prime Minister from April 1975
- Fairlie, Henry**, British journalist; columnist for *The Washington Post* ("Fairlie at Large") from 1976
- Fallows, James**, White House Chief Speechwriter from 1977 until 1979; thereafter Washington Editor, *The Atlantic Monthly*
- Fascell, Dante B.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida)
- Feinberg, Richard E.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1980
- Fisher, Max M.**, philanthropist and adviser to several presidents
- Foley, Thomas S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington)
- Ford, Gerald R.**, Vice President of the United States until August 8, 1974; President of the United States from August 8, 1974, until January 20, 1977; Republican candidate for President in 1976
- Foster, William C.**, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1961 until 1969
- Frankel, Max**, Associate Editor, *The New York Times*
- Frederick, Pauline**, correspondent, National Public Radio; moderator of one of the 1976 Presidential Debates
- Friendly, Alfred, Jr.**, *Newsweek* and *The New York Times* correspondent; member, National Security Council staff, Press and Congressional Liaison Office and National Security Council Press Officer, from March 1980 until January 1981
- Fukuda, Takeo**, Japanese Prime Minister from December 24, 1976, until December 7, 1978
- Gandhi, Indira**, Indian Prime Minister until 1977 and from 1980
- Garcia, Santiago Roel**, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1979
- Gardner, John W.**, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from 1965 until 1968
- Gardner, Richard N.**, advisor to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential campaign; U.S. Ambassador to Italy from March 1977
- Garn, Edwin Jacob "Jake"**, Senator (R-Utah) from December 21, 1974
- Garrison, Mark J.**, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from 1974 to 1978; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow
- Geisel, Ernesto**, President of Brazil until March 15, 1979
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, West German Foreign Minister
- Gilligan, John J.**, Governor of Ohio until January 13, 1975; fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center from 1975 until 1976; Administrator, Agency for International Development, from March 30, 1977, until March 31, 1979
- Ginsburg, Charles David**, lawyer; founder, Americans for Democratic Action; Executive Director, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission), 1967; General Counsel, Democratic National Committee, 1968
- Ginzburg, Aleksandr**, Soviet dissident and human rights activist
- Gierek, Edward**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party until September 1980
- Gilpatric, Roswell L.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1961 until 1964

- Giscard d'Estaing, Valery**, President of France from 1974
- Glenn, John H. Jr.**, Senator (D-Ohio) from December 24, 1974
- Goldberg, Arthur J.**, former Supreme Court Justice; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1965 until 1968; Ambassador at Large and head of the U.S. Delegation to the Belgrade CSCE Conference from September 23, 1977, until July 27, 1978
- Goldwater, Barry**, Senator (R-Arizona)
- Goldschmidt, Neil**, Mayor of Portland, Oregon until 1979; Secretary of Transportation from September 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Granum, Rex**, Press Director, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; White House Deputy Press Secretary from January 1977 until January 1981
- Gravel, Maurice Robert "Mike"**, Senator (D-Alaska)
- Greenfield, Mary Ellen "Meg"**, deputy editorial page editor, *The Washington Post*, and *Newsweek* columnist
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Habib, Philip C.**, U.S. Ambassador to Korea until August 19, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from September 27, 1974, until June 30, 1976; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1, 1976, until April 1, 1978; thereafter Senior Adviser to the Secretary on Caribbean Issues; also Secretary of State ad interim, from January 20 until January 23, 1977
- Hamilton, Lee H.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana)
- Harriman, W. Averell**, Governor of New York from 1955 until 1958; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1963 until 1965; Ambassador at Large from 1965 until 1969
- Harris, Patricia Roberts**, lawyer; Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from January 23, 1977, until August 3, 1979; Secretary of Health and Human Services from August 3, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Hart, Gary**, Senator (D-Colorado) from January 3, 1975
- Hartman, Arthur A.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 8, 1974, until June 8, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to France from July 7, 1977; also acting Secretary of State, February 1977
- Hassan II**, King of Morocco
- Hatfield, Paul G.**, Senator (D-Montana) from January 22 until December 14, 1978
- Hathaway, Dale E.**, Director, International Food Policy Research Institute until March 1977; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs (title elevated to Under Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs following passage of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978)
- Hayakawa, S.I.**, President, San Francisco State College until 1973; Senator (R-California) from January 2, 1977
- Heilman, Yehuda**, Executive Vice Chair, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
- Helms, Jesse R.**, Senator (R-North Carolina)
- Hertzberg, Arthur**, Rabbi; President, American Jewish Congress until 1978; also, Vice President, World Jewish Congress
- Hesburgh, Theodore**, Reverend; President, Notre Dame University until 1977; Chair, Overseas Development Council
- Higgins, Thomas**, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet
- Hilliard, William**, assistant managing editor, *Portland Oregonian*; panelist, 1980 Presidential Debate
- Hodges, Kaneaster, Jr.**, Senator (D-Arkansas) from December 10, 1977, until January 3, 1979

- Hoffberger, Jerold**, philanthropist; President, National Brewing Company
- Holbrooke, Richard C.**, managing editor, *Foreign Policy*, until 1976; member and foreign policy adviser, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from March 23, 1977, until January 13, 1981
- Holloway, James L. III**, Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations from 1974 until 1978; member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Holmes, Oliver Wendell Jr.**, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court from 1902 until 1932
- Hua Guofeng**, member of the Politburo; Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China from 1976 until 1980; Chair of the Chinese Communist Party from 1976 until 1981
- Hufstedler, Shirley A. Mount**, Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit until November 1979; thereafter, Secretary of Education
- Humphrey, Hubert Horatio, Jr.**, Vice President of the United States from 1965 until 1969; Democratic nominee for President in 1968; Senator (DFL-Minnesota) from 1971 until his death on January 13, 1978
- Humphrey, Muriel B.**, Senator (DFL-Minnesota) from January 25 until November 7, 1978
- Hunter, Robert E.**, member, National Security Council staff, West Europe Cluster, from January 1977 until August 1979; Middle East/North Africa Cluster, from September 1979 until January 1981
- Huntington, Samuel P.**, co-editor, *Foreign Policy*, until 1977; member, National Security Council staff, National Security Planning, from February 1977 until August 1978; thereafter Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs
- Hussein bin Talal I (Husayn)**, King of Jordan
- Hutcheson, Richard G., III**, White House Staff Secretary from January 1977 until January 1981
- Hyland, William G.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from January 21, 1974, until November 24, 1975; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 1975 until January 1977; member, National Security Council staff, USSR/East Europe Cluster, from January until October 1977
- Inderfurth, Karl F. "Rick"**, member, Carter-Mondale transition team, 1976; Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April 1979; Deputy Staff Director, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1979 until 1981
- Inouye, Daniel K.**, Senator (D-Hawaii)
- Jackson, Henry M. "Scoop"**, Senator (D-Washington)
- Jagoda, Barry**, media adviser, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; thereafter, Special Assistant to the President for Media and Public Affairs
- Janeway, Michael C.**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1977 until 1978
- Javits, Jacob K.**, Senator (R-New York) until January 3, 1981
- Jenkins, Kempton B.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Legislative Officer for Nuclear Non-Proliferation until 1978; staff member, Foreign Service Institute, from 1978 until 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade, from 1980; also Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, from 1976 until 1977
- Jennings, Peter**, correspondent, ABC News and co-anchor, *ABC World News Tonight* from 1978
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines**, President of the United States from 1963 until 1969
- Jones, David**, General, USAF; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force from July 1, 1974, until June 20, 1978; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 21, 1978
- Jordan, Hamilton**, Chair, Carter-Mondale campaign 1976; Assistant to the President from 1977 until July 1979; White House Chief of Staff from July 1979 until June 1980

- Kalb, Marvin**, correspondent, CBS News
- Kane, Robert**, Director of Athletics, Cornell University, until 1976; President, U.S. Olympic Committee from 1977 until 1981
- Katz, Julius L.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy until September 1976; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1976 until 1979
- Katzenbach, Nicholas DeB.**, Under Secretary of State from 1966 until 1969
- Kennan, George F.**, historian; Director, Policy Planning Staff and Counselor, Department of State during the Truman administration; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union during 1952; U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1961 until 1963
- Kennedy, Edward M. "Ted"**, Senator (D-Massachusetts)
- Kennedy, John F.**, President of the United States from 1961 until 1963
- Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah**, exiled leader of the Iranian Shi'ite sect to February 1979; first Supreme Leader of Iran from December 1979
- Khrushchev, Nikita**, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 until 1964
- Kirillin, Vladimir A.**, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister; Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Science and Technology
- Kirkland, Lane**, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO
- Kirschenbaum, Bruce**, Deputy to the Assistant to the President for Inter-governmental Affairs
- Kirschschrager, Rudolf**, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1974; thereafter, President of Austria
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969, until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973, until January 20, 1977
- Klurfeld, Jim**, reporter, *Newsday*
- Klutznick, Philip M.**, Secretary of Commerce from January 9, 1980, until January 20, 1981
- Knoche, Enno Henry "Hank"**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until August 1, 1977; also Acting Director of Central Intelligence from January 20 until March 9, 1977
- Knox, William Franklin "Frank"**, publisher, *The Chicago Daily News*; Republican Vice Presidential nominee, 1936; Secretary of the Navy from 1940 until his death on April 28, 1944
- Komer, Robert W.**, consultant, RAND Corporation; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from October 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Komplektov, Viktor G.**, Deputy Chief of the United States of America Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Korniyenko, Georgy M.**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
- Kosygin, Aleksey N.**, Chair (Premier) of the Soviet Council of Ministers until 1980; Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Kraft, Joseph**, syndicated columnist
- Kramer, Frank**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- Kreisberg, Paul H.**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi until 1975; Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977
- Kreps, Juanita Morris**, Vice President, Duke University until 1976; Secretary of Commerce from January 23, 1977, until October 31, 1979
- Kreisky, Bruno**, Chancellor of Austria
- Krimer, William D.**, interpreter, Department of State
- Krueger, C. Robert**, former member of the U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas); Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Mexican Affairs from October 23, 1979, to February 1, 1981

- Lake, W. Anthony K.**, head, International Voluntary Services, during the mid 1970s; Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from January 1977 until January 1981
- Larrabee, F. Stephen**, member, National Security Council staff, USSR/East Europe Cluster, from September 1978 until January 1981
- Laxalt, Paul D.**, Senator (R-Nevada)
- de Larosiere, Jacques**, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, from June 17, 1978
- Levine, Arthur**, President, United Synagogue of America
- Levitsky, Melvyn**, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy in Moscow until 1975; Bilateral Relations Section, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from 1975 until 1978; Deputy Director for Geographic Affairs, Office of UN Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, from 1978 until 1980; thereafter, Director
- Linowitz, Sol M.**, Ambassador-at-Large and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties; Chair, Presidential Commission on World Hunger from 1978 until 1980; Personal Representative of the President from 1980
- Lipshutz, Robert J.**, White House Counsel from 1977 until 1979
- Lissakers, Karin M.**, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1979
- Long, Clarence D.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Maryland)
- Long, Franklin A.**, chemist; Director, Cornell University Peace Studies Program
- Long, Russell B.**, Senator (D-Louisiana)
- Lopez-Portillo, Jose**, President of Mexico
- Luers, William H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from March 1975 until September 1976; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from September 1976 until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1977 until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from October 9, 1978
- Lugar, Richard G.**, Mayor of Indianapolis until 1975; Senator (R-Indiana) from January 3, 1977
- Luns, Joseph**, Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Maass, Richard**, founder, Conference on Soviet Jewry
- MacLeish, Archibald**, American poet and former Librarian of Congress
- MacNeil, Nicholas**, member, Carter-Mondale Transition Planning Group
- MacNeil, Robert**, co-anchor, PBS *The Mac-Neil-Lerher Report* (later *Mac-Neil Lerher Newshour*)
- Magnuson, Warren G.**, Senator (D-Washington) until January 3, 1981; President Pro Tempore from January 3, 1979, until January 3, 1981
- Makarov, Vasily G.**, Chef de Cabinet to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Mansfield, Michael J. "Mike"**, Senator (D-Montana) until January 3, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Japan from June 10, 1977
- Marshall, George C.**, Secretary of State from 1947 until 1949; Secretary of Defense from 1950 until 1951
- Mathias, Charles M., Jr., "Mac"**, Senator (R-Maryland)
- Maynes, Charles William "Bill"**, member, Carter-Mondale transition team, 1976; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 14, 1977, until April 9, 1980
- McCloy, John J.**, President, World Bank and International Monetary Fund from 1947 until 1949; U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, from 1949 until 1952; Chair, Chase Manhattan Bank from 1953 until 1960; Chair, Ford Foundation from 1958 until 1965; adviser to numerous presidents
- McCone, John A.**, Director of Central Intelligence from 1961 until 1965

- McCullough, David**, prize-winning American author and historian
- McGovern, George S.**, Senator (D-South Dakota) until January 3, 1981; Democratic nominee for President, 1972
- McHenry, Donald F.**, member, Department of State Transition Team, 1976; Project Director, Humanitarian Policy Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace until March 1977; U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations from March 1977 until September 1979; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from September 23, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- McIntyre, James T., Jr.**, Director, Georgia Office of Planning and Budget until February 1977; Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, from February until September, 1977; acting Director from September 1977 until March 24, 1978; thereafter Director
- McNamara, Robert S.**, Secretary of Defense from 1961 until 1968; thereafter, President, World Bank and International Monetary Fund
- Meany, George**, President of the AFL-CIO until 1979
- Miller, Israel**, Rabbi; founding President, American Zionist Federation; Chair, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; Vice President, Yeshiva University
- Miller, G. William**, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve from 1977; Secretary of the Treasury from August 6, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Mondale, Walter F. "Fritz"**, Senator (DFL-Minnesota) until December 30, 1976; Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Monroe, William B. "Bill"**, moderator, NBC *Meet the Press*
- Moore, Frank**, national finance director, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison from 1977 until 1981
- Moose, Richard M.**, staff associate, Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1976; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from March 18 until August 15, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 6, 1977, until January 16, 1981
- Morgan, Robert B.**, Senator (D-North Carolina) from January 3, 1975, until January 3, 1981
- Moyer, Homer**, General Counsel, Department of Commerce
- Moynihan, Daniel Patrick**, U.S. Ambassador to India from 1973 until 1975; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1975 until 1976; Senator (D-New York) from January 3, 1977
- Muskie, Edmund S.**, Senator (D-Maine) until May 1980; Democratic nominee for Vice President, 1968; Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, 1981
- Muzorewa, Abel**, Bishop; leader of the United African National Council, Rhodesia
- Navon, Yitzhak**, President of Israel
- Neidle, Alan F.**, Director and Special Assistant, Policy Planning and Reports Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Multilateral Affairs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Neto, Antonio Agostinho**, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); President of the People's Republic of Angola from November 11, 1975, until September 10, 1979
- Newsom, David D.**, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia until October 6, 1977; U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, from November 11, 1977, until March 30, 1978; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978; Secretary of State ad interim, May 2-4, 1980, and January 18, 1981
- Newsom, Eric D.**, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Special Assistant, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 1978; Deputy Director and also Acting Director, Office of International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, from 1978 until 1979; thereafter staff member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

- Nimetz, Matthew**, Counselor of the Department of State from March 30, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs from February 19 until December 5, 1980; also, acting Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, 1979
- Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974
- Nkomo, Joshua**, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
- Novak, Robert D.**, syndicated columnist
- Nunn, Samuel A.**, Senator (D-Georgia)
- Odom, William E.**, Lieutenant General, USA, Military Attache, U.S. Embassy in Moscow until 1974; research associate, Research Institute on International Change, Columbia University, from 1974 until 1975; associate professor, United States Military Academy, from 1974 until 1977; senior research associate, Research Institute on International Change, from 1975 until 1977; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981
- Ogarkov, Nikolay**, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union
- Ohira, Masayoshi**, Prime Minister of Japan from December 1978 until June 1980
- O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr. "Tip"**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) and Speaker of the House of Representatives
- Owen, Lord David**, British Foreign Secretary from February 21, 1977, until May 4, 1979
- Owen, Henry D.**, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1966 until 1969; Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution until March 1977; advisor to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 campaign; member, National Security Council staff, International Economics Cluster, from 1977 until 1981; also Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for International Economic Summits from October 20, 1978, until January 21, 1981
- Packard, David S.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 until 1971
- Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza**, Shah of Iran
- Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H.**, physicist; Director, Stanford University Linear Accelerator Center
- Park Chung-hee**, President of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) until October 26, 1979
- Pastor, Robert A.**, Executive Director, Linowitz Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations from February 1975 until January 1977; advisor to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 campaign; member, National Security Council staff, Latin American/Caribbean, North/South Cluster, from January 1977 until January 1981
- Patolichev, Nikolay Semenovich**, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade
- Pearson, James B.**, Senator (R-Kansas) until December 23, 1978
- Percy, Charles H.**, Senator (R-Illinois)
- Podgorny, Nikolay**, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet until June 16, 1977; Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Pol Pot**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (Cambodia) until 1981; also, Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) until January 7, 1979
- Powell, Joseph L., Jr. "Jody"**, White House Press Secretary from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Press, Frank**, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology until June 1, 1977; thereafter, Special Adviser to the President for Science and Technology and Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
- Proxmire, William**, Senator (D-Wisconsin)

- Pustay, John**, Lieutenant General, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Putnam, Robert D.**, Professor, University of Michigan; member, National Security Council staff, 1978
- Qaddafi, Muammar**, Colonel (Muamar Gaddafi), Chairman, Revolutionary Command Council of Libya
- Quandt, William**, member, National Security Council staff, Middle East/North Africa Cluster, from January 1977 until August 1979
- Rabin, Yitzhak**, Israeli Prime Minister from 1974 until 1977
- Rafshoon, Gerald**, Assistant to the President for Communications from July 1, 1978, until August 14, 1979; thereafter, media director, Carter-Mondale campaign
- Read, Benjamin M.**, President, U.S. German Marshall Fund until 1977; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management
- Reagan, Ronald W.**, Governor of California until January 6, 1975; Republican candidate for President in 1976; Republican nominee for President in 1980; President of the United States from January 20, 1981, until January 20, 1989
- Reuss, Henry S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); chair, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs
- Reynolds, Frank**, correspondent, ABC News; co-anchor, *ABC World News Tonight*, from 1978; original anchor, *America Held Hostage* (later renamed *Nightline*)
- Ribicoff, Abraham A.**, Senator (D-Connecticut) until January 3, 1981
- Robinson, Charles W.**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from January 3, 1975, until April 9, 1976; Deputy Secretary of State from April 9, 1976, until January 20, 1977
- Rockefeller, John D. III**, philanthropist; founder, Asia Society
- Rogers, Bernard**, General, USA; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army from 1976 until 1979; member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Rogers, William D.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from October 7, 1974, until June 18, 1976; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until December 31, 1976
- Rogers, William P.**, Secretary of State from 1969 until 1973
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano**, President of the United States from 1933 until 1945
- Rosenbaum, Herman**, President, National Council of Young Israel
- Rosenfeld, Stephen**, editor and columnist, *The Washington Post*
- Rostow, Walt W.**, Counselor and Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1966; Special Assistant to the President from 1966 until 1969
- Rowan, Carl T.**, Director, United States Information Agency from 1964 until 1965; thereafter, syndicated columnist
- Rowe, James H.**, lawyer; administrative assistant to Franklin Roosevelt from 1939 until 1941; adviser to Lyndon Johnson
- Rusk, Dean**, Secretary of State from 1961 until 1969; Professor, University of Georgia School of Law from 1970
- Sadat, Anwar al-**, President of Egypt
- Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich**, physicist and Soviet dissident; recipient, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize
- Sanders, Edward**, President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee from 1975 until 1976; Deputy National Campaign Director, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; Senior Adviser to the President and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Jewish Affairs from July 1978 until March 1980
- Saouma, Edouard**, Director, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, from 1976

- Saunders, Harold H. "Hal"**, member, National Security Council staff, until mid 1974; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from mid 1974 until 1975; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from December 1, 1975, until April 10, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro**, leader of the Angolan national liberation movement UNITA
- Schecter, Jerrold**, member, National Security Council staff, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, Press Officer and Associate Press Secretary from January 1977 until February 1980
- Scheel Walter**, West German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister from October 1969 to 1974; President of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1974
- Scheuer, James H.**, President, National Housing Conference until 1974; member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York) from January 3, 1975
- Schieffer, Bob**, correspondent, CBS News
- Schindler, Alexander**, Rabbi; President, Union of American Hebrew Congregations
- Schlesinger, James R.**, Secretary of Defense until November 19, 1975; Secretary of Energy from August 5, 1977, until July 20, 1979; Special Assistant to the President, Energy Office, from January 21, 1977, until August 4, 1977
- Schmidt, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Schultze, Charles L.**, Chair, Council of Economic Advisers, from 1977 until 1980
- Schweid, Barry**, correspondent, Associated Press
- Scowcroft, Brent**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 1975; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 3, 1975, until January 20, 1977
- Scranton, William**, former Governor of Pennsylvania; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from March 15, 1976, until January 19, 1977
- Senghor, Leopold**, President of Senegal
- Shcharanskiy, Anatoly**, Soviet dissident
- Sheinkman, Jacob**, Secretary/Treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers; President, Jewish Labor Committee
- Shriver, R. Sargent**, Democratic Vice Presidential nominee, 1972
- Shulman, Marshall D.**, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State
- Simon, William**, Secretary of the Treasury until January 1977
- Slepak, Vladimir**, Soviet radio engineer denied an exit visa in 1970
- Sloss, Leon**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until 1975; Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau and later International Security Programs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1976 until 1978
- Smith, Howard K.** co-anchor, *ABC Evening News*, until 1975; thereafter political analyst and commentator, ABC News; moderator of the 1980 Presidential Debate
- Smith, Ian**, Prime Minister of Rhodesia until June 1, 1979
- Smith, William**, Lieutenant General, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from 1975
- Solarz, Stephen J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York) from January 3, 1975
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I.**, Soviet novelist and historian forced into exile
- Solomon, Anthony M.**, Under Secretary of the Treasury from 1977 until 1980; President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1980
- Somoza Debayle, Anastasio**, President of Nicaragua
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut "Hal"**, member, National Security Council staff, until 1974; Counselor, Department of State from 1974 until 1977
- Sorensen, Theodore C. "Ted"**, President's Special Counsel from 1961 until 1963; Jimmy Carter's unsuccessful nominee for head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1977

- Spain, James W.**, U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from January 8, 1976, until August 21, 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from February 26, 1980
- Sparkman, John J.**, Senator (D-Alabama); chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until January 3, 1979
- Speth, James Gustave "Gus"**, co-founder and staff attorney, National Resources Defense Council; member, Council on Environmental Quality, from 1977 until 1979; acting Chair from April until August 1979; Chair, CEQ and Chair, Task Force on Global Resources and Environment, from August 2, 1979
- Stafford, Robert T.**, Senator (R-Vermont)
- Stennis, John C.**, Senator (D-Mississippi)
- Sternstein, Joseph**, Rabbi; President, Zionist Organization of America
- Stevenson, Adlai**, Democratic nominee for President in 1952 and 1956
- Stone, Marvin**, Editor, *U.S. News and World Report*
- Strauss, Robert S.**, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from 1977 until 1979; Personal Representative of the President from April 1979
- Sukhodrev, Viktor**, Soviet interpreter
- Suslov, Mikhail A.**, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee
- Tack, Juan Antonio**, Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Talmadge, Herman E.**, Senator (D-Georgia) until January 3, 1981
- Tannenbaum, Bernice S.**, National President, Hadassah
- Tarnoff, Peter**, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981
- Teng Hsaio-p'ing**, *See* Deng Xiaoping
- Thatcher, Margaret**, British Prime Minister from 1979
- Thornton, Thomas P.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; thereafter member, National Security Council staff, South Asia/UN Matters, North/South Cluster
- Tito, Josip Broz**, President of Yugoslavia until 1980
- Todman, Terence A.**, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica until January 24, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress from April 1, 1977, until June 27, 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Spain from July 20, 1978
- Toon, Malcom**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until October 1979
- Torrijos Herrera, Omar**, Brigadier General, Commander of Panamanian and National Guard, de facto leader of Panama
- Trudeau, Pierre Elliot**, Canadian Prime Minister until June 3, 1979, and from March 3, 1980
- Thurmond, J. Strom**, Senator (R-South Carolina)
- Togo, Fumihiko**, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
- Trewhitt, Henry**, diplomatic correspondent, *Baltimore Sun*; panelist, 1976 Presidential Debates
- Truman, Harry S.**, President of the United States from 1945 to 1953
- Turner, Stansfield**, Admiral, USN, Commander-in-chief, AFSOUTH, until February 1977; Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Twaddell, William H.**, Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from July 1975 until January 1977; Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary, from January 1977
- Udall, Morris K. "Mo"**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Arizona)
- Ushiba, Nobuhiko**, Japanese Minister for External Economic Affairs

Ustinov, Dmitry, Soviet Minister of Defense

Vaky, Viron P. "Pete", U.S. Ambassador to Columbia from April 5, 1974, until June 23, 1976; U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from July 26, 1976, until June 24, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 18, 1978, until November 30, 1979

Valeriani, Richard, diplomatic correspondent, NBC News; panelist, 1976 Presidential Debates

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 28, 1980

Vanik, Charles, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Ohio)

Vest, George S., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until March 27, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1977

Vogelgesang, Sandra, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; Special Assistant for Policy Planning, Bureau of European Affairs, from January 1979

Voorde, Frances "Fran", Deputy Appointments Secretary to the President

Vorontsov, Yuli M., Soviet Minister Counselor to the United States

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Walters, Barbara, correspondent, NBC News and co-anchor, NBC's *Today Show* until 1976; correspondent, ABC News and co-anchor, *ABC Evening News*, from 1976 until 1978; co-anchor, *ABC's 20/20*

Warnke, Paul C., Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 1977 until October 1978

Watson, Jack, Head, Carter-Mondale Policy Planning Group, 1976; Assistant to the President for Inter-governmental Affairs and Secretary to the Cabinet until June 1980; thereafter White House Chief of Staff

Watson, Thomas J. Jr., chair, International Business Machines, until 1979; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 29, 1979, until January 15, 1981

Weil, Frank A., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business and head of the International Trade Administration from 1977 until 1979

Westbrook, Samuel W. III, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF; action officer, Directorate of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, U.S. Air Force, from 1975 until 1977; member, National Security Council staff, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter, chief of the staff group for the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Wexler, Anne, White House Assistant for Public Outreach from May 1, 1978, until January 1981

Wilkins, Roy, Executive Director, NAACP

Wilson, Lewis, General, USMC; Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps; member, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States from 1913 until 1921

Wise, Phillip M., Jr., member, Carter-Mondale transition team; Deputy Appointments Secretary to the President, from August 1977 until May 1978; thereafter, Appointments Secretary to the President

Witteveen, Johannes H., Managing Director, International Monetary Fund

Woodcock, Leonard, President of the United Auto Workers until 1977; Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from July 1977 until March 1979

Yeh, George K.C., Republic of China Foreign Minister during the 1950s

York, Herbert, physicist; former Chancellor, University of California-San Diego

Young, Andrew J., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Georgia) until January 29, 1977; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 30, 1977, until September 23, 1979

XL Persons

Young, Charles William "C.W." or "Bill", member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Florida)

Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); chair, House Committee on International Relations

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammed, President of Pakistan

Zorinsky, Edward, Mayor of Omaha until December 1976; Senator (D-Nebraska) from December 28, 1976

Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974–1980

1. Editorial Note

Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter declared his candidacy for the Democratic Presidential nomination on December 12, 1974. In preparation for Carter's announcement speech, adviser Stuart Eizenstat and members of the Governor's Issues Group provided Carter with specific themes he needed to emphasize. In a November 1, 1974, memorandum, Eizenstat surveyed the current mood in a post-Watergate America:

"We are currently a country adrift from our moorings. Our leaders muddle through from day to day, reacting to crises, with no notion of where we are headed.

"As we approach our 200th anniversary as a nation, it is time that our actions be guided by defined goals we wish to achieve in the balance of the 20th century. These are not pie-in-the-sky hopes but realistic, achievable goals. These national goals must be clearly defined so that our citizens and our decision-makers know where we are headed and why we are going there."

Eizenstat stressed that while Carter did not need to define "the specific goals the nation must set for itself," he should "display some notion of the areas in which *specific, defined goals are a prerequisite to national government decision-making.*" In addition to five domestic areas, Eizenstat listed the elimination of domestic and international hunger and "a foreign policy which is realistic, reasonable, and which reflects our national goals and ideals and stresses the tempered use of power abroad." Referencing Carter's ability to demonstrate national leadership, Eizenstat noted:

"You have had to make executive decisions—to make a budget and live within it—to develop new programs and provide the leadership to carry through these programs—to deal with people on a daily basis, not with Washington lobbyists—while your principal opponents have never made executive decisions but simply react as legislators to problems—who can propose the world without regard to accountability or efficiency of their proposals. Your experience is closer to that required as President than theirs. Indeed, their 'duties' are such they can run for President and be Senator at the same time.

“You should stress your own varied background—e.g. farmer and nuclear physicist—with *emphasis* on your foreign policy experience.

“Your accomplishments should *not* be set out in washer-list form but should be interspersed throughout the speech.” (Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office, Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 1, Announcement Speech, 9/74–12/74)

Carter formally announced his candidacy at events both in Washington and Atlanta, Georgia. In an address he delivered at a luncheon held at the National Press Club, Carter briefly described his background, stressing the commonalities and dreams he believed all Americans shared. Such dreams, he rued, had been compromised by “debilitating compromise, acceptance of mediocrity, subservience to special interests, and an absence of executive vision and direction.” He called for the American people to “reaffirm and to strengthen our ethical and spiritual and political beliefs,” setting out specific steps that governmental officials should take to regain public trust. With regard to foreign policy, Carter asserted:

“It is obvious that domestic and foreign affairs are directly interrelated. A necessary base for effective implementation of any foreign policy is to get our domestic house in order.

“Coordination of effort among the leaders of our nation should be established so that our farm production, industrial development, foreign trade, defense, energy, and diplomatic policies are mutually supportive and not in conflict.

“The time for American intervention in all the problems of the world is over. But we cannot retreat into isolationism. Ties of friendship and cooperation with our friends and neighbors must be strengthened. Our common interests must be understood and pursued. The integrity of Israel must be preserved. Highly personalized and narrowly focused diplomatic efforts, although sometimes successful, should be balanced with a more wide-ranging implementation of foreign policy by competent foreign service officers.

“Our nation’s security is obviously of paramount importance, and everything must be done to insure adequate military preparedness. But there is no reason why our national defense establishment cannot also be efficient.” (*The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part II: *Jimmy Carter*, pages 3–4, 9) Carter’s handwritten notes outlining the specific items he intended to include in the draft are in the Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 1, Announcement Speech, 9/74–12/74.

Later that evening, Carter addressed a rally of family, friends, and political supporters at the Atlanta Civic Center. In his remarks, Carter asserted that winning the Presidency was not the “most important thing in my life.” Continuing, he noted: “There are many other things

that I would not do to be President. I would not tell a lie; I would not mislead the American people; I would not avoid taking a stand on a controversial issue which is important to our country or the world. And I would not betray your trust." Referencing his earlier address to the National Press Club, Carter commented that he had spent "25 or 30 minutes" covering "30 specific issues in some superficial way." Once he left gubernatorial office on January 14, 1975, he intended to "spell these issues much more clearly and much more definitively and much more thoroughly. So that by the time the end of this campaign arrives, the American people will know not only what I stand for, but, I hope with my efforts and those of other candidates, what this country ought to stand for." (*The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pages 11 and 12)

2. Address by Jimmy Carter¹

Tokyo, May 28, 1975

NEW APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy was the subject of an address delivered to the American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo, Japan, May 28, 1975. Mr. Carter said:

The world in 1975 is a very different world from that which we knew in the 1950's and 1960's. Recent events have proven that a stable world order for the future cannot be built on a preoccupation with the old strategic issues which have dominated East-West and North-South relations since the end of World War II.

¹ Source: *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 66–70. Carter delivered prepared remarks before the American Chamber of Commerce. Carter traveled to Japan to attend the Trilateral Commission meeting held in Tokyo and Kyoto May 30–31. Private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and Canada established the Trilateral Commission in 1973 to promote cooperation among these regions on common problems. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Trilateral Commission's Director, addressed the members on the last day of the conference. His remarks are printed in Charles B. Heck, ed., *Dialogue: Trilateral Leaders Discuss Global Redistribution of Power and Problems of Trilateral Community*, Japan, May 1975 (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1975), pp. 11–14. Brzezinski recalled that Carter's performance at the meeting had impressed him and convinced him to support Carter's bid for the Democratic nomination, even as the other likely Democratic nominees sought his counsel. Brzezinski began authoring foreign policy papers for Carter, and by the end of 1975 Brzezinski "had emerged as Carter's principal foreign policy adviser." (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 6–7)

Recently, with the end of the Vietnam conflict, a tremendous burden has been lifted from our shoulders—both an economic burden and one of divisiveness and doubt. Our over-involvement in the internal affairs of Southeast Asian countries is resulting in a mandatory reassessment by the American people of our basic foreign policies. The lessons we have learned can be a basis for dramatic improvements in the prospects for world peace and the solutions for international problems. The people of the United States are inclined to look toward the future and not to dwell on the mistakes of the past.

Lessons Learned

What are the lessons we have learned? What are our likely decisions about the future?

There is no doubt that our people are wary of any new foreign involvements, but we realize that many such involvements will be necessary.

We have learned that never again should our country become militarily involved in the internal affairs of another nation unless there is a direct and obvious threat to the security of the United States or its people. We must not use the CIA or other covert means to effect violent change in any government or government policy. Such involvements are not in the best interests of world peace, and they are almost inherently doomed to failure.

When we embrace one of the contending leadership factions in a country, too often it is the power of the United States, not the support of the people, which keeps that leader in power. Our chosen leader may then resort to repressive force against his own people to keep himself in power.

We have learned the hard way how important it is during times of international stress and turmoil to keep close ties with our allies and friends and to strive for multilateral agreements and solutions to critical problems. I hope that our days of unilateral intervention such as occurred in Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Dominican Republic are over.

Another lesson to be learned is that we cannot impose democracy on another country by force. Also, we cannot buy friends; and it is obvious that other nations resent it if we try. Our interests lie in protecting our national security, in preventing war, in peacefully promoting the principles of human freedom and democracy, and in exemplifying in our foreign policy the true character and attitudes of the American people.

We understand the vital importance of our relationship with our allies. Our friends in Japan, Western Europe and Israel must know that we will keep our promises; yet, they will be reassured not by promises but by tangible actions and regular consultations. It is particularly im-

portant that we recement strained relationships with our allies; that will be far easier to accomplish now that our involvement in Vietnam is over. The United States will always honor those commitments which have been made openly by our leaders and with the full knowledge and involvement of the people of our country.

We must never again keep secret the evolution of our foreign policy from the Congress and the American people. They should never again be misled about our options, our commitments, our progress, or our failures. If the President sets the policy openly, reaching agreement among the officers of the government, if the President involves the Congress and the leaders of both parties rather than letting a handful of people plot the policy behind closed doors, then we will avoid costly mistakes and have the support of our citizens in our dealings with other nations. Our commitments will be stronger; abrupt changes will be fewer.

Secretaries of State and Defense and other Cabinet officers should regularly appear before Congress, hopefully in televised sessions, to answer hard questions and to give straight answers. No equivocation nor unwarranted secrecy should be permitted.

Interdependence Among Nations

What are the other elements of our future foreign policy? This is no time for thoughts of isolationism. We can now turn our attention more effectively toward matters like the world economy, freedom of the seas, environmental quality, food, population, peace, conservation of irreplaceable commodities, and the reduction of world armaments. The intensity of our interrelated problems is rapidly increasing, and better mechanisms for consultation must be established and utilized before these problems become more dangerous.

Interdependence among nations is an unavoidable and increasing factor in our individual lives. We know that even a nation with an economy as strong as ours is affected by errors such as the excessive sale of wheat to Russia in 1973,² by commodity boycotts, and by the ebb and tide of economic events in the rest of the world. Our own temporary embargo of soybeans and other oil seeds was a damaging mistake to ourselves and to our friends like Japan.³ Such mistakes can be avoided in the future only by a commitment to consultation, as exem-

² Reference is to the July 1972 Soviet purchase of \$750 million worth of grain from the United States. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 7.

³ On June 27, 1973, the Nixon administration placed a temporary embargo on soybean and seed exports. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 46, footnote 2.

plified by the Trilateral Commission relationship among North America, Western Europe, and Japan.

The machinery of consultation must be reexamined and some new mechanisms developed. Others need to be abandoned or revitalized. We must strengthen international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. Our new commitment to multinational consultation should be reflected in the quality of the representatives we appoint to international agencies.

It is likely in the near future that issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of the military security problems which have dominated international relations in the world since World War II.

The relationship between Japan and the United States is based on both firm pillars of interest—our mutual security and our great economic relationship.

The security of Japan is vital to the United States, and we will maintain our commitment to Japan's defense. The sensitive question of the level and deployment of military forces here will, of course, be shaped in a continuing dialogue with Japan.

The enormous trade flow of \$24 billion a year is the largest overseas commerce the world has ever known. We rely on one another. There is no place for abrupt unilateral decisions which shock the other trading partner. Major foreign policy actions affecting the other must be thoroughly discussed in advance with our friend.

Interdependence means mutual sacrifice. For example, we must cooperate with our allies in reducing our demands for fossil fuel, assist them in the alternative development of energy resources, build up common stockpiles, plan jointly for future crises, and share the oil investments of the OPEC countries.

Among our people there is broad support for continuing the policy of *détente* with the Soviet Union and China—but not at the expense of close cooperation and consultation with our friends and allies. We must again reorient our foreign policy attention toward our friends. Our recent emphases have all too often involved our adversaries and ignored the interests and needs of our allies. *Détente* should be pursued on a mutually beneficial basis through a series of sustained, low key and open discussions among the participants—and not just dramatic or secret agreements among two or three national leaders.

Our concern with foreign policy, however, must go beyond avoiding the mistakes of the past, reaffirming our close relationship with our allies, and continuing the process of *détente*. We must end the continuing proliferation of atomic weapons throughout the world, which is as senseless as a waste of precious resources as it is a mortal

danger to humanity. We should refuse to sell nuclear powerplants and fuels to nations who do not sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty⁴ or who will not agree to adhere to strict provisions regarding international control of atomic wastes. The establishment of additional nuclear-free zones in the world must also be encouraged.

In addition, however, the United States and the Soviet Union have an obligation to deal with the excessive nuclear armaments which we possess. Our ultimate goal should be the reduction of nuclear weapons in all nations to zero. In the meantime, simple, careful, and firm public proposals to implement these reductions should be pursued as a prime national purpose in all our negotiations with nuclear powers—both present and potential. The Vladivostok Agreement⁵ obviously permits the continued atomic arms race.

We must play a constructive role in the resolution of local conflicts which may lead to major power confrontations. Peace in the Middle East is of vital interest to us all. While peace is the basic responsibility of the nations in the area, the United States must help secure this peace by maintaining the trust of all sides. We must strive to maintain good relations with the Arab countries as well as Israel, and to recognize Arab needs and aspirations as long as they recognize that the major element of a settlement is the guaranteed right of Israel to exist as a viable and peaceful nation. The rights of the Palestinians must also be recognized as part of any final solution.

It is essential that the flow of oil to Japan and Western Europe never be shut off. The United States should not consider unilateral action in the Middle East to assure our own nation's access to Mideast oil. Open or veiled threats of armed intervention do not contribute toward a peaceful settlement of the problems of this tortured region.

The peoples of the developing nations need the aid, technology, and knowledge of the developed nations. We need the developed na-

⁴ Reference is to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow in July 1968. On July 1, 1968, during a ceremony in the East Room of the White House, President Johnson made a statement endorsing the treaty; Dean Rusk and William C. Foster signed the treaty on behalf of the United States. Johnson transmitted the treaty to the Senate on July 9, and the Senate gave its consent to the agreement on March 13, 1969. Following ratification by the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 40 other states, the treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 250.

⁵ In late November 1974, General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford held a series of meetings in the Siberian port city of Vladivostok. At the conclusion of the summit, the leaders reached an understanding regarding the need to place overall limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The text of the Vladivostok Agreement is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 91. For the memoranda of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 90–93.

tions as sources for raw materials and as markets for our exports. The world will not be a safe or decent place in which to live, however, if it continues to divide between countries which are increasingly rich and those which are increasingly impoverished.

The knowledge that food, oil, fertilizer and financial credit are vital must not be the cause of international extortion; rather, our interdependence should provide a basis on which continuing international trade agreements can be reached. There is a danger that the recent economic successes of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel will encourage other confrontation by countries possessing scarce raw materials. This could be a serious and self-damaging mistake, resulting in a series of pyramiding and perhaps uncontrollable confrontations, leading to serious damage to the poorer and weaker nations.

A stable world order cannot become a reality when people of many nations of the world suffer mass starvation; when the countries with capital and technology belligerently confront other nations for the control of raw materials and energy sources; when open and discriminatory trade has become the exception rather than the rule; when there are no established arrangements for supplying the world's food and energy nor for governing, control, and development of the seas; and when there are no effective efforts to deal with population explosions or environmental quality.

We must remember that because of our tremendous and continuing economic, military and political strength, the United States has an inevitable role of leadership to play within the community of nations. But our influence and respect should go beyond our military might, our political power, and our economic wealth—and be based on the fact that we are right, and fair, and decent, and honest, and truthful.

Our U.S. foreign policy must once again reflect the basic ideals of our people and our nation. We must reassert our vital interest in human rights and humanitarian concerns, and we must provide enlightened leadership in the world community. The people of the United States want to be trusted and respected, and we are determined, therefore, to be trustworthy and respectful of others.

3. Statement by Senator Walter F. Mondale¹

Washington, June 2, 1975

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER VIETNAM

Mr. President.² Let me express my appreciation to Senator Cranston, Senator Kennedy, and others who have arranged this historic discussion. It is fitting that we begin the debate on the future course of America's post-Vietnam foreign policy in the context of the Senate's consideration of the military authorization bill.³ For it was our tragic experience in Vietnam which showed how empty is a foreign policy based on military power alone.

As we try to define America's future world role, we must take full account of the fact that the citizens of this country are profoundly skeptical. They know only too well that their patriotism has been exploited by political leaders who could no longer justify their actions with candor. I do not believe that the United States is about to become an isolationist country, but the American people no longer want to be the world's policemen nor go on one-man crusades. I believe that Americans are willing to continue to shoulder our fair share of the world's responsibilities, but only if these responsibilities are defined in terms that make sense, that are consistent with our basic values and that relate to our real concerns. This requires that we go back to basics—in the terms that we use to think about foreign policy, in the values we pursue, and in the way we view the real sources of America's prestige and power.

The first step in revising our thinking about foreign policy should be to jettison the amorphous term "national security," and to get back

¹ Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Senatorial Papers, Press Relations/Media Activities Records, Speeches, 1975, Senate Floor Statement on American Foreign Policy After Vietnam, June 2, 1975. No classification marking. Aaron's name appears on the first page of the statement in an unknown hand. Mondale delivered his statement on the Senate floor. During 1973 and 1974, Mondale had launched an exploratory campaign for the Democratic nomination, ultimately withdrawing his name from consideration in November 1974. He later recalled, "On the day I announced I was ending that experiment, I felt huge relief. After that I had no intention of going back into the presidential arena. I felt I had found my sweet spot in the Senate." (*The Good Fight*, p. 157)

² Reference is to President Pro Tempore of the Senate Eastland.

³ On March 3, 1975 Stennis introduced the Department of Defense Appropriations bill (S. 920). The Senate Armed Services Committee reported Stennis's bill to the Senate with amendments (S. Rept. 94-146) on May 15. During the last week of May and first week of June, Cranston, Kennedy, Hart, and Mondale opened debate in the Senate over the bill. Ultimately, the House version of the legislation (H.R. 6674; P.L. 94-106) was passed in lieu of S. 920. Ford signed the appropriations bill into law on October 7. See Spencer Rich, "Arms Debate Tied to View of Cold War," *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1975, p. A-7 and *Congress and the Nation*, vol. IV, 1973-1976, p. 168.

to talking concretely about our diplomatic, military, economic and other interests.

The term “national security” has dominated our thinking in foreign affairs for three decades. In the late 1940’s, when the National Security Council was established by law,⁴ we were concerned about a monolithic enemy—the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, and Communist parties throughout the world appeared to be acting in concert, using every means of diplomacy, military coercion, economic leverage and propaganda, orchestrated on behalf of Soviet imperialistic expansion. With the lessons of Hitler fresh in our minds, we felt, and I believe quite rightly, that we had to meet this threat with a comprehensive national effort. Otherwise we believed that the United States and the American people would ultimately be placed in direct jeopardy.

But as the years passed, the Sino-Soviet alliance cracked apart. Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc began to define their interests to suit themselves and not the Soviet Union.

Our own problems became more complicated and the concept of “national security” was not much of a guide to solving them. For example, the idea of national security has militarized our foreign policy to the point of being virtually helpless when confronted by major international economic problems such as energy. All we could do to respond to OPEC’s fourfold increase in the price of oil was to mutter empty threats about invading the Middle East.

But even worse, I believe the fog of national security helped to lead us into the tragic swamp of Vietnam, into the morass called Watergate.

In the early 1960’s we saw Vietnam as a threat to our overall national security. We could not see that our interests in Southeast Asia were diplomatic, not military. The problem was to contain the threat of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence, and not as some suggested at the time, to defend Hawaii.

While there was nothing wrong with encouraging a democratic, pro-U.S. government in Saigon, we failed to recognize that our bottom-line interest only required a reasonably independent South Vietnam, regardless of the complexion of its government. Skillful diplomacy, not military intervention, might have achieved—and in fact might still achieve—that basic diplomatic objective.

National security confused our objectives at home, as well as abroad. If we wanted to support higher education, we had to justify it in terms of national security. When we wanted to make sensible long-

⁴ Reference is to the National Security Act of 1947, which President Truman signed into law on July 26, 1947. The Act established the National Security Council, which met for the first time on September 26. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Documents 196–240.*

term investment in basic scientific research, we found we could only do it in the name of national security. When we faced the choice between a Great Society at home and defending our so-called national security in Southeast Asia, you know what took priority. The war on poverty was lost long before the war in Vietnam ground to its tragic finale.

In time, this bloated concept of national security ultimately came home to us with Watergate. Who can forget the passage in the White House tapes when Richard Nixon is groping for a way to try to justify to the American public the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office?

John Dean suggests, "You might put it on a national security grounds basis." The President responds, "National security. We had to get information coming out and everything coming out. The whole thing was national security." John Dean adds, "I think we could get by on that."

And there was an even more chilling exchange in the Watergate hearings when Senator Talmadge asked John Ehrlichman, "Now if the President could authorize a covert break-in, and you do not know exactly how that power would be limited, you do not think it could include murder or other crimes beyond a covert break-in, do you?" Mr. Ehrlichman answers, "I do not know where the line is, Senator."

Let's retire this term "national security" and get back to defining our interests more concretely, in terms of diplomatic interests, military interests, and economic interests; or political, humanitarian, ethnic and cultural interests.

I see nothing wrong in being frank about the fact that in the Middle East our support for Israel is based on political and cultural affinity, that our desire for good relations with the Arab states is based on economic interests, and that our hope for peace between the two is based on concern that war could prompt a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Portugal offers another example of how dealing with specific interests rather than the concept of national security helps clarify what is at stake. While we would like to see a democratic Portugal, and should do what we can to encourage that, our primary interest is military. We must not be too pious in our criticism of the present government and forget that we were willing to tolerate a truly odious dictator for generations—precisely because the Salazar regime⁵ provided us with a military base in the Azores that enabled us to control the Atlantic and support the Middle East.

⁵ Reference is to Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who served as the Portuguese Prime Minister from 1932 until 1968.

By putting our interest in Portugal's internal affairs into perspective, I think it should make it even more possible for us to be patient, to be more understanding of the very difficult internal problems of establishing a reasonably representative and progressive government in the aftermath of decades of tyranny. I believe we need not worry too much about how the political complexion in Portugal may change from day to day. Personally, I will be rooting for the moderate and democratic forces in Portugal, but as a government we should be clear that the essential American concern is for the continuation of our military relationship.

The second major issue we need to confront in defining our future foreign policy is how to support our basic values without winding up back in places like Vietnam. I do not believe the American people will support a foreign policy devoid of human values, yet how do we stop short of meddling in other peoples' affairs?

I believe strongly that we can and should support human rights, individual freedom and justice, governments who derive their power from the consent of the governed. I have always opposed communism because it has jeopardized these values. But somewhere along the line we lost sight of the fact that we were contesting tyranny, regardless of its political coloration.

We became absorbed in the narrower struggle against communism, and in the process supported and ultimately overcommitted ourselves to some of the most outrageously oppressive regimes in the world. And ironically, the consequence has often been to give a boost to the Communists by identifying the United States and our values with petty tyrants.

The lesson, I believe, is to support those who truly favor democracy, freedom, and social justice and treat with equal disdain tyrants, whatever their political label.

A second major lesson that we should have learned by now is that our commitment to freedom and justice cannot substitute for the lack of commitment on the part of others. We cannot care more about the integrity and independence of a country being threatened than its leaders. We must not offer to make sacrifices that are greater than the sacrifices to be borne by those we would help.

A third way to be true to our values, yet avoid the pitfalls of another Vietnam, is to turn our attention to the great unfinished business on the world's agenda: hunger, development, economic stability and progress, a new equitable regime for the oceans, a more effective control of conventional and nuclear arms. There is a very long list that has received too low priority for too great a time. By tackling these problems, I believe that we can fulfill our responsibilities, pursue our basic values, without inevitably being drawn into the agony of war. We

may, in fact, even be able to make a contribution to reducing some of the causes of human conflict.

Finally, if we are to define a new direction for American foreign policy, we must have a more balanced appreciation of the real sources of American power and influence in the world. With military power second to none, we were unable to alter the course of history in Vietnam. With the ability to destroy the world we could not prevent the oil-producing countries from bringing truly agonizing hardship to millions upon millions of Americans in the form of inflation and the deepest depression since the 1930's. And all the military might in the world does not enable us to command the respect we once had in the international arena.

Military power is increasingly irrelevant to the host of economic, social and political issues confronting this country. This is not to say that we do not have a fundamental military interest in a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union or with a secure Europe, Japan and Israel. But the oil cartel, the threat of other commodity cartels, the problem of world hunger, worldwide recession and inflation—none of these issues, which immediately affect the security of every American, can be resolved by military force.

Moreover, I am convinced that the basic source of American power to deal with these issues lies in the ability of the American people and their government to solve this nation's problems. Our ability to manage a growing and vibrant economy, to be first in the world in technological innovation; to lead the world in efforts to bring equality to all of our citizens; to provide social justice, good housing, jobs, schools; to take care of our old; to insure equal opportunity to our young—these are the things that once were the hallmark of America. We were respected for these things. Nations sought our advice and our counsel, because they had confidence in our leadership, in our sense of priorities, and in our humanity.

Now, after decades in which considerations of national security have taken priority over all others in this country, we have squandered \$150 billion worth of investment in the quagmire of Vietnam. We have spent over \$1 trillion in arms. We have sent our best and brightest into the defense industries, into the military services, into the secret intelligence agencies. We have kept our military machine polished, but have let our cities decay, our transportation systems collapse, our national unity dissolve. We have pursued American ideals in the jungles of Southeast Asia and have ignored them in the jungles of our cities.

If there is anything that must underline a new foreign policy for the United States, it should be the recognition that the source of America's strength and influence in the world is our ability to meet our

needs at home. If we can't solve our problems here, we are not going to solve our problems, or anybody else's problems, abroad.

This is not a call to isolationism, nor unilateral disarmament. We must keep this country strong militarily, and we will no doubt devote the resources to do so. The Soviet Union and others should not be tempted by recent events into miscalculating our commitment to our friends and allies. We are not opting out of the world.

In fact, I think that perhaps we have finally turned the last page on isolationism in the United States. Isolationism is an unwillingness to deal with the world as it is. At one time America demonstrated this by having nothing to do with international affairs. And when we became involved in world affairs, we seemed to want to control everything, to transform other countries in our image, to leave nothing to chance. This too was an unwillingness to deal with the world as it is, and really is a kind of isolationism.

Perhaps now we will begin to accept the diversity, the conflict, and even the disorder that are inherent in the world. We cannot completely control such things, and we have found, to our tragic dismay, that if we try, they only end up controlling us.

Mr. President. I have tried to outline my views on the basic principles underlying the development of a new American foreign policy in this post-Vietnam period.

—First, our policy must be one that is not dominated by elitist abstractions like “national security,” but which is grounded in concrete interests which the American people can identify with and support.

—Second, we must be more disciplined, but no less determined, in the pursuit of our ideals. The response to our overinvolvement in Vietnam is not a Philistine policy devoid of values. Rather, it is to rededicate ourselves more conscientiously to democracy, freedom, justice and the international agenda of human needs.

—Third, we must draw upon sources of national power and influence in addition to military power in the pursuit of our foreign policy. We must recognize that America is strong abroad only insofar as it is strong at home. World leadership and respect will be determined by how well we meet the needs of our own people—for only in that way can this nation recapture its unique claim to being the last, best hope for mankind.

4. Remarks by Jimmy Carter¹

Chicago, March 15, 1976

OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS

In a presentation to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976, Mr. Carter said:

I am pleased to speak to you today. This council is the oldest, the largest, and the most active organization of its kind in the country. For over 50 years you have helped make this city and this region better informed about a world which the St. Lawrence Seaway now brings to your doorstep. Men like Adlai Stevenson, Paul Douglas, and Frank Knox studied the world through this council and went on to make history.

I want to take this opportunity to explain how I shall approach the problems of foreign policy if I am elected President:

How I see our international situation today;

What our role in the world should be;

How we should approach our relationships with different kinds of international neighbors;

What kinds of policies, and what kind of policymakers we shall need so that our international relations can be true expressions of the goals and the character of the people of our country.

Our recent foreign policy, I am afraid, has been predicated on a belief that our national and international strength is inevitably deteriorating. I do not accept this premise.

The prime responsibility of any President is to guarantee the security of our nation, with a tough, muscular, well-organized, and effective fighting force. We must have the ability to avoid the threat of successful attack or blackmail, and we must always be strong enough to carry out our legitimate foreign policy. This is a prerequisite to peace.

Our foreign policy today is in greater disarray than at any time in recent history.

¹ Source: *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 109–119. Carter spoke before the members of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in the Prudential Auditorium. (Sean Toolan, "Might Send U.S. Troops to Africa, Carter Says," *Chicago Tribune*, March 16, 1976, p. 3) On March 16, Carter won the Illinois Democratic primary; see Jim Squires, "A Big Bouquet for Carter and a Wreath for Reagan," *Chicago Tribune*, March 17, 1976, p. 17.

Our Secretary of State² simply does not trust the judgment of the American people, but constantly conducts foreign policy exclusively, personally, and in secret. This creates in our country the very divisions which he has lately deplored. Longstanding traditions of a bipartisan policy and close consultation between the President and Congress have been seriously damaged.

We are losing a tremendous opportunity to reassert our leadership in working with other nations in the cause of peace and progress. The good will our country once enjoyed, based on what we stood for and the willingness of others to follow our example, has been dissipated.

Negotiations with the Soviets on strategic arms are at dead center, while the costly and dangerous buildup of nuclear weapons continues.

Public Confidence Eroded

The policy of détente, which holds real possibilities for peace, has been conducted in a way that has eroded the public confidence it must have.

The moral heart of our international appeal—as a country which stands for self-determination and free choice—has been weakened. It is obviously un-American to interfere in the free political processes of another nation. It is also un-American to engage in assassinations in time of peace in any country.

The people of other nations have learned, in recent years, that they can sometimes neither trust what our government says nor predict what it will do. They have been hurt and disappointed so many times that they no longer know what to believe about the United States. They want to respect us. They like our people. But our people do not seem to be running our government.

Every time we have made a serious mistake in recent years in our dealings with other nations, the American people have been excluded from the process of evolving and consummating our foreign policy. Unnecessary secrecy surrounds the inner workings of our own government, and we have sometimes been deliberately misled by our leaders.

For many nations, we have two policies; one announced in public, another pursued in secret. In the case of China, we even seem to have two Presidents.³

No longer do our leaders talk to the people of the world with the vision, compassion, and practical idealism of men like Woodrow Wilson and John Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson.

² Kissinger.

³ Presumable reference to Ford and Kissinger.

Our foreign policy is being evolved in secret, and in its full details and nuances, it is probably known to one man only. That man is skilled at negotiation with leaders of other countries but far less concerned with consulting the American people or their representatives in Congress, and far less skilled in marshaling the support of a nation behind an effective foreign policy. Because we have let our foreign policy be made for us, we have lost something crucial in the way we talk and the way we act toward other peoples of the world.

When our President and Secretary of State speak to the world without the understanding or support of the American people, they speak with an obviously hollow voice.

All of this is a cause of sorrow and pain to Americans, as well as to those who wish us well and look to us for leadership. We ought to be leading the way toward economic progress and social justice and a stronger, more stable international order. They are the principles on which this nation was founded 200 years ago, by men who believed with Thomas Paine that the “cause of America is the cause of all mankind.”

Every successful foreign policy we have had—whether it was the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin Roosevelt, The Point Four of President Truman or the Peace Corps and trade reform of President Kennedy—was successful because it reflected the best that was in us.

Vietnam to Angola

And in every foreign venture that has failed—whether it was Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Angola, or in the excesses of the CIA—our government forged ahead without consulting the American people, and did things that were contrary to our basic character.

The lesson we draw from recent history is that public understanding and support are now as vital to a successful foreign policy as they are to any domestic program. *No one can make our foreign policy for us as well as we can make it ourselves.*

The role of the United States in the world is changing. For years, we were the only free nation with the military capacity to keep the peace and the resources to insure world economic stability. Japan and Western Europe would never have been able to achieve their economic miracles without our help. Nor could world exports have risen to their present level of three-quarters of a trillion dollars, had not international trade and investment been backed for so long by the American dollars.

These were historic and generous accomplishments, of which we can be justly proud. But we also had the power to make or break regimes with adroit injections of money or arms, and we sometimes used this power in ways that are less commendable.

The world is different now. The old postwar monopolies of economic resource and industrial power have been swept aside and replaced by new structures. The Common Market countries and others like Japan, Mexico, Brazil, and Iran are strong and self-sufficient.

We have learned that we cannot and should not try to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other countries unless our own nation is endangered.

Over 100 new nations have come into being in the past 30 years. A few have wealth, but most exist in bitter poverty. In many, independence has set loose long-suppressed emotions and antagonisms. In Uganda and Angola, Bangladesh and Lebanon—and recently in the United Nations—we have seen what can happen when nationalist and racial passions, or tribal or religious hatreds, are left to run their course.

We cannot isolate ourselves from the forces loose in the world. The question is not whether we take an interest in foreign affairs, but how we do it and why we do it.

In the last few years, I have traveled in foreign lands, and met with many of their leaders. I have served on international bodies, such as the Trilateral Commission, which makes recommendations on some of these problems. I have given thought to the structure of what our foreign policy should be.

There are certain basic principles I believe should guide whatever is done in foreign lands in the name of the United States of America.

First, our policies should be as open and honest and decent and compassionate as the American people themselves are. Our policies should be shaped with the participation of Congress, from the outset, on a bipartisan basis. And they should emerge from broad and well-informed public debate and participation.

Second, our policies should treat the people of other nations as individuals, with the same dignity and respect as we demand for ourselves. No matter where they live, no matter who they are, the people of other lands are just as concerned with the struggles of daily life as you and I. They work hard, they have families whom they love, and they have hopes and dreams, and a great deal of pride. And they want to live in peace. Their basic personal motives are the same as ours.

Support Humanitarian Aspirations

Third, it must be the responsibility of the President to restore the moral authority of this country in its conduct of foreign policy. We should work for peace and the control of arms in everything we do. We should support the humanitarian aspirations of the world's people. Policies that strengthen dictators or create refugees, policies that prolong suffering or postpone racial justice, weaken that authority. Policies that encourage economic progress and social justice promote it. In an

age when almost all of the world's people are tied together by instant communication, the image of a country, as seen through its policies, has a great deal to do with what it can accomplish through the traditional channels of diplomacy.

Fourth, our policies should be aimed at building a just and peaceful world order, in which every nation can have a constructive role. For too long, our foreign policy has consisted almost entirely of maneuver and manipulation, based on the assumption that the world is a jungle of competing national antagonisms, where military supremacy and economic muscle are the only things that work and where rival powers are balanced against each other to keep the peace.

Exclusive reliance on this strategy is not in keeping with the character of the American people, or with the world as it is today. Balance of power politics may have worked in 1815, or even 1945, but it has a much less significant role in today's world. Of course, there are rivalries—racial, religious, national, some of them bitter. But the need for cooperation, even between rivals, goes deeper than all of them.

Every nation has a stake in stopping the pollution of the seas and the air. Every nation wants to be free from the threat of blackmail by international terrorists and hijackers. Every nation, including those of OPEC, sits on limited resources of energy that are running out. The vast majority of countries, including the Soviet Union, do not grow enough food to feed their own people. Every nation's economy benefits from expanding two-way trade. And everyone—except perhaps the speculator—has a stake in a fair and reliable international monetary system.

Our diplomatic agenda must also include preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and controlling the flow of narcotics.

In the future, we must turn our attention increasingly toward these common problems of food, energy, environment, and trade. A stable world order cannot become a reality when people of many nations of the world suffer mass starvation or when there are no established arrangements to deal with population growth or environmental quality. The intensity of these interrelated problems is rapidly increasing and better mechanisms for consultation on these problems that affect everyone on this planet must be established and utilized.

While the American people have had their fill of military adventurism and covert manipulation, we have not retreated into isolationism. We realize that increased anarchy will not only reverse the progress toward peace and stability that we have made, but also strengthen the hand of our adversaries.

That is why we must replace balance of power politics with world order politics. The new challenge to American foreign policy is to take the lead in joining the other nations of the world to build a just and stable international order.

We need to reorder our diplomatic priorities. In recent years, we have paid far more attention to our adversaries than to our friends, and we have been especially neglectful of our neighbors in Latin America.

Coordinate Our Policy With Friends

It is important to continue to seek agreements with the Russians and the Chinese, especially in the control of weapons. Success there could mean life instead of death for millions of people. But the divisions between us are deep. The differences of history and ideology will not go away. It is too much to expect that we can do much more in these relationships than reduce the areas of irritation and conflict and lessen the danger of war.

Our nation should coordinate its policy with our friends—countries like the democratic states of Europe, North America and Japan—those countries who share with us common goals and aspirations. We should work in concert with them. Ours are the fortunate countries of the world. But our continued prosperity and welfare depend upon increased coordination of our policies. If we can work together on goals which reflect the common needs and shared values of our people, we can make our societies the strong and stable inner core around which world cooperation, prosperity and peace can develop.

If we believe in the importance of this effort, we should make some changes. We must both lead and collaborate at the same time. We must consult with others more about our plans. The days of “Nixon Shocks” and “Kissinger Surprises” must end.⁴ Our goal should be to act in concert with these countries whenever we can.

And we must have faith in their commitment to democracy. We do not need to preach to the western Europeans about the dangers of communism as the Secretary of State did last week.⁵ Their traditions and political good sense are not inferior to ours.

Our policies toward the developing countries also need revision. For years, we have either ignored them or treated them as pawns in the big power chess game. Both approaches were deeply offensive to their people. The oil embargo taught us that even the least developed nation will eventually have control over its own natural resources and that

⁴ A reference to Nixon’s 1971 decision to institute a 90-day wage and price freeze and a 10 percent import surcharge and suspend the direct convertibility of U.S. dollars to gold, thus removing the United States from the gold standard. Also a reference to the U.S. “opening to China” in 1971 and 1972, which caught the Government of Japan by surprise.

⁵ Reference is to Kissinger’s instructions to the Embassy in Paris to deliver a “specific cautionary verbal message” to French Socialists about the dangers of cooperating with Communist politicians. (Jim Hoagland, “French Socialists Scorn U.S. Advice,” *The Washington Post*, March 3, 1976, p. A-19)

those countries which, alone or together, can control necessary commodities are a force that can neither be ignored or manipulated.

An attitude of neglect and disrespect toward the developing nations of the world is predicated in part on a sense of superiority toward others—a form of racism. This is incompatible with the character of American people.

We need to enlist the cooperation of the developing nations, for when we speak of the tasks of a stable world order, we include preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, policing the world's environment, controlling the flow of narcotics and establishing international protection against acts of terror. If three-quarters of the people of the world do not join in these arrangements, they will not succeed.

Our policies toward the developing world must be tough-minded in the pursuit of our legitimate interests. At the same time, these policies must be patient in the recognition of their legitimate interests which have too often been cast aside.

The developing world has, of course, a few leaders who are implacably hostile to anything the United States does. But the majority of its leaders are moderate men and women who are prepared to work with us. When we ignore the Third World, as we have for so long, the extremists will usually have their way. But if we offer programs based on common interests, we can make common cause with most of their leadership.

Our program of international aid to developing nations should be redirected so that it meets the minimum human needs of the greatest number of people. This means an emphasis on food, jobs, education, and public health—including access to family planning. The emphasis in aid should be on those countries with a proven ability to help themselves, instead of those that continue to allow enormous discrepancies in living standards among their people. The time has come to stop taxing poor people in rich countries for the benefit of rich people in poor countries.

In our trade relations with these nations we should join commodity agreements in such items as tin, coffee, and sugar which will assure adequate supplies to consumers, protect our people from inflation, and at the same time stop the fluctuation in prices that can cause such hardship and uncertainty in single-commodity countries.

Economic Development Challenges

The burden of economic development is going to be a heavy one. There are many countries which ought to share it, not only in Europe and Asia but in the Mideast. Today, a greater proportion of royalties from oil can be channeled to the Third World by international institutions. Tomorrow, they can receive a part of the profits from the mining

of the seas. The purpose of such development is not to level the economic lot of every person on earth. It is to inject the wealth-creating process into countries that are now stagnant; it is to help developing countries to act in what is their own best interest as well as ours—produce more food, limit population growth, and expand markets, supplies, and materials. It is simply to give every country a sufficient stake in the international order so that it feels no need to act as an outlaw. It is to advance the cause of human dignity.

We must also work with the countries of the communist world. The policy of East-West détente is under attack today because of the way it has been exploited by the Soviet Union. The American people were told it would mean a “generation of peace,” at no risk to the nation’s vital interests. And yet, in places like Syria or Angola, in activities like offensive missile development, the Soviets seem to be taking advantage of the new relationship to expand their power and influence, and increase the risk of conflict.

I support the objectives of détente, but I cannot go along with the way it has been handled by Presidents Nixon and Ford. The Secretary of State has tied its success too closely to his personal reputation. As a result, he is giving up too much and asking for too little. He is trumpeting achievements on paper while failing to insist on them in practice.

The relationship of détente is one of both cooperation and competition, of new kinds of contacts in some areas along with continued hostility in others. In the troubled history of our relationships with the Soviet Union, this is where we have arrived. The benefits of détente must accrue to both sides, or they are worthless. Their mutual advantage must be apparent, or the American people will not support the policy.

To the Soviets, détente is an opportunity to continue the process of world revolution without running the threat of nuclear war. They have said so quite openly, as recently as 1 month ago at their 25th Party Congress.⁶ To the Soviet Union, with our acquiescence, détente is surface tranquility in Europe within boundaries redefined to their benefit together with support for wars of national liberation elsewhere. It is having the benefits of the Helsinki Accords⁷ without the requirement of

⁶ The 25th Party Congress convened on February 24; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 266.

⁷ Reference is to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act, or Helsinki Accords, comprised of four “baskets” or categories. For the text of the Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975, by 33 European nations, the United States, and Canada, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. July 30 marked the opening day of the CSCE in Helsinki. Ford addressed conference delegates on August 1. For the text of Ford’s remarks, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 62.

living up to the human rights provisions which form an integral part of it. This is not the road to peace but the bitter deception of the American people.

But while détente must become more reciprocal, I reject the strident and bellicose voices of those who would have this country return to the days of the cold war with the Soviet Union. I believe the American people want to look to the future. They have seen the tragedy of American involvement in Vietnam and drawn appropriate lessons for tomorrow. They seek new vistas, not a repetition of old rhetoric and old mistakes.

It is in our interest to try to make détente broader and more reciprocal. Détente can be an instrument for long-term peaceful change within the Communist system, as well as in the rest of the world. We should make it clear that détente requires that the Soviets, as well as the United States, refrain from irresponsible intervention in other countries. The Russians have no more business in Angola than we have.

Favors Hard Bargaining

The core of détente is the reduction in arms. We should negotiate to reduce the present SALT ceilings on offensive weapons before both sides start a new arms race to reach the current maximums, and before new missile systems are tested or committed for production.

I am not afraid of hard bargaining with the Soviet Union. Hard bargaining will strengthen support for the agreements that can be reached, and will show that we, as well as they, can gain from détente. We can increase the possibility that the fear of war and the burden of arms may be lifted from the shoulders of humanity by the nations that have done the most to place it there.

Our vision must be of a more pluralistic world and not of a Communist monolith. We must pay more attention to China and to Eastern Europe. It is in our interest and in the interest of world peace to promote a more pluralistic Communist world.

We should remember that Eastern Europe is not an area of stability and it will not become such until the Eastern European countries regain their independence and become part of a larger cooperative European framework. I am concerned over the long-range prospects for Rumanian and Yugoslavian independence, and I deplore the recent infliction upon Poland of a constitution that ratifies its status as a Soviet satellite. We must reiterate to the Soviets that an enduring American-Soviet détente cannot ignore the legitimate aspirations of other nations. We must likewise insist that the Soviet Union and other countries recognize the human rights of all citizens who live within their boundaries, whether they be blacks in Rhodesia, Asians in Uganda, or Jews in the Soviet Union.

Our relations with China are important to world peace and they directly affect the world balance. The United States has a great stake in a nationally independent, secure, and friendly China. The present turmoil in Chinese domestic politics could be exploited by the Soviets to promote a Sino-Soviet reconciliation which might be inimical to international stability and to American interests. I believe that we should explore more actively the possibility of widening American-Chinese trade relations and of further consolidating our political relationships.

The Middle East is a key testing area for our capacity to construct a more cooperative international system. I believe deeply that a Middle East peace settlement is essential to American interests, to Israel's long-range survival and to international cooperation. Without a settlement, the region will become increasingly open to Soviet influence and more susceptible to radical violence. I believe that the United States should insure Israel's security while at the same time encourage both sides to address themselves to the substance of a genuine settlement.

There is no question that both Africa and Latin America have been ignored since the Presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. These areas should become, and indeed will become, increasingly important in the next decade. Our relationships with these must abandon traditional paternalism. The United States-Brazilian agreement, signed recently by Secretary of State Kissinger on his trip to Latin America, is a good example of our present policy at its worst. Kissinger's remarks during his visit that "there are no two people whose concern for human dignities and for the basic values of man is more profound in day-to-day life than Brazil and the United States" can only be taken as a gratuitous slap in the face of all those Americans who want a foreign policy that embodies our ideals, not subverts them.⁸

If our aim is to construct an international order, we must also work through the international bodies that now exist. On many of these issues, they are the only places where nations regularly come together. We have all been deeply disturbed by the drift of the United Nations and the other international organizations, and by the acrimony and cliquishness that seem to have taken hold. But it would be a mistake to give up on the United Nations.

In the future, we should make multilateral diplomacy a major part of our efforts so that other countries know in advance the importance the United States attaches to their behavior in the United Nations and

⁸ Reference is to a "Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultations on Matters of Mutual Interest," signed by Kissinger and Azeredo da Silveira in Brasilia on February 21. For Kissinger's remarks at the signing ceremony and the text of the memorandum, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 15, 1976, pp. 336–338.

other international organizations. We should make a major effort at reforming and restructuring the U.N. systems.

We Must Analyze International Institutions

We should undertake a systematic political and economic cost-benefit analysis of existing international institutions in the United Nations systems and outside, with a view to determining the appropriate level of U.S. support. We should end the current diplomatic isolation of the United States in international forums by working more closely with our allies and with moderate elements in the developing world on a basis of mutual understanding consistent with our respective national interests.

A stable world order cannot become a reality when people of many nations of the world suffer mass starvation, when the countries with capital and technology belligerently confront other nations for the control of raw materials and energy sources, when open and nondiscriminatory trade has become the exception rather than the rule, when there are no established arrangements for supplying the world's food and energy, nor for governing control and development of the seas, and when there are no effective efforts to deal with population explosions or environmental quality. The intensity of these interrelated problems is rapidly increasing and better mechanisms for consultation on these problems that affect everyone on this planet must be established and utilized.

For it is likely that in the future, the issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of the military security problems which have dominated international relations since 1945.

Finally, I said I would touch on the kind of people we need to administer our foreign policy. I believe that the foreign policy spokesman of our country should be the President, and not the Secretary of State. The conduct of foreign policy should be a sustained process of decision and action, and not a series of television spectacles. Under the current administration, the agencies which are supposed to conduct our foreign affairs have been largely wasted and demoralized. They must be revitalized and if necessary reorganized—to upgrade their performance, their quality, and the morale of their personnel.

In our search for peace we must call upon the best talent we can find in the universities, the business world, labor, the professions, and the scientific community. Appointments to our U.N. delegation, to other diplomatic posts, and to international conferences should be made exclusively on a merit basis, in contrast to the political patronage that has characterized appointments under this administration.

The world needs a strong America and a confident America. We cannot and should not avoid a role of world leadership. But our leadership should not be based just on military might or economic power or political pressure, but also on truth, justice, equality, and a true representation of the moral character of our people.

From this leadership the world can derive mutual peace and progress.

5. Memorandum From the Director of the Trilateral Commission (Brzezinski) to the Members of the Trilateral Commission¹

New York, May 21, 1976

SUBJECT

The Commission: Its Past and Future

Since the Ottawa and Washington meetings of the Commission² complete the first three years of the Commission's life span, I would like to share with you some personal impressions of what we have achieved in these three years and what we can hope to achieve in the future. I might also add that this is my final report to you as the Commission's director.

As I said in my address in Ottawa, the international context in which the Commission was established has changed significantly since its creation.³ While relations between the trilateral countries themselves are considerably freer of friction than they were in 1973, greater uncertainty clouds the East-West relationship and the salience of relations between the developed and the developing worlds to political and economic stability has been more clearly established. Throughout the period, I think it is fair to say that the Commission has been in the forefront of those who have sought to intensify cooperation between the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Trilateral Commission Files, Box 6, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chron File: 5/1/76–12/31/76. No classification marking.

² The Commission's executive committee met in Washington in December 1975. The Commission met in plenary session in Ottawa, Ontario, in May 1976.

³ Brzezinski's address is printed in Charles B. Heck, ed., *Dialogue: Improper Corporate Payoffs Termed a "Cancer" Which Weakens Firms, Subverts Markets and Threatens Democratic Values*, Canada, May 1976 (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1976), pp. 15–16.

trilateral countries and to propose progressive reforms in relations between North and South. Quite apart from the influence which it may have had in this way, the Commission has increasingly become an effective and recognized organization in which major problems of topical and political importance can be discussed in a policy-oriented fashion.

As I suggested in Ottawa, the uncertainties currently hanging over the East-West relationship make it appropriate that the Commission should begin its new phase by paying also some attention to relations with the Communist countries. I think it is also important to sustain the work that we have done in the North-South area. In this way we can contribute to insuring that the improvement in the tone of the discussions between the developed and the developing countries is translated into practical, longer range measures which can avert the threat of serious North-South turbulence.

I fear that otherwise North-South tensions might interact dangerously with East-West conflicts in such areas as the Middle East or Southern Africa. In general, this potential intersection of East-West and North-South conflicts deserves our closer attention. It represents a novel and an ominous development on the world scene.

I also proposed in Ottawa that now that the members of the Commission have established a good working relationship with one another, we might consider broadening the circle of those involved in our work by inviting guests to our meetings, possibly including some governmental representatives. I also suggested that in the future our task forces might give slightly lower priority to achieving consensus so as to provide more scope for originality. We shall be looking at these and other ideas for changing and improving the operation of the Commission during the coming weeks and months. We would welcome any comments and suggestions which you may have in this connection.

Finally, I would like to thank you for your interest and support in the Commission in its first three years. There is no doubt that during that time the idea of trilateralism has increasingly taken root in the consciousness of the leaderships, in and out of government, in our three regions. This has been an important change and one to which our efforts have, I believe, made a major contribution. For the future, our task will be to build on this initial success and ensure that the trilateral idea does not become frozen but remains flexible and relevant to changing international conditions. I look forward to continuing with you in this work.

6. Address by Jimmy Carter¹

New York, June 23, 1976

RELATION BETWEEN WORLD'S DEMOCRACIES

An address on Relations Between the World's Democracies was delivered by Mr. Carter at a luncheon of the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, N.Y., June 23, 1976. He said:

For the past seventeen months, as a candidate for President, I have talked and listened to the American people.

It has been an unforgettable experience and an invaluable education. Insofar as my political campaign has been successful, it is because I have learned from our people, and have accurately reflected their concerns, their frustrations, and their desires.

In the area of foreign policy, our people are troubled, confused and sometimes angry. There has been too much emphasis on transient spectaculars and too little on substance. We are deeply concerned, not only by such obvious tragedies as the war in Vietnam, but by the more subtle erosion in the focus and the morality of our foreign policy.

Under the Nixon-Ford Administration, there has evolved a kind of secretive "Lone Ranger" foreign policy—a one-man policy of international adventure. This is not an appropriate policy for America.

We have sometimes tried to play other nations one against another instead of organizing free nations to share world responsibility in collective action. We have made highly publicized efforts to woo the major communist powers while neglecting our natural friends and allies. A foreign policy based on secrecy inherently has had to be closely guarded and amoral, and we have had to forego openness, consultation and a constant adherence to fundamental principles and high moral standards.

We have often sought dramatic and surprising, immediate results instead of long-term solutions to major problems which required careful planning in consultation with other nations.

¹ Source: *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 266–275. Carter spoke before members of the Foreign Policy Association in the ballroom of the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. (Helen Dewar, "Carter: Consult Allies on Policy," *The Washington Post*, June 24, 1976, pp. A1, A6) In late December 1975, Carter had asked Brzezinski to develop a general outline of a basic statement on foreign affairs. Brzezinski and Gardner submitted a memorandum to Carter in January 1976, which, Brzezinski noted, would later become the basis of the address: "The speech was Carter's major statement on foreign policy, and it foreshadowed many of his actions and concerns as President." (*Power and Principle*, p. 7)

We must be strong in our internal resolve in order to be strong leaders abroad. This is not possible when Congress and the American people are kept in the dark. We simply *must* have an *international policy of democratic leadership*, and we must stop trying to play a lonely game of power politics. We must evolve and consummate our foreign policy openly and frankly. There must be bipartisan harmony and collaboration between the President and the Congress, and we must reestablish a spirit of common purpose among democratic nations.

What we seek is for our nation to have a foreign policy that reflects the decency and generosity and common sense of our own people.

We had such a policy more than a hundred years ago and, in our own lifetimes, in the years following the Second World War.

The United Nations, The Marshall Plan, The Bretton Woods Agreement, NATO, Point Four, The OECD, The Japanese Peace Treaty—these were among the historic achievements of a foreign policy directed by courageous Presidents, endorsed by bipartisan majorities in Congress, and supported by the American people.

The world since that time has become profoundly different, and the pace of change is accelerating.

There are one hundred new nations and two billion more people.

East-West tensions may be less acute, but the East-West rivalry has become global in scope.

Problems between the developed and developing nations have grown more serious, and in some regions have come to intersect dangerously with the East-West rivalry.

Economic nationalism complicates international relations, and unchecked inflation may again threaten our mutual well-being.

Finally, such global dilemmas as food shortages, overpopulation and poverty call for a common response, in spite of national and philosophical differences.

It is imperative, therefore, that the United States summon the leadership that can enable the democratic societies of the world once again to lead the way in creating a more just and more stable world order.

In recent weeks, I have made speeches on the subject of nuclear proliferation and also on the Middle East.² In the months ahead, I will speak out on other subjects of international concern.

² Carter delivered an address entitled “Nuclear Energy and World Order” before the United Nations in New York on May 13 and gave a speech on Middle East policies in Elizabeth, New Jersey, on June 6. Both are printed in *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 183–194 and 215–221, respectively.

Today I would like to speak about our alliances, and ways they can be improved to serve our national interests and the interests of others who seek peace and stability in the world.

Partnership With Europe, Japan

We need to consider how—in addition to alliances that were formed in years past for essentially military purposes—we might develop broader arrangements for dealing with such problems as the arms race and world poverty and the allocation of resources.

The time has come for us to seek a partnership between North America, Western Europe and Japan. Our three regions share economic, political and security concerns that make it logical that we should seek ever-increasing unity and understanding.

I have traveled in Japan and Western Europe in recent years and talked to leaders there. These countries already have a significant world impact, and they are prepared to play even larger global roles in shaping a new international order.

There are those who say that democracy is dying, that we live in the twilight of an era, and that the destiny of modern man is to witness the waning of freedom.

In Japan, Western Europe, Canada, some countries in Latin America, Israel, and among many other people, I have found not a decline of democracy but a dynamic commitment to its principles.

I might add that I can testify personally to the vigor of the democratic process in our own country.

In addition to cooperation between North America, Japan and Western Europe, there is an equal need for increased unity and consultation between ourselves and such democratic societies as Israel, Australia, New Zealand, and other nations, such as those in this hemisphere, that share our democratic values, as well as many of our political and economic concerns.

There must be more frequent consultations on many levels. We should have periodic summit conferences and occasional meetings of the leaders of all the industrial democracies, as well as frequent cabinet level meetings. In addition, as we do away with one-man diplomacy, we must once again use our entire foreign policy apparatus to reestablish continuing contacts at all levels. Summits are no substitute for the habit of cooperating closely at the working level.

In consultations, both form and substance are important. There is a fundamental difference between informing governments after the fact and actually including them in the process of joint policy making. Our policy makers have in recent years far too often ignored this basic dif-

ference. I need only cite the “Nixon Shocks” and the abrupt actions taken by former Treasury Secretary Connally.³

We need to recognize also that in recent years our Western European allies have been deeply concerned, and justly so, by our unilateral dealings with the Soviet Union. To the maximum extent possible, our dealings with the communist powers should reflect the combined view of the democracies and thereby avoid suspicions by our allies that we may be disregarding their interests.

We seek not a condominium of the powerful but a community of the free.

There are at least three areas in which the democratic nations can benefit from closer and more creative relations.

First, there are our economic and political affairs.

In the realm of economics, our basic purpose must be to *keep open the international system* in which the exchange of goods, capital, and ideas among nations can continue to expand.

“Must Avoid Unilateral Acts”

Increased coordination among the industrialized democracies can help avoid the repetition of such episodes as the inflation of 1972–73 and the more recent recessions. Both were made more severe by an excess of expansionist zeal and then of deflationary reaction in North America, Japan and Europe.

Though each country must make its own economic decisions, we need to know more about one another’s interests and intentions. We must avoid unilateral acts, and we must try not to work at cross-purposes in the pursuit of the same ends. We need not agree on all matters, but we should agree to discuss all matters.

We should continue our efforts to reduce trade barriers among the industrial countries, as one way to combat inflation. The current Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations⁴ should be pursued to a successful conclusion.

But we must do more. The International Monetary System should be renovated so that it can serve us well for the next quarter of a century. Last January, at a meeting of the leading financial officials, agreement was reached on a new system, based on greater flexibility of

³ See footnote 4, Document 4.

⁴ Reference is to the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, held in Geneva in 1973. Documentation on the negotiations, which culminated in April 1979, is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976 and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy.

exchange rates.⁵ There is no prospect of any early return to fixed exchange rates—divergencies in economic experience among nations are too great for that. But we still have much to learn regarding the effective operation of a system of fluctuating exchange rates. We must take steps to avoid large and erratic fluctuations, without impeding the basic monetary adjustments that will be necessary among nations for some years to come. It will be useful to strengthen the role of the International Monetary Fund as a center for observation and guidance of the world economy, keeping track of the interactions among national economies and making recommendations to governments on how best to keep the world economy functioning smoothly.

Beyond economic and political cooperation, we have much to learn from one another. I have been repeatedly impressed by the achievements of the Japanese and the Europeans in their domestic affairs. The Japanese, for example, have one of the lowest unemployment rates and the lowest crime rate of any industrialized nation, and they also seem to suffer less than other urbanized peoples from the modern problem of rootlessness and alienation.

Similarly, we can learn from the European nations about health care, urban planning and mass transportation.

There are many ways that creative alliances can work for a better world. Let us mention just one more, the area of human rights. Many of us have protested the violation of human rights in Russia, and justly so. But such violations are not limited to any one country or one ideology. There are other countries that violate human rights in one way or another—by torture, by political persecution, and by racial or religious discrimination.

We and our allies, in a creative partnership, can take the lead in establishing and promoting basic global standards of human rights. We respect the independence of all nations, but by our example, by our utterances, and by the various forms of economic and political persuasion available to us, we can quite surely lessen the injustice in this world.

We must certainly try.

Let me make one other point in the political realm. Democratic processes may in some countries bring to power parties or leaders whose ideologies are not shared by most Americans.

We may not welcome these changes; we will certainly not encourage them. But we must respect the results of democratic elections and the right of countries to make their own free choice if we are to re-

⁵ Presumable reference to the January 1976 meetings in Kingston, Jamaica, of the International Monetary Fund's Interim Committee (January 7–8) and Development Committee (January 9). See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 128 and 129.

main faithful to our own basic ideals. We must learn to live with diversity, and we can continue to cooperate, so long as such political parties respect the democratic process, uphold existing international commitments, and are not subservient to external political direction. The democratic concert of nations should exclude only those who exclude themselves by the rejection of democracy itself.

Our people have now learned the folly of our trying to inject our power into the internal affairs of other nations. It is time that our government learned that lesson too.

While it is too early to appraise the ultimate result of the weekend's elections in Italy, and though the outcome is a source of some relief since the Communist Party failed to obtain the plurality, it is clear that Italian political problems have been caused by the underlying social malaise of the country.⁶ Coping with this continuing malaise will require not only a major act of will on the part of Italian political leadership, but patient and significant assistance from Italy's Western European neighbors, as well as from the United States. We must give our most alert and sympathetic consideration to such needed assistance.

On Mutual Security

The second area of increased cooperation among the democracies is that of *mutual security*. Here, however, we must recognize that the Atlantic and Pacific regions have quite different needs and different political sensitivities.

Since the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, our commitments to the security of Western Europe and of Japan are inseparable from our own security. Without these commitments, and our firm dedication to them, the political fabric of Atlantic and Pacific cooperation would be seriously weakened, and world peace endangered.

As we look to the Pacific region, we see a number of changes and opportunities. Because of potential Sino-Soviet conflict, Russian and Chinese forces are not jointly deployed as our potential adversaries, but confront one another along their common border. Moreover, our withdrawal from the mainland of Southeast Asia has made possible improving relationships between us and the People's Republic of China.

With regard to our primary Pacific ally, Japan, we will maintain our existing security arrangements, so long as that continues to be the wish of the Japanese people and government.

⁶ Elections took place in Italy the weekend of June 19–20; see Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Voices Concern on Italy: Says Election Results Have Not Basically Eased Worry Over a Role for Reds," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1976, pp. 1, 8 and Alvin Shuster, "Communists Gain 49 Crucial Seats in Italy Contest: Christian Democratic Party Wins but Gap Is Narrowed in the Final Returns," *ibid.*, pp. 1, 6.

I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it should be made clear to the South Korean Government that its internal oppression is repugnant to our people, and undermines the support for our commitment there.

We face a more immediate problem in the Atlantic sector of our defense.

The Soviet Union has in recent years strengthened its forces in Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO today are substantially composed of Soviet combat troops, and these troops have been modernized and reinforced. In the event of war, they are postured for an all-out conflict of short duration and great intensity.

NATO's ground combat forces are largely European. The U.S. provides about one-fifth of the combat element, as well as the strategic umbrella, and without this American commitment, Western Europe could not defend itself successfully.

In recent years, new military technology has been developed by both sides, including precision-guided munitions that are changing the nature of land warfare.

Unfortunately, NATO's arsenal suffers from a lack of standardization, which needlessly increases the cost of NATO, and its strategy too often seems wedded to past plans and concepts. We must not allow our alliance to become an anachronism.

There is, in short, a pressing need for us and our allies to undertake a review of NATO's forces and its strategies in light of the changing military environment.

A comprehensive program to develop, procure, and equip NATO with the more accurate air defense and anti-tank weapons made possible by new technology is needed to increase NATO's defensive power. Agreement on stockpiles and on the prospective length of any potential conflict is necessary. We should also review the structure of NATO reserve forces so they can be committed to combat sooner.

In all of this a major European and joint effort will be required. Our people will not support unilateral American contributions in what must be a truly mutual defense effort.

Cooperative, Competitive Relations

Even as we review our military posture, we must spare no effort to bring about a reduction of the forces that confront one another in Central Europe.

It is to be hoped that the stalemated mutual force reduction talks in Vienna will soon produce results so that the forces of both sides can be

reduced in a manner that impairs the security of neither.⁷ The requirement of *balanced* reductions complicates negotiations, but it is an important requirement for the maintenance of security in Europe.

Similarly, in the SALT talks, we must seek significant nuclear disarmament that safeguards the basic interests of both sides.

Let me say something I have often said in recent months. East-West relations will be both cooperative and competitive for a long time to come. We want the competition to be peaceful, and we want the cooperation to increase. *But we will never seek accommodation at the expense of our own national interests or the interests of our allies.*

Our potential adversaries are intelligent people. They respect strength; they respect constancy; they respect candor. They will understand our commitment to our allies. They will listen even more carefully if we and our allies speak with a common resolve.

We must remember, too, that a genuine spirit of cooperation between the democracies and the Soviet Union should extend beyond a negative cessation of hostilities and reach toward joint efforts in dealing with such world problems as agricultural development and the population crisis.

The great challenge we Americans confront is to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that our good will is as great as our strength until, despite all the obstacles, our two nations can achieve new attitudes and new trust, and until, in time, the terrible burden of the arms race can be lifted from our peoples.

One realistic step would be to recognize that thus far, while we have had certain progress on a bilateral basis, we have continued to confront each other by proxy in various trouble spots. These indirect challenges may be potentially more dangerous than face to face disagreements, and at best they make mockery of the very concept of détente. If we want genuine progress, it must be at every level.

Our democracies must also work together more closely in a joint effort to help the hundreds of millions of people on this planet who are living in poverty and despair.

We have all seen the growth of North-South tensions in world affairs, tensions that are often based on legitimate economic grievances. We have seen in the Middle East the juncture of East-West and North-South conflicts and the resultant threat to world peace.

The democratic nations must respond to the challenge of human needs on three levels.

⁷ Nixon and Brezhnev first proposed the desirability of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) during the SALT negotiations in 1972. The first meeting took place in Vienna in October 1973. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Documents 340–371.

First, by widening the opportunities for genuine North-South consultations. The developing nations must not only be the objects of policy, but must participate in shaping it. Without wider consultations we will have sharper confrontations. A good start has been made with the Conference on International Economic Cooperation which should be strengthened and widened.⁸

Secondly, by assisting those nations that are in direct need.

There are many ways the democracies can unite to help shape a more stable and just world order. We can work to lower trade barriers and make a major effort to provide increased support to the international agencies that now make capital available to the Third World.

This will require help from Europe, Japan, North America, and the wealthier members of OPEC for the World Bank's soft-loan affiliate, the International Development Association. The wealthier countries should also support such specialized funds as the new International Fund for Agricultural Development, which will put resources from the oil exporting and developed countries to work in increasing food production in poor countries.⁹ We might also seek to institutionalize, under the World Bank, a "World Development Budget," in order to rationalize and coordinate these and other similar efforts.

It is also time for the Soviet Union, which donates only about one-tenth of one percent of its GNP to foreign aid—and mostly for political ends—to act more generously toward global economic development.

I might add, on the subject of foreign aid, that while we are a generous nation we are not a foolish nation, and our people will expect recipient nations to undertake needed reforms to promote their own development. Moreover, all nations must recognize that the North-South relationship is not made easier by one-sided self-righteousness, by the exercise of automatic majorities in world bodies, nor by intolerance for the views or the very existence of other nations.

"Limit the Flow of Arms"

Third, we and our allies must work together to limit the *flow of arms into the developing world*.

⁸ The Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) met in Paris December 16–19, 1975. In an undated memorandum to Ford, Scowcroft indicated that the conference had "reached agreement on a basis for beginning the North-South dialogue." See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 300.

⁹ Proposed during the November 1974 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) World Food Conference in Rome and formally established in 1977 as a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) finances development projects targeted at increasing food production in developing nations. The Fund began its operations in Rome in 1977.

The North-South conflict is in part a security problem. As long as the more powerful nations exploit the less powerful, they will be repaid by terrorism, hatred, and potential violence. Insofar as our policies are selfish, or cynical, or shortsighted, there will inevitably be a day of reckoning.

I am particularly concerned by our nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman. We sold or gave away billions of dollars of arms last year, mostly to developing nations. For example, we are now beginning to export advanced arms to Kenya and Zaire, thereby both fueling the East-West arms race in Africa even while supplanting our own allies—Britain and France—in their relations with these African states. Sometimes we try to justify this unsavory business on the cynical ground that by rationing out the means of violence we can somehow control the world's violence.

The fact is that we cannot have it both ways. *Can* we be both the world's leading champion of peace and the world's leading supplier of the weapons of war? If I become President, I will work with our allies, some of whom are also selling arms, and also seek to work with the Soviets, to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce the commerce in weapons of war.

The challenge we and our allies face with regard to the developing nations is a great one, a constant one, and an exciting one. It is exciting because it calls for so much creativity at so many levels by so many nations and individuals.

I have suggested steps which we and our allies might take toward a more stable and more just world order. I do not pretend to have all the answers. I hope you will help me find them.

What I do have is a strong sense that this country is drifting and must have new leadership and new direction. The time has come for a new thrust of creativity in foreign policy equal to that of the years following the Second World War. The old international institutions no longer suffice. *The time has come for a new architectural effort, with creative initiative by our own nation, with growing cooperation among the industrial democracies as its cornerstone, and with peace and justice its constant goal.*

We are in a time of challenge and opportunity. If the values we cherish are to be preserved—the ideals of liberty and dignity and opportunity for all—we shall have to work in the closest collaboration with like-minded nations, seeking, through the strength that follows from collective action, to build an international system that reflects the principles and standards of our national heritage.

The primary purpose of our foreign policy is to create and maintain a world environment within which our great experiment in freedom can survive and flourish.

Ours would be a chilled and lonely world without the other democracies of Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel and this hemisphere with whom we share great common purposes. There is a special relationship among us based not necessarily on a common heritage but on our partnership in great enterprises. Our present limits are not those of natural resources but of ideas and inspirations.

Our first great need is to restore the morale and spirit of the American people.

It is time once again for the world to feel the forward movement and the effervescence of a dynamic and confident United States of America.

7. Editorial Note

On July 15, 1976, former Governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter accepted the Democratic nomination for President and addressed delegates at the Democratic National Convention in Madison Square Garden in New York. In his acceptance speech, Carter referenced the relationship between security and peace and discussed the American character as it related to U.S. interactions with the world:

“The foremost responsibility of any President, above all else, is to guarantee the security of our nation—a guarantee of freedom from the threat of successful attack or blackmail, and the ability with our allies to maintain peace.

“But peace is not the mere absence of war. Peace is action to stamp out international terrorism. Peace is the unceasing effort to preserve human rights. Peace is a combined demonstration of strength and good will. We will pray for peace and we will work for peace, until we have removed from all nations for all time the threat of nuclear destruction.

“America’s birth opened a new chapter in mankind’s history. Ours was the first nation to dedicate itself clearly to the basic moral and philosophical principles: that all people are created equal and endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the power of government is derived from the consent of the governed.

“This national commitment was a singular act of wisdom and courage, and it brought the best and bravest from other nations to our shores. It was a revolutionary development that captured the imagination of mankind. It created a basis for a unique role of America—that of

a pioneer in shaping more decent and just relations among people and among societies.

“Today, two hundred years later, we must address ourselves to that role, both in what we do at home and how we act abroad—among people everywhere who have become politically more alert, socially more congested, and increasingly impatient with global inequities, and who are now organized, as you know, into some one hundred and fifty different nations. This calls for nothing less than a sustained architectural effort to shape an international framework of peace within which our own ideals gradually can become a global reality.

“Our nation should always derive its character directly from the people and let this be the strength and the image to be presented to the world—the character of the American people.

“To our friends and allies I say that what unites us through our common dedication to democracy is much more important than that which occasionally divides us on economics or politics. To the nations that seek to lift themselves from poverty I say that America shares your aspirations and extends its hand to you. To those nation-states that wish to compete with us I say that we neither fear competition nor see it as an obstacle to wider cooperation. To all people I say that after two hundred years America still remains confident and youthful in its commitment to freedom and equality, and we always will be.” (*The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pages 351–352)

The full text of the speech was printed in *The New York Times* on July 16. Memoranda and comments on the speech drafts are in the Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office, Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 1, Acceptance Speech, 7/76.

8. Editorial Note

In the weeks following the July 1976 Democratic National Convention (see Document 7), Democratic Presidential nominee Jimmy Carter and Vice Presidential nominee Senator Walter F. Mondale (DFL-Minnesota) took part in a series of domestic and foreign policy meetings in Plains, Georgia, with their primary advisers. Following each meeting, Carter and Mondale briefed the press and answered various press queries. At the conclusion of the July 29 meeting with the Carter–Mondale campaign’s foreign policy advisory group, Carter commented to the press:

“Today we had a joint discussion about foreign affairs. We emphasized the point that we are trying to learn as much as we possibly can about the interrelationship between our nation and others so that we can present to the world a foreign policy that is understood by the American people, which is predictable, and which has an acknowledged purpose, which can have bipartisan support, which can regain the trust of other nations in our country and which can accurately represent the character of the American people.

“We had specific discussions about the African nations, and particular emphasis today throughout the discussions on the developing nations of the world. Those who have been most sadly neglected in our own nation’s emphasis in the past few years under Presidents Nixon and Ford and Mr. Kissinger. I think this is the first time, certainly, that any presidential candidate has ever spent so much time studying the particular problems of the developing nations, but there is a very legitimate reason for it because of the past neglect and because of the importance—the crucial nature—for the future. We discussed our relationship on an East-West basis specifically, of course, with the People’s Republic of China and with the Soviet Union. We discussed the Middle East and the Mediterranean area, and within the special framework of the developing nations discussion, in addition to Africa we discussed countries in our own hemisphere.

“We also tried to analyze the proper interrelationship derived from the Monday [July 26] meeting between correlating defense policy establishment and foreign policy—our political interrelationship with other countries. We discussed some creative approaches to SALT II talks and we were particularly concerned in the Middle East in emphasizing the fact that without a complete confidence in our own government position on the Middle Eastern question, within Israel, that there can be no, or very little, possibility of an ultimate settlement in the Middle East. In other words, we have to have a consistent, unshakable, unchanging commitment of support for Israel, and with that understanding and acceptance within the Israeli nation that we can have a good hope for peace in the Middle East.

“We also discussed our relationship with South Africa, and Rhodesia, with an understanding that there would be no yielding on our part on the issue of human rights and majority rule.

“The other point that we did discuss was South America. The fact that we should get away permanently from an attitude of paternalism or punishment or retribution when some of the South Americans didn’t yield to our persuasion. There was a great revelation, to me at least, that within the Third World nations, the developing world, the unique leadership role that has been played by Mexico, Venezuela, and other Latin American leaders. I think the Latin American nations must be treated

as individuals. They must be recognized as far as their own worldwide leadership capabilities of influence. And to treat them in a paternalistic manner, or just in the hemispheric relationship, would be a mistake.”

Carter asked Mondale to discuss several additional points. Mondale responded:

“One of the other matters discussed was the very crucial importance of establishing and maintaining an ongoing high-level consistent relationship with our traditional allies in Western Europe, in Japan, and in Canada. This is the bedrock of American foreign policy, and that the administration ought to have that in mind at the highest level of priorities at all times. I think that is a crucial part of any kind of foreign policy that represents the best interest and ideals of the American people.

“We also talked about the crucial need to put a ceiling, not just on strategic arms where we think much lower ceilings are clearly needed, but also a similar ceiling on arms transfer of tactical armaments.

“Right now, as you know, the United States is the leading arms sales country in the world. But in order to put that kind of restriction on the transfer of arms, there must be an agreement reached between the Soviet Union, between other countries such as West Germany, England, which sell armaments, but also with the consuming countries, because this is a matter which arms purchasing nations around the world have a direct interest. And it would be our hope that we could move forward toward some international agreement between those who sell arms and those who buy arms to bring a dramatic reduction in the amount of the tragic, expensive arms sales that go on in the world today.” (*The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I: *Jimmy Carter*, pages 372–373)

9. Address by Jimmy Carter¹

Washington, September 8, 1976

ADDRESSING B'NAI B'RITH

On September 8, 1976, Mr. Carter addressed a convention in Washington, D.C., of B'nai B'rith, a national Jewish fraternal organization. He said:

It is a special pleasure to be here today, because I believe we share a common heritage, and a common commitment, that brings us together.

In 1843, B'nai B'rith was founded by a small group of immigrants who sought to preserve for themselves and others the religious and personal liberty they had been denied abroad.

So it was with those who founded my church in this country, to insure liberty of conscience.

I am proud to meet with a group of men and women with whom I share a total commitment to the preservation of human rights, individual liberty, and freedom of conscience.

I would like to talk to you about my view of how our nation should encourage and support those priceless qualities throughout the world.

This is, as you know, a difficult question. It requires a careful balancing of realism and idealism—of our understanding of the world as it is, and our vision of the world as it should be.

The question, I think, is whether in recent years our highest officials have not been too pragmatic, even cynical, and as a consequence have ignored those moral values that had often distinguished our country from the other great nations of the world.

We must move away from making policies in secret; without the knowledge and approval of the American people.

I have called for closer ties with our traditional allies, and stronger ties with the State of Israel. I have stressed the necessity for a strong defense—tough and muscular, and adequate to maintain our freedom under any conceivable circumstances.

¹ Source: *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part II: *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 709–714. Carter delivered his address before the convention of B'nai B'rith in the ballroom of the Washington Hilton Hotel. (Don Oberdorfer, "Carter Speaks on Human Rights," *The Washington Post*, September 9, 1976, p. A–8)

But military strength alone is not enough. Over the years, our greatest source of strength has come from those basic, priceless values which are embodied in our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights: our belief in freedom of religion—our belief in freedom of expression—our belief in human dignity.

These principles have made us great and, unless our foreign policy reflects them, we make a mockery of all those values that we have celebrated in this bicentennial year.

We have not always lived up to our ideals, but I know of no great nation in history that has more often conducted itself in a moral, unselfish, generous manner abroad, and provided more freedom and opportunity to its own citizens at home.

Still, in recent years, we have had reason to be troubled. Often there has been a gap between the values we have proclaimed and the policies we have pursued. We have often been overextended, and deeply entangled in the internal affairs of distant nations. Our government has pursued dubious tactics, and “national security” has sometimes been a cover-up for unnecessary secrecy and national scandal.

We stumbled into the quagmires of Cambodia and Vietnam, and carried out heavy-handed efforts to destroy an elected government in Chile. In Cyprus, we let expediency triumph over fairness, and lost both ways.

We responded inadequately to human suffering in Bangladesh, Burundi, the Sahel, and other underdeveloped nations.

We lessened the prestige of our Foreign Service by sending abroad ambassadors who were distinguished only by the size of their political contributions.

We have allowed virtually unlimited sales of United States arms to countries around the world—a policy as cynical as it is dangerous.

I find it unacceptable that we have in effect condoned the effort of some Arab countries to tell American businesses that, in order to trade with one country or company, they must observe certain restrictions based on race or religion. These so-called “Arab boycotts” violate our standards of freedom and morality.²

² In December 1945, the Arab League declared a boycott on trade between Arab countries and Israel. The boycott had evolved by 1948 to include three components: a continuation of the original boycott, a boycott against any companies operating in Israel, and a boycott against any companies that had relationships with companies operating in Israel.

I regret that a senior official of the Ford Administration, an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, last week told Congress that efforts should not be made to address this basic issue of human rights.³

Moreover, according to a recent House subcommittee report, the Department of Commerce has shut its eyes to the boycott by failing to collect information on alleged offenses, and failing to carry out a firm policy against the boycott.⁴

Enforce Anti-Boycott Laws

If I become President, all laws concerning these boycotts will be vigorously enforced.

We also regret our government's continuing failure to oppose the denial of human freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The Republican Administration with the Sonnenfeldt statement,⁵ has shown a lack of sensitivity to the craving of the Eastern European people for greater independence. That is unacceptable.

Only 13 months ago, President Ford and Henry Kissinger traveled to Helsinki to sign the treaty of comprehensive security and cooperation in Europe.⁶ It was supposed to lead to greater personal freedom for the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, including greater freedom to travel, to marry, and to emigrate. But since that elaborate

³ Presumable reference to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Gerald Parsky. On August 31 Parsky appeared before a Senate-House conference committee negotiating the pending tax revision bill and expressed the administration's opposition to a Senate provision to the bill that denied favorable tax benefits to American companies complying with the Arab boycott of Israel. (Edwin L. Dale Jr., "Boycott Penalty Opposed by Ford: Use of Tax Laws to Punish Concerns for Acts Against Israel Still Unresolved," *The New York Times*, September 1, 1976, p. 17)

⁴ Reference is to a Congressional report examining the impact of the Arab boycott. Representative Scheuer, a drafter of the report, asserted that investigations had revealed that for 10 years, the Department of Commerce had advised American businessmen that they "need not comply" with U.S. Government requests to file information about boycott demands. (David Binder, "Commerce Department Accused of Collusion in Arabs' Boycott," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1976, pp. 1, 5)

⁵ Reference is to off-the-record remarks Sonnenfeldt made at the December 1975 European Chiefs of Mission conference, held in London. He had posited that the United States should pursue an evolution of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. The Department transmitted a summary of his remarks in telegram 24976 to all European diplomatic posts, February 1, 1976; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 68. Syndicated columnists Evans and Novak referenced Sonnenfeldt's remarks in their March 22 column. ("A Soviet-East Europe 'Organic Union'," *The Washington Post*, March 22, 1976, p. A-19) Sonnenfeldt, addressing a Pentagon audience in late March, noted that the original and press reports of the Chiefs of Mission conference had distorted his remarks: "The press focused on the use of the word organic, and added the term union, which together, imply U.S. acceptance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. This assertion is incorrect." (*Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 73)

⁶ See footnote 7, Document 4.

signing ceremony in Finland, the Russians have all but ignored their pledge—and the Ford Administration has looked the other way.

Similarly, the American government has failed to make serious efforts to get the Russians to permit greater numbers of people to emigrate freely to the countries of their choice, and I commend those Members of Congress and others who have demonstrated a strong personal concern and commitment to that goal.

Despite our deep desire for successful negotiation on strategic arms and nuclear proliferation, we cannot pass over in silence the deprivation of human rights in the Soviet Union. The list of Soviet prisoners is long, and includes both Christians and Jews. I will speak only of two: Vladimir Bukovsky and Vladimir Slepak. Bukovsky, a young scientist, has been imprisoned most of the last 13 years for criticisms of the Soviet regime. Slepak, a radio engineer in Moscow, applied for an exit visa for Israel in April of 1970. The visa was denied and, since 1972, he has been denied the right to hold a job.

I ask why such people must be deprived of their basic rights, a year after Helsinki. And if I become President, the fate of men like Bukovsky and Slepak will be very much on my mind as I negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Liberty is curtailed in non-Communist countries, too, of course. There are many cases of political persecution in Chile and reports of brutal torture that are too well documented to be disbelieved.

There are those regimes, such as South Korea, which openly violate human rights, although they themselves are under threat from Communist regimes which represent an even greater level of repression.

Even in such cases, however, we should not condone repression or the denial of freedom. On the contrary, we should use our influence to increase freedom in those countries that depend on us for their very survival.

Denials of human rights occur in many places and many ways. In Ireland, for example, violence has bred more violence, and caused untold human suffering which brings sorrow to the entire civilized world.

I do not say to you that these are simple issues.

I do not say that we can remake the world in our own image. I recognize the limits on our power, and I do not wish to see us swing from one extreme of cynical manipulation to the other extreme of moralistic zeal, which can be just as dangerous.

But the present administration has been so obsessed with balance of power politics that it has often ignored basic American values and a proper concern for human rights. The leaders of this administration have rationalized that there is little room for morality in foreign affairs, and that we must put self-interest above principle.

I disagree strongly.

Ours is a great and powerful nation, committed to certain enduring ideals and those ideals must be reflected in our foreign policy.

There are practical, effective ways in which our power can be used to alleviate human suffering around the world.

We should begin by having it understood that if any nation, whatever its political system, deprives its people of basic human rights, that fact will help shape our people's attitude toward that nation's government.

Respect for Human Rights

If other nations want our friendship and support, they must understand that we want to see basic human rights respected.

Our power is not unlimited, but neither is it insignificant, and I believe that if we are sensitive and if we are concerned, there can be many instances when our power can make a crucial difference to thousands of men and women who are the victims of oppression around the world.

We must be realistic. Although we believe deeply in our own system of government and our own ideals, we do not and should not insist on identical standards or an identical system in all other nations. We can live with diversity in governmental systems, but we cannot look away when a government tortures people, or jails them for their beliefs, or denies minorities fair treatment or the right to emigrate.

Let me suggest some actions our government should take in the area of human rights.

First, we can support the principle of self-determination by refraining from intervention in the domestic politics of other countries but, obviously, we are going to protect our interests and advance our beliefs in other nations.

We should not behave abroad in ways that violate our own laws or moral standards. You and I would not plot murder, but in recent years officials of our government have plotted murder, and that is wrong and unacceptable.

In giving trade advantages or economic assistance to other governments, we should make sure that such aid is used to benefit the people of that country. There will be times when we will want to help those who must live under a repressive government. We may refrain from giving general economic aid or military assistance to a government, yet wish to provide food, health care, or other humanitarian assistance directly to the people.

The United States should lend more vigorous support to the United Nations and other public and private international bodies in

order to attract world attention to the denial of freedom. These bodies are limited in power, but they can serve as the conscience of the world community, and they deserve far more support than our government has given them in recent years.

Insofar as they comply with our own Constitution and laws, we should move toward Senate ratification of several important treaties drafted in the United Nations for the protection of human rights. These include the Genocide Convention that was prepared more than 25 years ago,⁷ the convention against racial discrimination that was signed during the Johnson Administration,⁸ and the covenants on political and civil rights, and on economic and social rights.⁹ Until we ratify these covenants we cannot participate with other nations in international discussions of specific cases involving freedom and human rights.

We should quit being timid and join Israel and other nations in moving to stamp out international terrorism!

These are some of the things our nation can do for a change to promote human rights in our imperfect world. The basic question is one of leadership. We have not had that kind of leadership in recent years. In foreign affairs, as in domestic affairs we need leaders who are not only concerned with the interests of the powerful, but who are especially concerned with the powerless, with the weak, with the disenfranchised, and with other victims of oppression. We have not had that kind of leadership in recent years.

If I am elected President, I intend to provide it.

Thank you.

⁷ Reference is to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951. Truman submitted the Convention to the Senate in 1949. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had favorably reported the treaty, the Senate had not approved it at the time of Carter's address.

⁸ Reference is to the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature by the UN General Assembly on December 21, 1965. U.S. officials signed the Covenant on September 28, 1966. It entered into force on December 4, 1969.

⁹ The United Nations adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which were both first presented to the General Assembly in 1954, on December 16, 1966, and opened both covenants for signature on December 19. The first covenant commits signatories to respecting the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life; freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly; and right to due process and fair trial. The second covenant upholds an individual's economic, social, and cultural rights, including self-determination, participation in cultural life, and the right to work. Carter would later sign both covenants at the United Nations on October 5, 1977; for Carter's remarks at the signing ceremony, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 79.

10. Memorandum From Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter¹

New York, September 27, 1976

SUBJECT

The forthcoming foreign policy debate and my recent trip to Europe

1. *Leadership is the issue.*

I think it is essential that the public be given a sharper sense than was the case in the domestic debate² as to what is the key issue. In my judgement, taking into account international expectations as well as the domestic mood, the two key and interrelated issues—which stand above the others—are:

1. Presidential leadership
2. The American leadership in the world.

The first of the above requires more affirmative and explicit leadership by the President himself; the second a clearer definition of goals for the United States and the global community, a more affirmative expression of a sense of historical direction, and a greater awareness of global issues.

Bearing the above in mind, I have a *concrete suggestion for the debate, in order to set the tone for it*:

1. If you are asked to make the opening response, use the initial part of the first three minutes for stating that *whatever the question is it has to be viewed in a larger context or perspective*; then go on to affirm that the major issue confronting us is the absence of effective Presidential leadership and the related absence of a clear sense of historical direction projected worldwide by America. You can then go on to use the rest of the three minutes to answer the specific question and you will have still additional two minutes as a follow-on.

¹ Source: Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office, Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 9, Debates—Briefing Material [2]. No classification marking. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. Brzezinski circled the word “debate” in the subject line of the memorandum. Brzezinski attached a copy of his Columbia University business card to the memorandum and added the following handwritten comment: “Stu—I hope the enclosed is of help in order *to focus* the debate. ZB.” The second Presidential debate was scheduled to take place in San Francisco on October 6; for additional information, see Document 11.

² The first Presidential debate between Ford and Carter took place in Philadelphia at the Walnut Street Theater on September 23. According to *The New York Times*, 90 million people watched the live televised debate, moderated by NBC News correspondent Edwin Newman, during which the candidates discussed domestic and economic policy. (R.W. Apple Jr., “Ford and Carter, in First Debate, Trade Charges on Economic Issue: Tone is Restrained,” September 24, 1976, pp. 1, 22) A transcript of the debate is printed in *Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77*, Book III, pp. 2283–2312.

2. If your opening comment involves a reaction to Ford's response, you can use that opportunity to raise the above theme very briefly, indicating to the public that *this is the key question for Americans to ponder*, then attack Ford on the specific question, and then use your own opening answer for a fuller definition of the basic theme as suggested under #1 above.

3. Remember: your audience is the nation and *not* the questioners. So focus on the *fundamentals* and not only on the questions—and keep hammering at the basic theme of no Presidential leadership and of no American vision for a world that needs direction and architecture.

4. In general, I feel that Ford's non-performance in this area ought to be attacked more sharply and more pointedly than was the case with his domestic performance.

For example, on detente, does he agree with Kissinger or with Reagan? On Cyprus, he should be faulted in some detail for his non-performance and for tolerating Kissinger's poor record.³ The critical implications of this for Western Europe and for Israel ought to be underlined.

Similarly, on Angola, the ineptness of his leadership and of Kissinger's handling of this matter ought to be highlighted and related to the present uncertainties about the future of the African continent.⁴ (Kissinger's recent "success" regarding Rhodesia⁵ can be diminished by the suggestion that it was made necessary by his failings in the past and that in fact the "success" is still very uncertain.)

In general, I should think that a major purpose of the debate on foreign policy would be *to leave the public with a clear impression that Ford has provided no leadership*. In other words, even if Ford claims successes for his foreign policy, the public should be left with the view—as

³ Reference is to the ongoing conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on Cyprus. On September 30, Kissinger addressed the UN General Assembly and referenced the "stalemate on the Cyprus problem." He noted that any settlement of the problem would need to come from the Cypriot communities, although the United States would assist in "restoring momentum to the negotiating process." For the full text of Kissinger's address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 25, 1976, pp. 497–510. For documentation on U.S. policy toward the Cyprus conflict, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976.

⁴ Presumable reference to the three-way struggle for political control over the former Portuguese colony of Angola. The Ford administration had covertly supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) during the Angolan civil war. Congressional opposition to this support culminated in an amendment to the FY 1976 Defense Appropriations bill (P.L. 94–212) prohibiting any use of funds in the bill for indirect or direct activities in Angola. (*Congress and the Nation*, volume IV, 1973–1976, p. 878) On January 29, 1976, Kissinger testified before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, outlining the implications of Angola for U.S. foreign policy. For the transcript of his testimony, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 67.

⁵ Presumable reference to the September 24 announcement that Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith would accept a British-U.S. formula for the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia. (Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Cautions That Decision By Rhodesia Is 'Only the Beginning'," *The New York Times*, September 25, 1976, pp. 1, 5) Kissinger had met with Smith and a Rhodesian delegation in Pretoria, South Africa, during his September 14–24 trip to Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Zaire, Kenya, and the United Kingdom.

suming he is convincing—that it was not due to him. Has Ford in fact given any major foreign policy speeches?

2. *Likely focus of the debate.*

The discussion of foreign affairs—assuming the domestic discussion is any guide—is likely to concentrate on no more than two or three major themes of interest to the newspapermen. I would anticipate that these themes would be:

1. East-West relationship (or detente);
2. Defense;
3. Middle East;
4. Maybe Africa.

These subjects should be well-covered in your briefing book. I would only add that on East-West you ought to stress the excessive promises made, Ford's ambiguity on detente (the non-use of the word,⁶ the Solzhenitsyn incident,⁷ etc.), the indifference to human rights, etc.

You will probably be asked how you expect to negotiate more toughly with the Russians, and what you propose to do to increase East European independence. Your answers on these issues ought to be well-balanced: tough on fundamentals but showing a willingness to accommodate. With regard to the Russians, you might stress in general that domestically they are quite weak (their economy is in difficulty, there is social unease, the non-Russian nations are gradually becoming restless), and hence that they need a genuine and *truly reciprocal* detente quite as much as we. This is not a matter of forcing them to change their system but of realizing that we do not need to appear as needing the detente more than the Russians.

On the East Europeans, you might first say that the Republican position on Eastern Europe has been ambiguous, then go on to stress the importance to us and to West Europe of both Romanian and Yugoslav independence, also emphasize that it is in the general interest of Europe that countries such as Poland become more autonomous. You could

⁶ Ford campaigned in Florida prior to the March 9 Republican primary there. During a television interview, in response to a question regarding Chinese views on détente, Ford commented: "I don't use the word 'détente' any more. I think what we ought to say is that the United States will meet with super powers, the Soviet Union and with China and others, and seek to relax tensions so that we can continue a policy of peace through strength." The transcript of the interview is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 268.

⁷ During the summer of 1975, the AFL–CIO decided to honor Soviet dissident and author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn at a banquet to be held at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Meany invited Ford to attend; Helms and Thurmond requested that Ford meet with Solzhenitsyn. Ford turned down both requests but later issued an open invitation for Solzhenitsyn to visit the White House. Solzhenitsyn ultimately rejected the invitation. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 155, 156, 158, 163–165, 170, 171, 178, and 215.

then follow by stressing that you would seek to deal more directly with the East European states, rejecting the notion that Eastern Europe is a Soviet sphere of influence and that all arrangements for Eastern Europe have to be cleared or channeled through Moscow. Finally, you might emphasize that you will insist on a scrupulous fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement,⁸ and that you will have a special review process set up to monitor the extent to which this Agreement has been fulfilled.

On the Middle East, the thing to stress would be the insecure nature of the stalemate, the different things said by Mr. Kissinger to the Arabs and the Israelis, and the uncertainty produced in Israel by American pressure and threats of a “reappraisal”. You might also, in responding to any claims about the Middle East by Ford, *emphasize the proposition that the Republicans have done absolutely nothing about the energy problem*. Accordingly, the United States remains as vulnerable as before to an oil crisis, and this simply enhances the threat inherent in the Middle Eastern situation.

I believe you have said that our imports of oil, as percentage of consumption, should not be allowed to increase above present levels and this goal is certainly the most honest and practical one set since October 1973.⁹ In contrast, Kissinger stated in July of 1976 that “despite efforts to conserve oil and develop alternative energy sources, Western oil imports from OPEC would increase from 27 million barrels/day to as much as 37 million/day in 1985”.¹⁰ This could amount to between 3–4 times higher than the present situation, and the political implications of this are far-reaching. This is another example of Ford’s non-leadership.

⁸ See footnote 7, Document 4.

⁹ Reference is to the OPEC oil embargo imposed during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.

¹⁰ Kissinger attended the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), meeting at the ministerial level in Paris June 21–22. In a statement before the Council on June 21, Kissinger highlighted the need for continued cooperation among the industrialized economies in four areas: noninflationary economic growth, international trade, transnational investment, and cooperation in energy. With regard to the last area, he noted: “For the next several years, our nations’ heavy dependence on imported oil will contribute to our political and economic vulnerability. The outlook for reducing our dependence in the next decade is not encouraging.” He then referenced the current and projected barrels per day figures, yet added that the industrial countries needed to reduce their immediate dependence on imported oil and develop alternative energy systems. (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 19, 1976, p. 77) The complete text of Kissinger’s statement is *ibid.*, pp. 73–83. Presumably Brzezinski drew the quotation from a July 13 article by Clyde Farnsworth, in which Farnsworth noted that the figures “were buried in a recent speech” that Kissinger had delivered, and then proceeded to list the figures, adding: “In other words, so long as the OPEC members maintain their alliance with non-oil producing countries of the third world, they will probably be able to extract concessions from the West in the negotiations over new international economic structures.” (“West Affirms Oil Import Needs,” *The New York Times*, July 13, 1976, p. 58)

3. *Counter-attack: Attack is the best defense.*

I think you ought to strive to the extent that you can to shift the discussion to such matters as:

- Non-proliferation
- Republican failures in Cyprus and Angola
- Republican indifference to the human rights issue, especially in the Soviet Union
- Republican disinterest and absence of leadership with regards to global issues (including on the last item, paralyzing differences between the Treasury Department led by Simon and the State Department)
- Absence of an energy program.

4. *Beyond Debates.*

It is my general view that the debates will not be decisive the way the Kennedy-Nixon debates may have been. The public is essentially looking for indications of true Presidential ability, and you will have shown that in the debates, but more than the debates will be required. This is why I feel strongly that *you should give at least one presidential-type speech a week (of the kind that you gave to the FPA in New York)*.¹¹ Insofar as foreign affairs are concerned, I think you ought to give a responsibly tough-nosed speech on East-West relations, along the lines of the draft that I have sent to you.¹² There is bound to be disagreement among your advisers on the tone and substance of this speech but I lean towards moderate and responsible toughness as being justified both by domestic political needs and actual international realities. In addition, you should demonstrate responsible humaneness and vision on the larger global issues and here a serious discussion of the North-South relationship would be the proper focus.

All of the above can be, and should be, reinforced by periodic release of position papers with a more sharply defined focus.¹³

5. *European Expectations.*

I was in Europe in connection with my regular work. I met there a number of people I know quite well (the Foreign Minister and President of Italy; the principal foreign policy advisers to President Giscard; some top British and German business and political leaders; as well as some key journalists).

¹¹ See Document 6.

¹² Not found and not further identified.

¹³ The Carter campaign released a series of position papers in six categories under the headings "The Federal System," "The Citizen and the System," "Agriculture and the Economy," "Business and Labor," "Energy and the Environment," and "Foreign Policy—U.S. Security." The issues papers are printed in *The Presidential Campaign 1976*, volume I, part I, *Jimmy Carter*, pp. 581–699.

I was struck by *the great expectations* that the Europeans seem to have regarding your prospective Presidency. There is a striking sense of anticipation as well as curiosity. I was plied with endless questions about you personally as well as about your likely policies. (Needless to say, I made it very clear that I was *not speaking* for you).

One important impression that I gained was that there may be in the foreseeable future real opportunity for a renewed and truly serious dialogue between the U.S. and France on both East-West and North-South problems. The French hinted that they would like to have serious discussions with us about their nuclear policies; this could involve some accommodation on their part with regards to their role in nuclear proliferation in return for some consideration on our part for their strategic concerns.

I should add, in passing, that the new French foreign minister is de Guiringaud. You might remember that I placed him on your right when you were making your speech before the FPA in New York. He was enormously impressed by you and I strongly suspect that the fact that he got to know you somewhat and had a serious conversation with you may have had a bit to do with his recent selection to be the Foreign Minister.

11. Editorial Note

In addition to Zbigniew Brzezinski's September 27, 1976, memorandum concerning the second Presidential debate between President Gerald Ford and Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter, scheduled for October 6 (see Document 10), other members of the Carter-Mondale campaign staff drafted briefing memoranda and books for Carter to use in his debate preparation. Copies of the memoranda and briefing books for the second debate are in the Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office, Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 9, Debates—Briefing Material [2] and Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office, Issues Office—David Rubenstein, Box 45, Briefing Book—September 24, 1976; *ibid.*, Briefing Book—9/28/76 [1] and [2], and *ibid.*, Debates—Reviewed [1] and [2].

Under a September 28 memorandum, adviser Stuart Eizenstat sent Carter the final briefing book, noting that advisers Richard Holbrooke, Robert Hunter, David Aaron, and Nicholas MacNeil had produced the content. Part I of the briefing book included the general comments and strategy section. In this part, the authors concluded: "You 'win' this de-

bate if you establish that you are a credible and competent potential world leader, in whom Americans can have confidence. You want to convey that you understand the issues and have command of the facts, that you can be trusted by the voters to preserve the peace, to keep America strong, and to project a sense of direction for a world that still needs American leadership. Stress your own experience—travels, visits with foreign leaders, Trilateral Commission, Naval.” (Carter Library, 1976 Presidential Campaign, Issues Office, Issues Office—David Rubenstein, Box 45, Briefing Book—9/28/76 [1])

The second Presidential debate took place on October 6 at 6:30 p.m. in the Palace of Fine Arts Theatre in San Francisco and was broadcast live on radio and television. National Public Radio (NPR) correspondent Pauline Frederick moderated the debate, while Associate Editor of *The New York Times* Max Frankel, *Baltimore Sun* diplomatic correspondent Henry Trewhitt, and National Broadcasting Company (NBC) diplomatic correspondent Richard Valeriani posed questions to the candidates. Following Frederick’s brief introductory remarks, Frankel asked Carter to address his criticisms of the foreign policy of the Richard Nixon and Ford administrations. Carter, drawing upon several of the themes contained in the briefing book, responded that the debate offered an opportunity to discuss leadership, character, and vision. He continued:

“Our country is not strong any more; we’re not respected any more. We can only be strong overseas if we’re strong at home, and when I become President, we’ll not only be strong in those areas but also in defense—a defense capability second to none.

“We’ve lost, in our foreign policy, the character of the American people. We’ve ignored or excluded the American people and the Congress from participation in the shaping of our foreign policy. It’s been one of secrecy and exclusion.

“In addition to that, we’ve had a chance to become now, contrary to our long-standing beliefs and principles, the arms merchant of the whole world. We’ve tried to buy success from our enemies, and at the same time we’ve excluded from the process the normal friendship of our allies.

“In addition to that, we’ve become fearful to compete with the Soviet Union on an equal basis. We talk about détente. The Soviet Union knows what they want in détente, and they’ve been getting it. We have not known what we’ve wanted, and we’ve been out-traded in almost every instance.

“The other point I want to make is about our defense. We’ve got to be a nation blessed with the defense capability that’s efficient, tough, capable, well organized, narrowly focused fighting capability. The

ability to fight if necessary is the best way to avoid the chance for or the requirement to fight.”

Valeriani returned to this theme later in the debate, asking Carter if he really believed that the United States was not the “most respected country in world,” or if the statement was campaign rhetoric. Carter answered:

“No, it’s not just campaign rhetoric. I think that militarily we are as strong as any nation on Earth. I think we’ve got to stay that way and continue to increase our capabilities to meet any potential threat. But as far as strength derived from commitment to principles; as far as strength derived from the people, the Congress, the Secretary of State, the President, sharing in the evolution and carrying out of a foreign policy; as far as strength derived from the respect of our own allies and friends, their assurance that we will be staunch in our commitment, that we will not deviate, and we will give them adequate attention; as far as strength derived from doing what is right, caring for the poor, providing food, becoming the breadbasket of the world instead of the arms merchant of the world—in those respects we are not strong. Also, we will never be strong again overseas unless we are strong at home. And with our economy in such terrible disarray, and getting worse by the month—we have got 500,000 more Americans unemployed today than we had 3 months ago; we have got 2½ million more Americans out of work now than we have when Mr. Ford took office—this kind of deterioration in our economic strength is bound to weaken us in the world.

“And we not only have problems at home but we export those problems overseas. So, as far as the respect of our own people toward our own Government, as far as participation in the shaping of concepts and commitments, as far as a trust of our country among the nations of the world, as far as dependence of our country in meeting the needs and obligations that we’ve expressed to our allies, as far as the respect of our country, even among our potential adversaries, we are weak. Potentially we are strong. Under this administration that strength has not been realized.” (*Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77*, Book III, pages 2409–2410 and 2426)

12. Editorial Note

During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter asked Cyrus R. Vance, who had served as Secretary of the

Army, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Special Envoy on the Cyprus and Korean situations, and negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, to serve as one of his foreign policy advisers. After Carter made his offer, Vance consulted with Richard Gardner, Anthony Lake, and Richard Holbrooke to gain a better sense of Carter's views. As he explained in his memoir of his tenure as Carter's Secretary of State: "He had a set of values that I found attractive. His thinking reflected a principled approach to foreign affairs, which I believed essential for the reestablishment of a broad base of domestic support for a more comprehensive foreign policy. His views on specific issues, although still largely unformed, were in the centrist mainstream in which I felt comfortable. I concluded that this intense and energetic man had a real chance to become the next president of the United States." (*Hard Choices*, page 29)

Upon further assessment and consultation, Vance agreed to join Carter's foreign policy team. In the early fall of 1976, Vance wrote that Carter had requested him to prepare a "memorandum setting out specific goals and priorities for a Carter foreign policy, should he be elected." (*Ibid.*, pages 29–30) Under cover of an October 24, 1976, memorandum to head of the Carter–Mondale Policy Planning Group Jack Watson, Vance sent two copies of a 25-page "Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Priorities" memorandum. On the first page of the overview, Vance noted that it "rapidly surveys, if not all the trees in the foreign affairs forest, at least the clumps of trees." He continued with a broad statement of themes, which he felt should constitute the primary elements of the Carter administration's foreign policy:

"(1) In its dealings with the Soviet Union, the United States will keep itself strong, and will stand resolutely firm to protect key United States interests. At the same time, the new Administration will continue to direct its efforts toward the objective of a further reduction of tensions between the two countries.

"—Although of central importance, US/Soviet issues will not be permitted to so dominate our foreign policy that we neglect other important relationships and problems.

"(2) The new Administration will bring a new sensitivity, awareness and priority to the vast complex of issues clustering around the relationships between the industrialized and the unindustrialized world, and the new set of global issues that are emerging, such as energy, population, environment, and nuclear proliferation.

"(3) The United States will continue in international forums its unwavering stand in favor of the rights of free men and, without unrealistically inserting itself into the internal operations of other governments, to give important weight to those considerations in selecting foreign policy positions in the interests of the United States.

“(4) In its conduct of its foreign policy, the new Administration will proceed with gravity, not flurry; will not try to do everything at once or solve all the world’s problems; and will keep its mind focused on long-term general objectives, not just the crises of the moment.

“(5) The new Administration will accept the necessity to make the Congress and the American people joint partners in foreign policy matters. To do so, the President will assume major public leadership on foreign policy matters, and make a major investment in educating the public to perceive the difference between its long-term interests and its short-term interests, and the difference between the interest of the nation as a whole and the interests of particular subconstituencies and interest groups within the United States.

“These are pervasive general foreign policy themes. But a President will not always have the luxury of setting his own agenda and his own timing. Unforeseen crises will occur, demanding instant reaction. And the new Administration will inherit several deep-seated, impacted sore spots (e.g., Mid-East, Korea, Greece-Turkey-Cyprus, Panama) that will require prompt attention, as appears in later pages.” (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980: Lot 84D241, Odds & Ends From the Transition)

Vance indicated that several others, including George Ball and Zbigniew Brzezinski, had been asked to prepare similar overview papers for Carter. For Brzezinski’s memorandum, which he co-authored with Henry Owen and Richard Gardner, see Document 13. As for his overview, Vance asserted: “My own was to become a kind of foreign policy road map and a standard against which I measured our success and failure in attaining the goals we ultimately set for ourselves.” (*Hard Choices*, pages 29–30) The full text of the overview is printed as Appendix I in *Hard Choices*, pages 441–462.

On November 30, Vance flew to Georgia to meet with Carter. That evening, they discussed many of the items outlined in the overview paper. At the conclusion of the meeting, Vance recalled that Carter asked him to serve as Secretary of State. The next morning, Vance shared with Carter his thinking about staffing the Department of State before the discussion turned to other choices for cabinet positions. He later reflected:

“In keeping with his declared intention to make greater use of the cabinet, and to keep his personal staff out of the line between them and himself—a sentiment I shared—Carter chose his cabinet officers before he named his White House team. He asked whether I had any objection to Zbigniew Brzezinski, who he had worked with at the Trilateral Commission, as White House adviser for national security affairs. I said that I did not know Brzezinski well, but I believed we could work together. I asked two conditions: first, that it be made clear that I would be the

president's spokesman on foreign policy; second, that I had no objection to Brzezinski's offering Carter independent foreign policy advice—in fact I encouraged the president to seek a variety of views—but that I must be able to present to him my own unfiltered views before he made any foreign policy decision. Carter readily agreed, and we turned to other subjects, including other names for cabinet posts." (Ibid., page 34)

13. Memorandum From Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Gardner, and Henry Owen to President-Elect Carter¹

New York, November 3, 1976

This memorandum contains our recommendations for action in ten key areas of foreign policy and national security where we believe action should be taken in the six months between election day and May 1, 1977. In each of these areas, we have divided our recommendations into two parts—decisions you will have to face (e.g., because of legislative requirements or already scheduled international negotiations) and further decisions we recommend as being in the national interest. In preparing this memorandum, we have drawn upon the "option papers" supplied by Jack Watson as well as our own independent study and analysis.

[Omitted here are an introductory paragraph and the table of contents.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 41, Transition: Foreign Policy Priorities, 11/76. No classification marking. Sent to Carter under a November 3 memorandum from Brzezinski, Gardner, and Owen, indicating it contained the "foreign policy priorities for the first six months." Another copy of the memorandum is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Counsel and Deputy Chief of Staff Files, Transition Files, Transition Notebooks. In addition to this memorandum and overview memoranda prepared by Ball, Sorensen, Warnke, and Vance, Carter-Mondale Policy Planning Group members Lake and Schaffer prepared 42 separate foreign and defense policy options papers. Copies of these papers are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, 1976–1977 Transition File (Anthony Lake), Box 112, Options Papers: Foreign and Defense Policy (Originals): Undated [I], [II], and [III] and in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Counsel and Deputy Chief of Staff Files, Transition Files, Transition Notebooks.

PART ONE: OVERALL CONCEPT

1. In the first three months after the Inaugural you will have the unique opportunity—given the likelihood of broad popular and Congressional support—to set U.S. policy on a new course. This will require:

- (a) Public enunciation of your overall concept and direction.
- (b) Adoption of specific actions on pressing issues.
- (c) Seizing the initiative in several policy areas in order to foreshadow and advance your overall strategy.

2. Four issues stand out as the most urgent of all:

- (a) The need to put the East-West relationship on a more stable basis;
- (b) The need to set in motion a process pointing toward a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement;
- (c) The need to initiate comprehensive and constructive North-South negotiations;
- (d) The need to contain the arms race and to rationalize our defense posture.

3. In your State of the Union Address² you will have the opportunity to sketch out the broad outlines of the foreign policy that you intend to follow. In that Address you should explicitly reassert the traditional role of the President as the formulator and articulator of U.S. foreign policy—making clear that henceforth the United States will speak to the world through you. We recommend the following themes:

A. The depth, extent, and pace of global change is ushering us into a new era of either global cooperation or fragmentation.

B. The United States has no choice but to be engaged in a protracted architectural process to reform and reshape the existing international system. Unlike the years 1945–50, this calls not for assertive American leadership but for more subtle inspiration and cooperation on a much wider front. The new international system cannot be confined to the developed countries but must involve increasingly the entire international community of more than 150 nation-states. That community, in addition to the traditional problems of war and peace, now confronts global problems never before faced by mankind.

C. That in the above context you set the following priorities for the United States:

² Presumable reference to the inaugural address, as Carter did not deliver a State of the Union address in 1977. For the inaugural address, see Document 15.

i. To enhance and deepen our collaboration with our friends in the industrial world—countries which share our values, have political systems similar to ours, and which because of their wealth have a special burden of responsibility to the rest of mankind.

ii. This cooperation should focus not only on improving prospects in the industrial world but on making it more possible for the new emerging states to enhance, through self-reliance, their own internal progress.

iii. In the foregoing context, we shall seek cooperation on the global problems with the communist countries, while striving to reduce areas of conflict and to codify more precise rules of reciprocal restraint—notably through strategic arms limitations and reductions and through agreements on regional restraints.

This speech would initiate a new phase in U.S. foreign policy, going beyond the Atlanticist/East-West Cold War framework of the years 1945–1976. The regional and functional recommendations that follow are designed to set such a foreign policy in motion.

[Omitted here are Part Two: Relations with Advanced Industrial Economies; Part Three: East-West Relations; Part Four: Relations with Developing Countries; Part Five: The Middle East; Part Six: Defense; Part Seven: Arms Control; Part Eight: Foreign Economic Policy; Part Nine: International Development; and Part Ten: Multilateral Organizations.]

14. Editorial Note

Secretary of State-designate Cyrus R. Vance testified on January 11, 1977, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was holding an open hearing in order to consider Vance's nomination. The previous afternoon, Vance had attended a closed, "get-acquainted" informal meeting with Committee members. Senator John Sparkman (D-Alabama) chaired the January 11 hearing and began the proceedings by summarizing Vance's professional career. He then called on Senators Jacob Javits (R-New York) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New York) to offer statements in support of the Vance nomination. Following their statements, Sparkman directed Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) to question Vance. Church stated:

"Mr. Vance, we have just come through an election campaign in which there was a lively debate on foreign policy matters. I think as a result of the election there is the expectation that the new President will be initiating changes in American foreign policy.

"I wonder if you might headline for the committee what you think some of those changes may be, and what your own view may be respecting that."

Vance responded:

"Thank you very much, Senator Church. I would be very happy to do that.

"First, let me start by briefly sketching what I would consider to be the fundamental policy principles which one could expect to guide the development of foreign policy during the next administration.

"Let me say that in doing this I run the risk of vastly oversimplifying the problem. But with that caveat at the outset, let me try.

"The first principle is the maintenance of peace. This depends upon healthy alliances, American strength, creative efforts to facilitate the resolution of regional disputes, as, for example, the problems of the Middle East. In this connection I think we must remember that American strength and leadership abroad proceed first from a strong America at home—strong in our economy, strong in our cohesiveness, strong in our confidence and our commitment to fundamental values.

"The second principle is a public confidence in our foreign policy requires confidence in how those policies are made. This, in my judgment, has at the heart of it a close and cooperative relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch. I do not believe that we can develop or properly implement American foreign policy without the closest cooperation between these two branches of the Government.

"I pledge myself and this administration to this end.

"Next, I believe that we must have openness, and toward that end all that can properly be disclosed in open sessions should be disclosed in open sessions. There will obviously be times when things cannot be, but the guiding principle will be that we will try and be as much open as possible. I know that the President-elect intends to communicate openly with the American people through the process of fireside chats in discussing foreign policy as well as domestic policy.

"I intend to meet once a month with the press, if not more often because of special circumstances, and hold a press conference to discuss with them whatever questions they may have.

"The third principle is the need for clear, easily understood, substantive priorities that will contribute to building the world that we want to live in. I have four particularly in mind.

"First is a strengthening of cooperation among our allies. This is central to everything else.

"Second, East-West relations are critical because they affect the question of world peace. In my judgment we should pursue the lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union in an active and aggressive

way, particularly in the area of the reduction and control of nuclear weapons.

“Further, I believe that we should seek a clearer understanding between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the meaning of détente so that we understand better how each of us perceives the process to operate. I think this is possible and can be done. In saying this, I do not believe that we will not continue to have political competition. I think indeed that we will have political competition with the Soviet Union. But I do think it is important to have a better understanding of what the ground rules are and what we can expect of each other.

“Let me note that I do not think that the preoccupation with these vitally important issues should so dominate our foreign policy that we neglect other critical issues which are growing increasingly important.

“Let me turn to them.

“These I consider to be of cardinal importance: I believe we must keep our eyes fixed on long-term objectives as well as on immediate political crises. These long-term objectives include control of nuclear arms and nuclear proliferation, economic development and the dignity of the developing world, energy, food, population, environment, and conventional arms transfers.

“These are the global issues which will determine how the next generation lives, and even whether it lives.

“I note, as all of you know better than I, that foreign policy is increasingly intertwined with economic policy. These sets of intertwined issues in my judgment are going to be some of the most important and complex issues with which we will be dealing in the years ahead. Indeed, I believe as we look over the next 5 to 10 years, we may find that these issues will be replacing many of the security issues which have so dominated the foreign policy agenda in the last 10 to 20 years as the most important issues with which we have to deal.

“Finally, we must have policies based upon fundamental values. In particular, we must stand for human rights. Without being interventionist I believe we can make this concern a major focus of our foreign policy calculations.

“I apologize for the condensation of these many and complex problems. But perhaps this will serve as a basis from which to start our discussion.”

After Senator Clifford Case (R-New Jersey) offered brief comments, Church returned to Vance’s point concerning a U.S. foreign policy based on fundamental values:

“This came up time and time again during the foreign policy debates during the recent national campaign. I for one am very happy that you have listed this as a point of departure for your own policy be-

cause I think that our foreign policy should reflect our values as a country. If we are going to mean anything to the world, we have to be true to ourselves.

"I would hope that this will translate into some refusal on the part of the administration to continue to extend military and economic aid to regimes that are systematically engaged in the repression of human rights, at least in the absence of overriding considerations of national security that might require us to adopt a different policy. Do I understand that by placing greater emphasis upon these fundamental values we can expect that your administration of the State Department will take into greater account the kinds of governments we are supplying aid to in the future?"

"Mr. Vance. Yes; you can.

"Matters of human rights will be given a greater emphasis with respect to those decisions. But I think it is important to make the point that you did; namely, that there are cases in which the security aspects are of overriding importance and that that has to be borne in mind.

"Senator Church. Of course.

"I can think of many countries to which we have given large amounts of aid under previous administrations that have had little or no impact upon the national security of the United States. I am encouraged by your statement that more attention will be given in the future to the nature and the character of the governments which we support with our aid programs."

Church then directed the questioning to a discussion of covert operations:

"Mr. Vance, the other side of the coin in the matter of human rights and fundamental values has to do with the methods that we use. Everyone knows today that under both Democratic and Republican Presidents in our recent past we have intervened through covert operations in many countries with a will, indeed with a zeal. Now these covert operations were unconnected with the gathering of central intelligence information, but were secret undertakings in foreign lands to manipulate political events in ways thought to be advantageous to the United States.

"Our methods were justified on the grounds that we must use them because the Russians do. They have embraced all of the black arts of covert operations—bribery, false propaganda, physical coercion, abduction, indeed even attempted assassination of foreign leaders.

"I don't know how we can be true to our own values as a country and continue to believe that it is our right to use such methods; though again, I recognize that in extremity a nation must do what is needed to assure its own survival. But we are not discussing cases of extremity,

and the habit of the past has been to intervene in these ways in the affairs of other lands, even when the objective was purely technical.

“Now I would like your own view on this. If method is the essence of whether or not we do adhere to our professed values as a nation, what are your views and what will be your policy as Secretary of State when it comes to decisions with respect to secret interventions in the affairs of other lands?

“Mr. Vance. I am very happy to give my views on this.

“Let me say by way of background that these kinds of covert actions have been going on for a long time. They were going on when I was in the Government, and I was part of the oversight committee at one point in connection with them. So I have thought long and carefully about the subject.

“I have come to the conclusion that covert actions—and I distinguish between covert collection of intelligence on the one part and covert actions against other countries, and I am talking about the latter—I am convinced that covert action against other countries should be carried out only in the most extraordinary circumstances. I believe that procedures should be established so that if there is a proposal to carry out a covert action, that it first has to be passed upon by a committee of the senior Cabinet officers, to include the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser, and importantly in my judgment, the Attorney General of the United States.

“I feel very strongly that the Attorney General of the United States should participate in the decisionmaking process by which the decision is arrived at which goes to the President of the United States. I think then that the President of the United States should personally approve in writing saying that he believes this to be vital to the national security and so endorse the carrying forward of this extraordinary circumstance.

“I then feel that notice should be given in advance to the appropriate committee or committees of the Congress so that they can provide their views to the President if they disagree with the proposal.

“I do not believe that the Congress should have a veto in that regard because I think that splits the responsibility. But I think that it is very likely that if the congressional committee said to the President, ‘We want to come in to see you as we have great concern for what is being proposed here,’ this would have great weight with any President as to whether he would then go forward with the operation.

“Finally, I believe there should be an adequate monitoring system so that once a covert action is approved, one keeps on top of it to determine what is happening, how it is proceeding, and whether it should be terminated.

“Unfortunately, experience in the past has shown that these develop a life of their own. Once started they are hard to turn back.” (*Vance Nomination; Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Hon. Cyrus R. Vance to be Secretary of State, January 11, 1977, pages 1, 4–6, 7–8*)

On January 14, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 15–0 to approve Vance as Secretary of State. President Carter formally appointed him on January 21.

15. Editorial Note

President Jimmy Carter highlighted the connections among strength, freedom, and responsibility in his inaugural address, delivered on January 20, 1977:

“Our Nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at home. And we know that the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation.

“To be true to ourselves, we must be true to others. We will not behave in foreign places so as to violate our rules and standards here at home, for we know that the trust which our Nation earns is essential to our strength.

“The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Peoples more numerous and more politically aware are craving, and now demanding, their place in the sun—not just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but for basic human rights.

“The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.

“We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength so sufficient that it need not be proven in combat—a quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal but on the nobility of ideas.

“We will be ever vigilant and never vulnerable, and we will fight our wars against poverty, ignorance, and injustice, for those are the enemies against which our forces can be honorably marshaled.

“We are a proudly idealistic nation, but let no one confuse our idealism with weakness.

“Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights. We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear that a world which others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people.

“The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to ensure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world’s armaments to those necessary for each nation’s domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth. We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pages 2–3*)

President Carter spoke at 12:05 p.m. from the East Front of the Capitol. Immediately before the address Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger administered the oath of office. The address was broadcast on radio and television. In his personal diary, the President characterized the speech:

“I think the inauguration speech itself, perhaps one of the briefest on record for the first inauguration of a president, was quite compatible with my announcement speech in December 1974, and also with my acceptance speech at the Democratic convention. It accurately expressed some of the major themes of my administration.” (*Carter, White House Diary, page 10*)

In a separate videotaped address to global audiences, the President reinforced the themes of the inaugural address:

“I have chosen the occasion of my inauguration as President to speak not only to my own countrymen—which is traditional—but also to you, citizens of the world who did not participate in our election but who will nevertheless be affected by my decisions.

“I also believe that as friends you are entitled to know how the power and influence of the United States will be exercised by its new Government.

“I want to assure you that the relations of the United States with the other countries and peoples of the world will be guided during my own administration by our desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations. The United States will meet its obligation to help create a stable, just, and peaceful world order.

“We will not seek to dominate nor dictate to others. As we Americans have concluded one chapter in our Nation’s history and are beginning to work on another, we have, I believe, acquired a more mature perspective on the problems of the world. It is a perspective which rec-

ognizes the fact that we alone do not have all the answers to the world's problems.

"The United States alone cannot lift from the world the terrifying specter of nuclear destruction. We can and will work with others to do so.

"The United States alone cannot guarantee the basic right of every human being to be free of poverty and hunger and disease and political repression. We can and will cooperate with others in combating these enemies of mankind.

"The United States alone cannot ensure an equitable development of the world resources or the proper safeguarding of the world's environment. But we can and will join with others in this work.

"The United States can and will take the lead in such efforts.

"In these endeavors we need your help, and we offer ours. We need your experience; we need your wisdom.

"We need your active participation in a joint effort to move the reality of the world closer to the ideals of human freedom and dignity.

"As friends, you can depend on the United States to be in the forefront of the search for world peace. You can depend on the United States to remain steadfast in its commitment to human freedom and liberty. And you can also depend on the United States to be sensitive to your own concerns and aspirations, to welcome your advice, to do its utmost to resolve international differences in a spirit of cooperation.

"The problems of the world will not be easily resolved. Yet the well-being of each and every one of us—indeed our mutual survival—depends on their resolution. As President of the United States I can assure you that we intend to do our part. I ask you to join us in a common effort based on mutual trust and mutual respect.

"Thank you." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pages 4–5)

The United States Information Agency videotaped Carter's remarks for broadcast to 26 nations on January 20. Additional documentation on this message is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXX, Public Diplomacy.

16. Address by Vice President Mondale¹

Brussels, January 24, 1977

In behalf of President Carter, I have come today to NATO Headquarters as a matter of the first priority. I have come to convey to you and the member governments of the North Atlantic alliance:

—The President's most sincere greetings;

—His commitment, and the full commitment of the United States, to the North Atlantic alliance as a vital part of our deep and enduring relations with Canada and Western Europe; and

—His dedication to improving cooperation and consultations with our oldest friends so as to safeguard our peoples and to promote our common efforts and concerns.

The President's conviction concerning NATO's central role is deep rooted and firm. As he stated in his message to the NATO Ministers last month:²

Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the partnership between North America and Western Europe. NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our collective security. The American commitment to maintaining the NATO alliance shall be sustained and strengthened under my Administration.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1977, pp. 182–185. All brackets are in the original. Mondale spoke before the North Atlantic Council (NAC) at NATO Headquarters. The Vice President traveled to Brussels (January 23–24), Bonn (January 24–26), Berlin (January 26), Rome (January 26–27), Vatican City (January 27), London (January 27–28), Paris (January 28–29), Keflavik (January 29), and Tokyo (January 30–February 1). For the President's remarks prior to Mondale's departure, the text of news statements and addresses, and Mondale's remarks at a news conference following his return to Washington, see *ibid.*, pp. 181–182, 185–197. Reports on the trip are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects, Henry Owen File, Box 29, Summit: London: VP Trip, 1–3/77 and Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 31, Vice President, Europe and Japan, 1/23/77–2/1/77. Additional material is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files: Trips, TR 2–1, Foreign Trip Upon Taking Office: Working Visit to Western Europe and Japan, January 23, 1977–February 1, 1977. Mondale later noted that he proposed the trip to Carter in order to “introduce the Carter–Mondale administration to our major allies,” adding that he “met the leaders we would work with for the next several years, asked for their cooperation in coordinating a series of economic stimulus measures, told them that we hoped to operate in an atmosphere of close consultation, and got home without touching off any major international incidents.” (Mondale, *The Good Fight*, p. 199)

² For text, see *Bulletin* of Jan. 3, 1977, p. 9. [Footnote in the original. Kissinger delivered a message from President-elect Carter in the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on December 9, 1976. Carter asserted: “I am convinced that NATO's mission and the North Atlantic alliance are no less important today than when NATO was originally established. I look forward to working closely with all the governments represented at this meeting.”]

This statement of renewed American commitment comes at a time of great promise in our country. We are a young Administration—some 90 hours old. We have come to office following a long period of difficulty in the United States, and of doubt among friends about our will and steadfastness. But this has also been a time of promising change in America, just as in Europe and elsewhere in the world. As President Carter said in his inaugural address, “The world itself now is dominated by a new spirit.”³

I share his belief that in the United States “there is evident a serious and purposeful rekindling of confidence.” There is a new understanding of our society and appreciation of our recognized limits. But there is also a new faith in the strength of our democratic system of government, a new willingness to meet challenges and continuing responsibilities abroad. Some of these challenges are unfamiliar to us all—as the wind of change has transformed so much of the world. We are ready to play our role in meeting these challenges. But we believe the requirement for leadership and creativity also falls upon our friends and allies in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.

I share the confidence of President Carter that, together, we will be equal to the tasks of the future as we have met those in the past. To this end, the United States is wholeheartedly dedicated:

—To the security, prosperity, and well-being of our people and of our allies;

—To “eternal vigilance” in preserving peace; and

—To promoting human values and human dignity for people everywhere.

In cooperation with our friends abroad, President Carter is proceeding immediately with steps to strengthen the American economy. He is proceeding with steps which will enable the United States to help meet the extraordinary energy challenge facing all our countries. He is giving priority attention to the agenda of vital economic and political issues before the industrialized nations of the West—in Europe, North America, and Japan. And President Carter is deeply conscious of the aspirations of people in the world’s developing nations and of the need for all of us to seek new and cooperative relations with these countries.

President Carter takes office at a time when we have moved from the rigid period of the cold war into a period of expanded contact and greater potential for accommodation—for mutual benefit—with potential adversaries in particular but still limited areas. It is now possible to talk, where before it was only possible to confront one another in deadly and undiminished hostility. And it is imperative that we con-

³ See Document 15.

tinue this dialogue, ever seeking to expand its depth and compass, yet fully consistent with Western interests.

At the same time, the President and his Administration are vitally aware of the continuing growth in Soviet military power and the uncertainties that lie ahead with inevitable changes in Soviet leadership in the years to come. The growth of Soviet military power makes us keenly aware of the need for the NATO alliance to modernize and improve its defenses—not for the sake of military power itself but, rather, for a more fundamental reason. This reason is stated in the North Atlantic Treaty: that we are determined to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage, and the civilization of our peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, justice, and the rule of law.

As President Carter said in his inaugural address about our own country:

We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength so sufficient that it need not be proven in combat—a quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal but on the nobility of ideas.

The Atlantic alliance has successfully withstood repeated testing for more than a quarter century. And as President Carter begins his Administration, we mark another milestone in U.S.-European relations—the 30th anniversary of the Marshall plan. Today, as we look back on how much we have done together, it is fitting to recall what Secretary of State Marshall said at Harvard in June 1947:

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.⁴

And this concern with basic values still motivates us today.

Mr. Secretary General, members of the Council, 30 years ago the United States entered into a firm commitment to enduring involvement on this continent—as vital to both the United States and Europe and as reflecting shared political and human values. President Carter has asked me personally to convey to you that the American commitment remains firm and undiminished.

In support of our close ties with our NATO allies—our commitment to allied defense—President Carter is determined to maintain fully effective defense forces in Europe. As you are well aware, we are determined to reduce waste and inefficiency in the U.S. defense budget. But he has asked me to inform you that his new budget and

⁴ For the text of Marshall's June 5, 1947, address, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. III, The British Commonwealth; Europe, pp. 237–239.

these efficiencies will not result in any decrease in planned investment in NATO defense—and these plans involve some growth.

Before I left Washington, President Carter emphasized to me his deep concern about NATO's defense. He told me that he is prepared to consider increased U.S. investment in NATO's defense. In turn, we look to America's allies to join with us in improving NATO's defense forces to the limit of individual abilities, to provide a defense fully adequate to our needs. Of course, economic and social problems make a strong claim on our resources—no less so in the United States than in Europe. And in a time of détente, it is easy to lose sight of the need for adequate defense. But this need is inescapable. It demands continuing efforts in common.

The alliance as a whole must take into account the growth in Soviet military power and together agree on the appropriate response. In improving our defense forces, we must redouble our efforts to standardize weapons, rationalize our military posture, increase efficiency, and improve reinforcement capability. We must place greater emphasis on improved force readiness. And as an alliance, we cannot accept reductions in NATO defense capabilities except through negotiations with the Warsaw Pact—negotiations fully securing allied interests and leading to a more stable military balance.

Negotiations on force levels in Europe—MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions]—must move forward with the closest attention paid to the interests of each member state and as a clear expression of common and agreed positions.

Furthermore, President Carter is committed to an early resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, looking toward another step this year in the effort to end the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. He has publicly stated that three basic principles will guide him in this effort:

—He will pursue arms control agreements in the best interests of the United States, the alliance, and world peace;

—He will insist on no less than equivalent advantage for the West in any agreement; and

—He will strengthen consultations and cooperation with America's natural friends and allies throughout the negotiating process.

The President has asked me today to affirm again his intention to consult closely with our NATO allies before the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are resumed. He also looks forward to working in closest cooperation with you on MBFR. And while the new Administration is undertaking a careful review of these negotiations, we anticipate no early change in U.S. proposals to our allies concerning the allied position at the force reduction talks.

At the same time the President has asked me to express to you his desire for closest possible consultations on the implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—and on looking to the future.⁵ Both seeking the full implementation of the Helsinki agreement and searching for further ways to improve security and cooperation in Europe are vital to the possibilities for productive discussions at the forthcoming review conference in Belgrade.⁶ But both depend on Western unity and on the success of our efforts to work together—both in NATO and in other forums—in the months before Belgrade. As President Carter said in his inaugural address: “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”

The issues that I have discussed so far relate directly to our security in the immediate area covered by the alliance and to the future of our cooperative relations together. Yet while the NATO alliance provides each of our nations with the blessings of peace and security in the North Atlantic, tension and conflict in some other parts of the world involving economic and political as well as military issues can adversely affect our common security.

President Carter and Secretary of State Vance are turning early attention to other areas of vital concern: in the Middle East, in southern Africa, in Cyprus, and regarding both the sale of conventional arms and efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. On these issues, the President looks forward to working closely with our friends and allies in Western Europe.

Mr. Secretary General, members of the council, we do not live in easy times. But they are hopeful times, as well. This is a period of historic opportunity. All Americans look to the future confident in the belief that—with vision, hard work, and firm unity of purpose—our association of free peoples will continue to provide the security and cooperation vital to us all.

This association goes beyond NATO itself. For the strength and vitality of the NATO alliance is only one task facing all of us. As we seek to promote and strengthen our security in the broadest sense, we must also use effectively those other forums we have to resolve the great economic and other issues facing our nations and peoples. And we must

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 4.

⁶ Reference is to the Belgrade CSCE Review Conference, scheduled to take place in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in October 1977.

work with those countries facing economic difficulty and support nations in Europe seeking to rebuild or strengthen democratic institutions.

Together, we share many strengths. Ours is an alliance of democratic governments, of economies which have provided an unprecedented abundance, of energetic and imaginative peoples. Our countries are part of a great civilization of high moral purpose, deep human values, and a shared commitment to justice and compassion. Our societies are resilient and flexible, and thanks to NATO, we have a strong common defense.

President Carter and his Administration are dedicated not only to preserving these strengths and virtues but also to building on them in the years ahead. This is his basic message to you and to your countries. I hope my visit here will also enable me to convey to the President your thoughts and your concerns. For these will be of great value to us in Washington as we shape our own policies and programs. I look forward to hearing your comments.

Years ago, Jean Monnet, the father of Europe, spoke eloquently on the problem facing us: "Europe and America," he said, "must acknowledge that neither of us is defending a particular country, that we are all defending our common civilization." We have acknowledged that basic truth, and it will bind us ever closer together in the years to come.

17. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, January 26, 1977

To General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev

As I take up my duties as President of the United States, I want to share with you my view on relations between our two countries.

I want to express my appreciation for the informal messages I have received from you² and in this connection I want to affirm that it is

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev-Carter Correspondence: 1-2/77. Confidential. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 1.

² No messages were found. Podgorny sent Carter a letter of congratulations on January 20. (Carter Library National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence With Foreign Leaders File, Box 20, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Chairman Nikolai V. Podgorny, 1/77)

my goal to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and benefit. That goal will have my close personal attention, as well as that of Secretary of State Vance.

I have read your public remarks with great interest, and they encourage me to believe that we share a common desire to enhance and preserve the prospect of lasting peace.

As I understood your very important speech at Tula,³ the Soviet Union will not seek superiority in arms, will oppose the concept, and will require only a defense sufficient to deter any potential adversary. The United States seeks nothing more or less for itself. With perseverance and wisdom therefore our two countries should be in a position to avoid a new armaments race. I have said to the American people that my firm goal is to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

There are three areas where progress can be made toward this goal. A critical first step should be the achievement of a SALT II agreement without delay,⁴ and an agreement to proceed toward additional limitations and reductions in strategic weapons. Moreover, I hope we can promptly conclude an adequately verified comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, and also strive to achieve greater openness about our respective strategic policies. It is also important to renew efforts for progress in the negotiations for a balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe.

We also have a responsibility to pursue policies that will prevent the troubled areas of the world from exploding into dangerous conflicts. The United States will work to promote a peaceful settlement in the Middle East on the basis of appropriate UN resolutions. Similarly in Southern Africa we are encouraging all parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement which promotes security and justice for all.

It is my belief that the USSR can contribute to the realization of progress toward peace in both of these critical areas.

My Administration attaches importance to the improvement of our bilateral economic relations, on the basis of mutual and equivalent benefits to the peoples of both our great countries. At the same time we cannot be indifferent to the fate of freedom and individual human rights.

We represent different social systems and our nations are different in background and experience. Competition over ideals and ideas is inevitable between our societies. But it need not prevent a common effort to shape a world that is more peaceful, just and humane. We live in a

³ Brezhnev's January 18 speech, which he delivered in Tula, is printed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIX, number 3 (February 16, 1977), pp. 1–5.

⁴ The SALT II negotiations, which began in November 1972.

world that increasingly requires collective responses to basic human problems, and my hope is that our countries can cooperate more closely in order to promote development, better nutrition, and a more meaningful life for the less fortunate portions of mankind.

I look forward to meeting you and to discussing with you both our differences as well as our common interests. Meanwhile I propose that we both do all that we can to further the progress of improving US-Soviet relations. I have asked Secretary Vance to prepare to meet with you, if you wish, in the spring to review the progress being made, to discuss key issues which are outstanding. At that time we will want to exchange views on a subsequent meeting between you and me.

Any specific suggestions you may wish to communicate to me on these or any other issues will be welcomed and carefully studied.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

18. Editorial Note

On January 27, 1977, the Department of State issued a statement, in response to a question posed at a January 26 news briefing, concerning the Soviet Union's treatment of Nobel Prize winning scientist Andrey Sakharov. The statement warned that any "attempts by Soviet authorities to intimidate Mr. Sakharov will not silence legitimate criticism in the Soviet Union and will conflict with accepted international standards in the field of human rights." (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 21, 1977, page 138)

During a January 31 news conference held at the Department of State, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance discussed the Carter administration's response to human rights concerns, specifically Sakharov's case:

"Q. Jim Anderson, UPI. Mr. Secretary, on the question of international civil rights, is this Administration going to continue the practice of speaking out on cases such as the Sakharov episode? Or are you going to continue the practice of your predecessor, exerting quiet diplomatic pressure and using his concept of linkage?

"Secretary Vance: On the issue of human rights, the President has often expressed his deep concern in this area and has reaffirmed that deep concern in the inauguration address.

“We will speak frankly about injustice both at home and abroad. We do not intend, however, to be strident or polemical, but we do believe that an abiding respect for human rights is a human value of fundamental importance and that it must be nourished. We will not comment on each and every issue, but we will from time to time comment when we see a threat to human rights, when we believe it constructive to do so.

“Q. Mr. Secretary, Barry Schweid of AP. On the same subject, one of the local pundits yesterday called it sudden diplomacy, suggesting that this speaking out hasn’t been very well thought out, particularly its impact on diplomacy.

“You refer to your trip to Moscow. Do you think the statement you have made on Sakharov and your general view on human rights will have an impact, a negative impact, on negotiations with the Soviet Union? Indeed, isn’t that what Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] called to tell you the other day?

“Secretary Vance: I do not believe that it will have a negative impact. As I indicated, we will from time to time speak out. I have discussed the matter with Mr. Dobrynin, but I am sure that our discussions with the Soviet Union on a whole range of matters will not be adversely affected by what we have said.”

After discussion of several issues, Vance again responded to questions relating to human rights violations:

“Q. Marvin Kalb, CBS. The President said yesterday that perhaps the statement about Sakharov should have been made by him or by you. Yet the day before the State Department made its statement on Sakharov, it did come out with a statement on Czechoslovakia, which apparently had been cleared. Are you not running the danger, sir, of setting up what amounts to a double standard of the manner in which you respond to violations of human rights in the Soviet Union and in smaller countries where there is not a direct, vital interest conflict?

“Secretary Vance: This is a very complex area. As I indicated, we will not be speaking out in every case. We will speak out when we believe it advisable to do so, but that will not be, as I said, in each and every case. It is an area where, as I said, I think we have an obligation to make our views frankly known; but we hope we can do it without being strident, as I said, or intrusive in an improper way.

“Q. Isn’t that really setting up a kind of double standard where the Department, or the Administration, might feel itself more free in condemning human rights in smaller countries where there is not a vital interest affected?

“Secretary Vance: No. I hope we will not have a double standard. I think what we have done so far would indicate we have not.

“Q. Jim Klurfeld from Newsday. On this same situation, there were reports that you were unhappy with the statement made on the Sakharov situation. I just wonder if you can tell us who did clear that statement. I think the President indicated yesterday he did not clear it. Who did clear it? And whether you feel that this is an instance in which you should not have spoken out.

“Secretary Vance: Let me say I did not see it; it was cleared at lower levels. I am not going to give the name of the individual. I have the responsibility in this Department, and therefore I accept that responsibility fully. Let me say that I respect Mr. Sakharov very deeply; I respect his, Mr. Sakharov’s, principles and his pursuit of those principles.

“Q. Your predecessor frequently said in speeches that not only is it inadvisable but rather it is counterproductive to speak out, specifically in the case of Soviet emigration—or emigration from the Soviet Union by minorities, including Jews, which dropped sharply after the United States tried to exert pressure. Do you subscribe to that theory, particularly, that speaking out is actually counterproductive?

“Secretary Vance: No, I do not share that view.

“Q. If you don’t share that view, could you say what your view is on that specific aspect of the problem?

“Secretary Vance: My view is that at times we will feel it appropriate and necessary to speak out and there will be other times when we will not.” (Ibid., pages 137–138, 140–141; brackets in the original)

In a January 31 evening report to President Jimmy Carter, Vance summarized the major themes of the press conference:

“You may already have seen the first press reports on my press conference this morning so I will not review in detail with you what transpired. The questions asked were along predictable lines, although I was struck by the degree of interest, even sharpness, on human rights issues. Since we have announced that this administration will speak out on selected international human rights issues, we will of course be asked continually why we are commenting on some and not on others. I am confident, however, that we have a credible rationale for making public statements on human rights questions and that the country expects your administration to pay more attention to such issues in the foreign affairs field. We have chosen Pat Derian to be the State Department Human Rights Coordinator which will give us a well qualified and sensitive person to follow human rights issues worldwide.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77)

19. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 1, 1977, 9:45–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Foreign Policy and National Security Issues for the 95th Congress

PARTICIPANTS

President Carter
Secretary of State Vance
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Senator Edward Brooke, Massachusetts
Senator Frank Church, Idaho
Senator Clifford Case, New Jersey
Senator John Sparkman, Alabama
Representative Clement Zablocki, Wisconsin
Representative Clarence Long, Maryland
Representative Dante Fascell, Florida
Representative Lee Hamilton, Indiana
Representative William Broomfield, Michigan
Representative C.W. "Bill" Young, Florida
Douglas Bennett, Congressional Relations, State Department
Jerrold Schecter, Associate Press Secretary, National Security Council/
Congressional Liaison

The PRESIDENT opened the meeting by saying he needed the advice of the Congressmen, and "I want to work closely with you." Over the past few months the President said he has been an active student of foreign policy and he wants to conduct "an aggressive foreign policy." The President noted the unique quality of Dr. Kissinger who did a lot of things on his own. However, the President said his administration will have a different "team" style. He mentioned Secretary Vance, Vice President Mondale, Dr. Brzezinski and others as team members. The President told the Congressmen that Paul Warnke would be the head of ACDA and chief SALT negotiator because "he is the best man to do this."²

Reporting on Vice President Mondale's trip, PRESIDENT CARTER said the meetings were "substantive" and the "agenda was iden-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Memos for the Record: 2–6/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Drafted on February 2, presumably by Schecter.

² Carter formally submitted Warnke's nomination to the Senate on February 4. The Senate confirmed Warnke as chief U.S. delegate to the SALT II talks and as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on March 9. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 137)

tical as if I had been there myself."³ He noted that FRG Chancellor Schmidt at first felt it was a token visit, but after spending four hours with his Cabinet and the Mondale mission, Schmidt was impressed with the substance of the discussions.

"I've enjoyed being President so far, and I hope to maintain that status," said President Carter, "but I know a mistake can get immediately magnified. You have been here a long time and I reserve the right to come to you with special problems. I have a genuine desire to work closely with you. Cy Vance has my permanent authorization to tell you my plans on foreign policy." Then the President ran down a list of issues under consideration, including SALT, Rhodesia, Panama, Middle East, Cyprus and NATO.

SECRETARY VANCE spoke to the Congressmen about an immediate problem in Egypt growing out of President Sadat's removal of subsidy for basic commodities. This resulted in price increases which caused riots in the country. President Sadat did not handle the situation forcefully and had to lower the prices again to prevent rioting. He was damaged by the way he handled the situation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy asked our Ambassador in Egypt for additional economic aid. Secretary Vance explained that the Administration proposes to shift funds from long-term development to short-term commodity assistance in order to help Egypt. The total would be \$190 million. President Sadat is the key to the Middle East situation, explained Secretary Vance.

The PRESIDENT said that everybody knows that Sadat has demonstrated a good attitude and that strengthening him would pay dividends.

REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON noted that while there are political reasons to support Sadat, we are making a mistake for the long-range. The commodity import program is difficult to administer and has been "very slippery." He said that such long-range economic projects as power plants, irrigation projects and industrial credit should not be knocked out because they will be the basis for a sound Egyptian economy. "If the political situation requires it, then reluctantly I guess we must make the move for short-term commodity aid."

SENATOR CASE said there is no disagreement with Secretary Vance's request in the short-term, but we should reconsider our long-term goals.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL said \$190 million is not a lot of money and the political pay-off is obvious, but where we go is important. "Egypt is the biggest sinkhole in the Middle East and this is short-

³ See Document 16.

term Band-aid money." We must look at long-term goals. How much money for an international consortium? How much program money? How far do we go into the short-term economic program? "We got to \$900 million before cut off and we didn't make a dent," said Fascell.

REPRESENTATIVE LONG said when somebody throws himself on your doorstep, do something. It is surprising they survive at all. Egypt is the most harem scarem country I know. We are inviting the Egyptians to eat up the seed corn. Then Representative Long said that the two nuclear reactors for Egypt ought to be cancelled.

PRESIDENT CARTER said that the request for nuclear reactors for Egypt and Israel had been left over from the previous Administration and were being reviewed but he gave no indication of how he would act as a result of the review. Rather, the President stressed the current situation in Egypt in terms of the need for food commodities and aid, "I consider it to be a crisis." The President said that Dr. Kissinger's achievement was to break Egypt away from the Soviets, and more and more Saudi Arabia is taking a tremendous interest in the Middle East. The President said he is asking Dr. Brzezinski to evolve a comprehensive four-year goal for our foreign policy.⁴ "I want to know where we will be in the Middle East, China, Cyprus and all the major issues." He told the Congressmen he will make them aware of these goals and the preparation of these goals. He said such a compilation would "help me to express our common purposes and what we want to achieve."

DR. BRZEZINSKI explained that the four-year goals in the past have always been statements of broad generalities but "we are trying to make these goals more specific with a little more deliberation and specificity."

REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM YOUNG asked Secretary Vance if Foreign Minister Fahmy asked for additional funds. VANCE said yes, but that to reply rapidly it would have to come from the aid program that had already been approved.

SENATOR BROOKE said that President Sadat has his priorities and that granting of immediate commodity aid would be a symbolic move.

⁴ During the transition period, Brzezinski had suggested that it would be useful for him to assemble for Carter "a briefing book containing the four-year goals of his Administration in the area of foreign policy." (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, p. 52) Carter approved this suggestion and announced at a January 12 meeting with members of Congress that Brzezinski and the NSC Staff would undertake the preparation of such a document. According to the minutes of the January 31 Cabinet meeting, Brzezinski indicated that the NSC Staff members were currently "working on a four-year foreign policy statement of goals, with recommended sequences and timing of US action in pursuit of those goals." (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 18, Cabinet Minutes, 1-5/77) For the statement, see Document 36.

REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON said that along with granting emergency aid the Egyptians be committed to capital projects in the Suez Canal area.

PRESIDENT CARTER then discussed the need to cut back on spending on weapons. He said he hoped, with the aid of Congress, to achieve an overall world-wide reduction in arms transfers. "We are the only nation that can take the lead on arms transfers," the President said.

SECRETARY VANCE said we are in the process of reviewing our own policies on how to proceed on arms transfers. The principle he wants to see carried out, said Secretary Vance, is for arms transfers to be designed to carry out our foreign policy, not to be used as an economic tool. We are putting our thoughts together to get a handle on arms sales problems in the world.

SECRETARY VANCE said he discussed this problem with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in reference to the Middle East. Dobrynin did not express opposition but coupled reduction of arms sales with a political solution in the Middle East.

REPRESENTATIVE LONG said, "We have a tremendous responsibility to make a start on this. If we say, "Let's have a treaty to limit arms transfers, a rough translation would be, 'let's not do anything'". He then raised the question of Egypt's purchase of \$1.6 billion worth of jets from France. "They make no contribution to peace in the Middle East. Why do we give day-to-day aid to Egypt while they buy expensive jets," asked Long.

SECRETARY VANCE. "I have not talked to the heads of state about arms purchases but I will on my trip."⁵

There was a general discussion of developing a pause in arms sales and SECRETARY VANCE pointed out that President Ford had approved the sale of weapons to Israel which include the CBU (cluster bombs) and the FLIR (forward looking infrared), along with tanks and artillery, and a decision will have to be made on whether to go forward with this commitment.⁶

⁵ Reference is to Vance's scheduled trip to Israel (February 15-17), Egypt (February 17-18), Lebanon (February 18), Jordan (February 18-19), Saudi Arabia (February 19-20), and Syria (February 20-21). Documentation on Vance's trip is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978.

⁶ During Allon's October 11, 1976, visit to Washington, Ford indicated that he would lift the ban on the sale of CBU and FLIR to Israel. (Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel That it Blocked in Past," *The New York Times*, October 12, 1976, pp. 1, 12)

SENATOR BROOKE noted that the President's proposal to limit arms transfers is a laudatory one, but he warned that we appear to be inferior in megatonnage and delivery vehicles to the Soviet Union.⁷

PRESIDENT CARTER said there had been some response in Germany and France during Vice President Mondale's trip on limiting arms sales. "They were not effusive but they responded well," said the President, "and we must see that France and Germany do not rush in to fill the gap when we limit sales. We are so far ahead that we have a great range of possibilities to moderate our arms sales."

SECRETARY VANCE. The simple step would be to change the procedures so that arms manufacturers must get advance permission from the Department before they proceed. Now they get people overseas steamed up in an early stage and then come back here and sell their systems.

SENATOR CHURCH. Arms sales are out of real proportion to the needs of the countries that are buying them. Sometimes it seems that we are exporting only arms and wheat but there is a serious problem with the internal forces in our own country. We have to recognize that aircraft companies have spent millions under the table to stimulate sales.

PRESIDENT CARTER stressed that consistency and frankness with Congress and the American people and a multinational approach are vital. THE PRESIDENT said he favored the idea of prior approval of American companies before they offer arms development to foreign countries. The PRESIDENT also made these points: (1) he wants to hold down the volume of nuclear weapons and the volume of nuclear capability. He said this goal was pursued with France and Germany and he was meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin later in the morning to discuss this problem.⁸ (2) "The African situation is explosive and we will follow the British lead in Rhodesia. Ambassador Young will be at two different conferences in Africa.⁹ He is not going to negotiate but he will let them know about our sincerity for majority rule. I want to see the Byrd amendment¹⁰ repealed and I will give my backing for the re-

⁷ An unknown hand underlined this sentence and placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to it.

⁸ The Carter-Dobrynin memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 3.

⁹ Reference is to Young's 10-day visit to Nigeria and Tanzania. He departed the United States on February 1. (Kathleen Teltsch, "Young, Taking Over U.N. Duties, Prepares to Leave for Africa Today," *The New York Times*, February 1, 1977, p. 2)

¹⁰ The Byrd Amendment, Section 503 of the 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Act (H.R. 8687; P.L. 92–156; 85 Stat. 423–430), prohibited the President from refusing to import strategic materials from non-Communist countries when there were no such bans against buying similar items from a Communist state. The Amendment thus permitted the United States to import Rhodesian chrome and other strategic materials, thus

peal. It will have great psychological impact. I would like to restore our position in Southern Africa. Dr. Kissinger was making good progress until the election took away his authority."

REPRESENTATIVE LONG said, half of the House has supported a resolution on a nuclear test ban treaty.¹¹ He asked how good a friend of ours President Sadat is. "I think that Sadat launched the most bloody war in the history of the Middle East, and we are building up a man who will start another war in the Middle East."

SECRETARY VANCE. There is no question Sadat is still a major figure and the man we should deal with in Egypt. I talked with Henry Kissinger and he told me Sadat was helpful and he considered him useful. I will have a better chance to answer your question after I talk with him.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. The question is how trustworthy is Sadat compared to others. We are dealing with a political reality, for the first time in 22 years Egypt's foreign policy is not based on playing the Russians off against us. Egypt is susceptible to an accommodation with Israel and has moved away from Arab socialism. The long range problem is radicalization of the country and it is a perilous race. A weak economy can produce political instability and bring a radical regime to power that will take a more extreme view.

REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON talked of the need to deny and delay arms sales to Israel and the Middle East in general including F-18's to Iran and F-16's to Saudi Arabia.

SECRETARY VANCE said, "we will sink the peninsula if we keep selling arms."

REPRESENTATIVE ZABLOCKI discussed his bill dealing with nuclear non-proliferation and the Arab boycott. He talked about dividing the package to deal with the boycott earlier and then nuclear non-proliferation.

SECRETARY VANCE said work on the boycott provision will have been completed when he returns from the Middle East and then I will testify.

circumventing UN trade sanctions instituted in 1966 against Southern Rhodesia. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, p. 47)

¹¹ Presumable reference to House Resolution 209, introduced by Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-New York) in the House of Representatives on January 31, which supported the President's intentions to pursue a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, seek ratification of SALT II, and pursue an agreement with the Soviet Union for major reductions in atomic weapons. Representative Richard Ottinger (D-New York) introduced 10 identical versions of House Resolution 209, with different cosponsors, on January 31 and February 1. All resolutions were referred to the House International Relations Committee.

SECRETARY VANCE is scheduled to appear before Senator Proxmire's committee February 28¹² to discuss the Export Administration Act.¹³

SENATOR CHURCH asked if a resolution limiting the sale of reactors would be helpful.

SECRETARY VANCE replied, "yes, it would be."

SENATOR SPARKMAN said that the pronouncement of President Carter on limiting nuclear weapons was one of the most heartening things to the American people.¹⁴

REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG asked what kind of timetable was necessary on the aid for Egypt.

SECRETARY VANCE said he wanted to proceed as soon as possible.

REPRESENTATIVE LONG said he was sympathetic and we would not lie down. But he added, "the Committee would ask some awfully tough questions as to why we were giving day-to-day aid to Egypt when Egyptians were buying jets from France for \$1.6 billion.

SECRETARY VANCE briefed the group on his meeting with Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd of Panama which did not get into substantive negotiations.¹⁵ He gave Boyd his views with respect to the treaty and told him it would be unhelpful if there were attacks on the United States. "We are anxious to move promptly to protect legitimate interests of the U.S. and Panama and to work out an agreement that is just and fair to both parties. The Tack-Kissinger principles¹⁶ were the basis for negotiations. Negotiations will resume on February 10. Ambassador Sol Linowitz will be the negotiator along with Ambassador Bunker. We have a strong negotiating team," said Secretary Vance.

REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG asked how much the U.S. will give up in Panama.

¹² Reference is to the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Vance testified before the subcommittee on February 28 and before the House International Relations Committee on March 1. Vance's statement before the House International Relations Committee is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1977, pp. 267–271.

¹³ Public Law 91–184; 83 Stat. 841; signed into law by Nixon on December 30, 1969.

¹⁴ Presumable reference to the President's inaugural address; see Document 15.

¹⁵ Vance met with Boyd on January 31. In his January 31 report to the President, Vance indicated that, among other points, he had informed Boyd that "we will not sacrifice U.S. interests or ignore the opinion of the Congress or the U.S. people." (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77) (declass)

¹⁶ On February 7, 1974, in Panama City, Kissinger and Tack initialed a joint statement of principles for the negotiation of a new Panama Canal treaty. For Kissinger's address and the text of the joint statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1974, pp. 181–185.

SECRETARY VANCE said, "it would be harmful if this got out but let me explain our position. (1) We want to assure access of all nations to a neutral Canal, guaranteed by the U.S. and Panama in peace or war. (2) We want to retain the right in the event the Canal is threatened in terms of operation, to take such steps as necessary to defend it with the Panamanians. (3) Then there's the question of the termination date.

SENATOR BROOKE asked if South Africa would pull away from Rhodesia.

SECRETARY VANCE said there is some hope but not a great deal of hope.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL (referring to Panama) talked about the possibility of transferring facilities versus the title on the land in the year 2000 as a possible approach to solving the problem. He also urged Secretary Vance to remove Venezuela and Ecuador from the countries currently affected by tariff preferences as a result of the OPEC oil boycott. Venezuela and Ecuador no longer have preferential tariffs because they are OPEC members but Representative Fascell noted they did not take part in the boycott and there is a great deal of aggravation because they do not have preferential tariffs.

20. Editorial Note

At his first press conference, held in the Old Executive Office Building on February 8, 1977, at 2:30 p.m., President Jimmy Carter discussed the impact addressing human rights concerns might have on U.S.-Soviet relations:

"Q. Mr. President, there have been a series of actions taken in recent days by the Soviet Union, including the expulsion of American journalists and the arrest of Alexander Ginsburg, actions that we have taken issue with in one form or another. How concerned are you that by being outspoken on issues of human rights that we may jeopardize possibly our relations with the Soviet Union on other matters?

"The President. Well, this brings up the question that is referred to as linkage. I think we come out better in dealing with the Soviet Union if I am consistently and completely dedicated to the enhancement of human rights, not only as it deals with the Soviet Union but all other countries. I think this can legitimately be severed from our inclination to work with the Soviet Union, for instance, in reducing dependence upon atomic weapons and also in seeking mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

"I don't want the two to be tied together. I think the previous administration, under Secretary Kissinger, thought that there ought to be this linkage; that if you mentioned human rights or if you failed to invite Mr. Solzhenitsyn to the White House that you might endanger the progress of the SALT talks.

"I don't feel that way. I think it ought to be clear, and I have made clear directly in communication to Mr. Brezhnev and in my meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, that I was reserving the right to speak out strong and forcefully whenever human rights are threatened—not every instance, but when I think it is advisable. This is not intended as a public relations attack on the Soviet Union, and I would hope that their leaders could recognize the American people's deep concern about human rights.

"I think in many other countries of the world there has been some progress. I think in the Soviet Union there has already been some progress. The number of Jews, for instance, who have been permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union in the last few months has increased.

"If this trend should continue, I would be encouraged. But I would have to take this position of being independent in my own public pronouncements. I've got a lot to learn. I was concerned the other day, for instance, when the AP reporter [George Krimsky] was expelled from Moscow. I had at first thought to retaliate by expelling the AP reporter from Washington. But I found out that was not the right approach to take.

"But we have got to be firm, and we have got to be forceful. But I don't want to tie everything together in one package so that we are timid about insisting on human rights.

"Q. Do you interpret this in any way as a kind of testing of you by the Soviet Union?

"The President. No, I don't. I don't interpret it as a testing. I regret the fact that the Soviet Union saw fit to expel a newspaper reporter. I regret very deeply the fact that the Soviet Union has now incarcerated Mr. Ginsburg, who has been one of the leaders in the Soviet Union in representing the case of the dissidents. But I can't go in with armed forces and try to change the internal mechanism of the Soviet Government.

"But I don't think it is designed to aggravate me or to test me or to test the will of this country. My commitment to human rights is clear. I will maintain that clarity to the maximum extent possible.

"I don't want to mislead the American people in dealing with the Soviets or with others. We can't expect overnight success. It requires long, tedious, labored, very carefully considered progress. I am not looking for magic answers but my determination is very deep." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pages 99–100; brackets in the original*)

The press conference was broadcast live on radio and television. The President noted in his personal diary: "I had my first press conference. I felt completely at ease and leveled with the press the best I could, describing frankly some of the crucial issues that face our country. The major emphasis was on SALT talks and human rights. I spelled out in general terms our positions on these issues and intend to keep the press conferences on schedule and not evade issues any more than necessary for national security." (*White House Diary*, pages 17–18)

21. Memorandum From the White House Press Secretary (Powell) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 21, 1977

RE

Soviet Dissidents

It seems to me that the Soviets should understand your feeling that it is necessary to build domestic political support for initiatives in arms control and for detente in general.² One of the reasons Ford-Kissinger failed in this effort and had to back away from detente was because the American people would not support a policy which seemed to abandon our position in support of basic human rights.

Surely the Soviets are sophisticated enough to understand that the domestic political flexibility we need to make progress in other areas is enhanced by your position on human rights.

Perhaps this could be conveyed to Dobrynin by you on an informal basis—by phone, for example. An even less formal way would be through Brzezinski. I could even do it through their Embassy Press Counselor Kamenev, whom I know.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 9, 2/22/77. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw it. The President wrote "cc Zbig. J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Hutcheson sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under a February 22 note, indicating that it was forwarded to Brzezinski for information. (*Ibid.*)

² The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word "domestic."

This probably should be done before you see Bukovsky on Tuesday³ to try to prevent another public reaction on their part which will only put us in a position of having to avoid the appearance of backing down.

³ Bukovsky met with Carter, Mondale, and Brzezinski in the Roosevelt Room at the White House on March 1 from 3:30 until 3:37 p.m. Clift, Eisele, Levitsky, and Krimer also attended this meeting. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter and Mondale See Bukovsky, a Soviet Dissident," *The New York Times*, March 2, 1977, p. A-1.

22. Statement by Secretary of State Vance Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations¹

Washington, February 24, 1977

It is my pleasure to begin today, before this distinguished committee, my testimony to the Congress on the Carter Administration's approach to foreign assistance.

Our foreign assistance programs are diverse in substance, serve a variety of objectives, and are aimed at a wide range of targets. In reviewing our foreign assistance program we should ask ourselves certain key questions:

- How do these programs fit together?
- What are the results of our aid in human terms?
- What ends are served?
- In short, is our aid money being wisely spent?

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1977, pp. 236–241. In his February 24 evening report to the President, Vance noted that the questions posed "covered the broad range from policy considerations to details on the financial composition of several of the items in our AID budget." He added, "Human rights was the subject of a number of questions, with the Committee appearing to understand the difficulties that one faces in balancing human rights objectives with security and development objectives." (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77) Vance provided similar overviews of the administration's assistance programs to the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on March 2 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on March 23. These statements are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1977, pp. 284–298 and April 11, 1977, pp. 336–339.

I hope to begin this difficult process of self-examination and cooperative dialogue with the Congress today—to provide you with a sense of how the Administration sees the total range of our foreign assistance programs as part of a broad foreign policy framework including:

—Our efforts at development cooperation in the context of an increasingly important North-South dialogue;

—Our ability to play a constructive role in the resolution of regional conflict in the Middle East, southern Africa, and other trouble spots in the world; and

—Our basic national security.

Our Basic Objectives

The foreign assistance efforts of the Carter Administration are guided by some fundamental foreign policy objectives:

—To demonstrate America's compassion for the poor and dispossessed around the world—those who, through no fault of their own, are exposed to daily suffering and humiliation and are struggling to survive;

—To make our fair contribution to the enormous task of the social, economic, and technological development of poor countries, an investment which in this interdependent world can pay us handsome dividends;

—To foster a climate of constructive cooperation, dialogue, and reciprocal benefit in our North-South diplomacy;

—To contribute to the cause of peace by providing incentives, in terms of economic and physical security, for the resolution of old, and potential, disputes;

—To maintain and foster the environment of international peace and security essential to social, economic, and political progress through selective military assistance that assures our friends and allies adequate self-defense, while preserving regional arms balances;

—To take the lead in encouraging the evolution of a world order based on an open economic system, a political structure reflecting a just balance of rights and obligations for all nations, and social progress and human rights for individuals wherever they might be.

This wide range of objectives is essential to the national interest of the United States in the complicated interdependent world in which we live.

Our own economic welfare is vitally affected by what happens elsewhere in the world. The standard of living of the American worker and the American consumer requires cooperation with the developing world—in expanding supplies of food, energy, and raw materials and in controlling population growth and wasteful use of scarce natural re-

sources. The stability of the U.S. economy depends greatly on responsible economic policies in the rest of the world, including the developing nations. The fortunes of all national economies, including our own, are linked to continued expansion of the highly integrated international system of trade, investment, and finance. And in a world in which social and economic progress has become a central issue of our time, our national security is linked to progress in the rest of the world.

In addition, economic issues have assumed increasing political importance. Disadvantaged people everywhere are rejecting the proposition that poverty must be their fate, and governments everywhere are putting the goal of economic development at the top of their national agendas. We have experienced severe worldwide economic dislocation: simultaneous inflation and recession and abrupt increases in energy prices have curtailed economic growth generally, but most painfully in the poorest countries. Equality of economic opportunity has become the paramount goal of diplomacy for 150 developing nations, just as it has been the goal of disadvantaged citizens and regions in American history.

We cannot effectively promote multilateral diplomacy, control the proliferation of nuclear arms, defuse international terrorism, reduce the buildup of conventional weapons, or protect our security interests in the oceans or space in a hungry, angry, and bitter world. We can achieve cooperation on these security issues only if we are doing our fair and reasonable share in the process of international development cooperation—only if we are seen as encouraging, not frustrating, the development aspirations of others.

In an imperfect world, the objectives we pose for our foreign policy are not always consistent. We cannot pursue all of them as fully as we might like all the time. In concrete instances we face a series of difficult choices. Some of these choices pit our best intentions against our most pragmatic calculations.

For example, both we and the poorer countries favor economic development, and we generally agree that development requires sound domestic policies as well as international transfers of resources to the poor countries. Moreover, one of our principal objectives is to see that the poorest people of the developing nations benefit from our assistance.

Our task is to achieve those ends without interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, mindful of the fact that there are limits to what we can achieve no matter how noble our motives.

Similarly, we hold strongly to the principles of basic human rights. We are working to fulfill both the letter and spirit of current legislation relating human rights concerns to foreign assistance. This committee it-

self spoke to this issue when it wrote in its own report last summer that:²

... should we profane our ideals in the interest of short-term security, we would cause the erosion of our greatest strength—that of a nation guided by dictates of reason and moral principles.

But in that report the committee also noted that we can best achieve our purpose through conscientious and systematic review of assistance programs on a country-by-country basis. In each case we must balance a political concern for human rights against economic or security goals. No formula can resolve the larger conflict of commitments, but prudent and dedicated attention to both the basic objectives and the day-to-day operations of our programs can make specific problems tractable.

This committee and the Congress have advocated “new directions” in our bilateral foreign aid programs.³ These directions call for increasing emphasis on the poor majority, increasing attention to human rights, and adherence to the moral principles that give us pride and dignity as a nation. The spirit of “new directions” underlies our general approach to all our aid programs.

The Carter Administration accepts the challenge that Congress has posed. We ask your cooperation in making “new directions” a reality—and in helping us resolve the difficult policy choices we face.

The challenge of the “new directions” means that, in 1977, we cannot talk simply in the dry terms of this or that funding level as if the power to budget and spend were the power to wish ourselves into a perfect world. We are interested in results in human as well as economic terms.

[Omitted here is a description of the various development assistance programs.]

² S. Rept. 94-1009, June 29, 1976; report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, together with additional views, to accompany H.R. 14260, foreign assistance and related programs appropriations bill, 1977. [Footnote in the original.]

³ Section 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (S. 1443; P.L. 93-189) on Development Assistance Policy contains the provisions of the “New Directions” mandate, which set out functional categories—such as population planning and agricultural production—as criteria for foreign assistance. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. IV, 1973-1976, pp. 851-852) See also *Implementation of “New Directions” in Development Assistance: Report to the Committee on International Relations Prepared by AID*. Committee Print, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975.

23. Editorial Note

During the course of his remarks before an audience of Department of State employees on February 24, 1977, President Jimmy Carter underscored his dedication to improving relations with adversaries in pursuit of peace and informing the American public about his administration's foreign policy:

"The final point I want to make before I answer your questions is this: We have some potential adversaries and some past adversaries with whom we want to have better relationships. And that applies to Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia. It applies even to North Korea and to Cuba. It applies to the People's Republic of China and to Russia and to countries like Iraq. With some we have relations; some, as you know, we do not. But our constant search will be to find common ground on which we can reach agreement so that we can set an example for the rest of the world in a friendly and mutually respectful attitude.

"I have been pleased so far at the response that has been received from our embryonic efforts to carve out grounds for understanding and peace. I think so far the Soviet Union has responded well. And we will continue these kinds of efforts, sometimes anticipating discouragements. But we will not be deterred, and we will not be discouraged ourselves.

"I want the American people to be a part of it. I am going to have a press conference at least twice a month. I will have frequent fireside chats. My next one will be devoted exclusively to foreign affairs and defense matters. And I am going to have trips around our country where I might meet in town meeting forums. And we will have call-in type radio programs so that people can ask me questions about domestic and foreign affairs and so that to the best of my ability I can give them straight answers.

"I think that when our country speaks, it ought to speak with a strong voice. And when a foreign policy is evolved, even though it might be the right foreign policy, exclusively by the President and the Secretary of State, and then promulgated to the world without the understanding or participation of the Congress, the other Cabinet members or the people of our country, the rest of the world knows that the President and the Secretary of State, powerful people, still speak with a hollow voice. So to the extent that you are involved in the evolution of an idea or a new approach or a consistent old approach, to that extent, we will all be strengthened.

"We are partners. I can't succeed as President unless you succeed. And if you make a serious mistake, I am the one who will be the focal point for that criticism and that despair and that disillusionment that

will follow. I think when we do make a mistake we ought to be frank about it and say we erred and this is the corrective action that we will take. And we will try to correct our error, and we will try to do better next time.

“I think the American people will respond well. And I think other nations that look to us for leadership will respond well, also.

“I want to make sure that we eliminate in our own country those vestiges of hatred or discrimination or deprivation of human rights that we still retain so that when we do criticize other countries, or when we do speak out to deplore the loss of those rights in other nations, that we, ourselves, might be free of justified criticism.

“Well, all these matters that have just come to my mind as I stand here before you are important to us all. And I just want to be sure that we work in harmony to alleviate tensions and to reinspire those who can legitimately, I hope, in the future look to us for justified inspiration.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pages 237–238*)

Carter spoke at 2:37 p.m. in the Dean Acheson Auditorium at the Department of State and then answered questions from Department and Agency for International Development employees. Prior to his remarks, Carter toured the Department’s Communications Center and typed a message on a teletype machine to the Embassy in Paris.

24. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, February 24, 1977

Topics for Discussion at Cabinet Meetings

Issue for Decision

The President wants two Cabinet members to take 10–15 minutes each at future Cabinet meetings to discuss interesting concepts or functions of their departments—with a preference, according to Jack

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 2/16–28/77. Unclassified. Drafted by Vogelgesang. There is no indication that Vance saw the memorandum.

Watson, for economic issues.² We need to tell Jack what topics you might suggest.

Background/Analysis

Your recent and projected trips provide some obvious possibilities.³ There would be substantial interest in your evaluation of Mideast peace prospects or the state of US-Soviet relations.

On the other hand, there may be even more compelling arguments for your treating topics which:

—Stress the connection between US domestic and diplomatic interests—particularly in the so-called “new issue areas”;

—Serve to emphasize State’s role and perspective beyond strictly diplomatic issues; and

—Help stimulate discussion and follow-through on such issues.

We believe that any one of the following topics might serve such functions, and would be pleased to help draft submissions for your review:

1. *Economic Issues*

a. *General*—A more conceptually-oriented discussion could revolve around *Shared Challenges Before Post-Industrial Society*—or how the trilateral partnership hits home. A combination of factors—the President’s campaign stress on working with allied industrial democracies, the problems they have in common (economic recovery, decreased confidence in government, crises of crime and urban decay) and related policy issues (need for more economic policy coordination/planning within and among the developed nations?)—suggest the value of a short, potentially provocative presentation.

b. *Specific cases*—You might get at some of the same points by using a specific concrete problem—like pending trade challenges on shoes or specialty steel—as a microcosm of problems that affect broader domestic and diplomatic interests. For example, a cutback on shoe imports could both affect US jobs and consumer prices and influence US relations with our Western European Allies, prospects for democratic progress in Southern Europe, prospects for trade liberalization at the Geneva trade talks,⁴ etc.

² Attached but not printed at Tab B is a February 16 handwritten note from the President to Watson instructing Watson to give him by Thursday of each week a “short list of topics from which I can select one for major emphasis” in advance of the next week’s Cabinet meeting.

³ In addition to his just-completed trip to the Middle East, Vance was scheduled to visit Moscow. See footnote 5, Document 19 and Document 31.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 6.

The growing problem of illegal immigration is another example of one specific question which reflects a range of larger issues: bilateral relations with Mexico, Korea, and the Caribbean nations; overall international population policy, and the US job situation.

c. *Foreign economic assistance*—How effective have US efforts been and what domestic consensus is there for continuing, changing, or expanding present programs?

2. *New Global Roster*: Since many still associate State with monitoring diplomatic events and bilateral relations abroad, you might spell out the range of new and expanding concerns (energy, food, population, environment, science and technology, North-South dialogue) and upcoming events that will affect them (CIEC, LOS conference, UN Special Session) which demand the Department's attention.⁵ Alternatively, concentrate on just one of the above—energy might be most topical—and stress the connection between domestic and international efforts on conservation, diversification of supply, and longer-term research and development.

3. *Multilateral Diplomacy*: Few organizations may be as badly understood as the UN. The same applies to US use of the UN. A brief *tour d'horizon* of the scope of UN activities and US problems and opportunities there could generate greater appreciation for multilateral diplomacy and affirm links with domestic concerns.

4. *Human Rights*: It's in the headlines—replete with complexity, contradiction, and potential backfire from abroad and at home. A presentation setting forth the outline of our objectives, preferred approaches, and problems we foresee might elicit helpful discussion.

5. *Defense Cluster*: Non-proliferation/arms control/arms sales. This area, too, is complicated, timely, and probably badly understood—and has obvious domestic economic spinoffs.

Recommendation for Action

That you sign the attached memo to Watson⁶ with the list of topics noted.

Approve

Disapprove

Let's discuss⁷

⁵ The CIEC was scheduled to hold a final ministerial meeting in Paris May 30–June 3. The sixth meeting of the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (1973–1982) was scheduled to take place in New York beginning May 23. The tenth UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) was scheduled to take place in New York May 23–June 30, 1978.

⁶ Attached but not printed at Tab A is an undated memorandum from Vance to Watson listing seven possible topics for discussion.

⁷ Vance neither approved nor disapproved any of the recommendations.

25. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Maynes) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 3, 1977

SUBJECT

President's Speech at the UN General Assembly

As you requested, we have prepared an outline of a speech which the President could deliver at the UN General Assembly in late March.²

We see the speech as a major opportunity for the US to take the high ground in its relations with the new countries—to demonstrate that the US seeks a new era of sympathetic and mutually beneficial relationships—to give new impetus to cooperative and productive work in international organizations.

The overall theme we have in mind is this: the time has come to address global problems in a manner which serves the interests of all peoples. That must be the purpose of all of our efforts. But we can act effectively only by acting together to meet common problems and to realize common benefits.

In suggesting this theme we have in mind that the President could capitalize on his worldwide reputation as a leader genuinely interested in improving life for the poor and the disadvantaged.

A possible title for the speech might be: "The Quality of Peace".

The basic structure would be as follows:

—First, a section on the global challenge and the opportunity that we and all other nations are facing.

—Second, a section on what the United States will stand for in the Carter Administration, setting forth broad principles and purposes.

—Third, what we intend to do regarding selected major problems, including the role of the UN itself.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 3/1–15/77. No classification marking. Drafted by Neidle and concurred in by Janeway. Neidle initialed for Janeway. A notation in an unknown hand reads: "Tony, I signed off for you." There is no indication that Vance saw the memorandum.

² The President delivered a speech at the United Nations on March 17; see Documents 28 and 29.

—Fourth, a final section on what we are asking of others—the other industrial countries, the developing nations, the Soviets, etc. The last section would drive home the fundamental theme of the speech.

This structure should permit us considerable flexibility. Various ideas, and possible initiatives, can be considered for inclusion under the different major headings. In addition, this kind of structure could help us to keep things within manageable length since it would be clear from the presentation that the President is not attempting under any one item to provide an exhaustive statement of the problem or of US policies.

A danger to which we must be sensitive in drafting is the possibility of implying more than we can deliver.

If you think we are on the right track in the attached outline,³ we obviously need to move quickly to flesh out details. We will need immediate help from many of the bureaus. We would solicit on an urgent basis their suggestions for specific items to be included, especially under Part III.

In any event, it would be quite helpful for us to have a meeting as soon as possible with you in order to get your reactions and further guidance.

³ Not printed. The 9-page, undated draft outline, entitled "The Quality of Peace," is divided into four parts: "The Challenge," "What the United States Stands For," "What the United States Will Do," and "What We Are Asking of Others."

26. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter**¹

Washington, March 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Weekly National Security Report #3

1. *Opinions*

Foreign Policy Design. Judging from press reactions—both domestic and foreign—there is considerable appreciation of your dedication to more effective and far-reaching strategic arms control; there is awareness of the depth and sincerity of your concern over nuclear proliferation; there is remarkably widespread support for your position on human rights, which has done so much to revarnish America's moral credentials.

Moreover, through the various missions undertaken immediately after the inaugural (to Southern Africa, to the Middle East, to Panama, and to the Aegean) you have signaled clearly that the Administration will be activist, and that you yourself will be in the tradition of those presidents who have exercised a personally active leadership in foreign affairs.

However, I do not believe that at this stage the larger design of what you wish to accomplish has emerged with sufficiently sharp relief. I discern two immediate needs, both of which might well be corrected in your forthcoming foreign policy speech:

1. You need to express a more coherent vision of what we aim to accomplish, of what our priorities are, and of how you define the present historical era within which US foreign policy has to be shaped;

2. You need to convey to the public your awareness of the complexity of the problems that we confront; disappointments and setbacks are normal in international affairs and accomplishments tend to be the exception. We are setting in motion a process, and the public must be made to understand that the President and his associates un-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Both Carter and Mondale initialed the memorandum. Brzezinski later explained that he had "initiated, approximately a month after his [Carter's] inaugural, the practice of sending him a weekly NSC report. It was meant to be a highly personal and private document, for the President alone. It contained usually some additional intelligence information or reports on policy implementation, as well as an occasional summary of more incisive papers written by NSC staffers, and frequently the report was opened by a brief one-page-long editorial piece by me, entitled 'Opinion.'" (*Power and Principle*, p. 65)

derstand that the problems we face will be with us for a long time to come, that there will be no easy solutions, and that the effort to build a more cooperative world framework will be tedious, painful, and frequently disappointing.

I think it is necessary to emphasize these themes especially because we are likely to confront two short-term dangers:

1. Given our disagreements with the French and the Germans over nuclear proliferation,² and given the likelihood of some bitter disappointments with the British and the French over the Concorde,³ it is possible that in the short-term our relations with our principal allies may in fact deteriorate. Since this will be coinciding with the forthcoming summit, we should anticipate some rough sailing in alliance relations.⁴ This may be unavoidable but it is bound to produce some adverse comments, especially since we have put so much stress on giving priority attention to better relations with our friends. Your critics, both at home and abroad, will certainly emphasize such frictions as evidence of our inability to do what we said we would strive to accomplish. A more specific policy implication of the foregoing might be a more concerted effort on our part to try to minimize the negative fallout from both the nuclear proliferation and the Concorde problems, as well as more stress on those aspects on which we are in fundamental agreement with our allies.

2. Secondly, it is likely that in the foreseeable future our negotiations with the Soviets over SALT may prove more rocky and difficult than the public has been led to expect. The Brezhnev response to you might be a foretaste of some very hard bargaining, and it is quite conceivable that our first report to the American people on SALT negotiations will have to emphasize not areas of agreement but the reasons why we have been unable to agree.⁵ Indeed, one of the forthcoming paradoxes may be that Paul Warnke before too long will be engaged

² Reference is to U.S. concerns about the proposed French sale in March 1976 of a uranium reprocessing plant to Pakistan and the German sale in June 1975 of a nuclear reactor and plutonium technology to Brazil. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Documents 334 and 289, respectively. Mondale expressed U.S. opposition to Schmidt during his January trip to Europe and Japan (see Document 16).

³ Presumable reference to issues related to landing rights for the Concorde—a supersonic airliner—at U.S. airports.

⁴ Reference is to the economic summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, scheduled to take place in London May 7–8; see Document 38.

⁵ Presumable reference to Brezhnev's February 25 letter to Carter, in which he criticized Carter's approach to arms control. The letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 12.

not in “selling” a SALT agreement to hard-nosed skeptics who will be accusing him of excessive softness, but that he will be justifying to his friends in the arms control community why it was impossible for the United States to accept disadvantageous Soviet terms. Such an ironical twist, incidentally, might make Warnke even more useful than you had expected!

All of the foregoing points to the proposition that the time is now ripe for doing precisely what you have determined to do: to deliver a formal, comprehensive, and systematic speech. In my judgment, it should be short on promises, it should be analytical, and it should seek to integrate the various strands discussed above into a broader approach.⁶

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

3. Concerns

Human Rights and AID. We are concerned that the issue of aid and human rights may get out of control next week. Deputy Secretary Christopher will testify on Monday before Humphrey’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate concerning military assistance.⁷ We expect him to be pressured on the Philippines and Korea and possibly other countries.

On Tuesday⁸ Representative Reuss will begin hearings on our multilateral aid. He will be pressing for a commitment to use our influence in the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and possibly the IMF to shut down *economic development* assistance to human rights violators.⁹ He is expected to specifically attack a paper mill project in Argentina (we cut our *military* sales credits to Argentina as a gesture of our concern about human rights in that country).

We have not yet established policy in these areas and we are concerned that the witnesses may be forced by the Congress to make policy ad hoc. This could have far-reaching consequences, not only with countries with whom we have important security relationships but also for the basic concept of multilateral assistance.

Efforts to use multilateral institutions in the human rights field have many pitfalls. Such a highly interventionist approach is directly contrary to the reason we have supported multilateral aid—in order to

⁶ The President wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Plan for 3/17 at UN.”

⁷ March 7. See Document 27.

⁸ March 8.

⁹ For additional information concerning Reuss’s proposed bill governing the U.S. vote in international financial institutions regarding loans to nations engaged in human rights abuses, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 20.

insulate economic development from politics. The less developed countries will react negatively. For example, countries that despise the regime in Chile nonetheless opposed our efforts to use the Inter-American Development Bank to bring pressure on the Chilean government.

Finally there is a serious conflict of values. Do we deprive people of jobs and economic progress because their governments suppress human rights?¹⁰

We need time to sort these issues out. I will be sending you a PRM for your signature next week on the overall subject of human rights.¹¹ I believe Administration witnesses should be instructed to inform the Congress that you have directed an urgent study of actions we can take in the field of human rights and ask for time before having to take a position on how and whether various assistance instruments might be employed by this Administration.

On a separate point, your desire for a modest increase in US economic assistance is running into problems on the Hill. You may want to use your Cabinet and Leadership meetings next week to emphasize your support of this program. Frank Moore supports this idea.

4. Reactions

Human Rights. Bukovsky's courtesy call at the White House received front-page and prominent inside-page coverage overseas.¹² Accounts in West European newspapers carefully detailed that photographs were permitted only with Mr. Mondale and that you limited your time to the Soviet dissident to ten minutes. In Paris, *Le Figaro* referred to the "skillful protocol adopted" which, it said, was "obviously intended to humor Moscow." *France-Soir* quoted the President as telling Bukovsky that he would defend human rights "not only in the USSR but in the whole world." The *Times of London* reported that "the impact of the occasion was indisputably diluted, doubtless by direct Presidential order." Coverage in the Italian press appeared to be somewhat more dramatic than elsewhere but did not vary much in substance from treatment in other European countries.

Notwithstanding the Bukovsky visit, the foreign press played the human rights issue as definitely broadened in focus beyond the Soviet Union. It is not clear where this feeling comes from, since, in fact nearly

¹⁰ The President wrote in the left-hand margin above this paragraph: "We should try to address in UN speech—see campaign speeches" and drew an arrow from this statement to the paragraph.

¹¹ Reference is to PRM/NSC-28, which Brzezinski sent to the President on May 20. It is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 46.

¹² See footnote 3, Document 21.

every statement has dealt with the Soviet Union, but the reaction is very helpful indeed—“Carter has hoisted the flag of human rights. His involvement is not selective or accidental. It is general and indivisible and applies to all continents and political systems. . . .” (Bonner Rundschau, Bonn) “he intended to keep speaking out against violations of human rights wherever they occurred in the world” (London’s Daily Telegraph).

Japan: “High-Risk Presidency”. Tokyo’s influential Sankei published an editorial evaluation of the Carter Administration’s first month in office. Noting that although “boldness and danger live together,” it said that both the domestic and foreign policies of the new President have been marked by an “astonishing dynamism” which raises doubts about a tendency toward an excessive idealism unlikely to mesh with reality, unlikely to produce practical results. Some Americans are, therefore, calling Jimmy Carter’s a “high-risk Presidency.”

**27. Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance¹**

Washington, March 7, 1977

Human Rights: An Important Concern of U.S. Foreign Policy

I am pleased to be here today to affirm this Administration’s commitment to making human rights an important concern of U.S. foreign policy. President Carter began this Administration with the inaugural pledge that “Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1977, pp. 289–291. All brackets are in the original. In a February 9 action memorandum to Christopher, Jenkins proposed that Christopher testify before the subcommittee, chaired by Senator Humphrey, owing to Christopher’s eventual “direct supervision over the [Department’s] Office of Human Rights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770043–2533) The Department transmitted an advance copy of Christopher’s remarks to all diplomatic posts in telegram 49664, March 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077–0054) For the record of the Humphrey subcommittee hearings, see *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, on Human Rights Issues and Their Relationship to Foreign Assistance Programs, March 4 and 7, 1977* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

of freedom elsewhere.”² Then, in his confirmation hearings, Secretary Vance stated that “we must have policies based upon fundamental values. In particular, we must stand for human rights.”³

The concern for human rights will be woven into the fabric of our foreign policy. If we are to do justice to our goals, we must act always with a concern to achieve practical results and with an awareness of the other demands on our diplomacy. When it is desirable to do so, we will speak out, trying to be neither strident nor polemical. This is not a one-way street, and we must expect that at times others may criticize us. We may decide to communicate by quiet diplomacy with the country involved to see what can be accomplished that way. Or we may prefer to approach the problem not bilaterally, but through multi-lateral channels. In some instances of human rights violations, assistance programs may be curtailed, but we must also recognize that to be evenhanded, we should not just penalize but also inspire, persuade, and reward.

Already our commitment has prompted definite actions. In pursuit of the goal of majority rule and equal rights in Southern Rhodesia, we have urged the Congress to repeal the Byrd amendment.⁴ The State Department expressed concern for the fate of human rights activists in Eastern Europe, and President Carter wrote to Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrey Sakharov to convey directly our hopes for the promotion of human rights.⁵ As part of a continuing review process, we decided to cut the level of security assistance to several countries because of concern over human rights violations.⁶ We will be instructing our Embassies to press the cause of human rights through private contacts. We are playing an active part in the work of the [U.N.] Human Rights Commission.

As an example of our humanitarian concern for the uprooted and dispossessed, I would observe that during fiscal year 1976 our government has expended some \$475 million on assistance to refugees on a worldwide basis, and the United States accepted 31,000 refugees for permanent resettlement in this country. We are of course continuing our generous assistance to refugees in the current year.

² See Document 15.

³ See Document 14.

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 19.

⁵ The President wrote to Sakharov on February 5. His letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 5.

⁶ During Vance’s February 24 appearance before the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (see Document 22), he indicated that the Department had requested reduced aid to Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay in the proposed FY 1978 foreign military and security assistance legislation. (Bernard Gwertzman, “Security Links Cited,” *The New York Times*, February 25, 1977, p. A-1)

We know that the Congress shares this commitment to human rights and deserves special credit for its attention to this issue in recent years.

The complexity of the challenge compels collaboration between us. By working together more closely and effectively we can restore confidence both at home and abroad in our undertaking to encourage respect for human rights. The Administration, as well as the Congress, must reflect in our policies the values of the American people.

We recognize that these first steps we have taken are just that. Change takes time—as demonstrated by the evolution of human rights within our own country: from religious freedom through the Bill of Rights, the abolition of slavery, universal suffrage, the four freedoms, the civil rights movement, and the struggle against poverty to the Equal Rights Amendment. It is a long, hard climb. But the course is firmly set.

There should be no mistake: The undertaking to promote human rights is now an integral part of our foreign policy. We know that domestic support for our policies will falter if they do not reflect traditional American values. But I want it to be clear that this is not a policy of convenience, adopted because of its popularity at home. A commitment to human rights protects the domestic vitality of these values, keeping clear our image of ourselves and encouraging us to make the democratic system work. It helps us to maintain leadership of the free societies that share similar values. And it serves as a pole of attraction to other states and peoples.

The question is neither the direction nor the strength of our commitment. The question we must answer is how to summon the statesmanship and the moral courage to deal with the practical dilemmas and complexities in promoting human rights in our foreign relations. Today I want to discuss briefly the complexities in linking human rights considerations to economic and security assistance.

The United States recognizes a wide range of human rights and believes all must be promoted. Our most concentrated areas of concern have been violations of the integrity of the person—officially sanctioned murders, tortures, or detentions without trial. These, of course, are areas emphasized by the legislation you approved. Political rights and civil protection are also accorded high priority.

At times it is inevitable that these concerns will conflict with our commitment to the goal of economic development. As Secretary Vance has stated, one of our fundamental foreign policy objectives is “to demonstrate America’s compassion for the poor and the dispossessed around the world—those who, through no fault of their own, are

exposed to daily suffering and humiliation and are struggling to survive."⁷

Other conflicts in policy may arise when the security of the United States is linked to that of a country whose human rights priorities are deficient. It should be uppermost in our minds that security assistance is rendered to maintain or enhance our own security, not to strengthen the hand of a repressive regime, although we must face up to that as an undesired and unintended consequence in certain cases.

We are working to fulfill both the letter and the spirit of current legislation relating human rights concerns to foreign assistance. We can best achieve this purpose through conscientious and systematic review of assistance programs on a country-by-country basis, in each case balancing a political concern for human rights against economic or security goals. In multilateral development banks the United States must work to maintain a broad international consensus and to avoid destructive bloc politics that would impair the pursuit of the banks' development objectives. No formula can resolve the larger conflicts of these positions, but prudent and dedicated attention to both the basic objectives and the day-to-day operations of our programs can make specific problems more tractable.

We have been developing a series of questions by which to chart the direction of our policy and our progress. Taken together as points of reference, they will make us surer of our basic course and less likely to be driven from it by the force of a particular circumstance. The questions we are considering include:

1. Will our action be useful in promoting the cause of human rights? Will it actually improve the human rights situation at hand? Or is it likely to make it worse?

2. What will be the most effective means of expressing our views? Quiet diplomacy? A public pronouncement? Withdrawal of aid or other tangible sanctions?

3. Even when there is only a remote chance that our action will be influential, does our sense of values, our American ethic, prompt us to speak out or take action?

4. Will others support us? Can we expect the aid of national and international organizations dedicated to furthering human rights?

5. Have we steered away from the self-righteous and strident, remembering that our own record is not unblemished?

6. Finally, have we remembered national security interests and kept our sense of perspective, realizing that human rights cannot

⁷ For a statement by Secretary Vance on Feb. 24, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1977, p. 236. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 6 above.]

flourish in a world impoverished by economic decline or ravaged by armed conflict?

The Administration alone cannot take all the actions that should be part of this government's efforts on behalf of human rights. The Congress has a unique role to play by reflecting public concern for human rights in the laws it passes and monitoring their implementation, by forming and funding assistance programs, and by assuring that our domestic law is in conformity with our international obligations.

We urge that you join us in giving present legislation with human rights provisions a chance to work and that we carefully consider together any new legislation. As a matter of especially high priority, we also urge your support for repeal of the Byrd amendment.

The first weeks of the Carter Administration have been a time of change and, we believe, a time of renewed hope for the advancement of human rights. We believe our general emphasis on this important arena of international concern has already begun to have a favorable impact. Last week, in a major foreign policy statement, the British Government declared a policy comparable to that of this Administration.⁸ We hope other governments will both speak out in support of human rights and pursue human rights objectives through their diplomacy.

In a number of countries, important segments of the population have been stirred to raise human rights issues internally. And in several countries, governments have taken positive steps, such as the release of political prisoners, which demonstrate that the voice of this Administration is being heard and listened to. This reaction encourages us along the path we have set.

⁸ In a March 3 address to the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers Association in London, British Foreign Secretary David Owen endorsed the Carter administration's human rights policy. Owen noted that the British Government would "apply the same standards and judgments to Communist countries" as it did to Chile, Uganda, and South Africa. (Bernard D. Nossiter, "Britain Supports Carter Stand on Human Rights," *The Washington Post*, March 4, 1977, p. A-1)

28. Editorial Note

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski provided a background briefing to the press at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York the afternoon of March 17, 1977, in advance of President Jimmy Carter's address before the United Nations

General Assembly that evening. After a short introduction by Associate Press Secretary Jerry Schecter, Brzezinski indicated that he would describe the nature and basic purpose of the speech, outline the conceptual structure, and draw attention to specific themes:

“Insofar as the first point is concerned—the nature and basic purpose of the speech—it is seen by us as a basic effort to define the President’s broad agenda for the future. It is not designed per se to advance specific proposals, though it does, as I will note subsequently, contain proposals. But it is primarily to set the framework of directions, to define the broad aspirations of the Administration in the field of international politics.

“In so doing, he has chosen this particular forum for his address in order also to underline his fundamental support for the institutions of the United Nations, for multilateral international cooperation. That was a very deliberate choice of the setting for his first major address in foreign policy.

“In the course of this address, he also wishes to outline his substantive priorities.

“And the speech, as you all know from having read it, focuses on three substantive priorities of his foreign policy—namely, the issue of arms control; secondly, the issue of North/South economic development; and, thirdly, the issue of human rights.

“In talking about the basic purpose and the fundamental thrust of the speech, let me make two additional points. The President has already demonstrated, by sending Vice President Mondale on his trip, that his basic focus is on close international cooperation, in the first instance, with our principal allies but, beyond that, with the international community as a whole. And secondly, the President in this speech, as well as in his other statements, has already reasserted the basic role of the President as the articulator of foreign policy and this he has done quite consciously and, in so doing, is also assuming the traditional role of the President as the public educator on policy issues. And his statements on foreign policy, this one as well as others, are designed also to enlighten public opinion, the public at large, on the nature of the fundamental problems that we confront and the kind of solutions which patiently, prudently, have to be sought in dealing with these problems.

“Let me secondly now say a word or two of the structure, the conceptual structure of the speech as it is perceived by us. It is essentially based on five fundamental parts.

“The first is an explicit affirmation of the President’s recognition of the essential intractability and complexity of international problems, his recognition that there are no easy solutions to existing difficulties—that the process of dealing with them will be a prolonged one, requiring sustained commitment from the American people.

“Secondly, the speech expresses the need for international cooperation in dealing with these problems. It takes as its point of departure the premise that while the United States can actively serve as an energizer, it cannot solve these problems by itself and that wider international cooperation is needed. And, in so doing, the President engages in a brief tour d’horizon of the fundamental areas in which international cooperation is either to be expected or is needed.

“And then, thirdly, he goes on to outline the three substantive priorities to which I’ve already made reference: arms control, economic development, and human rights.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Schecter/Friendly (Press) File, Subject File, Box 1, Brzezinski Briefings and Backgrounders (Press and Public): 1–9/77)

For the text of the President’s speech, see Document 29.

29. Address by President Carter Before the United Nations General Assembly¹

New York, March 17, 1977

Thank you, Mr. Secretary General.

Last night I was in Clinton, Massachusetts, at a Town Hall meeting where people of that small town decide their political and economic future.²

Tonight I speak to a similar meeting where people representing nations all over the world come here to decide their political and economic future.

I am proud to be with you tonight in this house where the shared hopes of the world can find a voice. I have come here to express my

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 444–451. All brackets are in the original. The President spoke at 7:35 p.m. in the General Assembly Hall at the Headquarters of the United Nations; Waldheim introduced the President. Following the address, Carter attended a reception hosted by Waldheim. Documentation concerning Department of State and NSC efforts in preparing the President’s address is in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 3/1–3/15/77; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights: 2–4/77; and Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 37, Human Rights: 2–3/77.

² For the text of the President’s March 16 remarks and the transcript of the question-and-answer session, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 382–402.

own support and the continuing support of my country for the ideals of the United Nations.

We are proud that for the 32 years since its creation, the United Nations has met on American soil. And we share with you the commitments of freedom, self-government, human dignity, mutual toleration, and the peaceful resolution of disputes—which the founding principles of the United Nations and also Secretary General Kurt Waldheim so well represent.

No one nation by itself can build a world which reflects all these fine values. But the United States, my own country, has a reservoir of strength—economic strength, which we are willing to share; military strength, which we hope never to use again; and the strength of ideals, which are determined fully to maintain the backbone of our own foreign policy.

It is now 8 weeks since I became President. I have brought to office a firm commitment to a more open foreign policy. And I believe that the American people expect me to speak frankly about the policies that we intend to pursue, and it is in that spirit that I speak to you tonight about our own hopes for the future.

I see a hopeful world, a world dominated by increasing demands for basic freedoms, for fundamental rights, for higher standards of human existence. We are eager to take part in the shaping of that world.

But in seeking such a better world, we are not blind to the reality of disagreement, nor to the persisting dangers that confront us all. Every headline reminds us of bitter divisions, of national hostilities, of territorial conflicts, of ideological competition.

In the Middle East, peace is a quarter of a century overdue. A gathering racial conflict threatens southern Africa; new tensions are rising in the Horn of Africa. Disputes in the eastern Mediterranean remain to be resolved.

Perhaps even more ominous is the staggering arms race. The Soviet Union and the United States have accumulated thousands of nuclear weapons. Our two nations now have five times more missile warheads today than we had just 8 years ago. But we are not five times more secure. On the contrary, the arms race has only increased the risk of conflict.

We can only improve this world if we are realistic about its complexities. The disagreements that we face are deeply rooted, and they often raise difficult philosophical as well as territorial issues. They will not be solved easily. They will not be solved quickly. The arms race is now embedded in the very fabric of international affairs and can only be contained with the greatest difficulty. Poverty and inequality are of such monumental scope that it will take decades of deliberate and determined effort even to improve the situation substantially.

I stress these dangers and these difficulties because I want all of us to dedicate ourselves to a prolonged and persistent effort designed first to maintain peace and to reduce the arms race; second, to build a better and a more cooperative international economic system; and third, to work with potential adversaries as well as our close friends to advance the cause of human rights.

In seeking these goals, I realize that the United States cannot solve the problems of the world. We can sometimes help others resolve their differences, but we cannot do so by imposing our own particular solutions.

In the coming months, there is important work for all of us in advancing international cooperation and economic progress in the cause of peace.

Later this spring, the leaders of several industrial nations of Europe, North America, and Japan will confer at a summit meeting in London on a broad range of issues.³ We must promote the health of the industrial economies. We must seek to restrain inflation and bring ways of managing our own domestic economies for the benefit of the global economy.

We must move forward with multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva.

The United States will support the efforts of our friends to strengthen the democratic institutions in Europe, and particularly in Portugal and Spain.

We will work closely with our European friends on the forthcoming Review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁴ We want to make certain that the provisions of the Helsinki agreement are fully implemented and that progress is made to further East-West cooperation.

In the Middle East we are doing our best to clarify areas of disagreement, to surface underlying consensus, and to help to develop mutually acceptable principles that can form a flexible framework for a just and a permanent settlement.

In southern Africa, we will work to help attain majority rule through peaceful means. We believe that such fundamental transformation can be achieved, to the advantage of both the blacks and whites who live in that region of the world. Anything less than that may bring a protracted racial war, with devastating consequences to all.

This week the Government of the United States took action to bring our country into full compliance with United Nations sanctions

³ See footnote 4, Document 26.

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 16.

against the illegal regime in Rhodesia. And I will sign that bill Friday in Washington.⁵

We will put our relations with Latin America on a more constructive footing, recognizing the global character of the region's problems.

We are also working to resolve in amicable negotiations the future of the Panama Canal.

We will continue our efforts to develop further our relationships with the People's Republic of China. We recognize our parallel strategic interests in maintaining stability in Asia, and we will act in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué.⁶

In Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, we will strengthen our association with our traditional friends, and we will seek to improve relations with our former adversaries.

We have a mission now in Vietnam seeking peaceful resolution of the differences that have separated us for so long.

Throughout the world, we are ready to normalize our relationships and to seek reconciliation with all states which are ready to work with us in promoting global progress and global peace.

Above all, the search for peace requires a much more deliberate effort to contain the global arms race. Let me speak in this context, first, of the U.S.-Soviet Union relationship, and then of the wider need to contain the proliferation of arms throughout the global community.

I intend to pursue the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union with determination and with energy.

Our Secretary of State will visit Moscow in just a few days.⁷

⁵ Congress cleared H.R. 1746 (P.L. 95-12; 91 Stat. 22-23) on March 15, and the President signed it into law on March 18. The legislation reinstated the embargo against the importation of Rhodesian chrome and other strategic minerals, but retained the substance of the Byrd Amendment that barred the President from refusing to import strategic materials from other non-communist countries. See footnote 10, Document 19. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, p. 47) For the President's remarks at the signing ceremony, held in the Cabinet Room, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 451-452. See also Austin Scott, "Embargo Restored on Chrome Import," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1977, p. A-2 and Charles Mohr, "President Pledges Foreign Aid Changes," *The New York Times*, March 19, 1977, p. A-4.

⁶ The February 1972 Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué, committed both the United States and the People's Republic of China to pursuing a normalization in relations. Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 203.

⁷ Vance traveled to Moscow March 27-30 to meet with the Soviet leadership on arms limitation proposals; see Document 31.

SALT is extraordinarily complicated. But the basic fact is that while negotiations remain deadlocked, the arms race goes on; the security of both countries and the entire world is threatened.

My preference would be for strict controls or even a freeze on new types and new generations of weaponry and with a deep reduction in the strategic arms of both sides. Such a major step towards not only arms limitation but arms reduction would be welcomed by mankind as a giant step towards peace.

Alternatively, and perhaps much more easily, we could conclude a limited agreement based on those elements of the Vladivostok accord on which we can find complete consensus, and set aside for prompt consideration and subsequent negotiations the more contentious issues and also the deeper reductions in nuclear weapons which I favor.

We will also explore the possibility of a total cessation of nuclear testing. While our ultimate goal is for all nuclear powers to end testing, we do not regard this as a prerequisite for the suspension of tests by the two principal nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States.

We should, however, also pursue a broad, permanent multilateral agreement on this issue.

We will also seek to establish Soviet willingness to reach agreement with us on mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean, as well as on such matters as arms exports to the troubled areas of the world.

In proposing such accommodations I remain fully aware that American-Soviet relations will continue to be highly competitive—but I believe that our competition must be balanced by cooperation in preserving peace, and thus our mutual survival.

I will seek such cooperation with the Soviet Union—earnestly, constantly, and sincerely.

However, the effort to contain the arms race is not a matter just for the United States and Soviet Union alone. There must be a wider effort to reduce the flow of weapons to all the troubled spots of this globe.

Accordingly, we will try to reach broader agreements among producer and consumer nations to limit the export of conventional arms, and we, ourselves, will take the initiative on our own because the United States has become one of the major arms suppliers of the world.

We are deeply committed to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And we will undertake a new effort to reach multilateral agreements designed to provide legitimate supplies of nuclear fuels for the production of energy, while controlling the poisonous and dangerous atomic wastes.

Working with other nations represented here, we hope to advance the cause of peace. We will make a strong and a positive contribution at

the upcoming Special Session on Disarmament which I understand will commence next year.⁸

But the search for peace also means the search for justice. One of the greatest challenges before us as a nation, and therefore one of our greatest opportunities, is to participate in molding a global economic system which will bring greater prosperity to all the people of all countries.

I come from a part of the United States which is largely agrarian and which for many years did not have the advantages of adequate transportation or capital or management skills or education which were available in the industrial States of our country.

So, I can sympathize with the leaders of the developing nations, and I want them to know that we will do our part.

To this end, the United States will be advancing proposals aimed at meeting the basic human needs of the developing world and helping them to increase their productive capacity. I have asked Congress to provide \$7½ billion of foreign assistance in the coming year, and I will work to ensure sustained American assistance as the process of global economic development continues.⁹ I am also urging the Congress of our country to increase our contributions to the United Nations Development Program and meet in full our pledges to multilateral lending institutions, especially the International Development Association of the World Bank.

We remain committed to an open international trading system, one which does not ignore domestic concerns in the United States. We have extended duty-free treatment to many products from the developing countries. In the multilateral trade agreements in Geneva we have offered substantial trade concessions on the goods of primary interest to developing countries.¹⁰ And in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration,¹¹ we are also examining ways to provide additional consideration for the special needs of developing countries.

The United States is willing to consider, with a positive and open attitude, the negotiation on agreements to stabilize commodity prices, including the establishment of a common funding arrangement for fi-

⁸ See footnote 5, Document 24.

⁹ The President submitted his foreign assistance program to Congress on March 17. For the text of the President's message to Congress, which was released on March 18, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I*, pp. 455–458.

¹⁰ See footnote 4, Document 6.

¹¹ Contracting Parties to the GATT met at the ministerial level in Tokyo September 12–14, 1973, and released the Tokyo Declaration. The declaration outlined the aims for the Tokyo Round of comprehensive, multilateral trade negotiations, which included securing "additional benefits for the international trade" of developing nations. For the declaration's text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1973, pp. 450–452.

nancing buffer stocks where they are a part of individual negotiated agreements.

I also believe that the developing countries must acquire fuller participation in the global economic decisionmaking process. Some progress has already been made in this regard by expanding participation of developing countries in the International Monetary Fund.

We must use our collective natural resources wisely and constructively. We've not always done so. Today our oceans are being plundered and defiled. With a renewed spirit of cooperation and hope, we join in the Conference of the Law of the Sea¹² in order to correct past mistakes of generations gone by and to ensure that all nations can share the bounties of the eternal oceans in the future.

We must also recognize that the world is facing serious shortages of energy. This is truly a global problem. For our part, we are determined to reduce waste and to work with others toward a fair and proper sharing of the benefits and costs of energy resources.

The search for peace and justice also means respect for human dignity. All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.

The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights. The United States has a historical birthright to be associated with this process.

We in the United States accept this responsibility in the fullest and the most constructive sense. Ours is a commitment, and not just a political posture. I know perhaps as well as anyone that our own ideals in the area of human rights have not always been attained in the United States, but the American people have an abiding commitment to the full realization of these ideals. And we are determined, therefore, to deal with our deficiencies quickly and openly. We have nothing to conceal.

To demonstrate this commitment, I will seek congressional approval and sign the U.N. covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights, and the covenants on civil and political rights.¹³ And I will work closely with our own Congress in seeking to support the ratification not only of these two instruments but the United Nations Genocide Convention and the Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-

¹² See footnote 5, Document 24.

¹³ See footnote 9, Document 9.

crimination, as well.¹⁴ I have just removed all restrictions on American travel abroad, and we are moving now to liberalize almost completely travel opportunities to America.¹⁵

The United Nations is a global forum dedicated to the peace and well-being of every individual—no matter how weak, no matter how poor. But we have allowed its human rights machinery to be ignored and sometimes politicized. There is much that can be done to strengthen it.

The Human Rights Commission should be prepared to meet more often. And all nations should be prepared to offer its fullest cooperation to the Human Rights Commission, to welcome its investigations, to work with its officials, and to act on its reports.

I would like to see the entire United Nations Human Rights Division moved back here to the central headquarters, where its activities will be in the forefront of our attention and where the attention of the press corps can stimulate us to deal honestly with this sensitive issue. The proposal made 12 years ago by the Government of Costa Rica, to establish a U.N. High Commission[er] for Human Rights, also deserves our renewed attention and our support.¹⁶

Strengthened international machinery will help us to close the gap between promise and performance in protecting human rights. When gross or widespread violation takes place—contrary to international commitments—it is of concern to all. The solemn commitments of the United Nations Charter, of the United Nations Universal Declaration for Human Rights,¹⁷ of the Helsinki Accords, and of many other international instruments must be taken just as seriously as commercial or security agreements.

This issue is important in itself. It should not block progress on other important matters affecting the security and well-being of our people and of world peace. It is obvious that the reduction of tension, the control of nuclear arms, the achievement of harmony in the troubled areas of the world, and the provision of food, good health, and education will independently contribute to advancing the human condition.

¹⁴ See footnotes 7 and 8, Document 9.

¹⁵ During his March 9 news conference, the President announced that the restrictions on travel to Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cambodia would be removed on March 18; see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 340 and "Last Travel Curbs Removed by Carter," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1977, p. 11.

¹⁶ For information on the 1965 proposal, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Document 323 and *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 344 and 347.

¹⁷ For text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1948, pp. 752–754.

In our relationships with other countries, these mutual concerns will be reflected in our political, our cultural, and our economic attitudes.

These then are our basic priorities as we work with other members to strengthen and to improve the United Nations.

First, we will strive for peace in the troubled areas of the world; second, we will aggressively seek to control the weaponry of war; third, we will promote a new system of international economic progress and cooperation; and fourth, we will be steadfast in our dedication to the dignity and well-being of people throughout the world.

I believe that this is a foreign policy that is consistent with my own Nation's historic values and commitments. And I believe that it is a foreign policy that is consonant with the ideals of the United Nations.

Thank you very much.

30. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 24, 1977, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Latin America

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher

Terence Todman

William Luers

Defense

Charles Duncan

Major Gen. Richard E. Cavazos

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General George S. Brown

Lt. General William Smith

CIA

Deputy Director Enno Knoche

Robert Hopkins

Treasury

Anthony Solomon

Edward Bittner

*Arms Control and Disarmament**Agency*

Leon Sloss

Commerce

Frank Weil

NSC

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Thomas Thornton

Robert A. Pastor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Overall Approach

The first and longest topic of discussion was the question of *how the United States should relate to Latin America*. The participants agreed that the new approach should be based on a recognition of the global nature of the region's problems, and U.S. policy should be aimed at working with Latin American governments on the North-South economic issues which are of greatest concern to them. At the same time, constructive bilateral relationships should be encouraged.

He suggested that the best overall policy may be a non-policy.² To follow the remarks in the President's United Nations speech, the U.S. should treat Latin America in a global context, rather than think about a regional policy.³ The President's Pan American Day speech on April 14

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 38, PRM/NSC–17 [3]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes; however, Pastor sent the minutes to Brzezinski under a March 25 memorandum and requested that Brzezinski comment "late today or perhaps tomorrow."

² According to the separate Summary of Conclusions of the PRC meeting, Christopher offered these comments. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 38, PRM/NSC–17 [3])

³ See Document 29.

provides the natural culmination of this process and the opportunity to suggest this approach.⁴

He then initiated a discussion of whether the U.S. had a special relationship with Latin America or not.

Assistant Secretary Todman suggested that we drop the rhetoric about a special relationship and deal with Latin America on bilateral, regional, or global levels depending on the issues. In the major economic areas, it is necessary to deal on a global basis and develop a single policy, and this is also the case on nuclear proliferation and immigration. But because of the geographical proximity, Latin America impinges on us more directly than other areas. For example, we share a border with Mexico and that requires special policies. We have certain regional institutions, and they require special policies.

Under Secretary Anthony Solomon agreed that we had special problems with respect to Mexico and Brazil, but the question of the special relationship relates to the region rather than to individual countries. He suggested that we would need special policies to these two countries. He said that the arguments *against* an overall special relationship to the region are very powerful.

Enno Knoche said that the possible consequences of ending the special relationship would be that it would tend to encourage Latin America to form blocs against the U.S., but he added that since this would not be in Latin America's long-term interest, he felt such blocs would not endure.

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan said the U.S. has had a special relationship with Latin America, and it still does. General Brown agreed, but he said that our special military relationships are eroding, and that we are going to miss them when they are gone. He said that this relationship—for example, the training assistance program for foreign air force personnel—provides an opportunity for us to influence these governments on human rights and other matters.

Intervention

Todman said that this issue aroused the greatest interest and controversy in Latin America where the U.S. has had a long history of intervention—most recently in the Dominican Republic and Chile. Now, we are being accused of intervention on behalf of human rights. The question is: to what extent do we need to intervene?

⁴ See Document 33.

Duncan said that we first needed to define our interests in the hemisphere, and said such a definition would be necessary to decide on the need for a "special relationship." Then, he prefers the option of "limited intervention."

Brzezinski returned to the question of whether we should have a special policy to Latin America. He said that the notion of a special policy is ahistorical. In the past, it has done nothing more than lock us into a cycle of creating unrealistic expectations and then having to live with the subsequent disappointments. The Monroe Doctrine which underlies this approach is no longer valid. It represents an imperialistic legacy which has embittered our relationships.

He recommended that if our relationships are to become healthier, then we need to put them on a more normal footing. He said that we can do this by stressing our bilateral relations and in seeing the region's problems in a global context, as the President said in his UN speech. And we should use this as a point of departure in the Pan American Day speech. What was needed was a normalization of our relations with Latin America. We did not want another Alliance for Progress.

Christopher said that he agreed with Brzezinski's assessment.

General Brown agreed and said that we should put the statement in the context that we have recognized that Latin America had reached adulthood. Brzezinski warned, however, that such an approach was also patronizing. Instead, he said that we should encourage Latin America to diversify its relationships with other countries and regions, and that we, in turn, should differentiate our approach to different governments.

Duncan agreed that a bilateral approach makes sense, but he said the relevant question on intervention is how should we react to the Soviets in this hemisphere.

Brzezinski said that we should not react reflexively; rather we should judge our response in terms of the likely consequences if the U.S. did not intervene. Nevertheless, he does not see a great likelihood of the U.S. intervening in Latin America in response to Soviet probes. He said that individual governments have a good sense of their own independence and therefore our reactions should be contingent on the way the other Latin Americans respond. But we cannot accept a blanket policy for all cases. Later, he said, and Solomon agreed, that a statement on nonintervention might be misinterpreted.

Leon Sloss of ACDA said that he agreed with Brzezinski's emphasis on a global and a bilateral approach, but he said that we should not discourage some regional institutions which have potential to contribute to the solution of certain problems—for example in arms control areas.

Brzezinski agreed that we should not discourage regional institutions, but he suggested that the healthiest approach would be a hands-off one, where the Latin Americans would approach us—instead of we, them—to pay attention to the regional institutions.

Solomon and Brzezinski agreed that the President should redefine our relationship rather than renounce it. Solomon said that the only viable regional economic institution was the Inter-American Development Bank, and a sign of its relative importance is the fact that Secretary Blumenthal will attend its annual ministerial meeting whereas he would not attend the one at the Asian Development Bank.⁵ Even the IDB has diversified its relationships—bringing on donors from Europe and Japan—although we are still the biggest contributor. But in trade or aid, it is hard to see a special relationship.

David Aaron pressed the issue of the special relationship a couple of steps further. One implication of a change in strategy would involve a shift in the distribution of U.S. resources abroad. Secondly, he noted that there was, in fact, a collective consciousness in Latin America.

Brzezinski said that we should not deceive ourselves. The consciousness is only collective when it is negative and in opposition to the U.S. Constructive relations demand greater specificity.

—In ideology, we want to show an affinity for democratic states.

—Security considerations demand that we recognize the geopolitical importance of Brazil and perhaps the special importance of the Caribbean to the United States.

—Economically, we need a more diversified strategy.

However, Brzezinski said we should not try to package these clusters of interests into a single policy.

Weil from Commerce agreed.

Relationships With Military Regimes

Christopher applied the approach suggested by Brzezinski to this next issue. He suggested that we adjust our relations so as to differentiate according to the kind of regime: warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with nonrepressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments.

Brzezinski agreed, noting that Brazil was not so repressive as is commonly thought. Duncan and General Brown also agreed with

⁵ The IDB Board of Governors was scheduled to meet in Guatemala City May 30–June 1, while the ADB representatives were scheduled to meet at ADB headquarters in Manila April 21–23.

Christopher and repeated the need to distinguish between kinds of military governments.

David Aaron suggested joining the two agreed approaches—the movement toward globalism and establishing a closer affinity with democracies—by a Presidential trip to selected democracies, say in Latin America as well as in Africa or Asia.

Aaron also said that if we are going to be sincere about moving toward a global approach, we must make clear that our policies with respect to democracies or repressive regimes must be the same in Latin America as in Africa or Asia. Given the special constituencies in the U.S., that would not be easy. We will have to go out of our way to do that.

Human Rights

Christopher said that it was very important for us to stay committed on our policy on human rights, but at the same time, we must *explore affirmative ways to express our policy*.

Solomon said that we should work with Congress to make clear why they should not be thinking about a Latin American policy on human rights. He and Christopher agreed on the need to obtain more discretionary authority and make more relevant distinctions in the application of our policy. If we define gross violations as torture or degrading treatment, instead of denial of due process, then we only single out seven–ten countries rather than 60–80. Then, we can have some impact.

Todman said that we should look at aid as a way to improve human rights conditions in very poor countries. For example in countries like Haiti, violations of human rights occur often because of impoverished conditions, and it does not make much sense for us to cut off aid in these circumstances.

Arms Transfers

Christopher asked whether the United States, as a declining source of arms to Latin America, is justified in adopting a special policy on arms transfers to Latin America.

General Brown reminded everyone that in the early Kennedy years we tried to get Latin American governments to shift defense expenditures to nation-building, but as sovereign states, they just turned to other sources to buy arms. As long as they are going to buy, he preferred that they buy from us rather than the Russians.

Sloss from ACDA said that we must approach this problem globally at both ends. Discuss it with the Soviets and with other suppliers, and at the same time urge restraint by purchasers. If this does not work, he is inclined to agree with George Brown.

Organization of American States

Christopher asked whether the OAS was part of the special relationship.

Todman thought the OAS was useful, but that it wasted a lot of time because it is not well-focused. He said he would like to see it strengthened.

Christopher suggested that we alter our relationship to the OAS to the way we relate to other regional organizations, like CENTO or ASEAN.

Solomon asked Todman how he would strengthen the OAS, and Todman answered that he would eliminate the Permanent Council and reduce the U.S. contribution, but we should do so after consulting with the Latin Americans.

Solomon said that in his experience in State and in ARA, every Administration had tried to strengthen the OAS and tried to make it more efficient, by cutting personnel and reorganization. The trouble is that the Latin Americans are very sensitive to their “perks,” and they perceived every effort to strengthen the OAS as an attempt to weaken it. He concluded that the OAS was useless, and there was nothing that could be done.

David Aaron said that if we want to follow the global approach to its logical conclusion, then our involvement in the OAS, which once played the role of a mini-UN, should be phased out. We really do not need it any longer. We should say we want to deal with Latin America like other regions.

Solomon acknowledged that that would indeed be perceived as the end to the special relationship, but noted that before doing that, we should look at the political ramifications and the domestic reaction, which he predicted would be negative. In conversations he has had with Latin American leaders, they all acknowledged privately that it was a worthless organization, but at the same time, they were horrified at the prospect of its being abolished. But he did not see anything we could do.

In fact, Latin Americans use the global North-South forum more and even take the SELA more seriously than they do the OAS.

Christopher said that the OAS was one of those institutions which would not die a natural death. Whenever it looks like it will, somebody turns the oxygen back on, and it has another life.

Aaron said that rather than try to leave it, abolish it, or resuscitate it with new ideas, the U.S. should just ask the OAS to justify itself.

William Luers from State said that we should be careful in formulating our policy to the OAS and more generally to the hemisphere, lest our new policy be perceived as a massive rejection of Latin America.⁶

Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Todman said that the value of individual contacts is very important to increase mutual understanding.

Christopher asked whether we should return to a more enlightened and generous policy with respect to cultural and educational exchanges with Latin America. Todman nodded yes.

Technical Assistance

Christopher asked whether we should put more money into technical assistance to Latin America.

Weil from Commerce said that question brought the discussion back to the beginning: What are our interests? If they are not special, then we should not give special assistance.

Summary and Miscellaneous

Christopher noted that Todman will be meeting with the Cubans in New York,⁷ that the Canal Treaty negotiations will be continuing, and that we should be increasingly sensitive to Brazil. Any overall statement needs to take into account our concern for special problems. He noted that the discussion was a little more philosophical than usual, but that we were probing for a relationship which adapted to the new realities.

The next step is the speech at the Organization of American States.

⁶ Earlier that day, Luers had testified before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs concerning the strengthening of hemispheric cooperation. He asserted that the United States faced an "opportunity and obligation to cooperate constructively with this new hemisphere. We must do so without sentimentality but with a sense of strong tradition, without paternalism but with respect for the sovereignty, independence, and dignity of each nation to find its own future." The complete text of Luers's statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 11, 1977, pp. 347-350.

⁷ Todman met with Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Pelegrin Torras in New York March 24-29 to discuss an agreement to regulate fishing. See Graham Hovey, "U.S. Negotiators and Cuba Open Talks on Fishing," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1977, p. 48. For the text of the joint communiqué issued on March 29, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1977, p. 421.

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 28, 1977, 11 a.m.–1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon
 Mr. Paul Warnke
 Mr. Phillip Habib
 Mr. William Hyland
 Mr. William D. Krimer,
 Interpreter

USSR

General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev
 Minister A.A. Gromyko
 Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
 Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
 Mr. G.M. Korniyenko
 Mr. O.M. Sokolov
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here are Brezhnev's expressions of condolence for the 300 Americans killed in an airliner collision in the Canary Islands and his introductory remarks on the status of U.S.-Soviet relations.]

Secretary Vance first wanted to thank the General Secretary for the frankness and openness with which he had addressed the various important questions before us. He, too, would try to speak frankly and openly, because he believed this to be the best way of achieving results. First, before beginning to set forth the views of the United States regarding the relations between our two countries, the Secretary wanted to transmit to Mr. Brezhnev a letter from President Carter.²

(Brezhnev took a few minutes to read the translation of the President's letter and passed it on to Minister Gromyko).

The Secretary said that all of us were heartened by Brezhnev's foreign policy remarks in his recent speeches. Last winter, as Governor Carter prepared to assume the presidency, he had been impressed and gratified by Brezhnev's public statement on the importance of good relations between our two countries. In particular, he was encouraged by

¹ Source: Department of State, Shulman Files: Lot 81D109, Vance to Moscow, March 28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. Drafted by Krimer; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. Printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 17. For subsequent memoranda of conversation, see *ibid.*, Documents 18–23. Vance departed Washington on March 25 and attended an NAC meeting in Brussels before arriving in Moscow. Following his meetings with Brezhnev, Vance met with West German, British, and French officials in Bonn, London, and Paris before arriving in Washington on April 2. For the text of Vance's news conferences while in Moscow, en route to London and Paris, and upon arrival in Washington; the joint U.S.–Soviet communiqué issued on March 30; Carter's March 30 press conference; and Brzezinski's April 1 news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1977, pp. 389–421.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 15.

Brezhnev's statement at Tula that detente meant a willingness to resolve differences and disputes by peaceful means, at conference tables.³ The President's deep conviction, which the Secretary shared and, in his judgment, was shared by a majority of the American people, was that our two countries must do everything they could to reduce the danger of war. The President, like Brezhnev, was a practical man and realized that the overall state of our relations would be determined largely by the specifics of the issues on our agenda. These were the "objective realities" of detente which determined where we were going.

The President, like Brezhnev, had been an officer in the armed forces of his country, and had a deep determination to do all he could to work toward a reasonable and fair regulation of military competition.

The Secretary well knew that Brezhnev had lived through the devastation of war, and knew the sorrow and suffering it would bring to all of our people, the young and the old. The Secretary, too, had experienced the horrors of war, had seen his friends and comrades die, and had lived with the responsibility for nuclear weapons for many years. It was his fervent hope that our children and Brezhnev's children would be spared the incalculable horror of a nuclear holocaust. At this point *Brezhnev* interrupted to tell a story in connection with alleged Soviet intentions to attack or threaten the United States. An Oriental tale related that at a bazaar a man had purposely started the rumor that at the far end of that bazaar someone was giving away pillows free of charge. As people heard him, they began running toward that part of the bazaar, until the man was left all alone. At that moment he began to wonder whether there might not be something to the rumor that he himself had started, and he thought that, just in case, he, too, should start running; who knows, maybe they were indeed giving out free pillows. Brezhnev said he knew that Americans liked anecdotes, and that is why he told this story by way of an analogy to those who started rumors about Soviet-war-like intentions.

The Secretary continued by saying that recently, Brezhnev had noted that there were objective possibilities for developing equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in various spheres for the good of both countries and universal peace. He heartily agreed with such a view of the situation.

Brezhnev had further said that the question was how soon such a development would begin. He was firmly convinced that we could begin that process now. We had an unparalleled opportunity to set our relations on a fresh course.

³ See footnote 3, Document 17.

At Tula Brezhnev had also said that detente meant an ability to take into consideration each other's legitimate interests. The two sides were realistic enough to know that we would have differences. But we shared a fundamental interest in improving our mutual understanding. Our differences must not distract us from working for peace. They also must not divide us.

The Secretary wanted to give Brezhnev a sense of developments in our country which had affected our national outlook. We have come through a hotly contested national election which was a process of renewal and of developing a new policy consensus in the country. Now a new government had taken office in Washington, but we were dealing with the same currents of opinion that had shaped our election debates. There was support for detente among the American people, but there were also concerns and apprehensions which had to be overcome.

At this point *Brezhnev* interrupted again and recalled how at the very beginning of the "Great Patriotic War", at the time Hitler had attacked Czechoslovakia and had allied himself with Mussolini, he had come home from work one day to the place where he lived in rather humble conditions together with his father. His father was a simple man, a steel worker, and this story, which Brezhnev was sure his colleagues on the Politburo had heard more than once, was well-suited to illustrate a simple working man's approach to the psychological questions of war. His father had asked him "Lyonya, which is the highest mountain in the world"? He had responded that it was Mt. Everest. His father then asked how tall was the Eiffel Tower in Paris? He had replied that it was some 300 meters tall. His father then said that if he and his friends had been authorized to do so, they would have built a tower twice as tall as the Eiffel Tower, would have hauled it up to Mt. Everest and topped it off with a gallows. There they would hang Hitler, and would instruct everybody to view this scene through a telescope. His father was obviously unaware of the fact that the curvature of the earth would make such viewing impossible. His father went on to say they would then declare that this would be the fate of not only the first instigator of war, but of any other war-monger. After hanging five, six, or seven such criminals the world would be rid of war. Much later, during the Nuremberg Trial, when the prosecutor there pronounced the words "instigator of War", Brezhnev recalled this heart-to-heart conversation between a father and a son. It was a true story and, while Brezhnev apologized for having interrupted, he felt it was a useful story, because it emphasized the need to defend peace.

The Secretary acknowledged that it was indeed a very useful story. He continued by saying that President Carter enjoyed the support of

the vast majority of the American people—more so than any President for many years—and therefore he could get support for arms control agreements. The point he wanted to make was of critical importance, because it meant that any agreements we could reach here the President could get ratified by Congress.

The Secretary said that what we wanted to set in motion during our talks was a process of improvement in key arms control issues, in our bilateral relations, and in international relations. The President had spoken of his belief that we were all here in good faith to pursue a more stable peace through new arms limitation negotiations. He felt that we must be bold and vigorous in achieving control over nuclear weapons. We were prepared to go far in this joint endeavor and explore new ideas. The positions the President advocated were an advance over the past—not only in the strategic arms area, but in stopping all nuclear testing, and moving ahead on a broad range of other arms control issues.

Our present talks were a crucial step in demonstrating that detente was a dynamic, long-term process. It was not static. We, like the Soviet Union, must give it new meaning, if it were truly to reflect greater mutual understanding. The Secretary would suggest that we begin regeneration of detente.

Without going into details now, the Secretary wanted to sketch out those areas which we would want to explore with the Soviet side. We will explore ways to address the Backfire and Cruise missile issues, we will make a comprehensive proposal which would enhance strategic stability and mutual confidence, we will discuss advance notification of missile test firings, averting military competition in space, and concerns that certain forms of civil defense can be destabilizing. We also hoped that our discussions will make a turning point in the long effort to achieve a total cessation of nuclear testing, a subject in which, the Secretary knew, the Soviet Union had deep concerns. Conditions may be right for the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise unique leadership in getting this process moving. We were moving promptly to secure Congressional ratification of the Treaty on the Threshold Test Ban and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.⁴ What we accomplish during our meetings here would help us in the ratification of

⁴ On July 3, 1974, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which prohibited underground nuclear tests above a 150 KT limit. On May 28, 1976, Ford and Brezhnev signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE), which extended the limitations of the TTBT to underground tests for peaceful purposes.

those treaties. Another area where we could work together to move forward was the Indian Ocean. We wanted to explore Soviet interest in mutual restraint in that area.

The Secretary pointed out that conventional arms exports were dangerous and wasted vast and increasingly scarce resources. Our two countries have accounted for a large proportion of such trade. In fact, the United States occupied first place in the export trade of conventional arms, and the Soviet Union second place. Competition between us in the export of arms placed stress on our bilateral relations. It should in any event be a matter of principle for advanced countries to make a serious effort to restrain and reduce this trade. We would welcome an expression of interest on the part of the Soviet side in an exchange of views on this subject. In this connection, we believed that the best way to begin was with suppliers. The United States was ready to exercise restraint in its own activities. We would be talking to our allies. The President was interested in Soviet views on prospects for cooperation. In the area of non-proliferation we were gratified by progress in the London Suppliers' Group,⁵ and in particular with very solid Soviet participation. These were important problems, and we hoped to continue in close cooperation.

The Secretary wanted to inform Brezhnev today that in the very near future we would announce certain policy decisions concerning nuclear non-proliferation. They will include the indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in the United States, and the restructuring of the U.S. breeder reactor program to emphasize designs other than the plutonium breeder. The Secretary had instructed our Embassy to inform Minister Gromyko in detail of these policy decisions. We shared Soviet concern about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we believed that the actions which we are about to take would constitute a major step forward toward this end.

We had reviewed the Vienna MBFR negotiations and our MBFR policy. The Carter Administration strongly supported these negotiations. A satisfactory agreement could enhance the security of both sides equally. The West had shown its will to move toward agreement. The December 1975 Western proposal to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons was

⁵ The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the London Suppliers' Group, was established following the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Members included the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Japan. A series of meetings in London between 1974 and 1977 resulted in agreements that set guidelines for the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology.

a substantial step.⁶ We hoped that the East would agree to the two basic objectives involved in these negotiations, which were parity in the form of equal military manpower in the area, and collectivity of limitations. If the East showed serious willingness to reach an agreement based on parity and collectivity, the way for movement on both sides would be open.

[Omitted here is discussion of strategic arms limitations, human rights, and economic policy.]

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Document 367.

32. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 1, 1977

SUBJECT

Weekly National Security Report #7

1. *Opinions*

After two months in office, let me give you a highly subjective assessment of where we stand with our foreign policy:

The public clearly understands that the Carter foreign policy is derived from an affirmative commitment to certain basic human values. Moreover, you have defined these values as “human rights,” which is both broader and more flexible than such words as “liberty” or “freedom.” This gives our foreign policy a wider appeal, more in tune with the emerging political consciousness of mankind—which is concerned both with liberty and equity.

Starting from that moral base, your basic priorities for our foreign policy, both in terms of actual substance and specific focus, are co-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. The President wrote “Good report. J” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

herent and consistent: (1) we will seek to coordinate more closely with our principal allies in order to provide the foundation for a more stable international system; (2) we will engage in a North-South dialogue in order to deal with wider human needs; (3) we will seek accommodation on the East-West front in order to avoid war and to widen trans-ideological cooperation. In addition, we will seek to halt the spread of arms, both conventional and nuclear.

The record is more mixed, in my judgment, when we look at more specific aspects of this broad policy:

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Here I think we have done very well. Our commitment to human rights has put the Soviet leadership on the defensive in an area where it had a free ride for at least the last eight years, and perhaps even for the last fifteen—if we count from the start of the Vietnamese War. The reason that Brezhnev et al are reacting so strongly to your insistence on human rights is not because they fear that we will make human rights a condition for our relations with them; they fear this insistence because they know that human rights is a compelling idea, and that associating America with this idea not only strengthens us, but it also generates pressures from within their own system. Ideologically they are thus on the defensive.

Moreover, with regards to SALT, by committing ourselves to reductions, we have made the Soviets seem opposed to genuine arms limitations. In the past, they have often made the United States look as if it was opposed to arms limitations. The tables have now been turned, though the chance for a comprehensive agreement this summer are very uncertain.

The next step should be this: we should ask the Soviets to explain what specifically they did not like about the package, thus drawing them into a discussion of it.

The Middle East

Your basic statement has created a flexible framework for dealing with hitherto intractable issues.² By combining the need for a compre-

² Presumable reference to a statement the President made regarding a possible Middle East settlement during the question-and-answer segment of the Clinton, Massachusetts town hall meeting on March 16 (see footnote 2, Document 29). When asked what he felt “must be done to establish a meaningful and a lasting peace” in the Middle East, Carter responded that the “first prerequisite” of a lasting peace was the recognition of Israel by its neighbors; second, the establishment of permanent borders for Israel; and third, the establishment of a homeland for Palestinian refugees “who have suffered for many, many years.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 386–387) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 23.

hensive peace with minor territorial changes but transitional security arrangements and with a homeland for the Palestinians, and by doing so publicly you have made a real breakthrough. The need is now for the parties concerned to understand that we are committed to these basic principles and that they provide the point of departure for more substantive negotiations among themselves. Again, this is a significant step forward from almost everything that the United States has said on the subject for at least ten to fifteen years, but persistence on our part will be required.

Latin America

We are still shaping our basic approach, but I am hopeful. I use the word "approach" advisedly; it will not be a new policy, something which every new Administration has tended proudly to proclaim—and then forget. Instead of focusing on Latin America as something special, to be protected by the Monroe Doctrine (which most Latin Americans resent) you are moving towards an approach which stresses bilateral relations, of various types, with individual Latin American states, and which deals with their broader problems in a wider global context. I believe this is responsive to their pride and to their needs.

The major cloud is the deterioration in our relationship with Brazil, something which ought to be repaired, given Brazil's present and potential role in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil is an emerging superpower and it is clearly in the U.S. interest to have it on our side. It can be a source of stability and influence not only in regard to Latin America but even in regard to Africa, in which it is likely to become increasingly engaged.

Trilateral Relations

We have made an excellent start, especially with the Mondale visit³ which put so much emphasis on genuine consultations. This reflected your emphasis on the primacy of these relations; and was further underlined by your meetings with Callaghan and Fukuda, and by your phone calls to Giscard and Schmidt.⁴ However, the nuclear proliferation issue has become a serious bone of contention. Your statement

³ See Document 16.

⁴ The President met with Callaghan on March 10 and Fukuda on March 21. The memoranda of conversation of these meetings are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe, and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIV, Korea; Japan. The memoranda of the President's March 3 telephone conversation with Giscard and his conversation with Schmidt are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

next week⁵ and the subsequent consultations might help to relieve this irritant, while the forthcoming summit should provide us with the opportunity for an affirmative recommitment to basic unity among the trilateral countries.

I should note, however, that our human rights policy has evoked rather mixed feelings in Western Europe. This is not surprising, given West European political traditions and their proximity to the Soviets, but for some Europeans—especially the Germans—it is a source of concern.

China

Our policy towards China is yet to unfold and it needs to be unfolded. Nonetheless, Soviet efforts to promote Sino-Soviet normalization and/or reconciliation have so far failed. This gives us the needed time to develop the required initiatives, though these should be forthcoming in the course of the spring, lest the Chinese begin to think that we ignore them or take them for granted. I will be making some concrete proposals soon.

South Asia

With the political change in India, we have again the opportunity for a significant improvement in U.S.-Indian relations.⁶ Though my own view of India's future remains pessimistic, such an improvement—at least in the short run—is highly desirable.

Africa

It is a morass. Current African events can be seen in terms of two broad interpretations, both of them probably right but each yielding a contradictory conclusion. The first is that Africa is in the midst of a social-political upheaval, with post-colonial structures simply collaps-

⁵ On April 7, during a question-and-answer session held in the Briefing Room at the White House, the President announced that the administration had engaged in a review of issues related to the use of nuclear power; as a result of that review, the administration would pursue a major change in U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies, designed to limit the production of plutonium, encourage research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles, increase production capacity for enriched uranium, and continue discussions with a number of governments over the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 581–583) The White House also released a statement on nuclear power policy, containing these and other objectives, on April 7. For the text of the statement, see *ibid.*, pp. 587–588. See also Edward Walsh and J.P. Smith, "U.S. Acts to Curb Plutonium, Asks Allies to Assist," *The Washington Post*, April 8, 1977, pp. A-1, A-19.

⁶ Reference is to the lifting of the Indian state of emergency imposed by Gandhi in June 1975; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, Documents 204, 207, 208, and 213. Gandhi called for elections in March 1977, only to be defeated by Janata Party leader Morarji Desai. Additional information about the election is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

ing. In that case, it is clearly inadvisable for the U.S. to become involved. On the other hand, events in Africa can also be seen as part of a broad East-West struggle, with pro-Western regimes being challenged by the pro-Soviet regimes. This dictates resistance to Soviet efforts. Both interpretations are probably right, and they point to the conclusion (in my mind) that we should press the Soviets to desist but do so outside of Africa, through diplomatic leverage, trade denial, etc., but not through direct involvement in Africa per se. In the meantime, the situation remains grave and it is possible that pro-Soviet developments in Ethiopia may soon be matched by a collapse of the pro-Western government in Zaire. This, together with the likelihood of very little progress in Southern Africa, portends a rather dark future.

Defense

Our basic position is strong, and a comprehensive reassessment of our force posture and fundamental strategic concepts is now under way. Under Brown's direction, I feel quite confident that by late summer we will be well under way towards a renovated and relevant strategic doctrine. However, in the conventional field and in long-range rapid strike capabilities much remains to be done, and NATO standardization is not moving forward as much as it should.

North-South Relations

We are yet to define our basic position. You made a good start in your UN speech,⁷ but the basic North-South strategy is yet to be shaped. I think it is quite clear that on this issue there will be major divisions within the Cabinet, and probably a tough fight in Congress. However, if one looks ten or twenty years ahead, it is clear that the United States needs desperately to fashion a comprehensive and long-term North-South strategy. Such a strategy is an essential component of your wider architectural effort.

International Economics

The Summit will be vital in this respect, especially with protectionism becoming increasingly appealing.⁸ The United States has to

⁷ See Document 29.

⁸ See Document 38. In his April 9 weekly report, Brzezinski indicated that he would focus the President's attention "on what needs to be done to give greater meaning to the 'architectural' notion with which your foreign policy has been associated." He continued: "The forthcoming summit will be an important test. Without some broader initiatives, the Summit may not live up to expectations no matter how much we seek to deepen them. The main reason our allies wanted the Summit is because they are concerned that the public—particularly in Europe—has lost faith in the liberal democratic political and economic system that has provided both prosperity and social stability. The purpose of the Summit is both to reaffirm our collective faith in that system and to take concrete steps to demonstrate its viability. As of next week we will be concentrating on this issue." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/77)

provide definite and clear-headed leadership, and our weaker allies (and all of them are much weaker than we) will be looking to you for personal leadership.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

33. Address by President Carter Before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States¹

Washington, April 14, 1977

Mr. Chairman, members of the Permanent Council, Mr. Secretary General,² Permanent Observers of the OAS, Chiefs of the Specialized Organizations and Agencies, members of the press, distinguished guests:

Hace tres años, tuve el honor y placer de hablar ante la Asamblea General de la OEA celebrada en mi estado de Georgia. Igual que en Atlanta, hoy seguiré el consejo de mis compañeros, que opinan—para el beneficio de buenas relaciones—sería mejor que no hablara en español hoy. [Three years ago I had the honor and pleasure of speaking before the General Assembly of the OAS held in my State of Georgia.³ As I did then in Atlanta, I will today follow the advice of my friends, who have the opinion that, in the interest of good relations, it would be better for me not to speak in Spanish today.]

Since I can also speak English, I will shift to that language.
[Laughter]

That day in Atlanta, 3 years ago, I shared with you some of the thoughts that my wife and I had brought back from our visits to several of the American States. I spoke particularly for the need for constant cooperation, consultation, and harmony among the nations of this hemisphere. I believe that just as strongly today as President of the United States as I did 3 years ago as Governor of Georgia.

I am delighted to be with you in this beautiful House of the Americas. For nearly three decades the OAS has stood for mutual re-

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 611–616. All brackets are in the original. The President spoke at 12:26 p.m. at the Pan American Union. The Department forwarded Carter's remarks to all American Republic diplomatic posts in telegram 85145, April 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770132–0029)

² Reference is to OAS Secretary-General Alejandro Orfila and OAS Permanent Council Chairman Juan Pablo Gomez-Pradilla.

³ The OAS General Assembly met in Atlanta during late April–early May 1974.

spect among sovereign nations, for peace, and the rule of law in this hemisphere. The OAS Charter pledges us to individual liberty and social justice. I come here now to restate our own commitment to these goals.

The challenge before us today, however, is not just to reaffirm those principles but to find ways to make them a reality. To do this, we must take account of the changes in our relationships that have taken place over the last 10 years, and we must candidly acknowledge the differences that exist among us. We must adapt our current policies and institutions to those changes so that we can pursue our goals more effectively.

As nations of the New World, we once believed that we could prosper in isolation from the Old World. But since the Second World War, in particular, all of us have taken such vital roles in the world community that isolation would now be harmful to our own best interests and to other countries. Our joining in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs are all signs that we understand this. So is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which Raul Prebisch of Argentina made into an important forum of the developing world. Venezuela is now cochairing the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America is a source of many creative ideas on development throughout the world. The leaders of many Latin American nations have been the driving force behind improving North-South negotiations.

In all these ways, the nations of Latin America were among the first in our changing world to see the importance of adapting global institutions to the new realities of our day.

The problems and the promises of our region have become as diverse as the world itself. The economies of most Latin American nations have been developing rapidly, although, of course, at different rates. Some have an impressive rate of growth. Some—a few are among the poorest in the developing world. Some have abundant energy resources; others are desperately short of energy. Some of our countries export primary products only. Some have become major exporters of advanced manufactured goods while others export little at all. Your problems of market access, technology transfer, and debt management sometimes defy regional solutions.

In addition to economic diversity, we have all developed widely varied forms and philosophies of government. This diversity has brought national pride and national strength. And as you've played more independent and important roles in world politics, we have all begun to construct more normal and more balanced and more equal relationships.

In the light of these changes, a single United States policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean makes little sense. What we need is a wider and a more flexible approach, worked out in close consultation with you. Together, we will develop policies more suited to each nation's variety and potential. In this process, I will be particularly concerned that we not seek to divide the nations of Latin America one from another or to set Latin America apart from the rest of the world. Our own goal is to address problems in a way which will lead to productive solutions—globally, regionally, and bilaterally.

Our new approach will be based on three basic elements:

First of all is a high regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean nation. We will not act abroad in ways that we would not tolerate at home in our own country.

Second is our respect for human rights, a respect which is also so much a part of your own tradition. Our values and yours require us to combat abuses of individual freedom, including those caused by political, social, and economic injustice. Our own concern for these values will naturally influence our relations with the countries of this hemisphere and throughout the world. You will find this country, the United States of America, eager to stand beside those nations which respect human rights and which promote democratic ideals.

Third is our desire to press forward on the great issues which affect the relations between the developed and the developing nations. Your economic problems are also global in character and cannot be dealt with solely on regional terms.

However, some of our own global policies are of particular interest to other American States. When major decisions are made in these areas, we will consult with you.

The United States will take a positive and an open attitude toward the negotiation of agreements to stabilize commodity prices, including the establishment of a common funding arrangement for financing buffer stocks where they are a part of individual and negotiated agreements.

We will actively pursue the multilateral trade negotiations with your governments in Geneva, Switzerland. We are committed to minimize trade restrictions and to take into account the specific trade problems of developing countries and to provide special and more favorable treatment where feasible and appropriate. We believe that this is in our mutual interest and that it will create important new opportunities for Latin American trade.

Our own science and technology can be useful to many of your countries. For instance, we are ready to train your technicians to use more information gathered by our own satellites, so that you can make

better judgments on management of your resources and your environment. Space communications technology can also be a creative tool in helping your national television systems to promote your educational and cultural objectives.

I have asked Congress to meet in full our pledges to the Inter-American Development Bank and the other multilateral lending institutions which loan a high proportion of their capital to the relatively advanced developing countries of Latin America.

And finally, we are directing more and more of our bilateral economic assistance to the poorer countries. We are also prepared to explore with other nations new ways of being helpful on a wide range of institutional, human development, and technological approaches which might enable them to deal more effectively with the problems of the needy. All of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries.

I would like to add a word about private investment. Your governments are understandably interested in setting rules that will encourage private investors to play an important role in your development. We support your efforts and recognize that a new flexibility and adaptability are required today for foreign investment to be most useful in combining technology, capital management, and market experience to meet your development needs. We will do our part in this field to avoid differences and misunderstandings between your government and ours.

One of the most significant political trends of our time is the relationship between the developing nations of the world and the industrialized countries. We benefit from your advice and counsel, and we count on you to contribute your constructive leadership and help guide us in this North-South dialog.

We also hope to work with all nations to halt the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. The States of Latin America took the initiative 10 years ago when you set up the first nuclear-free zone in any populated area of the world. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a model worthy of our own admiration.⁴ For our part, the United States will sign, and I will

⁴ The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (also known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), which prohibited and prevented the development, testing, use, or manufacture of nuclear weapons, contained two protocols. Protocol I committed countries outside of the treaty zone to undertake obligations of the treaty with respect to their territories within the zone. Protocol II, which Vice President Humphrey signed on behalf of the United States on April 1, 1968, called upon states possessing nuclear weapons to agree to respect the obligations in the Treaty to not use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. The United States became a party to Protocol II in 1971. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 226.

ask the Senate to ratify, Protocol I of the treaty, prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons in Latin America.⁵

However, banning the spread of nuclear explosives does not require giving up the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We mean to work closely with all of you on new technologies to use the atom for peaceful purposes.

To slow the costly buildup of conventional arms, we are seeking global policies of restraint. We are showing restraint in our own policies around the world, and we will be talking to supplier nations and to prospective buyers about ways to work out a common approach. We also believe that regional agreements among producers and purchasers of arms can further such a global effort.

I spent most of this morning working on a new United States policy to reduce the sale of conventional arms around the world. Again, you in Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge of eight South American nations to limit the acquisition of offensive arms in their region is a striking example. If the eight nations can implement their pledge, their own people will not be the only ones to benefit. They will have set a standard for others throughout the world to follow.

These are challenges that face us in the future. There are also problems that plague us from the past. And we must work together to solve them.

One that addresses itself to us is the Panama Canal. In the first days of my own administration, just a few weeks ago, I directed a new approach to our negotiations with Panama on a new Canal treaty. In the light of the changes which I discussed before, the Treaty of 1903,⁶ which combines [defines] our relationship with Panama on the canal, is no longer appropriate or effective.

I am firmly committed to negotiating in as timely a fashion as possible a new treaty which will take into account Panama's legitimate needs as a sovereign nation and our own interests and yours in the efficient operation of a neutral canal, open on a nondiscriminatory basis to all users.

Another problem which we must in a way address together is that of Cuba. We believe that normal conduct of international affairs and particularly the negotiation of differences require communication with all countries in the world. To these ends, we are seeking to determine

⁵ The President signed Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the White House on May 26. For his remarks at the signing ceremony, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 1027.

⁶ Reference is the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, signed by officials of the United States and Panama on November 18, 1903.

whether relations with Cuba can be improved on a measured and a reciprocal basis.

I am dedicated to freedom of movement between nations. I have removed restrictions on United States citizens who want to travel abroad.⁷ Today there are no restrictions imposed by our country. Today I have also removed similar travel restrictions on resident aliens in the United States.

We seek to encourage international travel, and we must take greater account of problems that transcend national borders. Drugs and international crime, including terrorism, challenge traditional concepts of diplomacy. For the well-being of our peoples, we must cooperate on these issues. With each passing year they will occupy a more and more central place in our deliberations.

I have a longstanding interest in the OAS, and I very much want to see it play an increasingly constructive role.

The General Assembly of the OAS has been an important forum for the direct exchange of views among our governments. Such ministerial consultations are extremely useful. They allow us to apply our own collective strength to political and economic problems.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has performed valuable services. It deserves increased support from all our governments. We believe deeply in the preservation and the enhancement of human rights, and the United States will work toward coordinated and multilateral action in this field. The United States will sign, and I will seek Senate approval of, the American Convention on Human Rights negotiated several years ago in Costa Rica.⁸ And we will support, in cooperation with international agencies, broadened programs for aiding political refugees. I urge this organization and all its member states to take a more active role in the care, protection, and the resettlement of political refugees.

The peacekeeping function is firmly embedded in the OAS Charter. I want to encourage the Secretary General of the OAS to continue his active and effective involvement in the search for peaceable solu-

⁷ See footnote 15, Document 29.

⁸ In an April 13 memorandum to the President, Brzezinski indicated that Department of State officials, Lipshutz, and the NSC Staff had all recommended that Carter announce in his Pan American Day speech his intention to sign and seek ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted by the Organization of American States in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 22, 1969. The President approved this recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights: 1-5/77) He signed the American Convention on Human Rights at OAS headquarters on June 1. For his remarks, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 1050-1051.

tions to several long-standing disputes in this hemisphere. The United States will support his efforts and initiatives.

The OAS, of course, is not the only instrument of cooperation among the nations of the Americas. The Inter-American Development Bank is among the most important multilateral mechanisms for promoting development of the world today. By bringing in nations outside the Western Hemisphere, the IDB bears testimony to Latin America's growing involvement with the rest of the world.

Within this hemisphere, many of you are working toward regional and subregional integration efforts—including those in the Caribbean, in the Central American Common Market, and the Andean Pact—and we favor such efforts.⁹ They are the first steps toward Bolívar's vision of a hemisphere united.

Let me conclude by bringing up a matter that is particularly close to me because of my long interest in inter-American affairs. My wife and I have traveled and made many friends in Mexico and Brazil, the two largest and most rapidly changing countries in Latin America. And we have traveled elsewhere and made many friends in Central and South America. My wife is presently studying Spanish, along with the wife of the Secretary of State,¹⁰ and I have tried to keep up with my own Spanish that I learned at school. I have seen clearly how greatly our country has been blessed and enriched by the people and cultures of the Caribbean and Latin America. And we are bound together—and I see it very clearly—in culture, history, and by common purposes and ideals.

The United States actually has the fourth largest Spanish-speaking population in the world. I tried to meet many of them during my campaign the last 2 years. And they gave me their support and their encouragement and their advice. The novels we read, the music we hear, the sports that we play—all reflect a growing consciousness of each other.

These intellectual, social, cultural, and educational exchanges will continue, either with or without government help. But there are steps that governments can take to speed up and enhance this process. In the months ahead, therefore, we plan to explore with your governments—individually and here in the OAS—new people-to-people programs, an

⁹ The General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration Between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua established the Central American Common Market (CACM) on December 13, 1960. Costa Rica joined CACM in 1963. The 1969 Cartagena Agreement established the Andean Pact, a trade bloc comprised of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela joined the Andean Pact in 1973.

¹⁰ Grace Vance.

increase in professional and scientific exchanges, and other ways of strengthening the ties that already link us.

The challenge we face is to awake our institutions to a changing world. We must focus our attention on the problems which face our countries and tailor each solution to its problem.

As you know, I am a new President. I've got a lot to learn. My heart and my interest to a major degree is in Latin America. I welcome every opportunity to strengthen the ties of friendship and a sense of common purpose and close consultation with the nations and the peoples of the Caribbean and Latin America.

Many of you are leaders representing your own governments. I ask for your advice and your counsel and your support as we face problems together in the future. This means a lot to our country, and it means a lot to us also to have intimate bilateral and direct relationships with you.

We look on the OAS, headquartered thankfully here in Washington, as a channel through which we might learn more and receive advice and make plans for the future.

Simón Bolívar believed that we would reach our goals only with our peoples free and our governments working in harmony. I hope that the steps that I have outlined today and the commitments that I have made will move us toward those goals of peace and freedom.

Thank you very much.

34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Weekly National Security Report #9

1. *Opinion**Human Rights: For a Broader Interpretation.*

As I signaled to you, some elements in Congress are seizing on human rights as an excuse for blocking constructive initiatives in the area of development aid or at least as an opportunity for attaching all sorts of restrictive conditions on such aid.² Abroad, some see our concern as excessively rigid and moralistic.

Despite this, I believe that our affirmative commitment to human rights is not only morally justified but is in keeping with historical trends, thereby giving American foreign policy additional influence and associating America as a society with a vital human concern. Otherwise, America runs the risk of being perceived only as a consumption-oriented society, making us the focus both of envy and of resentment.

However, the point to stress is that human rights is *a broad concept*. These two words should mean much more than just political liberty, the right to vote, and protection against arbitrary governmental action. Human rights, and this we should stress, means also certain basic minimum standards of social and economic existence. In effect, human rights refers to all three (political, social, and economic) and this is why these words have such universal appeal.

Such a broader, and more flexible definition would have several advantages: it would retain for us the desirable identification with a human cause whose time has come, and yet it would avoid some of the rigidities that are potential in the narrower political definition. It would give us the freedom to point at the most glaring abuses (e.g., political suppression in some countries, or total social indifference in others),

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Carter and Mondale both initialed the memorandum.

² Presumable reference to bills and amendments requiring U.S. representatives to the international financial institutions (IFIs) to vote against loans to countries designated as human rights violators. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Documents 33, 35–37.

though leaving us the necessary margin of flexibility in dealing with most governments. In general, we should stress that achieving human rights *is a process* and that we are watching carefully progress toward greater respect for human rights, realizing that there is no single standard for all the countries of the world.

I believe that all of the foregoing is implicit in what you have been saying, but making some of these points more explicit may make it more difficult for your critics to attack your position and for others to distort it into excessively rigid and politically confining meanings.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

35. Editorial Note

In preparation for President Jimmy Carter's April 25, 1977, interview with European journalists, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski provided the President with a thematic overview in an April 23 memorandum. Brzezinski indicated that the interview would help the President "set the scene for the London summits" and afford him the opportunity to discuss his views on "industrial-state relations." He devoted the first portion of the memorandum to the upcoming London meetings:

"The three meetings in London are all of a piece. In each, you have a chance to meet, on a group and personal basis, the leaders of most of our industrial state allies (you have seen so far Callaghan, Jenkins, Luns, Trudeau, Fukuda, and Soares). In each meeting, you will be able to lay out basic American commitments—both the steadfastness of purpose of a new Administration and directions and guidelines for the future.

"This is a start on a new time of building—different from the late 1940s (all start from an advanced industrial base, and the U.S. no longer has the same economic pre-eminence); but this time of building is just as challenging, just as vital, and even more difficult to gain popular support for new directions.

"Your trip is a direct extension of Vice President Mondale's trip 92 hours after Inauguration: it is a break with the past, in that there is a much clearer sense that allies are important in their own right, and that these relations should have pre-eminence. The past three years of economic slump have also reaffirmed the need for strong industrial state partners, in order to guarantee the security and prosperity of any one

nation. Interdependence has gone from being a slogan to being a practical reality in everyday life.

“Thus the summit meetings will not produce spectacular new initiatives or proposals for new institutions; that is not what is required, now. Instead, the various leaders need to begin thinking in common about problems in common. This can result in a framework for dealing jointly with basic issues; about building a broad framework of industrial state concerns leading to coordinated action. It is the creating of *ways* and working together—ways that can be developed and will endure over the coming years—that is the real ‘news’ to be expected from the summit, and the groundwork of future progress.

“Your energy policy is part of this new time of building. It will enable the United States to play a more effective role in the world. Clearly, foreign and domestic policies are related more closely together than at any other time in peacetime history.

“Basic Themes

“A number of basic American themes, to which you have been alluding in the past three months, will become clearer at the summit meetings:

“Leadership and Purpose: The emergence of the United States from a time of doubt and uncertainty, in which even some of our friends and allies abroad questioned our ability and willingness to act. An American sense of purpose has returned: but it is more mature, and is directed towards political and economic relations and developments—the building of new patterns of behavior and action for the future, in a *shared leadership* with other nations.

“Economic Actions: The need for coordinated strategies for ending the recession, and for breaking loose from the ‘stagnation’ pattern that led to the current difficulties (e.g. 15 million OECD unemployed). In all of the commercial issues—non-proliferation, arms transfers, defense procurement, advanced technology—there must also be a sharing of benefits. In defense procurement, a clear two-way street.

“Institutions: The importance of strengthening the work of existing institutions, whether NATO (where the issue is following-through on its potential) or the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, or the OECD, the IMF, the World Bank, and the IEA.

“Global Problems: The need for common effort on the global problems that are either here, or are emerging: including the spread of nuclear weapons (an issue that is inseparable from secure energy resources for all nations), the transfer of conventional arms, the relationship between rich and poor countries. In each, industrial-state leadership is needed.

“Developing World: The importance of not seeing the industrial states as an exclusive club, but directly concerned with what is hap-

pening in the developing world. Interdependence extends clearly into this dimension; and only by building upon the potential in relations with developing states can we provide for our own future. This means a better response to poor country needs: especially in the poorest countries of all. In greater justice, there is greater strength for us all.

“European Unity: Genuine U.S. support for European unity—however tentative and faltering it may be at the tail end of a recession. This is no less than a basic respect for European integrity, and a recognition (based on the past three years in particular) of the vital need for a strong European Community to help us all meet economic difficulties.

“U.S. Response: The United States is prepared to respond in a forthcoming way to Western European ideas and interests (as well as those of Japan). For all of them, U.S. receptivity is an incentive to develop and speak out on their own perspectives, their own contributions to common efforts. Already, there has been a virtually unprecedented series of consultations with the Allies—whether in working with the Japanese, in the Mondale trip, or in the many consultations held directly with the North Atlantic Council.

“NATO: A renewed American commitment to the NATO Alliance, with the emphasis on the strength of alliance unity, the value of existing strategy and doctrine, and the added value that can be gained from making NATO work more effectively than ever.

“Democracy and Human Rights: The added strength that all the Western nations draw from a renewed understanding of the democratic basis of common action—and of our internal political strength. For the first time the NATO Allies are all democracies, and—with developments in countries like Portugal and Greece (and Spain)—the basic vitality of democracy has been proved again. This has given an added impetus to the human dimensions of policy: not just human rights, but also the basic moral purpose of our nations which given them both legitimacy and strength.

“East-West: Working with Allies also involves East-West relations; including their interests in U.S. negotiations on SALT; Alliance responsibility for MBFR; better understandings on East-West trade; coordinated policy for Belgrade (which will come up at NATO the day after you are there)—as a constructive, non-confrontational effort that will still stress our shared concern for human rights.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 50, Presidential Interviews: 1-4/77)

The interview took place in the Oval Office at the White House at 2:30 p.m. on April 25. The journalists conducting the interview included Fred Emery of *The Times*, London, Henri Pierre of *Le Monde*, Horst-Alexander Siebert of *Die Welt*, and Vittorio Zucconi of *La Stampa*, Turin. During the interview, Pierre inquired as to the President’s gen-

eral approach toward Europe and the European Community, noting that some of Carter's predecessors "seemed to fear that a united Europe" might rise as a competitor to the United States and impact U.S. economic and political interests. Pierre asked if Carter held similar views. Carter responded:

"No. I think within 100 hours of my becoming President, the Vice President had begun consultations with the leaders of many nations in Europe. I have already met with Prime Minister Callaghan, with the leaders of Portugal, with the European Community, NATO. I will meet with the other leaders within the next 2 weeks. And this will likely be the only trip I shall take outside our country this year. I have no other plans at this time.

"I think all these items describe my deep concern about good relationships with Europe. I see no way that we can have a successful resolution of East-West problems without the full comprehension, understanding, participation with our allies and friends in Europe.

"We have, in addition to that, demonstrated, I think, in my own budget proposals to the Congress, an increasing emphasis on military capability within NATO. And I intend to stay over after the conference with the heads of state, to meet with the NATO leaders as well.

"The people of our country, regardless of who happens to be President, have a natural sense that our historical ties and our future are intimately related with the European countries.

"The other part of your question is that I strongly favor, perhaps more than my predecessors, a close interrelationship among the nations of Europe, the European Community, in particular.

"We have a legitimate reticence about trying to interfere, but I will do everything within the bounds of propriety to strengthen those natural ties—economically, politically, militarily—that do exist now among the countries of Europe and to strengthen them in the future. And when the nations involved consider it appropriate, I would certainly welcome the absorption within the European Community of Portugal and Spain.

"So, I think that already I have both come to realize and also have begun to act on the premise of a strong Europe as essential to our own good future and have recognized the importance of the bilateral relationships with the nations involved." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pages 776–777)

The full text of the interview transcript is *ibid.*, pages 775–783.

36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 29, 1977

SUBJECT

Four-Year Goals: Preliminary Statement

Purpose and Scope

The memorandum which follows is an attempt to define your four-year foreign policy goals. It is not meant to be a public statement—and its publication or revelation would be counterproductive. It would provide your critics with ammunition (both now and four years hence) and public disclosure would also make it more difficult to attain many of your goals. Moreover, in some ways any such statement is bound to be arbitrary and even simplistic—but otherwise it would have to be a book, with all the explanations, elaborations, and nuances included.

The document is not an interagency consensus statement. It was prepared, on the basis of the conceptual framework which you and I have often discussed, by Sam Huntington and myself, with NSC staff inputs. (Sam is also coordinating the PRM 10² effort.)

As of now, *you are the first consumer of this statement*. It has not been cleared with the Secretary of State nor with any other members of the Cabinet. At this stage, the document is meant only for your personal consumption. Once revised on the basis of your instructions and following a discussion with your principal advisers, it should become a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 63, Goals: Four Year: 4-7/77. Secret. Brzezinski sent the memorandum and the attached "Four-Year Foreign Policy Objectives" paper to the President under an April 29 covering memorandum, suggesting that Carter review the "objectives" paper prior to the upcoming London summit meeting. Although there is no indication that Carter saw the memorandum, in his diary entry for April 29, the President wrote: "The National Security Council staff has prepared for me what we call our international goals. This is a good framework around which to build our day-to-day decisions. I think a growing consciousness of these tangible goals will be good to bind us all together in a common effort." (*White House Diary*, p. 45) For additional information about the preparation of the "objectives" paper, see footnote 4, Document 19. Earlier versions of the April 29 memorandum are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 27, Goals/Initiatives: 4-5/77. Mondale's May 12 response to the memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 43.

² In PRM/NSC-10, issued on February 18, the President called for a comprehensive review of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities. Documentation on the PRM-10 process is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

decision paper from the top down, rather than a consensual statement filtered upwards through the bureaucracy.

This statement sets out *ten central objectives for the next four years*. It does not prescribe specific tactics but it does propose steps for the attainment of these ten central objectives, in addition to some others as well.

I believe the four year objectives—though ambitious—are realistic. In any event, they provide both stimulus and discipline for the development of specific policy choices for your decision. I should note that the second of these central objectives—that we cultivate the new “regional influentials”—is likely to be both controversial and possibly even occasionally in conflict with some of the other goals. Yet I believe that American interests and global stability require that we nourish a better relationship with these key states. Not to do so is to deprive ourselves of potentially very constructive relationships. Given the importance and sensitivity of this proposal, I attach a special annex (Tab IV),³ pertaining to these states.

Basic Concept

These ten central objectives are derived from a basic concept of what U.S. foreign policy should be at this historical stage. *I want to stress to you the importance of that concept*. A foreign policy to be effective must rest on a reasonably accurate assessment of the basic historical need. The Soviets periodically undertake a very deliberate reappraisal of their foreign policy based on the question: what is the nature of our historical phase? Has that phase changed, and—if so—what are the implications for the Soviet foreign policy? We should be similarly alert to the meaning of historical change. U.S. foreign policy in the past was relatively successful because the notions of Atlanticism and containment did correspond to the major needs of the late 40's and early 50's. Accordingly, this document is based on a unifying theme and you have to decide whether the definition of that theme—in the section called “Overall Concept”—is congenial to you.

Action

Accordingly, I would recommend: (1) that you review the document, make whatever changes you deem necessary, and give me further guidance; (2) that following further revisions in the light of your directives, the document be used as the basis for discussion with your principal advisers (such as the Secretary of State), and possibly even with top Congressional leaders (though perhaps without actual distribution); (3) that you give a comprehensive speech, maybe after the

³ Not printed.

summit, using largely the conceptual part in order to educate the public and to convey to all concerned that your various actions are part of an overall scheme (contrary to some criticisms that are now being voiced).

Even then, the document should not be distributed except perhaps at a restricted NSC meeting itself.

Please indicate whether this approach meets with your approval.⁴

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

COMMENTS

Let me also raise here the possibility that you consider using your Notre Dame University Address⁵ to develop the above approach. You might remember that I proposed a few days ago that you give a conceptual speech, attempting to integrate your overall policy, and follow it shortly thereafter by a town hall meeting specifically on foreign policy. The Notre Dame date comes roughly two weeks after the summit, and it might be a good place to summarize your basic conclusions, and then go on to deliver a more far-reaching and essentially conceptual statement on your foreign policy.⁶

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

COMMENTS

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff⁷

Washington, undated

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

Four-Year Foreign Policy Objectives

I. OVERALL CONCEPT

U.S. foreign policy can be expressed in terms of several broad purposes. Though interrelated, these purposes imply, though not rigidly, a

⁴ The President neither approved nor disapproved this option.

⁵ See Document 40.

⁶ The President neither approved nor disapproved this option.

⁷ Secret.

basic hierarchy. (At a specific level, choices are often necessary—as in the exemption of South Korea on security grounds from aid cutoff on human rights grounds).

These broad purposes are:

1. To assure the security of the United States;
2. To enhance peace by reducing international tensions and the probability of war;
3. To promote the prosperity of the United States;
4. To advance global wellbeing by creating an open, cooperative and equitable international economic order;
5. To expand fundamental human rights.

The document which follows is designed to promote all of these broad purposes, and it attempts to translate them into more specific goals in the political, economic and defense areas.

The basic conceptual frame of reference for the more specific goals is a historical perspective, which sees the United States as having to play a creative role in world affairs, in some ways similar to the role that the United States played following 1945. At that time, the United States in effect shaped a new international system, replacing the one that had collapsed during World War II. That new system then endured and worked reasonably well for the next quarter of a century or so. During much of that time, the basic concept that guided U.S. foreign policy was a combination of Atlanticism (primacy of the US-European link) and containment of the Soviet Union.

Faced in the early 70's with major world changes, the previous Republican Administration then developed a foreign policy focused primarily on a flexible balance of power, and on maneuver. It was also very pessimistic foreign policy, based on the notion that America had no permanent friends nor institutions on which it could rely, and that deeprooted trends were against us.

Your policy, as recommended here, is different. It places emphasis not so much on maneuver, but on building new structures—new relationships with friends, with adversaries, with the developing world, even with the whole world—that we hope will have a measure of permanence. It is, therefore, an optimistic policy—we hope to build a better world—not simply survive in a hostile one. *It is a policy of constructive global engagement.*

Its fundamental premise is that the U.S. needs to play today a role as constructive as the one it played after World War II, but in a vastly changed context.

The U.S. has to help in the shaping of a new international system that cannot be confined to the developed countries but must involve increasingly the entire international community of more than 150 nation states. Unlike the years 1945–50, this calls not for American dictation

but for more subtle inspiration and cooperative leadership on a much wider front. The international community, in addition to the traditional dilemmas of war and peace, now confronts global problems never before faced by mankind.

The need thus is not for a new anti-communist coalition, nor for an updated Atlanticism, nor for a policy focused only on the new nations, and certainly not for protectionism and isolationism. Rather, it requires *a broad architectural process* for an unstable world organized almost entirely on the principle of national sovereignty and yet increasingly interdependent socially and economically. In that process of widening cooperation, our relationships will have to involve varying degrees of intimacy:

1. With our closest friends in the industrial world—countries which share our values, have political systems similar to ours, and which because of their wealth have a special burden of responsibility to the rest of mankind—we will seek to deepen our collaboration;

2. With the emerging states, we will seek to develop close bilateral relations in some key cases, and to widen and to institutionalize arrangements for more genuine global cooperation;

3. With states with which we compete militarily and ideologically, we will seek through appropriate arrangements to reduce the chances of war and to codify more precise rules of reciprocal restraint.

II. TEN CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

With that basic concept as our point of departure, and in keeping with it, it is recommended that your foreign policy seek to attain during the coming four years these *central ten goals* (developed more specifically in the third part of this document):

1. To engage Western Europe, Japan and other advanced democracies in closer political cooperation through the increasing institutionalization of consultative relationships, and to promote wider macro-economic coordination pointing towards a stable and open monetary and trade system. Genuine collaboration with these states is the foundation stone of U.S. policy, and we must seek to intensify and to multiply our consultative links;

2. To weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political and, where appropriate, economic cooperation with the new emerging regional "influentials"—thereby widening, in keeping with new historical circumstances, our earlier reliance on Atlanticism or, more lately, on tri-lateralism. These regional influentials include Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Indonesia, in addition to our more traditional friends;

3. To exploit the foregoing in the development of more accommodating North-South relations, both political and economic, through

such devices as the Global Development Budget, the institutionalization of CIEC, the shaping of links between OECD and OPEC, etc.;

4. To push U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks into strategic arms reduction talks, using the foregoing as an entering wedge for a more stable U.S.-Soviet relationship. At the same time, we should seek to rebuff Soviet incursions, both by supporting our friends and by ameliorating the sources of conflict which the Soviets exploit. We should match Soviet ideological expansion by a more affirmative American posture on global human rights, while seeking consistently to make *détente* both more comprehensive and more reciprocal;

5. To normalize U.S.-Chinese relations in order to preserve the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a major stabilizing factor in the global power balance, offsetting Soviet conventional superiority and preventing the Soviet Union from concentrating its resources on a westward (Europe) or southward (Middle East, Africa) expansionary drive;

6. To obtain a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement, without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the reentry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East cannot for long be avoided, generating in turn serious consequences for Western Europe, Japan, and the United States;

7. To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa towards a biracial democracy and to forge—in connection with this process—a coalition of moderate black African leaders in order to stem continental radicalization and to eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence from the continent;

8. To restrict the level of global armaments through international agreements limiting the excessive flow of arms into the Third World (though with some consideration for goal No. 2), cooperative international restraints on nuclear proliferation, and a comprehensive test ban on nuclear testing;

9. To enhance global sensitivity to human rights through actions designed to highlight U.S. observance of such rights and through multilateral and bilateral initiatives meant to influence other governments to give higher priority to such human rights;

10. To maintain a defense posture capable of deterring the Soviet Union both on the strategic and conventional levels from hostile acts and from political pressure. This will require the U.S. to modernize, rationalize, and reconceptualize its defense posture in keeping with the broad changes in world affairs that have already been noted, to improve NATO military strength and readiness, and to develop capabilities to deter or to counter Soviet military intervention in the Third World.

It should be noted in connection with these broad objectives that the promotion of human rights is a goal that cross-cuts our relations

with the Soviet Union, the developing countries, and particularly the new regional influentials. In all these cases, our leverage should be used discreetly to advance human rights but no specific targets can be prescribed precisely.

Moreover, the point to stress is that human rights is *a broad concept*. These two words should mean much more than political liberty, the right to vote, and protection against arbitrary governmental action. Human rights, and this we should stress, means also certain basic minimum standards of social and economic existence. In effect, human rights refers to all three (political, social, and economic) and this is why these words have such universal appeal.

Such a broader, and more flexible definition would have several advantages: it would retain for us the desirable identification with a human cause whose time has come, and yet it would avoid some of the rigidities that are potential in the narrower political definition. It would give us the freedom to point at the most glaring abuses (e.g., political suppression in some countries, or total social indifference in others), though leaving us the necessary margin of flexibility in dealing with most governments. In general, we should stress that achieving human rights *is a process* and that we are watching carefully progress toward greater respect for human rights, realizing that there is no single standard for all the countries of the world.

The ten central objectives are refined and time-targeted in the pages which now follow. If approved by you, all of the specific as well as broader objectives *will become*, at appropriate times, *the subject of action directives from you*, requiring the pertinent department to submit more detailed studies and proposals for implementation.

[Omitted here are Part III: Central Objectives and Specific Steps and Part IV: Annex on Regional Influentials.]

37. Address by Secretary of State Vance¹

Athens, Georgia, April 30, 1977

Human Rights and Foreign Policy

I speak today about the resolve of this Administration to make the advancement of human rights a central part of our foreign policy.

Many here today have long been advocates of human rights within our own society. And throughout our nation that struggle for civil rights continues.

In the early years of our civil rights movement, many Americans treated the issue as a “Southern” problem. They were wrong. It was and is a problem for all of us.

Now, as a nation, we must not make a comparable mistake. Protection of human rights is a challenge for *all* countries, not just for a few.

Our human rights policy must be understood in order to be effective. So today I want to set forth the substance of that policy and the results we hope to achieve.

Our concern for human rights is built upon ancient values. It looks with hope to a world in which liberty is not just a great cause, but the common condition. In the past, it may have seemed sufficient to put our name to international documents that spoke loftily of human rights. That is not enough. We will go to work, alongside other people and governments, to protect and enhance the dignity of the individual.

Let me define what we mean by “human rights.”

First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person. Such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include denial of fair public trial and invasion of the home.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1977, pp. 505–508. Under an April 26 cover memorandum, Brzezinski sent Vance a handwritten note, dated April 26, from the President. In it, Carter wrote: “The Law Day speech is very good. I’ll do a much broader speech at Notre Dame. Good luck in Georgia. They’ll like you & the speech. J.C.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 4/77) Vance delivered the address as part of the Law Day ceremonies at the University of Georgia School of Law. The Department transmitted the text of the address in telegram 98034 to all diplomatic posts, April 30; the telegram is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 39. In his memoirs, Vance explained the purpose of his address: “I wanted to make clear the shape and substance of our human rights policy, and the fact that it was universal in application, yet flexible enough to be adapted to individual situations.” (*Hard Choices*, p. 46)

Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's economic development. But we also know that this right can be violated by a government's action or inaction—for example, through corrupt official processes which divert resources to an elite at the expense of the needy or through indifference to the plight of the poor.

Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of movement both within and outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government.

Our policy is to promote all these rights. They are all recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic document which the United States helped fashion and which the United Nations approved in 1948.² There may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve. But I believe that, with work, all of these rights can become complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The philosophy of our human rights policy is revolutionary in the intellectual sense, reflecting our nation's origin and progressive values. As Archibald MacLeish wrote during our Bicentennial a year ago: "... the cause of human liberty is now the one great revolutionary cause. ..."

President Carter put it this way in his speech before the United Nations:

All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.³

Since 1945, international practice has confirmed that a nation's obligation to respect human rights is a matter of concern in international law.

Our obligation under the United Nations Charter is written into our own legislation. For example, our Foreign Assistance Act now reads: "... a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries."⁴

² See footnote 17, Document 29.

³ See Document 29.

⁴ Reference is to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (S. 1983; P.L. 87-195; 75 Stat. 424). The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (H.R. 13680; P.L. 94-329; 90 Stat. 729), which Ford signed into law on June 30, 1976, amended the Foreign Assistance Act to include this goal.

In these ways, our policy is in keeping with our tradition, our international obligations, and our laws.

In pursuing a human rights policy, we must always keep in mind the limits of our power and of our wisdom. A sure formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values on others. A doctrinaire plan of action would be as damaging as indifference.

We must be realistic. Our country can only achieve our objectives if we shape what we do to the case at hand. In each instance, we will consider these questions as we determine whether and how to act:

1. First, we will ask ourselves, what is the nature of the case that confronts us? For example:

What kinds of violations or deprivations are there? What is their extent?

Is there a pattern to the violations? If so, is the trend toward concern for human rights or away from it?

What is the degree of control and responsibility of the government involved?

And finally, is the government willing to permit independent outside investigation?

2. A second set of questions concerns the prospects for effective action:

Will our action be useful in promoting the overall cause of human rights?

Will it actually improve the specific conditions at hand? Or will it be likely to make things worse instead?

Is the country involved receptive to our interest and efforts?

Will others work with us, including official and private international organizations dedicated to furthering human rights?

Finally, does our sense of values and decency demand that we speak out or take action anyway, even though there is only a remote chance of making our influence felt?

3. We will ask a third set of questions in order to maintain a sense of perspective:

Have we steered away from the self-righteous and strident, remembering that our own record is not unblemished?

Have we been sensitive to genuine security interests, realizing that outbreak of armed conflict or terrorism could in itself pose a serious threat to human rights?

Have we considered *all* the rights at stake? If, for instance, we reduce aid to a government which violates the political rights of its cit-

izens, do we not risk penalizing the hungry and poor, who bear no responsibility for the abuses of their government?

If we are determined to act, the means available range from quiet diplomacy in its many forms, through public pronouncements, to withholding of assistance. Whenever possible, we will use positive steps of encouragement and inducement. Our strong support will go to countries that are working to improve the human condition. We will always try to act in concert with other countries, through international bodies.

In the end, a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.

It is not our purpose to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but as the President has emphasized, no member of the United Nations can claim that violation of internationally protected human rights is solely its own affair. It is our purpose to shape our policies in accord with our beliefs and to state them without stridency or apology when we think it is desirable to do so.

Our policy is to be applied within our own society as well as abroad. We welcome constructive criticism at the same time as we offer it.

No one should suppose that we are working in a vacuum. We place great weight on joining with others in the cause of human rights.

The U.N. system is central to this cooperative endeavor. That is why the President stressed the pursuit of human rights in his speech before the General Assembly last month. That is why he is calling for U.S. ratification of four important human rights covenants and conventions and why we are trying to strengthen the human rights machinery within the United Nations.

And that is an important reason why we have moved to comply with U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. In one of our first acts, this Administration sought and achieved repeal of the Byrd amendment,⁵ which had placed us in violation of these sanctions and thus in violation of international law. We are supporting other diplomatic efforts within the United Nations to promote basic civil and political rights in Namibia and throughout southern Africa.

Regional organizations also play a central role in promoting human rights. The President has announced that the United States will sign and seek Senate approval of the American Convention on Human Rights.⁶ We will continue to work to strengthen the machinery of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This will include ef-

⁵ See footnote 10, Document 19 and footnote 5, Document 29.

⁶ See footnote 8, Document 33.

forts to schedule regular visits to all members of the Organization of American States, annual debates on human rights conditions, and the expansion of the inter-American educational program on human rights.

The United States is seeking increased consultation with other nations for joint programs on economic assistance and more general efforts to promote human rights. We are working to assure that our efforts reach out to all, with particular sensitivity to the problems of women.

We will meet in Belgrade later this year to review implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the so-called Helsinki conference. We will take this occasion to work for progress there on important human issues: family reunification, binational marriages, travel for personal and professional reasons, and freer access to information.

The United States looks to use of economic assistance—whether bilateral or through international financial institutions—as a means to foster basic human rights.

—We have proposed a 20 percent increase in U.S. foreign economic assistance for fiscal year 1978.

—We are expanding the program of the Agency for International Development for “New Initiatives in Human Rights” as a complement to present efforts to get the benefits of our aid to those most in need abroad.⁷

—The programs of the United States Information Agency and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs stress support for law in society, a free press, freedom of communication, an open educational system, and respect for ethnic diversity.

This Administration’s human rights policy has been framed in collaboration and consultation with Congress and private organizations. We have taken steps to assure firsthand contact, consultation, and observation when Members of Congress travel abroad to review human rights conditions.

We are implementing current laws that bring human rights considerations directly into our decisions in several international financial institutions. At the same time, we are working with the Congress to find the most effective way to fulfill our parallel commitment to international cooperation in economic development.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 58.

In accordance with human rights provisions of legislation governing our security assistance programs, we recently announced cuts in military aid to several countries.⁸

Outside the government, there is much that can be done. We welcome the efforts of individual American citizens and private organizations—such as religious, humanitarian, and professional groups—to work for human rights with commitments of time, money, and compassion.

All these initiatives to further human rights abroad would have a hollow ring if we were not prepared to improve our own performance at home. So we have removed all restrictions on our citizens' travel abroad and are proceeding with plans to liberalize our visa policies.

We support legislation and administrative action to expand our refugee and asylum policies and to permit more victims of repressive regimes to enter the United States. During this last year, the United States spent some \$475 million on assistance to refugees around the world, and we accepted 31,000 refugees for permanent resettlement in this country.

What results can we expect from all these efforts?

We may justifiably seek a rapid end to such gross violations as those cited in our law: "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (or) prolonged detention without charges. . . ." Just last week our Ambassador at the United Nations, Andrew Young, suggested a series of new ways to confront the practice of torture around the world.⁹

The promotion of other human rights is a broader challenge. The results may be slower in coming but are no less worth pursuing. And we intend to let other countries know where we stand.

We recognize that many nations of the world are organized on authoritarian rather than democratic principles—some large and powerful, others struggling to raise the lives of their people above bare subsistence levels. We can nourish no illusions that a call to the banner of

⁸ Presumable reference to the reduction of aid to Argentina, Ethiopia, and Uruguay; see footnote 6, Document 27.

⁹ Young presented a statement before the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on April 19, in which he spoke to three basic fears: "the fear of hunger, the fear of torture, and the fear of racism," adding that the three "are basic problems that we could attack with near-unanimity and high expectations of significant success if we agreed to focus on them as priorities." Young suggested that with regard to torture, the United Nations might consider establishing a group—under UN mandate—with the intent of investigating torture "on a worldwide basis" and staff a panel of "distinguished nonpartisan experts" who could carry out the mandate. For the text of Young's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 16, 1977, pp. 494–502. See also Kathleen Teltsch, "Young Says Criticism Will Not Deter Him," *The New York Times*, April 20, 1977, p. 3.

human rights will bring sudden transformations in authoritarian societies.

We are embarked on a long journey. But our faith in the dignity of the individual encourages us to believe that people in every society, according to their own traditions, will in time give their own expression to this fundamental aspiration.

Our belief is strengthened by the way the Helsinki principles and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights have found resonance in the hearts of people of many countries. Our task is to sustain this faith by our example and our encouragement.

In his inaugural address three months ago, President Carter said, "Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." Again, at a meeting of the Organization of American States two weeks ago, he said, "You will find this country . . . eager to stand beside those nations which respect human rights and which promote democratic ideals."

We seek these goals because they are right—and because we, too, will benefit. Our own well-being, and even our security, are enhanced in a world that shares common freedoms and in which prosperity and economic justice create the conditions for peace. And let us remember that we always risk paying a serious price when we become identified with repression.

Nations, like individuals, limit their potential when they limit their goals. The American people understand this. I am confident they will support foreign policies that reflect our traditional values. To offer less is to define America in ways we should not accept.

America fought for freedom in 1776 and in two World Wars. We have offered haven to the oppressed. Millions have come to our shores in times of trouble. In times of devastation abroad, we have shared our resources.

Our encouragement and inspiration to other nations and other peoples have never been limited to the power of our military or the bounty of our economy. They have been lifted up by the message of our Revolution, the message of individual human freedom. That message has been our great national asset in times past. So it should be again.

38. Editorial Note

On May 5, 1977, President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal departed Washington for London to attend the G-7 Economic Summit meeting, the four-nation meeting on Berlin, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting. At 9:35 a.m., Carter addressed the press assembled on the South Grounds at the White House. He outlined the scope and objectives for the meetings:

"We will have long discussions about close political interrelationships, consultations, with our closest allies and friends. We'll be dealing with problems that concern NATO, the defense of Europe, the relationships between the East and the West, among close friends and potential adversaries whom we hope to be our close friends in the future.

"I'll be having bilateral private consultations with more than a dozen leaders of foreign countries. I feel well briefed and well prepared. And my own hope is that I can well and truly represent what the American people would like to see their President do in discussing world problems with other world leaders.

"We will be pursuing our long-range goals for world peace, for nuclear disarmament, for holding down the sale of conventional weapons, for preventing the spread of the capability for nuclear explosives among nations that don't share it, for a discussion about the proper uses of energy and the sharing of world trade with others, for loans and direct aid to the less-developed countries, and the establishment of basic mechanisms by which these discussions can continue, not just at the summit level on special occasions but on a continual day-to-day interrelationship." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pages 809-810*)

On May 6, Carter traveled to Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, where he spoke to an audience at the Newcastle Civic Centre at 10:30 a.m. For his remarks, see *ibid.*, pages 811-813. That evening, Carter attended a dinner hosted by British Prime Minister James Callaghan at 10 Downing Street and took part in a question-and-answer session at Winfield House. In response to a question as to the special interest the United States would bring to the summit discussions, Carter answered: "Well, we're quite concerned about human rights, nonproliferation questions, and the control of the sale or reduction of the sale of conventional—nuclear weapons, and we want to join with our friends from Japan and the European Community in working out a reasonable approach to stabilizing the world economy." (*Ibid.*, p. 814)

The Economic Summit meeting took place in London May 7-8 at 10 Downing Street. Participants in addition to Carter included Calla-

ghan, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau of Canada, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy, and Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan. Documentation on the summit meeting, including the minutes of the sessions, is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy. Related documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control, and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe. The text of the Downing Street Summit Conference declaration and its annex, issued on May 8, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pages 819–824. In the declaration, the leaders pledged to create additional jobs while reducing inflation, undertake stated economic growth targets or stabilization policies, seek additional resources for the International Monetary Fund, expand opportunities for trade to strengthen the international trading system, conserve energy while reducing nuclear proliferation, and achieve a successful end to the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. For Carter's remarks following the reading of the joint declaration on May 8, see *ibid.*, pages 825–826.

On May 9, Carter met with Giscard, Schmidt, and Callaghan at 10 Downing Street to review questions relating to the status of Berlin. Although no record of the meeting has been found, the four leaders, at the conclusion of the meeting, released the text of a "Joint Declaration on Berlin." The text is printed *ibid.*, pages 840–841. Following the conclusion of the four-party meeting, Carter departed for Geneva to meet with Syrian President Asad before returning to London that evening. For Carter's remarks upon arrival at Geneva, see *ibid.*, pages 841–842. For the text of Carter and Asad's exchange of remarks preceding their meeting, see *ibid.*, pages 842–844. For the memorandum of conversation of the Carter–Asad meeting, which took place at the Intercontinental Hotel, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 32.

Carter and Vance attended the sessions of the North Atlantic Council meeting on May 10. During the morning session, which began at 11 a.m. in the Long Gallery at Lancaster House, Carter addressed the participants. After brief introductory remarks, Carter underscored the importance of relations among the industrial democracies in light of potential military and political challenges of the upcoming decade:

"At the center of this effort must be strong ties between Europe and North America. In maintaining and strengthening these ties, my administration will be guided by certain principles. Simply stated:

"—We will continue to make the Alliance the heart of our foreign policy.

"—We will remain a reliable and faithful ally.

“—We will join with you to strengthen the Alliance—politically, economically, and militarily.

“—We will ask for and listen to the advice of our allies. And we will give our views in return, candidly and as friends.

“This effort rests on a strong foundation. The state of the Alliance is good. Its strategy and doctrine are solid. We derive added strength and new pride from the fact that all 15 of our member countries are now democracies. Our alliance is a pact for peace *and* a pact for freedom.

“The Alliance is even stronger because of solid progress toward Western European unification and the expanding role of the European Community in world affairs. The United States welcomes this development and will work closely with the Community.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, page 849*)

Carter devoted the remainder of his remarks to outlining the areas of cooperation in political and defense matters. He underscored the complexity of East-West relations, adding that the approach to this relationship “must be guided both by a humane vision and by a sense of history. Our humane vision leads us to seek broad cooperation with Communist states for the good of mankind. Our sense of history teaches us that we and the Soviet Union will continue to compete. Yet if we manage this dual relationship properly, we can hope that cooperation will eventually overshadow competition, leading to an increasingly stable relationship between our countries and the Soviet Union.” (*Ibid.*) The President listed arms control, arms limitation, and human rights as areas for cooperation with the Soviet Union, recognizing that any success in these areas depended upon close consultation with the NATO members. He also proposed that the Council undertake a review of East-West relations that might assess future trends and implications. Turning to defense matters, Carter stressed: “Achieving our political goals depends on a credible defense and deterrent. The United States supports the existing strategy of flexible response and forward defense. We will continue to provide our share of the powerful forces adequate to fulfill this strategy. We will maintain an effective strategic deterrent, we will keep diverse and modern theatre nuclear forces in Europe, and we will maintain and improve conventional forces based here.” (*Ibid.*, page 850) He underscored cooperation in this area, as well, notably in the “development, production, and procurement of Alliance defense equipment.” (*Ibid.*, page 851) He reiterated these themes in his closing statement:

“To conclude:

“It is not enough for us to share common purposes; we must also strengthen the institutions that fulfill those purposes. We are met today to renew our dedication to one of the most important of those institu-

tions and to plan for actions that will help it to meet new challenges. Some of these actions can be taken in the near future. Others can be developed for review at our meeting next year at this time. I would be glad to offer Washington as the site of that meeting.

“The French writer and aviator, Saint-Exupéry, wrote that ‘the noblest task of mankind is to unite mankind.’ In that spirit, I am confident that we will succeed.” (Ibid., page 852)

The President provided a summation of his entire visit during remarks to news correspondents on May 10. In reference to that morning’s address, Carter commented:

“I think as far as the NATO meeting was concerned, most of the nations were relieved to know that the reluctance on the part of the United States 3 or 4 years ago to participate fully in NATO is now past, that we are a full partner, that our financial commitment to conventional forces in NATO are stronger than they were before. And I think that if they carry out the suggestions that I made this morning—and they were adopted unanimously—to do an analysis of NATO for the 1980s, to do a complete analysis of the relationship between the Western democratic societies and the Eastern Communist societies, and also to share the benefits of NATO as far as the purchase of equipment and so forth is concerned—these, of course, will be made back in Washington next year for the next NATO summit meeting.” (Ibid.)

The text of the NATO communiqué, released at the conclusion of the meeting on May 11, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1977, pages 601–602. Carter’s statement upon his return to Washington, made at a May 12 news conference, is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, page 860.

39. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 16, 1977, 3:15–4:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
BETWEEN DR. BRZEZINSKI AND LEADERS
OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY

PARTICIPANTS

Alexander Schindler
Melvin Dubinsky
Israel Miller
Jacob Sheinkman
Arthur Hertzberg
Herman Rosenbaum
Max Fisher
Richard Maass
Jerold Hoffberger
Arthur Levine
Yehuda Hellman
Ed Sanders
Mrs. Bernice S. Tannenbaum
Joe Sternstein
Harry Smith

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Robert Lipshutz
Stuart Eizenstat
Joyce Starr
William B. Quandt

Rabbi Schindler opened the discussion by noting that the crisis over arms supply had now abated,² but that apprehension continued in the American Jewish community concerning a possible peace plan that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 47, Chron: 5/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Quandt forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under a May 18 memorandum, recommending that Brzezinski send a copy of the memorandum to the Department of State. Brzezinski indicated his disapproval of the recommendation. Notations indicate that a copy of the May 16 memorandum was forwarded to the President for information on May 19 at 5 p.m. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 34.

² Reference is to Israeli concern over a pending administration measure concerning future arms sales (PD/NSC–13; see footnote 5, Document 40) that did not initially include Israel in a category of nations able to procure advanced weaponry. However, the President, on May 12, asserted that the United States had “ ‘special security responsibilities’ ” to Israel and that the Government of Israel would be able to purchase the advanced weapons. (“Carter Pledges ‘Special Treatment’ for Israel on Advanced Weapons,” *The New York Times*, May 13, 1977, p. 3)

the Administration would present at some point, combined with pressure to implement it. This plan, he believes, would consist of calling for peace in return for substantially complete Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank, which would be headed by the PLO. He asked for reassurances that this was not American governmental thinking.

Dr. Brzezinski replied that it was natural that some apprehensions exist at a time when we stand on the threshold of possibly important historical developments. In his view, the question of Israel's ability to survive as a strong and independent country, and the issue of whether the United States would support Israel, have been settled. The question is now whether Israel's permanence can be translated into a lasting peace. The kind of peace, and how it might be implemented, and the consequences that would follow from peace, must now be considered carefully. Peace, as difficult as it may be to achieve, will be much better than the continuing stalemate without peace. Israel's role, he noted, would be absolutely essential. In a peaceful Middle East, Israel could become the Switzerland of the Middle East. One needs to consider the trade-off between peace and stalemate. Stalemate runs the risk of war, continuing high military expenditures, and dependency on the United States. Movement toward peace can help to allay some of the concerns that now exist. The President feels that our relationship with Israel is a unique one and that it has spiritual and organic qualities.

On the question of whether the United States has a plan, if by that one means a blueprint that we are preparing to impose on the parties, the answer, Dr. Brzezinski stated, is an unequivocal "No." If by plan one means some concept of a peace settlement, the answer is "Yes." Our concept is based on a historical vision of how the conflict can be resolved and the President has spoken openly of this, as did Prime Minister Rabin when he was here.³ We have been thinking in terms of a meaningful peace, of establishing a framework for negotiations, and we have identified and repeated that negotiations will have to deal with the nature of peace, territory and security, and the Palestinian question. We have talked to Israeli and Arab leaders on these issues, pressing the Arabs to be more explicit on peace and the Israelis to be more explicit on territory and the Palestinians. That is where we are today. We hope that we can find some areas of complementarity and that we will then be able to prepare for a Geneva Conference. We cannot be certain of success, but it is an act of historical obligation to try to think constructively about a settlement. The parties themselves,

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 18–20.

however, will have to negotiate the final settlement, but we are trying to get them to think about the issues clearly.

Mr. Hertzberg noted that the American-Jewish leadership does not favor immobilism. All agree on the need for peace, and the President's statements that peace must be real have been viewed in a very positive way. The concern in the American Jewish community stems from the statement that the United States is asking Israel to be more explicit on the Palestinians and on territory. There is concern about the idea of a Palestinian entity which might be led by the PLO. The United States should not be the party to decide on such a state, but rather should try to end the conflict in a way that will be stable.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that one should not conclude that our preference is for a PLO-dominated state. Since we have no plan, we cannot define precisely how the Palestinian issue might be resolved, but we have some preferences that the West Bank and Jordan be linked. The question is how to get there. Should the United States push for this outcome, or should Israel dictate it, or should the Arabs themselves reach this conclusion? Clearly, the last is the best outcome. Arab views seem to be more realistic and Arab leaders recognize that a volatile situation in the West Bank is not in their interests. The facts of the situation are forcing the Arabs to think realistically. Dr. Brzezinski stated that his personal view is that a situation should not be imposed on the Palestinians, which they would reject and then turn to the Soviet Union. It would be better to have an Arab consensus on an outcome that Palestinian moderates could accept. The present Arab leadership is the most moderate that has existed since 1947.

In response to a question, Dr. Brzezinski noted that the American objective now is to establish a framework within which the parties will be able to deal with the issues. The President's statements have not resolved issues yet, but they have begun a probing of the issues. His use of words has been cautious and he has not prejudged outcomes, but he has tried to clarify underlying issues. Once the parties get to the negotiating table, we hope that the negotiations will not break down. There has to be an understood basis for negotiation, and this is the reason for developing the conceptual framework. He noted that the United States will not try to develop a blueprint, nor will it threaten Israel with the question of its survival, but we will talk frankly and honestly with Israel, and we will say the same thing to both Israel and the Arabs.

Responding to a comment on defensible borders, Dr. Brzezinski noted that he did not personally use that term. Israel has good defense lines today, but they are not borders. The borders of the final peace settlement, if they are recognized, will not be defensible in the same sense that they are today, but if Israel retains the current lines that she now occupies, these will never become recognized borders. So defensible

borders in any simple sense do not make much sense. Instead, one must try to think about what borders might be recognized and what recognition would be worth, combined with other arrangements for security that might be made. In the age of nationalism, he noted, territory is integrally tied to the sense of nationhood. Only Germany has accepted major territorial losses, and that was in context of total defeat and a recognition of guilt that went with the defeat. This is not the case with the Arabs, and we cannot expect them to abandon their claims to substantial amounts of their territory. Instead of referring to defensible borders, we should talk of mutually accepted borders, legitimacy, and should try to develop arrangements to support the agreements which will provide for fool-proof security. The President has been hinting at this. Security arrangements for Israel might include a binding US commitment. Israel is not totally independent and if Israel must be dependent, it might be best to make the US tie to Israel a binding one. One way would be through treaties.

A question was then raised concerning American arms supply, and Dr. Brzezinski said that it was difficult to be specific. He argued against the notion that the Defense Department was deliberately obstructive, citing the recent case of the Chariot tank where allegations of obstruction had not been well founded.⁴ On the question of the co-production of the F-16, he declined to answer, stating that this would have to be dealt with in the broad framework that the President has tried to set out whereby our policy aims at gaining the confidence of Israelis and Arabs, while, at the same time, trying on a global basis for arms reductions.

Mr. Fisher remarked that he hoped the United States would ask for more than moderation in words from the Arabs and that we would also look for moderation in terms of their action toward Israel. Dr. Brzezinski responded by acknowledging that Arab culture seems to favor some verbal exaggeration, and that on occasion Arab leaders seem to tell different things to different audiences. We are trying, however, to move the Arabs to take binding public positions from which they find it difficult to retreat. Concerning Arab intentions, Dr. Brzezinski noted that some Arabs may still hope that Israel can ultimately be destroyed in a second phase to follow a peace agreement. We will therefore insist on more than verbal assurances of their intentions, and will demand that objective barriers be created to make the second phase, if that is

⁴ Reference is to a front-engineered, 56-ton tank known as the Merkava or Chariot in English. ("Israel Reports a Tank With Armor That Can Withstand Any Arab Shell," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1977, p. 10) On May 13, *The New York Times* indicated that the President "reportedly approved an Israeli request to import American engine parts" to manufacture the tank. ("Carter Pledges 'Special Treatment' for Israel on Advanced Weapons," *The New York Times*, p. 3)

their intention, an impossibility. We want to make phase two an impossibility and phase one so attractive that they will commit themselves to it.

Dr. Brzezinski agreed to a statement that Rabbi Schindler could use with the press to describe the Administration's attitude. The agreed statement is as follows:

"We had a comprehensive discussion of the Middle East situation, including US-Israel relations, in the course of which Dr. Brzezinski reaffirmed the Administration's underlying commitment to the security of Israel, and particularly to the special and organic relationship that binds the United States to Israel. He further noted that the Administration's statements on the questions of territory, the Palestinians, and peace do not represent a blueprint to be imposed, but rather are a conceptual framework within which the parties can negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict."

40. Address by President Carter¹

South Bend, Indiana, May 22, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

To Father Hesburgh and the great faculty of Notre Dame, to those who have been honored this afternoon with the degree from your great university,

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 954–962. The President spoke at 3:25 p.m. at the commencement exercises at the University of Notre Dame Athletic and Convocation Center. Father Hesburgh conferred an honorary doctor of laws degree on the President and then offered opening remarks. On March 18, Hesburgh had sent Carter a memorandum congratulating him on the United Nations address (see Document 29) and noting that the Overseas Development Council, which Hesburgh chaired, planned to release *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977*, the fifth in the ODC's annual assessments of the relationship between the United States and the developing world. Hesburgh commented that the report might prove useful in Carter's elucidation of the "basic human needs" strategy as referenced in the United Nations address. Carter sent Hesburgh's memorandum to Eizenstat and Fallows under a March 28 handwritten note: "Begin working on a Notre Dame speech outline for May—use 'Human Rights' in its broadest sense. This ODC report is good basis for ideas. J.C." (Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 1, Notre Dame Speech 5–22–77) Additional materials regarding the speech preparation are *ibid.* According to the minutes of the May 23 Cabinet meeting, Brzezinski "commended the White House speech writers and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher for their work preparing the President's Notre Dame speech. He said that the speech reflects an ongoing effort to reassert the moral and political leadership of the United States—perhaps for the first time in fifteen years." (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 18, Cabinet Minutes, 1–5/77)

to the graduate and undergraduate group who, I understand, is the largest in the history of this great institution, friends and parents:

[Omitted here are the President's introductory remarks in which he referenced his honorary degree and praised Father Hesburgh for his commitment to civil rights and human rights. He also acknowledged the other honorary degree recipients and their support for human rights.]

Last week, I spoke in California about the domestic agenda for our Nation: to provide more efficiently for the needs of our people, to demonstrate—against the dark faith of our times—that our Government can be both competent and more humane.²

But I want to speak to you today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people both support and, for a change, know about and understand.

I have a quiet confidence in our own political system. Because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their people.

We are confident that democracy's example will be compelling, and so we seek to bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life.

We are confident that the democratic methods are the most effective, and so we are not tempted to employ improper tactics here at home or abroad.

We are confident of our own strength, so we can seek substantial mutual reductions in the nuclear arms race.

And we are confident of the good sense of American people, and so we let them share in the process of making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with the voices of 215 million, and not just of an isolated handful.

² On May 17, the President flew to Los Angeles, California, to attend the annual national convention of the United Auto Workers of America (UAW), held at the Los Angeles Convention Center. At the convention, he announced that Woodcock would serve as his representative to the People's Republic of China. (Carter, *White House Diary*, p. 53) Carter then went to the television studios of KNXT-TV, where he participated in a televised question-and-answer session with a live studio audience and persons stationed at five shopping centers in the Los Angeles area. At the conclusion of the broadcast, Carter departed for the airport and flew to Fresno to survey the effects of the California drought. His motorcade drove to Reedley, where he participated in a walking tour of the Kryder Farm and Silva Ranch. Carter's remarks at the UAW convention, during the studio broadcast, and at the farm and ranch are printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 887–894, 895–914, and 917–921.

Democracy's great recent successes—in India, Portugal, Spain, Greece—show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced. Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I'm glad that that's being changed.

For too many years, we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.

By the measure of history, our Nation's 200 years are very brief, and our rise to world eminence is briefer still. It dates from 1945, when Europe and the old international order lay in ruins. Before then, America was largely on the periphery of world affairs. But since then, we have inescapably been at the center of world affairs.

Our policy during this period was guided by two principles: a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but that it must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.

The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.

In less than a generation, we've seen the world change dramatically. The daily lives and aspirations of most human beings have been transformed. Colonialism is nearly gone. A new sense of national identity now exists in almost 100 new countries that have been formed in the last generation. Knowledge has become more widespread. Aspirations are higher. As more people have been freed from traditional constraints, more have been determined to achieve, for the first time in their lives, social justice.

The world is still divided by ideological disputes, dominated by regional conflicts, and threatened by danger that we will not resolve the differences of race and wealth without violence or without drawing into combat the major military powers. We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.

It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.

We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world.

We can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue—confidently—our efforts to inspire, to persuade, and to lead.

Our policy must reflect our belief that the world can hope for more than simple survival and our belief that dignity and freedom are fundamental spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an international system that will last longer than secret deals.

We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must be open; it must be candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement, resting on five cardinal principles.

I've tried to make these premises clear to the American people since last January. Let me review what we have been doing and discuss what we intend to do.

First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has even seen. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our Nation stands for more than financial prosperity.

This does not mean that we can conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and which will always be imperfect—a world that is complex and confused and which will always be complex and confused.

I understand fully the limits of moral suasion. We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In our own history, that power has ranged from Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream."

In the life of the human spirit, words *are* action, much more so than many of us may realize who live in countries where freedom of expression is taken for granted. The leaders of totalitarian nations understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.

Nonetheless, we can already see dramatic, worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state.

For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain the moral stature that we once had.

The great democracies are not free because we are strong and prosperous. I believe we are strong and influential and prosperous because we are free.

Throughout the world today, in free nations and in totalitarian countries as well, there is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights. And I believe it is incumbent on us in this country to keep that discussion, that debate, that contention alive. No other country is as well-qualified as we to set an example. We have our own shortcomings and faults, and we should strive constantly and with courage to make sure that we are legitimately proud of what we have.

Second, we've moved deliberately to reinforce the bonds among our democracies. In our recent meetings in London, we agreed to widen our economic cooperation, to promote free trade, to strengthen the world's monetary system, to seek ways of avoiding nuclear proliferation.³ We prepared constructive proposals for the forthcoming meetings on North-South problems of poverty, development, and global well-being. And we agreed on joint efforts to reinforce and to modernize our common defense.

You may be interested in knowing that at this NATO meeting, for the first time in more than 25 years, all members are democracies. Even more important, all of us reaffirmed our basic optimism in the future of the democratic system. Our spirit of confidence is spreading. Together, our democracies can help to shape the wider architecture of global cooperation.

Third, we've moved to engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the strategic arms race. This race is not only dangerous, it's morally deplorable. We must put an end to it.

I know it will not be easy to reach agreements. Our goal is to be fair to both sides, to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security. We desire a freeze on further modernization and production of weapons and a continuing, substantial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as well. We want a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, a prohibition against all chemical warfare, no attack capability against space satellites, and arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

We hope that we can take joint steps with all nations toward a final agreement eliminating nuclear weapons completely from our arsenals of death. We will persist in this effort.

³ See Document 38.

Now, I believe in détente with the Soviet Union. To me it means progress toward peace. But the effects of détente should not be limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola.

Cooperation also implies obligation. We hope that the Soviet Union will join with us and other nations in playing a larger role in aiding the developing world, for common aid efforts will help us build a bridge of mutual confidence in one another.

Fourth, we are taking deliberate steps to improve the chances of lasting peace in the Middle East. Through wide-ranging consultation with leaders of the countries involved—Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—we have found some areas of agreement and some movement toward consensus. The negotiations must continue.

Through my own public comments, I've also tried to suggest a more flexible framework for the discussion of the three key issues which have so far been so intractable: the nature of a comprehensive peace—what is peace; what does it mean to the Israelis; what does it mean to their Arab neighbors; secondly, the relationship between security and borders—how can the dispute over border delineations be established and settled with a feeling of security on both sides; and the issue of the Palestinian homeland.

The historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it's derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search for permanent peace.

We will continue to promote a settlement which all of us need. Our own policy will not be affected by changes in leadership in any of the countries in the Middle East. Therefore, we expect Israel and her neighbors to continue to be bound by United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338,⁴ which they have previously accepted.

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean disaster not only for the Middle East but, perhaps, for the international political and economic order as well.

⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, affirmed that the fulfillment of the UN Charter required the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. UN Security Council Resolution 338, adopted in October 1973, called for negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria aimed toward establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

And fifth, we are attempting, even at the risk of some friction with our friends, to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation and the worldwide spread of conventional weapons.

At the recent summit, we set in motion an international effort to determine the best ways of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful use while reducing the risks that its products will be diverted to the making of explosives.

We've already completed a comprehensive review of our own policy on arms transfers.⁵ Competition in arms sales is inimical to peace and destructive of the economic development of the poorer countries.

We will, as a matter of national policy now in our country, seek to reduce the annual dollar volume of arms sales, to restrict the transfer of advanced weapons, and to reduce the extent of our coproduction arrangements about weapons with foreign states. And just as important, we are trying to get other nations, both free and otherwise, to join us in this effort.

But all of this that I've described is just the beginning. It's a beginning aimed towards a clear goal: to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and rapidly changing historical circumstances.

We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We need their friendship and cooperation in a common effort as the structure of world power changes.

More than 100 years ago, Abraham Lincoln said that our Nation could not exist half slave and half free.⁶ We know a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds hungry.

Most nations share our faith that, in the long run, expanded and equitable trade will best help the developing countries to help themselves. But the immediate problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and repression are here now.

⁵ References are to PRM/NSC-12, issued on January 26, which called for a review of U.S. policy regarding the international transfer of conventional arms and PD/NSC-13, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," issued on May 13, which outlined the implementation of the administration's policy of conventional arms restraint. PRM/NSC-12 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control. PD/NSC-13 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 33. For the President's May 19 statement regarding PD/NSC-13, in which he indicated that the United States would now perceive arms transfers as an "exceptional foreign policy implement," see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 931-932. See also *Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, pp. 40-41.

⁶ Reference is to Lincoln's "House Divided" speech, which he delivered in Springfield, Illinois in June 1858, upon accepting the Illinois Republican Party's nomination for the Illinois U.S. Senate seat. Lincoln subsequently lost the election to the incumbent, Democrat Stephen Douglas.

The Western democracies, the OPEC nations, and the developed Communist countries can cooperate through existing international institutions in providing more effective aid. This is an excellent alternative to war.

We have a special need for cooperation and consultation with other nations in this hemisphere—to the north and to the south. We do not need another slogan. Although these are our close friends and neighbors, our links with them are the same links of equality that we forge for the rest of the world. We will be dealing with them as part of a new, worldwide mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations.

It's important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. We see the American and Chinese relationship as a central element of our global policy and China as a key force for global peace. We wish to cooperate closely with the creative Chinese people on the problems that confront all mankind. And we hope to find a formula which can bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us.

Finally, let me say that we are committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in southern Africa. The time has come for the principle of majority rule to be the basis for political order, recognizing that in a democratic system the rights of the minority must also be protected.

To be peaceful, change must come promptly. The United States is determined to work together with our European allies and with the concerned African States to shape a congenial international framework for the rapid and progressive transformation of southern African society and to help protect it from unwarranted outside interference.

Let me conclude by summarizing: Our policy is based on an historical vision of America's role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind. And it is a policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.

Thank you.

41. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, May 24, 1977

These are the paragraphs which I hope you will find helpful. They are designed to accomplish three purposes:

1. Continue the President's Notre Dame theme of combining a vision of America's international role with the realities of a novel international system;²

2. Establish an agenda for U.S. and OECD activity on North-South issues over the next year which, without hiding the difficulties of the concept, examines and develops a set of proposals around the theme of basic human needs; and

3. Establishes that this theme will be a major element in the continuing North-South dialogue post CIEC³ for constructive and legitimate reasons—not for tactical reasons of “splitting” the Group of 77.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff⁴

Washington, undated

As the Administration of President Carter has reviewed the major issues currently on the North-South agenda and begun to establish its own set of priorities, it has found one issue slighted in all the talk about a new international economic order. The issue has various names: the “absolute poverty” problem, the problem of “basic human needs,” the problem of “the forgotten forty percent.” Whatever we choose to call it, it is the problem of those one billion persons living at the razor's edge of existence. Again, as President Carter noted at Notre Dame, most na-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 122, Vance, Miscellaneous Communications with: 5/77. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned copy. There is no indication that Vance saw the memorandum.

² See Document 40.

³ Vance attended the final CIEC ministerial meeting in Paris May 30–June 3. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 265. For Vance's May 30 address to the CIEC, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 20, 1977, pp. 645–648.

⁴ No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.

tions share our faith that, in the longer run, expanded trade will best help developing countries to help themselves. But the immediate problems of hunger, disease, high infant mortality, illiteracy and stunted “life chances” *cannot* and *should not* be expected to await a longer-run answer.

If our nations did not have the knowledge and the resources needed to overcome these problems of meeting basic human needs within the next two decades, perhaps we could excuse ourselves from making any special effort to overcome the so-called “absolute poverty” problem.

But the knowledge of the development process and the knowledge of how to construct a viable approach to the resolution of this acute poverty problem is now within our grasp. What is missing is the joint willingness of developed and developing countries to recognize that the North-South dialogue is about *human beings* as well as nation-states, and that “equality of opportunity” for a richer and more meaningful life only makes sense as it applies to *people*.

In order to give proper focus to this aspect of the North-South dialogue, the United States proposes to proceed as follows. First, we, ourselves, will develop specific programs to overcome the absolute poverty problem globally. We have already determined the essential ingredients and objectives of such a program. It must deal with:

- Basic education, particularly in rural areas;
- Essential health services, again with emphasis on rural areas;
- increased food production and the provision of adequate nutrition;
- clean water.

At the June meeting of the OECD, we plan to ask the member countries to jointly cooperate with us in developing these programs as a principal part of the OECD’s general work program.⁵

Within a year, we would hope to be able to present to the developing countries a major set of programs for discussion. Our objective would be then to develop a joint effort that will effectively tackle the problem of meeting the basic human needs of the world’s poorest billion people. We recognize that this effort will require a substantial commitment of political will and resources on the part of all countries who choose to participate—North and South; developing and developed.

To carry this out and to conduct the North-South dialogue, we believe that serious consideration should be given to developing appro-

⁵ The Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development was scheduled to meet in Paris June 23–24; for the text of Vance’s intervention at the meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 25, 1977, pp. 105–109.

priate institutional arrangements for the North-South dialogue to continue. The United States believes that CIEC, itself, should continue to be available as a forum for such discussions. In the interim, we would suggest that our governments establish a group of recognized experts to monitor the implementation of the ideas being discussed here and to keep our governments abreast of the opportunities for further cooperation. As a part of this effort, the experts might prepare for the North-South discussions which we hope will come about by developing an overall program to meet basic needs.

42. Paper Prepared by the President's Assistant (Jordan)¹

Washington, June 1977

[Omitted here are the title page and the table of contents.]

REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

Because you have chosen to be active in many areas of foreign policy during your first year in office, there will evolve in the near future a number of critical decisions that will have to be made. And each of these decisions will be difficult politically and will have domestic implications that will require the support and understanding of the American people and the Congress.

The most significant of these decisions relate to specific countries and/or areas of the world. As best I can determine, those decisions which will require action on our part and/or the political support of the people and Congress are:

- The Middle East
- SALT II
- AFRICA
- Normalization of relations with Cuba and Vietnam
- Treaty with Panama
- Withdrawal of troops from Korea²

¹ Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan's Confidential Files, Container 34, Foreign Policy—Domestic Politics Memo—Hamilton Jordan Memo, 6/77. Confidential; Eyes Only. Jordan sent the paper to the President under an undated cover memorandum in which he explained that he attempted "to measure the domestic political implications of your foreign policy and outline a comprehensive approach for winning public and Congressional support for specific foreign policy initiatives."

² The President underlined the topics in each point.

It is my own contention that this confluence of foreign policy initiatives and decisions will require a comprehensive and well coordinated domestic political strategy if our policies are to gain the understanding and support of the American people and the Congress.

It is important that we understand the political dimensions of the challenges we face on these specific issues:

1. *There is a limited public understanding of most foreign policy issues.* This is certainly the case with SALT II and the Middle East. This is not altogether bad as it provides us an opportunity to present these issues to the public in a politically advantageous way. At the same time, most of these issues assume a simplistic political coloration. If you favor normalization of relations with Cuba or Vietnam, you are a “liberal”; if you oppose normalization with these same countries, you are “conservative”.

2. *To the extent that the issues we are dealing with have a “liberal” or “conservative” connotation, our position on these particular issues is consistently “liberal”.* We must do what we can to present these issues to the public in a non-ideological way and not allow them to undermine your own image as a moderate-conservative.³

3. *Congressional support in some form is needed to accomplish most of your foreign policy objectives.* A modest amount of time invested in consultation with key members of Congress will go a long way toward winning the support of Congress on many issues. Whereas members of Congress do not mind—and sometimes relish—a confrontation with the President on some local project or matter of obvious direct benefit to their district or state, very few wish to differ publicly with the President on a foreign policy matter.

4. *We have very little control over the schedule and time-frame in which most of these foreign policy issues will be resolved.* Consequently, a continuing problem and challenge will be to attempt to separate out the key foreign policy issues from domestic programs so the two will not become politically entwined in the Congress. This dictates a continuing focus on the historical bipartisan nature of U.S. foreign policy so the Republican members of Congress will be less tempted to demagogue these issues during the 1978 elections.

5. *Conservatives are much better organized than liberals and will generally oppose our foreign policy initiatives.* To effectively counter conservative opposition, we will have to take the initiative in providing coordination of our resources and political leadership. Our resources at present are considerable, but they are scattered among a variety of

³ Immediately following this point, the President wrote: “To challenge Soviets for influence is ‘conservative.’”

groups and institutions. To the extent our policy goals are being pursued, they are being pursued unilaterally by groups and people and without coordination. The very fact that your administration is active simultaneously in many areas of foreign policy dictates a comprehensive, long-range political strategy for winning the support of the American people and the Congress. To accomplish this goal, I would recommend a three step process:

I. *CONSULTATION*. Early consultation with Congress and interested/affected constituent groups is critical to the political success of these policies. In almost every instance, Senate ratification of a treaty and/or military and economic support which requires the support of Congress will be required to accomplish these foreign policy objectives. Consequently, it is important that we invest a small amount of time on a continuing basis in consultation with members of Congress and groups/organizations.⁴

II. *PUBLIC EDUCATION*. Public understanding of most of these issues is very limited. To the extent these issues are understood and/or perceived by the general public, they are viewed in very simplistic terms. This is a mixed blessing. On one hand, it becomes necessary to explain complex issues to the American people. On the other hand, because these issues are not well understood, a tremendous opportunity exists to educate the public to a certain point of view. In the final analysis, I suspect that we could demonstrate a direct correlation between the trust the American people have for their President and the degree to which they are willing to trust that President's judgement on complex issues of foreign policy.

In terms of public education, we have a tremendous number of resources. They include:

- Fireside chats
- Town meetings
- Speaking opportunities for President, Vice-President, First Family, Cabinet, etc.
- Public service media opportunities
- Groups outside government who support particular policies
- Democratic National Committee
- Mailing lists
- Etc.

III. *POLITICAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION*. Once foreign policy goals are established, it is critical that political strategies in support of those goals be developed and implemented. And it is important that the resources available to the Administration—both inside and

⁴ Following this paragraph, the President wrote: "Meeting this week." The meeting is not further identified.

outside of government—be coordinated and used in a way that is supportive of these objectives.

I have attempted in this memorandum to outline the first step in this process—consultation—as relates to foreign policy generally and the Middle East specifically. Steps II and III—public education and political planning and coordination—are the subject of a separate memorandum.

[Omitted here are Section A: “Consultation with Congress on Foreign Policy Initiatives,” Section B: “The Role of the American Jewish Community in the Middle East,” and the Summary of Recommendations.]

43. Editorial Note

On June 6, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance addressed the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in order to discuss the administration’s approach to the forthcoming CSCE Review Conference, scheduled to take place in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in October 1977. Vance asserted that he wanted to underline the “continuing importance” the Carter administration placed on the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (see footnote 7, Document 4):

“You are fully aware of this Administration’s interest in promoting more stable and mutually beneficial relations between the peoples of East and West. The Helsinki Final Act provides one framework for such cooperation.

“You are also aware of our commitment to honor and promote the rights of individuals, the human rights of all peoples, no matter what their political or social origins and affiliations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has provided a multilateral mechanism through which to pursue these aims.”

After praising the continued cooperation between the executive and legislative branches concerning the multiple issues related to the Helsinki Accords, Vance then stated the administration’s objectives for the upcoming meeting:

“—We seek full implementation of all the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act. None can be called more binding, more vital, than others. All three of the so-called baskets are important.

“—We seek incremental improvements in relations between East and West on all the fronts surveyed at Helsinki: political, economic, scientific, cultural, security, and humanitarian.

“—We seek to move forward on all these fronts simultaneously: the freer flow of people and ideas is as important to long-term security and cooperation as, for example, advance notice of major military maneuvers; the humanitarian pledges at Helsinki are as important as, say, the promises of greater commercial cooperation.

“—There will be consideration of new proposals. But we must not be diverted from assessment of how fully the specific undertakings of Helsinki have been carried out by all the signatories.”

Vance referenced the ambitiousness of the agenda, conceding that differences in “understanding and priority” might exist among participants. Although discussion of differences would be desirable, he asserted that such discussions could not “serve as a diversion or a cloak for inaction” in terms of reviewing progress made and anticipating subsequent implementation of other goals. He then continued:

“At Belgrade we will assess on the spot how best to be effective and persuasive in pursuing our objectives. Between public diplomacy and quiet diplomacy, we will strive for maximum practical impact. We will avoid grandiose new proposals that have little chance of being acceptable. Propaganda ploys, debating points have no place in our strategy. We will state our goals and our assessments clearly, without polemics. It would serve no one’s interests if such serious and far-reaching questions were dealt with in anything other than a serious and straightforward manner.”

Vance concluded his remarks by noting that the administration’s report on the implementation of the Final Act, a copy of which he had provided to the Commission, detailed and assessed the steps the United States had taken. He underscored the reality that no nation’s record “is perfect,” and added that the United States would accept “constructive criticism” of its own policy. Referencing his April 30 Law Day address, which he delivered at the University of Georgia (see Document 37), Vance stated that action in the cause of human rights “is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.” He concluded:

“So it will be in our decisions about working for implementation of the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act, those dealing with our political, economic, and military relations, as well as those affecting human rights.

“Respect for the undertakings solemnly accepted at CSCE is an effort to which our government is firmly committed, in the full knowledge that the pursuit of security and cooperation in Europe poses a test of our perseverance as much as of our ideals. I am confident that we will, together, persevere.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 27, 1977, pages 669–670)

44. Address by Vice President Mondale¹

San Francisco, California, June 17, 1977

A Framework for Middle East Peace: Shaping A More Stable World

In the last several months, I've undertaken two extended foreign trips on behalf of the President to Europe and Japan.² The more I travel, and the more nations I visit, the more I come to believe that the peoples of the world are not really so different—that all of us dream the same dreams for our children and that the real key to peace and cooperation in the world lies in better understanding between people. Diplomats and heads of state and elected officials must play a role, but we should never underestimate the power of ideas and education and greater understanding to break down the barriers of suspicion and fear that too often separate the nations of the world.

Your programs in the school system, on television, the lectures and seminars you hold, your model U.N. conference for students are all an important part of that effort. And I'm particularly pleased to see that you're joining together with a number of groups involved in international relations in a new World Affairs Center here in San Francisco, and I wish you every success in that venture. And so the contributions of an organization such as yours toward increased understanding in the world are really crucial, not only to the foreign policy efforts of this nation but to the search for peace.

With the words of his Inaugural Address, President Carter identified at the very outset of his Administration the guiding spirit of this nation's foreign policy:

Our nation can be strong abroad only if it is strong at home, and we know that the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation. To be true to ourselves, we must be true to others.

And he elaborated on the basic premises of our relations with other nations in his speech at Notre Dame³ this May:

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1977, pp. 41–47. All brackets are in the original. Mondale spoke before the World Affairs Council of Northern California. Additional information about the address is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Special Assistant for Speech Writing, Speech Text Files, World Affairs Council of Northern California, June 17, 1977.

² Reference is to Mondale's January 23–February 1 trip to Europe and Japan (see footnote 1, Document 16) and his May 14–23 trip to Europe.

³ See Document 40.

—Our policy must be rooted in our people's basic commitment to human rights.

—Our policy must be based on close cooperation with the Western industrial democracies. With them we share basic values; with them also we share a recognition that global problems cannot be solved without close cooperation among us. This was the message the President had me take to Europe and Japan in the first week of the Administration, and this was the spirit which guided the President and his colleagues at the London summit last month.⁴

—Our policy must seek to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China. It must do so in a balanced and reciprocal way, while we maintain a strong defense.

—Our policy must recognize that the cleavage between North and South is as important as between East and West. We must reach out to the world's developing nations, seeking to narrow the gap between rich and poor.

—Finally, our policy must provide incentives for all nations to rise above ideology or narrow conceptions of self-interest and work together to resolve regional conflicts and to meet global problems that confront all people.

As an Administration, we are only five months old. However, these months have been a period of intense activity. We are committed to shaping effective policies that truly reflect America's values and objectives, and we are committed to implementing policies with other nations so as to shape a more peaceful and stable world.

One of our first tasks has been to insure that our foreign policy reflects the commitment to basic human rights that we, as Americans, share. That commitment to the inherent dignity of the individual is at the heart of the American tradition. From it flows the democratic liberties that we cherish—such as the right to worship freely; freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and due process of law. Those are the basic strengths of our nation.

We have survived as a free nation because we have remained committed to the defense of fundamental moral values we cherish as a people. And unless our foreign policy reflects those values it will not earn the support of the American people. Without that support, no foreign policy—no matter how brilliantly conceived—can succeed.

I believe we have restored that commitment to human rights. I am proud that the United States today stands among those who uphold human rights and human dignity in the world. I am proud that no foreign leader today has any doubt that the United States condemns tor-

⁴ See Document 38.

ture, political imprisonment, and repression by any government, anywhere in the world. We believe that basic human rights transcend ideology. We believe all nations, regardless of political systems, must respect those rights.

Just as respect for human rights is central to our foreign policy values, so progress toward a just and lasting Middle East settlement is essential to the prospect of a more peaceful world. The President has asked me to describe what we are trying to do to achieve peace in the Middle East. We want the American people to have the fullest possible understanding of our approach, for your support is crucial to its success.

President Carter has now met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.⁵ The President met with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, and we hope that we will soon meet with the new Prime Minister.⁶

With the exception of the meeting with President Asad which was held in Geneva, I have participated in all of them and have sensed these leaders' great desire for peace and their longing for the benefits that peace can bring to nations too long mobilized for war. Yet at the same time, we also found deep fears and suspicions which must be overcome if peace is to be achieved in that strategic and troubled region of the world.

A genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East is of essential interest to all Americans. Conflict there carries the threat of a global confrontation and runs the risk of nuclear war. As we have seen, war in the Middle East has profound economic consequences. It can, and has, damaged the economies of the entire world. It has been a tragedy for the nations of the region. Even short of war, continued confrontation encourages radicalization and instability.

Genuine peace is needed by all parties to the conflict. The Arab nations need peace. Israel, above all, has a profound interest in peace; there is no question about that.

Israel's Survival

For almost three decades, Israel has borne the burden of constant war. More than half its entire budget is dedicated to defense. Its citizens

⁵ For the memoranda of conversation with Sadat, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 25 and 27. For the memoranda of conversation with Hussein, see *ibid.*, Documents 30 and 31. For the memorandum of conversation with Asad, see *ibid.*, Document 32. For the separate memoranda of conversation with Princes Fahd and Saud, see *ibid.*, Documents 36 and 37.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 39. On April 8, Rabin resigned as Prime Minister, effective April 22.

bear the highest average tax burden in the world—more than 60 percent of their income goes for taxes.

And yet, at the same time, this valiant nation has managed to create a miracle in the desert. With ingenuity, hard work, and skill it has created a land that could be a model for economic development and for political liberty to be emulated throughout the Middle East. Democracy has thrived in Israel despite the kind of adversity that has crushed freedom in other lands.

And yet, what of the future? Is it a future in which Israel's three million people try, by force of arms alone, to hold out against the hostility and growing power of the Arab world? Or can a process of reconciliation be started—a process in which peace protects Israel's security, a peace in which the urge for revenge and recrimination is replaced by mutual recognition and respect?

America has a special responsibility and a special opportunity to help bring about this kind of peace. This comes about first of all because of our unique and profound relationship with the State of Israel since its creation more than a generation ago. Our sense of shared values and purposes means that, for Americans, the question of Israel's survival is not a political question but rather stands as a moral imperative of our foreign policy.

Key Elements for an Agreement

And yet, our special relationship with Israel has not been directed against any other country. We have been able to enjoy the friendship of much of the Arab world, where we and our close allies have important interests.

It is precisely because of our close ties with both Israel and her Arab neighbors that we are uniquely placed to promote the search for peace, to work for an improved understanding of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help them work out what we hope will be a basis for negotiation leading to a final peace in the Middle East.

When this Administration entered office on January 20, we found that the situation in the Middle East called for a new approach. The step-by-step diplomacy of our predecessors had defused the immediate tensions produced by the war in 1973. But it was also evident that it would be increasingly difficult to achieve small diplomatic concessions when the ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained obscure. At the same time, it was unlikely that an agreement on a lasting peace could be achieved at one stroke.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is supported by all the parties, provides a basis for the negotiations which are required if

there is to be a settlement.⁷ But Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework for an enduring peace. Our concept was to use this framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace.

A major impediment to this approach lay in the fact that the positions of all sides were frozen. The words and phrases used by the parties had become encrusted with the fallout of countless diplomatic battles.

We have tried to regain momentum in this process. We have encouraged Arabs and Israelis to begin thinking again seriously about the elements of peace and not to remain committed to particular words and formulations.

To this end the President has tried to describe our understanding of what the key elements of an overall framework for an agreement might be:

—A commitment to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts to normalize relations among the countries of the area;

—The establishment of borders for Israel which are recognized by all and which can be kept secure;

—A fair solution to the problem of the Palestinians.

The President has set forth these elements not to dictate a peace or to impose our views but to stimulate fresh thought.

Relations Among Middle East Countries

President Carter has gone further than any of his predecessors to stress with Arab leaders the essential point that peace must mean more than merely an end to hostilities, stating as he did in Clinton, Massachusetts, last March:

... the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of peace.⁸

We have found that the Arab leaders did not insist that this kind of peace is something that only future generations could consider. Some

⁷ See footnote 4, Document 40.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 32.

leaders—such as King Hussein [of Jordan] during his visit to Washington—have made clear their commitment to a “just, a lasting peace, one which would enable all the people in [the Middle East] to divert their energies and resources to build and attain a brighter future. . . .”⁹

So we believe that we have made some progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize Israel’s right to exist and to recognize—however reluctantly—that this commitment is essential to a genuine peace; that peace must be structured in such a way that it can survive even if some leaders were to nurture aims to destroy Israel. Still, we have a long way to go. The Arabs have been insistent that Israel withdraw from the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. We have made clear our view that Israel should not be asked to withdraw unless it can secure, in return, real peace from its neighbors.

Borders and Security Arrangements

The question of withdrawal is, in essence, the question of borders. For peace to be enduring, borders must be inviolable. Nations must feel secure behind their borders. Borders must be recognized by all.

A crucial dilemma has been how to provide borders that are both secure and acceptable to all. It is understandable that Israel, having fought a war in every decade since its birth, wants borders that can be defended as easily as possible. But no borders will be secure if neighboring countries do not accept them.

The problem is that borders that might afford Israel the maximum security in military terms would not be accepted as legitimate by Israel’s neighbors. Borders that Israel’s neighbors would recognize, Israel has not been willing to accept as forming an adequate line of defense.

For this reason, the President has tried to separate the two issues. On the one hand, there must be recognized borders. But, in addition, there could be separate lines of defense or other measures that could enhance Israel’s security. The arrangements in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models of how Israel’s security might be enhanced until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully developed.

We would urge all the parties to think realistically about security arrangements to reduce the fear of surprise attack, to make acts of aggression difficult if not impossible, and to limit the military forces that would confront one another in sensitive areas.

This approach recognizes the fact that there is a profound asymmetry in what the two sides in the Middle East are seeking. On the one hand, a principal Arab concern is to regain lost territory. On the other,

⁹ For the full text of an exchange of toasts between President Carter and King Hussein on Apr. 25, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1977, p. 520. [Footnote in the original. The exchange is also printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 720–722.]

Israel wishes peace and recognition. Territory is tangible and once ceded difficult to regain short of war. Peace, on the other hand, can be ephemeral. Peaceful intentions can change overnight unless a solid foundation of cooperation and a firm pattern of reinforcing relationships can be established to insure that all have a stake in continuing tranquillity.

We believe that separating the imperatives of security from the requirement of recognized borders is an important advance toward reconciling the differences between the two sides. It is in this way that Israel could return to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor modifications as negotiated among the parties, and yet retain security lines or other arrangements that would insure Israel's safety as full confidence developed in a comprehensive peace. Thus, with borders explicitly recognized and buttressed by security measures and with the process of peace unfolding, Israel's security would be greater than it is today.

Future of the Palestinians

A further major issue is that of the future of the Palestinian people. It has been the source of continuing tragedy in the Middle East. There are two prerequisites for a lasting peace in this regard.

—First, there must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the Palestinians to live in peace alongside Israel.

—Second, the Palestinians must be given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past and toward a future in which they can express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully.

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to demonstrate that willingness by recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace, the President has made clear that, in the context of a peace settlement, we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully of the benefits of peace in the Middle East, including the possibility of some arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity—preferably in association with Jordan.

How this would be accomplished and the exact character of such an entity is, of course, something that would have to be decided by the parties themselves in the course of negotiation. However, the President has suggested that the viability of this concept and the security of the region might be enhanced if this involved an association with Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are for the parties themselves to decide.

Necessity of Negotiating

This leads me to a further crucial aspect of our approach—the necessity of direct negotiations among the parties concerned. We cannot

conceive of genuine peace existing between countries who will not talk to one another. If they are prepared for peace, the first proof is a willingness to negotiate their differences.

This is why we believe it is so important to proceed with the holding of a Geneva conference this year. That conference provides the forum for these nations to begin the working out of these problems together directly, face-to-face. We have a continuing objective to convene such a conference before the end of this year.

Underlying this entire effort to promote the process of negotiation is our determination to maintain the military security of Israel. There must be no question in anyone's mind that the United States will do what is necessary to insure the adequacy of Israel's military posture and its capacity for self-defense.

We recognize that America has a special responsibility in this regard. In fact, in promulgating our overall policy to curb the international traffic in arms, the President specifically directed the government that we will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the State of Israel. Let there be no doubt about this commitment by this Administration.

We do not intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel. If we have differences over military aid—and we may have some—it will be on military grounds or economic grounds but not political grounds. If we have differences over diplomatic strategy—and that could happen—we will work this out on a political level. We will not alter our commitment to Israel's military security.

Let me conclude by saying that we hope the concepts I have been discussing here today—concepts which the President has advanced at talks with Israeli and Arab leaders—will stimulate them to develop ideas of their own. We realize that peace cannot be imposed from the outside, and we do not intend to present the parties with a plan or a timetable or a map. Peace can only come from a genuine recognition by all parties that their interests are served by reconciliation and not by war, by faith in the future rather than bitterness over the past.

America can try to help establish the basis of trust necessary for peace. We can try to improve the atmosphere for communication. We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end, determine whether peace or war is the fate of the Middle East. That can only be decided by Israel and her Arab neighbors.

We believe that both sides want peace. As the President has said [at Notre Dame on May 22]:

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean disaster, not only for the Middle

East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well.

As we go forward in our mediating role, we will have to expect from time to time to have differences with both sides. But these will be differences as to tactics. Our overall objectives will be those that we believe are now shared by all sides: A permanent and enduring peace in the Middle East.

This is obviously a difficult task and there is always the possibility of failure. But it is a historic responsibility that requires the fullest possible support of the American people.

I believe we have this support. And as we go through the difficult days ahead, this support will sustain us. It will provide the strength we need to encourage all parties to put aside their fears and put trust in their hopes for a genuine and lasting Middle East peace.

John Kennedy once described the formula for peace not only in the Middle East but throughout the world, and I would like to close with his words [at the U.N. on Sept. 25, 1961]:

If we all can persevere—if we can in every land and office look beyond our own shores and ambitions—then surely the age will dawn in which the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.¹⁰

¹⁰ For the text of Kennedy's speech to the UN General Assembly, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961*, pp. 616–626.

45. Editorial Note

On June 19, 1977, reporters Bob Clark and Barrie Dunsmore of the American Broadcasting Company's (ABC) News Division interviewed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on the ABC television and radio public affairs program "Issues and Answers." During the interview, Clark commented that Vice President Walter Mondale had stated in his June 17 address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California (see Document 44) that the United States would not use the threat of reducing military aid to induce the Government of Israel to give up the occupied territories. Referring to the position of incoming Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin concerning the occupied territories, Clark inquired as to whether the United States would need to "apply pressure of some sort if it is going to play a significant role" in securing peace in the Middle East. Vance responded:

"I'm going to answer your question, but let me say something first because I'd like to sort of set this in a framework.

"When our Administration came into office, we decided that we were not merely going to react to situations, but that we were going to shape an agenda of items which we considered to be the highest priority and would proceed to deal with those issues.

"The first of those items was that dealing with the question of regional peace, which could affect, in the long run, world peace. And the Middle East was one of those obvious areas which involved regional peace. Another was, of course, Africa, where we're also working.

"Secondly, we agreed that we would work to achieve progress in the arms control area because of its importance not only to the big powers but to the world in general, and therefore, we agreed to attack both the problem of strategic arms and of conventional arms.

"Thirdly, we decided that we must work with our colleagues to try and control the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, and we have been working to that end.

"Fourthly, we decided it was of utmost importance to strengthen the alliance with our allies, and the most important example of that is NATO. We have been working in that area, as you well know.

"Fifthly, we decided that it was important to promote cooperation rather than confrontation with the Third World. Much of what we have been doing at CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation], in the OAS, in the meeting which I am going to be attending in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] is related to this. This is the whole range of so-called North-South problems that are dealing with these terribly complicated economic relationships which arise out of our relationships with the Third World.

"Next, we believe that we must seek normalization of relations with as many countries as possible, because without a dialogue—a diplomatic dialogue—there's no way even to advance our own interests, let alone hear what the concerns of the others are.

"And the last was, of course, the promotion of human rights.

"Now I just wanted to give you this sort of agenda of items which we have been using and proceeding along during this first stage.

"Now let me return, if I might, to the question of the Middle East. I think it's too early yet to say what the foreign policy of Mr. Begin is going to be. He is coming to the United States, hopefully, at the end of the month of July. I think we must wait until he comes and we have a chance to hear firsthand what his foreign policy is, what he is prepared to do with respect to the negotiation of a peace in the Middle East, before we jump to any conclusions.

“I would note that I’ve read the press in the last day or so that Mr. Begin’s coalition has apparently endorsed a policy which says that they are prepared to enter into peace negotiations without any preconditions. We will look forward to seeing Mr. Begin when he comes and to finding out specifically what flexibility there is.

“Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, the Vice President said flatly that we will not use the threat of reducing military aid to Israel to get them to give up occupied territories.

“Secretary Vance: That’s right.

“Mr. Clark: Does that mean that we would continue to sell arms to Israel, and to Arab countries to the extent that they buy them from us, regardless of whether there is any progress toward peace in the Middle East?

“Secretary Vance: We have urged all of the parties, and I have talked with the parties myself, about the need for restraint and reduction in arms sales in the area—and we will continue to do so. But let there be no question: We have a deep commitment to Israel that we will provide to Israel the arms which are necessary for its self-defense, and we will abide by that without any question. And I don’t want any lack of clarity on that point.

“Mr. Dunsmore: Well, let me put the question to you this way then, sir: At the end of the 1973 war, the United States went on an alert to prevent the Russians from intervening, which in effect was saying we would be prepared to go to war. If there’s another war in the Middle East, and it comes about, at least in part, because the Israelis have not been prepared to make what we consider to be reasonable concessions, would we go to war to save them?

“Secretary Vance: That is a question which is an iffy question, which I am not going to answer.

“Let me say that we have told Israel that we stand behind her, that we will do everything that’s necessary to preserve her security and integrity, should it be challenged. I think that sufficiently answers your question.

“Mr. Dunsmore: It’s a cliché of the Middle East that it’s up to the parties themselves to settle it, but left to their own devices they’ve had four wars. Surely there must be some kind of friendly persuasion that we are planning on both sides.

“Secretary Vance: We clearly feel that we have a role to play here as a country which has good relationships with both sides—with both Israel and her Arab neighbors. We believe that we can work with the parties to try and help them find common ground. We are committed to do everything within our power to bring this about.

“Whether it can be accomplished I don’t know, because the ultimate decision is going to be made, and has to be made, by the parties themselves. You can never have a lasting peace until it’s one agreed upon by the parties. We will feel free, as I have indicated before, to make suggestions to the parties as to what we believe are fair and equitable approaches to these common core issues which we have talked about so many times in the past.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1977, pages 81–82; brackets in the quotation are in the original)

The full text of Vance’s interview is *ibid.*, pages 78–83. The interview was broadcast on television and radio.

46. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, June 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM ON SOME POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR STABILIZING US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Given present strains in US-Soviet relations, the uncertainties involved in current Soviet political changes, and the fundamental limitations of the SALT negotiations, what actions by the United States might have a useful stabilizing effect? Following are some measures for consideration:

1. *Brezhnev Meeting*: It seems evident that the idea has been of persistent interest to Brezhnev, and, if he would be willing to accept a non-negotiating, “get-acquainted” session not tied to SALT, with as little build-up of advance expectations as possible, it might have intangible but considerable benefits in dispelling misconceptions. It is pos-

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 6/77. Secret. Carter wrote “Cy. J” in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; however, Brzezinski sent it to the President under a June 29 cover memorandum, noting: “Secretary Vance has submitted a memorandum identifying a number of measures which you may want to consider as part of an effort to ‘stabilize’ U.S./Soviet relations.” Brzezinski commented on several of the specific proposals outlined in the memorandum and concluded: “U.S.-Soviet relations are the product of deep and long-term historical forces and we should not become too preoccupied with transitory aspects, some of them deliberately generated by the Soviets in order to exercise psychological and political pressure on us.”

sible, but not likely, that Brezhnev would handle himself as gruffly as he did in Paris, but the gamble seems worth taking.²

2. *SALT*: It seems desirable to consider what measures could be taken before September to encourage the Russians to consider more actively possible areas of movement on their part, without ourselves appearing over-eager. One such measure might be to use the exploratory channel of non-governmental scientists who have been involved in the joint study group on arms control with the Soviet Academy of Sciences for the past 14 years. They have an invitation from the Soviet Academy, which could be used to arrange a meeting in August, primarily for the purpose of eliciting responses from the Soviet side. The group could include such men as Paul Doty, Herbert York, Wolfgang Panofsky, Franklin Long, Sidney Drell—all responsible men who have served in government, know the issues, and who could have access to such officials as Korniyenko, as well as the Academy scientists.³

3. *Technology*: This is a subject of preeminent interest to the Soviet leadership, and the possibility of some movement in this field would be a stabilizing incentive. Two illustrative possibilities:

A. Vladimir Kirillin, Deputy Prime Minister and head of the State Committee on Science and Technology, is coming to Washington in July. For him to be received by the President would be of more than symbolic importance. (We could also use the occasion to stress our interest in having Brezhnev receive Ambassador Toon, and it would be more effective to make the point in this way than to make it as a pre-condition.) Kirillin is a good man, a cryogenics scientist of repute, sober, reasonable, and influential.⁴

B. Frank Press has developed some ideas on how the Soviet Union could be given remote access to the Cyber 76 computer for use in its weather observation system. This would by-pass the security objections to having the computer on Soviet territory, and would yield results of considerable benefit to us.

4. *Steps to Increase Soviet Involvement in Global and North-South Issues*: This is a large subject, which needs more detailed examination than is possible in this memorandum, but it is worth consideration as an expression of our long-term interest in drawing the Soviet Union into more responsible and constructive participation in international

² In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "I agree. If B. is incompetent to negotiate, a mtg w Gromyko may be advisable." Brezhnev embarked on a 3-day state visit to France on June 20; see Jim Hogland, "Brezhnev in Paris, Focuses on Détente," *The Washington Post*, June 21, 1977, p. A-14.

³ In the left-hand margin near this paragraph, the President wrote: "They could be briefed, but not speak for me."

⁴ In the left-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: "I'm rather adamant re B. seeing Toon. He's acting like an ass."

efforts to deal with global problems.⁵ Although the Soviet response at the present time is likely to be limited, the effort to involve them, if advanced seriously and not propagandistically, will have present usefulness as a mark of our intentions, and may have substantial effects over time. Once we have completed our preparations, we could consider sending someone like Under Secretary Cooper to Moscow to discuss a number of concrete proposals.⁶ We could also shift the emphasis in some of our bilateral cooperative agreements to areas of primary interest to the Third World—e.g., earthquake prediction, tsunami research, health care delivery in developing areas, etc. (See attached memorandum from Anthony Lake on “Prospects for Expanded Soviet Bloc Role in North-South Problems.”)⁷

5. *Invigoration of US-Soviet Working Groups*: Among the working groups set up in the course of our Moscow meeting in March,⁸ some are proceeding as well as can be expected (Comprehensive Test Ban, Chemical Weapons, Indian Ocean) but some could be invigorated (Conventional Arms Transfers, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Radiological Weapons) with both symbolic and practical benefits. (This might also be true for the working groups on Civil Defense and Prior Notification of Missile Launching.)⁹ These have not had a high priority, but they could be made to demonstrate our seriousness of purpose and the network of issues of possible overlapping interest. (On the Anti-Satellite Weapons issue, a decision would be required whether to proceed with these discussions now, or to hold them pending resolution of other space issues involved in PRM-23.)¹⁰

6. *Examination and Development of Bilateral Scientific Agreements*: Although our experience with these agreements has been mixed, some among them have been clearly successful and mutually advantageous; perhaps some should be dropped; and others could be made much more useful than they have been, with proper high-level support.¹¹ Even taking into account the uneven results, they serve to dramatize the network of overlapping interests which connect the United States

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “Hans Detrich [Dietrich].” Reference is to Genscher.

⁶ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “ok.”

⁷ Not found attached. Printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs as Document 215.

⁸ See Document 31.

⁹ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “ok.”

¹⁰ Reference is to PRM/NSC-23, issued on March 28, which called for a review of existing space policy and prior efforts and formulation of a statement of overall national goals in space. PRM/NSC-23 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXV, United Nations; Law of the Sea.

¹¹ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “ok.”

and the Soviet Union, despite transient vicissitudes. The Bilateral Agreements include the following: Environmental Protection, Medical Science and Public Health, Artificial Heart Research and Development, Science and Technical Cooperation, Space Cooperation, Agriculture, Transportation, Studies of the World Ocean, Atomic Energy, Energy, and Housing and Other Construction. (Frank Press is engaged in a review of the Agreement on Science and Technical Cooperation and the Agreement on Space Cooperation. On the basis of his review, a program could be developed for increased support to those agreements which have been, or could be made, mutually beneficial.)

7. *Some Miscellaneous Possibilities:*¹²

A. The Soviet Union has been interested in opening a banking office in New York to perform deposit and loan functions. US banks are interested in expanding their services in Moscow. There are no legal barriers to this, and we could endorse and facilitate the project.¹³

B. We could begin to plan with the Soviet Union for a distinguished representation at the 60th Anniversary ceremonies in Moscow next November. This is an event of great personal interest to Brezhnev.

C. An expansion of scientific, academic and cultural exchanges would be well received by the Soviet Union, and could have substantial benefits, providing equitable treatment is assured for our exchangees.

D. A clarification of visa policy would eliminate some irritants in our relations and would be consistent with our CSCE obligations and general policies on contacts.

E. It is possible that the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Civil Aviation arrangements could be moved off dead center if we decided, on further examination, that the pooling proposal could be made to meet present CAB objections.

F. It is possible that the Yakutsk Liquified Natural Gas Project could be redesigned in a way that would merit support. This could be examined with the participating US firms and in consultations with Japan.¹⁴

G. In any forthcoming announcements concerning weapons procurement or deployment, consideration should be given to the effect we desire these announcements to have upon the Soviet Union.

¹²Next to this heading, the President wrote: "Put a good person to work on these. J."

¹³In the left-hand margin next to points A–E, the President wrote: "ok."

¹⁴In the left-hand margin next to points F and G, the President wrote a question mark.

47. **Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, June 28, 1977

SUBJECT

1976–1980 Goals for US Foreign Policy

Our overriding goals are to make the world safer and more humane. There are thus three general concerns which animate our foreign policy:

- Pursuit of peace.
- Promotion of equitable economic development and well-being.
- Protection of individual rights.

These are long-term goals. What is most notable about your approach to foreign policy is precisely your emphasis on undertaking now so many major efforts aimed at the quality of life in succeeding generations.

This means a very ambitious and far-reaching agenda. Many of the beginning steps now being taken will not bear tangible fruit for some time to come. But unless we start now, there will be no prospect of success.

PURSUIT OF PEACE

The pursuit of peace operates at several levels. Above all it involves the evolution of relationships with the *Soviet Union*. The opening

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 63, Goals: Four Year: 4–7/77. Confidential. Lake sent an earlier version of the memorandum to Vance under a June 27 action memorandum. In it, he noted: "The President apparently asked some time ago, in a marginal note, for a memo from you on our four year policy goals. The White House asked for it again last week. Neither the White House Staff nor S/S have a record or copy of his request; we are not, therefore, sure of exactly what he wanted." Lake then explained that S/P attempted to "describe such goals in an overall framework" to avoid a "flat listing" that would turn complicated issues into a "simple scorecard." (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 1, Misc: re Issues & Priorities '77) Notations on Lake's action memorandum indicate that the Department reworked the four-year policy goal memorandum as a memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski and sent it to the White House on June 28. (Ibid.) Although Brzezinski did not initial this copy of the memorandum, he did transmit another copy of the memorandum to the President under a July 5 cover memorandum, commenting: "As you can see, it does not advance our thinking on this subject much beyond the more comprehensive NSC paper which was prepared on this subject." Carter wrote on the memorandum: "Let Cy assess your more comprehensive goals. J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 63, Goals: Four Year: 4–7/77) The previous paper is Document 36.

months of the Administration have produced several areas of friction; to some extent this reflects Soviet difficulty in adjusting to the new style and emphasis of your Administration. There are also genuine areas of new contention—particularly on the theme of human rights. But the basic interests of both the US and USSR in avoiding crisis and tension remain unaltered.

—*Arms Control*. SALT is the centerpiece of the process. We have found a framework for agreement and now must establish enough confidence between the US and USSR *to achieve agreements that reduce, not merely limit, our strategic arsenals*. Achieving such agreements is a major goal, as is a *comprehensive test ban*. We will also work on other detente and disarmament related issues, including *an MBFR agreement, increasing East-West trade* and all the issues involved in the *Helsinki Final Act*.

We would also hope, over the next four years, to reach better implicit understandings with Moscow of “rules of the game” governing Soviet and US activities in third areas. Explicit agreement might be found on the *Indian Ocean*.

A halt to the pace of *nuclear proliferation* and agreements on the reduction in *conventional arms transfers* by the major developed country suppliers are key complementary processes, as well as ends in themselves. We can legitimately hope to freeze the number of nuclear weapons-capable states at six, at least for the coming four years. Energy issues complicate our negotiations with our OECD colleagues on nuclear non-proliferation, and long-term progress will be slow and uncertain. We can hope to stabilize and possibly reduce the total volume of arms sales through strong negotiating efforts. Since Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel are the big three of the arms sales, peace in the Middle East will be the key to any longer-term substantial reductions.

In addition to curtailing the weaponry of war and US-Soviet conflict, we must work to contain regional, local, or civil wars which threaten to involve the great powers, or which could seriously weaken our friends. This means meeting security commitments and maintaining military strength, as well as exploring initiatives in various trouble spots as they arise. Hence a policy keyed to the following central points:

—*Middle East*. Your talks with Arab and Israeli leaders have cleared the air for constructive discussion. Even recognizing the sudden complications of a new Israeli government, we have to build on that basis to explore mutually advantageous solutions, and launch negotiations for a *lasting Middle East settlement*. It is hard to be sanguine about a lasting settlement, but we must try to achieve one within the next year or so. At minimum, we must continue to try to avert another war.

—*Africa*. We have begun and should continue to achieve a peaceful resolution to problems in southern Africa. A peaceful *settlement in Rhodesia* and *elections and independence for Namibia*, both by 1978, and the beginning of a peaceful *evolution toward greater social, political and economic equality and justice in South Africa* itself are all high on our agenda. As a matter both of principle and practical politics, it is important to us that uncontrolled racial violence not develop in any of these areas. In the Horn of Africa there is serious potential instability and our policies will continue to aim at preventing warfare and limiting an expansion of Soviet influence.

—*Elsewhere*. We will work with our NATO allies towards a *mediated settlement of the Cyprus and Greek/Turkish problems* in the Aegean and a resumption of our defense cooperation with Turkey; take a more active role in *mediating inter-American state conflicts* such as those between Belize and Guatemala; seek, from a possibly skeptical Congress, approval for the anticipated *Canal treaty with Panama*, which will protect our interest in a secure, open, and neutral Canal.

The world is unusually free of armed conflict at the present time. We will watch carefully the potential development of crises or conflicts in all areas with the objective of working toward their peaceful resolution. The *North Korean* posture toward our troop withdrawals from the South; Soviet actions around *Berlin*; a possible internal crisis in *Pakistan*; and internal political transitions in *Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran* will be particularly sensitive.

Stress on process, rather than on single events, is central to promoting our relations with more estranged nations. Aside from our ongoing pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we hope to *establish formal ties* with most, if not all, those countries with whom we presently have tensions or no relations: Vietnam, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, Angola, North Korea, Mongolia, Albania, and others. Of these, *China* is the most important and we hope to have formal diplomatic relations with Peking within the next four years, with due consideration for the security of Taiwan.

No pursuit of lasting peace is possible without a firm *foundation of economic and political strength among our allies*. The Administration set the proper tone with the Vice President's post-Inaugural trip to Western Europe and Japan,² your meetings with key leaders in Washington, and the London Summit.

We must follow-up during the next four years with attention to several continuing concerns. Those include: (1) maintaining support for the process of European economic and political integration through

² See footnote 1, Document 16.

backing for the European Community, more open and substantive consultations, and policies which *help close the economic gap among OECD nations*; (2) doing our part to assure *a stronger and more effective NATO* through such efforts as serious consideration of standardization and rationalization of equipment; and (3) *encouraging those European nations*, that face the possibility of Communist participation in their governments, to *remain Western-oriented democracies*.

On more specific matters, we should try to defuse tension with the West Europeans and, where relevant, the Japanese on such issues as trade, nuclear proliferation, arms sales, human rights. Here, as in more general concerns, the key will be substantive prior consultations, sensitivity to real divergences in national interest and the realization that the US may have to modify some domestic and other diplomatic goals to retain good relations with our allies.

PROVISION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND WELL-BEING

We will concentrate increased attention on economic issues—both involving the global economy and specific regions and problems.

That implies:

—*More and Better Management of Global Concerns*. We will give higher priority to a range of transnational issues and revive momentum for international cooperation.

Projections for a *food gap* four or eight years hence persist, despite bumper crops this year. We are acting now to help assure increased food *production* (especially in developing nations), improved distribution of available food, and better *nutrition*, (both for the malnourished “Pepsi generation” of the affluent West and the undernourished needy of the Third World). We will hope specifically to have an *international food reserve* program³ in operation and to have set in motion major international efforts to *increase agricultural production in South Asia and Africa* within the next four years. A substantial increase in bilateral and multilateral aid is necessary to achieve these and other basic human need programs.

You have mapped out a National *Energy Plan*;⁴ organizations like the International Energy Agency are at work to assure cooperation

³ In a statement submitted to the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance on July 13, Katz indicated that the U.S. delegation to the June 1977 International Wheat Council (IWC) meeting in London had proposed a “coordinated system” of grain reserves. For Katz’s complete statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 22, 1977, pp. 265–267.

⁴ On April 18 at 8 p.m., the President, in an address to the nation broadcast live on radio and television, discussed the energy crisis facing the United States. He noted that the response to the energy problem constituted the “moral equivalent of war,” and went on to describe the “fundamental principles” informing the administration’s national energy plan. For the text of the President’s address, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I*,

among consuming countries. A major objective for this Administration must be *substantial progress in energy conservation at home and abroad and an increase and diversification in sources of supply*, with particular attention to safe development of nuclear technology. At the same time we will aim at limiting further major price increases by the OPEC states and at strengthening the coordination within the IEA to deal with any new embargo or restraints on production by the oil producers.

The priorities of energy must not obscure concern for the *environment*. Domestic and diplomatic efforts must and can be mutually reinforcing to help assure clean air and clean water. International conferences on clean water and desert control this year are setting priorities for the next decade and more in these areas.⁵ A "law of the sea" will also serve that end, as well as open new access to new resources.⁶ Our goal should be to get the kind of *LOS treaty* which will meet our real national interests, however, and not one which limits and restricts our access to the seabed resources.

—*New Relationship with the Third World*. The UN system is increasingly the focus of our dialogue with the developing countries. We are trying to strengthen the effectiveness of the UN and its related agencies. There is some risk of domestic hostility in this effort, and we must work with Congress and the public to *avert erosion of the US role in the UN and other multilateral institutions*. We may want to *fashion new forums for constructive discussion* of shared concerns in finance, investment, energy, economic development, trade and commodities—lest discourse lapse into polemic at the General Assembly. We particularly want to negotiate agreements to stabilize prices of key commodities, possibly linked by a common fund.⁷

pp. 656–662. Two days later, the President delivered an address before a joint session of Congress. In it, he asserted that the Executive and Legislative branches must "work together even more closely to deal with the greatest domestic challenge that our Nation will face in our lifetime. We must act now—together—to devise and to implement a comprehensive national energy plan to cope with a crisis that otherwise could overwhelm us." Carter referenced the seven goals—designed to reduce energy consumption and to increase the uses of alternative sources of power—outlined in his televised address and recommended that Congress "adopt these goals by joint resolution as a demonstration of our mutual commitment to achieve them." (Ibid., pp. 663–664) The full text of Carter's address, as well as a fact sheet on the energy program, are *ibid.*, pp. 663–688.

⁵ The UN Water Conference took place in Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 14–25. The UN Conference on Desertification was scheduled to take place in Nairobi, Kenya, August 29–September 9.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 24.

⁷ Presumable reference to commodity proposals introduced at the fourth UNCTAD conference, held in Nairobi, Kenya, May 3–28, 1976. Delegates adopted an Integrated Program for Commodities (IPC), with an objective of stabilizing commodity prices. The final resolution also called for a conference to develop a Common Fund for Commodities (CFC). For additional information on UNCTAD IV, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 301, 304–310.

More attention to *basic human needs* in economic development may both take the cutting edge off confrontation and—more importantly—help the invisible one billion poor of the world. At CIEC and OECD Ministerials, we opened the door for greater US and global emphasis on this human dimension of development.⁸ The US will provide substantial and effective amounts of foreign assistance, and we will *urge other OECD countries, particularly Japan, to increase their development assistance*. We will also intensify the process begun at the London Summit, CIEC and the OECD to *urge the Comecon countries, particularly the USSR, to become more constructively involved in North-South and development efforts*. We will also expect the LDCs to make the tough policy decisions to implement a human needs strategy. The US will adopt policies on *multilateral trade and technology transfer* issues which benefit the LDCs (or at least the poorest among them) at the same time as they benefit us. We also favor organization of international institutions dealing with resource transfers to enable the LDCs to have major roles in negotiations on international development issues. We will also *increase our focus on women* and the disproportionate deprivation of opportunity they too often endure, both in considering the ways in which our resources are used abroad and in the nomination of candidates for UN agency positions.

An important objective of this, as of previous administrations in the last decade, must be to *promote family planning and population limitation in areas of high growth*. There is often little we can do about this problem but our concern, technology, and support should be offered to anyone who needs it.

—*More Coordination and Cooperation Among the Trilateral Economies*. We will make little progress on global concerns or the related North-South Dialogue without sustained economic growth among OECD industrial nations. The roster of objectives is as vital as it is familiar: helping the world trading system work better, via successful conclusion as soon as possible of the *Multilateral Trade Negotiations*; improving operation of the international monetary order through *general guidelines on exchange rates and expanded financial facilities* (perhaps in both the IMF and the OECD); and giving more serious consideration to a *clearer global framework for investment*. Important as these efforts at systemic reform are, we must concentrate particularly on problems that have direct impact on our own citizens: unemployment, inflation, and urban malaise.

⁸ See footnotes 3 and 5, Document 41.

PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Provision of basic human needs brings us directly to promotion of internationally recognized *human rights*. US policy must thus stress the broad scope of economic, social, political, and civil rights.

Implementation of a human rights policy requires both consistency in our fundamental objectives and flexibility in how we deal with specific circumstances. Our goal should be a *clear improvement in the practices of as many countries as possible*, countries which at present are failing in their observance of the most fundamental human rights. We will engage other nations in the effort—both on a bilateral basis and through multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and international financial institutions.

Underpinning all these specific objectives is the need for *enhanced public confidence in our foreign policy*. Without this support, we will be unable to achieve these goals.

The collective effect of attending to peace, economic development, and individual rights is a new design for American diplomacy, drawn from the values and standards of the American people. It is a far reaching outline for action—clear in some areas, needing more definition in others.

—*There is overlap and interaction among our goals*. Pursuit of peace through US-Soviet agreement on strategic arms, for example, depends in part on American domestic confidence that our policy reflects our traditional concern for human rights. Our goals regarding conventional arms sales, human rights, nuclear proliferation, and energy may collide in very complex ways when applied, for example, in the Middle East.

—*Diplomacy also deserves public dialogue*. A shift from secrecy to raising issues for discussion with the Congress and the people before making decisions is already evident. In time, it should strengthen public support, buttress Congressional backing, give credence to calls for allied consultation, and educate the American people on the trade-offs between some short-term costs and longer-term objectives.

—*Finally, diplomacy succeeds most surely when it takes into account domestic priorities*. Conflicts and contradictions are inevitable in the sorting out of goals—whether for foreign or domestic policy.

To be effective, we must weigh such obvious trade-offs as increasing economic aid for the LDC's at the apparent expense of our own citizens or decreasing arms transfers at the possible cost of closing US factories and adding to our own unemployed. There are also opportunities for positive reinforcement of our domestic and diplomatic goals: through creative international initiatives on such problems as our cities, youth unemployment, basic human needs, food, and energy.

Because the interplay between domestic and diplomatic goals is so clear and because it suggests at least as many opportunities as problems, I conclude with a suggestion. You might wish to allot at least one Cabinet session each quarter to an assessment and projection of where our diplomatic and domestic goals interact and how we can best minimize the damage from frictions and capitalize on the connection.

Peter Tarnoff

48. Editorial Note

On June 29, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance addressed a meeting of the Asia Society in New York. Founded by John D. Rockefeller III during the 1950s, the Asia Society helped to improve American understanding of Asian cultures. Vance began his remarks, entitled “America’s Role in Consolidating a Peaceful Balance and Promoting Economic Growth in Asia,” by noting that American prospects for “sustaining and developing relationships” with East Asian nations were more promising than at any time since World War II. The Carter administration sought to capitalize upon positive developments in U.S.-Asian relationships, while preventing negative trends that might upset the “presently favorable regional environment.” U.S. interests in Asia, he asserted, “are enduring, and they are substantial.” He continued:

“I hope to leave you with these understandings:

“—First, the United States is and will remain an Asian and Pacific power.

“—Second, the United States will continue its key role in contributing to peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific.

“—Third, the United States seeks normal and friendly relations with the countries in the area on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect.

“—Fourth, the United States will pursue mutual expansion of trade and investment across the Pacific, recognizing the growing interdependence of the economies of the United States and the region.

“—Fifth, we will use our influence to improve the human conditions of the peoples of Asia.

“In all of this, there can be no doubt of the enduring vitality of our country’s relationships with the peoples of Asia and the Pacific.

“To the people of Asia I say tonight without qualification that our nation has recovered its self-confidence at home. And we have not abandoned our interest in Asia.

“We are and will remain a Pacific nation, by virtue of our geography, our history, our commerce, and our interests. Roughly one-quarter of all our trade is now with East Asia and the Pacific; last year we sold \$22 billion worth of our products in the region. For the last five years more of our trade has been with that region than with any other, including the European Community.

“To be able to speak of peace and stability in Asia is a welcome change. But serious problems persist. Our tasks are to help consolidate the emerging peaceful balance in Asia and to promote economic growth that offers promise to its peoples.

“The United States will pursue its relations with the nations of Asia with an open mind. We will continue to work closely with allies and friends. And we hope to normalize relations on a mutually constructive basis with those who have been adversaries.

“The United States recognizes the importance of its continuing contribution to Asian security. We will maintain a strong military presence in the area.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1977, pages 141–142)

The complete text of Vance’s address is *ibid.*, pages 141–145. The Department transmitted the text of the speech to all East Asian and Pacific diplomatic posts in telegram 151507, June 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770232–1067)

49. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Western Europe: An Overview

The issues you will face with Chancellor Schmidt (and later with Prime Minister Andreotti) are not limited to those two countries.² They are part of wider developments in Western Europe—and the relations of these countries with us—that have been characterized as malaise or stagnation.

Today's problems have several causes. Among them are:

—The mismanagement of the U.S. economy during the Vietnam War (particularly 1967–71) helped hasten the end of the effective workings of an international economic system that had prospered—with American strength and leadership—since the War. Since then, the central pivot of stability and confidence in the global economic system has been missing.

—The oil price rises of 1973–75 deepened gathering economic problems, pushing inflation into double digits and unemployment to levels not seen in post-Marshall Plan Europe. And these countries, after all, have much more searing memories of the 1930's economic failure than in the United States.

—In Europe—as here—there are few economic answers to what seem endemic problems; in Europe, even more than here, there has been a loss of confidence in the ability of institutions and leaders to solve the new economic riddle of “stagflation.” Only Germany, among the major states, is relatively untouched: but there the fear of economic collapse is deepest of all.

—Political institutions also seem unable to cope with basic social problems. With recession, there has been a widening gap between economic expectations that had come to be taken for granted (particularly in welfare states), and the ability of governments to deliver. These problems are particularly acute among the young—which is one reason the issue of youth unemployment was put in the agenda at the London

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 63, PRC 023, 7/9/77, Schmidt Visit. Confidential. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

² The President was scheduled to meet with Schmidt on July 13 and with Andreotti on July 26.

Summit. As governments conspicuously have failed to come to grips with economic and social problems—which are only partly of their making—loss of confidence has spread widely. Ironically, one of the most talented groups of European statesmen in recent memory presides over a collection of governments facing constant challenge—from both left and right. Protest voting has become almost the rule.

—In several European countries, the major political parties themselves are overdue for renewal (especially in Italy and from the center to the right in France); or they are so riven with factionalism—as in Britain—that even talented leaders are unable to effect reforms that will broaden their political base.

—At the same time, economic difficulty struck in the middle of a hopeful development: the progressive modernization of most European societies—searching for means of coping with post-industrial problems in labor-management relations, social organization, and cultural development.

—The European Community, meanwhile, lost the economic basis of its past success, at about the point when it was seeking to build a broader European *political* society on its economic strength. Yet instead of stepping back to re-establish the economic strength of the Community and its member nations, they are concentrating upon enlarging the Community and holding European elections. While both are worthy objectives—which politically we must support—they are being used as a substitute for the economic strength, cooperation, and purpose that the Community's founders and best minds have always known must be the basis of an effective Community.

Communist Parties (and Internal Reform)

It is against this background that the growth of West European Communist Parties is so unsettling. If West European economies were strong—and if there were strong confidence in the economic and political role of the United States on the Continent—there would be far less uneasiness about the French and Italian Communist parties (and far more optimism about dealing with them, based on democratic successes in Portugal and Spain). There would be more confidence that left-wing movements—engaged in needed transformation of societies—could in the process contain or simply pre-empt the influence of the Communists.

As it is, there is too little optimism in Europe that moribund governments can cope with the discipline of the Communist parties—acting with or without support from Moscow. The French Socialists and the Italian Christian Democrats each believe they can somehow derive strength from the more energetic Communists, without succumbing to them. In normal times, the intellectual left in these coun-

tries would be fighting anti-democratic movements tooth and nail. Now it, too, has lost its spirit and courage.

If Communists do gain or share power, the political impact will derive in large part from what this change will say about the perceived poverty of democratic alternatives. A victory by the Socialist-Communist coalition in France next March would very likely hasten the entry of the Italian Communists into the government in some form. It would almost surely drive Germany to the right—thereby polarizing the European Community and NATO (in addition to the problems a Mitterand Government would directly pose for those institutions). The United States and Germany would be bound even more closely together, and would be effectively isolated in the Atlantic relationship, along with a more conservative but ineffectual Britain. A further fear is that the United States would in some way withdraw from the Continent—a fear that is actually greater than the fear that the Soviet Union would gain direct advantages from Communists in a West European government.

The prospect of Communists in government also raises longer-range questions: which groups will manage social, economic, and political change in the major West European countries? Will they have enough political strength to manage these changes effectively? And who will provide the sense of direction and purpose for the European Community—assuming that it continues at all as more than a loose customs union?

Relations with the United States

At the heart of the Atlantic relationship, our European friends and allies look to us most for two kinds of “security”: military and economic.

1. *Military security* is more than just the continuation of our commitment to NATO, to its doctrines, and to deterrence of the Soviet Union. Here your London NATO visit—with your emphasis on reassurance and the steadfastness of American purpose—had a positive impact; and except for Germany, our allies place a *lower* estimate on the chances of a European war than we do.

Even more important as a *political factor* in Atlantic relations, our allies need to have confidence in our ability to manage relations with the Soviet Union. Almost without exception, they have been noticeably uneasy during the past few months—in part reflecting disquiet at the beginning of *every* new Administration.

But, there is also deep concern over the course of the SALT negotiations—as much for what “failure” would imply politically in East-West relations as for what it could mean in strategic terms. And widespread European concern earlier this year about our resolve in Africa

was heightened by worries that we are not able to manage the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Less important, but more visible, is widespread European uneasiness about your human rights policies (especially in Germany and France). This uneasiness is only in part based on different tactics or different concerns (as with the ethnic Germans in the East). It is more a fear that basic relations with Moscow will be damaged. Brezhnev has been quick to exploit these fears: in his visit to Paris, in his courting of the Germans, and in the effort to split us off from our allies at the Belgrade conference by presenting a “non-confrontational” alternative to Soviet-American bickering on human rights. In fact, however, your human rights position will in time be seen as a basic underpinning of European society—i.e., as supporting democratic structures and practices. It is already proving to be a weapon against the West European Communist parties.

For our allies, the alternatives to our effective managing of relations with Moscow are not pleasant: a return to earlier tensions; pressures to build up defenses (which their economies and their populations would not tolerate); damage to independent initiatives with the East (particularly by Germany and France); disruption of trading relations with the East; and perhaps even being left holding the sizeable debts of the Soviet Union and East European states.

Difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations also remind our allies that they have very little influence over the course of these relations—on which so much depends for them. Thus our Indian Ocean policy illustrated for Britain and France that security decisions are being taken about an area in which they have interests and involvements, but without their playing a real role. If it can happen there, what about in Europe?

2. *Economic security* for our allies in Europe depends in large part on their confidence that we can cope effectively with our *own* problems, that we will not export our problems to Europe (e.g., through protectionism), and that we will *in fact* see our economic future as bound up with Europe’s. The London Summit was an excellent beginning—but only that. The Europeans are waiting to see:

—Can we continue our economic recovery—without excessive increases in exports to Europe or succumbing to protectionist efforts to decrease their exports to us?

—Will we adopt a *truly effective* energy program to reduce dependence? (This deep concern is partly psychological: constant European pressing on this point goes far beyond the merits or value of an effective energy program, to the heart of our determination—or lack of it—to take the energy problem seriously.)

—Will we help finance weak European economies to avoid their having to impose import restrictions or undertake drastically restrictive measures?

—Are we truly committed to revitalizing international institutions, like the IMF, and are we prepared to follow through on the commitments made (jointly) in London?

—Will we approach the multilateral trade negotiations in ways which avoid threatening fundamental EC institutions like the Common Agricultural Policy?³

—Are we *capable* of preventing another Middle East war, that would cripple the European economy in another oil embargo?

—Can we understand—and account for—their long-range fears of being swamped by a more productive and innovative economy? *Concorde*, non-proliferation, defense procurement, and arms transfer policy are thus seen by many Europeans (especially in France) as interrelated. These issues raise real questions about the capacity of European economies to compete with the United States in an age increasingly dominated (in exportable goods) by high technology.

—Conversely, can we work with Western Europe (and Japan) so that the *restoration* of their economic strength will not lead to another period of intense economic competition (like that of 1970–73), in which the United States again defaults on its pledges to respect and support a strong European Community?

—Can we work out differences on North-South issues with them and the LDCs to prevent economic disruptions adverse to the more vulnerable European economies?

U.S. Leadership

Your Administration holds out great promise for Europe—and what it can derive from renewed American strength of will and purpose. You have effectively put Vietnam and Watergate behind us, and have offered the promise of new vigor in a host of areas. The “European first” strategy is attractive—but there is still a lot of cynicism about what you will do in practice. Even after the Summit, many Europeans are still from “Missouri.”

The issue is complicated by what has long been European ambivalence about American leadership: when it is not there (as during the Vietnam/Watergate years), there is deep concern about our will and purpose; but when we exercise leadership, there is contrary concern about *specific actions and U.S. dominance*. Thus many Europeans could welcome the vigor of your early decisions, and yet object to policies like

³ The 1957 Treaty of Rome, signed by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, defined general objectives for a Common Agricultural Policy, which included the initiation of subsidy payments and price supports designed to stabilize European agriculture. The European Commission proposed the CAP in 1960; provisions went into effect in 1962.

the one on non-proliferation that seem to strike at their economic interests. This contrary European reaction has happened in past Administrations—and it will happen again.

Unlike times in the past, however, the *relative* economic and political weight of the United States is not enough on its own to carry the day—*against* the ambivalence of Europeans, but perhaps *to* their ultimate self-interest.

Now, more than before, U.S. leadership must involve prodding, cajoling, consulting—and a lot of stroking. At times it will be valuable to accept European views of policy that are different from ours—simply as part of the relationship (as we did in not objecting to the most recent EC statement on the Middle East). You are the only Western leader with a firm mandate for the next four years—and you pay the penalty that weak European leaders will lean upon you, while at the same time trying to have their own way. There will be a further failure of European will if we seem not to respond to European needs, but little thanks if we do.

Above all else, you (and the government behind you) must convince the Europeans that you know what you are doing, that you have a sense of where you are going—and can articulate it—and have the strength to carry it through, beginning at home. You must convince them that you have *some* economic answers—even though they clearly do not; and you must convince them that you can manage all those other relations (with the Soviet Union, and in the Middle East) on which for them so much depends.

But even with economic recovery—and with a clear demonstration of your competence, purpose, and openness—the Europeans must do the rest for themselves (and you can encourage greater European leadership). But their doing this is complicated by the fact that the particular leaders you are dealing with this year have their own agendas of simply staying in power. We must find a way to reach beyond their short-term needs, to build relations with *countries* that will outlast this group of leaders.

50. Address by Secretary of State Vance¹

St. Louis, Missouri, July 1, 1977

The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations

This is a special occasion for me to meet with you and to discuss with you such an important subject: American relations with Africa.

Before I turn to our main topic, I would like to add a personal note about the man who has led this organization and who has been a voice for justice and freedom for nearly five decades. I speak of Roy Wilkins [outgoing executive director of the NAACP]—a personal friend, a man I have admired through the years.

Roy Wilkins has not finished his work. There remains an important agenda which he helped fashion—an agenda of human rights and social justice. I know that President Carter and others in his Administration will continue to seek his help, be inspired by his strength, and strive for what he believes to be just.

While guiding the NAACP, Roy never lost sight of the importance which Africa has had for our nation. Africa matters very much to the United States. This is a fact more and more Americans are coming to understand.

You in the NAACP have recognized this fact since the first days of your organization, almost 70 years ago—in sponsoring the first Pan African Congress in 1919;² in your calls, during the days of the Marshall plan, for effective assistance, as well, to Africa, the Caribbean, and other developing areas.

We in a new Administration hope that we can show similar vision as we build our policies toward Africa.

We proceed from a basic proposition: that our policies must recognize the unique identity of Africa. We can be neither right, nor effective, if we treat Africa simply as one part of the Third World, or as a testing ground of East-West competition.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1977, pp. 165–170. All brackets are in the original. Vance delivered his address before the annual convention of the NAACP. The Department transmitted the text of Vance's speech to all African diplomatic posts in telegram 153476, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770234–1039) For the text of the question-and-answer session following Vance's address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1977, pp. 170–174.

² Convening in Paris February 19–21, 1919, the first Pan African Congress brought together African leaders to address the status of Africa during the postwar period, specifically the former German colonies. Attendees endorsed the right of Africans to participate in their own governments and charged the League of Nations with upholding this right.

African reality is incredibly diverse. But out of this diversity comes a general fact of great importance: Africa has an enormous potential—in human talent, in resources to be developed, in energy to be harnessed.

Let us consider how this is true in terms of our own national interests; for Africa's potential is tied to our own.

—The success or failure of the search for racial justice and peace in southern Africa will have profound effects among the American people. And our participation in that search is based on the values of our own society.

—The role of the African nations at the United Nations, and in other multilateral bodies, is pivotal. One-third of the U.N. member states are African.

—Africa's mineral and agricultural wealth already provides a substantial portion of our imports of such commodities as copper, cobalt, and manganese for our industries, and cocoa and coffee for our homes. And Africa supplies 38 percent of our crude petroleum imports.

—Our direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa has increased nearly sixfold over the past 15 years; our trade now is almost 12 times what it was then. And the pattern of our trade with Africa includes an even larger share for black Africa. Trade with South Africa in 1960 was 39 percent of our commerce with Africa; now, our trade with Nigeria alone is double the value of that with South Africa.

—Beyond these political and economic ties that bind our futures, there are the social and cultural links from which we have benefited greatly. Our society and culture are enriched by the heritage so many Americans find in Africa. We experience this enrichment every day—in our literature, our art, our music, and our social values.

During the past few months, as we have considered the specific policies I will discuss today, a number of broad points have emerged. They define the general nature of our approach.

First, the most effective policies toward Africa are affirmative policies. They should not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise. Daily headlines should not set our agenda for progress. A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention.

Second, our objective must be to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace with itself and at peace with the world. The long-term success of our African policy will depend more on our actual assistance to African development and our ability to help Africans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers for short-term diplomatic advantage.

Third, our policies should recognize and encourage African nationalism. Having won independence, African nations will defend it against challenges from any source. If we try to impose American solutions for African problems, we may sow division among the Africans and undermine their ability to oppose efforts at domination by others. We will not do so.

Fourth, our policies must reflect our national values. Our deep belief in human rights—political, economic, and social—leads us to policies that support their promotion throughout Africa. This means concern for individuals whose rights are threatened anywhere on the continent. And it means making our best effort peacefully to promote racial justice in southern Africa. In this we join the many African nations who, having won their freedom, are determined that all of Africa shall be free.

Fifth, our ties with Africa are not only political, but cultural and economic as well. It is the latter two that are most enduring.

And finally, we will seek openness in our dealings with African states. We are willing to discuss any issue, African or global; to broaden our dialogue with African nations; and to try to work with them, even when we may not agree.

Only thus can we promote our views without rancor. Our renewed relations with the People's Republic of the Congo, our experience at the recent conference on southern Africa in Maputo [U.N.-sponsored International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, May 16–21], and our work with African delegations at the United Nations all demonstrate the value of this approach.

In the end, of course, our Africa policy will be judged by results, not intentions.

Assistance for Human Needs

One of Africa's principal concerns is that its basic human needs be met. Despite its vast resources, it is still one of the least developed areas of the world. Eighteen of the twenty-eight least developed countries in the world are African.

We are prepared to help.

In addition to our growing trade and investment relationships with African nations, we are committed to providing economic assistance that will directly improve the lives of those most in need. Turning this principle into practice cannot be accomplished overnight. But it must be done.

Our economic assistance to Africa is being increased from \$271 million in fiscal year 1976 to a projected \$450 million in fiscal year 1978. We hope that assistance from our European friends will also increase, and expect to consult with them on how we all can make the most effective contributions.

To help our aid reach rural villages, we will emphasize support for the development and sharing of appropriate technology and techniques. I have in mind such devices as small farm machinery now being manufactured in Senegal, Upper Volta, Mali, and elsewhere; hand-hydraulic palm oil presses in Nigeria; and basic agricultural extension methods that have succeeded in one nation and could be applied in another. We will also expand support for agricultural research in Africa and try to assure that our own technical assistance is appropriate to African requirements.

We also acknowledge the needs of African states for advanced techniques that will enable them to develop and process more of their own natural resources.

Our Agency for International Development, headed by Governor [John J.] Gilligan, is determined to cut down on red tape in approving assistance projects, so it can respond quickly and effectively. Greater attention will be given to projects which can be started quickly and require minimal outside technical assistance or expensive equipment.

Men and women are more important than machines. Africa's natural resources will be developed by Africa's people. Human development is thus the key to Africa's future. While we will provide additional opportunities for Africans to study here, emphasis will be on programs of training and education in Africa.

We must also remember the importance of Africa's infrastructure. It is a vast continent, and improved transport and communications are essential to its welfare.

I am aware, as I indicate these directions for our programs, how tempting, but mistaken, it would be to design blueprints for another continent's development. We can only work effectively if we work cooperatively with African governments in behalf of *their* development priorities. Accordingly, we will seek to increase our contribution to the African Development Fund. And we are requesting from the Congress \$200 million for the Sahel, to be managed in coordination with the Club du Sahel.

The long drought in the Sahel devastated the economies of some of the poorest countries in the world. Now these countries are working together to become self-sufficient in food production and to develop the ability to withstand future droughts.

In the Club du Sahel, the African states plan together for the region. The donor nations participate in the planning and determine how each can assist most effectively. They then commit the resources necessary to meet their goals. In this process, we are discovering the great value of encouraging coordination among African states; of planning with them and with other donors; and of concentrating on regional

problems rather than isolated projects. For it will be essential that sensible and effective programs be planned and implemented.

America can fully support African development only if we meet the kind of commitments I have outlined. I hope that every citizen with an interest in Africa will make it clear, to the Congress and to us in the executive branch, that he or she wants those commitments met.

Promotion of Human Rights

While we address the reality of human need in Africa, we must also do what we can in behalf of human justice there.

We will be firm in our support of individual human rights. Our concern is not limited to any one region of the continent.

We must understand the diversity of African social and value systems. Gross violations of individual human dignity are no more acceptable in African terms than in ours. One of the most significant events in modern African history—and in the international effort to promote human rights—was the recent decision by Commonwealth countries to condemn the “massive violation of human rights” in Uganda.³ Many African nations took part in this decision. Their action should be applauded.

Abuse of human rights is wrong on any grounds. It is particularly offensive when it is on the basis of race. In southern Africa, issues of race, of justice, and of self-determination have built to a crisis.

—The conflict in Rhodesia is growing. Rhodesian incursions into neighboring countries exacerbate an already dangerous situation and deserve the condemnation they have received. The choice between negotiated settlement and violent solution must be made now. The same is true for Namibia. Many lives—black and white—hang in the balance.

—The risk of increased foreign involvement is real.

—Violence within South Africa grows. There may be more time there than in Rhodesia and Namibia for people of goodwill to achieve a solution. But progress must soon be made, or goodwill could be lost.

—Crisis within the region has brought pressure for stronger action at the United Nations, and appeals to our responsibilities under its charter.

This is the reality we face. The dangers, our interests, and our values, as well as the desires of the Africans themselves, require our involvement—and our most dedicated and practical efforts.

³ Reference is to a communiqué released during the British Commonwealth heads of government meeting in London June 8–16 condemning Ugandan human rights abuses and reaffirming support for majority black rule in Rhodesia. See R.W. Apple Jr., “Uganda Condemned by Commonwealth,” *The New York Times*, June 16, 1977, p. 5 and Bernard D. Nossiter, “Leaders Condemn Uganda,” *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1977, p. A-11.

We cannot impose solutions in southern Africa. We cannot dictate terms to any of the parties; our leverage is limited.

But we are among the few governments in the world that can talk to both white and black Africans frankly and yet with a measure of trust. We would lose our ability to be helpful if we lost that trust. It is therefore essential that our policies of encouraging justice for people of all races in southern Africa be clear to all.

After careful consideration, this Administration has decided to pursue actively solutions to all three southern African problems—Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situation within South Africa itself. These problems must be addressed together, for they are intertwined.

Some have argued that apartheid in South Africa should be ignored for the time being, in order to concentrate on achieving progress on Rhodesia and Namibia. Such a policy would be wrong and would not work.

—It would be blind to the reality that the beginning of progress must be made soon within South Africa, if there is to be a possibility of peaceful solutions in the longer run;

—It could mislead the South Africans about our real concerns;

—It would prejudice our relations with our African friends;

—It would do a disservice to our own beliefs; and

—It would discourage those of all races who are working for peaceful progress within South Africa.

We believe that we can effectively influence South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia while expressing our concerns about apartheid. Implicit in that belief is the judgment that progress in all three areas is strongly in the interest of the South African Government.

We believe that whites as well as blacks must have a future in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. We also believe that their security lies in progress. Intransigence will only lead to greater insecurity.

We will welcome and recognize positive action by South Africa on *each* of these three issues. But the need is real for progress on *all* of them.

Let me review briefly our approach to each.

Rhodesia

We are actively supporting a British initiative to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. In coming weeks, we will be seeking agreement on a constitution that would allow free elections, open to all parties and in which all of voting age could participate equally. These elections would establish the government of an independent Zimbabwe. Our goal is that this be accomplished during 1978.

This constitution should include a justiciable bill of rights and an independent judiciary, so that the rights of all citizens, of all races, are protected.

We also hope to lend greater assistance to the peoples of neighboring nations whose lives have been disrupted by the crisis in southern Africa.

Namibia

In Namibia a solution leading to independence is being sought through the efforts of the five Western members of the Security Council, with South Africa, the United Nations, and other interested parties, including the South West Africa People's Organization. That solution would include free elections in which the United Nations is involved, freedom for political prisoners, repeal of discriminatory laws and regulations, and the withdrawal of instruments of South African authority as the elections are held and independence achieved.

On the basis of our discussions thus far, we are encouraged by the prospects for an independent Namibia, one which will take its rightful place in the African and world community. We welcome the indications of flexibility on the part of South Africa. We are gratified by the confidence shown by many African governments in the efforts of the United States and Western associates on the Security Council. Differences remain, however, and progress will require a willingness on all sides to be openminded and forthcoming. But we will persevere.

South Africa

While pursuing these efforts for peace and justice in Namibia and Rhodesia, we have also expressed to the South African Government our firm belief in the benefits of a progressive transformation of South African society. This would mean an end to racial discrimination and the establishment of a new course toward full political participation by all South Africans.

The specific form of government through which this participation could be expressed is a matter for the people of South Africa to decide. There are many ways in which the individual rights of all citizens within South Africa could be protected. The key to the future is that South African citizens of all races now begin a dialogue on how to achieve this better future.

The South African Government's policy of establishing separate homelands for black South Africans was devised without reference to the wishes of the blacks themselves. For this reason, and because we do not believe it constitutes a fair or viable solution to South Africa's problems, we oppose this policy. We did not recognize the Transkei, and we will not recognize Bophuthatswana if its independence is proclaimed in December, as scheduled.

We deeply hope that the South African Government will play a progressive role on the three issues I have discussed. We will applaud such efforts. If there is no progress, our relations will inevitably suffer.

We cannot defend a government that is based on a system of racial domination and remain true to ourselves. For our policy toward South Africa is reinforced by change in our own society. The activities of the NAACP are a testament to the inseparability of our foreign and domestic goals. It is also entirely fitting that Andy Young [U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations], who has done so much in the struggle against our divisions at home, should now be contributing so well to the design and effectiveness of our policies abroad.

I have heard some suggest that we must support the white governments in southern Africa, come what may, since they are anti-Communist. In fact, the continued denial of racial justice in southern Africa encourages the possibilities for outside intervention.

Similarly, when such crises as the recent invasion of Zaire arise,⁴ we see no advantage in unilateral responses and emphasizing their East-West implications. We prefer to work with African nations, and with our European allies, in positive efforts to resolve such disputes. As President Carter recently said, it is best to fight fire with water.⁵

The history of the past 15 years suggests that efforts by outside powers to dominate African nations will fail. Our challenge is to find ways of being supportive without becoming interventionist or intrusive.

We see no benefit if we interject ourselves into regional disputes. We hope that they can be resolved through the diplomatic efforts of the parties themselves in an African setting.

We are aware of the African concern that we have sometimes seemed more interested in the activities of other outside powers in Africa than in Africa itself. They know that some argue we should almost automatically respond in kind to the increase in Soviet arms and Cuban personnel in Africa.

We cannot ignore this increase—and we oppose it. All sides should be aware that when outside powers pour substantial quantities of arms and military personnel into Africa, it greatly enhances the danger that disputes will be resolved militarily rather than through mediation by African states or by the OAU [Organization of African Unity].

⁴ Reference is to the March 1977 invasion from Angola of the southern Zaire province of Shaba, formerly known as Katanga.

⁵ During his May 22 Notre Dame address (see Document 40), the President commented: "For too many years, we've been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We've fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water."

This danger is particularly great in the Horn, where there has been an escalation of arms transfers from the outside. The current difficulties in Ethiopia, and the tensions among nations in the area, present complex diplomatic challenges. We seek friendship with all the governments of that region. We have established an embassy in the new nation of Djibouti. Its peaceful accession to independence marks a step toward stability in what remains a troubled area.

We will consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisers on their borders, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa. But we hope such local arms races and the consequent dangers of deepening outside involvement can be limited.

In accordance with the policy recently announced by the President, arms transfers to Africa will be an exceptional tool of our policy and will be used only after the most careful consideration.⁶

We hope that all the major powers will join us in supporting African nationalism, rather than fragmenting it, and in concentrating on economic assistance rather than arms.

Our approach is to build positive relations with the Africans primarily through support for their political independence and economic development and through the strengthening of our economic, cultural, and social ties. Our new and positive relationships with nations like Nigeria encourage us in this course. Our efforts to build such relations may not seize the headlines. But this quiet strategy will produce long-term benefits.

Our relations will be closest with those nations whose views and actions are most congruent with ours. We will never forget or take old friends for granted. Their continuing friendship is a fundamental concern; they can rely on our support. When the territorial integrity of a friendly state is threatened, we will continue to respond to requests for appropriate assistance.

We do not insist that there is only one road to economic progress or one way of expressing the political will of a people. In so diverse a continent, we must be prepared to work with peoples and governments of distinctive and differing beliefs.

American representatives in Africa met last May to compare notes and discuss new policy ideas.⁷ They agreed that almost everywhere in

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 40.

⁷ Presumable reference to a May 10 meeting in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, of 33 U.S. diplomats from African posts in order to discuss U.S. policies toward Africa. Young also attended the meeting. (Michael T. Kaufman, "Young, Opening African Trip, Meets in Ivory Coast With 33 U.S. Envoys," *The New York Times*, May 11, 1977, p. 2)

the continent there is a new feeling about America—a sense of hope, a sense that we have returned to our ideals.

The future of Africa will be built with African hands. Our interests and our ideals will be served as we offer our own support. It will require the understanding and approval of this audience, and of Americans everywhere.

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 8, 1977

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #20

1. Opinion

A Time of Testing

I believe that your first period of true testing in international affairs is now upon us. With the Soviets, with our European Allies, and with the Middle East, you confront important obstacles to achieving the objectives you have set for yourself and for carrying through the lines of policy which you have publicly articulated.

How you handle each of these issues will have an important impact on all of them in terms of how other world leaders assess the nature of your statecraft. It is worthwhile to examine each of these issues separately in some detail.

Brezhnev and SALT

For reasons that are in part tactical but which may have more profound motivation, the Soviets have sought to put you in a box. While we are conducting "business as usual" on many fronts (CTB, the Indian Ocean, Scientific Cooperation, etc.), the Soviets, including Brezhnev, have been publicly unresponsive to our many initiatives and, indeed, have claimed our relationship is poor. They have tied an improvement in these relations quite specifically to SALT, making our acceptance of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 7-9/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President wrote "Zbig. J" in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum.

their position the litmus test. At the same time, since May they have, in effect, adjourned the substantive discussion of major SALT issues until September at the earliest, while continuing their public attacks on our SALT position and dismissing the B–1 decision.² Their strategy appears to be to put maximum pressure on you at the eleventh hour of the existing agreement and, in the meantime, keep up a drumfire of public pressure in the hopes that American opinion will cause you to compromise on key points.³

Looking backward, it may well be that the Soviets have misinterpreted our willingness to compromise last May on a three-part SALT agreement.⁴ Coming only six weeks after we tabled our comprehensive proposal they may have felt that the rough treatment they gave us at the time paid off and may believe that further public pressure along those lines may pay off again. They seem to be adopting a similar attitude on the summit: we wanting it and they putting it off.

Our Nervous Allies

Our European allies are always anxious. If we do not get along with the Soviets, they are concerned about the threat to them. If we get along well with the Soviets, they fear condominium over them.⁵ The allies are particularly anxious with a change of Administrations. The Soviets traditionally have sought to drive a wedge between the United States and the Europeans at each change of Administration by suggesting either that we will not defend their interests or that we are incompetent to do so.

The Soviets are making the same effort again. Their opportunities are enhanced by the political and personal insecurities of several West European leaders. That this is, in fact, a campaign is clear by the fact that they are using the human rights issue on which Schmidt, in particular, is vulnerable because of his desire to liberate ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The human rights issue is being portrayed by the Soviets as a campaign which you undertook “out of the blue.” It is important to bear in mind that we have had indications that make clear that there was a

² Reference is to the administration’s decision to discontinue deployment of the B–1 bomber, which the President announced at a June 30 news conference. For Carter’s remarks, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pp. 1197–1208. See also *Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, pp. 131, 134–135.

³ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “The public is with us so far.”

⁴ Vance and Gromyko met in Geneva May 18–20 to discuss SALT II. For additional information about the three-part framework, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 167.

⁵ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “True.”

basic decision to crack down on Soviet dissidents in the middle of last year.⁶ In fact, Sakharov's letter to you was provoked by widespread fear among the dissidents that the Soviets were about to launch such a campaign.⁷ While the reasons for the antidissident campaign are not clear, and are most probably domestic in nature, the effort to blame your Human Rights policy is a Soviet tactic to drive a wedge between you and our allies.

The Middle East

There is no question but that your objectives and your approach in the Middle East face a serious test in the next several weeks. There is strong Israeli and domestic opposition to the objectives you have set forward and the way in which we have sought to stimulate movement. The delicacy of the issues, and the fact that the Arabs and the Israelis interpret the same things differently, has made the need for a steady U.S. course all the more important if our policy is to remain clear. For example, it is unfortunate that we are now receiving reports that your efforts to explain our position to American Jewish leaders yesterday is being interpreted by some of them as signifying that pushing you hard enough pays off.⁸

The Challenge

In SALT, the Middle East, and on human rights, it may well be that ultimately we will have to adjust our objectives and our approach. However, the way we do this is extremely important.⁹ If we appear to be responding to the latest pressure, we will simply invite greater pressure, and unfortunately each area impacts on the other. Everyone is taking our measure and assessing our steadfastness: the Soviets in general, the Middle Easterners in regard to their problem; our allies be-

⁶ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote: "Let's have a brief on this."

⁷ Presumable reference to Sakharov's January 21 letter to the President; see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 2.

⁸ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "That's Amitay's claim." Reference is to Morris "Morrie" Amitay, AIPAC Executive Director. On July 6, the President met with U.S. Jewish leaders at the White House. In his diary entry for that day, the President noted: "We approached this with trepidation, but the meeting came out well. I reassured them that our basic commitment was the preservation of Israel as a secure and peaceful and sovereign nation. We were insisting that the Arabs commit themselves to implementing peace in its fullest sense, that my own preference was that the Palestinian state or entity should not be independent but part of Jordan." (*White House Diary*, pp. 67-68) For the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 49.

⁹ In the left-hand margin next to these two sentences, the President wrote: "Now I see no need to change."

cause of their dependence on us; and even the Chinese are talking tough.

Personally, I do not believe that any significant alteration in our approach is yet required on any of these issues. But if we should decide to make changes, it is crucially important that we do so in a deliberate manner.

Thus, in the next several weeks, we should give extraordinary care to public as well as background remarks concerning SALT, the Middle East, and our relations with our allies. We should spread the word throughout the government that we wish to convey a patient, determined, yet relaxed attitude toward these major issues. Also, you should take the time to lay out at some depth your views to our allies (like Schmidt), so that they sense their larger strategic dimension instead of just listening to them. As for possible modifications in our approach, you will have an opportunity to consider them when you receive the results of the PRC's work on the Middle East,¹⁰ Human Rights,¹¹ and separate memoranda being prepared for you on US-Soviet relations (the assessment and the list of your initiatives).¹²

Whither the Federal Republic of Germany?

The second of the two opinion pieces this week was written by Colonel William Odom of my staff. Bill served a total of 8 years in both East and West Germany. He was also an Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from 1972 to 1974. His opinion piece is interesting—and timely—reading in light of Chancellor Schmidt's impending visit.¹³

"The division of Germany at the end of World War II put the major issue of Europe in this century on ice: the emergence of German power and the relative decline of Britain and France. Furthermore, the Federal Republic broke with the traditional ambivalence about Germany's place in the East or the West by choosing the West. In the intervening three decades, many political leaders in the West have come to *assume*

¹⁰ The Policy Review Committee met on July 12 to discuss the Middle East. For a summary of this meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 50.

¹¹ Presumable reference to the preparation of the response to PRM/NSC-28; see footnote 11, Document 26.

¹² According to an undated memorandum from Vance to Carter regarding the June 26 memorandum prepared in the Department (see Document 46), the President had, on July 6, requested further refinement of the proposals contained in that memorandum. Vance indicated that the Department had followed this directive and offered five additional initiatives: Soviet involvement in North-South issues; expansion of scientific, academic, and cultural exchanges; visa policy; civil aviation; and U.S.-Soviet working groups on various topics. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 6/77)

¹³ Schmidt visited the United States July 13–15.

that indeed the Federal Republic is *irreversibly part of the West as well as a rooted democracy*. Development in three areas could throw *those assumptions into doubt*: (1) The reassertion of German power; (2) the domestic and inter-German political crisis; (3) U.S. policy toward Europe and the USSR.

German power, military and economic, is once more a source of concern in Europe. The NATO alliance has increasingly become a U.S.-German military affair that inspires thinly veiled concern among the NATO allies, especially France and Britain. The European Community has its economic center of gravity in Germany. The FRG stabilizes the EC and plays a key role in the international monetary system. German economic wealth causes no less concern in both Eastern and Western Europe than Germany military power. Thus, the possibility of German political pre-eminence in Europe is again a shadow haunting Europe.

The FRG domestic political crisis has several sources. First, economic prosperity, the German salve for defeat in the last war, has recently been threatened by the specter of inflation and unemployment, seriously undermining the public confidence. Even a change of political leadership will not likely change the popular mood. Second, the SPD *Ostpolitik* has not produced the kinds of results that were promised, either in inter-German relations or in relations with Moscow. That makes the SPD vulnerable to attack by the German right, especially the southern German CSU which is Catholic and anti-Communist. Moreover, the SPD is ex-Marxist and has a northern Protestant following, making the SPD's cultural ties to the East German populace suspect as being more natural than ties to Bavaria. Third, some FDP members of the SPD coalition are already openly dealing with the opposition CDU/CSU. The weakness of the SPD's political base is now also reflected in the loss of control of the Bundesrat. Thus, Helmut Schmidt is in serious political trouble, but the CDU/CSU does not offer a strong alternative.¹⁴

U.S. policy toward Europe and USSR puts additional pressures on the FRG at a time when its ability to manage them is declining steadily. The nuclear energy question, of course, touches the issue of economic prosperity for the Bonn leaders no less than our demand that they risk inflation by loosening up credits and stimulating imports. In the MBFR negotiations, we have recently joined with the NATO participants to overcome Bonn's resistance to tabling manpower strengths by national totals, a move Genscher (of the FDP) has opposed because it could be one more step toward allowing Soviet eventual success in using MBFR

¹⁴ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "I'm not an expert on German politics—Some of the initials are confusing."

to put a lid on FRG military forces levels (something the German right can associate with the Versailles Treaty limitations). Moreover, German paranoia is encouraged by what may look like a tacit negotiating arrangement between NATO and the Soviets intended to keep Germany weak and divided. At the same time, Schmidt acts as if detente were were *his* private preserve and openly castigates the U.S. human rights policy.

The three interacting developments—(1) German military and economic power combined with political weakness, (2) the crisis of *Ostpolitik*, and (3) the tensions created by U.S. policies—make Bonn uncomfortable with the West and frustrated by the East. This is a step back toward the traditional German predicament of being in the middle. At the same time, the interaction of external and domestic political factors could damage the fragile roots of West German democracy. Economic deprivation, fear of Communism, and growing disillusionment with the Western democracies, including the U.S., could in the long run feed anti-democratic and authoritarian sentiments in schizophrenic Germany. The Soviet Union, to be sure, will attempt to exploit the emerging opportunity to loosen Bonn's ties with the U.S."

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

52. Remarks by President Carter¹

Charleston, South Carolina, July 21, 1977

[Omitted here are the President's introductory remarks.]

And I want to talk to you today about the hopes and problems that we as southerners and as Americans share together. I feel a special kinship with your State legislators. For 4 years I was a member of the Georgia Senate, and I still prize State government not only for the talents of those who work in it but, as Fritz Hollings says, for the closeness to the people it represents.

Our Southern States have a proud tradition of local, independent government, and now you're the heirs of that tradition. But we in the South have also felt, perhaps more directly than many others, some of the rapid changes that have taken place in this modern age. More and

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pp. 1309–1315. The President spoke at 3:08 p.m. in the Gaillard Municipal Auditorium before members of the Southern Legislative Conference attending their annual meeting.

more our own lives are shaped by events in other cities, decisions in other States, tensions in other parts of the world.

And as Americans we cannot overlook the way that our fate is bound to that of other nations. This interdependence stretches from the health of our economy, through war and peace, to the security of our own energy supplies. It's a new world in which we cannot afford to be narrow in our vision, limited in our foresight, or selfish in our purpose.

When I took office almost exactly 6 months ago, our Nation was faced with a series of problems around the world—in southern Africa, the Middle East, in our relationships with our NATO allies, and on such tough questions as nuclear proliferation, negotiations with our former adversaries, a Panama Canal treaty, human rights, world poverty.

We have openly and publicly addressed these and other many difficult and controversial issues—some of which had been either skirted or postponed in the past.

As I pointed out in a recent press conference, a period of debate, disagreement, probing was inevitable.² Our goal has not been to reach easy or transient agreements, but to find solutions that are meaningful, balanced, and lasting.

Now, a President has a responsibility to present to the people of this Nation reports and summations of complex and important matters. I feel more secure as President making decisions if I know that either the most difficult, the most complex questions that face me have been understood and debated by you and understood and debated by the Congress.

In the past I think our Nation's leaders have been guilty of making decisions in secret. And even when the decision turns out to be the right one, it makes the President, the Secretary of State speak with a weak voice when they speak alone.

Today, I want to discuss a vitally important aspect of our foreign relations, the one that may most directly shape the chances for peace for us and for our children. I would like to spell out my view of what we have done and where we are going in our relations with the Soviet Union and to reaffirm the basic principles of our national policy.

I don't have any apology for talking about foreign affairs at a southern legislative conference, because foreign affairs and those difficult decisions ought never to be made with a concept that we can abandon common sense and the sound judgment and the constructive influence of the American people.

² Reference is to the President's July 12 news conference. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 1231–1239.

For decades, the central problems of our foreign policy revolved around antagonism between two coalitions, one headed by the United States and the other headed by the Soviet Union.

Our national security was often defined almost exclusively in terms of military competition with the Soviet Union. This competition is still critical, because it does involve issues which could lead to war. But however important this relationship of military balance, it cannot be our sole preoccupation to the exclusion of other world issues which also concern us both.

Even if we succeed in relaxing tensions with the U.S.S.R., we could still awake one day to find that nuclear weapons have been spread to dozens of other nations who may not be as responsible as are we. Or we could struggle to limit the conventional arsenals of our two nations, to reduce the danger of war, only to undo our efforts by continuing without constraint to export armaments around the world.

As two industrial giants, we face long-term, worldwide energy crises. Whatever our political differences, both of us are compelled to begin conserving world energy and developing alternatives to oil and gas.

Despite deep and continuing differences in world outlook, both of us should accept the new responsibilities imposed on us by the changing nature of international relations.

Europe and Japan rose from the rubble of war to become great economic powers. Communist parties and governments have become more widespread and more varied and, I might say, more independent from one another. Newly independent nations emerged into what has now become known as the Third World. Their role in world affairs is becoming increasingly significant.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have learned that our countries and our people, in spite of great resources, are not all-powerful. We've learned that this world, no matter how technology has shrunk distances, is nevertheless too large and too varied to come under the sway of either one or two super powers. And what is perhaps more important of all, we have, for our part, learned, all of us, this fact, these facts in a spirit not of increasing resignation, but of increasing maturity.

I mention these familiar changes with which you are familiar because I think that to understand today's Soviet-American relationship, we must place it in perspective, both historically and in terms of the overall global scene.

The whole history of Soviet-American relations teaches us that we will be misled if we base our long-range policies on the mood of the moment, whether that mood be euphoric or grim. All of us can re-

member times when relations seemed especially dangerous and other times when they seemed especially bright.

We've crossed those peaks and valleys before. And we can see that, on balance, the trend in the last third of a century has been positive.

The profound differences in what our two governments believe about freedom and power and the inner lives of human beings, those differences are likely to remain; and so are other elements of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition is real and deeply rooted in the history and the values of our respective societies. But it's also true that our two countries share many important overlapping interests. Our job—my job, your job—is to explore those shared interests and use them to enlarge the areas of cooperation between us on a basis of equality and mutual respect.

As we negotiate with the Soviet Union, we will be guided by a vision of a gentler, freer, and more bountiful world. But we will have no illusions about the nature of the world as it really is. The basis for complete mutual trust between us does not yet exist. Therefore, the agreements that we reach must be anchored on each side in enlightened self-interest—what's best for us, what's best for the Soviet Union. That's why we search for areas of agreement where our real interests and those of the Soviets coincide.

We want to see the Soviets further engaged in the growing pattern of international activities designed to deal with human problems—not only because they can be of real help but because we both should be seeking for a greater stake in the creation of a constructive and peaceful world order.

When I took office, many Americans were growing disillusioned with *détente*—President Ford had even quit using the word, and by extension, people were concerned with the whole course of our relations with the Soviet Union. Also, and perhaps more seriously, world respect for the essential rightness of American foreign policy had been shaken by the events of a decade—Vietnam, Cambodia, CIA, Watergate. At the same time, we were beginning to regain our sense of confidence and our purpose and unity as a nation.

In this situation, I decided that it was time for honest discussions about international issues with the American people. I felt that it was urgent to restore the moral bearings of American foreign policy. And I felt that it was important to put the U.S. and Soviet relationship, in particular, on a more reciprocal, realistic, and, ultimately, more productive basis for both nations.

It's not a question of a "hard" policy or of a "soft" policy, but of a clear-eyed recognition of how most effectively to protect our own secu-

riety and to create the kind of international order that I've just described. This is our goal.

We've looked at the problems in Soviet-American relations in a fresh way, and we've sought to deal with them boldly and constructively with proposals intended to produce concrete results. I'd like to point out just a few of them.

In the talks on strategic arms limitations, the SALT talks, we advanced a comprehensive proposal for genuine reductions, limitations, and a freeze on new technology which would maintain balanced strategic strength.³

We have urged a complete end to all nuclear tests, and these negotiations are now underway.⁴ Agreement here could be a milestone in U.S.-Soviet relations.

We're working together toward a ban on chemical and biological warfare and the elimination of inventories of these destructive materials.⁵ We have proposed to curb the sales and transfers of conventional weapons to other countries, and we've asked France, Britain, and other countries to join with us in this effort.

We are attempting to halt the threatening proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world which don't yet have the ability to set off nuclear explosives.

We've undertaken serious negotiations on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.⁶ We've encouraged the Soviets to sign, along with us, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would ban the introduction of nuclear weapons into the southern part of the Western Hemisphere.⁷

We have begun regular consultations with the Soviet leaders as co-chairmen of the prospective Geneva conference to promote peace in the Middle East.

³ See footnote 4, Document 51.

⁴ Presumable reference to trilateral U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which began in Geneva in mid-July. Documentation on the talks is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control.

⁵ PD/NSC-15, "Chemical Warfare," issued on June 16, directed a U.S. delegation under the auspices of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to initiate bilateral consultations with the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan, followed by negotiations with the Soviet Union, on a ban on chemical weapons. PD/NSC-15 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control.

⁶ Discussions concerning Indian Ocean arms limitation took place in Moscow June 21–27. Documentation on the discussions is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

⁷ See footnote 4, Document 33.

We and our allies are negotiating together with the Soviet Union and their allies in the Warsaw Pact nations to reduce the level of military forces in Europe.

We've renewed the 1972 agreement for cooperation in science and technology, and a similar agreement for cooperation in outer space.⁸

We're seeking ways to cooperate in improving world health and in relieving world hunger.⁹

In the strategic arms limitation talks, confirming and then building on Vladivostok accords, we need to make steady progress toward our long-term goals of genuine reductions and strict limitations, while maintaining the basic strategic balance.

We've outlined proposals incorporating significant new elements of arms control, deep reductions in the arsenals of both sides, freezing of deployment and technology, and restraining certain elements in the strategic posture of both sides that threaten to destabilize the balance which now exists.

The Vladivostok negotiations of 1974 left some issues unresolved and subject to honest differences of interpretation. Meanwhile, new developments in technology have created new concerns—the cruise missile, the very large intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviets.

The Soviets are worried about our cruise missiles, and we are concerned about the security of our own deterrent capability. Our cruise missiles are aimed at compensating for the growing threat to our deterrent, represented by the build-up of strategic Soviet offensive weapons forces. If these threats can be controlled, and I believe they can, then we are prepared to limit our own strategic programs. But if an agreement cannot be reached, there should be no doubt that the United States can and will do what it must to protect our security and to ensure the adequacy of our strategic posture.

Our new proposals go beyond those that have been made before. In many areas we are in fact addressing for the first time the tough, complex core of longstanding problems. We are trying for the first time to reach agreements that will not be overturned by the next

⁸ American and Soviet officials signed a joint agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and technology during the May 1972 Moscow summit meeting. The agreement authorized the creation of a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. (United Nations *Treaty Series*, volume 852, p. 141) For additional information about the Joint Commission's duties, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 227. At the July 1977 meeting of the Joint Commission, U.S. and Soviet officials opted to renew the agreement for an additional 5 years. (United Nations *Treaty Series*, volume 1087, pp. 102–103)

⁹ For additional information on U.S.-Soviet joint health initiatives, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Documents 286 and 297.

technological breakthrough. We are trying, in a word, for genuine accommodation.

But none of these proposals that I've outlined to you involves a sacrifice of security. All of them are meant to increase the security of both sides. Our view is that a SALT agreement which just reflects the lowest common denominator that can be agreed upon easily will only create an illusion of progress and, eventually, a backlash against the entire arms control process. Our view is that genuine progress in SALT will not merely stabilize competition in weapons but can also provide a basis for improvement in political relations as well.

When I say that these efforts are intended to relax tensions, I'm not speaking only of military security. I mean as well the concern among our own individual citizens, Soviet and American, that comes from the knowledge which all of you have that the leaders of our two countries have the capacity to destroy human society through misunderstandings or mistakes. If we can relax this tension by reducing the nuclear threat, not only will we make the world a safer place but we'll also free ourselves to concentrate on constructive action to give the world a better life.

We've made some progress toward our goals, but to be frank, we also hear some negative comments from the Soviet side about SALT and about our more general relations. If these comments are based on a misconception about our motives, then we will redouble our efforts to make our motives clear; but if the Soviets are merely making comments designed as propaganda to put pressure on us, let no one doubt that we will persevere.

What matters ultimately is whether we can create a relationship of cooperation that will be rooted in the national interests of both sides. We shape our own policies to accommodate a constantly changing world, and we hope the Soviets will do the same. Together we can give this change a positive direction.

Increased trade between the United States and the Soviet Union would help us both. The American-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission has resumed its meetings after a long interlude.¹⁰ I hope that conditions can be created that will make possible steps toward expanded trade.

In southern Africa we have pressed for Soviet and Cuban restraint. Throughout the nonaligned world, our goal is not to encourage dissen-

¹⁰ American and Soviet officials signed a joint agreement for the establishment of a Joint Commercial Commission during the May 1972 Moscow summit meeting. The commission would negotiate a bilateral trade agreement, work on commercial and trade issues, and monitor the U.S.-Soviet trade relationship. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 227.

sion or to redivide the world into opposing ideological camps, but to expand the realm of independent, economically self-reliant nations, and to oppose attempts at new kinds of subjugation.

Part of the Soviet Union leaders' current attitude may be due to their apparent—and incorrect—belief that our concern for human rights is aimed specifically at them or is an attack on their vital interests.

There are no hidden meanings in our commitment to human rights.

We stand on what we have said on the subject of human rights. Our policy is exactly what it appears to be: the positive and sincere expression of our deepest beliefs as a people. It's addressed not to any particular people or area of the world, but to all countries equally, yes, including our own country.

And it's specifically not designed to heat up the arms race or bring back the cold war.

On the contrary, I believe that an atmosphere of peaceful cooperation is far more conducive to an increased respect for human rights than an atmosphere of belligerence or hatred or warlike confrontation. The experience of our own country this last century has proved this over and over again.

We have no illusions that the process will be quick or that change will come easily. But we are confident that if we do not abandon the struggle, the cause of personal freedom and human dignity will be enhanced in all nations of the world. We're going to do that.

In the past 6 months we've made clear our determination—both to give voice to Americans' fundamental beliefs and to obtain lasting solutions to East-West differences. If this chance to emphasize peace and cooperation instead of animosity and division is allowed to pass, it will not have been our choice.

We must always combine realism with principle. Our actions must be faithful to the essential values to which our own society is dedicated, because our faith in those values is the source of our confidence that this relationship will evolve in a more constructive direction.

I cannot forecast whether all our efforts will succeed. But there are things which give me hope, and in conclusion I would like to mention them very briefly.

This place where I now stand is one of the oldest cities in the United States. It's a beautiful town of whose culture and urban charm all Americans are proud—just as the people of the Soviet Union are justly proud of such ancient cities as Tbilisi or Novgorod, which there they lovingly preserve, as you do in Charleston, and into which they in-

fuse a new life that makes these cities far more than just dead remnants of a glorious historical past.

Although there are deep differences in our values and ideas, we Americans and Russians belong to the same civilization whose origins stretch back hundreds of years.

Beyond all the disagreements between us—and beyond the cool calculations of mutual self-interest that our two countries bring to the negotiating table—is the invisible human reality that must bring us closer together. I mean the yearning for peace, real peace, that is in the very bones of us all.

I'm absolutely certain that the people of the Soviet Union, who have suffered so grievously in war, feel this yearning for peace. And in this they are at one with the people of the United States. It's up to all of us to help make that unspoken passion into something more than just a dream. And that responsibility falls most heavily on those like you, of course, but particularly like President Brezhnev and me, who hold in our hands the terrible power conferred on us by the modern engines of war.

Mr. Brezhnev said something very interesting recently, and I quote from his speech: "It is our belief, our firm belief," he said, "that realism in politics and the will for détente and progress will ultimately triumph, and mankind will be able to step into the 21st century in conditions of peace, stable as never before."

I see no hidden meaning in that. I credit its sincerity. And I express the same hope and belief that Mr. Brezhnev expressed. With all the difficulties, all the conflicts, I believe that our planet must finally obey the Biblical injunction to "follow after the things which make for peace."

Thank you very much.

53. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Brown¹

San Francisco, California, July 29, 1977

The Framework for National Security Decisionmaking

The headlines always deal with specific issues such as the B-1 or the so-called neutron bomb.² But today I want to talk more about the framework within which those decisions are made more than about the decisions themselves.

As you well know, the security of the United States is the first responsibility of any Administration. The reason is obvious: Unless the safety of the nation is assured, we can have no reasonable chance of responding effectively to more than our most basic domestic needs.

For the last 6 months, with that priority in mind, the President has spent more time on national security than on any other single issue. No doubt, most of you have heard or read about some of the results—the meetings in Moscow on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], the decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea,³ the drive to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, renewed negotiations over the Panama Canal, even discussions with Cuba and Vietnam.

I have heard two conclusions drawn from these activities. The first is that ours is a purely reactive posture that deals with problems only once they have become acute. The second is that beneath the velvet glove of our diplomacy there is another velvet glove. Both conclusions are wrong. Let me tell you why.

Most Americans now recognize why the United States, which became heavily involved in world affairs during and after World War II,

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1977, pp. 297–301. All brackets are in the original. Brown spoke before the World Affairs Council of Northern California. For the text of the question-and-answer session following Brown's remarks, see *ibid.*, pp. 301–304.

² Reference is to the cancellation of the B-1 bomber (see footnote 2, Document 51) and the development of enhanced radiation weapons (ERW). Documentation about ERW is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.

³ Reference is to the President's decision to withdraw 33,000 U.S. Army troops from South Korea beginning in 1978 and concluding in 1982 or 1983. On May 11, the Department of State announced that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George Brown and Habib would fly to Seoul on May 24 to engage in talks with South Korean officials. (Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. and Seoul to Start Discussion Of Troop Pullout Late This Month," *The New York Times*, May 12, 1977, p. 4) On June 5, the administration announced that it had informed the Governments of South Korea and Japan that the United States would remove 6,000 American ground troops from South Korea by the end of 1978. (Bernard Gwertzman, "6,000 Ground Troops in Korea Will Leave by end of Next Year: Timetable is Disclosed by U.S." *The New York Times*, June 6, 1977, p. 1)

continues to remain involved—inextricably—despite Vietnam and the other difficult, if less searing, experiences of the last decade.

We cannot afford to see the rest of the world dominated by another power. Our safety depends in large part on an orderly diffusion of power rather than an attempt to concentrate it in our own hands, let alone having it fall into a single power center elsewhere. We need independence, territorial integrity, and freedom from external attack not only for ourselves but for others as well. We recognize that need through our treaty and nontreaty commitments.

We would, in my view, find it virtually impossible to preserve our internal liberties if we were an island of democracy in a sea of totalitarianism. We could hardly hope to maintain a stable and expanding economy if we were deprived of external markets. Defense in this modern age would become an almost intolerable burden if we did not have allies to contribute both resources and strategic locations to the collective security. In a time of instant communications, we could hardly insist on human rights at home and silently watch their violation abroad.

Maybe it has become a cliché, but we do in fact inhabit an interdependent world. Our own actions have widespread international effects. Decisions by other nations can have a major impact on us as well. The oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent increase in our petroleum imports—which now make up half our oil consumption—constitute only the more obvious index of interdependence. We are bound to care—and care deeply—about what happens in many parts of the world. Because of our power and influence, other nations are bound to care about us; some of them will always seek our involvement in their problems. Isolation today is about as relevant for the United States as the one-horse shay.

Perhaps we have been too much of an international busybody in the recent past. But no one can doubt that there remains much to busy us in this dynamic world.

The Soviet Challenge

Our principal long-term problem continues to be the Soviet Union. Whether we like it or not, the Soviet leadership seems intent on challenging us to a major military competition. To quote a friend and colleague—someone whose professional efforts over the past 15 years have been focused on arms control and who during most of that time has considered that U.S. actions were driving the competition: The principal factor driving the arms race now is the Soviet military buildup, strategic and tactical.

The most evident—and dangerous—features of this challenge arise from the steady annual increases, in real terms, in the Soviet de-

fense budget, the buildup and improvement of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the modernization of Soviet ground and tactical air forces in Eastern Europe, and the growing sophistication of Soviet naval forces, which include a gradually expanding capability to project military power at considerable distances from Russia itself.

Whatever the motives behind it, the challenge is serious; we must not underestimate it. At the same time, we should recognize that the resulting competition is not an all-out contest compared with arms races of the past. It isn't a purely military competition either.

We are spending a little more than 5 percent of GNP on our defense establishment. Our best current estimate is that the Soviets are allocating between 11 and 13 percent of a much smaller GNP to their military effort, with the bulk of it designed to give them a capability against the United States and its immediate allies, although a significant amount reflects the problem posed by the People's Republic of China.

Both sides—and especially the United States—could invest a great deal more in defense. As of now, however, it would be a mistake to concentrate all our attention or the bulk of our resources on the arms race. The competition reaches into other areas also, and we have comparative advantages in them, whereas in the military arena the present balance and prospective potentials of the two sides are close. In fact we welcome peaceful competition because when it comes to industrial, agricultural, and technological strength; to the efficiency as well as the humaneness of our system; and to relative political influence, we have it all over the Soviet Union, and we can act with the confidence and restraint that knowledge justifies.

We must take account of the Soviet challenge at all times. Failure to do so will be dangerous and could be fatal. But there are other trends in the world that could have long-term effects, either helpful or perilous to our security; we must recognize them as well.

We have every reason to be encouraged by the revival of freedom in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. We may possibly find some hope in the possible rejection by the Eurocommunists—a posture we must view with caution—of Moscow as the sole font of wisdom and authority. It is even conceivable that some "Socialist" nations, particularly those that do not live right in the shadow of the U.S.S.R., are becoming dissatisfied with having no alternative to dealing with and depending on the hardcore Soviet bloc for their security and well-being. That is the good news.

The bad news is that we also face a number of more dangerous developments. Nuclear weapons already are an unprecedented threat to mankind; their continued proliferation—horizontal as well as vertical—can only make matters worse. More generally, the violent settle-

ment of disputes seems to be on the increase. Subversion, terrorism, and organized national force are on almost constant display. And their lethality is being heightened by the expanding trade in nonnuclear weapons and technologies. We live in a tough neighborhood.

Current Issues and the U.S. Role

It is a neighborhood where, as the result of earlier and often neglected developments, a number of current and potentially explosive issues beg for a solution one way or another. The differences in the Middle East may have been narrowed; they have not disappeared. Racial tensions and clashes in Africa are mounting. The Sino-Soviet dispute is quiescent but by no means extinct. The rising price of oil continues to send periodic shocks through the international economy. We still lack an agreed international law of the seas.

The list could be made even longer and more forbidding. But the main point about it is this: While many of the issues may be specialized or regional in nature—and may not even involve the Soviet Union to begin with—they can escalate rapidly to the superpower level unless they are contained, defused, and eventually resolved. We should be concerned about them for many reasons. We must, in any event, be concerned about them on national security grounds.

The analogy of the two scorpions in a bottle may not precisely capture the current situation. (It undoubtedly oversimplified the real situation of the past as well. Now, as then, there are lots of other bugs, ants, crickets, butterflies, and also a few vipers in the bottle.) Nonetheless, we should be wary of letting the two scorpions and their bottle be put on top of a powder magazine built over a match factory. The scorpions may be cautious, but someone else could strike a match.

It would be tempting to turn our backs altogether on this turbulent and dangerous world. But that choice is no longer open to us. The United States is bound to have a substantial but finite influence on the rest of the world. If other nations do not catch colds when the United States sneezes, they will certainly feel the draft.

Our highest hopes for a world of peace and order have not been realized. But our worst fears have not materialized. Utopia is not just around the corner, but Armageddon is not inevitable either. Despite constraints and mistakes, our record of accomplishments has been, on the whole, a good one. Now is not the time to turn away from it.

As a nation, we are less inclined than in the 1960's to see a threat in every alien event—and that is a part of wisdom. But wisdom and inertia are not the same thing. It is true that we could adopt a passive strategy, reacting to events only in the hope of staying out of trouble rather than acting to shape them. But that is not the President's style.

He does not propose to be an observer or arbitrator; neither do I. He likes to take initiatives; in my own area of responsibility, so do I.

We have learned that we cannot mold the international environment at all precisely to our preferences, however altruistic those preferences may be. But we can still try to help create a world that accepts and respects certain fundamental rights of nations—rights such as national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom from unprovoked attack. We may not have a grand design—and I certainly don't want to propose a pentagonal model—but we can still seek a reasonably peaceful and stable international environment.

If that is our goal, as I believe it is, then we must pay attention to the major issues and trends I have noted. The peaceful settlement of disputes is to our interest; it is to everyone's interest. At the same time, we must adapt to where necessary, and control if possible, the trends which could threaten the nation's security. A strong national defense is part, but only one part, of that process. Short-term diplomacy and longer run programs to create a more benign international environment must have equal priority. Once that is understood, the outlines of our strategy and posture should become evident.

Our actions can be the more restrained, the greater our strength. The glove may be velvet, but friends and foes will find that there is—and will continue to be—a firm hand inside it.

The Approach to Issues and Trends

As we come to grips with current issues and provide support to our diplomacy, it is essential that we in the national security community abandon old stereotypes. Lord Keynes once claimed that: "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. . . ." Where one issue in particular is concerned, some of us give the impression of becoming the slaves, if not to a defunct economist at least to some strategist from a bygone age.

I refer to the Panama Canal. On this issue, in this day and age, it is surely unreasonable to cling to obsolete asserted rights and outmoded claimed privileges at the risk of losing everything—or of preserving our position only at a terrible cost in blood, treasure, and long-term hostility. The issue of the Panama Canal is not the sanctity of treaties or the maintenance of essential U.S. security interests; we have successfully insisted on both.

Successful completion of negotiations will result in the United States and the Republic of Panama signing a new treaty binding the two parties until the year 2000. The treaty will guarantee the neutrality of the canal, the access of all U.S. ships to it in peace and war, and U.S. protection of it in collaboration with Panama.

If we do not obtain such a treaty, those rights will just as surely be in jeopardy. According to the best informed military opinion, we can't defend the canal from a hostile Panama. It is too vulnerable to a sack of dynamite—or to a glove in the gears. Our relations with Latin America will deteriorate. We will be worse off without a reasonable revision of the existing treaty than with one.

Accordingly, the real issue before us is whether we, as a party to the original treaty, have the imagination, the magnanimity, and the realism to recognize that a number of fundamental social and ethical conditions have changed and that it is in our self-interest to renegotiate the treaty.

I believe we have those qualities and that on this issue, as on others, we can make progress in defusing what could otherwise become an explosive situation into which troublemakers might be drawn.

Where longer term trends are concerned, the desirability of controlling nuclear proliferation cannot be in question from the standpoint of national security. The President's determination to conserve energy supplies and reduce our dependence on foreign oil makes equally good sense on the same grounds. So do efforts to review outstanding issues with old foes and former adversaries.

The Role of Defense

Finally, if we are to achieve a reasonable settlement of explosive current issues and have the time to affect longer run trends before they become explosive, we and our allies have work to do in the realm of defense. If we are to bring other and more constructive instruments to bear on international problems, our collective security system must be effective, reliable, and durable.

Strength breeds the confidence not only to talk but also to institute constructive change. I regret, in this connection, that I cannot review in detail my trip to the Republic of Korea and Japan.⁴ First, I must report on it to the President. But this much I can say: The situation on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia has changed greatly since 1950.

⁴ Brown attended the tenth annual Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul July 25–26. At the conclusion of the meeting, Brown and South Korean Defense Minister Suh Jong Chul issued a joint statement affirming that the ground combat force withdrawals did not signify a change in U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea. The statement also indicated that the majority of U.S. soldiers stationed in South Korea would remain there until the final year of the withdrawal. (Bernard Weintraub, "U.S. Will Keep Bulk of Combat Forces in Korea Until 1982: Response to Plea by Seoul," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1977, pp. 1, 6) On July 27, Brown, then in Tokyo, briefed Fukuda and other Japanese Cabinet ministers as to the nature of the agreement. (John Saar, "Brown Allays Japanese Misgivings About U.S. Withdrawal Forces From Korea," *The Washington Post*, July 28, 1977, p. A-14) Documentation on Brown's trip is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIV, Japan; Korea.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is now a fact of life. No one should doubt that the United States will remain a major power in the western Pacific and East Asia. Our capability for the rapid deployment of U.S. forces has been enhanced and will be strengthened still further.

Elements of our tactical Air Force will remain in South Korea, and other units—ground, naval, and air—will be in the theater. The Republic of Korea, for its part, now has twice the population and five times the GNP of North Korea. Above all, we will continue to work with our Korean ally to assure that any attack from the North can be defeated even after the 4–5-year period during which the U.S. ground forces will be withdrawn from the peninsula. Surely those are powerful conditions of deterrence and stability.

Make no mistake about it; we are determined to maintain and modernize our collective security system. We are equally determined, to the extent that the arms competition cannot be brought under control, to strengthen the competitive position of the United States.

Where our allies have developed the necessary strengths, we will adjust the collective burdens to assure that our long-term security arrangements remain commensurate with the capabilities and stakes of the partners. Otherwise those arrangements cannot endure.

Where technology has produced total or partial substitutes for more traditional weapons systems, and has done the job efficiently, we will—with all due caution—begin the substitution. That, in fact, is the main basis for planning to turn over some of the functions of the penetrating manned bomber to long-range cruise missiles and canceling production of the B-1.

Where inefficiencies exist, as in our use of scarce personnel and our maintenance of an excessive base structure—and other overhead—we will attack them as vigorously as our other problems. Furthermore, we will not be deterred from that attack—although we may on occasion be delayed—by domestic political obstacles.

Most important of all, where increases in hostile foreign forces threaten our ability to maintain the conditions of collective security, we will insure the restoration of our position. Nothing in history suggests that we can reach our goals from a position of weakness.

We are not in a position of weakness in those functions and regions we consider vital to our security. The strategic nuclear balance, despite the Soviet buildup, remains in equilibrium. The balance of tactical power in Europe is more precarious, but it has not yet tilted against NATO to the point where deterrence of the Warsaw Pact is threatened. If another war begins in the Middle East, it will not be because of a lack of Israeli strength. The situation in Korea, in our judgment, is and can be kept militarily stable, despite increases in North Korean offensive

power. And our naval forces still control the sea lanes to Europe, the Middle East, and northeast Asia.

There is where we would prefer to halt the military competition and begin the process of equitable arms reduction. From the standpoint of the United States, now is the time to stop the buildup—if others are willing, end the folly of nuclear proliferation, and cease the wasteful transfer of conventional arms in excess of their real needs to developing nations.

But we cannot bring about those results unilaterally. If others will not cooperate, we will adapt. Certainly we will not shrink from a world that demands increased strength as well as greater justice.

I realize that I have outlined a complex approach to the problems of national security. At times the approach may appear internally inconsistent. It is not. We can move toward the peaceful resolution of international differences only if the conditions of collective security are maintained. We can maintain the conditions of collective security—without excessive cost and risk—only if we move to resolve current international differences and deal constructively with long-term trends.

To do both we need moral, diplomatic, and economic—as well as military—strength. We also need your understanding and support.

54. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 26, 1977

SUBJECT

Foreign Policy: The First Six Months

On vacation I read articles reviewing your first six months' foreign policy which struck me as so silly and superficial—focusing largely on how good or bad our relations were with other governments and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 26, Foreign Policy: 5/77–11/29/77. Confidential. Sent for information. The President wrote "Good. J" in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. In his July 29 weekly report, Brzezinski offered his assessment of the first 6 months of the administration in the "form of a report card, self inflicted." Carter added the following notation at the end of that report: "You're too generous—We must a) have clear goals & b) be tenacious." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weekly National Security Report: 7–9/77)

urging you to improve them—that I thought it might be useful to review what had really gone on in the last six months, to see whether more useful lessons could be drawn.

1. *Risk of War.* The media have always been preoccupied with whether Soviet leaders smile or frown at the US. But events since 1945 suggest that the ups and downs of detente are not the main factor shaping the danger of conflict between these two countries: The super-powers are drawn into adversary confrontation more by local crises in other areas than by coolness in their bilateral relations. So in assessing how your policy in the last six months has affected the risk of conflict, we should look to what has happened in potential crisis areas:

(a) *Middle East.* In the last six months the US developed a clear policy regarding the principles that should govern a general Middle East settlement. The Arab countries responded with a modest show of flexibility; the Israeli election produced a government less flexible than its predecessors, and its stance is popular at home. So the search for a settlement will be even longer and more difficult than seemed likely a few months ago. But you have defined the kind of settlement that is needed, which is a necessary first step.

(b) *Korea.* Your announced decision to withdraw US forces from Korea involved both potential pluses and minuses.² The *pluses* were twofold: Withdrawal of one brigade in 1978 should permit significant savings if that brigade is disbanded (as one brigade of each of the other two lightly-armed US Army divisions has been disbanded); whether or not this is done, eventual withdrawal of all US forces will give us the option of confining US involvement in any future Korean war to air and sea action. The *minus* is that the North Korean government may be more inclined to consider a pre-emptive attack. If the timing of further withdrawals after 1978 can be made dependent on North Korean actions and attitudes, we will have committed ourselves to the right long-term course without enhancing the risk of conflict.

(c) *Europe.* Six months ago there seemed some danger that the balance of power in Central Europe would shift sufficiently in favor of the USSR to encourage Soviet leaders to mount growing pressure on the West (or perhaps to intervene in a grey situation such as Yugoslavia, if the occasion arose). This risk has been reduced by the program to build up NATO forces that you launched in London.³

2. *Economic.* The most likely threat to the industrial democracies is not war, but a long-term deterioration in their economic circumstances,

² See footnote 3, Document 53.

³ See Document 38.

due to continuing stagflation. Policies to which the US contributed in the last six months have somewhat reduced this danger:

(a) *Macro-Economic Policies*. At London, the seven leading industrial nations committed themselves to sensible growth and stabilization targets for 1977. These commitments strengthened pro-growth groups in the German and Japanese governments, and hence contributed to the German and Japanese expansionist decisions which will probably be taken soon, and which should yield good growth records in 1978, after a dismal German growth record in 1977. Summit stabilization pledges probably also strengthened the commitment of the French, British, and Italian governments to needed and painful anti-inflationary policies.

(b) *Financial Indebtedness*. In your first six months, the US played a large role in bringing about international agreement to establish a new \$10 billion IMF facility to make loans to developed and developing countries that are running deficits.⁴ This has been a major success, even if one has to look among the corset ads to find press articles about it.

(c) *Trade*. Bob Strauss' agreement with the European Commission has gotten the long-stalled Tokyo Round trade negotiations moving again, although there are still serious obstacles ahead.⁵

(d) *Energy*. Your domestic energy program⁶ set the stage for a continuing attack by the main industrial countries on one of the main threats to growth and price stability in the industrial world: the imbalance between global energy supply and demand.

None of this is going soon to solve the economic problems facing the industrial countries, particularly the weaker European nations. But our policies in the first six months have helped to get things moving in the right direction. And they have helped to strengthen the international institutions—IMF, Summitry, GATT—within which further progress can be sought.

⁴ Reference is to the Witteveen facility, named after IMF Managing Director H. Johannes Witteveen, allowed the IMF to borrow funds from member countries to disburse to other member nations. The facility became operative in February 1979.

⁵ At a July 11 meeting in Brussels with representatives of the European Commission, Strauss outlined a timetable to continue the Tokyo Round talks (see footnote 4, Document 6 and footnote 11, Document 29), which had been stalled, in part, due to issues relating to agricultural goods, and expressed his hope that negotiations could be concluded in 90 days after January 1978. ("Strauss Hopes Talks on Trade Will Bring an Accord by Spring: Negotiator Outlines Four 'Phases' in Bargaining—Confers With Common Market Leaders," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1977, p. 35) In late July, U.S. and EC negotiators agreed to a series of negotiating procedures concerning agricultural products, thus allowing the talks to go forward. ("U.S., Common Market Settle 4-Year Dispute On Agricultural Talks," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 28, 1977, p. 8)

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 47.

3. *Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.* In the last six months the US recognized the long-term importance of these two areas and acted accordingly, seeking the basic changes that are needed, rather than the quick fixes that make good news stories.

—Instead of accepting a quick and relatively meaningless deal on arms control, the new Administration sought a major reduction in strategic force levels that would enhance nuclear stability, even if it took longer to achieve.

—We are launching the long-term international study of how to meet peaceful nuclear energy needs without proliferation pledged at the Summit. If this study eventually suggests creation of a major new international institution to provide assurances of nuclear fuel to importing countries and to store spent fuel, it could be one of the most important new advances in global architecture since the 1940s.

4. *Defense Policy.* The last six months have seen major shifts in defense policy, which will make it more effective in supporting US foreign policy:

—A shift from the previous Administration's undue emphasis on strategic forces to greater stress on general purpose forces, the type of military power that counts most in an age of nuclear parity.

—Within general purpose forces, increased emphasis on Europe-oriented forces, which are badly in need of improvement.

There's a lot more work to be done in strengthening US conventional forces, particularly ground forces in Europe and air and naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. But our policy has begun to reflect the right priorities.

5. *North-South Relations.* The last Administration focused on cosmetic gestures to respond to LDC concerns in UN debates. In its first six months, this Administration focused on substance:

(a) *IBRD.* You reversed the previous Administration's position and committed the US to support a large general increase in the World Bank's resources.⁷

⁷ In 1976 World Bank officials sought an increase in the bank's capitalization. The Ford administration, however, approved a lower level than desired by McNamara. (Thomas E. Mullaney, "Carter and World Bank Goals: Leaning Toward More Cost Aid," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1977, p. 83) In his message to Congress on foreign assistance, released on March 18 (see footnote 9, Document 29), Carter indicated that the administration would increase the amount of aid to the international financial institutions.

(b) *Aid*. You pledged the US to a large increase in aid⁸ and commissioned internal and external studies⁹ as to how it might best be achieved.

(c) *Commodities*. The US settled on a sensible commodity stabilization policy which, if agreed to by others, should reduce price fluctuations that are equally harmful to developed and developing countries.

6. *Public Confidence*. You have restored a measure of public confidence in US foreign policy by aligning it in greater degree with traditional American values. I am sceptical that your human rights policy will do much to change dictatorships around the world and that US African policy will avert continuing turmoil in Southern Africa; but I'm also sceptical that either of these policies does any harm, and both policies do considerable good at home—in re-establishing the connection between US foreign policy and US public opinion that was fractured by the seeming opportunism of the last Administration.

7. *The Rest*. Compared to these accomplishments, the matters on which the media tend to focus seem trivial:

—Doubtless *Giscard* and *Schmidt* have moments of irritation with your ideas. This hasn't prevented the important accomplishments noted above; indeed, it may well be the price of these accomplishments. And it seems to be tapering down, if not a thing of the past, to judge from *Schmidt's* last visit.

—*Brezhnev* is annoyed by your human rights campaign. But nothing in the past record of Soviet policy suggests that this will prevent him or his successors from entering into any agreements with us that they conceive to be in the Soviet interest—any more than a US retreat from human rights would cause him to offer us substantive concessions. He is probably also put out because you have made clear that progress in the US-Soviet relations depends on concrete agreements; but this was an overdue change in past US policy.

8. *Conclusion*. The success or failure of foreign policy isn't determined by whether heads of government do or don't say nice things about us. It's determined by whether we're successful in building the world order to which you pledged yourself in the campaign. This means looking for areas of common interest, particularly with the industrial democracies—but also with developing and Communist coun-

⁸ At the CIEC meeting in Paris May 30–June 3, Vance announced that the administration planned to seek an increase in bilateral and multilateral aid over the next 5 years; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 265.

⁹ Presumable reference to the DCC development assistance review and a Brookings Institution study entitled *An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategy*. For summaries of each study, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 282.

tries, and creating or strengthening international institutions that can give effect to these interests. This takes time. But if you stick with it (instead of being diverted by media demands for instant and superficial successes)—in short, if you do as well in the next 3½ years in focusing on structural problems as you did in the first six months, even the press will admit by 1980 that your Administration has accomplished more than any President since Truman, who also focused on architectural improvements rather than cosmetic gestures.

55. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 21, 1977

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko

Your meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko could be a turning point. Soviet policy is apparently confused and uncertain.² Brezhnev claims he has serious concerns about you and about the general thrust of our policies. The talks with Gromyko, therefore, are an opportunity for you to shape the relationship personally and directly. But the talks will also be the first chance for the top leadership to assess you personally. Gromyko's report of his meeting here in Washington thus will be a critical input to the politburo and Brezhnev's future decisions.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 9/15–21/77. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to the President under a covering memorandum in which he made two suggestions for the conduct of the upcoming meeting with Gromyko. He suggested that Carter begin the meeting with a plenary session in which he could "expound systematically your approach to US–Soviet relations and your view in general of US foreign policy." Secondly, Brzezinski offered that the President, at the conclusion of the meeting, "invite Gromyko to your office for a personal conversation with you alone. The meeting will thus end on a cordial note (which is more important than the illusion of cordiality before serious discussions) and you can then convey a final and personal message to Brezhnev." Attached but not printed are a Comprehensive Test Ban background paper, a Comprehensive Test Ban issues paper, and two papers on the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

² Gromyko met six times with Carter and Vance in Washington September 22–23; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 50 and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents 182 and 183. After attending the UN General Assembly meeting, Gromyko returned to Washington to meet with Carter and Vance on September 27; see *ibid.*, Document 184.

The Soviet Perspective

Over the next month or so, Brezhnev will be putting the finishing touches on whatever programmatic statement he and the politburo intend to issue in honor of the new constitution and the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. These occasions tend to take on more than a purely ceremonial significance. Probably, there will be an appraisal of the general international situation, and in particular, the future course of Soviet-American relations. While the Soviets could opt for a freeze in relations, Brezhnev's preference probably is to reinstate "detente."

—He knows that you will certainly be in office to deal with his successor; moreover, the Soviets cannot ignore the fact that the US has emerged from the Vietnam-Watergate turmoil with a new sense of confidence and thus in a far better strategic position to endure a period of stagnation or even confrontation.

—In contrast to our situation, the Soviets are approaching the end of the Brezhnev period which will be symbolized by the new constitution. While this period has been marked by certain Soviet successes in containing dissent at home and in East Europe and in expanding Soviet influence, in the past several years troubles have also grown—in relations with the US, in the Middle East, in India and Africa. The growth of Soviet military power has not provided a basis for permanent political influence, in part because international concerns have broadened to include newer issues in which the USSR risks irrelevancy. And, finally, the USSR is constrained by the fact that it finds itself deeply indebted to and dependent on the Western world for its economic growth.

Your Objectives

Since the Soviets, including Brezhnev, profess confusion over your policies, you may want to use this as an opening theme:

- (1) laying out the general line of your policy;
- (2) relating it to Soviet-American relations, and
- (3) indicating quite frankly some specific problems we have with Soviet behavior.

1. American Foreign Policy

Your policies have been designed to be responsive to the rapid changes occurring in the world and to reflect the new sense of confidence and moral consciousness among our people:

—We recognize that a number of the challenges that arise from this process of change impose special responsibilities on the most advanced industrial countries—for example, non-proliferation, economic and social justice, the desire for individual liberty, and the gap between rich

and poor nations, transcend ideological boundaries and the traditional great power rivalries.³

—The US identifies with these aspirations and will pursue policies to help shape the process in a constructive manner.

—This is the context in which we view the question of human rights.

—A major part of your UN speech⁴ will deal with the global agenda.

A second element in your policy will be the continuing close relationship with our allies in Europe and Asia; we intend to give the alliances a new sense of purpose by cooperating not only in the traditional areas of military and political affairs, but increasingly in new areas.

Third, the US will continue to maintain a strong defense posture. This is not said as a threat but reflects the realities of the present period.⁵

Finally, we want to work for a reduction in tensions—both in regional conflicts such as the Middle East and Africa, and in functional areas of arms control, arms transfer, and non-proliferation.⁶

2. US-Soviet Relations

US-Soviet relations will occupy an important place in your policies and can contribute to the growth of a new international order.⁷

—We recognize that strong elements of competition and rivalry persist in that relationship. They have deep historical roots and reflect the differences in our two societies.

—Recognizing these realities we nevertheless believe that stronger elements of a cooperative relationship can emerge if we accept the principles of *restraint* and *reciprocity*. These can be the foundations of a genuine detente; on this basis we can gain domestic support. Otherwise, relations will be erratic.

The current task is how to give our common interests a new impetus, so that the cooperative elements will become the predominant feature of the relationship.

³ In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President listed: "Technology, Food, non-prolif, LAmer, Mid E, S Africa, NATO, PRC, V Nam, Cuba, Japan, S Korea."

⁴ See Document 56. In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: "Hum Rts."

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "strong defense."

⁶ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "Arms Sales, MBFR, CTB, SALT, Indian Oc, Satellites."

⁷ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "US/SU, Peace, Competition."

We see the following agenda:

—Soviet policy in the *Middle East* is a test of whether we can work together to promote the general international objective of building a lasting peace, or whether the USSR will be bound by the narrower national interests of maintaining its alignment with the most radical elements of Arab politics.⁸

—We will continue to work for a Geneva conference, but the question is whether the Soviet Union will use its influence to create the necessary preconditions—both procedurally and substantively—or simply try to isolate Israel while fueling an arms race.

—Soviet behavior thus far raises some serious questions for us.

Similarly, we are puzzled by Soviet policy in Africa:

—The US has taken the lead in trying to arrange a peaceful settlement in Southern Africa—but we have had little support from the USSR—indeed, we have mainly heard criticism.⁹

—Both countries should have learned lessons from Vietnam and Angola that involvement of the two strongest powers in explosive regions turning regional conflicts into confrontations can only lead to disasters.

3. Arms Control

The US has taken the initiative in almost every area of arms control, in SALT, the test ban, and the Indian Ocean, proposals for discussing ban on interference with satellites, and discussing civil defense.

—Constant criticism from the Soviet Union suggests to us that the Soviet Union is more interested in making propaganda points than negotiating: the campaign against our SALT proposals and the neutron bomb are cases in point.

Nevertheless, we are now prepared to move to a broad front:

—We will continue to press for an end to *all* nuclear explosions as soon as possible; the Soviets have only raised political conditions. If we want to demonstrate a genuine interest in halting proliferation of nuclear weapons and reducing the threat of war, then a comprehensive ban without political conditions, or exceptions for peaceful tests, is an issue where *immediate* progress is possible. We do not even rule out a temporary cessation of all testing to give the negotiation a momentum. It is now up to the Soviet side.

⁸ In the right-hand margin slightly above this paragraph, the President wrote: “Mid E–SU coop?”

⁹ Immediately below this point, the President wrote: “S Africa–SU Coop?”

In the Indian Ocean, we are also ready to take a new initiative to stabilize the situation immediately and then bring about some reductions; next week we will present a new plan to the Soviet negotiators.

—In general, we are willing to restrict our activities, if the USSR is ready to reciprocate.

—For example, we would give assurances that we do not intend to deploy B-52s in the area if the USSR would, in turn, not deploy strike aircraft.

—We will not alter our present submarine operations if the USSR reciprocates.

In short, our approach reflects the basic principle of reciprocity, which should govern all our relations, and above all be manifested in the SALT negotiations.

—In SALT, you have had a chance to discuss our most recent proposal.

—We are not seeking unilateral advantages over the USSR, but the Soviet Union must recognize that we have some serious concerns about future strategic relationships; no agreement that ignores these concerns would ever pass the Congress or obtain popular support. Indeed, we could not sign such a treaty.

—On the other hand, we have taken account of Soviet concerns, and have gone more than half way to meet them. Our proposals on cruise missiles have a far greater impact on US forces than on Soviet forces.

—The Soviet response has been discouraging; we cannot engage in a process in which the US makes a series of proposals but the USSR simply rejects them or picks out an isolated element for agreement.

In sum, arms control and SALT in particular is an area where we can give the relationship a more positive character. Or, it can become a wedge that drives us apart and leads to actions that both sides may regret.

As President, you will have to submit a new defense budget to the Congress.

—If there is progress on the major arms control issues, you can reflect this in your budget.

—If not, then the American people will expect us to respond to the challenge we see in the unconstrained build up of Soviet military forces.

4. European Security and Cooperation (CSCE)

(The Soviets are quite nervous about the Belgrade Conference; they frankly do not know what to expect, so whatever you say on this issue will be a significant foreshadowing of our line in the Conference.)

—We are not seeking a confrontation, nor will we turn this Conference into a polemical debate.

—What we want is constructive outcome that will show progress in *all* areas; we will make some new proposals and are prepared to consider Soviet ideas.

—But the Conference will have to undertake a full and frank review of performance of all participants, including performance in human rights (Principle VII). If the original agreement is to have any meaning, then each participant must be willing to submit their record to a frank scrutiny.¹⁰ We are ready to accept criticism, and in turn, we have to make our own concerns known.

Our overall goal in CSCE is to set a higher standard of conduct for *all* nations to observe—and to underline the proposition that obligations, once freely undertaken, must be fully respected.

5. *Trade*

We recognize that over the longer term US-Soviet relations will have to have a greater economic dimension.

—At present the Congress would not be ready to consider changes in the law.¹¹ Later, after Soviet-American relations have developed more positively, you are prepared to take up the issues of MFN and credits. Frankly, this depends on Soviet policy in critical areas—the Middle East and arms control—and also on the question of emigration.

—We will not impose conditions, but merely face the realities of the mood in this country.

6. *In Summary:*

We seem to be approaching a crossroads; we hope that the Soviets are willing to take the more constructive path. The message Gromyko should carry back is that the US wants a cooperative relationship, but it depends on whether there is reciprocity and restraint. We want a comprehensive and reciprocal detente—and are prepared to work for it with the Soviets.¹² This is the message, in addition to personal greetings, that Gromyko ought to convey to Brezhnev.

¹⁰ The President underlined “each participant” and “submit their record to a frank scrutiny.”

¹¹ Reference is presumably to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act (P.L. 93–618; 88 Stat. 1978), introduced in 1973, which President Ford signed into law on January 3, 1975. The amendment denied most-favored-nation trade status to nations with non-market economies that restricted emigration. The President could, however, grant yearly waivers to the ban.

¹² The President underlined the words “comprehensive” and “reciprocal detente.”

7. *Specific Agenda*

The above could serve as a point of departure for a discussion of more specific issues, and I would assume that you would wish to deal with them in the following sequence:

- SALT
 - CTB
 - The Middle East
 - Southern Africa
 - Other Items (Secretary Vance suggests human rights issues in the USSR)
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56. **Address by President Carter Before the United Nations General Assembly¹**

New York, October 4, 1977

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, assembled delegates, and distinguished guests:

Mr. President, I wish to offer first my congratulations on your election as President of the 32d General Assembly. It gives my own Government particular satisfaction to work under the leadership of a representative from Yugoslavia, a nation with which the United States enjoys close and valued relations. We pledge our cooperation and will depend heavily on your experience and skill in guiding these discussions which we are beginning.

Mr. President, I would also like to express again the high esteem in which we hold Secretary General Waldheim. We continue to benefit greatly from our close consultations with him, and we place great trust in his leadership of this organization.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pp. 1715–1723. The President spoke at 10:20 a.m. in General Assembly Hall at the Headquarters of the United Nations. Prior to the address, the President met with Waldheim and General Assembly President Lazar Mojsov. Additional documentation concerning Department of State and White House efforts in preparing the President's address is in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 7/16–31/77; Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 52, 9/28/77 [1]; and Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 1, UN Speech September 1977. The President believed that the speech was well-received, commenting in his diary: "There's a different attitude among the nations of the world toward us, brought about by our own new policies and by the influence of Andrew Young." (*White House Diary*, p. 112)

Thirty-two years ago, in the cold dawn of the Atomic Age, this organization came into being. Its first and its most urgent purpose has been to secure peace for an exhausted and ravaged world.

Present conditions in some respects appear quite hopeful, yet the assurance of peace continues to elude us. Before the end of this century, a score of nations could possess nuclear weapons. If this should happen, the world that we leave our children will mock our own hopes for peace.

The level of nuclear armaments could grow by tens of thousands, and the same situation could well occur with advanced conventional weapons. The temptation to use these weapons, for fear that someone else might do it first, would be almost irresistible.

The ever-growing trade in conventional arms subverts international commerce from a force for peace to a caterer for war.

Violence, terrorism, assassination, undeclared wars all threaten to destroy the restraint and the moderation that must become the dominant characteristic of our age.

Unless we establish a code of international behavior in which the resort to violence becomes increasingly irrelevant to the pursuit of national interests, we will crush the world's dreams for human development and the full flowering of human freedom.

We have already become a global community, but only in the sense that we face common problems and we share for good or evil a common future. In this community, power to solve the world's problems, particularly economic and political power, no longer lies solely in the hands of a few nations.

Power is now widely shared among many nations with different cultures and different histories and different aspirations. The question is whether we will allow our differences to defeat us or whether we will work together to realize our common hopes for peace.

Today I want to address the major dimensions of peace and the role the United States intends to play in limiting and reducing all armaments, controlling nuclear technology, restricting the arms trade, and settling disputes by peaceful means.

When atomic weapons were used for the first time, Winston Churchill described the power of the atom as a revelation long, mercifully withheld from man. Since then we have learned in Dürrenmatt's chilling words that "what has once been thought can never be unthought."²

² Reference is to Swiss author and playwright Friedrich Dürrenmatt. The line Carter quotes is from Dürrenmatt's 1961 play entitled *The Physicists*.

If we are to have any assurance that our children are to live out their lives in a world which satisfies our hope—or that they will have a chance to live at all—we must finally come to terms with this enormous nuclear force and turn it exclusively to beneficial ends.

Peace will not be assured until the weapons of war are finally put away. While we work toward that goal, nations will want sufficient arms to preserve their security.

The United States purpose is to ensure peace. It is for that reason that our military posture and our alliances will remain as strong as necessary to deter attack. However, the security of the global community cannot forever rest on a balance of terror.

In the past, war has been accepted as the ultimate arbiter of disputes among nations. But in the nuclear era we can no longer think of war as merely a continuation of diplomacy by other means. Nuclear war cannot be measured by the archaic standards of victory or defeat.

This stark reality imposes on the United States and the Soviet Union an awesome and special responsibility. The United States is engaged, along with other nations, in a broad range of negotiations. In strategic arms limitation talks, we and the Soviets are within sight of a significant agreement in limiting the total numbers of weapons and in restricting certain categories of weapons of special concern to each of us. We can also start the crucial process of curbing the relentless march of technological development which makes nuclear weapons ever more difficult to control.

We must look beyond the present and work to prevent the critical threats and instabilities of the future. In the principles of self-restraint, reciprocity, and mutual accommodation of interests, if these are observed, then the United States and the Soviet Union will not only succeed in limiting weapons but will also create a foundation of better relations in other spheres of interest.

The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interest, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 percent or 20 percent, even 50 percent. Then we will work for further reductions to a world truly free of nuclear weapons.

The United States also recognizes a threat of continued testing of nuclear explosives.

Negotiations for a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions are now being conducted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. As in other areas where vital national security interests are engaged, agreements must be verifiable and fair. They must be seen by all the parties as serving a longer term interest that justifies the restraints of the moment.

The longer term interest in this instance is to close one more avenue of nuclear competition and thereby demonstrate to all the world that the major nuclear powers take seriously our obligations to reduce the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

My country believes that the time has come to end all explosions of nuclear devices, no matter what their claimed justification, peaceful or military, and we appreciate the efforts of other nations to reach this same goal.

During the past 9 months, I have expressed the special importance that we attach to controlling nuclear proliferation. But I fear that many do not understand why the United States feels as it does.

Why is it so important to avoid the chance that 1 or 2 or 10 other nations might acquire 1 or 2 or 10 nuclear weapons of their own?

Let me try to explain why I deeply believe that this is one of the greatest challenges that we face in the next quarter of a century.

It's a truism that nuclear weapons are a powerful deterrent. They are a deterrent because they threaten. They could be used for terrorism or blackmail as well as for war. But they threaten not just the intended enemy, they threaten every nation, combatant or noncombatant alike. That is why all of us must be concerned.

Let me be frank. The existence of nuclear weapons in the United States and the Soviet Union, in Great Britain, France, and China, is something that we cannot undo except by the painstaking process of negotiation. But the existence of these weapons does not mean that other nations need to develop their own weapons any more than it provides a reason for those of us who have them to share them with others.

Rather, it imposes two solemn obligations on the nations which have the capacity to export nuclear fuel and nuclear technology—the obligations to meet legitimate energy needs and, in doing so, to ensure that nothing that we export contributes directly or indirectly to the production of nuclear explosives. That is why the supplier nations are seeking a common policy, and that is why the United States and the Soviet Union, even as we struggle to find common ground in the SALT talks, have already moved closer toward agreement and cooperation in our efforts to limit nuclear proliferation.

I believe that the London Suppliers Group must conclude its work as it's presently constituted so that the world security will be safeguarded from the pressures of commercial competition. We have learned it is not enough to safeguard just some facilities or some materials. Full-scope, comprehensive safeguards are necessary.

Two weeks from now in our own country, more than 30 supplier and consuming nations will convene for the International Fuel Cycle

Evaluation, which we proposed last spring.³ For the next several years experts will work together on every facet of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The scientists and the policymakers of these nations will face a tremendous challenge. We know that by the year 2000, nuclear power reactors could be producing enough plutonium to make tens of thousands of bombs every year.

I believe from my own personal knowledge of this issue that there are ways to solve the problems that we face. I believe that there are alternative fuel cycles that can be managed safely on a global basis. I hope, therefore, that the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation will have the support and the encouragement of every nation.

I've heard it said that efforts to control nuclear proliferation are futile, that the genie is already out of the bottle. I do not believe this to be true. It should not be forgotten that for 25 years the nuclear club did not expand its membership. By genuine cooperation, we can make certain that this terrible club expands no further.

Now, I've talked about the special problems of nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation at length. Let me turn to the problem of conventional arms control, which affects potentially or directly every nation represented in this great hall. This is not a matter for the future, even the near future, but of the immediate present. Worldwide military expenditures are now in the neighborhood of \$300 billion a year.

Last year the nations of the world spent more than 60 times as much—60 times as much—equipping each soldier as we spent educating each child. The industrial nations spent the most money, but the rate of growth in military spending is faster in the developing world.

While only a handful of states produce sophisticated weapons, the number of nations which seek to purchase these weapons is expanding rapidly.

The conventional arms race both causes and feeds on the threat of larger and more deadly wars. It levies an enormous burden on an already troubled world economy.

For our part, the United States has now begun to reduce its arms exports. Our aim is to reduce both the quantity and the deadliness of the weapons that we sell. We have already taken the first few steps, but we cannot go very far alone. Nations whose neighbors are purchasing large quantities of arms feel constrained to do the same. Supplier na-

³ The first International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation organizing session took place at the Department of State October 19–21, and was attended by delegates from 40 countries and 4 international organizations (IAEA, Common Market, NEA, and IEA). For a press release announcing the meeting, the President's remarks at the October 19 plenary session, and the text of the communiqué issued on October 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1977, pp. 659–664.

tions who practice restraint in arms sales sometimes find that they simply lose valuable commercial markets to other suppliers.

We hope to work with other supplier nations to cut back on the flow of arms and to reduce the rate at which the most advanced and sophisticated weapon technologies spread around the world. We do not expect this task to be easy or to produce instant results. But we are committed to stop the spiral of increasing sale of weapons.

Equally important, we hope that purchaser nations, individually and through regional organizations, will limit their arms imports. We are ready to provide to some nations the necessary means for legitimate self-defense, but we are also eager to work with any nation or region in order to decrease the need for more numerous, more deadly, and ever more expensive weapons.

Fourteen years ago one of my predecessors spoke in this very room under circumstances that in certain ways resembled these.⁴ It was a time, he said, of comparative calm, and there was an atmosphere of rising hope about the prospect of controlling nuclear energy.

The first specific step had been taken to limit the nuclear arms race—a test ban treaty signed by nearly a hundred nations.⁵

But the succeeding years did not live up to the optimistic prospect John F. Kennedy placed before this assembly, because as a community of nations, we failed to address the deepest sources of potential conflict among us.

As we seek to establish the principles of détente among the major nuclear powers, we believe that these principles must also apply in regional conflicts.

The United States is committed to the peaceful settlement of differences. We are committed to the strengthening of the peacemaking capabilities of the United Nations and regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States.

The United States supports Great Britain's efforts to bring about a peaceful, rapid transition to majority rule and independence in Zim-

⁴ Kennedy addressed the UN General Assembly on September 20, 1963. For the text of his address, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 693–698.

⁵ Reference is to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and under water. Officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the treaty in Moscow on August 5, 1963. Following the Senate's favorable consideration of the treaty on September 24, Kennedy signed the treaty on October 7, and it entered into force on October 10. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, Documents 359 and 366.

babwe.⁶ We have joined other members of the Security Council last week and also the Secretary General in efforts to bring about independence and democratic rule in Namibia.⁷ We are pleased with the level of cooperation that we have achieved with the leaders of the nations in the area, as well as those people who are struggling for independence.

We urge South Africa and other nations to support the proposed solution to the problems in Zimbabwe and to cooperate still more closely in providing for a smooth and prompt transition in Namibia. But it is essential that all outside nations exercise restraint in their actions in Zimbabwe and Namibia so that we can bring about this majority rule and avoid a widening war that could engulf the southern half of the African Continent.

Of all the regional conflicts in the world, none holds more menace than the Middle East. War there has already carried the world to the edge of nuclear confrontation. It has already disrupted the world economy and imposed severe hardships on the people in the developed and the developing nations alike.

So, true peace—peace embodied in binding treaties—is essential. It will be in the interest of the Israelis and the Arabs. It is in the interest of the American people. It is in the interest of the entire world.

The United Nations Security Council has provided the basis for peace in Resolutions 242 and 338,⁸ but negotiations in good faith by all parties is needed to give substance to peace.

Such good faith negotiations must be inspired by a recognition that all nations in the area—Israel and the Arab countries—have a right to exist in peace, with early establishment of economic and cultural exchange and of normal diplomatic relations. Peace must include a process in which the bitter divisions of generations, even centuries, hatreds and suspicions can be overcome. Negotiations cannot be successful if any of the parties harbor the deceitful view that peace is simply an interlude in which to prepare for war.

Good faith negotiations will also require acceptance by all sides of the fundamental rights and interests of everyone involved.

⁶ In late August–early September, Young and British Foreign Secretary Owen traveled to Nigeria, Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabwe to consult with African leaders on the question of establishing majority rule in Zimbabwe. At the conclusion of these meetings, Owen and Young returned to London. On September 1, Owen presented to the British Parliament proposals for establishing majority rule. For the text of both the proposals and a joint news conference by Owen and Young, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1977, pp. 417–427.

⁷ Reference is to the ongoing negotiations in Pretoria regarding the future of Namibia. Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa.

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 40.

For Israel this means borders that are recognized and secure. Security arrangements are crucial to a nation that has fought for its survival in each of the last four decades. The commitment of the United States to Israel's security is unquestionable.

For the Arabs, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be recognized. One of the things that binds the American people to Israel is our shared respect for human rights and the courage with which Israel has defended such rights. It is clear that a true and lasting peace in the Middle East must also respect the rights of all peoples of the area. How these rights are to be defined and implemented is, of course, for the interested parties to decide in detailed negotiations and not for us to dictate.

We do not intend to impose, from the outside, a settlement on the nations of the Middle East.

The United States has been meeting with the foreign ministers of Israel and the Arab nations involved in the search for peace.⁹ We are staying in close contact with the Soviet Union, with whom we share responsibility for reconvening the Geneva conference.

As a result of these consultations, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to call for the resumption of the Geneva conference before the end of this year.¹⁰

While a number of procedural questions remain, if the parties continue to act in good faith, I believe that these questions can be answered.

The major powers have a special responsibility to act with restraint in areas of the world where they have competing interests, because the association of these interests with local rivalries and conflicts can lead to serious confrontation.

In the Indian Ocean area, neither we nor the Soviet Union has a large military presence, nor is there a rapidly mounting competition between us.

Restraint in the area may well begin with a mutual effort to stabilize our presence and to avoid an escalation in military competition. Then both sides can consider how our military activities in the Indian Ocean, this whole area, might be even further reduced.

⁹ Memoranda of conversation of these meetings are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 105–118.

¹⁰ On September 30, Vance and Gromyko met for 90 minutes to discuss both the Middle East and arms limitation. Both agreed to work toward resolving issues of Palestinian representation at a resumed Geneva conference. (Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. and Soviet Vow Big Push on Mideast: Vance Meets Gromyko and Sees Cooperation on Geneva Talks," *The New York Times*, October 1, 1977, pp. 1, 4)

The peaceful settlement of differences is, of course, essential. The United States is willing to abide by that principle, as in the case of the recently signed Panama Canal treaties.¹¹ Once ratified, these treaties can transform the U.S.-Panama relationship into one that permanently protects the interests and respects the sovereignty of both our countries.

We have all survived and surmounted major challenges since the United Nations was founded. But we can accelerate progress even in a world of ever-increasing diversity.

A commitment to strengthen international institutions is vital. But progress lies also in our own national policies. We can work together to form a community of peace if we accept the kind of obligations that I have suggested today.

To summarize: first, an obligation to remove the threat of nuclear weaponry, to reverse the buildup of armaments and their trade, and to conclude bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements that can bring security to all of us. In order to reduce the reliance of nations on nuclear weaponry, I hereby solemnly declare on behalf of the United States that we will not use nuclear weapons except in self-defense; that is, in circumstances of an actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, our territories, or Armed Forces, or such an attack on our allies.

In addition, we hope that initiatives by the Western nations to secure mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe will be met by equal response from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Second, an obligation to show restraint in areas of tension, to negotiate disputes and settle them peacefully, and to strengthen peace-making capabilities of the United Nations and regional organizations.

And finally, an effort by all nations, East as well as West, North as well as South, to fulfill mankind's aspirations for human development and human freedom. It is to meet these basic demands that we build governments and seek peace.

We must share these obligations for our own mutual survival and our own mutual prosperity.

We can see a world at peace. We can work for a world without want. We can build a global community dedicated to these purposes and to human dignity.

¹¹ At a September 7 ceremony at OAS headquarters, the President and Torrijos signed the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. For the texts of both treaties, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1977, pp. 483-501.

The view that I have sketched for you today is that of only one leader in only one nation. However wealthy and powerful the United States may be, however capable of leadership, this power is increasingly only relative. The leadership increasingly is in need of being shared.

No nation has a monopoly of vision, of creativity, or of ideas. Bringing these together from many nations is our common responsibility and our common challenge. For only in these ways can the idea of a peaceful global community grow and prosper.

Thank you very much.

57. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 21, 1977

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #33

1. *Opinion*

We need to look ahead and develop a coherent strategy—including priorities, timing, and yes, linkages—for managing our dealings with the Soviet Union, including the barrage of arms control negotiations, and such major political issues as CSCE, human rights, and the Middle East. We need this strategy to guide our own planning and action, and to make sure we do not run into difficulty with Congress and the public on the Soviet front.

For the American public, how the Soviet connection is managed is a central standard for evaluating the foreign policy performance and competence of any administration. The public becomes anxious when they think things are going badly with the Soviets; but they equally—and sometimes more so—become nervous when they think things are going too well because they suspect good relations are being bought with concessions. Above all, the American public wants a sense that the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 10–12/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. Both the President and Mondale initialed the memorandum. In an attached note to Brzezinski, Inderfurth wrote: “For your file. DA [David Aaron] has pursued the action item. Rick.”

Soviet connection is under control and that those managing it know what they want.

Simply put, we may have something of a problem in how the public sees our conduct of Soviet Affairs. Pat Caddell's recent poll is one of a number of straws in the wind. It shows a considerable negative shift in opinion concerning performance on Soviet policy and the related area of human rights. To some extent, attitudes toward our Soviet policy reflect a broader concern (one that you are familiar with) that we are trying to do too much too quickly on too many different fronts. To the extent that we can convey coherence and control in our Soviet policy, we will counter this perception and build public confidence in our general foreign policy efforts.

A key issue is whether we should try to wrap up CTB with SALT in the near term. There is a strong connection between them in that both are about strategic nuclear capabilities—and to conclude both at the same time would be a powerful realization and demonstration of your commitment to the control of nuclear weapons. Indeed, at one point we accelerated our CTB efforts when it seemed that SALT might be indefinitely stalled.

This said, it is not clear that it is feasible to get to a CTB in the desired timeframe without conceding points important to us. Indeed, if the Soviets sense that we are eager to wrap CTB up with SALT, they would have a major incentive to link the two and try to wring more concessions from us. There is also a good risk that Congress and the public, rather than applauding the simultaneous conclusion of SALT and CTB as two blows struck for peace, instead will question whether we bought the double deal with unwarranted concessions. PNE's, for example, is an area where we may ultimately have to compromise. But it is such an article of faith on the left and the right that they should stop, that any such concession in the SALT II timeframe will be scored as a retreat.

On balance, I think we need a controlled and phased strategy to guide us through the minefields I have sketched above. I think that a step-by-step approach is not only the best way to handle the Soviets substantively, but also to convey a sense of competence and control to Congress and to the public, and to avoid the sort of progressive euphoria which, in the past, has been followed with sharp questions and suspicions about what it really cost. In essence, I am talking of building and staging our relations and agreements with the Soviets over the span of your first term in office. The timetable might look something like this:

—A SALT II agreement, combined with a Summit, in late winter or early spring after Panama. It could well take us that long to get there in any event.

—An Indian Ocean stabilization agreement concluded at the same time or perhaps earlier if it looks desirable. It is a moderate step within reach which might help maintain momentum in the relationship, while buying us time on more serious and difficult fronts.

—A grey area systems initiative, possibly linked to MBFR, to follow shortly after SALT II and demonstrate our continued concern for Backfire, SS–20's, etc. We have started planning work on this.²

—A CTB agreement in late 1978, perhaps before the elections.³ Your Spring Summit meeting could be used to open the way.

—Intensive negotiations in 1979 looking to the expiration of the SALT II Protocol which coincides with the end of your first term, and is, therefore, a major political benchmark.

These are the key elements. A comprehensive plan would have to fit in such negotiations as MBFR, ASAT, CW, radiological weapons, civil defense, and conventional arms restraints. Each of these could be fitted into a general scheme of steady and controlled progress in our dealings with the Soviets. Indeed, if we want to add something to SALT for a possible Spring Summit, ASAT in some ways is a more directly related subject and perhaps more feasible on terms acceptable to us, than CTB.

Finally, a major argument for the approach I am describing is the need to phase the various negotiations and agreements to give the Soviets a continuing incentive to moderate their behavior in our relationship generally. The Soviets have gotten used to some pressure on human rights and their tack now is to down-play the issue and to suggest that we have learned our lesson. You may have to speak out again publicly on the issue to disabuse the Soviets and to head off domestic charges that you are backing off human rights. When you do speak out, the Soviets' reactions will be moderated to the extent they are enmeshed with us in a controlled process of negotiations, and have something to lose.⁴

Similarly, in the period immediately ahead, getting to Geneva on the Middle East and what happens once we are there will be real tests of Soviet intentions. How they respond cannot be divorced from SALT or any other negotiation. Especially disruptive Soviet behavior in the Middle East could not help but affect SALT and, above all, how any

² In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: "I don't favor deliberate delay—just hold firm on PNE, etc & not be in a hurry."

³ Reference is to the November 1978 mid-term elections.

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "Brezhnev attacks on [Arthur] Goldberg are helping us."

SALT agreement is received here in the country at large. This is a point which, before long, we ought to convey quietly to the Soviets.⁵

Please indicate if the above approach makes sense. If it does, it might be useful for you to spell it out to Cy, and perhaps some key Congressional leaders (e.g. at one of the breakfasts)—with the added benefit of conveying to all that you have a deliberate and staged strategy on this vital issue.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "I agree."

58. Address by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)¹

Houston, Texas, November 5, 1977

The United States and the Third World

I will speak for a while first on the approach of a new Administration to the crucial economic issues we are addressing with the developing nations. The phrase "new Administration" may no longer be accurate after 10 months. But I think we do have an approach to these issues that is new in some of its directions and priorities. Before getting to the specific issues themselves, let me say a few words about context.

For many years during the period after World War II, American relations with Latin America, Africa, and Asia were looked at primarily through the prism of the cold war. And especially with regard to Africa and Asia, our concerns for close relations with our traditional allies cut across our inclination to support the movement toward independence by Europe's colonies.

In recent years, we have come to look at the problems of the Third World more in their own right, in terms of realities of the Third World itself. We *can* do so because we have come to appreciate better the limits to the influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the Third World. We *must* do so because of the growing importance of the Third World to us, politically as well as economically, and because

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1978, pp. 24–27. Lake delivered his address before members of the African Studies Association (ASA) and Latin American Studies Association (LASA) at their joint meeting.

only bad policy ensues when we allow either our global fears or our global hopes to skew our vision of the facts.

This is not to say we should be indifferent to the influence of the Soviet Union in the Third World or elsewhere. We and the Soviets have different views of history and of the future; our relationship continues to have competitive, as well as cooperative, elements.

But in terms of our own self-interest, we must begin to deal with the developing nations on a basis which takes full account of their growing importance to us. And we should understand that the determination of Third World nations to decide their own policies, their wish to determine their own fates, is a basic protection for the world of diversity we want to see preserved.

So it is no longer possible to say that East-West relations or ties among the industrial democracies are more important to us than North-South policies. For different reasons, they are all vital to U.S. interests and to the kind of world we want for our children. Advancement of our objectives in one area cannot be divorced from progress in another. Worldwide energy security, for example, affects the economic welfare of the industrial democracies, the developing world, and the eastern Communist states. Economic cooperation among the United States, Europe, and Japan affects growth in the Third World; by the same token, their economic health is important to our own.

Another way of looking at the importance of the U.S.-Third World relationship is to enumerate some of those problems which cannot be solved without their cooperation.

- Controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons requires the assistance of India, Iran, Brazil, and Argentina, among others.
- Restraining the dangerous growth of conventional arms races must be addressed on every continent.
- Human rights, including the economic dimension of those rights, are a concern to us wherever they are in jeopardy.
- Managing an economically interdependent world to assure global growth and promote economic equity requires close cooperation between the governments of the industrial democracies and those of the developing nations.

Managing the Relationship

For many of these first months in office, the Administration has been reviewing—and arguing about—how this complex, interconnected relationship with the developing nations can be managed. Let me summarize some general conclusions we have come up with in six points.

First, we must adopt a positive and constructive attitude in addressing international problems encompassing the developing coun-

tries. We will seek common ground with these countries, for progress will only be possible when solutions are mutually beneficial to all parties.

Second, we will recognize in our actions that interdependence is more than a slogan. It requires us, as we fashion our domestic economic policies, to take into account their impact on the rest of the world, including the Third World. Traditionally, the economies of the developing countries have relied upon the economic dynamism of the major industrial economies. We must continue to be reliable on that score. But it is increasingly true that we have a major stake in the health and vitality of the Third World, as well. No less than 35% of our exports went to developing countries, while almost half of our imports came from them.

Third, the structure of the international system is changing, gradually evolving from a "North" and a "South" into a global community in which all countries have responsibilities as well as rights. Much of the North-South rhetoric has, unfortunately, implied that only the industrial nations have obligations. This cannot be true. If fully accepted, it fosters both paternalism and resentment. Even the phrase "North-South," and the dichotomy it sets up, obscures the gradations that exist among nations. This analysis does not mean we can—or should try to—split the Group of 77.² But as the economies of developing countries advance from one level to another, it is important that they show increasing concern for the global welfare. They will have a growing stake in the common good.

Key oil-producing nations, for example, now ponder the damaging effect of rising oil prices on the health of the global economic system and, therefore, on their own long-term economic development. Even small oil price rises can easily wipe out the gains which the Third World could reap from aid, investment, and loans from the industrial nations. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal calculated the other day that each percentage point of increase in oil prices adds \$400 million to the U.S. energy cost; it has an even more devastating impact on other countries.

Each nation must also face its responsibilities to its own citizens, who are most in need—and our own country is no exception. However well-functioning the international economic system, development is fundamentally a challenge for each government and society to address in its own terms.

² The Group of 77 is a caucus of developing countries formed in 1964 at the first U.N. Conference on Trade and Development to present a unified bargaining position in their negotiations with industrialized countries. It is now composed of 115 developing countries. [Footnote in the original.]

Fourth, while our policies must be global in their concept, their implementation must be specific to each situation. Policies must be tailored to take into account the great diversities that exist among the developing countries.

For the economically stronger countries, the most appropriate areas of cooperation are trade and access to private capital and technology. Most of Latin America is now in this position. While aid still plays an important role in the region, its prosperity depends primarily upon the continuing evolution of an open international financial and trading system in which developing countries can participate ever more fully.

For the poorer nations, including most African countries, official development assistance—foreign aid—remains the vital source of external capital. Africa will benefit from the intention of the World Bank—and of our own Agency for International Development—to focus concessional assistance on the nations most in need.

Fifth, we accept the diverse models of economic and political development that the less developed countries (LDC's) have chosen to benefit their peoples. But we also believe that certain human rights have universal application. Human rights include not just the basic rights of due process, together with political freedoms, but also the right of each human being to a just share of the fruits of one's country's production.

Sixth, we recognize that the economic and social issues we all face—such as protecting the environment and the oceans—are global problems from which Communist countries are not immune and to which they can and should make a positive contribution. Consequently, it will be our policy to encourage a constructive role by the centrally planned economies—to increase their development assistance generally and to join us and developing countries in a global development effort.

Basic North-South Issues

These six principles only have meaning, of course, in terms of the specific issues we face: liberalizing trade, insuring adequate balance-of-payments financing, improving our foreign assistance performance and reorienting its focus in the direction of poor people, stabilizing commodity price fluctuations, and facilitating the flow of investment and technology on terms fair to companies and governments. Underlying many of these issues, however, are at least three basic tensions.

1. We frequently face difficult choices between our short-term and our longer term interests.

2. We sometimes confront a tension between what we consider to be sound economic policy and, at the same time, our desire to maintain

a positive momentum in our political relationships with the developing nations.

3. On almost every issue, we must find ways to enhance the participation of LDC's in international decisionmaking in a way that is acceptable to them and to us.

Let me say a word about each.

First, trade-offs between short-term and longer term interests.

We are, as you know, in a period of economic difficulties, both in the United States and abroad. Governments everywhere are under pressure to respond to the immediate plight of their citizens, particularly the need to protect jobs. This results in at least two policy dilemmas for the United States.

- It is axiomatic that a liberal trade regime is in the interest of both the developed and the developing nations. Freer trade can promote the long-term development of the resources the world needs, provide lower prices and greater choice for consumers, and increase opportunities for producers in all countries. Trade can be an engine for economic development and a means for developing nations to participate in the international economic system. All this is accepted in principle, as the stated goal of all countries participating in the current multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. But the harsh political reality is that these longer term benefits are threatened by short-term protectionism.

The United States has been in the forefront in encouraging the negotiations to move forward. We must continue to do so, while seeking to cushion the impact of immediate dislocations. In the months ahead the United States will be vigorously pushing for trade liberalizing measures in the current trade negotiations in Geneva. We will be giving special attention to products of interest to LDC's. And we will do our best to work with other countries to devise trading rules which promote trade between the developed and developing world.

- Another example of the need—and the difficulty—in protecting the future against shorter term pressures is the issue of foreign assistance. Our foreign aid program has undergone many changes over the past decade, from the large, capital-intensive programs of the 1960's to the small programs we now increasingly support—much of which is focused on rural development.

This Administration intends to give more priority to development assistance than it received throughout the 1970's. We see these development programs as an integral part of our overall strategy of promoting flows of development finance, as the most efficient and direct method of transferring resources to countries which do not have full access to private capital markets, and as the most direct way to attack poverty.

We believe that larger and more effective foreign assistance programs—bilateral and multilateral—are in the U.S. national interest and in the interest of global development. So year by year, it is increasingly important to convince the Congress and the public that devoting resources to the fight against poverty abroad is tied to the ultimate health of our economy here at home.

The Administration consequently faces the challenge of demonstrating to American citizens that foreign assistance works—that it can, together with other policies, make a difference in the global food, energy, or population balance and that it can, by mobilizing the assistance of other donors and encouraging sound domestic policies on the part of recipients, stimulate growth and equity.

Let me say another word about our approach to foreign assistance. Our focus on meeting basic human needs, which is an integral part of our overall human rights policy, is not as simple as it may appear. We face at least two basic challenges here.

- In some cases, we face a dilemma when we consider foreign assistance for countries where political and economic human rights are denied. Our assistance is targeted on improving the economic conditions of poor people. Since aid is generally government-to-government, the regime concerned inevitably derives some political boost from our assistance. But we do not want to deprive poor people because of the nature of their government. In such cases, our decisions must be made on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis and very human terms.

- In addition, meeting basic human needs is not, in our view, a welfare program but a way for a country and a society to develop. Accordingly, we will encourage host governments to make an increasing commitment of their own to the needs of their poor, at the same time as we increase our aid to them. Many developing countries faced with balance-of-payments problems, high energy prices, and the need for massive domestic investment, may resist placing a priority emphasis on the well-being of their poor. Because the poor are often excluded from the political process, their concerns are given less weight by governing elites. If we place conditions on our aid, these elites could charge us with attempting to intervene in their internal affairs. Our challenge is to be sensitive to their concerns, while promoting our views and our commitment to the poor.

A second dilemma which underlies our North-South efforts is the need both to maintain a cooperative multilateral political environment for discussing economic issues while expressing our differences over what are the soundest and most effective economic policies that can serve our common long-term interests.

I can think of two cases where this issue has arisen. In the area of commodity policy, the developing nations have proposed the negotia-

tion of an integrated commodity program for 18 different raw materials. The idea is to relate international efforts to address the problem of each commodity market through a common financing mechanism—a common fund. This proposal has assumed a strong political significance in the North-South dialogue.

The United States and other industrial nations agree with Third World leaders that commodity issues are of central importance to the world economy and to the economic development of many countries. But we are convinced that effective measures can be devised only if each market is addressed as an individual case and that these individual arrangements form the best basis for a common commodity policy and funding arrangement. Negotiations on this question begin November 7.³ We will enter them in the hope that we can advance a positive and realistic position. We face the challenge of supporting what we consider sound economic policies, while working to maintain a constructive negotiating atmosphere.

Another such area is debt. Developing countries have been seeking generalized forgiveness of past official debt, which many of them see as a structural impediment to future development.

We seek to respond to such financial needs by arranging additional resource transfers, through bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance. But our analysis shows that every debtor is in a different situation. Some have little problem managing their debts. Others face only a temporary difficulty in servicing their loans. Still others may face long-term structural problems characterized by an inadequate net flow of financial resources.

In cases of extreme and urgent need, obviously we stand prepared to discuss debt rescheduling. But in the divergent circumstances we face, we believe any generalized debt forgiveness would be inadvisable. First, the benefits to debtors would bear little relationship to their development needs, since some nations with the largest debts are growing fast and can more easily service them. Second, by treating all countries alike, we would, in effect, be discriminating against those countries which have struggled to pursue policies to reduce their indebtedness over time. And third, a general debt moratorium would be seized upon by those who have traditionally cried “giveaway” at any effort to transfer resources to the Third World.

³ Negotiations on the Common Fund (see footnote 7, Document 47) opened in Geneva on November 7. The negotiations were suspended later that month. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 280, 281, 284–286, and 295. (“Third World’s Hopes for Common Fund Seem Dim as Commodities Parley Opens,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 8, 1977, p. 16)

A third basic issue underlying North-South economic relations is the need to expand LDC participation in the management of the world economy.

One of the major drives behind the new international economic order is Third World desire for greater political participation in the global economy. The developing nations want not only a larger slice of the global pie, they want to be at the table when the pie is sliced and have a voice in its apportionment.

We are convinced that it is essential to widen the circle of international decisionmaking. We believe that the economic system must be fair, and equally important, it must be seen as fair. But going from principle to practice presents us with difficult issues.

- First, there is the question of how broadbased global economic management can be. While we live in a world of sovereign nations, it is also a world of states which are unequal in their ability to influence the system, for good or bad. Thus it is exceedingly difficult for the international community, including developing countries themselves, to select which developing countries should play the largest role.

- There is also the practical question of which management arrangements and institutions should be expanded. Should the most advanced developing countries be invited to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development? Would they want to? Should their voice and vote be enlarged in international financial institutions, and if so, are they willing to undertake commensurate obligations? Should we make a special effort to incorporate LDC's into institutions which have yet to be created—such as for energy or the oceans? These are some of the issues we are addressing now.

To summarize, I think it is fair to say that despite the increasing complexities of North-South relations and the conceptual as well as practical problems we face, the Administration has made considerable progress in formulating a set of positive development policies.

- We are intent on making substantial increases in our foreign assistance, while emphasizing the focus on meeting basic human needs.

- On commodities, we reversed the policy of previous years and have accepted the principle of a common fund to facilitate buffer stocks.

- We have agreed to an expansion of World Bank activities, also a reversal of previous policy.

- The Administration has agreed to the expansion of International Monetary Fund lending and is now seeking congressional agreement.

- In the trade negotiations, we are willing to reduce trade barriers on products of special interest to LDC's.

- We will vigorously negotiate for a system of internationally coordinated national food reserves.

- And for once, we are taking the United Nations very seriously on economic and social issues.

The general principles I have suggested tonight are only a shorthand for reality. This is especially true when one speaks in the abstractions of economics. Our statistics and our analyses concern the lives of billions of people in the coming generation—people here in America and people abroad. If we turn inward, toward protectionism and indifference, the human cost would be intolerably high. That is the essential problem we will be addressing on almost every foreign policy issue we now face.

Contributions of scholars such as yourselves can be threefold.

- Your objective analyses of events in Latin America and Africa are valuable as scholarship. They are also valuable for policymakers trying to understand the facts with which we must deal.

- Equally valuable would be your thoughts on some of the policy dilemmas I have discussed. I am quite sincere in hoping each of you will consider writing me with your views and suggestions. Asking you to do so is one of the reasons I came here.

- And finally, whatever your views, let me urge you to press them on decisionmakers in both the executive branch and the Congress and to contribute to the public debate on these issues.

Such involvement may seem, to many of you, inconsistent with the objectivity of a scholar. I have no quarrel with such an individual conclusion. But before reaching it, I hope you will consider one point.

We are emerging now from the most contentious period in the last 100 years of our nation's history. The war in Vietnam so engaged the passions of us all—as it should have done—that we began to think too easily about all policy issues in terms of simple categories: right or wrong, interventionism or noninterventionism, *realpolitik* or idealism.

As I have tried to suggest tonight, the time has passed when we can think in the simple terms of any doctrine, whether derived from Munich or Vietnam. The complexities of our challenges, the necessary breadth of our priorities, and the depth of our dilemmas elude such simple formulas.

If we are to have a decent public debate on our policies—which we want—and if we are to show how progressive policies abroad are in our long-term national interest—as we must—then there can be no substitute for the participation in those debates of scholars such as yourselves. For one essence of scholarship is to help us comprehend more clearly the complexities we must address, without retreat to a world of comforting simplicity.

59. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 18, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance Strategy

The President has reviewed the interagency paper on foreign aid² and made the following decisions.

1. *Strategy #2 is approved.* This strategy would concentrate on helping poor people in poor countries, with flexibility to reach poor people in middle-income countries as well. (The paper indicates that this strategy “would provide both bilateral development aid and PL-480³ to meet the basic human needs of poor people, primarily in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 16, Economic Assistance Strategy: 10/77-5/78. Confidential.

² Reference is a November 9 paper entitled “Concessional Economic Assistance Options,” prepared by Owen and Erb, which Owen transmitted to the President under a November 9 memorandum. Owen indicated that the PRC had directed the paper’s preparation in order to assist the President in his decisions related to foreign assistance strategies and funding levels “that will guide internal US planning.” (Ibid.) Under a November 11 memorandum, Brzezinski sent the President the Owen–Erb paper and Owen’s November 9 memorandum, suggesting that Carter focus on the pages containing the basic decision issues. (Ibid.) Brzezinski returned the paper to Owen and Erb under a November 14 memorandum, directing them to review the President’s comments that specified a program of action. (Ibid.) A draft of the Owen–Erb paper, which Owen and Erb circulated to recipients on November 2, is also *ibid.* Owen’s November 9 memorandum and Owen and Erb’s November 9 paper are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 282.

³ The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), signed into law by Eisenhower on July 10, 1954, established the Food for Peace program. Under the provisions of the law, the United States could make concessional sales of surplus grains to friendly nations, earmark commodities for domestic and foreign disaster relief, and barter surplus for strategic materials. Eisenhower’s successors continued to support legislation extending P.L. 480 on a multi-year basis. With P.L. 480 scheduled to expire on December 31, 1977, Carter administration officials and members of Congress had begun drafting in early 1977 legislation both authorizing the extension of P.L. 480 and revising several of its provisions. The omnibus Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (S. 275; P.L. 95–113, 91 Stat. 915) subsequently extended P.L. 480 through 1981, while the Interna-

poor countries, which would continue to receive top priority, but also in middle-income countries if enough aid were available. The dominant factor in allocating aid among countries would be where it would do the most good to help poor people; any aid to governments of middle-income countries would thus depend on the recipient's commitment to helping its poor." The paper also notes that Security Supporting Assistance will continue to be used to advance our political purposes; that global needs such as food, health, and population will be emphasized; that concessional aid will be provided for technological collaboration with both poor and middle-income countries; and that the international institutions' hard-loan windows will aid middle-income countries while their soft-loan windows aid poor countries.)⁴

ACTION: State, AID, OMB

2. *The moderate funding option is approved.* This would raise bilateral and multilateral concessional development aid (including SSA) in FY 1982 to somewhat over \$10 billion in current dollars and to around \$8 billion in constant 1977 dollars, or an increase of about one-third in FY 1978 levels of concessional aid in real terms. (The paper notes that this could result (i) in an increase of 50% in real terms over the FY 1978 contributions to soft-loan windows of multilateral banks; (ii) in an increase of about 100% in real terms in bilateral development aid over FY 1978 levels; (iii) in SSA remaining about where it is now; and (iv) in an increase in PL-480 sales. The paper points out that this mix of programs is only one of a number that might be appropriate at this funding level.)⁵

ACTION: State, Agriculture, AID, OMB

3. The President has asked that a comprehensive program be developed to describe the need for development assistance to the American people, stressing both the conservative and idealistic implications of this assistance, and using well-known persons in a wide variety of fields for this purpose.⁶

tional Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-88) placed a greater emphasis on nutrition, family planning, and the developmental aspects of aid.

⁴ On the November 9 paper, Carter approved this option and added a handwritten notation: "Supported by Peter Bourne."

⁵ On the November 9 paper, Carter approved this option and added a handwritten notation: "Supported by Peter Bourne."

⁶ On the November 9 paper, Owen and Erb added the following postscript: "Whatever your choice among these strategies and funding levels, we face a difficult task in carrying it out—in making needed improvements in bilateral development aid, and in selling both bilateral and multilateral aid to the Congress. But we can address both these tasks more effectively if we have a clear sense of your long range goals." Below the postscript, the President wrote: "Need to sell to people—Develop comprehensive PR effort. Needs to sound conservative & idealistic—let's use popular persons from movies, sports, etc. Also we do not need to use World Bank measurements which minimize importance of PL 480."

ACTION: State, Treasury, and AID should prepare a memorandum outlining such a program, and covering both multilateral and bilateral aid, by December 15.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

60. Editorial Note

On December 20, 1977, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski held a press briefing at the White House from 10:35 to 11:10 a.m. Brzezinski devoted the briefing to placing President Jimmy Carter's upcoming trip to Poland (December 29–31), Iran (December 31–January 1), India (January 1–3), Saudi Arabia (January 3–4), Egypt (January 4), France (January 4–5), and Belgium (January 6) within the broader context of the administration's foreign policy. He explained that the administration understood this trip, and another trip scheduled for the spring of 1978, as "reflecting a recognition of the need for the United States to pursue a wider foreign policy more identified with global change and more responsive to global diversity." Continuing, he indicated that the President's May 22 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame (see Document 40) foreshadowed the need for this type of policy, adding:

"Our point of departure is the view that we are living in a time in which the world is experiencing the most extensive and the most intensive transformation in its entire history. There are obviously many ways of defining the nature of that transformation. But I think it is doubtlessly true that one of its very key aspects is the phenomenon of global political awakening.

"In other words, a world that was politically and socially passive is now becoming truly activist. The consequence of this is a rising crescendo of political and social demands worldwide. It thus represents an altogether new reality in the totality of our common experience. It is on the implication of this that I would like to focus my remarks."

Brzezinski then referenced three substantial phenomena of what he termed this "global political awakening." These included the collapse of Western colonialism, the primacy of the nation-state as a form of political organization, and an increase in world population. He then identified four additional aspects related to changes in the international system: the division of the world into key clusters, the dispersal of

world power, the "fading of single ideological or revolutionary models," and the division of labor in the world economy.

Returning to the concept of a political "awakening," Brzezinski concluded his remarks by sketching out the potential impact on U.S. policy:

"What are the broad policy implications of this? Let me suggest four basic implications. The first is that the relevance of the West to the politically awakening world has to be largely on the level of creative innovation. That innovation has to operate both on the material as well as on the spiritual level.

"On the material level, if the world—if the Western world—is willing to accept the reality of interdependence and channel it into constructive directions, it will have a very important role to play and especially so if it accepts the notion of a certain humanistic responsibility for changes which are not only profound, but potentially positive. We are dealing with changes which involve for the first time the emergence of a community in which there is greater responsiveness to the demands and needs of other societies than our own. Thus, a great deal depends on the West's collective ability to deal with the problems of the South, particularly in the North-South context and on the level of the material response. Creative interdependence means reforming the existing institutions, adjustment and acceptance of certain new realities. On the spiritual level, this means acknowledgment of the reality of human rights defined very broadly, not only in terms of liberty, but also in social terms.

"Secondly, and closely connected with it, is the need for a wider economic system. For many years to come I think we will be preoccupied with the very difficult process of how to widen the existing political and economic international system. Here again I think it is useful to reflect on our own domestic experience.

"The last 100 years or so of American social and political experience involved the widening of participation for political groups, for social groups in the American system as a whole. Ultimately, and most recently this process involved blacks and women, but earlier the whole struggle of the trade union movement was a struggle over participation and the right to organize.

"On the global scale, we need to widen the scope of the international system beyond the purely Atlanticist connection, to reform the international system that was designed after 1945 for a reality which has profoundly altered.

"Thirdly, we will have to anticipate the consequences of regional conflicts and try to deal with them before they escalate. If regional conflicts become simultaneously North-South and East-West conflicts, they will be very difficult to control. We see the potential for such con-

junction or intersection between East-West and North-South issues in Southern Africa, or in the Middle East, or even potentially in Central America if the Panama Canal [Treaty] is rejected.

“Finally, we have to respond to the new issues that are truly for the first time global in character, global in character in terms of such issues as nuclear proliferation, arms transfers and, last but not least, human rights.

“All of that is part of a process of responding to altogether new circumstances in which the very character of the international system is changing. The President’s trip is part of our effort to respond to that. It is designed to show that we recognize this change, that we want to be associated with it, and that we want to give it positive direction.

“This is why he is visiting some advanced industrial democracies, notably France and Belgium; a relatively more open communist country involved in East-West relations—Poland; richer but still developing countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia; and a developing democracy, India.

“Similarly, Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria fit these categories.

“In effect, we want to demonstrate that the time has come for a wider American foreign policy in its scope, a foreign policy which recognizes ideological pluralism and which is willing to work towards a broader political and economic international system.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Schecter/Friendly (Press) File, Subject File, Box 1, Brzezinski Briefings and Backgrounders (Press and Public): 10/77–1/78)

61. Editorial Note

On December 28, 1977, President Jimmy Carter participated in an interview with Tom Brokaw of NBC News, Bob Schieffer of CBS News, Robert MacNeil of the Public Broadcasting Service and co-host of “The MacNeil–Lerher Report,” and Barbara Walters of ABC News. The interview took place in the Red Room of the White House, beginning at 8 p.m., and was broadcast live on radio and television. The President began the broadcast by noting:

“This year we have had fireside chats and television programs and telephone call-in shows and press conferences twice a month from almost every State in the Nation. And I’ve been very pleased to stay in touch with the American people.

"Tonight we have four distinguished news reporters from the four major networks in our country. And I want to welcome you here as another opportunity for me to speak to the American people with tough interrogations from those who understand our country very well."

The President subsequently fielded questions about his upcoming trip (see Document 60), the Middle East, the potential for a strategic arms limitation agreement in 1978, and domestic issues related to the Federal Reserve and the economy. In response to a question posed by Walters as to the administration's top priorities for 1978, Carter indicated that the status of the Panama Canal Treaty existed as one of the most important issues to resolve:

"About 75 years ago in the middle of the night the American Secretary of State signed the Panama Canal Treaty that presently is in existence. No Panamanian has ever signed it; no Panamanian ever saw it before it was signed. It was signed by a Frenchman who benefitted financially from the terms of the treaty on behalf of the Panamanians.

"That treaty gave us a chance to do a tremendous job in building the Panama Canal, keeping it open for international shipping. It's helped our country a lot. It's something of which we can be proud.

"Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy recognized that the present treaty was inadequate. President Johnson started negotiations to change it. Presidents Nixon and Ford continued. And we concluded it this year.

"It's one of the most difficult political questions that we'll have to deal with. It's going to take a lot of time in the Congress to pass it.

"What we wanted was one that treated us and Panama fairly, and we got it. We wanted a treaty that did not put a financial burden on the American taxpayer, and we got it. We wanted treaties that would guarantee proper operation of the Panama Canal itself, for us and for foreign shipping, and we got it. We wanted treaties that would also guarantee us permanently the right to take what action we think necessary to keep the canal safe, to defend it, and to keep it open for us to use, and we got it.

"We wanted treaties—two treaties there are—that would give us the right for expeditious passage in time of need or emergency, for our ships to go to the head of the line and go through the canal without delay, and we got it. We wanted treaties also that would be acceptable in the eyes of the international community, particularly in Latin America, and we got them.

"So, this is what we have tried to do under four Presidents, and we have finally succeeded. And I would say that would be one of the most difficult challenges that we have politically this year. It is absolutely crucial that the Senate ratify these treaties, and I think the terms are very favorable to us and to Panama.

“Mr. Brokaw. You’ve got all that in the treaty, Mr. President. Do you have the votes in the Senate?”

“The President. I think we will get the votes in the Senate.

“Mr. Brokaw. Do you not now have them?”

“The President. I can’t say for sure that we do because many Senators still haven’t expressed their commitment to me or their opinion. But I was talking to President Ford this past week, who’s strongly supportive of the treaties, along with Secretary Kissinger and others, and he said that in his speeches to college groups and others around the Nation, that he is getting an increasingly favorable response from the audience. I think public opinion is building up for the treaties as they know the terms of them.

“Mr. MacNeil. Could we interpret this as the beginning of a new campaign on your part to get out and sell the treaty? You’ve been criticized for having left the ground to the opposition somewhat. Are you going to make a major effort personally to try and sell it?”

“The President. Yes. I consider it one of my most important responsibilities.

“Mr. MacNeil. And you can meet the deadline that President Torrijos has set of April, which he says is urgent, and that Panama’s patience could be exhausted.

“The President. Well, no, I don’t feel any constraint to operate under a deadline. But both Senator Byrd and I and the leaders of the Senate all hope that we can resolve that issue early in the year, certainly I think by April.

“Ms. Walters. On that—since, by the way, just to get back to my original questions—it seems that your priorities next year are very similar to your priorities this year, energy and the economy. But in October, you and President Torrijos issued a statement—a joint statement to remove doubts about the rights of the United States to defend the neutrality of the canal and also the right of ships to pass promptly through it. A number of Senators have felt that they might be more comfortable with this if it were actually written into the treaty.

“Would you be willing to see the treaty amended so that it would reflect this understanding, this statement between you and General Torrijos?”

“The President. No. I think it would be good to have a signed agreement between me and President Torrijos, and he has indicated he would be glad to sign that statement that was made, and of course, I would too. I think the Senate could express an understanding that the treaty was being approved by them with the understanding that this was a proper interpretation. But to actually amend the treaty would re-

quire Panama to have another referendum on the subject, and they've already had one.

"Many people in Panama think that the treaties are too favorable to the United States. And I don't think it would be fair to them after they negotiated in good faith to cause them to have a completely new referendum. I would certainly hate to have two ratification votes in the Senate, separated by several months. So, I think that the Senate can very well express its understanding of what the treaties mean. We can exchange documents with the Panamanian leader. To amend the treaties, though, I think would be inadvisable." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pages 2195–2196)

The President responded to several additional questions related to domestic political issues, criticism of his leadership, and his Presidential style before the interview concluded. The full text of the interview is *ibid.*, pages 2187–2202. Briefing materials prepared by Press Secretary Jody Powell, Special Assistant Barry Jagoda, and Chief Speechwriter James Fallows in preparation for the interview are in the Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 65, 12/28/77 [1].

62. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 12, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Report for 1977: A Critical Self-Appraisal

I. *THE INHERITANCE*

The international position of the United States at the end of 1976 was not good.

Our Allies were uneasy about our constancy, our will, and our ability to lead. Our adversaries were openly speculating about the political consequences of "the general crisis of capitalism." The Third World was generally hostile or disappointed. The American public distrusted our policies and deplored the apparent lack of moral content in our actions and goals.

More generally, there was a widespread sense abroad that the United States was fearful of global change, indifferent to the newly surfacing aspirations of mankind, and thus unable to exercise creative leadership, designed to propel historical change in the right directions.

More specifically,

—The *Europeans*—though the overall relationship with Europe had been improving since the 1973 "Year of Europe" fiasco² and the energy-related political crisis of 1974—were uneasy that the United States was not genuinely in favor of European unity. There was a feeling that the U.S. ranked its relations with the Soviet Union above

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 49, Chron: 1/78. Secret; Eyes Only for the President. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to the President under a January 13 cover memorandum, noting that he, Aaron, and the NSC Staff had prepared it and suggesting that parts of the memorandum might be shared with top congressional leaders and a "friendly columnist." He also recommended that the President provide a copy to Rosalynn Carter, as he believed the First Lady would "find it informative." The President wrote "no" on the cover memorandum next to the recommendation that the memorandum be shared with congressional leaders and the press; however, he underlined Rosalynn's name and wrote "ok" in the margin. The First Lady added the following notation: "Zbig, I made very few comments but found it very interesting. I'd think some of it could be presented to press. R." In the top right-hand corner of the cover memorandum, the President wrote: "Zbig—I read it all & agree with most of it."

² Reference is to Kissinger's April 23, 1973, address entitled "The Year of Europe," which he delivered before the annual meeting of Associated Press editors in New York. In it, Kissinger proposed the promulgation of a new Atlantic Charter and the articulation of common objectives. For the text of the address, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 8.

those with its Allies. The two Economic Summits³ had not succeeded in restoring a sense of confidence that the Western States could overcome their economic difficulties, either individually or in concert. That economic woe was compounded by uncertainty over the course of domestic European politics, especially in southern Europe. The fact that the Republican administration had seemed to be writing Portugal off as lost compounded European anxieties.

—The *Soviets* were projecting a sense of confidence, flushed with recent success in Angola, and were capitalizing on the centrality which the Soviet-American relationship had apparently acquired in U.S. foreign policy to seek a condominium arrangement over the heads of U.S. Allies.

—Relations with the countries of *Eastern Europe* were at a generally low ebb. The previous Administration tended to see policy toward these countries as a subordinate to that followed toward the USSR. President Ford's comments on Eastern Europe during the television debate further reinforced the feeling that little concern and attention was devoted to Eastern Europe.⁴

—Our bilateral relations with the *PRC* were eroding. Trade had declined from the 1974 high. Government-facilitated scientific and cultural exchanges were fewer in 1976 than in 1975.

—In the *Middle East*, the Arabs were perplexed by the U.S. failure to move beyond initial step-by-step arrangements undertaken after the 1973 war. Virtually no movement toward accommodation had taken place since the Sinai II Agreement of 1975.⁵ The severe war in Lebanon had diverted attention from the peacemaking process.

—The *Greece-Turkey-Cyprus* triangle presented a specific problem. Turkey remained deeply embittered, and fearful that the new Administration would echo the pro-Greek position of the Congress. Greece had

³ References are to the November 1975 Economic Summit at Rambouillet, France and the June 1976 Economic Summit at Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico. For documentation on both summits, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 91–152.

⁴ Reference is to the October 6, 1976, Presidential debate in San Francisco; see Document 11. During the discussion on Eastern Europe and the Helsinki Agreement, Ford asserted: "There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford administration." When asked by Frankel to clarify his remarks, Ford added: "I don't believe, Mr. Frankel, that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Romanians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. Each of these countries is independent, autonomous; it has its own territorial integrity. And the United States does not concede that those countries are under the domination of the Soviet Union." (*Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77*, Book III, pp. 2416–2417)

⁵ Reference is to the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, commonly known as Sinai II, signed on September 1, 1975. For the text of the agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 226.

withdrawn its forces from NATO (though in practice this meant little);⁶ the Turkish DCA was stalled in Congress;⁷ and both the Cyprus intercommunal discussions and Greek-Turkish negotiations were not moving.

—The United States was badly out of tune with the *Third World*, with little awareness of the need for economic, political and social change or sympathy for ideological diversity. There was overemphasis on realpolitik and an exaggerated preoccupation with the Soviet threat. Through the Third World, there was a pervasive feeling of anti-Americanism.

- The *Latin Americans* were resentful of continued neglect, and fearful about the consequences of the emphasis being placed by Washington on the U.S.-Brazilian relationship. We had failed to come to grips with the Panama problem.

- The *Africans* were openly hostile to our policies, to the point that Nigeria even cancelled an official visit by the U.S. Secretary of State,⁸ though the Lusaka speech⁹ was beginning to make a turn-around. The burden of our misadventure in Angola was still very heavy.

- In *South Asia*, we were still laboring under the heritage of the Nixon “tilt” of 1971¹⁰ and personal animosities between American and Indian leadership. The Indians were veering ever closer to the Soviet Union.

- There was no comprehensive approach to *Third World economic problems*. While the UNGA Seventh Special Session¹¹ had removed

⁶ The Government of Greece withdrew military forces from NATO in early August 1974; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 20.

⁷ Reference is to the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, which remained stalled in Congress as late as September 1976. During a September 29, 1976, meeting with Caglayangil, Kissinger indicated that the Turkish Government would “obtain nothing” until after the Presidential election. (Ibid., Document 246)

⁸ The Government of Nigeria rescinded an invitation for Kissinger to visit Nigeria during his April–May 1976 African trip. (John Darnton, “Nigeria Cancels Invitation to Kissinger,” *The New York Times*, April 8, 1976, p. 8) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 212.

⁹ Reference is to Kissinger’s April 27, 1976, address in Lusaka, Zambia, in which he discussed U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. For the text of the address, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 77.

¹⁰ Reference is to the Nixon administration’s “tilt” toward Pakistan during the 1971 political crisis and subsequent war between India and Pakistan, which had developed as a result of the crisis.

¹¹ The UN General Assembly Seventh Special Session took place in New York September 1–16, 1975, and focused upon development and international economic cooperation, including food assistance. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-14, Part I, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976, Documents 27–29 and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 117, 124, 286, and 295–299.

some of the worst pressure, CIEC showed little prospect of success,¹² and the Nairobi UNCTAD meeting had been a debacle.¹³

- In the *United Nations* we were largely isolated and ineffective; the attitude of the Administration in the wake of the Moynihan era did little to stem the downward trend of U.S. opinion toward the United Nations.

—Various *global issues* were simply on the back burner. Many believed, both at home and abroad, that the Indian explosion¹⁴ proved that the *nuclear* horse had already left the barn and it was too late to slam the door. In addition, the U.S. was the world's number one *arms* merchant and showed no signs of diminishing its aggressive sales effort. Finally, with respect to human rights, the image of the United States abroad was that of a nation primarily concerned with might and money, only involved with human rights when these happened to coincide with other interests.

—*International economic issues*. By year's end, the cautious optimism of the summer had given way to growing concern about a slowdown in world economic growth. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), launched in 1973, were moving at a snail's pace despite commitments of the principal trading countries to a more energetic negotiating effort.¹⁵ At home, protectionist pressures from sectors impacted by imports were on the rise. Finally, OPEC announced in late December a 5–10% price increase on oil, an action which would adversely affect trade flows and payments balances in 1977.¹⁶

World opinion reflected these criticisms and concerns. Here is a brief sampling:

—If the Carter Administration gives more consideration to the views and worries of *Allies and friendly countries*, "it will be worth much more than Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' . . ." (*Frankfurter Neue Press*, January, 1977)

—The "greatest task facing *Japan, the U.S. and Europe* this year is to establish a new cooperative structure . . ." (Tokyo's *Sankei*, January, 1977)

—"There has been a feeling among the Allies that if Kissinger's policy was flawed, it was his emphasis on the *Soviet relationship*. They have long suspected that he went further than necessary to be friendly

¹² See footnote 8, Document 6.

¹³ See footnote 7, Document 47.

¹⁴ Reference is to the May 1974 Indian nuclear explosion.

¹⁵ See footnote 11, Document 29.

¹⁶ OPEC announced the price increase at the OPEC Oil Ministers meeting at Doha, Qatar, December 15–17. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 113.

with the Muscovites. In this lies Carter's opportunity." (Joseph Harsh in the *Christian Science Monitor*, December, 1976)

—"The USSR . . . has silently forged a formidable war machine. Will the West be so irresponsible as to let it do this? This is the great question on the eve of the inauguration of the new U.S. President . . ." (Paris' *Aurore*, January, 1977)

—Kissinger, because of his step-by-step approach, "was able to set aside the most difficult issues between *Egypt and Israel* and select the manageable ones for negotiation. His successor will not be able to do so. There now is a consensus in the area that there is no room for further small steps." (Henry Tanner in the *New York Times*, December, 1976)

—"There can be no greater tonic to the Third World countries than the knowledge that we have, at last, come to the end of the Kissinger era. We hope that Mr. Carter . . . will display a refreshing readiness to see *African problems* in far more clear-cut terms of principle than those at any time reflected in the posture of the State Department during Kissinger's tenure." (The *New Nigerian*, January, 1977)

—"We think the realities of world politics give *Latin America* a position not very high in President Carter's priorities." However, "following a policy of indifference . . . anything concrete or substantive that Carter would do would at least be something . . ." (*El Universal*, Caracas, January, 1977)

—"Jimmy Carter has promised to make life much more difficult for would-be *buyers of arms* from the U.S. . . . But a man with Mr. Carter's commitments on cutting unemployment is going to find it very hard to cut foreign (arms) sales, too." (*Financial Times* of London, January 1977)

—" . . . the seeming indifferences of the last Administration to such value (human rights) contribute to the declined confidence in the foreign policy and, eventually to its loss at the polls." (The *Washington Post*, January, 1977)

II. YOUR RESPONSE

U.S. foreign policy was clearly in need of broad renovation. Your Administration recognized the need to move on a wide front, to deal with a variety of complex issues—thus making a break with the predominant pattern of U.S. foreign policy in previous years. That pattern had largely involved a heavy concentration on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, with most other aspects of foreign policy being derivative of that relationship.

Instead, the new Administration accepted the reality of complexity and of change, and it placed emphasis not so much on maneuver, but on building new relationships with friends, with adversaries, with the developing world, even with the whole world—in the hope thereby of

renovating the existing international system. In so doing, it was motivated by the following central objectives:

1. To engage Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced democracies in closer political cooperation, thereby also promoting wider macro-economic coordination among them.

2. To weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political, and, where appropriate, economic cooperation with the new emerging regional powers, thereby extending our earlier reliance on Atlanticism to include such newly influential countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Indonesia in a wider pattern of international cooperation.

3. To exploit the foregoing in the development of more accommodating North-South relations, both political and economic, thereby reducing the hostility toward the United States that in recent years had developed within the Third World.

4. To push U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks into strategic arms reduction talks, and to widen the scope of American-Soviet collaboration by engaging the Soviet Union in a wider pattern of negotiating relationships, thereby making detente both more comprehensive and reciprocal.

5. To normalize U.S.-Chinese relations in order to preserve the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a major stabilizing factor in the global power balance.¹⁷

6. To seek a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement, without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the reentry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East would be difficult to avoid.

7. To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa and to forge closer cooperation with the moderate black African countries.

8. To restrict the level of global armaments and to inhibit nuclear proliferation through international agreements as well as unilateral U.S. acts.

9. To enhance global sensitivity to human rights through pertinent U.S. actions, comments, and example, thereby also seizing the ideological initiative.

10. To renovate the U.S. and NATO defense posture in keeping with the requirements posed by the Soviet arms buildup.

The basic premise of the foregoing was that the United States should undertake to play in the world as constructive a role as the one that it did play shortly after World War II, but in a vastly changed context. The new Administration felt that the U.S. should help in the shaping of a new international system that cannot be confined to the developed countries but must involve increasingly the entire international community of more than 150 nation-states. Unlike the years 1945–1950, this should call not for American dictation but for more subtle inspiration and cooperative leadership on a much wider front.

¹⁷ In the left-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: "While protecting Taiwan/US critical relationships."

[Omitted here is Section III. Policy Performance and Evaluation.]

IV. AN OVERVIEW

It is probably fair and not only self-serving to conclude that the first year in foreign policy was a *relative success*. Progress has been made toward deeper and more structural improvements in regard to a number of key regional, bilateral or global problems. The Administration has not gone for quick successes or band-aids; on the contrary, it has undertaken responses which are potentially of a more structural and enduring kind. The real payoffs will come later but they are likely to last longer.

Our accomplishments and our shortcomings can perhaps be best summarized in a brief table:

Our pluses:

—U.S. again identified at home and abroad with moral values, generating some genuine progress regarding human rights;

—Shaped a new agenda for international action on neglected areas of human rights, non-proliferation, arms restraint;

—More emphasis on the centrality of Alliance relations in U.S. foreign policy and on the priority of North-South accommodation;

—Explicit U.S. support for European unity and progress on NATO military renovation;

—Novel emphasis on importance of bilateral relations with France, India and new regional influentials; underscoring our respect for diversity;

—Generation of genuine momentum for comprehensive peace in the Middle East;

—Identification with African states and liberation leaders in the search for a solution to the Southern African conflict—preemption of Soviet influence in that area.

—Panama Canal treaties and new maturity in our relations with Latin America;

—Arms sales for the first time under control and substantive talks underway with Allies and Soviets;

—An active policy to inhibit nuclear proliferation, including the initiation of INFCE;¹⁸

—The initiation of a wide spectrum of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, even while deemphasizing the primacy of U.S.-Soviet relations in U.S. foreign policy;

¹⁸ See footnote 3, Document 56.

—Determined efforts to scale down U.S.-Soviet nuclear armaments, to halt qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry; and to obtain a CTB;

—Positive U.S. interest in East European independence and respect for human rights, without subordination to U.S.-Soviet relations;

—Enhancement of U.S. long-range rapid reaction military capability;

—Energetic pursuit of the MTN, joint efforts against inflation, and stimulation of economic growth.

Our minuses:

—Unnecessary friction with some friendly states over nuclear non-proliferation;

—Stimulation of fear of U.S. unilateralism and unpredictability;

—Uncertainty about how we reconcile detente and Alliance security;

—Lack of adequate preparation of the Soviets for our new approach;

—Underestimation of domestic reaction to some aspects of our Middle Eastern policy;

—Absence of concrete economic initiatives on the North-South front;

—Seeming disinterest in the Far East;

—Some loss of credibility in the energy and non-proliferation areas;

—Seeming softness in our policy regarding Soviet assertiveness;

—Except for the Notre Dame address, inadequate articulation of our broad foreign policy assumptions and priorities.

With the above in mind, it is noteworthy to note the nature of the criticism that has lately been directed at this Administration's foreign policy. Almost none of it entails any specific or concrete charge. The Administration is neither condemned for any particular major failure (such as the Bay of Pigs) nor for any particular misdeed (destabilization of Chile, or the fruitless enterprise in Angola, or the ineptitude regarding Cyprus). In contrast, it is criticized more generally for a lack of cohesion, for absence of clearcut priorities, or for shortcomings on the level of tactical execution.

Some of these charges may, in fact, be justified. It is probably true that in the first year we undertook too much and thus could not deliver enough. At the same time, what we undertook was in some respects a response to what we inherited. Thus, in a sense, the generalized charge of lack of cohesion involves in some measure an acknowledgment that there has been an absence of specific failures or misdeeds.

Our own self-criticism—in addition to the ones made earlier—would tend to be of a different nature: we probably did overstate our determination to pursue a different and more ambitious SALT agree-

ment than we are now prepared to accept, and we may have thereby created the false impression in Moscow that being tough with the Carter Administration in fact pays off. We may have at times overstated the importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, thereby again stimulating fears in Western Europe that the United States is preparing to cut a deal with the Soviet Union not entirely in keeping with European interests. We probably have not put enough emphasis on our relations with China, and we have failed to exploit the Chinese end of the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle in order to advance our own interests. We did occasionally act with insufficient consistency in regard to the Middle East, and in retrospect the U.S.-Soviet statement was both too explicit and implied more than was either intended or necessary.¹⁹

More generally, there is also the wider issue of the total impression created by our foreign policy. In this connection, it might be useful to look at alternative U.S. foreign policies in terms of four types, each based on certain basic preferences and assumptions. I could call them, to emphasize that they are part of a spectrum (with exaggerations at the edges), the liberal/liberal model; the liberal; the conservative; and the conservative/conservative. In a condensed fashion, the foregoing can be represented as follows:²⁰

| <u>Liberal²</u> | <u>Liberal</u> | <u>Conservative</u> | <u>Conservative²</u> |
|---|---|---|--|
| Basic Priority: Detente | Basic Priority: Close relations with Allies and Third World | Basic Priority: Balance of power | Basic Priority: Primarily anti-communism |
| Emphasis on SALT and arms control | Both competition as well as accom- modation with the Soviets | Anti-Soviet focus | Anti-Soviet emphasis |
| Clear-cut preference for defense cuts | Moderate toughness on SALT | Pro-Chinese | Anti-Chinese |
| Eagerness to accommodate with Cuba | Normalization with China | Suspicious of SALT and arms control | Anti SALT and arms control |
| | | Indifferent to Cuba | Hard on Cuba |
| | | Indifferent to Vietnam | Hard on Vietnam |

¹⁹ The U.S.-Soviet joint statement on the Middle East and the reconvening of the Geneva Conference was released on October 1. For the text, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 120.

²⁰ In the left-hand margin next to the table, the First Lady wrote: "I don't think this should be released to the press."

| | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| Eagerness to accommodate Vietnam | Caution on Cuba and Vietnam | 5–10% real growth per annum in defense | 10–15% per annum real growth in Defense spending |
| Settle regional conflicts together with Soviets | Moderate increases—under 5% per annum—in the defense budget | Pro B-1 Pro human rights in Communist regimes | Foreign aid only for political and predominantly anti-communist purposes |
| Be nice to the Third World | Pro human rights generally | Indifferent to LDCs | Generally anti-LDC |
| Discontinue arms exports | Limited and pragmatic involvement of Soviets in solution of regional conflict | Inclined to keep Soviet Union out of regional solutions | Pro South Africa |
| Hit hard the conservative regimes on the issue of human rights (but ignore violations by radical regimes) | | Suspicious of Panama Canal Treaty | Pro human rights in Communist regimes Anti Panama Canal Treaty |

By and large, at the risk of some simplification, it can be said that the conservative² position can be identified with Senator Goldwater; the conservative position with Senator Jackson and Henry Kissinger; the liberal policy position has been on the whole characteristic of your Administration; the liberal² posture has been associated with McGovern.

However, lately on a number of issues the dividing line between your stand and the liberal² position has become blurred, and in some respects, your foreign policy has appeared to some people as increasingly fitting the liberal² model. Some have the impression that accommodation with the Soviet Union is your primary objective; that we wish to settle regional problems by working primarily with the Soviet Union, that we are not sensitive to Allied concerns; and that we are harder on human rights only when they are violated by conservative regimes.

Foreign policy to a large extent is a matter of nuance and tone. Given the shifts in public opinion within the United States, I think it would be useful for you to adopt occasionally a tone which would place you more precisely within the liberal model and even at times leaning toward the conservative model. Needless to say, my own judgment is that the liberal model corresponds best to the nature of global change and provides the more fruitful approach for a creative American role in the world. Our ability to adopt that posture, however, will be greatly weakened politically if we are seen as primarily following a

liberal² approach; we can even gain some political support if, from time to time, we seem to be adopting a somewhat tougher conservative posture, especially on such matters as the Soviet role in the world, Cuban “neocolonialism”, or on human rights.

V. THIS YEAR'S PRIORITIES

A recent review with the Vice President has yielded the following priorities for the next year:

Must Win Issues (Presidential)

- Progress in Middle East negotiations
- Ratification of Panama Canal Treaties
- SALT/CTB

High Priority (Presidential)

- Defense Decisions during Congressional review of the Budget (e.g., M–X) and a Presidential Address on Defense Issues
- International Economic and Trade Policy (including East-West Trade)
 - Trip to Latin America, Africa
 - NATO/Economic Summits and follow-on
 - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Legislation
 - Human Rights
 - Arms Sales

In addition to supporting you on these Presidential Priority Agenda items, my staff will be bringing to your attention decisions on gray area systems initiatives, intelligence charters, and Indian Ocean arms limits. There are three other matters that are emergency or high priority issues requiring a national strategy and your attention.

—International economic issues: in particular, a defense of the dollar, a continued freeze on oil prices, coordinated stimulation of the world economy, MTN agreement (this year), and commodity agreements. These issues may come to have a very important and difficult political dimension in our relations with West Germany and the oil producing countries.

—China. We need to find ways to maintain momentum on that aspect of our relations where we have common concerns—global security issues deriving from Soviet efforts to expand their influence. I will be suggesting that in the spring, about the time of a SALT agreement, I should visit Peking.²¹ The Chinese have explicitly asked for such a visit

²¹ Brzezinski traveled to Beijing in late May 1978. For the memoranda of conversation of Brzezinski's meetings with Chinese officials, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 108–111.

and it would help balance a SALT agreement politically both in China and at home. Subsequently, I believe the Vice President should visit China later this year after the Congressional elections.²² We can offer the Chinese little else but visits, until concrete progress on normalization opens up.

—Soviet Union. We have invested a great deal of effort in the expansion of the U.S.-Soviet negotiating relationships. Some of these have been moving forward in a promising fashion. There is thus some real hope for a more stable and more generally reciprocal U.S.-Soviet relationship. At the same time, either by design or simply as a response to an apparent opportunity, the Soviets have stepped up their efforts to exploit African turbulence to their own advantage. The Soviet/Cuban military presence in Ethiopia is particularly dangerous and could then produce a reaction in this country which could jeopardize not only SALT but the wider fabric of the emerging U.S.-Soviet relationship. Accordingly, at some early opportunity, you should communicate your concerns to Brezhnev, emphasizing to him that there is no such thing as a selective or compartmentalized detente.

—Greece and Turkey. The new Ecevit Government opens up the prospect of real progress on Cyprus and the Aegean.²³ However, for Congressional reasons related to Panama, we don't want to move too quickly. We need a quiet planning session with the Turks to map a coordinated strategy with respect to progress on Cyprus and associated progress on the Turkish DCA.

Bearing in mind last year's experience, as well as our overall appraisal, it might also be noteworthy in this connection to note the following. We confront a danger of an alliance developing for the purpose of stalemating our foreign policy as a whole. The linkage of such issues as Panama, SALT and the Middle East, not to mention priority issues of the second order, or a crisis in Ethiopia, could generate a coalition which might effectively make the case for a "tougher" foreign policy. Different constituencies would emphasize different aspects but the total effect could be one of stalemate. Accordingly, you should:

—Somewhat toughen your rhetoric on foreign policy issues, emphasizing more the theme of national security and human rights.

—Stand firm in the negotiating process in SALT by insisting on Soviet concessions regarding Backfire and the numerical aggregates.

²² Mondale did not visit China until August 1979.

²³ Ecevit served as Prime Minister of Turkey from June to July 1977, whereupon he was succeeded by Demirel. Following a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly in late December 1977, Demirel resigned, and Koruturk appointed Ecevit as Prime Minister. Ecevit won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly on January 17, 1978. Documentation on these developments is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.

Also, adopt a delaying posture regarding China, CTB and MBFR, and stay away from definitely sensitive areas of international politics (i.e., Cuba and Vietnam, which give us nothing and cost a great deal).

—Concentrate on Panama, and on other steps toward peace in the Middle East, so that ratification of the Panama Treaties and peace progress in the Middle East would represent tangible accomplishments before we plunge last into SALT.

—Give a pro-defense speech some time this winter.

[Omitted here is the annex entitled “Record of Goals and Actions.”]

63. Address by Secretary of State Vance¹

Los Angeles, January 13, 1978

Foreign Policy Decisions for 1978

Our country, within sight and memory of some Americans still living, has been transformed from a largely agrarian society to the world’s greatest industrial power—one in which economic, political, and social mobility are the accepted order of the day. The fantastic stories of Horatio Alger, as well as those of H.G. Wells, have come true. Of course, there is still poverty in America. There is still lack of sufficient opportunity for many. There is still discrimination.

But, day by day, and despite a few deplorable detours, we have held remarkably to the journey begun by our Founding Fathers—toward a new nation in a new world in which each citizen might stand free and equal beside his neighbor, able to make the most of his or her human potential.

When I am asked about the American people—as I often am by leaders of other countries—I say that as a people we have today a renewed faith in our old dreams, and this is something President Carter and I believe in very deeply. Because of who and what we are, both the basic interests and the ideals of our people must be present in our foreign policy, or it will not be long sustained.

- We must maintain a defense establishment modern and strong enough to protect ourselves and our allies.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1978, pp. 23–26. Vance delivered his address before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

- We must protect American investment overseas and insure continuing access to vital raw materials.
- We must be strongly competitive economically so that American families can continue to enjoy their standard of living.
- We must maintain our close relations with our allies, while we seek at the same time improved contacts with our main competitor, the Soviet Union, and with the nonaligned nations.

All of this, and more, can be pursued—as we pursue our national interest—while still expressing the deeper ideals and aspirations that have led us to our remarkable economic and social progress here at home.

Our strength lies not only in our ideals but in the practical way we identify problems and work systematically toward their solution. We do the best when we are true to ourselves.

That is why America was at her best in the Marshall plan, why we have felt at home with Food for Peace and the Peace Corps. That is why I find such broad public support for President Carter's emphasis upon human rights—including not only rights to the integrity of the person and political rights but the rights to food, clothing, shelter, housing, health, and education.

That is why, with all its difficulties, we have embarked on a course of diplomacy in the Middle East which may help bring peace to the people of that region.

That is why we are trying to help bring solutions—not our solutions but solutions through free elections—in Rhodesia and in Namibia so that people there will have their chance for human emancipation and development.

That is why we seek arms control arrangements through negotiations and have adopted a conscious policy of restraint on conventional arms transfers.

That is why we took tangible first steps in 1977 toward other goals, as well: to stop further nuclear proliferation; to reach agreements on the control of strategic weapons, agreements that will enhance the security of our nation and all the world; to reach agreement with our Western industrial partners on policies leading to economic revival and growth; to reaffirm our commitment to normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China; to reduce military competition in the Indian Ocean; to emphasize our support for racial equality and full political participation of all the people of South Africa.

The Carter Administration in 1977 made a conscious and deliberate effort to construct a foreign policy based upon American interests and upon American values and ideals.

In 1978, there are actions, decisions, and choices which we must make here in America—some of them difficult—which will help determine how such a policy can be nourished and further evolve.

Panama Canal Treaties

One involves the decision of the U.S. Senate on the Panama Canal treaties—treaties which are the culmination of 14 years' work by four American Presidents of both major political parties and their Secretaries of State. This is a decision which is being watched not only by all the nations of Latin America—all of which favor the treaties—but by other nations around the world.

Through these treaties, we can secure—definitively and permanently—our right to use the canal and to protect it. It is a place for us to put the lie, once and for all, to the wornout charge that we Americans are interested only in making the Southern Hemisphere safe for our own economic interests.

Imagine, if you will, that a foreign country controlled and administered a 10-mile-wide strip of land running the length of the Mississippi River. How long do you think the people of this country would willingly accept such a situation? This is an issue requiring understanding and foresight.

If we ratify the treaties, we can make clear to the world that disputes can and should be settled peaceably—through the rule of law and negotiation. And, most importantly, we can insure and safeguard the long-term usefulness and viability of the canal itself to all who use it, including ourselves.

Economic Relations

Another decision we must make is one regarding our economic relations with the rest of the world.

In 1978 we shall be moving toward a conclusion of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations with other importing and exporting countries.

In 1962, when President Kennedy argued for the passage of the historic Trade Expansion Act, which led to 10 years of worldwide economic expansion, he rightly pointed out that "a rising tide lifts all boats."²

Today the world is badly in need of economic recovery. Other major nations are suffering rates of inflation and unemployment which rival or are even higher than ours. The Tokyo Round, of and by itself, will not instantly restore worldwide economic prosperity. It will, how-

² Kennedy signed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (H.R. 11970; P.L. 87-794; 76 Stat. 872) into law on October 11, 1962.

ever, encourage new investment and profitable exchange. If it fails and falls victim to a new wave of international protectionism, we can be sure that many of the "boats" will founder and some may sink.

I know that this is not an abstract, theoretical matter for the American worker or businessman or farmer who depends for his family's living on production of steel, CB radios, color television sets, microwave ovens, textiles, footwear, automobiles, computers, sugar, and many other items. The changing world economy has made other nations competitive in production of these products, and we are feeling the result of it.

The Carter Administration knows this and is doing its best to help the American industries and people affected. The new steel program, announced in December,³ is a part of that. So are our present discussions with Japan on reducing its import barriers and increasing its rate of growth.⁴

But we and others must help ourselves in ways that do not throw the world back into the kind of disastrous protectionist spiral that we all experienced in the Great Depression.

Under economic pressure, one country, and then another, in the 1930's closed its borders to foreign goods. High tariffs increased the price of everything to everyone, everywhere. Then we closed our banks and our businesses and our farms as we fell into worldwide depression. The great ports of our country were, as you well know, empty and forlorn places.

A new wave of protectionism would imperil the American profits and 10 million jobs which depend on those exports. The hardest hit of all would be the American farmer, who is having a hard time staying in the black right now. California is an agricultural state.

I have just learned that there is more acreage under cultivation in the United States to produce food which we sell to Japan than there is total acreage under cultivation in Japan. If Japan, for instance, were to close its borders to our food and fiber as part of a trade war, farms and

³ On December 6, 1977, the Carter administration announced its plan to revitalize the U.S. steel industry. In addition to loan guarantees, tax breaks, and economic assistance to communities impacted by steel layoffs, the plan also featured a "trigger" or reference price system designed to eliminate the importation of lower-priced steel into the United States. Solomon, during a December 6 news conference, explained that the reference prices, pegged to the costs of production of the most efficient steel producers, would "trigger" a government investigation if countries exported steel to the United States below the set reference price. (James L. Rowe, Jr., "Administration Warns Against Raising Prices," *The Washington Post*, December 7, 1977, pp. D-8, 11) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 80.

⁴ For information on these discussions, which were held in Tokyo January 9-13, see *ibid.*, Documents 97 and 98.

rural communities in this State and elsewhere in America would be severely harmed.

So we must make the necessary decision to keep our commitment to both domestic and world economies which are open to competition and which reward productivity. That will involve knocking down barriers to our products elsewhere in the world. But it will also involve our acceptance of the fact that to buy from us, other countries must be able to sell to us.

Third World

We also have decisions to make—beyond those surrounding the Panama Canal treaties and the Tokyo Round—about a whole range of relations with the so-called Third World. These countries, most of them gaining their independence after World War II, are increasingly involved in our daily lives.

You know how the amount and cost of oil from these countries affect this country.

We also get more than 50% of the tin, aluminum, and manganese we need from less developed countries and substantial amounts of our lead, tungsten, and copper.

In addition, we depend on the emerging countries for an important share of our exports. Recent figures show, for instance, we exported \$29 billion in goods to the non-oil-producing developing countries. This was three times the 1970 figure, three times our exports to Japan, and \$3 billion more than our exports to all of industrialized Europe. These exports, of course, mean American jobs.

At the same time, it is in the developing world that many of the so-called global problems are most evident and threatening.

Inefficient and wasteful use of the Earth's resources, pollution of the oceans and atmosphere, nuclear proliferation, unchecked arms competitions—all of these are problems which involve not only these countries but also the safety of the human race.

Most countries of the Third World have too little food; many lack the means to produce enough of their own. Almost all have exploding populations.

Even the most optimistic projections for the future point to population increases in the Third World of some 75% by the year 2000. Perhaps even more troubling, this growth seems certain to be concentrated in already hard-pressed urban centers. Imagine, if you will, as the projections indicate, a Mexico City with 32 million people; Sao Paulo with 26 million; and Calcutta, Bombay, Rio de Janeiro, Seoul, Peking, and Shanghai each with some 19 million in 22 years.

In the years immediately ahead, many of the key nations of the Third World will be even more a part of our daily dialogue than they are today. We must decide how we shall relate to them.

These countries believe that they should no longer be the “hewers of wood and drawers of water” for the rich Western nations, and we understand this. In the past year, we have reduced their suspicion of the United States and, thereby, lessened the likelihood that we could be faced with attempts at new cartels, built around raw materials and commodities other than oil, and unending political and economic hostility.

The countries of the Third World now feel that we regard them as important and sovereign nations and that we identify with their human aspirations. The emerging nations of the world can be constructive partners of the United States.

Make no mistake about it. These countries are not early-day miniatures of the United States. Many will choose paths of political and economic development which we will not approve. But a majority, at least, will be looking to us for understanding and assistance as they seek to build modern societies.

Will we be willing to share our technology with these countries? Will we be ready to help stabilize the basic commodity prices on which many of their economies are based? Will we treat their products fairly in the international marketplace? Will we be willing to support their national economic development plans when they do not always suit our own tastes? All these questions are complex and some pose difficult problems. But this Administration fully realizes that we shall harm our own interests and we shall not be true to our own values if we fail to address these issues sympathetically.

Southern Africa

An immediate and tangible test of our intentions toward the Third World lies in southern Africa. I speak of the three principal problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situation within South Africa itself. We cannot impose solutions in southern Africa. We cannot dictate terms to any of the parties; our leverage is limited.

But we are among the few governments in the world that can talk to both white and black Africans frankly and yet with a measure of trust. We would lose our ability to be helpful if we lost that trust. It is, therefore, essential that our policies of encouraging justice for people of all races in southern Africa be clear to all.

After careful consideration, this Administration is actively pursuing solutions to all three southern African problems. These problems must be addressed together, for they are intertwined.

Some have argued that apartheid in South Africa should be ignored for the time being in order to concentrate on achieving progress on Rhodesia and Namibia. Such a policy would be wrong and would not work. It would be blind to the reality that the beginning of progress

must be made soon within South Africa if there is to be a possibility of peaceful solutions in the longer run. It could mislead the South Africans about our real concerns. It would prejudice our relations with our African friends. It would do a disservice to our own beliefs. And it would discourage those of all races who are working for peaceful progress within South Africa.

We believe that we can effectively influence South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia while expressing our concerns about apartheid.

We believe that whites as well as blacks must have a future in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. We also believe that their security lies in progress. Intransigence will only lead to greater insecurity.

We will welcome and recognize positive action by South Africa on each of these three issues. But the need is real for progress on all of them, and we shall need the continued support of the American people for a policy which can encourage and press for that progress.

Arms Limitation

Another decision facing us, as a people, is one which is now reflected in our discussions on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union. Security is the issue here. We pursue our security in two ways:

- By maintaining a military establishment which will see to the safety of ourselves and our allies and
- By arms control.

What we cannot achieve by mutual, equal limitations, we insure by our own strength.

Thus, we have to think of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as a process. It is a process of discovering whether we can work out some of our security problems with the Soviet Union. It is a process also in the sense that we try to solve what strategic problems we can at each stage; then, we move on to the next stage and the next level of problems.

We do not seek reductions in arms for their own sake but only when reductions promote security. But there can be an important result from arms reductions alongside an increase in our security: the potential for us and for others, including those in the developing world, to cut spending on armaments and to reorder priorities.

If we have the courage and patience to see it through, I believe we can both lower the threshold of international danger and release new resources for the works of peace through SALT and other such negotiations. But we must summon the will to do it. For it is in our relations with the Soviet Union that war and peace issues and decisions are most involved.

Our policies toward the Soviet Union are based upon a realistic appreciation that this is a serious competitive relationship and that Soviet

objectives in the world are very different from ours. It is also important to recognize, however, that there are specific matters on which our interests are not in conflict—not least, in the avoidance of nuclear war.

In the cause of peace and of our own interest, we have engaged the Soviet Union on a wide range of concrete matters intended in the first instance to stabilize the military competition and to regulate the political competition. These are our first objectives, because they go to the heart of the issue of war and peace.

Beyond these objectives, we seek to enlarge areas of common understanding and common action on a range of international issues, including human rights; cooperation on matters affecting the lives of people everywhere, such as disease, food supply, pollution of the environment, and the application of science and technology.

Progress in these fields is uneven and may take a long time, but we draw patience and a long-term perspective from our realization of how far we have come from the intense and dangerous cold war spirit that prevailed only a few decades ago.

The alternative to this active dialogue with the Soviets implies a return to the tensions and mutual isolation of the cold war. Many of you and the leadership of this Administration remember what that period was like. In good conscience, we cannot recommend that we lead the country back to the troubles and fear of that era.

Middle East

Tomorrow I leave for Jerusalem to assist at an event that we all would have regarded as impossible just a few short months ago.⁵ The Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel will sit down together, around a conference table, to start the detailed negotiation of peace between Israel and the Arab states. After three decades of estrangement and hostility, the process of reconciliation has begun.

I am sure that you, as all Americans and peoples the world over, have been as moved as I was by the dramatic events of the weeks just past. President Sadat's sudden and spectacular visit to Jerusalem captured the imagination of all of us; it was an act of vision and statesmanship.⁶ The warmth of his reception by Prime Minister Begin and the people of Israel, surmounting the bitter memories of four wars which

⁵ Reference is to the opening session of the Egyptian-Israeli Political Committee January 16–20 in Jerusalem. For documentation on the session and on Vance's meetings with Middle East leaders, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 194–197, 199, 201, and 203–206.

⁶ Sadat flew to Tel Aviv and then traveled to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977, the first visit to Israel by an Arab head of state since Israel's founding in 1948; see *ibid.*, Document 152.

had brought tragedy to every family, gave clear testimony to the desire for peace.

President Sadat's initiative and Prime Minister Begin's response have set in motion a negotiating process which began with the Cairo preparatory conference in December and will continue at ministerial level in a Military Committee in Cairo and a Political Committee in Jerusalem. Both Egypt and Israel have emphasized that they view the negotiations now underway as laying the groundwork for negotiations among all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, looking toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

After his discussion with President Sadat last week, President Carter made clear the task facing the Middle Eastern Political Committee meeting in Jerusalem.⁷

- First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency.

- Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

- Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects; it must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

I believe that these principles, as stated by the President, should be acceptable to the governments and peoples on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

To move from principles to concrete achievement will require flexibility and courage, qualities of statesmanship of which the leaders of Egypt and Israel have already given full display.

For our part, we stand ready to help Arabs and Israelis achieve their peace. It is important to our national interests that we do so; our values and character as a people demand no less than our greatest effort to help resolve this tragic conflict.

We will participate actively in the work of the Jerusalem meeting, as the parties have asked us to do. When difficulties in the negotiations arise, we may be able to make some helpful suggestions to bridge the gaps between the parties; however, we will not impose a blueprint for

⁷ Carter met with Sadat and Schmidt in Aswan, Egypt on January 4. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 185. For the President's statement to the press after the meeting, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 19–20.

resolution of issues which ultimately only the peoples of the area can resolve.

There can be no turning back from Jerusalem. Arab and Israeli peoples would bitterly resent a diplomatic failure now that these long-hostile nations have found the will and the capacity to approach each other in mutual respect.

From what I have said today, I believe that you can tell that I am basically optimistic about our foreign policy and the chances for future advances in the cause of peace.

Despite our problems, this is a strong and free country and one which is filled with hope and vitality.

Some 33 years into the nuclear age, the world has not blown itself up. Indeed, we have in those years, through diplomacy and international leadership, lessened the chances of that ever happening.

We have, since World War II, seen more than 100 new countries enter nationhood. They are becoming productive, self-sustaining members of the international community.

The task ahead, as I see it, will be to persevere on the course we have charted. This is a time when political and economic change is taking place so rapidly—Peter Drucker has aptly called this “an age of discontinuity”—that it might tempt some to retreat to our old, inward fortress America habitudes.⁸

However, we are now being true to ourselves, and faithful to what one 200-year-old document called “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”⁹ In the past year, President Carter has led us to make the hard decisions that have shown again that our country has not lost its faith in man’s perfectability.

We have great strength. Properly channeled, our strength can be a catalytic and vital force in bringing peace, opportunity, and material well-being to millions of people—in America as well as abroad.

⁸ Drucker, a Claremont Graduate University professor and consultant who wrote on management theory and practice, published *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society* in 1969.

⁹ Reference is to the Declaration of Independence. The actual line reads: “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”

64. Editorial Note

On January 19, 1978, at 9 p.m., President Jimmy Carter delivered his State of the Union address before both Houses of Congress. His remarks were broadcast live on radio and television. After an introduction by Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas “Tip” O’Neill, the President devoted the first portion of his address to domestic items, including the establishment of a Department of Education and civil service reform, before emphasizing the main themes of his administration’s foreign policy:

“In our foreign policy, the separation of people from government has been in the past a source of weakness and error. In a democratic system like ours, foreign policy decisions must be able to stand the test of public examination and public debate. If we make a mistake in this administration, it will be on the side of frankness and openness with the American people.

“In our modern world, when the deaths of literally millions of people can result from a few terrifying seconds of destruction, the path of national strength and security is identical to the path of peace.

“Tonight, I am happy to report that because we are strong, our Nation is at peace with the world.

“We are a confident nation. We’ve restored a moral basis for our foreign policy. The very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights.

“We stand for human rights because we believe that government has as a purpose to promote the well-being of its citizens. This is true in our domestic policy; it’s also true in our foreign policy. The world must know that in support of human rights, the United States will stand firm.

“We expect no quick or easy results, but there has been significant movement toward greater freedom and humanity in several parts of the world.

“Thousands of political prisoners have been freed. The leaders of the world—even our ideological adversaries—now see that their attitude toward fundamental human rights affects their standing in the international community, and it affects their relations with the United States.

“To serve the interests of every American, our foreign policy has three major goals.

“The first and prime concern is and will remain the security of our country.

“Security is based on our national will, and security is based on the strength of our Armed Forces. We have the will, and militarily we are very strong.

“Security also comes through the strength of our alliances. We have reconfirmed our commitment to the defense of Europe, and this year we will demonstrate that commitment by further modernizing and strengthening our military capabilities there.

“Security can also be enhanced by agreements with potential adversaries which reduce the threat of nuclear disaster while maintaining our own relative strategic capability.

“In areas of peaceful competition with the Soviet Union, we will continue to more than hold our own.

“At the same time, we are negotiating with quiet confidence, without haste, with careful determination, to ease the tensions between us and to ensure greater stability and security.

“The strategic arms limitation talks have been long and difficult. We want a mutual limit on both the quality and the quantity of the giant nuclear arsenals of both nations, and then we want actual reductions in strategic arms as a major step toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.

“If these talks result in an agreement this year—and I trust they will—I pledge to you that the agreement will maintain and enhance the stability of the world’s strategic balance and the security of the United States.

“For 30 years, concerted but unsuccessful efforts have been made to ban the testing of atomic explosives—both military weapons and peaceful nuclear devices.

“We are hard at work with Great Britain and the Soviet Union on an agreement which will stop testing and will protect our national security and provide for adequate verification of compliance. We are now making, I believe, good progress toward this comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions.

“We are also working vigorously to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world which do not now have them and to reduce the deadly global traffic in conventional arms sales. Our stand for peace is suspect if we are also the principal arms merchant of the world. So, we’ve decided to cut down our arms transfers abroad on a year-by-year basis and to work with other major arms exporters to encourage their similar constraint.

“Every American has a stake in our second major goal—a world at peace. In a nuclear age, each of us is threatened when peace is not secured everywhere. We are trying to promote harmony in those parts of the world where major differences exist among other nations and threaten international peace.

“In the Middle East, we are contributing our good offices to maintain the momentum of the current negotiations and to keep open the

lines of communication among the Middle Eastern leaders. The whole world has a great stake in the success of these efforts. This is a precious opportunity for a historic settlement of a longstanding conflict—an opportunity which may never come again in our lifetime.

“Our role has been difficult and sometimes thankless and controversial. But it has been constructive and it has been necessary, and it will continue.

“Our third major foreign policy goal is one that touches the life of every American citizen every day—world economic growth and stability.

“This requires strong economic performance by the industrialized democracies like ourselves and progress in resolving the global energy crisis. Last fall, with the help of others, we succeeded in our vigorous efforts to maintain the stability of the price of oil. But as many foreign leaders have emphasized to me personally and, I am sure, to you, the greatest future contribution that America can make to the world economy would be an effective energy conservation program here at home. We will not hesitate to take the actions needed to protect the integrity of the American dollar.

“We are trying to develop a more just international system. And in this spirit, we are supporting the struggle for human development in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America.

“Finally, the world is watching to see how we act on one of our most important and controversial items of business—approval of the Panama Canal treaties. The treaties now before the Senate are the result of the work of four administrations—two Democratic, two Republican.

“They guarantee that the canal will be open always for unrestricted use by the ships of the world. Our ships have the right to go to the head of the line for priority of passage in times of emergency or need. We retain the permanent right to defend the canal with our own military forces, if necessary, to guarantee its openness and its neutrality.

“The treaties are to the clear advantage of ourselves, the Panamanians, and the other users of the canal. Ratifying the Panama Canal treaties will demonstrate our good faith to the world, discourage the spread of hostile ideologies in this hemisphere, and directly contribute to the economic well-being and the security of the United States.”

The President then acknowledged the applause from the audience before referencing two moments that had taken place during his recent trip to the Middle East, South Asia, and Europe that also “confirmed the final aims” of U.S. foreign policy:

“One was in a little village in India, where I met a people as passionately attached to their rights and liberties as we are, but whose chil-

dren have a far smaller chance for good health or food or education or human fulfillment than a child born in this country.

“The other moment was in Warsaw, capital of a nation twice devastated by war in this century. There, people have rebuilt the city which war’s destruction took from them. But what was new only emphasized clearly what was lost.

“What I saw in those two places crystallized for me the purposes of our own Nation’s policy: to ensure economic justice, to advance human rights, to resolve conflicts without violence, and to proclaim in our great democracy our constant faith in the liberty and dignity of human beings everywhere.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pages 95–97*)

The full text of the President’s State of the Union address is *ibid.*, pages 90–98.

65. Report by President Carter to the Congress¹

Washington, January 20, 1978

To the Congress of the United States:

I will be working closely with the Congress in 1978 to enact a program addressed to the immediate and the long-term needs of our economy. I am proposing tax reductions and reforms to continue our strong economic recovery, to encourage increased investment by American businesses, and to create a simpler and fairer tax system. I am seeking legislation to address the special problems of the disadvantaged and the unemployed. And I am taking new steps to combat inflation.

This report to the Congress on the condition of the economy sets forth the overall framework within which my economic proposals were formulated. It outlines, for you and for the Nation, my economic priorities for the years ahead and my strategies for achieving them.

[Omitted here are sections of the report focusing on domestic economic issues.]

¹Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 129–144*. The report is the President’s annual report to Congress on economic policy.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT PROMOTE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

Outside the United States, the world economy has seen a hesitant recovery from the deep recession of 1974–75. The rapid pace of economic growth that was widespread over most of the postwar years has all but disappeared. Unemployment is high, and in most industrial countries except the United States it is rising. Inflation is at high levels and declining only very slowly.

The imbalances in the international economic system continue to strain the world economy. Because of the surpluses of oil-exporting countries, many countries have sizable deficits, including the United States. Some industrial nations are also running large and persistent surpluses—thus increasing the pressures on countries in deficit. These imbalances have been a major factor contributing to disorder in exchange markets in recent months.

The condition of the world economy requires above all that nations work together to develop mutually beneficial solutions to global problems. If we fail to work together, we will lose the gains in living standards arising from the expansion of world commerce over the past three decades. If the world economy becomes a collection of isolated and weak nations, we will all lose.

The first priority in our international economic policy is continued economic recovery throughout the industrial world. Growth of the U.S. economy—the largest and strongest in the world—is of vital importance. The economic program that I have proposed will ensure that America remains a leader and a source of strength in the world economy. It is important that other strong nations join with us to take direct actions to spur demand within their own economies. World recovery cannot proceed if nations rely upon exports as the principal source of economic expansion.

At the same time all countries must continue the battle against inflation. This will require prudent fiscal and monetary policies. Such policies must be supplemented by steps to reduce structural unemployment, measures to avoid bottlenecks by encouraging investment, and cooperation in the accumulation of commodity reserves to insulate the world from unforeseen shocks.

Reducing the widespread imbalances in international payments will require several parallel steps. To begin with, each individual country must ensure that its own policies help relieve the strains. The United States will do its part. In 1977 we had a current account deficit of about \$18 billion. While not a cause for alarm, this is a matter of con-

cern. We can take a most constructive step toward correcting this deficit by moving quickly to enact the National Energy Plan.²

Countries in surplus should also do their part. Balance of payments surpluses in some countries have contributed to the economic stagnation among their trading partners. Where their own economies have slack, it is appropriate for nations in surplus to stimulate the growth of domestic demand—thereby increasing their imports and improving the prospects for growth in deficit countries. In some countries, lifting restraints on imports from abroad and reducing excessive government efforts to promote exports would be useful. After consultations with the United States, the Japanese have indicated they will take a series of steps toward reducing their large surplus.³

The system of flexible exchange rates for currencies also can be helpful in correcting unsustainable imbalances in payments among countries. Since its inception in 1973, this system has operated well under unprecedented strains.

During 1977 the U.S. dollar has fallen in value against several key currencies. The decline in the dollar's value has occurred primarily against the currencies of those nations that have large trade and payments surpluses, and was not surprising in view of our large payments deficit and their surpluses. Late in 1977, however, movements in our exchange rate became both disorderly and excessively rapid. The United States reaffirmed its intention to step in when conditions in exchange markets become disorderly and to work in close cooperation with our friends abroad in this effort.

Under the flexible exchange rate system basic economic forces must continue to be the fundamental determinant of the value of currencies. However, we will not permit speculative activities in currency markets to disrupt our economy or those of our trading partners. We recognize fully our obligation in this regard, and we have taken steps to fulfill it.

Although substantial progress can be made toward a balanced world economy, some imbalances will persist for a substantial period of time. Financing requirements will remain large while adjustments occur. The private markets can and will continue to channel the bulk of the financing from surplus to deficit countries. But it is essential that adequate official financing also be available, in case of need, to encourage countries with severe payments problems to adopt orderly and responsible corrective measures. To meet this critical need the United States has strongly supported a proposal to strengthen the In-

² See footnote 4, Document 47.

³ See footnote 4, Document 63.

ternational Monetary Fund by the establishment of a new Supplementary Financing Facility.⁴

The United States also will continue to contribute resources to promote growth in the economies of the developing nations. International assistance efforts—through bilateral aid and multilateral institutions—must continue to expand. We must also keep our doors open to imports from developing countries, so that their economies can grow and prosper through expanded trade.

A keystone of our international economic policy is to work with our trading partners to protect a free and open trading system. The American economy benefits by exporting those products that we make efficiently, and by importing those that we produce least efficiently. An open trading system increases our real incomes, strengthens competition in our markets, and contributes to combating inflation.

The United States will firmly resist the demands for protection that inevitably develop when the world economy suffers from high unemployment. The ensuing decline in world trade would worsen our problem of inflation, create inefficiencies in American enterprise, and lead to fewer jobs for American workers. But international competition must be fair. We have already taken and we will, when necessary, continue to take steps to ensure that our businesses and workers do not suffer from unfair trade practices.

I place great importance on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations now under way in Geneva. I believe our negotiators will bring home agreements that are fair and balanced and that will benefit our economy immensely over the years to come. The importance of these discussions can hardly be overemphasized. The trading system that emerges from the negotiations will set the tone for international commerce well into the 1980s. Our commitment to a successful conclusion to these talks underscores our long-term emphasis on the retention and expansion of open and fair trade among nations.

THE CHALLENGE BEFORE US

In this message I have outlined my fundamental economic goals and the strategy for attaining them. It is an ambitious, but I believe a realistic, agenda for the future. It calls for a broad range of actions to improve the health and fairness of the American economy. And it calls upon the American people to participate actively in many of these efforts.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 54.

I ask the Congress and the American people to join with me in a sustained effort to achieve a lasting prosperity. We all share the same fundamental goals. We can work together to reach them.

Jimmy Carter

66. **Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, January 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Foreign Policy Priorities and East-West Relations

The drift of the discussion on "our priorities" at the staff meeting last week provokes me to comment on a number of items, first on the drift, then on priorities, and finally on the East-West relationship.

There was some talk of the shift of emphasis to Western Europe and "security" that occurred in 1973, talk in answer to your question about the "priorities" of the previous administration. The fundamental reason for that shift, however, was not underscored, not even mentioned. Kissinger *had* to shift. He did not want to. During the October War, he became hysterical at both the Soviets and the NATO allies because they were not following his script. He called the West Europeans "jackals" and "hyenas" when they did not dance to his tune during the Middle East War. The Europeans simply had taken him at his word: he asserted that he and the Soviets had established a special relationship to make the world safe. A little war in the Middle East was surely manageable by the superpowers. SALT was not NATO business; why should the Middle East be different? Henry cut out the allies, and they drew their conclusions. They cut him out of their economic affairs (oil)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 26, Foreign Policy: 12/77-12/78. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Huntington. Brzezinski circled the "information" designation, drew an arrow to Odom's name, and added the following handwritten notation in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum: "This is a lively & provocative paper. Why don't you show it to *someone* to stimulate comments. ZB." An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Brzezinski "noted" the memorandum on January 26.

and left the security field entirely to him. I watched this from Moscow.² NATO diplomats in Moscow refused to believe that this was a crisis. Neutral attaches blamed the U.S. for making it into a crisis. During the first days of the Egyptian offensive, Soviet generals told me that if the U.S. and USSR stick together, we can overcome any other state that troubles us. (This “condominium” preference was voiced most recently at Belgrade by Vorontsov when he suggested that the U.S. and the USSR work out a draft alone; then all other attendees would have to accept it!)³ After the Israeli counter-offensive, and our strategic alert, these same generals lectured me on the dangers of war!

The lesson was clear. Neither SALT nor trade nor credits had basically altered the competitive character of the East-West relationship. The OPEC embargo forced Henry to consider the North-South axis however much he had previously tried to ignore it. The Vietnam “end game” was additional evidence, for those who cared to understand, that his East-West scheme was based on dubious assumptions.

I repeat this, although you know it well, because it refutes those who argue, as Rosenfeld, Kraft, and others do, that the outlines of our present foreign policy (“priorities,” if you will) are a legacy from Kissinger. Our legacy today is Henry’s failure, not his outline of a new direction. His efforts failed: (a) to stabilize the strategic balance; (b) to moderate Soviet competitive behavior in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia; (c) to produce significant U.S.-Soviet economic interaction; (d) to address the North-South economic and political issues. At the same time, his East-West policy exacerbated tensions in our own alliance system while facilitating Soviet management of the Warsaw Pact.

Detente has not only produced mixed results from our viewpoint; it has also failed to meet key Soviet objectives. The crux of the policy for Moscow is taken from two sources: “Two Tactics of Social Democracy”⁴ and the “law of primitive socialist accumulation.”⁵ In 1905 and in the mid 1920s, the question was the same: could a weak “working class” (or socialist sector) politically lead (economically exploit) the stronger peasant (capitalist) class? The Leninist answer was yes, with correct party leadership. Soviet policy toward the West in the 1970s is designed for a similar correlation of political and economic forces, but

² Odom served as a military attaché at the Embassy in Moscow from 1972 to 1974.

³ Presumably Vorontsov made the statement at the Belgrade CSCE Review Conference. See footnote 6, Document 16.

⁴ Reference is to Lenin’s *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, published in 1905.

⁵ Credited to Soviet economist Yevgeni Preobrazhenski, who employed the law in his writings during the 1920s.

now on a global scale. Correct political leadership plus a firm grasp of the "military question," these were the essential prerequisites for 1905 and the Five Year Plans, and they remain so for Soviet policy today. Soviet consciousness of these historical analogies was vividly demonstrated in 1975, the 70th anniversary of the writing of "Two Tactics," when the theme was played throughout the year in the Soviet press. By 1974, however, it was already clear that "law of primitive socialist accumulation," that is, large credits and technology from the West, was not as active as expected. The U.S. would not be as easily "collectivized" as the peasantry. The collapse in South Vietnam and the swing of U.S. military attention back to Europe altered the "military question." The Middle East, of course, was also a strategic setback. The only thing left of detente was SALT, and SALT's importance for Moscow was everything but arms control. It had become the single factor that might prevent the alteration of the East-West relationship by the changing North-South and East-West relationships. The Soviet slogan was and remains, "the most important thing today is to prevent nuclear war" (omitting to observe, of course, that it is the "least likely" kind of war today). And it means, "If the U.S. doesn't give us priority attention over West-West and North-South, we have the military might to regain American attention."

As I understood your statement of the "priorities" of this Administration, it took basic account of these realities of strategic and economic relationships which Henry had reluctantly faced after 1973 but could not adapt to without surrendering the primacy of "cooperation" over "competition" on the East-West front.

Human rights meant recognition of the necessity of a national consensus for the main thrusts of any foreign policy, and it meant recognition that some foreign policies and alliances are not viable for the U.S. if our political values conflict too sharply.

Emphasis on the tri-lateral region meant recognition of the true sources of our economic, political, and potentially, our military power. And it meant recognizing that a large number of problems of interdependency have been neglected for some time.

A new context for the East-West relationship meant evading the Soviet strategy taken from "two tactics" and "primitive socialist accumulation." It meant leaving the cooperative door open, but it also excluded the practice of paying the Soviets to behave, to refrain from bully-boy tactics in international affairs.

Attention to the North-South dimension meant a lot of things, many of which strike me as still muddled and confused, but it put priority on the OPEC connection in the international economic structure, and it seemed to recognize changing power realities in the third world as more than a simple function of the East-West competition.

Those priorities strike me as sound for 1970, 1973, 1977 and for the foreseeable future. Looking back over the year, however, I find a number of mistakes in our managing of these priorities.

The opening shots on the East-West front last spring were well aimed, and we appeared launched on a promising campaign, clarifying the realities of the relationship and the price of the game. By summer, however, our policy was shot through with schizophrenia. Dropping off the comprehensive SALT proposal and allowing confusion to creep into the human rights policy, muting it, put the Administration right back in Henry's position. On the one hand, it appeared that we might indeed make the East-West relationship fit the realities of a "new context." On the other hand, we seemed to believe that politically we need a SALT deal as badly as the Soviets do. Moreover, putting SALT above the West-West relationship (NATO) was bound to create difficulties with the allies, as it clearly is doing. And it was bound to give the Chinese cause to lecture us just the way they lectured Henry about the USSR.

The proliferation of other arms talks, in a different context, could be a strong gambit, but in the present context, it may be confusing to our allies, the Soviets and to our own public and the Congress. It locks us more firmly in Henry's predicament of an unrealistic promise of what the talks will yield and prevents their effective use as part of a political strategy.

The only part of the East-West front where we have avoided a misstep is in economic interaction. The Jackson-Vanik amendment⁶ is saving us from ourselves by preventing movement while we are not organized for a coherent strategy in trade, credits and technology. Here we need both a strategy and an Executive Branch organization for controlling the East-West economic interaction in and for cooperation with the Congress. In the best event, the returns on this front will be modest, but certainly we can avoid "giving away the farm," or creating that impression.

How can we overcome this schizophrenia in East-West relations?

First, we must realize that politically Moscow needs SALT much worse than we do. We only need SALT if it is something like the comprehensive proposal, i.e., if it constrains and reduces in a very significant—not a marginal—way. The Soviets greatly need the talks politically as "the centerpiece" of East-West relations. For Moscow, SALT must represent to the American public the only thing that is saving the West from the Soviet military arsenal: it must keep our political attention. Otherwise, the East-West relation will appear less important,

⁶ See footnote 11, Document 55.

which it is, except when Moscow rattles its sabre occasionally, something that Henry discovered can happen with or without SALT.

This year, we should slowly build public patience on the SALT front. Moscow will be faced with paying a price for our attention. As long as we are even and deliberate, the Soviets will stay with the negotiation process. They simply have no viable alternative except a rapprochement with China, something that will not solve the economic and political stagnation in either China or the USSR.

On the economic front there should be lots of anticipation and very little movement. In the interim, we must get the legislation and the Executive organization in place to implement effectively a national strategy in the economic relations in the event that Moscow chooses to try to avoid historical irrelevancy by opening its economy to the West on some principles other than "primitive socialist accumulation."

Effective management of the East-West relation seems to require two kinds of tensions. First, in our relationship with the USSR, the seeking, not the reaching, is the most important thing about negotiations, be they economic or arms control. I am most impressed at the moderation in Soviet behavior that comes when they are anticipating some gain, some policy goal, not after they achieve it. The Soviet anticipation of the 1974 trade agreement was enormous, and their manners were much better than usual. The let down from the collapse of the trade agreement was probably not much greater than it would have been had the deal been completed.

The second kind of tension is between the U.S. and the NATO allies over European security. The alliance thrives when we are threatening to pull out *and* when the Soviets look menacing. We need a little of both, but not too much of either.

Our priorities in 1977 seemed most likely to create an effective mix of these tensions. The confusion seems to have come from alternative views of the past: the Kissinger aspirations of 1972 versus the realities of post-1973. Given Soviet internal conditions and objective international conditions, Brezhnev does not have the option of meeting those earlier aspirations. We must keep the cooperative door open but expect little response. That won't make spectacular press for our policy, but it will make good history.

67. Address by President Carter to the Nation¹

Washington, February 1, 1978

Panama Canal Treaties

Good evening.

Seventy-five years ago, our Nation signed a treaty which gave us rights to build a canal across Panama, to take the historic step of joining the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.² The results of the agreement have been of great benefit to ourselves and to other nations throughout the world who navigate the high seas.

The building of the canal was one of the greatest engineering feats of history. Although massive in concept and construction, it's relatively simple in design and has been reliable and efficient in operation. We Americans are justly and deeply proud of this great achievement.

The canal has also been a source of pride and benefit to the people of Panama—but a cause of some continuing discontent. Because we have controlled a 10-mile-wide strip of land across the heart of their country and because they considered the original terms of the agreement to be unfair, the people of Panama have been dissatisfied with the treaty. It was drafted here in our country and was not signed by any Panamanian. Our own Secretary of State who did sign the original treaty said it was "vastly advantageous to the United States and . . . not so advantageous to Panama."³

In 1964, after consulting with former Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, President Johnson committed our Nation to work towards a new treaty with the Republic of Panama. And last summer, after 14 years of negotiation under two Democratic Presidents and two Republican Presidents, we reached and signed an agreement that is fair and beneficial to both countries.⁴ The United States Senate will soon be debating whether these treaties should be ratified.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book, I, pp. 258–263. All brackets are in the original. The President spoke at 9 p.m. from the Library at the White House. His remarks were broadcast live on radio and television. In his diary entry for January 11, the President noted: "Senator Byrd suggested that instead of having a fireside chat on Panama that I deliver the speech in the Senate chamber. George Washington did this a couple of times, and Byrd said he'd be willing to have television cameras there to cover it as a news event. First he wants to check with [Alan] Cranston, Baker, and the others, but it's an intriguing and interesting proposition." (*White House Diary*, p. 163)

² See footnote 6, Document 33.

³ Reference is to John Hay.

⁴ See footnote 11, Document 56.

Throughout the negotiations, we were determined that our national security interests would be protected; that the canal would always be open and neutral and available to ships of all nations; that in time of need or emergency our warships would have the right to go to the head of the line for priority passage through the canal; and that our military forces would have the permanent right to defend the canal if it should ever be in danger. The new treaties meet all of these requirements.

Let me outline the terms of the agreement. There are two treaties—one covering the rest of this century, and the other guaranteeing the safety, openness, and neutrality of the canal after the year 1999, when Panama will be in charge of its operation.

For the rest of this century, we will operate the canal through a nine-person board of directors. Five members will be from the United States and four will be from Panama. Within the area of the present Canal Zone, we have the right to select whatever lands and waters our military and civilian forces need to maintain, to operate, and to defend the canal.

About 75 percent of those who now maintain and operate the canal are Panamanians; over the next 22 years, as we manage the canal together, this percentage will increase. The Americans who work on the canal will continue to have their rights of employment, promotion, and retirement carefully protected.

We will share with Panama some of the fees paid by shippers who use the canal. As in the past, the canal should continue to be self-supporting.

This is not a partisan issue. The treaties are strongly backed by President Gerald Ford and by Former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk and Henry Kissinger. They are endorsed by our business and professional leaders, especially those who recognize the benefits of good will and trade with other nations in this hemisphere. And they were endorsed overwhelmingly by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which, this week, moved closer to ratification by approving the treaties, although with some recommended changes which we do not feel are needed.⁵

And the treaties are supported enthusiastically by every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General George Brown, the Chairman, General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral James

⁵ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave final approval to the treaties (Exec N, 95th Cong. 1st Sess—Exec Rept 95-12) on January 30. (Robert G. Kaiser, "Senate Unit Gives Strong Approval To Canal Treaties," *The Washington Post*, January 31, 1978, pp. A-1, 10) The treaties then went to the floor of the Senate the first week of February. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, p. 54)

Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, General David Jones, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and General Louis Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps—responsible men whose profession is the defense of this Nation and the preservation of our security.

The treaties also have been overwhelmingly supported throughout Latin America, but predictably, they are opposed abroad by some who are unfriendly to the United States and who would like to see disorder in Panama and a disruption of our political, economic, and military ties with our friends in Central and South America and in the Caribbean.

I know that the treaties also have been opposed by many Americans. Much of that opposition is based on misunderstanding and misinformation. I've found that when the full terms of the agreement are known, most people are convinced that the national interests of our country will be served best by ratifying the treaties.

Tonight, I want you to hear the facts. I want to answer the most serious questions and tell you why I feel the Panama Canal treaties should be approved.

The most important reason—the only reason—to ratify the treaties is that they are in the highest national interest of the United States and will strengthen our position in the world. Our security interests will be stronger. Our trade opportunities will be improved. We will demonstrate that as a large and powerful country, we are able to deal fairly and honorably with a proud but smaller sovereign nation. We will honor our commitment to those engaged in world commerce that the Panama Canal will be open and available for use by their ships—at a reasonable and competitive cost—both now and in the future.

Let me answer specifically the most common questions about the treaties.

Will our Nation have the right to protect and defend the canal against any armed attack or threat to the security of the canal or of ships going through it?

The answer is yes, and is contained in both treaties and also in the statement of understanding between the leaders of our two nations.⁶

The first treaty says, and I quote: "The United States of America and the Republic of Panama commit themselves to protect and defend

⁶ A joint statement of understanding was issued on October 14 after a meeting between Presidents Carter and Torrijos; for the text, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, p. 1793. For the texts of the Panama Canal treaties, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1977, pp. 483–501.

the Panama Canal. Each Party shall act, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to meet the danger resulting from an armed attack or other actions which threaten the security of the Panama Canal or [of] ships transiting it."

The neutrality treaty says, and I quote again: "The United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality established in this Treaty, which shall be maintained in order that the Canal shall remain permanently neutral. . . ."

And to explain exactly what that means, the statement of understanding says, and I quote again: "Under (the Neutrality Treaty), Panama and the United States have the responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure to ships of all nations. The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the two countries shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently [shall] have the right to act against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal."

It is obvious that we can take whatever military action is necessary to make sure that the canal always remains open and safe.

Of course, this does not give the United States any right to intervene in the internal affairs of Panama, nor would our military action ever be directed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of Panama.

Military experts agree that even with the Panamanian Armed Forces joined with us as brothers against a common enemy, it would take a large number of American troops to ward off a heavy attack. I, as President, would not hesitate to deploy whatever armed forces are necessary to defend the canal, and I have no doubt that even in a sustained combat, that we would be successful. But there is a much better way than sending our sons and grandsons to fight in the jungles of Panama.

We would serve our interests better by implementing the new treaties, an action that will help to avoid any attack on the Panama Canal.

What we want is the permanent right to use the canal—and we can defend this right through the treaties—through real cooperation with Panama. The citizens of Panama and their government have already shown their support of the new partnership, and a protocol to the neutrality treaty will be signed by many other nations, thereby showing their strong approval.

The new treaties will naturally change Panama from a passive and sometimes deeply resentful bystander into an active and interested partner, whose vital interests will be served by a well-operated canal. This agreement leads to cooperation and not confrontation between our country and Panama.

Another question is: Why should we give away the Panama Canal Zone? As many people say, "We bought it, we paid for it, it's ours."

I must repeat a very important point: We do not own the Panama Canal Zone. We have never had sovereignty over it. We have only had the right to use it.

The Canal Zone cannot be compared with United States territory. We bought Alaska from the Russians, and no one has ever doubted that we own it. We bought the Louisiana Purchases—Territories from France, and that's an integral part of the United States.

From the beginning, we have made an annual payment to Panama to use their land. You do not pay rent on your own land. The Panama Canal Zone has always been Panamanian territory. The U.S. Supreme Court and previous American Presidents have repeatedly acknowledged the sovereignty of Panama over the Canal Zone.

We've never needed to own the Panama Canal Zone, any more than we need to own a 10-mile-wide strip of land all the way through Canada from Alaska when we build an international gas pipeline.

The new treaties give us what we do need—not ownership of the canal, but the right to use it and to protect it. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said, "The strategic value of the canal lies in its use."

There's another question: Can our naval ships, our warships, in time of need or emergency, get through the canal immediately instead of waiting in line?

The treaties answer that clearly by guaranteeing that our ships will always have expeditious transit through the canal. To make sure that there could be no possible disagreement about what these words mean, the joint statement says that expeditious transit, and I quote, "is intended . . . to assure the transit of such vessels through the Canal as quickly as possible, without any impediment, with expedited treatment, and in case of need or emergency, to go to the head of the line of vessels in order to transit the Canal rapidly."

Will the treaties affect our standing in Latin America? Will they create a so-called power vacuum, which our enemies might move in to fill? They will do just the opposite. The treaties will increase our Nation's influence in this hemisphere, will help to reduce any mistrust and disagreement, and they will remove a major source of anti-American feeling.

The new agreement has already provided vivid proof to the people of this hemisphere that a new era of friendship and cooperation is beginning and that what they regard as the last remnant of alleged American colonialism is being removed.

Last fall, I met individually with the leaders of 18 countries in this hemisphere.⁷ Between the United States and Latin America there is already a new sense of equality, a new sense of trust and mutual respect that exists because of the Panama Canal treaties. This opens up a fine opportunity for us in good will, trade, jobs, exports, and political cooperation.

If the treaties should be rejected, this would all be lost, and disappointment and despair among our good neighbors and traditional friends would be severe.

In the peaceful struggle against alien ideologies like communism, these treaties are a step in the right direction. Nothing could strengthen our competitors and adversaries in this hemisphere more than for us to reject this agreement.

What if a new sea-level canal should be needed in the future? This question has been studied over and over throughout this century, from before the time the canal was built up through the last few years. Every study has reached the same conclusion—that the best place to build a sea-level canal is in Panama.

The treaties say that if we want to build such a canal, we will build it in Panama, and if any canal is to be built in Panama, that we, the United States, will have the right to participate in the project.

This is a clear benefit to us, for it ensures that, say, 10 or 20 years from now, no unfriendly but wealthy power will be able to purchase the right to build a sea-level canal, to bypass the existing canal, perhaps leaving that other nation in control of the only usable waterway across the isthmus.

Are we paying Panama to take the canal? We are not. Under the new treaty, any payments to Panama will come from tolls paid by ships which use the canal.

What about the present and the future stability and the capability of the Panamanian Government? Do the people of Panama themselves support the agreement?

Well, as you know, Panama and her people have been our historical allies and friends. The present leader of Panama has been in office for more than 9 years, and he heads a stable government which has encouraged the development of free enterprise in Panama. Democratic elections will be held this August to choose the members of the Panamanian Assembly, who will in turn elect a President and a Vice President by majority vote. In the past, regimes have changed in Panama,

⁷ Carter met with Latin American leaders in September 1977 during the signing ceremonies for the Panama Canal treaties.

but for 75 years, no Panamanian government has ever wanted to close the canal.

Panama wants the canal open and neutral—perhaps even more than we do. The canal’s continued operation is very important to us, but it is much more than that to Panama. To Panama, it’s crucial. Much of her economy flows directly or indirectly from the canal. Panama would be no more likely to neglect or to close the canal than we would be to close the Interstate Highway System here in the United States.

In an open and free referendum last October, which was monitored very carefully by the United Nations, the people of Panama gave the new treaties their support.

The major threat to the canal comes not from any government of Panama, but from misguided persons who may try to fan the flames of dissatisfaction with the terms of the old treaty.

There’s a final question—about the deeper meaning of the treaties themselves, to us and to Panama.

Recently, I discussed the treaties with David McCullough, author of “The Path Between the Seas,” the great history of the Panama Canal.⁸ He believes that the canal is something that we built and have looked after these many years; it is “ours” in that sense, which is very different from just ownership.

So, when we talk of the canal, whether we are old, young, for or against the treaties, we are talking about very deep and elemental feelings about our own strength.

Still, we Americans want a more humane and stable world. We believe in good will and fairness, as well as strength. This agreement with Panama is something we want because we know it is right. This is not merely the surest way to protect and save the canal, it’s a strong, positive act of a people who are still confident, still creative, still great.

This new partnership can become a source of national pride and self-respect in much the same way that building the canal was 75 years ago. It’s the spirit in which we act that is so very important.

Theodore Roosevelt, who was President when America built the canal, saw history itself as a force, and the history of our own time and the changes it has brought would not be lost on him. He knew that change was inevitable and necessary. Change is growth. The true conservative, he once remarked, keeps his face to the future.

But if Theodore Roosevelt were to endorse the treaties, as I’m quite sure he would, it would be mainly because he could see the decision as

⁸ *The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870–1914* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977).

one by which we are demonstrating the kind of great power we wish to be.

"We cannot avoid meeting great issues," Roosevelt said. "All that we can determine for ourselves is whether we shall meet them well or ill."⁹

The Panama Canal is a vast, heroic expression of that age-old desire to bridge the divide and to bring people closer together. This is what the treaties are all about.

We can sense what Roosevelt called "the lift toward nobler things which marks a great and generous people."

In this historic decision, he would join us in our pride for being a great and generous people, with the national strength and wisdom to do what is right for us and what is fair to others.

Thank you very much.

⁹ Reference is to Roosevelt's 1899 speech entitled "The Strenuous Life."

68. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 9, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #46

1. *Opinion*

Strategic Deterioration

You should start giving more serious thought to, and personally engage in some discussion of, three developments which cumulatively may adversely affect the overall global position of the United States. These are:

1. Growing indications of political instability in Western Europe;²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² The President placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this point.

2. The potential consequences of major Soviet/Cuban success in Ethiopia;³

3. Our failure to exploit politically our relatively favored position in the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle.⁴

The cumulative effect of these trends could be very serious internationally and then domestically. By the fall we could be under attack for having presided over a grave deterioration in the U.S. global position. In that setting, SALT will not have a chance, and our ability to deal with other issues will be severely reduced.

The linchpin of our policy towards the Soviet Union has been a strong Western Europe, closely tied to the United States; moreover, in recent years we have subtly and cautiously exploited Soviet fears of China to encourage Soviet restraint. Given present trends, our first asset—Western Europe—may be partially undermined from within.

At the same time, we have failed almost entirely to take advantage of the opportunity inherent in the Sino-Soviet hostility, while concentrating heavily on enlarging the scope of U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

Political trends in Western Europe are ominous. The Italians have in effect cut a deal with the Communist party that will bring them into the Parliamentary coalition. The French left coalition of the Socialist and Communist is the favorite to win the March elections.⁵ German politics are increasingly manifesting neutralism and anti-U.S. symptoms, while Schmidt's economic policy is not helpful to the West's overall political and economic strength.⁶ Our initiative for NATO force improvements—though desirable—increasingly looks like we are using military measures to prop up a politically weakening alliance. In sum, by the end of March we could see major Communist advances in Europe, and then an important backlash at home with the Administration being criticized for doing too little too late.

At the same time, demonstrable Soviet success in the African Horn is likely to have a very direct psychological and political impact on Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁷ It will simply demonstrate to all concerned that the Soviet Union has the will and the capacity to assert itself. This will encourage Libya and Algeria to act more aggressively; it will also make more likely increased Cuban involvement in the Rhode-

³ The President wrote "agree" in the right-hand margin next to this point.

⁴ The President wrote "Later—(post-Panama)" in the right-hand margin next to this point.

⁵ The President underlined the word "favorite" and placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁶ The President underlined the phrase "anti-U.S." and wrote "True" in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁷ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "Iran, SA, Egypt should stand firm re crossing of Somali border."

sian conflict. In effect, first through a proxy (as in Angola) and now more directly (as in Ethiopia) the Soviet Union will be demonstrating that containment has now been fully breached.

Finally, in part because of Chinese rigidity,⁸ and in part because (in my judgment) of excessive sensitivity to the Soviets,⁹ we have slighted the Chinese connection. Even if normalization has to proceed slowly, and Vance's trip to Peking bears this out, there is no reason why the consultative relationship—resting quite frankly on a shared concern over Soviet aggressiveness—should not be cultivated.¹⁰ This is why I favor your instructing me to visit China sometime in March or April to engage in quiet consultations (not bilateral negotiations—and the Chinese would have to agree to this in advance) regarding global issues, thereby also sending a signal to the Soviets which might prove helpful on such matters as the Horn or SALT.¹¹ (Domestically, it would be viewed as a hardnosed act, and hence useful.)

The above paragraphs are primarily designed to help you focus on the larger aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and to point to some serious dangers on the horizon.

In terms of action, I think we need to spend some time reviewing the larger picture, especially in regards to Europe, and hence:

1. I hope the next NSC meeting might provide such an opportunity, even if the specific issues will relate largely to SALT and the African Horn.¹² In addition, I am initiating some urgent reviews within NSC of our European position;

2. The SCC will meet this Friday¹³ and prepare specific recommendations for you regarding the African Horn;

3. I would suggest that you talk to the Vice President and to Harold Brown regarding the political and strategic aspects of a possible trip by me to the Far East, since I expect Cy will be skeptical. I believe that such a trip would be helpful; and a firm decision by you, with the larger strategic picture in mind, is now needed.

4. We should begin elaborating a public and Congressional strategy to protect us against domestic backlash, should these developments (some largely beyond our control) occur. I think one approach would be to have some key senators in to see you for a discussion of what might be done as a way of sharing with them the limited range of

⁸ The President underlined the phrase "Chinese rigidity" and wrote "yes" in the right-hand margin next to this portion of the sentence.

⁹ The President underlined the phrase "sensitivity to the Soviets" and wrote "no" in the right-hand margin next to this portion of the sentence.

¹⁰ Vance visited China August 20–26, 1977. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 47–52.

¹¹ See footnote 21, Document 62.

¹² Presumable reference to the February 23 NSC meeting. The meeting minutes are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa.

¹³ February 10. The notes of the SCC meeting are scheduled for publication *ibid.*

options before us and of encouraging them therefore to produce a more understanding reaction, if these developments take place.¹⁴

2. *National Security Calendar* (Attached)¹⁵

¹⁴ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "We need a larger 2-hour meeting with key Reps & Senators."

¹⁵ Not printed.

69. Address by the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

New Orleans, Louisiana, February 13, 1978

Human Rights: The Diplomacy of the First Year

I am delighted to be here today among so many old friends. Last August, I had the good fortune of addressing the Gavel Awards luncheon at the American Bar Association convention.² On that occasion I discussed the principles that guide one of the most important foreign policy initiatives of the Carter Administration—the human rights policy.

Today, after 1 year's experience with that policy, I would like to talk about how those principles have been put into practice—to talk about the diplomacy of human rights.

Before doing so, let me remind you that our policy concerns three categories of rights:

- The right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person;
- The right to fulfill one's vital needs such as food, shelter, health care, and education; and
- Civil and political rights.

In his inaugural address, President Carter set the tone for a foreign policy based firmly on our values as a nation. "Because we are free," he said, "we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere."³ In

¹ Source: Department of State BULLETIN, March 1978, pp. 30–33. Christopher delivered his address before the American Bar Association.

² For text of address, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1977, p. 269. [Footnote in the original.]

³ For full text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 14, 1977, p. 121. [Footnote in the original. See Document 15.]

this single sentence, from which so much has flowed, the President was expressing an old and sometimes ignored truth with new vigor.

Our strength as a nation and our magnetism to the world at large are predicated on our commitment to human rights. It is only proper that the human rights considerations so important to our national life be reflected in our international life as well. This means they must be fully integrated into our diplomacy.

The pursuit of this cause is not an ideological luxury cruise with no practical port of call. Our idealism and our self-interest coincide. Widening the circle of countries which share our human rights values is at the very core of our security interests. Such nations make strong allies. Their commitment to human rights gives them an inner strength and stability which causes them to stand steadfastly with us on the most difficult issues of our time.

In this first year, I have been impressed by what a subtle, creative, and flexible process diplomacy can be in advancing the cause of human rights. Diplomacy is not just words—though words can be highly effective. It is also an impressive variety of intangible symbols and gestures, as well as tangible measures.

Diplomacy can be a rich mix, indeed. In the case of our human rights objectives, we have evolved a mix that is proving effective.

Capsule View of the Diplomacy

Frank Discussion. The primary ingredient of human rights diplomacy has a seeming simplicity: We frankly discuss human rights in our consultations with foreign diplomats and leaders. An obvious technique, yes. Just words, yes. But I must tell you that many of us have been amazed at its effectiveness.

A career Foreign Service Officer told me recently that until last January it would have been unusual for our ambassador to raise with the leader of another country, in face-to-face conversation, the fate of political prisoners. Our diplomats tended to shy away from direct high-level dialogue on such sensitive human rights issues.

That has changed. Time after time in the past year we have had such conversations. And very often these very frank discussions have led to beneficial results. Sovereign governments have reexamined conditions in their capitals and provinces, and releases of prisoners and other positive actions have followed.

When we raise human rights with another government, we take an affirmative stance. We explain that our people, our Congress, and our government are deeply troubled by the human rights abuses we believe to be occurring. And we ask for the other government's assessment of the situation and the prospects for improvement. Sometimes, it is true, the response is truculent and defensive. Sometimes, we are

charged with “intervening” in the internal affairs of another sovereign state.

But much more often, the response is a real effort to join issue on the merits. Frequently, there is candid acknowledgment of the validity of our interest—an interest rooted in solemn international agreements that make the way a government treats its own citizens a matter of legitimate international concern.

Just as frequently there is disagreement over the degree and the causes of the problem. It is often asserted, for example, that terrorism justifies repression. But usually these differences in perspective are overtaken by a consideration of possible improvements. By consideration, for example, of whether:

- Those held without trial, often incommunicado and for lengthy periods, can soon be released or at least charged and tried;
- The return to civilian rule can proceed on schedule; or
- Those responsible for mistreating prisoners will be prosecuted.

Sometimes we achieve explicit understandings on such issues. More commonly there is an implicit recognition of the need for improvement and for further consultations as the situation evolves. Either way, the raising of the issue has profound significance. Rather than being conveniently ignored, human rights abuses are brought to the center of the diplomatic interchange. There, they must be addressed.

I believe the almost geometric increase in world awareness of human rights issues is perhaps the major accomplishment of our human rights diplomacy. This new consciousness not only helps curb existing human rights abuses, it also acts as a deterrent to new violations.

Symbolic Acts. The words of human rights diplomacy can effectively be joined with symbolic acts. For example, trips to other countries by our senior officials and official invitations to the leaders of other nations to visit the United States can be used to advance our human rights objectives. Such visits can mark our recognition that a country has an outstanding human rights record or provide the opportunity to discuss human rights problems with the leader of a country where improvements are urgently needed.

There are a host of other measures that can be used symbolically to send the desired signal, such as: cultural and educational exchanges; selection of the site of international conferences; the level of our representation at diplomatic events; port visits by our fleet. Carefully used, such symbols and gestures can help advance the cause of human rights.

There is also significance in our willingness to meet, on appropriate occasions, with opposition leaders from countries with serious human rights problems. My colleagues and I have met with a number of such leaders in Washington—including some who are living in exile

from their homeland. And abroad, our ambassadors regularly meet with opposition leaders.

These meetings enable us to hear both sides of the story, to learn how a human rights problem is seen by those directly affected, and to demonstrate that we are concerned about all the people of the country involved, not just those in power.

Public Comment. Beyond private diplomatic discourse and important symbolic steps, the diplomacy of human rights must sometimes include criticism of regimes implicated in serious human rights violations.

Public comment by our government is an official act that directs the attention of the entire world to the objectionable practices of another government. We believe that such criticism can have some inhibiting effect on such governments. We do not generally prefer this approach but neither will we shrink from it.

Needless to say, public comment has been our first line of approach with respect to countries like Cambodia and Uganda, where we have little or no diplomatic contact but yet where unspeakable violations of human rights are occurring as a matter of deliberate state policy. We deplore these policies. We hope other governments which have the contact that we lack can make known the extent of international concern and bring about improvements.

We have also, of course, spoken openly and forthrightly at the Belgrade meeting that has been reviewing implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.⁴ That document contemplates a full and frank review of whether the signatories have lived up to their human rights commitments. It is clear that the Soviet Union and the East European countries, in varying degrees, have not done so. We have not hesitated to say so publicly, to request an explanation, and to seek compliance.

Our comments and those of West European governments have helped sustain the Helsinki accord as a living force in the cause of human rights, an engine for keeping constant pressure on governments to respect the rights of their people. Our silence would have effectively permitted that force to fade away.

In speaking of our public efforts, I should note that we are actively using our public diplomacy tools such as the U.S. Information Agency to convey our human rights concerns to various nongovernmental audiences abroad. The Voice of America has increased its attention to these issues. Our embassies and offices abroad have organized sem-

⁴ For an outline of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1977, p. 405; for full text of the CSCE Final Act, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. [Footnote in the original.]

inars in which thoughtful Americans can directly express their human rights concerns to people from similar walks of life in foreign countries.

Our human rights initiative has given recognition and a new stimulus to the longstanding efforts of private nongovernmental organizations in this field. We applaud these endeavors and recognize that over time they may well outdistance any governmental effort.

Appropriate Action. When our relationship with another government includes economic and military assistance, we are prepared to take tangible steps to recognize good human rights performance or to manifest our concern over human rights violations. When appropriate or necessary, in other words, we will support our words with actions. In taking such steps, we are guided and strengthened by important legislative provisions enacted by a Congress overwhelmingly committed to the cause of human rights.

Taking due account of the needs of the poorest, we have made a fundamental decision gradually to channel a growing share of our economic assistance to countries that respect the human rights of their people.

On the other hand, when countries we assist consistently curtail human rights, and where our preferred diplomatic efforts have been unavailing, we must consider restrictions on the flow of our aid, both overall levels and individual loans or grants. Thus, over the course of the past year we have, for example:

- Deferred bilateral economic assistance to certain countries;
- Opposed loans by the World Bank and the other international financial institutions to countries that engage in flagrant violations of human rights; and
- Taken steps to insure that food aid provided to countries with serious human rights problems will reach the needy.

We have also advised other departments of the government on human rights conditions abroad that may affect their activities. For example, a recently enacted statute calls for the Export-Import Bank to take human rights considerations into account, and the Bank regularly seeks advice on this issue.⁵

Human rights performance is also an important factor in our decisions on military assistance and commercial arms sales subject to government licensing. We have reduced or declined to increase our mili-

⁵ Presumable reference to P.L. 95-143 (91 Stat. 1210), signed into law by the President on October 26, 1977. The law amended the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to require the Bank's Board of Directors to take under consideration the observance of human rights in determining the extension of loans and guarantees. It also amended the act in order to extend the Bank's operating authority to September 30, 1978, from June 30, 1978. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 48)

tary aid to a number of countries and refused to issue licenses in a variety of instances.

The diversity of cultures and the different stages of economic and political maturity tend to produce agonizing, almost incredibly complex, choices in granting or withholding aid. Moreover, human rights, while a fundamental factor in our foreign policy, cannot always be the decisive factor. But the difficulty of the decisions will not deter us from supporting our words with action.

International Support. It is important to note that we are not alone in pursuing the diplomacy of human rights. Increasingly, other governments are standing with us. In the United Nations, in the Organization of American States, and in other contexts we have strong partners in the cause of human rights. Recently, we initiated consultations with our West European allies and others on how to promote broader international cooperation in support of human rights. In general, we are finding strong support for giving human rights a higher priority in international relations.

Human Rights Data Base. As I reflect on the first year of human rights diplomacy, there is one area in which I would like to ask for the creative thinking and counsel of this great association. I refer to the need I perceive for an objective, authenticated data base on human rights conditions in all countries.

Let me put the problem in perspective. With the aid of our embassies around the world, we are constantly trying to gather reliable and extensive human rights data. Nevertheless, the validity of our information on human rights conditions in other countries is frequently challenged. Probably it is inevitable that the data collected by any one country would be suspect. Coverage is bound to be limited, and there may be the suspicion that the collecting country has an ax to grind.

What is needed is an objective, widely respected clearinghouse for human rights information on all countries of the world. This would be an important resource for us and others interested in taking human rights conditions in other countries into account in policymaking. It would thus both inform our decisions and authenticate the existence and severity of human rights problems.

Perhaps you will be able to suggest how such a clearinghouse might be created. It is clear that it must be international in scope. What is not so clear is whether it should be sponsored by a private organization or by a group of countries or an international organization. Once created, I could visualize that such an entity might also play an important educational role in improving human rights conditions around the world. We stand ready to help in creating such an organization.

U.S. Concerns

This then is a capsule view of the diplomacy of human rights. It is a diplomacy that refuses to "be indifferent to the fate of freedom else-

where.” It is a diplomacy that has permitted the United States to seize the initiative for human progress once again. Surveys conducted abroad have shown time and time again that the renewed interest in human values expressed by the President and implemented by our diplomatic efforts has had an enormously positive impact on the view people in foreign countries hold of America and our role in the world.

We are daily concerned with our government’s response to human rights conditions in other countries. But our credibility—and indeed the inner health of our society—depends upon facing up to our problems here at home and seeking to improve our own human rights situation.

Much of President Carter’s domestic program is directed toward the enhancement of the human rights of Americans. Proposals for welfare reform, efforts to cut the cost of health care, and the commitment to full employment are obvious examples. We should also note that, within the past year, travel restrictions for American citizens abroad have been eliminated,⁶ and visa requirements for foreigners coming to this country have been significantly eased.

It is well to remember that we are far from perfect. Our ample due process with all its guarantees does not afford perfect justice. But whatever our shortcomings, they are faced frankly and openly. The three constitutional branches of government have the responsibility to do so. And the “fourth branch” is there to insure that that responsibility is met.

Progress to Date

In making human rights a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy and greatly increasing sensitivity to human rights concerns, we have helped to create an atmosphere in which human rights progress is much more likely to occur. We do not take credit for particular improvements, but we note the tangible evidence from every continent that the condition of large numbers of people—of individual, identifiable human beings—is less oppressive now than it seemed one year ago.

Africa. There have been releases of substantial numbers of political detainees; for example, Sudan, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Mali, and Ghana are moving toward reestablishment of civilian governments. Most African leaders have intensified their efforts to promote agricultural development. Nigeria and other African nations are supporting creation of an African human rights commission under U.N. auspices.

⁶ See footnote 15, Document 29.

Near East. Morocco moved toward political liberalization after nearly a decade of rule by decree. Restrictions on freedom of the press were lifted and significant numbers of political prisoners were released. Tunisia authorized establishment of the Tunisian League for the Rights of Man which has been permitted to investigate allegations of human rights violations. Iran released a substantial number of political prisoners and agreed to a visit by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

South Asia. There was in India a magnificent resurrection of democracy. Nepal released political prisoners and lifted newspaper curbs. Sri Lanka changed its government for the sixth time since independence through the free choice of its people. Pakistan released over 11,000 political prisoners.

East Asia. The Indonesian Government released 10,000 political detainees, confirmed its intent to release 20,000 more in accordance with its previously announced release schedule, and agreed to resumption of ICRC visits. South Korea released all but one of the Myong Dong prisoners—opposition political and religious leaders who had opposed the government. The Philippine Government eased some of its martial law restrictions and released some detainees. The new Government of Thailand has eased press restrictions, improved trial procedures, and stated its intent to seek general elections early next year.

Latin America. Political prisoners were released in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Argentina, and Peru. The military governments of Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia announced that elections will be held in 1978. States of siege were lifted in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Most Latin American governments have allocated increased resources to improving the living standards and productivity of their poor farmers. Some restrictive laws have been repealed in Panama. And El Salvador, Haiti, and Paraguay agreed to visits by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Europe. For the first time in NATO's history, every member of the alliance is a democracy. New churches have been constructed in Poland. Certain countries of Eastern Europe have eased their restrictions on emigration and family reunification. Some human rights activists in Poland and Romania have been released from prison. And live television programs in Hungary have allowed prominent Westerners to voice their views on political issues.

Problems

Despite these many improvements and others like them, the fact remains that the distance covered is dwarfed by the distance that remains to be traveled. I could recount in detail the retrograde human rights developments of the past year, as well as the horrendous human

rights violations that persist across the globe—in many of the countries I have just mentioned as well as elsewhere.

- Suffice it to say that in all quarters of the world, too many people are still subject to torture and are suffering in squalid prisons, uncharged and untried.

- Too many people are hungry, have inadequate shelter, and lack medical care and educational opportunity.

- Too many people are living under martial law or are otherwise barred from political participation.

- Too many are denied the right to emigrate or even to travel freely within their own country.

These problems are the challenges of the future. They will not be solved easily. But our experience with 1 year of human rights diplomacy convinces us that while the journey is long it is not impossible.

Of course none of us can know for sure where the progress of human rights may lead. But every so often during the past year, as I have struggled to understand the deep meaning of human rights, I have felt a fleeting intimation of what untold spiritual and material riches may lie ahead—perhaps centuries ahead—in a world of true, universal human freedom. Justice Holmes perhaps had a similar feeling—and certainly expressed it much better than I ever could—when he said:

I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares a chamber for the winged thing it never has seen but is to be—that man may have cosmic destinies that he does not understand. And so beyond the vision of battling races and an impoverished earth I catch a dreaming glimpse of peace.

I think that in the last analysis the cause of human rights has power and will succeed because, no matter what the obstacle, it tenaciously allows the world's people to "catch a dreaming glimpse of peace."

70. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, undated

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

I. INTRODUCTION

For a generation our nation's foreign policy has reflected a strong and outward looking America. In this tradition, and building upon the achievements of previous Administrations, we have over the past year formulated our policies on the critical issues that will shape the remainder of our lives, and those of the next generation.

1. *The Complex International Agenda*

As we look ahead to the 1980's our nation faces complex international challenges:

—The strategic arms race with the Soviet Union increases superpower tension and the risk of nuclear war.

—The widening use of nuclear energy, necessary to the economic well-being of many nations, threatens at the same time to promote the spread of nuclear weapons.

—Long standing regional disputes pose the constant threat of regional wars, endangering world peace.

—Growing inventories of conventional weapons aggravate regional tensions and waste scarce economic resources.

—Economic recovery in the industrial nations is not rapid enough; economic development in the third world is a global concern; and both require the strengthening of international economic cooperation.

—Fostering human rights in our own society and abroad is necessary to a just international order and a measure of the vitality of our most basic values as a nation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 1, 3/2/78 2 Copies of Report on 1977 prepared but not released. No classification marking. According to a February 24 memorandum from Christopher to Lake, Lake drafted the paper. Christopher, commenting on an earlier version of the paper, recommended that Lake rework the format, send it to the bureaus to obtain updated comments, and then forward it to Vance. He continued: "At that point, I would hope that, with an appropriately hedged cover sheet, it would become a public document. But even if it does not, it will have served an important purpose." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memoranda from WC to Bureaus—1978) Attached to the version of the paper printed here is a cover page indicating that Vance had requested the paper and that the Bureau of Public Affairs planned to issue it. Notations in an unknown hand on the cover page read: "Please return to S/P—L Rowe" and "3/2 final 12:30 p.m. S/P." An additional notation indicates that the paper was not published.

The United States approaches these challenges with extraordinary human and physical resources. Our unparalleled strength has its roots deep in the character and nature of our country:

- The inherent strength and resiliency of our society;
- Our deep-seated respect for the rights and potential of the individual regardless of circumstances of birth;
- Our economic power and resources;
- A superior technological and industrial base;
- A military capability second to none;
- A tradition of inventive diplomacy and a willingness to assume the responsibilities of leadership.

Our strengths as a nation are amplified by our long-standing alliances with other nations. We confront our challenges together.

Together, we also face a new pattern of international relations in the late 1970's. For close to three decades, the Cold War dominated our view of the world; today, we must deal with a pluralistic international setting of several major dimensions:

—First are our ties to the democratic, industrial nations of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. These ties serve the central political, economic, and military interests of the United States. They have proven their durability and their continuing value. The cohesion and strength of these relationships remain an essential precondition to progress in our other relations.

—There is the evolving East-West relationship, marked by continuing competitive elements, and yet promising in its opportunities for cooperation.

—Relations between the industrial societies and the developing nations now touch every major issue before us. Increasingly, nations both North and South recognize the need to seek common ground.

—Modern technology, while it has brought great benefits, has also created a new set of challenges which are global in scope and in the necessary dimensions of their resolution, developing and allocating scarce resources, protecting the world environment, confronting the dangers of nuclear proliferation, encouraging the free flow of information, applying medical and agricultural knowledge to the enhancement of human life.

—The widening pattern of international associations, the economic, political, technical and cultural bodies—public and private—plays an increasingly important role in facilitating the cooperative efforts necessary to deal effectively with international problems.

These elements interact to create a new pattern of international life and new demands for diplomatic skill and creativity. Shifting coali-

tions among nations are coming together around particular interests, often cutting across ideological, regional and political lines. From the core relationship with our historical allies and friends, we are able, on an increasing number of issues, to join together with nations we have not worked closely with in the past. This is especially true with the developing world. Moreover, when the nations of the communist world seek constructive solutions to common problems, we and others are ready to join with them. We seek the most inclusive coalitions that can be effective in meeting the particular challenges before us.

We are also operating on the assumption that no animosity is so deep that there is not some common ground. For instance, we find ourselves associated with the Soviet Union on certain issues, such as the Law of the Seas, even as we stand in opposition on other issues. At the same time, we recognize that our alliances can never be so total that disagreements on some issues are precluded.

We recognize that diverse and equally valid American goals may themselves come into conflict, particularly over the short term. Thus, our interest in secure energy supplies can conflict with our interest in preventing nuclear proliferation, for nuclear energy without adequate safeguards can be used to develop nuclear weapons. Our commitment to human rights may sometimes clash with our desire to maintain close ties to countries whose cooperation we need on security or economic issues.

The pursuit of our basic principles must therefore be flexible and pragmatic, for balances inevitably must be struck. Both our principles and their pragmatic pursuit are traditional American strengths. As we reassert the international vitality of our national ideals, we must remain practical in recognizing the limits to our power and the conflicting demands which our ideals may make upon our policies. America has been most successful in the world when it has maintained this sense of practical idealism.

The changing nature of international cooperation and competition, our diverse interests in the world, the absence of armed conflicts involving American force, all contribute to move American foreign policy beyond the generalized doctrines of times past. Our policies do not lend themselves to simple doctrinal explanations. We must therefore take special care to work closely with the Congress, to open our policies to broad public discussion and to encourage alternative points of view within the Administration itself. All voices must be heard: America's foreign policy cannot be sustained without the understanding and support of the American people.

2. Agenda for 1978

The decisions which the Administration, Congress and American people face in 1978 will be made, in large measure, within the context of

the goals we set for ourselves during 1977. In important respects, our choices in 1978 will shape the character of America's role in world affairs for years to come:

—We will persist in continuing long term efforts to promote human rights, to check nuclear weapons proliferation and to restrain the growth in conventional arms traffic.

—Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties will secure our future interests in the Canal and set the pattern for a healthy new relationship between big powers and smaller countries, a relationship of clear mutual benefit and respect.

—We will continue during the coming months to pursue a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union that will strengthen our security as well as that of our allies, and reduce the risks and tensions that accompany an uncontrolled nuclear weapons race. We will at the same time press for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

—Diplomacy for peace in the Middle East, southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa will continue, in the hope that these particularly dangerous regional disputes can be resolved.

—An effective American energy program must be enacted.

—We will pursue a more open trading system that serves the economies of all nations.

—Through a more effective foreign aid program, we will seek to encourage the growth and well-being of developing societies. Their economic progress will promote our own.

We have always responded well as a nation to immediate challenges. Today, more than ever, we face another critical test: whether we can rally for the long haul, whether we can make the short-term sacrifices sometimes necessary to secure our future interests.

We have emerged from our national ordeal in Vietnam. In 1978, a strong America has the opportunity to show that we have the confidence to play a positive role of world leadership. This positive American role is essential if the world is to come to grips with the problems that could otherwise engulf it.

The choices we face touch every American. While the immediate interests of our citizens are diverse, over the longer run each of us shares an interest in a foreign policy that serves three goals: to be true to our values, to seek peace, and to enhance the well-being of our people and the peoples of all nations. The body of this report addresses each of these fundamental objectives.

II. VALUES

American values provide the base of our policy. Our concern for the welfare of others coincides with our own national interest:

—to do what we can to alleviate injustice and tension before they erupt into violence;

—to help reduce the threat of war and the high cost of military establishments;

—to contribute to the global economic growth and equity on which our own national prosperity depends.

Human Rights:

The human rights policy of this Administration most clearly represents the application of our values to the practical decisions of foreign policy.

Our concern is for those human rights which have been recognized internationally—in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,² and other UN covenants and conventions; in the American Convention on Human Rights;³ and in the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These documents codify the right to be free from torture or arbitrary arrest; the right to political freedom; and basic economic rights and opportunities. Our focus on these human rights is not an attempt to impose the American political system on others. These rights can be enjoyed under various political systems and in differing manner. They are rights to which all are entitled.

It is easy to be for all these rights in our rhetoric. Indeed no civilized nation has ever declared itself against them. It is more complex to take the human rights dimension into account in the major foreign policy decisions we take. We are trying to do that. That is how we view our obligations to American law and tradition.

Human rights concerns have been integrated into all levels of our dealings with foreign governments—from Presidential exchanges to the discussions of working level officials. It is clear to all governments that we consider how they treat their own people as an important factor in all our dealings with them.

We have affirmed our commitment to formal international standards—by finally signing the UN covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights and on civil and political rights⁴ and by signing the American Convention on Human Rights. We are working to improve the human rights machinery of the UN and the Organization of American States, and to secure better implementation of the human rights provisions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

² See footnote 17, Document 29.

³ See footnote 8, Document 33.

⁴ See footnote 9, Document 9.

These multilateral efforts are important since they emphasize that America is not preaching to the rest of the world, but adding its voice to all the others who are working to improve the plight of individuals.

Words must be supported with actions. Proposals for American assistance—loans or grants through our aid program; our position on loans in the international development banks; military assistance or even sales—are carefully reviewed from a human rights point of view. This is a time-consuming process, since we analyze the human rights situation in the country concerned, who will benefit from the assistance, and how we can effectively assist the cause of human rights and the lot of the neediest.

We have modified aid allocations on human rights grounds and we are working to ensure that our bilateral programs meet the basic human needs of the poor for food, shelter, health care, and education. We oppose loans in the international development banks to countries with serious human rights problems, unless the loans are aimed at satisfying basic human needs. We have accepted the fact that our relations with certain countries may be strained as a result of our attention to human rights. As human rights conditions improve, these strains should be eased.

It may be of interest to record some of the actual dilemmas we face, for example, in linking human rights and foreign assistance. We often ask ourselves: should we oppose a loan which could promote the economic condition of poor people, in hopes of influencing their governments to permit a greater exercise of political rights? Would withholding security aid in a particular situation stimulate a siege mentality, leading to an even harsher crackdown on dissident elements, or would its practical effect be to promote human rights? How can we best show recognition of the progress a society is making, and thus reinforce that process, even if the general human rights situation remains unacceptable?

These and other hard questions require case-by-case analysis. Some observers will find our choices inconsistent. This is because tactics should be adaptable, although our goals are not. We will take those actions we believe will be most effective in each country, and which are consistent with statutory provisions designed to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights.

We must also keep our human rights concerns in balance with other national interests. We often must determine how best to respond to the needs of individuals living under authoritarian regimes, while still retaining the necessary cooperation of their governments on security or economic matters that are vital to us. Even in striking this balance however, our broad goal remains the same: economic and security

policies, as well as policy on “human rights”, are guided by a concern with the impact of all we do on the welfare of individuals.

We are embarked on a long term endeavor. Progress must be measured over the long run. This Administration will probably not see the full results—successful or not—of our efforts in this field. Nor can we claim credit for many decisions made by sovereign foreign governments. But we have contributed to an international climate in which tangible progress was made in 1977:

—Thousands of prisoners have been freed.

—Some political systems have become a little more open. States of siege have ended and elections have been scheduled in a number of countries.

—International human rights commissions have been permitted to visit countries formerly closed to them.

The world was not transformed by such events. But many individuals were better off at the end of 1977 than at its beginning.

This is a sound beginning, but our experience has shown us that there are sometimes even better ways to proceed:

—In this first year we have most often reacted to human rights violations by reducing or ending economic or military assistance programs. We wish to increasingly emphasize positive actions to help governments which are trying to improve the lot of their own people. We are working to find ways to use our assistance affirmatively, to promote human rights, rather than in ways which are primarily punitive.

—We must work even more closely with international organizations and foreign leaders to find the most constructive ways to advance human rights in cultures and political traditions different from our own.

In our dealings with other nations and people we must recognize human rights problems of our own. The President’s plans for welfare reform, urban renewal, more jobs for disadvantaged youth, are all part of a commitment constantly to improve our own human rights performance.

In sum, there has been a perceptible change in the international view of what the United States stands for in the world. Our most durable source of strength is the symbol of individual liberty and opportunity that we represent to others.

[Omitted here are sections III. Peace and IV. Individual Economic Well-Being.]

V. CONCLUSION

One year ago, we decided to give new priority to several complex longer-term issues that are becoming increasingly important to our na-

tional interests: issues such as human rights, energy, trade, nuclear non-proliferation, and conventional arms sales.

We realized, but perhaps did not adequately explain to the American people, that progress on these issues would be slow, and that by raising some of them we would complicate certain of our bilateral relations.

We decided that these global problems had to be addressed at once, because it is clear that we cannot approach the key issues in our foreign policy *seriatim*. For example, we cannot so concentrate our energy on the political diplomacy of international peace, essential as it is, that we discover, too late, that poverty and injustice within nations makes peace among nations impossible.

The relationship between energy and nuclear proliferation illustrates this point. We can use the connection between the two issues to find progress on both: while seeking through cooperative international efforts to fire a safer nuclear fuel cycle, we can use progress on development of non-nuclear energy sources to reinforce our arguments against the development of unsafe nuclear facilities. Conversely, we emphasize also that the dangers of nuclear proliferation make the development of non-nuclear and safe nuclear power all the more important.

Our reluctance to set one or two rigid conceptual doctrines—to pretend that the complexities of a mature American foreign policy can be summarized in one or two catch phrases—is a matter of conscious choice. We will apply ourselves with more vigor to the necessity of explaining this reordering of our strategies and inter-related priorities in the coming year.

Some lessons that we can draw, in the light of the last year's experience, include:

—We recognize that since we are more deeply engaged than ever in long-term efforts, results may come slowly: in many areas, we do not expect dramatic developments in the first year or two. We do expect to be judged on whether measured progress is being achieved, however—and on how much will have been achieved by the end of President Carter's first term in office.

—The fact is that, without a single over-arching concept, we will have to build a national consensus behind American foreign policy on new premises and new approaches: if there is a lag in public perception of our design, it is partly because many people still think in terms of bipolar diplomacy, when relations with the Soviet Union dwarfed all other concerns. Now, however, we must operate on a broad range of issues in a pluralistic world, in which relations with the Soviet Union are central but not all encompassing.

—In discussing and debating our policies, we will ask also that the press and public be willing to wrestle with complexity and eschew the comfort of simple slogans and a belief in quick solutions.

—Clear priorities need not be precluded by multiple goals. Certain issues—because of their urgency, their importance, or both—must and do receive our most serious attention. As indicated above, we place at the top of our agenda for 1978 the following issues:

- Approval of the Panama Canal treaties;
- Achievement of a sound SALT treaty, and other arms control measures;
- Peace-making in the Middle East and southern Africa;
- International economic recovery and development, including progress at the multilateral trade negotiations and a strong American aid program;
- Energy and nuclear non-proliferation; and
- Promoting human rights.

—Abroad, we will continue to work especially closely with our alliance friends in addressing these challenges.

—At home, in almost every case, progress in 1978 will be heavily dependent on positive Congressional action, and close cooperation between the legislative and executive branches. We welcome the role and responsibility of the Congress. As we share power in an open and constitutional way with the Congress, we also share responsibility with the members of both Houses to address pressing issues in an expeditious and constructive fashion.

—Finally, a practical approach requires an understanding that our actions need continuing examination and correction: when circumstances change (as they did in the Middle East in late 1977), or when we discover that we are making mistakes (as we may have done in early months, in pressing certain nations to address too many of our concerns at once), it is wiser to change tactics than to insist on the perfection of our approach.

In almost every case of American involvement in foreign crises, we view our role as that of a facilitator, a provider of good offices. On occasion, we may advance ideas or drafts, but our overriding desire is to get the parties together to discuss the key issues in a meaningful way. This has been true in the Middle East, in southern Africa, in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere.

By committing our economic, diplomatic and moral resources, the chances for the successful resolution of disputes are improved. But the solutions themselves will depend almost always on the good will and ingenuity of the parties themselves. For solutions that they have themselves designed and adopted are the solutions that are most likely to endure.

On economic and other global issues, we can help to form coalitions of nations working together to resolve the problems that no single nation can meet alone.

We can do all this, however, only if we are willing to show leadership through example as well as strength. Only through our own constructive domestic and foreign policies—whether on energy or the Panama Canal—can we inspire and presume to encourage other nations to act with us for the common good.

As President Carter said at the United Nations last October,⁵

“However wealthy and powerful the United States may be—however capable of leadership—this power is increasingly relative, the leadership increasingly is in need of being shared.

“No nation has a monopoly of vision, of creativity, or of ideas. Bringing these together from many nations is our common responsibility and our common challenge. For only in these ways can the idea of a peaceful global community grow and prosper.”

⁵ See Document 56.

71. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 3, 1978

SUBJECT

Speech on Defense Policy

At Tab A is an outline of a speech on this Administration's defense policy for your consideration.²

The speech should note briefly that you conceive national security to be more than military affairs and that your efforts in the non-military areas of national security have been many. That must not, however, lead anyone to the mistaken view that you neglect the military dimen-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 64, Speeches: Wake Forest University: 10/77–3/78. Confidential. The President initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski also wrote “ZB file” in the top-right hand corner of the memorandum. Huntington sent the memorandum and the speech outline to Brzezinski under a March 3 cover memorandum, indicating that he, Odom, Putnam, and Westbrook had attempted to incorporate Brzezinski's and Aaron's suggestions. Huntington also requested that Brzezinski send both the memorandum and the outline to the President.

² Attached but not printed. The undated, 3-page outline is entitled “Defense Policy Speech.” For the text of the address as delivered by the President on March 17, see Document 72.

sion of this country's security. If we and our allies seek a world of "peace without victory" while others, pretending to accept that spirit of detente, actually seek "victory without war," the world will not be safe, and the military factor will become crucial. Recent Soviet behavior is not reassuring on this point.

You, as Commander-in-Chief, will make clear to the American public and our allies that military power is a fundamental component of national security. Furthermore, a strong and rich nation cannot escape the political responsibility of military power. Well-reasoned examples of this Administration's decisions on future military programs will show that you carefully have considered the trends in national security affairs and are providing the flexibility needed to cope with the wide range of contingencies which the U.S. could face during this decade. Your personal involvement in maintaining military readiness will be highlighted.

The speech would set forth the following principles:

—We do not seek military superiority but we will not allow others to attain it.

—It is not our policy to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to exacerbate regional and local conflicts, and we cannot view with equanimity interventions by other powers in such conflicts.

—We shall seek arms agreements when they are possible and prudent, but we shall sustain and improve our military capabilities where necessary.

—We shall be forthcoming in encouraging further economic and technological cooperation with those who act to restrain destabilizing military competition.

It would be easy for a number of states, not only Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also Yugoslavia and our NATO allies to reach a mistaken conclusion about where we are going because we have emphasized cooperation for the past year. This speech should redress the balance and set the backdrop for other statements you may find important to make on national security as events unfold in Africa, the Middle East, and a post-Tito Yugoslavia.

In sum, the image to be conveyed is not belligerence or alarm, but rather competence and confidence in the pursuit of the national strategy which you set last summer.³

³ See footnote 2, Document 36.

Jim Fallows has been consulted on this outline. I have also invited Harold Brown to make inputs into the preparation of this speech.⁴

Are we heading in the right direction with this outline?⁵

⁴ According to an NSC Correspondence Profile, Brzezinski sent a March 3 memorandum to Brown requesting his views. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 64, Speeches: Wake Forest University: 10/77–3/78) Brown's March 18 reply is *ibid*.

⁵ The President indicated his approval by checking the "Yes" option. He wrote "but" next to the option and drew a line from it into the lower margin where he added: "ok—Let Harold have a major input. I want it to answer questions raised by Sam Nunn, Goldwater & others, & also to teach the average American what we have & are doing. Keep language simple—not too much theory—].” He continued: "p.s. One or two news-worthy specific items would help. (ASAT—MX—CM—CTB—SALT, etc)."

72. Address by President Carter¹

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, March 17, 1978

[Omitted here are the President's introductory remarks.]

This morning I would like to talk to you about our national security—where we now stand, what new circumstances we face, and what we are going to do in the future.

Let me deal at the beginning with some myths. One myth is that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests and its friends around the world. That is not the case, as will be explained in this speech and demonstrated in our actions as a nation.

Another myth is that our defense budget is too burdensome and consumes an undue part of our Federal revenues. National defense is, of course, a large and important item of expenditures, but it represents only about 5 percent of our gross national product and about a quarter of our current Federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's defense spending is mainly for intercontinental missiles or nuclear weapons. Only about 10 percent of our defense budget goes for strategic forces or for nuclear deterrence. More than 50 percent is simply to pay for and support the services of the men and women in our Armed Forces.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 529–535. The President spoke at 9 a.m. in Wake Forest University's Wait Chapel. Following his address, he attended a reception for Representative Steve Neal (D–North Carolina).

Finally, some believe that because we do possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, that we need do nothing more to guarantee our Nation's security. Unfortunately, it's not that simple.

Our potential adversaries have now built up massive forces armed with conventional weapons—tanks, aircraft, infantry, mechanized units. These forces could be used for political blackmail, and they could threaten our vital interests unless we and our allies and friends have our own military strength and conventional forces as a counterbalance.

Of course, our national security rests on more than just military power. It depends partly on the productive capacity of our factories and our farms, on an adequate supply of natural resources with which God has blessed us, on an economic system which values human freedom above centralized control, on the creative ideas of our best minds, on the hard work, cohesion, moral strength, and determination of the American people, and on the friendship of our neighbors to the north and south.

Our security depends on strong bonds with our allies and on whether other nations seek to live in peace and refrain from trying to dominate those who live around them.

But adequate and capable military forces are still an essential element of our national security. We, like our ancestors, have the obligation to maintain strength equal to the challenges of the world in which we live, and we Americans will continue to do so.

Let us review briefly how national security issues have changed over the past decade or two.

The world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is now a division among the Communist powers. The old colonial empires have fallen, and many new nations have risen in their place. Old ideological labels have lost some of their meaning.

There have also been changes in the military balance among nations. Over the past 20 years, the military forces of the Soviets have grown substantially, both in absolute numbers and relative to our own. There also has been an ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power—to intervene in local conflicts, with advisers, with equipment, and with full logistical support and encouragement for mercenaries from other Communist countries, as we can observe today in Africa.

This increase in Soviet military power has been going on for a long time. Discounting inflation, since 1960 Soviet military spending has doubled, rising steadily in real terms by 3 or 4 percent a year, while our own military budget is actually lower now than it was in 1960.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank number two in world naval forces.

In its balanced strategic nuclear capability, the United States retains important advantages. But over the past decade, the steady Soviet buildup has achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses—diplomatic, military, and economic—and we will.

As President and as Commander in Chief, I am responsible, along with the Congress, for modernizing, expanding, and improving our Armed Forces whenever our security requires it. We've recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy. And out of this process have come some overall principles designed to preserve our national security during the years ahead.

We will match, together with our allies and friends, any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs. We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us.

We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the internal domestic affairs of other countries, nor to aggravate regional conflicts. And we shall oppose intervention by others.

While assuring our own military capabilities, we shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms control agreements wherever possible.

We shall use our great economic, technological, and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote American values. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific, and economic goals. But if they fail to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels or in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United States for such cooperation with the Soviets will certainly erode.

These principles mean that, even as we search for agreement in arms control, we will continue to modernize our strategic systems and to revitalize our conventional forces. And I have no doubt that the Congress shares my commitment in this respect.

We shall implement this policy that I've outlined so briefly in three different ways: by maintaining strategic nuclear balance; by working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and by maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and friends in our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.

Let me take up each of these three in turn.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons do not free us from the need to analyze the situation objectively and to make sensible choices about our purposes and means.

Our strategic forces must be—and must be known to be—a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. They will never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, to coerce, or to blackmail us or our friends.

Our continuing major efforts in the SALT talks taking place every day in Geneva are one means toward a goal of strategic nuclear stability.

We and the Soviets have already reached agreement on some basic points, although still others remain to be resolved. We are making good progress. We are not looking for a one-sided advantage. But before I sign any SALT agreement on behalf of the United States, I will make sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that we will be at least as strong, relative to the Soviet Union, as we would be without any agreement.

But in addition to the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must make other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade, improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces in silos increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union. But however remote, it is a threat against which we must constantly be on guard.

We have a superb submarine fleet, which is relatively invulnerable to attack when it's at sea, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which give our submarine ballistic missile force even greater range and security.

I have ordered rapid development and deployment of cruise missiles to reinforce the strategic value of our bombers. We are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile and a Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If it becomes necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale deployment and development of these systems.

Our strategic defense forces, our nuclear forces, are a triad—land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and air-breathing missiles, such as bombers and cruise missiles. Through the plans I've described, all three legs of this triad will be modernized and improved. Each will retain the ability, on its own, to impose devastating retaliation upon an aggressor.

For 30 years and more we've been committed to the defense of Europe, bound by the knowledge that Western Europe's security is vital

to our own. We continue to cooperate with our NATO Allies in a strategy for flexible response, combining conventional forces and nuclear forces so that no aggressor can threaten the territory of Europe or its freedom, which in the past we have fought together to defend.

For several years we and our allies have been trying to negotiate mutual and balanced reduction in military forces in Europe with the Soviets and with the Warsaw Pact nations who are their allies. But in the meantime, the Soviets have continued to increase and to modernize their forces beyond a level necessary for defense. In the face of this excessive Soviet buildup, we and our NATO Allies have had to take important steps to cope with short-term vulnerabilities and to respond to long-term threats. We are significantly strengthening U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe and improving our ability to speed additional ground and air forces to the defense of Europe in a time of crisis.

Our European allies, who supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat strength, are also improving their readiness and their reinforcement capabilities and their antitank defenses. The heads of the NATO governments will be here in our country attending a summit meeting in May,² where we will address our long-term defense program which will expand and integrate more closely allied defense plans.

For many years, the United States has been a major world power. Our longstanding concerns encompass our own security interests and those of our allies and friends far beyond our own shores and Europe.

We have important historical responsibilities to enhance peace in East Asia, in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, and throughout our own hemisphere. Our preference in all these areas is to turn first to international agreements that reduce the overall level of arms and minimize the threat of conflict. But we have the will, and we will also maintain the capacity, to honor our commitments and to protect our interests in those critical areas.

In the Pacific, our effective security is enhanced by mutual defense treaties with our allies and by our friendship and cooperation with other Pacific nations.

Japan and South Korea, closely linked with the United States, are located geographically where vital interests of great powers converge. It is imperative that Northeast Asia remain stable. We will maintain and even enhance our military strength in this area, improving our air

² Reference is to the May 30–31 North Atlantic summit meeting in Washington. The President addressed the North Atlantic Council on May 30; see Document 83. Documentation on the summit meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

strength and reducing our ground forces, as the South Korean army continues to modernize and to increase its own capabilities.

In the Middle East and the region of the Indian Ocean, we seek permanent peace and stability. The economic health and well-being of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, depend upon continued access to the oil from the Persian Gulf area.

In all these situations, the primary responsibility for preserving peace and military stability rests with the countries of the region. But we shall continue to work with our friends and allies to strengthen their ability to prevent threats to their interests and to ours.

In addition, however, we will maintain forces of our own which can be called upon, if necessary, to support mutual defense efforts. The Secretary of Defense, at my direction, is improving and will maintain quickly deployable forces—air, land, and sea—to defend our interests throughout the world.

Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but this will be possible only if we maintain appropriate military force levels. Reaching balanced, verifiable agreements with our adversaries can limit the cost of security and reduce the risk of war. But even then, we must—and we will—proceed efficiently with whatever arms programs our own security requires.

When I leave this auditorium, I shall be going to visit with the crew aboard one of our most modern nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the Atlantic Ocean.³ The men and women of our Armed Forces remain committed, as able professionals and as patriotic Americans, to our common defense. They must stand constantly ready to fight, in the hope that through strength, combat will be prevented. We as Americans will always support them in their courageous vigil.

This has been a serious and a sober talk, but there is no cause for pessimism. We face a challenge, and we will do whatever is necessary to meet it. We will preserve and protect our country and continue to promote and to maintain peace around the world. This means that we shall have to continue to support strong and efficient military forces.

For most of human history, people have wished vainly that freedom and the flowering of the human spirit, which freedom nourishes, did not finally have to depend upon the force of arms. We, like

³ In his diary entry for March 17, the President noted: "We spent the day on the 95,000 ton USS *Eisenhower*, with a complement of about 6,300. It and the *Nimitz* are the largest warships in the world. It was an exciting display of professional competence by a very young crew. The F-15s and five other kinds of plane put on a good demonstration, and we were accompanied by a Spruance-class destroyer, a fleet frigate, and the nuclear cruiser *Virginia*, which also demonstrated their firepower. In spite of the impressiveness of the display, I don't believe we need to build another nuclear carrier, which costs about \$2.5 billion and enormous quantities of money to operate." (*White House Diary*, p. 179)

our forebears, live in a time when those who would destroy liberty are restrained less by their respect for freedom itself than by their knowledge that those of us who cherish freedom are strong.

We are a great nation made up of talented people. We can readily afford the necessary costs of our military forces, as well as an increased level, if needed, to prevent any adversary from destabilizing the peace of the world. The money we spend on defense is not wasted any more than is the cost of maintaining a police force in a local community to keep the peace. This investment purchases our freedom to fulfill the worthy goals of our Nation.

Southerners, whose ancestors a hundred years ago knew the horrors of a homeland devastated by war, are particularly determined that war shall never come to us again. All Americans understand the basic lesson of history: that we need to be resolute and able to protect ourselves, to prevent threats and domination by others.

No matter how peaceful and secure and easy the circumstances of our lives now seem, we have no guarantee that the blessings will endure. That is why we will always maintain the strength which, God willing, we shall never need to use.

Thank you very much.

73. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 7, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #53

1. *Opinions*

To achieve your foreign policy objectives—a more peaceful world based on a reduction of arms, a deeper understanding with the Soviet Union, and restraint and the resolution of conflicts in the third world—it will take more than simply negotiating each of these matters in their isolation and in terms of the technical questions they pose. To have full

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

public and political support here and abroad for overcoming the kinds of obstacles we have encountered, we must orchestrate our efforts so they will be mutually reinforcing and not mutually contradictory.

Foremost among those steps we will be taking shortly is the Vance mission to Moscow² and the possibility of significant progress in SALT. That visit, to be successful, needs to be part of a broader effort on a number of fronts. It is important that the mission itself not be merely a negotiating session devoted to the specifics of SALT but that it address other issues in the US/Soviet relationship which are the source of deep concern, both in your government and with the public at large.

It is clearly in the Soviet interest, and part of the Soviet strategy, to focus attention on SALT, and to proclaim the agreement to be evidence of a general improvement in US-Soviet relations. This then leaves the Soviets free to pursue their political objectives elsewhere and by other means.

In addition to *negotiating*, with an agreement being clearly also in the U.S. interest, it is therefore imperative that the U.S. focus also on the larger dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Indeed, the U.S. side should open the discussions with a broad review of the relationship, emphasizing that we seek a detente that is *increasingly comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal*. Unless we do that, we enable the Soviets to set the tone and to define the priorities of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, clearly to their own advantage. Moreover, I am quite convinced that unless detente becomes comprehensive and reciprocal, we will face an increasing rebellion at home, and SALT *will not be ratified*.

I think it is not unfair to summarize the Soviet strategy as involving the following elements:

1. Keep movement going forward on detente in the area of arms control relationships. This both restrains any U.S. build-up, and generates a more passive U.S. attitude on other issues;³

2. Create the impression of a special U.S.-Soviet relationship, which frightens both the Europeans and the Chinese;

3. To induce the Europeans increasingly into a self-Finlandized attitude, in part out of fear of the Soviet Union, and in part out of wishful thinking that a genuine detente truly exists;

4. To prevent a rapid resolution of the Middle Eastern problem and to increase U.S. difficulties, in the hope of radicalizing the Arabs and of gaining greater leverage;

² Vance met with Brezhnev in Moscow April 19–23; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 99–103.

³ The President placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this and the subsequent five points.

5. To exploit any opportunities in Africa, or elsewhere, to advance Soviet interests, either directly or indirectly;

6. To intimidate the U.S. and its allies by massive propaganda campaigns, such as the one directed at the neutron bomb, and through general vilification of U.S. motives, policies, and society.

Our response, accordingly, must be one in which we stress the importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, as well as our determination to compete in all areas of the relationship if cooperation does not in fact develop.

We should, in view of the above, tell the Soviets very frankly that their behavior in Africa is intolerable.⁴ If Soviet/Cuban forces are intruded into the Southern African conflict, this will jeopardize detente as a whole and we will react strongly. This should be stated directly, unambiguously, and forcefully.

In this connection, specific reference should be made to the Brezhnev-Nixon communique, in which joint rules of restraint were explicitly defined.⁵ The Soviets should be told that we view them as having violated these jointly agreed rules.

In addition, the Soviets should be told that our relationship is now at a watershed. We are willing, anxious, and ready to try to improve it, to widen the scope of cooperation, and to work together on a wide range of issues. We will not stand for a selective detente, in which the Soviet side arbitrarily defines the rules of the game. Decisions that will be made this summer on SALT *as well as on other issues* will affect our relationship for many years to come.

Subject to your revisions of the above, I would recommend that a letter of instructions from you to Cy be drafted and given to him prior to his departure.⁶ I do not believe that either U.S. interests, or your own leadership, will be well served if the sessions in Moscow become merely a bargaining exercise on the specifics of SALT.⁷ The state of U.S. public opinion, as well as the thrust of recent Soviet actions, simply do

⁴ The President underlined the word "intolerable" and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ The President underlined the phrase "Brezhnev-Nixon communique" and wrote "give me a copy" in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Presumable reference is to the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 29, 1972. The text is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1972, pp. 897–898. A separate communiqué, which references the "Basic Principles," was released at the conclusion of the May 1972 Moscow summit meeting and is *ibid.*, pp. 898–902.

⁶ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "Prepare draft." For the President's April 14 letter to Vance, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 96.

⁷ The President underlined "bargaining exercise" and wrote "I agree" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

not give us that luxury. Moreover, the Soviets tend to respect a broadly gauged approach. A realistic and non-belligerent toughness draws from them a respectful response. Eagerness or a narrowly focused negotiating attitude tends to be exploited.

There are also a number of specific actions and events that need to be orchestrated to support your overall objectives:

—*Africa*: We need to intensify our political effort to call attention to Soviet/Cuban intervention. We should encourage the Yugoslavs and Algerians who are questioning Cuba's non-aligned credentials—something that apparently troubles the Cubans significantly.⁸ We should also see, in our proposed private, direct contacts with the Cubans, if we cannot discourage further adventures in Eritrea and Southern Africa, holding out the prospects of significant steps in normalization.

—*NATO*: The Summit Meeting⁹ will provide an important opportunity to stress your concern for security issues and to repair whatever strains may exist as a result of the neutron bomb episode.¹⁰ We should make this a significant event in your Presidency, including major accomplishments in terms of both political content and adoption of allied defense programs. Given the stresses of the last few weeks, we believe we will be in a strong position to press the Allies to be forthcoming on the long-term defense program. *We should also stress the importance of a Soviet response to our MBFR initiative which will be tabled next week.*¹¹

—*Defense Debate*: There is strong Hill pressure for an increase in defense spending above your budget. I believe it is important that we not simply resist these increases across the board but, rather, indicate we are prepared to accept some increase and work to shape those increases that will take place. I have in mind, for example, acceleration of the MX/Trident II missile and a modest Continental Air Defense package, both aimed at diminishing opposition to SALT.¹²

—*China*: We are putting together a strong technology package and program for the China trip. We should also emphasize some other se-

⁸ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "I agree." In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "Should support Owen on Cuba troop estimate."

⁹ See footnote 2, Document 72.

¹⁰ On April 7, the President released a statement indicating that he had decided to "defer production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects." The statement underscored that the Carter administration would continue to consult with Western European allies and discuss "appropriate arms control measures" to broach with Soviet officials. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 702) Documentation on ERW is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. V, European Security, 1978-1983.

¹¹ The President underlined "our MBFR initiative" and wrote "what is it?" in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹² In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "good items if budget increased."

curity dimensions to our relationship. I will be providing further suggestions to you.

—UN: The Special Session on Disarmament will be an opportunity to place the monkey on the Soviets' back to be forthcoming in response to your neutron bomb decision, on MBFR and in other forums.¹³ We should press them hard but avoid picking up for the sake of propaganda some longstanding ideas in the disarmament community which will provoke an extremely bad reaction among crucial defense-oriented Congressmen as well as our NATO allies. I believe we can have an aggressive posture in the SSOD without creating fears that we have become soft.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

¹³ See footnote 5, Document 24. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "Let's push SS 20 argument."

74. **Article by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Maynes)¹**

Washington, undated

The Maturing of American Diplomacy

How does one describe the trends of American diplomacy today? Were it 30 years ago, in the full flush of American power and opportunity, we might adopt Dean Acheson's metaphor and proclaim ourselves "present at the creation."² But American strength, while greater absolutely, is now matched relatively by the strength of others, and American opportunity too often seems transformed into foreign challenge.

Moreover, American confidence seems to have given way to American self-examination. We no longer seem to enjoy the grandeur of simplicity in our foreign policy. Our goals seem more distant and unattainable; our resources inadequate; our people fed up; our gov-

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1978, pp. 48–51. All brackets are in the original. Maynes's article is based on an address he delivered before the Conference on International Studies at Columbia University in New York on April 7.

² Reference is to Acheson's memoirs, entitled *Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

ernment divided; our friends uncertain. There seems a diffusion of power everywhere. We find no accepted poles of authority, no widely shared principles of action.

If Dean Acheson was present at the creation, where are we? We are at a stage which marks the "greening of American diplomacy."³ We are witnessing its democratization and final maturity.

For a century and more, this country enjoyed the luxury of ignoring the rest of the world. Geography provided the basis of our foreign policy, and isolation from foreign crises was the result.

At the end of World War II we moved to a new stage. We began, fitfully, to apply our growing national power to the world stage. Overwhelming and almost unchallengeable national power provided the basis of our foreign policy, and intervention and involvement in several foreign crises were the result.

Now we are entering a third stage in our diplomatic development. We are attempting, again fitfully, to adjust to the new power of others while trying to maintain or enhance our own. The result is a challenge to this country of a unique sort, for we are being asked for the first time to practice diplomacy as other nations have always been forced to practice it. Like other nations we are finding that our foreign policy goals are at least as likely to be attained because of the subtlety of our approach as through the morality of our cause or the strength of our military and economy. We can no longer order so we have to practice the art of persuading others.

What does all this mean in practice? In the period following the Second World War, American power rose to unprecedented heights. With the rest of the world in ruins, the United States accounted for 60% of the world's industrial production, 50% of its military spending, and a commanding share of its monetary reserves. Some call this period the "golden age of American diplomacy." But the phrase is not at all appropriate. It was not a golden age of American diplomacy but an exhilarating age of American governance. The task of American foreign policy then lay primarily in deciding among ourselves what to do, much less in deciding how to persuade others to do it with us. Other friends, given their weakness, had little choice. In that period, America achieved an influence over the entire globe—its politics, its economics, its culture—that had never been seen before and probably will never be seen again.

³ Presumably Maynes based this phrase on Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* (New York: Random House, 1970). In it, Reich heralded the development of the counter-culture in the 1960s, noting that the organizational society of the early postwar era had given way to a more egalitarian society.

Yet despite the passing of that age, we also in a sense can feel “present at the creation,” for changing world realities are creating a whole new tradition and environment for American diplomacy.

There are several paradoxical aspects of this development that deserve examination, and I would like to turn to them now.

Nationalism and Interdependence

The diffusion of power internationally and the accelerated development of a global economy have radically changed the international environment. The code word for this is interdependence, a reality that requires a different approach to diplomacy, that presupposes, on the part of the American foreign policy establishment and the public, a more nuanced understanding of international political realities. Yet habits are hard to break, and a clash between reality and perception continues to hamper our efforts.

The most ready example of this is our national struggle to come to grips with the opportunities and risks of detente. But another more telling example is our persistent misunderstanding of the politics and importance of the nonaligned nations. Linked to this is our deep resentment of this effort to pursue aggressively their interests as though such a cause of action was permitted only for the developed countries. It is ironic that our most enthusiastic flagwavers and manipulators of nationalistic symbols are invariably incapable of understanding similar feelings among others.

The debate over the Panama Canal treaties is a case in point. The canal may have had strategic importance to us in the past, and it may still be of vital interest to us as a free and open waterway. But we could hardly maintain that its military importance is the same in an age of ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines as it was 30 years ago. Moreover, we have no exclusive claims to vital interests there, as these interests are shared by the Panamanians, the other South American countries, as well as the rest of the world. Yet the entire Panama Canal debate tells us something about ourselves and the forces that move nations in 1978. The careful calculation of national interest and of net advantage—the essence of traditional diplomacy—was nearly swamped in the emotional and unpredictable national reaction to the canal treaties. We were fortunate that we had people in the Senate who displayed real political courage.

A segment of our public’s reaction to President Carter’s recent overseas tours to developing countries is another good example of our lingering tension between national bias and international reality.⁴

⁴ Presumable reference is to the President’s trips to Venezuela March 28–29, Brazil March 29–31, and Nigeria and Liberia March 31–April 3.

Ritualistically the press denounced the trips as without purpose or focus. Three decades of habitual summitry had given us, what one might call an acute case of "Eurovision." This view accepts as a matter of course our President's dealing with heads of state in Paris, Moscow, or London, or for that matter any capital in Europe. Yet it becomes bewildered, bemused, or cynical when he is welcomed in Rio, Lagos, or New Delhi. Minds close and eyes glaze when it is explained that India is the 10th industrial power in the world as well as the globe's largest democracy, that we conduct more trade with Nigeria than South Africa, or that Brazil is on the way to a global as well as regional role.

This "Eurovision" perceives the non-Western world only as a ragtag collection of nonviable ministates, a concern of the Peace Corps, missionaries, and readers of the *National Geographic*. Yet the facts are these.

- U.S. exports to the less developed countries, exclusive of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, constituted about one-fourth of the total U.S. exports in the past 2 years, approximately equaling what we export to East and West Europe, to the Soviet Union, and to China.

- Close to one-half of our imports—about \$60 billion—originate in the Third World, including more than 9 out of 13 critical minerals.

- Since the early 1970's, when our dependence on foreign oil began to challenge our complacent perceptions, we have in fact increased our oil imports by eight times and are close to importing one-half of our total oil consumption.

- Countries like India, Brazil, Nigeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia play a role on the world stage that dwarfs that of some of the countries we traditionally consider "critical."

These realities underline an essential fact—the health and progress of American society are vitally linked to the economic and political stability of the Southern Hemisphere. Yet whether we have the maturity to understand that point remains very much in doubt at present.

International Institutions

International institutions are another example of how America's perceptions are not always synchronized with changing realities. America was principally responsible for the creation of the current family of international institutions. Their creation seemed a few years ago one of the most imaginative ideas ever put into practice. Yet increasingly, we see it suggested that these institutions are a nice place to visit, but one wouldn't want to conduct his diplomacy there.

Since the mid-1960's, however, international institutions have changed enormously without many understanding the transformation. Look at the budgets. In the beginning, expenditures of the U.N. system

were only about \$200 million a year, and they were basically for operating expenses. Now the budget of the U.N. system, excluding the development banks, exceeds \$2.5 billion per year, and the organization is active not only in four major peacekeeping operations but also is devoting more than 90% of its budget to economic and social problems.

At our urging the United Nations has entered such fields as technical assistance, environment, population, and drug control. With this new scope and with new resources—with several key countries, in addition, using the U.N. system as a channel for their development assistance—the United Nations has assumed unprecedented significance.

Meanwhile, the World Bank has become a much more important vehicle for development assistance than the U.S. aid program (which tends to be focused on a few swing countries in sensitive regions of the world). Indeed, a major triumph of U.S. diplomacy has been success in using international institutions to persuade other countries to assume a major share of the burden of global development efforts. Only a few years ago our share was around 40%; now it is closer to 20%.

Yet today international institutions are under unprecedented attack—an attack much more dangerous than some of the rhetorical assaults we have witnessed in the past. There are efforts to place totally unworkable restrictions on our contributions to international institutions.

If these efforts succeed, no international agency will, for example, be able to assist any government to increase production of certain products whose potential export might at some future date be competitive with American producers. We are asked, as World Bank President Robert McNamara has pointed out, to deny Papua New Guinea the right to increase palm oil production on the theory that this might be competitive with our soybean production when, in fact, our troubles—if we at some point have any—will stem from soybean production in Brazil; and this is the result of investments from a Japan still shocked by our decision in 1973 to ban soya exports to Japan in order to hold down prices here.⁵

At the same time, popular rhetoric continues to denounce the domination of the United Nations by ministates; yet anyone with knowledge of international organizations knows that the true influence is exerted by countries of growing power and influence—countries such as Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. By the end of this century, it is expected that the top 12 countries in the world in terms of population will not include a single Western power except the United States. The

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 2.

Third World now represents 74% of the world's people; it has 58% of the world's armed forces.

The reasons behind this Administration's decision to devote a new degree of attention to the United Nations then are not trivial or the result of Andy Young's [U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] personal views. The U.N. system is the essential element for the conduct of foreign relations by most of the Third World countries. It is the collective source of much of their diplomatic influence, the basic outlet for their foreign relations initiatives. As we come to comprehend better the importance of these countries to us, we realize the necessity of dealing with them through international organizations. In short, the perception of the U.N. system as a nice but essentially meaningless institution should end. It does not match the reality of 1978.

This greater interest in international institutions is laying the groundwork for addressing many of the more important issues on the international agenda—issues which can only be effectively handled in the multilateral context. The catalogue is almost endless: energy, population, food, health, pollution, money supply, economic growth, human rights, narcotics control, arms sales, nuclear proliferation, outer space, the deep seabed. Yet we face this paradox. In the past we praised international institutions and tended not to use them. Now we use them and tend not to praise them. How long can this continue without undermining the instruments we need?

Human Rights: Religion or Foreign Policy?

A renewed emphasis on human rights is a major new trend in American foreign policy, strongly supported by the American people. It is more than posturing toward foreigners as it expresses the essential values of our society. It is more than just another factor grafted on our diplomatic efforts to be evaluated by simple input-output analyses. Yet it is here where we encounter an enormous controversy with cries of success and failure sometimes uttered by the same person. How does one measure success in this endeavor? We might suggest two possibilities.

First, if one views the human rights issue as a religious campaign, then one is almost never satisfied because, regardless of the progress made, one will always see more to do. The danger of such an approach is that the opponents of human rights will begin to argue that unless the same degree of success can be attained everywhere, the whole effort should be abandoned.

Second, if the human rights effort is viewed from a more traditional foreign policy point of view, then the foremost "success" of our human rights policy lies in the undeniable fact that human rights have become a global issue and are decreasingly an exclusive domain of American

concern. This is a major—and we should hope not short run—change in international practice.

The recently concluded meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Commission provides an example of what I mean.⁶ It was one of the most successful in a decade. More important, it provided evidence that African and Asian countries are assuming a leadership role in an area where many in this country believe that only we care. For the first time in U.N. history, the Commission took action under its 1503 procedures⁷ against a member state—in this case Uganda, Uruguay, Equatorial Guinea, and a number of other countries. The credit for this development lies more in a growing international consciousness than in any efforts by the United States.

Yet at this point it is unclear whether this country has the patience to build the kind of international consensus on human rights that will make the subject a central issue of international diplomacy. Recalling an influence we no longer enjoy, we may overlook a collective success we stand some chance of achieving.

Foreign Policy Design and Domestic Demands

Perhaps the most striking aspect of this new age of diplomacy is its field of practice. We have entered an age of democratic diplomacy which is revolutionizing the craft. It used to be said that foreign policy had only a small constituency. But who can say that today? The constituency is growing every day; the problem is that it is not of one mind and too often it is angry.

For decades our leaders have argued that to accomplish a political task, one must organize. I think it is safe to say Americans have learned how. The civil rights, consumer, and antiwar movements have provided on-the-job training to all of us. As a result, on a growing number of issues, foreign policy appears to be losing its earlier character as a largely autonomous sphere of action and thought. Foreign policy is becoming more inextricably linked to domestic politics and policy.

In the postwar period, we should recall, the two realms were not so closely linked.

- It was only recently that the dependence of the United States on certain raw materials reached the point that shifts in the terms of trade or embargoes could have a radical effect on our domestic economy.

⁶ The 34th UN Human Rights Commission meeting took place in Geneva February 6–March 10. For a summary of the meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 125.

⁷ Adopted in 1970, these procedures, set out in ECOSOC Resolution 1503, outlined steps for dealing with communications regarding human rights violations.

- It was only in the 1960's that the rise of the multinational corporations changed the policy focus of large U.S. firms so that today up to 30% of total U.S. corporate profits can be attributed to overseas operations.

- It was also only in a recent period that our allies and some of the more successful developing countries began to compete directly with American industry in our internal market whereas before there was little that American business or labor had to fear.

We can also look for another reason why foreign affairs and domestic affairs are becoming linked. In the past the domestic burden of foreign policy usually increased in the event of a foreign policy failure as when diplomacy ended and war began. Thus, the domestic burden of our foreign policy increased sharply during the Korean and Vietnam wars; as the burden increased, so did political division at home.

Today, these burdens seem to increase not only in the case of a foreign policy failure but in the event of a foreign policy "success." An arms control agreement may result in sharply increased defense expenditures as we are urged to redouble our efforts in areas not covered by the new compact or as we build costly verification equipment. A successful international energy policy may require drastic domestic reforms to succeed. An economic agreement may further shift the terms of trade against American business. In all three cases what might legitimately represent a diplomatic triumph, far from easing domestic burdens, could actually increase them.

As a result, today when some foreign policy issue begins to shape, it is not just a few foreigners or key Senators who express the same view. Today's State Department official can rest assured that he will hear from others. The very first may be his mother, who wants him to cut out whatever he is doing. Then he will take a phone call from a Senator who never before had taken an interest in the subject, then a letter from an irate American Legion member. His press officer will ask guidance to answer questions from the Associated Press. His former colleagues—either from Brookings or from the American Enterprise Institute, depending on their politics—will pay a friendly visit to express their views. Then a congressional hearing on the topic will feature distinguished citizens, including former officials of the State Department, leaders of nongovernmental organizations, and academic experts. Editorials will spring up like mushrooms in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and, of course, the *Atlanta Constitution*.

Computerized letterwriting is a new development, the side product of the political campaigns of 1972 and 1976. It can produce hundreds of thousands of identical letters from all over the country, as we have seen in the case of the Panama Canal. The State Department, in turn, is providing computerized replies. Because the pressures are so

great and on so many issues, the practitioners of foreign policy today require communications and political skills which yesterday were less critical. This may be an overlooked reason for the growing role of the White House in foreign affairs. It is not a power grab away from the State Department but an effort to provide “technical assistance.”

A Vision for a Complex World

We live in an age of “all-at-once-ness”—in time and place. Good or bad news that used to take days or even months to travel now bombard our nervous systems incessantly and simultaneously. There is no recovery time in our body politic; no time for recuperation and regeneration; no time to absorb and reflect on what has occurred and how we reacted before new, unanticipated events propel us to divert attention from one crisis to another. The pace, the crazy rhythm of events, magnified by their immediate impact, deprive us all of even the luxury of pause and reflection. When, we might ask, have the contemporary George Kennans got time for thoughtful meditation to fuse a profound understanding of history with a professional ability at prediction?

There is one feature of the international system from which we can derive both hope and concern. It is what one might almost call the homeostasis of world diplomacy. Homeostasis, in case you have forgotten, is the almost miraculous self-adjusting property of a system to maintain its stability by a coordinated response of its parts to any stimuli that tend to disturb it.

In simple words, our international system may have become so complex, so interrelated, and so unfathomable that its very complexity seems to keep it out of harm’s way and leaves in total confusion and ignorance not only those who attempt to reform it but, fortunately, those too who would try to do it in. On the other hand, the system is hardly without defects, and its plastic character make it difficult to undertake reform. Precisely because the enterprise is so difficult, only a collective effort can succeed—which means a more vigorous and engaged diplomacy.

In this effort, words remain the sharpest tool of attack and, when in trouble, the last line of defense. But American diplomats have no monopoly on the definition of words; and the impact of words is so much greater and more unpredictable in our age of participatory diplomacy. We are all vulnerable to the dictionary guerrillas who do not necessarily battle for the clarity of thought.

Rather, they twist and bend the meaning of terms to fit and serve their self-serving interpretation, their particular cause. Hence, the struggle in debate here, in international conferences abroad, and in negotiations about such terms as “human rights,” “basic human needs,” “the new international economic order,” and a host of other currently

topical expressions such as “Palestinian homeland,” “internal settlement” and so on and so on.

Nevertheless, words remain important. They convey ideas, and ideas confer power. That is the essence of diplomacy.

Some of the more practical in our society might argue that power devolves more from military strength, economic capacity, and technological superiority and that those factors are what enable us to get what we want as we deal with the rest of the world. That may have been the ultimate argument in the age of Bismarck, but I submit that it is neither practical nor in our long-term interest to rely exclusively or excessively on that kind of power today. In today’s world insufficient power comes out of the barrel of a rifle, or the smokestacks of Pittsburgh.

No, to the contrary, our influence rests more upon our vision, our ideals, and—yes—our words. The real question is how much our vision reflects the concerns and interests of the community of nations—a community of which we are a part but no longer the proprietor.

What we require in 1978 is a vision that is clear enough to be understood by others, flexible enough to take into account the constant changes in world society, strong enough to guide our diplomacy, and worthy enough to be supported by our people.

Such a vision will have to be developed with the cooperation of many parties. But the building blocks are obvious:

- The vision must address the issues of world security from a larger viewpoint than narrow nationalism can provide.
- The vision must address the issues of American welfare from a framework of improving the welfare of the international community as a whole.
- The vision must serve to strengthen international institutions and procedures that help more rationally to share power *and* responsibility.
- The vision must embrace human rights in their broadest meaning which involves a commitment to the dignity of human beings in the material and political sense.

Always, we will need to back up our vision and our words with resources and action. Even then, we will not always get what we want. But there is no alternative. The dynamics of our society and of world affairs do not permit us either to go on our way or to have our own way. We live in a participatory age, and frankly, I think, we shouldn’t want it any other way.

75. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Washington, April 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Observations on Your Presidency

The Camp David discussions were very helpful in focusing our attention on ways in which we can all better serve your goals.² Below I outline some observations which I hope will be of some value in determining how we should proceed from here:

Speeches

My most basic recommendation is that you should dramatically increase the degree to which you emphasize the public education role of your presidency. In retrospect, I believe that this function has been seriously under-emphasized and that the Administration's efforts have suffered as a result.

Where you have given major speeches—such as those at Notre Dame, Charleston, Wake Forest and ASNE—they have served as useful basic charters which have provided the comprehensive factual and philosophical framework of a particular policy to experts and editorialists, to our allies and adversaries, and especially to the public.³ Each of these speeches has been enormously valuable.

I propose that you undertake a much heavier speaking schedule, not only in Washington but around the country, on issues of greatest

¹ Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Foreign Policy Material From the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Office of the Vice President: June 2, 1977–December 3, 1978, Memoranda: Vice President to President, January–June 1978. No classification marking. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum.

² Reference is to the April 16–17 retreat at Camp David for Cabinet and White House staff members. In *White House Diary*, Carter indicates that he took notes during the retreat for subsequent dictation. (p. 185) During the discussions, Carter explained the genesis of the retreat: "I wanted you here because I could see a deterioration of our esteem in the public eye, and I don't disagree with the public. What has bothered me is a lack of cohesion and team spirit, which is almost inevitable. We have a damn good administration, a fine cabinet, a good staff. I wish you knew each other as well as I know you." (*ibid.*, p. 188) Christopher's talking points and handwritten notes of the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 1, Camp David Mtg.—4/16–17, 1978.

³ For the Notre Dame, Charleston, and Wake Forest speeches, see Documents 40, 52, and 72. Mondale is also referring to the President's April 11 remarks before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, which were broadcast live on television and radio. For the text of his remarks, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 721–727.

importance to your Administration. Such a schedule will provide opportunities for comprehensive articulation of the basic philosophy and direction of your Administration. You could focus on a series of issues, spelling out to the American people where you're going, how you intend to get there, and what kinds of problems you see in the way.

I suggest you put Stu Eizenstat in charge of a small task force, which would work closely with Jody, to map out a long-term public speaking strategy. It would recommend forums for and prepare speeches on such matters as government reorganization and responsiveness, the economy, education and the environment. The series might appropriately begin with a speech on the difficulties of grappling with many of today's difficult problems, emphasizing that you became President in order to tackle tough issues such as government reorganization, health care, tax reform, illegal immigration, social security financing, Panama Canal, SALT, and others which have been festering for years but which cannot be ignored.

I have sensed a much greater disposition on your part to articulate comprehensively your positions on foreign policy than those in the domestic area. I sense you are reluctant to define your own approach and philosophy regarding domestic issues. I may be wrong, but I sense that when you feel you are being characterized as being too liberal, you react in a way designed to counteract that definition; similarly, when you are being characterized as too conservative, you react in the opposite way.

In short, I have the impression that you intensely dislike being defined or "labeled". That may have some value, but I fear it also contributes to the feeling that people don't know you, they can't feel you, they don't know where you are going. I believe that by giving more major speeches, you will not only perform your public education role but it will require those of us serving you to help define and describe the Administration's goals more effectively than we do now. Also, these speeches hopefully will become the documents on which the next election is fought.

I believe a lot of work has to be put into your speeches. If Stu mapped out a long-range schedule, we would have more lead-time to prepare them and could make better use of thoughtful outsiders. Most of your speeches tend to be descriptive and detailed demonstrations of what you know and the amount of work that went into a particular decision; but at the same time they tend to be, for many listeners, fairly heavy and incomprehensible, lacking the eloquence and persuasiveness that a Presidential address should possess. I would hope a good deal of thought could be put into how we can make these speeches more persuasive and eloquent.

Public Perceptions of Your Presidential Leadership

Your critics make many charges directed at your leadership, including the following:

- You are allegedly weak, uncertain and indecisive. They point to the absence of vetoes and attempt to make your views appear to be uncertain, equivocal and subject to bending under pressure. There have been no public displays of anger. Your efforts to de-imperialize the Presidency have resulted in diminishing the awe of the office.

- That you are preoccupied with foreign affairs;
- That you live a cloistered and private life and that you don't really enjoy the company of others in informal settings;
- That you are a manager and not a leader;
- That you become overwhelmed by minutiae;
- That your staff tends to be limited, at least in terms of Washington experience, and that you are not getting sufficient advice from persons of stature and experience other than the original friends you brought from Georgia.

I find very few people ever arguing that you're not bright, honest, decent or hard-working; rather, they argue that you are ineffective.

The great potential and exciting opportunity of this public perception is that, in most instances, it is inaccurate and can be quickly remedied by simply letting the public see more clearly what those of us who work with you see daily. This argues that you should undertake the much stronger public education role outlined above. It argues for some vetoes and/or strong rhetoric. It argues for strong discipline of disloyal persons to reverse the present complete lack of fear that anyone will pay a price—any prices—for unauthorized leaks or damaging statements. (As Strauss puts it, "There is no penalty for screwing up in this Administration.") It argues for the political engagement of your cabinet officers in an effort to serve your broadest goals. It argues for other steps that demonstrate visibly the strength of your leadership. Finally, I think we should look for proper ways for you to perform that will enable people to "look up" to your office without returning to the Nixon imperial presidency.

I believe the "indecisive" issue is due largely to leaks which purport to show uncertainty when, in fact, it is an essential part of the decision-making process to hear different views. If we can start plugging most of these leaks, I think we'll be hearing much less of this criticism.

I fear there is a good deal of validity to the argument that you spend too much time poring over staff memos in your office, and not enough time in public giving speeches and appearing with people. As someone said, when we elect a President, we don't want a manager. We can hire them. We want a leader.

Your perceptions, philosophies and objectives for America can be explained only in the public role. I think you do too little of it. If there's one element of your Presidency that cries out for correction, in my judgment, that is it.

Limited Range of Advice

I know you get all kinds of advice, but I'm afraid that much of it comes in a way that is not always helpful. I think you should have informal meetings—perhaps bi-weekly—with some of the wise and experienced people in this town and elsewhere, people who want nothing from you and who have no axes to grind. Getting together periodically with small groups of these people—preferably in the evening, away from the press and off the record—could be invaluable.

I can think of people who would be candid with you in such meetings, who would not talk about them afterwards, and with whom you could try out new thoughts and ideas. Several who come to mind are Jim Rowe (Roosevelt, Johnson), Clark Clifford (Truman), David Ginsberg (Truman), Ted Sorensen (Kennedy), John Gardner (Johnson), but there are others. Nearly anyone you wanted would be very flattered to be asked and very willing to help.

Foreign Policy

I think there has been inadequate strategic political thinking in the development of our foreign policy. Most of our foreign policy initiatives do not enjoy the same kind of congressional and political appraisal when they are being developed that their domestic counterparts do. You tend to get too personally identified with foreign policy initiatives whose chances of success are slight. I can think of many such instances with which the Secretary of State is closely and personally identified, and others with which you are as well.

I have long sensed an attitude among the foreign policy advisers that there is something suspect about looking at a foreign policy problem in the context of the political environment in which it must be fought. I couldn't disagree more profoundly with this attitude, and I think we must do everything possible to reverse it.

I don't believe, for example, that the option you finally selected on the neutron bomb issue—which I think is a good one—ever appeared in the options paper given you. Rather, the paper simply dealt with absolutes and it was only after a broader public debate that the option that you ultimately settled on emerged as the sensible answer.

Also, I think you get too personally and too deeply involved in too many minor foreign issues. I have talked repeatedly about the number of foreign visitors. But it is hard to think of any issue—whether it is Belize, Cyprus or Namibia—in which you don't become deeply im-

mersed once you learn of it. I realize that seeing foreign visitors and working on foreign problems is important, but I think we need a better balance.

My Role

I believe I should also make a basic re-evaluation of the ways in which I have been serving you. In reviewing the last few months, I have concluded that I have been spending too much time on routine work which parallels and often duplicates the efforts of others and which they could do just as well on their own; at the same time I have not been doing those things that others cannot do. I have in mind such things as the western trip, which produced more benefits for the Administration than I expected.⁴ It put the problems in focus and identified where we should be concentrating our efforts, which before the trip had been diffuse and uncoordinated. I have been told that there has been a substantial improvement in western attitudes towards us as a result of that trip, and especially our follow-up efforts.

I should be doing more of this kind of domestic travel and giving more comprehensive speeches articulating our policies. I should also have a heavy campaigning schedule which will enable me to play a stronger role as spokesman for our programs. I don't know if you concur with this conclusion or not, but if you do I think it would be helpful in gaining greater public understanding of and support for our goals. I don't in any way wish to de-emphasize my role with Congress or my advisory role with you, but I believe my public education role has suffered somewhat.

The Mood of the Country

I would like to mention just one thing about the so-called "conservative" trend in the country that everyone is talking about. If you ask people whether they are conservative or liberal, there is no question but that more will identify themselves as conservatives than would have been the case several years ago. But if you ask people whether government should help provide more and better housing, education, health care, environmental protection and the rest, a very high percentage of the population still strongly supports government activity of that kind.

There is obviously great public concern about inflation and the management of government. I don't consider trying to deal with inflation or trying to improve the management of government to be illiberal

⁴ Presumable reference to Mondale's January 10–13 trip to New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Montana, Washington, Idaho, and Nevada.

undertakings. Rather, I consider them to be necessities if we are to have progressive government.

Indeed, there is broad support for progressive efforts. If we look at those issues on which we have had the greatest success so far—in the progressive areas of housing, jobs, economic development, strip mining, educational funding, etc.—they have all been controversial initially but they all enlisted strong and positive support in the Congress. Polls show your tax reform proposals are supported publicly by better than 2 to 1 margins.

It is my hope that your Administration will demonstrate that we can have both jobs and price stability. If we can, we will have a decisive advantage over the Republican opposition which clearly favors trying to beat inflation at the expense of jobs, a position which I consider to be insensitive.

76. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 21, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #55

1. *Opinion*

A Contractual or Flexible Foreign Policy?

One thought has been gnawing at me recently that might be worth a minute or two of your reflection. As I think about our foreign policy, I am struck by the degree to which it can be rightly called a “contractual” foreign policy: i.e., the major thrust of it is on *negotiating* agreements or devising formulas. It is reminiscent of legal negotiations and it does not adequately take into account the need to manipulate and influence political processes.

We have thus put a lot of effort into negotiating new proliferation restraints, in negotiating new agreements with the Soviets, in negotiat-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

ing new verbal formulas for dealing with the Middle Eastern problem, in negotiating and then ratifying the Panama Canal Treaties,² etc., etc.

Yet foreign policy, though involving the foregoing, also involves the need to influence attitudes and to shape political events. This requires a combination of additional steps, none of which we have yet truly employed. In some cases, what is needed is a demonstration of force, to establish credibility and determination and even to infuse fear;³ in some cases it requires saying publicly one thing and quietly negotiating something else;⁴ in many cases what is needed is prolonged and sustained exchange of political views, so that even our enemies share or at least understand our perspectives. Often it does not require *solving* problems but striking the right posture and sometimes letting problems fester until they are ripe for action.

Examples of the foregoing would include quiet efforts *to manipulate* African leaders to obtain desired results; a willingness to back some friendly country very strongly, so that it in turn is prepared *to use its force* on our behalf (for example, I think there is a good chance that by tangibly backing Morocco with arms we could get Hassan to use his troops for us the way Castro is using his on behalf of the Soviets);⁵ readiness *to use black propaganda* to stimulate difficulties for our opponents, for example by encouraging national sentiments among the non-Russian Soviet peoples or by using deception to divide the Soviets and Cubans on African policy.⁶

I will be developing some ideas for you regarding the above,⁷ but at this stage I simply wanted to register with you a basic point: namely, that our foreign policy has to operate on many levels and use many tools. The world is just too complicated and turbulent to be handled effectively by negotiating “contracts” while neglecting the need also to manipulate, to influence and to compel.

² On March 16, the Senate approved the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal by a vote of 68–32. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 55) On April 18, the Senate voted to ratify the basic treaty by the same vote of 68–32. (Adam Clymer, “Senate Votes to Give up Panama Canal; Carter Foresees ‘Beginning of a New Era,’” *The New York Times*, April 19, 1978, pp. A–1, A–16; *Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 56)

³ The President underlined “demonstration of force” and wrote “Like Malaguez [Mayaguez?].” in the left-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence. He also underlined “to infuse fear.”

⁴ The President underlined “saying publicly one thing” and “negotiating something else” and wrote in the left hand margin “Lying?”

⁵ The President underlined “to use his troops for us” and wrote “Proxy war??” in the left-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence.

⁶ The President underlined “by using deception” and placed a question mark in the left-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence.

⁷ The President underlined this portion of the sentence and wrote “You’ll be wasting your time” in the left-hand margin.

Asian Neglect

I have received recently a letter from a colleague who summarized for me some criticisms of our Asian policy, which are shared by a number of Asian specialists.

In summary form, his key points are these:

- Pacific Asia has been accorded too low priority.
- The Korean troop withdrawal has been unsettling; the timing was precipitate.⁸
- Our naval posture is inadequate to deal with the growing Soviet presence.
- U.S. weakness vis-a-vis Moscow justifiably causes China to view us as a less attractive partner.
- We have not pursued our bilateral relations with China with sufficient vigor.
- Our emphasis on normalizing relations with Vietnam makes little sense, compared to the need to strengthen our ties with ASEAN countries.
- Our human rights policy has been poorly implemented, particularly its emphasis on punitive measures against the violators rather than providing incentives to those with improving records.
- We have failed to use the China card against the Soviets.
- Our weakened relations with Japan concern the entire region.
- In the absence of confidence in U.S. policy in Asia, normalization becomes more difficult, for our assurances to Taiwan of our continued commitment to its tranquility become less credible.

We will be correcting some of these shortcomings shortly: the meeting with Fukuda and the Economic Summit⁹ ought to improve the economic relationship with Japan and infuse new political vitality into the Alliance; the adjustment of combat troop withdrawals from Korea should be welcomed by the Koreans; the Vice President's trip to the ASEAN countries¹⁰ will properly place higher emphasis on collaboration with our friends than on our earlier (and in my judgment premature) efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam; we hope to activate

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 53.

⁹ Fukuda visited Washington May 1–3. Documentation on his visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIV, Korea; Japan. The next economic summit was scheduled to take place in Bonn July 16–17. For the minutes of the meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 142–145. For the President's remarks at the conclusion of the summit, see Document 92.

¹⁰ Reference is to Mondale's trip to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Guam, and Hawaii April 29–May 5. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

step by step our relationship with China. In your comments to the press you might consider placing more emphasis on Japan, Korea, and China [Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

77. Address by Secretary of State Vance¹

Cincinnati, Ohio, May 1, 1978

Foreign Assistance and U.S. Policy

Today I want to discuss with you a subject about which I care deeply because of its importance to our nation. I speak of foreign assistance.

Over the years the League of Women Voters has endeavored to explain and support our foreign assistance programs. You have done this as an essential part of your nonpartisan program of public education. Your interest in and knowledge of foreign assistance has been a key element in making people aware of what their government is trying to achieve with these programs.

The United States has a profound stake in its relationships with the nations and peoples in developing countries. Our response to their problems, needs, and aspirations tests not only the quality of our leadership in the world but our commitment to economic and social justice.

Let me begin our discussion by posing three questions. First, why do we have foreign aid programs? Second, what are these programs designed to accomplish? Third, do they work?

During the past 15 months as the Carter Administration fashioned aid budgets, reorganized aid programs, and discussed aid issues with Congress, we have thought with great care about these three questions. Today, in discussing our conclusions, I want to return to the basic elements of our aid programs.

Why Foreign Aid

Our foreign policy flows from what we are as a people—our history, our culture, our values, and our beliefs. One reason this nation has a foreign aid program is that we believe we have a humanitarian and

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1978, pp. 14–17. Vance delivered his address before the national convention of the League of Women Voters. The text of the question-and-answer session following his address is *ibid.*, pp. 17–19.

moral obligation to help alleviate poverty and promote more equitable economic growth in the developing world.

We cannot be indifferent when half a billion people are hungry and malnourished, when 700 million adults are illiterate, and when one and a half billion people do not have minimal health care. As free people who have achieved one of the highest standards of living in the world, we cannot fail to respond to such staggering statistics and the individual lives they encompass. We can be proud that we are a people who believe in the development of human potential.

The answer to the question of why we have foreign aid programs also goes beyond our system of values and our concern for the less fortunate. Foreign aid is clearly in our national economic and political interest.

The success or failure of developing countries to grow more food, develop new energy supplies, sell their raw materials and products, curb their birthrates, and defend themselves against aggression will matter to Americans.

Our economic health and our security are more closely tied today than ever before to the economic well-being and security of the developing world. Progress there means more jobs and more prosperity for the United States.

- The non-oil-producing developing countries are a major market for American goods, taking a quarter of our total exports last year. About the same share of our total exports goes to Europe and the Communist countries combined.

- Products from less developed countries—including raw materials such as tin, copper, bauxite, and lead—accounted for nearly a quarter of our total imports last year.

- Our nation gained more than \$7 billion from our direct private investment in the developing world in 1975. And in 1976 developing countries absorbed nearly \$11 billion of our direct foreign investment.

- In the export of our agricultural abundance last year, developing countries purchased half of our exports of cotton, 65% of our wheat, and nearly 70% of our rice.

- Our economy benefits substantially as aid dollars are spent here to buy commodities and services. For example, for every dollar we have paid into such organizations as the World Bank and the regional development banks for Latin America, Asia, and Africa, about \$2 has been spent in the U.S. economy.

The economic growth of the developing world is taking place primarily as a result of massive efforts by the leaders and peoples of the developing nations. For many, the most critical international factors in their growth and development are our policies toward trade, invest-

ment, commodities, and technology. Our economic aid, as well as that provided by other developed nations, also makes a crucial contribution to their well-being. For some countries—particularly the low-income nations—it is the principal source of foreign exchange and technical assistance. But for many others, it serves as an essential complement to other components of their development strategy.

In addition to America's economic involvement in the developing world, our political interests are strongly engaged as well. Developing countries are often key participants in the quest for peace. Regional stability and peace in the Middle East, southern Africa, and elsewhere cannot be achieved without the cooperation of developing nations. Achieving progress on the global issues which directly affect peace—arms restraint and nonproliferation—depends in large measure on strengthening political ties between the industrialized and developing worlds.

Our ties to developing countries are essential in many other areas which affect our national security: in deploying our armed forces and in maintaining access to straits, ports, and aviation facilities.

But the peace and stability we seek in the world cannot be obtained solely through the maintenance of a strong defense in concert with others. The social unrest which breeds conflict can best be prevented if economic growth and an equitable distribution of resources are realized. As Pope John XXIII so eloquently stated: "In a world of constant want there is no peace. . . ."

Foreign Assistance Programs

In view of the stakes involved, our foreign aid goals must be matched by our performance. The Carter Administration is asking the Congress to authorize and appropriate \$8.4 billion for our economic, food, security assistance programs, and contributions to the international financial institutions this fiscal year. About 16% of this sum represents government guarantees and will not result in actual spending. We are requesting these sums because we believe that foreign aid can and does work. We believe it can have a direct impact on economic growth and the maintenance of peace.

Let me give you a summary of what we are trying to do.

First, in the area of bilateral economic assistance, we are trying to determine the most effective way to channel this aid to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty. In doing so we are implementing a strategy which targets our resources directly on the needs of the poor. Called the "basic human needs" approach, this development strategy seeks to help people meet such basic needs as nutrition, shelter, education, and health care. It is not an international welfare program. It is, in-

stead, an approach to development which gives the poor a chance to improve their standard of living by their own efforts.

- Farmers need good quality seed if they are going to escape subsistence agriculture and grow enough food for their families and to sell at the market as well. Our aid program in Tanzania, for instance, is helping that government establish a seed multiplication project to provide improved seed for the main crops grown there. The impact on the lives of Tanzanian farmers should be large.

- In vast sections of West Africa, people cannot live in potentially fertile agricultural areas because of a terrible disease—river blindness. We are helping to finance efforts to suppress this affliction. Some success has been achieved. Small farmers are already beginning to re-settle in areas which had been virtually abandoned.

- Education is critical to human development. In numerous poor countries, our aid goes to training people in rural and urban areas in basic skills which permit them to earn a better living. Education takes place in many ways besides the schoolroom. It can be carried by low powered local radio programs, such as one we fund in Guatemala, or by direct broadcast satellite TV, as in an experiment we assisted in India.

Second, the programs of the World Bank and the regional development banks through which we channel a significant amount of our foreign aid range from large, capital intensive programs, such as dams and roads, to smaller scale programs designed to directly improve the lives of the poor. These institutions can mobilize and coordinate large amounts of capital for development. And they can build consensus between aid donors and recipients on development goals. In performing these roles, they well serve U.S. interests. The work of these institutions is varied.

- In Buenaventura, Colombia—one of the poorest cities in the hemisphere—the Inter-American Development Bank is trying to relocate slum dwellers and provide the city with safe drinking water to reduce disease.

- In the West African country of Benin, the African Development Fund is improving rural health services by constructing dispensaries in remote areas and training people to run them.

- In Burma, an Asian Development Bank loan will increase fish production for domestic consumption, thus raising the low protein intake of the population.

Third, we support the development programs of the United Nations, which finance technical assistance to poor countries and provide direct humanitarian assistance to children, refugees, and other groups in need of particular relief.

- In India, the U.N. Children's Fund is working to restore and improve potable water resources in the areas hardest hit by the November 1977 cyclone and tidal wave.

- In Central America, experts from the U.N. Development Program are working in four countries to develop energy from underground volcanic steam.

I could go on and on, citing projects in various countries aimed at specific problems and particular groups. The point is that when we are discussing aid levels, we must remember we are not talking about abstract statistics: we are talking about whether or not we can fund practical projects that make a difference to people in need.

There is another important aspect of our foreign aid program which I would like to mention very briefly—our security assistance programs.

These programs have three important objectives. First, they are designed to assist our friends and allies to provide for their legitimate defense needs. Second, these programs support our strategic and political objectives of reducing tensions and promoting stability in areas of potential confrontation and conflict. Third, they provide economic assistance to countries which are experiencing political and economic stresses and where U.S. security interests are involved. The vast majority of our security assistance aid goes to support our peace efforts in the Middle East and in southern Africa. In providing assistance to such nations, we help them meet the economic strains imposed by tensions in their regions.

Does Foreign Aid Work?

Do all these programs work?

There is a popular myth that foreign assistance often does not produce results. The record shows otherwise.

It is impossible to separate foreign assistance from other factors that produce development. But foreign assistance has been central in some measure to the following achievements.

- Between 1950 and 1975 the developing countries grew more rapidly than either they or the developed countries had grown in any time period in the past.

- Substantial increases in life expectancy are taking place in many developing countries.

- The number of children in primary schools in the developing world has trebled since 1950, and the number of secondary students has increased sixfold during the same period.

- The battle against communicable disease has produced significant results. Smallpox is now confined to a small area of Africa, and the

numbers of people suffering from Malaria has been reduced by 80–90% in the past three decades.

- The yields of rice and wheat in Asia are estimated to be substantially higher today because of the introduction of high-yielding varieties. More than a billion dollars worth of grain each year is ascribed to the new seed.

Beyond these successes, the record reveals countless instances in which projects funded by foreign assistance have improved the lives of people in fundamental ways.

- When a village has clean water, its children are no longer made sick from the water they drink.

- When couples have access to family planning services, there are fewer mouths to feed.

- When a clinic is constructed, modern medicine enters lives for the first time.

- And when a job program begins, the unemployed can find work and have incomes.

Progress has been made. But more has to be done. Over the last 15 months the Carter Administration has made a substantial effort to further improve the management and effectiveness of all of our programs.

Let me report to you on some of the steps we have already taken or will soon implement to achieve this objective.

One of the key problems with foreign assistance over the years has been a lack of adequate coordination between our bilateral programs and our activities in the international financial institutions. Responsibility for these various programs is spread throughout several Cabinet Departments and agencies.

Shortly before his death, Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced legislation which called for a sweeping reorganization of the government's foreign aid programs designed to meet these defects in coordination, The Carter Administration announced its support of the basic purposes of this bill. Although the Congress will probably not consider this legislation in the current session, the Administration is moving to put into place a new interagency coordinating mechanism which we believe will go a long way toward having the executive branch better coordinate its diverse development efforts.²

² Humphrey's International Development Cooperation bill proposed the establishment of a single foreign aid agency charged with administering bilateral and multilateral aid programs. Following Humphrey's death on January 13, Case and Sparkman introduced the bill in Congress. Although Humphrey's bill was not enacted into law, the President subsequently issued Executive Order 12163 on September 29, 1979, establishing the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). The IDCA began operations on October 1, 1979. See Graham Hovey, "A Humphrey Legacy: Bill to Streamline Foreign Aid," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1978, p. A-3; *Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, pp. 74–75; and *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 1792–1800.

The Agency for International Development has been reorganized under the leadership of Governor John Gilligan. More authority is being delegated to our AID missions abroad. Tighter controls are now imposed on financial and operational procedures. In addition, AID has eliminated some complex and cumbersome procedures which have slowed our ability to design and implement projects.

The United States has encouraged the multilateral banks to better take into account the lessons of the past—both successes and failures. The Administration has also shared congressional concerns about high salary levels of bank employees. We want the banks to look especially hard at more effective ways to reach poor people directly, as well as to operate in the most cost effective ways.

In our security programs we have tightened management controls and have instituted an interagency committee to provide coordinated recommendations to me and the President on all aspects of our arms transfer and security assistance programs.³

Finally, because we recognize that science and technology offer many opportunities for expanding the development process, President Carter has proposed the creation of a new U.S. foundation on technological collaboration.⁴ This foundation will support the application of our research to development problems. And it will improve the access of the developing countries to American science and technology.

We will continue to seek ways to improve the management and delivery of our foreign assistance programs. Accountability to the Congress and to the public is an essential element of our approach.

Other Key Issues

There are several other important questions relating to our foreign assistance programs which I would like to discuss.

First, there is a growing belief that we are both giving more aid and at the same time losing control over where it goes. Let me put this issue in perspective.

Clearly, we are not shouldering a disproportionate burden of global aid flows. While in absolute terms the U.S. aid program is larger than that of any other nation, as a percentage of GNP we rank in the bottom 25% of all non-Communist country donors.

Concerning control, we are very active in attempting to steer multilateral assistance in directions we think best for our nation and for global development. We have often been successful in encouraging the

³ Presumable reference to the Arms Export Control Board.

⁴ Presumable reference to the proposed Foundation for International Technological Cooperation (FITC).

types of projects consistent with our desired policies. We will be working closely with Congress to develop procedures which permit the United States to express its views about multilateral lending policies as effectively as possible. But in doing so, we must recognize the damage that would be done if the international character of these institutions were lost.

Second, our foreign assistance programs must be consistent with our determination to improve the conditions of political, economic, and civil rights worldwide. Over the past year we have reviewed all of our aid programs for their impact on human rights. In some cases we have reduced assistance to governments with consistent records of repression. We have also increased aid to others with good or improving human rights policies.

We face a dilemma when applying human rights considerations to foreign assistance. We do not want to support governments which consistently violate human rights. On the other hand, we do not wish to deny our assistance to poor people who happen to live under repressive regimes. We must resolve this dilemma on a case-by-case basis. In general, we have approved aid programs when they would directly benefit the poor since we recognize that people have economic as well as political rights.

Third, there is the question of which countries should receive our aid. The President has decided that our concessional assistance programs should focus primarily but not exclusively on the poorest countries. In the more advanced developing countries we do not want to substitute our own support for the assistance those governments should be giving. On the other hand, we cannot be indifferent to the plight of people who are no less poor because they live in middle income countries and who need our help. We are resolving this problem by insisting that our efforts to mount programs in middle income developing nations be matched by efforts of the host country.

Fourth, it is sometimes argued that we cannot afford to spend large amounts of money to help solve problems abroad when we have many pressing domestic needs. But I firmly believe that it would be a serious mistake to try to trade off international obligations for domestic priorities. Both need to be addressed.

The health of our nation is increasingly dependent on the world economy. If we neglect international progress, we undermine the welfare of our own society. As a nation we have a major concern with improving the lives of poor people. I do not believe this is a credible commitment if made only domestically. And as a percentage of the Federal budget for 1979, our economic assistance is only 1.47%. Adding our security assistance programs does not increase this figure substantially.

We can afford to increase foreign aid expenditures at a reasonable rate, as we must. At the same time, we can afford to increase our domestic education budget, expand programs for the elderly, and fund other critical domestic programs as we are now doing. Helping the children of Pakistan have adequate diets does not mean that we need neglect the children of Cincinnati, Boston, or Los Angeles. Helping the farmers of Mali grow more food does not mean we need to abandon the farmers of Texas, Illinois, or Colorado. And helping the nations of the Middle East remain at peace does not mean that we cannot help meet the needs of our cities. We do not have a choice. Both foreign aid and adequate domestic expenditures are essential to the national interest.

Senator Humphrey raised a fundamental issue about foreign aid. He said: "The question we must decide is whether or not the conditions of social and economic injustice—poverty, illiteracy, and disease—are a real threat to our security. I think they are and they require the same commitment of policy, will, and resources as does our conventional national defense."

As someone charged with helping to protect the national security, I agree with Senator Humphrey's assessment of the role of foreign aid in the scheme of our national priorities. I agree with his approach to the tasks of alleviating poverty and working for peace.

He believed in harnessing the energy and creativity of the American people to solve problems which have plagued the world for centuries. I share his faith in our abilities. I share his optimism that we can do the job.

I ask that you help us inform the American people why foreign aid is essential to the nation's economic health, political interests, and preservation of its humanitarian tradition.

78. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Cabinet¹

Washington, undated

In order to infuse greater clarity into public understanding of our foreign policy, the President wishes that all Cabinet members understand our key foreign policy goals so that they may be emphasized in your public statements and speeches.²

The summary which follows is based on major Presidential speeches as well as statements by Secretary of State Vance and other top officials.

Our Foreign Policy Goals

1. *We seek wider cooperation with our key allies and a more cooperative world system.* Close collaboration with Japan and Western Europe has long been the point of departure for America's global involvement. Responding to changes over the past 15 to 20 years in the global distribution of power, we are seeking to broaden these patterns of cooperation. This means developing new and wider relationships with such regionally influential nations as Nigeria, Indonesia, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Brazil.

2. *Stabilizing the U.S.-Soviet relationship.* Through a broader range of negotiations we are pursuing a pattern of detente which must be both comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal.

3. *Maintaining sufficient military capabilities to support our global security interests.* To achieve this we shall maintain a strategic nuclear balance; work closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; maintain and develop a quick reaction global force available for rapid development [*deployment*] to counter threats to our allies and friends in Asia, the Middle East, and other regions of the world.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 26, Foreign Policy: 12/77-12/78. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent an earlier version of the memorandum to the President under a May 5 memorandum, asserting: "One way to reduce public confusion over our policy is for all top officials to use certain key formulations when speaking about foreign affairs. Indeed, the repetition of certain 'code phrases' (e.g., 'détente must be both comprehensive and reciprocal') will help to indicate that we speak with a single voice from the top down." He added that the attached memorandum "is designed to accomplish that objective." (Ibid.)

² The earlier version of this paragraph (see footnote 1 above) reads: "In order to infuse greater clarity into public understanding of our foreign policy, the President wishes that all Cabinet members use certain common formulations and phrases in their public statements and speeches." The President crossed out the portion of the paragraph beginning with "use" and ending with "their," drew a line into the right-hand margin, and added the replacement text found here.

4. *Politically we shall remain engaged in all regions of the world.* We shall preserve our strategic and economic presence in the Asian-Pacific area by widening our cooperation with Japan and expanding our relationship with China. We shall enhance our collaboration with the moderate states of Africa in the cause of African emancipation. In Latin America, we are no longer tied to a regional approach. We shall strengthen bilateral ties with the nations of Latin America while cooperating more fully with them in their global concerns. In the Middle East, we continue to pursue a genuine peace settlement. Our commitment to Israel remains unshakeable while we expand our relationships with moderate Arab countries.

5. *Constructive and cooperative solutions to emerging global problems.* We are committed to head off any drift toward nuclear non-proliferation and the reduction of conventional arms sales.

6. *Sustaining support for our policies by rooting them firmly in moral values.* Our devotion to human rights is responsive to man's yearning everywhere for greater social justice. We seek a revival of America's optimism, a reawakening of America's idealism, and commitment to reform.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

79. Editorial Note

On May 5, 1978, President Jimmy Carter delivered remarks at a town hall meeting at the Convention Center in Spokane, Washington. Carter visited Spokane as part of a 3-day trip, May 3–5, to Colorado, California, Washington, and Oregon. After an introduction by Representative Thomas Foley (D-Washington) and Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Washington), the President discussed several domestic issues, including inflation and the administration's energy program, conceding that there were "no easy answers" to these problems facing the United States. Foreign policy, he continued, failed to yield easy answers as well:

"I know that in the past we've made some very serious mistakes. The Vietnam war, Watergate, the CIA revelations have kind of torn the fabric of our society, because the American people were not involved in making those decisions. We were faced with mistakes for the first time after they were revealed to us. And we create, sometimes, in the minds

of American people, an image that we don't know exactly what we want to do.

"I don't claim to know everything about what we want to do. But we try to bring the debate out into the open and let various voices be heard, so that when I do make a final decision about SALT talks or non-proliferation, or the use of solar power, or the control of the waste of energy, or farm agriculture policy, or urban policy, I will have listened to hundreds, even thousands of voices of Americans who know better answers than I do about a specific subject and who care deeply about our country.

"So, to me it's important that we do have some confusion, that we do have an open debate, that we do have disputes on occasion and even outright criticisms. I think that's good in a strong, democratic society. I don't fear it. I also don't fear addressing some very difficult questions that have been ignored too long and have now become crises in our Nation."

During the subsequent question-and-answer portion of the event, an audience member asked the President if he viewed Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa as a "test" of U.S. policy, then rephrased the question to inquire as to the nature of U.S. policy "toward Soviet intervention" in Africa and elsewhere. The President responded:

"I think we are holding our own in the so-called peaceful competition with the Soviet Union, in Africa, and in other parts of the world. Again, I hate to refer repeatedly to what existed in the past, but I think it's accurate to say that never before in the history of our Nation have we shown any substantial interest in the continent of Africa.

"Just a few weeks ago, I visited Nigeria, the greatest nation in Africa in many ways—economically, population, vigor, influence, growing influence. There are about 100 million people who live in Nigeria. It's one of the present and future leaders of black Africa. I was the first American President, by the way, in the history of our country who had ever made an official visit to a black African nation.

"Two or three years ago when Secretary Kissinger wanted to go and visit Nigeria, the country would not even let him enter that country. But I was received with open arms in a tremendous outpouring of friendship and realization of mutual purpose.

"We are trying to do the same thing in other parts of Africa, particularly where the black nations exist. We've got a good advantage in having a man like Andrew Young head our United Nations delegation. He's trusted by black people, not only in Africa but in the Caribbean area, in Latin America, and around the world—also in this country, of course. But just the fact that I appointed him to be our U.N. Ambassador is a demonstration to those people in tangible terms that we care about them for the first time in 200 years.

“Now, the Soviets are obviously trying to use their influence in Africa and other parts of the world. In many instances when they have come into a nation that has a changing government, their major input has been weapons, and they are much more easy to buy weapons from than we are. They will supply excessive weapons to countries like Somalia and Ethiopia, in the Horn of Africa, resulting in this instance by an attack on Ethiopia on Somalia with Soviet weapons. Both countries got them from the Soviet Union.

“The Soviets have gone into Ethiopia, using Cuban troops to fight against Somalia. I deplore this very much. In the strongest possible terms we have let the Soviets and Cubans know that this is a danger to American-Soviet friendship and to the nurturing and enhancement of the principle of *détente*.

“The Soviets know very clearly how deeply I feel about this. I’ve communicated directly with Brezhnev through private, sealed messages. And Cy Vance just came back from Moscow recently, having repeated to the Soviets, ‘Be careful how you use your military strength in Africa if you want to be a friend of the United States and maintain peace throughout the world.’

“So, I think that they are mistaken. There’s a strong sense of nationalism in Africa. Once the Soviets are there to help with military weapons when a new government is formed, then the people of that country almost invariably want the Soviets to get out and let them run their own affairs.

“I think there’s an innate racism that exists toward black people within the Soviet Union, as compared to us. We know how to live with white and black people together. We respect each other. We’ve learned this the hard way. But there’s a great deal of appreciation in Africa for this attitude on the part of the United States, as contrasted with the Soviet Union. And there’s another very major factor that I mentioned yesterday morning in Denver at the Governor’s Prayer Breakfast, and that is that there’s a strong sense of religious commitment throughout black Africa and indeed the northern part of Africa as well, Egypt and the others. They may be Arabs, they may be Moslems, they may be Christians or others, but they worship God.

“And this is a sense or a mechanism of a feeling of brotherhood and sisterhood that binds us together very strongly. They recognize that the Soviet Union is a Communist and an atheistic nation, and it’s a very present concern in the minds and hearts of Africans who, on a temporary basis, will turn to the Soviets to buy weapons because we won’t sell the weapons to them.

“We come in later with economic aid, with trade, with friendship, with the commitment to democracy and freedom, to human rights, and I believe in the long run our system will prevail. We could compete

more directly and effectively with the Soviets on a temporary basis by trying to sell our weapons to every country that calls for them. I don't think that's the right approach.

"I'd rather depend on the basic commitment of American people to human rights, to religious commitment and freedom, and to a sense of equality with those people who might be brown or yellow or black, than to depend on the Soviets trying to buy friendship through the sale of weapons designed to kill." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pages 863, 871–872)

**80. Memorandum From the President's Chief Speechwriter
(Fallows) to President Carter¹**

Washington, May 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Naval Academy Speech

I understand from Fran² that you have agreed to speak at the Naval Academy on June 7. So that we can begin our consultations and research as soon as possible, it would help me to know whether you have any subject in mind.

Jody has mentioned one theme that sounds promising to me—a discussion of the role of the military now, after the time when they took so much abuse, and were so wounded in spirit, during Vietnam. Not only would that theme be appropriate for the audience, but also it could enable you to sound firm as at Wake Forest,³ when discussing the relevance of the military ideal in this generation. It would also allow you to deal with such basic policy issues as military preparedness, vet-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 63, Speeches: Annapolis, 5–6/78. No classification marking. The President wrote "Jim" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Hutcheson returned the memorandum to Fallows, Brzezinski, Wise, and Voorde under a May 11 cover memorandum; a notation on the memorandum in Inderfurth's hand reads: "DA, this is in the works. Rick." In addition, an unknown hand added "done" and a checkmark on the cover memorandum. (Ibid.)

² Voorde.

³ See Document 72.

erans policy, pensions, the volunteer army, military challenges of the next decade, and even SALT.

What is your advice?⁴

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: “No—See Zbig re my opening statement to JCS yesterday at lunch. Strength of U.S.-Regional alliances—Mil/Pol/Econ interrelated. Also above theme can be included. List many individual ideas & items & then see me—J.” In a May 23 memorandum, Fallows provided the President with detailed suggestions from a variety of “authorities” who were contacted in order to obtain their advice on the Annapolis address. (Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 5, Annapolis, June 7, 1978)

81. Editorial Note

On May 28, 1978, reporters Bob Abernethy and Bill Monroe of NBC News, Elizabeth Drew of *The New Yorker* and Carl T. Rowan of Field Syndicate interviewed President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski on the NBC television and radio public affairs program “Meet the Press.” Responding to a question as to the viability of détente in light of recent Soviet actions and U.S. criticisms thereof, Brzezinski asserted:

“As far as détente is concerned, I think it is terribly important for all of us to understand what it is and what it is not. There is a tendency to assume that détente is the equivalent of a comprehensive, indeed, total accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. That has never been the case.

“Détente really is a process of trying to contain some of the competitive aspects in the relationship, competitive aspects which I believe still are predominant, and to widen the cooperative aspects. In that process at one time or another either the cooperative or the competitive aspects tend to be more predominant.

“I would say today the competitive aspects have somewhat surfaced and I would say categorically that this is due to the shortsighted Soviet conduct in the course of the last 2 or so years.”

Referring to Brzezinski’s use of the word “shortsighted,” one of the reporters asked Brzezinski if he had any reason to believe that Soviet conduct “would cease” to be shortsighted. Brzezinski responded:

“I think that if the Soviet Union realizes that there are genuine rewards in accommodation and genuine costs in unilateral exploitation of the world’s troubles, then the cooperative aspects will expand.

"I am troubled by the fact that the Soviet Union has been engaged in a sustained and massive effort to build up its conventional forces, particularly in Europe, to strengthen the concentration of its forces on the frontiers of China, to maintain a vitriolic worldwide propaganda campaign against the United States, to encircle and penetrate the Middle East, to stir up racial difficulties in Africa, and to make more difficult a moderate solution of these difficulties, perhaps now to seek more direct access to the Indian Ocean.

"This pattern of behavior I do not believe is compatible with what was once called the code of *détente*, and my hope is, through patient negotiations with us, but also through demonstrated resolve on our part, we can induce the Soviet leaders to conclude that the benefits of accommodation are greater than the shortsighted attempt to exploit global difficulties."

Following several questions related to Africa and Brzezinski's trip to China (see footnote 21, Document 62), the interview returned to the topic of the Soviet Union. Referencing the list of Soviet actions Brzezinski had described, one of the journalists then asked Brzezinski if he would be in favor of linking U.S. trade and technology transfers to Soviet behavior. Brzezinski commented:

"First of all, I don't think it was a string of horrible things. It was a list of actions undertaken apparently in a combative or competitive spirit in order to gain political advantage in relationship to us. This is the kind of conduct we wish to transform, to moderate.

"Our response to it does operate on many levels. On the one hand we try to negotiate with the Soviets where it is mutually useful to negotiate—for example, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. On the other hand, we are trying to strengthen ourselves where it is necessary, and we have done a great deal, for example, in regard to NATO.

"Beyond that we are trying to develop stronger relationships with various regional powers which do feel threatened by the Soviet Union and which, if encouraged and supported, can themselves help to provide overall global stability. Last but not least, we are enhancing our own long-term relationship with the People's Republic of China as a contribution to global stability.

"I don't believe we are wringing our hands. I think we are trying to respond responsibly to a complicated and difficult challenge." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1978, pages 27–28)

In his memoirs, Brzezinski noted that President Jimmy Carter expressed concern over his appearance on "Meet the Press." On the morning of May 29, the President informed Brzezinski that he "went too far" in placing blame on the Soviet Union. Brzezinski recounted:

"He went on to say that my comments might even threaten *détente* and he was wondering whether he shouldn't write a letter to Brezhnev

to reiterate his commitment to SALT. I told the President that 'it's really important that we discuss this fully, because this raises a question of fundamental judgment. In my view, the West confronts a basic danger, and how we respond may be decisive to the future of this country.' I added that I was distressed if my statements went further than he felt they should, and I asked him to review the transcript of what I said and not just rely on the *Washington Post* reporting of it." (*Power and Principle*, pages 220–221)

Summarizing his view of Brzezinski's "Meet the Press" interview in his diary entry for May 29, the President wrote:

"On *Meet the Press*, Zbig was very abusive against the Soviets—excessively so—and I chastised him about it. He was quite upset. I don't want to create sympathy for the Soviets among the European allies, or to drive them away from continued negotiations with us on SALT and the comprehensive test ban. The saving grace about it is that Zbig's always had a reputation of being anti-Soviet. I told him our relationships with the Soviet Union were much more important than those with China as far as the safety of our country is concerned—the prevention of war—at least for the rest of this century." (*White House Diary*, page 197)

82. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, May 29, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to put before you some reflections on the current and future state of our relations with the Soviet Union, and some suggestions on how these relations might best be managed in the coming months. The matter is urgent, because I believe we face the prospect of a serious deterioration of these relations in coming months.

It is extremely important, I believe, that we work through a clear set of guidelines on this issue that can be used to instruct all levels of the government and to provide a basis for explaining our policies to the American people. For our public, our allies, and the Third World, it is important to dispel any impression of uncertainty or unresolved conceptual differences.

My thoughts on the subject follow:

I. BACKGROUND

US Opinion

An intense mood of exasperation and hostility toward the Soviet Union is rapidly building up in this country. In part, the mood draws its intensity from a reaction to the complexity and difficulty of many problems in international affairs and from the aftermath of Vietnam. But there are also elements more directly related to the Soviet situation:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 50, Chron: 5/78. Secret; Nodis. There is no indication that the President saw the version of the letter printed here. Vance sent the letter to the President under a May 29 memorandum indicating that he had prepared it prior to "the events and public statements of this weekend." Presumably Vance is referring to both the talks he and the President had with Gromyko concerning strategic arms in Washington May 27–28 and Brzezinski's denunciation on "Meet the Press" of Soviet behavior (see Document 81). Brzezinski later commented that Vance was "deeply upset" by the "Meet the Press" appearance and had called Brzezinski to insist that the administration had to "speak with one voice," noting that Brzezinski's remarks "were making it less clear who was articulating the position of the Administration." Brzezinski continued: "I pointed out to Cy that I felt that I had spoken in keeping with the President's position, but I knew that he was not mollified. I subsequently learned that he had written to the President and complained to him." (*Power and Principle*, p. 221) In his memoirs, Vance characterized Brzezinski's remarks as "provocative," commenting: "Along with my most senior and experienced advisers, I was convinced that loose talk about 'playing the China card,' always a dangerous ploy, was a particularly risky move at a time when we were at a sensitive point in the SALT negotiations." (*Hard Choices*, p. 116) The President noted that Vance had met with him on June 1 to "express his deep concern, in a very friendly way, about the relationship between him and Zbig and the fact that we had too many voices speaking on foreign policy—myself, Jody, Zbig, Andy, and him—and it was creating confusion." (*White House Diary*, p. 198)

—Frustration over recent developments in Africa and Afghanistan, made more difficult by a high level of Soviet and Cuban involvement, and compounded by what is seen as our inability to respond effectively to these developments in the short run.

—Concern over the widespread impression that the United States appears to have become militarily weaker and less resolute, and that the Soviet Union is or may become stronger than the United States.

—Understandable anger at Soviet actions in the human rights area, including the harsh treatment of Orlov and others.²

Soviet Views

On the Soviet side, there also appears to be building up a mood of greater harshness and frustration. We must contend with a Soviet perspective, which, however much we would challenge its validity, contains the following elements:

—The Soviets regard their moves in Africa as falling within the bounds of acceptable competition for influence;

—They regard our interest in the dissidents as a sign of our desire to overthrow their system;

—They feel frustrated and upset that they have been excluded from effective action in the Middle East;

—They react sharply to disparagements from our side;

—Overall, they see our actions as unpredictable, and they have become uncertain whether we now want a SALT treaty.

If this Soviet mood, which feeds upon as well as feeds the American mood, is translated into new Soviet hard-line actions, it could mean still greater military expenditures (which we should and will match); concerns among our allies upon which the Soviets will play; greater mischief-making in Africa; an active rejectionist strategy in the Middle East; and new Soviet pressures on Eastern Europe. The prospect of a summit this fall could obviously be clouded.

The US-Soviet relationship has special importance now because there will probably be leadership changes in the Soviet Union in the near future, and the cast of our relationship at that time may set the tone and direction of our relationship for a long time to come.

In addition to the foreign policy developments that could be anticipated from a severe deterioration in US-Soviet relations, I am concerned about the effect on our domestic political situation. While there may well be short-term favorable response, at least from some quarters, I believe the dominant response, especially over a longer period, would

² Reference is to Soviet physicist Yuri Orlov.

be strongly negative. The applause would come from sectors of American political life who are not likely to be numbered among your supporters, whereas the prevailing sentiment among your natural constituency would surely be a negative reaction to the intensified arms race, the renewal of Cold War tensions, and the consequent weakening of domestic programs. The heightening of militancy, the polarization of political positions, and the destructive emotional tensions that would be generated would make it more difficult to realize the objectives to which you have dedicated your Administration.

II. POLICY

To put our relations on a more stable footing, while advancing our interests and clarifying our public stance, we need to take steps to insure that we have a coherent approach in three general areas: our direct relations with the Soviets; our competition (as well as cooperation) in third areas; and our public position.

A. *Direct Relations*

The essential issue here is the military balance. The fact is that the Soviet Union has greatly increased its defense expenditures in the past fifteen years while ours have declined in real terms since the Vietnam War years. It is also true that the Soviets have now reached a state of broad equivalence with us, certainly in terms of military strength and, to a lesser extent, in terms of military reach. The question is whether they will seek to go beyond parity to dominance in some areas.

Our response, as put in Harold Brown's excellent posture statement, is the right one: a prudent increase in our defense spending, keyed to NATO and mobile forces while maintaining our strength in the Pacific.³ Continued efforts to strengthen NATO and other alliance relationships are also crucial.

Stabilizing the arms competition between ourselves and the Soviets is the other essential element of maintaining the military balance. A major priority in the Soviet-American relationship is therefore the negotiation of a SALT treaty. Despite all that is said about the difficulty of getting the treaty ratified, I believe that when it is signed and presented to the Congress, major sources of support will emerge as you and the entire Administration make a major effort to carry the case to the American people. Ultimately, with proper preparation, I believe this issue can be made a political advantage instead of the liability it is now wrongly thought to be.

³ Documentation on the Department of Defense posture statement is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

Furthermore, the timely conclusion of a SALT treaty will have a useful effect on our management of the relationship with the Soviet Union. The ratification process in the United States will provide an incentive for responsible Soviet behavior that does not now exist.

Another aspect of our direct relations—human rights—deserves review.

The Soviets seem to be engaged in a draconian effort to reduce the dissident movement by trials, harsh sentences, additional arrests and detentions, and a severance of contacts between dissidents and Western newsmen. It seems probable that the Orlov trial will be followed in June by the trials of Ginsburg and Shcharanskiy.⁴ It now appears that after some indecision the Soviet authorities concluded, mid-point in the Belgrade Conference, that they would no longer seek to conciliate Western pressures on the human rights issue, and would try to reduce their vulnerability on these issues by rigorous police measures.⁵

The one favorable development in this area is that the level of Jewish emigration has continued to increase in recent months.

I believe it would be useful for us now to study the experience of the past 16 months in order to refine the forms and intensity of pressure that seem to be most productive, as well as the most effective combination of governmental and private forms of pressure. We need to form a judgment on how best to use our influence to give some measure of protection to prominent dissidents, and to encourage longer-term movement toward greater constraints on the Soviet political police. From our experience thus far, it seems clear that public attention can afford only a measure of protection to prominent dissidents. There is a critical point beyond which the effect of public pressure has been to stiffen Soviet determination not to capitulate, and to encourage harsher measures.

Our ability to influence Soviet behavior on this and other issues would be stronger if there were the prospect of improved trade relations, which now appear remote.

⁴ The trials were scheduled to begin on July 10.

⁵ On July 8, Goldberg released a statement through the Department of State: "I sought for 6 months, as head of the U.S. delegation at the recently concluded Belgrade conference, to work for better understanding on the part of the Soviet Union of Western concern for the fulfillment of the human rights pledges of the Helsinki Final Act. The announcement that Anatoli Shcharanskiy and Aleksandr Ginzburg are to be brought to trial July 10, therefore, causes me great personal distress. I hope that the Soviet authorities, as they conduct these trials, will be aware that Western public opinion will be drawing its own conclusions about Soviet respect for the Helsinki agreement and about the nature of future U.S.-Soviet relations. All of us, in the East and West, will be the losers if the Soviet authorities ignore their Helsinki commitments." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1978, p. 28)

An additional issue that deserves further study is the US-Soviet-Chinese triangle. I believe that this is a factor of which we must be continually aware as we shape our relations with each. Clearly Chinese attitudes toward us are heavily influenced by our policies towards the Soviets. Zbig's trip was useful in indicating to the Chinese our firmness.⁶ It is less clear to me that "playing the China card" has much effect on Moscow's actions.

B. Competition and Cooperation in Third Areas

Increasingly, we are faced with two differing views of the US-Soviet relationship; although so far we have managed to combine the two in our public statements, it is becoming more difficult to do. We have always recognized that the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union has been a combination of cooperation and competition, with the competition not preventing either side from seeking agreements in our mutual benefit in such areas as SALT. Now, however, we are coming to the point where there is growing pressure on the part of some people to have us portray the competitive aspects of the relationship as taking clear precedence over the search for areas for cooperation. This fundamental issue has begun to spill out into the public domain through recent statements and press interviews. It should be resolved within the government in order to avoid presenting a picture of division which will weaken us.

We have an interest in expanding areas of cooperation with the Soviets, not only through direct exchanges but in diplomatic or programmatic cooperation in their areas of the world.

But the harsh reality is that a growing Soviet military reach is being translated into an increasingly assertive Soviet competitive drive in the Third World, with a focus on Africa.

We cannot object to competition. It is inherent in our relationship. To insist that detente be made perfect is to ensure that competition in any area will prejudice the possibility of progress in other areas.

As you stated in your Chicago press conference⁷ and elsewhere, we do not and should not link Soviet behavior in the Third World to progress on issues in which we have so fundamental a security interest as SALT. Yet Soviet behavior will of course affect the willingness of the American people and the Congress to give approval to formal agreements with the Soviets.

⁶ See footnote 21, Document 62 and Document 81.

⁷ For the transcript of the President's news conference in Chicago on May 25, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 972-979.

While we cannot put an end to competition or to Soviet efforts to help insure territorial integrity at the request of African governments, we can and should make clear our opposition to military adventures which exacerbate conflicts, inhibit peacemaking, and go beyond reasonable defensive efforts. In particular, we should expose attempts to gain political advantage through encouraging bloodshed.

It is evident that we cannot *force* a change in Soviet and Cuban policies in Africa. But there are many things we can do to influence their decisions. If we are to preserve our interest in SALT and other central aspects of the US-Soviet relationship, it is crucial that we do all we sensibly can to deter and prevent further Soviet/Cuban adventures in Africa and encourage their gradually scaling down their activities.

Such a strategy includes efforts designed to strengthen our friends, limit the areas in which the Soviets and Cubans can find easy entree, build longer-term relationships with the countries of the region. The execution of this strategy is underway:

—We have steadily increased our public and private diplomatic pressures directed against the Soviets and Cubans themselves, emphasizing our concern and interest in stability and peace in Africa.

—We have intensified our consultations with non-aligned states. A number of these states share our views about Cuban and Soviet actions, and have urged restraint on Moscow and Havana. Our European allies and some African and Arab moderates have made parallel diplomatic approaches; and Iraqi, Syrian, and Algerian pressures against the Soviets and Cubans in Eritrea may in part have flowed from this effort.

—We have strengthened our ties with African countries over the last year, particularly through our commitment to help resolve the southern African disputes. This has fundamentally contributed to our credibility throughout the continent and to limiting opportunities for Soviets and Cubans.

—Our substantially increased economic assistance, and the military assistance we have offered some of the more vulnerable countries in east Africa, have provided us with strong cards in many countries.

—Our long-term plans for further increases in economic aid to the area, greater effort to help Africans increase their trade with us, and offers of appropriate technology in assisting African economic development are tools we can exploit and which the Soviets cannot match.

—Above all, African nationalism itself—while not a tool we can use directly—is the most powerful force available against extended Soviet and Cuban influence. The inevitable role this force will play offers us considerable grounds for optimism over the next few years, assuming southern Africa does not explode into a major racial war.

An interagency study (PRM-36)⁸ is currently reviewing other measures we might take to limit or constrain the Soviets and Cubans, ranging from improvement of diplomatic relations with countries currently under Soviet/Cuban influence to strengthening of the military capability of key African states.

C. Public Statements

It is essential that we project publicly a sense of confidence and consistency as we pursue a coherent and long-term strategy towards the Soviets.

It is damaging when our policies are characterized as either "hard" or "soft," or as swinging between those poles. In either case, such characterizations irritate one group or another in the United States; send the wrong signals to the Soviets and our allies; give disproportionate emphasis to one aspect or another of our policies, which properly contain both "hard" and "soft" elements; and tend to encourage the damaging and unrealistic swings of public mood from gloom to euphoria and back again.

We should give more attention than we have to the psychological side of our relations with the Soviet Union. We are less likely to get the Soviets to move in directions we want by demanding that they capitulate to public pressure, than by leaving the way open for them to move with pride intact, having made our wishes known in private. While we should continue to criticize the Soviet Union in appropriate ways when it is called for, public expressions of indignation by themselves tend to emphasize our apparent impotence, and to inflame public and Congressional sentiment in ways that are unproductive. (Witness the declaration of nine Senators last week⁹ that they will oppose the ratification of a SALT treaty because of Soviet actions in Africa and the Orlov trial.)

In a more positive sense, we can help encourage a more cooperative attitude on the part of the Soviet leaders by conspicuous attention to the sense of equality to which they attach so much importance. And if they respond positively, we should refrain from crowing about any gestures they may make.

In protesting Soviet lack of restraint, it is important for us to be precise in our complaints rather than general, tailoring our demands for Soviet action to the seriousness of the situations and the real degree

⁸ PRM/NSC-36, issued on May 23, directed the Policy Review Committee to undertake a review of U.S. policy concerning objectives in limiting Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa.

⁹ May 18. The Senators included Baker, Bellmon, Curtis, Danforth, Domenici, Garn, Lugar, Morgan, and Zorinsky. ("Senators Link SALT Doubts To 'Disturbing' Soviet Deeds," *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1978, p. A-10)

of control and initiative exercised by Moscow. We should pick our targets for a sharpshooter's rifle, not a shotgun.

An improvement—both in substance and in public perceptions—may lie in making two important distinctions. We must distinguish between what it is possible to gain in the way of altered Soviet behavior, and what is not. And, in our public stance, we should concentrate as much on what we are doing to compete as on Soviet behavior to which we object.

Whenever we make public demands for actions the Soviets do not then take, or build up their power or activities, we make ourselves look weak.

It would be better, in international and domestic political terms, to exhibit a great firmness, giving stronger emphasis than we are now doing to *our* strength, *our* confidence, *our* actions—in the defense budget, in Africa, in our economy, and in the reassertion of our ideals. For in the long run, we hold most of the cards in the East-West competition.

After there is agreement on the various elements of that strategy towards the Soviets, I recommend that:

—I find the occasion privately to discuss with Gromyko, for an extended period of time, where we stand in our relations and what both sides can do to prevent a serious deterioration.

—You or I give a major speech on US-Soviet relations in which you would express the combination of the firmness, confidence, and tact with which you seek realistically to regulate a basically competitive relationship in ways that will be less dangerous for the world.¹⁰ It would counteract public anxiety about a perceived decline in American power. And it would present the case for both a strong defense establishment and our security interest in arms control. Such a speech would provide an authoritative framework for all statements by our spokesmen in the following months.

The thoughts that I have shared with you in this letter are the result of my belief that we have reached a critical point in our relations with the Soviet Union and perhaps with China as well, and that it is therefore essential to do a careful and searching analysis of our options for dealing with these central questions of American foreign policy over the next few years.

For that reason, I believe we should undertake a special review of US-Soviet relations. I would personally lead the drafting and preparation of options for your ultimate decision, incorporating the views of

¹⁰ The President delivered a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations on June 7; see Document 87.

Harold, Zbig, Stan,¹¹ and other key officials. The importance and the need for a systematic review of this vital issue is clear.

Once the NATO meetings¹² are out of the way, I feel it would be most helpful to have a small meeting to discuss these matters before beginning a review.

Respectfully,

Cy

¹¹ Stansfield Turner.

¹² See Document 83.

83. Remarks by President Carter¹

Washington, May 30, 1978

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General,² Excellencies, members of the Council, and distinguished guests:

On behalf of the people of the United States, I welcome here today our closest friends and allies, the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Twenty-nine years ago, at an uncertain time for world peace, President Truman spoke these words on signing the North Atlantic Treaty, and I quote from him: "In this pact, we hope to create a shield against aggression . . . a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and a happier life for all our citizens."³

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1011–1014. The President spoke at 9:35 a.m. in the Concert Hall at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts during the opening ceremonies of the North Atlantic Alliance summit. The President also attended the morning and afternoon sessions on May 30, held at the Department of State, and hosted a luncheon for delegates at the White House. For the President's May 30 statement upon signing a congressional joint resolution (S.J. Res. 137; P.L. 95–287) reaffirming the unity of the Alliance commitment at a ceremony held in the Department's Jefferson Room, see *ibid.*, p. 1014. For the text of the final communiqué released at the conclusion of the summit on May 31, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1978, pp. 8–10. Documentation on the May 30–31 summit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.

² Bulent Ecevit and Joseph M.A.H. Luns, respectively.

³ For the text of Truman's April 4, 1949, address on the occasion of signing the North Atlantic Treaty, see *Public Papers: Truman, 1949*, pp. 196–198.

The alliance born that day in April 1949 has helped preserve our mutual security for nearly 30 years, almost a decade longer than the time between the two great wars of this century. History records no other alliance that has successfully brought together so many different nations for so long without the firing of a single shot in anger.

Ours is a defensive alliance. No nation need fear aggression from us, but neither should any nation ever doubt our will to deter and to defeat aggression against us. The North Atlantic Alliance is a union of peoples moved by a desire to secure a safe future for our children in liberty and freedom. Our Alliance is unique, because each of us 15 democratic nations shares a common heritage of human values, the rule of law, and faith in the courage and spirit of free men and women.

The military strength and the common political purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance has led us to cooperate in a thousand individual efforts, rightly conferring upon us the name of "community." And it has given us the self-confidence and strength of will to seek improved relations with our potential adversaries.

As an American I am proud that the commitment of the United States to the security, independence, and prosperity of Europe is as strong as ever. We are part of you, and you are part of us. The mutual pledges of trust we exchanged here in 1949 still hold firm and true.

During the next 2 days we will reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance, to its strategy and doctrine, and to each other. We will review a year-long effort to assess East-West relations as they exist now and as they may develop in the future. We will review our cooperation in defense procurement. And through a broad program of defense cooperation, we will seek to reinforce our individual efforts to guarantee our security against aggression for many years ahead.

We must be aware of the new challenges that we face individually and collectively, which require new efforts of us all.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries pose a military threat to our Alliance which far exceeds their legitimate security needs. For more than a decade the military power of the Soviet Union has steadily expanded, and it has grown consistently more sophisticated. In significant areas the military lead we once enjoyed has been reduced.

Today we can meet that military challenge, but we cannot be sure of countering the future military threat unless our Alliance modernizes its forces and adds additional military power. In this effort the United States will play its part across the spectrum of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. I'm gratified that America's allies are joining with us in building up their military might.

In the past year the United States has increased substantially its conventional combat strength in Europe and is enhancing its capability

for rapid deployment of additional forces to that continent. United States theater nuclear forces are being modernized, and the United States will maintain strategic nuclear equivalence with the Soviet Union.

Our Alliance centers on Europe, but our vigilance cannot be limited just to that continent. In recent years expanding Soviet power has increasingly penetrated beyond the North Atlantic area.

As I speak today, the activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa are preventing individual nations from determining their own future. As members of the world's greatest alliance, we cannot be indifferent to these events because of what they mean for Africa and because of their effect on the long-term interests of the Alliance itself.

I welcome the efforts of individual NATO Allies to work for peace in Africa and to support nations and people in need, most recently in Zaire.⁴

Our Alliance has never been an end in itself. It is a way to promote stability and peace in Europe and, indeed, peace in the world at large.

Our strength has made possible the pursuit of détente and agreements to limit arms, while increasing the security of the Alliance. Defense in Europe, East-West détente, and global diplomacy all go hand in hand. Never before has a defensive alliance devoted so much effort to negotiate limitations and reductions in armaments with its potential adversaries. Our record has no equal in the search for effective arms control agreements.

The United States continues to move forward in its negotiations with the Soviet Union on a new agreement to limit and reduce strategic nuclear weapons. Our objective is to preserve and advance the security of all the members of our Alliance. We will continue to consult and to work closely with our allies to ensure that arms control efforts serve our common needs.

NATO Allies are also working for the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe to provide greater security for all European peoples at lower levels of armaments, lower tensions, and at lower costs. The Allies have recently made a new proposal to the Warsaw Pact, and we call upon those nations to respond in the positive spirit in which our offer was made.

⁴ Reference is to the mid-May second Katangan invasion from Angola into Zaire's Shaba province. ("Zaire Reports an Attack in South By Communist-Backed Katangans," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1978, p. 15) The United States provided support to Belgian-French rescue efforts in Zaire by contributing Air Force transport planes. The Carter administration also extended credit to Zaire under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act. ("Belgian and French Troops Fly to Zaire to Save 2,500 Foreigners; U.S. Sends Planes and Speed Aid," *The New York Times*, May 19, 1978, p. 17)

Our efforts to reduce weapons and forces in both these negotiations are guided by the need for equivalence and balance in the military capabilities of the East and West. That is the only enduring basis for promoting security and peace.

The challenges we face as allies do not end here. Economic changes within our countries and throughout the world have increased our dependence upon one another and complicated our efforts to promote economic and social welfare for our people.

Social changes generated partly by economic and political progress will require creative thought and effort by each of our nations. Our Alliance derives additional strength through our shared goals and experiences.

Finally, we face the challenge of promoting the human values and human rights that are the final purpose and meaning of our Alliance. The task is not easy—the way to liberty has never been—but our nations preeminently comprise the region of the world where freedom finds its most hospitable environment.

As we seek to build *détente*, therefore, we must continue to seek full implementation by Warsaw Pact countries as well as our own of the Helsinki accords on security and cooperation in Europe that was signed 3 years ago.

If we continue to build on the fundamental strength of the North Atlantic Alliance, I am confident that we can meet any challenge in the years ahead. In the future, as in the past, the Government and people of the United States will remain steadfast to our commitment to peace and freedom that all of us as allies share together.

Thank you very much.

84. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 31, 1978

SUBJECT

Reflections at Midweek: The US and the USSR

I believe this has been an important and *potentially* very constructive week. It has involved the conjunction of four important developments:

1. *NATO countries* displayed more unity on vital matters than expected, and I have not the slightest doubt that they also gained a great deal of personal confidence in your leadership. In fact, I think the Summit has been an important personal success for you;²

2. For the first time, *the Soviets and the Cubans* are beginning to take our concerns about their African policies seriously. Till now, they have dismissed them; they are now beginning to show signs of genuine concern;

3. Similarly for the first time, *the Chinese* are beginning to take us seriously, and this could pay dividends in the longer run. In part, this is due to my visit; more importantly, to your public statements and posture;

4. *The public* is beginning to perceive this Administration as realistically prepared to face the realities of global power. I consider Tuesday's editorial in *The Washington Post* to be particularly significant,³ as was Meg Greenfield's column in *Newsweek*. I believe you will be hearing significant echoes of Congressional support in the days to come, and this will not be without its domestic political effects.

It is essential that these benefits not be dissipated but be exploited towards positive ends. Let me specifically suggest the following:

1. That you take advantage of an early opportunity to stress that *detente has to be reciprocal and comprehensive*. The issue is *not* detente itself, but the Soviet violation of the code of detente. This lesson has to be driven home in a responsible and persistent way.

2. It is essential that we do not convey the impression of uncertainty or anxiety. Premature whispers to the Russians about our desire

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 79, Brzezinski Chron—To/From President: 5-6/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 83.

³ "A Long-Haul Foreign Policy," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 1978, p. A-16.

to promote friendship might be misconstrued by them as an indication of a *new zig-zag* and as evidence of lack of resolve. It would be useful if you were to indicate to State your determination that the Administration cohesively convey the same tone—a point which *The Washington Post* editorial so well stressed and so much welcomed.

3. It should be made clear to the Russians that our purpose is *not to humiliate them*, and that we are prepared to deal with them seriously, on the basis of *reciprocity*. Accordingly, I think it would be useful if you were to instruct Cy and me to have separate talks with Gromyko and Dobrynin respectively, or each alone with Dobrynin—in order to convey the same message. That message ought to be that we are still interested in SALT, etc., but that we cannot sustain a selective detente which they exploit to their own advantage in a manner inimical to our vital interests; and that any positive gesture by them would be reciprocated by us. For example, tangible even if quiet steps to reduce the Soviet/Cuban military presence in Africa (notably Ethiopia and Angola), and a commitment not to exacerbate the situation around Rhodesia would be reciprocated by us. On the other hand, Soviet unwillingness to give us these assurances will necessarily force us not only to support our friends but also to seek friends where we can find them (and here the China alternative is a very subtle but persuasive argument).

4. In regard to China, we should be very careful to continue stressing the proposition that our long-term interests are congruent not because of tactical anti-Sovietism, but *because of our joint commitment to a world of diversity* (a point I stressed in my report to NATO).⁴ Subtle hints of long-term congruence of interest are more likely to induce the Russians to compete for our favors.

Above all, what we now need is to demonstrate prudent resolve so that the four gains mentioned at the outset of this memorandum are translated into tangible benefits internationally and lasting domestic advantages politically.

⁴ During the summit meeting, Brzezinski delivered a report on China. (*Power and Principle*, p. 221)

85. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

I believe the speech should outline certain fundamental propositions regarding the relationship—and not focus much on current policy issues, be they SALT, human rights, or Africa. The public—and the world—need to be reminded that what is involved is “a long haul” policy—not a series of either quick fixes or dramatic shifts.² Your statement on the “fundamentals” would thus provide the framework for your specific policies, and reassure all concerned that the United States has a clear sense of direction.

Anything you say will be scanned most carefully for “soft” or “hard” signals, and this makes it all the more important that the tone be consistent with your own sense of measured determination.³ The press will be only too eager to find evidence of a new turn.

As I see it, the central difficulty we confront—one truly vital to our national future—is the Soviet inclination to exploit global turbulence for shortsighted gains, while engaging in a massive military buildup which increasingly gives it additional political leverage. This challenge must be confronted in a responsible way, which is neither alarmist nor escapist.⁴

Accordingly, I attach two items:

1. Some suggested language;⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 89, Annapolis Speech: 6/7/78 [2]. Secret. The President did not initial the memorandum. According to Brzezinski, the President decided to deliver a formal speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: “After telling us that he expected all of us to hew to one line, and that Vance should be the principal public spokesman on foreign policy, he then proceeded to develop the draft of the speech entirely on his own.” (*Power and Principle*, p. 320) The President did, however, request that Brzezinski, Brown, Turner, and Vance provide him with speech outlines. Brown’s and Turner’s outlines, sent under June 2 cover memoranda, are in the Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 5, Annapolis, June 7, 1978. For Vance’s points, outlined in a June 2 letter to Carter, see Document 86. Hertzberg and Doolittle’s suggested outline, sent to the President under a June 2 memorandum, is in the Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 5, Annapolis, June 7, 1978.

² The President underlined “a long haul” policy.”

³ The President underlined “measured determination.”

⁴ The President underlined most of this paragraph.

⁵ The 5-page outline is not printed. The President underlined most of the outline.

2. Some conclusions from a recent NIE dealing with growing Soviet capabilities, and their political implications.⁶

⁶ Not found attached. Presumable reference to NIE 11–4–78, “Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena,” May 9, which is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

86. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, June 2, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

As you requested, I am writing to provide material to supplement my letter of May 29, 1978,² for possible use in your Annapolis speech. In doing so, I will try to minimize repetition of points made in the letter.

I.

The United States and the Soviet Union each face a strategic choice—do we want to seek broadened areas of mutual interest as we compete in other areas, or will we revert to the days of general antagonism? We prefer the former course. It means a safer world and a more secure America. A relationship of this kind would include the following elements:

A. We would expand areas of cooperation in our mutual interest, such as arms control agreements that enhance our security, or agreements for cooperation in science and technology which promise a better life for our people.

B. We would recognize and accept the continuation of competition, but within moderating limits. The American people should not expect, in this generation, to see an end to competition with the Soviets. We, too, will compete ideologically, politically and economically. But both sides should be fully aware of the dangers, to their bilateral relationship and to world peace, if they fuel local and regional conflicts, rather than work together and with others on peaceful solutions.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 5, Annapolis, June 7, 1978. No classification marking. There is no indication that the President saw this copy of the letter.

² See Document 82.

Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa have exacerbated conflicts and increased bloodshed. No one quarrels with the right of a country to appeal to friendly powers for assistance in maintaining territorial integrity. We have helped meet that call from Zaire. But such help should be coupled with a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. And it should not be a pretext for prolonged military intervention and political dominance.

We call on the Soviet Union to adopt a policy of restraint in Africa, forsaking the temptation to achieve short-term political gain at the expense of long-term stability. We also call on the Soviet Union to play a constructive part in finding peaceful solutions for the future of Eritrea and for the remaining problems of decolonization and majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Competition in areas like Africa will not deter our efforts to find agreements that serve the security interests of both countries. But when peaceful competition turns to confrontation, it cannot help but erode the political base for cooperation in both nations. This is not a threat, but a fact of life. Our intention is not to gain an advantage, but to try to head off a deterioration in our relations that would follow a continued pattern of excessive competition.

C. We would also expect the continuation of strong defenses on both sides, and the maintenance of the military parity. Despite the Soviet build-up over the past ten years, the United States and our Allies are strong, and fully equal to the challenge we face.

D. Support for human rights, not as an effort to undermine governments, but to uphold an international standard to which both nations are committed.

II.

As we cooperate and compete, we must also remain strong. This will include:

A. Demonstrated resolve not to allow any nation to gain military superiority over us. This will involve the strengthening of vital military programs in the U.S. and its Allies, as we are doing.

B. Achievement of dependable arms control agreements that enhance our security.

C. Public and Congressional support for efforts to assist old and new friends in need of security or economic assistance.

D. Maintenance of an American leadership that recognizes the necessity of working with other nations, and that acknowledges the desire of many developing nations to preserve real sovereignty and independence, and to resist an unhealthy overdependence on either the United States or the Soviet Union.

E. The continued assertion of our national ideals, the most powerful ideas in the world.

F. Our superior technological capacity, our unmatched industrial base, our expanding trade relations around the world.

G. The cohesion of our society, and our ability to criticize our shortcomings openly, and in a constructive spirit, so as to better correct them.

III.

We are determined to pursue policies of unsurpassed readiness and cooperation in managing our relations with the Soviet Union. No issue is more central to the foreign interests of the United States, and none is nearly as important in assessing the strategic and nuclear threats to world peace. Our views must be made clear to the people of this country and of the Soviet Union, and they will be. But effective diplomacy can suffer if the tone of public debates between our governments is heated. The resulting atmosphere makes it less likely that firm positions quietly conveyed will be fully understood by the other side.

Providence has destined that both the United States and the Soviet Union are great powers with global interests. Although we do not share a similar world view, neither should seek to impose its conceptions on others or to exclude the other from constructive participation in the issues that face mankind. We are confident of our future and our ability to help build a world at peace.

Taken together with the May 29 letter, I hope that these points may be helpful.

Respectfully,

Cy

87. Address by President Carter¹

Annapolis, Maryland, June 7, 1978

[Omitted here are the President's introductory remarks.]

Today I want to discuss one of the most important aspects of that international context—the relationship between the world's two greatest powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

We must realize that for a very long time our relationship with the Soviet Union will be competitive. That competition is to be constructive if we are successful. Instead it could be dangerous and politically disastrous. Then our relationship must be cooperative as well.

We must avoid excessive swings in the public mood in our country—from euphoria when things are going well, to despair when they are not; from an exaggerated sense of compatibility with the Soviet Union, to open expressions of hostility.

Détente between our two countries is central to world peace. It's important for the world, for the American public, and for you as future leaders of the Navy to understand the complex and sensitive nature.

The word "détente" can be simplistically defined as "the easing of tension between nations." The word is in practice however, further defined by experience, as those nations evolve new means by which they can live with each other in peace.

To be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of cooperation, then détente must be broadly defined and truly reciprocal. Both nations must exercise restraint in troubled areas and in troubled times. Both must honor meticulously those agreements which have already been reached to widen cooperation, naturally and mutually limit nuclear arms production, permit the free movement of people and the expression of ideas, and to protect human rights.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1052–1057. The President spoke at the Naval Academy commencement exercises at 10:42 a.m. in the Navy-Marine Corps Memorial Stadium. His address was broadcast live on radio and television. On the evening of June 4, the President met with Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Jordan, Mondale, Young, and Turner to discuss the address. He recalled that they read through the individual paragraphs he had written: "There were no material changes, and we decided to put the paragraphs in the most effective order. I think it will be a good speech, tough but well-balanced." (*White House Diary*, p. 199) In his diary entry for June 7, the President noted: "Reaction to the Soviet speech [at the Naval Academy] was good. It will provide a benchmark for our decisions in the future, and we've sent a copy of the speech to the State Department and all our embassies with the points to be emphasized. Most reporters played it tough, which is good. If it's tough at home and the Soviets consider it mild, that's perfect." (Ibid.)

Neither of us should entertain the notion that military supremacy can be attained, or that transient military advantage can be politically exploited.

Our principal goal is to help shape a world which is more responsive to the desire of people everywhere for economic well-being, social justice, political self-determination, and basic human rights.

We seek a world of peace. But such a world must accommodate diversity—social, political, and ideological. Only then can there be a genuine cooperation among nations and among cultures.

We desire to dominate no one. We will continue to widen our cooperation with the positive new forces in the world.

We want to increase our collaboration with the Soviet Union, but also with the emerging nations, with the nations of Eastern Europe, and with the People's Republic of China. We are particularly dedicated to genuine self-determination and majority rule in those areas of the world where these goals have not yet been attained.

Our long-term objective must be to convince the Soviet Union of the advantages of cooperation and of the costs of disruptive behavior.

We remember that the United States and the Soviet Union were allies in the Second World War. One of the great historical accomplishments of the U.S. Navy was to guide and protect the tremendous shipments of armaments and supplies from our country to Murmansk and to other Soviet ports in support of a joint effort to meet the Nazi threat.

In the agony of that massive conflict, 20 million Soviet lives were lost. Millions more who live in the Soviet Union still recall the horror and the hunger of that time.

I'm convinced that the people of the Soviet Union want peace. I cannot believe that they could possibly want war.

Through the years, our Nation has sought accommodation with the Soviet Union, as demonstrated by the Austrian Peace Treaty,² the Quadripartite Agreement concerning Berlin,³ the termination of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, joint scientific explorations in space,⁴

² Reference is to the Austrian State Treaty, signed by representatives of the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France on May 15, 1955. The treaty granted Austria independence and arranged for the withdrawal of all occupation forces.

³ The Quadripartite Agreement, ratified by the West German Bundestag in 1972, and signed by representatives of the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, regularized relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic within the context of the Four-Power relationship.

⁴ See footnote 8, Document 52.

trade agreements, the antiballistic missile treaty,⁵ the interim agreement on strategic offensive armaments,⁶ and the limited test ban agreement.⁷

Efforts still continue with negotiations toward a SALT II agreement, a comprehensive test ban against nuclear explosives,⁸ reductions in conventional arms transfers to other countries, the prohibition against attacks on satellites in space, an agreement to stabilize the level of force deployment in the Indian Ocean, and increased trade and scientific and cultural exchange. We must be willing to explore such avenues of cooperation despite the basic issues which divide us. The risks of nuclear war alone propel us in this direction.

The numbers and destructive potential of nuclear weapons has been increasing at an alarming rate. That is why a SALT agreement which enhances the security of both nations is of fundamental importance. We and the Soviet Union are negotiating in good faith almost every day, because we both know that a failure to succeed would precipitate a resumption of a massive nuclear arms race.

I'm glad to report to you today that the prospects for a SALT II agreement are good.

Beyond this major effort, improved trade and technological and cultural exchange are among the immediate benefits of cooperation between our two countries. However, these efforts to cooperate do not erase the significant differences between us.

What are these differences?

To the Soviet Union, détente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence in a variety of ways. The Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad. Obviously, areas of instability in the world provide a tempting target for this effort, and all too often they seem ready to exploit any such opportunity.

As became apparent in Korea, in Angola, and also, as you know, in Ethiopia more recently, the Soviets prefer to use proxy forces to achieve their purposes.

To other nations throughout the world, the Soviet military buildup appears to be excessive, far beyond any legitimate requirement to de-

⁵ Reference is to the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on May 26, 1972, which limited strategic defense systems.

⁶ Presumable reference to SALT. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969-1972.

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 56.

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 52.

fend themselves or to defend their allies. For more than 15 years, they have maintained this program of military growth, investing almost 15 percent of their total gross national product in armaments, and this sustained growth continues.

The abuse of basic human rights in their own country, in violation of the agreement which was reached at Helsinki, has earned them the condemnation of people everywhere who love freedom. By their actions, they've demonstrated that the Soviet system cannot tolerate freely expressed ideas or notions of loyal opposition and the free movement of peoples.

The Soviet Union attempts to export a totalitarian and repressive form of government, resulting in a closed society. Some of these characteristics and goals create problems for the Soviet Union.

Outside a tightly controlled bloc, the Soviet Union has difficult political relations with other nations. Their cultural bonds with others are few and frayed. Their form of government is becoming increasingly unattractive to other nations, so that even Marxist-Leninist groups no longer look on the Soviet Union as a model to be imitated.

Many countries are becoming very concerned that the nonaligned movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with the Soviet Union and dependent upon the Soviets for economic sustenance and for military and political guidance and direction.

Although the Soviet Union has the second largest economic system in the world, its growth is slowing greatly, and its standard of living does not compare favorably with that of other nations at the same equivalent stage of economic development.

Agricultural production still remains a serious problem for the Soviet Union, so that in times of average or certainly adverse conditions for crop production, they must turn to us or turn to other nations for food supplies.

We in our country are in a much more favorable position. Our industrial base and our productivity are unmatched. Our scientific and technological capability is superior to all others. Our alliances with other free nations are strong and growing stronger, and our military capability is now and will be second to none.

In contrast to the Soviet Union, we are surrounded by friendly neighbors and wide seas. Our societal structure is stable and cohesive, and our foreign policy enjoys bipartisan public support, which gives it continuity.

We are also strong because of what we stand for as a nation: the realistic chance for every person to build a better life; protection by both law and custom from arbitrary exercise of government power; the right of every individual to speak out, to participate fully in government,

and to share political power. Our philosophy is based on personal freedom, the most powerful of all ideas, and our democratic way of life warrants the admiration and emulation by other people throughout the world.

Our work for human rights makes us part of an international tide, growing in force. We are strengthened by being part of it.

Our growing economic strength is also a major political factor, potential influence for the benefit of others. Our gross national product exceeds that of all nine nations combined in the European Economic Community and is twice as great as that of the Soviet Union. Additionally, we are now learning how to use our resources more wisely, creating a new harmony between our people and our environment.

Our analysis of American military strength also furnishes a basis for confidence. We know that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can launch a nuclear assault on the other without suffering a devastating counterattack which could destroy the aggressor nation. Although the Soviet Union has more missile launchers, greater throw-weight, and more continental air defense capabilities, the United States has more warheads, generally greater accuracy, more heavy bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better missile submarines, and superior antisubmarine warfare capability.

A successful SALT II agreement will give both nations equal but lower ceilings on missile launchers and also on missiles with multiple warheads. We envision in SALT III an even greater mutual reduction in nuclear weapons.

With essential nuclear equivalence, relative conventional force strength has now become more important. The fact is that the military capability of the United States and its allies is adequate to meet any foreseeable threat.

It is possible that each side tends to exaggerate the military capability of the other. Accurate analyses are important as a basis for making decisions for the future. False or excessive estimates of Soviet strength or American weakness contributes to the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda effort.

For example, recently alarming news reports of the military budget proposals for the U.S. Navy ignored the fact that we have the highest defense budget in history and that the largest portion of this will go to the Navy.

You men are joining a long tradition of superior leadership, seamanship, tactics, and ship design. And I'm confident that the U.S. Navy has no peer, no equal, on the high seas today, and that you, I, and others will always keep the Navy strong.

Let there be no doubt about our present and future strength. This brief assessment which I've just made shows that we need not be overly

concerned about our ability to compete and to compete successfully. Certainly there is no cause for alarm. The healthy self-criticism and the free debate which are essential in a democracy should never be confused with weakness or despair or lack of purpose.

What are the principal elements of American foreign policy to the Soviet Union? Let me outline them very briefly.

We will continue to maintain equivalent nuclear strength, because we believe that in the absence of worldwide nuclear disarmament, such equivalency is the least threatening and the most stable situation for the world.

We will maintain a prudent and sustained level of military spending, keyed to a stronger NATO, more mobile forces, and undiminished presence in the Pacific. We and our allies must and will be able to meet any foreseeable challenge to our security from either strategic nuclear forces or from conventional forces. America has the capability to honor this commitment without excessive sacrifice on the part of our citizens, and that commitment to military strength will be honored.

Looking beyond our alliances, we will support worldwide and regional organizations which are dedicated to enhancing international peace, like the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for African Unity.

In Africa we and our African friends want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict, and free of the burdens of poverty and hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work toward these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and that recognize aspirations.

The persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this hopeful vision. We are deeply concerned about the threat to regional peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed. That is why I've spoken up on this subject today. And this is why I and the American people will support African efforts to contain such intrusion, as we have done recently in Zaire.⁹

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing works of peace rather than the weapons of war. In their assistance to Africa, let the Soviet Union now join us in seeking a peaceful and a speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and in Namibia. Let us see efforts to resolve peacefully the disputes in Eritrea and in Angola. Let us all

⁹ See footnote 4, Document 83.

work, not to divide and to seek domination in Africa, but to help those nations to fulfill their great potential.

We will seek peace, better communication and understanding, cultural and scientific exchange, and increased trade with the Soviet Union and with other nations.

We will attempt to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among those nations not now having this capability.

We will continue to negotiate constructively and persistently for a fair strategic arms limitation agreement. We know that no ideological victories can be won by either side by the use of nuclear weapons.

We have no desire to link this negotiation for a SALT agreement with other competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we do recognize that tensions, sharp disputes, or threats to peace will complicate the quest for a successful agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a simple recognition of fact.

The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.

We would prefer cooperation through a *détente* that increasingly involves similar restraint for both sides; similar readiness to resolve disputes by negotiations, and not by violence; similar willingness to compete peacefully, and not militarily. Anything less than that is likely to undermine *détente*. And this is why I hope that no one will underestimate the concerns which I have expressed today.

A competition without restraint and without shared rules will escalate into graver tensions, and our relationship as a whole with the Soviet Union will suffer. I do not wish this to happen, and I do not believe that Mr. Brezhnev desires it. And this is why it is time for us to speak frankly and to face the problems squarely.

By a combination of adequate American strength, of quiet self-restraint in the use of it, of a refusal to believe in the inevitability of war, and of a patient and persistent development of all the peaceful alternatives, we hope eventually to lead international society into a more stable, more peaceful, and a more hopeful future.

You and I leave here today to do our common duty—protecting our Nation's vital interests by peaceful means if possible, by resolute action if necessary. We go forth sobered by these responsibilities, but confident of our strength. We go forth knowing that our Nation's goals—peace, security, liberty for ourselves and for others—will determine our future and that we together can prevail.

To attain these goals, our Nation will require exactly those qualities of courage, self-sacrifice, idealism, and self-discipline which you

as midshipmen have learned here at Annapolis so well. That is why your Nation expects so much of you, and that is why you have so much to give.

I leave you now with my congratulations and with a prayer to God that both you and I will prove worthy of the task that is before us and the Nation which we have sworn to serve.

Thank you very much.

88. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holbrooke)¹

Honolulu, Hawaii, June 16, 1978

Changing Perspectives of U.S. Policy in East Asia

I am honored to be with you today to talk about U.S. policy toward Asia and I'm particularly delighted to have once again the opportunity to visit Hawaii, a State which symbolizes the U.S. role as a Pacific nation with vital security and economic interests stretching far into Asia. Today, I would like to go beyond that truism and discuss with you how the United States, and particularly these 13 Western States, relate to the emerging Pacific community.

Most Americans, especially on the eastern seaboard, first look east toward the great nations of Europe. They see Asia as far away and rather exotic. But, in fact, the Far East is not very far any more. It took me about 12 hours to fly here from Washington, but I would need only 7 more to go on to Tokyo. The tip of the Aleutian Islands of the State of Alaska extends as far west into the Pacific as New Zealand and is as close to Japan as Kansas City is to San Francisco. Asian Russia is visible across the Bering Strait from Alaska. The Sun first shines on American territory each day in Guam, which is much closer to Singapore than to San Francisco.

The Pacific is at once a transportation route, a source of national resources, including food and energy, and the locus of much of the world's population. More ominously, because of its strategic and commercial importance, the Pacific is an area of potential conflict. Our last

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1978, pp. 1–5. All brackets are in the original. Holbrooke delivered his address at the Western Governors' Conference.

three wars began in Asia, and the only foreign attacks on American soil since 1812 occurred in the Pacific.

Another important dimension of America's Asian character is of particular significance to the Western States—the cultural and ethnic bonds provided by the people who have immigrated here from the Orient. Asian-Americans have contributed to all aspects of American life since the middle of the last century. In the States which you represent, over 2 million people, or about 5½% of the population, claim an Asian heritage. Our host State of Hawaii provides one of the best examples of the influence and role of Asian-Americans in our society.

While the fundamental nature of our nation's involvement in Asia and the Pacific is timeless, we have already entered a new era in the region, and it is time to recognize it. It is an era filled with hope and the promise of stability, prosperity, and the emergence of a genuine Pacific community. But this hope can be realized and the promise fulfilled only if the United States plays a major economic role and fulfills its responsibility to help maintain the strategic balance.

Adjusting to Circumstances

Our policy objectives are thus clear. To achieve them requires some adjustment to the changed circumstances we now find in Asia. What are some of these changes? What are the new perspectives?

The fall of Saigon marked the end of a 30-year period of history that began with the collapse of the European and Japanese colonial empires in Asia between 1944 and 1954. Playing a remarkable new role in world affairs, the United States filled part of the resulting vacuum by supporting heavily many of the new nations of the region, while Communist states were established in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In this period, American policy produced some striking successes and many enduring relationships. Our presence allowed many newly independent countries to buy time, time which was often well used. The reconstruction of Japan, the economic miracles in Taiwan and Korea, and the evolution of the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) into strong and viable nations are remarkable successes in which we played a major role. But the period also saw our intervention in Indochina, and this triggered the most divisive foreign policy debate the country has ever known, a debate which has left hidden scars and persistent myths among both former "hawks" and former "doves."

But as we debated our proper role in Asia, Asia itself was changing rapidly—and dramatically—and not quite the way many expected it to change. A few years ago, many predicted that, if Vietnam fell, we would be entering a period of declining stability as a voracious Communist monolith rolled over economically weak and politically shaky

non-Communist countries. These smaller wars would beget larger ones until we would be in direct confrontation with one of the superpowers.

Reality looks far different. The Communist countries are economically weak and—after sharing common ground against us—are now bitterly divided. The sharpening of the Sino-Soviet split, the Vietnamese-Cambodian border skirmishing, and the recent deterioration of Vietnamese-Chinese relations clearly reveal serious and chronic problems among these countries. The roots of these three rivalries lie deep in the historical and geopolitical realities of Asia. We do not expect them to abate in the foreseeable future. This presents a sharp contrast with the other nations of the region.

The forces of regional economic integration are growing. Japan is increasing its trade with the rest of Asia. ASEAN is successfully engaged in increased economic cooperation through a web of consultations encompassing practically every phase of economic activity. Our two-way trade with ASEAN in 1977 was over \$10 billion. When that is added to our approximately \$15 billion in trade with Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan, the total is almost as large as our trade with Japan. These countries—whose combined population totals 300 million (more than South America) have achieved between 6% and 11% annual growth in GNP over the last 6 years. It is now the only group of countries in the world within which real GNP's are doubling every 7–12 years.

As these countries prosper and mature, they will be increasingly looking to U.S. markets for more sophisticated products. To cite an example of particular interest to the Western States, Singapore's decision to purchase thirteen 747's and six 727's from Boeing is the first step in a transaction which will ultimately be worth \$900 million.

From the standpoint of security, the strategic balance that exists today among the four most powerful countries in the region—China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States—is clearly in our nation's interests. Although important differences remain with Peking, it is fair to say that the United States, China, and Japan share an interest in maintaining that stability—a significant and hopeful change from the pattern of the past half century in which U.S. Far Eastern policy constantly required us to choose, in effect, between China and Japan. This situation, true only since Henry Kissinger's 1971 trip to Peking,² has created dramatic new opportunities throughout Asia: It is one of our main tasks not to lose these opportunities—which are diplomatic, strategic, political, and economic—through inattention, inaction, or misunderstanding.

² Kissinger made his first, secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVII, China, 1969–1972, Documents 139–144.

The face of Asia has changed, and the U.S. role must change as well. Since the outset of the Carter Administration, we have tried to shape U.S. policies to accommodate these new perspectives. U.S. policies and actions seek to maintain the current equilibrium and not allow any single power to achieve a preponderance of influence or military superiority in the region. A new role has been defined—one that does not return us to the inappropriate level of earlier involvement in the internal affairs of the region and yet does not constitute a confusing and destabilizing “abandonment” of Asia.

As we began this process and some adjustments took place, some on both sides of the Pacific mistook them to mean a lessening of American concern about Asia or a reduced U.S. priority for the region as a whole. Others concluded from the collapse of Saigon, the closing of U.S. bases in Thailand, and our decision to reduce our military presence in Korea, that the United States was abandoning its strategic and security role in the region.

These new myths about U.S. attitudes toward Asia do not square with the reality of our foreign policy and the four basic elements of the Administration’s Asian and Pacific policy.

U.S. Military Presence

The first essential element is that we are committed to keeping a strong, flexible military presence in the region to help maintain the present balance of power. To emphasize this point, the President sent Vice President Mondale and National Security adviser Brzezinski on special missions to Asia. The Vice President visited the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand [April–May], while Dr. Brzezinski went to Korea and Japan after the People’s Republic of China [May–June].³

At every stop, they indicated publicly and privately our firm resolve to continue to play a major role in the region; and with every ally they reaffirmed the American treaty commitments to that country. Consider also the following.

- Except for our planned ground troop withdrawals from Korea, we will maintain our current level of military and naval forces in the Pacific. In addition, we will actually increase the number of tactical aircraft in Korea by 20% this year and strengthen other forces by the introduction of several advanced weapons systems within the next few years. This will include Trident nuclear missiles for our submarine fleet, cruise missiles for our B–52’s, the airborne warning and control

³ For text of Vice President Mondale’s address at the East-West Center in Honolulu on May 10, 1978, following his trip, see BULLETIN of July 1978, p. 22. [Footnote in the original.]

system, and the latest advanced fighter aircraft, such as F-14's for our carriers and F-15's for Air Force squadrons.

- Our combat troop withdrawal from Korea is being conducted in a way that will insure that stability is maintained on the peninsula. As U.S. troops leave, we plan to turn over \$800 million in military equipment to bolster South Korean forces in addition to continuing assistance to Korea's military modernization program. The scheduled departure of our forces has been "backloaded" with only one battalion leaving this year, two more in 1979, and the withdrawal continuing into 1981–82. This careful phasing will give us ample opportunity to assess North Korea's behavior and will give Seoul time to train and equip its units. Our commitment to the Republic of Korea remains firm. South Korean forces now defend virtually the entire demilitarized zone with the U.S. military comprising only 5% of all forces in the country. We believe that the U.S. division can be withdrawn without jeopardizing the stability which has existed for the past 25 years.

- With the agreement of the Philippine Government, and with full regard for Philippine sovereignty, we are committed to maintaining the two important U.S. bases in the Philippines. This will enhance our ability to project U.S. military strength into Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa and to protect Pacific and Indian Ocean shipping lanes over which 90% of Middle Eastern oil is transported.

Relations With Japan

The second element of our strategy is our relationship with Japan—still the cornerstone of our Asian policy.⁴ Our fundamental relationship has never been better despite serious economic stresses. The depth of commitment that both countries have brought to relieving these stresses and the efforts of Prime Minister Fukuda and President Carter have helped us resolve some difficult problems, such as the Tokai Mura nuclear facility, color TV and specialty steel imports, and fishing rights disputes. Perhaps the most significant effort has been our joint undertaking to address Japan's current account surplus which reached \$14 billion in 1977. Sparked by efforts of Japanese Minister for External Economic Affairs Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japan's Ambassador to the United States Fumihiko Togo, our Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Robert S. Strauss, and our Ambassador to Japan Michael Mansfield, we have agreed to a number of steps such as:

- Japanese agreement to increase beef and citrus import quotas;
- Establishment of a U.S.-Japan forest products study group to explore ways to expand trade in this area; and

⁴ Japan was featured in the June 1978 BULLETIN, p. 1. [Footnote in the original.]

- Establishment of a U.S.-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee to expand U.S. exports to Japan by resolving market access problems encountered by U.S. firms.

In addition, Japan has decided to stimulate its domestic demand to absorb production and reduce pressure to export.

We are continuing regular discussions with Japan in support of these steps. The Japanese current account surpluses and our bilateral deficits with Japan continue to be large, but we believe that the trend will move in the right direction if both nations remain firmly committed to the goals we have set for ourselves in remedying this serious problem. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) are equally important but less visible. Minister Ushiba and Ambassador Strauss agreed to get down to serious business on the MTN. They are now moving at top speed along with the European Community, Australia, and others to meet their mid-July deadline for agreement on the main elements.

Relations With the P.R.C.

The third element in our Asian and Pacific strategy is our commitment to normalizing relations with China. While we do not have a firm timetable, one of President Carter's first actions as President was to reaffirm the Shanghai communique of 1972.⁵ He has expressed his determination to complete the process of building a new relationship with Peking.

In structuring our relationship with the Chinese, we will not enter into any agreements with others that are directed against the People's Republic of China. We recognize and respect China's strong commitments to independence, unity, and self-reliance.

Dr. Brzezinski's trip to China was the most recent affirmation of the importance to both countries of the Washington-Peking relationship. As Dr. Brzezinski said in Peking, a strong and secure China is in America's interest. I accompanied him on his visit and can attest to the fact that it enhanced U.S.-Chinese relations from a long-range strategic point of view.⁶

Nevertheless, there is an incompleteness in the relationship which, over time, could render it vulnerable to extraneous factors, raising once again the prospects of needless confrontation or misunderstanding between two major powers. This would deprive us of the opportunity to achieve greater cooperation with China on global and regional issues.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 29.

⁶ See footnote 21, Document 62. Brzezinski made the statement in a toast at a banquet the evening of May 20. (*Power and Principle*, p. 217)

Normalization would not solve all of our problems or disagreements, but it would help consolidate our nonconfrontational relationship, and it would help insure that the current balance in the entire region remain intact. We are, therefore, convinced that normalization is an essential objective for our new Asian policy.

In pursuing this objective, we are constantly mindful of the well-being of the people of Taiwan. Thus, we are continuing to seek that framework which allows us to move ahead with our strategically and historically important relations with the People's Republic of China while at the same time taking full account of our concerns regarding Taiwan. Our interest is that whatever solution there may be to the "Taiwan question" that it will be a peaceful one. We are confident that in the future we still would be able to continue the many mutually beneficial relationships which link us to the people of Taiwan.

Trade and Investment

The fourth key element of our post-Vietnam/Asia policy is a strong emphasis on promoting U.S. trade and investment in Asia. Economic relations are now the single most important emerging element of our relationship with Asia, and they must not turn into a one-way flow.

Prompted by our large trade deficit with the region, some have argued recently that U.S. trade with Asia is increasingly disadvantageous to the United States. It is our conviction, however, that increasing U.S. exports is the best way to reduce our trade difficulties with Asia. The reason is clear and simple: International Trade and U.S. exports create jobs for Americans.

The Department of Commerce estimates that every billion dollars of U.S. exports translates directly into 30,000 American jobs. One out of every three agricultural sector jobs is now export-directed. In the manufacturing sector, one out of every seven jobs is export-related. Thus, our exports to Japan alone in 1977—which totaled \$10.5 billion—provided direct employment for 315,000 Americans. Our total exports to all of Asia in 1977 of \$20.9 billion provided jobs for about 627,000 Americans. But even these figures do not tell the whole story. The Department of Labor estimates that for every job directly involved in the production of items for export, another job is created in an allied or supporting industry.

Slow export growth over the last 4 years is second only to energy imports as a cause of the large and destabilizing U.S. trade deficit. Recognizing this, President Carter asked Secretary of Commerce Kreps to head a Cabinet-level task force to review our export policy. The task force recommendations, which will be presented to the President soon, focus on modifications of governmental procedures which create disin-

centives to exports and propose new governmental programs to facilitate marketing efforts by U.S. firms abroad.⁷

It is here that States play a dramatic and leading role, particularly through export industries and business. More than \$20 billion in exports were shipped from the Western States in 1976. California led the entire country by a large margin in the export of manufactured goods with over \$8 billion in shipments and over \$11 billion in total exports—65% of which went to Asian and Pacific countries. Washington, with over \$3 billion in manufacturing exports, also ranked among the top eight States in the nation. Oregon sends 83% of its \$1.6 billion in exports to Asia—trade which provides jobs to 11% of Oregon's work force.

Exports are an increasingly important part of the States' economies. Most of the Western States tripled or quadrupled the dollar value of their exports between 1972 and 1976, with Idaho registering a sixfold increase. Inflation accounted for some of those gains, but there were solid indicators of real gains. For example, the total number of persons employed in manufacturing exports in the Western States almost doubled between 1972 and 1976.

The importance of export promotion to the Western States is clear. In Alaska 22% of manufacturing employment is related to exports; in Washington, the figure is 12.5%; in Arizona and in Hawaii, it is 11.6%. In California the percentage is lower—7.8% but the absolute numbers are large: 125,000 people are employed in manufacturing exports alone.

Export promotion efforts can be helped by informing business constituents that the investment climate in Asia is much improved as well. Following the end of the Vietnam war, the American business community grew less certain about the prospects for maintaining a favorable economic climate in Asia. But now that 3 years have passed, we can see that those fears were exaggerated and unjustified. As a result of the political stability in the market economy countries, there is a tremendous regional market developing that will be increasingly hungry for American quality products and attractive to American capital. Together, utilizing already existing facilities such as the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Federal and State Governments can be important catalysts in helping America increase its share of the lucrative trade and investment markets.

The other side to the coin is that the future of the Pacific community is closely tied to the maintenance of open markets in the Western

⁷ The President established the National Export Policy Task Force in April with Kreps as chair and Weil coordinating the working group. (Richard Halloran, "Export Aid is Weighed," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1978, pp. D-1, D-7) In late July, Kreps submitted to the President a 12-point national export policy plan. (John T. Norman, "Plan for a National Export Policy Is Sent to President by Administration Officials," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 1978, p. 14)

States. This is true for Japan and for the newly industrializing nations of the region. The latter group, in particular, presents us with new challenges as they are becoming increasingly competitive with us in world markets. We must insure that this competition is conducted according to accepted international trade rules and that we have domestic policies in place to cushion any adjustment costs to our own industries and workers. It is essential to the growth and development of both Asia and the American West to keep our markets open.

This is not an easy task for public officials or for the Western businesses and workers that must compete. However, there is hardly anything more important to the future of the advanced developing nations of Asia nor any greater test of our ability to keep open the world economy.

There are many other subjects which I would like to discuss—our recent ANZUS consultations,⁸ the emergence of ASEAN for which Vice President Mondale expressed our strong support on his recent trip, and the question of relations with Vietnam, to whom we have made a reasonable offer to establish diplomatic relations and to lift the trade embargo. Unfortunately, time will not permit.

Human Rights

There are two humanitarian problems of deep concern—the plight of the Indochina refugees and food shortages. Refugees are still fleeing from Vietnam and the incomprehensible horrors of Cambodia; in fact, at an increasing rate lately. Many set out in rickety boats with few supplies, and estimates are that only half make it to another port. There they often languish in barely adequate conditions in makeshift camps. The Vice President and I were deeply moved by what we saw, and the Vice President reported his findings to President Carter and Secretary Vance. Our view is that the United States, with its great humanitarian tradition, cannot turn its back on this continued outflow of people.

On June 14 the Administration announced its intention to receive 25,000 Indochinese refugees per year.⁹ We will do our part, but we call on other nations to join us in an international effort to deal with this tragic situation and to assist in alleviating the burden on the Southeast Asian and Pacific countries who temporarily accommodate Indochinese refugees. Some nations, like France, Australia, Canada have responded well; others have been less helpful.

⁸ For text of the final communique issued by the ANZUS Council (Australia, New Zealand, United States) on June 8, 1978, see BULLETIN of July 1978, p. 48. [Footnote in the original.]

⁹ See "U.S. Will Admit More 'Boat People,' State Dept. Says," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1978, p. A-6.

No other part of our nation has done more than the Western States to assist those already here. Despite the growing dimensions of the problem, I hope that the spirit of American compassion will not allow us to turn our backs on those still in desperate need of help.

The Indochina refugee dilemma is the most visible aspect of our human rights efforts. But the drama and urgency of that situation should not obscure the fundamental actions of the United States in promoting the dignity and rights of people in all nations. We will continue to speak out in appropriate fashion when we feel that human dignity is being diminished or those rights abridged, and we believe that real progress has been made in some countries with which we have long had, and intend to maintain, very close ties of friendship.

The other humanitarian concern I would like to mention—one long predating the refugee problem—is the state of agriculture, which remains the weakest link in the Asian development scene. Surveys by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank indicate that improvements in rural living standards in much of non-Communist Asia lag further behind the modernized industrial sector. There are also serious food shortages and nutritional deficiencies in some areas. For example, one-third of last year's entire world trade in rice—well over 2 million tons—went to Indonesia. This is a genuine cause for concern.

In the short term, the United States and other donors can do much to alleviate the food shortages and malnutrition plaguing some Asian countries. In the long run, the answer lies in the development and modernization in the rural economies of Asia. The United States can make a large contribution to this process with carefully directed development programs supported by PL-480¹⁰ and assistance by the Agency for International Development, support for agricultural development projects sponsored by international lending institutions, and the transfer of appropriate technology and capital to the rural sector. We are working closely with the ASEAN countries to achieve just this sort of development. Japan is also aiding in this effort.

In sum, Asia today presents both challenges and opportunities for Americans. We are an integral part of the process of change in the region because of our history, our geography, and because of shared values and interests. We will always be a power in the region, but we realize that power must be newly defined and redefined as circumstances evolve. In Asia and the Pacific, it now largely means cooperation not only with old friends but, if they wish, with old adversaries. Our interest and involvement in the region will remain, but the shape and size of that involvement will continue to adapt.

¹⁰ See footnote 3, Document 59.

We are pleased that the governments of the region are taking the initiative in promoting the security and well-being of their peoples. We are proud of the constructive role of the United States in the area, and we look forward to continued cooperation with this most dynamic and populous region of the world.

If the people of the American West continue to build special and closer ties with the Pacific—in trade, in cultural exchange, in people-to-people contacts, and in any other ways—it will strengthen our nation, the entire vast region, and the cause of peace and progress in this most exciting and dynamic part of the world.

89. Editorial Note

On June 19, 1978, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance testified on U.S.-Soviet policy before the House Committee on International Relations. Fourteen members of the committee had sent a letter to President Jimmy Carter requesting that the administration clarify its policy toward the Soviet Union in light of recent statements made by Vance, the President, and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance Urges Effort by U.S. and Russians to Reduce Tensions: Asserts Carter Backs View," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1978, pages A-1, A-12) Vance began by thanking the committee for affording him the opportunity to address the issues contained within the letter. He continued:

"There is perhaps no more important question on which we must consult than the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. I use the word 'range' advisedly. For it is very important, as we deal with these critical issues, that we recognize a fundamental reality of this relationship: That it is not a relationship with a single dimension but with many; that even as we have sharp differences, as we inevitably will, there are many other areas in which we continue to cooperate and to seek useful agreement; and that to view U.S.-Soviet relations from the perspective of a single dimension is to run the risk of failing to identify our interests carefully and to act accordingly."

The Secretary noted that the President's June 7 address at the U.S. Naval Academy commencement exercises (see Document 87) outlined and described the elements of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Vance highlighted three points: the maintenance of military, economic, and political strength; the pursuit of treaties and agreements crucial to peace and security; and mutual conduct in global affairs. Regarding

this last component, the Secretary suggested that he intended to address it "in its African context, where interest is presently focused." Commenting that he would devote greater attention to the specifics of the policy in an address the next day, Vance explained that the administration's strategy "is based upon an affirmative and constructive approach to African issues: helping African nations meet their pressing human and economic needs; strengthening their ability to defend themselves; building closer ties throughout Africa; and assisting African nations to resolve their conflicts peacefully." (*Department of State Bulletin*, August 1978, pages 14 and 15)

On June 20, Vance addressed the annual meeting of the U.S. Jaycees, who had convened in Atlantic City, New Jersey. After highlighting the importance of the African continent in human, economic, and political terms, the Secretary referenced his July 1, 1977, address (see Document 50), noting: "I said that we can be neither right nor effective if we treat Africa simply as an arena for East-West competition. Our Africa policy has not changed. Its objectives remain forward looking and positive." After summarizing the objectives as ones that prioritized commitment to social and economic justice, resolution of disputes, respect for nationalism, support for defense needs, and respect for human rights, Vance explained how the administration had applied them to issues of the greatest concern in Rhodesia, Namibia, the Horn of Africa, and Zaire. He then discussed the objectives in greater detail:

"—We will rely on our strengths—our trade, aid, economic, and cultural ties—which have developed over the years. To these we have added our common commitment to social justice and human development. These are the most enduring elements in the relationship between Africa and America. They bind us to nations throughout the continent.

"It is essential to the success of our policies that Africans know that we share their goal of economic development. This means increasing trade and investment in ways that benefit both Africa and the United States. And it means continuing to increase our aid to African nations. We will do so because there is genuine need, because it is important to our own economic well-being, and because it will strengthen the independence of African nations.

"—Our strategy is to work with others in Africa and beyond for the peaceful resolution of disputes. We can help African nations avoid human suffering and prevent the diversion of resources from human development. Moreover, a potential conflict resolved is a conflict of which others cannot take advantage. We will help to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity which can play a vital role in

working for peace. Ultimately, it is Africans themselves who will bring peace to their continent.

“—We will continue to respect the growing spirit of African national independence because it is important to economic and political progress and because Africans will firmly resist yielding their hard-won independence to outside powers. The history of the last 20 years demonstrates that fact.

“—It has been our policy since the beginning of the Administration to consider security requests from African nations with legitimate defense needs. Our friends in Africa must know that we can and will help them to strengthen their ability to defend themselves. Any increase in American military assistance will be done prudently and will be consistent with this Administration’s policy of seeking arms restraint and concentrating our assistance on economic development.

“—In private and public, we have emphasized our concern about the nature of Soviet activities in Africa and we have been in contact with European, Arab, and African countries and members of the non-aligned movement who share our concern. We have pointed out to the Soviets the problems which their activities pose for Africa and for our overall relations. Our actions will continue to be consistent with our commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes and with due regard for the concerns of those African countries affected.

“—In Africa as elsewhere, we will work along with others of all races to foster respect for individual human rights. We believe that civil and political liberties and the right of each individual to basic necessities, such as decent health care, education, and food, should be respected throughout the continent.

“The strategy we are pursuing is a realistic approach that emphasizes our strengths and encourages an evolution of events that is in both Africa’s interests and our own. It is a strategy that has earned the support of African leaders throughout the continent.

“We do not ignore that there is a residue of suspicion among some Africans who have fought against colonialism that our policy is simply a tactic and not a reflection of a genuine commitment to African needs. Only time and our continued demonstration that we mean what we say will meet this problem.

“We are convinced that an affirmative approach to African aspirations and problems is also the most effective response to Soviet and Cuban activities there. Any other strategy would weaken Africa by dividing it. And it would weaken us by letting others set our policies for us.

“Our nation and the nations of Africa have much in common. We struggled hard for our independence, and we intend to remain free. We

are blessed with great human and natural resources, and we intend to develop them fully. We are committed to racial justice, and we intend to achieve it in our lifetime. And we share a common vision of Africa's future—where African hopes and dreams for a better life and for peace have become a reality." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1978, pages 10–13)

The Department of State transmitted the text of Vance's address to all African diplomatic posts and Copenhagen in telegram 156252, June 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780260–1134)

90. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Congressional Foreign Policy Discussion

I. *Your Conduct of the Meeting*

1. Since this is clearly a meeting with the President, you should set the tone for it through an opening statement, and then ask for only brief (5–10 minutes) supplementary comments by Cy, Harold, and myself. I would urge you to *impose strict time constraints* on your supporting cast. Otherwise the Congressmen will feel "talked at" instead of being "talked with."

2. Cy will be prepared to comment on the state of our key negotiations (SALT, Middle East, Southern Africa); Harold on our defense posture (NATO, and, if needed, SALT); I on the China trip or more generally on broad global changes.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 26, Foreign Policy: 12/77–12/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under a June 19 note, indicating that 70 members of Congress would attend the meeting and inquiring as to whether or not Young should attend. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the East Room of the White House on June 20 from 7:07 to 10:12 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Although no record of the meeting has been found, an article in the *Chicago Tribune* contains assessments of the meeting from three participants: Udall, Fascell, and Solarz. ("Carter displays united foreign policy front," June 21, 1978, p. 6) Attached but not printed is a list of participants.

II. *Your Overview*

1. *Basic Message:* Your basic commitment is to the shaping of a more just and equitable international system for a world that has now become more politically awakened (and you might mention the emotional outpouring of the Panamanians as an example)² and that thus cannot be confined to a system dominated exclusively by the developed countries. The world now includes more than 150 nation-states, and their aspirations as well as participation require a wider framework. Unlike the years 1945–1950, when America played a creative role in shaping the post-World War II international system, this calls not for a predominantly American response but for more subtle inspiration and cooperative leadership on a broader front.

In effect, we are seeking to shape a cooperative global community, while attempting to dampen the more traditional East-West conflicts and to resolve the novel global and North-South issues.

2. *Your Ten Key Goals—and Our Performance*

Early in 1977 you set yourself ten key goals as a way of achieving a more equitable international system.³

Your Key Goals

1. To engage Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced democracies in closer political cooperation, thereby also providing wider macroeconomic coordination among them.

2. To weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political, and economic cooperation with the new emerging regional powers, thereby extending our earlier reliance on Atlanticism to include such newly influential countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Indonesia in a wider pattern of international cooperation.

Response

The first Summit was quite useful; the second is about to be held;⁴ more frequent and more direct personal top-level contacts and consultations than ever before (including phone calls).

Your two trips were designed to advance that goal;⁵ the Vice President has recently been to Indonesia; U.S. has better relations with all of those mentioned than at any previous point.

² Presumable reference to the reception the President received in Panama. Carter traveled to Panama June 16–17 in order to sign the protocol confirming the exchange of documents ratifying the Panama Canal treaties.

³ See Document 36.

⁴ See Document 92.

⁵ See Document 60 and footnote 4, Document 74.

3. To exploit the foregoing in the development of more accommodating North-South relations, both political and economic, thereby reducing the hostility toward the United States that in recent years has developed within the Third World.

We have made excellent progress politically; here especially noteworthy is the breakthrough in Panama and the formulation of a new policy towards Latin America, a policy no longer based on a single slogan but one which recognizes both the importance of bilateral relations with individual Latin American countries and the global character of many of their concerns. However, so far we have not done enough to formulate an economic policy dealing with North-South problems.

4. To push U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks into strategic arms reduction talks, to widen the scope of American-Soviet collaboration by engaging the Soviet Union in a wider pattern of negotiating relationships, thereby making detente both more comprehensive and reciprocal.

We have made progress on a wide range of bilateral issues and are pressing to get SALT. At the same time, we have finally made the Soviets aware that we are concerned over their lack of restraint in the use of military proxies in Africa. We do not expect the cold war to revive and we are prepared both to compete and to cooperate simultaneously. At the same time, we have developed more extensive relations with East European states—both those externally independent and those internally more liberal.

5. To normalize U.S.-Chinese relations in order to preserve the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a major stabilizing factor in the global power balance.

We remain committed to such normalization; in the meantime we are broadening the scope of our bilateral relations and have recently held mutually useful global consultations.

6. To seek a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement, without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and

The last year has been one of remarkable progress. We are disappointed with the most recent Israeli answer, but will continue

the reentry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East would be difficult to avoid.

7. To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa and to forge closer cooperation with the moderate black African countries.

8. To restrict the level of global armaments and to inhibit nuclear proliferation through international agreements as well as unilateral U.S. acts.

9. To enhance global sensitivity to human rights through pertinent U.S. actions, comments, and example, thereby also seizing the ideological initiative.

10. To renovate the U.S. and NATO defense posture in

to press for negotiations.⁶ In the meantime, we are continuing our efforts to draw the moderate Arabs into closer ties with the West.

We have made progress on Namibia and Rhodesia. Moreover, we have established more positive relations with a larger number of African countries. At the same time, we are concerned that the Soviet/Cuban intrusion into Africa will interfere with our efforts to obtain peaceful accommodation; moreover, African governments remain quite vulnerable to such significant external military presence.

We have now developed a policy of U.S. restraint on the sale of arms,⁷ while the INFCE program⁸ is a very tangible response to what is now increasingly recognized to be a genuine global problem.

While progress has been uneven, there is not a continent which is unaware of U.S. concerns; moreover, tangible progress has been made in a number of Latin American and Asian countries.

The recent NATO Summit reflects tangible progress;⁹ the

⁶ Presumable reference to the Israeli Cabinet's decision on the occupied territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Criticizes Israel but Plans to Press for Renewed Talks," and William E. Farrell, "Sadat Says He Is Still 'Optimistic' On Peace Despite Israeli Response," both *The New York Times*, June 21, 1978, pp. A-1, A-4.

⁷ Presumable reference to PD/NSC-13; see footnote 5, Document 40.

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 56.

⁹ See Document 83.

keeping with the requirements posed by the Soviet arms buildup.

Long-Term Defense Program¹⁰ is a tangible expression, as is the reinforcement of the U.S. commitment.

III. *Four Likely Problem Areas*

The legislators are likely to be most concerned with the state of U.S.-Soviet relations; our African policy; the Middle East; and perhaps China.

I would suggest the following comments:

1. *U.S.-Soviet relations*: Our long-term objective remains constant: to prevent the spread of Soviet influence, to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, and to increasingly assimilate the Soviet Union in wider international cooperation. The recent public exchanges were necessary to convince the Soviets that we are serious about our concerns, namely that the Soviet Union is overly inclined to use its growing military power to exert political pressure and particularly to exploit Third World turbulence, thereby preventing moderate solutions to international problems. We have repeatedly tried through private correspondence to convince Brezhnev that we are serious. Your speech reaffirmed our commitment to a detente based increasingly on mutual restraint and on reciprocity.¹¹ We want to draw the Soviet Union into a wider fabric of international cooperation.

Africa: Our central objective is the creation of majority rule governments and elimination of racial oppression. At the same time, we want to avoid a situation in which East-West and North-South conflicts intersect. This is precisely why we object so strongly to the Soviet/Cuban intrusion. It makes moderate solutions more difficult to achieve and it runs the risk of transforming difficult regional problems into graver international conflicts. We would like the Africans, particularly acting through the OAU, to resolve African problems themselves.

Middle East: You might express cautiously your disappointment at the recent Israeli response. Any peaceful solution must be based on the complete application of UN Resolution 242. I would suggest you simply ask the legislators for their advice, without being too specific on what we might do next.

China: You might make the point that we remain committed to normalization, and that in the meantime it is in our mutual benefit to

¹⁰ NATO members attending the North Atlantic Alliance Washington summit (see footnote 9 above) agreed to a 15-year plan designed to modernize and improve military forces. (Kenneth H. Bacon, "NATO Members Agree on Defense Plan, Differ on Approach to African Situation," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 1978, p. 5)

¹¹ See Document 87.

widen the scope of our global cooperation. You might mention that I specifically told Chairman Hua on your behalf that we seek closer relations with China for long-term strategic reasons and not because of any tactical expediency. How fast we move on normalization depends on our ability to negotiate successfully some of the outstanding issues; it also depends on Congressional attitudes, and here asking for their advice may also be the best way to deal with the issue.

91. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 7, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #66

1. *Opinion: Choices*

In four key policy areas—China, the Middle East, Africa, and the Soviet Union—we are at the point where some basic choices need to be made. If we do not make them explicitly and consciously, we are likely to find it more difficult to attain our key objectives.

Let me state them very concisely:

A. *China*

We have embarked on a course that could have very great international consequences. U.S.-Chinese normalization could open the doors to a political-economic relationship with one-fourth of mankind. It could alter the international balance. Success here would be a very major and historic accomplishment for you.

However, in seeking it, we should avoid actions that convey to the Chinese insensitivity to their concerns. The issue of Vietnam is very germane here. The Chinese see Vietnam as veering towards the Soviets, and they are genuinely alarmed and outraged. A Soviet presence in Vietnam would provide the Soviets with a strategic springboard,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7-9/78. Secret; Sensitive. On the first page of the memorandum, the President noted: "Zbig—1. I should think that a U.S.-Vnam relationship would be better for PRC. Worse for USSR. I agree with State, but don't wish to push any effort now. J."

as threatening to China's security as are the Soviet forces now in Mongolia.

The Vietnamese, probably encouraged by the Soviets, are now making noises about U.S.-Vietnamese normalization. The State Department said yesterday, "Our policy is clear. We are prepared to normalize relations."²

This willingness comes at the wrong time and in the wrong context. It will reinforce Chinese concerns, and thus needlessly complicate the more important task—normalizing with Peking. You need to choose: Vietnam or China, and China is incomparably more important to us.

If you agree, you might wish to have me send a note to the State Department, asking that efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam be postponed until the other issue is resolved.

B. *The Middle East*

We are nearing a very crucial point: once the U.S. "suggestions" are submitted, we will have no choice but to push with all our resources to obtain a settlement. Without such a settlement it is likely that the situation in the Middle East will deteriorate greatly.

The alternative, which the Vice President recommends, is to adopt a less assertive strategy, playing for time and limiting damage to our relations with Israel and with the Jewish community. This course would produce less controversy, and it will be less politically risky. It will also, however, perpetuate the Middle Eastern problem, and thus pose some dangers to Sadat himself.

If you choose to go ahead, you will face an unavoidable confrontation. Are we ready for it? Do you have the resources to prevail? What specifically can we do to make certain that rejection of our "suggestions" is too costly for the parties concerned? Cy and I are developing some thoughts for you, but only you can decide whether we are prepared for a major confrontation—without which no settlement seems possible—later this summer and probably throughout much of the fall.

However, if you do decide to cut the Gordian Knot, a sustained time-commitment by Cy will be needed. The Middle East issue cannot be handled on a part-time basis. Either he will have to give it a *major* portion of his time over the next several months, or you should appoint

² Reference to press guidance issued by the Department of State on July 6 for that day's noon press briefing. Telegram 170745 to CINCPAC Tokyo, July 6, indicated that Hodding Carter III had stated that U.S. policy with regard to normalization "is clear. As we have stated at each of the three rounds of talks with the Vietnamese in Paris last year, we are prepared to normalize relations at the diplomatic level and to exchange embassies and ambassadors. Once embassies are in place, we would lift the trade embargo." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780278-0662)

a top-flight negotiator (but one loyal to you and one whose success will be *your* success).³ This challenge will not be overcome on a part-time basis, and endless exercises in drawing up draft declarations are no substitute for direct political negotiations, with someone holding noses to the grindstone.

C. *The Soviet Union*

Here we confront three basic choices: (a) the scope of what we negotiate and seek to ratify; (b) the human rights issue; (c) rules of detente and the Soviet involvement in Africa.

We should not tie the three issues together, but we should be consistent and firm on each.

On negotiations, the key issue which you ought to review is whether the chances for SALT would be increased or decreased if SALT is coupled with CTB. On the basis of the last two weeks' discussions, I believe that you will have a unified administration behind you on SALT, and a disunited or disingenuous one on CTB. Moreover, I fear that opposition to SALT would be reinforced, and not diluted, by opposition to CTB. Thus the more effective sequence might be SALT signing, then China, then SALT ratification, and then CTB.

However, this entails a political judgment on which you might prefer to consult with the Vice President and Ham.⁴ In the meantime, we are proceeding energetically on both SALT and CTB.

On human rights, the Soviet rejection of our Shcharanskiy overture (and we should now let the word out to the Jewish community that we tried),⁵ the other trials, and the insulting Pravda postcard campaign directed at you (see below Facts)⁶ indicate that the Soviets have concluded that they can safely ignore our earlier protestations. I think the time is ripe for a strong statement of condemnation of the Soviets—and let the Soviets link this to SALT if they choose. (I do not understand the

³ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President added a question mark and drew an arrow from it to the sentence.

⁴ Hamilton Jordan.

⁵ In the right-hand margin, the President wrote "ok" and drew an arrow from it to this portion of the sentence. On July 7, the Department released a statement reading, in part: "The U.S. Government has repeatedly made its concern for Mr. Shcharanskiy known, both privately to the Soviet Government and publicly. Our interest in him is natural in view of his activities on behalf of human rights, particularly for the right to emigrate which we and the American people have a firm commitment to promote." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1978, p. 28)

⁶ In the "Facts" section of the weekly report, Brzezinski noted: "Komsomolskaya Pravda has organized an insulting campaign, directed at you personally. I know of no precedent for it. I understand that we have now received from 7,000 to 9,000 postcards, as per the attached Xerox (Tab A). I believe that our displeasure at this personal campaign should be explicitly registered with the Soviets."

argument that we must not link anything to SALT, but that we must also not do some things—on human rights, China, Africa, etc.—because the Soviets might link that to SALT.)⁷ Your credibility on human rights is now at stake, and Cy should tell Gromyko in no uncertain terms that your Administration intends to speak up.⁸ Moreover, it would be good if State was instructed to do so—because if you alone do so the newspapers will be full of stories, attributed to State Department officials, critical of your position on human rights.

On detente and Africa, I remain of the view that the position you stated at Annapolis⁹ should be the basic guideline—and not the twist put on it by subsequent testimony before Congress and by the McHenry trip.¹⁰ Unless both we and the Soviets come to exercise restraint in the injection of force into Third World disputes, the situation will become more tense, with negative consequences for all. I believe your Annapolis formulations on detente should be reiterated publicly—and perhaps the Congressional meeting Monday¹¹ night might be a good place for such initial restatement (with Cy then echoing you).

In addition, we should give serious consideration to the possibility of limiting either some exchanges with the Soviets or the flow of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. Words alone cannot successfully convey to the Soviet Union that we are seriously concerned about some of the above-mentioned matters. Some moderate but deliberate action is also necessary, and exchanges and the technology flow provide the most obvious avenues.

Ultimately, detente is not an end in itself but a means of achieving a more cooperative world. If we let detente be defined primarily by Soviet actions, we will pay a high price internationally and also domestically (and the latter is becoming evident already).

D. Africa

We plunged heavily into African problems—which, alas, the British created. But should we be so heavily engaged? And should we really lean towards Nkomo, Neto, etc.—and not Muzorewa, Savimbi,

⁷ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "I agree"

⁸ Reference is to Vance's meetings with Gromyko in Geneva July 12–13; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 132–137.

⁹ See Document 87.

¹⁰ Reference is to the administration's late June decision to send McHenry to Angola to meet with Neto and other Angolan officials. (Walter Pincus and Robert G. Kaiser, "U.S. Envoy Dispatched to Angola: Talks With Neto To Focus on Calming Tensions With Zaire," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1978, pp. A-1, A-22)

¹¹ July 10. The briefing took place in the State Dining Room at the White House from 6:56 to 10:05 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of the briefing has been found.

Senghor, etc? Sadat was very eloquent on these points with the Vice President, and perhaps Fritz has reported this to you already.¹²

I know that our commitment is to majority rule, and not to any particular individuals or orientation. Yet the *perceived* effect of our policy is to favor the left and the guerrillas. Moreover, in Angola, we are beginning to inch up to Neto, who does not even command the support of his own people.

Perhaps the British will succeed in seducing Nkomo—but if they do not, then maybe we should choose to quietly disengage and lower our own direct involvement.¹³ This will not be a satisfactory outcome, but it may be better than being drawn into a massive conflict between the forces of apartheid and Soviet/Cuban dominated guerrillas.

A final thought: our foreign policy till now has been heavily “contractual.” Yet political problems cannot be resolved by patient negotiation of peace contracts or agreements alone. At some point, it is necessary to bring a situation to a head—to have a brief crisis or confrontation even—and then to resolve it, with one’s own forces marshalled in the background to provide the needed sanction or leverage.

This is essentially true of the Middle East and of U.S.-Soviet relations. A period of tension with Israel is probably an unavoidable prelude to a settlement; U.S.-Soviet frictions in the past contributed to the development of mutually understood rules of the game governing European affairs and the strategic equation. The same may now be needed regarding human rights and intervention in Third World problems. A period of friction or crisis is not the same thing as a confrontation—and it should not be viewed as mindless advocacy of conflict. But unless some situations are brought to a head, they are likely to fester, with destructive consequences for either regional or international peace. Making the right choice at the critical moment is ultimately the basic test of statesmanship.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

¹² The President wrote “no” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Reference is to Mondale’s trip to the Middle East; he met with Sadat in Cairo on July 3 and 4. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 259, footnote 2. For Mondale’s recollections about the trip, see *The Good Fight*, pp. 205–209.

¹³ The President underlined “to quietly engage” and wrote “a good possibility” in the right-hand margin next to the sentence.

92. Remarks by President Carter¹

Bonn, July 17, 1978

Having been fortunate enough to make an official state visit to the Federal Republic of Germany immediately prior to the summit conference, I would like to express the thanks, on behalf of all the American delegation, to President Scheel, to Chancellor Schmidt, and to the people of the Federal Republic, for their hospitality.

I have been very pleased at the results of this summit conference. The results have exceeded the expectation of all of us. The discussions and the conclusions have been carefully prepared. Each one of us has been cautious at this summit not to promise things which we could not subsequently deliver.

The assessments have been long, sometimes tedious, but comprehensive in nature. They are substantive and specific. I think each leader has gone the limit, within the bounds of political actualities, to contribute everything possible from our own individual nations to the common well-being of the world.

Our contributions have been mutually supportive. They have been different, one from another, because our capabilities and our needs are different.

We have dealt with the very serious problem of protectionism and mutually committed ourselves to successfully concluding the multilateral trade negotiations to permit free markets to keep our people employed at home.

The Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Japan, have generously committed themselves to increased economic growth. Other nations have joined in this commitment. The United States, recognizing our own responsibilities, and at the request of others, have committed ourselves to a comprehensive energy policy and its implementation—to cut down the importation of oil by 2½ million barrels a day by the year 1985, to raise the price of oil, which is too cheap in our own country, to the world market level to discourage waste.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1309–1310. The President spoke at 7:12 p.m. at the conclusion of the Bonn Economic Summit in the Bonn Stadt Theater following statements made by Schmidt, Trudeau, Giscard, Andreotti, Fukuda, and Callaghan. The President departed Washington on July 13 and made a State visit to the Federal Republic of Germany July 14–15, prior to attending the economic summit, which took place at the Palais Schaumburg July 16–17. Documentation on the State visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe. For the minutes of the economic summit meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 142–145. For the text of the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit meeting and a joint statement on international terrorism, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1978, pp. 2–5.

We and the Canadians have recognized our need to provide some predictability, some dependability upon a supply of nuclear fuels to other nations, commensurate with a mutual profession against proliferation of nuclear explosives and the adherence to international safeguards.

We have all been concerned about inflation and have made our plans to deal with this all-pervasive threat throughout the world.

This is a time when we also recognize our strength, our stability, the benefits of peace. And our hope is that in the analysis of transient problems, with which we are trying to deal successfully, that we need not ever lose sight of the base of common purpose that binds us together in a successful endeavor in the free and democratic nations of the world.

We will be carefully monitoring progress after this summit adjourns, to make sure that those commitments made in sincerity are not forgotten nor abandoned in the months ahead.

I would like to say, finally, that we have not forgotten the developing nations of the world. We are fortunate, we've been blessed with economic and political and military strength and with a fine, high standard of living for our own people. We recognize the need to share this with other, less developed countries. And all these cumulative commitments, I think, will be very good and constructive for the entire world economy in the months ahead.

I personally believe that the strong statement on controlling air piracy, terrorism, is in itself worth the entire preparation and conduct of the summit. We are determined that this commitment be carried out individually and collectively. And our Foreign Ministers have been instructed immediately to contact other nations around the world without delay, to encourage them to join in with us in this substantive and, I think, adequate move to prevent air hijacking in the future.

I leave this summit conference with a resolve to carry out our purposes, to continue our mutual discussions and consultations, and with a new sense of confidence.

This has been a very successful meeting among us. The preparation for it was very instructive and educational, and the superb chairmanship of Chancellor Schmidt has helped to ensure its success.

93. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter**¹

Washington, August 4, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #69

1. *Opinion*

Negotiations/Consultations

In our foreign policy we have placed primary emphasis on two different efforts:

1. Obtaining Congressional support for major but controversial (and hence politically costly) undertakings;
2. Negotiating the resolution of genuinely important issues (notably SALT, the Middle East, and Southern Africa).

We have done well on the former; we are making some progress on the latter.

I believe, however, that we need to engage also to a greater extent in *consultations*, the explicit purpose of which is to generate mutual understanding and the implicit consequence of which might be also some greater accommodation with the parties concerned.

For example, Andy's² great success in Africa is based not only on our approach to Rhodesia and Namibia but also on the series of consultative trips he has taken to the region and the rapport he has helped you establish with African leaders. Moreover, I believe it is fair to say that the Chinese would have never agreed to the kind of flexibility and movement that has now developed in our relationship if I had simply put a negotiating proposal before them on the table. Prior to my visit, they were insisting that everything depended on normalization; now they have in effect accepted the segmentation of the relationship into three parts (the process of normalization; the expansion of *governmental* bilateral relations; consultations on international issues). But that emerged as a byproduct of prolonged discussions (some 15 hours) on broad subjects, which contributed to greater mutual understanding.

I think we need to do that also with the Soviets. Nixon himself, using Kissinger in addition to negotiating with them, would occasion-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7-9/78. Secret. The President wrote the following notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Zbig—more on non-testing of depressed trajectory flights of SLBM's—J."

² Andrew Young.

ally engage in discussions in depth and at length, regarding our respective world viewpoints, interests, trends, etc., thereby also creating the context for some accommodation. We have not done enough of that—and Dobrynin has hinted to me as much. Given the present frictions, an effort to clear the air—but on the basis of firmness regarding those matters which we consider important (notably their military buildup and their conduct in the third world)—is needed.

Historically, a phase of friction in U.S.-Soviet relations has contributed to the emergence of new “rules of the game,” regarding either restraint in the use of conventional forces, or on strategic matters, or even regarding espionage. We now need to develop similar understandings regarding restraint and accommodation on such matters as the use of military proxies or direct military intrusion into third world conflicts. But that will require candid and prolonged discussions.

In general, our approach has been one in which we have focused on the negotiation of specific issues, in a legal-contractual fashion, somewhat neglecting the need to develop and sustain a political dialogue.

I would think that it would be especially useful if you would dispatch periodically Cy, me, Andy, and others—to talk to the principal leaders with whom we are trying to maintain or develop closer relations: this would be flattering even to Giscard, or Schmidt, or Fukuda—and certainly to the Shah, or Fahd, or Obasanjo, or Desai; and it would also be useful with Hua, or Tito, Gierek, Ceausescu, etc. This could supplement your direct personal contact with these leaders, and in some cases could reinforce any ongoing negotiations.

From the domestic point of view, doing the above would also convey the feeling that you are *deliberately orchestrating* some of the diversity of viewpoints around you on behalf of your strategic goals. Incidentally, the Soviets have long used, and quite effectively, the tactic of occasionally sending “hard” spokesmen to convey a soft message, and “soft” spokesmen to convey a hard message, in order to enhance the credibility of that message, and to show that the “soft” and “hard” options are deliberate instruments of policy and not merely reflections of internal vacillation. FDR did some of the same, and it is in your interest to promote also such a perception of yourself.

Finally, there is the fact that such consultations—conducted on a regular basis with ten or so top leaders around the world—would reduce some of the foreign misunderstandings and anxieties regarding our policy.

Cy is departing tonight for the Middle East where he will, in effect, carry out at least in part the kind of consultations I have in mind with

leaders there.³ In addition, I would suggest the following as further examples:

—A meeting on your behalf with Hua this fall when he visits Eastern Europe, or you personally might meet with Teng at Princeton if he comes to the UNGA (and that would be quite dramatic).

—A mid-fall swing through Africa by Andy to consult on how the Rhodesian situation is evolving and the Namibian settlement being implemented. This might be accompanied by a special side visit by an emissary to South Africa.

—A consultative visit to key European capitals (including some East European) and the Shah in the fall both on foreign policy and key economic issues.

—If there is no U.S.-Soviet summit this year, broad consultations in Moscow (maybe even involving not only Cy's but also my participation).

2. Analysis

Key Foreign Policy Votes in 1978

There have been four key votes on foreign policy issues this year: Panama,⁴ the Middle East Arms Sales,⁵ lifting the embargo against Turkey,⁶ and Rhodesia.⁷

³ Vance met with Middle East leaders in the United Kingdom. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Documents 266-273.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 76.

⁵ On May 15, the Senate voted to approve plane sales to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. (Robert G. Kaiser, "Senate Approves Mideast Jet Sales, 54-44," *The Washington Post*, May 16, 1978, pp. A-1, A-10) The President had announced the sales on February 14 but agreed to defer formal notice to Congress of the sales until the Panama Canal treaties had passed. Carter submitted the contracts to Congress in late April. The package included 15 F-15s for Israel, 50 F-5Es for Egypt, and 60 F-15s for Saudi Arabia. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, p. 64)

⁶ The Senate on July 25 approved the repeal of the 1975 Turkish arms ban. The McGovern-Byrd amendment to the International Security Assistance bill specified that the arms be used for defensive purposes only and required that the President report to Congress every 60 days on progress made toward a settlement on Cyprus. (Graham Hovey, "Senate Acts to Lift Arms Ban on Turks, But Adds Warning: Help Tied to Cyprus," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1978, pp. A-1, A-4) For documentation on the administration's efforts to lift the embargo, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece.

⁷ On July 26, the Senate considered the repeal of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, instituted during the Johnson administration. The Case-Javits amendment to the International Security Assistance bill required the Carter administration to lift sanctions but only after the President had certified that certain conditions in Rhodesia had been met. The Senate approved the bill, which contained both the amendments on Turkey and Rhodesia, the evening of July 26. (Graham Hovey, "Curbs on Rhodesia Upheld by Senate, But Conditionally: Carter Could Lift Sanctions," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1978, pp. A-1, A-6)

—Fifteen Senators (11D/4R) have *sided consistently* with the Administration; 5 are not returning to the Senate (marked by an asterisk), and none are up for reelection.

Democrats:

| | | |
|---------|---------------|------------|
| Bumpers | P. Hatfield * | McGovern |
| Culver | Hodges * | Ribicoff |
| Glenn | Humphrey * | Sparkman * |
| Gravel | Inouye | |

Republicans:

| | |
|---------|-----------|
| Chafee | Pearson * |
| Mathias | Stafford |

—Twenty-five Senators (19D/6R) have voted with the Administration *3 out of 4* times, including: Robert Byrd, Church, Hart, Long, Muskie, Baker, Hayakawa, Percy.

—Forty-seven Senators (26D/21R) have voted with the Administration *half the time*, including: Cranston, Jackson, Kennedy, Moynihan, Nunn, Stennis, Goldwater, Javits.

—Four Senators—Dole, Domenici, Laxalt and the Allens—have *never* voted with the Administration.

Based on the above, here are a few observations:

1. The 3 out of 4 votes must be watched most carefully for *defections*. It probably contains many Democrats who think they have done enough and many Republicans who may think they have done too much already.

2. We should probably work the most on those who have voted with us half the time. The split seems to be on liberal/conservative lines, based on fairly emotional issues. Less emotional issues may produce different divisions, thus we must work with this group closely.

3. Those who never vote with the Administration are clearly doing it for party reasons and are hopeless.

4. Baker's support and that of the Republicans is what has made up for Democratic defections. It should be noted, however, that the Republican group that supports us shifts and that we won without Baker on Rhodesia.

Public Views on U.S. Military Strength

Recent polls indicate that a majority of Americans are now dissatisfied with how U.S. military power compares to that of the Soviet Union. The proportion of the public feeling such dissatisfaction has been rising since late 1976, when it stood at 41 percent. Late this spring, it reached 55 percent.

The number of Americans who prefer the United States to be “superior” to the USSR has stayed between 46 and 48 percent over the past 18 months (47 percent prefer the U.S. to be “about equal”). The increased dissatisfaction with America’s relative military power comes from the increased number who have come to perceive the United States as being weaker than the USSR.

In a poll taken last month, 42 percent of the public said the United States was militarily weaker than the USSR (up from 27 percent in late 1976). Only 12 percent said the United States was militarily stronger (down from 29 percent in late 1976).

Brezhnev on Foreign Economic Relations

Two years ago Brezhnev had this to say about the relationship between foreign policy and economic relations: “In foreign economic relations, politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade are woven together. Consequently, the approach to them and the management of them must be integrated, tying into one knot the efforts of all departments and, our political and economic interests. This is precisely how the Party’s Central Committee has posed this important question.”

4. *National Security Affairs Calendar* (Tab A)⁸

5. *Foreign Media Reaction* (Tab B)

⁸ Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.

94. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, August 15, 1978, 3:50–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Policy Implications of Interaction of Political Trends in Key Regions with Soviet Conventional and Strategic Buildup

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President*State:*
Secretary Cyrus Vance*Defense:*
Secretary Harold Brown*ACDA:*
Mr. Paul Warnke*JCS:*
General David Jones*CIA:*
Admiral Stansfield Turner*White House:*
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. Hamilton Jordan*NSC:*
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
(notetaker)

The meeting started with Brzezinski making the point that the purpose of the meeting is to examine the implications for U.S. policy of the interaction of political trends in key regions with the Soviet strategic and conventional buildup. He then suggested that the President call upon Stan Turner to initiate a discussion in regard to the three regions mentioned in the agenda given in the recent NIE.²

Turner: The Soviets are more assertive because of their power; because they feel that the U.S. is not as competitive. They are aware of the limitations of their power but they see detente as permitting effective competition. Moreover, their increasing war fighting capability gives them greater confidence. They are buoyed by their experience in Africa. Moreover, abroad the perception is one of change in the balance of power.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #11 Held 8/15/78, 8–11/78. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bartholomew. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the minutes. Brzezinski sent the minutes and a separate memorandum on action items deriving from the meeting to the President under an August 16 memorandum requesting the President's approval. Brzezinski indicated that he did not plan to circulate the minutes but asked Carter if there was "anyone in particular that you would want to have read" the minutes. Carter responded: "Those who were there." He also instructed Brzezinski to follow up on the action items. (Ibid.)

² NIE 11–4–78, "Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena," May 9; see footnote 6, Document 85.

The President: Are the Soviets better off today than they were a few years ago? Are they better off now in Africa than they were three or four years ago?

Turner: The record in Africa is mixed, but one should note Ethiopia and Angola.

The President: Let's consider where the Soviets are now stronger than they were, where their political influence is greater.

Turner: I think they are clearly in a stronger position in Africa, in India and Pakistan, and in Southeast Asia.

The President: Even considering what happened to them in Egypt?

Turner: Yes.

Vance: I don't agree. Look at what happened to them in Egypt, Somalia, Guinea and the Sudan. They tried to block the Namibia settlement but it went ahead. In India, Desai has replaced Gandhi and Desai is more to the center. It is not clear at all that their position around the world is better today than it has been.

Brown: Their position in Ethiopia is better. And certainly their role in Rhodesia compared to five or seven years ago is greater and more troublesome. On Namibia, the outcome remains to be seen. In North Africa, Qhadafi is a wild card and they have some influence with him. The Soviets are shipping substantial arms to Libya. The picture is mixed politically in the Pacific.

Brzezinski: We have to compare the present Soviet position and action with what it has been in the past. Under Stalin the Soviets concentrated on areas in immediate proximity to them (above all Europe) and we contained them. Then Khrushchev tried to use Sputnik and general Soviet momentum to launch a political, ideological appeal of global dimensions. This effort failed and in this Cy Vance is right. But today we face an ominous development in which the Soviets are compensating for the decline in their economic and ideological appeal with military pressure—massive arms, insertion of troops. It is a clear sign of their confidence in the military dimension of the balance that they moved to insert Cuban troops in Africa. This has major political implications.

The President: I sense that three or four years ago the Soviets saw Sub-Saharan Africa as an open field. Now, if the Soviets intrude, they face opposition from us, Black leaders elsewhere in Africa, and from the world. So they cannot see Africa as an open, unimpeded avenue. Also, in Europe they face the problem of Euro-Communism. And in Eastern Asia I think their influence has weakened.

Turner: But they are in a much stronger position in Vietnam and this is the dominating consideration in Southeast Asia. I think there is a standoff in Japan. But I think they are in a better position in India and Pakistan.

Vance: North Korea leans more towards China than in the past. The Japan-China PFT was a blow to them in the world generally.

The President: If I look at things from Brezhnev's perspective, I would feel that what causes us problems also causes him problems. He doesn't want to see Angola or Cuba or Vietnam or China turn to the West; or have Mozambique turn to us for trade; or to see trade between us and Eastern Europe build up. If I were Brezhnev, I would hate to see these things happen. We have to take advantage of our opportunities and it is for this group to see that we do.

Brown: The Soviets are not a likable partner. When they get in, they seek to dominate. But if you compare their situation with five years ago, they are better off even if they do have the problems the President cited. Their influence with India, Pakistan and so forth, depends on their military power. They don't have much in the way of economic power. Though the Soviets do have real worries, they do have levers—above all the military. In all of the places we have talked about, they feel the Soviets are relatively more powerful, vis-a-vis the U.S., than they were five years ago. There is a certain ambivalence in response: for example, it has moved the Europeans to spend more. The Soviets are respected and feared, not loved, but they have options. So the Soviets may have certain apprehensions but do think they are much better off today than they were.

The President: We should enumerate the areas where we think we have a problem—political, trade, or military influence. We should approach each country or area as a separate question to be addressed. Congress is more aware of the need for peaceful competition with the Soviets than ever before. We should plan our political strategy on this basis and consult with Congress and get them aboard. For example, Mozambique and Angola are good cases for moving. What are others? We need to do this on a country-by-country basis: where we should move, what the problems are, the key Congressional elements to get on board, how to win public approval for our efforts. Our strength should help us. Brezhnev is vulnerable to competition. We have gotten the Allies to go with us. We should explore how we can do this with others.

I want to discuss our military presence abroad. I want to consider places where we can make it felt without direct military confrontation. I have no feel from Harold Brown or the JCS of the consequences of a military base in the Sinai. If at Camp David there is no agreement,³ there will be fear for the future and a U.S. base could be stabilizing. I don't know if we should do it, or how rapid the Soviet reaction would be. This is one place for a military presence and there may be others in

³ Reference is to the upcoming Camp David talks, scheduled to take place that September.

the world. We should publicize our military presence elsewhere in the world.

Twelve months of our propaganda against the Cubans in Africa has led to worldwide pressure on them to get out. They are moving out of Ethiopia and it will be hard for them to stay in Angola.

Our reputation for weakness, vis-a-vis the Soviets, is not deserved. Many of us are guilty of this. For example, at defense budget time, we tend to play up Soviet military capabilities and downplay our own. When we decided to have a public demonstration of our defense capabilities, the cruise missile test failed. We need a careful public relations effort to show that we are strong militarily as well as economically and politically. We recognize the Soviet buildup, but we are not vulnerable or weak. We have to put all of this into proper perspective and correct the weaknesses we have acknowledged. We have to do this in the defense budget for 1980 and decide what is best for us.

Jones: The JCS have had a lot of discussion of this. They see a dilemma. Things now are better than they are perceived but the trends for the future are worse than they are perceived. And the perception of imbalance today takes the focus away from the really serious problem of imbalance in the future. There is a deeper underlying concern about the military trends in the JCS than I have ever seen, and it is real and genuine. What we do today won't impact on the military balance until the future, but it will affect the perceptions of the future and the present.

Brown: There is too pessimistic a view of the military balance now and not a pessimistic enough view of the balance in 1982-83.

Brzezinski: We have to separate the global competition with the Soviets from the competitions in peripheral areas. We will do well enough in the peripheral areas. The Soviets will not sweep over Africa.

I am more concerned about Soviet power and perceptions in two areas—Western Europe and the Persian Gulf—which could affect the overall U.S./Soviet balance. In Europe we and the Europeans are doing more than ever before to assure a conventional balance. But internal politics and instabilities in Europe may mean that Europe's stronger NATO shield will be held with a trembling hand. There are also internal difficulties in Saudi Arabia and the situation is unstable in Iran and Yemen. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are concerned about the power balance between us and the Soviets. They see troublesome ambiguities in our conduct.

Vance: Some military trends are very disturbing. But we are better off politically than we give ourselves credit for. I agree with the President's presentation, but there could be serious political effects down the road from the military trends.

Warnke: The description on pages 10 and 11 of Soviet motives in arms control applies precisely to us as well.

Brown: Some events in Europe already can be attributed to the military trends and Soviet power. The 3 percent defense budget increase is one. But Norway backed off FRG participation in an exercise and, though there are domestic reasons, I think perceptions of Soviet power were involved. The Germans themselves may be starting to negotiate with the Soviets on different security premises—I am thinking of Bahr and Wehner. It is hard to see how much all this has to do with military power, but it has something to do with it.

Turner: On the President's remarks, the Soviets would not be bothered if Angola turns somewhat to the West. They would still have 20,000 Cuban troops there. The UNITA still gives them reason to remain. As for more trade between the West and Eastern Europe, it is not a major factor in their economy and they are now turning back to the Soviets in any event. On Cuba, we can open relations, but Cuba will still be so dependent on the Soviets that the Soviets cannot be replaced. The Soviets would see all of these steps as retrograde but they would not tremble.

Vance: I think we should work with the Germans on Poland. The Germans just turned down a loan. Zbig and I have been discussing this.

The Vice President: I think we have made impressive progress in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, we have good relations where before we were barely able to talk to them. The return of the Crown to Hungary had a strong psychological effect.⁴ We have good relations with Romania.

The President: I think our relation with Nigeria is a notable achievement in our African policy.

I sense in Harold Brown's memo⁵ and in the NIE a feeling of despair and of abject inferiority. I don't feel this. If I look at the globe from Brezhnev's standpoint, I see tremendous problems everywhere, starting with uncertain allies. I don't feel the sense of Soviet superiority that is in these memos. We should start to be more hard-nosed about our defense expenditures. There are things we can do that would cause the Soviets concern. We should not tell Brezhnev that we are building a big nuclear carrier and a fleet of escorts, and not GLCMs or medium-range

⁴ Documentation on the January 1978 return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XX, Eastern Europe.

⁵ Not further identified; however, Brown did send a memorandum to the President focusing on the Soviet Union and U.S. defense capabilities on August 13. On the cover memorandum, Brzezinski noted that he had underlined portions of Brown's memorandum that "bear on the forthcoming NSC meeting." Brown's memorandum is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

ballistic missiles in Europe. We should focus our defense spending on the most important weapons that show our strength. Our substance is sapped by non-weapons spending in the defense budget. We should also consider the proportion of the Soviet budget that goes to meet China, to control Eastern Europe, and to build a continental air defense that we don't have to depend on. We have done too much equivocating with Congress on defense.

Brown: Efficient management is important. But we cannot simply pick three or four important weapons. The total amount of money we spend determines our military capabilities. Soviet expenditures are efficient. We don't think much of Soviet air defenses, but they have a different doctrine and this expenditure contributes to their sense of security.

Brzezinski: Two points: 1) we have to make measured responses to the Soviets on the defense level; 2) politically, we are in one of those periods of friction with the Soviets which in the past have tended to produce new rules governing the relationship. The Soviets may learn from the costs they are now incurring, e.g., developments in the non-aligned movement and the Chinese move into Africa and now Europe. So we need to exercise considerable caution in how we handle the Soviets in this period of friction. We should insulate SALT and other arms control matters as much as we can. But we should be wary of initiatives that invite the Soviets to forget what has happened (the difficulties they have created) and make sure we make them reflect on the political costs of their actions. If we do this it may result, as it has in the past, in greater restraint in their future behavior. We must let them know that Third World turbulence will be with us for a long time and that their relations with us will be affected by how the Soviets behave. I think we are on the right course and we should keep on it.

The President: Other than increasing the defense budget, what else should we do to improve relations with the Soviets?

Vance: The key still is SALT. I think nothing will improve the relationship unless we have a SALT agreement.

Brzezinski: SALT may no longer be so decisive in the overall political and military relationship.

Brown: The relationship may get somewhat worse without SALT. But will it get better *with* SALT? I doubt it.

The Vice President: We have pursued human rights for more than a year. Is it a net plus or what? By pouring it on the Soviets on human rights, do we strengthen the people we don't want to come to power? U.S. opinion thinks we have overdone it with the Soviets on human rights.

Brzezinski: What actually have we done? We have been restrained in terms of government acts and have not talked much about human

rights in the Soviet Union, after the gestures at the beginning of the Administration.

The Vice President: But are we strengthening the Soviet elements we don't like. Suslov must be arguing that Helsinki got them in a lot of trouble and encouraged centrifugal tendencies in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. Now the U.S. is exploiting these tendencies to weaken the Soviet Union. The Soviet reaction may be that we have to get tough, we need leaders who will stand up to the United States.

The President: Our human rights stance aggravated the Soviets. Some Allies think we did too much.

Page 25 of the NIE lists five goals of Soviet policy. I assume they are still applicable today.

Brzezinski: The goal of movement into the Third World has higher priority for the Soviet Union today.

The Vice President: The Soviets wish they had never signed Helsinki but they are stuck with it. It is now a major factor in relations between the Soviets and Eastern Europe as well as the West. We have to stand on our position on the Helsinki accords. But some of the things we have to say do strengthen the hard liners. It is a tricky road to walk. We have to stand behind our position.

Warnke: This is partly the price the Soviets had to pay to get the recognition of the European status quo at Helsinki.

Brzezinski: It is a mistake to punish the Soviets for their actions on human rights and not for their actions in the Third World. Unfortunately, this is the impression that was conveyed by the efforts surrounding Shcharanskiy, etc.⁶ The prevailing impression is that we are penalizing the Soviets for how they conducted their internal affairs rather than for their international behavior where we are on much stronger ground.

The President: I don't disagree. But both are part of the successful arousing of world public opinion against the Soviets, both speaking out on human rights and my statements on Africa. I feel that as a result the Soviets have lost esteem in the non-aligned movement and in the Western world. I remember when we used to be on the defensive on human rights. We were the target and the Soviets were the great protector of human rights. We were seen as aggressors because of Vietnam. Now the Soviets have the onus of being intruders, especially in Africa with the Cubans. We have done part of the job and have had a net gain on this.

I sense in this meeting a special concern with the rate of the Soviet military buildup and our response. But we stand well everywhere else.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 91.

We need an objective analysis of the proportion of the Soviet military budget which is not comparable to our own needs. After all, we don't have to maintain a million men on the Canadian border.

Brown: Twenty-five percent of the Soviet budget goes for defense against China. But the forces they maintain in Eastern Europe are the forces they would use for attack on Western Europe.

The President: You have about got me convinced that we need to do more on defense. We also have to compete in other areas for minds and hearts in different countries—through trade, economic relations and the like. We should delineate the things we can do above and beyond the military, that would let us compete peacefully.

Brzezinski: We are developing with State a package of measures to undercut the Soviets and Cubans in Africa.

The President: What can we do to assure the Saudis and Iran? We need an NIE on the kinds of peaceful actions that can permit us to compete around the world. It ought to assess the various nations and regions, assess the use of our technology, and develop a propaganda effort designed to show that our strength is greater than now perceived. We should all make an effort to do this and to sell our position.

Brzezinski: This must entail a strategic concept: 1) continued strengthening of our relations with the European Allies; 2) stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran; 3) stronger relations with Japan, China, and Korea.

The President: This should be in the spirit of peaceful competition with the Soviets. We do have to make sure that there is no need for apology on the military side. Maybe we are deficient on this, or have been in the past. We should remedy the deficiencies.

Brown: Military power won't *win* for us. We have to rely on other things to build our influence. For example, things are looking better with Iraq—they are turning to us because we have things to offer.

The Vice President: We should involve the private sector more. American businessmen see more people around the world than government officials do. Our world economic position is shrinking. We ought to particularly enlarge and expand our position in Asia and help the private sector to do this.

Vance: We are already doing a great deal. Chuck Robinson will be leading an OPIC group to the Far East. John Moore will be going to Japan.

The President: We ought to use the 50 state governors, for example, ask them to organize trade missions to various countries. They would be delighted.

We should put together a program on what we could do in the peaceful competition, vis-a-vis various countries. We need to identify the specific countries.

Brzezinski: The countries should be identified strategically in relationship to our stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China.

The Vice President: We should do more to compete economically. The recent tax law means that U.S. multinational firms are hiring non-U.S. citizens because it is easier and cheaper. This is the kind of mistake we should work on.

The President: When Eanes came to the NATO Summit meeting,⁷ he was very concerned about Spain and, in answer to my question, said we could help by getting the key conservative Spanish military leaders to visit the U.S., and we did that. I think we should reach out our hands to military leaders and others and do more to bring people to the U.S.

Brown: Bringing military leaders here also reassures them about our capabilities because of what they see here.

Brzezinski: We will do a paper summarizing the conclusions of this meeting and the things that should be done.

The President: I want to ask Paul Warnke what he thinks the impact would be on the Soviets' desire for cooperation with us and detente if we were to commit GLCMs to Western Europe and establish a military presence in the Middle East.

Warnke: The Soviets would feel that they would have to match us with conventional GLCMs in Europe, but putting GLCMs in Europe would not torpedo SALT. It would just accelerate Soviet development of cruise missile capabilities. But would Western Europe feel better if *both* sides had cruise missiles, rather than neither having them? I think that there would be greater fear in Western Europe of surprise attack.

Brzezinski: Cruise missiles are not a surprise attack weapon.

Jones: Our inability to talk about command and control of cruise missiles with the Allies—targeting, range, and the like—is slowing our GLCM programs and this is what caused the slip from 1982. We need to open a dialogue with the Allies on these subjects. The dialogue itself would help to reassure the Allies.

The President: With reference to the trip I have asked Harold Brown to make to Europe, I have to do a personal letter to Callaghan, Schmidt and Giscard to find out what their thinking is and what they will do on: 1) ERW; 2) GLCMs in Europe; 3) medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe.⁸ I don't have answers from them on these items.

I have no doubt that if the Soviets had a chance to get a military base in the Middle East they would do it. But is it good for us to do it?

⁷ See Document 83.

⁸ Brown was scheduled to travel to Europe in October.

Warnke: To return to your first question, I think the main Soviet reaction to putting GLCMs in Europe would be a very heavy ERW-style campaign on the Germans. They would react in this manner rather than in SALT.

They would see an American military base in the Sinai as separate from SALT. They don't believe in linkage. They would not like it but they would accept it. It would not interfere with arms control.

Vance: In my session with the SFRC, they went into the question of a military base in the Middle East at length. I said that the suggestion had been put to the U.S. but that we had made no decision. Glenn thought it would be very serious, that it would change the whole relationship with Israel and the Arabs and that it would increase the possibility of our being involved in a conflict. The question is very controversial.

Brown: Details on any base in the Middle East will matter in reactions to it. One is whether Israel and Egypt each asked for it. Another is the kind of base—for example, the JCS are examining a trilateral—U.S.-Israel-Egyptian—base for training purposes. In any event, the chances of our being embroiled in a conflict in the area would go up if we have a base there.

Vance: I think that if a base is critical to a security guarantee and the linchpin that will get us a peace agreement, then we should do it. But it should not just be thrown in at any point.

Jones: We are looking at a trilateral training base that would be open to all.

The President: Both Begin and Sadat raised the base with me. Sadat said that we should conclude a mutual security treaty with Israel. I need an answer on the base question for the Camp David meeting. The Israelis have always said they don't want U.S. troops. But I might face a request on the base nonetheless. I don't know whether we want the base option or not. Looking at our problem in reassuring Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, do we want a land presence in the Middle East or are our ships in the Eastern Mediterranean enough?

Brown: We have done a paper which we have given to Zbig and to Cy's people.⁹ There are marginal military advantages to an American military base in the Sinai. But it does mean that we are more likely to be involved in any conflict. If it is needed as a guarantee to secure a peace agreement, then it is sensible and there are military advantages in relation to the region. And a peace agreement in the Middle East cancels out the added risk that a base entails of getting involved in a conflict.

⁹ Not found and not further identified.

Brzezinski: A base helps secure a Middle East agreement. It also gives Saudi Arabia and Iran reassurance.

The President: Does the U.S. want a base in the Middle East if we can get a peace settlement without it? Do we want a base to reassure the Saudis and Iran?

Brown: We have to be asked to establish a base by Egypt and Israel. If we have choices in the matter, we should not establish a base if it is not necessary to get a peace settlement.

Jones: We would prefer a base in Saudi Arabia from the military standpoint and the critical importance of Saudi Arabia.

Brzezinski: A base in the Sinai does more for us throughout the region. A base in Saudi Arabia will be more susceptible to internal instability.

The Vice President: If we can get a peace settlement, we should be ready to pay for it with a base. The Sinai accords and the electronic systems set up are very important. Sadat would like an excuse not to invade Israel and to help resist his hotheads. There is nothing now in the way. An American base in the Sinai would be just a psychological, stabilizing presence.

Vance: A base would certainly help us with the problem of what to do with the air base in the Sinai and with the Israeli settlements problem as well.

The President: The base would be on Egyptian soil. If I thought there were any *opposition* from Egypt or Israel to a base, then I wouldn't do it. But I do think a base would contribute to stability in the area.

Turner: Saudi support for a base will be critical. The Soviets will try hard to split the Arabs on the issue and Saudi support will be needed to help hold firm against this.

The President: This meeting has been helpful to me. I would like to ask each of you to send Zbig further thoughts and comments on the issues we discussed and on the items we talked about doing.

95. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter**¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Strategy for Camp David

For the talks at Camp David to succeed, *you will have to control the proceedings from the outset* and thereafter pursue a *deliberate political strategy* designed to bring about significant changes in both the Egyptian and Israeli substantive positions.² I strongly suggest that you bear the following points in mind:

1. *Sadat cannot afford a failure* and he knows it; both Sadat and Begin think that you cannot afford failure; but *Begin probably believes that a failure at Camp David will hurt you and Sadat, but not him*. He may even want to see Sadat discredited and you weakened, thus leaving him with the tolerable status quo instead of pressures to change his life-long beliefs concerning Judea and Samaria.

2. You will have to convince both leaders, but especially Begin, that failure at Camp David will have directly adverse consequences for our bilateral relations and in terms of Soviet influence in the region.

3. *Sadat will define success in terms of substance*, and in particular an Israeli commitment to the principle of withdrawal on all fronts. *Begin will define success largely in terms of procedural arrangements* and will be very resistant to pressures for substantive concessions.

4. You will have to persuade Begin to make some substantive concessions, while convincing Sadat to settle for less than an explicit Israeli commitment to full withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination.

5. *Your most important meetings will be with each leader individually, not with both together*. You cannot expect Sadat and Begin to reveal their fall-back positions in front of each other, but in private you may be able to move them toward greater flexibility.

6. During the first round of meetings, you will want to reestablish a personal relationship with each leader, expressing your understanding of their concerns and appealing to their statesmanship. During the sec-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Geographic File, Box 13, Middle East—Negotiations: (7/29/78–9/6/78). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Outside the system. Sent for action. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² The talks among Carter, Begin, and Sadat were scheduled to take place at the Presidential retreat at Camp David beginning September 5. Documentation on the Camp David summit is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980.

ond and third days, you will want to be frank and direct in discussing substantive points. Begin in particular will need time to reflect on what you say. There will be a natural break in the talks on Saturday, and Begin should understand that you will be pressing for decisions on Sunday.³

7. *Both Sadat and Begin must starkly see the consequences of success and failure if they are to make hard choices.*

—Failure brought on by Sadat's intransigence would bring to an end the special US-Egyptian relationship. Even if Sadat is not held responsible for the collapse of negotiations, we would find it increasingly difficult to maintain the close ties of the past few years and the Soviet Union would find opportunities to strengthen its position in the area at Sadat's expense as well as our own. Sadat must be told that we cannot afford more surprise moves by him if we are to work together effectively for a peace agreement. We expect to be consulted before Sadat takes new initiatives.

—Begin must see that US-Israeli relations are based on reciprocity. Our commitment to Israel's security and well-being must be met by an Israeli understanding of our national interests. *If Israel is responsible for blocking progress toward peace in the Middle East, Begin should be told clearly that you will have to take the following steps, which could affect the US-Israeli relationship:*

—Go to the American public with a *full explanation of US national interests in the Middle East* (strategic relations with Soviets, economic interests, oil, cooperation with moderate regimes).

—Explain the scale of US aid to Israel (\$10 billion since 1973, or nearly \$4000 for each Israeli citizen). Despite this, Israel is unwilling to reciprocate by showing flexibility in negotiations.

—*We will be prepared to spell out publicly our views on a fair settlement.*

—We will be unable to defend Israel's position if the negotiations shift to the UN or Geneva.

—Both Sadat and Begin can be assured that progress toward peace will mean a strong relationship with the United States, including in the economic and security areas, and enhanced ability to control developments in the region in ways that will serve our mutual interests.

8. The *absolute minimum* you want from each leader is the following:

—*From Sadat:*

—*Acceptance of a long-term Israeli security presence in the West Bank/Gaza.*

³ September 9 and 10.

—A *five-year interim regime for the West Bank/Gaza*; no independent Palestinian state; deferral of negotiations on borders and sovereignty until end of five-year period.

—*Less than an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination as guidelines for negotiations.*⁴

—Willingness to negotiate guidelines for West Bank/Gaza even if Hussein does not come in.

—Repetition of “no more war” pledge;⁵ willingness to renew UNEF in October; honoring terms of Sinai II, including commitment to peaceful resolution of differences.

—A willingness to negotiate seriously if an agreement on principles is reached.

—*From Begin:*

—Acceptance of all the principles of 242, including withdrawal and the “inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war,” as applicable on all fronts.

—*Modifications in “self-rule” proposal* in order to make it sufficiently attractive to moderate Palestinians to bring them in as participants and to increase prospects of their accepting its main features (open borders, some Israeli security presence, some Israeli rights to live in West Bank, self-government) beyond five years. These modifications require⁶ an *Israeli acceptance of the principle of withdrawal; a moratorium on organized settlement activity, in contrast to the rights of individuals to acquire land on a reciprocal basis; a visible termination of the military occupation at the outset of the five-year period; devolution of authority for the new regime from an agreement among Israel, Egypt, and Jordan; and general self-government for the Palestinians.*

—Flexibility on the remaining issues of settlements and air bases in Sinai.

9. *Begin and Sadat are likely to try to shift the discussions to new proposals of their own.* Begin may concentrate on details as a diversion from the larger issues. Sadat may try to enlist your support for a bold move on his part which will put Begin in the corner. The risk is that you could lose control of the talks and be diverted from the central issues either by Begin’s legalisms or Sadat’s imprecision. You should keep the focus on the large picture, the strategic choices, and refer new proposals or suggestions for textual language to the Foreign Ministers and Secretary Vance. With Sadat, you will have to hear him out on his new strategy without appearing to collude with him against Begin.

10. *Both leaders will constantly be trying to get you to side with them on specific points.* They will not hesitate to remind you of what we have said to them in the past. Begin will remember that we called his “self-

⁴ The President added “Acceptance of” to the beginning of this point.

⁵ Sadat made the pledge when he visited Israel in November 1977. See footnote 6, Document 63.

⁶ The President underlined “These modifications require.”

rule” plan a “fair basis for negotiations,” and Sadat will have very much in mind the promises made at Camp David.⁷ Your best defense against these efforts to manipulate you will be to *concentrate on the future choices, on the strategic consequences of success or failure, and on the need for each side to transcend past positions.*

11. *Sadat is very likely to want to explore the possibility of reaching secret understandings with you and Begin on some elements of a settlement.* This is apparently more important to him than a declaration of principles. There are clearly risks in relying on secret agreements, but Sadat’s willingness to be forthcoming on some issues may well depend upon our ability, as well as Begin’s to assure him that he will not be embarrassed by leaks.

12. If Sadat shows more flexibility than Begin, we may be perceived by the Israelis and their supporters as colluding with the Egyptians. This could be politically awkward, and you may want to suggest discreetly to Sadat that he not rush to accept any suggestions we put forward publicly. It will help our credibility if we are seen to be pressing both sides for concessions. *While we do want Sadat to accept our ideas, the timing and circumstances in which he does so should be very carefully coordinated.*

13. (The number may be symbolic.) If the meetings end in disagreement, we should not attempt to paper over the differences. The consequences of a failure should be publicly explained by you, and Sadat and Begin should understand from the outset that this will be the case.

Finally, I summarize below what I consider to be the acceptable minimum that we must aim for on the central issues:

1. *Withdrawal/Security on the West Bank/Gaza*

Sadat should agree to an Israeli security presence during the five-year interim period and for an indefinite time beyond; he should agree to defer decisions on the precise location of borders and on sovereignty until the end of the transitional period. In return, he should be able to claim credit for ending the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and for establishing that the principle of withdrawal will be applied in the final peace settlement dealing with these areas.

Begin should agree that the principle of withdrawal does apply on all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza, provided that its application takes into account Israel’s long-term security needs in the area; sovereignty will remain in abeyance until a final peace agreement is

⁷ Presidents Sadat and Carter met at Camp David in February. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 210 and 211.

reached at the end of the five-year period. This will allow Begin to take credit for protecting Israel's fundamental security interests, while not requiring that he explicitly abandon Israel's claim to sovereignty over these areas.

2. *Settlements*

There should be a moratorium on organized settlement activities, but both parties should agree that provisions should be made for individual Israelis and Palestinians to do business and to live in Israel and the West Bank/Gaza in the spirit of open borders, free movement of peoples, and normal peaceful relations.

3. *Negotiations*

Both parties should commit themselves to *continuing negotiations* on both the Sinai and the West Bank/Gaza issues.

4. *Resolution 242*

Both parties should reiterate their commitment to all of the principles of Resolution 242 as the basis for peace treaties on all fronts. In addition, they should agree on the Aswan language on Palestinian rights,⁸ and should commit themselves to the concept of full peace and normal relations. Sadat should repeat his commitment to "no more war" and agree to the renewal of UNEF in October.

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of Ambassador Eilts' last conversation with President Sadat.⁹ It is well worth reading. Sadat seems to be preparing more surprises.

[Omitted here is a 2-page chart entitled "Camp David Summit," dated September 1.]

⁸ See footnote 7, Document 63.

⁹ Not found attached. Eilts met with Sadat on August 26. The memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Document 16.

96. Address by President Carter Before a Joint Session of Congress¹

Washington, September 18, 1978

Camp David Meeting on the Middle East

Vice President Mondale, Speaker O'Neill, distinguished Members of the United States Congress, Justices of the Supreme Court, other leaders of our great Nation, ladies and gentlemen:

It's been more than 2,000 years since there was peace between Egypt and a free Jewish nation. If our present expectations are realized, this year we shall see such peace again.

The first thing I would like to do is to give tribute to the two men who made this impossible dream now become a real possibility, the two great leaders with whom I have met for the last 2 weeks at Camp David: first, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and the other, of course, is Prime Minister Menahem Begin of the nation of Israel.

I know that all of you would agree that these are two men of great personal courage, representing nations of peoples who are deeply grateful to them for the achievement which they have realized. And I am personally grateful to them for what they have done.

At Camp David, we sought a peace that is not only of vital importance to their own two nations but to all the people of the Middle East, to all the people of the United States, and, indeed, to all the world as well.

The world prayed for the success of our efforts, and I am glad to announce to you that these prayers have been answered.

I've come to discuss with you tonight what these two leaders have accomplished and what this means to all of us.

The United States has had no choice but to be deeply concerned about the Middle East and to try to use our influence and our efforts to advance the cause of peace. For the last 30 years, through four wars, the people of this troubled region have paid a terrible price in suffering and division and hatred and bloodshed. No two nations have suffered more

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1533–1537. All brackets are in the original. The President delivered his address at 8:06 p.m. in the House Chamber at the Capitol. His address was broadcast live on radio and television. The President, Sadat, and Begin returned to Washington from Camp David the evening of September 17 and signed the two agreements. For their remarks at the White House signing ceremony, see *ibid.*, pp. 1519–1523. For the texts of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, and accompanying letters, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1978, pp. 7–11.

than Egypt and Israel. But the dangers and the costs of conflicts in this region for our own Nation have been great as well. We have long-standing friendships among the nations there and the peoples of the region, and we have profound moral commitments which are deeply rooted in our values as a people.

The strategic location of these countries and the resources that they possess mean that events in the Middle East directly affect people everywhere. We and our friends could not be indifferent if a hostile power were to establish domination there. In few areas of the world is there a greater risk that a local conflict could spread among other nations adjacent to them and then, perhaps, erupt into a tragic confrontation between us super powers ourselves.

Our people have come to understand that unfamiliar names like Sinai, Aqaba, Sharm el Sheikh, Ras en Naqb, Gaza, the West Bank of Jordan, can have a direct and immediate bearing on our own well-being as a nation and our hope for a peaceful world. That is why we in the United States cannot afford to be idle bystanders and why we have been full partners in the search for peace and why it is so vital to our Nation that these meetings at Camp David have been a success.

Through the long years of conflict, four main issues have divided the parties involved. One is the nature of peace—whether peace will simply mean that the guns are silenced, that the bombs no longer fall, that the tanks cease to roll, or whether it will mean that the nations of the Middle East can deal with each other as neighbors and as equals and as friends, with a full range of diplomatic and cultural and economic and human relations between them. That's been the basic question. The Camp David agreement has defined such relationships, I'm glad to announce to you, between Israel and Egypt.

The second main issue is providing for the security of all parties involved, including, of course, our friends, the Israelis, so that none of them need fear attack or military threats from one another. When implemented, the Camp David agreement, I'm glad to announce to you, will provide for such mutual security.

Third is the question of agreement on secure and recognized boundaries, the end of military occupation, and the granting of self-government or else the return to other nations of territories which have been occupied by Israel since the 1967 conflict. The Camp David agreement, I'm glad to announce to you, provides for the realization of all these goals.

And finally, there is the painful human question of the fate of the Palestinians who live or who have lived in these disputed regions. The Camp David agreement guarantees that the Palestinian people may participate in the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects,

a commitment that Israel has made in writing and which is supported and appreciated, I'm sure, by all the world.

Over the last 18 months, there has been, of course, some progress on these issues. Egypt and Israel came close to agreeing about the first issue, the nature of peace. They then saw that the second and third issues, that is, withdrawal and security, were intimately connected, closely entwined. But fundamental divisions still remained in other areas—about the fate of the Palestinians, the future of the West Bank and Gaza, and the future of Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territories.

We all remember the hopes for peace that were inspired by President Sadat's initiative, that great and historic visit to Jerusalem last November² that thrilled the world, and by the warm and genuine personal response of Prime Minister Begin and the Israeli people, and by the mutual promise between them, publicly made, that there would be no more war. These hopes were sustained when Prime Minister Begin reciprocated by visiting Ismailia on Christmas Day.³ That progress continued, but at a slower and slower pace through the early part of the year. And by early summer, the negotiations had come to a standstill once again.

It was this stalemate and the prospect for an even worse future that prompted me to invite both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to join me at Camp David. They accepted, as you know, instantly, without delay, without preconditions, without consultation even between them.

It's impossible to overstate the courage of these two men or the foresight they have shown. Only through high ideals, through compromises of words and not principle, and through a willingness to look deep into the human heart and to understand the problems and hopes and dreams of one another can progress in a difficult situation like this ever be made. That's what these men and their wise and diligent advisers who are here with us tonight have done during the last 13 days.

When this conference began, I said that the prospects for success were remote. Enormous barriers of ancient history and nationalism and suspicion would have to be overcome if we were to meet our objectives. But President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have overcome these barriers, exceeded our fondest expectations, and have signed two

² See footnote 6, Document 63.

³ Sadat and Begin met in Ismailia December 25–26, 1977. See Christopher S. Wren, "2 Leaders Tour Suez Canal City, Symbol of Egypt's Peace Hopes," December 26, 1977, p. 47 and Henry Tanner, "Rift on Palestinians: Plan for a Joint Declaration Dropped After West Bank Issue Stalls Meeting," December 27, 1977, pp. A-1, A-17, both *The New York Times*.

agreements that hold out the possibility of resolving issues that history had taught us could not be resolved.

The first of these documents is entitled, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David." It deals with a comprehensive settlement, comprehensive agreement, between Israel and all her neighbors, as well as the difficult question of the Palestinian people and the future of the West Bank and the Gaza area.

The agreement provides a basis for the resolution of issues involving the West Bank and Gaza during the next 5 years. It outlines a process of change which is in keeping with Arab hopes, while also carefully respecting Israel's vital security.

The Israeli military government over these areas will be withdrawn and will be replaced with a self-government of the Palestinians who live there. And Israel has committed that this government will have full autonomy. Prime Minister Begin said to me several times, not partial autonomy, but full autonomy.

Israeli forces will be withdrawn and redeployed into specified locations to protect Israel's security. The Palestinians will further participate in determining their own future through talks in which their own elected representatives, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, will negotiate with Egypt and Israel and Jordan to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel has agreed, has committed themselves, that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people will be recognized. After the signing of this framework last night, and during the negotiations concerning the establishment of the Palestinian self-government, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The future settlements issue will be decided among the negotiating parties.

The final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be decided before the end of the 5-year transitional period during which the Palestinian Arabs will have their own government, as part of a negotiation which will produce a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan specifying borders, withdrawal, all those very crucial issues.

These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, with which you all are so familiar. The agreement on the final status of these areas will then be submitted to a vote by the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, and they will have the right for the first time in their history, the Palestinian people, to decide how they will govern themselves permanently.

We also believe, of course, all of us, that there should be a just settlement of the problems of displaced persons and refugees, which takes into account appropriate United Nations resolutions.

Finally, this document also outlines a variety of security arrangements to reinforce peace between Israel and her neighbors. This is, indeed, a comprehensive and fair framework for peace in the Middle East, and I'm glad to report this to you.

The second agreement is entitled, "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel." It returns to Egypt its full exercise of sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula and establishes several security zones, recognizing carefully that sovereignty right for the protection of all parties. It also provides that Egypt will extend full diplomatic recognition to Israel at the time the Israelis complete an interim withdrawal from most of the Sinai, which will take place between 3 months and 9 months after the conclusion of the peace treaty. And the peace treaty is to be fully negotiated and signed no later than 3 months from last night.

I think I should also report that Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat have already challenged each other to conclude the treaty even earlier. And I hope they—[*applause*]. This final conclusion of a peace treaty will be completed late in December, and it would be a wonderful Christmas present for the world.

Final and complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces will take place between 2 and 3 years following the conclusion of the peace treaty.

While both parties are in total agreement on all the goals that I have just described to you, there is one issue on which agreement has not yet been reached. Egypt states that agreement to remove the Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel says that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations themselves.

Now, within 2 weeks, with each member of the Knesset or the Israeli Parliament acting as individuals, not constrained by party loyalty, the Knesset will decide on the issue of the settlements. Our own Government's position, my own personal position is well known on this issue and has been consistent. It is my strong hope, my prayer, that the question of Israeli settlements on Egyptian territory will not be the final obstacle to peace.

None of us should underestimate the historic importance of what has already been done. This is the first time that an Arab and an Israeli leader have signed a comprehensive framework for peace. It contains the seeds of a time when the Middle East, with all its vast potential, may be a land of human richness and fulfillment, rather than a land of bitterness and continued conflict. No region in the world has greater natural and human resources than this one, and nowhere have they been more heavily weighed down by intense hatred and frequent war. These agreements hold out the real possibility that this burden might finally be lifted.

But we must also not forget the magnitude of the obstacles that still remain. The summit exceeded our highest expectations, but we know that it left many difficult issues which are still to be resolved. These issues will require careful negotiation in the months to come. The Egyptian and Israeli people must recognize the tangible benefits that peace will bring and support the decisions their leaders have made, so that a secure and a peaceful future can be achieved for them. The American public, you and I, must also offer our full support to those who have made decisions that are difficult and those who have very difficult decisions still to make.

What lies ahead for all of us is to recognize the statesmanship that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have shown and to invite others in that region to follow their example. I have already, last night, invited the other leaders of the Arab world to help sustain progress toward a comprehensive peace.

We must also join in an effort to bring an end to the conflict and the terrible suffering in Lebanon. This is a subject that President Sadat discussed with me many times while I was in Camp David with him. And the first time that the three of us met together, this was a subject of heated discussion. On the way to Washington last night in the helicopter, we mutually committed ourselves to join with other nations, with the Lebanese people themselves, all factions, with President Sarkis, with Syria and Saudi Arabia, perhaps the European countries like France, to try to move toward a solution of the problem in Lebanon, which is so vital to us and to the poor people in Lebanon, who have suffered so much.

We will want to consult on this matter and on these documents and their meaning with all of the leaders, particularly the Arab leaders. And I'm pleased to say to you tonight that just a few minutes ago, King Hussein of Jordan and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, perhaps other leaders later, but these two have already agreed to receive Secretary Vance, who will be leaving tomorrow to explain to them the terms of the Camp David agreement.⁴ And we hope to secure their support for the realization of the new hopes and dreams of the people of the Middle East.

This is an important mission, and this responsibility, I can tell you, based on my last 2 weeks with him, could not possibly rest on the shoulders of a more able and dedicated and competent man than Secretary Cyrus Vance.

Finally, let me say that for many years the Middle East has been a textbook for pessimism, a demonstration that diplomatic ingenuity

⁴The records of Vance's meetings are in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Documents 58-60, 62, and 64.

was no match for intractable human conflicts. Today we are privileged to see the chance for one of the sometimes rare, bright moments in human history—a chance that may offer the way to peace. We have a chance for peace, because these two brave leaders found within themselves the willingness to work together to seek these lasting prospects for peace, which we all want so badly. And for that, I hope that you will share my prayer of thanks and my hope that the promise of this moment shall be fully realized.

The prayers at Camp David were the same as those of the shepherd King David, who prayed in the 85th Psalm, “Wilt thou not revive us again; that thy people may rejoice in thee? . . . I will hear what God the Lord will speak: for he will speak peace unto his people, and unto his saints: but let them not return again unto folly.”

And I would like to say, as a Christian, to these two friends of mine, the words of Jesus, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be the children of God.”

97. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1978, 9:45 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Carter-Gromyko Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Warnke
Ambassador Toon
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/20–25/78. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Drafted by Krimer. For the discussion of SALT at this meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 218.

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

First Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko

Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin

Mr. V.G. Makarov

Mr. V.G. Komplektov

Mr. A.A. Bessmertnykh

Mr. N.N. Detinov

Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President first wanted to tell the Minister that he was glad to have him come back to Washington for this meeting. He was happy to note that relations between our two countries appeared to be rapidly improving. He believed that a matter of first priority for our two states was successful completion of the work on the SALT Agreement.² As far as we were concerned, this could be accomplished this morning. The President also wanted Gromyko to know that a comprehensive detente remained a major aim and keystone of our policy. We wanted our relations with the Soviet Union to be based on mutual respect and mutual advantage. There had been mention of competition as well as cooperation between us. The President wanted to put major emphasis on cooperation.³

The President noted that there were a number of differences between us which had resulted from competition. He proposed to mention them briefly.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, the ongoing MBFR negotiations in Vienna, U.S.-PRC negotiations, trade and science topics, the comprehensive test ban, and Africa.]

² In his weekly report, September 29, Brzezinski suggested that it would be helpful for Carter to stress to Gromyko several points made previously: "that we desire to improve the relationship, that it is our determination to seek SALT, but that the overall status of the US-Soviet relationship is not immune to events in key parts of the world. In this connection, we are concerned about Cuban/Soviet behavior in Africa and Soviet attacks on the Camp David Accords." The President underlined "improve the relationship," "seek SALT," "not immune," "Africa," and "Camp David Accords." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7-9/78)

³ In the September 29 weekly report (see footnote 2 above), Brzezinski made the following point: "In brief, I think it is important to use the meeting with Gromyko also to communicate a broader message: that as you said at Annapolis, detente should be *genuinely comprehensive and reciprocal*. Otherwise, I am quite convinced that the US-Soviet relationship will again deteriorate, and this will certainly complicate attainment of such otherwise desirable objectives as SALT. If he does not get this message clearly from you, he certainly will not get it clearly from anyone else." In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President drew a mark pointing toward the first sentence.

*Overall Soviet-US Relations*⁴

Gromyko had to tell the President quite frankly that over the recent period our relations had worsened. It was true, of course, that he did discern a somewhat more positive note in recent statements by the President's representatives, in the President's comments today and in some press articles, indicating that in⁵ the most recent period, during the past month perhaps, there had been somewhat of a turning point for the better. That might be so, but he had to say that he had not discerned anything truly substantive to indicate an improvement in our relations. The fact that our relations had become worse as compared to the past was known to the whole world, and this could not fail to concern and perplex the Soviet Union. He wanted to convey this to the President in all frankness. He had taken note of the President's pronouncement, contained in his message to Brezhnev, where the President had used words to the effect that we should not try to place the blame for the worsening of relations between us, but should look ahead.⁶ This was quite understandable, but he would point out that the Soviet Union was not prepared to assume any blame for the worsening of relations and he wanted the President to know that.

Gromyko noted that in those matters where our respective views did not fully coincide, or did not coincide at all, affairs could be conducted in a number of different ways. These differences could be discussed without crossing a certain line, throwing back the relations between us.⁷ These relations had been laboriously built up between the Soviet Union and the United States and the process had not been easy. Quite the contrary, it had been an arduous and difficult road. On the one hand, relations between us could be conducted with the use of fine instruments, seeking ways to bridge gaps and to come to mutual understanding. On the other hand, one could also use an axe, raising and dropping it repeatedly to sever the threads that existed between us. Again, speaking quite frankly, he would point out that in his view the latter method was the one used by the United States quite frequently in the recent past. Of course, such a situation could not but have a negative impact on the delicate process called international detente. He

⁴ Krimer added the title of this section by hand.

⁵ Krimer added this preposition by hand.

⁶ Presumable reference is to the President's September 2 letter to Brezhnev. In it, the President commented: "I am distressed, as I know you are, that relations between our two countries have not developed well. We would each have our own explanation of why this has been the case, but I do not believe it would be useful to repeat familiar arguments about who or what is to blame." The President's letter is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 142.

⁷ The sentence originally began with "These." Krimer deleted it and capitalized "differences."

would hope that in all assessments of each other's policy neither side would fail to observe a certain sense of proportion and not go beyond a certain limit. As seen by many people, one or two statements by the leaders of one of our countries were quite enough to derail detente. Of course, it would not be much of a detente if that were really true. He regarded it as a process that goes much deeper, one that was based on the hearts and minds of literally hundreds of millions of people.⁸ He did believe that if one plotted detente as a curve on a graph, on the whole that curve was pointing upward. There were ups and downs, to be sure, but on the whole if one felt the pulse of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people all over the world, detente was on an upward track. It was a process that needed to be developed and was developing, but the greater the effort applied in that direction the better and stronger it would be. For its part, the Soviet Union was fully prepared to do all in its power to promote everything that furthered detente, and to preserve in our mutual relations everything that had been achieved in the past, and boldly go further.

Gromyko wanted to assure the President that in all its actions the Soviet Union was not trying to undercut relations between the United States and third countries so long as these relations were not directed against the Soviet Union. He and the Soviet leadership felt that conditions were now ripe for going ahead, improving and strengthening our relations.

Gromyko noted that in his statement today the President had not referred to one thought which he had repeatedly expressed in the past. Perhaps that was only an oversight, but it was an axiom of foreign policy that the nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States to an enormous extent determined the general world situation, the state of detente, the state of East-West relations and the international atmosphere as a whole. That was indisputable, and it was an idea the President had put forward in the past and, with which the Soviet Union agreed wholeheartedly.⁹

The President wanted to repeat that, as he had said earlier, good relations with the Soviet Union were a keystone of our foreign policy.

Gromyko said that was one aspect of the matter, the other being that these relations determined the general situation throughout the world. That was not necessarily to everyone's liking and he was aware of the many epithets being directed at each of us, but particularly at the Soviet Union, referring to superpowers, to attempts at exercising he-

⁸ Krimer substituted "détente" for "it."

⁹ Krimer deleted the comma following the second "and" in this sentence and substituted "one."

gemony, etc.¹⁰ He felt that neither of our countries were to blame in that respect, for neither we nor they had elected ourselves as superpowers.¹¹ That had resulted from an objective process of historical development.¹²

Gromyko wanted to speak briefly on some specific aspects the President had touched upon.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, MFBR negotiations, China, trade issues, Africa, comprehensive test ban, and SALT.]

¹⁰ Krimer deleted the comma following “and,” inserted “the” before “many,” substituted “us” for “them,” and added a comma following “us.”

¹¹ Krimer changed “were” to “was” and substituted “of us” for “we nor they.”

¹² Krimer substituted “the” for “an.”

98. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, October 23, 1978

SUBJECT

Central America: An Emerging and Urgent Issue for U.S. Policy

As the dust blown up by the crisis in Nicaragua settles for the moment, and the mediators try to patch together an “enduring democratic solution,” I think it is important to step back and ask ourselves: Can a Nicaraguan-type crisis happen again?² And, if so, what are we doing now to prevent similar crises?

The simple answer is that it can happen again, and is likely to in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. The conditions which gave rise to the crisis in Nicaragua exist in these countries, only in a more advanced state.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 54, PRM/NSC–46 [1]. Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “a good memo. ZB.” Inderfurth and Bartholomew also initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum.

² Documentation on the Nicaraguan “crisis” and the mediation effort is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America.

The unique element in Nicaragua is, of course, Somoza, but I believe that his presence meant only that violence and polarization would occur in Nicaragua *first*; not that it won't occur elsewhere. In a few years, if we don't address the underlying problems in Central America, the Nicaraguan crisis of 1978 will seem easy in comparison. *I would urge you to place Central America relatively high on your list of priorities for 1978–1979.*

I. Characteristics Common to the Region

The three Central American countries share (with Nicaragua) the following tragic characteristics:

1. *Political Alignment: Three Groups.* (1) A strong, intransigent military government with little or no popular support; (2) revolutionary guerrilla groups which are predominantly indigenous but maintain ties with the Cubans and with each other; and (3) a relatively weak but hopeful middle, which includes political parties (Christian and Social Democrats), the Church, and small business. Since the middle of the political spectrum in Central America is considerably to the right of that in the U.S., the political middle is generally quite conservative by U.S. standards.

2. *Severe Structural Problems.* Economic inequality; rapid population growth; inadequate bureaucratic capabilities; and slow economic growth.

3. *Continued Massive U.S. Presence.* The U.S. influence and presence in this region remains very formidable. The perception of U.S. influence often is greater than the reality but in Central America that is both an asset and liability: it enables us to more easily achieve some of our objectives, but it also stimulates a negative and reactive nationalism among some and a "Fanonian" immaturity among others.³

The U.S. commitment to human rights and democratization is clearly and widely understood. The military governments that once felt they could serve the U.S. interest in stability in whatever way they wanted now feel inhibited from using violence or torture to suppress political opposition or to eliminate guerrilla movements. As Torrijos likes to say, "After Carter, military dictators have to count to 10 before killing someone." Both the democratic opposition and the guerrillas seem intent on taking advantage of this new situation.

4. *Political Polarization.* Government-sanctioned counter-terrorism was the rule before the Carter Administration. Now, the military governments—like Somoza's—have begun harassing the middle. The left has done this as well. Polarization has increased as the middle has been

³ Reference is to Frantz Fanon, an influential anti-colonial theorist and author.

forced to choose sides. If the opposition prevails in Nicaragua, the democratic middle in these other countries may conclude that it is time to throw their fate in with the guerrillas against the government.

5. *Transnational Linkages*. The extremes have obtained help, training, and encouragement from abroad. The military has obtained arms from the Israelis, Argentines, and the international black market. The left is getting increasing help from each other. A recent intelligence report suggests that the Cubans have also decided to encourage local—in this case, Honduran cadres—to assist in training and equipping their comrades, the TP faction of the Sandinistas.

These conditions combine to present U.S. policy with two major problems, perhaps dilemmas:

1. How do we deal with the fact that the political middle is under attack from the two extremes? What can we do to effectively promote our human rights policy?

2. How do we reconcile our goal of wanting to discard a century of U.S. paternalism with a need and an instinct to try to manage events rather than let them manage us?

Regardless of the outcome in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala will continue to be plagued by polarization. The left will harass, and the right will repress, creating more support for the left. The political dynamic is almost inevitable. Moreover, whatever happens in Nicaragua will spill over to its neighbors, and indeed it already has.

II. *How to Tackle the Issues? A Conceptual Framework*

If I may borrow one of your analytic modes, I think the problem of Central America can be best understood by viewing it in three concentric circles:

1. The internal political upheavals in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala.

2. The relationship of those countries with each other and with Costa Rica and Panama. (Dealing not only with the problem of international terrorism, but also with the El Salvador-Honduras border dispute, Belize, and the Central American Common Market.)

3. The larger relationship of Central America to the U.S., Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the Caribbean.

A. Our *goals* are the following:

1. *Internal Politics in Central America*.

(a) Strengthen the democratic center in each country and the links between these groups in different countries.

(b) Provide an atmosphere conducive to the eventual evolution of democratically-elected governments.

(c) Encourage a more equitable distribution of wealth and the necessary socio-economic reforms which will permit this.

2. *Central America*

Our goals are to strengthen the peace by assisting in the settlement of long-standing territorial disputes and to promote economic cooperation and integration.

3. *Caribbean Basin*

Our goals have been spelled out in the President's Caribbean policy.

The first circle—internal politics in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—is the most urgent, but we will not have a coherent and positive policy until we have begun to address all three sets of problems associated with each concentric circle.

B. Our *means* for pursuing these goals are considerable. We have relatively large bilateral assistance programs to these small and poor countries, and a large proportion of the loans they receive from the Inter-American Development Bank are concessional (from FSO) over which we have a veto. This leverage has in the past translated into real influence. For example, our decision to withhold support for a loan to build a hydroelectric project in El Salvador last year led the government to lift the state of siege. Unfortunately, we continue to deal with aid and loans one at a time without any overall strategic approach.

Perhaps the most important source of U.S. influence is simply U.S. symbolic support, including Presidential attention. An expression of interest by the President in the 10-year-old El Salvador-Honduras border dispute encouraged the Hondurans to ratify a mediation agreement in September 1977 (during the Canal Treaty signing in Washington).⁴ I would guess that a small touch by the President at a well-timed moment could have a large impact on this area. (We may want to factor into a future review the possibility of a short visit by the President—perhaps as a follow-on to a Mexico trip⁵—to the area, and to stimulate negotiations on El Salvador-Honduras, Belize, or on economic integration to try to reach a conclusion before that. Such a visit would also help to restore some sense of stability to a region still rocking with Nicaragua.)

⁴ In his diary entry for September 8, 1977, the President noted that he had met with President Romero that day: "My major purpose was to get El Salvador to agree to a mediation formula for the border dispute with Honduras. He agreed to move on this, which has kept the Pan-American Highway closed for a long time and resulted in severing of relationships altogether between Honduras and El Salvador. Before they left Washington, this was done." (*White House Diary*, p. 94)

⁵ Carter visited Mexico in February 1979, but no other Central American countries.

III. *A U.S. Strategy for Central America*

I think Central America is a powder keg of instability which could blow up and take with it Carter's Latin American policy. The scenario is the same as what may face us in Nicaragua: a choice between supporting an unpopular military dictator or intervening to prevent a Communist take-over. Neither alternative is satisfactory, but in order to face a different choice, we have to begin developing a strategy now to mobilize U.S. influence in support of the goals listed above.⁶ We currently have no strategy and are doing nothing positive which contributes to the realization of these goals except in an ad hoc fashion. We are reacting to events at points of relatively little influence; we need to get in front of the political process in Central America rather than get pulled along by it.

I have spoken to Vaky, and he agrees on the urgency of this matter and its great importance, but he doesn't think that his Bureau has the capability of handling it now.⁷ He suggested that I work on it with Richard Feinberg of Policy Planning in State. I don't think we can wait, and if there are few people in State who can work on it, we can turn to the Agency *and* to our Embassies for support. Indeed, I think it would be very useful to involve our Embassies in this exercise as fully as possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you agree that Central America is an area which requires our urgent attention.⁸
2. That you approve, in principle, my drafting a terms of reference for inter-agency review with Vaky and Policy Planning (Richard Feinberg). The terms of reference will proceed directly from the analytic framework suggested in this memo, but I will send the final version to you for your approval when it is completed.⁹
3. Would you like me to draft a short memo from you to the President on this subject?¹⁰

⁶ An unknown hand underlined the word "now."

⁷ Reference is to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Vaky.

⁸ According to Aaron's handwritten notation in the left-hand margin, he supported this recommendation.

⁹ According to Aaron's handwritten notation in the left-hand margin, he supported this recommendation. Next to the recommendation, Inderfurth wrote: "Why not a PRM? RI." Brzezinski approved this recommendation and wrote "PRM" on the "Approve" line.

¹⁰ Next to this recommendation, Inderfurth wrote: "Alternatively, have Bob reduce this to one page for use in this week's WR [Weekly Report] as an 'Alert' item." According to a handwritten notation below Inderfurth's comment, Aaron supported this recommendation. Brzezinski also indicated his approval by writing "OK. ZB." Brzezinski also wrote "1 page alert"—RI—WR" beneath the "Approve" line.⁹ Inderfurth wrote an additional note to Brzezinski and Aaron: "ZB/DA, I also suggest that Turner be tasked with preparing an intelligence assessment on prospects for instability in Central America. Rick."

99. **Address by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)¹**

San Francisco, California, November 16, 1978

The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or Plaintiffs

Eight years ago I spoke to the Commonwealth Club on the subject "The United States and the Third World." That was in 1970, the year of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. My remarks at that time dwelt on the growing influence of the newly independent nations in the United Nations and in world affairs generally. I dwelt also on growing differences which were appearing between the views of these countries and those of the United States. This was true with respect to the process of decolonization, trade, and racial discrimination.

In 1970 most Americans were only vaguely aware of the potential power and influence of the developing countries. The general opinion was that the newly independent countries of this century would not, for many years to come, be major factors in either economic or political affairs.

A series of events over the last 6 years has shaken that view. In 1973 the Arab oil-producing states successfully mounted an embargo against the United States. Once the oil-producing states understood their power as a result of the embargo, they moved successfully to raise the price of oil dramatically. Other developing countries, instead of expressing dismay at the impact of the price rises on their own economies, saw benefits for the developing world in general in relating similar tactics to other commodities. In 1974 in Algiers the new international economic order was born with its strong demands for greater equality in economic relations between the developed and the developing countries.²

North-South Dialogue

The new international economic order in the form of a declaration of U.N. purposes and of the obligations of industrialized states to make

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1979, pp. 30–32. All brackets are in the original. Newsom delivered his address before the International Relations Section of the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council of Northern California.

² The fourth conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries, or Non-aligned Movement (NAM), met in Algiers, September 5–9, 1973, and proposed the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO). On January 30, 1974, Algerian Representative to the United Nations Abdellatif Rahal, proposed a convocation of an UN special session to discuss development issues.

sweeping changes in trade, aid, and investment policy, was brought before the sixth special session of the United Nations in 1974.³ The United States found itself virtually isolated as European countries expressed at least rhetorical sympathy for the thrust of this new order. That session brought home starkly to American policymakers for the first time the potential impact of these demands on our political as well as our economic relations with the developing world.

The next 2 years, then, saw the beginning of a fundamental reassessment of how the have and have-not nations would relate to each other. At the seventh special session, in September of 1975, with the memory of the fruitless confrontations the previous year still fresh in their minds, both sides began to rethink their respective positions and to search for areas of constructive dialogue and possible cooperation.⁴ One of the results was the formation, in December of that year, of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) with 8 members from the developed world and 19 from the developing world.⁵ While CIEC did not, over the some 18 months of its existence, succeed in finding accommodation between all of the issues where the North and South differ, it did contribute measurably to the ongoing dialogue and resulted in concrete progress on some issues such as food and agriculture and technical assistance. And while CIEC did narrow some gaps between the North and the South, many of the developing countries were unhappy with their exclusion from the limited membership of the CIEC.

As a result, CIEC was succeeded by the Committee of the Whole which includes all member states of the United Nations. This is now an important forum for discussion of economic matters relating to the North-South dialogue. The developing countries would like to give it a decisionmaking role. We continue to believe decisions on major economic issues should be made by existing organizations having responsibilities in the specific functional areas, for example, the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] for trade, the IMF [International Monetary Fund] for monetary affairs.

There were other elements to the dialogue. The year 1976 saw the Nairobi meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, known as UNCTAD 4.⁶ While providing its share of confrontation, this

³ The Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly met in New York, April 9–May 2, 1974. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 257.

⁴ See footnote 11, Document 62.

⁵ The Conference on International Economic Cooperation met in Paris December 16–19, 1975. For Scowcroft's report to Ford on the conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 300.

⁶ See footnote 7, Document 47.

meeting saw the United States continuing to signal its willingness to maintain a constructive dialogue regarding the demands of the developing countries. This willingness to engage in dialogue was, however, clearly separated from any affirmation of the legitimacy of all the other demands of these countries. Subsequently, at Colombo, Sri Lanka, the nonaligned nations met and found that economic issues had replaced political issues as the prime vehicles for expressing their aspirations and frustrations.⁷

I have been speaking to you about the Third World. I know that there are those who question the validity of this term. They rightly point out that there is a tremendous difference between the least developed and the middle countries. This is true. Nevertheless, the strong feelings which exist among these countries arising from a common heritage of colonialism, from their perception of themselves as economically developing nations and from a feeling that they lack a voice in major economic decisions affecting them, give these countries a solidarity which is a reality. That solidarity withstood differences over the oil crisis. It has withstood general differences of view, for example, between those countries that are interested in debt relief and those countries which are more concerned about their international credit standing.

Importance of the North-South Relationship

It has been my experience that audiences attuned to the more exciting political aspects of foreign affairs do not find equal stimulation in discussions of economic issues. Yet, the average American citizen—concerned for his job, his standard of living, and the value of the dollar at home and abroad—has good reason to pay attention to the demands, sometimes excessive, of the Third World nations. Only a few statistics will illustrate why.

- In 1977, 35% of total U.S. exports—\$42 billion—went to developing countries.
- The United States sells more manufactured goods to the developing countries than to Western Europe, Japan, and all the Communist countries combined.
- The developing countries accounted for more than half of all U.S. exports of industrial machinery, electrical machinery, and aircraft.
- They bought 50% of our wheat exports, 60% of our cotton exports, 70% of our rice exports, and 90% of our coal exports.
- The United States imported goods worth \$67 billion from developing countries in 1977—45% of our total imports.

⁷ The fifth annual conference of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 16–19, 1976.

These are impressive statistics, but they are hard to relate to our everyday lives. It perhaps comes closer to home if we address the importance of the North-South relationship in terms of questions like:

- Will your gas tank be full?
- How much will it cost to fill it up?
- How much more would you need to pay for a chocolate bar, for coffee, for copper wire, if the developing countries should seek to emulate the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and restrict supplies or raise prices?
- How many workers would be laid off in your community if developing countries shifted their purchases from the United States to other suppliers?

Each issue has implications for our daily lives as well as for our relationship with two-thirds of the peoples of the world. The developing nations have addressed themselves to several key issues. Each one presents us with problems, particularly in a time of economic difficulties. Approval of new departures for any one of them could face strong opposition in the Congress. Yet each one is a key to whether we shall be partners or adversaries in our relations with the developing world. Let me take briefly each one in turn.

Economic Issues

Trade. The first is trade. The developing countries want improved access to our markets for their exports. They want special and preferential treatment for their manufactured products.

We believe improved market access is desirable and in our own interest. In the event of injury to domestic industry, of course, we must take temporary measures to protect jobs and producers, preferably through adjustment assistance or, if necessary, through restrictions at the borders.

There has been hard bargaining with many developing countries in the multilateral trade negotiations which have just wound up work in Geneva. These extended and complex negotiations have offered the developing countries an opportunity to gain benefits. Unfortunately, we feel they have not fully availed themselves of these opportunities.

Foreign Aid. The developing countries also seek an increase in the transfer of resources which they need for economic development. They wish a level of economic assistance from developed countries which would represent seven-tenths of 1% of such countries' gross national product. The implications of this demand are illustrated by two simple facts.

- The enthusiasm for foreign aid in the United States is declining. In 1970 we ranked seventh among the developed countries in the per-

centage of our gross national product transferred concessionally to developing countries. Today we have dropped to twelfth.

- We have changed our approach to foreign aid in part as a result of congressional legislation. In the face of a continued need by many countries for infrastructure assistance, particularly in Africa, we are concentrating more and more on the needs of the poor. We look to the multilateral institutions to provide infrastructure assistance. We are unable to supply straight budgetary assistance to meet the special problem of middle-income countries. This problem is particularly acute in the Caribbean.

Some of the most active negotiations have related to commodities. The developing countries have given a high priority to stabilizing broad fluctuations in commodity prices which have such a profound effect on countries depending almost entirely on one or two primary products.

We have now indicated our acceptance in principle of the idea of a common fund which would be used to help commodity agreements to stabilize commodity prices.⁸ We still have differences over the form of such a fund and whether it would also be used to provide resources not directly related to stabilization of commodity prices. Those who follow both our relations with the developing countries and our relations with Congress will hear more of the common fund in the days ahead.

Debt Relief. Debt is a highly important and highly emotional issue, as it is with individuals. We have always taken the position that debt relief should be conditioned upon a debtor country promising to undertake a comprehensive sound economic development or stabilization program, one that would insure that excesses in resource mismanagement are not repeated. Many feel strongly that the developed countries have an obligation to relieve them of their debt burden. We are now committed to debt forgiveness for the poorest countries and are studying how much relief we should provide in 1980.

The two principal multilateral financial institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—were founded well before the creation of most of the nations in the United Nations today. Newly independent countries and many other Third World countries as well wish to move away from voting in international institutions based on financial contributions toward a one state, one vote system giving a

⁸ The Common Fund negotiations began in Geneva in November 1977; see footnote 3, Document 58. Talks on the Common Fund were scheduled to resume in Geneva on November 14, 1978. On November 16, *The Washington Post* reported that the Carter administration agreed to make a direct contribution to the Fund. (Hobart Rowen, "U.S., in Key Shift, Accepts Demand of Third World," p. A-21) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 318.

preponderant voice to the developing countries. Such a move in the minds of many in the United States would represent a departure from the objectivity and nonpolitical character of these institutions.

Technology Transfers. Developing countries today must often pay very large amounts in order to obtain the rights to technology which they feel important for their industrial development. They are seeking to liberalize the transfer of technology believing that this would speed up the closing of the gap between rich nations and poor nations. They also seek support for expanding their indigenous capacity to develop and adopt such technology.

There is, of course, a vast quantity of technology which is noncommercially held, and we have ongoing programs which seek to make that available to the developing countries. On the other hand, technology of commercial value held by firms in the investing nations has a value which these firms, understandably, do not wish to relinquish without a return on their investment. Various ways by which this privately owned technology can be more easily transferred are under consideration. The matter remains a significant and controversial issue.

Foreign direct investments are an important source of economic resources and technology for the developing countries. Differing views exist, however, on whether such investments are beneficial to the developing nations. For more than a year the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations has sought to elaborate a code of conduct within which such corporations could operate to the satisfaction of both sides. In the view of the developed world, private foreign investment represents one of the best and least political means by which transfers of both capital and technology can be effected. And while the corporate investors are willing to accommodate to demands for sharing of ownership and management which will provide greater benefits and opportunities for the people of the countries involved, they must ask and receive some kind of assurance that, once having invested their capital, the rules of the game will not be changed in ways which result in the loss of their investment.

Political Issues

I have dwelt today upon the economic issues which are under constant discussion between the developed nations of the North and the developing countries of the South. When nations gather, increasingly these are the concerns that trouble them most. And these concerns have a direct impact on political relations which in turn can affect the climate in which the economic issues are resolved. One soon finds that there is no distinction between political and economic affairs when the livelihood and security of nations is involved.

The strong efforts of the United States to resolve the problems in the Middle East have a direct bearing upon our access to the vital re-

sources of this region and to the economic health of the nations processing these resources.

The political issues of South Africa, Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia can cloud our dialogue with African states on other issues, even when our position on such matters as trade, development assistance, commodity policy, and debt rescheduling is clear and positive.

The danger of political instability in key areas threatening our national security is ever present. One needs only to look at events in Iran and consider the effects of a change in the orientation of that country on our strategic and economic interests in the area, or to look at Nicaragua and think about the implications of spreading unrest in Central America, our doorstep, to understand the political-economic interrelationship.

Finally, there are a whole series of foreign policy issues of prime importance to us—nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, arms control—which cannot be moved forward in a meaningful fashion without the cooperation of the Third World countries.

Ultimately, in our national interest, we wish to do what we can to see that Third World societies evolve in ways which are compatible with the kind of world we wish to live in and leave to our children. If we ignore these countries, their needs, and their aspirations, we will forfeit our ability to exert this influence which can be so important to our own future.

So, the issues that we face in dealing with the Third World have implications not just for our daily lives, but also for our national security now and our future in the society of men. Thus, the fostering and strengthening of the dialogue between the North and the South is extremely important to all of us.

Fostering a Positive Dialogue

The coming year will see a large number of international conferences devoted to fundamental questions of relations between developed and developing countries. Negotiations have recently begun under UNCTAD auspices on a new international wheat agreement; in April the law of the sea conference will resume consideration of who controls the vast mineral resources of the deep seabeds; in June UNCTAD 5 convenes in Manila; in August the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development begins in Vienna; and in 1980 we expect a U.N. General Assembly special session on development. Moreover, progress is being made in developing a positive dialogue with the Third World.

One can point to the Association of the South East Asian Nations. These five nations—Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—are important friends and trading partners particularly

of the states on the west coast. They are keenly interested in all of the North-South issues. They have taken a leading and constructive role in the international discussions of these issues. They have had direct dialogues with the United States, the European Economic Community, Japan, Canada, and Australia. In addition, they are reconciling difficult trade matters among themselves. They are demonstrating by their own growth the very great potential which exists in the developing countries. They have received and deserved strong support from us. Their progress demonstrates that despite the complexity of these issues, dialogue can bring positive results for both.

In 1978 relations between the United States and the Third World remain a significant part of our foreign policy agenda. As much as any other issue these matters bear directly on your daily life and mine. It is the hope of those of us who deal with them that, despite the complex nature of these issues, they will receive the serious attention of those concerned with foreign affairs. We hope in turn that organizations such as those represented here today will lend their support for a positive and constructive role for the United States in this ongoing discussion with nations which represent three-fifths of the world's population.

100. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 2, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #81 (U)

1. *Opinion*

On Negotiating

The comments which follow are not meant to be just negative—but I feel that I should share my concern that the way we have been conducting our negotiations on some key issues may be reducing our credibility and therefore also our ability to attain our goals.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 29, NSC Weekly Reports, 6–12/78. Secret. The President wrote the following notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Zbig—You comment as though you've not been involved in the process & that everyone has been wrong except you. J."

In negotiations there often comes the time to force the issue to a head by making the other side take stock of the consequences of failure. One should even be willing to deliberately create such circumstances, as Sadat has done from time to time. Of course, before one does so one should carefully marshal one's resources and calculate timing very carefully.

SALT

We have been dribbling our concessions, and asserting from time to time that we would go no further. Yet time after time we would then make additional concessions.²

The latest example pertains to the ALCMs: as a major concession we told the Soviets that we would accept the limit of 35 as an average. The Soviets countered with 25. We immediately offered 30 as a compromise. The Soviets are now talking of a figure of between 25 and 30 as the outcome, despite our accommodation on the definition issue.³

Indeed, Cy put the new definition to Dobrynin earlier this week on the assumption that this would solve all the remaining issues—an assumption Dobrynin led us to suspect is true. The opposite has happened, and the Soviets are even reopening some old issues.

I am convinced the Soviets want a SALT agreement, and I think there is a good probability that we could have obtained one some months ago had we been prepared to establish credibly the position that we are no longer able to make further adjustments and that we can wait.⁴

Cuba

We told the Cubans we would not go to Havana without an expectation of concrete positive developments—by which we clearly meant their troops in Africa. We then proposed to go to Havana if they would simply let out the four American political prisoners. When they refused to do even that, we end up sending a delegation anyway, albeit at a somewhat lower level. This does not help our credibility.⁵

² In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "SU does the same."

³ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "Only symbolically important."

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "B.S. We've waited 2 years."

⁵ At the end of this paragraph, the President wrote: "your proposal." Additional information about the political prisoners and the U.S. delegation to Havana, which consisted of Tarnoff and Pastor, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

The Middle East

I suspect that the root cause of our current difficulty is that Begin feels he can get away with almost anything; and that Sadat and the Saudis no longer have confidence that we can deliver either on the wider peace nor on regional protection from the Soviets. Not having pressed at Camp David for some direct linkage between the accords, we have failed to respond in any concrete way to Begin's subsequent negative actions regarding the West Bank.⁶

South Africa

The basic reason why our difficulties are mounting is that our middle-of-the-road solutions are collapsing as the situation becomes polarized. The fact of the matter is that neither the whites nor the blacks take us very seriously. There is no bite to our proposals, because we are visibly reluctant to press the Soviet-Cuban issue (and thus leave the radical blacks with an increasingly attractive militant option), or to apply sanctions to the whites (thus encouraging them to engage in dilatory tactics).⁷

In brief, we should be prepared to demonstrate to all concerned that the U.S. has clout as well as patience, and that there are evident and predictable costs for disregarding U.S. interests. Instead, we have given rise to the view that the best way of dealing with us is to simply keep nibbling away, and that eventually the U.S. will simply adjust its position. *Stonewalling* or even *breaking off negotiations* is an established part of the negotiating tradition.⁸ The Soviets, the Israelis, the French and others practice it well.⁹ We should, too—and every one of the above negotiations should be reviewed from that standpoint.

2. *Alert**The Arc of Crisis*

If you draw an arc on the globe, stretching from Chittagong (Bangladesh) through Islamabad to Aden, you will be pointing to the area of currently our greatest vulnerability. All at once, difficulties are surfacing in Iran and Pakistan, and they are thinly below the surface in India and are very manifest in Bangladesh, and there is reason to believe that the political structure of Saudi Arabia is beginning to creak. Turkey is also becoming more wobbly.

⁶ The President bracketed this paragraph and added the following in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: "What have you suggested?"

⁷ The President underlined the phrase "the radical blacks" and added the following in the left-hand margin next to this sentence: "Almost *all* blacks."

⁸ The President wrote "when?" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁹ The President underlined "Soviets," "Israelis," and "French."

As I mentioned to you, George Ball will spend the next two weeks as an NSC consultant working on the Iranian problem.¹⁰ He is very pessimistic and concerned about the situation. His pessimism is shared by Clark Clifford, who has sent me a long memo bearing on Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf.¹¹ Both feel that we will increasingly have to search for alternative arrangements.

There is no question in my mind that we are confronting the beginning of a major crisis, in some ways similar to the one in Europe in the late 40's. Fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance to us are threatened with fragmentation.

The resulting political vacuum might well be filled by elements more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. This is especially likely since there is a pervasive feeling in the area that the U.S. is no longer in a position to offer effective political and military protection.

If the above analysis is correct, the West as a whole may be faced with a challenge of historic proportions. A shift in Iranian/Saudi orientation would have a direct impact on trilateral cohesion, and it would induce in time more "neutralist" attitudes on the part of some of our key allies. In a sentence, it would mean a fundamental shift in the global structure of power.

President Truman confronted a similar crisis in the late 40's in Western Europe. At that time, internal weaknesses also interacted with an external challenge. It took a very major and collective effort to respond effectively. That response involved a long-term solution for political initiatives as well as more direct security commitments.

I have asked an interagency group to review this problem on an urgent basis. Though Ball will work primarily on Iran, I might have him give some thought to this subject as well.

Before too long, we may have to consult also with our primary allies regarding the need for a collective response, lest the kind of instability that we are seeing in Pakistan and Iran becomes also manifest in the Persian Gulf. This subject will doubtless come up in the January meeting, and before then we will have some recommendations for you regarding what needs to be done by the U.S. alone, by the U.S. and its principal allies, and by the countries directly concerned.

In the meantime, it might be appropriate for you to mention this emerging problem in some of your discussions with Congressional leaders and also to bear it in mind when you are making some of your

¹⁰ Documentation on Ball's mission is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977-November 1979.

¹¹ Not further identified.

key decisions regarding the defense budget and other foreign policy issues (SALT, China, the Arab/Israeli dispute).

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

101. Remarks by President Carter¹

Washington, December 6, 1978

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

What I have to say today is fundamentally very simple. It's something I've said many times, including my acceptance speech when I was nominated as President and my inaugural speech when I became President.² But it cannot be said too often or too firmly nor too strongly.

As long as I am President, the Government of the United States will continue throughout the world to enhance human rights. No force on Earth can separate us from that commitment.

This week we commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We rededicate ourselves—in the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, who was the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission—to the Universal Declaration as, and I quote from her, “a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations.”

The Universal Declaration and the human rights conventions that derive from it do not describe the world as it is. But these documents are very important, nonetheless. They are a beacon, a guide to a future of personal security, political freedom, and social justice.

For millions of people around the globe that beacon is still quite distant, a glimmer of light on a dark horizon of deprivation and repression. The reports of Amnesty International, the International Commis-

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 2161–2165. The President spoke at noon in the East Room at the White House at a ceremony commemorating the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Prior to delivering these remarks, the President hosted a reception and briefing by administration officials for human rights activists, members of Congress, and administration officials involved in human rights policy formation. For the text of comments made by the President, Vance, Brzezinski, and Derian at the briefing, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 176.

² See Documents 7 and 15.

sion of Jurists, the International League for Human Rights, and many other nongovernmental human rights organizations amply document the practices and conditions that destroy the lives and the spirit of countless human beings.

Political killings, tortures, arbitrary and prolonged detention without trial or without a charge, these are the cruelest and the ugliest of human rights violations. Of all human rights, the most basic is to be free of arbitrary violence, whether that violence comes from government, from terrorists, from criminals, or from self-appointed messiahs operating under the cover of politics or religion.

But governments—because of their power, which is so much greater than that of an individual—have a special responsibility. The first duty of a government is to protect its own citizens, and when government itself becomes the perpetrator of arbitrary violence against its citizens, it undermines its own legitimacy.

There are other violations of the body and the spirit which are especially destructive of human life. Hunger, disease, poverty are enemies of human potential which are as relentless as any repressive government.

The American people want the actions of their government, our government, both to reduce human suffering and to increase human freedom. That's why—with the help and encouragement of many of you in this room—I have sought to rekindle the beacon of human rights in American foreign policy. Over the last 2 years we've tried to express these human concerns as our diplomats practice their craft and as our Nation fulfills its own international obligations.

We will speak out when individual rights are violated in other lands. The Universal Declaration means that no nation can draw the cloak of sovereignty over torture, disappearances, officially sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction of freedom within its own borders. The message that is being delivered by all our representatives abroad—whether they are from the Department of State or Commerce or Agriculture or Defense or whatever—is that the policies regarding human rights count very much in the character of our own relations with other individual countries.

In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to development. Toward regimes which persist in wholesale violations of human rights, we will not hesitate to convey our outrage, nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected.

In the coming year, I hope that Congress will take a step that has been long overdue for a generation, the ratification of the Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.³ As you know, the genocide convention was also adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 30 years ago this week, 1 day before the adoption of the Universal Declaration. It was the world's affirmation that the lesson of the Holocaust would never be forgotten, but unhappily, genocide is not peculiar to any one historical era.

Eighty-three other nations have ratified the genocide convention. The United States, despite the support of every President since 1948, has not. In international meetings at the United Nations and elsewhere, when I meet with foreign leaders, we are often asked why. We do not have an acceptable answer.

I urge the United States Senate to observe this anniversary in the only appropriate way, by ratifying the genocide convention at the earliest possible date.

This action must be the first step toward the ratification of other human rights instruments, including those I signed a year ago.⁴ Many of the religious and human rights groups represented here have undertaken a campaign of public education on behalf of these covenants. I commend and appreciate your efforts.

Refugees are the living, homeless casualties of one very important failure on the part of the world to live by the principles of peace and human rights. To help these refugees is a simple human duty. As Americans, as a people made up largely of the descendants of refugees, we feel that duty with special keenness.

Our country will do its utmost to ease the plight of stranded refugees from Indochina and from Lebanon and of released political prisoners from Cuba and from elsewhere. I hope that we will always stand ready to welcome more than our fair share of those who flee their homelands because of racial, religious, or political oppression.

The effectiveness of our human rights policy is now an established fact. It has contributed to an atmosphere of change—sometimes disturbing—but which has encouraged progress in many ways and in many places. In some countries, political prisoners have been released by the hundreds, even thousands. In others, the brutality of repression has been lessened. In still others there's a movement toward democratic institutions or the rule of law when these movements were not previously detectable.

To those who doubt the wisdom of our dedication, I say this: Ask the victims. Ask the exiles. Ask the governments which continue to practice repression. Whether in Cambodia or Chile, in Uganda or South

³ See footnote 7, Document 9.

⁴ See footnote 9, Document 9.

Africa, in Nicaragua or Ethiopia or the Soviet Union, governments know that we in the United States care. And not a single one of those who is actually taking risks or suffering for human rights has ever asked me to desist in our support of basic human rights. From the prisons, from the camps, from the enforced exiles, we receive one message: Speak up, persevere, let the voice of freedom be heard.

I'm very proud that our Nation stands for more than military might or political might. It stands for ideals that have their reflection in the aspirations of peasants in Latin America, workers in Eastern Europe, students in Africa, and farmers in Asia.

We do live in a difficult and complicated world, a world in which peace is literally a matter of survival. Our foreign policy must take this into account. Often, a choice that moves us toward one goal tends to move us further away from another goal. Seldom do circumstances permit me or you to take actions that are wholly satisfactory to everyone.

But I want to stress again that human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States. Our human rights policy is not a decoration. It is not something we've adopted to polish up our image abroad or to put a fresh coat of moral paint on the discredited policies of the past. Our pursuit of human rights is part of a broad effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world, a world in which human beings can live in peace, in freedom, and with their basic needs adequately met.

Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy. And I say this with assurance, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.

For the most part, other nations are held together by common racial or ethnic ancestry, or by a common creed or religion, or by ancient attachments to the land that go back for centuries of time. Some nations are held together by the forces, implied forces of a tyrannical government. We are different from all of those, and I believe that we in our country are more fortunate.

As a people we come from every country and every corner of the Earth. We are of many religions and many creeds. We are of every race, every color, every ethnic and cultural background. We are right to be proud of these things and of the richness that lend to the texture of our national life. But they are not the things which unite us as a single people.

What unites us—what makes us Americans—is a common belief in peace, in a free society, and a common devotion to the liberties enshrined in our Constitution. That belief and that devotion are the sources of our sense of national community. Uniquely, ours is a nation founded on an idea of human rights. From our own history we know how powerful that idea can be.

Next week marks another human rights anniversary—Bill of Rights Day. Our Nation was “conceived in liberty,” in Lincoln’s words, but it has taken nearly two centuries for that liberty to approach maturity.

For most of the first half of our history, black Americans were denied even the most basic human rights. For most of the first two-thirds of our history, women were excluded from the political process. Their rights and those of Native Americans are still not constitutionally guaranteed and enforced. Even freedom of speech has been threatened periodically throughout our history. Only in the last 10 to 12 years have we achieved what Father Hesburgh has called “the legal abandonment of more than three centuries of apartheid.” And the struggle for full human rights for all Americans—black, brown, and white; male and female; rich and poor—is far from over.

To me, as to many of you, these are not abstract matters or ideas. In the rural Georgia country where I grew up, the majority of my own fellow citizens were denied many basic rights—the right to vote, the right to speak freely without fear, the right to equal treatment under the law. I saw at first hand the effects of a system of deprivation of rights. I saw the courage of those who resisted that system. And finally, I saw the cleansing energies that were released when my own region of this country walked out of darkness and into what Hubert Humphrey, in the year of the adoption of the Universal Declaration, called “the bright sunshine of human rights.”⁵

The American Bill of Rights is 187 years old, and the struggle to make it a reality has occupied every one of those 187 years. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is only 30 years old. In the perspective of history, the idea of human rights has only just been broached.

I do not draw this comparison because I want to counsel patience. I draw it because I want to emphasize, in spite of difficulties, steadfastness and commitment.

A hundred and eighty-seven years ago, as far as most Americans were concerned, the Bill of Rights was a bill of promises. There was no guarantee that those promises would ever be fulfilled. We did not realize those promises by waiting for history to take its inevitable course. We realized them because we struggled. We realized them because many sacrificed. We realized them because we persevered.

⁵ Reference is to a speech Humphrey delivered at the 1948 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia. Humphrey, then Mayor of Minneapolis, supported a civil rights plank in the Democratic Party platform and used the speech to advocate for that position. Convention delegates ultimately accepted the plank. In November 1948, Humphrey, the DFL candidate, defeated incumbent Republican Joseph Ball for a U.S. Senate seat.

For millions of people around the world today the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is still only a declaration of hope. Like all of you, I want that hope to be fulfilled. The struggle to fulfill it will last longer than the lifetimes of any of us. Indeed, it will last as long as the lifetime of humanity itself. But we must persevere.

And we must persevere by ensuring that this country of ours, leader in the world, which we love so much, is always in the forefront of those who are struggling for that great hope, the great dream of universal human rights.

Thank you very much.

102. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Two Years Down; Two to Go (U)

After each half year in 1977, I sent you an appraisal of the Administration's foreign policy record.² Two years since you took office may be an even better time to review both the record and the tasks ahead. I haven't tried to examine the whole field—focusing only on a few salient areas. (U)

1. *War and Peace*. The main accomplishment of the last two years was in reducing the chances of war in the two most dangerous areas of possible US-Soviet conflict: (C)

a. In the *Middle East*, there is a greater chance of setting in motion a process that could lead to peace than at any time since the creation of Israel. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 27, Goals/Initiatives: 6/77–12/78. Confidential. Sent for information. Owen sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a December 8 handwritten note, indicating that it was for the President. Dodson wrote the following comment on the note: "ZB—I did not clear this with anyone—it seemed like a personal analysis. CD." Brzezinski initialed the top-right hand corner of the memorandum and, according to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, sent it to the President on December 11. The President wrote "Generous—J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 184.

² For Owen's 1977 mid-year appraisal, see Document 54. The end of year appraisal is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 91.

b. In *Central Europe*, a NATO buildup has been launched, which seems likely to restore the military stability that had been called into question by Soviet military programs in the mid-1970s. (C)

These are big improvements. There are still a lot of risks ahead, particularly in unstable countries on the periphery of the USSR, but we're clearly better off than in December 1976. This improvement was made possible because we had our priorities right: During the campaign you said that the main focus of US foreign policy should be on constructive cooperation with our friends. What we have done to this end in Europe and the Middle East has been more important in reducing risk of war than anything that has been, or could have been, accomplished in direct dealings with the USSR. (C)

Substantial progress has also been made in those dealings, however; the main advantage of SALT-II may be in paving the way for a more ambitious SALT-III agreement, in which we can get at the principal cause of nuclear instability: technological change. This argues for seeking a SALT-II whose ratification will not provoke such intense opposition or leave such a residue of bitterness in this country as to prejudice our ability to move quickly to far-reaching follow-on negotiations. (C)

2. *Prosperity*. The second test of a successful foreign policy is whether it helps or hurts our economic well-being. (U)

You worked out a strategy with our partners at Bonn³ that is bearing fruit: Germany and Japan have taken stimulus measures; the US is giving fighting inflation top priority; and these policies are creating a convergence of economic policies that Jacques de Larosiere, head of the IMF, believes portends a steadily improving world economic situation. (U)

We have also taken a stagnant *Multinational Trade Negotiation* and brought it to the verge of success. (U)

Energy remains a problem, but we're moving in the right direction—toward deregulation, which will allow market forces to reduce oil imports and spur oil production. Your recent anti-inflation decisions have strengthened OPEC confidence in the dollar and thus moderated pressures for price increases. (C)

These achievements create a good prospect for a strong dollar and a continuing reduction in the US external deficit. To fulfill this prospect, we will need in the next two years to: (U)

—press Japan to adopt a more stimulative domestic policy (de Larosiere considers Japan's failure to fulfill its 7% growth target world economic problem #1); (C)

³ See Document 92.

—ratify and implement an MTN agreement (an effort that Bob Strauss says will make the Panama Canal look like a picnic);⁴ (C)

—allow the US oil price gradually to rise to world levels, as pledged at Bonn; (U)

—press your export promotion program, even when this conflicts with other US objectives; (C)

—make our exports more competitive, by increasing US investment and productivity—even if this means tax changes and cutting back on otherwise desirable government regulations. (C)

More important than any of these will be how we prosecute the fight on inflation, which is treated under (4) below. (U)

3. *North-South*. You said in the campaign that you would restore morality to US foreign policy. This means different things to different people. To me, it means helping the one billion people in the world who live in desperate poverty. (U)

Most of these people are not in the middle-income developing countries; these countries, moreover, do not need concessional aid. What they need is a good MTN agreement, and strong multilateral financial institutions from which they can borrow on hard terms. We have moved actively to achieve both. This Administration's lead in creating the new IMF facility⁵ and our progress in making up our World Bank arrearages is in refreshing contrast to past US neglect of these two institutions. The case for thus helping middle-income countries is clear in terms of US self interest: They are increasingly important economic partners. (U)

The case for helping poor developed countries rests on a longer term consideration, our interest in meeting global problems, and on moral grounds: When Bob Lipshutz swore in members of the Hunger Commission,⁶ he referred to a quotation from Matthew; when I had looked it up, it seemed to me the best justification of aid to poor countries that I had read: "In as much as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."⁷ We're not ashamed to take moral considerations into account in our private lives; there's no reason we shouldn't do so as a nation, as well. (U)

⁴ The President underlined the phrase "make this look like a picnic." In the left-hand margin next to this point, he wrote: "nothing could do this."

⁵ Reference is to the Witteveen Facility; see footnote 4, Document 54.

⁶ Reference is to the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, which met for the first time on October 5. Owen assumed White House oversight for the Commission in mid-July. For information concerning the Commission's membership, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 251.

⁷ Reference is to the New Testament book of Matthew, chapter 25, verse 40.

Your Administration has significantly increased foreign aid. The biggest increase has been in multilateral aid; this makes sense because one US dollar here mobilizes three dollars from other donors. You have also improved the quality of aid by directing concessional development loans and PL 480 more clearly to the needs of poor people in poor countries—leaving hard loans to meet the needs of middle-income countries and SSA to meet political needs. This maximizes the amount of concessional aid available for the poor. (U)

We have moved toward the developing countries' views about the Common Fund, although it's not yet clear whether this will result in agreement.⁸ (U)

North-South oratorical tensions persist, and this will continue for some time. But US *substantive* policies toward LDC's have improved and this should be reflected in these countries' attitudes, as well as prospects. (U)

Our main North-South task in the next two years will be to continue these policies. The most important innovation may be creation of the Foundation for International Technical Cooperation with developing countries announced in your Caracas speech.⁹ The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are so impressed that they have said they might contribute \$10 million.¹⁰ (U)

All this may have only a limited political pay-off, at least in the short run; aid recipients are not noted for their gratitude. But it will have a lot to do with what happens to a good many human beings—and thus with whether your effort to restore moral purpose to US foreign policy succeeds. (U)

4. *Conclusion.* A common thread runs through this memo: Your foreign policy achievements to date have been considerable—more than most Presidents can count in their first two years; ultimate success rests on continuing these policies in the next two years. (U)

But here is the dilemma: Success of your foreign policy also rests on your anti-inflation program achieving its goals. This will probably, as I suggested after the London Summit, have to be our central task for the next several years: Like European countries and Japan in the early 1970's, we will have to stick to tight fiscal and monetary policies, de-

⁸ See footnote 8, Document 99.

⁹ Reference is to the President's March 29 speech before the Venezuelan Congress. In it, the President commented: "For the rest of this century, the greatest potential for growth is in the developing world. To become more self-reliant, developing nations need to strengthen their technological capabilities. To assist them, I am proposing a new United States foundation for technological collaboration." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 621) For the full text of the President's remarks, see *ibid.*, pp. 619–623.

¹⁰ In the right-hand margin, the President drew an arrow to this sentence and wrote: "Let's pursue aggressively."

spite the pressures that slowing growth and rising unemployment may create for premature reflation. (U)

This anti-inflation campaign will, by its nature, call into question some of the other policies described above—e.g., the NATO defense build-up, allowing US oil prices to rise to world levels in 1980, and increasing our aid for developing countries. Posing this dilemma doesn't tell us *what* decisions we should make about these problems. But it does suggest *how* we should make them. When other industrial countries faced similar choices, we were quick to remind them that their decisions affected us and that we wanted to be consulted. The reverse is even more true, given our central position in the alliance. (C)

This won't be easy: It's hard enough to make choices within the pluralistic US government, let alone involve other countries. Yet it will be the price of holding together the alliance among industrial democracies on which our security and prosperity depends. A defense program that involves less than a 3% increase, an aid program that doesn't rise as rapidly as we had hoped, oil prices that reach world levels in 1981 rather than 1980—these changes may be manageable. But only if our allies feel that their views and interests have been taken into account, as we make these hard choices in the next two years. (C)

103. Statement by the Representative to the United Nations (Young)¹

New York, December 14, 1978

The world-awakening to human rights and fundamental freedoms that emerged in 1948 in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has taken on a new urgency in the past few years. For perhaps the first time in history we can truly say that there is a worldwide human rights movement, and it is steadily gaining force.

Mahatma Gandhi in 1921 wrote that every good movement passes through five stages: indifference, ridicule, abuse, repression, and, finally, respect. We know that human rights abuses are usually, when first noted, regarded with indifference. Then will come the ridicule, then the abuse, and perhaps even the repression. This is the path of progress. It has been true in the United States, India, across the African

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1979, pp. 59–60. All brackets are in the original. Young made the statement in plenary.

Continent. It is no less true in the East or Middle East than it has been in the West and South. It is part of the process of widening participation in the public dialogue, of expanding the concerns and concepts we use when we develop public and international policy.

There is no room for self-righteousness and self-congratulation in the field of human rights. Each of our nations has people of vision and people of fear, those who create and those who repress and torture. I believe we should identify particular problems and work together toward solving them. It is better to solve one small problem than to engage in political fireworks about the grand issues of our time. We have the potential of a new pragmatism in these halls, and I hope it grows.

Behind this new pragmatism is, I think, the growing realization that we, indeed, have common goals and that if we stop fearing and fighting each other we might find some practical solutions. The task is too serious to waste our effort in nonproductive exercises. We are faced with the necessity of promoting worldwide rapid, peaceful social change if we are to move toward the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In 1967, a few months before his death, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., reflected on the next steps of the struggle for full human rights and came to the conclusion that the crisis of the modern world is international in scope and that this is a crisis that “involves the poor, the dispossessed, and the exploited of the whole world.”²

Today, more than 1 billion people live in conditions of abject poverty—starving, idle, and numbed by ignorance. Life expectancy in the poorest countries is only slightly greater than half that in the industrialized countries.

The sad fact is that most of the people in these countries who were born in the year we adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not around anymore to celebrate this occasion. And most of those who are still here have very little to celebrate. Three quarters of their number in these countries do not have access to safe water. They cannot read the speeches we make today honoring human rights. They earn less money in a year than most of us in this hall of the United Nations earn in 1 day—and even that is only a figure of speech, since most of them have never been paid at all for their work.

The birthright of these people has been disregarded, denied, and violated, although it was done not by torturers, not by jailers, not by persecution, and not by repressive government. As President Carter re-

² King delivered these remarks as part of five lectures he delivered for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in November and December 1967.

minded us a week ago: "Hunger, disease, poverty are enemies of human potential which are as relentless as any repressive government."³

The freedoms from arbitrariness, torture, and cruel punishment are the rights of everyone by the simple fact that he or she is born. The freedom of thought, speech, religion, press, and participation in public affairs are so fundamental that they enhance the quality of our life and character as individuals. Their exercise cannot be made dependent on any other considerations. But we must understand too that these rights are hollow for any individual who starves to death. Therefore, the human rights struggle is not only a defense of our individual liberty but also a struggle to protect life.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a call for worldwide movements to promote human rights. This call is often heard with alarm by many who believe that there is far more to lose than to gain by encouraging political, economic, and social change. Perhaps, in the short run, there is some cost for those who have special privilege or for those who have an investment in thinking of themselves—as a nation or class or race—as superior or more advanced than others. But the plain lesson of history is that as the circle of participation in society widens, almost everyone profits. They profit not just in a better standard of living for everyone but in the productivity of the economy, in better social services for everyone, in wider political participation, and in more freedom and more protection for human rights.

The process of change entails risks. But change is inevitable. It is not a question of being able to withstand change or even of directing it; it is a question of understanding change and cooperating with it. The change of our time, the basic dynamic of our time, leads to more participation by more people in society. Poverty is the basic obstacle to the realization of human rights for most people in the world today. Where poverty is the problem, participation is the answer, participation in the economic life of the society. Economic growth must be pursued with equity in mind and not just for the profit of the few at the top or for the power of the state and the government. The ultimate goal of economic development must be equity, with broader participation in production and consumption by all as the main objective. Speaking before the opening session of the 8th General Assembly of the Organization of American States [June 21, 1978], President Carter said: "The challenge

³ Made at a ceremony on Dec. 6, 1978, commemorating the adoption of the Universal Declaration (for full text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 1979, p. 1) [Footnote in the original. The President's address is printed as Document 101.]

of economic development is to help the world's poor lift themselves out of misery."⁴

He called upon that Assembly to join together the concepts of economic development and social justice: "We must also devote our common energies to economic development and the cause of social justice. Benefits of the world's economy must be more fairly shared, but the responsibilities must be shared as well."

To share responsibility is to make more participation possible. The more participation, the wiser will be the government. Prime Minister Manley made a stirring affirmation of his own faith in democracy when he spoke to us in October. He was, you will recall, urging us to united efforts in the struggle against apartheid. He said: "We believe that any government which has the courage to mobilize its people and tell the truth will receive the overwhelming support of its citizens." I also believe that. We must let our people hear the truth, the whole truth. And we must not be afraid to mobilize our citizens to participate more fully in the political and economic processes.

Expanding participation should not be limited, however, to government initiative. There is an important role for nongovernmental organizations. For the last year the Government of India has been reminding us of the importance of autonomous—and I stress that word—autonomous national human rights institutions.

We need not fear change if we build into it more equity and more participation. Indeed, fear of social change is the thing we need to fear the most. If we are afraid of it and try to preserve that which is already eroding beneath our feet, we will fail, because the dynamic of history is to widen the circle of those who participate in society. Whether the struggle is for medical care for those who do not have it, bread for those who are hungry, freedom from prison for those imprisoned for conscience's sake, freedom of the press to print dissenting opinions, a job for those who are unemployed, the right to self-determination of majorities oppressed by minorities, the right of workers to organize, the right to speak one's own language in one's own school—all of these are demands for more participation and more dignity.

If we invest just half as much energy and imagination in building a world community of the people as we have wasted in resisting the aspirations of the people, we will overcome.

I believe that we are at the end of the period of cold wars, in the middle of the era of detente, and just beginning to find ways to build the structures of cooperation. Cooperation will demand a different sub-

⁴ The President's remarks are printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1141–1146.

stance and different style than confrontation. It will take a while for us to learn how to change, and I am afraid that we will all carry with us for some years some of the characteristics of confrontational politics. But it is more rewarding for everyone, even if it is more difficult and demanding, to practice the art of building community and cooperation for the common good. I believe we can get just as excited about building something as we can about protecting something. I believe that cooperation for the common good of humankind can be as powerful an incentive to our imaginations as fear for our survival. Indeed, I submit that cooperation for the common good, for the protection and promotion of human rights, is the way to survival.

Perhaps some neglected methods can be of great help to us in the struggle to promote and protect human rights.

First, an emphasis on autonomous, national institutions. We have not given due credit, nor due attention, to the creative role of independent, private institutions, dedicated to the protection and promotion of human rights. My own experience was with the civil rights movement and the churches of this country, and I know what they were able to do in a few short years. Also, the role of a free and responsible press needs to be recognized. The press can be a guardian of the public interest and a critic of the abuses—where they exist—of public power, and of private power, for that matter.

A second way to promote human rights is the use of the United Nations and of government authority and influence as a catalyst and agent of goodwill in stimulating a process of participation by those who have common interests and concerns. The United Nations and interested nations are doing this in the case of Zimbabwe and Namibia, where the effort is not to impose a solution but to facilitate the building of communication among all the parties which are concerned, so that by talking to one another they learn to formulate their own solutions to their own problems.

This is what the United States has been trying to do in the Middle East; acting not as a judge between Egypt and Israel but as a mediator, trying to be a catalyst in a process of ever-expanding conversation and cooperation. This is what the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala are trying to do in Nicaragua; not the imposition of an external answer but the strengthening of the process of consultation among all parties involved so they can find their own answers.⁵

I believe we can be even more active in this way than we have been at the United Nations. It is not enough to halt conflicts and to provide buffer or peacekeeping forces. It is not enough to denounce problems

⁵ Reference is to the ongoing tripartite mediation efforts in Nicaragua.

or supposed culprits. We must find a positive, creative role, of being the catalyst of change, of promoting the process of wider participation where there are conflicts so that all the parties are involved.

In the struggle to make all people free, we ourselves must become free. Freedom is not some distant state of affairs when there will be no more problems and history will have arrived at some utopia, some paradise, some order of perfect justice. Freedom is solidarity with those who are less free than we are. Freedom is taking the risk of working for social justice for all people.

The United Nations was brought forth as a result of the struggle for freedom against tyranny. There are many forms of tyranny, and none of us are exempt from the temptation to conspire with tyranny against freedom by remaining indifferent to the struggle of others to be free. But our very humanity rests in our capacity to identify with the other and to join in the struggle to make all persons free.

The United Nations is now challenged to take the next steps that can move us forward in the struggle of humankind for peace, justice, and freedom. If we accept this challenge, I believe we will all be free someday.

104. Address by President Carter to the Nation¹

Washington, December 15, 1978

Diplomatic Relations Between the United States
and the People's Republic of China

Good evening,

I would like to read a joint communique which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China:

¹Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 2264–2266. All brackets are in the original. The President spoke at 9 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on radio and television. In his diary entry for that day, the President commented: "The big day for the China announcement. We were favorably impressed with Teng and the rapidity with which he moved and agreed to accept our one-year treaty with Taiwan, our statement that the Taiwan issue should be settled peacefully would not be contradicted by China, and that we would sell defensive weapons to Taiwan after the treaty expires." (*White House Diary*, p. 265) For the official U.S. statement issued on December 15, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, p. 2266.

[*At this point, the President read the text of the joint communique, which reads as follows:*]

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique² and emphasize once again that:

- Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
- Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
- Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
- The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
- Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

Yesterday, our country and the People's Republic of China reached this final historic agreement. On January 1, 1979, a little more than 2 weeks from now, our two Governments will implement full normalization of diplomatic relations.

As a nation of gifted people who comprise about one-fourth of the total population of the Earth, China plays, already, an important role in world affairs, a role that can only grow more important in the years ahead.

² See footnote 6, Document 29.

We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or expedient reasons. In recognizing the People's Republic of China, that it is the single Government of China, we are recognizing simple reality. But far more is involved in this decision than just the recognition of a fact.

Before the estrangement of recent decades, the American and the Chinese people had a long history of friendship. We've already begun to rebuild some of those previous ties. Now our rapidly expanding relationship requires the kind of structure that only full diplomatic relations will make possible.

The change that I'm announcing tonight will be of great long-term benefit to the peoples of both our country and China—and, I believe, to all the peoples of the world. Normalization—and the expanded commercial and cultural relations that it will bring—will contribute to the well-being of our own Nation, to our own national interest, and it will also enhance the stability of Asia. These more positive relations with China can beneficially affect the world in which we live and the world in which our children will live.

We have already begun to inform our allies and other nations and the Members of the Congress of the details of our intended action. But I wish also tonight to convey a special message to the people of Taiwan—I have already communicated with the leaders in Taiwan—with whom the American people have had and will have extensive, close, and friendly relations. This is important between our two peoples.

As the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, issued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. I have paid special attention to ensuring that normalization of relations between our country and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan. The people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade, and other relations with Taiwan through nongovernmental means. Many other countries in the world are already successfully doing this.

These decisions and these actions open a new and important chapter in our country's history and also in world affairs.

To strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship between China and the United States, I am pleased to announce that Vice Premier Teng has accepted my invitation and will visit Washington at the end of January.³ His visit will give our Governments the opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin working together to enhance the cause of world peace.

³ For documentation on Deng's visit, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 201–210.

These events are the final result of long and serious negotiations begun by President Nixon in 1972, and continued under the leadership of President Ford. The results bear witness to the steady, determined, bipartisan effort of our own country to build a world in which peace will be the goal and the responsibility of all nations.

The normalization of relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than this: the advancement of peace. It is in this spirit, at this season of peace, that I take special pride in sharing this good news with you tonight.

Thank you very much.

105. Editorial Note

On December 15, 1978, following his address to the nation regarding the normalization of relations with China (see Document 104), President Jimmy Carter spoke to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room. The President began his remarks by underscoring the historical importance of the announcement:

“It’s something that I and my two predecessors have sought avidly. We have maintained our own United States position firmly, and only since the last few weeks has there been an increasing demonstration to us that Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng have been ready to normalize relations. I think the interests of Taiwan have been adequately protected. One of the briefers will explain the details to you.”

The President then noted that he had spoken with Japanese Prime Minister Ohira and that the administration had also notified Taiwanese leaders and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. He continued:

“My own assessment is that this will be well received in almost every nation of the world, perhaps all of them, because it will add to stability. And the Soviets and others know full well, because of our own private explanations to them, not just recently but in months gone by, that we have no desire whatsoever to use our new relationships with China to the disadvantage of the Soviets or anyone else. We believe this will enhance stability and not cause instability in Asia and the rest of the world.

“I’m very pleased with it. And I obviously have to give a major part of the credit to President Nixon and to President Ford, who laid the groundwork for this successful negotiation. And most of the premises that were spelled out in the Shanghai Communiqué 6 years ago or more have been implemented now.

“You can tell that I’m pleased, and I know that the world is waiting for your accurate explanation of the results.”

The President replied to one question about the reaction of the congressional leadership to the announcement before indicating that he would answer one additional question. Answering a question about the Taiwanese response, the President commented:

“I doubt if there will be massive applause in Taiwan, but we are going to do everything we can to assure the Taiwanese that we put at top—as one of the top priorities in our own relationships with the People’s Republic and them—that the well-being of the people of Taiwan will not be damaged.

“To answer the other question, I don’t think this will have any adverse effect at all on the SALT negotiations as an independent matter. And I think that the Soviets, as I said earlier, have been expecting this development. They were not surprised, and we have kept them informed recently. Their reaction has not been adverse, and we will proceed aggressively as we have in recent months, in fact throughout my own administration, to conclude a successful SALT agreement.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 2267–2268*)

On December 19, at 4:30 p.m., the President participated in a taped interview for broadcast on the CBS television network. CBS Evening News anchor Walter Cronkite conducted the interview from the CBS studios in New York; the President was in the Map Room at the White House. Cronkite began the interview by noting that the United States had not received any commitment from the government in Beijing that it would not “use force to take Taiwan.” He asked the President if the current, or a subsequent, government in China attempted reunification, would the United States deploy force to help the Taiwanese resist. Carter responded:

“In the first place, the People’s Republic of China does not have the capability of launching a 120-mile attack across the ocean against Taiwan, who are heavily fortified and also heavily armed. And we have made it clear to the People’s Republic that after this year, when the treaty does expire, this coming year, that we will sell to Taiwan defensive weapons.

“I think it is accurate to say also, Walter, that the major interest that the People’s Republic of China has in the Western Pacific is peace and good relationships with us. They know our firm expectations, clearly expressed to them, that the differences between China and Taiwan will be settled peacefully. And I think to violate that understanding with us would be to wipe out all the benefits to them and to Asia of peace and their new relationship with us.

“We have, obviously, a desire and a commitment to maintain peace in the Western Pacific. And as would be the case with an alterca-

tion between any two peoples, we would certainly be deeply concerned. But I don't want to speculate on under what circumstances we might take military action because I think it's an absolutely unnecessary speculation, because the people of China want peace, they want good relationships with us, and because Taiwan is so strong and will stay strong."

Cronkite then asked the President several questions about the Soviet response to the decision, the upcoming visits of Chinese officials, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) before addressing reactions some members of Congress had concerning the announcement:

"Mr. Cronkite. Mr. President, some Members of Congress, including Democrats and some liberal Republicans, are claiming that you failed to live up to an administration pledge to consult with Congress before taking any such action as you have toward Taiwan and Peking. And now, there's a threat of a court challenge to the constitutionality of your cancelling the treaty without congressional approval. How seriously do you view this? Do you feel that either Congress or the courts could block this arrangement with both Taiwan and Peking?"

"The President. No. My constitutional responsibility in establishing relationships with foreign countries is clear and cannot be successfully challenged in court.

"We have had constant consultations with the Congress over the past 2 years. And our goal in establishing normal relations with China has been made clear on numerous occasions by me personally. When Secretary Vance went to China and came back, he gave the Congress leaders and Members a thorough briefing. Dr. Brzezinski did the same thing after his visit to China. I have met with all the Members of Congress who would come to sessions here at the White House.

"One of the deliberate items on my own agenda in explaining to them and answering their questions was about the terms under which we would normalize relationships with China. I might add that when numerous delegations of congressional leaders have gone to the People's Republic and come back, they have also given me and Secretary of State Vance their views on what ought to be done. Almost invariably their recommendation was to proceed expeditiously with normalization of relations with China.

"So, there's been a clear understanding, really ever since 1972, of the policy of our Government toward China, a desire to normalize relations, and also a clear expression of my views both publicly and privately to the Members of Congress about our goals and the plans for accomplishing this goal.

"I might say in complete candor that in the last 2 or 3 weeks, when the negotiations were building up to a climax in an unanticipated degree of rapidity of movement, we did not consult with anyone outside

of a very tiny group within the executive branch of Government about the prospective success. But what did happen should not be a surprise to anyone. The congressional views were well known to me. My views were well known to the Members of Congress.

“Mr. Cronkite. Mr. President, what was the need for such haste? Why could you not have consulted with the congressional leaders first, before making the final commitment?”

“The President. Well, Walter, my experience in negotiating sensitive and complicated agreements with foreign leaders, including the experience at Camp David and otherwise, is that to negotiate through the news media, through public pronouncements and with wide divergencies of views expressed by different leaders in a country, is not conducive to success. And I’m authorized and directed by the Constitution and my responsibility is to conduct negotiations of this kind.

“We did not depart from the established policy of our country that’s been extant since President Nixon went to China in 1972. And I think had we caused a public debate in our country about all the ramifications of the negotiations at the very time we were trying to conclude these discussions with the Chinese, it would have resulted in failure. And our country would have lost a wonderful opportunity to a great stride forward and all the benefits that will be derived from this agreement.

“So, I don’t have any doubt that what I did was right and correct. I don’t have any doubts that had we made a public issue of it, it would have complicated the issue unnecessarily.”

Cronkite followed Carter’s answer with a question regarding the U.S.–Taiwan Defense Treaty, before concluding the interview with a question related to the Senate’s confirmation of the SALT II treaty:

“Mr. Cronkite. Do you think that putting the Chinese question on the agenda of the next session of Congress might complicate the confirmation of a SALT treaty?”

“The President. No, I think not. What we will ask the Congress to do next session is to pass special legislation to permit us to continue our cultural relations with Taiwan, our trade relations with Taiwan, the application of the Eximbank, and the support of loans to China—to the people of Taiwan, rather, and also to authorize us to sell weapons to Taiwan after the defense treaty expires.

“So, I think that even those who oppose the normalization of relations with China will favor the continued relationships with Taiwan, which this legislation will have to authorize. So, I don’t think this will complicate the other issues in Congress. They’re almost as complicated as they can get anyhow. I don’t think this will hurt at all.” (Ibid., pages 2275–2279)

106. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 28, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #83 (U)

1. *Opinion*

One of the major concerns of the other leaders present at Guadeloupe will be to obtain from you a sense of your strategic direction.² In part, this is due to some anxiety that this Administration does not have any overall scheme, and that the United States is no longer prepared to use its power to protect its interests or to impose its will on the flow of history. (S)

It is, therefore, quite critical that you use the meeting in order to share with your colleagues your thinking, especially on the level of high strategy, in addition to much more specific discussion of such issues as SALT, China, the Middle East, Iran, Africa, etc. (S)

I believe that as we enter 1979, you, quite literally, have a historic chance to start shaping a new global system, with the United States as its predominant coordinator if no longer the paramount power. The fulfillment of that opportunity depends critically on how you play the China/Soviet Union issues, and also on how you respond to the deteriorating situation along the Indian Ocean. (S)

The key issue is how you perceive and handle the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and how you fit your handling of that relationship into your wider strategy. There are different views of handling U.S.-Soviet relations, and important consequences flow from these differences. Your policy, as it has evolved through your speeches and actions, is quite distinctive and—I believe—historically more relevant. It is not: (S)

1. *Confrontation*, or renewed Cold War (e.g., Reagan): A bitter, hostile, head-on confrontation advocated almost as an end in itself. The key weakness of this approach is that the United States would eventually find itself alone in taking on the Russians, for this is too simplistic an image for the increasingly complex world. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 6-12/78. Secret; Nodis. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Reference is to the January 4-9, 1979, summit meeting in Guadeloupe, which the President, Callaghan, Giscard d'Estaing, and Schmidt were scheduled to attend. Documentation on the Guadeloupe summit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

2. *Condominium*, based on a balance of power to preserve the status quo (e.g., Nixon/Kissinger): This approach is based on the essentially pessimistic view that the West is in decline and that the best we can do is to prevent change in the central areas, while letting the Soviets win in the less important peripheries. The key weakness of this approach is that the world is too dynamic to sustain an essentially reactionary balance-of-power policy, while the “condominium” would be bitterly resented by everyone else, and thus would backfire strongly against our own alliance relationships. (S)

3. *Simply a Partnership* as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., McGovern): According to this view, a U.S.-Soviet partnership on a broad front, starting with SALT, will be the basis for world peace, and hence it ought to be the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. The key weakness of this approach, much as of the one above, is that it frightens our friends and allies, be they the West Europeans, Japanese, and lately the Chinese, and it can be easily translated into appeasement. Indeed, typical of this approach is its concomitant unwillingness even to criticize the Soviets either for their militant intrusion into Africa or for their excessive strategic build-up; as well as its willingness to give gratis assurances on the Chinese, asking nothing in return. In effect, alternatives 2 and 3 elevate the USSR into a global partner of the United States, while giving the Soviets a hunting license to exploit global turbulence to their advantage. (S)

Your policy, if I understand it correctly, seeks: (S)

4. *Reciprocal Accommodation*, which means (1) containment, (2) resistance to indirect expansion, (3) ideological competition, and, most important and above all, (4) creation of a framework *within which* the Soviet Union can accommodate with us, or face the prospect of isolating itself globally. This offers the best hope for the United States and for our values, and it avoids the risks inherent in the three other approaches mentioned above because it seeks to fit the U.S.-Soviet relationship into a cooperative context of U.S.-European-Japanese, and now also Chinese, relations. (S)

What does the fourth approach mean in practice? (S)

1. It means keeping open the option to the Soviets for genuine global cooperation with the United States, but doing so in a patient fashion. I think that we have made a mistake in putting so many deadlines on SALT and on Brezhnev’s visit here; that simply conveys over-anxiousness, the Soviets can exploit that against us, and we hurt ourselves domestically. We should stress to the Soviets that we are prepared to be patient, that there is a constructive place for them in a wider framework of international cooperation, that there are many global issues on which we could cooperate, and that we are prepared to seek detente and cooperation on the basis of genuine reciprocity, as in-

licated in your Annapolis speech.³ And, if that reciprocity is missing, as it has been on Africa, Cuba, and the Persian Gulf, we are prepared to assert our interests. (S)

2. It means cooperating with Europe and Japan in drawing China into a more genuine involvement in global cooperation, pointing toward a world of diversity. You should explain to Teng, and also to the "Gang of Guadeloupe," that diversity is the same thing as non-hegemony; i.e., pluralism. In that sense we have genuinely compatible strategic objectives with the Europeans, Japanese, *and* the Chinese. This compatibility has to be cultivated cautiously but consistently. Moreover, if the Chinese were to sense that we are timid, or that we are using them only to obtain a better bargain for a bilateral accommodation with the Soviets, they could swing quickly to the other extreme. (S)

3. It means facing up to the danger that the Soviet military build-up is likely to intersect with regional instability. In fact, it has already started doing so, first in Africa, and now, and potentially much more dangerously, in the Persian Gulf. (S)

The required response involves *not* giving the Soviets gratis guarantees on China. Whenever the Soviets ask for assurances regarding China, we should be responsive by saying that we do not intend to exploit China against the Soviet Union, but couple that with a pointed request for the withdrawal of Cubans from Africa and for a halt to Soviet activities in the Persian Gulf. (S)

In any case, we should not allow ourselves to be drawn into sponsoring a blockade of China from defensive West European arms, since a strong and secure China is an essential contribution to global stability, and the Chinese are entitled to acquire defensive arms from the West. (In the past, the Soviets were not shy about arming the Chinese against us.) (S)

4. It requires a U.S. military posture which is adequate to balance the Soviet Union through essential equivalence and adequate collective conventional forces. In brief, it means carrying out PD-18,⁴ with or without SALT. (S)

5. It means affirming our position on human rights, which greatly increases the moral appeal of the United States and provides an effective response to Soviet ideology. (S)

There is no doubt the global yearning for human rights is ready to be tapped, and you have started tapping it in a genuinely important fashion. I notice that the new Pope is beginning to join you in it. (S)

³ See Document 87.

⁴ PD/NSC-18, "U.S. National Strategy," issued August 24, 1977, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

6. With regard to the arc of instability along the Indian Ocean, we need to respond collectively, and that is a fitting subject for a special discussion in Guadeloupe. In the meantime, we may have to take some steps to convince the Soviets that we will back our friends in Iran, come what may. The disintegration of Iran, with Iran repeating the experience of Afghanistan, would be the most massive American defeat since the beginning of the Cold War, overshadowing in its *real consequences* the setback in Vietnam. (S)

7. It means, finally, making a basic decision on whether we will seek a breakthrough to peace in the Middle East sometime in the first half of 1979. The West Europeans can help us, if you choose to push hard, and we should make an early decision on this matter. I fear that without such an effort, the Middle East will become increasingly radicalized as it accommodates itself to the reality of U.S. inability to obtain a wider settlement and perhaps also to provide protection to the region from the Soviets. There is a subtle interaction between the problem of Iran, Turkey, and the Middle East, and a United States lead on these issues is quite necessary. You have been pointing in the right direction, and we should now mobilize our allies for more overt support on behalf of our efforts. These efforts, moreover, should be fitted into the larger framework which I have sketched out above. (S)

If you agree, some comments to that effect at Guadeloupe might provide your colleagues with the needed feeling that the United States has historical direction. If you do not agree, some alternative statement would still be desirable, for in either case the yearning for American leadership must somehow be met. (S)

2. Facts

Trends in World Opinion Toward the U.S. and USSR

Newly analyzed evidence on foreign opinion toward the U.S. and the USSR indicates that adverse trends, dating back nearly two decades, have been reversed in the last several years. From the early 1960s until the mid 1970s, sympathy for America was eroded by Vietnam and Watergate, while distrust of the Soviet Union was eroded by detente. As a result, the earlier favorable gap between Soviet and American standing in the eyes of European and Japanese publics narrowed dramatically. More recently, however, scattered but quite consistent polling results suggest that U.S. standing is beginning to recover, though it remains below the highs of the early 1960s, while Soviet standing by contrast has plummeted to depths unequalled in nearly two decades. (U)

The changes now apparently underway in Europe and Japan suggest that the U.S. is recapturing the political-ideological initiative that had slipped to the Soviets during the 1960s. In a parallel development,

the Department of State has recently reported that the American public's willingness to defend our principal allies has risen steadily since 1974. Taken together with the changes in foreign opinion, this evidence suggests that—whatever the ups and downs of day-to-day alliance affairs—the psychological underpinnings of our central alliances are in improving shape. (U)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

107. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Priorities for 1979–80

It is quite possible that, in addition to normalization with Peking, we will achieve in the next month or two both a SALT II agreement and completion of the Tokyo Round of the MTN. An Egyptian-Israeli treaty is also possible if the next few weeks produce greater flexibility.

Success on even three of these four issues, on top of the Panama Canal Treaty, would represent historic foreign policy achievements for the first two years of your Administration. At the same time, it becomes especially important to look at some of the implications of such successes for our foreign policy priorities and activities over the next two years. I have been reviewing these priorities in some detail, and thought it would be useful to present for your consideration a summary of this review.

SALT, MTN, and the Middle East agreements, as well as China normalization, would mean that foreign policy issues will have a high visibility here in the U.S. as we head into 1980, despite the attention domestic priorities will receive in a time of fiscal austerity. The success of your first term will be greatly affected by our ability to gain Congressional approval of SALT and MTN agreements and measures related to

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 1/79. Secret; Nodis. Carter wrote "cc Cy Zbig—No other copies—Let Fritz, Ham [Jordan] read mine.]" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A notation on another copy of the memorandum in an unknown hand reads: "12/28/78: orig. to Secy Vance." (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 1, Misc: re Issues & Priorities '78)

China normalization. The difficulties of gaining such approval will be substantial, including likely erosion of the bi-partisan foreign policy support we have enjoyed.² Efforts with the Congress on these issues should therefore have priority over all other foreign policy concerns. Their success would bring significant substantive benefits and consolidate the leadership position of the United States. Setbacks would be very damaging to our relationships abroad and the Administration's ability to gain domestic support on other foreign policy issues.

We should plan our other foreign policy initiatives in this context. The review of specific issues that follows seeks to do so.

At the same time we should keep in mind the shape of our policies as a whole, and the impression they convey. Two years ago, we recognized that the U.S. must manage a broad foreign policy agenda, including, in addition to the core security issues, new emphasis on concerns such as nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, limiting conventional arms sales, and development in the Third World.³

It will be important that we maintain these goals, however we may shape our priorities and tactics during the next two years. Our human rights policies may come under increasing attack in certain domestic circles if friendly but authoritarian governments, where human rights have been an issue, give way to more radical or less friendly rule. Our nuclear non-proliferation concerns may well come under increasing pressure abroad. Without significant progress in gaining multilateral restraint, our unilateral conventional arms sales policies will become vulnerable. But, in each case, our goals are very important. We have been making progress on each issue. And our constancy on each is critical to our general credibility, even as we make pragmatic decisions about our tactics.⁴

In presenting our policies publicly, *we should emphasize that the practical progress we have made on central issues (SALT, China, trade, the Middle East) is fundamentally strengthening both our relationships abroad and the international system.* We should also continue to hold out our longer term vision of a world in which we have not only helped stabilize East-West relations and diffused regional tensions, but also have made progress on issues which will determine the quality of life for succeeding generations—e.g., development in the Third World, limiting population growth, the law of the seas, preserving the environ-

² The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "erosion" and ending with "support" and added in the left-hand margin: "We must prevent."

³ The President underlined the phrase "broad foreign policy agenda" and wrote "Should be kept clear to the public" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ The President underlined the word "constancy" and wrote "important" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

ment. These concerns have helped give a special character to this Administration's policies. Our human rights policies, which I believe are well conceived and managed, provide the philosophical core of our approach to the world.⁵

It will be especially important that we continue to work very closely with our allies abroad. We may find ourselves increasingly turning to them to share responsibilities in areas where we have in the past been able to exercise power almost exclusively on our own.⁶ This can be turned to our benefit by injecting increasing vitality and life into our alliance relationships. As the international system becomes more pluralistic and, during the next year or two, as the financial resources we can use to support our diplomacy become more constrained, we need to help our public think all the more in terms of Western interests, influence, and power rather than exclusively in terms of U.S. interests, influence and power. Our diplomacy in Africa and Europe over the past two years, for example with regard to Namibia and Zaire, CSCE and Cyprus, illustrates the advantages of such an approach.

We must also continue to project confidence in Western and American power and policies. We should emphasize our defense modernization efforts and our strong ties to NATO, Japan, ANZUS and a growing number of developing countries. While firmly responding to Soviet activities in ways that emphasize our own advantages in the Third World, we should be careful not to emphasize excessively Soviet strengths and gains in our own statements.⁷ Doing so would create fears within NATO and here at home that we cannot manage East-West relationships effectively. If we were to let our rhetoric run ahead of the practical responses realistically available to us, we would create expectations about our ability to dominate events that we could not then meet. This plays into the critics' hands, and creates a damaging and erroneous impression of weakness. It would hurt us at home and abroad, and could be especially damaging in SALT debates.

Running through this analysis is the point that we must, during the next two years, give consolidation of gains on SALT, China, MTN and the Middle East priority over other policies and new initiatives. The following thoughts on our priorities for the next two years repre-

⁵ The President wrote "True" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁶ The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "increasingly" and ending with "responsibilities" and added "good" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁷ The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "not" and ending with "gains." In the left-hand margin, he drew an arrow to this sentence and added: "Important for DOD & NSC." In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, he wrote: "Unfortunately, this is what we have been doing." The President turned the memorandum horizontally in order to write this comment.

sent an effort to shape our tactics on the latter to fit the primacy of the former, while maintaining our goals and the special character of your foreign policies.

I have divided our priorities into three categories: 1) *crucial issues* on which success would have far reaching benefits; 2) *important issues* on which success would be valuable but less critical to our interests; and 3) some complicating *contingencies* on which we should keep an eye and for which we should quietly plan. On each issue, I suggest some of the opportunities and problems we will have to address.

I. *Crucial Issues*

A. *Middle East*: Success in concluding an Israeli-Egyptian Treaty, and in beginning to build further on the Camp David framework, would confer great substantive benefits and solidify perceptions of your foreign policy leadership. This would ease the path of SALT and other policies and negotiations listed below.

If we are able to gain an Egyptian-Israeli treaty, the next steps in building on the Camp David framework will be still more difficult than the Treaty negotiation. We face two basic problems:

—Concrete decisions will be required of leaders in the West Bank and Gaza who have never before had to make them, and who lack a decision making mechanism. These people are at the mercy, as individuals, of the winds blowing from Amman and Beirut (PLO). We must therefore make the potential of Camp David attractive enough in their eyes that they actively participate in the peace process, and gain the acquiescence and engagement of the other Arab parties.⁸

—We will also have to deal with the hard reality that the Israelis do not see the advantages in a West Bank and Gaza accord that they may see in a Sinai agreement. On Sinai, they can see a realistically available alternative that is preferable to the *status quo* and therefore worth concessions on their part. There is no realistic alternative on the West Bank and Gaza that is preferable from the Israeli viewpoint, especially if normalization of relations with Egypt has been achieved.

On each of these two counts, progress will require positions on our part that are inherently unattractive to the Israelis. The settlements issue will become still more contentious. There will be fall-out on the Hill. We will have to manage all of this with real sensitivity to Israeli longer term concerns about our constancy.⁹

The alternative to pursuing progress on the West Bank and Gaza is letting an Egypt-Israel bilateral treaty stand alone as a separate peace.

⁸ In the left-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: "I would put US/SU relations # 1." The President also drew part of a circle around his comment.

⁹ In the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent paragraph, the President noted: "I agree with general analysis." The President turned the memorandum slightly in order to write his comment.

To do this would probably result in our being on friendly terms only with Israel and Egypt, with the rest of the Middle East open for a return of Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia might not hold out against an Arab consensus at odds with Egypt and the U.S. A friendless Sadat regime would become more dependent than ever on us, and render precarious the stability of the bilateral treaty. Polarization between Egypt/Israel and the rest of the Arabs might also lead our European allies into increasingly pro-Arab positions. Moreover, we could be forced to consider allying ourselves with the Saudis to a degree we have not contemplated before in order to preserve as much as possible of our bilateral relationship. This itself could cause severe political problems domestically.

Thus, I believe that we should continue to press forward for the West Bank/Gaza agreement.

B. *Management of East-West Relations*: Now that the historic normalization with China has occurred, we need to reinforce a position of careful balance between Moscow and Peking, while improving relations with both.¹⁰ A "tilt" in either direction could dramatically increase world tensions and impair our ability to control the distance that it is in our interest to maintain between Peking and Moscow. Furthermore, recent opinion polls show that our public overwhelmingly wants a balanced approach.

On dealing with Moscow, I think that we are following an approach that has earned the respect of the Soviets and the American people. The lowering of voices on both sides in recent months has reassured our friends and allies that the Administration is effectively managing this key international relationship.

Preparations for the Madrid CSCE Conference will require attention and allied coordination.¹¹

We must continue to press the Soviets for responsible behavior in other regions; their actions in the Third World affect our interests, and will become a major debating point for opponents of SALT. But, as I noted above, we should continue to emphasize Western strengths more than Soviet advances in our public statements.¹²

The one change I would advocate is a more forthcoming attitude in approving U.S. sales to the USSR of non-strategic items.¹³ This will not

¹⁰ See Documents 104 and 105. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "*The most important.*"

¹¹ The Madrid CSCE Review Conference was scheduled to take place in November 1980.

¹² The President wrote "True" in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and drew two arrows from it to the two sentences in the paragraph.

¹³ The President wrote "I agree" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

only encourage U.S. business to pursue actively this potentially vast market, it will also allow us vigorously to promote U.S. entry into the opening Chinese market, while observing a policy of “even-handedness.”

I believe we should consider an effort to repeal Jackson-Vanik,¹⁴ after SALT ratification, if the state of detente is positive, and if events in the Middle East are not complicating.

With regard to China, gaining Congressional approval of legislation relating to normalization will be our first priority in terms of timing. I expect that we will gain approval, but there will probably be attempts to add reservations or amendments (for example directing certain types of arms sales or relations with Taiwan) that we will have to beat back.

We should plan to conclude a number of basic agreements with Peking in 1979 which will enable us to expand our trade and exchange relationships. Settlement of claims/assets issues, a consular agreement, and formal bilateral agreements on some of the science and technical areas where we have already made progress are practicable. Given Peking’s present mood of looking outward, particularly toward the West, we can also try to draw the Chinese more actively into several international issues, for example on refugees and disarmament, where they have showed reluctance in the past. Our decisions on technology transfer and on arms sales by our allies, however, are particularly sensitive in terms of the balance we want to maintain with the Soviets. We should move with great care in both these areas.

C. SALT:

Beyond the extraordinary substantive stakes involved, failure to conclude and gain approval of a SALT II Agreement would be seen as a major setback here and abroad. The negative effect on Soviet thinking about our relations could be profound and long lasting, especially as it would come at a time of transition in Soviet leadership.¹⁵

The SALT debate itself could be abrasive for our relations with the Soviets. It must be made clear that we cannot go back to Moscow for last minute adjustments of the text, as it was possible to do with Torrijos.¹⁶ We must also be wary, in managing the debate, not to be drawn into shifts in our policies elsewhere in the world that would damage our over-all relationship with the USSR.

¹⁴ See footnote 11, Document 55.

¹⁵ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: “all true.”

¹⁶ Reference is to the exchanges with Torrijos during the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations.

We will face a number of decisions on how to relate the timing of other arms control initiatives and negotiations to the SALT II debate.

We are committed to beginning on SALT III soon after ratification of SALT II, and perhaps even before. The earlier we might gain an agreement that restrains theater systems such as the SS-20, the lower the level at which this program would be capped. But before pressing negotiations on gray area systems with the Soviets, we should be sure to develop a solid alliance consensus on how to handle this subject.¹⁷ Any allied concerns on SALT III and theater systems would play back directly into SALT II debates here. The priority we give to allied concerns may mean we should start SALT III discussions at a slow pace.

As suggested below, it could be very important to our non-proliferation policies that we reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban by the end of 1979; we should seek progress in the negotiations during the coming year, but not try to reach final agreement until after SALT II ratification.¹⁸

The possibility that a SALT II agreement might create conditions for progress on MBFR is also considered below.

D. Trade and the Dollar: The importance of international economic issues to our own economy and to our political relationships abroad has become increasingly evident. Working to enhance the strength of the dollar, which depends primarily on the anti-inflation program, remains crucial.¹⁹

1979 is likely to see a major struggle in the Congress over approval of an MTN package, as well as in response to the likely introduction of new protectionist measures aimed at our major trading partners (especially Japan) and at the more advanced LDC's.²⁰

The stakes are very high, not only in terms of the economic benefits to us and the future of the international trading system, but also in avoiding the acrimony abroad that would follow Congressional rejection. Our relationships with Europe would be damaged; and trade is an even more important strand in our ties to Asian friends. This is, I believe, a major strategic issue.²¹

¹⁷ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "I'll pursue at Guadeloupe" and drew an arrow from the comment to the sentence.

¹⁸ The President underlined the phrase "the end of 1979," and in the left-hand margin next to the paragraph, he wrote: "earlier."

¹⁹ The President underlined the word "crucial."

²⁰ The President underlined the phrase "approval of an MTN package."

²¹ The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "a" through the end of the sentence. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, he wrote "True" and drew arrows from it to this sentence and the first sentence in the next paragraph.

Interagency planning of our Congressional strategy for MTN, led by STR, should be completed as soon as possible. It will be important, both on the merits and to help us sell an MTN package, that we press ahead with export promotion measures.

E. *North-South Issues*: We are considering ways in which we can move the international dialogue away from rhetorical exchanges about resource flows, to focus more on the concrete problems that must be solved. This means concentration on practical programs in health, agriculture, etc. We are developing a coherent strategy of tying some practical, modest initiatives to the major North-South conferences scheduled for the next two years. Such initiatives must be sized to our limited resources.

In any case, there will be major efforts needed—with the G-77, our Congress and the U.S. public—to gain agreement and support on commodities (including both the Common Fund and a number of individual agreements) and our AID appropriations for FY 80.

II. *Important Issues*

A. *Western Asia*: A further breakdown of stability in this vital oil producing region can gravely affect our national security and that of our allies and could dangerously engage U.S. and Soviet interests. Domestic political concern could focus on perceived setbacks in the area, affecting a wide range of other Administration concerns, including SALT and our economic policies. There is an interagency effort to develop a coherent approach to this problem. Given the area's extraordinary diversity, this strategy will require a number of substrategies that can encompass local rivalries and conditions. An essential problem is that many of the instabilities flow from domestic difficulties over which we have little influence, and a resurgence of Islamic nationalism which presents challenges to our interests but also to the Soviets'.²²

B. *African Policies*: The greatly increased influence in Africa which our new policies have gained for us is likely to erode if we do not gain a Namibia settlement. In any case, a growing crisis in Rhodesia is likely. We must seek to position ourselves in a manner that can best help maintain confidence with African nations and manage East-West aspects. This means continuing efforts to consult the Front Line states,²³ making it clear that we are prepared to help the Rhodesian parties reach agreement whenever they wish us to do so and they have the will

²² In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "We need to do a *religious* analysis."

²³ Originally an ad hoc caucus, the Front-Line states were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, the five countries bordering Zimbabwe and Namibia. Following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the OAU included it in this designation.

to negotiate; and voicing our concerns to the Soviets while carefully managing our public statements. Our impartiality among the Rhodesian parties will be increasingly important if, as seems likely, Rhodesia again becomes a lively Congressional issue. Our relations with Pretoria will need to reflect any progress in Namibia, but not go so far as to imply a backing away on apartheid.

C. *Mexico*: Your February trip reinforces the fact that we are starting to give the future of our relations with Mexico the proper attention.²⁴ Putting these relations on a solid basis of cooperation would pay handsome dividends over the next decades, both in reducing our dependence on Middle Eastern oil and in helping us manage together problems that could otherwise create constant tensions and domestic political problems for us both.²⁵ We should approach the many complex issues with Mexico—including especially natural gas and migration—in the context of a positive, long-term strategy.

D. *Nicaragua and Central American Stability*: The Nicaraguan crisis has links and/or parallels to the situations in neighboring countries. Costa Rica, Panama and Venezuela are watching to see what we can accomplish. El Salvador and Guatemala share most of Nicaragua's political characteristics. A settlement in Nicaragua could help us encourage moderate evolutions in these two neighbors. Deterioration in Nicaragua will have repercussions here that could affect congressional action on such issues as Panama Canal Treaty implementation and AID levels.

E. *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and CTB*: Our non-proliferation policies have been designed and implemented well. We have had some success on a number of discrete issues (e.g., France and Pakistan), and the INFCE is a creative measure that could point the way to resolve some thorny technical issues.

But I am concerned about the potentially difficult period of late 1979/January–June 1980.²⁶ Some twenty-two countries will then be candidates for renegotiation of our bilateral nuclear agreements. Most can be deferred or managed. But India will be very difficult.

In addition, the 1980 NPT Review Conference is scheduled for that June.²⁷

²⁴ The President was scheduled to travel to Mexico to meet with López-Portillo February 14–15, 1979. Documentation on his visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

²⁵ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "Play down oil & gas."

²⁶ The President underlined the word "concerned" and added "I am too" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

²⁷ Documentation on the NPT Review Conference is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control.

Success in these renegotiations—and the context of the Review Conference—will be strongly affected by the results of the INFCE, scheduled for completion in February, 1980; by progress in arms control negotiations among the nuclear powers; by the confidence potential proliferators like Korea and Taiwan have in their security and our assurances; and by attitudes toward the U.S. as a reliable nuclear fuel and technology supplier.

If the INFCE results are inconclusive, and we do not have a good case to make on arms control among the nuclear powers, we could easily see a backlash against the NPT at the Review Conference. A number of the more than 100 nations which have ratified the Treaty could renounce it.

Particularly important, both for the Review Conference and the Indian renegotiation, will be agreement on a CTB. Yet a CTB treaty would have rough sledding on the Hill. I would recommend that we seek to reach a CTB agreement after SALT II ratification, toward the end of 1979 or early 1980, and then consider whether, rather than moving promptly for ratification, we should send it to the UN Committee on Disarmament for its review.²⁸ This would please the Indians and others, and could defer contentious Senate debate until after our elections.

F. Other Arms Control Initiatives:

A SALT II agreement might make it possible to gain the political level decisions necessary to make progress at the MBFR talks. The primary focus will remain on the Soviet position on data; we must remain firm here.²⁹

We might wish to look at ways of bringing the French into the discussions, perhaps by adding a few new participants and thus moving part way towards their proposed European Disarmament Conference.³⁰

With regard to conventional arms sales limitations, we will want seriously to review progress on multilateral restraint when looking this spring at our unilateral policies.³¹ But even if progress is minimal, we should avoid so dramatic a change in our own policies of restraint that

²⁸ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "We can wait on ratification."

²⁹ The President underlined "must remain firm" and added "agree" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

³⁰ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "Guadeloupe item."

³¹ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "I'll be [unclear—reluctant?] to change."

we imply either final failure in seeking restraint by others, or that we have concluded our goal was misguided.

G. *Eastern Mediterranean:*

Progress on Cyprus is needed, both for the sake of Greek-Turkish rapprochement, including Greek reintegration into NATO, and to avoid a congressional backlash that could endanger our Turkish security assistance package.

Turkey's economic difficulties are profound, and could at some point create a political crisis that would be damaging to our interests. Our own ability to respond is limited, and we will continue to urge our European allies to think creatively about ways to form *ad hoc* multi-lateral arrangements that could complement IMF support.³² This is a part of a broader problem: how best to support financially troubled important upper tier LDC's and weaker European nations. The IMF itself will bear an increasing load. We face an important effort next year to gain congressional authorization and perhaps appropriation of some \$5 billion for our share of an agreed 50 percent IMF quota increase, unless we decide to defer this request until the following year.

H. *Refugees:*

We plan to introduce new legislation that will simplify existing authorities and expand the ceiling for "foreseeable" refugees, thus reducing the pressure on the Attorney General's parole authority.³³ I believe we should appoint a high-level Refugee Coordinator to focus interagency actions, so that the issue receives the priority concern that it deserves.³⁴

The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, mandated by the Congress last September, should get under way early next year.³⁵ Its terms of reference will be very broad. Its report, due October 1, 1980, offers an opportunity to pull together a more coherent way of managing this complex and politically charged area.³⁶

³² The President underlined "complement IMF support." In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote "Guadeloupe item—not bypassing IMF" and drew an arrow from this comment to the sentence.

³³ The Refugee Act of 1980 (S. 643; P.L. 96-212), which the President signed into law on March 18, 1980, established new admissions policies for refugees, regardless of country of origin.

³⁴ In January 1979, the President appointed Richard Clark as Ambassador at Large and U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.

³⁵ Public Law 95-412, which the President signed into law on October 5, 1978, established the Commission and mandated its study of the laws and practices concerning immigration and reporting of recommendations to the President and Congress.

³⁶ *U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners, March 1, 1981* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981)

I. *Normalization with Angola, Iraq, Cuba and Vietnam, etc.:*

Normalization of relations with such countries should remain our goal, as part of our vision of a more stable international system. And in each case, normalization would be a useful step in expanding U.S. influence and posing a counterweight to substantial Soviet interests and influence. But the complexities of normalization are real in each case and the domestic political context must always be given full weight. I would recommend, therefore, continuing caution but forward movement.³⁷

III. *Contingencies*

A. *Possible Conflicts:* Zaire; Ogaden/Ethiopia-Somalia; Sino-Viet (Soviet); Egypt-Libya; Argentina-Chile (perhaps drawing in Peru and Bolivia).

B. *Possible Instability:* Turkey; Post-Tito Yugoslavia; Iran; China; Egypt; Poland; El Salvador; Saudi Arabia; Pakistan; Zambia; Romania; Sudan; the Philippines; and countries moving to democracy, e.g., Nigeria, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia.

C. Post-Brezhnev USSR.

D. Repolarized Arab world.

E. The Korean Peninsula during and after U.S. withdrawals.

F. Possible Soviet moves affecting Yugoslavia, Romania, other Eastern European nations, or China.³⁸

³⁷ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote: "No hurry on most of these—Trade, visits, then maybe interest sections, *then* maybe normalization for Iraq, etc—Status quo on Cuba."

³⁸ In the margin below this point, the President wrote: "We should increase or sustain efforts re Pakistan, E. Europe, Afghanistan, Brazil, Cent. America, etc—."

108. Briefing by Secretary of State Vance and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 15, 1979

SECRETARY VANCE²

I am delighted that so many of you have joined us today. I particularly want to thank the two main business organizations represented here, and especially their leadership, for their efforts in advancing public understanding of a major foreign policy issue. Both Councils have played—and will continue to play—important roles in strengthening our economic relations.

It is now 1 month since the President announced that the United States and the People's Republic of China had reached agreement on the establishment of full and normal diplomatic relations.³ Today I would like to share with you some of the background leading up to the President's historic decision and outline what we believe it means for the United States and for the world.

Few other foreign policy issues have so long divided Americans as "the China question." In the 1930's, Americans became deeply aware and often passionately concerned with the tragedy and suffering of China. In the early 1940's, our two nations fought together against the Axis Powers. In the late 1940's we tried—ultimately without success—to help the two sides in the Chinese civil war find a peaceful settlement to their conflict.

Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States reached a nadir in the 1950's. Our armies clashed in Korea, and at home the China issue left a deep mark on the domestic political landscape. One of the tragedies of that period was the destruction of the careers of some outstanding Foreign Service officers because they reported events in Asia as they saw them.

The impasse in our relations with Peking persisted despite the emergence during the 1960's of incontestable evidence of serious rivalry between the Soviet Union and China. The United States, enmeshed in military involvement in Southeast Asia, and China, preoc-

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1979, pp. 14–21. All brackets are in the original. The Department of State held the briefing for chief executives and other officials from member firms of the National Council for U.S.–China Trade and the USA/ROC Economic Council.

² Press Release 13. [Footnote in the original.]

³ For text see *Bulletin* of January 1979, p. 25. [Footnote in the original. See Documents 104 and 105.]

cupied with the Cultural Revolution, were unable to make progress toward overcoming our differences.

The year 1971 marked the beginning of a new phase. Across a vast gulf of misunderstanding and mutual distrust, the Governments of Peking and the United States began a dialogue, starting with Henry Kissinger's dramatic trip to Peking in 1971 and President Nixon's visit in 1972.⁴ The Shanghai communique of that year set a framework for our new relationship.⁵

But that dialogue was incomplete. The United States still formally recognized the Republic of China—whose *de facto* control encompassed only Taiwan and a few adjacent islands—as the legal Government of China. Despite this, we were able to begin contacts and ultimately, in 1973, even establish Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking.⁶ But the nature of the relationship with Peking remained limited in scope and depth by the political, legal, and economic implications of our lack of mutual recognition.

Nonrecognition—the delicate state in which we dealt with Peking in the 6 years after the Shanghai communique—presented daily practical problems. Although both sides made major efforts to minimize these limitations, they became increasingly inhibiting. Discussions with the Chinese often foundered on the fact that in the absence of recognition, many activities either could not proceed at all or had to be conducted at a low level. Contacts were constrained, including those that might have produced greater understanding on global issues. Trade was limited, and opportunities often would go elsewhere. Legal problems hung over commercial transactions because of American claims and frozen P.R.C. assets dating back to 1950. More importantly, not to try to move forward would have been to risk moving backward—and backward movement in U.S.-Chinese relations would have caused serious damage to our global position.

So even before he was inaugurated, President Carter made his first China decision. In an act of continuity with two previous Presidents, he reaffirmed the Shanghai communique as the basis for our relationship and specifically reaffirmed its commitment to work toward normal relations.

⁴ For documentation on the July and October 1971 Kissinger visits and the February 1972 Nixon visit, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVII, China, 1969–1972.

⁵ For text of the joint communique issued in Shanghai on Feb. 27, 1972, see *Bulletin* of Mar. 20, p. 435. [Footnote in the original. See footnote 6, Document 29.]

⁶ The United States and the People's Republic of China established the liaison offices in March 1973. Bruce was appointed Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office (USLO).

We were not at all certain at that time that we could, indeed, reach that ultimate goal. But we felt it essential to try, and we were prepared to take as much time as was necessary to achieve it on an acceptable basis.

With this in mind, we began discussions within the Administration, as well as an intensive series of consultations both with Members of Congress and with a wide cross-section of American businessmen, scholars, and others. From our consultations and review, two central thrusts, and several specific concerns, emerged.

These basic thrusts could not have been clearer. On the one hand, a substantial majority of Americans wished to see the United States and the People's Republic of China establish diplomatic relations; but at the same time, an equally large majority had deep concerns about Taiwan's future prosperity, security, and stability. We shared these concerns. The President decided that we would only establish diplomatic relations with Peking if such an action could be accomplished in a way that did not damage the well-being of the people on Taiwan or reduce the chances for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

Beyond these basic considerations, several specific concerns emerged.

First, there was widespread and legitimate concern over Peking's insistence that prior to normalization the United States must unilaterally abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan rather than terminate it in accordance with its own provisions, to which the United States and Taiwan had agreed in 1954.⁷ Furthermore, we wished to establish that after normalization, even in the absence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, all other agreements and treaties would remain in effect.

Second, we shared with Congress and the American public a deep concern over the strong assertions by Chinese officials concerning their right to "liberate" Taiwan in any way they saw fit. From an American point of view, the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves was of critical importance; we could not move forward if Peking continued to talk and think about the Taiwan issue in such inflammatory terms.

Third, a consensus rapidly emerged, inside and outside the government, that it was essential that we continue a wide range of relations with the people on Taiwan on a nongovernmental basis after normalization. In particular, these postnormalization relations would have to include continued sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan.

⁷ Dulles and Yeh signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in Washington on December 3, 1954. For the text of the treaty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, p. 899.

With these priorities emerging, I visited Peking in August of 1977, and Dr. Brzezinski went there in May of 1978.⁸ We found a newly confident leadership emerging in Peking as a period of intense internal turmoil subsided. We found many points of common interest on global matters, although on some important issues we continued to have differences. Our discussions on normalization were of an exploratory nature. These overall discussions reinforced our view that a strong, secure, and peaceful China was in the interest of world peace.

In the early summer, President Carter instructed Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, Chief of the Liaison Office in Peking, to begin a series of presentations outlining our views on normalization. In five meetings, Ambassador Woodcock laid out the American position.⁹

On September 19, President Carter met with the new head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, Ambassador Chai Zemin.¹⁰ Involving himself directly in the discussions for the first time, the President told the Chinese that we were ready to normalize relations if our concerns about the future well-being of the people on Taiwan were met.

In completing his presentations on November 4, Ambassador Woodcock indicated to the Chinese that we would be willing to work toward a January 1, 1979, target date for normalization if our concerns were met. The Chinese began their response in early December. In mid-December, negotiations intensified with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping becoming personally involved. Finally, on December 14, we reached agreement that met our fundamental concerns,¹¹ and the announcement of our decision to establish diplomatic relations was made on December 15.

We have been able to establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in a way that protects the well-being of the people on Taiwan. The importance of this is fully reflected in the arrangements that we have been and will be establishing.

First, the United States will not abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty. Rather we have given notice that we will exercise our right to terminate the treaty with Taiwan in accordance with its provisions, which permits termination by either party after 1 year's notice. All other treaties and agreements will remain in effect.

⁸ For information about Vance's trip, see footnote 10, Document 68. For information about Brzezinski's trip, see footnote 21, Document 62.

⁹ For documentation on Woodcock's meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, China, Documents 119–121, 127, 141, 149, and 159.

¹⁰ For the September 19 memorandum of conversation, see *ibid.*, Document 135.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, Document 168.

Second is the critical question of the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. It is clear from the actions and statements of the P.R.C. in the last month that normalization has, in fact, enhanced the possibilities that whatever the ultimate resolution of the issue may be, it will be pursued by peaceful means.

Since the normalization of relations, the P.R.C. has adopted a markedly more moderate tone on the Taiwan issue.

- On January 9 of this year, Vice Premier Deng told Senators Nunn, Glenn, Hart, and Cohen that: "The social system on Taiwan will be decided by the people of Taiwan. Changes might take 100 years or 1,000 years. By which I mean a long time. We will not change the society by force."¹²

- On New Year's Day, after 25 years, the P.R.C. ceased firing propaganda artillery shells at the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Third and finally, after the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty on December 31, 1979, we will continue our previous policy of selling carefully selected defensive weapons to Taiwan. While the P.R.C. said they disapproved of this, they nevertheless moved forward with normalization with full knowledge of our intentions.

In constructing a new relationship with the people on Taiwan, we are taking practical steps to insure continuity of trade, cultural, and other unofficial relations. The President has taken steps to assure the uninterrupted continuation of such relations from January 1, 1979. In the future these relations will be conducted through a nonprofit nongovernmental corporation called the American Institute in Taiwan. This corporation will facilitate ongoing and, we are confident, expanding ties between the American people and the people on Taiwan. Taipei will handle its unofficial relations with this country in similar fashion.

Let me say a word or two about the American Institute in Taiwan, the legislation it requires, and its operations. Congress will be asked to approve an omnibus bill that will authorize the funding of the American Institute in Taiwan and confirm its authority to act in a wide range of areas. I hope we will have your active support for expeditious passage of that bill.¹³

¹² For the transcript of this meeting, see *ibid.*, Document 191.

¹³ The Taiwan Relations Act (H.R. 2479; P.L. 96-8), which the President signed into law on April 10, authorized the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan, which allowed the United States to continue to conduct relations with Taiwan. Taiwan would conduct its diplomacy with the United States under the auspices of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. The Act also maintained various cultural and other links between the two nations. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, pp. 65-68) For the President's remarks upon signing the bill into law, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 640-641.

The institute will have its headquarters in Washington with field offices in Taiwan. It will provide the full range of commercial and other services that have been previously provided through official channels to businessmen, both from the United States and from Taiwan. In your private business dealings on Taiwan, you may freely contact the institute's staff for advice or can deal directly with local firms and the authorities there. In short, we see no change necessary in the way private American business has been conducted on Taiwan up to now. Eximbank loans, OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] guarantees, and other important arrangements will continue.

With these new arrangements in place, we expect Taiwan to continue to prosper. Taiwan's dynamic economic growth is one of the most impressive stories of the last decade; it is now our eighth largest trading partner, and per capita income is among the highest in Asia.

As anyone who has studied the issue can attest, normalization of relations with Peking was not an easy step to take. The difficulties always argued for themselves, and further delay was always an inviting option for any President. But we all recognized that sooner or later we would have to move. As I have already said, failure to try to move forward would have left us in danger of moving backward—at great cost to our global position. By the time we took the decisive step, every other member of NATO, our two treaty partners in ANZUS [Australia and New Zealand], and Japan had long since recognized the P.R.C., as had most other nations of the world. They were ready for our action—and most of them, including all the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), applauded it.

When we acted, we did so in a way that enhances significantly the prospects for stability and peace in Asia and the Pacific. We acted in a way that will move us toward our objective of a stable system of independent nations in Asia and that will also increase the chances of maintaining a stable equilibrium among the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.

The United States will continue to play an active role in order to maintain that stable equilibrium. For reasons of geography, history, and economics, we are as much a Pacific nation as an Atlantic nation, with deep and abiding national interests in the region. We will maintain balanced and flexible military forces in the region, as the recent successful conclusion of the base agreements with the Philippines so clearly demonstrates. And we will not hesitate to act, as required, to protect our vital national interests.

The rapidly expanding relations between our two nations in science, trade, and exchanges require the kind of structure that diplomatic relations can provide. It will allow a much freer exchange between our cultures. And with full relations, we are in a far better position to en-

courage China's role as a constructive member of the world community. We will be discussing all of these matters with Vice Premier Deng when he visits us in 2 weeks.¹⁴

It is particularly useful on this occasion to note some of the economic benefits we expect to flow from the establishment of diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. These include our participation as a regular supplier of agricultural commodities to China; the ability of U.S. exporters to compete on an equal basis with other suppliers; and the resumption of shipping, air, banking, and other normal economic relations with China.

Let me emphasize that in normalizing relations we acted in a way that does not threaten any other nation but can increase the sense of community of nations that we seek to encourage.

We believe that China has an important role to play in the search for global peace and stability. The same is true for the Soviet Union. Our national interests are best served when we seek to improve relations with both nations while protecting our vital strategic interests. This was the case during the late winter and spring of 1972, a period during which both the Shanghai communique and SALT I were achieved. Equilibrium and stability, not isolation, are our strategic objectives. For this reason, we also look forward to the early conclusion of the SALT agreement with the Soviet Union and to improvement of our trade relations with the Soviets as well as the Chinese.

In conclusion, let me urge you to support the President's decision and the legislation to continue relations with the people on Taiwan. We seek your support in explaining the strategic and historic necessity of this action. And we encourage you to develop greater trade and contact with both the People's Republic of China and the people on Taiwan.

It was just short of 7 years from the Shanghai communique to normalization of relations. Through a difficult period, two great nations began to restore contact and shape a new relationship. We all recognize that a new era is upon us. Opportunities previously denied to us have now begun to take shape.

The nations grouped in and around the world's largest ocean—the Pacific—contain close to half the world's population. These nations must decide whether to choose the path of greater cooperation and growth or to enter into a period of unresolved struggles for influence.

For our part, the United States will enter the closing decades of the 20th century ready to play a leading role in the search for peace and economic well-being. The lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and China was an obstacle to progress for many years.

¹⁴ See footnote 3, Document 104.

Having now surmounted it, we face the tremendous challenge ahead with a sense of excitement and hope.

[Omitted here are remarks by Blumenthal and Kreps.]

DR. BRZEZINSKI¹⁵

My purpose is to place our China policy in a wider context. As I address you, a number of troubling developments dominate the headlines.

- The Shah of Iran is planning to depart for a rest, leaving behind him a new administration which will seek to return tranquility to an unsettled country in which the United States has an enormous stake.¹⁶

- Vietnam has invaded its neighbor, Cambodia.¹⁷ Through an act of aggression, it has imposed a subservient regime upon a Cambodian people wearied of the inhumane, callous rule of Pol Pot.

- Among the first governments to recognize the new Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom Penh was Afghanistan, a strategically important country which borders on Iran and Pakistan and in which Soviet influence has increased significantly in recent months.

- The situation in the Horn of Africa and in South Yemen, Angola, and southern Africa remains uncertain, as Cuban troops continue to promote Soviet interests.

- Indeed, all the developing countries in the arc from northeast Asia to southern Africa continue to search for viable forms of government capable of managing the process of modernization. Their instability, uncertainty, and weakness can be exploited and intensified by outside powers.

Balanced against these unsettling developments, however, are a number of quieter yet more significant, positive developments.

- Progress has been made in bringing peace to the Middle East. The progress is slow and often painful. But through the persistent diplomacy of President Carter and Secretary Vance, we are, I believe, inexorably moving toward the realization of the Camp David accords. We are promoting reconciliation to one of the most volatile disputes in the world.

- In Latin America, U.S. policy has undergone significant change, and our relations with most countries in the region are at or near all

¹⁵ Text from White House press release. [Footnote in the original.]

¹⁶ During his January 11 press conference, Vance indicated that the Shah was prepared to leave Iran; see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1979, p. 7.

¹⁷ In late December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and took Phnom Penh in January 1979.

time highs. The ratification of the Panama Canal treaties was an historical milestone.

- We have significantly improved the nature of our relations with black African countries.

- Our relations with India have never been better; and we are retaining our ties of friendship with Pakistan.

- In East Asia, a delicate balance of power exists favorable to our interests. We have normalized relations with China, in part, to consolidate the balance.

- Such regional organizations as ASEAN and the Organization of African Unity are playing an increasingly positive role in bringing stability to their regions.

- In recognition of the growing conventional military capability of the Soviet Union, we are increasing our military expenditures—as are our NATO allies—to make sure our European defenses remain strong.

- While we have not yet managed to establish a more stable world monetary and trading system, we have made progress in recent months in stabilizing the dollar and in creating a more orderly and growing world market through MTN.

- We will reach a SALT II agreement which will place a cap on the deployment of new and more missiles and which introduces a note of stability in the precarious strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Added to these favorable developments are those of the spirit. After the debilitating decade of Vietnam and Watergate, our people are returning to their social moorings and exhibiting their traditional will and idealism. Worldwide, too, we have once again assumed the mantle of moral leadership, with the importance we attach to human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and limitation of conventional arms sales. Certainly as much as and probably more than any other major power, the United States is addressing in a forthright manner the problems of our age. We remain an innovative society and a worldwide source of inspiration.

These positive developments are the result of the President's commitment—as he enunciated at Notre Dame more than a year ago—to a policy of constructive global engagement, a policy of trying to influence the changes of our era in directions that are compatible with our interests and values. Under that broad heading, we have crystallized seven fundamental objectives for our foreign policy:

- To enhance our military security;
- To reinforce our ties with our key allies and promote a more cooperative world system;

- To respond in a positive way to the economic and moral challenge of the so-called North-South relationship;
- To improve relations between East and West;
- To help resolve the more threatening regional conflicts and tensions;
- To cope with such emerging global issues as nuclear proliferation and arms dissemination; and
- To reassert traditional American values—especially human rights.

At the outset, I should note that American foreign policy confronts a fundamental analytical question: Are the issues of the moment which I mentioned earlier—Iran, Indochina, the Horn, Afghanistan—indications of longer term trends? Do we respond to these issues not only with the sense of urgency which is obviously called for but with a sense of historical despair as well? Or are the positive developments more indicative of our era? Should we continue on course? In short, is an optimistic or pessimistic view of history justified? It seems to me that this issue underlies the emerging foreign policy debate in the United States.

Without being Pollyannaish, this Administration is basically optimistic. We recognize the future is ours only with effort. Continued American vigilance, preparedness, and decisiveness are necessary to grasp the better future before us. But an optimistic view of history and of America's future lies at the heart of this Administration's foreign policy and of our China policy.

I do not mean to downplay or belittle the seriousness of the current foreign policy challenges. Important, indeed vital, issues are at stake. But in each situation, we are developing responses appropriate to the challenges involved. The United States will suffer occasional setbacks, but we will continue to be able to offset our losses with gains elsewhere—such as those that have occurred in recent years in our relations with India, Egypt, Eastern Europe, Ghana, the Sudan, and East Asia.

What we emphatically reject are apocalyptic visions about the future ability of the United States to pursue and defend our interests abroad. The pessimism that one hears from many quarters conveys a sense of Armageddon and of the need to rush to the barricade at every challenge without forethought.

Today, we seek neither a world order based on a Pax Americana nor an order based on a Soviet-American condominium. Neither order is possible or just.

Rather, we are in the process of creating a diverse and stable community of independent states. Working with our traditional allies—we cannot do the job alone—we are beginning to create a framework

for wide-ranging international cooperation involving the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and many of the emerging regional powers such as Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, India, and Indonesia. And with the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, we very significantly increase the scope of international cooperation.

We wish, of course, to include the Soviet Union in that framework of cooperation. Indeed, a fundamental choice the Soviet Union faces is whether to become a responsible partner in the creation of a global system of genuinely independent states or whether to exclude itself from global trends and derive its security exclusively from its military might and its domination of a few clients. We hope and encourage the Soviet Union to be cooperative, but, whichever path the Soviet Union chooses, we will continue our efforts to shape a framework for global cooperation based not on domination but on respect for diversity.

We recognize that the world is changing under the influence of forces no government can control. The world's population is experiencing a political awakening on a scale without precedent in its history. The global system is undergoing a significant redistribution of political and economic power.

The record of the past 2 years suggests, however, that the United States need not fear this change. To the contrary, the record shows that we can shape this change to our benefit and attain security in a world of diversity.

Not only does the record of the past 2 years suggest realistic optimism is warranted. Our own past and the quality of our people also encourage confidence. For our national experience as a nation of diverse origins and of change speaks to the emerging global condition. Not just our wealth, not just our military might, but our history as a pluralistic people and our commitment to the values of freedom and independence which now stir all of mankind give us a naturally key role in shaping the trends of our time.

Given our assessment of history and the goals of the Administration, these points should be made about our China policy.

- We see normalization as having long-term, historic significance. It comprises part of our effort to consolidate and improve our relations with all the emerging powers in the world. And none of these powers is more important than China, with its nearly billion people and third largest defense budget in the world.

- We did not normalize out of tactical or expedient considerations; rather we recognized reality. The People's Republic of China is going to play an increasing role in world affairs, and it was important for us to have a continuing, broadened, and structured relationship with this government.

- We recognize that the P.R.C. and we have different ideologies and economic and political systems. We recognize that to transcend the differences and to make our new relationship successful will require patience, wisdom, and understanding. We harbor neither the hope nor the desire that through extensive contacts with China we can remake that nation into the American image.

- Indeed, we accept our differences. Normalization is an important part of our global effort to create a stable community of diverse and independent nations. As President Carter stated in his cable to Premier Hua Guofeng on January 1: “. . . the United States desires a world of diversity in which each nation is free to make a distinctive contribution to . . . the manifold aspirations . . . of mankind . . . we welcome the growing involvement of the People’s Republic of China in world affairs.”¹⁸

- We consider China as a key force for global peace simply by being China: an independent and strong nation reaching for increased contact with the rest of the world while remaining basically self-reliant and resistant of any efforts by others to dominate it.

- As Vice President Mondale stated on January 1: “We feel bonds of friendship, but sentiment alone cannot bridge the gap between us. What has brought us together is an awareness of our parallel interests in creating a world of economic progress, stability, and peace.”¹⁹

The community of interest we share with China is particularly evident in Asia, where we both desire peace, stability, and nations free of outside domination.

East, Southeast, and South Asia is one of the most important regions of the world today. The economies of the area are booming; the people are dynamic. The United States has great economic and security interests around the rim of Asia: in Japan, South Korea, all the Pacific islands down to the Philippines, and in Southeast Asia as well.

To protect our interests, we retain a strong military presence in the region, we maintain appropriate weapon sales throughout the region, and we are prepared to act on our interests should the need arise.

Few actions will contribute more to the security and stability of our important positions around the rim of Asia, however, than a constructive involvement with China. As we improve our relations with Beijing, China will also wish to keep us involved in the region and not, as in the past, seek to drive us away.

¹⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, China, Document 185.

¹⁹ Mondale made these remarks during ceremonies at the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington; see Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Officials See a Bright Future in New Relationship With Peking,” *The New York Times*, January 2, 1979, pp. A-1, A-9.

For the first time in decades, we can enjoy simultaneously good relations with both China and Japan. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this fact. Normalization consolidates a favorable balance of power in the Far East and enhances the security of our friends.

Now the Chinese are turning outward and extending their hand to the West. We are prepared to respond less in confidence that in the future their hand will remain extended than in the knowledge that without a reciprocal gesture, their hand would certainly be withdrawn. And by developing bonds of commerce and shared understanding, we reduce the chances of future animosity.

That is why we have completed the process of normalization begun by President Nixon, President Ford, and Secretary Kissinger.

Normalization, therefore, is an act rooted in historical optimism and political realism. This change in our China policy does not represent retreat or abandonment of our previous positions; rather, it reflects our determination to be globally engaged, to welcome diversity, and to shape our future.

For a generation, we said “no” to the reality of East Asia. We refused to recognize reality, we sought to isolate China, and we lived by myths—with two wars and with incalculable cost to the region and to us. Now, we say “yes” to reality. We are confident that as an Asian and Pacific power with a positive relationship with Beijing, we will significantly contribute to the peace and prosperity of the American people and of all peoples in the region.

109. Address by President Carter on the State of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress¹

Washington, January 23, 1979

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker,² Members of the 96th Congress, and my fellow citizens:

Tonight I want to examine in a broad sense the state of our American Union—how we are building a new foundation for a peaceful and a prosperous world.

Our children who will be born this year will come of age in the 21st century. What kind of society, what kind of world are we building for them? Will we ourselves be at peace? Will our children enjoy a better quality of life? Will a strong and united America still be a force for freedom and prosperity around the world?

Tonight, there is every sign that the state of our Union is sound.

Our economy offers greater prosperity for more of our people than ever before. Real per capita income and real business profits have risen substantially in the last 2 years. Farm exports are setting an all-time record each year, and farm income last year, net farm income, was up more than 25 percent.

Our liberties are secure. Our military defenses are strong and growing stronger. And more importantly, tonight, America—our beloved country—is at peace.

Our earliest national commitments, modified and reshaped by succeeding generations, have served us well. But the problems that we face today are different from those that confronted earlier generations of Americans. They are more subtle, more complex, and more interrelated. At home, we are recognizing ever more clearly that government alone cannot solve these problems. And abroad, few of them can be solved by the United States alone. But Americans as a united people, working with our allies and friends, have never been afraid to face problems and to solve problems, either here or abroad.

The challenge to us is to build a new and firmer foundation for the future—for a sound economy, for a more effective government, for

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 103–109. The President delivered the address at 9:04 p.m. in the House Chamber at the Capitol. O’Neill introduced the President. The President’s address was broadcast live on radio and television. In his diary entry for January 23, the President characterized the address: “I made a briefer, clearer, more balanced State of the Union address this evening. I thought the delivery was relatively poor, but it got good reviews. At least that chore is out of the way for another year.” (*White House Diary*, p. 281)

² Reference is to President Pro Tempore of the Senate Magnuson and Speaker of the House O’Neill.

more political trust, and for a stable peace, so that the America our children inherit will be even stronger and even better than it is today.

We cannot resort to simplistic or extreme solutions which substitute myths for common sense.

In our economy, it is a myth that we must choose endlessly between inflation and recession. Together, we build the foundation for a strong economy, with lower inflation, without contriving either a recession with its high unemployment or unworkable, mandatory government controls.

In our government, it is a myth that we must choose between compassion and competence. Together, we build the foundation for a government that works—and works for people.

In our relations with our potential adversaries, it is a myth that we must choose between confrontation and capitulation. Together, we build the foundation for a stable world of both diversity and peace.

[Omitted here is the portion of the address devoted to domestic policy.]

A strong economy and an effective government will restore confidence in America. But the path of the future must be charted in peace. We must continue to build a new and a firm foundation for a stable world community.

We are building that new foundation from a position of national strength—the strength of our own defenses, the strength of our friendships with other nations, and of our oldest American ideals.

America's military power is a major force for security and stability in the world. We must maintain our strategic capability and continue the progress of the last 2 years with our NATO Allies, with whom we have increased our readiness, modernized our equipment, and strengthened our defense forces in Europe. I urge you to support the strong defense budget which I have proposed to the Congress.³

But our national security in this complicated age requires more than just military might. In less than a lifetime, world population has more than doubled, colonial empires have disappeared, and a hundred new nations have been born. Mass communications, literacy, and migration to the world's cities have all awakened new yearnings for economic justice and human rights among people everywhere.

³ In his January 22 message to the Congress transmitting the administration's FY 1980 budget, the President indicated that the defense budget "provides for growth in outlays in real terms of 3% above the current year's spending." He noted that the budget also "continues my policy of steady modernization of our strategic forces and improved combat readiness of our tactical forces." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 98) The President signed official copies of the budget at a January 22 ceremony held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. For the text of his remarks, see *ibid.*, pp. 95–96.

This demand for justice and human rights is a wave of the future. In such a world, the choice is not which super power will dominate the world. None can and none will. The choice instead is between a world of anarchy and destruction, or a world of cooperation and peace.

In such a world, we seek not to stifle inevitable change, but to influence its course in helpful and constructive ways that enhance our values, our national interests, and the cause of peace.

Towering over this volatile, changing world, like a thundercloud on a summer day, looms the awesome power of nuclear weapons.

We will continue to help shape the forces of change, to anticipate emerging problems of nuclear proliferation and conventional arms sales, and to use our great strength and influence to settle international conflicts in other parts of the world before they erupt and spread.

We have no desire to be the world's policeman. But America does want to be the world's peacemaker.

We are building the foundation for truly global cooperation, not only with Western and industrialized nations but with the developing countries as well. Our ties with Japan and our European allies are stronger than ever, and so are our friendly relations with the people of Latin America, Africa, and the Western Pacific and Asia.

We've won new respect in this hemisphere with the Panama Canal treaties. We've gained new trust with the developing world through our opposition to racism, our commitment to human rights, and our support for majority rule in Africa.

The multilateral trade negotiations are now reaching a successful conclusion, and congressional approval is essential to the economic well-being of our own country and of the world. This will be one of our top priorities in 1979.

We are entering a hopeful era in our relations with one-fourth of the world's people who live in China. The presence of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping next week will help to inaugurate that new era.⁴ And with prompt congressional action on authorizing legislation, we will continue our commitment to a prosperous, peaceful, and secure life for the people of Taiwan.

I'm grateful that in the past year, as in the year before, no American has died in combat anywhere in the world. And in Iran, Nicaragua, Cyprus, Namibia, and Rhodesia, our country is working for peaceful solutions to dangerous conflicts.

In the Middle East, under the most difficult circumstances, we have sought to help ancient enemies lay aside deep-seated differences that have produced four bitter wars in our lifetime.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 104.

Our firm commitment to Israel's survival and security is rooted in our deepest convictions and in our knowledge of the strategic importance to our own Nation of a stable Middle East. To promote peace and reconciliation in the region, we must retain the trust and the confidence both of Israel and also of the Arab nations that are sincerely searching for peace.

I am determined, as President, to use the full, beneficial influence of our country so that the precious opportunity for lasting peace between Israel and Egypt will not be lost.

The new foundation of international cooperation that we seek excludes no nation. Cooperation with the Soviet Union serves the cause of peace, for in this nuclear age, world peace must include peace between the super powers—and it must mean the control of nuclear arms.

Ten years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union made the historic decision to open the strategic arms limitations talks, or SALT. The purpose of SALT, then as now, is not to gain a unilateral advantage for either nation, but to protect the security of both nations, to reverse the costly and dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race, to preserve a stable balance of nuclear forces, and to demonstrate to a concerned world that we are determined to help preserve the peace.

The first SALT agreement was concluded in 1972. And since then, during 6 years of negotiation by both Republican and Democratic leaders, nearly all issues of SALT II have been resolved. If the Soviet Union continues to negotiate in good faith, a responsible SALT agreement will be reached.

It's important that the American people understand the nature of the SALT process.

SALT II is not based on sentiment; it's based on self-interest—of the United States and of the Soviet Union. Both nations share a powerful common interest in reducing the threat of a nuclear war. I will sign no agreement which does not enhance our national security.

SALT II does not rely on trust; it will be verifiable. We have very sophisticated, proven means, including our satellites, to determine for ourselves whether or not the Soviet Union is meeting its treaty obligations. I will sign no agreement which cannot be verified.

The American nuclear deterrent will remain strong after SALT II. For example, just one of our relatively invulnerable *Poseidon* submarines—comprising less than 2 percent of our total nuclear force of submarines, aircraft, and land-based missiles—carries enough warheads to destroy every large- and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union. Our deterrent is overwhelming, and I will sign no agreement unless our deterrent force will remain overwhelming.

A SALT agreement, of course, cannot substitute for wise diplomacy or a strong defense, nor will it end the danger of nuclear war. But

it will certainly reduce that danger. It will strengthen our efforts to ban nuclear tests and to stop the spread of atomic weapons to other nations. And it can begin the process of negotiating new agreements which will further limit nuclear arms.

The path of arms control, backed by a strong defense—the path our Nation and every President has walked for 30 years—can lead to a world of law and of international negotiation and consultation in which all peoples might live in peace. In this year, 1979, nothing is more important than that the Congress and the people of the United States resolve to continue with me on that path of nuclear arms control and world peace. This is paramount.

I've outlined some of the changes that have transformed the world and which are continuing as we meet here tonight. But we, in America, need not fear change. The values on which our Nation was founded—individual liberty, self-determination, the potential for human fulfillment in freedom—all of these endure. We find these democratic principles praised, even in books smuggled out of totalitarian nations and on wallposters in lands which we thought were closed to our influence. Our country has regained its special place of leadership in the worldwide struggle for human rights. And that is a commitment that we must keep at home, as well as abroad.

The civil rights revolution freed all Americans, black and white, but its full promise still remains unrealized. I will continue to work with all my strength for equal opportunity for all Americans—and for affirmative action for those who carry the extra burden of past denial of equal opportunity.

We remain committed to improving our labor laws to better protect the rights of American workers. And our Nation must make it clear that the legal rights of women as citizens are guaranteed under the laws of our land by ratifying the equal rights amendment.

As long as I'm President, at home and around the world America's examples and America's influence will be marshaled to advance the cause of human rights.

To establish those values, two centuries ago a bold generation of Americans risked their property, their position, and life itself. We are their heirs, and they are sending us a message across the centuries. The words they made so vivid are now growing faintly indistinct, because they are not heard often enough. They are words like justice, equality, unity, truth, sacrifice, liberty, faith, and love.

These words remind us that the duty of our generation of Americans is to renew our Nation's faith—not focused just against foreign threats but against the threats of selfishness, cynicism, and apathy.

The new foundation I've discussed tonight can help us build a nation and a world where every child is nurtured and can look to the fu-

ture with hope, where the resources now wasted on war can be turned towards meeting human needs, where all people have enough to eat, a decent home, and protection against disease.

It can help us build a nation and a world where all people are free to seek the truth and to add to human understanding, so that all of us may live our lives in peace.

Tonight, I ask you, the Members of the Congress, to join me in building that new foundation—a better foundation—for our beloved country and our world.

Thank you very much.

110. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 26, 1979

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #86

This week I am giving you two items for your weekly report: a frank and personal midterm assessment; and several maps which speak for themselves by graphically conveying what you and I recently discussed. I hope they are useful.

1. *Opinion: Midterm Assessment*

You have Cy's analysis of what we have accomplished thus far in your Administration as well as an outline of future priorities.² As you know, I generally agree with his analysis of our longer-term priorities. This brief note seeks to lay out, at the mid point of your Administration, the major issues and questions which will dominate our foreign policy concerns as you approach the 1980 election.

I believe there are four issues. First, what will be your principal foreign policy success *in 1980*? Second, how should we play out the implementation of the Camp David accords? Third, what do we do to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 1-2/79. Secret; Eyes Only. The President wrote "Zbig. Interesting. J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 107.

maintain the crucial and delicate balance between ourselves, the Soviet Union and China? And fourth, what can be done to our national security process to overcome a deep-seated perception that we are in disarray—an image which gravely undermines the very real and substantive successes of this Administration.

Achievements in 1980

Your intense work over the last two years on SALT, the Middle East and China is bearing fruit. We are about to sign a SALT agreement, and with effort and firmness we might have a Middle East treaty. The Deng visit will dramatize a very real diplomatic accomplishment.³

But the question as we approach 1980 is what do we do for an encore. The achievement of the SALT summit will evolve into a long, possibly bitter and potentially inconclusive ratification debate. Legislative liaison experts now estimate we may not achieve Senate ratification before Thanksgiving and possibly not before Christmas. While ratification itself will be an achievement, it is hard to believe it will provide much political momentum for the campaign of 1980, especially if the Soviets in the meantime again do something that generates further public concerns about their motives and actions.

The problems of the Middle East are likely to drag on in one form or another. This is addressed in detail below. It is also true that we are likely to continue to have turmoil in Iran with wider international repercussions.

We have surveyed the possible achievements which we might seek that could come to fruition in 1980. Success in Southern Africa, if it is possible, will not have a great public impact. CTB is likely to produce a divisive debate in Congress. Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation will be a positive step but will not command enormous public attention. The same may be said for an Indian Ocean agreement or the establishment of some new rules regarding the proliferation of nuclear capabilities as the result of INFCE.⁴

The only measure apart from those indicated below that might have a broad impact is the achievement of a first step MBFR agreement focusing primarily if not exclusively on U.S.-Soviet reductions in Central Europe. Such an agreement could well be signed at a Summit of the more than a dozen nations which participate in MBFR. It could be a significant political event, indicative of improving East-West relations. We could seek to time such an initial agreement for the spring of 1980, shortly before the Democratic Convention.

³ See footnote 3, Document 104.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 56.

The Middle East

Better still would be a significant breakthrough to peace in the Middle East. It seems clear that in any case fulfillment of Camp David will be an essential yardstick to measure the success of your Presidency. This will require additional direct and deep involvement on your part. I am still convinced that genuine progress is achievable.

However, we must recognize that the American Jewish community harbors deep suspicion of this Administration. This can only be overcome by a successful conclusion to the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Moreover, suspicion is easily rekindled—witness the resurgence of Jewish concern after the euphoria of Camp David.

In this situation I believe our strategy should be to make a maximum effort in the near future to conclude a treaty, to be followed by negotiations regarding self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. Once the latter are underway, we would be able to lower the profile of our involvement in Middle East matters until after the 1980 election. This maximum effort should be made between now and late spring—to be followed by a gradual easing off on our part.

Another way perhaps of dealing with the linkage issue—in the event that it proves impossible to obtain a formal Israeli commitment to elections on the West Bank—might be an understanding between the Israelis and the Egyptians or between the Israelis and ourselves (with us conveying it to the Egyptians) that Israel will now undertake a series of unilateral steps designed to set in motion a political process on the West Bank/Gaza, pointing toward eventual self-government. This could involve release of some prisoners, fewer restrictions on political activity, the initiation of discussions on the subject of elections and the scope of authority for the self-government, self-restraint on settlements, etc. The point would be to substitute tangible Israeli actions for the formal commitment that the Israelis may be unwilling to make publicly (I will be exploring these and other ideas with Cy Vance and Bill Quandt, and the above is merely suggestive).

In any case, we have little time left for endless litigation of the issue, and within the next two weeks or so some basic strategic decisions concerning the rest of this year and next year ought to be made.

US-USSR-China

Normalization with China obviously carries with it the risk of Soviet over-reaction and miscalculations in both Peking and Moscow. We are now directly in the middle of a very delicate balancing act—one which is complicated by the fact that both Brezhnev and Deng are old and we could, even in the next few years, see significant governmental changes in both countries.

There is also a ripple effect. The Germans, for example, are already nervous that the Soviet response to our playing “the China card” will result in the Russians playing “the German card.” By this they are evidently concerned that pressure could be brought on Berlin or that some other aspect of Soviet-West German relations could be adversely affected.

Thus, it is extremely important for allied solidarity as well as global stability for this three-cornered relationship to be handled with the utmost care. From a political standpoint it is important to maintain momentum with both Peking and Moscow. I believe this means that you should plan on emerging from both the Deng visit and the Brezhnev visit⁵ with concrete plans to visit both China and the Soviet Union before the 1980 election. (You should make some tentative scheduling decisions on this even before you meet with Deng.)

Such summits in Peking and Moscow will not only enhance your own prestige but serve as a focus for structuring our relations with both China and the Soviet Union over the next 18 months. They will provide both reassurance of a continuing relationship with both countries and positive incentives for both to maintain a measure of restraint in their mutual relations.

My second recommendation is that you take more direct command of our relationship with the Soviet Union. You should insist on tight personal control of all actions affecting our relationship with the Soviet Union. You have taken this approach in regard to the Middle East and China with significant success. There is a potential for great disarray, given the different ideological views in your Administration. We cannot afford this disarray any longer, but it is likely to intensify in the absence of better discipline.

The Process

This leads me to my final concern. Substantively, we are doing extremely well. You have dispelled the popular impression that you are not skilled in foreign policy. You have made real progress on a number of key issues, and today the U.S. has better relations with the more important countries in the world than *at any point* since 1945.

But as an Administration, we have not dispelled the notion that we are amateurish and disorganized and that our policies are uncertain

⁵ During a December 7, 1978, question-and-answer session at a breakfast with members of the White House Correspondents Association, the President indicated that he would like to host Brezhnev in Washington for 4–5 days to discuss “a broad range of agenda items.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 2180) Responding to reporters’ questions in Plains, Georgia, on December 25, the President suggested that it was unlikely that the meeting would take place in January, but adding: “We would be ready in January if the Soviets are.” (*Ibid.*, p. 2287)

and irresolute. (The latest issue of *Foreign Affairs*⁶ makes a very strong case to that effect, and that is becoming the conventional wisdom.) This is the direct result not of our policies but of the way in which almost anyone in the bureaucracy feels free to talk to the press, discuss and distort the most intimate decision-making processes, and generally promote themselves or their personal policy preferences. It is extremely destructive, not only of our foreign policy but of political support for this Administration. I am afraid I see no remedy to this problem short of a significant shake-up, particularly in the State Department. There are faults here in The White House, in the NSC, and certainly in Defense. But one cannot have a discussion with any journalist in this city without gaining the very clear impression that the leaks and misinformation coming out of the State Department are of unprecedented proportions.

I am prepared to direct my staff to have no conversations with the press whatsoever unless specifically authorized by me or David.⁷ I believe we can similarly discipline the rest of the White House Staff. We should save our crackdown on the Pentagon until after we have SALT ratified; but this is not a major problem anyway, and we can take action against any outrageous examples of disloyalty or indiscretion (the Singlaub case⁸ had a constructive impact in DOD). In the State Department, I believe the principal problem areas that require shaking up are: the Iran desk, which has consistently misrepresented your policy; the staff in the Human Rights office; some key people in the Secretariat, including those who deal with the press; and some Assistant Secretaries, who grind their own axes with the press (most recently on the question pertaining to the Kennedy invitation to the Deng dinner).⁹ All of them, in different ways, have contributed to the public sense of disarray.

I have hesitated to set down this view for fear it would be misinterpreted. But I simply feel I would not be honest with you or myself if I did not express my deepening concern for the destructive impact of the

⁶ Presumable reference to *Foreign Affairs*, volume 57, number 3, "America and the World 1978." In it, authors surveyed and analyzed the President's foreign policy successes and limitations during the second year of his administration.

⁷ David Aaron.

⁸ Reference is to Army Major General John Singlaub, Chief of Staff of U.S. forces in South Korea, who in 1977 had criticized the President's decision to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea (see footnote 3, Document 53).

⁹ On January 26, *The Chicago Tribune* reported that the President, over the objection of several of his aides, had extended an invitation to Kennedy to attend the January 29 State dinner in honor of Deng. A White House aide confirmed a report by CBS News correspondent Leslie Stahl that the White House had sent the invitation to Kennedy on January 25. The aide indicated that Kennedy supporters had lobbied the White House and the Department to ensure that Kennedy received an invitation. ("Carter Invites Teddy: Guess who's coming to dinner?" p. D-6) See also "Kennedy Invited to Teng Dinner," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1979, p. A-5.

undisciplined and unprofessional conduct that characterizes various parts of the bureaucracy in the State Department.

This kind of thing does not have to go on. It did not happen under Dean Rusk; it did not happen under Henry Kissinger; it did not even happen under William Rogers. It is destructive, and I do think that you should consult some of your close political advisers (Ham, Jody,¹⁰ etc.) on how best to reassert more effective discipline. I do not wish to offer advice along these lines because it could be misconstrued as being self-serving.

In sum, if our foreign policy efforts are not only to be successful but be perceived as such so as to contribute to your political strength in 1980, it is necessary to focus on those few issues which will come to fruition at that time. And it is important that we do so with a genuine sense of cohesion and loyalty. I want you to know that I myself and my staff will do our utmost to refrain from contributing to public disarray. A similar commitment elsewhere in the government should be required as well.

2. Trends

Attached are the maps I referred to at the beginning of this report.¹¹ They cover three time frames—1955, 1966 and 1979. Each map is color coded as follows:

| | |
|------------|--|
| Blue | Aligned with U.S. or West |
| Light Blue | Non-Aligned but trending toward West (not necessarily the U.S.) |
| White | Non-Aligned |
| Pink | Non-Aligned but trending toward USSR (not toward communism per se) |
| Red | Aligned with USSR |

I believe these maps, albeit in a simplified fashion, capture the significant political changes that have occurred over the past two and a half decades. Here are a few observations:

1. The most *far-reaching* changes have taken place in *Asia*—the Far East, Southeast Asia and South Asia—and the most important of these has been the *PRC*. The alignment of India has also shifted during this period and it could be argued that India should now be considered trending toward the West (light blue) rather than non-aligned (white). The next year—and the fate of Indira Gandhi and the Janata Party—

¹⁰ Jordan and Powell.

¹¹ Not printed.

should answer this question. From a policy standpoint, one point is obvious—the Carter Administration has recognized the reality of these new alignments in Asia and has fashioned its policy accordingly. U.S. policy is now joined with the present and future, not the past.

2. In terms of *numbers*, the *greatest* change has occurred in *Africa*. Taking into account the explosion of new nations, there have been 23 alignments or realignments over the past 25 years. The end to this change is not in sight.

3. The greatest *potential* area of change is in the “*arc of instability*.” You will note a question mark by Iran on the 1979 map, as well as its white coloration. That same question mark could be applied to the region.

4. The area of *least* change—with the obvious exception of Europe—has been the *Western hemisphere*, although to our south there has been a slight trend toward less alignment with the U.S. Given the history of the region—and the need to set U.S.-Latin relations on a more mature basis for the future—this is probably a *positive* development (up to a point).

5. With respect to *worldwide trends*, the United States has reason to be optimistic; the Soviets less so. Again, the changing political alignment of the PRC is largely responsible for this. In addition, our region of the world is relatively stable; the Soviet Union’s is not. The next few years, however, will be critical ones. How the conflicts in the Middle East, the “*arc of instability*,” and Southern Africa are resolved will go a long way toward determining the alignments of the future.

As you have often mentioned, the world today is undergoing tremendous change—demographic, social, economic and political. The attached maps reflect the *surface manifestations* of these changes. Far more interesting would be a map that depicted the *undercurrents* of change. In lieu of such a map, studies such as the one you recently requested on the international implications of Islamic fundamentalism will be essential.¹²

¹² Not found.

111. Remarks by President Carter¹

Atlanta, Georgia, February 20, 1979

Chairman Milton Jones, Chancellor George Simpson, Dr. Joe Pettit, Mr. Kroll,² honored guests, fellow Tech students and alumni, ladies and gentlemen:

I have always been proud that I attended Georgia Tech, and I've always been grateful for what I learned here.

I have attended as a full-time student four different colleges in my life. Georgia Tech is by far the most difficult—[*laughter*]*—*and a number of years ago I decided that my being elected President was the only way that I would ever have a chance to get a degree from Georgia Tech. [*Laughter*] This has made it worthwhile. [*Laughter*]

I remember when I first came to Tech, the entire world was at war. Our Nation was under attack on two fronts and was desperately gearing up for a total war effort that we had not known since we fought each other in the 1860's.

In 1942, 1943, it was not yet a time for victories for the United States nor for our allies, and many people feared that Western democracies might be overwhelmed. We now face a very different world from the world in which I came of age. The old empires are gone, and the maps are covered with new and developing nations with names that we had then never heard.

But one thing has not changed as much as I had hoped. It's still a world of danger, a world in which democracy and freedom are still challenged, a world in which peace must be rewon day by day. Too many people still lack the simplest necessities of life, and too many are deprived of the most basic human rights. As the events of recent days

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 300–306. All brackets are in the original. The President spoke at a special convocation, which took place at 12:30 p.m. in Alexander Memorial Coliseum at the Georgia Institute of Technology. In his diary entry for February 20, the President commented: "I made a foreign affairs speech at Georgia Tech and got the first honorary degree they've ever given. They had to pass a special rule by the Board of Regents that an honorary degree could be given by a college in the university system only to an alumnus of the college who had become president of the United States." (*White House Diary*, p. 295) The President had attended Georgia Tech before he received a commission to the U.S. Naval Academy.

² Reference is to the Chairman of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia Milton Jones, Chancellor of the University System George Simpson, Jr., President of the Georgia Institute of Technology Joseph Pettit, and President of the Georgia Institute of Technology National Alumni Association Bernard Kroll.

have shown, peace remains a fragile thing, vulnerable to assaults from all sides.

Disturbances in Iran, the Western Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, are a challenge to our determination and our leadership. They underscore the importance of strength in our national defenses, wisdom in our diplomacy, and steadfastness in the pursuit of arms control and peace.

I want to speak to you today about America's role and America's purpose in this world of change and turbulence.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the leader in moving our world closer to a stable peace and genuine security. We have the world's strongest economy; we have the world's strongest military forces; and we share burdens of mutual defense with friends abroad whose security and prosperity are as vital to us as to themselves.

With our strong allies, we have succeeded in preventing a global war for more than one-third of a century—the longest period of general peace in modern times. And as President of the United States, I am determined to keep our Nation at peace.

We help to sustain a world trading and monetary system that has brought greater prosperity to more of the world's people than ever before in history. We are working to resolve conflicts among other nations so that each can develop its own future in independence and peace. And we've helped to maintain the conditions in which more than 100 new nations have come into being, and in which human hope—and its fulfillment—has taken a revolutionary leap forward.

In short, we in the United States provide the bedrock of global security and economic advance in a world of unprecedented change and conflict.

In such a world America has four fundamental security responsibilities: to provide for our own Nation's strength and safety; to stand by our allies and our friends; to support national independence and integrity of other nations; and to work diligently for peace.

We do not oppose change. Many of the political currents sweeping the world express a desire that we share—the desire for a world in which the legitimate aspirations of nations and individuals have a greater chance for fulfillment.

The United States cannot control events within other nations. A few years ago, we tried this and we failed. But we recognized as inevitable that the uncertainty and the turmoil that come with change can have its darker side as well. We saw this in a senseless act of violence last week in Afghanistan, when a brave and good man—Ambassador

Adolph Dubs—gave his life in the performance of his duty as a representative of the United States.³

As we meet here today at Georgia Tech—enjoying the blessings of freedom and peace—we must remember that we are indebted for those blessings to the sacrifice of men and women like Spike Dubs.

We also see the darker side of change when countries in turbulence provide opportunities for exploitation by outsiders who seek not to advance human aims, but rather to extend their own power and their own position at the expense of others.

As I speak to you today, the country of Iran—with which we have had close relations for the last 30 years—is in revolution.⁴ It's been our hope that Iran could modernize without deep internal conflicts, and we sought to encourage that effort by supporting its government, by urging internal change toward progress and democracy, and by helping to provide a background of regional stability.

The revolution in Iran is a product of deep social, political, religious, and economic factors growing out of the history of Iran itself. Those who argue that the United States should or could intervene directly to thwart these events are wrong about the realities of Iran. So, too, are those who spout propaganda that protecting our own citizens is tantamount to direct intervention.

We have not and we will not intervene in Iran, yet the future of Iran continues to be of deep concern to us and to our friends and allies. It's an important nation in a critical part of the world, an immediate neighbor of the Soviet Union, a major oil producer that also sits beside the principal artery for most of the world's trade in oil. And it is still a significant potential force for stability and progress in the region.

Iran is a proud nation with a long history—more than 2,000 years—of struggle to establish and to guarantee its own freedom. The independence of Iran is also in our own vital interest and in the interest of our closest allies—and we will support the independence of Iran.

Out of today's turmoil, it is our hope that these troubled people will create a stable government which can meet the needs of the Iranian people and which can enable that great nation not only to remain independent but to regain its internal strength and balance.

³ Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul on February 14 and was killed during an attempt to free him. For the President's and Vance's comments at a February 18 ceremony honoring Dubs, which took place at Andrews Air Force Base, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 295–296.

⁴ Documentation on the Iranian Revolution is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. X, Iran: Revolution, January 1977–November 1979.

We are prepared to support that effort as appropriate and to work with the Iranian Government and the people as a nation which shares common interests and common aspirations with us.

But just as we respect Iran's independence and integrity, other nations must do so as well. If others interfere, directly or indirectly, they are on notice that this will have serious consequences and will affect our broader relationships with them.

At the same time, we are intensifying our efforts to promote stability throughout the Middle East so that the security and the independence of the nations of that part of the world will be maintained.

At my direction, the Secretary of Defense recently carried out comprehensive consultations in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, concerning the security of that region.⁵ We are determined to work with these nations and with others to put the peaceful development of the region on a sound and a lasting foundation.

Recent disturbances in the region have underlined the need to work even more urgently towards peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. To this end, Israeli and Egyptian negotiators, the Foreign Ministers of both countries, will return to Camp David tonight at the invitation of the United States.⁶

They will be meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. And I myself will do whatever I can to promote the success of the Camp David negotiations. And if it should be necessary, and the parties show adequate flexibility, I will call another summit conference to work for peace.

I urge all leaders throughout the Middle East to recognize the vital importance for their region for these talks to succeed.

For us in the United States, any crisis in the Middle East has the most immediate and serious consequences. But we are also deeply concerned by what is happening now in Southeast Asia. The same principles of American policy apply: We support the independence and integrity of the regional nations; we will stand by our friends; and we will continue as a nation to work for peace.

Just in the last few weeks we've seen a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia⁷ and, as a result, a Chinese frontier penetration into Viet-

⁵ Documentation on Brown's consultations is in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980 and *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

⁶ Documentation on the meetings is in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980.

⁷ See footnote 17, Document 108.

nam.⁸ Both actions threaten the stability of one of the world's most important and promising regions—Southeast Asia.

We have opposed both military actions. Let me outline very briefly the principles that govern our conduct.

First, we will not get involved in conflict between Asian Communist nations. Our national interests are not directly threatened, although we are concerned, of course, at the wider implications of what might happen in the future and what has been happening in the past.

We are using whatever diplomatic and political means are available to encourage restraint on all parties and to seek to prevent a wider war. While our influence is limited, because our involvement is limited, we remain the one great power in all the world which can have direct and frank discussions with all the parties concerned. For this reason, we have a useful and important role to play in the restoration of stability. We will continue our efforts, both directly with the countries involved and through the United Nations, to secure an end to the fighting in the region, to bring about a withdrawal of Vietnam forces from Cambodia, and of Chinese forces from Vietnam, and to gain the restoration of the independence and integrity of all nations involved.

At the same time, we are continuing to express our deep concern that this conflict may widen still further—with unforeseen and grave consequences for nations in the region and also beyond.

In any event, the United States is fully prepared to protect the vital interests of our people wherever they may be challenged. We are in close consultation with our friends and allies in the region, especially the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the ASEAN nations. Their continued stability and prosperity are of great importance to us.

The normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China is already an accomplished fact and will not be reversed. This was the simple, long overdue recognition of the reality of the government in Peking.

In the last few days, we've consulted directly with leaders around the world—and with our own congressional leaders, as well—about events both in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The responsibilities that we face are serious, and they are shared by the administration and the Congress, by our Nation, and our allies—and our common understanding and our adherence to a common cause are vital.

All of us know that the internal affairs of Iran or combat even among Communist nations are of concern to us. Many nations are trou-

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 205–207, 212, 214–220.

bled, even threatened by the turmoil in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. To stand by our friends and to help meet their security needs in these difficult times, I will consult with the Congress to determine what additional military assistance will be required. This added measure of support is crucial for stability throughout the Indian Ocean area.

And let me repeat, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the world, we will stand by our friends. We will honor our commitments. And we will protect the vital interests of the United States, and you can depend on it.

As we face this immediate series of crises, we also look constantly to the broader needs of security. If we are to meet our responsibilities, we must continue to maintain the military forces we need for our defense and to contribute to the defense of our allies.

This year, I have proposed a substantial real increase in the defense budget.⁹ The events of recent weeks underscore the responsibility of the Congress to appropriate these funds in full. There must be no doubt that the people of the United States are fully prepared to meet our commitments and to back up those commitments with military strength.

Turmoil and crisis also underscore the vital needs to work wherever possible to stabilize and to reduce competition in strategic nuclear weapons. This effort has the same ultimate goals as does our strong defense—the goals of security, stability, and peace. In pursuit of these goals, our Nation faces no more important task this year than the successful conclusion of a strategic arms limitation agreement.

Just as we work to support national independence and to aid our friends and allies in times of trial, we must work to regulate nuclear arms capable of threatening life throughout this planet. For a SALT agreement is a fundamental element of strategic and political stability in a turbulent world—stability which can provide the necessary political basis for us to contain the kinds of crises that we face today, and to prevent their growing into a terrible nuclear confrontation.

After more than 6 years of negotiations—conducted by three different Presidents—agreement has now been reached on most of the major components of a sound and verifiable SALT II treaty.

The emerging agreement will establish for the first time equal numbers of strategic arms for both sides. It will thus reverse the Soviet's numerical advantage which was temporarily established in the SALT I treaty of 1972, when they had about a 40-percent built-in negotiated advantage.

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 109.

To reach these new levels, the Soviets will be required to reduce their overall number of strategic arms. Over 250 Soviet missiles or bombers—about 10 percent of their strategic forces—will have to be destroyed or dismantled. At the same time, because we are now well below the agreed ceiling, we could substantially increase our own operational strategic forces.

The SALT II agreement will also provide negotiated limits on building new types of weapons and limits on the improvement of existing ones—the so-called qualitative arms race can be controlled.

SALT II will limit the size of land-based missiles and the number of warheads that can be placed on them. Without these limits, the Soviets could vastly increase the number of warheads on their large land-based missiles—with grave implications to the strategic balance. SALT II will therefore contribute to our ability to deal with the growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles. Without it, the Soviet Union could continue to increase the number of their warheads, tending to nullify our effort to protect our missiles.

The agreement will also permit us and our allies to pursue all the defense programs that we believe might eventually be needed—the M-X missile; the Trident submarine and its missiles; air, ground, and sea-launched cruise missiles; cruise missile carrier aircraft; and a new penetrating bomber. These would be permitted.

Thus SALT II would allow our own prudent programs to move ahead and also will place important limits on what the Soviets might otherwise do. And this SALT II agreement will be a basis for further negotiations for additional substantial cuts in the level of nuclear armaments.

Without the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union could have nearly one-third more strategic forces by 1985 than with SALT II. We would, of necessity, as a nation, match such a buildup. The costs would be enormous, the risks self-evident. And both nations would wind up less secure.

The stakes in SALT are too high to rely on trust. Any SALT II treaty that I sign will be adequately verifiable, using our own independent means of guaranteeing Soviet compliance with terms of the agreement.

SALT II will specifically forbid any interference that would impede our ability to verify compliance with the treaty. Any effort on the part of the Soviet Union to interfere with our verification activities would be a detectable violation of the agreement itself, and an early signal of any possible cheating.

Finally, let me put this agreement in the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union and the turbulence that exists in many parts of the world. The question is not whether SALT can be divorced from

this complicated context. It cannot. As I have often said, our relationship with the Soviet Union is a mixture of cooperation and competition. And as President of the United States, I have no more difficult and delicate task than to balance these two. I cannot and I will not let the pressures of inevitable competition overwhelm possibilities for cooperation, any more than I will let cooperation blind us to the realities of competition, which we are fully prepared to meet.

Because this carefully negotiated and responsible arms control agreement will make the world safer and more secure, it is in our national interest to pursue it, even as we continue competition with the Soviet Union elsewhere in the world. Therefore, I will seek both to conclude this new SALT agreement and to respond to any Soviet behavior which adversely affects our interests.

To reject SALT II would mean that the inevitable competition in strategic nuclear arms would grow even more dangerous. Each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction—as serious as it may be in its own right—would take on an added measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For it would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability. It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this dangerous dimension of our military competition under control.

In today's world, it is vital to match the pursuit of ideals with the responsible use of force and of power. The United States is a source of both, ideals and power. Our ideals have inspired the world for more than two centuries; and for three generations, since World War II, our power has helped other nations to realize their own ideals.

The determination and strength of purpose of the American people are crucial for stability in a turbulent world. If we stand together in maintaining a steady course, America can protect its principles and interests and also be a force for peace.

Americans have always accepted the challenge of leadership. And I am confident that we will do so now.

Thank you very much.

112. Address by Vice President Mondale¹

Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 22, 1979

Preserving Freedom and Peace in a Nuclear Age

Today I want to talk with you about how our nation can preserve its freedom, its beauty, and its peace in a nuclear age.

Our own Hubert Humphrey once said that: "In this world, disaster is but a step away. There is no margin for error."² Returning to a dark age of unrestrained nuclear arms competition would reduce that margin. Allowing any nation to gain military advantage over the United States would be equally dangerous.

We must not—and we will not—let either happen. This is the determination of the Carter Administration. This is the view of the vast majority of the American people—who overwhelmingly support both an arms control agreement and a strong national defense. And I am confident that Congress shares this view as it prepares to consider both the strategic arms limitation treaty and our proposed defense programs.

There are some Americans, however, who fear that we are not strong enough as a nation to move ahead with SALT. That view—of the current military balance and of SALT—is wrong, and it can lead us in the wrong direction. It not only underestimates America's overwhelming nonmilitary advantages, it seriously misjudges both our relative military strength and the effect of a SALT agreement.

Our military position today is secure, and we are taking steps to assure that it remains secure. And a sound SALT agreement will make us stronger as a nation because it will contribute to that security.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1979, pp. 14–16. Mondale delivered his address at a conference organized by the Department of State, the Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, and a consortium of other Minnesota organizations. Additional information about the address is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Special Assistant for Speech Writing, Speech Text Files, Remarks, SALT Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, February 22, 1979.

² The quotation is from Humphrey's Vice Presidential acceptance speech, made before the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on August 27, 1964. Humphrey, in extolling Johnson's leadership qualities, highlighted Johnson's November 27, 1963, address before a joint session of Congress: "I'm sure you remember these words—'Let us continue.' Those simple and direct words of President Johnson reached the hearts of our people. Those words rallied them, lifted them, and unified them. In this world disaster is ever but a step away. There is no margin for error. The leader of the free world, the leader of American democracy, holds in his hands the destinies not only of his own people but holds in his hands the destinies of all mankind." ("Transcript of Acceptance Speeches by Johnson and Humphrey at Atlantic City," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1964, p. 12)

Let me make that point again. The SALT agreement we hope to present to the American people is not a gift to the Soviets; it is an agreement which serves the security interests of our nation and of the world. It does not weaken us; it strengthens us.

We have watched carefully the steady growth of Soviet military power in recent years. In some areas, the Soviets are ahead of us; in others, we are ahead of them. What matters for us is not whether the two forces are identical, but whether they are in an overall balance—for that is the basis of security today.

For example, the Soviets have always had a larger land army. But we do not need to match them man-for-man because of the strength of our more numerous allies. The Soviet Union has always had more tanks. But we have three times as many antitank weapons in Western Europe as there are Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe.

The critical question is not whether we match the forces the Soviets have built to meet their own security needs but whether we meet U.S. and allied security needs. Without question, our forces meet those needs.

U.S. Strategic Advantages

To begin with, the United States has certain strategic advantages.

- We have friendly neighbors on our borders. The Soviet Union has far longer and far more vulnerable borders.
- We have only one major adversary. The Soviets face two. Fully 25% of its combat forces are deployed on the Soviet-Chinese border.
- We have easy access to the sea. The Soviets are restricted by narrow straits, by a long and icy winter, and by other natural barriers.

Our military capabilities today are enormous and growing stronger. And our allies and friends significantly increase our overall strength.

Nor are we standing still. Because of steady growth in Soviet defense spending and capabilities over the past decade—particularly in central Europe—we have had to reverse the pattern of shrinking American defense efforts. We and our allies committed ourselves last year to increasing individual defense expenditures.³ The defense budget President Carter submitted to Congress last month reflects that commitment.⁴

³ The NATO allies expressed the commitment in the final communiqué issued at the end of the May 30–31, 1978, summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council. See Document 83 and footnote 1 thereto.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 109.

We must continue to protect our own and our allies' interests. We are strengthening our forces in Europe. We are improving our ability to speed additional ground and air forces in the event of a crisis. And our European allies, who provide most of NATO's combat forces, are steadily improving their forces' readiness and effectiveness.

But it is the awesome power of our nuclear weapons that I want to emphasize this afternoon.

Many of you here today remember the shuddering reality of our first atomic bomb. Today, the United States has over 20,000 nuclear weapons.

- Each warhead on one of our Poseidon missiles is two times more destructive than the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One Poseidon submarine carries more than 140 warheads. Each Poseidon can deliver more destructive force than all the bombs—nuclear and conventional—that were dropped during World War II. We have 31 of these Poseidon submarines.

- More than half of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles are equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's)—which enable one rocket to carry a number of warheads and thus strike at several different targets. Each of the Minuteman warheads carries eight times the force of the first atomic bomb. And soon we will double that destructive power.

We have 348 heavy bombers which can carry 2,000 megatons of total power. Let me illustrate what that means. If every car of a train that extended from Minneapolis to Winona⁵ were filled with TNT and blown up, that would be one megaton.

I cite these facts to give you a sense of the enormous scale—and the great diversity—of America's nuclear strength.

The Soviets, of course, also have a large arsenal. But the factor that keeps us at peace is not simply what each of us has; it is whether there is any possibility that a nuclear attack on us or our allies would not mean massive destruction for the Soviets.

Let me take the worst case. It is possible that, in the early to mid-1980's, the Soviets—with a surprise attack—could destroy most of our land-based missiles while keeping a large number of their missiles in reserve. In doing so, they also must consider the grim possibility that we would have already launched our missiles before theirs arrived. The possibility, even theoretical, that our missiles would be vulnerable is something we are working very hard to avoid.

But even if our land-based missiles were vulnerable to a surprise attack, we could still totally destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society

⁵ Approximately 100 miles.

with the rest of our nuclear arsenal. No sane leader could expect to gain an advantage from launching such a suicidal attack.

Modernization and Restructuring

To assure that our strategic forces will be a convincing deterrent in the future, we are carrying out the most extensive modernization and restructuring of our nuclear forces in over a decade.

First, we have put three-quarters of our strategic warheads in our largely invulnerable submarines and mobile bombers; three-quarters of the Soviet Union's warheads are on more vulnerable fixed land-based missiles.

Second, we are adding to the capabilities of our strategic bombers. Our B-52 force is being equipped with long-range cruise missiles. That force eclipses Soviet air defense expenditures. These missiles will enable our B-52's to remain outside Soviet air defenses and still strike significant Soviet targets with extraordinary accuracy.

Third, we are placing more powerful, sophisticated missiles in our existing submarines. We are about to launch our new, longer-range Trident submarine; and we are developing a still more powerful and accurate missile for these Trident submarines.

Fourth, we are substantially improving our land-based missile force. Our Minuteman III's will be considerably more accurate. We are accelerating development of a new and much larger land-based missile called the M-X. And we are carefully analyzing the alternatives available for making our intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) less vulnerable. The SALT agreement now being considered will not constrain a single one of these alternatives. Indeed, it will help make these alternatives feasible and safe.

We will continue to maintain a convincing deterrent with a nuclear weapons force. But in a world of nuclear weapons, more is not necessarily better. We are not more secure today because we and the Soviets have tens of thousands of warheads rather than thousands.

For the stark reality is that neither of us can win an all-out arms race. It is a futile search for a temporary advantage. We will match what they do, and they will do the same, in a spiral of ever-increasing risk and cost.

Thus the power we share with the Soviet Union carries this imperative for our security: We must slow, and ultimately reverse, this dangerous and burdensome competition. That is an imperative recognized for nearly three decades. Every President since the beginning of the nuclear era—and both major political parties—have understood that security depends on both a sound defense and sound arms control.

Background to SALT II

Building on the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, President Kennedy concluded the first arms control agreement with

the Soviet Union in 1963—halting poisonous nuclear-weapons testing in the atmosphere.⁶ Later we reached agreements that banned nuclear weapons from the ocean floor and from outer space.

The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty now binds more than 100 nations.⁷ It has not yet removed the specter of nuclear proliferation, but it has advanced that objective significantly.

Since first proposed by President Johnson, we have been engaged in broader Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. During the Nixon Administration, these negotiations severely restricted both sides from building new antiballistic missile systems. These systems would have cost billions of dollars and added new dangers to the arms race.

Under President Nixon, SALT I placed the first limits on the number of strategic offensive missiles. It prevented the Soviets from continuing to increase the number of their missiles by several hundred each year.⁸

For the past 6 years, three Presidents of both parties have been negotiating the next step in arms control—the SALT II agreement. The negotiations have been intense. We have proceeded carefully and deliberately. And we are near agreement.

What SALT II Will Accomplish

Let me explain what this agreement will accomplish.

First, it will establish equal limits on the number of missiles and bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the other side. The first SALT agreement in 1972 froze the number of strategic missiles, leaving the Soviets with a numerical advantage which was then offset by U.S. technological superiority. The new agreement firmly establishes the principle of equal numbers.

Second, these limits will be lower and more encompassing than those in the first SALT agreement. The new overall limits would force the Soviets to eliminate over 250 strategic missiles and bombers. This is a 10% reduction and about 750 fewer than they are likely to have in the absence of SALT. On the other hand, because we are below the new limits, we would actually be able, if we chose, to increase the overall number of our strategic weapons in operation.

Third, the agreement will place lower limits on specific weapons, including those with more than a single warhead.

Fourth, for the first time, we will curb the number of new systems and begin to limit the race to make existing systems more deadly. Only

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 56.

⁷ See footnote 4, Document 2.

⁸ See Document 52.

one new ICBM will be permitted to each side. The number of warheads on a single missile would be limited. And there would be restraint on increasing the size of land-based missiles.

What would be the major effect of this agreement on our security? Instead of an estimated 3,000 Soviet strategic weapons by 1985, there would be 2,250. The strategic balance will be more stable and, therefore, safer. We will have greater confidence and certainty in our own defense planning. And the defense programs that we and our allies need and have planned can proceed forward on schedule.

Verification and Competition

But how do we know the Soviets will not violate the agreement? The answer is—we can see for ourselves.

We have powerful and varied systems for observing the Soviets. Besides our photographic satellites, we have other highly sensitive and, therefore, highly classified means of verification. The large size and limited number of bases for intercontinental missiles, heavy bombers, and nuclear submarines eases our task.

And the SALT agreement itself makes a major contribution. SALT II would forbid any interference which would impede our ability to verify compliance with the treaty. And for the first time the Soviets have agreed to regularly exchange precise data with us on each country's missiles.

This is not a new and uncertain challenge. We have monitored Soviet compliance with SALT I. We know what we can see. And we know that we can detect any violation large enough to affect the strategic balance—and do so in time to respond effectively.

Yet with all this, some critics suggest that we should not move ahead with SALT, even if it strengthens U.S. and allied security. They contend that Soviet actions elsewhere—in the Third World or on human rights—compel us to withhold approval of SALT II. This would be a profound mistake.

As President Carter said two days ago, we “. . . cannot let the pressures of inevitable competition overwhelm possibilities for cooperation any more than [we can permit] cooperation to blind us to the realities of competition. . . .” And the President said this:

It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this most dangerous dimension of our military competition under control.⁹

⁹ For the full text of the President's address at Georgia Tech on Feb. 20, 1979, see *Bulletin* of Mar. 1979, p. 21. [Footnote and brackets in the original. For the address, see Document 111.]

We will continue to compete peacefully with the Soviets. In this competition, we hold many cards—not only our military aid but our economic ties, our understanding of diversity, and, most of all, our support for the determined sense of independence in emerging nations around the world.

But as we compete, we must also cooperate to limit the most dangerous competition—nuclear weapons. This is in our calculated self-interest. SALT is not a reward for Soviet good behavior. It is a benefit for ourselves and for mankind.

With or without SALT, competition with the Soviets in many areas will continue. We will respond to any Soviet behavior which adversely affects our interests. Without SALT, that competition becomes more dangerous, and the possibilities for cooperation are dimmed.

We must recognize our overwhelming strengths as a nation. We must see the future not as a threat but as an opportunity to make our children's lives safer and more rewarding than our own. The emerging SALT agreement represents such an opportunity.

Military competition today is carried out in highly technical terms. The debates on SALT will be very complex. Let us not, as we explore the technicalities in all the detail they deserve, lose sight of these simple truths: A nuclear war would destroy much—if not all—of what we love. We must do everything in our power to see that it never happens. We prevent it today with a military defense strong enough to deter our potential adversaries. We will maintain that deterrence.

But that alone will not make us secure. We must also, at long last, reverse the dangerous race in nuclear weapons that each year increases nuclear stockpiles and each year makes us less safe. That is what SALT is about.

With the vision that set him apart from other men, Hubert Humphrey defined our present challenge over a decade ago. He not only cared deeply, he thought deeply about the nature of America's security in a nuclear world.

Nuclear power has placed into the hands of men the power to destroy all that man has created. Only responsive statesmen—who perceive that perseverance in the pursuit of peace is not cowardice but courage, that restraint in the use of force is not weakness but wisdom—can prevent international rivalries from leading to an incinerated world.

Let us have Hubert's wisdom—and summon Hubert's courage—as we set the course which will help define our future for years to come.

113. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 24, 1979

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #89

I. *Opinion*

Foreign Policy: Tone and Orchestration

You confront a paradox: everyone who has met with you, whether it be mass media dinner guests or participants in the Congressional foreign policy briefings, afterwards invariably say how immensely impressed they were by your mastery of foreign policy, by your knowledge of details, and by your ability to relate that knowledge to a broad vision. Just last night I was told that Mrs. Reston² commented after a dinner with you that she cannot recall any President who could match you in that regard. After one of the Congressional briefings, Tip O'Neil said that no one can have the slightest doubt that you are not only fully in charge of foreign policy but that you have a clear and coherent picture as to where this country ought to be heading.³

Yet at the same time, it is a fact that both abroad and increasingly at home the United States is seen as indecisive, vacillating, and pursuing a policy of acquiescence. We are perceived as neither responding effectively to Soviet assertiveness and as unable to generate a broad strategy that is relevant to the times.

Why this incongruity?

Part of the answer, I suppose, is to be found in what you said at the State Department the other day: we live in a complex age, and complexity does not lend itself to simple explanations.⁴ We can no longer

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 1-2/79. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Reference is to journalist Sally Reston, married to syndicated columnist James "Scotty" Reston.

³ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, the President wrote "good idea" and drew an arrow pointing downward from the comment.

⁴ On February 22, the President took part in a foreign policy conference at the Department of State for editors and broadcasters. In his opening remarks the President asserted: "Looking back over the last several years, particularly the last 2 years, I've been struck by the increasing complexity, however, of international affairs. I'm encouraged by what I judge to be a willingness on behalf of the American people to attempt to understand complex issues, not to oversimplify them, and to support policies and decisions that basically and openly address these complex issues responsibly and realistically." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 310*)

color the world in shades of black and white, and we can no longer reduce challenges to a single phenomenon, be it Hitlerism or Stalinism. However, I suspect that part of the problem is also to be located on a less philosophical plane, with some of it related to tone and orchestration.

For example, I think a genuine problem has been created by the press's fascination, exploitation and magnification of the so-called Vance-Brzezinski rivalry. To be sure, some differences do exist and you are not only aware of them, but, as you have often said, you do want divergent viewpoints presented to you. At the same time, the fact is that on most matters Cy and I are in basic agreement, and there has been no underhanded maneuvering to have one's point of view prevail.

As one looks back on previous administrations, one can note similar divergences, and in the case of FDR they were certainly much wider philosophically and more intense. The real difference is that FDR was seen as orchestrating and deliberately exploiting such differences whereas the press is now creating the impression that you are buffeted by them. You know and we know that this is not so, but it is the perception that is damaging.

Accordingly, it would be very useful if you took some deliberate steps to demonstrate that you are exploiting the differences while pursuing a steady course. Schram in a recent story asserted that this is exactly what you are doing and it was the first positive expression of that view.⁵

One way to achieve that objective would be to use Cy soon and visibly in relationship to China, and to use me in some fashion in relationship to the Soviet Union. For example, you told Deng that the United States and China should have regular consultations. When the crisis in Indochina is over, it would be useful for Cy and some of his top assistants to go to Peking at your direction to engage in high-level discussions. Similarly, it might be useful, and domestically even appealing, to have me spend a couple of days in Moscow in consultations with the

⁵ Presumable reference to Martin Schram, "Birth of a Notion," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1979, pp. A-1, A-8. Schram referenced a January 2 meeting at the White House, during which the President, Mondale, and several White House aides discussed the upcoming State of the Union address. The meeting, Schram noted, generated a broader philosophical discussion about possible themes for the Carter administration. He continued: "New Foundation. As the Carter advisers came to see it, the theme stands for a new approach to today's problems. A new way of taking a long-range look at what is wrong and a new way of solving things on a long-range basis—heavy on concept but spare on promises." (*Ibid.*, p. A-1)

Soviets on issues of common concern, perhaps with my counterpart who works for Brezhnev. This could be in preparation for the Summit.⁶

With reference to the latter, I should note that we really have not had sustained and truly tough-minded "consultations" with the Soviets since you took office. Most of Cy's sessions have been primarily negotiating ones, and I suspect that some of the misunderstandings that exist are due to suspicions that have become more intense. Kissinger, even while bombing Hanoi, did engage in such forthright consultations with the Soviets and they were mutually helpful in defining more precisely the limits of what is tolerable and what is not. At the minimum, I would suggest engaging in some soul searching with Dobyryn here on the basis of guidance cleared by you and Cy.

In addition, it might be useful for Cy to give a foreign policy speech in which he would stress some of the themes that you have recently expressed: the importance of power, and our recognition that relations with the Soviet Union may require from time to time a forceful American reaffirmation of our interests (e.g., in relationship to Iran, or peace in the Far East, or the Soviet military buildup). I am scheduled to give a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in Chicago some time in late March or early April and my plan is to use it, subject to your approval, for a strong defense on SALT and for an explanation of its importance to our overall foreign policy.⁷

There may be other ways in which orchestration by you could be symbolically expressed, but I have the feeling that some initiatives along the lines suggested above are needed.

Finally, I attach a page from Nixon's memoirs which is very suggestive.⁸ If we can combine a Camp David success with a wider Middle East regional security initiative and a comprehensive energy initiative, we might generate genuine momentum that would be politically significant.

2. *National Security Affairs Calendar* (see Tab A)⁹

⁶ Reference is to the summit meeting between the President and Brezhnev, scheduled to take place in Vienna June 16-18; see Document 120.

⁷ On April 4, Brzezinski addressed a dinner meeting of the Chicago Committee of the Council on Foreign Relations; see Harry Kelly, "Brzezinski defends SALT II; says that Soviets cannot cheat," *The Chicago Tribune*, April 5, 1979, p. 6.

⁸ Brzezinski attached a photocopy of page 497 of *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978). He drew the President's attention to the following paragraph: "Having hit the lowest of low points in 1971, we suddenly rebounded with a series of stunning successes, among them the announcement of the China trip, a breakthrough in the SALT negotiations, an extremely popular and apparently effective economic program including a freeze of wages and prices, and the scheduling of a Soviet summit. These and other things gave us a momentum that carried right into the presidential election year of 1972." Brzezinski also underlined a portion of the first sentence.

⁹ Attached but not printed.

114. Editorial Note

On March 5, 1979, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell announced that Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had invited President Jimmy Carter to Egypt and Israel, respectively, to discuss the “peace process, regional security, and bilateral issues.” Powell indicated that the President would depart Washington for Egypt on March 7 and would then proceed to Israel on March 10. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, page 383*) In remarks prior to his departure, the President asserted: “So, it is with hope that I depart, hope tempered by sober realism. As a friend of Egypt and a friend of Israel, we will do our best to help them achieve the peace that they have paid for in blood many times over.

“In doing this, in seeking to lay the basis for a stable and a peaceful Middle East, we will also be serving our own deepest national interests and the interests of all the people of the world.” (*ibid.*, page 395)

The President arrived in Cairo on March 8. For Sadat’s and the President’s comments at a welcoming ceremony held at Qubba Palace, see *ibid.*, page 405. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met with Sadat that evening at Tahra Palace from 7:10 to 8:54 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) On the morning of March 9, Carter, Sadat, and the Presidential party boarded a train for Alexandria. En route, Carter and Sadat took part in an interview conducted by U.S. news correspondents Walter Cronkite (CBS News), John Chancellor (NBC News), and Peter Jennings (ABC News). For the transcript of this interview, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pages 407–410*. Later that evening, Carter and Sadat met at Mamoura Palace in Alexandria.

On the morning of March 10, the Presidential party departed Alexandria for Cairo via helicopter. At 1 p.m., the President addressed the People’s Assembly of Egypt, which had convened in the Assembly Chamber of the People’s Assembly Building. Following his introductory remarks, the President turned to the efforts made the previous fall:

“Last September, the course of negotiations took the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel to Camp David, in the wooded mountains near the Capital of the United States of America.

“Out of our discussion there came two agreements: A framework within which peace between Israel and all her neighbors might be achieved, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people realized—and also an outline for a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, in the context of a comprehensive peace for the Middle East.

“Those agreements were rooted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which established the basic equation between

an Arab commitment to peace and Israeli withdrawal in the context of security. The treaty which is now being negotiated between Egypt and Israel reflects those principles.

“Since the two agreements were signed, we have been working to bring both of them to fruition. The United States has served as a mediator—not to press either party to accept provisions that are inconsistent with its basic interests.

“In these negotiations, a crucial question has involved the relationship between an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the broader peace envisioned and committed at Camp David. I believe that this body and the people of Egypt deserve to know my thinking on the subject.

“When two nations conclude a treaty with one another, they have every right to expect that the terms of that treaty will be carried out faithfully and steadfastly. At the same time, there can be little doubt that the two agreements reached at Camp David—negotiated together and signed together—are related, and that a comprehensive peace remains a common objective.

“Just in recent days, both Prime Minister Begin in Washington and President Sadat here in Egypt have again pledged to carry out every commitment made at Camp David.

“Both leaders have reaffirmed that they do not want a separate peace between their two nations. Therefore, our current efforts to complete the treaty negotiations represent not the end of a process, but the beginning of one, for a treaty between Egypt and Israel is an indispensable part of a comprehensive peace.

“I pledge to you today that I also remain personally committed to move on to negotiations concerning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and other issues of concern to the Palestinians and also to future negotiations between Israel and all her neighbors. I feel a personal obligation in this regard.

“Only the path of negotiation and accommodation can lead to the fulfillment of the hopes of the Palestinian people for peaceful self-expression. The negotiations proposed in the Camp David agreements will provide them with an opportunity to participate in the determination of their own future. We urge representative Palestinians to take part in these negotiations.

“We are ready to work with any who are willing to talk peace. Those who attack these efforts are opposing the only realistic prospect that can bring real peace to the Middle East.

“Let no one be deceived. The effect of their warlike slogans and their rhetoric is to make them in reality advocates of the status quo, not change; advocates of war, not peace; advocates of further suffering, not

of achieving the human dignity to which long-suffering people of this region are entitled.

“There is simply no workable alternative to the course that your nation and my nation are now following together. The conclusion of a treaty between Israel and Egypt will enable your government to mobilize its resources not for war, but for the provision of a better life for every Egyptian.

“I know how deeply President Sadat is committed to that quest. And I believe its achievement will ultimately be his greatest legacy to the people he serves so well.

“My government, for its part, the full power and influence of the United States of America, is ready to share that burden of that commitment with you. These gains which we envision will not come quickly or easily, but they will come.

“The conclusion of the peace treaty that we are discussing will strengthen cooperation between Egypt and the United States in other ways. I fully share and will support President Sadat’s belief that stability must be maintained in this part of the world, even while constructive change is actively encouraged. He and I recognize that the security of this vital region is being challenged. I applaud his determination to meet that challenge, and my government will stand with him.

“Our policy is that each nation should have the ability to defend itself, so that it does not have to depend on external alliances for its own security. The United States does not seek a special position for itself.

“If we are successful in our efforts to conclude a comprehensive peace, it will be presented obviously, each element of it, to this body for ratification.

“It is in the nature of negotiation that no treaty can be ideal or perfect from either the Egyptian or Israeli point of view. The question we’ve faced all along, however, is not whether the treaty we negotiate will meet all the immediate desires of each of the two parties, but whether it will protect the vital interests of both and further the cause for peace for all the states and all the peoples of this region. That is the basic purpose and the most difficult question which we are resolved to answer.

“Such a treaty, such an agreement, is within our grasp. Let us seize this opportunity while we have it.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I*, pages 413–414)

The complete text of the address is *ibid.*, pages 412–414.

Following a luncheon at Mena House in Giza, Carter and Sadat met and subsequently made a statement to the press about Carter’s visit. For the text of the statement, see *ibid.*, page 415. After touring the pyramids at Giza, the Presidential party departed for Tel Aviv. For the

remarks of Israeli President Yitzhak Navon and Carter at a welcoming ceremony in Tel Aviv the evening of March 10, see *ibid.*, pages 415–417. Following these remarks, Carter went by motorcade with Begin to the entrance of the city of Jerusalem. On March 11, Carter and Begin, in addition to other U.S. and Israeli officials, met from 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., 3:08 to 3:35 p.m., and 5 to 5:30 p.m. For the public remarks of Begin and Carter, made at the conclusion of this meeting, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pages 417–419.

Carter and U.S. officials met with Begin and members of the Israeli Cabinet the morning of March 12, from 10:20 to 11:20 a.m. At 12:16 p.m., Carter addressed the members of the Israeli Knesset. In his opening remarks, the President affirmed the U.S. commitment to Israel before turning to a discussion of the peace process:

“At Camp David, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat forged two frameworks for the building of that comprehensive peace. The genius of that accomplishment is that negotiations under these frameworks can go forward independently of each other, without destroying the obvious relationship between them.

“They are designed to be mutually reinforcing, with the intrinsic flexibility necessary to promote the comprehensive peace that we all desire. Both will be fulfilled only when others of your Arab neighbors follow the visionary example of President Sadat, when they put ancient animosities behind them and agree to negotiate, as you desire, as you’ve already done with President Sadat, an honorable solution to the differences between you.

“It’s important that the door be kept open to all the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinians, with whom, above all, Israel shares a common interest in living in peace and living with mutual respect.

“Peace in the Middle East, always important to the security of the entire region, in recent weeks has become an even more urgent concern.

“Israel’s security will rest not only on how the negotiations affect the situation on your own borders but also on how it affects the forces of stability and moderation beyond your borders.

“I’m convinced that nothing can do more to create a hospitable atmosphere for those more distant forces in the long run than an equitable peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

“The risks of peace between you and your Egyptian neighbors are real. But America is ready to reduce any risks and to balance them within the bounds of our strength and our influence.

“I came to Israel representing the most powerful country on Earth. And I can assure you that the United States intends to use that power in the pursuit of a stable and a peaceful Middle East.

“We’ve been centrally involved in this region, and we will stay involved politically, economically, and militarily. We will stand by our friends. We are ready to place our strength at Israel’s side when you want it to ensure Israel’s security and well-being.

“We know Israel’s concern about many issues. We know your concern for an adequate oil supply. In the context of peace, we are ready to guarantee that supply.

“I’ve recommitted our Nation publicly to this commitment, as you know, only in recent days in my own country.

“We know Israel’s concern that the price of peace with Egypt will exacerbate an already difficult economic situation and make it more difficult to meet your country’s essential security requirements. In the context of peace, we are prepared to see Israel’s economic and military relationship with the United States take on new and strong and more meaningful dimensions, even than already exist.

“We will work not only to attain peace but to maintain peace, recognizing that it’s a permanent challenge of our time.

“We will rededicate ourselves to the ideals that our peoples share. These ideals are the course [*cause?*] not only of our strength but of our self-respect as nations, as leaders, and as individuals.

“I’m here today to reaffirm that the United States will always recognize, appreciate, and honor the mutual advantages of the strength and security of Israel. And I’m here to express my most heartfelt and passionate hope that we may work together successfully to make this peace.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pages 427–428*)

The complete text of the address is *ibid.*, pages 424–428.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski participated in a meeting with Begin and his Cabinet later that afternoon. The Presidential party departed Tel Aviv en route to Cairo the afternoon of March 13. At a departure ceremony, the President commented: “President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and I remain determined to exert every ounce of effort at our command to bring the peace negotiations to a successful conclusion. We will not fail.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, page 429*)

After meeting with Sadat, the President told reporters assembled at the Cairo International Airport that Sadat had accepted the proposals the United States had made and that Begin had agreed to present them to the Knesset, asserting: “I am convinced that now we have defined all of the main ingredients of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which will be the cornerstone of a comprehensive peace settlement for the Middle East.” (*Ibid.*, page 430) For the President’s remarks upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base shortly after midnight on March 14, see *ibid.*, pages 430–432.

Documentation on the President's visit, including the memoranda of conversation of the meetings referenced above, is in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980.

115. Address by Secretary of State Vance¹

Seattle, Washington, March 30, 1979

America's Commitment to Third World Development

These past weeks have been a time to deal with immediate diplomatic issues of extraordinary importance to our nation. Tonight I want to speak about an issue that may seem less immediate but is no less important: our approach to the economic future of the developing nations.

Before turning to our strategy toward the North-South dialogue between the industrial and developing nations, let me first talk for a moment about why the development of Third World countries matters to us.

Its human dimension is clear. At least ½-billion people regularly go hungry in a world of plenty. A half-billion is an abstract number, another statistic among many and, therefore, too easily dismissed. But when we pause to picture in our minds how much human suffering lies behind that single statistic, the scope of our moral challenge is evident. The continuation of that suffering is an affront to the conscience of men and women everywhere.

Americans have long recognized this challenge: We have generously shared our resources in times of tragedy and need abroad, from the great hunger in Ireland in 1847, to the Marshall plan and point 4 program² 100 years later. We are determined today, despite budgetary stringency, to live up to that historic moral responsibility.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1979, pp. 33-37. Vance delivered the address before the Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging International Order. For the text of the question-and-answer session following Vance's address, see *ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

² Reference is to the Truman administration's program for technical assistance, commonly known as Point Four, as it was the fourth foreign policy objective Truman described in his January 20, 1949, inaugural address. See *Public Papers: Truman, 1949*, pp. 112-116.

Our humanitarian commitment is reinforced by the recognition that it also serves our national self-interest to assist the process of equitable growth within the developing nations. We need to help shape an international economic system which will support and stimulate that growth.

Here on this Pacific rim, you know well a fact that is true for our entire nation: that your prosperity and well-being depend on the increasing prosperity and well-being of others throughout the world.

Some 75% of the Northwest's wheat crop is sold on world markets. Fully one-third of western Washington's forest products economy is dependent on those markets, and that dependence is increasing.

One dollar in eight in this State's economy comes directly from international trade. More than a quarter of a million jobs in Washington and Oregon alone depend on exports.

Much of this trade, as you know, is with developing countries. Four of the State's 10 biggest export customers are developing countries. Seven of the State's biggest sources of imports—imports without which your economy could not function—are developing countries.

These countries of the Third World are increasingly involved in our daily lives. We know how oil from these countries affects us. As a nation, we also get more than 50% of the tin, rubber, and manganese we need from less developed countries and substantial amounts of our tungsten and cobalt. We now export more to the developing countries, including the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, than to the Common Market, Japan, and the Communist countries combined. For example, almost one-half of our commercial aircraft sales abroad are to developing nations.

So, as we survey and address questions of the evolving international economic order, we do not do so on some abstract basis. We do so as a matter of economic self-interest and, for some sectors of our economy, of survival.

The participation of the developing countries is also essential to solving pressing global problems that will shape the character of our future. Inefficient and wasteful use of the Earth's resources, pollution of the oceans and atmosphere, nuclear proliferation, unchecked arms competition, all of these involve the well-being and safety of the human race. None can be solved without the involvement of the developing nations.

Most countries of the Third World have too little food and rapidly growing populations. We face the prospect of a population increase in the final quarter of this century which will equal the entire growth of world population from the birth of Christ to 1950. Roughly 90% of this increase will be in developing countries. And perhaps more troubling,

this growth seems certain to be greatest in already hard-pressed urban centers. Imagine, if you can, what current projections would indicate: a Mexico City with 32 million people; a Sao Paulo with 26 million; Calcutta, Bombay, Rio de Janeiro, Seoul, Beijing, and Shanghai each with some 19 million in 20 years or so.

We all recognize that the developing countries themselves bear the major burden for responding to these challenges. The industrial countries, however, can play a crucial role in assisting their efforts. Whether, and how, we help the developing nations in pursuing their development goals is one of the central issues of our time.

U.S. Approach

Our approach to development in the Third World is based on four fundamental tenets.

First, we are committed to supporting strong and equitable growth in the developing nations, as a matter of our national interest as well as our national ideals. And we recognize that at times this requires facilitating adjustment in our own economy in ways which will support economic growth in the Third World.

Second, we are committed to improving the international system in ways which will be mutually beneficial to all, which respond to the particular needs of the developing nations, and which accord them an appropriate voice in decisions that affect them. By the same token, we believe firmly that as nations develop and grow stronger, they incur increasing responsibility to contribute to, as well as gain from, the international economy.

Third, despite the economic pressures we and other industrial nations now face, the United States remains committed to increasing transfers of resources from the richer to the poorer nations.

Let me emphasize, however, a *fourth* point. As we cooperate with developing nations in seeking useful changes in the international system, and as we consider the level and nature of our resource flows, we must be clear about our priorities. Alterations in the international system and resource transfers among nations are not ends in themselves. They are a means to the compelling goal of development within nations.

We cannot spend so much time and energy on our international discussions of the roadmap that we lose sight of our destination. The destination—the goal we share—is to find practical ways to have an appreciable impact on the lives of people around the world, and especially on the lives of those for whom daily survival is an unanswered question.

We envision an international economic system which is not rigidly divided into northern and southern blocs. We seek a global community

which furthers the well-being of all countries, in which all recognize the responsibilities of each to the others, in which the richer help the poorer for the benefit of all, in which international deliberations are focused as much on practical ways of serving human needs as on levels of resource flows among nations, and in which every nation dedicates itself to economic justice as well as economic growth.

We can help build such a system in a number of ways: in our closer cooperation with the other industrial nations, constantly taking account of the effect on each other of our domestic decisions; in encouraging constructive involvement of Communist nations in the promotion of a healthy global economic system; in our positive participation in the current North-South dialogue, and in our search for practical programs that can best promote Third World development.

North-South Negotiations

Let me concentrate today on the negotiations that are taking place between industrial and developing nations and the practical focus on development itself that we hope can be achieved.

The distinction between industrial and developing nations, between North and South, is clearly eroding. The industrial and agricultural performance of some of the developing nations now surpasses that of some of the industrial countries. But negotiations between North and South remain valuable. While we believe a broader global community is emerging in which rigid economic blocs no longer predominate, we understand the importance the developing countries attach to the Group of 77. The developing nations can use their cohesion to bring greater clarity and purpose to our negotiations.

We face an unusually large number of important international conferences in the coming 18 months. These meetings provide an extraordinary opportunity for progress on issues of importance to developing nations—and to us all.

As we prepare for them, we must first recognize the progress that already has been made. Last week in Geneva, for example, agreement was reached on most of the basic elements of a common fund to help finance international buffer stocks and other commodity development measures.³ This marks an important milestone in a process launched at the fourth U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in 1976. Over the past 2½ years of intensive negotiations, all participants moved from their original positions in search of common ground. The negotiations

³ Negotiations on the Common Fund resumed in Geneva on March 12. On March 20, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that “tacit agreement” had been achieved on the size of the Common Fund. (“Agreement Is Reached On Support Fund Size For Commodity Prices,” p. 38)

now move into a more technical phase leading to the drafting of articles of agreement, a process which could be concluded as early as the end of this year.

In the past few years, industrial nations and international institutions have undertaken a number of other important measures of concrete benefit to the developing countries.

- Multilateral and bilateral aid flows have increased steadily in recent years. Agreements have recently been or will soon be concluded to enable the multilateral development banks to increase significantly, in real terms, their lending levels over the next 3 to 4 years.

- Resources available through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financing balance-of-payments difficulties have been substantially increased—through liberalization of the IMF Compensatory Financing Facility; through the fourth IMF quota increase; and through the establishment of new IMF facilities including the trust fund and the \$10-billion Witteveen facility.

- Consuming countries have agreed to the concept of shared responsibility with producing countries for financing buffer stocks to stabilize prices in commodity markets. Agreements for coffee and tin were renegotiated; a new agreement for sugar has been reached;⁴ and negotiations on rubber and a new cocoa agreement are underway. Such agreements can have important anti-inflationary benefits for our own economy.

- All Western industrial countries have implemented preferential tariff systems for developing countries. The multilateral trade negotiations will provide new opportunities for all nations to increase their economic welfare. Just as consumers and producers will benefit in our own country, so they can gain in the developing world.

- And donor countries have agreed to the concept of easing or eliminating the official debt burden of the poorest countries.

The United States has played a leading role in many of these and other international initiatives and we have taken national measures to support them.

- We have increased our foreign economic assistance from \$3.7 billion in fiscal year 1975 to \$7 billion in fiscal year 1979.

- In the commodities field, the United States is a member of the tin agreement, and we intend to make a contribution to the tin buffer stock. We are seeking Senate approval to join the sugar agreement, and we hope to conclude new cocoa and rubber agreements in which we can

⁴ These agreements regulated commodity prices and sales among signatories. The United States signed the most recent versions of the coffee agreement in 1975, the tin agreement in 1976, and the sugar agreement in 1977.

participate.⁵ Last month we put forth ideas on a price stabilization agreement for copper.⁶

- We endorsed the concept of a common fund, and we worked toward that end with flexible new proposals on the major issues involved.

- On trade, the United States has generally resisted protectionist pressures. We have a preferential tariff system for the developing countries which has assisted growth in their manufactured exports.

- We now have legislation enabling us to waive interest payments on past development loans to the poorest countries and to allow principal to be paid into local currency accounts to be used for development purposes.

- Almost all our development assistance to the poorest countries is now in grant form.

- We have facilitated access to the technology that is in the public domain, and we have helped developing countries draw upon our advanced technologies—using satellites, for example, to develop their natural resources and improve their internal communications.

- The President is proposing the creation of an international development cooperation administration which would consolidate or improve coordination among our bilateral and multilateral development assistance programs.⁷

In short, there has been real progress. But far more remains to be done in concluding agreements to stabilize commodity markets, bringing the developing nations more fully into the world trading system and implementing the new codes and tariff reductions of the multilateral trade negotiations, facilitating the adjustment of domestic

⁵ The Senate ratified the 1977 International Sugar Agreement on December 1, 1979. Church had blocked ratification of the agreement, which the United States had signed in 1977 (see footnote 4 above), asserting that it did not “provide sufficient protection” for American sugar producers. In 1980, Congress approved legislation (H.R. 6029) implementing the treaty. (“Participation by U.S. In Sugar Agreement Is Ratified by Senate,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 3, 1979, p. 34; *Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 387) Negotiations on a new cocoa agreement reached a stalemate in December 1979 after several rounds of talks, which took place throughout 1979. (“Cocoa Pact Talks End Without New Accord,” *The Wall Street Journal*, December 3, 1979, p. 35) In October 1979, 55 nations approved a rubber agreement in order to stabilize the world price of rubber and create a buffer stock. (Victor Lusinchi, “World Pact on Rubber Price Reached,” *The New York Times*, October 6, 1979, p. 38) On May 22, 1980, the Senate voted 90–1 to ratify the agreement. (Art Pine and Richard L. Lyons, “Ways and Means Votes Against Carter’s Oil Import Fee,” *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1980, p. A–6)

⁶ In late February, U.S. representatives to an UNCTAD meeting in Geneva discussed elements of a copper agreement, including the establishment of a copper buffer stock of 1 million MT. (“U.S. in Switch, Suggests Stockpile Plan For Copper at UN Conference in Geneva,” *The Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 1979, p. 38)

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 77.

economies to changing patterns of world trade, arriving at a common understanding of the responsibilities of both governments and corporations to create a better environment for international investment and the flow of technology, assuring adequate assistance to nations facing acute financial difficulties, strengthening the scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries, increasing aid flows to countries which need it most and can use it effectively, and finding ways to assure an appropriate role for developing countries in international economic institutions.

This is a heavy agenda. And these are difficult times in which to address it, since most of the industrial nations face difficult domestic economic challenges.

In a period of fiscal austerity, there is a danger, which we must frankly address, that negotiations between North and South could return to the rancor of earlier years. This will happen if each nation becomes so concerned with its own problems that it forgets the essential reality of an interdependent age: that each nation can surmount its own difficulties only if it understands and helps resolve the difficulties of others as well.

The industrial nations must maintain their commitment to the well-being of the developing nations. The developing nations must recognize that making demands which the industrial nations cannot meet will only produce international acrimony, not progress. And the oil-producing nations must recognize their special responsibilities for the health of the global economy and their fundamental stake in its continued vitality.

A Practical Focus

This brings me to a central point. Our progress in North-South negotiations—our progress toward a more equitable and healthy new international economic order—will turn on our common ability to avoid endless debates on sterile texts and to focus instead on concrete development problems which we can tackle together and which directly affect people's lives.

Only by focusing on practical ways to meet human needs can we remain clear about our goals and clear in explaining them to our peoples. I know that the American people will never be convinced that there is an inherent value only in resource flows among nations. They want to know, and have a right to know, how their taxes are being used to better the lives of people abroad.

It is this practical—and human—focus which compels us to concentrate our aid on programs that directly improve the lives of poorer people abroad. We believe it is important that we concentrate our re-

sources on programs which most directly contribute not only to growth but also to equity in those countries which receive our aid.

This approach is not only this Administration's policy. It has been expressed by the Congress in the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act⁸ and the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978.⁹ And it applies not only to our bilateral aid programs but also to those programs we support in the multilateral development institutions.

Growth without equity can lead to a situation in which a growing economic pie is cut into ever more unequal pieces. Equity without growth can lead to a situation where a shrinking economic pie is cut into equal but ever smaller pieces. Neither situation can lead to long-term political or economic health. Both growth and equity are necessary.

A practical focus also requires that we be clear about our priorities. Thus while we will continue to work with the developing countries in addressing the future of the international political and economic system, we intend increasingly to concentrate on specific development goals: energy, food, health, and increasing the capacity of the developing countries to obtain and apply the knowledge and technology they need.

There is good reason for seeking international emphasis on each of these areas:

- An ample supply of energy at reasonable prices is essential to economic advancement. It is also a key to our own prosperity.
- Adequate food and good health are basic to human survival and productivity.
- And the ability of people and institutions in the developing countries to obtain, develop, adapt, and apply technology is critical to most development problems.

Let me illustrate these priorities today by describing our current efforts and future plans in two areas—energy and food. In the coming months and in other forums such as the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development and the World Health Assembly, we will be addressing the others as well.¹⁰

⁸ Public Law 93–189, which Nixon signed into law on December 17, 1973, added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (S. 1983; P.L. 87–195; 75 Stat. 424) a statement of policy regarding development assistance authorizations. It also contained the provisions of the “New Directions” mandate. See footnote 3, Document 22.

⁹ The President signed the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978 (H.R. 1222; P.L. 95–424; 92 Stat. 937–961) into law on October 6, 1978. The Act authorized U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance for FY 1979 and endorsed the concept of using foreign assistance to fulfill “basic human needs.”

¹⁰ The conferences were scheduled to take place in Vienna August 21–30 and in Geneva May 7–25, respectively.

Energy

No issue we face today more clearly demonstrates the interests we share with the people of the developing world than energy. The commuter buying gasoline in Seattle and the peasant farmer buying kerosene near Khartoum both face the harsh reality of rising world petroleum prices. Governments in the richest countries and those in the poorest must deal with the impact of higher energy costs and rising energy demand on their national economies.

Let me be frank. The worldwide energy situation, already serious, is likely to get worse before it gets better. For the foreseeable future, in the absence of substantial new efforts, worldwide growth in energy demand will continue to outpace worldwide growth in energy production.

We must do what is necessary in our own country to restrain consumption and increase domestic production. But we cannot solve the energy problem by what we do here alone. It is a global challenge.

Thus, we have a direct interest in helping developing countries devise their own effective energy policies—helping them identify their energy resources, determine their current and future energy demand, identify the technology they need, and obtain the necessary financing. Let me tell you what we are already doing in each of these areas.

We are now helping several developing countries survey their national energy resources, define their future energy needs, and construct alternative energy strategies.

With our strong support, the World Bank is significantly expanding its program to help developing countries finance further exploration and development of fossil fuels. The Bank envisages loans amounting to as much as \$3 billion over the next 5 years.

We are devoting substantial financial resources to research on renewable energy sources. In addition to private financing, the Department of Energy has budgeted over \$600 million this year to study, develop, and demonstrate renewable energy technology. We have asked the Congress for more than \$700 million for these efforts next year. These programs can lead to technological developments that directly benefit the developing nations.

The Agency for International Development (AID) has requested \$42 million in FY 1980 for the actual application of renewable energy technologies in developing countries.

We have accelerated our training and technical assistance programs for energy professionals and institutions in the developing countries. We have proposed a new institute for scientific and technological cooperation, which would become an important element of our foreign

assistance program.¹¹ Energy will be a major focus of the work of the institute as it both helps strengthen scientific and technological capacities in developing countries and also identifies domestic American research relevant to development abroad.

And we are providing substantial direct and indirect financial assistance to help developing countries acquire the energy technology they need. The Export-Import Bank authorized approximately \$2 billion in energy-related loans and guarantees to developing countries in fiscal year 1978. This has produced more than \$3 billion in U.S. exports of energy equipment. The World Bank, to which we are the largest contributor, has already provided about \$10 billion for financing of conventional power projects. And the other development banks also are active in this area.

But we must and will do more.

- We will respond positively to additional requests from developing nations for help in evaluating their energy resources, needs, and strategies.

- We will encourage the regional development banks to expand their energy programs and to consider new approaches to encourage further private capital flows into mineral and energy development in their regions.

- President Carter and other heads of state at the Bonn economic summit last July¹² pledged to increase assistance for harnessing the vast energy potential of the Sun, the wind, the oceans, and other renewable resources. We are now in the process of formulating a coordinated effort which will be discussed at the Tokyo summit in June.¹³

- With strong U.S. backing, the United Nations will hold a World Conference on New and Renewable Energy in 1981. We intend to play an active role in that effort.

- We will increase our support for research, development, and training efforts of national and regional energy institutions in developing countries. We will encourage other nations to join us in this effort.

- We will also work with other nations to determine whether it would be useful to supplement the work of such institutions. Together we will seek to identify gaps in current efforts, and ways to fill them, including the possible establishment of new institutions. For example,

¹¹ Title IV of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 (P.L. 96–53), which the President signed into law on August 14, 1979, authorized the President to establish an Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation.

¹² See Document 92.

¹³ The summit was scheduled to take place June 28–29; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 221 and 222.

international research centers—which enjoy support from developed and developing countries, private organizations, and multilateral institutions—have played a major role in addressing developing country agricultural problems. If, as a result of discussions with our colleagues in developed and developing countries, there is agreement that this approach would be appropriate in the field of energy, the United States would support such international energy centers.

- We must assure that as new renewable energy technology becomes relatively less expensive, adequate financing is available for the developing countries to acquire it. We will ask the World Bank to undertake a thorough review of this question.

These steps and others we will be discussing with developed and developing countries in the months ahead can help assure that high energy costs do not undermine economic growth and a steadily improving way of life for those who live in the developing world.

Our future economic well-being and theirs carries an inescapable imperative: We must work together to expand the availability of energy for developed and developing countries alike. There is no promise for any of us in an intensifying competition for limited energy supplies.

Food

Let me turn to a second development priority which we intend to focus on in the months ahead—the stark fact that one out of every five of our fellow human beings is sick or weak or hungry because he or she simply does not have enough to eat.

In one respect, this is a question of the equity with which economic benefits are distributed. Millions are too poor to buy food, even when it is available. As I have stressed, our overall development efforts must address this fundamental issue.

But it is also clear that in many developing countries, food production is not keeping pace with population growth. The long-range prospects point to even greater food deficits in developing countries in the years ahead. Not only will we approach the limits of new land to cultivate, but soil erosion, desert encroachment, and simple overuse are robbing the world's historic breadbaskets of their productive capacity because of inadequate land and resource management practices.

The United States is already doing a great deal to increase the availability of food in the developing world. Roughly half of our bilateral economic development assistance—approximately \$600 million this year—is devoted to agriculture and rural development. We provide roughly two-thirds of the world's concessionary food assistance. Our contribution this year will amount to \$1.4 billion. And we have contributed \$200 million to the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

But, as with energy, we must and will do more. Last September the President established a Commission on World Hunger.¹⁴ The commission will report this summer on concrete proposals for additional efforts in dealing with the world food problem.¹⁵

In the meantime, we are moving ahead in several areas. We continue to believe that an effective International Wheat Agreement, with an expanded Food Aid Convention, would help stabilize world wheat prices and strengthen world food security.¹⁶ We are disappointed that after more than 2 years of effort, a workable international arrangement could not be achieved at last month's negotiations.¹⁷ If prospects improve for reaching an accord, we are prepared to resume these negotiations.

Under the existing Food Aid Convention, we are committed to providing a minimum of 1.9 million tons of food assistance annually. We will more than double that minimum commitment, regardless of whether a new Food Aid Convention is successfully negotiated. And we are strongly encouraging other current and potential donors to do the same.

To assure that our food aid commitments can be met even during periods of tight supply, we are seeking to establish a special government-held wheat reserve which would add to food security for food-deficit countries.¹⁸

The agricultural research breakthroughs of the past decade and a half have been of enormous benefit to the developing world—with improved plant strains, better animal breeds, and more efficient farming techniques. Much of this research has concentrated on cereal crops and cattle. While continuing research in these areas, we must now devote greater attention to some of the traditional crops and animals raised by poor farmers on marginal lands and to less widely grown crops that

¹⁴ See footnote 6, Document 102.

¹⁵ The Presidential Commission on World Hunger prepared a paper on the hunger problem, which Linowitz sent to Vance and the President in June. The paper is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 257.

¹⁶ The International Grains Arrangement or Agreement (IGA), promulgated in 1967 during the Kennedy Round of the GATT and entered into force on July 1, 1968, consisted of two legal instruments: the Wheat Trade Convention (WTC) and the Food Aid Convention (FAC). The FAC committed signatories to providing a fixed amount of commodities (4.5 tons) to developing nations each year. In 1971 signatories negotiated a new umbrella agreement for the WTC and FAC—the International Wheat Agreement—and renewed it in 1974, 1975, and 1976.

¹⁷ See Victor Lusinchi, "Talks to Stabilize World Wheat Price Breaks Down," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1979, p. D-5. Signatories eventually approved a new Food Aid Convention in London on March 6, 1980.

¹⁸ Documentation on the administration's efforts to establish a wheat reserve is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

hold promise as new sources of food and income. These will be major agricultural priorities of the institute for scientific and technological cooperation. Other government agencies will also increase their support for such research.

We must also do more to prevent the tragic loss of 10–20% of the food which is produced each year in the developing countries. More food is lost to rodents, insects, and spoilage in the developing world than all the food aid to the developing world combined. We are already a major contributor to the Food and Agriculture Organization's post-harvest loss fund, and both AID and the new institute will be devoting increasing resources to finding better ways to assure that what people toil to produce is available to sustain them.

Finally, we intend to channel our food and development assistance increasingly to countries which are seeking to adopt domestic policies which encourage their own food production and equitable distribution and promote better use of water and land resources. We intend to participate actively in the upcoming World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development which will be addressing these essential questions.¹⁹

Conclusion

Programs such as those I have mentioned today are no cure-all. But they come to grips with the most pressing problems of the developing countries, and they will make a difference where it counts most—in the daily lives of people. They will insure that more people in the developing countries will have enough food to eat, that fewer children will die in infancy, that there is sufficient energy to power more irrigation pumps and to bring more heat and light to distant villages.

The resources we can bring to bear may seem small in comparison to the magnitude of the problems which must be solved. But let us remember that development is a long-term process. Our hopes for the coming decades are lifted by the fact that people are better off in most developing countries today than they were two decades ago.

Life expectancy in the developing world in the past two decades has jumped from 42 to over 50, an increase which took the industrial nations a century to accomplish. Adult literacy in the developing world has jumped from one-third in 1950 to over one-half. In the past quarter of a century, per capita income in the developing countries grew on the average of almost 3% a year. This is about 50% better than historical growth rates in Western nations during their industrialization.

¹⁹ The FAO World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) was scheduled to take place in Rome July 12–20, 1979.

This is not cause to be sanguine; but it is reason to be confident that practical progress can be made. But only if:

- We and the other industrial countries recognize that we share a common destiny with the developing world;
- They, the developing nations, recognize their responsibilities both within the international system and for equity as well as growth in their own societies; and
- All of us, together, recognize the wisdom of a great man the world has now lost—Jean Monnet.²⁰ “We must put our problems on one side of the table,” Monnet said, “and all of us on the other.”

²⁰ Monnet died in mid-March.

116. Editorial Note

President Jimmy Carter took part in an interview with editors and news directors, consisting of his introductory remarks and a question-and-answer session, at the White House on April 7, 1979. The session began at 1:16 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. In response to a question concerning the global perception of the administration’s human rights policy, the President commented:

“Well, there have been a number of occasions around the world where our human rights policy, which I espouse very strongly and think we ought to maintain, has been a diplomatic problem—in dealing with the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, South Korea, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, the Philippines—just been described—and other countries. I could name a lot of them.

“Q. Afghanistan.

“The President. Afghanistan and others. I acknowledge that. I think, in balance, it’s one of the best things that we have ever done since I’ve been President. I think for us to raise the banner of being deeply committed to human rights has been and has had an enlightening effect on the rest of the world.

“Some of the administrations or the regimes in other nations have been embarrassed. But I can assure you—and I don’t think I’m saying this in a gloating way—that in previous administrations, quite often—even in very popular administrations—when visits were made to countries, say, in Latin America just to use an example, there have been, sometimes, massive anti-American demonstrations against very pop-

ular leaders, like Eisenhower or Truman or Nixon or Rockefeller and others.

"When we have visited those countries, the response has been overwhelmingly favorable and friendly among the people, even when I drove through the streets of Rio de Janeiro in the midst of an argument where human rights and nuclear power were raised.

"I think the people have responded well, even though the leaders in some countries have been somewhat embarrassed.

"I think it's also reminded the American people about our own Nation's principles. And sometimes the arguments with the totalitarian regime that has several thousands of people imprisoned without trial and without any charge, those arguments have made vivid in the minds of Americans that we are indeed better, or different—I think better—in our basic philosophy than those philosophies espoused in some other countries.

"There has been a substantial shift toward democratization in many of those nations, partially encouraged by our own standards on human rights. And there have been literally tens of thousands of political prisoners released from within those countries in the last year and a half or so because of our human rights position.

"The last point that I would like to make in this answer is that it's raised the issue of human rights to a high degree of intensity. There are very few leaders in the world, in the 150 countries that now exist, who don't every day or every week have to remind ourselves—including me—to what degree are we violating basic human rights? To what degree are we earning the condemnation of the rest of the world? To what degree are we arousing the animosity or distrust or displeasure or disappointment among our own people because we violate those rights?

"I'm very proud of what we have done. And I think in balance, this posture on human rights has helped us considerably.

"If you would go back 3 years or so and look at the attitude, for instance, in the General Assembly of the United Nations every fall when it convened, where our Nation was the butt of every joke and the target of every attack mounted by almost 100 nations on Earth, and compare it with the difference now, the last 2 years, part of that improvement is because we have espoused basic human rights.

"I think this is particularly true in Africa where black people now feel they've got a friend in the United States; they can depend on us.

"So, to answer your question, I think we've got the right policy, and I intend not only to maintain it but to elevate our commitment to that principle." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pages 626–628*)

117. Remarks by President Carter¹

New York, April 25, 1979

President Al Neuharth,² distinguished members of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, other guests and friends:

I want, first of all, to commend and to endorse the theme of this convention: the defense of the first amendment of our Constitution and the freedom of the press.

Liberty of expression is our most important civil right, and freedom of the press is its most important bulwark. We can never afford to grow complacent about the first amendment; on the contrary, you and I and others must actively protect it always.

The American press has grown enormously since the Nation's early days—not only in its size and breadth but in its concepts of its own duties and its own responsibilities. The highest of these duties is to inform the public on the important issues of the day. And no issue is more important than the one I want to discuss with you today in a solemn and somber and sincere way—the control of nuclear arms.

Each generation of Americans faces a choice that defines our national character, a choice that is also important for what it says about our own Nation's outlook toward the world.

In the coming months, we will almost certainly be faced with such a choice—whether to accept or to reject a new strategic arms limitation treaty. The decision we make will profoundly affect our lives and the lives of people all over the world for years to come. We face this choice from a position of strength, as the strongest nation on Earth economically, militarily, and politically.

Our alliances are firm and reliable. Our military forces are strong and ready. Our economic power is unmatched. Along with other industrial democracies who are our friends, we lead the way in technological innovation. Our combined economies are more than three times as productive as those of the Soviet Union and all its allies. Our political institutions are based on human freedom. Our open system encourages individual initiative and creativity, and that, in turn, strengthens our entire society. Our values and our democratic way of life have a magnetic appeal for people all over the world which a materialistic and a totalitarian philosophy can never hope to challenge or to rival.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 693–699. The President spoke at 12:35 p.m. in the Grand Ballroom at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel at the annual convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association.

² Reference is to President of the American Newspaper Publishers Association Allen Neuharth.

For all these reasons, we have a capacity for leadership in the world that surpasses that of any other nation. That leadership imposes many responsibilities on us, on me as President, and on you, other leaders who shape opinion and the character of our country.

But our noblest duty is to use our strength to serve our highest interest—the building of a secure, stable, and a peaceful world. We perform that duty in the spirit proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in 1963, the year he died. “Confident and unafraid,” he said, “we labor on—not toward a strategy of annihilation, but toward a strategy of peace.”³

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the possibility of mutual annihilation makes a strategy of peace the only rational choice for both sides.

Because our values are so different, it is clear that the United States of America and the Soviet Union will be in competition as far ahead as we can imagine or see. Yet we have a common interest in survival, and we share a common recognition that our survival depends, in a real sense, on each other. The very competition between us makes it imperative that we bring under control its most dangerous aspect—the nuclear arms race. That is why the strategic arms limitation talks are so very important. This effort by two great nations to limit vital security forces is unique in human history; none have ever done this before.

As the Congress and the American people consider the SALT treaty, which is now nearly complete, the debate will center around four basic questions: Why do we need SALT? How is the treaty related to our overall defense strategy? Can Soviet compliance be verified? How does the treaty relate to Soviet activities which challenge us and challenge our interests?

Let me address each question in turn.

First, why do we need a strategic arms limitation treaty? We need it because it will contribute to a more peaceful world—and to our own national security.

Today, we and the Soviet Union, with sharply different world outlooks and interests, both have the ominous destructive power literally to destroy each other as a functioning society, killing tens of millions of people in the process. And common sense tells us—as it tells the Soviet Union—that we must work to make our competition less dangerous, less burdensome, and less likely to bring the ultimate horror of nuclear war.

Indeed, the entire world has a vital interest in whether or not we control the strategic arms race. We have consulted closely with our

³ Reference is to Kennedy’s June 10, 1963, commencement address delivered at American University. For the text of the address, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 459–464.

allies, who count on us not only to maintain strong military forces to offset Soviet military power, but also, and equally important, to manage successfully a stable East-West relationship. SALT is at the heart of both these crucial efforts. That is why the leaders of France and Great Britain, Germany, England, Canada, and other nations have voiced their full support for the emerging treaty.

Some nations which have so far held back from building their own nuclear weapons—and at least a dozen other nations on Earth now have that capability—will be strongly influenced in their decision by whether the two nuclear superpowers will restrain our weapons. Rejection of the new strategic arms limitation treaty would seriously undermine the effort to control proliferation of these deadly weapons. And nothing, nothing, would more surely damage our other critical efforts in arms control—from a ban on all nuclear testing to the prevention of dangerous satellite warfare in space; from equalizing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to restraining the spread of sophisticated conventional weapons on Earth.

Every President since the dawn of the nuclear age has pursued the effort to bring nuclear arms under control. And this must be a continuing process.

President Kennedy, building on the efforts of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, signed the first agreement with the Soviet Union in 1963 to stop the poisonous testing of nuclear explosives in the atmosphere.⁴

In 1968, 5 years later, under President Johnson, the United States and the Soviet Union joined other nations throughout the world in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an important step in preventing the spread of nuclear explosives to other nations.⁵

In 1972, under President Nixon, the SALT I agreement placed the first agreed limits on the number of offensive weapons, and the antiballistic missile treaty, the ABM treaty, made an enduring contribution to our own security.⁶

President Ford continued in negotiations at Helsinki and at Vladivostok.⁷ Each negotiation builds on the accomplishments of the last. Each agreement provides a foundation for further progress toward a more stable nuclear relationship.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 56.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 2.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 109.

⁷ For information about the November 1974 Vladivostok meetings, see footnote 5, Document 2. For information about the July–August 1975 Helsinki meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 171–174.

Three Presidents have now spent more than 6 years negotiating the next step in this process—SALT II. We have all negotiated carefully and deliberately. Every step of the way, we've worked with our military leaders and other experts, and we've sought the advice and counsel of the Members of Congress.

An overwhelming majority of the American people recognize the need for SALT II. Our people want and our people expect continued, step-by-step progress toward bringing nuclear weapons under control.

Americans will support a reasoned increase in our defense effort, but we do not want a wholly unnecessary return to the Cold War and an all-out arms race, with its vastly greater risks and costs. Through strength, we want world peace.

Let me turn to the second question—how is SALT II related to our overall defense strategy?

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union today are essentially equivalent. They have larger and more numerous land-based missiles. We have a larger number of warheads and, as you know, significant technological and geographical advantages.

Each side has the will and the means to prevent the other from achieving superiority. Neither side is in a position to exploit its nuclear weapons for political purposes, nor to use strategic weapons without facing almost certain suicide.

What causes us concern is not the current balance but the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup. Over the past decade, the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, year by year, while our own defense spending over that decade has had a net decrease.

In areas not limited by SALT, SALT I, they have launched ambitious programs to strengthen their strategic forces. At some future point, the Soviet Union could achieve a strategic advantage, unless we alter these trends. That is exactly what I want to do—with the support of the American people and the bipartisan support of Congress.

We must move on two fronts at the same time. First, within mutually accepted limits, we must modernize our own strategic forces. Along with the strengthening of NATO, that is a central purpose of the increased defense budget that I've submitted to Congress—improvements which are necessary even in a time of fiscal restraint. And second, we must place more stringent limits on the arms race than are presently imposed by SALT I. That is the purpose of the SALT II treaty.

The defense budget I've submitted will ensure that our nuclear force continues to be essentially equivalent to that of the Soviet Union.

This year, we've begun to equip our submarines with new, more powerful, and longer range Trident I missiles. Next year, the first of our

new, even more secure Trident submarines will be going to sea, and we are working on a more powerful and accurate Trident II missile for these submarines.

Our cruise missile program will greatly enhance the effectiveness of our long-range bomber force. These missiles will be able to penetrate any air defense system which the Soviet Union could build in the foreseeable future.

We are substantially improving the accuracy and the power of our land-based Minuteman missiles. But in the coming decade missiles of this type, based in fixed silos, will become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack. The Soviets have three-quarters of their warheads in such fixed-based missiles, compared to only one-quarter of ours. Nevertheless, this is a very serious problem, and we must deal with it effectively and sensibly.

The Defense Department now has under consideration a number of options for responding to this problem, including making some of our own ICBM's mobile. I might add—and this is very important—that the options which we are evaluating would be far more costly—and we would have far less confidence of their effectiveness—in the absence of SALT II limits. For without these limits on the number of Soviet warheads, the Soviet Union could counter any effort we made simply by greatly increasing the number of warheads on their missiles.

Let me emphasize that the SALT II agreement preserves adequate flexibility for the United States in this important area.

Our strategic forces must be able to survive any attack and to counterattack military and civilian targets in the aggressor nation. And the aggressor nation must know that we have the ability and the will to exercise this option if they should attack us. We have had this capability—which is the essence of deterrence—in the past; we have it today; and SALT II, plus the defense programs that I've described, will ensure that we have it for the future.

The SALT II agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition, and by helping to define future threats that we might face, SALT II will make our defense planning much more effective.

Under the agreement, the two sides will be limited to equal numbers of strategic launchers for the first time, ending the substantial Soviet numerical advantage which was permitted in the currently effective SALT I treaty.

To reach these new and lower levels, the Soviets will have to reduce their overall number of strategic delivery systems by 10 percent—more than 250 Soviet missile launchers or bombers will have to be dismantled. Naturally, the Soviets will choose to phase out their older systems, but these systems are still formidable.

The missiles, for instance, to be torn down are comparable in age and payload to our Minuteman II missiles and to our Polaris missiles, presently deployed. Under the agreement, they will not be permitted to replace these dismantled systems with modern ones. Our own operational forces have been kept somewhat below the permitted ceiling. Thus, under the agreement, we could increase our force level, if necessary.

SALT II will also impose the first limited but important restraints on the race to build new systems and to improve existing ones—the so-called qualitative arms race.

In short, SALT II places serious limits on what the Soviets might do in the absence of such an agreement. For example, without SALT II, the Soviet Union could build up to some 3,000 strategic systems by 1985. With SALT II, we will both be limited to 2,250 such weapons.

This new arms control agreement will, obviously, serve our national interests. It will reduce the dangerous levels of strategic arms and restrain the development of future weapons. It will help to maintain our relative strength compared to the Soviets. It will avert a costly, risky, and pointless buildup of missile launchers and bombers—at the end of which both sides would be even less secure.

Let me turn now to the third of the four questions—how can we know whether the Soviets are living up to their obligations under this SALT agreement?

No objective—no objective—has commanded more energy and attention in our negotiations. We have insisted that the SALT II agreement be made verifiable. We are confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the United States detecting it.

Our confidence in the verifiability of their agreement derives from the size and the nature of activities we must monitor and the many effective and sophisticated intelligence collection systems which we in America possess.

For example, nuclear submarines take several years to construct and assemble. Missile silos and their supporting equipment are large and quite visible. Intercontinental bombers are built at a few plants, and they need major airfields. Our photoreconnaissance satellites survey the entire Soviet Union on a regular basis, and they give us high confidence that we will be able to count accurately the numbers of all these systems.

But our independent verification capabilities are not limited only to observing these large-scale activities. We can determine not only how many systems there are, but what they can do. Our photographic satellites and other systems enable us to follow technological developments in Soviet strategic forces with great accuracy. There is no ques-

tion that any cheating which might affect our national security would be discovered in time for us to respond fully.

For many years, we have monitored Soviet strategic forces and Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements with a high degree of confidence. The overall capability remains. It was certainly not lost with our observation stations in Iran, which was only one of many intelligence sources that we use to follow Soviet strategic activities. We are concerned with that loss, but we must keep it in perspective.

This monitoring capability relates principally to the portion of the new agreement dealing with the modernization limits on ICBM's and to only a portion of such modernization restraints.

The sensitive intelligence techniques obviously cannot be disclosed in public, but the bottom line is that if there is an effort to cheat on the SALT agreement, including the limits on modernizing ICBM's, we will detect it, and we will do so in time fully to protect our security.

And we must also keep in mind that quite apart from SALT limits, our security is affected by the extent of our information about Soviet strategic forces. With this SALT II treaty, that vital information will be much more accessible to us.

The agreement specifically forbids, for the first time, interference with the systems used for monitoring compliance and prohibits any deliberate concealment that would impede verification. Any such concealment activity would itself be detectable, and a violation of this part of the agreement would be so serious as to give us grounds to cancel the treaty itself.

As I have said many times, the stakes are too high to rely on trust, or even on the Soviets' rational inclination to act in their own best interest. The treaty must—and the treaty will be—verifiable from the first day it is signed.

And finally, how does SALT II fit into the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union?

Because SALT II will make the world safer and our own Nation more secure, it is in our national interest to control nuclear weapons even as we compete with the Soviets elsewhere in the world.

A SALT II agreement in no way limits our ability to promote our interests or to answer Soviet threats to those interests. We will continue to support the independence of Third World nations who struggle to stay free. We will continue to promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional disputes and to oppose efforts by any others to inflame these disputes with outside force. And we will continue to work for human rights.

It's a delusion to believe that rejection of a SALT treaty would somehow induce the Soviet Union to exercise new restraints in trou-

bled areas. The actual effect of rejecting such a treaty might be precisely the opposite. The most intransigent and hostile elements of a Soviet political power structure would certainly be encouraged and strengthened by our rejection of a SALT agreement. The Soviets might very well feel that they then have little to lose by creating new international tensions.

A rejection of SALT II would have significance far beyond the fate of a single treaty. It would mean a radical turning away from America's longtime policy of seeking world peace. We would no longer be identified as the peace-loving nation. It would turn us away from the control of nuclear weapons and from the easing of tensions between Americans and the Soviet people under the system of international law based on mutual interests.

The rejection of SALT II would result in a more perilous world. As I said at Georgia Tech on February 20, "Each crisis, each confrontation, each point of friction—as serious as it may be in its own right—would take on an added measure of significance and an added dimension of danger. For it would occur in an atmosphere of unbridled strategic competition and deteriorating strategic stability. It is precisely because we have fundamental differences with the Soviet Union that we are determined to bring this most dangerous element of our military competition under control."⁸

For these reasons, we will not try to impose binding linkage between Soviet behavior and SALT, and we will not accept any Soviet attempts to link SALT with aspects of our own foreign policy of which they may disapprove.

Again, SALT II is not a favor we are doing for the Soviet Union; it's an agreement carefully negotiated in the national security interests of the United States of America.

I put these issues to you today, because they need discussion and debate and because the voices of the American people must be heard.

In the months ahead, we will do all in our power to explain the treaty clearly and fully to the American people. I know that Members of Congress from both parties will join in this effort to ensure an informed public debate. And you, more than any other group I can imagine in the United States, share this responsibility with me and with the Congress.

During this debate, it's important that we exercise care. We will be sharing with the Congress some of our most sensitive defense and intelligence secrets. And the leaders in Congress must ensure that these secrets will be guarded so that the debate itself will not undermine our own security.

⁸ See Document 111.

As the national discussion takes place, let us be clear about what the issues are—and are not.

Americans are committed to maintaining a strong defense. That is not the issue.

We will continue to compete, and compete effectively, with the Soviet Union. That is not the issue.

The issue is whether we will move ahead with strategic arms control or resume a relentless nuclear weapons competition. That's the choice we face—between an imperfect world with a SALT agreement, or an imperfect and more dangerous world without a SALT agreement.

With SALT II, we will have significant reductions in Soviet strategic forces; far greater certainty in our defense planning and in the knowledge of the threats that we might face; flexibility to meet our own defense needs; the foundation for further controls on nuclear and conventional arms; and our own self-respect and the earned respect of the world for a United States demonstrably committed to the works of peace.

Without SALT, the Soviets will be unconstrained and capable, and probably committed to an enormous further buildup.

Without SALT, there would have to be a much sharper rise in our own defense spending, at the expense of other necessary programs for our people.

Without SALT, we would end up with thousands more strategic nuclear warheads on both sides, with far greater costs—and far less security—for our citizens.

Without SALT, we would see improved relations with the Soviet Union replaced by heightened tensions.

Without SALT, the long, slow process of arms control, so central to building a safer world, would be dealt a crippling and, perhaps, a fatal blow.

Without SALT, the world would be forced to conclude that America had chosen confrontation rather than cooperation and peace.

This is an inescapable choice we face. For the fact is that the alternative to this treaty is not some perfect agreement, drafted unilaterally by the United States in which we gain everything and the Soviets gain nothing; the alternative now, and in the foreseeable future, is no agreement at all.

I am convinced that the United States has a moral and a political will to control the relentless technology which could constantly devise new and more destructive weapons to kill human beings. We need not drift into a dark nightmare of unrestrained arms competition. We Americans have the wisdom to know that our security depends on more than just maintaining our unsurpassed defense forces. Our secu-

rity and that of our allies also depends on the strength of ideas and ideals and on arms control measures that can stabilize and finally reverse a dangerous and a wasteful arms race which neither side can win. This is a path of wisdom. This is a path of peace.

118. Address by Secretary of State Vance¹

Chicago, May 1, 1979

Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World

From the first days of our nation; Americans have held a staunch optimism about the future. We have been a self-confident people, certain about our ability to shape our destiny. And we are a people who have not only adapted well to change, we have thrived on it.

We are now living in a period of history marked by deep and rapid change. Tonight, I want to talk about change and how America can use its extraordinary strength to meet the challenges of a changing world.

America's optimism has been jarred in recent years—by a bitter war, by domestic divisions that tested our democratic institutions and left many of our people skeptical about government, by the sudden awareness that our economic life at home can be shaped by actions abroad, and by the realization that there are events which affect us but which we can only partly influence.

There is much that we can and have learned from these experiences. But fear of the future is not one of them.

Let me share with you frankly my concern that the distorted proposition being advanced by some that America is in a period of decline in the world is not only wrong as a matter of fact but dangerous as a basis for policy.

For we would imperil our future if we lost confidence in ourselves and in our strength and retreated from energetic leadership in the world. And we would imperil our future, as well, if we reacted in frustration and used our power to resist change in the world or employed our military power when it would do more harm than good.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1979, pp. 16–19. Vance delivered his address before a meeting of the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges.

The realization that we are not omnipotent should not make us fear we have lost our power or the will to use it. If we appreciate the extraordinary strengths we have, if we understand the nature of the changes taking place in the world, and if we act effectively to use our different kinds of power to shape different kinds of change, we have every reason to be confident about our future.

America's Strengths

We must begin with a clear understanding of our own strengths as a nation.

America's military strength today is formidable. I know of no responsible military official who would exchange our strategic position for that of any other nation.

- We have friendly neighbors on our borders.
- We have strong and reliable security relationships. Together, these allies more than double our overall military strength.
- We have easy access to the sea, which enables us to have diversified strategic forces and the ready capacity to project our power.

Our economy, and those of our allies, are more than three times as productive as those of the Soviets and their allies.

The industrial democracies continue to lead the way in technological innovation and in harnessing that technology to serve mankind.

And the way of life of our people and what we stand for as a nation continue to have magnetic appeal around the world.

Because we and our allies are the engines of creative change in almost every field, because of the vitality of our political institutions and the strength of our military forces, we have a capacity for leadership—and an ability to thrive in a world of change—that is unsurpassed.

The issue is not whether we are strong. We are. The challenge is to use these unquestioned strengths appropriately and effectively to advance our interests in a world undergoing different kinds of change.

What are these changes, and how can we use our strength effectively?

Stable Strategic Equivalence

The first element of change is the evolution from an earlier period of American strategic supremacy to an era of stable strategic equivalence.

We should harbor no illusion that we could return to the earlier era. Neither side will permit the other to hold an exploitable strategic advantage. Each side has the financial and technical resources to keep pace with the other. With the stakes so high, we know that both of us will do whatever is necessary to keep from falling behind. That is why essential equivalence has become the only realistic strategy in today's nuclear world.

This rough balance can also serve the cause of stability—even if some find it unsettling compared with our earlier supremacy. It is this essential equivalence in strategic arms which allows us to move ahead on arms limitation. For if one side were far ahead, it would feel no special urgency about arms control, and the side that was behind would refuse to negotiate from a position of weakness. Only when both sides perceive a balance, as is now the case, can we hope for real arms control progress.

Our response to this broad change in the security environment has several elements.

We will assure that essential equivalence in nuclear arms is maintained. We will not be overtaken by the momentum of Soviet military programs.

We have undertaken a far-reaching modernization of our strategic forces. We are improving each leg of our strategic triad—with cruise missiles for our B-52 bombers, with a new Trident I missile for existing submarines and the development of a new Trident submarine and Trident II missile, and with development funding for the M-X missile. And we are examining, in a timely fashion, the options for offsetting the probable future threat to the land-based portion of our missile force.

At the same time, we are equally determined to enhance our security by applying mutual limits to nuclear arms. We are at the threshold of a SALT II treaty. It is a critical step in the process of bringing strategic weapons under sensible control. As its terms become known and debated, I am confident that the Senate will agree that it will enhance our national security and that of our allies. Its rejection would lead to an intensification of the nuclear arms race. The risk of nuclear war would increase. The costs to our taxpayers would rise sharply. It would heighten tensions with the Soviets, trouble our allies, and deal a crippling blow to future arms control prospects.

The American people, and our allies, understand the importance of decreasing tensions with the Soviet Union and seeking common ground where our interests may converge.

While we address strategic issues, we must also be especially sensitive to the importance of maintaining a balance of conventional forces. At the NATO summit last summer, we and our allies committed ourselves to real increases of 3% in defense expenditures and to modernize and upgrade NATO forces.² Last year's repeal of the arms em-

² See Document 83.

bargo against Turkey was an important step to help bolster NATO's southern flank.³

In Europe and elsewhere, we are committed to maintain strong conventional forces. And no one should doubt that we will use those forces if our vital interests or those of our allies are threatened.

In these ways, we will maintain, and strengthen, our security in an age of essential equivalence by meeting the new problems it presents and by seizing the new arms control opportunities it affords.

Growing Risks of Regional Conflicts

A second change is the reality that the risks posed by regional conflicts have grown. Many of these conflicts are long standing. They have roots deep in history, in geography, in religious and ethnic differences.

But as more nations acquire more sophisticated arms, regional conflicts become more dangerous. They pose a constant threat of wider confrontation. As a result, the United States must be more active in working to help settle these disputes peacefully.

The fact is that no nation is more intensively engaged in the continuing effort to dampen the flames of conflict around the world than the United States.

No other nation could have played the role that the United States has played in helping Israel and Egypt achieve an historic peace treaty.⁴ And we will continue to remain actively involved in the effort to achieve a comprehensive peace—a peace in which Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinian people can live with security and with dignity.

In southern Africa, in the eastern Mediterranean, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the world, we are using the influence we have for peace. Progress does not come easily or quickly. There will be setbacks, for the path to peace is often more difficult than the road to war. But with persistence and steadiness, we *can* help provide the parties to conflict with an alternative to violence—if they choose to take it.

In some cases, these efforts will involve working with other interested nations as a catalyst for bringing the parties together. In other situations, we will support international and regional institutions that provide a framework for easing tensions. When we believe it will con-

³ See footnote 6, Document 93. On September 26, 1978, the President lifted the arms embargo against Turkey by signing into law the International Security Assistance Act (S. 3075; P.L. 95–384). For the text of the President's statement on signing the bill, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, p. 1636.

⁴ Reference is to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, signed at Washington on March 26, 1979. For the text of the treaty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1979, pp. 3–15.

tribute to regional stability, we will assist nations threatened by external force to strengthen their ability to defend themselves.

In all cases, we will oppose attempts by others to transform local disputes into international tests of will. Every nation has a responsibility to recognize that there is greater safety in healing, rather than fueling, local conflicts.

Changes Within Nations

A third kind of change we must address is change *within* nations.

As a result of mass communications, better education, urbanization, and growing expectations for a better life, there is a new tide in many Third World nations, as more and more people demand a fuller share in their government and their economy. These demands can place extraordinary pressures on economic, social, and political institutions.

This ferment can at times cause the kind of turmoil that adversely affects our interests, at least in the short run. But rather than reacting in opposition to such change, or assuming that it necessarily works against us, let us look at two central questions: Is this kind of change generally in the interest of our nation? And what are the best instruments through which we can help others meet popular aspirations in an orderly and peaceful fashion?

The answer to the first question, in my judgment, is that the growing demand of individuals around the world for the fulfillment of their political, social, and economic rights *is* generally in our interest. These aspirations are producing new or strengthened democratic institutions in many nations throughout the world. And America can flourish best in a world where freedom flourishes.

Should we not gain confidence from this expansion of democracy, which is taking place not because we force it but because of its inherent appeal?

And what is that inherent appeal? Surely it lies in the enhanced opportunity that democracy provides for the realization of fundamental human rights—the rights to political and religious expression, to political participation, and to economic justice.

These values are remarkably attuned to the demands of change. The change which confronts many nations—particularly the less developed nations—challenges cultures, ways of living and communicating, notions of individual and national autonomy. The great strength of democratic processes is their flexibility and resilience. They allow accommodation and compromise. By giving all groups a voice in the decisions which affect their lives, democratic societies are far better able to shape a peaceful and stable balance between tradition and progress.

Internal change in other countries will sometimes be turbulent and difficult. At times, it may run in repressive directions. But we must not let our concerns about the crosscurrents blind us to the tide running in favor of freedom.

In seeking to help others meet the legitimate demands of their peoples, what are the best instruments at hand?

Let me state first that the use of military force is not, and should not be, a desirable American policy response to the internal politics of other nations. We believe we have the right to shape our destiny; we must respect that right in others. We must clearly understand the distinction between our readiness to act forcefully when the vital interests of our nation, our allies, and our friends are threatened and our recognition that our military forces cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the purely *internal* problems of other nations.

In helping other nations cope with such internal change, our challenge is to help them develop their own institutions, strengthen their own economies, and foster the ties between government and people.

To do so, we must continue to provide them with increasing levels of development assistance. We must maintain human rights policies which work in practical ways to advance freedom. And we must accept the fact that other societies will manage change and build new institutions in patterns that may be different from our own.

Third World nations will fiercely defend their independence. They will reject efforts by outsiders to impose their institutions. We should welcome this spirit. For our national interest is not in their becoming like us; it is that they be free of domination by others.

This strategy of affirmative involvement and support for the independence and the diversity of developing nations serves us well. It capitalizes on the West's inherent strengths. And it improves our ties to developing countries in a context which does not force them to make an explicit choice between East and West.

The test of our will in dealing with domestic change abroad will come not in how we use our military might but in whether we are willing to put our resources behind our words—and to make them work effectively.

An Increasingly Pluralistic World

A fourth kind of change that we are seeing is in the international system itself. Building on our experience as a pluralistic nation, we must learn to deal effectively with an increasingly pluralistic world.

Since the early 1960's, we have seen the emergence of dozens of new nations, each with its distinctive identity, each fiercely intent on fulfilling its national aspirations.

We have seen the development of new powers in the world, nations which play an increasingly important role in international economic and political life.

And we have come to recognize that many of the challenges we face are genuinely global in scope. Halting the spread of nuclear weapons, managing the world's resources sensibly and fairly, preserving an environment that can sustain us—these problems do not derive from any single nation nor can any single nation, working alone, resolve them.

A world where many must participate in designing the future rather than a few, where progress often requires cooperative effort, demands more—not less—American leadership. It requires us to exercise that leadership creatively, to inspire others to work with us toward goals we share but cannot achieve separately. It calls for a new kind of diplomacy.

We must practice, wherever possible, an inclusive form of diplomacy, working together with others to achieve common goals. Such multilateral efforts are time consuming and complex. But they can often be more productive than working alone.

The core around which these broader efforts must be built is a strong and solid relationship with our traditional allies. We have worked hard in this Administration to strengthen that partnership, and we have done so.

Working together with our allies we are able, on an increasing number of issues, to engage others in collective efforts to resolve some of the more intractable problems we face. Let me cite just one example—our effort to find a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle.

At our initiative, 44 nations have come together to search for ways—both technical and institutional—to enable nations to pursue peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. There is no “American” answer to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation; there is only an international answer, and we are working with others to find it.

We are strengthening our ties with those developing nations which exert increasing economic and political influence. We have worked to bring these and other developing nations more fully and fairly into the decisionmaking of international institutions which affect their life and ours. For enduring solutions to problems we face in common can be found only if all who have a stake also have a role and recognize their responsibilities as well as their rights in the world community.

To work effectively in a changing international system we must be prepared to work with nations whose ideologies are different from our

own. By establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, for example, we are now in a better position to deal directly and forthrightly with a government that represents one-fourth of the world's people.

We have embarked on a deliberate effort to enhance the role of the United Nations and regional institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the Organization of African Unity. These institutions often can provide the most effective setting for resolving international disputes and for broadening the realm of international cooperation.

To secure the cooperation of other nations, we must deal with them on a basis of mutual respect and independence. Our achievement of a new Panama Canal treaty, which secures our use of the canal for coming generations, has demonstrated that fair dealing with other nations, whatever their size, can serve our interests as well as theirs. Our relations throughout this hemisphere have benefited as a result.

A Changing World Economy

Let me turn finally to the change we are seeing in the international economy—the growing stake every nation has in economic decisions made beyond its borders.

America's strength rests on the vitality of America's economy. Our economy continues to provide expanding opportunity for our people and continues to fuel growth around the world. We must also recognize the other side of this coin—the health of other economies around the world increasingly affects the health of our economy.

Our exports provide Americans with jobs—in fact, one out of every eight jobs in the manufacturing sector—and income for our firms and farmers. Every third acre of our farmland produces for export. Imports from abroad provide us with essential raw materials, they afford our consumers greater choice, and they dampen our inflation.

This growing economic interdependence requires that our government work with others to help create international conditions in which all nations can thrive. We cannot seek to build our own economic future at the expense of others, nor will we allow others to compete unfairly. For a new era of economic nationalism could have tragic consequences, just as it did during the protectionist warfare of the 1930's.

We are deeply involved in working with other nations to meet the challenges of a changing world economic order.

We have been successful in strengthening economic cooperation among the industrial nations. We have instituted regular economic summits to coordinate our economic policies so that they reinforce rather than undermine one another. And there has been far closer col-

laboration among our monetary authorities in restoring order to foreign exchange markets.

We have initialed an important new multilateral trade agreement that will establish fair trading rules for the next decade.⁵ It will have a direct and positive impact on our economy.

We have agreed with the other industrialized members of the International Energy Agency to cut back our collective demand for oil by 2 million barrels a day. To fulfill this commitment—and to reduce our own costly and dangerous dependence on oil imports—the President has initiated a sensible program for achieving greater domestic conservation and production. For we must begin to deal urgently with a markedly changed global energy environment.

We recognize that a well-managed foreign assistance program contributes to the economic performance of the developing countries. Their growth has become an increasingly important factor in the health of our own economy. Aiding that development is not only an investment in the future of others, it is an investment in our own future as well.

The Path We Will Follow

In the foreign policy choices we are now making, we are determining the path we will follow in a new era. In unsettled times, each of us has a responsibility to be clear about how we would deal with the world as we find it.

Most Americans now recognize that we alone cannot dictate events. This recognition is not a sign of America's decline; it is a sign of growing American maturity in a complex world.

We are stronger today because we recognize the realities of our times. This recognition, together with an equally clear understanding that we remain the most powerful of nations, should make every American as staunchly optimistic about our nation's future as we have always been.

There can be no going back to a time when we thought there could be American solutions to every problem. We must go forward into a new era of mature American leadership—based on strength, not belligerence; on steadiness, not impulse; on confidence, not fear.

We have every reason to be confident. For 200 years, we have prospered by welcoming change and working with it, not by resisting it. We

⁵ The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva concluded in mid-April. On June 19, the President transmitted to Congress the text of the trade agreements negotiated and entered into in Geneva and the text of the proposed Trade Agreements Act (P.L. 96-39). For the President's transmittal message, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 1092-1094.

have understood, at home and abroad, that stability is not the status quo. It comes through human progress. We will continue in this American tradition.

119. Editorial Note

On May 9, 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced at the White House that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiations had concluded. The U.S. and Soviet Governments instructed their delegates at Geneva to incorporate agreements reached by Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin during their negotiations into the draft treaty and resolve any outstanding issues. Vance commented on the significance of the treaty and then discussed the way forward:

“This treaty will not only mark the end of one negotiation, it will open the way for another. When it is ratified by the Senate, it will become the cornerstone for still further limits in reductions in SALT III.

“The national debate which we now commence is not only about this treaty. We are still considering as well the inescapable realities of a nuclear world—the necessity to our security of a strong defense and the grave danger to our security of an unlimited race in nuclear arms, for our security today lies in maintaining a stable strategic balance between two nations with awesome power.

“The SALT II treaty will make a substantial contribution to that stability. We have demonstrated through the SALT process that even as we compete in some areas, the United States and Soviet Union can and must cooperate to lessen the dangers of war. In this way, the treaty can serve to open the path to a more constructive and peaceful relationship between us.

“This treaty is a message of hope for us and for all the people of the world.”

Brown explained that the SALT II treaty would aid the United States in maintaining a strategic nuclear balance. He highlighted the main elements of the agreement and concluded:

“In sum, SALT will help us maintain flexible and credible deterrence, stability, and essential equivalence. Without the treaty, we could also do these things, but it would be more costly and less certain. None of the challenges we face would be less without the treaty, and some would be considerably greater. All the increases we plan in our defense

efforts with SALT would still be needed without it. But many more would be needed as well.

"I see the treaty as a valuable method of helping, along with our own moderately increased programs, to meet our nation's strategic needs, and, if the Soviet Union will emphasize cooperation rather than competition, SALT will also allow a healthier state of U.S.-Soviet relations." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1979, pages 23-24)

On May 11, President Jimmy Carter took part in an interview and question-and-answer session with editors and news directors. The interview began at 1:15 p.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The President discussed the beginning of the ratification process in his opening remarks:

"Perhaps more important than anything that I will address while I'm President and perhaps the most important vote that the incumbent Members of the Senate will ever cast is concerning the ratification of SALT II.

"It's a fair treaty, enforceable treaty, verifiable treaty, and rejection of this treaty would have a devastating, adverse effect on our Nation's relationship with the Soviet Union, on our ability to deal effectively with our allies, with uncommitted nations, and with the control of nuclear weaponry or explosives in the future throughout the world. That's one issue."

The President noted that the Middle East peace treaties, signed by Egyptian and Israeli officials, constituted the second crucial international issue facing the United States. He continued:

"We hope that the other nations in that region will soon realize the importance of these treaties. We'll do all we can to implement them fully and to demonstrate to all those who are interested that we believe in and are committed to a comprehensive peace settlement."

During the question-and-answer portion of the interview, a reporter asked the President for his assessment of the SALT treaty and whether or not he could guide the treaty through the Senate in the same form in which he intended to sign it. The President responded:

"Well, you know, we've negotiated this SALT treaty now for going on 7 years, under three Presidents, and it's been negotiated in the most extreme specificity, much greater specific, detailed negotiation than ever existed with the limited test ban or SALT I or the ABM treaty.

"There's been a hard negotiation, a tough negotiation on both sides, and the Soviets, I think, as have we, have been not only tough but fair. We have gotten the best deal we can. It's not perfect. I could have written a unilateral treaty if I didn't have to consult with the Soviets, that it would have been more attractive to us and less attractive to them. But for the Senate to expect the Soviets substantially to change

their posture just because we unilaterally want them to do so is fruitless and, I think, would cause a rejection of SALT treaty completely.

“I think the treaty is to our great advantage and also to the Soviets’ great advantage. And I need not go into all the details of SALT II, but I think that it’s, at the very least, very fair, well-balanced, stable, verifiable, adequate, and a move in the right direction. It leads to SALT III, which will be even better.

“Rejection of the treaty, however, will have the most devastating consequences to our country and, I think, to world peace. It will sever, to a substantial degree, the workable relationship between ourselves and the Soviets. It will shake the confidence of our own NATO Allies in our ability to get along reasonably well with the Soviets and leave them in an increasingly vulnerable position. It would make it almost impossible for us to pursue successfully the control of nuclear weapon development in countries like India, Pakistan, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and other nations who have the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons, but have refrained from doing so because they saw an overall, worldwide restraint.

“If we show that we are not willing to restrain our own nuclear arsenal, when it’s to our advantage and the Soviets’ both to do it—we would already have several thousand nuclear weapons—there’s no way that I could go to someone like Prime Minister Desai in India, with whom I have had long discussions on this, and say, ‘We have set a good example for you, now you restrain yourself and don’t ever develop another explosion in India.’ It would be almost impossible for me to do it. So, it would wipe out any real good opportunity for us to constrain nuclear weaponry.

“And as you know, there are three ways that we can compete with the Soviet Union. One is militarily through a prospective or actual war, which we both want to avoid. The other is what we are doing. We are meeting them competitively in the political realm and also in the philosophical and moral and ethnic [*ethical?*] realm. And that’s where the competition goes on.

“If the Soviets should sign SALT II and, in effect, ratify it—which is, I think, inevitable—and if we should sign it and then reject it, we would lose our competitive ability to reach effectively the hearts and minds of other people around the world who will be making a choice between us, on the one hand, and the Soviets, on the other, in the future for military, political, trade alliances; because the Soviets can put themselves through a massive propaganda effort, which would be inevitable, too, in their role of a powerful but fair and peace-loving nation.

“We would be put in the role of a powerful nation that was, in effect, in their opinion, a warmonger who refused even to participate in an equitable restraint on the most destructive weapons on Earth. And

how we could deal effectively as a nation in competition with the Soviets after we rejected the SALT treaty is something that I cannot understand and which I would hate to have to face as a President.

“So, I am asking the Senators—the ones that were sitting around this table day before yesterday [May 9]—‘Before you vote on SALT, take yourselves out of the role of a Senator or out of the role of the chairman or a member of the Armed Services Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee, and put yourself in the position of the President, who would have to implement a national policy and an international policy after our Nation was crippled, in effect, by the consequences of a SALT II rejection.’

“This is undoubtedly the most important single issue that I will ever have to face as President, unless we are faced with actual war. And I hope that every American will join in with me, not in a quiescent way, just observing what’s going on, but in an active way. And I particularly hope the news media will assess the details of the SALT agreement, the consequences of either passage or rejection, and let your voices be heard in the strongest possible way.

“It transcends partisanship; it transcends the necessary objectivity of the news media toward politicians. And I hope that legitimately, within the bounds of the role of the news media, that you will actively support and promote the ratification of the SALT treaty.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pages 845–852*)

120. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Summit Strategy

The memorandum that follows provides a framework for your approach to the summit by reviewing what we have learned from pre-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Vienna Summit Briefing Book, 6/79 [1]. Secret. The President wrote: “Zbig, David [Aaron], Warren [Christopher], and Marshall [Shulman]” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. The memorandum is also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 197.

vious summits; by outlining the central objectives of the two sides; by identifying the key messages and accomplishments; and by describing the scenario and strategy for these negotiations.

Moreover, we attach at Tab A a more detailed statement of our tangible and intangible maximum objectives for the entire summit; Tab B contains the Soviet text of the proposed joint communique;² and Tab C contains a memorandum previously prepared by Bill Hyland on the experience of past summits.

History and Setting

Some months ago, you read Hyland's memorandum, and I would urge you to reread it (Tab C). In brief, it points out that some summits created unreal expectations and, hence, generated disillusionment (e.g., the first Nixon-Brezhnev Summit of 1972).³ Some were outright failures, notably Paris in 1960 (Khrushchev walked out over the U-2 incident),⁴ and Vienna in 1961⁵ (Kennedy was browbeaten and assessed to be a weak leader). Despite its relatively low key, Glassboro⁶ was a rather unusual success in that it helped bring the USSR to recognize the need for a comprehensive strategic arms control process, despite the then-blazing Vietnam conflict.

You will be meeting Leonid Brezhnev in a setting of unusual uncertainty and difficulty. Never has the mixed character of the relationship of cooperation and competition been more in evidence. Despite the successful completion of SALT II, U.S.-Soviet relations are clearly strained by a number of conflicting interests. The United States is increasingly skeptical of Soviet intentions because of the momentum of its military programs and its intervention in the Third World. In the past, we could discount Soviet intentions because Soviet capabilities were limited; today, even benign Soviet intentions are becoming increasingly suspect because of the implications of Soviet capabilities.

² Tabs A and B were not attached. The summit meeting between the President and Brezhnev was scheduled to take place in Vienna June 16–18.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 257–302.

⁴ On May 1, 1960, a U.S. U-2 unarmed reconnaissance plane was shot down 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union. Khrushchev exploited the incident at the May 1960 four-power summit meeting in Moscow, causing the summit to collapse. See *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960*, vol. X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, Documents 147–156 and *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960*, vol. IX, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960, Germany; Austria, Documents 164–192.

⁵ Reference is to the June 3–4, 1961, Vienna summit. See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. V, Soviet Union, Documents 82–90.

⁶ Reference is to the June 1967 summit meeting between Johnson and Kosygin, held at Glassboro State College in Glassboro, New Jersey. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 228–237.

A further and critical element of uncertainty is due to the fact that the Soviet Union is already undergoing the trauma of a succession crisis. We do not know when Brezhnev will be replaced nor by whom. However, at Vienna you will be communicating through Brezhnev with the whole collective leadership, and—hopefully—through it perhaps also with the next generation of Soviet leaders as well. In some ways this may diminish the importance of whatever personal rapport you can develop with Brezhnev, but it enhances the importance of the signals and messages that you will want to transmit.

The U.S. side is also an uncertain quantity to the Soviet side. The firm centerpiece of the relationship now is SALT but the fate of SALT II in the Senate is unsure. The sensitivity of the United States to assertive Soviet behavior in the developing world, combined with our reluctance to get involved, makes it difficult for the Soviets to predict our reactions and can create the possibility of dangerous miscalculations.

Soviet Objectives

The Soviets have ample reason to invest in the relationship. They do not want our economic and technological might mobilized against them. They do not want us to move closer to China.⁷ They want to reduce the chances that security issues in conflict between us boil up to confrontation, yet they are unlikely to yield their positions in Africa, the Middle East or anywhere else.

While you would like to accomplish as much as possible—including strengthening SALT II reductions, agreeing on a number of other arms control measures and reconciling differences in the Third World—the Soviets have made it clear to us that they would be satisfied with signing SALT and having a positive atmosphere. We have their draft communique (Tab B). It is down to earth and businesslike. It has the usual Soviet boiler plate but is surprisingly moderate and breaks little new ground. They want to minimize consideration of contentious security and regional issues. They are prepared to reach further agreement on ASAT and MBFR but we don't know whether they are willing to make the needed concessions. They say little about economic relations, obviously seeking to avoid being a supplicant.

In effect, the Soviet objective is to create the impression of a U.S.-Soviet partnership in the management of world affairs; to downplay the importance of the U.S.-Chinese relationship;⁸ to improve the atmospherics and some tangibles of the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship; but not to limit in any way Soviet freedom of action in regards either to Europe or some of the Third World areas of turbulence.

⁷ The President underlined most of this sentence and the previous one.

⁸ The President underlined most of this clause and the previous one.

In addition, the schedule proposed by the Soviet side minimizes public exposure and thus diminishes their usual penchant for public camaraderie. Above all, we are getting one message—no surprises.⁹ Their approach is one of extreme caution. What they appear to fear most is the picture of a young U.S. President making dramatic initiatives (*a la* March 1977) without careful preparation in advance to ensure their acceptability to the Soviet leadership.

Tone and Style

Given the character of Soviet objectives, atmosphere will be a particularly important aspect of this summit.¹⁰ Every indication is that both sides seek a positive atmosphere. We should understand, however, that the Soviets have more to gain and less to lose than you do from pumping up the atmospherics. A glowing summit gives the Soviet leadership a boost at home and abroad, because they face no public comparison between pretense and actual results.

In managing the atmosphere and the substance of the summit, a number of points deserve being kept in mind:

1. There is little to be gained by philosophical discourse or ideological debate with the Soviet leaders; they are not psychologically confident enough to engage at the philosophical level as the Chinese do; in particular, trying to debate rules of conduct becomes frustrating because of the gap in perceptions;¹¹

2. Concrete issues, however, are more easily resolved but only if they have been well prepared and the Soviets do not have to contend with surprises that have not been aired by the collective leadership;¹²

3. Soviet leaders are quite sensitive to their personal treatment;¹³ they are particularly concerned over any slights reflecting the inferiority of the USSR. This will be a particularly important issue at this summit with Brezhnev's ill health. It is not in our interest to exploit his infirmities.

4. Meeting the "people" is of little interest to the Soviets. Their preoccupation is with those who have the power of decision. As a concession to us, they have reluctantly agreed on a joint call by the two Presidents on Austrian President Kirchschrager.

⁹ The President underlined the phrase "no surprises."

¹⁰ The President underlined the words "atmosphere" and "particularly important."

¹¹ In this point, the President underlined "little to be gained," "ideological debate," and "rules of conduct."

¹² In this point, the President underlined "Concrete issues" and "well prepared."

¹³ The President underlined "sensitive to their personal treatment."

5. There is no basis for “personal trust”;¹⁴ the Soviet system breeds power struggles; it is unlikely they would trust foreigners if they do not trust their own colleagues; expecting Western leaders to act against their class or national interest would subject a Soviet leader to ridicule, if not worse, in the Politburo;

6. Talks, that is conversation, mean little compared to the reassurance found in written documents and precise obligations; that is one reason why communiqués and joint principles and treaties have more importance in the USSR than in other diplomatic exchanges; but the “spirit” of a document is virtually non-existent;¹⁵

7. The main value to you may be simply to get some feel for the mind set of the Soviets and their mode of reasoning. The top Soviet leaders do in fact have extraordinary power and will make decisions. But they have no great incentive to make concessions and thereby expose themselves politically.¹⁶ Negotiations therefore take place within a pre-defined framework, and on any issue it is important for the Soviets to point to the precise concession they extracted in the bargaining.

Scenario

We originally wanted at least four days of talks. The Soviets have reduced the time available for discussion by making the first and fourth days largely ceremonial and by insisting that your private meeting with Brezhnev be on the last day. At this point we have agreed to a minimum of seven hours of talks with the possibility of two more on the final day before signing the SALT Treaty.

This will put a premium on the conversations at the two dinners. Accordingly we have in mind making them as small as possible—you, Cy, Harold, me and Dave Jones on our side and Brezhnev, Gromyko, Alexandrov, Ustinov and Ogarkov on theirs. Soviet attendance however is not yet set.

Equally important is the sequence of substantive issues. The first working day (Saturday, June 16) will be devoted to SALT and other arms control issues. This will be an upbeat day and we will be the hosts for the talks and the dinner. The next day will be hosted by the Soviets and will involve more contentious arms control, security and regional issues.

This will be the most important meeting from the standpoint of conveying firmness and determination to defend our interests. It will inevitably be more downbeat, with the atmosphere more filled with

¹⁴ The President underlined most of this clause.

¹⁵ In this point, the President underlined “Talks” and “mean little.”

¹⁶ The President underlined “no great incentive to make concessions.”

conflict and tension. The last day will see a private meeting and the SALT and other document signing and this should provide a positive conclusion to the summit.

In effect we have something of a drama—at first things are good, then they turn tense, then finally there is a positive resolution. The toasts and your remarks at the signing ceremony will be the key indicators of what is transpiring and they must be carefully crafted with that in mind. At the outset of the talks we must be careful to moderate expectations. The theme of SALT plus serious consultations, as we agreed previously, is the best note to strike before the summit begins.¹⁷

U.S. Strategy and Objectives

This wary and uncertain setting makes it important that we concentrate on those objectives that have the greatest potential for longer term impact on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I would define the central strategic objectives of the Vienna Summit in the following terms:

1. To consummate SALT II and to initiate SALT III;
2. To give additional impetus to further U.S.-Soviet arms control measures (such as ASAT, MBFR, CTB, CAT, etc.);
3. To make not only Brezhnev but also the Soviet leaders who stayed at home more aware that the U.S. sees the Soviet Union as insensitive to our vital interests or concerns in such regions as the Middle East, Southern Africa, Cuba, and Vietnam.¹⁸

In effect, your objective is to demonstrate that the United States can successfully manage the contradictory positive and negative tendencies in our relationship. To do that, you must articulate a conception of a reciprocal and realistic detente, based not only on the common interest in avoiding nuclear war, but also on genuine respect for each side's security concerns.¹⁹ This requires that you be candid with the Soviet leaders about our deep dissatisfaction with Soviet performance on a whole range of security-related issues. They must be made to understand that to move in a constructive direction now, U.S.-Soviet relations must involve positive Soviet behavior on key security issues of paramount U.S. concern.

At the same time, Soviet leaders must be convinced that our complaints do not derive from a desire for bad U.S.-Soviet relations, or from

¹⁷ The President underlined "SALT plus serious consultations."

¹⁸ The President underlined "our vital interests." He also underlined "Middle East" and "Southern Africa" and wrote "ok" under each. He underlined "Cuba" and "Vietnam" and placed a question mark under each. In the right-hand margin next to this point, he wrote "W. Europe, S. Asia, N. Africa, Mediterranean."

¹⁹ The President underlined the phrases "common interest in avoiding nuclear war" and "respect for each side's security."

the desire to gain a one-sided advantage—but that we genuinely wish those relations to improve.²⁰

To this end, it is essential that all key members of your delegation be explicitly instructed to deliberately and repeatedly emphasize certain key and simple themes to their Soviet counterparts. Only a delegation that speaks with a united voice, that keeps repeating the same key themes is likely to convey the message that needs to be heard back in the Kremlin.

Accordingly, I would recommend that you instruct everyone going to Vienna to make the following points to every Soviet that they encounter:

1. The United States wishes to join the Soviet Union in containing the nuclear arms race through further cuts in SALT II and more ambitious cuts in SALT III, as well as through other arms control measures;²¹

2. The United States wishes to see the Soviet Union as a partner in dealing with many emerging global problems, the solution of which need not be the object of ideological disputes (food, development, energy, etc.);²²

3. The United States cannot be indifferent to Soviet insensitivity to our concerns in such areas as the Middle East, Southern Africa, Vietnam, or Cuba—and such insensitivity will produce strong American reactions, particularly on matters which are of concern to the Soviet Union (e.g., China);²³

4. Soviet military buildup, both strategic and conventional, has gone beyond the point of legitimate defense needs, and is generating a genuine threat to the United States and its principal Allies—and unless the Soviet side shows restraint, the West, with the United States in the lead, will undertake major, comprehensive, and matching efforts.

If we succeed in communicating these messages effectively, we will have achieved our basic objectives. SALT II ratification will get a boost. Our Allies will maintain confidence in our leadership. You will have set a clear framework for a constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship regardless of who succeeds Brezhnev.

²⁰ The President underlined “genuinely wish those relations to improve.”

²¹ The President wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this point and, beneath the point, added “We should mutually enhance verification techniques.”

²² The President wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this point and, beneath the point, added “Closer regular consultations.”

²³ The President wrote below this point “VNam, Cuba ok but too narrow. South Asia, N. Africa more important.”

Next Steps

The final impression of the meeting will be shaped by the communique issued jointly by the two parties. It must be prepared well in advance. We need your guidance, therefore, on how to proceed on the full range of issues that are candidates for discussion.

In response to your admonition that we not be timid in our goals for the Summit, Tab A contains a statement of our maximum objectives organized around the agenda as it now stands. However, realism dictates the conclusion that not all these objectives will be attained at the Summit itself. The Soviets have also stressed to us that they desire “no surprises.” It follows therefore that these objectives need to be prioritized and prepared in advance with the Soviets.

Accordingly, I would welcome your guidance as to which of the items at Tab A you want us to pursue with particular vigor. Once I know your priorities, and with your permission, I will ask Dobrynin to join me and Christopher for a preliminary review of those items which ought to be discussed with the Soviets in advance of the Vienna Summit. In this manner, we will enhance the prospects of attaining not only our broad strategic objectives, but also the more concrete goals listed in Tab A.

Tab C**Paper Prepared by William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff²⁴**

Washington, undated

Soviet-American Summitry

Summit meetings between the American President and the Soviet leaders inevitably stimulate great expectations that a new and favorable turning point will be reached. Rarely have positive expectations been justified; in those cases of a relatively “successful” summit, the results have been produced more by the surrounding or preceding circumstances than by the actual negotiations between the leaders.

One of the problems is the persistent American belief that such meetings are of special significance because they: (1) create “goodwill” among the participants; create a better “atmosphere” for resolving issues and permit the American case to be made to the leaders that have the power of decision. These attitudes explain in part why in retrospect

²⁴ Secret. The President wrote “good. J” in the top right-hand corner of the paper.

summit meetings have seemed of such little value and on occasion even dangerously misleading.

The tone and approach to summits was set by President Roosevelt, who had great confidence in his own ability to deal with foreign leaders, and he saw Stalin largely in terms of an adversary who could be won over by powers of persuasion. Because the actual substance of the wartime meetings was secret, they were represented as dramatic success stories. The inevitable post-war disillusionment made all summits appear dangerous traps, in which the Soviets received major concessions.

The death of Stalin in 1953, however, revived summitry; Churchill sensed that the Kremlin might be in some disarray and wanted to confront the new leaders; Dulles was skeptical, but even Eisenhower was intrigued. He wrote:

“ . . . a major preoccupation of my mind throughout most of 1953 was the development of approaches to the Soviet leaders that might be at least a start toward the birth of mutual trust.”

The quest for “mutual trust” was in fact the theme of the Geneva summit of July 1955, and the subsequent “spirit” the meeting engendered.²⁵ The meeting was not the intimate conclave Churchill had wanted but a formal, ritualistic series of meetings, with little substance and no achievements. Within days Khrushchev had repudiated any semblance of cooperation on Germany (one purpose of the meeting) and the USSR was moving into the Middle East with arms sales to Nassir—a subject not even raised.

If the summit of 1955 was a leisurely, cosmetic affair, the subsequent meetings, held under Soviet pressures on Berlin, were, in effect, safety valves to drain the threatened crisis of a separate German peace treaty. The well known summit in Paris of May 1960, was aborted by the U-2 incident, though most observers believe that Khrushchev had concluded beforehand that there was little hope of getting his demands on Berlin.²⁶

The Kennedy summit of 1961 in Vienna was an example of the fecklessness, not to say the danger, of turning summit meetings into ideological debates.²⁷

²⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Documents 180–250.

²⁶ See footnote 4, above.

²⁷ See footnote 5, above.

Much like the Kitchen debate between Khrushchev and Nixon in 1959,²⁸ at the 1961 Vienna summit the two leaders consumed great time in arguing over the merits of their respective economic and political systems. Naturally, neither was persuaded by the other's arguments, but it may be that Khrushchev concluded that Kennedy would not be a formidable opponent in a confrontation. In any case, the opportunity to deal concretely with Berlin was frittered away leading eventually to the Cuban missile crisis.

The Glassboro summit of 1967²⁹ was somewhat unique; it featured the Soviet premier, Kosygin, but not the party chief (thus perhaps downgrading its importance); it was arranged as an extension of a UN visit by Kosygin and much of the time was consumed by a debate about SALT and ABM; the US arguing for the start of talks and the Soviets, ironically, arguing that ABMs should not be included because they were defensive and hence "moral" (they shifted totally by the spring of 1970, when they argued for a separate ABM treaty).

It might be noted that one of the hazards of summitry is that the planning stage is subject to the unforeseen event—the U-2 in May 1960 and the Czech invasion that aborted the Johnson summit in 1968,³⁰ and the bombing and mining of Haiphong in May 1972.³¹

The Nixon summits were unusual in their frequency.³² Nixon and Brezhnev met 3 times in a little over 24 months. Nixon was against an early summit; he wanted to use it to gain some leverage on other issues; this was somewhat effective in the Berlin and SALT negotiations, but much less so in involving the Soviets in Vietnam peace efforts.

Nixon personally had little use for the give and take of summits as far as substance was involved but he saw their political and symbolic benefits. The actual meetings were almost entirely prepared beforehand; only a few minor SALT matters were still open for negotiation in 1972; nothing much was left open in 1973; and in 1974, only the level of the threshold of the underground test ban.

²⁸ Nixon made an unofficial visit to the Soviet Union July 23–August 2, 1959, in order to open the American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park in Moscow. During a tour of the exhibit on July 24, Nixon and Khrushchev came to a model American home and stopped in the kitchen. While there, they engaged in an argument about the relative merits of capitalism and Communism. The argument became known as the "kitchen debate."

²⁹ See footnote 6, above

³⁰ Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia the night of August 20–21, 1968. See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80 and 81.

³¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. III, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Documents 131–136.

³² Documentation on the May 1972, June 1973, and June–July 1974 summits is *ibid.* and in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June, 1972–August 1974.

There may in fact have been something to the personal rapport established between Brezhnev and Nixon, particularly since after the first meeting there were no major divisive issues on the agenda. The assumptions of "detente" were under fire, however, when Nixon resigned a little over a month after his July meeting with Brezhnev. It was the concern that the relationship might rapidly deteriorate after Watergate that led Ford to a quick meeting in Vladivostok.³³ Another purpose of that meeting was to salvage the SALT discussion which had more or less stalemated in the Nixon summit. Ford picked up an easy personal relationship, helped in part by the "success" of reaching an agreement at Vladivostok.

The last "summit" was the Ford-Brezhnev meeting [in] Helsinki, it lasted only a few hours.³⁴ By then Brezhnev was beginning to show signs of wear; he was particularly fatigued by the round of meetings at Helsinki and not pleased by what seemed a western success in the speeches, publicity and documents.

A few general observations on Summits may be in order:

1. There is little to be gained by philosophical discourse or ideological debate with the Soviet leaders; they are not psychologically confident enough to engage at the philosophical level as the Chinese do; in particular, trying to debate rules of conduct becomes frustrating because of the gap in perceptions;³⁵

2. Concrete issues, however, are more easily resolved but only if they have been well prepared and the Soviets do not have to contend with surprises that have not been aired by the collective leadership;

3. Soviet leaders are quite sensitive to their personal treatment; they are particularly concerned over any slights reflecting the inferiority of the USSR.

4. Meeting the "people" is of little interest to the Soviets. Their preoccupation is with those who have the power of decision (this, incidentally, is why Congressional delegations do so poorly in the USSR);

5. There is no basis for "personal trust"; the Soviet system breeds power struggles; it is unlikely they would trust foreigners if they do not trust their own colleagues; expecting western leaders to act against their class or national interest would subject a Soviet leader to ridicule, if not worse, in the politburo;

³³ See footnote 5, Document 2.

³⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 171–174.

³⁵ In the right-hand margin next to this point and the next six points, the President placed a checkmark.

6. Talks, that is conversation, mean little compared to the reassurance found in written documents and precise obligations; that is one reason why communiqués and joint principles and treaties have more importance in the USSR than in other diplomatic exchanges; but the “spirit” of a document is virtually non-existent;

7. The main value to Western leaders may be simply to get some feel for the mind set of the Soviets and their mode of reasoning. The top Soviet leaders do in fact have extraordinary power and will make decisions. But they have no great incentive to make concessions and thereby expose themselves politically. Negotiations therefore take place within a pre-defined framework, and on any issue it is important for the Soviets to point to the precise concession they extracted in the bargaining.

[Omitted here is a 2-page profile of Brezhnev.]

121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)¹

Washington, July 13, 1979

SUBJECT

The Next 18 Months

I ASSUME:

—terrific bind on resources, —state budget (cut for FY 80 by 5% yesterday), AID, FMS, ESF, etc., plus SALT military and energy.

—very tough political environment for Carter—possible squeaks or losses in early primaries, overwhelming emphasis by White House on election related policies both domestic and foreign (Kirby² tells me

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director: Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298: Box 18, Next Eighteen Months 8/9/79–9/10/79. Confidential. Copies were sent to Lissakers and Berger. Kreisberg added the “from” line by hand. In the top-right hand corner of the memorandum, Lake wrote: “Ed—Hold for this PM. TL.” Presumable reference to Edward O’Donnell, Lake’s Special Assistant. Kreisberg drafted the memorandum as part of a larger project coordinated by Lake and Tarnoff to provide Vance with recommendations designed to structure and define the remainder of Vance’s time as Secretary. Lake and Tarnoff submitted their recommendations to Vance in an August 9 memorandum, Document 123.

² Presumable reference to Policy Planning Staff member William Kirby, Jr.

this is clearly evident already in Bob Strauss's approach to Middle East negotiations).³

—SALT treaty passes the Senate—for if it doesn't, Vance will be spending all his time mending the Soviet fences and our allied wells.

THIS MEANS:

—even less likely Carter or Vance should want to take on major *new* initiatives. We've assumed that all along. It is simply underlined triply now.

—programs that may *cost* money or imply new outlays are not going anywhere unless they are strictly in support of what we're already doing and of the highest priority (e.g., Vance's approval of another \$60 million in PL-480 for Egypt without even waiting to see what other claimants may be or even what our resource base for the PL-480 pie is likely to be).

—Vance is going to have to spend a lot more time SELLING our foreign policy domestically; the President doesn't have too much to sell on domestic economic policy.⁴

—foreign policy credibility of the US administration—always uncertain during an election year in terms of our ability to commit and deliver on new policies—is going to be lower than we've seen it since Watergate. This means hesitation by allies and others to be strongly supportive of US initiatives which may not have bipartisan support inside this country and their own.

I SUGGEST, THEREFORE:

—that Vance focus particularly on defending and articulating what we've done;⁵

—that he concentrate on strengthening existing policy areas where they are sagging and where we may suffer losses;

—Central America⁶

—non-proliferation

—relations with Allies

—relations with energy producing states, Middle East and elsewhere

³ Strauss resigned as Special Representative for Trade Negotiations on August 8. Earlier in 1979, the President appointed Strauss as Ambassador at Large for the Middle East negotiations. Resigning from his Special Representative position allowed Strauss to focus more attention on the Middle East.

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this point, Lake placed a checkmark and an asterisk.

⁵ In the left-hand margin next to this and the following points, Lake placed a checkmark.

⁶ In the left-hand margin next to this and the next three points, Lake placed a checkmark. He also deleted a dash placed erroneously before "Middle East."

—and above all, ensuring we do not suffer visible setbacks in 1980.⁷

—that he intensify his involvement in pressing Congress and the White House for the indispensable minimum resources we need. With a recession and countervailing claims all over the domestic economy and from Defense, that will be something he's going to have to spend much more time on than he has previously.⁸

—that he *not* devote excessive amounts of his time to North-South issues. Not because they may not be important but because in the domestic environment of 1980 that is not where people are going to be looking, EXCEPT where active US involvement is necessary in order to prevent a grave and visible deterioration.⁹

—that to the extent he becomes involved in new issues—long-term debt relief for LDCs, energy development in non-OPEC LDCs, etc.—these be clearly tagged as issues for the next term but for which ground needs to be laid, etc.¹⁰

Paul H. Kreisberg¹¹

⁷ In the left-hand margin next to this point, Lake placed a question mark.

⁸ Lake placed a vertical line in the margin to the left of this point and added a checkmark and asterisk.

⁹ Lake placed a vertical line in the margin to the left of this point and wrote “[unclear] and rebut.”

¹⁰ Lake placed a vertical line in the margin to the left of this point and added two checkmarks.

¹¹ Kreisberg signed “Paul” above his typed signature.

122. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 2, 1979

SUBJECT

Four year Goals Revisited²

On the basis of a very hurried survey of the goals material you gave me today, I conclude:

1. The Administration's impressive accomplishments in foreign policy look much less impressive when compared with the goals the Administration set for itself in 1977.³ This is due not to a paucity of achievement but rather to the scope and magnitude of the goals. A dramatic example of this is Arab-Israeli relations, where the Administration obviously scored a major triumph at Camp David, but which does not produce a very good rating when compared to the goal of a comprehensive peace settlement including Palestinians and with Saudi involvement and backing. As a consequence of this phenomenon, however, it clearly would not be desirable to use the April 1977 goals statement⁴ in any public presentation of the Administration's foreign policy record.

2. The 1977 goals do make for some interesting reading now as a reflection of the dominant approaches to foreign policy at the start of the Administration. Despite the fact that this statement was primarily the work of you and me, it is still striking to me now to see the important role in it of the foreign policy approach which you labeled "Liberal 2" in your January 1978 report.⁵ In this connection, it might be useful to do a think piece for purely internal consumption on why it was the Administration was so successful in achieving its goals in some areas (e.g., China) and unsuccessful in others (e.g., Africa). I suspect such an analysis would relate success and failure to the extent to which the goals were based on realistic assumptions concerning the hard power politics of the situation. While I won't give it a high priority, if you're

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 63, Goals: Four Year Foreign Policy Goals—1980 Review: 8/79–10/80. No classification marking. Sent for information. Huntington left the National Security Council Staff in August 1978 and returned to Harvard University, where he served as Director of the university's Center for International Affairs.

² Huntington added "Four year" to the subject line by hand.

³ Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴ See Document 36.

⁵ See Document 62.

agreeable, I may at some point try to undertake such an interpretive re-evaluation.⁶

Attached at Tab A is a topical outline of the goals statement with my judgments as to how well the Administration has done so far in achieving the goals it set out for itself. In many areas, my knowledge of the detailed specifics of these actions is rather limited, and here I have simply put a question mark. In other cases, I've made guesses that may or may not be very well informed. Performance is graded on a scale of zero to ten, with the latter meaning achievement of all goals set forth in the paper. In arriving at these ratings, I have also made some qualitative judgments about the relative importance of specific goals within each topic.

Obviously, I could go around and get a much more accurate read-out of how well we've done by talking with the NSC specialists in each area, but I have doubts as to whether that would really produce a great deal more that was useful.

Tab A

Outline Prepared by Samuel P. Huntington⁷

Washington, undated

FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, AUGUST 1979

1. Relations with Advanced Industrial Democracies
 - A. Political coordination — 8
 - B. Cooperation with Europe — 3
 - C. Cooperation with Japan — 4
 - D. Economic cooperation — 5
 - E. Recovery — 2
 - F. Finance — ?
 - G. Investment — 0?
 - H. Trade — 9
2. Relations with Emerging Regional "Influentials"
 - A. General steps — 8
 - B. Venezuela — 8
 - C. Brazil — 2?
 - D. Nigeria — 6?

⁶ Brzezinski underlined the word "interpretive," placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence, and wrote "OK."

⁷ Secret.

| | | |
|---|---|----|
| E. Saudi Arabia | — | 5 |
| F. Iran | — | 6 |
| G. India | — | 8 |
| H. Indonesia | — | 7? |
| 3. North-South Relations | | |
| A. Political Relations | — | 2 |
| B. Economic relations | — | 6? |
| C. Relations with specific countries | | |
| (1) Panama Canal | — | 10 |
| (2) Cuba | — | 1 |
| 4. Relations with Soviet Union and Its Allies | | |
| A. Arms Control | — | 3 |
| B. Political and economic issues (Eastern Europe) | — | 8 |
| C. Social issues | — | 8 |
| 5. Relations with China | — | 9 |
| 6. The Middle East | | |
| A. Arab-Israeli conflict | — | 3 |
| B. Trade and development | — | 6 |
| C. Persian Gulf | — | 4 |
| 7. Africa | | |
| A. South Africa | | |
| (1) Zimbabwe | — | 3 |
| (2) Namibia | — | 1 |
| (3) South Africa | — | 2 |
| B. Communist state presence | — | 1 |
| 8. Arms Control | | |
| A. Conventional arms transfer | — | 6 |
| B. Nuclear proliferation | — | 8 |
| C. CTB | — | 0 |
| 9. Human Rights | | |
| A. Multilateral action | — | 6 |
| B. Bilateral relations | — | 9 |
| C. Unilateral action | — | 7 |
| 10. Defense | | |
| A. Defense posture | — | 2 |
| B. Defense management | — | 5? |
| C. NATO | — | 7 |
| D. East Asia | — | 8 |

123. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Next Eighteen Months

In thinking about this exercise,² we began by looking back at your December memorandum to the President.³ The most impressive fact that emerges from such a review is the extraordinary progress made since then on the “big issues”: SALT, China legislation, MTN, and the Middle East. You wrote to the President that success on three of the four would be historic. Specific goals on all four were met.⁴

As we thought about how you will allocate your time in the next eighteen months, we tried to identify ongoing issues which will continue to require your attention, to subjects that you might want to leave primarily to others in the Department, and new areas of concentration.

We start with the premise that, after your UNGA period in New York, and especially after SALT is ratified (an increasingly likely prospect for the fall), you will have the opportunity to decide how to use a dividend of unallocated time. Unless you give some clear signals on how you expect to use this time, the bureaucracy naturally will try to

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980: Lot 84D241, Goals and Objectives 1979. Secret; Eyes Only. Tarnoff initialed for Lake.

² Tarnoff solicited input for the memorandum from all regional and functional assistant secretaries. According to several of the submissions, Tarnoff requested this support in an August 2 memorandum. Although this memorandum has not been found, copies of the bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to/from Tarnoff/Wisner/Perry. Tarnoff sent copies of these submissions, which included Vance’s marginal comments and notations, to Christopher, Newsom, Read, and Lake under an August 29 memorandum. (Ibid.) The Bureau of Public Affairs did not submit a memorandum at this time, but Dyess did send Christopher a memorandum, August 14, entitled “Priority Policy Issues for Public Affairs,” which Christopher noted. Lake sent another copy of the August 14 memorandum to Christopher under an October 12 memorandum in advance of a meeting with the PA Bureau leadership. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director: Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 18, Next Eighteen Months—Mtgs. w A/S) Additional documentation on follow-up efforts concerning the exercise are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to/from Tarnoff/Wisner/Perry.

³ See Document 107.

⁴ Vance placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

fill the vacuum with issues that are not necessarily worth your own attention.

Since you have announced your intention not to serve in the second Carter Administration, you need more than ever to show a command of the important continuing issues as well as an energetic approach to new areas, so as not to be perceived, in the final months, as a lame duck.⁵

We do not suggest that the coming months will provide fertile ground for dramatic new successes. There isn't much money available—indeed, we will be fighting to avoid real cuts in our foreign policy resources. And the domestic political climate as we head into the election is obviously difficult.

We do believe, however, that you can be extremely effective in a number of areas in which you can leave a lasting imprint, by defining new substantive longer-term goals, influencing public opinion, or strengthening the institutions of your office and this building.⁶

I. Priority Old Issues.

In this category are issues that have, from the beginning, represented cornerstones of the Administration's foreign policies. Your active involvement is needed in each case either to build on a partial success or to keep the pressure up on finding solutions. In certain cases, your presence is necessary so that other agencies or other advisors do not counsel the President in ways that could lead to dramatic policy reversals or sharp increases in international tensions.

A. Middle East: No issue continues to present more difficulties and dangers.⁷ Clearly your involvement is crucial even with Strauss's appointment.⁸ We are concerned that the U.S. is moving in the direction of dealing with the Palestinians without adequate study of the effect of such moves on: Israeli flexibility on the West Bank/Gaza; Israeli doubts about the U.S. at a time that a change in government may be near in Jerusalem; and the 1980 Presidential candidates who may polarize this emotional issue within the U.S.

⁵ Vance underlined "you need more than ever to show a command of the important continuing issues as well as an energetic approach to new areas," and wrote "I agree" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. En route from the Middle East to Rome on May 27, Vance informed reporters that he would serve only one term as Secretary of State. According to *The New York Times*, Vance asserted: "After four years in office, you get too tired, you lose freshness and imagination. After four years, you ought to get out and turn it over to someone else." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance Makes It Clear He Won't Stay On After 1980," May 29, 1979, p. A-2)

⁶ Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "by."

⁷ Vance placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this heading and sentence.

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 121.

Quite frankly, we doubt that we can both move closer to the Palestinians and exercise significant pressure on Israel to make progress in the autonomy negotiations or on Lebanon.⁹ If we have to choose—and we believe it necessary to do so, we favor the second objective over the first.

If we fail, a year or so hence, to have gained progress on the¹⁰ West Bank/Gaza, then we might want to move on the U.S.-Palestinian front for the sake of our Saudi and other ties. We do not think that now is the time.

B. *US/USSR/China Relations*: Given the differing conceptual views of the triangle, your own heavy involvement on such issues as MFN for the USSR and the PRC will remain important.¹¹ If SALT II fails, of course, your primary task will be to salvage what we can with the Soviets, not to mention the Allies. With the likelihood of a succession before 1981, it is especially important for you to be closely involved in the handling of the post-Brezhnev period.

C. *Arms Control, Post-SALT*: In terms of actual new agreements, we should be thinking about a push for CTB, since we will soon be entering the late 1979–1980 period of new non-proliferation activity you noted for the President.¹² If a full agreement is not possible, a fallback to agreement on principles might be useful.

An ASAT agreement might be reachable and, less likely, a RW agreement.¹³ Progress on CW is unlikely.

More important than these specific agreements will be base laying: for SALT III; with the Allies for TNF negotiations (immensely complicated; actual negotiations unlikely to move quickly; but very important in Allied context); and for MBFR progress, perhaps in 1981. Reg should also proceed on laying a new base for CAT.¹⁴

⁹ Vance drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "I want to talk about this." The opening of the autonomy talks, the next phase in the Middle East peace negotiations following the signing of the peace treaty in March, took place in Beersheva, Israel, May 25. (Bernard Gwertzman, "Egypt and Israel Open Negotiations At Beersheba on Palestinian Areas," *The New York Times*, May 26, 1979, p. 3)

¹⁰ An unknown hand placed brackets around this word.

¹¹ Vance underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "your" and added "I agree" in the left-hand margin next to it.

¹² Vance underlined "we should be thinking about a push for CTB," and wrote "ok" in left-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹³ Vance underlined most of this sentence and wrote "yes" in the left-hand margin next to it.

¹⁴ Vance underlined most of this paragraph. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote "all of these are important & potentially [unclear]." The TNF negotiations were scheduled to take place in December. "Reg" is a reference to Bartholomew.

D. *Relations with Allies*: Despite the absence of specific disagreements, our relations with major Allies (especially the Summit partners) are not strong. It is unfortunate but true that our key friends are slowly losing confidence in the Administration's ability to lead both domestically and internationally. You and Harold Brown are the only senior officials of the Administration whose standing remains high. The Governments in the U.K., Canada, France, Japan and probably the FRG are likely to be in place well beyond the 1980 U.S. elections; this fact gives them a certain over-confidence, not to say arrogance, in dealing with an Administration perceived to be in political trouble. Your time and attention on key issues between the U.S. and our Allies—TNF deployments, energy—is probably indispensable.¹⁵

E. *Southern Africa*: Your personal stature with the British, South Africans and key African players—as well as in the Congress and the American black community—is such that you will probably want to remain fully involved in both Namibia and Rhodesia.¹⁶ Additionally, our African policy could run into heavy weather in coming months. For you to distance yourself from the difficulties could be perceived by the Africans and much of the Third World as an abandonment of the one policy that most distinguished this Administration from its predecessors.

F. *Central America and Western Asia*: These areas are very different from each other except in one crucial¹⁷ respect: they will be the scene of crucial Administration decisions on how to manage change and a positive evolution, in terms of U.S. interests, of regimes that are repressive, weak, unrepresentative and pro-American.¹⁸ As you know, the Administration is deeply divided on this issue, and our policies have zig-zagged in every case. These developments are also a subject of domestic political interest.

II. *Old Issues to be Delegated.*

It is always difficult to step away from an important issue, especially when it has not been successfully resolved. If we recommend less of your involvement in these areas, it is because we believe that they

¹⁵ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "yes."

¹⁶ Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "is," placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to it, and wrote "yes."

¹⁷ An unknown hand placed brackets around this word and wrote "important" in the right-hand margin. Vance placed a checkmark above "important."

¹⁸ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "Correct. I will have to keep a close eye on these while delegating as much as possible."

could be competently handled by others—at least on a day to day basis—and that your time could be better spent elsewhere.

A. *Indochina and Refugees*: Dick Clark will handle refugees well although he will require some guidance and attention from you and Chris.¹⁹ Dick Holbrooke should continue to pursue ideas on how to get at the Kampuchea problem and further our excellent ties to ASEAN nations.²⁰ But prospects on Kampuchea are unpromising in the medium-term.

B. *Non-Proliferation*: We are approaching crucial decisions in this area with respect to South Africa and India/Pakistan. In addition, the NPT review/renegotiation conference will soon be on us.²¹ Given the cross-cutting political-scientific-strategic nature of the issues involved, we suggest that Chris be given oversight of the issue, including management of the various individual components—both geographic and functional.²²

C. *Northern Africa (Western Sahara)*: This area needs more effort by the Department. Dave Newsom and NEA should give greater priority to thinking through how we can do more for Hassan while encouraging him towards flexibility on the Saharan dispute.²³ Without the latter, the former is a prescription for growing longer-term difficulties in our relations with interested Arab and African nations (c.f., OAU resolution).²⁴ David should also oversee a review of our relations with Algeria.²⁵

¹⁹ Vance placed two parallel, vertical lines in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent sentence and wrote “OK.” Reference is to Christopher. In a statement on July 31 before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee, Vance provided background on the Indochinese refugee crisis and noted that the Carter administration had agreed to increase the admission of Indochinese refugees into the United States from 7,000 to 14,000 per month. The conflict between China and Vietnam, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, and human rights abuses all contributed to the refugee crisis. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, pp. 4–6)

²⁰ Vance underlined this sentence, placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to it, and wrote “yes.”

²¹ Scheduled for the spring of 1980.

²² Vance underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “suggest” and ending with “issue.” In the right-hand margin next to it, he wrote “yes.”

²³ Vance underlined this sentence. Reference is to the disputed territory of the Western Sahara. In the mid-1970s, Spain ceded control of the Western Sahara to both Morocco and Mauritania. The Frente Polisario opposed the claims of both states to the territory.

²⁴ At the July 17–20 Organization of African Unity summit in Monroeville, Liberia, delegates approved a resolution calling for a referendum in the Western Sahara. (Leon Dash, “African Leaders Adopt Compromise On Mideast Pact,” *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1979, p. A–13)

²⁵ Vance underlined this sentence. He also placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “ok” in the margin.

D. *Mexico*: Matt and Pete should continue to stay closely involved as Krueger takes over.²⁶ However, you or Chris may have to step in if, as is possible, domestic political considerations continue to be a key element in determining our policies toward Mexico.²⁷

E. *Korea*: We need to think through alternatives for improving the hostile political climate on the Peninsula if the tripartite talk idea²⁸ flounders. Holbrooke to manage.²⁹

F. *Japan*: Ohira is a strong and well-disposed leader, and we should find ways to keep up our consultations with the Japanese on a wide variety of issues. We must also convince the suspicious Japanese that our policies and attention are not Sinocentric. Holbrooke to manage.³⁰

G. *Africa North of the Zambezi*: You might ask Dick Moose and S/P to oversee analyses of our policy towards the Horn and Zaire. We are treading water in both areas, but we can foresee a dangerous drift, especially in Zaire, unless we and others increase the pressure for reform.³¹ We also need to keep an eye on relations with Nigeria, where we should plan to concentrate progress and resources in order to develop closer relations with the new civilian government.³²

H. *Human Rights*: Chris continues to manage this issue well although we still advocate a system which would give his committee oversight responsibility for both military and economic assistance pro-

²⁶ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "yes" in the margin. References are to Nimetz and Vaky. On June 22, the President announced that he would nominate former Representative Robert Krueger (D-Texas) as Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Mexican Affairs. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 1134-1135)

²⁷ Vance underlined most of this sentence, placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it, and wrote "yes."

²⁸ Presumable reference to the tripartite talks on the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula discussed by the President and Park during Carter's June 29-July 1 State visit to South Korea. (William Chapman and Edward Walsh, "U.S., Park to Propose Talks With North," *The Washington Post*, July 1, 1979, pp. A-1, A-29) Documentation on the State visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, volume XIV, Korea; Japan.

²⁹ Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote "6 party talks."

³⁰ Vance underlined this sentence and placed a checkmark next to it. In the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence, he wrote "we have built a good base & we must continue development."

³¹ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence. Next to it, he wrote "ok" and "Zaire is dangerous & difficult."

³² In mid-August, Shehu Shagari was elected Nigeria's first civilian President, marking the end of military rule.

grams.³³ This Administration should not let this term end without ratification of the genocide and other human rights conventions.³⁴

Chris might also want to initiate a review of the two years of experience that we have had in applying our human rights objectives to individual cases in order to derive a body of operating principles.³⁵

I. *Eastern Mediterranean*: Turkey ticks away as an issue which could explode. Considerable Congressional and public lobbying will be needed to keep our assistance levels high enough to pursue this important relationship. Chris and Matt to handle.³⁶

J. *India/Pakistan*: Apart from our nuclear proliferation concerns, the strategic and political stakes in the subcontinent are becoming more critical. Chris and Constable to handle.³⁷

K. *Poland*: Here the serious economic/financial situation, coupled with a call for Western assistance, give us a unique opportunity for influence with a key Eastern European government. We may have opportunities, through the international financial institutions, to help shape this socialist economy, including the level of Polish military spending. However, attempts to politicize our assistance, or put an anti-Soviet twist on it, will have to be resisted. Matt could manage.³⁸

L. *Foreign Assistance*: You might want to have Chris, Tony, Doug and Brian put together a strategy for our next foreign assistance submissions in what promises to be an extremely difficult political and resource climate.³⁹

III. *Issues Deserving More Attention*

A. *Public Statements and Appearances*: We are concerned that one result of the SALT debate and the political campaigns may be to narrow the focus of public discussions of foreign policy towards a preoccupa-

³³ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "yes." The committee reference is to the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, colloquially known as the "Christopher Group" or "Christopher Committee." Documentation on the establishment of the committee is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

³⁴ Vance underlined "genocide" and "other human rights conventions." In the right-hand margin, he wrote "I agree."

³⁵ Vance placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "yes."

³⁶ Vance underlined this sentence and wrote "ok" in the right-hand margin next to it.

³⁷ Vance underlined this sentence and, in the right-hand margin next to it, wrote: "Dave [Newsom] should be included." Reference is to Peter Constable.

³⁸ Vance underlined this sentence and, in the right-hand margin next to it, inserted a comma and added "with George [Vest]."

³⁹ Vance underlined "have Chris, Tony, Doug and Brian put together a strategy" and wrote "yes, *priorit*" in the left-hand margin. References are to Christopher, Lake, Bennet, and Atwood.

tion with Soviet actions and balances of power.⁴⁰ This is apparently one of the objects of Henry Kissinger's testimony.⁴¹ If this happens, the contributions of your recent speeches, especially the ones on North/South issues and political change, could be forgotten.⁴² During the next 18 months, we would urge you to be much more actively involved in speeches and TV appearances and press conferences to articulate the themes you have been developing recently.⁴³ Although you will not be making political speeches as such, you will be speaking authoritatively about the Administration's view of the world and the success or failures of U.S. policies. Because of the campaign atmosphere in this country, you will have an opportunity not only to define the Administration's policies but to lay the groundwork for what the President's second term could achieve in foreign affairs.

As one S/P staff member put it in a recent memo:

"Some sort of basic national post-Vietnam consensus on foreign policy must inevitably emerge, and I think the Secretary ought to make a major effort to shape it.⁴⁴ Secretary Vance has stored up a great deal of respect and credibility, both among sophisticates—the press, the bureaucracy, the Congress, and related academia—and, to the extent they have followed foreign policy, among the public. Those assets should be invested. There is probably no one who could have a greater public impact in addressing these issues in a sustained way at the conceptual level."

B. *Energy*: We are convinced that both the Department and you personally should play a more aggressive role on economic issues.⁴⁵ This is one area in which we would seriously fault the Department's performance. Energy is probably the most serious issue the nation faces. It is an international issue, yet the Administration's handling of

⁴⁰ Vance wrote "yes" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁴¹ Kissinger testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 31. He conditioned his support for the SALT treaty on the President's willingness to authorize an increase in military spending. *The New York Times* reported that Kissinger had "urged that the Senate attach to its resolution of ratification a statement of principles warning the Soviet Union that failure by it or by such allies as Cuba to exercise restraint around the world would 'seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process.'" (Charles Mohr, "Kissinger Suggests Senate Link Treaty to More Arms Funds: Proposes Other Conditions," August 1, 1979, pp. A-1, A-6)

⁴² Presumable reference to Vance's addresses before the Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging International Order (see Document 115) and the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges (see Document 118).

⁴³ Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "we" and, in the left-hand margin, wrote "ok."

⁴⁴ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "I would like to do this."

⁴⁵ Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote "yes."

the matter is primarily carried out in a domestic context. There is a vacuum here that the State Department ought to fill.

We suggest that you meet soon with Dick Cooper, EB and others to discuss how we can become more involved and what we should be pressing for in this area.⁴⁶ Attached is a list of proposals which might be explored for possible new initiatives.⁴⁷

C. *North/South Issues*: You have expressed an interest in spending more time on these issues. Your support, and speeches, have been very valuable for what progress we have made in the last two years; but you will have to spend more time in the bureaucratic arena, and in getting fully acquainted with the substance of these complex matters, to have the desired impact.

We have been more effective at setting broad directions than in obtaining practical movement. The recent fiasco on the liberalization of the Compensatory Finance Facility makes the point.

Budgets and politics make dramatic new North/South initiatives unthinkable. But as listed in previous memos, there are a number of specific issues on which progress may be possible (e.g., a bond guarantee scheme to increase LDC access to private credit and debt questions).⁴⁸ We are working on a contingency fund proposal as part of the FY'81 ESF budget. And we may want to suggest to you that Tom Ehrlich set up a working group, perhaps including SFRC and HFAC staffers, to work on a streamlined foreign aid bill, looking toward our FY'82 submission.⁴⁹ Church and Zablocki should be consulted first. This would lay the groundwork for Congressional action in 1981.

D. *Institutional Issues*: We would encourage you to make a conscious effort to upgrade the role and performance of the Department in the next eighteen months.⁵⁰ Thanks to your stature and standing with the President, the Department usually is involved in key policy decisions. However, participation by your top officials is often not institutionalized—it is only a result of your involvement on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis.⁵¹ When you leave, your successor may find that the Department's presence in the key decision-making processes is again

⁴⁶ Vance underlined this sentence, placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it, and wrote: "ok after Labor Day."

⁴⁷ Not printed is an undated, 1-page set of proposals entitled "Energy Initiatives."

⁴⁸ Vance underlined this sentence.

⁴⁹ Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote "interesting."

⁵⁰ Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote "yes."

⁵¹ Vance underlined the portion of this sentence from the beginning and concluding with "institutionalized."

open to question, even challenge.⁵² Specific problems: (1) Outside the Department, you still are not adequately a part of the decision-making process in the intelligence field (sensitive collection and covert actions) or in the strategic policy (witness Phil Odeen's study). Anything more that you can do to inform key Department personnel, on a thorough and systematic basis, of meetings that you hold outside of the Department (examples: on the Hill, with Stan Turner) would enable the bureaucracy to serve you better.⁵³ Similarly, more should probably be done to find ways to have senior Department officers accompany you to key meetings.⁵⁴ If they are with you when decisions are debated, their roles at working levels in the inter-agency process are enhanced. (2) Inside the Department, you may want to consider weekly meetings on new subjects of interest to you, such as energy and North/South relations.⁵⁵ If you had agendas and brief papers prepared for these meetings, you would thereby force the Department's attention to these areas in a decisive way.

E. *The Foreign Service*: The new Foreign Service Act is likely to pass, and this measure will result in a more productive and more professional corps.⁵⁶ There are, however, additional ways for you to strengthen the performance of the career service in the months to come. Appointing the most promising FSO's, with years of service before them, to key policy positions in the Department is one way to promote excellence and continuity.⁵⁷ Authorizing "stretch assignments" for out-

⁵² Vance underlined most of this sentence.

⁵³ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the previous sentence and wrote "you are right."

⁵⁴ Vance placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "you are probably right."

⁵⁵ Vance placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "yes."

⁵⁶ On June 21, Vance testified before a joint hearing of subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and Post Office and Civil Service Committees on the administration's proposed Foreign Service reform legislation. (Kathy Sawyer, "Vance Unveils Proposals To Alter Foreign Service" *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1979, p. A-3) On June 28, Fascell introduced the Foreign Service Act of 1979 (H.R. 4674), which was referred to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. On July 9, Church introduced the Senate version of the bill (S. 1450), which was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Neither bill made it out of the respective committees. In March 1980, Fascell re-introduced the legislation in the House (H.R. 6790). The legislation, with amendments, passed the House and Senate in September; the House and Senate both adopted the conference report in late September-early October. The President signed the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465) into law on October 17. The act eliminated the Foreign Service Reserve category, established a Foreign Service "bill of rights," created a new Senior Foreign Service, and outlined new pay guidelines. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, p. 93)

⁵⁷ Vance underlined this sentence. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote "yes."

standing middle-grade officers is another way.⁵⁸ At the same time, the senior officers who are being encouraged to leave the Service should be treated with greater consideration, and your willingness to hold a reception for them next month is a step in that direction.⁵⁹ Finally, schedule permitting, we recommend finding some opportunities in coming months for you to appear occasionally before groups of FSO's (e.g., the Open Forum). Such appearances would not only give the career professionals a better sense of the man whom they work for, it would also be an expression of interest on your part in a dialogue with a broader spectrum of career officers.⁶⁰

F. *Multilateral Diplomacy*: A recent Chicago CFR poll shows a significant decline among elite groups for the UN. More broadly, a growing mood of nationalism undermines popular support for multilateral diplomacy and multilateral assistance. On the other hand, we are doing more of our diplomatic and economic business through multilateral groups and organizations. More thought needs to be devoted to revitalizing multilateral organizations.⁶¹ Sometimes, multilateral diplomacy works best outside the framework of established international organizations. For you to review the international structures available to us, and recommend how the U.S. can use them best, could be a valuable service to this and succeeding Administrations.

⁵⁸ Vance underlined this sentence. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote "yes." A stretch assignment allows a Foreign Service officer at a lower grade to be paneled into a higher grade position without requiring a promotion to the higher grade.

⁵⁹ Vance underlined most of this sentence. He placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to it and wrote "yes."

⁶⁰ In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Vance wrote "There aren't that many hours in the day unfortunately."

⁶¹ Vance underlined this sentence. In the left-hand margin next to it, he wrote "S/P to look at this—perhaps with outside consultants."

**124. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State
(Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

The Next 18 Months

We are in a new period.

There will be no more foreign policy extravaganzas requiring long planning and negotiation, sustained Presidential involvement, and extensive Congressional debate (such as the Panama Canal Treaties, China normalization, and SALT). Thus, before discussing the ten goals, I want to describe some of the constraints of the new context in which we will be operating in the remainder of the Term.

(a) The time is short, more like a year than 18 months. In the immediate future, the focus will be on SALT. If SALT is approved by Thanksgiving, that leaves less than a year until the 1980 Presidential elections.

(b) Priority for domestic issues will preclude the President's personal involvement in foreign policy initiatives requiring a major commitment of his time. Existing commitments (e.g., Middle East negotiations), the day-to-day flow of foreign "crises", and unavoidable state visits will continue to occupy an important place on the President's calendar, but he will not be able to make substantial time for new initiatives. And probably he shouldn't. It is also realistic to note that the President does not have a large store of political capital that he can draw on to manage foreign policy initiatives.

(c) After SALT, the Congress will be unable to give foreign policy issues the major chunks of time which it has given such issues in the first three years. Of course, Congress will spend a substantial amount of time in 1980 dealing with unavoidable foreign policy items (such as trade agreements and appropriations), but in the main the Congress will want to spend its time focusing on energy and the economy. And probably it should.

(d) Our goals will be constricted by election year politics. This does not mean that we should step back from projects which are in the national interest, but we must recognize that our ability to initiate and accomplish must reckon with political factors. The President's political

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980: Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memoranda to the Secretary—1979. Secret. There is no indication that Vance saw the memorandum. An unknown hand placed a checkmark in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

advisers will naturally want to avoid foreign policy actions which would be unpopular with segments of the electorate. In addition, with the long stream of primaries, we can expect even ephemeral issues to be stridently debated in public.

We may be able to overcome the foregoing constraints in specific instances, but they will provide the overall context. In that context, the following are ten points for emphasis in the last 18 months.

1. *Latin America*. An unusual opening for progress in Latin American relations is provided by the Panama Canal Treaties, our role in the removal of Somoza,² and our human rights policy. Systematic attention by you and others on the 7th Floor to Latin America can pay big dividends, and can be done without cutting across the constraints outlined above.

(a) *Andean Countries*. The opening is especially important with respect to the Andean countries. Their democratic leanings make us natural allies on many problems. We should consult more with them, learn from them, and seek to make common cause with them in approaching the hemisphere's problems.

(b) *Brazil*. The new Figueredo regime affords an opportunity to put our relations on a sound and friendly footing.³ We started off on the wrong foot with Brazil but they have recently shown signs that they are ready for a closer relationship. We should begin to consult with them not primarily on bilateral matters, but on regional and global issues, treating them as the equals that they may some day be. Sometime during this period, I would like to consider making a trip to Brazil, which, if it went well, might be seen in contrast to the trip I made at the very beginning of the Administration, carrying the rather heavy non-proliferation message.⁴

(c) *Mexico*. We have had a roller-coaster relationship with Mexico, with more downs than ups. The US-Mexican Coordinator gives us a mechanism to try to smooth out the relationship.⁵ It is however a rather awkward mechanism which will work only if it has support at the highest levels. You have devoted considerable time to Mexican relations, but some of that investment was lost when Roel was replaced.⁶

² In July, the State Department demanded that Somoza, who had fled to Miami from Nicaragua after his resignation, persuade the acting Nicaraguan President to step down or Somoza could not stay in the United States. Somoza left Miami, eventually taking refuge in Paraguay. (Wayne King, "Somoza Is Planning A Foreign Trip Soon From Exile in Miami," *The New York Times*, July 20, 1979, p. A-4)

³ Figueredo succeeded Geisel as President of Brazil in March 1979.

⁴ In early March 1977, Christopher participated in high-level talks with Brazilian officials regarding nuclear energy issues. The talks concluded after 1 day. (Bruce Handler, "Nuclear Talks in Brazil End Abruptly," *The Washington Post*, March 3, 1977, pp. A-1, A-16)

⁵ See footnote 26, Document 123.

⁶ On May 16, Lopez-Portillo replaced Foreign Secretary Santiago Roel Garcia with Jorge Castaneda. Lopez-Portillo also replaced the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Budget and Planning. (Alan Riding, "President of Mexico Shuffles His Cabinet On Eve of Castro Visit," *The New York Times*, May 17, 1979, p. A-13)

We should work especially hard to prevent the border from continuing as a source of friction. The domestic political overtones of anything we do vis-a-vis Mexico will have to be assessed with special care.

(d) *Caribbean*. Substantial effort should be devoted to following up on Phil Habib's analysis and discussions regarding the Caribbean.⁷ To do so, we will have to challenge the prevailing wisdom that aid to the Caribbean must be taken "out" of the aid funds for Latin America as a whole. I am not reluctant to argue that it is in our national interest for us to put a disproportionate amount of our aid resources into development of countries in the western hemisphere.

2. *The Genocide Treaty*. Human rights will be one of the hallmarks of this Administration. However, some are beginning to suggest (wrongly, I think) that the human rights initiative has run out of steam and that the Administration is trimming its sails. A decisive counter to this insinuation would be a strong Administration effort to ratify the Genocide Convention, which was first submitted to the Senate thirty years ago. While requiring some Presidential and Senatorial time, this goal could be within reach after the SALT debate. I recommend that we make it one of the highest foreign policy objectives for 1980. If we succeed, we could then turn to the other human rights conventions.⁸

3. *Indochina*. Our interests have been served well by our policies in the PRC/Vietnamese conflict and Cambodian debacle. Recent developments, however, may require a more aggressive role during the next 18 months. We may have to take the lead in mounting initiatives regarding the famine in Cambodia, the Vietnamese security threat to ASEAN nations and the possibility of renewed PRC/Vietnamese military conflict.

4. *South Asia*. The instability and uncertainties in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan provide great opportunities for creative diplomacy. In India, we should move briskly with the new administration to avoid slipping back to the pre-Desai attitudes.⁹ Pakistan presents a striking challenge to our capacity to blend our non-proliferation policy with our other foreign policy objectives. In Afghanistan, we need to avoid over-eagerness which might rescue the Soviets from a major failure.

5. *North-South Dialogue*. Our generalized intention to give more attention to the North-South dialogue will require some specific initiatives. I understand that Tony Lake is developing and scrubbing a list of possible approaches. We should meet on this subject sometime during

⁷ Habib had served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until 1978. Vance later asked Habib to serve as an Ambassador at Large and "troubleshooter" on various regional issues, including the Caribbean. (John M. Goskho, "Caribbean Ministates New Source of Concern," *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1979, pp. A-1, A-10)

⁸ The Senate did not ratify the Genocide Convention until 1988.

⁹ Desai resigned as Prime Minister in July, and Chaudhary Charan Singh became Prime Minister.

the first three weeks of September, before you leave for the UN. Among the issues we should consider is how to develop a better forum for the North-South dialogue. The UN Committee of the Whole is plainly not an optimum mechanism.

6. *Foreign Service Reform.* The enactment of the Foreign Service legislation should be one of our highest priorities.¹⁰ It will not require much time on the floor of the Senate or the House, and does not impinge on the other restraints set forth at the beginning of this memorandum.

7. *Trade Agreements with the PRC and Soviet Union.* The approval of these trade agreements should be one of our principal legislative goals for 1980. To gain this approval, especially in the Soviet case, will require a mobilization of business support as well as sensitive dealings with the interests groups. Once approved, we should give a strong impetus to the implementation of the agreements.

8. *A Non-Isolationist Energy Policy.* Our evolving energy policy has some “Fortress America” overtones. One of our responsibilities in the next 18 months is to ensure that we do not isolate ourselves on this issue. One way to do this—and a way that could have great substantive benefits as well—would be to explore fully the possibilities of joint development of the tar sands in Canada and Venezuela. There is wide agreement that these tar sands deposits are an enormous source of potential energy which could be developed if sufficient capital is made available from governmental sources. We should make sure that our new energy legislation is flexible enough to permit such joint development.

9. *Normalizing Diplomatic Relations.* The United States had less-than-normal relations with 13 countries when we came into office. We now have reduced that to 10 countries: Albania, Angola, Cuba (Interests Section), Equatorial Guinea, Kampuchea, Iraq (Interests Section), North Korea, South Yemen, Vietnam, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. We should improve this record during the last 18 months, asking ourselves in each instance whether a continuation of the current anomaly serves any national interest. Normalization in some instances may prove to be politically impossible, either from a domestic or international standpoint. However, there are other instances where we can make progress without impinging on any of the constraints set forth at the beginning of this memorandum. Vietnam will be one of the most difficult, but also one of the most important. Progress in our relations with all three African countries on the list would seem a reachable goal. An end to the isolation of Rhodesia would be especially welcome.

¹⁰ See footnote 56, Document 123.

10. *A Comprehensive Middle East Settlement*. No list of goals would be complete without this reference, but there is no need to elaborate.

Finally, a postscript about your own activities. I firmly believe that you should increase your contacts with the American public in the forthcoming period. This would mean more speeches in the U.S., and fewer Congressional appearances (where your statements do not get the attention they deserve). It would mean more U.S. television appearances, which should be undertaken even if it means cutting something else out.

In such speeches and appearances, I urge that you relax your discipline and discuss your philosophy and concept of American security and foreign policy. It would be good for the American people to hear it. And it would be helpful to the President.

125. Editorial Note

On September 7, 1979, President Jimmy Carter spoke to reporters assembled in the Old Executive Office Building. The President addressed the administration's attempts to modernize the United States' "strategic triad," consisting of air, land, and sea defenses. He noted that the fixed, land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system was increasingly vulnerable to attack. Earlier, on June 8, White House Deputy Press Secretary Rex Granum announced that the President had agreed to pursue development and deployment of "full-scale," mobile ICBMs, known as MX. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, page 1016*) During the September 7 briefing, Carter referenced this decision, indicating that he had done so to ensure a "strategic deterrent," and elaborated:

"The MX will enable us to continue with a modernized, unsurpassed, survivable strategic deterrent ICBM, submarine-launched, and heavy bomber triad, armed with cruise missiles. Clearly, the way we base the MX to enhance its own security from attack is vital to the ability it has to defend our country."

"At the time that I made the decision to build the MX, I established five essential criteria which the basing system would have to meet. First, it must contribute to the ability of the strategic forces to survive an attack. Second, it must be verifiable so as to set a standard which can serve as a precedent for the verifiability of mobile ICBM systems on both sides. Third, it must minimize the adverse impact on our own environment. Fourth, its deployment must be at a reasonable cost to the

American taxpayer. And fifth, it must be consistent with existing SALT agreements and with our SALT III goal of negotiating for significant mutual reductions in strategic forces.”

The President provided additional details as to the configuration of the MX system and then outlined how the configuration met the essential criteria. He concluded his remarks, noting:

“Unhappily, we do not yet live in the kind of world that permits us to devote all our resources to the works of peace. And as President, I have no higher duty than to ensure that the security of the United States will be protected beyond doubt. As long as the threat of war persists, we will do what we must to deter that threat to our Nation’s security. If SALT II is ratified and SALT III is successful, then the time may come when no President will have to make this kind of decision again and the MX system will be the last weapon system of such enormous destructive power that we will ever have to build. I fervently pray for that time, but until it comes, we will build what we must, even as we continue to work for mutual restraint in strategic armaments.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pages 1599–1601*)

At 2:35 that afternoon, the President took part in an interview and question-and-answer session with reporters. The interview took place in the Cabinet Room in the White House. The President began the session by stating:

“This is an interesting day for you to be in Washington. We have, as usual, an accumulation of both domestic and foreign issues to be addressed by me and by my associates, with whom you’ve met already.

“It is a coincidence that we have already had a major announcement on the deployment of the MX missile in a mobile form this morning, and in just a few minutes, about 4 o’clock, I will make a statement to the Nation concerning Soviet troops in Cuba.”

The President highlighted a variety of domestic issues and then answered questions from the assembled reporters. In response to a question about Soviet and American postures regarding defense, the President asserted:

“When I assess in my own mind the trends in Soviet influence the last 10 or 15 years, say—just to get out of my own administration and to make it a bipartisan thing—versus the Soviet Union, I’m very encouraged.

“The Soviets did win an advantage in Afghanistan. That Soviet-endorsed government is in substantial danger, and that’s significant. But when you compare that with our new relationship with India, compared to what it was 5 years ago, or our new relationship with Egypt, the strongest and most powerful Arab country, compared to what it was during the time of the Aswan Dam construction when Egypt was

absolutely committed to the Soviet Union and was dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid, and now are completely friends with us and have prohibited Soviet technicians and others from coming into the country—that's a major change in the Mideast itself.

"The People's Republic of China, a fourth of the people on Earth—it wasn't long ago that they were endorsed and supported by and were the closest of allies with the Soviet Union. Now, we have a new and burgeoning friendship with the people of the People's Republic of China, and we have not lost our financial and economic and friendly relationships with the people on Taiwan.

"I could continue to go on, but those are major countries. There have also, obviously, been some setbacks. I don't deny that.

"I think that the present commitment that I have given to defense has reversed a longstanding trend. For 15 years, our country was making no real increase in defense expenditures. In fact, when I came into office, our real commitment to defense was less than it was in 1963. This year, the current fiscal year, we have accommodated all the impact of inflation, and we have at least a 3-percent growth in defense expenditures.

I think we have restrengthened NATO, which was very weak, not only militarily but politically. There's a new spirit and a new dynamism and a new cooperation in NATO that did not exist before.

"On strategic weapons systems, if you take our sea-based missiles and you assess the dramatic progress being made with the Trident submarines and the new Trident missiles, that's a quantum step forward. "The air-breathing leg of our triad, with the new generations of cruise missiles coming along—that's a major technological and strategic breakthrough. And with the MX missile that I announced this morning on land-based, silo-type missiles—this is the first time that we have ever seen a single missile acquire such a tremendous importance, and it not only gives our country a better defense or attack capability, it also contributes to stability because you've got a lot more defense with a lot fewer missiles.

"So, I think that if you look at other factors—our espousing human rights, the economic strength of our country, our overall trade relationships—in almost every measure, I do not see our country as being affected detrimentally, as contrasted with the Soviet Union.

"We recognize that they are a military nation; they put a lot more emphasis on military weaponry than do we. And we are much more inclined to support the status quo, to put down regional conflagrations and conflicts than are the Soviet Union. They espouse a revolutionary political thesis and, to them, the change of governments, quite often, is in their advantage. We, generally, are inclined to support the gov-

ernment that is in power, unless it is so obnoxious to our own standards and principles that we cannot accept it.

“So, the Soviets are inclined to stir up trouble; we’re inclined to try to dampen trouble and to provide peace. That’s one thing that gives them an advantage when there is trouble. But I think we have stood up well against them, and I think we can continue to do it in the future on a peaceful, competitive basis. There’s no doubt in my mind that the ideals and the principles and the basic strengths of America can prevail and have prevailed.” (Ibid., pages 1607, 1611–1613)

At 4:15 p.m. that afternoon, in the Briefing Room at the White House, the President spoke to reporters concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. Earlier, at a September 5 press conference, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had asserted that this development “is a matter of serious concern.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, page 14) Carter referenced Vance’s remarks and added:

“We are confident about our ability to defend our country or any of our friends from external aggression. The issue posed is of a different nature. It involves the stationing of Soviet combat troops here in the Western Hemisphere, in a country which acts as a Soviet proxy in military adventures in other areas of the world, like Africa.

“We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns if the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, relations between our two countries will inevitably be adversely affected. We are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union, and we are consulting closely with the Congress.

“Let me emphasize that this is a sensitive issue that faces our Nation, all of us, and our Nation as a whole must respond not only with firmness and strength but also with calm and a sense of proportion.

“This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration. As Secretary Vance discusses this issue with Soviet representatives in the coming days, the Congress and the American people can help to ensure a successful outcome of these discussions and negotiations by preserving an atmosphere in which our diplomacy can work.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pages 1602–1603*)

126. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 13, 1979

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #109

1. *Opinion—Acquiescence vs. Assertiveness*

I think all of us in this Administration should think through two questions, which are both perplexing and troublesome:

1. Why is the public not giving this Administration, and particularly the President, due credit for genuinely substantive foreign policy accomplishments—accomplishments which no other Administration in recent years has matched in a comparable period of time?

2. Why is public opinion in the world at large, notably in allied countries, viewing this Administration as perhaps the most timid since World War II?

The easy answer to these questions is that the U.S. public is simply misinformed, because of the excessively critical and even prejudiced views of the Washington press corps; and that this jaundiced perspective, echoed by a mindless foreign press, then shaped the stereotypes with which we are now saddled.

There is doubtless some truth in that answer, and perhaps even a great deal of truth. However, it is certainly not the entire truth. I think that to find a more complete explanation one has to take a closer look at the increasingly pervasive feeling in the country and abroad that in the U.S.-Soviet relationship the Soviet side increasingly is the assertive party and the U.S. side is the more acquiescent. This is seen as true in terms of arms competition, though you are the first President in a decade and a half to reverse the trends; this is seen as especially true in terms of international behavior, particularly in relationship to the various trouble spots. For better or for worse, we were passive in Iran; the Soviets are far from passive in Afghanistan. We pursued a diplomatically amiable policy in Africa; the Soviets relied on Cuban arms, not without some effect. In Latin America, and particularly in Central America, revolutionary fervor is on the rise, and we have not been able to give those who want to rely on us a sense of security.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 6-9/79. Top Secret. The President wrote "Good. C" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

To be sure we have gained notable diplomatic successes—China normalization, India, and elsewhere—but these do not obviate the impression of assertiveness on the one side and acquiescence on the other—despite Soviet internal weaknesses, bureaucratic stagnation, and the dramatic drop in Soviet ideological appeal.

Moreover, those decisions which you took and which were not only the right decisions but the tough decisions—on such matters as China, the MX,² the defense budget, or even arms to Yemen³—have been interpreted as primarily motivated by the desire either to compensate for past weaknesses (e.g., Yemen vs. passivity on Ethiopia) or to obtain some other desired result (e.g., to obtain SALT ratification).

These perceptions, you and I know, are not correct—but they are part of the political reality which provides part of the answer to the two questions with which I opened. In addition, the neutron bomb debacle certainly did lasting damage in Europe⁴ and today much of the world is watching to see how we will behave on the Soviet/Cuban issue.

None of the above is designed to suggest that we should somehow adopt a reckless policy of confrontationism, nor is it meant to hint that our policy has been one of appeasement. But it is meant to suggest that both in tone and occasionally in substance, we have been excessively acquiescent,⁵ and that the country craves, and our national security needs, both a more assertive tone and a more assertive substance to our foreign policy. I believe that both for international reasons as well as for domestic political reasons you ought to *deliberately toughen both the tone and the substance of our foreign policy*. The country associates assertiveness with leadership, and the world at large expects American leadership insofar as the Soviet challenge is concerned. That challenge is real, and a recognition of it does not mean that we have to abandon such positive objectives as arms control and notably SALT II. We should be mature enough to be able to seek, all at the same time, SALT II; and more defense efforts; and pursue a more assertive foreign policy.

What would a more assertive foreign policy mean? As I said earlier, it does not mean confrontation or war. It does mean, however, the following:

1. We are now beginning to do what needs to be done in defense, but we should keep stressing that this is being done on its own merits

² See Document 125.

³ Documentation on military assistance to Yemen is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 73.

⁵ See Tab A. [Footnote in the original. Tab A, an undated memorandum, is attached but not printed.]

and is not simply a means of buying SALT. In doing more for defense, as you have done, we ought to stress publicly what you have often said privately: that this is your prime responsibility and that you are the first President in 15 years to reverse the downward trends.

2. Less hesitation in explicitly condemning Soviet/Cuban exploitation of Third World turbulence. This means occasionally a very tough-minded remark by you and your instructions to the Secretary of State, to me, and to others at least to echo or perhaps to go a touch beyond you. I have had no difficulty in selling SALT (ask Anne Wexler) in the context of a tough pitch. Thus toughening our rhetoric will not hurt SALT but probably help it, while projecting a firmer image. The French have a saying: "c'est le ton qui fait la chanson" (it's the tone that makes the song). And our tone has been somewhat opaque; at least, that is the way the country hears it, and what the country thinks it hears we have to recognize as part of our reality.

3. We should adopt a forceful policy of ostracizing Cuba, of maximizing Cuban economic difficulties by urging others to refrain from providing economic assistance, by sharing massively all our intelligence on Cuban activities and on the Soviet build-up of Cuban power-projection capability.

4. While our relationship with China has to stand on its own feet and we cannot use China merely as a "card" against the Soviet Union, the fact is that the U.S.-Chinese relationship does not operate in a vacuum. If the Soviets are insensitive to our concerns, we should go beyond your warnings and do some things in the Chinese-American relationship that they explicitly do not like. This means, at this stage, the transfer of genuinely sensitive technology to China and some consideration of a serious military dialogue with the Chinese. We need not decide now how far we go in this, but we do need to convey to the Soviets that their cynical use of the Cubans against us will be reciprocated in a manner that in some fashion is painful to them.

5. Radio Liberty/Voice of America should be instructed to step up their broadcasts to Soviet national minorities, notably the Moslems and Ukrainians. I see no reason why the Soviets should be free to agitate against us in Puerto Rico as well as throughout the world but we should somehow remain intimidated by the fact that Moscow is sensitive to the problem of its national minorities.

6. We should resume our talks with the Soviets on the issues that you raised with Brezhnev in Vienna: the need for reciprocal restraint.⁶ In so doing, we should not hesitate to convey to them that we are pre-

⁶ For documentation on the summit in Vienna, including records of the President's meetings with Brezhnev, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 199-208. Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty in Vienna on June 18.

pared to take steps they do not like, and after two and a half years of making that point we should actually take some such steps (as suggested above). Moreover, I really wonder whether State can convey credibly to the Soviets the proposition that we are prepared to retaliate.

7. There are also other things we could do—e.g., Afghanistan, etc.—but the above indicates a range of possible reactions.

I know that the above is going to trouble you, and perhaps even irritate you. However, the need to review our approach is now particularly timely because of the Cuban problem. I do not see the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba as posing a challenge of the 1962 type, and therefore I do not advocate extreme solutions for it. But failure to cope with it firmly can have the effect of vitiating your foreign accomplishments and conclusively stamping this Administration as weak, and that is why I feel that in general the time has come to adopt a more assertive posture.⁷

Adopting such a posture will require some specific decisions, thereby prodding those parts of the government which have contributed so much to the image of an acquiescent Administration. You may wish to use one of the Friday morning breakfasts to discuss this larger issue. We all want to follow as closely as possible the direction and the tone that you set, and now may be the moment for a review and for some appropriate signals.

Finally, there is no doubt in my mind that the country will rally behind the President as he responds firmly to a foreign challenge. Truman gained enormously from being perceived as tough and assertive—and undercutting a President engaged in a vigorous assertion of national security is usually seen as unpatriotic and divisive.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

⁷I also feel uneasy about how and with what determination the brigade issue is now being negotiated. Only last Tuesday we presented our position to the Soviets, indicating that the best outcome would be withdrawal, though hinting that perhaps some other outcome could eventually be considered; by Thursday the State Department was leaking that the Soviet force may be in fact on a training mission and suggesting that withdrawal was no longer an issue (see the authoritative leaks on Thursday morning in both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*), hardly a way of indicating to the Soviets that the issue is of grave concern to us and that we are approaching the matter with resolve! [Footnote in the original. Presumable references to Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Probes Soviet Unit's Role in Cuba," *The Washington Post*, pp. A-1, A-17 and Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Weighing View That Soviet Force is Training Cubans," *The New York Times*, pp. A-1, A-17, both September 13, 1979.]

127. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 21, 1979

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #110

1. *Opinion**The Parallel: 1961 but not 1962*

Most people think you are in a situation now which parallels that of Kennedy in 1962: the Cuban missile crisis. Accordingly, subconsciously (and in the case of politicians, expedientially) most people will compare the outcome, and you personally, to Kennedy's "success" in October–November 1962.

Yet the situation is really not analogous; we face a political challenge, and we cannot fully undo the reality we don't like, whereas in 1962 we faced a direct military challenge, and we could—through direct military pressure—undo it. Yet if the outcome in the end appears to be inadequate, most people will declare you as having been "defeated" and perhaps even blame you for both generating the problem (note what Javits said at the meeting) and then for being timid in responding to it.

In fact, you are facing a situation much more like that faced by Kennedy *in 1961*, when the Soviets suddenly put up the Berlin wall. That situation was "unacceptable," but we had no choice except to live with it. Kennedy was not prepared to knock it down. Neither are we prepared to create a military confrontation in order to get the Soviets to remove their troops from Cuba.

But Kennedy did something else also, and hence the foregoing argument *is not an unexpected plea from me for acquiescence*. Kennedy responded to this "unacceptable" situation, with which he had to live, by taking a number of steps designed to indicate to the public that he would assert U.S. interests, and if necessary, be prepared to use force. He sent additional troops to Berlin, and he put more emphasis on our overall defense efforts—in addition to adopting a very tough public posture on the Soviets. At the same time, he did not pretend—through some cosmetic formula—to have solved the problem.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 6–9/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President wrote "Zbig. C" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

I personally do not favor sending more troops to Guantanamo, because Guantanamo to most Latin Americans looks like an imperialist outpost from days gone by—and it tends to reinforce the legitimacy of the Soviet troop presence in Cuba. I do favor the other steps, which I have incorporated in your speech outline: more defense, more intelligence, some limited steps regarding China (because that actually does concern the Soviets and we have to do at least one thing that genuinely bothers them), and a more generally tough line on Soviet adventurism and disregard for our interests.²

We should do all of these things, even if the Soviets give us something on Cuba. The fact is that *they will not give us enough* to enable us to proclaim a victory, and, much more important, even if we did, I have not the slightest doubt that the public will not accept some cosmetic arrangement of relocation within Cuba as a Carter “victory.”

For the foregoing reasons, I would recommend:

1. That we start talking up the Berlin wall analogy;³
2. That we take the specific steps that I recommend in the speech outline, including at least one that genuinely hurts the Soviets;
3. That for the next several months at least we maintain a tough posture on the Soviets in our public pronouncements.⁴

What about SALT then? My view is that you will not get SALT ratified if the public thinks that we were timid on this issue. What I advocate above permits us also to argue that SALT is necessary for our national security, that it stands on its own feet, that it permits us to pursue a genuinely mature foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, which includes:

1. More defense
2. SALT ratification
3. Assertive competition.⁵

In the next few days you will be under considerable pressure to adopt a cosmetic solution and consider the case closed, or to exclude any response directed at the Soviet Union from our menu of responses—or both. In my judgment, such an outcome would be domes-

² The President addressed the nation regarding the Soviet brigade in Cuba on October 1; see Document 129. According to Brzezinski, the President had already, by the third week of September, decided to give such a speech “because national concern had greatly increased.” (*Power and Principle*, p. 349)

³ In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “You & Jody & State do so” and drew an arrow from it to the point.

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “ok.”

⁵ In the right-hand margin next to these points, the President wrote: “ok.”

tically politically self-defeating, and it will undermine the only basis for getting SALT ratification, namely public confidence in our firmness.⁶

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

⁶ The President underlined "public confidence in our firmness."

128. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 24, 1979

SUBJECT

A Proposal (U)

In the next fifteen months Americans will be primarily concerned with two inter-related problems: the US economy, and the US world role. This memorandum suggests that the time is ripe for major and mutually reinforcing initiatives which will set the tone for the Administration's handling of both these issues during the coming year. (C)

[Omitted here is information about the U.S. economy.]

II. US World Role

Since the late 1940s most Americans have believed that a strong US world role was essential to a peaceful world. And they have seen holding our own in competition with the USSR as an essential element of that role. I doubt most people are unduly excited about a few thousand Soviet soldiers in Cuba. But they are excited about what they see as a continuing Soviet attempt to exploit change in Third World areas; Cuba is only the latest example.² (C)

There is some analogy here to inflation: No one expects Soviet pressure in third areas to fade away quickly. But people do want some evidence that we are mounting a comprehensive effort to meet the So-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 16, Economic Assistance Strategy 6/78-9/79. Confidential. Sent for information. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. An attached note reads: "Donna—I guess ZB hand carried the attached package???? pb 9/25/79."

² The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "a" and ending with "areas."

viet challenge. As on the economic front, they want to see some light at the end of the tunnel. (C)

What is needed to meet this need is less specific immediate actions (which might look like gimmicks) than a basic change in emphasis, which will be reflected in a variety of actions over time. The Cuban problem could be the occasion for a speech spelling out that shift. You might recall that your Annapolis speech had said that the US was ready to respond to either competition or cooperation, depending on Soviet actions;³ after pointing out that the Soviets' actions since then have made clear that *their* main emphasis is on competition,⁴ you could indicate that we are ready to respond in kind: While we are still anxious to join in cooperation (SALT), where this serves both sides' interests, our main effort must be to make clear to the USSR that the competition they are forcing on us will be unrewarding. This means:

—Responding directly to Soviet pressures in Third World areas, e.g., by military aid to intended victims and, if requested by countries of the region concerned, by interdicting the movement of outside forces across national frontiers to intervene in local hostilities.⁵ (C)

—Trying to mitigate turbulence that lends itself to exploitation by the USSR and its proxies—e.g., by intensified efforts to reach a settlement in the Middle East and by providing *effective* aid (which doesn't necessarily mean more money) for economic development in troubled areas of the developing world. (C)

—Pushing ahead with the 3% real increase in defense expenditures.⁶ (C)

It also means (though you may not want to say this in your speech) counter-pressures on the USSR—e.g., not being deterred by Soviet concerns from feasible improvement in our relations with China. (C)

What is important, I repeat, is less specific measures, which will no doubt be modified or discarded as events evolve, but a general shift in emphasis: not a return to the cold war, but an adjustment of the balance between competition and cooperation in response to recent Soviet behavior. You would be signalling that we have read the Soviets' signal and are sending an equally clear one in return. We hope that it will be read; to the extent that the Soviets respond by shifting away from competition toward cooperation, we will be only too glad to do the same. (C)

³ See Document 87.

⁴ The President underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with "main" and ending with "competition."

⁵ The President underlined "by military aid to intended victims," "if requested," and "interdicting." In the left-hand margin next to this point, he wrote "war?"

⁶ The President placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.

All this will not get Soviet troops out of Cuba; I doubt anything will. But it will show the American people that we have drawn the proper conclusions from these troops' presence and other Soviet actions, and are taking steps to reflect these conclusions in the conduct of US-Soviet relations. (C)

Such a speech would be welcomed abroad. Last week in Paris, Art Hartman told me that the French are worried less about Cuba than by what they see as a generally assertive Soviet policy in Third World areas. They would welcome a firmer US response—a clear indication that we realize what the Soviets are up to and will act accordingly. (C)

III. Conclusion

These two initiatives should be seen as mutually reinforcing elements of a coherent program to strengthen the⁷ US and its position in the world: Pushing for higher productivity will strengthen the US at home; responding effectively to Soviet competition will strengthen it abroad. Neither initiative will yield early results. But both will strengthen the Administration's standing, at home and abroad—indicating that we have longer-term programs to help meet the problems that worry Americans most. (C)

If you make the Soviet speech first, because of Cuba, you could indicate that a second speech would soon follow, foreshadowing the domestic economic programs that are also needed to maintain our national and international strength. (C)

The second speech could not only announce your new campaign to boost investment and productivity, but also rehearse the other elements of our anti-inflationary strategy, emphasizing that prolonged fiscal and monetary restraint is the key to success. This may not be a popular message, but the leaders who have done best politically in the industrial countries (Schmidt, Giscard, LDP leaders in Japan) are those who have proposed hard measures to beat inflation, while those who have done poorly (Trudeau, Callaghan) have given the impression of trying to please everyone.⁸ A President who tells it like it is, and thus is seen to put the country's interest over personal and political advantage, will make anyone who argues for painless approaches to inflation look second-rate. (C)

Once made, these two speeches should set the theme for the Administration's posture during the remainder of your first term. You should come back to this theme at every occasion—stressing the need to strengthen our country, and underlining the steps to improve pro-

⁷ The President underlined "strengthen the."

⁸ The President placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

ductivity and restrain Soviet competition that are needed to fulfill this task. You will be seen to be looking beyond specific problems to a broad vision of the country's future and the policies that are needed to achieve it. This is what the much-abused term "leadership" means. (C)

If this approach makes sense, I'm sure Bill Miller could offer more detailed suggestions as the specific content of the economic speech I have in mind.

After writing this memo, I read an article in the *Sunday Star*,⁹ quoting a recent piece by the British observer, Henry Fairlie. One sentence caught my eye: "If Carter understood that the question of American power is what is really nagging at the American people, he would occupy the main ground of this election, which is still vacant, and in which the President's authority can be overwhelming."¹⁰ I believe you do understand it. Which is why I am offering these suggestions on how to translate that understanding into action. (C)

⁹ Reference is to the September 23 issue of *The Washington Star*.

¹⁰ The President underlined the phrase "question of American power."

129. Address by President Carter to the Nation¹

Washington, October 1, 1979

Peace and National Security

Good evening.

I want to talk with you about the subject that is my highest concern, as it has been for every President. That subject is peace and the security of the United States.

We are at peace tonight, as we have been at peace throughout the time of my service in this office. The peace we enjoy is the peace of the strong. Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the world. Those defenses are stronger tonight than they were 2 years ago, and they will be stronger 2 years from now than they are tonight, because of carefully planned improvements that are going forward with your support and with the support of the Congress.

Our program for modernizing and strengthening the military forces of the NATO Alliance is on track, with the full cooperation and participation of our European Allies. Our strategic nuclear forces are powerful enough to destroy any potential adversary many times over, and the invulnerability of those forces will soon be further assured by a new system of powerful mobile missiles. These systems are designed for stability and defense.

Beyond these military defenses, we are on the threshold of a great advance in the control of nuclear weapons—the adoption of the second strategic arms limitation treaty, SALT II.

This evening, I also want to report to you about the highly publicized Soviet brigade in Cuba and about its bearing on the important relationship between our Nation and the Soviet Union.

This is not a simple or easy subject. The United States and the Soviet Union are the two most powerful nations on Earth, and the rela-

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 1802–1806. The President delivered his address at 9 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on radio and television. The Department transmitted the text of the speech to all diplomatic and consular posts in telegram 258451, October 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790451–0362) Brzezinski recalled that the President had directed him to begin preparing the speech in mid-September, “and I did so with special emphasis on the wider character of Soviet activities in the Third World, stressing that these were not compatible with a stable detente.” (*Power and Principle*, p. 350) In his diary entry for the weekend of September 29–30, the President recounted: “Because the issues were so profoundly complicated—ourselves, Cuba, the Soviets, SALT, Congress, politics—this has been the most laborious speech preparation of my life.” After the address, he offered the following assessment: “The speech went over well, and the general result was exactly what we wanted: to defuse the Soviet troop issue and let the nation recall the importance of SALT. It was a quiet but good birthday.” (*White House Diary*, p. 358)

tionship between us is complex because it involves strong elements of both competition and cooperation.

Our fundamental philosophies conflict; quite often, our national interests conflict as well. As two great nations, we do have common interests and we share an overwhelming mutual concern in preventing a nuclear war. We must recognize therefore that nuclear arms control agreements are vital to both our countries and that we must also exercise self-restraint in our relations and be sensitive to each other's concerns.

Recently, we obtained evidence that a Soviet combat brigade has been in Cuba for several years.² The presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us.

I want to reassure you at the outset that we do not face any immediate, concrete threat that could escalate into war or a major confrontation—but we do face a challenge. It is a challenge to our wisdom—a challenge to our ability to act in a firm, decisive way without destroying the basis for cooperation that helps to maintain world peace and control nuclear weapons. It's a challenge to our determination to give a measured and effective response to Soviet competition and to Cuban military activities around the world.

Now, let me explain the specific problem of the Soviet brigade and describe the more general problem of Soviet-Cuban military activism in the Third World.

Here is the background on Soviet forces in Cuba: As most of you know, 17 years ago in the era of the cold war, the Soviet Union suddenly attempted to introduce offensive nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba. This direct threat to the United States ended with the Soviet agreement to withdraw those nuclear weapons and a commitment not to introduce offensive weapons into Cuba thereafter.³

At the time of that 1962 missile crisis, there were more than 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Most of them were withdrawn, and we monitored their departure. It was believed that those who stayed behind were not combat forces, but were there to advise and train Cubans and to perform intelligence functions.

Just recently, American intelligence obtained persuasive evidence that some of these Soviet forces had been organized into a combat unit. When attention was then focused on a careful review of past intelligence data, it was possible for our experts to conclude that this unit had

² See Document 125.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Documents 84, 91, 95, 99, and 102.

existed for several years, probably since the mid-1970's, and possibly even longer.

This unit appears to be a brigade of two or three thousand men. It is armed with about 40 tanks and other modern military equipment. It's been organized as a combat unit. Its training exercises have been those of a combat unit.

This is not a large force, nor an assault force. It presents no direct threat to us. It has no airborne or seaborne capability. In contrast to the 1962 crisis, no nuclear threat to the United States is involved.

Nevertheless, this Soviet brigade in Cuba is a serious matter. It contributes to tension in the Caribbean and the Central American region. The delivery of modern arms to Cuba and the presence of Soviet naval forces in Cuban waters have strengthened the Soviet-Cuban military relationship. They've added to the fears of some countries that they may come under Soviet or Cuban pressure.

During the last few years, the Soviets have been increasing the delivery of military supplies to Cuba. The result is that Cuba now has one of the largest, best equipped armed forces in this region. These military forces are used to intrude into other countries in Africa and the Middle East.

There's a special relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Cubans get their weapons free; other Soviet satellite countries have to pay for their military supplies.

The Communist regime in Cuba is an economic failure that cannot sustain itself. The Soviet Union must send to Cuba about \$8 million in economic aid every day.

Fidel Castro does not pay money for Soviet arms; the Cuban people pay a much higher price. In every international dispute, on every international issue, the Cuban regime automatically follows the Soviet line.

The Soviet brigade is a manifestation of Moscow's dominance of Cuba. It raises the level of that dominance, and it raises the level of responsibility that the Soviet Union must take for escalating Cuban military actions abroad.

Now, I want to report further on what we are doing to resolve these problems and to counter these activities.

Over the past 3 weeks, we've discussed this issue at great length with top Soviet officials.⁴ We've made it clear that the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern to us.

⁴For documentation on the oral and written exchanges, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 219, 221-224, and 226-228.

The Soviet Union does not admit that the unit in question is a combat unit. However, the Soviets have made certain statements to us with respect to our concern: that the unit in question is a training center, that it does nothing more than training and can do nothing more; that they will not change its function or status as a training center. We understand this to mean that they do not intend to enlarge the unit or to give it additional capabilities.

They have said that the Soviet personnel in Cuba are not and will not be a threat to the United States or to any other nation; that they reaffirm the 1962 understanding and the mutually agreed upon confirmation in 1970⁵ and will abide by it in the future. We, for our part, reaffirm this understanding.

These assurances have been given to me from the highest level of the Soviet Government.

Although we have persuasive evidence that the unit has been a combat brigade, the Soviet statements about the future noncombat status of the unit are significant. However, we shall not rest on these Soviet statements alone.

First, we will monitor the status of the Soviet forces by increased surveillance of Cuba.

Second, we will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in this hemisphere. Those nations can be confident that the United States will act in response to a request for assistance to meet any such threat from Soviet or Cuban forces.

This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the Organization of American States and a party to the Rio Treaty.⁶ It's a reaffirmation in new circumstances of John F. Kennedy's declaration in 1963 "that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the island of Cuba in an offensive action against any neighboring countries."⁷

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 224, 226, and 228.

⁶ The 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known as the Rio Treaty, committed its signatories to providing assistance to meet armed attacks.

⁷ Kennedy addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors and took part in a question-and-answer session at the Washington Statler Hilton Hotel on April 19, 1963. In response to a statement made by a reporter that the American public felt that the administration's policy toward Cuba was one of "inaction," Kennedy indicated that the United States had "taken a good many actions" to contain Communism in the Western Hemisphere. After outlining several of these actions, he noted: "In addition, the United States maintains a constant surveillance. We have indicated that we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring country. We have indicated also that we would not accept a Hungary in Cuba, the use of Soviet troops against Cubans if there was any internal reaction against

Third, I'm establishing a permanent, full-time Caribbean joint task force headquarters at Key West, Florida. I will assign to this headquarters, forces from all the military services responsible for expanded planning and for conducting exercises. This headquarters unit will employ designated forces for action if required. This will substantially improve our capability to monitor and to respond rapidly to any attempted military encroachment in this region.

Fourth, we will expand military maneuvers in the region. We will conduct these exercises regularly from now on. In accordance with existing treaty rights, the United States will, of course, keep our forces in Guantanamo.

Fifth, we will increase our economic assistance to alleviate the unmet economic and human needs in the Caribbean region and further to ensure the ability of troubled peoples to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination.

The United States has a worldwide interest in peace and stability. Accordingly, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to further enhance the capacity of our rapid deployment forces to protect our own interests and to act in response to requests for help from our allies and friends. We must be able to move our ground, sea, and air units to distant areas, rapidly and with adequate supplies.

We have reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

We are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities—both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and our methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights.⁸

These steps reflect my determination to preserve peace, to strengthen our alliances, and to defend the interests of the United States. In developing them, I've consulted not only with my own advisers but with congressional leaders and with a bipartisan group of distinguished American citizens as well.⁹ The decisions are my own,

Castro. In many ways we have attempted to isolate Cuba and to indicate our determination to continue that policy until Cuba is free." (*Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963*, p. 329)

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 225.

⁹ Clifford had organized a group of seven former high-ranking officials, constituted as the Citizens Advisory Committee on Cuba, in order to provide the administration with advice concerning the U.S. response to the Soviet brigade and suggestions for the President's speech. In addition to Clifford, the group included McCloy, Bundy, Linowitz, Packard, McCone, and Scowcroft. Clifford then expanded the group to 16 members, adding Rusk, Rogers, Kissinger, Ball, Gilpatric, Harriman, Schlesinger, Katzenbach, and Scranton. On September 29, the President hosted a White House luncheon and received recommendations from the group, with the exception of Scranton, who did not attend. (Bernard Gwertzman, "President Gets Wide-Ranging Advice on Soviet Troops From 15 Experts," *The New York Times*, September 30, 1979, p. A-3)

and I take full responsibility for them as President and as Commander in Chief.

I have concluded that the brigade issue is certainly no reason for a return to the cold war. A confrontation might be emotionally satisfying for a few days or weeks for some people, but it would be destructive to the national interest and to the security of the United States.

We must continue the basic policy that the United States has followed for 20 years, under six administrations of both parties, a policy that recognizes that we are in competition with the Soviet Union in some fields and that we seek cooperation in others—notably maintaining the peace and controlling nuclear arms.

My fellow Americans, the greatest danger to American security tonight is certainly not the two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba. The greatest danger to all the nations of the world—including the United States and the Soviet Union—is the breakdown of a common effort to preserve the peace and the ultimate threat of a nuclear war.

I renew my call to the Senate of the United States to ratify the SALT II treaty.

SALT II is a solid treaty. Ensuring compliance with its terms will not be a matter of trust. We have highly sophisticated, national technical means, carefully focused on the Soviet Union, to ensure that the treaty is verifiable.

This treaty is the most important step ever taken to control strategic nuclear arms. It permits us to strengthen our defense and to preserve the strategic balance at lower risk and lower cost. During the past few years, we have made real increases in our defense expenditures to fulfill the goals of our 5-year defense plan. With SALT II, we can concentrate these increases in areas where our interests are most threatened and where direct military challenge is most likely.

The rejection of SALT would seriously compromise our Nation's peace and security.

Of course we have disagreements with the Soviets. Of course we have conflicts with them. If we did not have these disagreements and conflicts, we would not need a treaty to reduce the possibility of nuclear war between us.

If SALT II is rejected, these disagreements and conflicts could take on a new and ominous dimension. Against the background of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race, every confrontation or dispute would carry the seeds of a nuclear confrontation.

In addition, SALT II is crucial to American leadership and to the further strengthening of the Western Alliance. Obviously, a secure Europe is vital to our own security. The leaders of our European Allies support SALT II—unanimously. We've talked to a number of those

leaders in the last few days. I must tell you tonight that if the Senate fails to approve the SALT treaty, these leaders and their countries would be confused and deeply alarmed. If our allies should lose confidence in our ability to negotiate successfully for the control of nuclear weapons, then our effort to build a stronger and more united NATO could fail.

I know that for Members of Congress this is a troubling and a difficult issue, in a troubling and difficult time. But the Senate has a tradition of being the greatest deliberative body in the world, and the whole world is watching the Senate today. I'm confident that all Senators will perform their high responsibilities as the national interest requires.

Politics and nuclear arsenals do not mix. We must not play politics with the security of the United States. We must not play politics with the survival of the human race. We must not play politics with SALT II. It is much too important for that—too vital to our country, to our allies, and to the cause of peace.

The purpose of the SALT II treaty and the purpose of my actions in dealing with Soviet and Cuban military relationship are exactly the same—to keep our Nation secure and to maintain a world at peace.

As a powerful nation, as a super power, we have special responsibilities to maintain stability even when there are serious disagreements among nations.

We've had fundamental differences with the Soviet Union since 1917. I have no illusions about these differences. The best way to deal with them successfully is to maintain American unity, American will, and American strength. That is what I am determined to do.

The struggle for peace—the long, hard struggle to make weapons of mass destruction under control of human reason and human law—is a central drama of our age.

At another time of challenge in our Nation's history, President Abraham Lincoln told the American people: "We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth."¹⁰

We acted wisely then and preserved the Nation. Let us act wisely now and preserve the world.

¹⁰ Reference is to Lincoln's December 1, 1862, message to Congress on the State of the Union.

130. Remarks by President Carter¹

Washington, November 15, 1979

President Meany, Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirkland, men and women of the greatest labor movement in the world:

[Omitted here are the President's introductory remarks.]

But today we have other important matters to consider. For a brief time this afternoon I want to speak with you and all Americans about some fundamental principles upon which our Nation was founded and which we must never forget. To some, these ideals may seem at times to be old fashioned or outmoded. But we've been clearly reminded in recent days that these principles mean just as much to us now as they have ever meant during any time of critical decision in the history of our Nation.

These fundamentals have old names to which we must continually give new meaning—names like "strength," "courage," "patriotism," "independence," "the love of freedom," "human rights," "justice," "concern for the common good."

This is the 12th day that more than a hundred innocent human beings, some 60 of whom are members of the United States diplomatic mission, have been held hostage in our Embassy in Iran. For a rare time in human history, a host government has condoned and even encouraged this kind of illegal action against a sovereign territory and official diplomatic relations of another nation. This is an act of terrorism—totally outside the bounds of international law and diplomatic tradition.

In this time of trial, our deep concern is for the lives of these brave hostages, our Nation's loyal citizens and faithful representatives. Every American feels anger and outrage at what is happening to them, just as every American feels concern for their safety and pride in their great courage. This crisis calls for firmness, and it calls for restraint. And I'm proud that this situation has brought forth calm leadership by officials and private citizens throughout this country.

Firmness does require patience, and it requires perseverance. Firmness also means measured action, deliberate actions that clarify the real issues, reduce the likelihood of violence, protect our interests, and ensure justice.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 2120–2125. The President spoke at 2:25 p.m. before the 13th constitutional convention of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations, meeting in the Sheraton Washington Hotel ballroom.

The United States has done nothing and will do nothing that could be used to justify violent or imprudent action by anyone. While we are pursuing all avenues of diplomatic resolution, we're also acting unilaterally as appropriate—with restraint, yes, but without hesitation.

First, in order to discourage violence and possible bloodshed here, which when televised and transmitted back to Iran might threaten the safety of the hostages, I've discouraged the issuing of permits for demonstrations on Federal properties here in Washington. Consistent with our laws and pursuant to my own powers and responsibilities, I have also encouraged local and State officials to take similar legal action.

Second, I've directed our immigration authorities to review the visas of some 50,000 Iranian students, who are guests here in our country.² Our Nation is fully committed to the enhancement of human rights, the protection of legal rights, and the enhancement of civil justice. All provisions of the United States Constitution will be honored. All foreign nationals who are here lawfully may continue here with their work or their studies. But those who are here illegally will be processed promptly and lawfully for deportation back to their own country.

Third, I want to remove any question that our principles might be compromised by our supposed need for Iranian oil. Early this week, therefore, I ordered an immediate halt to any purchases or shipments of Iranian oil to the United States of America.³

I'm determined to make clear that we will never allow any foreign country to dictate any American policy.

Fourth, in order to protect our economic interests and to ensure that claims on Iran by the United States or by United States citizens are settled in an orderly manner, we've legally frozen official Iranian property and financial assets.⁴ The order does not affect any accounts other than those of the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, or other government-controlled entities.

² On November 10, the White House issued an announcement directing Civiletti to identify any Iranian students in the United States not in compliance with entry visa requirements and begin deportation proceedings. In addition, the President directed the Immigration and Naturalization Service to issue a notice requiring Iranian students to report their present location and status to local INS offices. (*Ibid.*, p. 2109)

³ In remarks to reporters made in the Briefing Room at the White House the afternoon of November 12, the President discussed this decision and indicated that he had directed Duncan to collaborate with Congress, other officials, and industry leaders to develop "new measures to conserve oil" in light of the situation. (*Ibid.*, p. 2110) Proclamation 4702, issued by the President on November 12, codified the discontinuance of oil purchases. For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 2110–2111.

⁴ Executive Order 12170, issued on November 14, blocked all property and assets. For the text, see *ibid.*, pp. 2118–2119.

Yesterday I further instructed Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador McHenry to oppose any discussion of Iran's problems in the United Nations Security Council as long as American hostages are being held.⁵ Only after the hostages are released will we be willing to address Iran's concerns and, then, under the provisions of international law and under the charter of the United Nations. The members of the United Nations Security Council, I am pleased to announce to you, have agreed unanimously with our own proposal.

It's important for all of us to remember that we will not compromise our fundamental principles of justice no matter how grave the provocation nor how righteous our indignation. At the same time, we will continue to use our influence around the world to obtain the same kinds of human rights for people everywhere.

In this instance, we are upholding an important principle on behalf of the entire world community. It's a clear tenet of international law and diplomatic tradition that the host government is fully responsible for the safety and well-being of the property and the legal representatives of another country. Less than a year ago—and this is a fact not generally known or recognized—less than a year ago, 70,000 American citizens were in Iran. As you know, thousands of people were killed during the upheavals there, but almost miraculously and because of the good work of Cyrus Vance and others, our people were brought home safely. I thank God for it. Despite the turmoil, each succeeding Iranian Government—and they were being changed, as you know, quite rapidly—protected the citizens of other countries.

Foreign visitors are often vulnerable to abuse. An embassy is not a fortress. There are no embassies anywhere in the world that can long withstand the attack of a mob, if the mob has the support of the host government itself. We had received repeated assurances of protection from the highest officials in the Iranian Government, even a day or two before the mob was incited to attack and before that protection was withdrawn at the last minute. The principle of inviolability of embassies is understood and accepted by nations everywhere, and it's particularly important to smaller nations which have no recourse to economic or military power. This is why the United Nations Security Council has also unanimously supported our demand for the release of the American hostages.

In accordance with this principle, as recognized and observed by all civilized countries, the Iranian Government and its leaders are fully

⁵ Vance flew to New York the morning of November 14 to obtain support for this position. (Bernard Gwertzman, "U.N. Session Averted: U.S. Wins Support to Bar Council Meeting Until Hostages are Freed," *The New York Times*, November 15, 1979, pp. A-1, A-16)

responsible for the safety and well-being of our representatives in Iran, in Tehran, and they will be held accountable for that responsibility. It is unthinkable that any responsible government in today's modern world could regard the seizure and the holding of the diplomatic officials of another nation as a realistic means to advance any cause whatsoever. Terrorism is not an acceptable means to resolve disputes between individuals or between nations.

No act has so galvanized the American public toward unity in the last decade as has the holding of our people as hostages in Tehran. We stand today as one people. We are dedicated to the principles and the honor of our Nation. We've taken no action which would justify concern among the people or among the Government of Iran. We have done nothing for which any American need apologize. The actions of Iranian leaders and the radicals who invaded our Embassy were completely unjustified. They and all others must know that the United States of America will not yield to international terrorism or to blackmail.

These difficult days have reminded us of basic facts and principles which are fundamental to the existence of us as a people. We will honor all constitutional protections and international law and custom, and we will not let our freedom and our security be jeopardized.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the President's remarks.]

131. Remarks by President Carter¹

Washington, December 12, 1979

United States Defense Policy

Chairman Reg Jones, members of the Business Council:

It's indeed a pleasure for me to be with you again. This afternoon I would like to make a very important statement to you, following which the Chairman and I will walk down the hall, and I'd like to greet each one of you individually, as has been my custom in the past when we've been together. And then we'll have a chance for a few questions that you might want to put to me concerning energy or inflation or legislation before the Congress or Iran or other matters of interest to you.

But my first concern, and the first concern of every President who has ever lived in this house, is and must be the security of our Nation. This security rests on many kinds of strength, on arms and also on arms control, on military power and on economic vitality and the quality of life of our own people, on modern weapons, and also on reliable energy supplies. The well-being of our friends and our allies is also of great importance to us. Our security is tied to human rights and to social justice which prevails among the people who live on Earth and to the institutions of international force and peace and order, which we ourselves have helped to build.

We all hope and work and pray that we will see a world in which the weapons of war are no longer necessary, but now we must deal with the hard facts, with the world as it is. In the dangerous and uncertain world of today, the keystone of our national security is still military strength, strength that is clearly recognized by Americans, by our allies, and by any potential adversary.

Twice in this century, each time in the aftermath of a global war, we were tempted in this country by isolationism. The first time, we suc-

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 2232–2237. The President spoke at 5 p.m. in the East Room of the White House before members of the Business Council. Brzezinski sent a proposed speech outline to the President under an October 17 cover memorandum, requesting the President's "reactions and guidance." He indicated that he and his staff planned to develop a draft for subsequent revision by the President's speechwriters, adding, "It is meant to be a serious speech and not an exercise in oratory, and therefore I do want to focus on substance above all." Brzezinski continued: "I think it would also be better to keep plans for the speech restricted, because otherwise the exercise will degenerate into 'group-think' (like the Cuban brigade speech, which at one time had as many as 14 people drafting it). It is impossible to do a decent job in such a context." The President wrote "Zbig, ok—proceed. J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. (Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 12, President's Address to the Business Council—Part II Defense Speech 12/12/79)

cumbed to that temptation, withdrawing from our global responsibilities, and you know what the result was. A generation later the world was again engulfed by war. But after the Second World War, we built a national consensus, based on our own moral and political values, around the concept of an active role for America in preserving peace and security for ourselves and for others.

Despite all the changes that have swept across this world in the last 30 years, that basic consensus has endured. We've learned the mistake of military intervention in the internal affairs of another country when our own American security was not directly involved. But we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of the power of the United States is a potential Vietnam. The consensus for national strength and international involvement, already shaken and threatened, survived that divisive and tragic war.

Recent events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and United America, a nation which is supported by its allies and which need not bluff or posture in the quiet exercise of our strength and in our continued commitment to international law and the preservation of peace. Today, regardless of other disagreements among ourselves, we are united in the belief that we must have a strong defense and that military weakness would inevitably make war more likely.

So, the issue we face is not whether we should be strong; the issue is how we will be strong. What will be our defense responsibilities for the 1980's and beyond? What challenges must we confront in meeting those responsibilities? What defense programs do we need, and how much will we spend to meet them? How can we correlate most successfully our military readiness and our arms control efforts? To begin with, our defense program must be tailored to match our responsibilities.

In Europe our military forces have provided the foundation for one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity that continent has ever enjoyed. Our strength, both conventional and nuclear, helps to maintain peace while our allies work together and build together through the European Community and also nurture their historical ties to the countries of Eastern Europe. Our mutual commitments within the Atlantic Alliance are vital to us all, and those commitments are permanent and unshakable.

American military strength provides the framework within which our mature friendships with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand all contribute to stability in the Pacific basin and throughout the world.

The prospects for peace in the Middle East have been enhanced by a strong America and by confidence in us among our friends in Egypt

and in Israel. We are determined to continue the progress which has been made in the Middle East.

We must and we will continue to meet these and our other responsibilities. But there are reasons for concern about our ability to sustain our beneficial and our peaceful influence throughout the world—real reasons for concern.

For nearly 20 years now, the Soviet Union has been increasing its real defense spending by 3 or 4 percent each year, 3 or 4 percent compounded annually. In contrast, our own defense spending has declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976. This is creating a real challenge to American leadership and to our influence in the world.

We will almost certainly face other challenges, less direct, though no less serious. The 1980's are very likely to bring continued turbulence and upheaval, as we've experienced in the 1970's. Problems of energy price and energy supply will continue to strain the economy of the developed world and will put even more severe pressures on the developing nations. Political instability, which is already serious enough, may even intensify as the newer nations struggle to cope with these problems, which are serious enough for us.

As in the past, when the winds of change threaten to arouse storms of conflict, we must be prepared to join our friends and our allies in resisting threats to stability and to peace.

The steady buildup by the Soviets and their growing inclination to rely on military power to exploit turbulent situations call for calm, deliberate, and sustained American response.

Through the mid-1970's, the United States relied on the defense strategy and also on force structures devised during the early 1960's, a time when we enjoyed strategic nuclear superiority and a tactical nuclear monopoly, when Soviet seapower was limited and the Soviet military presence outside Eastern Europe almost nonexistent. All that had changed by the time I took office as President.

Beginning in 1976 and continuing in my own administration, we've set out to counterbalance the growth in Soviet military power by launching new efforts that draw on our own considerable strengths. During each of the last 4 years, there has been a moderate increase in real defense spending. In Europe we've taken steps, as you know, to reverse a decade of relative decline in the military strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

When I first began to meet with Atlantic Alliance leaders almost 3 years ago, I found them very troubled by the state of our military strength in the Atlantic Alliance. I promised to raise our own level of defense spending, in real terms, by some 3 percent per year and our NATO allies responded by making the same pledge. With American

leadership, NATO also took the crucial step of adopting a bold, long-term defense program, which will extend over 15 years.² That program is helping us to increase our capacity to deter or to defeat any surprise attack that may be launched against our European allies and, therefore, against ourselves.

We are also taking steps to redress the balance in other theater nuclear forces. This action, as you know, we've been pursuing in the last few days.

In the early 1960's, the United States removed its medium-range missiles from Europe. We could do this then because there was overwhelming United States strategic superiority. But the Soviet Union did not show similar restraint. The accelerating development of their relatively long-range, mobile, multiwarhead SS-20 missile is a major escalation in theater nuclear armaments. With the advent of rough strategic parity, this new missile creates a potentially dangerous weakness in NATO's ability to deter aggression. In the SALT II negotiations, we carefully protected our freedom to correct this weakness.

Just a few hours ago, I was informed that the NATO Alliance resolved to strengthen its theater nuclear weapons to offset actual Soviet deployments. The agreement reached this afternoon in Europe was a unanimous agreement very encouraging to all of us.³ Now, on the basis of strength, we can negotiate with the Warsaw Pact to reduce nuclear weapons and also to reduce, we hope, conventional weapons throughout the European theater.

In the area of intercontinental or strategic forces, we also face adverse trends that must be corrected. Improved Soviet air defenses now threaten to make our strategic bombers vulnerable. The cruise missile will be our solution to that problem. Production of the first generation of air-launched cruise missiles will begin next year.

In addition, our land-based Minuteman ICBM's are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of the improved accuracy of the Soviet Union's multiwarhead missiles. That's why we decided last spring to produce the MX missile.⁴ The relatively small number of MX missiles to be deployed will have mobility and a large number of shelters and will be far less vulnerable than our present fixed-shelter Minutemen.

² See footnote 10, Document 90.

³ Reference is to the communiqué issued on December 12 at a special meeting in Brussels of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, the Ministers agreed to deploy 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in order to replace existing Pershing I-A missiles. In addition, as part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1980, p. 16.

⁴ See Document 125.

Further, in response to any first strike against us, the MX will have the capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet military targets. The MX missile, deployed as I've just described, will not undermine stability, but it will deter attack and encourage negotiations on further nuclear arms limits. In addition, by increasing the difficulty of any contemplated Soviet strike, it will contribute to the survivability of our own strategic bombers and submarines. Even with SALT II, America needs the MX to maintain the strategic nuclear balance.

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine force. The first new Trident submarine has already been launched, and the first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already been put to sea.

Thus, each leg of our strategic triad is being modernized—cruise missiles for our bombers, the MX for our intercontinental missiles, and Trident for our undersea deterrent. Nor will we neglect our conventional forces, though here we must rely heavily on the parallel efforts of our allies, in Asia as well as in Europe. They must bear their proportional share of the increased costs of a common defense.

I'm determined to keep our naval forces more powerful than those of any other nation on Earth. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990's, and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Seapower is indispensable to our global strategy, in peace and also in war.

And finally, we are moving rapidly to counterbalance the growing ability of the Soviet Union, directly or through surrogates, to use its military power in Third World regions, and we must be prepared to deal with hostile actions against our own citizens or our vital interests from others as well. For this purpose, we need not only stronger forces but better means for rapid deployment of the forces that we already have.

Our 1981 defense budget and our 5-year defense program will meet this need in two different ways. The first will be a new fleet of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry the heavy equipment and the supplies for three Marine brigades that can be stationed in forward areas where United States forces may be needed. With their supplies already near the scene of action, the troops themselves can then be moved in by air very rapidly. The second innovation will be a new fleet of large cargo aircraft to carry Army tanks and other equipment over intercontinental distances. Having rapid deployment forces does not necessarily mean that we will use them. We intend for their existence to deter the very developments that would otherwise invoke their use.

We must always remember that no matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security depends on the abilities, the training, and the dedication of the people who serve in our

Armed Forces. I'm determined to recruit and to retain, under any foreseeable circumstances, an ample level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

To sum up, the United States is taking strong action: first, to improve all aspects of our strategic forces, thus assuring our deterrent to nuclear war; second, to upgrade our forces in NATO and in the Pacific, as part of a common effort with our allies; third, to modernize our naval forces and keep them the best in the world; fourth, to strengthen our rapid deployment capabilities to meet our responsibilities outside NATO; and fifth, to maintain an effective force of highly trained military personnel.

We must sustain these commitments in order to maintain peace and security in the 1980's. To ensure that we press forward vigorously, I will submit for fiscal year 1981 a budget to increase funding authority for defense to more than \$157 billion, a real growth of more than 5 percent over my request for fiscal year 1980.⁵ Just as in 1979 and in 1980, requested outlays for defense during fiscal year 1981 will grow by more than 3 percent, in real terms, over the preceding year. We will sustain this effort.

My 5-year defense program provides a real funding increase that will average more than 4½ percent each year. I intend to carry out this program. With careful and efficient management, we should be able to do so within the budget increases I propose. If inflation increases or exceeds the projected rates that we now expect, I intend to adjust the defense budget as needed, just as has been done in 1980 fiscal year.

Much of this program which I've outlined to you will take 5 years or more to reach fruition. The imbalances it will correct have been caused by more than a decade of disparity. This cannot be remedied overnight, so we must be willing to see this program through. To ensure that we do so, I'm setting a growth rate for defense that will be tolerable for our country over the long haul.

The most wasteful and self-defeating thing that we could do would be to start this necessary program, then alter it or cut it back after a year or two when such an action might become politically attractive. The defense program that I'm proposing for the next 5 years will require some sacrifice—but sacrifice that we can well afford. It will not increase at all the percentage of our gross national product devoted to defense, which will remain steady at almost exactly 5 percent per year.

We must have a long-range, balanced approach to the allocation of Federal expenditures. We will continue to meet such crucial needs, of

⁵ The President submitted the FY 1981 budget to Congress on January 28, 1980. For his remarks at the budget signing ceremony and the text of the budget message, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 225–232.

course, as jobs and housing and education and health, but we must realize that a prerequisite to the enjoyment of such progress is to assure peace for our Nation. So in asking congressional support for our defense efforts, I'm asking for consistent support, steadfast support—not just for 1980 or 1981, but until these commitments have been fulfilled.

Sustained American strength is the only possible basis for the wider, truly reciprocal *détente* which we seek with the Soviet Union. Only through strength can we create global political conditions hospitable to worldwide economic and political progress and to controlling both conventional and nuclear weapons.

As the strongest, most advanced country on Earth, we have a special obligation to seek security through arms control as well as through military power. So, I welcome the debate by the Senate in its consideration of the SALT II treaty. It will enable us to build a clearer understanding that these efforts in both arms control and in defense are vital to our security and they are mutually compatible, one with another.

There are several reasons why SALT II will strengthen the military aspect of our national security:

First, we can better maintain strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons with SALT II. Without it, the Soviet Union can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage that they may achieve in the early 1980's, and conceal from us what they are doing. For us, maintaining parity with these uncontrollable Soviet activities would add to our costs in time, money, and also uncertainty about our own safety.

Second, we can better maintain the combat efficiency and readiness of our non-nuclear forces with SALT II than we can without it. Whatever the level of the defense budget, more of it will have to go into strategic weapons, atomic weapons, if SALT II is not ratified.

Third, we can better strengthen the unity, resolve, and capability of the NATO Alliance with SALT II than we can without it. That's why the heads of other NATO countries have urged strongly its ratification.

Fourth, we can better continue the SALT process, which has now been going on for more than 30 years, the process of negotiating further reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals, with SALT II than without it. Without SALT II and all its limits, its rules, and definitions in place, any agreement in SALT III would, at the very best, take many more years to achieve.

And finally, we can better control the proliferation of nuclear weapons among currently non-nuclear nations with SALT II than without it. This could be one of the most important factors involved in our pending decision on the SALT treaty.

All of these issues are extremely important and they are intimately interrelated. A strong defense is a matter of simple common sense; so is SALT II.

I will do my utmost as President to keep America strong and to keep our Nation secure, but this cannot be done without sustained effort and without some sacrifice, which our Nation can certainly afford.

The best investment in defense is in weapons that will never have to be used and in soldiers who will never have to die. But the peace we enjoy is the fruit of our strength and our will to use this strength if we need to. As a great nation devoted to peace, we must and we will continue to build that American strength.⁶

Thank you very much.

⁶ On the last page of the outline that Brzezinski sent the President in October (see footnote 1 above), Carter added: "a) Record of peace b) Peace depends on recognition of our military strength and national will c) Security of U.S. paramount responsibility d) Best investment in defense is weapons never used and soldiers who never die—because we are strong."

132. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Our Response to Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan (U)

One of our basic problems with the Soviets, as has been the case with all our recent predecessors in office, is maintaining our credibility in Moscow. We have frequently protested Soviet actions (bases in Vietnam, Cubans abroad, etc.). Since we have not always followed these verbal protests up with tangible responses, the Soviets may be getting into the habit of disregarding our concern. (C)

Warren Christopher will be meeting with our major Allies in London on Monday.² They will be looking to us for leadership, for specific evidence that we are unwilling to let the Soviets get away with this invasion with impunity. With this in mind, you may wish to instruct

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Geographic File, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf Afghanistan: (12/26/79-1/4/80). Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for action. Brzezinski added the date to the memorandum by hand. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 25-27.

² December 31.

Christopher to inform these governments that we are taking tangible steps in our bilateral relationship with Moscow to manifest our displeasure. (S)

Since in your conversations yesterday with European leaders³ you drew a parallel between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the one in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it may be useful for you to know what actions Johnson and Rusk took after the August 20, 1968 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. (You may be sure the Soviets have the list at hand and will draw comparative conclusions about the international environment in which they operate. The same will be true of most countries of the world, especially those anywhere near Afghanistan.) Within three days of the invasion:

(1) The President made a strong public statement.⁴

(2) Secretary of State made a public statement.⁵

(3) We initiated a Security Council meeting.

(4) We suspended bilateral talks with the Soviets on peaceful uses of the atom.⁶

(5) Embassy Moscow was instructed to restrict all official and social contacts with Soviet officials.⁷

(6) We sent the same instructions to all US diplomatic missions worldwide.

³ In a December 28 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Blackwill provided a brief summary of the President's calls to Thatcher, Schmidt, Cossiga and Giscard d'Estaing that day. (Ibid.) At 4:30 p.m. that day, the President spoke to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room and commented: "I have discussed this serious matter personally today with several other heads of government, all of whom agree that the Soviet action is a grave threat to peace. I will be sending the Deputy Secretary of State to Europe this weekend to meet with representatives of several other nations to discuss how the world community might respond to this unwarranted Soviet behavior. Soviet military action beyond its own borders gives rise to the most fundamental questions pertaining to international stability, and such close and extensive consultations between ourselves and with our allies are urgently needed." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 2287*)

⁴ Presumable reference to Johnson's August 21, 1968, statement, recorded for broadcast by radio and television networks. Johnson asserted: "The tragic news from Czechoslovakia shocks the conscience of the world. The Soviet Union and its allies have invaded a defenseless country to stamp out a resurgence of ordinary human freedom. It is a sad commentary on the Communist mind that a sign of liberty in Czechoslovakia is deemed a fundamental threat to the security of the Soviet system." (*Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, p. 905*)

⁵ Reference is to Rusk's August 22, 1968, news conference, held at the White House; see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 9, 1968, pp. 261–263.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Document 289.

⁷ See *ibid.*

(7) Rusk told Dobrynin on August 23 that there would be no movement on other issues until the situation in Czechoslovakia was clarified.⁸

(8) The State Department actively discouraged US business ties with the Soviet Union.

(9) We stopped, turned down or delayed requests for export licenses to the Soviet Union.

(10) We stopped participation in trade fairs in the Soviet Union.

(11) We cancelled pending cultural exchanges with the Soviets. (C)

As you will recall, the invasion of Czechoslovakia also resulted in the cancellation of the scheduled first round of SALT talks between Washington and Moscow. While I would oppose any freeze on our efforts to achieve SALT ratification, I think it would be a mistake to confine our response to this Soviet intervention in Afghanistan to words. In this connection, I enclose a memorandum from Marshall Brent of the NSC Staff which lists a menu of actions we could take to evidence our displeasure with Moscow.⁹ I would welcome your guidance on what you feel might be done. I do think something definite in our bilateral relationship with Moscow should follow this extraordinary act of Soviet arrogance and brutality and that Warren Christopher should inform the Allies on Monday what specific steps we intend to take. In my judgment, such resolve on our part would have significant benefits for us, both domestically and internationally. (S)

⁸ Rostow transmitted a summary of the Rusk–Dobrynin conversation via telegram to Johnson at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on August 24; see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XIV, Soviet Union, Document 290.

⁹ Not found attached.

133. Editorial Note

From 1:04 to 1:50 p.m. on December 31, 1979, President Jimmy Carter participated in a taped television interview with Frank Reynolds, a correspondent with ABC News and co-anchor of ABC's "World News Tonight." Portions of the interview were scheduled to air that evening on the program with other segments scheduled to air on ABC throughout the week. Reynolds conducted the interview from the ABC News studios in New York; the President was in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

Earlier, on December 29, Carter had sent a hotline message to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For additional information about this message, and Brezhnev's response, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume VI, Soviet Union, Document 248. Reynolds devoted a portion of the interview to this development:

"Mr. Reynolds. Mr. President, you've mentioned Afghanistan. Could you tell us what was Brezhnev's response to your message to him?

"The President. He responded in what I consider to be an inadequate way. He claimed that he had been invited by the Afghan government to come in and protect Afghanistan from some outside third nation threat. This was obviously false. Because the person that he claimed invited him in, President Amin, was murdered or assassinated after the Soviets pulled their coup.

"The leader that's presently been imposed upon the Afghan people was apparently brought in by the Soviet Union or either has not yet come into Afghanistan—He's not been seen since he was anointed to be the leader by the Soviets and their cohorts in Afghanistan. He also claimed that they would remove their forces from Afghanistan as soon as the situation should be stabilized and the outside threat to Afghanistan was eliminated.

"So that was the tone of his message to me, which as I say, was completely inadequate and completely misleading.

"Mr. Reynolds. Well, he's lying, isn't he, Mr. President?

"The President. He's not telling the facts accurately, that's correct.

"Mr. Reynolds. Have you changed your perceptions of the Russians in the time that you've been here? You started out it seemed to a great many people believing that if you expressed your good will and demonstrated it that they would reciprocate it.

"The President. My opinion of the Russians has changed most [*more*] drastically in the last week than even the previous two and one-half years before that. It is only now dawning upon the world that the magnitude of the action that the Soviets undertook in invading Afghanistan. . . . This is a circumstance that I think is now causing even former close friends and allies of the Soviet Union to re-examine their opinion of what the Soviets might have in mind. . . . I think it is imperative that within the next few days, after we consult with one another that the leaders of the world make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot have taken this action to violate world peace not only in that region, but throughout the world without paying severe consequences. . . .

"What we will do about it, I cannot say. But, to repeat myself, the action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my opinion

of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they've done in the previous time that I've been in office.

"Mr. Reynolds. But what we and the other nations allied with us do will involve more than stiff notes of protest . . . ?

"The President. Yes it will.

"Mr. Reynolds. It will. Action will be taken?

"The President. Yes." (*American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1977-1980*, Document 409) According to a transcript of the interview published in *The New York Times* on January 1, 1980, Reynolds also asked the President about the return of U.S. hostages in Iran, protection of broader U.S. interests, and the difficult decisions facing the President. He inquired as to whether or not the President would be forced to "make a choice," presumably regarding the rescue of the hostages. The President responded:

"A. That's an option that we have explored very thoroughly. Obviously we cannot separate the safety of the 50 hostages from our long-term American interests because they are intertwined. I don't see any conflict between the two and for us to peremptorily cause bloodshed or start a war in Iran and in that entire Persian Gulf region just to show that I am brave or courageous or forceful or powerful would be exactly the wrong thing to do for the hostages and for our long-range interests. So I don't see any conflict between the two." ("Transcript of President's Interview on Soviet Reply," page 4)

In his diary entry for December 31, the President noted:

"I had a one-hour interview with Frank Reynolds of ABC. He's going to chop up the interview into four or five sections and broadcast them on prime time the rest of the week. Jody thought the interview was great, and I think it was a very good one." (*White House Diary*, page 383)

134. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Relevance of the Truman Doctrine to Current Situation (U)

As you consider options regarding the situation in Southwest Asia, I would like to recall for you an earlier crisis which in my judgment has some striking parallels with the present challenge we face in Afghanistan, in that region and globally. I have in mind the events which led up to the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, announced by Truman in his message to Congress on March 12, 1947.² (C)

Truman's message responded to what he perceived to be a clear and present danger. It was the threatened collapse under Soviet pressure of two countries which at the time were at the outer limits of American consciousness—Greece and Turkey. Communist governments had been established with the aid of Soviet troops throughout the Balkans. Greece was in the midst of a civil war, instigated in the main by communist-led insurgents. Concurrently, Moscow was putting pressure on Ankara to revise the Montreux Convention³ to prevent access of non-Black Sea powers into the Black Sea, and had raised claims of sovereignty against two areas in Turkey. (C)

All this in a region which prior to 1947 had been a British sphere of influence of little or no strategic interest to the United States. Within this country there was strong sentiment for a rapid U.S. disengagement from all of Europe and a return to isolationism. Truman was also under considerable pressure from a number of politicians, especially Henry Wallace, who argued that the U.S. should undertake more strenuous efforts to cooperate with Moscow. (C)

Against this background, the United States received an urgent message in late February 1947 that the British intended to cease aid to

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 67, Truman Doctrine: 1/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Brzezinski added the date to the memorandum by hand. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Blackwill and Larrabee sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 2 memorandum, requesting that he sign it. A notation on the cover memorandum in Larrabee's hand indicates that Brzezinski signed it on January 2.

² For the text of Truman's message, see *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 176–180.

³ Brzezinski corrected the spelling of Montreux. The 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits gave Turkey control over the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles and regulated transit of warships.

Greece and Turkey within six weeks. The issue, as Truman, Acheson and Marshall prophetically realized was not simply the question of aiding Greece and Turkey, although that was a startling enough idea at the time. They also were among the first in the post World War II period to recognize the importance of buttressing regional security and sending Moscow an unmistakable signal that the United States was determined to protect not only old vital interests but new ones as well, and to resist Soviet pressure. (U)

Truman's message was a turning point in U.S. foreign policy. Specifically he:

—announced that it was the policy of the United States to support free peoples who were resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures;

—requested Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400 million;

—asked Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey to assist in the task of reconstruction and to help supervise the use of U.S. financial and material support;

—asked Congress for authority to provide for the instruction and training of select Greek and Turkish personnel; and

—asked Congress to provide authority to permit the rapid and effective use in terms of needed commodities, supplies and equipment, of any funds that they authorized. (U)

(The relevant excerpt from Truman's speech is at Tab A.)⁴

This speech marked the beginning of one of the most creative periods of U.S. diplomacy. Most importantly, it signalled the intention of the U.S. to abandon its past hesitancy and to assume a more activist role internationally. Without this rapid and resolute action on our part, the Soviet Union would have continued to increase its pressure on Turkey and in Greece, and the evolution of Southern Europe and the Middle East would undoubtedly have been quite different. (U)

Today we face a Soviet challenge in an area of the world which is only a little more unfamiliar to most Americans than were Greece and Turkey in 1947. As in 1947, the West looks to us because only we can provide the necessary leadership and resources to turn back the Soviet threat to our interests in the region and beyond. As in 1947, a U.S. public formerly weary of war and international responsibility is in-

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated, typewritten page containing the relevant excerpts from Truman's message.

creasingly ready to respond to a call for a more active American role in the world to protect our vital interests, as the President defines them. There are, however, two sharp differences between the present Soviet challenge in South Asia and the threat in 1947. The Soviet intervention in the present case is both more blatant and more brutal than in 1947, and the Gulf is unquestionably more vital to Western interests today than were Greece and Turkey 30 years ago. (C)

135. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Strategic Reaction to the Afghanistan Problem

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the first time since 1945 that the Soviet Union used its military forces directly to expand its power. This took place even though we warned the Soviet Union of adverse consequences. Moreover, Afghanistan is the seventh² state since 1975 in which communist parties have come to power with Soviet guns and tanks, with Soviet military power and assistance (Vietnam, Angola, Laos, South Yemen, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and now probably Afghanistan). Four of these takeovers occurred since January 1977.

I think it is clear that the Soviets have discounted our likely reaction and that they have concluded that our previous expressions of concern need not be heeded. In effect, because we did not overreact to their previous acts of assertiveness, they have discounted the likelihood of a genuinely punitive reaction on our part to this extraordinary application of Soviet military power.

In the light of the foregoing, I would like to urge you to consider altering our formula on arms for China from "we will not sell arms to

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Geographic File, Box 17, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf Afghanistan: (12/26/79–1/4/80). Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. To the right of the subject line, Brzezinski added the following: "(This was drafted before your very eloquent statement this afternoon. But the recommends. still stand)." Regarding the White House statement of January 3, see footnote 4, Document 136.

² Brzezinski underlined this word.

China" to "we will not sell offensive arms to China."³ This shift in formulation would enable you to provide the Chinese with the over-the-horizon radar and perhaps later with anti-tank weaponry. Given the scale and the boldness of the Soviet move, these reactions are both needed and hardly excessive. Moreover, they would communicate tangibly our willingness to support those who are prepared to stand up to the Soviets, and the Chinese are certainly in that category.

More broadly, we have to move deliberately to fashion a wider security arrangement for the region, lest Soviet influence spread rapidly from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran.⁴ I cannot emphasize strongly enough the strategic consequences of such a development. It would place in direct jeopardy our most vital interests in the Middle East.

The recommended subtle change in terminology, initiating a limited defense arrangement with China, could be the point of departure for a wider security effort in the region. You are already moving firmly on Pakistan, and I believe the Congress will support you. We should implement rapidly your decisions on new bases in the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Oman area, and survey teams will now be going out.⁵

Beyond the above, we will need an aid package for Pakistan, and that could be expensive, though it might be shared with Saudi Arabia. Also, if we can stiffen Pakistan's back, we should be in a position to extend some aid to the Afghani rebels, in order to keep the Soviets bogged down.

Finally, we need to do something to reassure the Egyptians, the Saudis, and others on the Arabian peninsula that the U.S. is prepared to assert its power, and that requires a visible military presence in the area now. You might consider consulting with Sadat about military deployment to an Egyptian base of a U.S. brigade for joint maneuvers.⁶ This would be an impressive demonstration of U.S. determination to contest, if necessary, Soviet military preeminence in the region.

³ Brzezinski placed an arrow and a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. In his memoirs, he indicates that Brown and Donovan supported this proposal, while Vance, Christopher, and Cutler opposed it. According to Brzezinski: "The President concluded that under the present circumstances it would suffice for Brown to indicate to the Chinese that the United States would be willing to provide China with over-the-horizon radar and would give China more favored treatment in trade than the Soviet Union, but that 'it would be a quantum leap to go to arms sales' at this time. It was better, he concluded, to leave that option open." (*Power and Principle*, p. 431)

⁴ Brzezinski placed an arrow and a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

⁶ Brzezinski placed an arrow and a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

The above recommendations require major decisions by you, but I believe that a major historical turning point has been reached. You have the opportunity to do what President Truman did on Greece and Turkey, and I believe that this is desirable both for domestic and international reasons. The country will respond to a firm call for measured but also sustained action, and I am sure the Congressional leadership will support you.

I would recommend that you raise the above issues at the breakfast,⁷ and provide Harold with whatever guidance you think is appropriate for his trip.⁸

⁷ Presumable reference to the January 4 foreign policy breakfast attended by Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, Donovan, Jordan, and Cutler. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

⁸ Reference is to Brown's departure for China on January 4. For documentation on Brown's visit, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 290–295.

136. Address by President Carter to the Nation¹

Washington, January 4, 1980

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

I come to you this evening to discuss the extremely important and rapidly changing circumstances in Southwest Asia.

I continue to share with all of you the sense of outrage and impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American hostages and the holding of them by militant terrorists with the support and the approval of Iranian officials. Our purposes continue to be the protection of the long-range interests of our Nation and the safety of the American hostages.

We are attempting to secure the release of the Americans through the International Court of Justice, through the United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts. We are determined to

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 25–27. The President spoke at 9 a.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. His remarks were broadcast live on radio and television.

achieve this goal. We hope to do so without bloodshed and without any further danger to the lives of our 50 fellow Americans. In these efforts, we continue to have the strong support of the world community. The unity and the common sense of the American people under such trying circumstances are essential to the success of our efforts.

Recently, there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of the peace in Southwest Asia. Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union.

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.

The Soviets claim, falsely, that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But the President, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated—along with several members of his family—after the Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul. Only several days later was the new puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.

The United States wants all nations in the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic, and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies, and our friends.

Therefore, the world simply cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity. Fifty nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan. We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviet

Union and other permanent members may veto action of the Security Council. If the will of the Security Council should be thwarted in this manner, then immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations, where no Soviet veto exists.²

In the meantime, neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow back to Washington.³ He's working with me and with my other senior advisers in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this administration, and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis. As circumstances change in the future, we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review in consultation with the leaders of the Senate.⁴

² On January 14, the General Assembly, meeting in emergency session, approved Resolution A/RES/ES-6/2, which deplored the intervention in Afghanistan and called for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. For the text of both resolutions, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1980, pp. 72–73.

³ On January 2, the National Security Council met from 1 to 3:35 p.m. in order to discuss Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan, SALT II, and Brown's trip to China. Portions of the minutes are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 245 and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, China, Document 287. In a January 2 memorandum to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Turner, and Jones, Brzezinski summarized the decisions reached at the meeting, noting that the President's recall of Watson from Moscow would be announced that day. For the text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 252. At 5:04 p.m., Powell announced the recall, noting that Watson would arrive in Washington on January 3. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 11–12)

⁴ In his January 2 memorandum (see footnote 3 above), Brzezinski stated: "The SALT II Treaty will be left on the Senate calendar. There will be no effort to bring it to the Floor for a vote. Our public posture will be to reaffirm that SALT is important irrespective of the tone of our relationship with the Soviet Union but, at this time, we do not believe it is advisable to bring it to a vote." On January 3, Powell read a statement to reporters assembled in the Briefing Room at the White House; in it, he noted that by letter the President had asked Byrd to delay consideration of SALT II. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 12)

The Soviets must understand our deep concern. We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet consular facilities, and most of the cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted.

I have decided to halt or to reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them.⁵ These new policies are being and will be coordinated with those of our allies.

I've directed that no high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell will not be delivered.⁶ This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.

I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action.⁷ The undelivered grain will be removed from

⁵ Administration officials reached these decisions at the January 2 NSC meeting; see footnote 3 above.

⁶ In a January 3 memorandum to the President, Mondale expressed his opposition to reducing grain sales to the Soviet Union, noting that it benefited the United States to continue these sales and maintain the Soviet market. Mondale conceded that if the President had to take action on grain, he should cancel the agreement for sales in excess of those already contracted. After summarizing the steps the administration had taken and noting that they constituted a "most significant response" to the invasion, Mondale asserted: "I realize that you have to make this decision without regard to politics." However, he stated the impact that such a decision might have on commodity prices and farmer support for the administration, continuing: "Because of that, this decision could undermine your ability to persevere in a strong and unified assault upon the Soviet Union with a unified nation behind you. To me, there is something particularly grubby about using food as a weapon and the use of it could damage us in the international community as well. I might also point out that we did not use the food weapon in the case of the holding of American hostages and I believe to do so now would also raise questions as to how the differences in policy might be justified. I try very hard not to be a hair shirt for you, but I feel very strongly about this matter and have therefore written this memo." (Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Office of the Vice President, Box 205, Memos From the VP to the President [7/1/1979-9/2/1980]) For the full text of Mondale's memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 253. In his diary entry for January 3, the President commented: "After much debate, my inclination is to stop all grain sales to the Soviets above the 8 million tons guaranteed by an international agreement—all for animal feed. Fritz very strongly opposed." (*White House Diary*, p. 388)

⁷ During a January 5 news conference, Bergland indicated that he supported the President's decision and noted that the President had instructed him to take steps to "protect farmers' income." He commented: "We have consistently said that food should not be used as a weapon because as a general rule food assistance goes to people who are poor and hungry and defenseless. But in this instance, we are talking about the Soviet government. The two are not the same. The Soviet Union has invaded by armed aggres-

the market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices.⁸ We will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the alleviation of hunger in poor countries, and we'll have a massive increase of the use of grain for gasohol production here at home.

After consultation with other principal grain-exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments on their part to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans, but there is absolutely no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and in the interest of the security of our own Nation, and they are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and others who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north. The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined tonight. I have consulted with leaders of the Congress, and I am confident they will support legislation that may be required to carry out these measures.

History teaches, perhaps, very few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression, unopposed, becomes a contagious disease.

sion a country—an independent, free-standing state. The President had a choice to make. Do we sit idly by and continue to accommodate the Soviet's whims and demands? Or do we say no, we're not going to simply conduct business as usual? He took the proper action. I support him and I think ultimately the farmers and other citizens of the country will support the President in this enterprise." (*American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, Document 412)

⁸ In separate memoranda to Bergland and Acting Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, Jr., dated January 7, the President directed each to terminate shipments of agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union. The Secretaries could grant export licenses for the shipment of 8 million MT of wheat and corn per year, under the terms of a 1975 agreement. In the letter to Bergland, Carter directed that he take "action, through commodity purchases, and through the price support and grain reserve programs, to protect America's farmers from the impact of this unanticipated action." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 31)

The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action.

With the support of the American people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, we will protect our Nation's security, and we will preserve the peace. The United States will meet its responsibilities.

Thank you very much.

137. Editorial Note

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski took part in a briefing for non-Washington editorial page editors and writers on January 8, 1980. The briefing took place from 11:36 a.m. to 12:01 p.m. in the Old Executive Office Building. Brzezinski initiated the session by stating:

"I thought that it might be most useful if I were to open with a few little comments, and then perhaps respond to any questions that you may wish to raise. We are obviously going through a very serious beginning for the new decade. Perhaps, however, it is not only symbolic that these events are taking place in the first year of the 1980s.

"We have entered the fifth decade of U.S.-Soviet competition. I think it is useful to think about that, particularly for you, since you are editorial writers, in an historical perspective. The decade of the '40s was the decade of U.S. entrance into world affairs, and of Soviet expansion because of the vacuum that developed as a consequence of World War Two.

"The decade of the '50s brought the definition of clear lines in the West and in the Far East; Berlin and Korea; and obviously I am oversimplifying here. The decade of the '60s was that premature global competition, with the Soviets, under Khrushchev, moving out too abruptly and without sufficient power base, resulting in the conflict in Cuba and the respite for the United States, this shaken by the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

"The decade of the '70s was the decade of Soviet build-up, but also accommodation; the search for a more enduring cooperative relationship. What will the decade of the '80s be? That is the central issue now confronting us. And that is the issue which is at stake in Afghanistan.

"It can also be a decade of cooperation, not only under arms control but over the wider issues that should concern too much U.S. global

power—global cooperation and so forth. It can, however, also be a decade of conflict, of conflict arising out of the new reality of overlapping imperial power. For the first time, not only is American power global but Soviet power is becoming global.

“The President takes a very serious view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan because it is an exercise of power outside of the established perimeters, whatever the moral justification, drawn as a consequence of World War Two. It is the first time that Soviet military forces have been used beyond the lines that were drawn historically by May, 1945. And they are being used, also, not against a country engaged in the East-West conflict, but a neutral, non-aligned country.

“We have undertaken a response to this action of Soviet intervention and aggression. That response is designed to be punitive and also to be a warning. That response requires national support. I do hope, I expect, that it will be forthcoming, because I think the American people realize that there are important issues involved. That response will be a sustained one. It is not a flash in the pan.

“But beyond that, as a nation, and U.S. opinion-makers, we have to think about not only responding to the act, but also of responding to the consequences of the act. The consequences of the act are regional and strategic in nature, and not local and limited; they are regional and strategic in nature. They do involve the stability of the region, which is potentially of vital importance to us, and to those who are of vital importance to us.

“And this is why we are confronted with a problem which in some respects bears historical analogy to the challenge that President Truman confronted when, in the late winter of 1947, he was abruptly informed that he had six weeks in which to decide whether to replace the British as the stabilizing ally for two wobbly, internally-ruled, highly-vulnerable countries remote from the United States by distance and culture: Turkey and Greece. These were countries much further from us geographically then than are Pakistan and Iran today.

“So this is the perspective which I would like to share with you on a problem which is a serious one, and which requires a great deal of national attention, which calls for a very mature and responsible response, which we do not view as a subject that requires a debate, but rather a serious national commitment.

“It is useful in this context to be reminded that this is not, this is the Soviet Union—this is part of a process which has involved us now over four decades. Perhaps that is enough by way of a very broad connection. Perhaps I can now respond to more specific points. And I would appreciate it if you would identify yourselves, because I don’t know who you are, and maybe your colleagues don’t know.”

Brzezinski then responded to questions concerning Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and India. He concluded his remarks by thanking the participants, adding:

“I wish this could go on longer because we are dealing here with some vital issues. But I wish you well. And I think particularly at this time it is terribly important that the American public, through you, look at the problems we face in a realistic way—but also not in an overly dramatized fashion. I think what they have to understand is that this is a long haul proposition. The competition has lasted for 40 years; it is not going to end quickly; there are not going to be victors or losers in it very quickly, unless we fold up entirely, which we do not intend to do.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Schecter/Friendly (Press) File, Box 1, Brzezinski Briefings and Backgrounders (Press and Public): 1/80)

138. Address by President Carter on the State of the Union Before a Joint Session of Congress¹

Washington, January 23, 1980

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker,² Members of the 96th Congress, fellow citizens:

This last few months has not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our Union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our Union.

The 1980's have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 194–200. The President spoke at 9 p.m. in the House Chamber at the Capitol. O'Neill introduced the President. The address was broadcast live on radio and television. Additional information about the preparation of the State of the Union address is in the Carter Library, Hertzberg Donated Historical Material, Speech Files, Box 12, State of the Union Drafts With Staff Comments, 1/23/80. In telegram 21783 to all diplomatic and consular posts, January 26, the Department provided background information for use in discussions with host country officials concerning the address or broader foreign policy themes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800044–1090)

² Reference is to Magnuson and O'Neill.

At this time in Iran, 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

I'm determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is.

Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together, squarely and courageously. We will face these challenges, and we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our Nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will not yield to blackmail.

We continue to pursue these specific goals: first, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States; secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure, as quickly as possible, their safe release, if possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens; to enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence, which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world; and also to convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north, in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan, and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages are released.

But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union.

Now, as during the last 3½ decades, the relationship between our country, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union is the most

critical factor in determining whether the world will live at peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

In the 1940's we took the lead in creating the Atlantic Alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.

In the 1950's we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we rearmed to assure the continuation of that containment.

In the 1960's we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin, and we faced the Cuban missile crisis. And we sought to engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.

And in the 1970's three American Presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt the growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive, not only for the sake of our two nations but for the security and peace of the entire world.

In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power, and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That's why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—SALT I and SALT II. Especially now, in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort to control nuclear weapons will not be abandoned.

We superpowers also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure.

But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression.

While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union. That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic penalties on the Soviet Union.³ I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States. I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products. I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items. And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.⁴

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which

³ See Document 136 and footnotes 4, 5, and 6 thereto.

⁴ In a January 20 letter to Kane, the President urged the Committee to advise the International Olympics Committee that if the Soviet Union failed to remove its troops from Afghanistan within the next month, "Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will." The President also recommended that if the troops were not removed, the USOC should propose that the games be held in Montreal (the site of the 1976 Summer Olympics) or at a variety of sites, or be cancelled. He added that if the International Olympics Committee rejected that proposal, he would urge the USOC and other Olympic Committees not to participate in the Moscow games. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 106–107)

most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years, you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world. We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the Five Year Defense Program. It's imperative that Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981, encompassing a 5-percent real growth in authorizations, without any reduction.

We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas. We've helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances, and recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized, intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.⁵

We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 131.

historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when Ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.⁶

We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western Pacific.

We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.⁷

We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity.⁸ The United States will take action consistent with our own laws to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.⁹

In the weeks ahead, we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region. We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.

Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing

⁶ On January 25, Israel returned a portion of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt; the two nations were scheduled to exchange ambassadors within in a month. (Christopher S. Wren, "Israel Returns Biggest Part of Sinai So Far to Egypt, Finishing First Stage," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1980, p. A-1)

⁷ Documentation on these arrangements is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

⁸ On March 5, 1959, at Ankara, the United States signed defense agreements with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1958–1960*, vol. XV, South and Southeast Asia, Document 346.

⁹ Brzezinski and Christopher traveled to Pakistan at the end of January in order to meet with Zia and Shahi to discuss security concerns. Following 2 days of talks in Islamabad, Brzezinski announced on February 3 that the aid package the President proposed would be postponed. In the interim, the administration would seek support from other nations in assisting Pakistan. (Stuart Auerbach, "U.S. to Seek Help From Other Nations on Aid to Pakistan," *The Washington Post*, February 4, 1980, p. A-18) The White House did announce on January 31 that the President had pledged \$5 million to the UNHCR Afghan relief program, designed to aid Afghan refugees fleeing to Pakistan, and \$300,000 in grant aid to voluntary organizations for use in their relief programs. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 256–257)

values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation which we represent and those of our allies—in Europe and the Pacific, and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and Southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our Nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they are doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer forces are adequate for current defense needs, and I hope that it will not become necessary to impose a draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the Selective Service System must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.¹⁰

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information, and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear. We can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engaged in promoting world peace. We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together through open, democratic methods, the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring.

¹⁰ For the President's February 8 statement on Selective Service revitalization, see *ibid.*, pp. 289–291. In his diary entry for January 23, he noted, "Up until the last minute I had to fight off the draft dodgers in my group who didn't want registration, but Harold [Brown], Cy, Zbig, Jody, Hamilton, Rosalynn, Lloyd [Cutler], Jerry [Schecter] all agree with me." (*White House Diary*, p. 394)

That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America’s first goal. In the coming years, as a mighty nation we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation’s security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

As you well know, I have been working with the Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past 3 years to meet this need. We have made progress together. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation.¹¹ Our Nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in the United States, and our Nation’s most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8 percent and gasoline consumption by 5 percent below what it was the year before. Now we must do more.

After consultation with the Governors, we will set gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 States, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met.

I’ve established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 million barrels a day—well below the level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an oil import fee if necessary. I’m prepared to lower these imports still further if the other oil-consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing immediately.

The single biggest factor in the inflation rate last year, the increase in the inflation rate last year, was from one cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil—and at the same time reduce inflation.

¹¹ Reference is to the Energy Security Act (P.L. 96–294), introduced in the Senate on April 9, 1979, which the President signed on June 30.

As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But all of us can conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you—in fact, all the people of America—to help our Nation. Conserve energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 indeed a year of energy conservation.

Of course, we must take other actions to strengthen our Nation's economy.

First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the Federal budget.

Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we'll build also on the historic national accord with organized labor to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary Government regulation.

Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new program to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste." We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980's.

And fifth, we must use the decade of the 1980's to attack the basic structural weaknesses and problems in our economy through measures to increase productivity, savings, and investment.

With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade—just as our foreign and defense policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world. We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America—and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad.

Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us, "You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980's with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want: an America strong and free, an America at peace, an America with equal rights for all citizens—and for women, guaranteed in the United States Constitution—an America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen, an America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities

and on our farms, an America that helps to feed the world, an America secure in filling its own energy needs, an America of justice, tolerance, and compassion. For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people.

Together as one people, let us work to build our strength at home, and together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world.

Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement.

Thank you very much.

139. Editorial Note

On January 28, 1980, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski took part in a briefing for editorial page editors and writers on foreign policy issues. The briefing took place from 3:33 to 4:09 p.m. in the Old Executive Office Building. Brzezinski indicated in his opening remarks that he would emphasize three points:

"The first is that the constructive agenda that the President set for himself three years ago remains both still valid and binding in spite of the events that have transpired in the last few weeks and which do call for sustained response. When we assumed office we were deeply conscious of the fact that America was somehow becoming increasingly irrelevant to a world of very rapid change and there were many concerns that were apparently indifferent to us and yet were motivating much of mankind, and there were problems of a global type which needed urgent addressing: nonproliferation, development, food, regional conflicts, human rights.

"I want to stress that even though we have been necessarily preoccupied in recent weeks with matters of a more traditional type, a military challenge with strategic consequences, these issues still remain of importance to us and we will pursue them, for a very good reason. Unless we do so, we are going to be living in a world which will be more and more hostile to our values and more and more opposed to our interests. We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to our children, to try to shape a more decent world. I know it sounds maudlin and it sounds trite, but it is a central fact, that if this country is to preserve its well-being and its way of life, we have to shape a more decent world, a

more cooperative world, and that in turn means addressing ourselves to the genuine and real concerns of the world that is now politically awakened, that is no longer controlled by a few empires based in Europe, that is genuinely organized politically.

"This is why the constructive agenda to which we remain dedicated is still binding and I stress that particularly because I know that I am seeing, as the person who in this administration is more preoccupied with the other things that I will be talking about in a second, and indeed I am and have been, because my job is national security, and these other things are an immediate danger to our national security. But I simply wish to put it to you that our national security also depends on shaping a more decent world, and this is something that concerns the President, that concerns me very deeply, and I know the Secretary of State has been very actively and successfully engaged in dealing with these problems, and I do not wish the inference to be drawn that we are now fundamentally altering our foreign policy. We are not.

"This being said, let me go on to the other two points. The first is that *détente* is indivisible. We probably will be facing before too long a Soviet peace offensive designed at dividing us from our allies, the West Europeans, the Japanese, from us. It should not work. In my judgment it will not work. There is no such thing as having *détente* with the Soviet Union in one part of the world and open competition and the use of force in another part of the world. This is something which I am sure our allies understand well, and I think that the Soviets will find the West, by which I mean essentially the industrial democracies, including Japan, to be united on this very fundamental issue.

"This doesn't mean that we want to drive the West Germans, for example, into renewed Cold War intentions in an area of great sensitivity to them, such as Berlin and the flow of human beings across the German frontier. We have recognized the specificity of some of the countries concerned.

"But on the fundamental issues we feel and they feel that our common stakes are engaged and that we will not let a Soviet propaganda campaign divide us. But we ought to expect such a campaign. Indeed, it is beginning to surface.

"The final point which I want to stress is that security is increasingly indivisible. It may seem like an obvious point but it really isn't yet, in practice. The fact of the matter is that there are three central strategic zones of importance to the United States: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Mideast. In two of these zones we have a permanent military presence and obligatory commitments. In the third one, the Mideast, we do not. We have neither. Yet in recent years all three have become almost equally important to us and of an interdependent im-

portance to us in the sense that jeopardy to any one of the three jeopardizes the other two and directly involves—and jeopardizes our own interests. We could not afford to lose Western Europe. We could not afford to lose the Far East and we cannot afford to lose the Mideast.

“So we have now a situation in which there are three central strategic zones, each of which is important to us, and a jeopardy to any one of those three means jeopardy to the other two and cumulatively to us. Yet we do not have security arrangements which fully reflect that reality. We do not have that. And we will not have them, in an identical sense, in all three regions. We are not aiming at a repetition of the European experience, for example, in the Mideast, a NATO-type alliance.

“But we are moving, clearly, towards an enhancement of our political and military presence in that part of the world in order to increase its security. That is an important strategic development and it reflects the notion that security is increasingly indivisible, and this being the case, there will be some pressures towards greater consultations within the Alliance and with our allies on these matters, and thus over time a more symbiotic relationship will develop in terms of political consultations, perhaps even some military arrangements between all three zones.

“We are far from it yet. The Japanese, certainly, are not even militarily engaged fully in their own defense so we can’t expect them to be engaged in the defense of the Mideast. The Europeans have enough on their own hands to assure the defense of Western Europe and we have some very active business that we are conducting with them such as theater nuclear force deployments. So they are not going to move into the Mideast to help us.

“Nonetheless, there is emerging now a greater sense of concern, a willingness to consult on security matters, a greater willingness to consult on economic aid to the Persian Gulf, West Asia and East region and thus in effect a new important historical trend is being set into motion, translating on the political/military plane to reality of the interdependence of the three security zones.

“So those are the three propositions which I would like to put to you very broadly and perhaps it may serve as a conceptual framework for the discussion we can now have on current developments or policies.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Schecter/Friendly (Press) File, Box 1, Brzezinski Briefings and Backgrounders (Press and Public): 1/80)

140. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 30, 1980

SUBJECT

The Skeleton of a Strategy for the Middle East

The purpose of our Persian Gulf strategy is to protect our vital interests there—interests shared with Europe and Japan. Because the projection of Soviet power and influence into the region is the major threat to those interests at the moment, countering those is the first priority strategic task.

In effect, we have to complete the third phase of the great architectural task undertaken by the United States after World War II. We constructed an alliance in Western Europe; we undertook explicit defense commitments in the Far East; we built CENTO, a regional security organization that never really flourished. Now we need to shape a more flexible framework for regional security in the Middle East. That regional security framework will have to avoid excessive formality, adapt to the realities of intraregional conflicts, and facilitate varieties of participation by concerned friends both in the region and in the other two central strategic zones, Western Europe and the Far East.

The following outlines a number of steps we are either taking or need to consider taking in order to fulfill your vision of the security requirements and American interests in the region. The essence of our strategy is to strengthen our presence and capability by

- establishing facilities for U.S. forces;
- strengthening friendly governments and the security cooperation among them; and
- reducing the influence of the Soviet Union, its surrogates (Cuba, the GDR) and its friends (PDRY).

You are well aware of our work on obtaining facilities in the region and improving our rapid reaction force capabilities. We plan to strengthen friendly governments and the security cooperation among them by engaging in joint efforts to protect Pakistan, support the Afghan rebels, and reduce the threat of the PDRY against Oman, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In the latter connection, we will also be cooperating with our European allies, and possibly the Jordanians and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 55, Chron, 1/18–31/80. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

Egyptians, both in operations and contingency plans. Our long-term objective can be described as a Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region with a permanent U.S. naval presence and surge capability, an Afghanistan whose neutrality has been restored, a strengthened Pakistan, a more cohesive and cooperative Iran, and an Arabian Peninsula free from threat from the PDRY.

We have taken a number of actions to begin the implementation of our Persian Gulf strategy. A status report follows.

Please indicate whether you would wish an NSC meeting on some of the following subjects, whether some of them in your judgment should be dropped, and whether you have any specific or general guidance that you could give us as we continue to work on the following:

Actions Undertaken and/or Ongoing

1. *Political/Diplomatic:*

—The State of the Union Address.²

—Agha Shahi visit to Washington.³

—Reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement with Pakistan,⁴ new definition of assurances, and consultations with Congress.

—Development of political assurances for states providing military facilities (Oman, Somalia, Kenya—before SCC).⁵

—Approaches to Spain, Morocco, and others about enroute basing and overflight support (in progress).

—Christopher trip to Europe on Afghanistan and East-West relations.⁶

—Brown mission to China.⁷

—Clifford mission to India.⁸

—Brzezinski/Christopher mission to Pakistan.⁹

² See Document 138.

³ Administration officials met with Shahi in Washington on January 12. (Graham Hovey, "Washington Vows to Help Pakistan: Carter and Vance Meet Islamabad Official in Response to Soviet Actions in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, January 13, 1980, p. 15)

⁴ See footnote 8, Document 138.

⁵ Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

⁶ Christopher consulted with officials in London, Rome, Bonn, and Paris during mid-January. Records of these meetings are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

⁷ See footnote 8, Document 135.

⁸ Clifford met with Gandhi in New Delhi at the end of January.

⁹ See footnote 9, Document 138.

2. *Economics:*

—Actions for the Persian Gulf region:

- Economic aid package for Pakistan: bilateral (ready); multilateral (being negotiated).
- German efforts to reschedule Turkish debt.
- Bilateral refugee aid to Pakistan.

3. *Military:*

—Bartholomew/Murray mission to Oman, Somalia, and Kenya for military facilities (in progress).¹⁰

—Technical teams for base surveys in Oman and Somalia (there).

—Initial effort to create a military consortium for aid to Pakistan (Japan, Saudi Arabia, U.K., France, and FRG—underway).

—Bilateral U.S. military aid to Pakistan.

—Military exercises:

- AWACs to Egypt.
- B-52 flights over Indian Ocean.
- Marine Amphibious Unit enroute to the Arabian Sea may conduct one or more exercises if local states agree (Oman, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt), and if you approve.

—Increased U.S. Naval presence in the Indian Ocean (two carrier battle groups).

—RDF (forces allocated, JTF in progress of formation, limited contingency planning).

4. *Intelligence:*

—Special efforts toward Iran.

—[1 line not declassified]

—Carlucci mission to Saudi Arabia.

—Several “Presidential findings.”

Actions Under Consideration

1. *Political/Diplomatic:*

—Meeting of the seven foreign ministers on aid to Pakistan (being scheduled).

2. *Economic:*

—7-nation consortium for Pakistan: German lead on Turkey.

¹⁰ Documentation on the joint Department of State–Department of Defense delegation to the region is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

3. *Military:*

—RDF sea-lift improvement: rapid acquisition of commercial RO/RO ships and SL-7 class transports.

—Expansion of Diego Garcia facilities.

—Brigade exercise in Egypt (employing forces now based in the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, for example).

—Contingency planning with Jordan and with U.K. and France for a crisis in Arabian Peninsula.

4. *Intelligence:*

—Iraq connection.

Additional Steps to Consider

1. *Political/Diplomatic:*

—Western Summit (in addition to the foreign ministers meeting).¹¹

—Propaganda offensives against Cuban and GDR involvement in the Persian Gulf region.¹²

—Steps to accelerate the West Bank autonomy talks.

—Further high level China/U.S. visit (President to China; Hua to U.S.).¹³

2. *Economic:*

—Long-term program of economic aid to Turkey and Pakistan by Europeans and Japan.¹⁴

—Alter U.S. position on sanctions toward Iran.¹⁵

3. *Military:*

—Form a separate U.S. unified command for the Persian Gulf region.

—Shift our military assistance groups into training and management assistance, not just military sales (critical for all MAAGs on the Arabian peninsula).

—Military facilities in Pakistan.

—French aircraft carrier to replace U.S. carrier in the Mediterranean?

¹¹ The President placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this point.

¹² The President wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this and the following point.

¹³ The President wrote “later” in the right-hand margin next to this point.

¹⁴ The President wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this point.

¹⁵ The President underlined the word “alter” and wrote “no” in the right-hand margin next to this point.

4. *Intelligence:**[2 lines not declassified]*

141. Memorandum From Hedley Donovan to President Carter¹

Washington, February 20, 1980

Maybe this is already going on somewhere in State or NSC, but if not, I believe you and the country would be well served by a high-level study of U.S. foreign policy options and objectives, 1980–85.

I do not have in mind a public Presidential Commission! I was thinking of a few very good people detached from operational duties for a few months.² They should work under the general direction of Cy or Zbig (or somehow both?) with a firm understanding that this study is expressly ordered by the President.

The underlying principles and premises of U.S. foreign policy should be re-examined, clothed in concrete detail, and ranked by priorities.

There is considerable confusion today, among our Allies, probably in the Soviet leadership, and certainly in U.S. opinion, about the basic philosophy of your Administration in foreign policy. The confusion will be exploited and compounded as the election campaign unfolds. But there is also genuine and legitimate confusion. It is not simple to answer the simple question: Has Carter's foreign policy changed? What is left of detente? How Allied are our Allies?

Along with these profound questions about the direction of policy, there are almost equally important questions of the ways and means. How should our impending military buildup be shaped to give maximum support to our long-range strategic objectives in foreign policy?

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Donovan Files, Box 1, Foreign Policy Study, 1980–85 [CF, O/A 706]. Eyes Only. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. A copy of a subsequent report, which consists of two binders and is entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities, 1980–85," is in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 20.

² In a 3-page August 12 memorandum from Donovan to the President, contained within the final report (see footnote 1 above), Donovan indicated that the Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and International Communications Agency prepared the 24 chapters constituting the report.

What kind of intelligence capabilities are needed for whatever kind of world we foresee?

I have been struck in my brief experience here with the difficulty that even the most thoughtful people have in finding time to think about the year after next. Iran and Afghanistan have of course imposed exceptionally heavy day-to-day pressures. But even pre-Iran it was my impression that the top people in foreign policy, including the President, had little chance to stand off from immediate problems and think ahead.

I have also been struck by the high quality and quantity of the *compartmented* wisdom within the government foreign policy community. I had an interesting conversation the other day with our Ambassador-Designate to Turkey.³ He has quite concrete policy proposals and is prepared to guess/hope that within specific periods of time these could lead to certain specific improvements in the internal stability of Turkey and its dependability as an Ally. These proposals would add up to his U.S. “program” for Turkey over the next several years. Some of his ideas may be debatable; there may be Jim McIntyre constraints he doesn’t appreciate, etc., but I am confident that the intellectual resources exist in Washington to establish a coherent set of U.S. objectives and expectations for Turkey. And I’m sure the appropriate experts could build a list of U.S. “programs” and scenarios, 1980–85, for the 30 or 40 most important countries and all the major regions. These could be valuable pieces of paper; still more valuable would be a systematic effort to look at the separate programs and scenarios *in relation to each other*.

I have asked previously whether you were satisfied there is enough “contingency” planning in our foreign policy. I ran up a list of a dozen or so contingencies, some obvious, some perhaps outlandish. A much larger and more knowledgeable list could of course be drawn up. This kind of thinking should be a major element in the foreign policy study I am proposing. And again, there should be a systematic effort to relate different places and situations to each other. If Contingency A happens in Country B, does it increase the likelihood of Contingency C in Country D, and what might be the further consequences in Countries E and F?

To be factored into all these projections: Assumptions about energy, trade and investment, aid, the dollar.

³ Reference is to Spain, whom the President appointed Ambassador to Turkey on February 19.

142. Editorial Note

On March 27, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to provide an overview of the Carter administration's foreign policy. Vance noted that for the past 4 months concern had been focused on southwest Asia, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan. Decisions made in any of those areas, he continued, had to be placed within a broader, strategic outline. Responses needed to focus on immediate concerns, while taking into account long-term strategic interests. Vance suggested that his appearance before the Committee could serve the purpose of solidifying "broad agreement on the general course that best suits America's interests and needs in the coming decade." Recognizing that a full consensus proved unlikely given the complexity of an independent world, he, nonetheless, stated:

"But I do believe that despite differences on decisions that we have made and that we and others will make during the 1980s, our nation can now shape a new foreign policy consensus about our goals in the world and the essential strands of our strategy to pursue them.

"This consensus can be built around agreement on two central points.

"—First, the United States must maintain a military balance of power. Our defense forces must remain unsurpassed. Our strategic deterrent must be unquestionable. Our conventional forces must be strong enough and flexible enough to meet the full range of military threats we may face. As a global power, we must maintain the global military balance. Our strength is important to our own safety, to a strong foreign policy free from coercion, to the confidence of allies and friends, and to the future of reciprocal arms control and other negotiations. Our strength also buttresses regional balances that could be upset by the direct or indirect use of Soviet power.

"—The second central point is this: that our military strength, while an essential condition for an effective foreign policy, is not in itself a sufficient condition. We must nurture and draw upon our other strengths as well—our alliances and other international ties, our economic resources, our ability to deal with diversity, and our ideals. By drawing fully on these strengths, we can help shape world events now in ways that reduce the likelihood of using military force later. A global American foreign policy can succeed only if it has both these dimensions.

"Some have argued that a strong response to Soviet military growth and aggression is overreaction. But to disregard the growth of Soviet military programs and budgets or to explain away aggression as a defensive maneuver is to take refuge in illusion.

“It is just as illusory, and just as dangerous, to believe that there can be a fortress America or that the world will follow our lead solely because of our military strength. America’s future depends not only on our growing military power; it also requires the continued pursuit of energy security and arms control, of human rights and economic development abroad.

“As we look to the 1980s, our first obligation is to see the world clearly. We confront a serious and sustained Soviet challenge, which is both military and political. Their military buildup continues unabated. The Soviet Union has shown a greater willingness to employ that power directly and through others. In that sense, Afghanistan is a manifestation of a larger problem, evident also in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.

“The world economic order is undergoing dramatic change. An energy crisis has rocked its foundations. Economic interdependence has become a daily reality for the citizens of every nation. At the same time, the assertion of national independence has reshaped the political geography of the planet. There is a profusion of different systems and allegiances and a diffusion of political and military power. Within nations, we see an accelerating rise in individual expectations.

“These challenges require a full American engagement in the world—a resolve to defend our vital interests with force if necessary and to address potential causes of conflict before they erupt. These hearings can help illuminate how best to order and serve the wide range of interests we have in a world grown increasingly complex.

“In my remarks today, I will discuss eight central American interests for the coming years. Each is broad in its own terms. But I do not believe that any of these interests can be narrowed, much less disregarded, without doing damage to the others.

“—Our most basic interest, and first priority, is the physical security of our nation—the safety of our people. This requires strong defense forces and strong alliances.

“—It also requires that we and our allies firmly and carefully manage a second area of concern: East-West relations.

“—A third area of interest—controlling the growth and spread of nuclear and other weapons—enhances our collective security and international stability.

“—Fourth, we must confront the global energy crisis and strengthen the international economy; for doing so is central to our well-being as a people and our strength as a nation.

“—A fifth interest, peace in troubled areas of the world, reduces potential threats of wider war and removes opportunities for our rivals to extend their influence.

“—Our diplomacy in troubled regions and our ability to pursue our global economic goals are strengthened by pursuing a sixth interest: broadening our ties to other nations—with China, for example, and throughout the Third World.

“—The advancement of human rights is more than an ideal. It, too, is an interest. Peaceful gains for freedom are also steps toward stability abroad and greater security for America.

“—And finally, we cannot disregard our interest in addressing environmental and other longer term global trends that can imperil our future.”

Vance then discussed in greater detail these eight elements of a broader American foreign policy before offering his concluding remarks:

“I know that no one is more acutely aware of the breadth and complexity of our challenges than the members of this committee. We face a broad agenda. It requires constant, hard choices among compelling yet competing interests. In a dangerous world, it requires a willingness to defend our vital interests with force when necessary and a diplomacy of active and constructive engagement to reduce the dangers we may confront. It requires sacrifice in resources for our defense and help for other nations, in reduced consumption of energy, and efforts to control inflation. It will test our wisdom and our persistence.

“We will be badly served if we fail to understand a world of rapid change and shy away from its complexity. The flat truth is that complex problems can seldom be resolved by simple solutions.

“Some have said that we are trying to do too much. I say that we cannot afford to do less, in our own national interest.

“Some say that in trying to do too much, we have accomplished too little. I say that in strengthening our military posture, in reemphasizing and strengthening NATO, in negotiating the SALT II Treaty, in normalizing relations with China, in helping to achieve peace between Israel and Egypt and a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, in advancing peace in Zimbabwe, in the Panama Canal treaties, in the successful multilateral trade negotiations and other improvements in the international economic system, in closer ties to developing nations, and in promoting human rights—in all these areas, I say we are on the right road, even if it is a long and difficult one.

“Some say that in seeking peaceful change toward human justice in every area of the world, we encourage radicalism. I say that the world is changing, that human beings everywhere will demand a better life. The United States must offer its own vision of a better future, or the future will belong to others.

“Some have said that the executive and legislative branches cannot collaborate effectively on foreign policy. I say that the record over the past few years has been a good one.

“Some say that America is in a period of decline. I am convinced they are wrong.

“There is no question that the years to come present a somber prospect. Soviet challenge in Afghanistan and beyond, energy crisis, revolutionary explosions when expectations run ahead of progress—such current events are all too likely to be harbingers of the trends of the coming decade. This is the reality we confront.

“But it is also a reality that our strengths—military, economic, and political—give us an unmatched capacity for world leadership. We can succeed if we combine power with determination, persistence, and patience. We can make progress if we promote the full range of our interests and use the full range of our strengths.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1980, pages 16–25)

Vance later wrote that his March 27 testimony served as his “final opportunity as secretary of state to define and explain America’s foreign policy and its role in a changing world.” In assessing his appearance, he noted:

“I had hoped the March 27 hearing would spark a serious discussion in Congress, the press, and inside the administration about the way the United States should conduct itself in a world in which the many complex problems are not susceptible to solution by simple answers or the use of military power alone. I was convinced that the main lines of our foreign policy remained valid and would stand up well under a searching cross-examination. But televised hearings do not encourage such debate. The senators were more interested in the events of the moment, such as the grain embargo and energy. Senator Si Haya-kawa carried this one step further by pressing me on the burning issue of collecting traffic fines from Iranian students in Washington.” (*Hard Choices*, pages 395–397)

143. Address by Vice President Mondale¹

Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 12, 1980

U.S. Call for an Olympic Boycott

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the honorary President of the U.S. Olympic Committee—the President of the United States. And I am delighted to be in the lovely community of Colorado Springs, the home of the U.S. Olympic Committee.

I speak to you as leaders dedicated to amateur sport and as citizens dedicated to America's best interests. I know that everyone in this room loves our country. And I want to express the nation's gratitude for your efforts at Lake Placid to persuade the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to move or postpone the Moscow games.² I thank your leaders as well for stating that the committee would be guided by the President's decision on the best interests of the nation.³

As we meet today, the lesson of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan still waits to be drawn. History holds its breath; for what is at stake is no less than the future security of the civilized world. If one nation can be subjugated by Soviet aggression, is any sovereign nation truly safe

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1980, pp. 14–15. All brackets are in the original. Mondale delivered his address before the U.S. Olympic Committee House of Delegates. Earlier drafts of the address are in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Special Assistant for Speech Writing, Speech Text Files, Address to United States Olympic Committee House of Delegates, Colorado Springs, Colorado, April 12, 1980. Later that day, the United States Olympic Committee voted to support the President's call for a boycott of the Moscow games. (Steven R. Weisman, "U.S. Olympic Group Votes to Boycott the Moscow Games," *The New York Times*, April 13, 1980, pp. A-1, A-18) Earlier, the President sent a mailgram to Kane, dated April 5, and similar mailgrams to the House of Delegates members reiterating his belief that the USOC should vote not to send the U.S. Olympic team to Moscow: "There are times when individuals and nations must stand firm on matters of principle. This is such a time. If we clearly and resolutely show the way, other nations will follow." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 616) Documentation on the Olympic boycott is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XXV, United Nations; Law of the Sea.

² On February 8, Kane addressed the executive board of the International Olympics Committee, meeting in Lake Placid, New York, prior to the start of the 1980 Winter Olympics, and requested that the Summer Olympics be relocated from Moscow. (Neil Amdur, "U.S. Olympic Chief Says Soviet Broke Games Contract," *The New York Times*, February 9, 1980, pp. A-1, A-4) Vance, an honorary Vice President of the U.S. Olympic Committee, spoke before the International Olympics Committee on February 9; for his remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, p. 50. On February 12, the International Olympics Committee reaffirmed the decision to allow the Olympics to proceed in Moscow. (Neil Amdur, "World Committee Reaffirms Moscow as Site of Olympics," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1980, pp. A-1, A-12)

³ The White House, on February 20, released the text of a statement indicating that the President had informed the USOC that the United States should not send an Olympic team to Moscow. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981*, Book I, p. 356)

from that fate? If 100,000 Russian troops, and the barbaric use of lethal gas, and the specter of nightly assassinations—if these fail to alarm us, what will? If the Soviet lunge toward the most strategic oil-rich spot on Earth fails to unite us, what will? And if we and our allies and friends fail to use every single peaceful means available to preserve the peace, what hope is there that peace will long be preserved?

While history holds its breath, America has moved decisively. To show the Soviet Union that it cannot invade another nation and still conduct business as usual with the United States, our country has embargoed 17 million tons of grain, tightened controls on high technology trade, limited Soviet fishing in our waters, raised our defense budget to upgrade all aspects of our forces, strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, intensified development of our rapid deployment forces, and offered to help other sovereign states in the region to maintain their security.

In the U.N. General Assembly, the United States joined more than 100 other nations in an unprecedented majority calling for the immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.⁴ But the President, the Congress, and the American people understand that a world which travels to the Moscow games devalues its condemnation and offers its complicity to Soviet propaganda.

I am convinced that the American people do not want their athletes cast as pawns in that tawdry propaganda charade. And I urge you to respect that undeniable consensus. Your decision today is not a question of denying our Olympic team the honor they deserve; for the American people, as you know, deeply respect the sacrifice we are asking our athletes to make. It is no longer a question of whether participation in the Moscow Olympics confers legitimacy on Soviet aggression. When the Communist Party prints a million handbooks to tell its top activists that the Summer Games mean world respect for Soviet foreign policy, surely that issue is behind us.

Nor is it a question of drawing a line between sports and politics. That line the Soviets long ago erased. When billions of rubles are diverted to the games from Soviet domestic needs; when Moscow and other Olympic cities are purged of dissidents who might speak out; when Soviet children who might meet Western people and ideas on the streets are packed off to internal exile; when Soviet emissaries roam the globe offering athletes expense-paid trips to Moscow; when Soviet sports officials distort the number of teams committed to participating—surely the issue of Soviet politics in Soviet sports is also behind us.

Above all, the decision you will make today is not a choice between a sports issue and a national security issue; for the President and Congress have made it clear that the Olympic boycott is a genuine ele-

ment of America's response to the invasion of Afghanistan. It is an unambiguous statement of our national resolve. It is a keystone in our call to our allies for solidarity.

We must not—and cannot—break that link between America's power to check aggression and America's call for an Olympic boycott. Your vote is a test of our will, our confidence, our values, and our power to keep the peace through peaceful means. It is not a partisan issue—for both political parties resoundingly supported the President's action in Congress. It is not a parochial issue; for the American people overwhelmingly agree that we must not go to Moscow.

And it is not just a national issue—for citizens and governments throughout the world share our judgment. From his exile in Gorky, Andrei Sakharov—the unsilenceable father of human rights and the father of the Russian H-bomb—calls on America, saying that “a united position on the Moscow Olympic Games must obviously be a basic part” of the world's response. This morning, as many as 50 nations—leading political and sports powers—await your signal to join us.

Athletes and sports organizations and national bodies around the world await your lead to mobilize their commitment. They do so for good reason. Today virtually every industrial nation on Earth is dangerously dependent on Persian Gulf oil. How could we convince the Soviets not to threaten the gulf, if a blow was dealt to our deterrent? How could our government send a message to Moscow, if tomorrow's *Pravda* brags that our policies have been repudiated?

It is fitting that the same ancient nation that gave us the Olympics also gave us democracy; for your decision here is truly a referendum on freedom.

Berlin Olympic Games

And thus it is also a referendum on America's character and fundamental values. The athletes here, and the athletes you represent, may have been born a full generation after the Berlin Olympics. But as their advisers and trustees, you bear the responsibility of linking that history to their duty. For the story of Hitler's rise is more than an unspeakable tragedy, more than a study in tyranny. It is also a chronicle of the free world's failure—of opportunities not seized, aggression not opposed, appeasement not condemned.

By the fall of 1935, the Nazis had passed the notorious Nuremberg laws reducing the Jews to nonpersons and were flexing their military muscle. For a hopeful moment, American opinion was galvanized—and editorials and amateur athletic unions across the country urged a boycott of the Berlin Olympics. An American member of the International Olympic Committee, Ernest Jahncke, made the plea most eloquently when he wrote the President of the IOC.

If our committee permits the games to be held in . . . Germany, . . . there will be nothing left to distinguish [the Olympic idea] from the Nazi ideal. . . . It will take . . . years to reestablish the prestige of the games and the confidence of the peoples of the world. Sport will lose its beauty and its nobility and become, as it has already become in Nazi Germany, an ugly, ignoble affair.⁴

The call for a boycott was rejected. And the reasons for rejection are bone chilling—even across all these decades. Do not drag sports into the arena of politics, they were told. It will destroy the Olympic movement, they were told. It will only penalize our American athletes, they were told. Solutions to political problems are not the responsibility of sporting bodies, they were told. Let us take our Jews and blacks to Berlin and beat the Nazis, they were told. If America refuses to go, we will be the only ones left out in the cold, they were told.

Such reasons prevailed. Only weeks after American attendance was assured, Nazi troops took the Rhineland; and Hitler readied Germany for the games. His preparations cast uncanny foreshadows. For he expelled foreign journalists, who told the truth about persecution. He ordered his vicious propaganda concealed from foreign visitors. And he too looked forward to legitimacy. As Joseph Goebbels boasted on the eve of the Olympics, the Reich expected the games “to turn the trick and create a friendly world attitude toward Nazi political, economic, and racial aims.”

It worked. Not even Jesse Owens’ magnificent personal triumph diminished Hitler’s international propaganda success—a coup he linked directly to his master race doctrine. We revere Jesse in death as in life; for he was an exemplary American, an inspiration to millions everywhere, and a personal friend loved by many of you here today. But neither Jesse’s achievements in Berlin nor any words spoken at the games prevented the Reich from exploiting the Olympics toward their own brutal ends. Listen to Nazi War Minister Albert Speer’s report on the Fuhrer’s mood as the happy spectators left Berlin: “Hitler was exulting over the harmonious atmosphere that prevailed. . . . International animosity toward Nazi Germany was plainly a thing of the past, he thought.” Before long, the Nazi war machine scarred the face of Europe, and soon the night closed in.

The Need for Sacrifice

We are far from that time—but not from that script. Like you, I understand the ideals of sport—for sportsmanship is synonymous with

⁴ Jahncke wrote this in a November 25, 1935, letter to Count Henri de Baillet-Latour, President of the International Olympic Committee. (“Jahncke Asks Ban On Olympic Games: American Committee Member Charges Germans Violate Tenets of Fair Play,” *The New York Times*, November 27, 1935, p. 2)

fair play. Like you, I am in awe of the Olympic tradition—stretching over centuries, reaching out across cultures.

And like every American, I know the exhilaration of Olympic victory. Few moments in my life match the electricity I felt at Lake Placid. And few human experiences can compare to the years of sacrifice, pain, and yearning that you and our athletes have invested in this summer. But I also know, as you know, that some goals surpass even personal achievement. To any young athletes who feel singled out for suffering, I say, it is war above all that singles out our young for suffering. And it is war that our peaceful resolve can prevent.

Everyone across the board is being asked to sacrifice. We need only ask the farmers of the midlands if they have sacrificed. Or ask the workers in our export industries if they have sacrificed. Or ask the computer companies whose products have been embargoed. Or ask the businesses whose years of planning have come undone. Or ask the young sailors in the Indian Ocean task force. Or ask the American families whose taxes support our defense budget. Or ask the Afghan athlete who faces the Soviets not on a field in Moscow but as a resistance fighter in Kabul.

A heavy burden lies on your shoulders. We recognize the enormous price we are asking our athletes to pay. We recognize the tremendous sacrifice we are asking of sports officials. But on behalf of the President of the United States, I assure you that our nation will do everything within its power to insure the success of the Los Angeles games;⁵ to help the Olympic Committee restore its finances; to provide even greater assistance to the development of amateur sport; and, above all, to recognize the true heroism of our athletes who do not go to Moscow.

I believe all Americans will thank you—both for the contribution you make to our national security and to the further integrity you confer on amateur sport; for I believe that the Olympic movement will be forever strengthened by your courage. You will have restored to the modern Olympics the ancient “truce of the gods.” No nation may serve as the Olympic host while invading and subjugating another: That was the rule for the Greek city-states, and that must be the rule again today.

Forty-five years ago, when an American official took his stand against Berlin, he said this:

Place your great talents and influence in the service of the spirit of fair play and chivalry—instead of the service of brutality, force, and power . . . Take your rightful place in the history of the Olympics . . .

⁵ The 1984 Summer Olympics were scheduled to take place in Los Angeles, California. The Soviet Union ultimately boycotted those games.

The Olympic idea [has been rescued] from the remote past. You have the opportunity to rescue it from the immediate present—and to safeguard it for posterity.⁶

His words reach out to us across the decades. History rarely offers us a second chance. If we fail to seize this one, history itself may fail us.

⁶ Reference is to Jahncke, who included the statement in his November 25 letter; see footnote 4, above.

144. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance submitted a resignation letter to President Jimmy Carter on April 21, 1980, citing his inability to support Carter's decision to launch a rescue operation to free the American hostages held in Iran. At an April 11 National Security Council meeting, participants supported the rescue attempt; Vance did not attend the meeting as he was away from Washington. In his resignation letter, Vance noted, "I know how deeply you have pondered your decision on Iran. I wish I could support you in it. But for the reasons we have discussed I cannot.

"You would not be well served in the coming weeks and months by a Secretary of State who could not offer you the public backing you need on an issue and decision of such extraordinary importance—no matter how firm I remain in my support on other issues, as I do, or how loyal I am to you as our leader. Such a situation would be untenable and our relationship, which I value so highly, would constantly suffer." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1980, page 2)

Vance delivered the letter to the President the afternoon of April 21:

"With great sorrow, I handed him the letter. He started to put it away. I asked him to read it. He did, and then slowly put it in his pocket. He said we would have to talk again. I told him that I wanted to make it clear that I would resign whether or not the mission was successful. I agreed to his request not to make my resignation public until after the rescue attempt, and to remain in my position until the mission was completed. It was clearly understood that my decision was irrevocable, whatever the outcome of the rescue operation. Over the next three days I offered whatever advice and help I could to make the operation a success." (*Hard Choices*, page 411)

During the subsequent attempt on April 24, two U.S. aircraft collided during a refueling stop, resulting in the deaths of eight Americans. For the text of Carter's April 25 address to the nation, wherein he indicated that the rescue operation had been aborted but that casualties had ensued, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book I, pages 772-773.

During the morning of April 28, Vance met with the President at the White House, where he received the President's letter accepting his resignation. He and Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter III rode back to the Department of State and discussed the press conference Vance intended to hold later that morning. Vance recalled that it was "a sad moment and not the way I had wanted to end the work we had begun in January 1977 when we had forged what I believed, and still believe, was a foreign policy worthy of a great nation." (*Hard Choices*, page 412)

Vance announced his departure from his position during a briefing held in the Department of State's press room:

"I believe that all of you have received copies of my letter to the President and the President's letter to me.

"I have the greatest admiration for the President, and I am most grateful for the opportunity which he has given me to serve him and our nation.

"As I leave office, I'm proud to have been able to participate in the important foreign policy actions and new directions which have been taken under President Carter's leadership. They are important, not only for the present but for the future of our nation as well.

"As you know, I could not support the difficult decision taken by the President on the rescue operation in Iran. I, therefore, submitted my resignation to the President last week. I have told the President that I continue to support fully his policies on other foreign policy issues. I have assured him that he can count on my support for his continued leadership of our nation. He will always have my deepest respect and affection.

"Thank you all whom I have gotten to know well over these last 3½ years. That has also been a pleasure for me.

"Q. What is it about the rescue mission that you could not support?

"A. I do not want to go into details. I think my position is very clear on that, and that's all I want to say. Thank you very much.

"Q. Is anybody else leaving with you?

"A. No. I hope that everyone in the Department will stay and support the Acting Secretary and the President, and I'm going to tell him that.

"Q. Are you going back to Wall Street?

“A. I haven’t made up my mind what I’m going to do. That might well be the case.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1980, pages 2–3)

On April 29, the President announced from the Briefing Room at the White House that he had designated Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D–Maine) as his Secretary of State nominee, touting Muskie’s “extensive knowledge of foreign affairs.” Following Carter’s announcement, Muskie offered a brief statement:

“The world is in turmoil. The issues are complex. But I believe that in this instability the United States must be perceived as stable and as a source of strength in the free world. As Secretary of State, I will devote my full energies to achieve these goals. I respond to this challenge with genuine hope. America remains a land of great opportunity.

“If these are dangerous times, they are also times of uncommon opportunity. I harbor no doubt that the great majority of Americans share that view and will sacrifice to that end, and I cannot stand in the wings when so much is at risk and so many have raised questions about the country’s sense of purpose.

“And so let me end as I began: First to thank the people of Maine for their unstinting support for many years and to recognize a great contribution already made by Secretary Vance and my thanks to the President for an awesome but a stimulating challenge as I face the months ahead. Thank you, Mr. President.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pages 791–792)

145. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 1, 1980

SUBJECT

Foreign Policy Discussion (U)

I think it would be useful if in the informal group discussion you took Senator Muskie through the following process:

1. Outline to him your fundamental approach to world affairs and the key principles of your foreign policy.

2. Indicate to him very clearly the central guidelines *that you have set* on some key issues. This is essential to avoid new disputes and zig-zags. The world must understand that there is constancy and continuity in Washington and that we are not entering into a new grand debate. (You might give him your State of the Union message² to read and tell him that this is where you stand.)

3. Focus on those genuinely important issues that do require a policy review and new decisions. Indicate the preparations needed and our approach to upcoming key events (a calendar is attached).³

4. Run through more quickly the remainder of the U.S. foreign policy agenda (as per the attached papers).⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 5/80. Secret. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. On May 3, the President met with Brown, Brzezinski, Muskie, Aaron, Christopher, Owen, Tarnoff, Lake, Newsom, and Read at Camp David from 9:05 a.m. to 12:02 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) A record of this meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 5/80. In his diary entry for May 3, the President noted that the participants had "discussed the relationship between State and the NSC, Defense, the White House, and Congress. I emphasized that I wanted to work with the deputy and assistant secretaries in State so I could have some benefit from their proposals, other than just to have a conglomerate watered-down, lowest-common denominator recommendation—which has always been the case. It became more obvious as we discussed the situation that Cy had been bogged down in details and captured by the State Department bureaucracy. Everyone felt good after the meeting, and it resolved a lot of problems that could have been handled a long time ago had Cy been willing to let anyone penetrate the State Department shell." (*White House Diary*, pp. 424–425)

² See Document 138.

³ Not attached.

⁴ Attached but not printed are 11 papers: "The USSR," "Western Europe," "Middle East (less Persian Gulf)," "Iran Crisis," "Security Framework—Southwest Asia," "Latin America and the Caribbean," "East Asia," "Defense Posture in Support of Foreign Policy," "Global Issues," "Economic: International Energy," and "Economic: North-South."

To facilitate the above, I would recommend that you proceed as follows:

1. *Fundamental Approach.* The distinctive quality of the Carter foreign policy is that it blends the two main strands of traditional American thinking on foreign policy issues—strands that have often been seen as in conflict.

You favor a more open, positive approach toward the Third World—but you also believe it is essential to maintain a power equilibrium. The former is designed to shape a more decent world in a revolutionary age—for otherwise America would be isolated and increasingly vulnerable. The latter is designed to prevent Soviet exploitation of that revolutionary process and to create the preconditions for a more genuine and stable detente. (McGovern and Kennedy have emphasized the former and slighted the latter; Nixon and Kissinger have stressed the latter and ignored the former.)

In addition, in the more immediate future, we must face the fact that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses a very major strategic threat, both in the region and because it is clearly international aggression, and failure to resist it undermines a central principle of world order since the Second World War. It is not Afghanistan per se which is the issue but the simultaneous disintegration of Iran as the American strategic pivot and the disappearance of Afghanistan as a buffer that invites Soviet political meddling and quite possibly even military intrusion into a region of vital importance to us. This is why it is no exaggeration to say that we confront the most serious long-term strategic challenge since the inception of the Cold War. Failure to recognize its magnitude and to respond accordingly would be an historic error, with probably irreversible consequences.

(Your State of the Union message is germane here.)

2. *Central Guidelines.* On four broad issues, your position is clear and firm, and there will be no deviation:

a. *Soviet Union:* The Soviet Union must be made aware *tangibly* that aggressive behavior entails costs. This means no sudden warming of relations while the Soviets are busy suppressing the Afghans and thus altering the strategic situation in the third central strategic zone of vital importance to us.

b. *Western Europe/Japan:* We need to establish close unity, and that will be the major purpose of the Venice Summit.⁵ At the same time, the Allies must be made to recognize that detente is not divisible and they

⁵ The Venice Economic Summit was scheduled to take place June 22–23. Documentation on the summit is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy. For the text of the declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1980, pp. 8–11.

have an interest in supporting our efforts in Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf and with the Soviet Union. We must find a way to more effectively interact with the EC-9 to shape common perceptions and actions.

c. *Security Framework for Southwest Asia*: Your State of the Union message commits us to shaping quietly a regional security framework. This means a gradually enhanced U.S. military presence and the development of a variety of security relationships. These efforts are now in train, and they will continue.

d. *Middle East*: The Camp David process will move forward; May 26 must be seen as marking genuine progress;⁶ we will work closely with both Sadat and Begin to the extent that it is possible, and we will not be diverted by European or other initiatives from the Camp David approach.

3. *Policy Issues*. Please see the attached papers for a somewhat more specific summary of key policy issues. The four mentioned above come first, and in addition to them, Iran clearly poses more immediate policy dilemmas.

Basically, we need to focus on the following issues:

a. What specifically do we say to Gromyko at the May 15 meeting?⁷ How do we keep the pressure on Moscow to draw the *right lessons* from Afghanistan? How do we avoid Soviet expansion into Iran?

b. What are our goals for the Summit? How do we prevent our Allies from fragmenting security/detente into self-serving compartments? How and when do we revive SALT without weakening allied resolve? How do we move forward on TNF?

c. What should our strategy be in Iran, given the likely allied steps? What if economic sanctions fail? Can we diminish the issue? Should we act militarily at some point? Should we contemplate another rescue?⁸

d. What do we do if Begin refuses to budge? How do we engage the moderate Arabs, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia? How do we react if Sadat decides to bring the issue to a head?

The above is treated in more detail in the enclosed papers, and I would suggest that you then simply go through them, since each is de-

⁶ In a March 26, 1979, letter to the President, Begin and Sadat indicated that they would do everything possible to complete negotiations associated with the comprehensive peace settlement by May 26, 1980. (*American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents 1977-1980*, Document 302)

⁷ Muskie and Gromyko met on May 16 when they were in Vienna to attend ceremonies marking the 25th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty; see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 278. Prior to this, Muskie and Brown were in Brussels to attend a joint session of the NATO Defense Planning Committee May 13-14.

⁸ See Document 144.

signed to facilitate a quick review and to highlight both your policies and the key objections that we might confront.

146. Statement by Secretary of State-Designate Muskie¹

Washington, May 7, 1980

Let me begin with a basic point: I believe now, as I believed a week ago, that the Congress must be a full partner in designing our international posture and must be fully informed on its implementation. The Administration, the nation, and our foreign policies are the stronger when the Congress is consulted before major policy decisions are made, and during the course of major negotiations.

This is the first of what I expect to be many discussions with this committee. I look to Capitol Hill—to my colleagues and friends here—for guidance as well as support, for suggestions and healthy challenge. I also want to take a moment to offer some general views—on our foreign policy, on the role of the Secretary of State, on the connection between our international posture and our condition at home.

We are a nation of great power. Our actions and decisions have global effects. For our own people, for our friends around the world—and for those who are not our friends—our fundamental course must always be clear.

I have brought no detailed new blueprint to this hearing. Only days ago I was seated on your side of this room. In the days ahead I will be carefully reviewing all significant elements of our international posture. Presumably I will recommend to the President that we adjust some old policies and assert some new initiatives. But I can certainly state this much now; I would not be here if I did not support the central elements of the foreign policy now in place—the policy that has been fashioned by President Carter and Secretary Vance.

While there may be changes, there will also be continuity. Our nation's foreign policies will continue to serve our nation's interests—the

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1980, pp. 1–2. Muskie testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of his nomination. The Senate confirmed Muskie's nomination on May 7 by a vote of 94 to 2. At a White House ceremony on May 8, Muskie was sworn in as Secretary of State. For the President's and Muskie's remarks, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 861–864.

same interests that previous Administrations and previous Secretaries of State have sought to defend and advance.

Foreign Policy

Let me begin with my fundamental beliefs. I believe in strong American defenses. We must maintain the military balance. We must continue to modernize all elements of our defense forces. Dollars spent on defense, as in any other area, must never be dollars wasted.

I believe in strong alliances—in our collective defense, in continuing to strengthen our forces, in consulting regularly and with trust.

I believe in a firm and balanced policy toward the Soviet Union. The search for common ground has been disrupted not by American preference but by Soviet action. While aggression continues we must not relent in imposing a heavy price. As Soviet policies allow, we must never be blind to opportunities to work for peace.

I believe that balanced arms control agreements fortify our security. The SALT II agreement is no gift to our rivals; it can serve our own interests by limiting the threats we face.

I believe in a positive diplomacy of active engagement. It is in our interest to work for peace in troubled areas, especially the Middle East. It is to our advantage to improve our relations with nations which have interests in common with us—including many whose views and values differ from ours. We must build our new relationship with the People's Republic of China. We must continue to broaden our ties to the nations of the Third World and of Eastern Europe.

And I believe that America must stand for human progress. Our freedom and rights are more secure when freedom and human dignity are advanced around the world. Our own economy is strengthened by the economic progress of others. We must lead international efforts to surmount an international energy crisis and its consequences; to address the condition of hundreds of millions of human beings living in degrading poverty; and to strengthen an international trading system that is fair to our workers and our farmers, our businessmen and our consumers.

These past months have been times of great trial. Terrorism in Iran, aggression in Afghanistan, radical escalation in the price of petroleum—these and other challenges will test us fully in months to come.

But the past few years have been times also of accomplishment and strong American leadership. Modernization of conventional and theater nuclear forces in NATO, Camp David, SALT II, China normalization, the Panama Canal treaty, peace in Zimbabwe, regular economic summits, successful multilateral trade negotiations, human rights advances in many countries, each is a new strength we can use to buttress American leadership in the future.

I am confident of that leadership or I would not be here before you. Americans want their country to be a constructive international presence. And we are. We have many strengths, not least of which is our system of values, founded upon a belief in individual worth.

Role of the Secretary of State

Your inquiry today is directed not only to the substance of our foreign policies but also to my concept of the role of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State must carry out a number of duties. And priorities must be set among them. These are my priorities.

First, and most important, the Secretary of State is the principal adviser to the President on foreign policy issues. He must have the primary responsibility for recommending our foreign policy course, and seeing that the President's decisions are then implemented. President Carter has made it clear that he expects me to play this role, and I intend to do so.

Second, the Secretary of State is the President's principal spokesman for his foreign policies. I intend to be very active in this role. I strongly believe in the value of clear and direct public discussion of our foreign policies. And I intend to consult very closely with the Congress on the shape and direction of our foreign policies.

Third, the Secretary of State must make sure that the State Department and the Foreign Service, as a whole, are fully engaged in the processes by which policy is made and in discussions of foreign policy with the Congress and our public. Neither the Secretary nor the Department can succeed if they do not have confidence in each other, and work together.

I intend to make full use of the Department and our Ambassadors in a fourth role: the conduct of our diplomacy abroad. There are times when only a Secretary of State can manage a negotiation for our nation. But to the extent possible, I will limit my own travel and rely on our skilled diplomats.

A Secretary of State has other roles, as well: in administration of the State Department, in helping manage and coordinate the overseas activities of U.S. Government agencies, and in managing the flow of information from the State Department to the White House and other agencies. Each must be carried out efficiently. Each should require less of the Secretary's time than the first roles I discussed.

This is my concept of the job. The President has said that he supports me in it. I will need your support, and counsel, as well.

Concluding Thoughts

Let me conclude with these thoughts. I come to this new assignment after 22 years as a member of the U.S. Senate. I have participated

with many of you in the foreign policy debates of the past decade—indeed, the past generation.

Through these trials our society has been moved to strengthen and vigorously exercise our machinery for dissent and disagreement. That is all to the good. We are better for it.

But our challenges call on us to focus as intently upon another part of our national character—our ability to pull together and respond as Americans when our interests are under attack.

I do not believe there can be unanimity on the great and complex questions before us. But there can be a spirit of cooperation as we address them. I appear before you today in that spirit.

147. Address by President Carter¹

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 9, 1980

Chairman Yarnall and President Bodine,² Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen:

[Omitted here are the President's introductory remarks.]

For the past 6 months, all of our policies abroad have been conducted in the glare of two crises: the holding of American hostages in Iran and the brutal invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. In meeting these crises our tactics must change with changing circumstances. But our goals will not change and have not wavered.

We will not rest until our fellow Americans held captive in Iran—against every tenet of law and decency—are safe and home free.

Along with other nations who have condemned Soviet aggression, we will continue to impose economic and political costs on the Soviet Union until it withdraws its armed forces and restores the independence of Afghanistan.

These two crises underline the reality that our world is indeed a dangerous place, but what I want to emphasize today is that amid the crises of the moment, no matter how profoundly significant they are,

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 873–880. The President spoke at 1:02 p.m. in the Grand Ballroom of the Fairmont Hotel before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia.

² Reference is to D. Robert Yarnall, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors and William Bodine, Jr., President.

the fundamentals of American foreign policy are being carried forward with consistency, with strength, and with determination.

The central reality that confronts America today is that of a complex world, a world that is turbulent because it is politically awakened in its entire breadth for the first time in its collective history.

Our world is one of conflicting hopes, ideologies, and powers. It's a revolutionary world which requires confident, stable, and powerful American leadership—and that's what it is getting and that's what it will continue to get—to shift the trend of history away from the specter of fragmentation and toward the promise of genuinely global cooperation and peace. So, we must strive in our foreign policy to blend commitment to high ideals with a sober calculation of our own national interests.

Unchanging American ideals are relevant to this troubling area of foreign policy and to this troubled era in which we live. Our society has always stood for political freedom. We have always fought for social justice, and we have always recognized the necessity for pluralism. Those values of ours have a real meaning, not just in the past, 200 years ago or 20 years ago, but now, in a world that is no longer dominated by colonial empires and that demands a more equitable distribution of political and economic power.

But in this age of revolutionary change, the opportunities for violence and for conflict have also grown. American power must be strong enough to deal with that danger and to promote our ideals and to defend our national interests. That's why the foreign policy which we've shaped over the last 3 years must be based simultaneously on the primacy of certain basic moral principles—principles founded on the enhancement of human rights—and on the preservation of an American military strength that is second to none. This fusion of principle and power is the only way to ensure global stability and peace while we accommodate to the inevitable and necessary reality of global change and progress.

The complexity of interrelated and sometimes disturbing events and circumstances requires that we in America increase the degree of public understanding of our foreign policy and public support for it. It is extremely complicated. It is rapidly changing in its tactical confrontations on a day-by-day basis, and the degree in a democracy with which Americans do understand these complex issues is a prerequisite for success. Foreign policy no longer has a single or a simple focus, such as defeating Nazi aggression or repelling a monolithic Stalinist threat. Instead, Americans must be mature enough to recognize that we need to be strong and we need to be accommodating at the same time. We need to protect our own interests vigorously while finding honorable ways

to accommodate those new claimants to economic and political power which they have not had in the past.

There are two obvious preconditions for an effective American foreign policy: a strong national economy and a strong national defense. That's why I placed the highest priority on the development of a national energy policy, which our country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle against inflation—and I've been very pleased lately at the trend in interest rates and the good news we had this morning on the Producer Price Index.³ The Congress and I are moving resolutely toward this goal; in fact, every single American is involved. This common effort to deal with a worldwide economic challenge does require some sacrifice, and I'm determined that the sacrifice will be fairly shared.

The response of our democracy to economic challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980's and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed. Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our Nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the common commitment of a free people who comprise American society give us the assurance of success.

We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs for defense—a 4- or 5-percent real growth above the inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has caused us some concern. For much of this same period, our spending for defense had been going down. If these adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our alliances. We and our allies have pledged ourselves to sustained, real annual increases in our defense spending.

Our task is to build together a truly cooperative global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's peoples, cultures, and religions. This will not be an easy task. The philosophical basis of such a community must be re-

³ On May 9, the Bureau of Labor Statistics issued its monthly Producers Price Index report, which indicated that prices paid by retailers rose only five-tenths of one percent during April. (Edward Cowan, "Producer Price Rise Cut to 0.5% in April; Cost of Food Drops," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1980, pp. 1, 31)

spect for human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.

In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we will stay on the steady course to which we've been committed now for the last 3½ years. We pursue five major objectives; first, to enhance not only economic but also political solidarity among the industrialized democracies; second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship with the nations of the Third World; third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the Middle East and in other troubled areas of the world; fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially those which are now threatened in Southwest Asia; and fifth, to advance arms control, especially through agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union, and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced relationship with the Soviets.

Our first objective, solidarity with our allies, is the touchstone of our foreign policy. Without such solidarity, the world economy and international politics may well degenerate into disorder. This is why we've led the North Atlantic Alliance in its program to upgrade its conventional forces. And last winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.⁴

Next month the seven leading industrial democracies will hold a summit meeting in Venice.⁵ I look forward to being there with the other six leaders of our most important allies. It's our collective intention not only to make the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity.

Second, we will persevere in our efforts to widen the scope of our cooperation with the newly awakened nations of the Third World. By the end of this century, 85 percent of the world's population will be living in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In the last several years, through the Panama Canal treaties, through our commitment to majority rule in Africa, and through normalization of relationships with China, we have vastly improved the relationship of the United States with these regions. We can be proud of our accomplishments in building strong new bridges to the developing world.

The United States respects the desire of the developing nations for genuine nonalignment, and we respect the nonaligned movement as the expression of that desire. Nations which value their own independence are already resisting efforts to subvert the nonaligned movement and make it a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Last year's meeting in Ha-

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 131.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 145.

vana was a notable example of Soviet failure, through their puppet Castro regime, to convince the other nonaligned countries to be subservient to the Soviets.⁶ The United States is eager to work with countries who pride themselves on their independence for the resolution of conflicts and for the promotion of greater global social justice.

Third, we'll continue to work for peace in the Middle East. Such peace is essential to all parties concerned. Israel deserves peace, and Israel needs peace for its long-term survival. The Arab nations require peace in order to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and to ensure that their own social development can move forward without disruption and without foreign intrusion. The West, including the United States, must have peace in the Middle East or run grave risks that the radicalization of that area will draw outsiders into its explosive conflicts.

The Camp David process has already led to the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. Of course, Egypt is the largest and the most important and the strongest Arab state. We are determined to reach a comprehensive settlement, and we will not be diverted from that goal.

Sol Linowitz, our negotiator, is just now returning from the Middle East.⁷ And I will be meeting with him this weekend to get a full report from him on progress made and to determine the steps that our country will take in the coming weeks to bring a successful conclusion to this very difficult effort.

As we continue our efforts in the Middle East, I take pride as well in the contributions that we have also made in other areas, such as the Panama Canal Treaty already mentioned and the achievement of peace and majority rule in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. These are major accomplishments, not only of benefit to the people directly involved but to our national interest as well. And it may very well be that in retrospect in years ahead, looking back on this administration and this time, that those particular efforts, making new friends among literally billions of people, as in China and Africa, this will be recognized as the most important achievement of our time.

And fourth, and very important: The West must defend its strategic interests wherever they are threatened. Since 1945 the United States has been committed to the defense of our hemisphere and of Western Europe, and then later of the Far East, notably Japan and

⁶ The sixth conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries took place in Havana September 3–9, 1979.

⁷ Linowitz reported on his trip in a May 10 memorandum to the President. It is published in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Document 362.

Korea. These commitments for a common defense are very valuable to the people involved in those other areas, and of course they are extremely valuable to us as well.

In recent years it's become increasingly evident that the well-being of those vital regions and our own country depend on the peace, stability, and independence of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. Yet both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the pervasive and progressive political disintegration of Iran put the security of that region in grave jeopardy.

I want to reemphasize what I said in my State of the Union Address on January 23d, and I quote:

"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."⁸

Peace is what we want. Peace is what we have maintained. Peace is a prerequisite to progress. Peace is a policy of our country. The maintenance of peace must be predicated on adequate American strength and a recognition of that strength, not only by our own people and our allies but by our potential adversaries as well.

We have been provoked in the last few months. Every action has been designed to take advantage not of our military force, which is formidable and unequalled, but on the benefits of the use of our alliances and on economic, political, and diplomatic efforts. The steps that we are taking on our own, and with the cooperation of others, involve complicated measures, considerable expense, and a careful balance between the collective security needs of the region involved and its political realities. These political realities, again, are difficult to understand, extremely complex, and in every instance rapidly changing. We are making good progress. We must, and we will, make more progress.

The necessity of common action in the Southwest Asian region is dictated not by any belligerence on the part of peace-loving nations, but by the clear strategic threat that stems from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A failure to respond convincingly to that contemptuous act of aggression would only invite its repetition.

Beyond the violence done to Afghanistan's independence and its people, the Red Army troops consolidating their hold there are also taking positions from which Soviet imperialism could be extended more deeply and more dangerously in the politics of this vital area. Afghanistan had long been a buffer against outsiders seeking to dominate

⁸ See Document 138.

that region. Any quick examination of a map will convince you of the truth of that statement. That is the historic role to which Afghanistan must be restored.

Soviet success in their invasion of Afghanistan, even at the high cost in blood and the high cost in respectability which Moscow is now paying, could turn Afghanistan from a roadblock against aggression into a launching pad for future incursions. This would threaten Pakistan and Iran, but not just those nations alone. Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, unless checked, confronts all the world with the most serious, long-term strategic challenge since the cold war began. To underestimate the magnitude of that challenge would constitute an historic error, an error with probably historic consequences.

America's position is clear. It is consistent, as well, with the interests and with the commitment of our allies, whose well-being, along with our own, is intimately tied to the security and the independence of this strategically vital region. We must therefore work together in meeting the challenge which we face in common.

Our goal is the withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops, the neutrality or non-alignment of Afghanistan as a nation, and the encouragement of the formation there of a government acceptable to the Afghan people. Those goals and commitments are clear, they are simple, they're extremely important, and they are shared with almost every other people on Earth. Within this region itself the nations must also realize that our desires match theirs—to cooperate in the preservation of the region's independence, stability, and peace.

Fifth, this administration has been and remains committed to arms control, especially to strategic arms limitations, and to maintain a firm and balanced relationship with the Soviet Union. Our resolve to pursue this goal remains as strong as ever.

Early this morning I had breakfast with the new Secretary of State, Ed Muskie, and with my other close foreign affairs and defense advisers.⁹ We expect later on this coming week that Ed Muskie will meet with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.¹⁰ They will be discussing these issues, again, in a clear, consistent, forceful, proper, balanced way. One statement that we will make very clearly is that arms control and strategic arms limitation is of crucial importance to the United States, to the people of the Soviet Union, and to all other people on Earth.

⁹ The President took part in a breakfast meeting that morning from 7:33 to 9:05 a.m. Attendees included Muskie, Brown, Christopher, Jordan, Donovan, Cutler, and Brzezinski. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

¹⁰ See footnote 7, Document 145.

The SALT II agreement is a major accomplishment of my administration. It contributes directly to the security of the United States, and we intend to abide by the treaty's terms as long as the Soviet Union, as observed by us, complies with those terms as well. Of course, we will seek its ratification at the earliest opportune time.

The time is also fast approaching when we must think beyond SALT II, to negotiating wider and more comprehensive arrangements dealing both with additional categories of strategic nuclear weapons and with weapons of less than intercontinental capability. If the decade of the 1980's is not to become the decade of violence, we must make renewed efforts to stabilize the arms competition and to widen the scope of arms control arrangements. After close consultation with our allies and with the Soviet Union we intend to pursue these expanded efforts to control weapons of all kinds.

Détente with the Soviets remains our goal, but détente must be built on a firm foundation of deterrence. The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace. They cannot commit aggression, and they, in doing that, must realize that they cannot still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the West, and specifically with us. They must understand that their invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound adverse effect on American public attitudes toward the Soviet Union.

We represent a strong but peaceful nation, and there can be no business as usual in the face of aggression. The Soviets will not succeed in their constant efforts to divide the Alliance in Europe or to lull us into a false belief that somehow Europe can be an island of détente while aggression is carried out elsewhere. But let me be equally clear that the way to improved relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is the path we prefer.

Together these five objectives that I have outlined are the compass points that guide America's course in this world of change and challenge. They link our specific actions to each other, to the past, and to the future.

Our foreign policy is designed to be responsive to the revolutionary age in which we live. To be effective it must have the wise understanding and the wide support of the American people. That depends on public realization that foreign policy is not a matter of instant success. We must expect prolonged management of seemingly intractable situations and often contradictory realities. To play our historic role of protecting our interests and at the same time preserving the peace, the United States must be steady and constant. Our commitment to American ideals must be unchanging, and our power must be adequate and credible.

While we seek to attain our broad ultimate objectives, we must never lose sight of immediate human suffering. We've not forgotten and we will not forget the 53 Americans imprisoned in Iran. Our Nation places a great value on human life and on human freedom. We will continue to make every effort, using peaceful means if possible, and through collective action with our allies, to obtain the release of our countrymen. And we will remind the Iranian leaders that the integrity and the independence of their own country can only suffer from this policy of theirs that led to international isolation and also internal disintegration. We have no permanent quarrel with the Iranian people. We wish to fashion a relationship of dignity with them, once this illegal action has been put behind us.

Our Nation has continued to act responsibly and in good faith toward both the people and the leaders of Iran. Our rescue attempt was a mission of mercy, not a military attack. No Iranian was killed or harmed in any way. Its only aim was to rescue innocent victims of terrorist exploitation. I regret only that it did not succeed and that eight gallant young men died in the accident as the rescue team was leaving its desert rendezvous.

This morning I participated in a memorial service for those eight young men.¹¹ And before the service I met individually with every family involved. As I approached them I had some trepidation, but in every instance they reached their arms out for me, and we embraced each other, and I could tell that their concern was about me, not about them. And they made comments to me, "God bless you, Mr. President. We are praying for you, Mr. President. And we are proud of our son or our husband, who was willing to give his life for our country and for freedom."

Our commitment to a world that represents human rights has been heard by all people, by free people and also by those who do not know the meaning of freedom. The eagerness of large numbers of Cubans, for instance, to flee their own country is eloquent testimony to the failure of the totalitarian Castro regime. We must ensure that the Cubans who arrive in the United States and the Haitians who arrive in the United States will be treated with all the humanity and the compassion which we've extended to other groups and which we extend to each other.

Every family, probably, in this room which came to our country came here as immigrants, sometimes as refugees, and we should not be callous to those who come in our present day and age under the same or even more difficult circumstances. In order to bring an end to the suffering and the death on the high seas and to permit us to best allo-

¹¹ The memorial service took place at Arlington National Cemetery. For the President's eulogy, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book I, pp. 864-865.

cate scarce Federal resources, the process of bringing in these refugees must be orderly, and it must be in accordance with our laws.

We're working vigorously, yesterday and today, with 16 nations and with international organizations, at a conference on refugees in Costa Rica, to develop alternatives that will permit safe and orderly evacuation of the Cubans who are seeking to leave.¹² For ourselves, we will give highest priority to family reunification, and we prefer, of course, prescreening in Cuba or in a third country, such as Costa Rica. Let me emphasize again that we treat those seeking asylum and those who are refugees from Cuba, from Haiti, and from other countries, equally, on a case-by-case basis as is required by American law.

And finally I'd like to say to you that America's foreign policy must always reflect the kind of people we are. We are a strong people, we are a caring people. We care about human rights, we care about decent living standards, we care about the independence of nations, and we care about the rights of individual human beings. We have a sober, responsible recognition that American power is especially important in a turbulent world where others depend upon us for their safety and for their freedom. Our interests and our ideals serve each other. Our power must be used in the service of both—interest *and* ideals.

The course I have mapped to you today in this brief outline form is neither simple nor easy, but it's a sound course, it's a safe course, which we must pursue.

Our foreign policy deserves your understanding and your support, not only for our Nation's own security but in order that people everywhere can be certain of America's commitment to use its vast power with a clear, firm, steady purpose—to seek for all humankind what we have: a future of progress, of freedom, and of peace.

Thank you very much.

¹² Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo Odio organized the conference. Attendees included representatives from the United States, Australia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Italy, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, the Netherlands, the Vatican, UNHCR, OAS, and the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration. ("18 Nations Move to Assist Exodus," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1980, p. 11)

148. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, June 2, 1980, 9–10:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with the Allies (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Mr. George Vest, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs

Mr. Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Treasury

Deputy Secretary Robert Carswell

OSD

Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy

Mr. Frank Kramer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

Agriculture

Secretary Bob Bergland

Dr. Dale Hathaway, Under Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs

Commerce

Deputy Secretary Luther Hodges (Acting Secretary)

Mr. Homer Moyer, General Counsel

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Mr. Bruce Clarke, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

Mr. Joe Zaring, NIO for Western Europe

USUN

Ambassador Donald McHenry

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. David Aaron

Ambassador Henry Owen

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 19, State: 5–6/80. Secret. No drafting information appears on the summary. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The President wrote “Zbig. J” in the top right-hand corner of the summary.

NSC

Mr. Robert D. Blackwill

Brig. General William Odom

Mr. Marshall Brement

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In opening the discussion, *Secretary Muskie* asked CIA if our lack of success with the Allies in persuading them to respond vigorously to the Afghanistan crisis was an indication that they disagreed with our strategic analysis of the situation. He noted that our original rationale had been to try to persuade the Soviets to withdraw and to deter repetition of the Soviet invasion. The Secretary asked if the Europeans had in effect accepted a permanent Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. *CIA* said yes, *Ambassador Komer* thought that was indeed the case, and *David Aaron* added that there was an important train of thought in Europe that argued that we would in the end have to trade Western acceptance of the Babrak regime for eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. (S)

Responding to *Secretary Muskie's* observation that these issues should be discussed at the Venice Summit,² *Dr. Brzezinski* stressed that it was important for the leaders of the West to talk together in detail about the strategic challenge, either formally or informally at dinner. Before going to the Summit, the President would have to decide if he wished to pose sharply and directly the strategic issues we confront, or to soft-pedal them. *Dr. Brzezinski* thought that the President should use the Venice forum to portray the Soviet challenge as he saw it and to make clear that palliatives such as a partial Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would not work. With this approach the President would stress that if we did not act to meet the Soviet threat in Southwest Asia, a fundamental tipping of history would occur. *Giscard*, *Schmidt* and *Ohira* all had said that they more or less concurred with our strategic assessment, but it was important to get their collective agreement at Venice to our view of the implications of Afghanistan. If we could do that, the individual measures we had proposed would then be easier to achieve. Therefore, the President should make a tough-minded, forceful statement at Venice. (S)

Secretary Muskie observed that if we fell back from any of our efforts so far to apply punitive measures against the Soviets, we would inevitably have reduced in European eyes the urgency of our evaluation of the crisis and made it easier for them to minimize their own

² See footnote 5, Document 145. In addition to the final declaration, the summit participants released statements on Afghanistan, diplomatic hostage-taking, refugees, and hijacking. For the texts, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1170–1172.

contributions in meeting the crisis. He thought the President should make a statement in Venice in a way to force the Allies to face up to the issue. The President should ask whether the Allies agreed with our strategic evaluation or not. *Dr. Brzezinski* agreed and said that it was important to set a higher standard for European action than we thought they could probably meet. This would show U.S. leadership and also realistically recognize that we had to ask for more in order to get the minimally acceptable. (S)

In beginning to go through the individual measures we had pursued relating to Afghanistan, *Secretary Muskie* asked *Secretary Bergland* to address the issue of the grain embargo.³ Bergland observed that this matter would be decided by something over which we had no control—weather. If the Soviet Union could harvest 225 metric tons of grain this year, it could muddle through with minimal grain imports whatever we did. We would not know until late June or July how the Soviet crop would turn out. *Under Secretary Hathaway* added that Argentina would not cooperate with us in this endeavor and that the key to holding at last year's export level to the Soviet Union was Canada. If Canada cooperated with us, Australia would follow. (S)

Hathaway stressed that in order to gain Canadian cooperation, Presidential intervention would be necessary. The Canadian bureaucracy was dead set against our approach. In stressing that the Allies were generally against us on this matter, *Henry Owen* said that the chances of Canadian cooperation were less than 50–50. Moreover, if the Soviets had an average crop year, our efforts to reduce grain exports would not make much difference anyway. In any case, the Canadians would make a decision on this issue in the next week or so and if we intervened, it would have to be soon. *Bergland* agreed and stressed we had only two alternatives—to pressure the Canadians or to abandon this effort altogether. He thought the Canadians could be pressured but we must act now. *Secretary Muskie*, observing that this issue was a centerpiece of our post-Afghanistan measures, said if we dropped it this would signal to the Europeans and the Soviets that we were in effect dropping our anti-Afghanistan effort. We would be saying that the problem was too tough. That would be perceived abroad as a relaxation of our determination to respond to the Soviet invasion. *Dr. Brzezinski* agreed and said that we had no choice except to go to the Canadians. It would be better to fail because Ottawa did not agree than to drop the effort ourselves. The consensus at the table was thus that talking points should be urgently drafted for the President to use in a telephone con-

³ See Document 136 and footnotes 5 and 6 thereto.

versation with Trudeau asking that the Canadians maintain their grain exports to the Soviet Union at last year's level.⁴ (S)

Noting that the Allied response to our efforts to restrain export credits to Moscow was very bleak, *Secretary Muskie* asked if we should nevertheless press ahead on this issue. *Dr. Brzezinski* said he thought that tactically we should continue to pressure the Europeans on credits even though we knew we would not get their complete cooperation. To do otherwise would send the wrong message to the Allies. At the same time, *Dr. Brzezinski* stressed that we should keep our efforts private since we did not wish to inflate this matter publicly to a point at which our lack of success became a public defeat for the President. *Secretary Muskie* registered the participants' agreement that we should continue to push the Europeans on credits. (S)

Moving on to COCOM, *Komer* emphasized that this issue had long-range strategic implications and that we should press the Europeans hard. The *JCS* agreed. *Secretary Muskie* thought reduced technology transfer to the USSR had the greatest potential for giving pain to the Soviets over time. The group thought that we should do our best to expand the COCOM list, recognizing that the Europeans would resist. Again, all concurred that this should not be a matter for public discussion. (S)

On the Olympics, it was agreed that we should send messages this week to ensure that there is no slippage among those who had already decided not to go to the Olympics and to try to persuade individual federations not to attend the Moscow Games. Near the time of the Moscow Games, we should also emphasize to those who would be attending that we hoped they would insist on reduced ceremonies (no flags, anthems, etc.) at Moscow. *Dr. Brzezinski* suggested that we try to think of ways to give more credit to those governments which would not be going to the Olympics. *Secretary Muskie* agreed, and thought perhaps the Senate might do something in this respect, as might the UN and public groups in the U.S. *Aaron* wondered whether we might

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, the President wrote: "ok—An official cable should also be sent. J." The President spoke with Trudeau on June 10 from 3:33 until 3:42 p.m., while the President was in Grand Island, Nebraska in order to view tornado damage. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) On June 11, *Brzezinski* prepared a summary of the telephone conversation for the President. In the summary, he indicated that the President had "asked that Canada hold its grain shipments to the USSR in 1980–81 to this year's level, noting that the EC and Australia would follow the US and Canadian lead. Trudeau said that the Cabinet planned to discuss the issue on June 16 and that he could probably give you a final answer at Venice, if not before. On a temporary basis, he would maintain shipments at the 1979–80 level until December, but he could not make any commitment beyond that." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, *Brzezinski* Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 6/80) The summary is scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe. No cable has been found.

schedule bilateral games—track with the Kenyans, swimming with the Australians, and the like—and it was agreed that these suggestions would be followed-up. (S)

On the remaining issues before the group, it was agreed that we should make clear to the Allies that, aside from political-level contacts, we intended to maintain our basic practice of minimal contacts with the Soviets and hoped they will do the same; *State* promised an options paper on the issue of debt relief for Pakistan;⁵ and all thought it would be useful to press the Allies harder on the NATO defense response to Afghanistan, especially the Belgians and Dutch who were apparently not going to make their three percent defense commitment. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then reminded the participants that the President had endorsed the following division of labor concepts for coordinating U.S. and Allied contributions to the security of the Persian Gulf region:

1. Most important is that our Allies increase their commitments to NATO's defense. This is the greatest contribution they can make while the U.S. is building a security system for the Persian Gulf region. (S)

2. Facilitating U.S. enroute access for military contingencies in the region is the next most helpful thing the Allies can contribute. They should be pressed to provide that access. (S)

3. On military exercises and deployments, we should encourage our Allies to go through with those they have already planned but not to do more at this time. (S)

4. We should encourage the British, French, and Australians to improve their rapid deployment capabilities, but we should not encourage them to go beyond their current plan. (S)

5. We should encourage the Allies to expand their security assistance to key regional countries, particularly Turkey, but also Oman, Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan. We should encourage them to maintain at least the same level of economic aid to Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan and to expand economic aid with the smaller countries in the region. (S)

Finally, David Aaron observed that another matter of transatlantic concern in the next months was CSCE and the CDE. It was agreed that there would be a follow-on to this meeting next week⁶ which would discuss how this issue might affect our relations with the Allies and, if required, what steps we should take after the President's call to Trudeau on Canadian grain exports.⁷ (S)

⁵ Not found.

⁶ There is no indication that a follow-on meeting took place during the next week.

⁷ In the margin below this paragraph, the President wrote: "We must *convince* the Allies that there will be no business as usual until they help us force the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. They must face up to this choice. Otherwise, we will all fail, & the Soviets will win this struggle—(they will still have a bear by the tail in Afghanistan). J."

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 4, 1980, 1:15–1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Thomas J. Watson, Jr., United States Ambassador to the Soviet

Union

Mr. Marshall Brement, NSC Staff Member

The President. Congratulations on your daughter's wedding. I hope everything went well. (U)

Ambassador Watson. Everything was fine. Thank you very much. (U)

The President. I understand you appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning. How did it go? (U)

Ambassador Watson. I think it was a good session. There were no problems. (U)

The President. What message did you bring them? (U)

Ambassador Watson. I voiced complete support for all your policies and everything you have been doing. I stressed the importance of evenhandedness and of getting the country behind the President. I talked about the need for the draft, and even for universal military training, if our adversaries as well as our allies and others throughout the world are not going to regard us as paper tigers. (C)

The President. That is a very good message. (U)

Ambassador Watson. I very much appreciate the chance to talk with you and I know that your time is very short. There are four points that I would like to make to you and I have written them down. The first point at the top of my list is real congratulations for the appointment of Ed Muskie. I have a summer house in Maine, have had it since 1958,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 6/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House. Drafted by Brement, who sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a June 4 covering memorandum, requesting that Brzezinski approve it. Brement also noted that the memorandum "should make interesting reading for future historians studying internecine rivalry within the US government in the late 1970s." Brzezinski placed a checkmark on the covering memorandum, indicating that he approved it, and added the following handwritten notation: "It makes for hilarious reading, but it's accurate! ZB." Aaron's notation on the covering memorandum, dated June 12, reads: "ZB—This is wonderful! DA."

and I know Senator Muskie very well. The appointment was terrific, a real ten strike. Was this your own idea? (U)

The President. Sometimes other people around here think of good ideas, but this was something I thought of myself. (U)

Ambassador Watson. Well, you deserve real congratulations for it! My second point is the need to find some way to go on with a strategic dialogue with the Soviets, particularly if the SALT process flounders. Both my DCM² and I think it would be a good idea to form high level groups of strategists from both sides to continue the dialogue process. There has to be some way to follow up and to talk together, especially if SALT won't apply. (C)

(Dr. Brzezinski entered the Oval Office.)

As far as the sanctions which we are undertaking against the Soviets, I am completely with you all the way, even though many of them will lose their effectiveness as time goes on. But we have no choice, it seems to me, except to continue them, and not to make any basic changes in what we are doing. (C)

The President. I think we ought to hold firm on that. (C)

Ambassador Watson. My third point (turning to Dr. Brzezinski) and here you might disagree with me, because I'm going to mention China. The Soviets have a paranoid fear of China. They have a long border with that country and they are irrational on the subject. They do not talk about China. In fact, during my tour there no Soviet has even mentioned the subject to me. So I think it important that we do not take actions that will be misunderstood by them and that we maintain an even-handed policy and not hurt them in this regard just to hurt them. (C)

The President. All the actions we have taken toward China are based on our desire to improve relations with that very important country. We are not normalizing our relations with the Chinese just in order to hurt the Soviets. (C)

Ambassador Watson. I am no historian, and Dr. Brzezinski certainly knows more about the subject than I do, but it seems to me that the Chinese have a tendency to jump around from bed to bed. And I think we ought to make sure that they are lashed down to our bed before we undertake actions which we might regret later on. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski. You have to remember that we are very sexy people. (U)

Ambassador Watson. The fourth point I would like to make, if I may, is to raise the confusion and conflict between the NSC and the State Department. This is bad for our country and, when such confusion exists,

² Garrison.

it cannot help but affect morale in our embassies, particularly when there is disagreement about basic policies. (C)

The President. What kinds of policies? (C)

Ambassador Watson. Well, China would be one thing—the policy of evenhandedness, especially the question of MFN and of supplying strategic products to the Chinese. We seem to be sending out mixed signals. (C)

The President. This is a misconception. There have been no high level differences on China policy. You can ask both Ed Muskie and Cy Vance and they will tell you that all our decisions about China were reached with complete compatibility at the top level. There are, of course, differences within the State Department, with each area and head of area thinking his area should be preeminent and that his area is the most important for our foreign policy. Dick Holbrooke's attitude toward China is different from that of the man in charge of European affairs.³ I think that is the real origin of any confusion regarding our policies. The State Department is an unwieldy, compartmentalized bureaucracy. That is its nature and it is not going to change. On MFN, we wanted to move together with both the Soviets and the Chinese, but events made that impossible. I can assure you that on the question of normalization with China and on the sale of military related equipment to China there have been no major differences at the top levels of this Administration. Isn't that so, Zbig? (C)

Dr. Brzezinski. There's been only one difference that I am aware of. And that is that Fritz pushed for MFN for China even before we did. (C)

Ambassador Watson. Still, I think we should keep in mind the basic nature of the Chinese and what they believe in. What are the real differences between the Chinese takeover of Tibet and what has happened in Afghanistan? (C)

Dr. Brzezinski. One main difference is that the Chinese invasion of Tibet took place many years ago and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place last December. We cannot as policy-makers deal with events which took place in the distant past, or continually place in the forefront such occurrences as the Soviet takeover of the Baltic States. In fact, the President's policy on the USSR was quite clearly articulated in his speech in Philadelphia.⁴ (C)

Ambassador Watson. I did not in any way mean to suggest that we should condone what the Soviets did in Afghanistan. If you look back at the original telegram sent out by Garrison and me on December 25,

³ Presumable reference to Vest.

⁴ See Document 147.

you will see that our recommendations encompassed about 80% of what the Administration finally decided to do about Afghanistan.⁵ We are in complete agreement with that policy. (C)

The President. Did you get a copy of my letter to Gromyko? (C)

Ambassador Watson. No, I don't think so. (U)

The President. You ought to see it. (U)

Ambassador Watson. I have not seen it as yet, but I have been out of Moscow for some time. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski. Unless you have had an advance copy, you probably have not seen it, because Warren Christopher will be taking it to Europe with him to discuss with our allies. But the letter will be delivered through you in Moscow.⁶ We think it is important that the Embassy be used more in the future than it has been in the past, when we relied too much on Dobrynin. You should know that it is the NSC that has been urging greater utilization of Embassy Moscow. (C)

The President. We will be greatly minimizing our use of Dobrynin. (C)

Ambassador Watson. I think that is important. Thank you very much. I certainly appreciate all the support which you have given me. (C)

The President. Has there been any change in the way they have been treating you since the Afghanistan crisis began? (C)

Ambassador Watson. Nothing at all. They treat me with the greatest respect. And I have instant access to high level Soviets. It was for this reason that I thought it important to see you. I wanted to demonstrate the importance which you attach to the work of my Embassy. And I intend to go out now and get our message across to every member of the Politburo. (C)

(The President walked across the room to his desk, took a copy of his Philadelphia speech from the desk and handed it to the Ambassador.) (C)

The President. This is a basic document. Ed Muskie worked on it. You ought to take a careful look at it, if you have not read it. (C)

Ambassador Watson. I have not seen it as yet. I think it may have been given when I had already left Moscow. I will study it carefully. Thank you very much for your time. I hope that someday we will have a chance to see you in Moscow. Mrs. Brement has been there recently, but we have not had many other visitors and no high level visits. (C)

⁵ Possibly Watson is referring to telegram 28126 from Moscow, December 29, 1979. In it, he listed various options for U.S. counteractions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150-2177)

⁶ A letter from Muskie to Gromyko about Afghanistan, dated June 5, was delivered on June 12 by Watson. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 282 and 283.

The President. I don't rule out a visit to Moscow at some point. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski. I will be glad to travel there. (U)

Ambassador Watson. If we could contrive some way to get you to visit us, it would really be a fine thing. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski. Perhaps the President could stop off on his way to China. (C)

Ambassador Watson. Sometimes I think that all you would need would be a half hour and you could straighten the whole thing out. (C)

The President. Thank you for coming by. I think it is very important to convey to the Soviets how disturbed we are about the invasion of Afghanistan and at the same time that we are ready to resume a productive relationship as soon as they withdraw their troops from that country. (C)

Ambassador Watson. Every chance we have we try to get that message across. (C)

150. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, June 21, 1980

SUBJECT

Issues for the Coming Months

This memorandum suggests a way you might wish to order priority issues for the remainder of this year. It represents my personal views; I have not had time before your trip to clear it with others.²

I have divided these issues into three categories:

- (1) core issues which deserve your close personal attention;
- (2) priority issues you could delegate but should monitor closely;

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Donovan Files, Box 1, Foreign Policy Study, 1980–85 [CF, O/A 706]. Secret; Nodis. Printed from an uninitialed copy. There is no indication that Muskie saw the memorandum.

² Reference is to Muskie's departure for the Venice Economic Summit (see footnote 6, Document 145). Following the meeting, Muskie traveled to Ankara to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting and to Kuala Lumpur to meet with ASEAN Foreign Ministers.

(3) secondary issues for which responsibility should be clearly fixed, and which need only be monitored by you in a general way.

I suggest that, however you decide to order these issues, you use a listing such as this to make sure that responsibility for each issue is clearly fixed among Chris, the Under Secretaries, and the Assistant Secretaries.

I hope this listing of issues also provides useful background in deciding on specific accomplishments to pursue and in choosing speech topics.

Presidential campaigns are not periods conducive to grand accomplishments. This period is no exception. The Soviets, the Europeans, Middle Eastern leaders and others—as in similar periods before—will prefer to wait for our election results before committing themselves to us on most issues.

But much can still be done:

—In a few areas, tangible accomplishments are possible.

—We can position ourselves—and, to some degree, events—for early accomplishments in the second term.

—As an essential means to this positioning, you are in an extraordinarily strong position to explain publicly our policies in important areas, clearly and directly.

Unhappily, the specific accomplishments which might be possible—e.g., in southern Africa, in Law of the Sea negotiations—do not generally lie in areas of current, central concern: our relations with our allies, East-West relations, our position in the Middle East and South-west Asia, and the state of the international economy.

Despite this fact, the major problems we face in these central areas require your putting them at the core of your personal agenda.

We must give our allies, our adversaries and our public a clear sense of a strategy for dealing with expanded Soviet capabilities and involvement; with the economic challenges afflicting the industrial democracies; and with the Third World instabilities and tensions that involve the interests of the superpowers and their allies.

By the end of the year, we can realistically seek to be in a position in which:

—We and the allies are closer to agreement on the strategic implications of Afghanistan. There will not be complete agreement and we will still need to be pressing on them our view of the relationship between deterrence and detente, but the current trans-Atlantic sniping can at least be muted. The temptation to score points off each other in our and some of our allies' electoral campaigns will continue to be strong; succumbing will continue to be shortsighted and, in the long run, politically damaging.

—The Soviets (and our allies) understand that progress in East-West relations is possible if Moscow shows restraint, and that we remain committed to arms control.

—*And, perhaps most important, we will be able to move rapidly on the two key issues that can unlock other doors: SALT II and the Arab-Israeli negotiations.*

One caveat before turning to a discussion of these core issues: while they should be given priority attention in your public statements, we must avoid giving the impression that these issues now represent the sum and substance of all our foreign policies. To the degree that we have made our response to Afghanistan synonymous with our foreign policy in recent months, we have made the Russians seem stronger than they are; the U.S. weaker than we are; our allies concerned that there has been a basic American shift back towards a bipolar view of the world; and our foreign policy appear more reactive than it is.

At Tab A³ is a summary of broader themes you may wish to review as background for your coming speeches.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

³ Not found attached. Tab A, a 3-page paper entitled “Themes,” is attached to a draft of the memorandum in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 18, TL Sensitive Six Months Project 5/80.

151. Address by Secretary of State Muskie¹

New York, July 7, 1980

The Costs of Leadership

I welcome this opportunity to address the Foreign Policy Association and to raise with you an issue of fundamental and long-term importance to our nation. It is a matter that cuts across all aspects of our foreign policy. It will decide whether the United States can have an effective, affirmative foreign policy in the years ahead—or be left simply to wring our hands and react to crises.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1980, pp. 28–29. Muskie delivered his address before the Foreign Policy Association.

The issue is this: Are we willing to commit sufficient resources to the defense of our interests and the promotion of our ideals abroad? The issue was raised again by the decision last week on Capitol Hill to lop off still more of the funds we budget to help other countries bolster their security, develop their economies, and help their people to survive.² In less than 90 days, FY 1980 will be over. We've gone all this time with no aid appropriation for 1980. We've limped along at last year's spending levels. The practical effect has been deep cuts in critical programs and projects. Now we have a supplemental appropriation. It belatedly funds a few of the most urgent activities—but then excludes all the others. This is not a solution. It has simply prolonged much of the problem.

Consider just a few examples of what we are forced to neglect because of the delay and the deletions I have mentioned.

- There is currently a serious shortage in Export-Import Bank lending authority, a vehicle to promote American trade. That means fewer American jobs and reduced American profits.

- Foreign military credit sales are curtailed—credits that could have been used in areas of the world important to our security. Can anyone look at Soviet activism in the world and conclude that this is the time to neglect the security needs of our friends?

- The international military education and training program—a program that increases the professionalism of military officers in developing countries—has been cut by 25%.

- We are funding international narcotics control efforts at 20% below the amount approved earlier by a conference of the House and Senate. This is not a large program, but it serves our interests by attacking the drug problem that costs the American people billions each year in crime, in lost health, and in ravaged lives.

- We have to absorb serious cuts in the Agency for International Development's (AID) programs to promote food production, rural development, and nutrition. Projects in the Caribbean, in Kenya, and in North Yemen are among those in jeopardy.

- The multilateral programs are especially hard hit. Only 16% of what we owe the World Bank has been approved. Funding for the African Development Fund would drop 40% from the budgeted

² Presumable reference to House and Senate approval on July 2 of supplemental foreign assistance appropriations for FY 1980. The House rejected a proposal to add \$528 million in foreign aid. (Martin Tolchin, "Congress Approves \$16.9 billion In Added Appropriations for 1980," *The New York Times*, July 3, 1980, pp. A-1, D-14) Muskie had earlier criticized congressional inaction on the appropriations bill during a June 13 news conference, noting that the lack of activity allowed the Soviet Union to take advantage of "the doors of opportunity to spread their influence." ("Muskie: Congress Jeopardizing Policy by Not Approving Aid Bill," *The Washington Post*, June 14, 1980, p. A-11)

amount—inviting interpretations that America’s concern for this important African institution is waning and reversing the steady improvement in our relations with Africa under President Carter. There is also a serious deficiency in funds for the Asian Development Bank.

When we fall short in our contributions to these banks, development—and people—suffer. Our influence in the banks suffers. Our ability to get others to contribute suffers. Ultimately, our diplomacy suffers. Our contributions to the banks are not simply invented by the Administration; they are negotiated. The Carter Administration has been scrupulous about consulting the Congress at every stage of those negotiations. When the funds are then cut, developing countries lose help they desperately need. And in the process, other contributors—our allies and friends—lose confidence in America’s word.

I am not here simply to mourn the fate of a single aid bill, though in these times that would be cause enough for concern. What concerns me even more is a pattern. There is no lack of rhetoric calling for more American leadership in the world—leadership we must continue to provide. But if we are to continue to lead, then we must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership requires.

Humanitarian Concerns

If this declining trend in foreign assistance persists, we will contribute to a human tragedy of massive proportions. For we should always keep in mind that these programs work to help people. Let me cite just a few examples.

- Between 1966 and 1972, AID helped design 250 clean water systems in rural villages in Thailand. The program was successful and continued by the Thai Government. Now 800 villages are served. As a result, water-borne disease—a major Third World killer—has declined. At the same time, incomes have climbed and village life is more stable.

- In another case, AID started a credit system in Colombia enabling small farmers to take advantage of land reform. In a 15-year span, almost 35,000 small farms in Colombia have been financed. AID has sponsored similar programs throughout the Third World.

- An AID program in rural Guatemala has stressed improved teacher training and better school equipment. Through this program, the dropout rate in participating rural schools has been cut by over 30%.

Viewed from a distance no single project is dramatic. But for the people helped, even small projects are transforming lives. And the cumulative global impact is profound.

Impact on U.S. Interests

Let me emphasize that these programs involve far more than our humanitarian instincts. They bear strongly on our national interests.

For the fact is that we have a deep and growing stake in developing countries. We cannot get along without them—as trading partners and markets; as sources of essential materials; as necessary partners in efforts to address pollution and population, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and countless other issues touching all of our lives. We want them to progress because we care about people. We also want them to succeed because our own economic health is bound up with theirs.

Our economic support funds—a central element in our security assistance—have been essential to our efforts to help strengthen the economies of such friends as Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. These funds also have provided major support for our effort to help bring stability and peaceful change to southern Africa.

There is nothing mysterious about the purpose of our international programs. It is an approach that makes sense in the world just as it does in our businesses, our families, or in any other aspect of our lives. Anticipating a problem and dealing with it is invariably safer and cheaper than waiting for crisis to erupt.

It is in our interest to do all we can now to counter the conditions that are likely to drive people to desperation later. It costs less to invest now in clean water systems than to work later at curing the diseases caused by foul water. It is prudent to help people toward agricultural self-sufficiency, instead of offering later the emergency programs needed to sustain life against drought and famine. We would rather send technicians abroad to help grow crops than send soldiers to fight the wars that can result when people are hungry and susceptible to exploitation by others. So let there be no mistake. By slashing these international programs we are not saving money. We are merely postponing and dramatically raising the costs that one day will come due.

These programs are important for another reason. With them, we have an opportunity to influence events in crucial areas of the world. Without them, our power to shape events is drastically diminished. All of us are concerned—and rightly so—that we not slip into military weakness. We are steadily modernizing our military posture. Yet cutting back our other international programs contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It cuts back our arsenal of influence. Our support for liberty in the world—our defense of American and Western interests—cannot be mounted with military weapons alone. The battle for American influence in the world requires more than rockets, certainly more than rhetoric. It requires the resources that make our diplomacy effective.

Consequences

What are the likely consequences for America if we lack those resources? The first consequence is American isolation. We need healthy

trading partners. We need access to facilities and resources. We need the support of others in helping to achieve peaceful alternatives to regional conflicts. We need political support—whether it be in resisting terrorism in Iran or aggression in Afghanistan. But we cannot expect the cooperation and support of others on issues of importance to us if we are unprepared to offer concrete support on matters of importance to them—particularly their own economic development and social progress.

Isolation would be only one consequence. Declining American aid, and declining American influence, would also help the Soviets exploit internal instability—in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and in many other places where the Soviets are prepared to exploit tensions to expand their power and to limit Western influence. Nothing that I know of the American people suggests to me that they want to give the Soviets this kind of free ride. I believe the American people want their nation to resist Soviet expansionism—not only militarily but by helping other nations defend their freedom and feed their people. I believe the American people want their nation to be actively involved in the world.

Finally, the decline of American aid and influence would hamper our efforts to settle dangerous disputes and build peaceful, democratic solutions.

Let me give you an example. Over the past 3 years, many in the Congress fought bitterly against President Carter's Rhodesian policy. President Carter—courageously and almost alone—insisted that the United States actively support Britain's effort to bring a democratically elected government to Rhodesia. Fortunately President Carter prevailed against bitter opposition. In fact, his refusal to compromise prematurely on Rhodesia helped bring to an end a bloody civil war in that country. The result has been good for the people of Zimbabwe and bad for the Soviets, who sought to exploit turmoil there.

Consider another case. We have been trying for a year and more to strengthen the center in Nicaragua to help moderates there resist extremist solutions. Every time we tried to appropriate the funds necessary to support our efforts in Nicaragua, the effort was defeated. Finally, Congress has acted to make possible \$75 million needed to fulfill our commitment.³ But in the delay, we suffered a loss of credibility. The

³ The administration had proposed \$75 million in aid for Nicaragua in November 1979 as part of a broader assistance package to Central America and the Caribbean. During a May 19, 1980, White House briefing for members of Congress, the President noted that the Senate had, that day, approved the supplementary development allocation for Central America. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 942) The President signed into law the authorizing legislation for the Special Central American Assistance Act (H.R. 6081; P.L. 96–257) on May 31.

willingness of the United States to work for democracy was called into question throughout the region.

The point is this: Those most concerned about Soviet and Cuban activism in the world should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to support the moderate transition from repressive tyranny to democratic development. For by failing to support the alternatives to radicalism, we help radicalism to breed.

This continuing assault on foreign assistance is not only short sighted; it is dangerous to American interests. For it threatens the capacity of the United States to play a positive role in the world, to compete effectively with the Soviets, to encourage emerging—and threatened—democracies. It threatens to strip America of all its instruments except the instruments of destruction.

I believe that the American people, if they have the facts, will understand what is at stake. I believe they will understand that a generous investment in security assistance and economic development abroad is necessary to a strong America.

I am not new to this issue. Twenty-two years ago I made my support for international assistance a centerpiece of my first Senate campaign.⁴ And I am fully prepared to press the message until it gets through.

I think it is time for a healthy national debate on this subject. And I invite you, as citizens vitally concerned with America's role in the world, to contribute to that debate. The price of silence could be growing isolation and even irrelevance for America. That is a price no American should want us to pay.

⁴ Muskie, a former Governor of Maine, defeated Republican Senator Frederick Payne in 1958.

152. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 7, 1980

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #149

1. *Opinion**Foreign Policy and the Elections*

Foreign policy should offer you the greatest opportunity for the exercise of Presidential leadership, in a manner that could significantly influence the outcome of the elections. Despite the constraints on Presidential power, foreign affairs is the area in which you have the greatest discretion and, thus—at least in theory—the most opportunity for demonstrating effective leadership, for taking dramatic action, and for mobilizing national support. Indeed, I have already heard from a number of well-informed sources that the Republicans are very much concerned that you will stage some sort of a foreign policy coup or undertake some bold initiative, or cut some significant deal in the area of foreign affairs shortly before the elections.

Unfortunately, the present international situation simply does not lend itself to some sudden and dramatic stroke—unless we are confronted by a crisis. (In that event, a very strong and firm response, even involving military action, is likely to be quite popular. Moreover, I have confidence in our crisis-management machinery, and I believe that our performance would be good.) But short of that, I cannot offer a prescription for a major Presidential initiative of a type that would have significant electoral effect. Something like Eisenhower's "I would go to Korea" does not seem to be available, and we must be careful not to initiate some move in the Middle East or regarding the Soviets that will appear contrived.

In any case, whatever happens, we need to do much better than we have done so far in making the country understand both the constructive character of your foreign policy and the dangers inherent in Reagan's approach.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 127, Weekly National Security Report: 8–12/80. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² The Republican National Convention took place in Detroit, Michigan, July 14–17. Delegates nominated Reagan for President and Bush for Vice President. The Democratic National Convention was scheduled to take place in New York August 11–14.

Accordingly, in this memorandum I plan to address myself as briefly and concisely as I can to four broad themes that deal with foreign affairs:

- I. The distinctive character of the Carter foreign policy;
- II. Public criticism of Reagan's approach;
- III. Crises that we might confront;
- IV. Initiatives that we might take.

I. *The distinctive character of the Carter foreign policy:*

I think the most distinctive hallmark of your foreign policy is that you have blended together two elements that traditionally have been seen in America as being in conflict: concern for moral principle and recognition of the importance of American power.³ In recent years, McGovern and later Kennedy have stood for the former, while Nixon and Kissinger have stood for the latter.

In contrast, you have managed to combine the two in order to shape a foreign policy that has been both moral and realistic. It can be best summarized by the following themes:

(1) Restoring America's military and economic strength for the long-term.⁴

(2) Recognition of global complexity.⁵

(3) Progress toward a genuine partnership both with Western Europe and the Far East.⁶

(4) On the basis of renewed strength, Allied cooperation, and diplomatic firmness we can also seek accommodation with the Soviet Union.⁷

(5) Importance of the Third World.⁸

(6) Human rights is a dominant idea of our times.⁹

Finally, we neither run the world nor can run away from it.¹⁰ We cannot be guided by nostalgia for the fifties (U.S. preponderance) or by

³ The President underlined "concern for moral principle" and "importance of American power" and placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence.

⁴ The President underlined this point.

⁵ The President underlined "of global complexity."

⁶ The President underlined the portion of this point beginning with "genuine."

⁷ The President underlined the portion of this point beginning with "accommodation."

⁸ The President underlined "the Third World."

⁹ The President underlined "human rights." He placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this and the previous five points.

¹⁰ The President underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with "we." He extended the right-hand margin bracket to include this sentence.

the partial isolationism of the early 1970s. The many tangible accomplishments of your term (Panama, Camp David, China normalization, etc.) are the consequence of this approach. They demonstrate how responsible use of American power and influence can contribute to global peace and human progress.

I believe the above summarizes the themes of your Administration's foreign policy, and that in time it will become clear that this was the proper course for the nation at this time: a building presidency, not a flamboyant, "fire-fighting" one. However, many of these themes—and even some specific actions, like the Panama Canal treaties—are clearly not popular politically. To be sure, there is merit in an "educational campaign"; but the direct electoral benefits of discussing all the central themes of your foreign policy are less obvious. "Complexity" and "change," for example—however real in today's world—are a source of anxiety, not political approbation.

It is possible to group these themes in more politically attractive ways, however, around two primary themes and two secondary ones:

Primary:

—American strength (defense, economic, energy, alliances); and
—peace.

Secondary:

—morality (human rights, Third World); and
—building for the future (alliances, economic summits, Third World).¹¹

In my judgment, you are in fact on strong grounds on national strength—where the Republicans are trying to make you look weak—and on peace. In the former area, you have *reversed* nearly a decade's (Republican) decline in our spending, are increasing the defense budget by 3–4% in real terms, buying the right modern weapons, and creating a capacity to protect (through deterrence, not conflict) Western vital interests in the Persian Gulf.¹² There is the NATO 3% commitment, the Long-Term Defense Program, and the TNF decision. There is the energy program—for the first time beginning to reduce our national vulnerability to decisions taken by other countries in this area. MTN directly helps U.S. businessmen, farmers, workers and consumers. And the economic summits (plus your building efforts in the U.S. economy) are also contributing directly to U.S. strength in the world.

¹¹ The President underlined portions of this theme and the previous three themes.

¹² The President placed a dash in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

These are facts; but another fact is that we have not publicized our successes as we need to do—and, for that and other reasons, thus do not get the credit that you and your Administration justly deserve. We can be assertive—not defensive—in this area.

With regard to peace, the record is clear: *despite* the anxieties and difficulties of various crises (like Iran), no U.S. soldier has died in combat.¹³ This is the first four-year term since Eisenhower's second when that has been true; and in fact you are the first President since Hoover (!) to have no combat losses. You also did the "impossible" in bringing Egypt-Israel peace and the end of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe race war.

Strength and peace are two excellent themes. And combining them also brings in arms control, the effort to reduce the risks of conflict from a position of strength, and the balanced, mature approach to the Soviet Union.¹⁴

The morality issue has primarily a selective audience—e.g. ethnic-Americans on CSCE; the "Humphrey wing" of the party on developing-country problems.¹⁵ But there is also a general sense in the country of the importance of "standing for something"—a theme you used in good effect in 1976.¹⁶

Finally, there is value in emphasizing how your policies build for the future, beginning with national strength, but also in strengthening our alliances (where, of course, there will be considerable press/public skepticism); dealing with economic and energy realities; and creating openings to the new poor centers of the future.¹⁷ Put in this sense—not as adjusting to "complexity" or "change"—I believe most Americans would welcome straight talk from their President, as opposed to the simplicities of a Reagan. Americans are also responsive to challenge, provided at the same time they are told what to do about it—as we have been doing, though often without the clarity and persistence that is needed.

II. *Public criticism of Reagan's approach:*

In contrast, Reagan's approach can be attacked head-on for being both *escapist and dangerous*. In brief:

¹³ The President placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹⁴ The President placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹⁵ The President underlined "morality issue."

¹⁶ The President underlined "standing for something."

¹⁷ In this sentence, the President underlined "build for the future," "national strength," "strengthening our alliances," "economic and energy," and "new poor centers." He also placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to the first part of this sentence.

—The Reagan Platform is an escape from reality.¹⁸ The Platform and Reagan's own statements seem to view the world only in terms of the U.S.-Soviet struggle and by over-simplifying virtually every world problem. There is no recognition of the new forces in the world nor of the need for the United States to give historical change a positive direction. (Reagan also calls for massive defense increases, while also promising a tax cut.)

—Reagan is nostalgic for the past, especially in his dangerous hankering for strategic superiority which would produce a massive arms race, as well as the general nostalgia for the world of the 1950s, when American military and economic preponderance were the consequences of the collapse of Europe and Japan in World War II.¹⁹

—The Reagan Platform is a repudiation of even the limited achievements of past Republican foreign policy.²⁰ This comes across most strongly in Reagan's skepticism regarding arms control.²¹ Given his objection to SALT II, is Reagan for or against Nixon-Kissinger's arms control centerpiece, SALT I?

—The Reagan Platform is an endorsement for what Carter has been doing. In its few positive parts, the Reagan Platform in effect endorses what the Carter Administration has been doing on the Middle East (though the words "Camp David" are never mentioned), your efforts to enhance NATO and defense capabilities, your tough response to the Soviets on Afghanistan (though it undercuts the latter by recent expedient statements on the grain embargo).

—Moreover, Reagan's approach is woefully inadequate on arms control, which it slights, and in regard to the Third World, which it largely ignores. It could also jeopardize the expanding U.S.-Chinese relationship by inflaming the Taiwan issue (with the emphasis on the U.S.-Taiwan military connection).²²

In brief, his foreign policy is unrealistic, simplistic, and indifferent to moral issues. It is historically antiquated and potentially dangerous. It is easy to slide from over-simplification into extremism, and Reagan's foreign policy would take America on such a slide.

III. *Dangers that we might confront:*

Public debate over foreign policy aside, this coming fall could be punctuated by a series of crises, the handling of which could decisively

¹⁸ The President underlined "escape from reality."

¹⁹ The President underlined "strategic superiority" and "massive arms race."

²⁰ The President underlined "repudiation" and "past Republican foreign policy."

²¹ The President underlined "arms control."

²² The President placed a dash in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

affect the outcome of the elections. Such a crisis might include any of the following:

(1) *A tragic hostage development*: Some of our hostages could be put on trial, or one or more of them could die, or we might simply learn that some of them have disappeared. Khomeini appears determined to embarrass you in whatever way possible.

(2) *Break-up in Iran*: Khomeini's death and the collapse of public order could prompt the disintegration of Iran and the outbreak of civil war, precipitating even a Soviet intervention. At the present moment, we have relatively few means of influencing the outcome of such a civil war, while we do know that the Soviets have started training for military operations directed at Iran.

(3) *A Soviet peace offensive, or a new military offensive in Afghanistan, or (most probably) both*: The Soviets will most likely intensify their efforts to woo Western Europe and perhaps even the United States through arms control initiatives, while maintaining their assertive posture in Afghanistan. Their objective will be to achieve Western acquiescence while splitting the West even further.

(4) *A crisis in the Middle East*: Some violent act (West Bank, Syria, Lebanon) could occur, sparking a new cycle of emotion and retaliation, or—less likely—there could be some upheaval in either Saudi Arabia or Egypt jeopardizing the stability of the region.

(5) *A confrontation with Cuba*: The Cubans could launch a new refugee wave,²³ in order to embarrass you and to hurt you politically.

(6) *Caribbean instability*: There could be even more violence and instability—perhaps another “Nicaragua.”

At the same time, all of the above could also offer opportunities for decisive leadership. Such a reaction could galvanize national support and cause a patriotic upsurge. Thus, on the hostage issue we should at least have the option to take prompt military action, either through a blockade or (perhaps) the seizure of Kharg Island. I believe you should ask Harold Brown to take some quiet steps to make sure that *prompt* military action could be initiated in the event of such crisis. We will not be able to wait for days to react.

The break-up of Iran would pose serious dilemmas, and our reaction would have to be calibrated to any Soviet initiative. In any case, we would want to act here in concert with some of the key regional countries, as well as our Allies, although again the adoption of a very firm posture could have a very positive effect.

²³ Reference is to the influx of Cuban refugees into the United States beginning the spring of 1980.

Insofar as the Soviets are concerned, we should keep reiterating that Afghanistan is the litmus test of Soviet intentions—though without putting ourselves in the position of emphasizing Soviet failure to respond. If the Soviet Union wishes accommodation, we are ready for the solution of the Afghanistan problem, which combines transitional security arrangements with a total Soviet withdrawal. In any case, we cannot afford any zig-zags in our policy toward the Soviet Union, and a tough public posture by you and by Muskie is essential, especially if we are at the same time to be able to argue credibly that we are prepared to seek arms control arrangements with the Soviets as a matter of mature realism.

With respect to Cuba, it seems to me that renewed provocations by Castro should be very firmly rebuffed; and the forcible deportation to Cuba, through the use of the U.S. Navy, of some Cuban criminals might be an appropriately dramatic step, designed to signal Castro that there are limits beyond which the U.S. cannot be pushed. In the Caribbean, we need to be able to act promptly and credibly, without the appearance of indecisiveness with which we are (unfairly) charged over Nicaragua.

IV. Initiatives that we might take:

There are some initiatives that you could take that might be helpful in demonstrating effective Presidential leadership in the area of foreign affairs. The following come to mind and you may wish to indicate here (by marginal notes) as well as above, whether you want me to develop any of these further:

(1) The hostage crisis: I think we should think about a more aggressive strategy—though recognizing the political liabilities of an effort that does not work. We might explore the possibility through our various intermediaries of a meeting between Muskie and some responsible Iranian official, *if* anyone emerges in the next three months. Indeed such a meeting, if held in October, could have significant impact even if it did not lead to the immediate release of the hostages—provided, of course, that a legitimate and realistic process toward resolutions is the result. There are undoubtedly some other ideas; but the problem is that without some initiative we will surely be accused of permitting the crisis to have become routine.

(2) We might explore secretly with the Soviets the possibility of some major withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan just prior to the elections. Though such an eventuality is not likely, it is conceivable that the Soviets might reach the conclusion that Reagan will be too dangerous, especially given his repudiation of arms control. One must be extremely careful how one undertakes any such probes because they could contribute to the impression of zig-zagging. That is why they

should not be undertaken formally in the Muskie-Gromyko channel but more by indirection and quiet hints (for example, in some of my informal talks with Dobrynin and especially with the Poles, who are anxious to promote a peaceful resolution of the Afghanistan problem).

(3) Though the political benefit of U.S.-Soviet TNF talks would not be great, it probably would be useful to have some exploratory discussions no later than October. That would demonstrate that your personal interest in nuclear arms control can be promoted alongside the policy of firmness on Afghanistan. Indeed, such discussions would demonstrate that the kind of mature and two-track policy that we wish to pursue with the Soviets is a more viable alternative to Reagan's extremism. We would need to judge the value of this somewhat later, in terms of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and the effectiveness of Reagan's attacks on our Afghan policy.

(4) If the Soviets continue to be beastly on Afghanistan, and if the Bush visit to China²⁴ goes reasonably well, you might consider having me visit Beijing for consultations, in late September or early October, thereby underscoring your special accomplishment in expanding the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

(5) A summit meeting with Begin and Sadat would probably not produce any results between now and November. In any event, we need to try inducing Sadat and Begin to help infuse new life in the Camp David process. The downside is that Begin probably will not wish to be helpful. Yet we should in any case seek to restart the talks, and have Sol²⁵ go to the area for a *sustained* period of time. A September trip by Muskie could also be helpful, both for the negotiations and for reasserting our commitment to Israel.

(6) You might contemplate convening a summit meeting on East-West relations with our principal Allies (or, alternatively, a Schmidt meeting here in September). With the Olympics behind us, it might be timely to hold a 1-2 day meeting of the Guadeloupe type, but including also the Italians and Japanese in order to discuss where do we go from here on the Soviet strategic threat posed through the Afghanistan invasion. There happens to be a real need for such a meeting, but it should not be convened unless we are certain that it would prompt some tangible steps going beyond the Venice Communique.²⁶ Nonetheless, this could be an effective demonstration of leadership, and perhaps by early fall our friends might be inclined to go along because of increasing concern over what foreign policy Reagan might pursue, plus

²⁴ Bush traveled to China in late August.

²⁵ Linowitz.

²⁶ See footnote 5, Document 145.

their increasing awareness of the common challenge in the Persian Gulf.

(7) There are also a series of specific military-defense initiatives that you could take, showing that there is bite to your emphasis on enhanced defense capabilities, both generally and in regard to the new Soviet strategic challenge in West Asia. These could include:

(a) Altering our carrier deployments, reducing our presence in the Mediterranean and enhancing our presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Creating a Middle East/Persian Gulf unified command, taking this territory out of the regional responsibilities of PACOM and EUCOM and underlining the seriousness of the Carter doctrine;²⁷

(c) Announcing the production of ERWs, to be stored in the United States for rapid deployment to Europe when needed;

(d) Adopting some of the Steadman study recommendations²⁸ and streamlining and upgrading the JCS. This could move us toward the general (not joint) staff system, and could be justified by a need to streamline the JCS as an outgrowth of the Iranian raid experience;

(e) Further, sustained exposition of our Southwest Asia strategy and the specific steps we are taking through a major strategic speech.

None of the above are major steps, but cumulatively they could underline the seriousness of your commitment to enhance defense, without at the same time requiring major budgetary reprogramming. In general, I believe that the best posture in this area is assertiveness in expounding what we have done in the past three and a half years. It is a creditable record—in defense, arms control, peacemaking, peace itself, energy, human rights, and international economics. As I indicated above, our biggest problem is not with the charges the Republicans will level against us, but the need to get our story out more forcefully and effectively.

For the past few years, there has been merit in a low-key approach in presenting our case—and it has worked, in terms of taking the nation beyond the phobias of Vietnam and Watergate, which so weakened our capacity to have an effective or assertive foreign policy. In my judgment, we can now move towards a greater highlighting of our purposes, achievements, and challenges to the nation for further action—and gain a good public response. The themes of strength and peace do not need to be elaborate; but only if we constantly pound them home,

²⁷ See Document 138.

²⁸ Reference is to John Steadman, *The National Military Command Structure: Report of a Study Requested by the President and Conducted in the Department of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1978). In the report, Steadman and his staff examined elements of the NMCS and evaluated their effectiveness.

in a series of statements, speeches, etc., are we finally going to get some of the credit we deserve. This, after all, was the central tactic of your recent trip to Europe,²⁹ where each speech and statement reinforced all the others—and eventually it got through to the media, which saw this as a highly effective foreign policy effort. The message also got through to our Allies, and their response also played well here. This can, in my view, be repeated in the campaign here this fall—starting with your acceptance speech.³⁰

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

²⁹ After the Venice Economic Summit, the President visited Vatican City, Belgrade, Madrid, and Lisbon before returning to Washington on June 26.

³⁰ Delegates to the Democratic National Convention nominated the Carter-Mondale ticket. On the evening of August 14, the President delivered his acceptance speech; for the text, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 1538–1539.

153. Address by Secretary of State Muskie¹

Los Angeles, California, August 7, 1980

Human Freedom: America's Vision

We stand for human freedom. It is what unites us as a people. It is what distinguishes us from our adversaries. It is our compass in the world to defend our freedoms at home and to advance human freedom around the world.

There are those who suggest that the freedom of other people is none of our business, that with enough military hardware our freedom can be secure while the freedom of others is stifled, that our purpose in the world is to preserve the status quo.

I say, and I believe you say, that is an invitation to trouble. It is a narrow vision of ourselves and of the world. It would be a foreign policy of reaction.

We must, of course, equip ourselves with the arms to defend our vital interests. But that's not enough. We must also arm ourselves with the conviction that our values have increasing power in today's world.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1980, pp. A–C. Muskie delivered his address before the United Steel Workers of America. The opening paragraphs of the speech are omitted in the original.

For if America is not the companion of human progress in the world, if we do not work to shape events in progressive directions, the world will pass us by. If we do not promote freedom in the world, there will be less freedom in the future for Americans.

Today, let me describe to you the kinds of freedom we must promote and the tools we need to promote it.

First is the freedom of nations: the freedom of nations, including our own, to be independent, to be free of outside domination. That has been and is the enduring goal of U.S. foreign policy. But it cannot be our only goal, for America's national interest, America's national ideals, require that we support other kinds of freedom in the world.

This Administration is committed to a second kind of freedom: the political freedom of people within nations.

And we are committed to a third goal: the freedom from poverty and human misery, conditions that destroy human lives and create unrest in the world.

A narrower approach, an approach which ignores the hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed. For it would ignore the political stirring of humanity, the current of human freedom that is gaining strength in the world. And when peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries.

So when Soviet troops seek to crush the freedom of an independent nation, we will oppose it.

When an adversary threatens our vital interest in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, in the Caribbean, in Asia or elsewhere, we will oppose them.

When foreign governments allow the seizure of American citizens, as in Iran, we will not give up until they are home safe and free.

And when governments anywhere suppress the freedoms of their own people, when malaria or malnutrition degrade human lives, we will oppose that as well.

We believe, in short, that America can flourish best in a world in which freedom is growing—freedom in all its aspects: national independence, political liberty, and freedom from hunger, poverty, and disease.

To promote these freedoms, we need to maintain a foreign policy that rests on four pillars.

- The first is an unwavering commitment to our security through a strong defense, solid alliances, and unyielding opposition to aggression.
- The second is an unrelenting effort to help resolve the regional disputes that threaten peace.
- The third is our foreign assistance programs which support the security and progress of other nations around the world, while providing us with the influence we need to advance our interests.

- The fourth is our support for human rights and human dignity.

In each of these four areas, this Administration has been active, and it has achieved results. The world is an unruly place. The headlines will always reflect new crises and new challenges. But I'm tired of hearing the fear merchants who overstate the dangers and undersell America for their own political profit. Let's listen to the facts and not their fears.

Military Modernization

First, this Administration is devoted heart and soul and sinew to a strong national defense. We have undertaken the most sweeping military modernization program in nearly 20 years.

In the 8 years before President Carter took office, real defense spending after inflation had declined by more than 35%.

Since taking office, this Administration has increased real defense spending every year by 10% overall.

We are modernizing every element of our strategic nuclear forces, with the new MX missile on land, with a new Trident submarine and missile at sea, and with new cruise missiles in the air. We are building a new rapid deployment force and obtaining new basing rights abroad to strengthen our hand in emergencies. We have led our NATO allies in several major initiatives: a new long-term modernization of NATO's conventional forces, real increases in allied defense spending, and deployment of new missiles in the European theater to meet the Soviet buildup.

Let us be clear. This military modernization program has, and will continue to involve, heavy costs. Our 5-year defense program will put defense spending in fiscal 1985 at a level more than 25% higher than in fiscal 1978. This is a price we must pay to preserve our strength.

In recent weeks, you and I have heard this effort described as inadequate. We have heard the call for a military buying binge. And we have heard demands that we radically alter our fundamental national security objective from a stable military balance to a quest for across-the-board military superiority.

Let there be no mistake. That is a prescription for a dramatic new arms race. For having achieved a position of equivalence, the Soviet Union will not accept military inferiority anymore than we will—no matter what the price to the people of the Soviet Union.

The costs of a new arms race would be staggering. We would have to cut back significantly on vital human services. And most importantly, we would increase the risk of a nuclear nightmare.

The consequence of a new arms race would not be greater security. It would be greater insecurity at home and abroad.

And there is a further point. In this effort to achieve military superiority, we would destroy the future of arms control. For arms control can only move forward on the basis of genuine equivalence. That is the basis of the preliminary agreement reached with the Soviets by President Ford in Vladivostok in 1974. It is the basis of the SALT II Treaty. It is the basis on which we have agreed with our allies to pursue further arms control, including limits in Europe.

Let us have no illusions. If we abandon the quest for arms control now, if we cast aside the treaty negotiated by three Presidents—two Republicans and one Democrat—the threats we face will be greater. Our knowledge about Soviet military plans will be less certain. Our own defense will be more difficult.

Today America is strong, and we are growing stronger. We have already reversed more than a decade of inattention to our national defense. We are prepared as a nation to spend whatever is needed.

But we must be as hard on overspending on the military as we are on waste in our domestic programs. And we should reject outmoded military doctrines that add danger to an already dangerous world.

Our commitment to the freedom of nations also means that we must be prepared to oppose aggression against the freedom of others.

Every day Afghan people are dying in defense of freedom. Every day the Soviet Union is paying a price for their aggression. Every day the free nations of the world must demonstrate their opposition to this assault on freedom.

Measures like our grain embargo and the Olympic boycott express not only our disapproval; they express the readiness of the American people to sacrifice in the cause of freedom. These sacrifices were necessary. And they have been felt in the Soviet Union.

I am proud of our athletes who did not go to Moscow, and I know you are, too. I am proud of our farmers and our businessmen and workers who have given up exports to send the Soviets a message. And I know you are, too. For the message has been received in an Olympics that was a sham, in declining meat supplies on Soviet shelves, and in the stinging rebuke of world opinion.

The rhetoric of the past few weeks calls for us to be firmer on Soviet aggression but to reverse the grain embargo, to write off the Olympic boycott, to conduct business as usual.

There is a short answer. We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by doing less.

We know, and the American people know, that we cannot oppose aggression abroad without exerting ourselves at home. We know, and the American people know, that security cannot be bought without sac-

rifice. To suggest otherwise in the hope of gaining partisan advantage is not leadership but expediency.

Achieving Peace

A second element of a foreign policy of freedom is to build peace: to help achieve peaceful, negotiated settlements to dangerous disputes in the world.

You know of President Carter's patient efforts to bring forth an agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. That agreement was a beginning, not an end. It was the beginning of a long and difficult process that is not yet over. Camp David was one of the finest achievements of this or any other Administration. It has already produced peace between Israel and Egypt. And it provides the only practical process yet devised that can lead to a comprehensive peace.

In a similar fashion, the Panama Canal Treaty, which ended 14 long years of negotiations, healed festering resentments in Latin America and laid the groundwork for sounder relations between the United States and our neighbors in this hemisphere.

To build peace and buttress our strategic position, we have normalized relations with the People's Republic of China.

President Carter's unswerving support for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia helped end a bitter and bloody civil war. It helped bring forth a new nation, Zimbabwe, based on majority rule and minority rights.² It helped calm a dispute that could have become a broader conflict in Africa. By working toward a settlement, by refusing to lift sanctions against Rhodesia until a fair settlement was insured, we emphasized not only our commitment to peace but our willingness to support abroad the principles of democracy and freedom we espouse at home.

Lloyd McBride³ and the steelworkers stood by the President in that difficult moment. You supported continuing the sanctions until a fair, free election could be held. You can be proud that this union has contributed in an important way to a solution that fostered peace.

There is a lesson in this experience. The same people who call now for a narrow vision of our foreign policies were bitterly opposed to our approach in southern Africa. Had they prevailed, there would not have been a settlement in Rhodesia. The fighting would have raged on. This would have been bad for the people of Zimbabwe, bad for the region, bad for our allies, bad for us, and good only for the Soviets who stood to profit from conflict.

² Zimbabwe achieved independence in April.

³ President of the United Steel Workers of America.

Foreign Assistance

A third element of a foreign policy of freedom is helping developing nations defend their independence, expand their economies, and dispel poverty.

For a good many years, this union and its members have understood an important fact—that a generous foreign assistance program is not a giveaway but a gateway: a gateway to new markets and new influence for the United States and a gateway to greater world stability.

That fact needs to be better understood by the American people.

American foreign assistance dollars are investments we make in others and in ourselves. These U.S. investments mean security aid to nations whose independence is threatened by outside intervention. These investments mean economic development for poorer nations. They help developing countries buy American equipment to build highways and dams, help hire American experts to strengthen their institutions, help them produce the food and the jobs that increase living standards for their people. And these investments directly benefit our own people.

Seventy cents of every dollar we commit for country-to-country development programs are spent here in the United States. They purchase American goods and American services, from farm equipment to technical training. Those purchases amounted to nearly \$2 billion last year alone. Our Agency for International Development has spent over \$650 million for goods and services just in California over the past 10 years. Well over another billion dollars last year went to American farmers for grain and other agricultural commodities.

The economic return to the American people goes beyond what is spent here, for our investments in development abroad create new markets for U.S. goods. Every dollar we pay into institutions like the World Bank, for example, generates between \$2 and \$3 of new growth in our own economy. The activities of these development banks mean 50,000–100,000 new American jobs each year.

In such transactions everyone gains. The United States gains jobs and markets and the capacity to help shape events in constructive ways. Small, struggling nations gain strength against aggression and subversion; they gain economic and social progress. Millions of people gain the beginnings of a better life. And the cause of freedom also gains.

So I would urge you to continue to defend these programs and help defeat attacks and cuts recently suffered in the Congress.⁴ Together, we must convince the American people that the defense of

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 151.

freedom requires not only a strong military fist but also an extended hand.

Human Rights

Finally, let me emphasize a fourth element of a foreign policy of freedom: support for human rights.

Throughout a long history of struggle and success, the trade union movement in general, and the steelworkers in particular, have supported that cause.

Today, as hundreds of thousands of refugees flee from assaults on human rights around the world, the steelworkers once again are showing their concern. Your effort on behalf of the AFL-CIO Cambodia Crisis Campaign, which Lloyd McBride unveiled this week, is a dramatic testament to the power of this great union for good. And it is an eloquent expression of your support for human rights.

Human rights has been a special concern of this Administration.

We stand for the right of people to be free of torture and repression, to choose their leaders, to participate in the decisions that affect their daily lives, to speak and write and travel freely.

There are limits on our capacity to influence affairs in other countries. And we must seek a practical approach that builds the long-term strength of our friends. But the fact that there are obstacles and risks should not keep us from holding up the banner of human rights—and it will not.

Ultimately, our firm support for human rights, for human freedom, will help build a more stable world. It will help remove the causes of violent and convulsive change.

There is, in various places in the world, a strong tide for human rights. We see the evidence for this in Spain, in Greece, in Portugal, in Ghana, in Nigeria, in Ecuador and in Peru, in other nations which have recently embraced and strengthened democracy. America cannot claim sole credit for these developments. But we can take pride that we have encouraged abroad the freedoms we enjoy at home, for they run hand in hand.

I have sketched the outlines of the foreign policy of freedom: a strong emphasis on security, a vigorous quest for peace, concrete development for nations and peoples, and practical support for human rights. This has been our policy for the past 4 years. And despite the difficulties, despite limits to our influence, it is working.

We must not succumb to the voices which say we should now turn back. These voices are pessimistic about the possibilities of freedom in the world. They see change abroad, for the most part, as dangerous for America. They are hostile to it. We see in change not only threats to be met but opportunities to be seized.

Their voices sound a note of fear, rather than hope, when they speak about the world. They have cried out against our efforts to strengthen the center in Nicaragua and to pursue prudent arms limitation agreements.

Above all, these voices suggest that our defense of freedom should be concentrated almost exclusively in arms.

We do need to revitalize our military. And we are. America can and will do all that is necessary to maintain its military position, to counter aggression, and to deter war.

America is and will remain a global power, second to none. But I believe the American people understand that a foreign policy premised on a renewed arms race is a foreign policy of folly, not wisdom; of weakness, not strength.

I believe the American people will rightly refuse to write a blank check for belligerence. America's purpose is not a new cold war but a realistic peace based on a solid foundation of deterrence.

We must seek security not only in arms but also in a diplomacy that is generous, that is willing to cope with inevitable change, that is faithful to decent human values. If we do that, we can be in the 1980s not only as strong as steel but as resilient and enduring. We can be not only a fortress of arms but a fortress of hope and freedom as well.

154. Editorial Note

On August 21, 1980, President Jimmy Carter delivered remarks at the annual convention of the American Legion, taking place in Boston, Massachusetts at the John B. Hynes Veterans Auditorium. The President began his remarks by outlining the efforts of the Veterans Administration in providing support for veterans, especially those who served during the Vietnam war. He then described the four specific objectives of his administration's national security policy: preventing war, sharing in the protection of industrial democracies in Europe and Asia, safeguarding and strengthening links to nations in the Middle East, and defending America's vital interests if threatened anywhere. After a brief summary of the administration's efforts to enhance U.S. strategic forces and deterrent capabilities, the President explained the relationship of this effort to projections of American force:

"Our strategy, now modernized to take advantage of Soviet planning and Soviet attitudes, must leave them no room for the illusion that they can obtain any advantage over the United States of America by the

use of their force. And we will keep our forces that strong and that clearly dominant.

“Recently there’s been a great deal of press and public attention paid to a Presidential directive that I have issued, known as PD-59. As a new President charged with great responsibilities for the defense of this Nation, I decided that our Nation must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack—in *responding* to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with my own national security advisers, we have been evolving such an improved capability. It’s been recently revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. It’s a carefully considered, logical, and evolutionary improvement in our Nation’s defense capability and will contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.

“No potential enemy of the United States should anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to ensure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an integrated plan for their use.

“Equally vital for our strategic purposes is the pursuit of nuclear arms control and balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals in the world. Just as we build strategic forces equal to our needs, we seek through negotiated agreements to keep unnecessary competition from carrying us into a purposeless and dangerous nuclear arms race to the detriment of our Nation’s security and to the detriment of the adequate strength of our conventional and other forces. We will continue to make every responsible effort to bring our forces and those of any potential foe under strict, balanced, and verifiable controls, both in the quantity of strategic arms and in their quality.

“I want to make clear that if an unlimited nuclear arms race should be forced upon us, we will compete and compete successfully. Let no one doubt that for a moment. But to initiate such a dangerous and costly race, abandoning our efforts for nuclear weapons control, would be totally irresponsible on our part.

“The destructive power of the world’s nuclear arsenals is already adequate for total devastation. It does no good to increase that destructive power in search of a temporary edge or in pursuit of an illusion of absolute nuclear superiority. To limit strategic nuclear weapons, as the SALT treaties do, is not to reduce our strength, but to reduce the danger that misunderstanding and miscalculation could lead to a global catastrophe. This is a course that has been pursued by the last six Presidents, both Democratic and Republican. To go beyond the reductions that

were outlined in the SALT II treaty, as I firmly intend to do, is to advance the stability on which genuine peace can be built.”

The President then surveyed the steps his administration had taken to uphold U.S. strategic interests in several geographic regions and to support democratization, independence, and development in other nations. In his concluding remarks, he returned to the theme of American strength:

“We do not maintain our power in order to seize power from others. Our goal is to strengthen our own freedom and the freedom of others, to advance the dignity of the individual and the right of all people to justice, to a good life, and to a future secure from tyranny. In choosing our course in the world, America’s strength must be used to serve America’s values.

“The choices ahead are every bit as demanding as the ones we’ve already made. Facing them takes a clear understanding of where we are and where we want to go as a nation. Responding to dangers that might menace our future security also will measure America’s common sense and courage, just as previous history has measured America’s common sense and courage.

“I’ve known America’s courage by seeing it tested. I’ve seen it in the men who went to Iran to attempt so valiantly in an isolated desert to rescue their fellow Americans who are still held hostage there. I saw it in the families of the men who died in that effort, and I’ve seen it in the families with whom I’ve met as frequently as possible of the citizens who are still held captive in Iran. What a nation we are to produce such men and women. All Americans are thankful to them.

“And finally let me say that our country also has the courage to reject the easy illusions of something for nothing, the fantasy goals of strength without sacrifice, the irresponsible advocacy of shortcut economics and quick-fix defense policy. There are no magic answers. Easy solutions are very difficult to find. Courage, sometimes quiet courage, unpublicized courage, is the most to be appreciated.

“I see this kind of courage in you, as veterans who have served and sacrificed already, but who still work continuously for the sake of service, not for recognition or reward. Your example strengthens my faith in our Nation and in the future of our Nation. With your help and with your courage and with your common sense, I know America will continue to be a nation of unmatched strength, a nation that faces the world as it is today and works with realism to bring to the world of the future freedom, peace, and justice.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pages 1549–1556)

Documentation on PD/NSC–59 “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” issued July 25, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

155. Statement by Secretary of State Muskie¹

New York, August 25, 1980

Securing the World's Common Future

I welcome this opportunity to address the U.N. special session on economic development. I intend to speak frankly. And I will suggest some specific obligations of the world's nations—including my own—to secure our common future on a fragile planet.

We meet because we are in the midst of a world economic crisis. We cannot escape it. We must respond to it. Millions of our fellow humans are starving, and millions more are malnourished, on what can be a bountiful planet. Soaring oil prices have crippled the developing world; even the strongest industrial economies are struggling. Infectious recession and inflation touch us all. Nations in desperate need of growth and development instead face worsening trade deficits, deeper debt, and diminishing prospects for meeting the needs of their people.

The work ahead is substantial. The time is short. But if we take an ambitious view, seasoned with realism, we can accomplish our main purposes at this special session. We can adopt a realistic international development strategy that will help improve development prospects. And we can agree on procedures and an agenda for a new round of global economic negotiations—serious work aimed at concrete progress where the need is urgent and consensus appears within reach. My country will participate constructively in these proceedings. Progress is essential for the world's interest and also our own.

We are encouraged that progress is possible because progress has been made. The fact is that over the past decade many people in developing nations have attained better lives. Per capita income in the Third World has risen by some 3% per year. Exports have increased by 8.7% annually. Manufacturing output is higher. Life expectancies and literacy rates have improved. Infant mortality rates have declined. Striking progress has been made, much of it recently, in adjusting the system to improve Third World prospects.

- The flow of aid to poorer nations has steadily increased. More than \$100 billion in replenishments for the multilateral development banks and their affiliates have been agreed.

¹ Source: Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1980, pp. 76–78. All brackets are in the original. Muskie made the statement before the 11th Special Session of the UN General Assembly. The General Assembly met in special session from August 25 until September 15 in order to discuss progress made in the establishment of the New International Economic Order and actions related to economic cooperation (see footnote 3, Document 99).

- Access to International Monetary Fund resources has been sharply increased. Terms are more flexible. New facilities are in operation. A major quota increase is in process. The World Bank has also launched an innovative program of lending for structural adjustment.

- The common fund negotiations have been completed. We have moved ahead on individual commodity agreements.

- On trade, last year's multilateral trade agreement will mean an average cut of 25% in tariffs on principal developing-country exports. Preferential tariff systems have been adopted by all Western industrial countries.

- Use by developing countries of world capital markets has increased fourfold—from \$11 billion in 1970 to \$44 billion in 1978.

- The effort to increase world food supplies has been advanced through the International Fund for Agricultural Development and through the concentration of World Bank resources. In the past 5 years the World Bank committed some \$11.6 billion to agricultural projects.

- And in another urgent priority area—energy—the World Bank will be lending well over \$10 billion for energy projects between now and 1985.

This partial listing is not the record of a world community frozen in shortsighted self-interest, rigidly divided by ideology or stalemated on methods. Those tendencies do afflict us. Yet in recent years we have also found the common sense and good will to move forward.

But our accomplishments are still far short of our needs. My government has just completed a major study of the world's population, resources, and environmental prospects for the year 2000—just 20 years away.² Its conclusions remind us again why these debates must move from rhetoric to reality. Our "Global 2000" study begins with a harsh truth. In the year 2000, the world population will be more than half again higher than in 1975. Over the last quarter of this century, more than 2 billion people will be added—2 billion more mouths to feed, bodies to clothe, individual hopes to be fulfilled.

Given this fact, the study tells us what could happen if nations fail to act in time and with reason. Based on current trends, food production should nearly double. Still, the number of people going hungry will rise by millions. Many nations already hungry see their croplands

² Reference is to an interagency study commissioned by the President in 1977 on the projected state of the world by the end of the century. The President directed that the Department of State and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) lead the study. On July 24, the White House released the 3-volume report, entitled *Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century*. For additional information, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Documents 343, 344, and 346–348.

and grasslands drying to desert—a loss each year equal to the size of my home State of Maine.

On energy, from the vantage of a precarious present, we could face a punishing future. Unless trends are changed, oil supplies will be insufficient and, for many, unaffordable. Wood, the main household fuel for over 1 billion people, will be found only at ever greater distances and in dwindling amounts.

We have become accustomed to warnings about the need to conserve nonrenewable resources such as oil. But the “Global 2000” study also points up serious stresses on renewable resources—croplands and forests, fisheries, air, water, and land—resources we have taken for granted as endless.

Another central observation of the study is that protecting the environment and succeeding in economic development are not competing goals but complementary paths. Poverty worsens the most acute environmental dangers, such as the loss of forests and soil. Thus we will not save the environment unless we also solve the problems of the poor and move the global economy forward.

“Global 2000” is not a forecast. It is a projection of present trends. But it is another chilling reminder that our common future depends on our common success, here and throughout the complex of relations known as the North-South dialogue. We must work together to raise food production, to diversify energy sources and to use energy and other resources more efficiently, to protect our common environment, to restrain population growth, to deal effectively and equitably with mounting deficits, and to keep an open system of trade.

It falls to us to rewrite the future. It is within our power to do so. But it will require a change not only in the quantity but in the character of our effort. For as fast as we have run in recent years, the challenges still outpace us. Too often, as the Brandt Commission reminds us, we have engaged in a “dialogue of the deaf,” in which “we judge ourselves by our good points and the other side by their failings.”³ The result is frustration and deadlock.”

Global Responsibilities

That deadlock must be broken. The demands of our common future require it. They compel a new inquiry. We must ask not only what individual nations can take from the global system but what each nation must bring to it. Without exception, we must recognize that assigning responsibility for the future to others is not an answer but an

³ Reference is to the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The ICIDI or Brandt Commission report, entitled *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, was released in 1980.

abdication. Such excuses will not feed, nor clothe, nor heal, nor comfort our successors if we fail. And fail we will, unless all nations are fully engaged.

Industrial Countries. I do not by any means exclude my own country from this prescription. In suggesting what different societies, differently situated, should offer, let me begin with the industrial countries.

- First, we must reduce the rate of our domestic inflation. Spiraling prices restrain growth and make the world economy more vulnerable and less fair.

- Second, we should keep our markets open, particularly to products from developing countries.

- Third, the industrial nations must use energy more efficiently, increase domestic production, spur the development of new energy sources, and cut our reliance on imported oil.

- Fourth, despite the need for budget restraint to control inflation, we should increase our aid to the developing nations. This Administration has said many times to the American Congress and the American people that our present levels of assistance to lower income countries are not enough. I intend to keep doing all in my power to change that condition.

- Fifth, developed countries should continue to accept an increasing role for developing countries in international economic decisionmaking—a role commensurate with their growing importance in the world economy and their willingness to share international obligations.

- Sixth, we must increase the capacity of developing countries to apply science and technology for development. We must accelerate the transfer of information, technology, pollution-control strategies, and other skills.

Most of these steps will entail short-term sacrifice for the sake of long-term returns. I believe the American people will support those investments. But as a former practicing politician, let me speak frankly. The American people will insist that their contributions have an effect—that people's lives must actually be changed for the better. And we can assure that only if other nations are also prepared to do their part.

Oil-Exporting Nations. The oil-exporting nations have a unique responsibility. In recent years rising oil prices have been a ponderous drag on development and growth and a major cause of inflation. This year the oil-importing developing countries will have to spend—for that single commodity—almost double the amount they will receive

from all sources in aid. Thus steps such as these by oil-exporting nations will be vital to our common goals:

- First, they must adopt stable price and supply policies to avoid further trauma to the international economy.
- Second, the oil-exporting countries must increase their aid and recycle more of their surpluses directly to developing countries.
- Third, oil-exporting countries should join with consuming nations in working for rational global energy arrangements.

Developing Countries. Whatever the level, external assistance will always be a secondary factor. The major determinants are internal—the ability to use resources effectively, to encourage innovation, and to share broadly the benefits of growth. Thus, there are responsibilities that developing countries must shoulder.

- First, domestic and external resources must be used efficiently and fairly, with concentration on such priority areas as energy and food.
- Second, serious family-planning efforts are vital. Nine-tenths of the world's population increase in the next 20 years will be in developing countries. No other single factor does more to darken their future.
- Third, as their economic strength grows, individual developing nations should accept more responsibility for the common management of international economic problems.

- Fourth, as their development proceeds, they must open their own economies to free flows of world trade.

Centrally Planned Countries. The market economy countries have received dominant attention in the North-South dialogue. But the centrally planned countries have global responsibilities as well. Empty bellies will not be filled by polemics. No nation or group of nations has grounds to remain aloof from this struggle. World opinion looks to the centrally planned countries:

- First, to increase their assistance to developing countries;
- Second, to increase their unconditioned purchases of LDC [less developed country] products; and
- Third, to cooperate in international efforts to stabilize commodity markets.

Proposals

For all of us, the principles I have outlined must be the basis for practical action. For our part the United States is prepared to join with others to meet the global challenge.

Our most urgent task is to confront the specter of imminent famine haunting Africa. This summer alone the United States has provided an

additional 235,000 tons for emergency African food relief. We strongly urge that all nations able to contribute foodstuffs or funds join under the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization to coordinate relief to drought-afflicted regions. I am happy to note that the Director General will convene a meeting of concerned governments and international organizations in the coming weeks.⁴

Targets have been set for annual food assistance in the new Food Aid Convention,⁵ and for emergency food aid through the international emergency food reserve. We encourage others to join us in the effort to reach those targets, to guarantee that food will be available to those in need. Further, we should develop reserves that are adequate to back up donor commitments and assure that food emergencies can be met. My government is working toward a 4-million-ton reserve of wheat to assure our food aid commitments.⁶

Despite efforts to produce more food, many poor developing countries will still have to import substantial quantities over the next decade. We should consider new arrangements to assist those developing countries that are improving their own food production.

We should explore ways to channel more international funds, both concessional and nonconcessional, into food production. We, therefore, support rapid agreement on an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). We would also consider further measures to strengthen IFAD.

To help developing countries adjust to oil-driven balance-of-payments deficits, we favor continued improvements in International Monetary Fund facilities, including subsidizing the Supplementary Financing Facility. Such arrangements should receive strong support

⁴ In an August 4 memorandum to Muskie, Owen indicated that an “extraordinary international effort” would be needed to avert starvation in drought-affected areas in Africa. Owen requested that at the 11th Special Session Muskie announce that the United States would ask Saouma to convene an emergency conference to organize aid relief for Africa. Lake forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Christopher under an August 7 memorandum, indicating that he was to inform Owen that “S/P, the bureaus, IDCA, and USDA” all recommend that Muskie make this announcement. At a September 20 meeting of donor countries and international organizations in Rome, Saouma announced that the United States, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, West Germany, Switzerland, France, and Algeria had made cash or food aid contributions. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 276, footnotes 3 and 4 thereto.

⁵ Signatories approved a new Food Aid Convention in London on March 6, which replaced the FAC negotiated in 1971 as part of the International Wheat Agreement (IWA). In a May 9 message to the Senate transmitting the Food Aid Convention, the President indicated that the United States intended to pledge 4,470,000 MT of grains. The complete text of Carter’s message is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, pp. 865–866.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 277, footnote 14.

from those who prosper as oil prices climb. Private capital flows also will continue to play a critical role. We look forward to the Development Committee's report on proposals for increasing nonconcessional flows to developing countries.

We are committed to the stimulation of energy production worldwide and to the increased use of renewable fuels. The United States strongly supports an expansion of World Bank energy programs, to permit Bank participation in multinational risk-sharing ventures to discover and develop new energy sources. Here, too, as we agreed at the Venice summit, we are open to new institutional and financial arrangements. We will participate positively in the U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy Sources.⁷ We urge the U.N. Secretariat and member nations to make every effort to insure its success.

Coal is an attractive alternative to high-priced oil. We will expand our capacity to produce and ship coal, and we are ready to help developing countries establish coal-burning facilities and increase their use of coal.

We support discussions between oil-exporting and oil-importing nations on ways to insure orderly market conditions and on further assistance for non-oil developing countries.

Requests for population program assistance have outpaced the international community's ability to respond. We are ready to join an international commitment to double, in this decade, the availability and use of family-planning and related health services.

On trade, my country would support a pledge by all countries to restrain protectionism and ease adjustment. Such a commitment would provide more assured market access to developing countries. Also, beyond the sharp reductions in tariffs already agreed, we are prepared to increase the benefits of our generalized system of preferences for poorer developing countries.

These proposals reflect the positive approach we believe our common problems demand and this special session deserves.

Let me conclude with this observation. I am persuaded, to the depth of my being, that the challenges ahead are not beyond us. The "Global 2000" report has been described as a reconnaissance of the future. It describes the possibility. I believe it will not be the reality. The vision we share is a vision of opportunity and of peace. It is within our capacity to alter the future to fit that vision. The resources do exist. The solutions can be found. Together we can summon the will. Knowing what is at stake, we must not fail.

⁷ The conference took place in Nairobi August 10–21, 1981.

156. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 3, 1980

SUBJECT

East-West Relations: A Formula for U.S. Policy in 1981 and Beyond

I want to offer some perspectives on the *current state* of East-West relations and an *integrating formula* for putting both the resources and a clear sense of strategic direction into our policies toward the Soviet Union in the next four years. You will recognize much of the analysis, but I hope the framework is helpful for tying rhetoric to actions and programs in a comprehensive fashion. The inspiration for this memo comes in part from Sam Huntington's recent paper on U.S.-Soviet relations which he wrote for Hedley Donovan,² but it also stems from my own efforts in strategic doctrinal changes, the Persian Gulf Security Framework, and East-West technology transfers. We have accomplished a great deal over the past three years, and I would like to maintain the momentum and include additional areas and programs.

The East-West Balance

In early 1977 you told Sam and me to "tell us how we are doing in the world vis-a-vis the Soviets." PRM-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment was the reply.³ It treated military and non-military categories as well as all major regions of U.S.-Soviet competition.

1. The military *balance* was judged as "essential equivalence" and the *trends* as adverse. That judgment looks sound in retrospect.

2. In the non-military categories of technology, economics, diplomacy, and political institutions, the U.S. was ahead although the critical military-related technology gap was closing in several areas. In retrospect this judgment has been vindicated.

3. In the major regions outside Europe, Soviet prospects were judged best in Africa and the Persian Gulf region. The Caribbean was cited but without alarm. In retrospect, the record is mixed in Africa; Iran as a crisis point was predicted; we were too optimistic about the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 58, Chron: 9/1-9/80. Confidential. Sent for information. The President wrote "Very interesting. J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Presumable reference to Huntington's contribution to the "U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities, 1980-85" report coordinated by Donovan; see Document 141.

³ See footnote 2, Document 36.

Caribbean; and Southeast Asia has been more volatile than anticipated. In East Asia, our normalization with the PRC faces the USSR for the first time ever with a China-Japan-U.S. tie of good relations.

4. In Europe, PRM-10 emphasized the certainty of political uncertainty in both Eastern and Western Europe. That judgment remains valid. The emergence of a more traditional German *Ostpolitik*, exploited by Moscow in the traditional manner, signals growing difficulties in West-West relations, i.e., within the Alliance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has given unambiguous evidence of the strategic interaction between the Persian Gulf region and European-Soviet relations: Soviet power projection that affects the oil states of the Persian Gulf tends to reinforce the accommodationist politicizing forces in Western Europe and thereby exacerbates U.S.-European relations vis-a-vis Moscow and the Persian Gulf.

The Transition from Era I to Era II in East-West Relations

Critics within the U.S. and abroad have complained that the U.S. has not pursued a steady or consistent course in U.S.-Soviet affairs. The President, in particular, is believed by many to be responsible for this. It is, in their view, all his fault.

To some extent, the apparent inconsistency is real. Soviet power projection has been used more extensively in the last few years than even informed policy and intelligence circles believed it would be. "Changing" U.S. policy, therefore, has been "catching up" U.S. policy. Consistent policy outputs are impossible when the inputs differ substantially from those anticipated.

To a larger extent the inconsistency is only apparent. It looks that way because the foreign policy and press elites themselves are split on fundamental assumptions about U.S. foreign policy. They are awakening to and becoming disturbed by the transition from the first era in East-West relations—1945 to the mid-1970s (U.S. dominance and Pax Americana)—to the second era—the 1980s and 1990s (the nature of which is still being defined, as Soviet military power makes itself felt). But they are reacting to this awakening in quite different ways. At least three fissures divide foreign policy and media elite views, and perhaps even the broader public, as they assess the incipient realities of Era II.

First, there are fundamental differences over the *political utility of military force*. At the strategic nuclear level, some believe "assured destruction" is enough. Others believe force balances and capabilities make a political and diplomatic difference. At the conventional level, some argue that our Vietnam experience shows that conventional military power is greatly overrated. Others say that Vietnam proves the importance of using conventional military power effectively, of not squandering it where our interests are small.

The second fissure is *East-West versus North-South primacy*, between those who view East-West relations as still the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and those who believe that North-South relations rival if not exceed East-West relations for the cornerstone role.

The third fissure concerns *economics—the growing incongruities between economic power on the one hand* (Europe, Japan, and Saudi Arabia) *and military security responsibilities on the other hand* (the U.S. carries them all). It is only vaguely recognized, but it has enormous potential to evoke an “isolationist-internationalist” dichotomy in security policy prescriptions.

These fissures prevent a foreign policy consensus on East-West relations and mean that in the 1970s, and perhaps into the 1980s, no U.S. policy toward the USSR can have broad and constant support. The domestic need to accommodate both sides of each fissure, particularly in Congress for budgets, inevitably creates the impression, if not the reality, of a wavering U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and our allies. Thus, blaming the President is far from an adequate explanation.

The primary task for U.S. foreign and defense policy in the early 1980s, therefore, is to complete the transition to Era II peacefully and to give that era a definition and direction appropriate to changed realities. Success will depend in part on closing the three fissures, and a compelling formula articulated by the President will help close these. Only their closure will provide the liberal consensus necessary for a sustained realistic policy.

A U.S. Policy for Era II

Era II may or may not be dominated by the U.S. A return to the Cold War is not possible because regaining the military preponderance of that time is not feasible. Were it feasible, a Cold War balance would be the best choice because it was a period relatively secure from general war. A return to detente of the early 1970s is equally infeasible. The Soviets would demand higher terms and be no less aggressive in projecting power into the disputed regions. Even if the Soviet leaders personally desired a relaxation, the centrifugal forces within the USSR, in the Warsaw Pact, and in client states elsewhere would make it too risky. They are trapped in their own expansive dynamic which limits fundamental choices.

Neither the containment policy nor the detente policy alone is adequate to deal effectively with the new level of Soviet power. A more comprehensive approach is essential. The U.S. must neither rely largely on military power nor passively “contain” Soviet power. The U.S. must *engage* the USSR *competitively*.

Huntington defined four elements of a policy toward the USSR on which “competitive engagement” can be built.

- a. Maintenance of military deterrence.
- b. Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.
- c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits.
- d. Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, bloc states, and minority nationalities in the USSR.

A number of things have been accomplished over the past three years to provide the programs and policies for “competitive engagement” over the next four years. When they are specifically related to the four elements of the policy, a clear view of how to proceed in East-West relations begins to emerge. That follows for each element.

a. *Maintenance of military deterrence through military pre-eminence.*

The doctrinal changes marked by the “strategic” PD-41, 50, 53, 57, 58, and 59 provide the direction our military programs must take to maintain deterrence in the 1980s.⁴ The gap between our political objectives and our military capabilities must be reduced. This can be accomplished through simultaneous improvements in our force posture and meaningful arms control agreements.

—*Force Improvements.* We must address our military deficiencies in a three-pronged attack which includes:

—*The Budget.* Not only must the budget be increased, but Defense, FEMA, and the DCI must let the strategic PDs guide their program choices. To date, they have yielded little to the new doctrine.

—*Organization.* All three agencies must be reorganized to improve “factor productivity,” with particular emphasis on the Pentagon. The President tried to reorganize DoD once, but the effort failed. He succeeded with FEMA. He must succeed in the next term with DoD.

—*Manpower.* We must also solve the military manpower problem. That probably means a return to the military draft.

The objective of these measures may not be “military superiority” but it should be “military pre-eminence” for the US and its allies, in terms of both nuclear and conventional forces.

—*Arms Control.* Arms control, too, plays a part in the military balance. Arms control, however, is headed for indefinite dormancy in the 1980s unless it is tied symbiotically to our defense policy. PD-50 prescribed the process that can achieve that symbiosis. ACDA, State, and even ISA at Defense have failed to see this merit in the directive. Yet it is precisely arms control that is at risk without the PD-50 approach.

⁴ Copies of PD/NSC-41, “U.S. Civil Defense Policy,” September 29, 1978; PD/NSC-50, “Arms Control Decision Process,” August 14, 1979; PD/NSC-53, “National Security Telecommunications Policy,” November 15, 1979; and PD/NSC-57, “Mobilization Planning,” March 3, 1980, can be found at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library website. Documentation on PD/NSC-59 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

SALT I and II were developed to support our assured destruction defense policy of the 1960s. In the 1970s, that policy became inadequate. ACDA and State drifted into the position of seeing arms control as a surrogate for a defense policy. Now we are hesitantly awakening to the defense policy problem in Europe. We cannot move with confidence into TNF and SALT III negotiations because we are in transition with our defense policy. That is not the only defense policy problem for arms control. ASAT negotiations move on although we have not the slightest idea of our force goals for space. No military service has responsibility for them. The same is true for CTB. We have not developed our defense requirements for nuclear weapons development and production of nuclear materials. Yet we are on a CTB track that enjoys no interagency consensus.

Two major PD-50 tasks must be launched to extract us from this disastrous course on which arms control now proceeds toward self-destruction. First, an across-the-board assessment of all negotiations vis-a-vis one another is essential. Second, a somewhat more narrow review of the TNF/SALT III sector is needed to clarify what kind of SALT III can assist our national security in an unambiguous and objective way. To do that, we must also *review the whole of our strategy and force structure for the defense of Europe*. Both efforts should be complete by next spring. To make these serious endeavors, the President will have to reconfirm his commitment to the PD-50 process within the agencies.

b. *Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.*

We must devote special attention to the three interrelated strategic regions of Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Caribbean region is also overdue for our security attention as is Southeast Asia.

We have major work to accomplish in each area, notwithstanding much that has already been accomplished. NATO, as mentioned in connection with PD-50, needs a reassessment of our strategy for its defense. The Persian Gulf Security Framework effort must be kept on track, a separate unified command being one of the first steps next year. For the Caribbean we must begin a similar security framework effort. In East Asia, the nature of military ties with China will need further definition.

In addition to these regional activities, some key functional area reviews must be accomplished:

—A successful policy of containment depends on capable conventional force projection. We have a modest beginning in the RDF.

—Security Assistance policy needs significant revision, budgeting, and perhaps changed legislation.

—Our intelligence capabilities in each region must be improved and expanded with all the speed possible.

—Military training assistance and advisory policy needs repair.

The most difficult area in the 1980s may prove to be Europe, West-West relations. Overcoming the lag between our own recovery from the hopes of the early 1970s and Europe's recovery from its present illusion of divisible detente, will not occur without political trauma. How to defend Europe effectively cannot be dodged as it has been for three decades. And until that is decided, arms control within that theater will be difficult to implement in a way that is not politically and militarily injurious to the West. The LTDP was a modest beginning which must be turned into a major revolution in the 1980s.

c. Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits to the East.

The Soviet Union and East Europe will continue to look to the West as a source of reprieve from their economic plight. The West must exploit that need with offers of economic assistance based on rigorous and measurable political conditions.

With the new COCOM policies, we have begun to control more effectively the strategic technology transfers. The next step is East-West trade coordination. Credits and trade must be coordinated on an alliance basis. Such a step logically follows from our COCOM policy. Otherwise, the "alternative supplier" problem will continue to deny us the political advantages of our greatest edge over the Soviets—economic advantage. In the "process know-how" proposal to COCOM we have already moved slightly toward trade coordination. That is why Europe resists it. The diplomatic efforts now in progress to prevent the FRG (Kloeckner) and France (Creusot-Loire) from taking our ARMCO and ALCOA deals with the Soviet Union can be the seed from which East-West trade coordination grows. If the Germans believe that Soviet markets are critical for their machine exports, then we can retaliate by denying them our import market. We have strong laws that allow the President to force Europe to choose between the US as a trading partner and the Soviet Bloc as a market. Once the allies are whipped into line, we can dictate the political terms of East-West trade.

The Soviets deeply fear a Western united economic front. If we do not present them with one in the 1980s, the incongruities between security burdens and economic power in NATO will create a political backlash in the US which will destroy public support for US troops in Europe. The Mansfield Amendment was merely a hint of what can come⁵ if the Europeans continue to can get without paying for, because we choose not to tax them [*sic*].

⁵ Senator Mansfield proposed amendments in 1971 and 1974 to reduce the American troop presence in Europe. Both were defeated.

To move from the rhetorical to the operational, *we should use the post-Afghanistan policy with our allies to lay the basis for East-West trade coordination at the Economic Summit in Canada next summer.* Once the Soviets see an emerging united economic front, we will have important opportunities for our economic diplomacy.

d. *Reduction of Soviet influence over 1) client states, 2) bloc states, and 3) national minorities in the USSR.*

It is time to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence, and the opportunities are large. We have the beginnings of a policy for the three non-Russian areas of Soviet influence.

—*Client States.* In Southwest Asia, in the Horn of Africa, in Southern Africa (Angola), in Yemen, in the Caribbean, and in Southeast Asia we can and should bring some reverses to the Soviet projection of power. This will involve more vigorous support for anti-Soviet movements afoot in all areas.

—*Bloc States.* We already have a policy for East Europe of encouraging its autonomy vis-a-vis the USSR. *We must help Poland consolidate recent gains.*

—*Minorities in the USSR.* We can do more on the nationality question within the USSR. The human rights policy is, of course, already a weapon in our arsenal. In an age of nationalism, there is nothing permanent about Soviet “internationalism” and Soviet borders—something we can imply and encourage others to say explicitly.

A competitive approach to spheres and areas of Soviet influence will make further Soviet projection of power more difficult. A passive containment approach will permit Soviet consolidation of recent gains and new efforts to expand further.

The Soviet Union, however militarily strong it is becoming, suffers enormous centrifugal political forces. A shock could bring surprising developments within the USSR, just as we have seen occurring in Poland. The dissolution of the Soviet Empire is not a wholly fanciful prediction for later in this century. US policy should sight on that strategic goal for the longer run. When it comes, Era II will be at an end, and we can anticipate Era III.

To sum up, through a strategy of “competitive engagement” the President can, I believe, heal some of the fissures in our foreign policy and media elite opinion on the three key assumptions for US military, foreign, and economic policy. In a second term he will be freer to stand above the day-to-day criticisms that have heretofore made a steady course difficult to follow, particularly funding programs and pursuing adequate legislation. He also has the enormous advantage of several inchoate policy developments (as outlined above) that will allow him, rather than the Soviets and our allies, to define the nature of Era II in

East-West relations. Basic steps have already been taken in each of the four elements of "competitive engagement." As policy slogans form each element, the following are possibilities:

a. *Maintenance of military deterrence.*

US "military pre-eminence" is the essential basis for deterrence and security. We shall acquire it and maintain it with our allies.

b. *Containment of Soviet expansion where deterrence fails.*

"Three interrelated security zones" are the basis for containing Soviet power projection.

c. *Offers of politically conditioned economic benefits.*

"Reciprocally advantageous East-West trade" is our goal, but trade is not compatible with threats to our security and foreign policy interests.

d. *Reduction of Soviet influence over client states, Bloc states, and non-Russian minorities in the USSR.*

"Resistance to Soviet internationalism" is encouraged wherever states and nations find it oppressive and unwanted.

157. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Muskie¹

Washington, September 5, 1980

Presenting U.S. Foreign Policy to the American People: Bureau Ideas

In response to your request last week, twenty-two bureaus and offices have prepared the attached memoranda² on the ways in which U.S. foreign policy problems can best be presented to the American people. This memo summarizes their answers to the questions that were posed to them.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL, 9/1–15/80. No classification marking. Drafted by C. Ries (S/P) on September 3 and cleared by Berger. Ries initialed for Berger. There is no indication that Muskie saw the memorandum.

² Not printed. Contributors included P, IDCA, AID, A, AF, ARA, CA, EB, EUR, H, HA, INM, INR, IO, L, NEA, OES, PA, PER, PM, D/CT, and RP.

I. *What does the public need to know about the world to make it more receptive to the “hard options” of our policies?*

Complexity:

Several of the bureaus see a need to convey a greater sense of the complexity of today's world and the constraints on our freedom of action. We should not minimize the costs or risks associated with our policies, suggest quick or easy fixes, or downplay the degree to which American foreign policy success depends on the support of other nations, such as our NATO allies or Third World countries.

David Newsom singles out four issues that are particularly hard to explain to the American people: Third World demands, unanticipated political change, the relative strength of the U.S. in the world, and the independent views of our allies.

A number of the memos suggest that more can be done to make foreign policy seem relevant to everyday concerns. We can stress the economic stakes we have in foreign relations (jobs, resources and the prices paid for imports are three immediate suggestions). We can relate development efforts abroad to pressures to emigrate to the U.S. (OES), or to narcotics flows (INR, OES). A number suggest that we can do more to explain foreign policy in human terms, without oversimplification.

Resources

The growing reluctance of Americans to dedicate sufficient resources to foreign affairs, particularly to economic and military assistance, is a commonly recognized problem. It is also agreed that we should actively seek to build support for aid, stressing that it is crucial to our effectiveness in changed international economic and political circumstances. In addition to the competitive (with the Soviets) and humanitarian rationales, we can show that aid helps create stable growing economies which are increasingly important to us as markets for our exports (H, IDCA, PA). Developing countries are sources of raw materials (AID, H). Helping LDC's address their pressing social and economic problems can enhance political stability (IDCA). The public bemoans a supposed loss of U.S. influence in the world, yet desires reduced aid levels. We can highlight the cost of aid cuts in terms of influence (NEA). One caveat, however: a tendency to exaggerate the benefits of aid in the past is part of our problem today. We should, therefore, be willing to keep expectations reasonable (EB).

Specific Issue Ideas

Third World needs: dramatize with use of Caribbean area. Poverty at home leads to migration pressures on U.S. (P).

Fault found with U.S. policy "weakness" whenever unfavorable change occurs: recall radical changes which occurred during period of preponderant U.S. power (Nasser, Iraq, Castro etc.) (P).

Strategic balance: selective use of "how does it look from Moscow" (P); sober respect for Soviets but not all-powerful, long run mutual interests (PM, PA).

Refugees, immigrants: historical success stories, always adjustment problems (RP); need to share burdens (PA).

Congressional relations: agreement on policies takes work but strengthens policy; legislated constraints can be costly (H).

Intelligence: stress role of intelligence community in digestion of mass of data needed for modern policymaking (INR).

Energy: challenge myths, e.g. no energy problem, U.S. deserves subsidized oil, can break cartel with wheat. Stress collateral role of allies, LDC's (EB).

Trade: economic/political costs of protectionism, injury alternatives available, effective competition not unfair, LDC's offer markets (EB).

Narcotics: example of modest assistance program with direct domestic benefit (INM).

Human Rights: grounded in U.S. and international law, pragmatic, promotes security, strong card in ideological competition, long term solution to refugee problems (HA, PA).

Arms Control: preserve base; push SALT without catalyzing business as usual attitude; SALT in our interest, not "favor" to Soviets; TNF—keep low visibility/freedom of action (PM, PA).

Terrorism: decade of violence likely—need to attack root causes (D/CT).

Latin America: Unsung success story; convey sense of changing scene and our confidence that we advance U.S. interests by promoting LA democracy; coolness with southern cone only temporary. (ARA)

II. *How can the problems confronting U.S. foreign policy be best presented to the American people?*

—Use an overall framework or strategy statement; perhaps revive annual foreign policy statements³ (H).

—Need quicker adaptation of speaking engagements to changing foreign policy priorities, more aggressive use of FSO visits to hometowns (EUR).

—The Secretary should make a Report to U.S. People on U.S. foreign policy goals and responsibilities. Work in foreign service role in conceiving and carrying out U.S. foreign policy (PER).

³ The Nixon administration issued annual reports on foreign policy; for information concerning the 1970, 1971, and 1972 reports, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 60, 85, 86, and 104. For a portion of the text of 1973 report, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 9.

—Need to reiterate themes, particularly those of allies speech (Commonwealth/WAC August 8).⁴ Make two economic speeches in next two months (EB).

—Require that all Deputy Assistant Secretaries and above make a speech monthly. Add speaking skills section to efficiency report on FSO's (IO).

—Stress citizen services stories to personalize department, build support, combat ivory tower image (CA).

—Consider establishment of consular services office on Capitol Hill (OES).

—Intensify and institutionalize communications with key interest groups interested in foreign policy. Improve press guidance to avoid cliches, evasiveness. Department Spokesman should be willing to deal with reasonable hypothetical questions. Testify on Hill on interagency agreed positions only. Consider monthly summaries of current foreign policy with Q's and A's. Make senior officials available to networks for a series of TV specials on the problems and imperatives of foreign policymaking (AF).

⁴ Reference is to Muskie's August 8 address in San Francisco before the Commonwealth Club of California and the World Affairs Council of Northern California. Muskie asserted: "We in the United States need to be sensitive to the special concerns and vulnerabilities of our allies. At the same time, our allies must accept the growing responsibility that comes with growing strength. They must be prepared to bear their share of our common burdens." (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1980, p. 17)

158. Radio Address by President Carter to the Nation¹

Washington, October 19, 1980

Foreign Policy

This is President Jimmy Carter, speaking to you from the Oval Office of the White House.

For the past 4 years, the United States has been at peace. We've strengthened the foundations of our security. We have pursued our na-

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book II, pp. 2337–2341. The President spoke at 12:10 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on the Mutual Broadcasting System.

tional interests in a dangerous and often unstable world. And we've done so without recourse to violence and war. This is no accident. It's the result of a careful exercise of the enormous strength of America.

Today I want to talk to you about what we must do together in the next 4 years to ensure our own security and to keep the peace.

The cornerstone of both security and peace is our ability to defend ourselves. In the last analysis we must be able to meet our commitments and pursue our goals peacefully, with calm assurance and confidence. That requires military strength.

We face a potential adversary, the Soviet Union, whose government has funneled much of the wealth and talents of its own people into the construction of a military machine. We would prefer to compete peacefully with Soviet farmers to feed the world, with Soviet textile workers to clothe it, with Soviet doctors to heal it, with Soviet scientists to give it new forms of energy. Those races would be a joy to run. But that is not the challenge they lay before us. Instead, we see a large buildup of Soviet military forces; we see the arming and use of client states such as Cuba; and we see the brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This long-term challenge demands a steady, resolute response. Historically, our country has moved sharply up and down in its support for defense. After each war we have disarmed and demobilized, and then later embarked on crash buildups. Such erratic actions are always wasteful and sometimes dangerous.

My commitment has been different. It's been to provide for a steady rebuilding of our defenses. We've increased our real spending for defense—spending above and beyond inflation—every year since I became President. For 7 of the previous 8 years it had declined sharply, a 35-percent reduction in defense spending between 1969 and 1977. The effects of this long decline cannot be eliminated at a stroke. But we have made an excellent start, especially by putting our technological superiority to work.

For example, by producing a number of types of long-range cruise missiles, we can multiply the power of our existing ships and aircraft. We are doing just that. When I took office, we had no new battle tank or modern armored fighting vehicle. Now they are both in production. No answer had been found to the prospective vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles and silos. Now there's an answer—the mobile MX missile.

There was no overall plan for strengthening United States and other Allied forces in Europe. Now we have a good plan, and we are putting it into effect. We're deploying antitank missiles at a rate five times faster than the Soviets are deploying their tanks. On NATO's

eastern flank, we're working to reintegrate Greece into the NATO command structure, and we attach great importance to this effort.

Our purchases of army equipment, jet fighters, and attack aircraft had dropped by some two-thirds in the 8 years before I became President. Since then, we have increased them by 50 percent.

When I came into office, I found that we had little capability for quick action in the critical Persian Gulf region. Now we have prepositioned equipment for 12,000 Marines and munitions for 500 aircraft. We've arranged for the use of five different sites in the region. We've deployed two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean. They give us air and naval superiority to act instantly to keep open the Straits of Hormuz, through which much of the world's oil trade flows.

More will have to be done. Even further increases in pay and benefits will be needed to keep trained service men and women in our volunteer forces. Barring some unexpected decrease in Soviet military efforts, we will also need to increase our investments in the ships, aircraft, tanks, and other weapons that are the muscle of our conventional forces. Military forces give us security, but they are not an end in themselves. As I've said many times, the best weapon is one which need never be fired in combat, and the best soldier is the one who never has to shed his blood on the field of battle.

Besides our military programs, we've devised something else, what might be called a secret weapon. This weapon will knock out about a fourth of all the Soviet long-range missiles and bombers that we project for 1985. It will eliminate thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads the Russians could otherwise have. It will enhance our intelligence-gathering capabilities to monitor what the Soviet Union is doing. It will do all this without firing a shot, without interfering with a single one of our own planned military improvements, without costing a dime. Indeed, it will save us billions of dollars.

This secret weapon, of course, is not a weapon at all. Nor is it a secret. It is SALT II, the strategic arms limitation treaty which we have signed after 7 years of negotiations with the Soviet Union, and which now awaits approval by the Senate.

This agreement strengthens our strategic position. It also strengthens peace, for what is at stake is more than a single treaty, however advantageous. What is at stake is a process, an extremely important process, the process of gradually reducing the possibility of nuclear war.

Thirty-five years after Hiroshima, the shadow of what was unleashed there still hangs over the world. We've lived with it for so long that we are in danger of becoming casual about it. We must not do that. Even a single hydrogen bomb dropped on a single major city could cause millions of deaths and injuries in the first few seconds and mil-

lions more in its wake. It is beyond the power of words to describe the horror of a nuclear holocaust. It would dwarf all the accumulated barbarities and cruelties of mankind's long history put together. More people would die in a few hours than in all the wars of all nations since the dawn of recorded history.

Most of us seldom think seriously about the possibility of nuclear war. But as the President of the United States, entrusted with the power to unleash that force, charged with the responsibility to bend every effort of mind and heart and will to see to it that it need never be unleashed, then it is something I think about every day and every night of my life.

Over the last 20 years we've taken some tentative steps away from the nuclear precipice. Now, for the first time, we are being advised to take steps that may move us toward it.

A few days ago my opponent in the current election campaign promised to scrap the nuclear arms treaty we've already signed. He said, and I quote, "The one card that's been missing in these negotiations is the possibility of an arms race."² He also urges that we seek nuclear superiority. His position—and I think I state it accurately—is that by abandoning the current agreement and suggesting an all-out nuclear arms race, we could perhaps frighten the Soviets into negotiating a new agreement on the basis of American nuclear superiority.

I've had 4 years of sobering experience in this life-and-death field, and in my considered judgment this would be a very risky gamble. It is most unlikely that it would lead to any new agreement. A much more likely result would be an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and almost certainly a new rupture in Soviet-American relations. The long, slow momentum of arms control would be broken. Any future effort to negotiate arms limits—for example, on antisatellite systems, on nuclear weapons tests, on conventional and nuclear arms in Europe—would all be imperiled.

² During a September 30 interview with Associated Press reporters, Reagan offered this statement in response to questions as to whether he would begin arms talks with Soviet leaders at present military strength levels or wait until the United States had achieved parity with the Soviet Union. Reagan commented that the Soviets would "be more inclined to negotiate in good faith" if they knew that the United States "is engaged in building up its military." Responding to a follow-on question if this meant that the United States should not wait to start new negotiations, Reagan asserted: "No, I think that if you start, they know our industrial strength. They know our capacity. The one card that's been missing in these negotiations has been the possibility of an arms race. Now the Soviets have been racing, but with no competition. No one else is racing. Now they know the difference between their industrial power and ours. And so I think that we'd get a lot farther at the table if they know that as they continue, they're faced with our industrial capacity and all that we can do." ("Reagan Would Toughen U.S. Stand on Arms Pact," and "Excerpts From Reagan Interview on Policies He Would Follow," both *The New York Times*, October 2, 1980, p. B-13)

The most important duty of a President is to defend the Nation and its vital interests. Part of that duty is to judge what course of action will diminish the possibility of nuclear war. My considered judgment, based on a very thorough knowledge of all the factors involved, is that the course I am following would do that, and that the departure recommended by my opponent would have just the opposite effect.

His argument is not with me alone. It is with our allies who, without exception, support both the SALT treaty and the continuing process of nuclear arms control. His position is a departure from the policies of President Truman, President Eisenhower, and all Democratic and Republican Presidents who have served in this office since then. Whatever their other differences, all of them saw a duty to slow the arms race and to bring the terrible weapons of nuclear annihilation under some kind of rational control.

I do not propose to turn away from that duty. I propose to lead our country in fulfilling it.

Though we must continue to work for arms control, which is in our mutual interest, we must recognize that Soviet-American relations have grown colder in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. The world has condemned this act of aggression, and the Soviets are being made to realize that this military occupation of a freedom-loving nation cannot be continued without severe adverse consequences. But we must not let ourselves become obsessed by fear and rivalry. If we do, we run the risk of neglecting the many other problems which are related to the Soviet Union only indirectly or not at all.

Peace is the work of many hands. It's the struggle for justice in many dark corners. It is striving to solve problems long stalemated and bitterly disputed. It's having the courage to rise above old failures and to act upon new hope. As we raise our shield against war, let us also hear the stricken voice of the homeless refugee, the cry of the hungry child, the weeping of the bereaved widow, the whispered prayer of the political prisoner. We are one with the family of all people, and the concerns to the human family are many. Around the world we've rejected the counsels of pessimism and have dared to make progress toward peace.

In the Far East, we've placed our relations with China on an honest and sensible footing. This makes the global balance of power more stable and strengthens peace both in Asia and around the world.

In the Middle East, 7 years ago this month, there was war—the fourth Arab-Israeli war in just 25 years. Today Egypt and Israel are at peace, and Israel is more secure from attack than she has ever been. We've recognized the strategic interrelationship between Israel's security and our own. When I first met President Sadat at the White House in April 1977, I told him that I intended to work for a complete peace

between his country and Israel—acknowledgement of the right to exist, direct negotiations, open borders, diplomatic recognition, ambassadorial exchange, and mutual trade.³ He told me that he too longed for that day, but it would never happen in his lifetime. Prime Minister Begin shared his dream and his skepticism. Now that dream has come to pass, in their lifetime and in yours and mine.

We have much more work to do. But we have fundamentally changed the situation in the Middle East. The question is no longer Israel's right to exist. The question now is the terms of a broader peace between a strong and secure Israel and her neighbors.

A bitter war is now going on in the Persian Gulf, complicating even further our efforts to obtain the release of our hostages in Iran.⁴ Think how much more dangerous that new war would be if we did not have peace between Israel and Egypt, by far the most significant military powers in the region. We will continue to consult closely with Israel and with Egypt on strategic matters of mutual interest in our common effort to preserve the peace.

In southern Africa 4 years ago, it was clear that time was running out for regimes based on the doctrine of racial supremacy. I'm proud that because we've recognized this fact, we could help with the peaceful settlement that this year brought a democratically elected government to power in Zimbabwe. We've developed excellent relations with Nigeria and other independent nations on the African Continent. There, as elsewhere, we've placed America's influence on the side of human forces that inevitably shape the future.

In Central America, a new and more just social order is emerging. We approve that struggle for justice, and at the same time we affirm our faith that economic reform can best be achieved when human rights are respected. I'm convinced that the people of Central America can find their way forward, leaving old injustices, without submitting to new tyrannies. As Americans, we all have reason to be proud of our new relationship with Panama, a relationship that has turned an isthmus of discord into a zone of peace.

I've sought to guide us in the spirit of liberty and peace. When we lose touch with that spirit, when we begin to think of our power as an end in itself, when we begin to think that the only source of respect is the threat of force, then we lose the best that is within us.

We seek a world in which the rule of law, not the threat of force, is the language of statecraft. We seek a world in which nations put aside the madness of war and nuclear arms races and turn their energies in-

³ See footnote 5, Document 44.

⁴ Reference is to the Iran-Iraq war which began in September.

stead to the conquest of our common global enemies—dwindling resources, ecological decay, ignorance, and hunger.

No one can guarantee you a future of unvarying success. I certainly do not promise you that. Nor will I tell you that the transition from the troubled world of today to the hoped for world of tomorrow will be an easy one. I promise you only that if you entrust the responsibilities of this office to me for another 4 years, this Nation will have the strength to be secure, and I will continue to find peace by seeking solutions to the real problems, the hard problems. I will do so with both hope and realism, with both determination and restraint.

We will keep our Nation strong. But this I can say to you: Peace is my passion. And within the limits of the wisdom and opportunity God grants me, peace is my pledge.

159. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 21, 1980

SUBJECT

Themes for your Foreign Policy Debate

It is important that in the debate you not only demonstrate a superior knowledge of foreign affairs (which you clearly have) but also

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 16, Debate Themes: Foreign Policy, 10/80. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the memorandum was part of a briefing book prepared in advance of the debate. The only Presidential debate of the 1980 campaign took place at the Cleveland, Ohio, Convention Center Musical Hall on October 28 at 9:30 p.m. and was broadcast live on radio and television. The League of Women Voters sponsored the debate, which was moderated by ABC News political commentator Howard K. Smith. Stone, Ellis, Hilliard, and Walters served as panelists. For the transcript of the debate, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book III, pp. 2476–2502. In his diary entry for October 28, the President noted: “In the debate itself it was hard to judge the general demeanor that was projected to the viewers. Reagan was ‘Aw, shucks’ . . . this and that . . . ‘I’m a grandfather, and I would never get this nation in a war’ . . . and ‘I love peace . . .’ He has his memorized tapes. He pushes a button, and they come out. He apparently made a better impression on the TV audience than I did, but I made all our points to the constituency groups—which we believe will become preeminent in the public’s mind as they approach the point a week from now of actually going to the polls. Both sides felt good after the debate. We’ll see whose basic strategy is best when the returns come in next Tuesday.” (*White House Diary*, p. 476)

convey to the public several broad themes, which show clearly the contrast between you and Reagan. The war/peace theme is the obvious one, but in the discussion of foreign affairs you may want to relate any specific comments to two or three broader themes, contrasting your foreign policy with Reagan's. By emphasizing such broader themes, the public will get a better sense of your statesmanship, in contrast to Reagan's sloganeering. To the extent possible, every comment on foreign policy should reflect the themes discussed more fully below.

The distinctive quality of your foreign policy is that it combines respect for morality with the recognition of the importance of power in world affairs. When you assumed office in 1977, you set yourself two central tasks:

1. To improve America's political position in the world, overcoming the isolation in which America found itself after eight years of Republican rule and fifteen years of the Vietnam war;
2. To improve America's strategic position, after eight years of Republican neglect of our strategic needs and some fifteen years of a sustained Soviet defense effort.

As a consequence, you have succeeded in greatly improving our relations with the Third World, in identifying America through your human rights policy with the basic aspirations of our time (and this is why you have a right to be *optimistic* in your historical vision), and your various concrete policy successes reflect this progress (Panama, Zimbabwe, Camp David, China, etc.). It is important that in your comments you emphasize this theme, noting that Reagan's administration would be likely to produce again *America's global isolation*.

At the same time, you have not neglected the dimension of power. Here you have pursued a sophisticated policy of emphasizing arms control with a long-term effort to improve our overall defense posture (NATO modernization, RDF, MX, Trident, PD-59). Moreover, the normalization of relations with China has also contributed to an improved strategic situation for the United States. By moving forward with SALT, you have held out the possibility of a greatly reduced or even contained arms race, and that too enhances our security.

In effect, your foreign policy has been responsive to the fact that we live in an age of complexity, and that the President has to make careful and mature judgments, weighing carefully a variety of trade-offs while avoiding simplistic slogans. You have done this throughout by stressing the proposition that *on the one hand America must positively identify itself with global change (and thus also improve its own political position in the world) and on the other hand remain strong, both through its system of alliances as well as its own defense effort*.

Accordingly, your foreign policy, by combining the ability to work with the new forces in the world with an emphasis on American strength, is more likely to generate a condition of global peace and gradual accommodation of regional or ideological disputes.

All of the foregoing enables you to state confidently and very affirmatively that “tyranny is everywhere on the defensive”; that “freedom is the genuine inevitability of our times”; that “American principles and values are relevant to our times.” These optimistic themes regarding the future follow logically from your broad approach to the world.

In contrast, Reagan’s foreign policy can be defined as:

1. Dominated by a nostalgia for the past;
2. Preoccupied one-dimensionally with weaponry.

The nostalgia for the conditions of the fifties, a time of unique American military and economic preponderance, shows the degree to which Reagan has no sense of history and particularly no vision for the future. Neither our relations with the Third World nor our relations with the Soviet Union can be shaped in the eighties on the basis of what existed thirty years ago. Any effort to do so is simply likely to produce America’s isolation in a hostile world. At the same time, Reagan’s one-dimensional preoccupation with weaponry is likely to precipitate an arms race while giving the Soviets no incentive to exercise any restraint, be it in the Persian Gulf area or in regard to Poland. It is likely to generate more intense confrontations and thus threaten world peace.

In connection with the foregoing, it might be also possible to register subtly the relevance of Reagan’s advanced age to our concerns with the future. The decade of the eighties cannot be managed by an America led by an aged President, dominated by nostalgia for the past. America must convey a vital message to the world, 80% of whose population is composed of politically awakened Third World peoples, most of them quite young. A world of change and youth requires a vital and forward-looking America.

To conclude, the three themes which you should have very clearly in your mind as you speak are:

1. That your foreign policy reflects an optimistic recognition of the nature of change in the world and America’s ability to convey a morally relevant sense of direction to that world;
2. That under your stewardship American strength has been increased, our Allies have been strengthened, and our strategic position in the world has also improved;
3. That the proper response to complex global change is not nostalgia for the fifties.

The Qs and As which are attached focus on more specific issues, but are designed with the above considerations in mind.²

² Not printed are 12 Presidential debate briefing papers on foreign policy and national security. A cover page, dated October 20 and presumably prepared by Inderfurth and Eric Newsom, lists the titles of the papers: "Leadership," "Military Balance," "SALT," "U.S.-Soviet Relations," "Western Alliance," "Persian Gulf," "Hostages," "Middle East Peace Process," "U.S. Policy Toward China," "Central America," "Human Rights," and "Future Goals."

160. Remarks by President Carter¹

Washington, November 4, 1980

1980 Presidential Election

I promised you 4 years ago that I would never lie to you. So, I can't stand here tonight and say it doesn't hurt.

The people of the United States have made their choice, and, of course, I accept that decision but, I have to admit, not with the same enthusiasm that I accepted the decision 4 years ago.² I have a deep appreciation of the system, however, that lets people make the free choice about who will lead them for the next 4 years.

About an hour ago I called Governor Reagan in California, and I told him that I congratulated him for a fine victory.³ I look forward to working closely with him during the next few weeks. We'll have a very fine transition period. I told him I wanted the best one in history. And I then sent him this telegram, and I'll read it to you. "It's now apparent that the American people have chosen you as the next President. I congratulate you and pledge to you our fullest support and cooperation in

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1980-81*, Book III, pp. 2687-2688. The President spoke at 9:54 p.m. at the Sheraton Washington Hotel. His remarks were broadcast live on television.

² On November 5, *The New York Times* reported that with 73 percent of the popular vote counted, Reagan had garnered 50 percent, Carter 42 percent, and John Anderson (who ran as an independent candidate) 6 percent of the vote. Several Democratic incumbents in the Senate and House lost their reelection bids, including McGovern, Bayh, and Brademas. (Hedrick Smith, "President Concedes: Republican Gains Victories in All Area and Vows to Act on Economy," pp. A-1, A-18)

³ Carter and Reagan spoke from 8:35 to 8:37 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

bringing about an orderly transition of government in the weeks ahead. My best wishes are with you and your family as you undertake the responsibilities that lie before you." And I signed it Jimmy Carter.

I have been blessed as only a few people ever have, to help shape the destiny of this Nation. In that effort I've had your faithful support. In some ways I've been the most fortunate of Presidents, because I've had the daily aid of a wise man and a good man at my side, in my judgment the best Vice President anybody ever had, Fritz Mondale.

I've not achieved all I set out to do; perhaps no one ever does. But we have faced the tough issues. We've stood for and we've fought for and we have achieved some very important goals for our country. These efforts will not end with this administration. The effort must go on. Nor will the progress that we have made be lost when we leave office. The great principles that have guided this Nation since its very founding will continue to guide America through the challenges of the future.

This has been a long and hard-fought campaign, as you well know. But we must now come together as a united and a unified people to solve the problems that are still before us, to meet the challenges of a new decade. And I urge all of you to join in with me in a sincere and fruitful effort to support my successor when he undertakes this great responsibility as President of the greatest nation on Earth.

Ours is a special country, because our vast economic and military strength gives us a special responsibility for seeking solutions to the problems that confront the world. But our influence will always be greater when we live up to those principles of freedom, of justice, of human rights, for all people.

God has been good to me, and God has been good to this country, and I'm truly thankful. I'm thankful for having been able to serve you in this capacity, thankful for the successes that we have had, thankful that to the end you were with me and every good thing that I tried to do.

There's an old Yiddish proverb that I've often thought of in the days and months that I've held this office. It says simply, "God gives burdens; also shoulders." In all the days and months when I have served you and served this country, you've readily given me your shoulders, your faith, and your prayers. No man could ask any more of his friends.

I've wanted to serve as President because I love this country and because I love the people of this Nation. Finally, let me say that I am disappointed tonight, but I have not lost either love.

Thank you very much.

161. Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting¹

Washington, December 3, 1980, 11 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

The seventy-fourth meeting of the Cabinet was called to order by the President at 11:00 a.m. The Vice President and all members of the Cabinet were present except Secretary Goldschmidt, who was represented by Deputy Secretary Beckam. In addition, the following people were in attendance:

| | |
|--------------------|-------------------|
| Rosalynn Carter | Sol Linowitz |
| Max Cleland | Gus Speth |
| Douglas Costle | Stansfield Turner |
| Roland Freeman | Jack Watson |
| Rex Granum | Anne Wexler |
| Thomas Higgins | Eugene Eidenberg |
| Bruce Kirschenbaum | |

1. The President opened the meeting by expressing his gratitude to the members of the Cabinet for their work during his administration. He commented on their fine working relationship, and said they had made a significant contribution to the country. He said the transition had been both graceful and generous so far, and mentioned that his meeting with President-elect Reagan had gone well.²

—The President reminded the Cabinet that this administration still had the authority and responsibility to run the government and urged them not to be timid in exercising that authority.

—The President encouraged the Cabinet to compile an accurate historical record of their time in office, and to be aggressive in disseminating that record.

—The President also reported his plans to return to Plains, Georgia, after the inauguration. He said he and his family would make their home there, although he would spend some portion of his time in Atlanta, where the Presidential papers would be housed until a library is built.

—The President told the Cabinet they would be receiving information prepared by Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to the President, concerning the identification and handling of Presidential papers.

¹Source: Carter Library, Vertical File, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 12/21/78–12/13/80. No classification marking. The President wrote “ok. J” in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the minutes.

²The President met with Reagan in the Oval Office on November 20 from 2:07 until 3:32 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) For Carter’s recollection of the meeting, see *White House Diary*, pp. 486–487.

—The President commented on the preparation of the FY 1982 budget. He said it would be restrained while at the same time honoring commitments of the Democratic Party. He praised the Congress for its recent approval of the Alaska Lands Bill, and the creation of a “superfund” to clean up toxic wastes. The President asked if any Cabinet members wanted to make any comment.

2. The Vice President began his remarks by stating that history would deal more kindly with the Carter Administration than had the voters.

—He mentioned especially the record established in behalf of human rights, saying that the U.S. had asserted fundamental American values.

—He said that the U.S. had been at peace during the Carter years, and noted the absence of any major scandal touching the presidency. Finally, the Vice President praised Mrs. Carter for her graceful tenure as First Lady.

[Omitted here are comments by McIntyre, Miller, the President, Schultze, and Muskie.]

8. The President commented on some of the difficulties in providing leadership to the Western Alliance.

—The President also reviewed the difficulties involved in achieving the release of the American hostages in Iran, while noting that over 50,000 Americans had been safely removed from that country.

—He reported that the last U.S. response to Iran’s conditions for the hostages’ release preserved American honor and integrity.

—The President also expressed his appreciation for Ambassador Linowitz’s work on the Egyptian/Israeli negotiations. He said he encouraged President-elect Reagan to maintain the Camp David process and stated that both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin want it to continue.

—Finally, the President expressed the hope that the new administration would state publicly that the new provisions of SALT II would govern American policy until either the Treaty was ratified or new agreements were achieved. The President observed that the SALT II Treaty effectively protects U.S. interests.

9. Secretary Brown noted that a dramatic change had occurred in the American public’s attitudes toward defense in the last four years. He said he believed a consensus had emerged in support of a responsible growth in military power. Mr. Brown pointed out that there were greater moral restraints on our use of power than the Soviets. He concluded with a statement of personal respect for the President.

10. The President responded by saying he thought relationships between the State Department, Defense Department and NSC had been

mostly harmonious. He suggested that reports of divisions had been exaggerated by the press. The President said he had made the final decisions, and that he was proud of the Administration's legacy in foreign affairs.

[Omitted here are comments by Askew.]

12. The President commented that many of the Administration's foreign policy initiatives had been difficult politically, but were good for the country.

13. Mr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security, observed that the President had fashioned a foreign policy that fused principle with power. He said that these two concepts no longer needed to be viewed as antithetical. He also warned that the foreign affairs of the U.S. could not be conducted effectively without a President who takes an active role in them.

[Omitted here are comments by Harris.]

15. Ambassador McHenry praised the President for his sensitivity to civil rights issues, as well as the opening toward Africa. He said that during the Carter Administration relations with the new nations of Africa were greatly strengthened.

[Omitted here are comments by the President and Hufstedler.]

18. The President concluded the Cabinet Meeting at 12:10 p.m. by expressing the hope that the achievements of the Administration would be neither denigrated or ignored. The President and Mrs. Carter left the Cabinet Room to standing and sustained applause.

Respectfully submitted,

Eugene Eidenberg

162. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, December 3, 1980

CARTER ADMINISTRATION—ACCOMPLISHMENTS

1. *Building America's military strength.*

—In eight years preceding President Carter, defense spending—after inflation—declined by more than 35%. Spending on strategic nuclear forces declined 20%.

—Since January 1977, *real defense spending has increased every year.* Overall increase of 10%—after inflation. Under Five-Year Defense Plan, real defense spending will have increased more than 27% between FY 1978 and FY 1985.

—Engaged in *most comprehensive modernization of military posture in over a decade.*

Strategic forces

—Upgrading each leg of strategic nuclear triad:

—four years ago, no program for a mobile ICBM; today, *MX missile* is in full-scale engineering development.

—four years ago, *Trident submarine* program bogged down in contractor disputes, way behind schedule. Today, shipbuilder claims resolved; first Trident will undergo sea trials this year; join fleet next year. Already begun to equip Poseidon subs with longer range, more accurate *Trident I missile*; by 1982, 12 Poseidons will be armed with Trident I.

—four years ago, no long-range, *air-launched cruise missiles* included in defense program. Today, well on way to equipping B-52's with over 3000 cruise missiles; first squadron ready in 1982. Will be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses for foreseeable future, as opposed to B-1 bomber the President rejected; would have been obsolete and a waste of money.

U.S.-Allied defense cooperation

—Four years ago, the defense posture of NATO was in serious trouble. Today, NATO is engaged in a broad-scale defense modernization effort.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981: Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL, 12/1–15/80. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. There is no indication that the President saw the paper. Muskie transmitted the paper to the President under a December 11 cover memorandum, indicating that the summation “is truly impressive.” (Ibid.) In a November 17 memorandum for heads of departments and agencies, Watson had requested the preparation of summaries of major accomplishments for submission to the President by December 12. (Ibid.)

—At President Carter's initiative, NATO adopted, in 1978, a comprehensive *Long-Term Defense Program* to upgrade its forces in ten specific areas, from air defense to command and control.²

—Following U.S. leadership, the Alliance members committed themselves to *3% annual increases* in real defense spending through the mid-1980's.

—In December 1979, NATO agreed to modernize and upgrade its *long-range theater nuclear forces* by deploying Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe.

—With recent *reintegration of Greece* into NATO, the southeastern flank of the alliance is strengthened.

—Congressional repeal of *Turkish arms embargo*, at urging of Administration, resulted in reopening of U.S. installations there; strengthening of NATO's southeastern flank.

—Recently agreed with *Great Britain* to assist it in modernizing its *nuclear arsenal*.

—Steady growth in our *strategic relationship with Japan*. New Joint Defense Guidelines of 1978.

—Renegotiated *base agreement with Philippines* which stabilizes military presence in Southeast Asia through 1991.

Non-allied contingencies

—Engaged in significant enhancement of our capability to move forces rapidly to distant trouble spots, particularly Persian Gulf.

—Increased our *naval presence in Indian Ocean*.

—*Prepositioning* military equipment in region.

—Negotiating *access rights* to key local port and airfield facilities in region; concluded agreements with Kenya and Oman.

—Expanding airlift capability through development of new *CX cargo aircraft*.

—Establishing new *Rapid Deployment Force*, composed of units from all services.

—Persuading *our allies to assume more of defense burden* in their own regions as we shift resources to Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf contingencies.

2. *Balanced, enforceable arms control to reduce enormous dangers and costs of an all-out nuclear arms race.*

—After nearly seven years of negotiation by three Presidents, President Carter concluded *SALT II Treaty*. Would make us more secure by

² See footnote 10, Document 90.

limiting the threats we face. All U.S. strategic programs could go forward under the treaty. But the Soviets would be restrained in significant ways.

—Under President Carter’s leadership, the United States has led in the search for ways of enjoying the benefits of nuclear energy without increasing the *risk of nuclear weapons proliferation*. In 1977 President Carter initiated the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, involving 66 nations in an effort to expand international consensus on safer nuclear technologies. US has led the drive to expand membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty—to 115 countries today. We have worked with International Atomic Energy Agency to tighten international safeguards and standards for nuclear commerce.

3. *Exercising leadership to strengthen the international stand against Soviet aggression.*

—Firm response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan serves two purposes: to impose a substantial, continuing cost on the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan; to demonstrate that Soviet aggression anywhere will meet firm resistance. Have acted in three areas:

- *First*, in our *direct relations* with the Soviets, we have:

—*cancelled grain sales* (decision denied Soviets 17 MMT of grain; Soviets able to replace less than half. Together with poor Soviet harvest, has meant less meat on Soviet shelves. Per capita meat consumption down to 1975 levels. Thwarted important objective of Soviet government—increasing meat supplies to Soviet people).

—*led Olympic boycott* (61 nations chose not to attend. Turned Olympics into largely Eastern European affair. Denied Soviets desired goal of using Olympics as symbol of world acceptance of Soviet foreign actions).

—tightened controls on sale of *high technology* items to Soviet Union.

—*sharply restricted Soviet fishing in US waters* (lost their allocation of about 300,000 tons of fish; about 4% of their total worldwide catch).

—*curtailed exchange programs*.

—*limited Aeroflot flights* to US.

—suspended plans for opening new US *consulate* in Kiev and Soviet consulate in New York.

- *Second*, we have moved to address the new security situation *in the region*:

—increased and accelerated *military preparedness* for contingencies in the area (greater naval presence in Indian Ocean; RDF; repositioning of equipment; new base and port access rights).

—President Carter *placed the Soviets on notice* that we would regard an attempt to control the Persian Gulf region as an assault on our vital interests, to be met by any means necessary including military force.

—have worked to strengthen security and stability of nations in region (e.g. Western aid to Turkey, Pakistan; Camp David peace process).

- *Third*, we have worked with other nations to *strengthen the international response* to this Soviet aggression:

—few nations have been so sharply and broadly condemned (104 nations in the UN; Islamic nations—twice).

—have pressed our friends and allies to support the direct measures we have taken and to sustain their own sanctions against the Soviet Union.

4. *Search for peaceful, negotiated solutions to potentially explosive regional disputes.*

—President Carter's leadership was instrumental in achieving the historic *Camp David agreements* between Egypt and Israel. For the first time since its creation, Israel today is at peace with its most powerful Arab neighbor, Egypt. For the first time, a negotiating process has been created to address both Israel's security and Palestinian rights.

—The President's unwavering support for *negotiating in Rhodesia* helped bring an end to a bloody civil war, a majority rule government and a decent hope for peace and long-term stability.

—Together with the other Western members of the UN Security Council, we have made substantial progress toward a peaceful transition to independence and majority rule in *Namibia*.

—After fourteen years of negotiation, we concluded a new *Panama Canal Treaty* which provides a more secure future for the Canal and removes a long-time irritant in our relations with nations throughout the Hemisphere.

5. *Broader cooperation with our allies than ever before.*

—Largely as a result of US leadership, NATO has done more in the past four years to *strengthen its collective defense* than in any comparable period in its history.

- Long-Term Defense Program.

- commitment to annual 3% real increases in defense spending.

- theater nuclear weapons modernization.

—NATO allies *stood firm* against considerable Soviet pressure to reverse *TNF modernization decision*.

—unprecedented degree of *genuine consultation* on defense and arms control matters (during SALT negotiations, for example).

—The scope of our cooperation has moved beyond collective defense:

—through progressively more constructive *economic summits*, industrial democracies have coordinated domestic as well as international energy and economic policies to a greater extent than in the past (e.g. national energy import goals).

—Venice Summit demonstrated essential unity of allies in insisting on *total, not cosmetic, Soviet withdrawal* from Afghanistan.

—while we sought broader measures, the fact is that our allies have joined us in imposing significant *economic sanctions on Iran* for holding US hostages.

—industrial democracies have joined together in a massive *aid program for Turkey*.

—over past few years, Western democracies have shown an unprecedented degree of *cooperation toward resolving dangerous regional disputes* (e.g. Rhodesia, Namibia, Zaire-Angola).

6. *Building stronger relationships with countries of growing importance on the world scene.*

—*Normalization of relations with China* has enabled us to deal directly and forthrightly with a quarter of the world's population; but-tressed our strategic position.

—Have given new attention to our *relations with developing nations of particular importance*—Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, for example.

—Have strengthened our *cooperation with regional organizations* of growing importance—the OAS, the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Group in Latin America; the OAU in Africa; and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.

—Our commitment to a fair result in Panama, to majority rule in southern Africa, and to the advancement of human rights and human freedom around the world has demonstrated that US is prepared to deal with developing nations on basis of shared interests and mutual respect. *Significantly improved relationships in Africa, Latin America and Asia*. In recent UN votes on Afghanistan and Iran, for example, most of developing nations stood with the US. Would have been highly unlikely a decade ago.

—Made important progress on *economic issues* of shared importance with developing world:

—*new trade arrangements* with developing nations under the new multilateral trade negotiations framework;

—*access of developing nations to International Monetary Fund resources* sharply increased—including new \$10 billion supplementary financing facility.

—on energy, have supported commitment of World Bank to join with private and governmental sources to fund \$33 billion to *LDC oil and gas projects* by 1985.

—on commodities, have reached agreement on *common fund* to support agreements which stabilize international commodity supplies and prices. *Individual commodity agreements* under discussion or in place for sugar, coffee, tin, cocoa and rubber.

—have strengthened the coordination of our foreign assistance programs with creation of *International Development Cooperation Agency*.

7. *Building a sounder international economy.*

—US provided leadership necessary to revitalize the *multilateral trade negotiations* which resulted in new *long-term trade agreement*. Agreement will open greater access to international markets; provide fairer trading rules for the next decade.

—Negotiated a number of *orderly marketing agreements* to regularize the flow of certain imports which threatened to severely disrupt American producers; instituted—and now reviewing adequacy of—“*trigger price*” mechanism on steel to prevent other nations from engaging in unfair trading practices.

—Reached agreement with Japan for substantially improving access of goods and services to Japanese markets; *substantially improved our balance of trade with Japan*.

—Through successive economic summits and in the International Energy Agency, have played leadership role in setting *reduced oil import targets* by major consuming nations. Groundwork has been laid for major *expansion of US coal exports* that will aid US economy and help our allies cut oil imports. President’s *far-reaching domestic energy program* already resulting in lower oil imports—imports down 10% in 1979; down even more so far in 1980. We are working to *augment and diversify the world’s energy sources* by supporting increased World Bank lending for LDC energy projects and by a number of innovative programs for cooperating in energy planning, research and development in Third World countries.

8. *Asserting our national commitment to human rights.*

—Our pursuit of human rights progress around the world has given *renewed meaning to America’s purpose in the world*—to defend our freedom and to help advance freedom of others. And it serves our long-term interest in building a *more stable world*.

—Have infused our national commitment to individual freedom and dignity into *day-to-day conduct of foreign policy*. Human rights considerations now taken into account fully in allocation American assistance; President has signed number of important international *human rights covenants*.

—While we cannot claim full credit, we believe our practical efforts have contributed to *significant human rights improvements* in many countries. Thousands of political prisoners have been released in over a

dozen countries; in a number of cases, torture of prisoners has been reduced; trials opened to the public.

—*Spotlight of international attention* has been focused on those governments which consistently violate human rights, as our efforts are joined by other nations, individuals, regional and international organizations.

—Have taken a leadership role in resettlement of *refugees* from Indochina and the Caribbean; and in international relief effort for people of *Kampuchea*.

163. Farewell Address by President Carter to the Nation¹

Washington, January 14, 1981

Good evening.

In a few days I will lay down my official responsibilities in this office, to take up once more the only title in our democracy superior to that of President, the title of citizen.

Of Vice President Mondale, my Cabinet, and the hundreds of others who have served with me during the last 4 years, I wish to say now publicly what I have said in private: I thank them for the dedication and competence they've brought to the service of our country. But I owe my deepest thanks to you, to the American people, because you gave me this extraordinary opportunity to serve.

We've faced great challenges together, and we know that future problems will also be difficult. But I'm now more convinced than ever that the United States, better than any other country, can meet successfully whatever the future might bring. These last 4 years have made me more certain than ever of the inner strength of our country, the unchanging value of our principles and ideals, the stability of our political system, the ingenuity and the decency of our people.

¹ Source: *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book III, pp. 2890–2893. The President spoke at 9 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House. His remarks were broadcast live on radio and television. In his diary entry for January 14, the President wrote: "I delivered the farewell address, and the response was good. I described the pressure of special interest groups, how they fragment the country. Primarily I emphasized, however, the threat of nuclear destruction, environmental issues, and consideration for human rights. These are the same themes I used in my acceptance speech in 1976, my inaugural address four years ago, and that I pursued when I was president." (*White House Diary*, p. 507)

Tonight I would like first to say a few words about this most special office, the Presidency of the United States. This is at once the most powerful office in the world and among the most severely constrained by law and custom. The President is given a broad responsibility to lead but cannot do so without the support and consent of the people, expressed formally through the Congress and informally in many ways through a whole range of public and private institutions. This is as it should be.

Within our system of government every American has a right and a duty to help shape the future course of the United States. Thoughtful criticism and close scrutiny of all government officials by the press and the public are an important part of our democratic society. Now, as in the past, only the understanding and involvement of the people through full and open debate can help to avoid serious mistakes and assure the continued dignity and safety of the Nation.

Today we are asking our political system to do things of which the Founding Fathers never dreamed. The government they designed for a few hundred thousand people now serves a nation of almost 230 million people. Their small coastal republic now spans beyond a continent, and we also now have the responsibility to help lead much of the world through difficult times to a secure and prosperous future.

Today, as people have become ever more doubtful of the ability of the Government to deal with our problems, we are increasingly drawn to single-issue groups and special interest organizations to ensure that whatever else happens, our own personal views and our own private interests are protected. This is a disturbing factor in American political life. It tends to distort our purposes, because the national interest is not always the sum of all our single or special interests. We are all Americans together, and we must not forget that the common good is our common interest and our individual responsibility.

Because of the fragmented pressures of these special interests, it's very important that the office of the President be a strong one and that its constitutional authority be preserved. The President is the only elected official charged with the primary responsibility of representing all the people. In the moments of decision, after the different and conflicting views have all been aired, it's the President who then must speak to the Nation and for the Nation.

I understand after 4 years in this office, as few others can, how formidable is the task the new President-elect is about to undertake, and to the very limits of conscience and conviction, I pledge to support him in that task. I wish him success, and Godspeed.

I know from experience that Presidents have to face major issues that are controversial, broad in scope, and which do not arouse the natural support of a political majority. For a few minutes now, I want to

lay aside my role as leader of one nation, and speak to you as a fellow citizen of the world about three issues, three difficult issues: the threat of nuclear destruction, our stewardship of the physical resources of our planet, and the preeminence of the basic rights of human beings.

It's now been 35 years since the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. The great majority of the world's people cannot remember a time when the nuclear shadow did not hang over the Earth. Our minds have adjusted to it, as after a time our eyes adjust to the dark. Yet the risk of a nuclear conflagration has not lessened. It has not happened yet, thank God, but that can give us little comfort, for it only has to happen once.

The danger is becoming greater. As the arsenals of the superpowers grow in size and sophistication and as other governments, perhaps even in the future dozens of governments, acquire these weapons, it may only be a matter of time before madness, desperation, greed, or miscalculation lets loose this terrible force.

In an all-out nuclear war, more destructive power than in all of World War II would be unleashed every second during the long afternoon it would take for all the missiles and bombs to fall. A World War II every second—more people killed in the first few hours than in all the wars of history put together. The survivors, if any, would live in despair amid the poisoned ruins of a civilization that had committed suicide.

National weakness, real or perceived, can tempt aggression and thus cause war. That's why the United States can never neglect its military strength. We must and we will remain strong. But with equal determination, the United States and all countries must find ways to control and to reduce the horrifying danger that is posed by the enormous world stockpiles of nuclear arms.

This has been a concern of every American President since the moment we first saw what these weapons could do. Our leaders will require our understanding and our support as they grapple with this difficult but crucial challenge. There is no disagreement on the goals or the basic approach to controlling this enormous destructive force. The answer lies not just in the attitudes or the actions of world leaders but in the concern and the demands of all of us as we continue our struggle to preserve the peace.

Nuclear weapons are an expression of one side of our human character. But there's another side. The same rocket technology that delivers nuclear warheads has also taken us peacefully into space. From that perspective, we see our Earth as it really is—a small and fragile and beautiful blue globe, the only home we have. We see no barriers of race or religion or country. We see the essential unity of our species and

our planet. And with faith and common sense, that bright vision will ultimately prevail.

Another major challenge, therefore, is to protect the quality of this world within which we live. The shadows that fall across the future are cast not only by the kinds of weapons we've built, but by the kind of world we will either nourish or neglect. There are real and growing dangers to our simple and our most precious possessions: the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the land which sustains us. The rapid depletion of irreplaceable minerals, the erosion of topsoil, the destruction of beauty, the blight of pollution, the demands of increasing billions of people, all combine to create problems which are easy to observe and predict, but difficult to resolve. If we do not act, the world of the year 2000 will be much less able to sustain life than it is now.

But there is no reason for despair. Acknowledging the physical realities of our planet does not mean a dismal future of endless sacrifice. In fact, acknowledging these realities is the first step in dealing with them. We can meet the resource problems of the world—water, food, minerals, farmlands, forests, overpopulation, pollution—if we tackle them with courage and foresight.

I've just been talking about forces of potential destruction that mankind has developed and how we might control them. It's equally important that we remember the beneficial forces that we have evolved over the ages and how to hold fast to them. One of those constructive forces is the enhancement of individual human freedoms through the strengthening of democracy and the fight against deprivation, torture, terrorism, and the persecution of people through the world. The struggle for human rights overrides all differences of color or nation or language. Those who hunger for freedom, who thirst for human dignity, and who suffer for the sake of justice, they are the patriots of this cause.

I believe with all my heart that America must always stand for these basic human rights at home and abroad. That is both our history and our destiny.

America did not invent human rights. In a very real sense, it's the other way around. Human rights invented America. Ours was the first nation in the history of the world to be founded explicitly on such an idea. Our social and political progress has been based on one fundamental principle: the value and importance of the individual. The fundamental force that unites us is not kinship or place of origin or religious preference. The love of liberty is the common blood that flows in our American veins.

The battle for human rights, at home and abroad, is far from over. We should never be surprised nor discouraged, because the impact of

our efforts has had and will always have varied results. Rather, we should take pride that the ideals which gave birth to our Nation still inspire the hopes of oppressed people around the world. We have no cause for self-righteousness or complacency, but we have every reason to persevere, both within our own country and beyond our borders.

If we are to serve as a beacon for human rights, we must continue to perfect here at home the rights and the values which we espouse around the world: a decent education for our children, adequate medical care for all Americans, an end to discrimination against minorities and women, a job for all those able to work, and freedom from injustice and religious intolerance.

We live in a time of transition, an uneasy era which is likely to endure for the rest of this century. It will be a period of tensions, both within nations and between nations, of competition for scarce resources, of social, political, and economic stresses and strains. During this period we may be tempted to abandon some of the time-honored principles and commitments which have been proven during the difficult times of past generations. We must never yield to this temptation. Our American values are not luxuries, but necessities—not the salt in our bread, but the bread itself. Our common vision of a free and just society is our greatest source of cohesion at home and strength abroad, greater even than the bounty of our material blessings.

Remember these words: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

This vision still grips the imagination of the world. But we know that democracy is always an unfinished creation. Each generation must renew its foundations. Each generation must rediscover the meaning of this hallowed vision in the light of its own modern challenges. For this generation, ours, life is nuclear survival; liberty is human rights; the pursuit of happiness is a planet whose resources are devoted to the physical and spiritual nourishment of its inhabitants.

During the next few days I will work hard to make sure that the transition from myself to the next President is a good one, that the American people are served well. And I will continue, as I have the last 14 months, to work hard and to pray for the lives and the well-being of the American hostages held in Iran. I can't predict yet what will happen, but I hope you will join me in my constant prayer for their freedom.

As I return home to the South, where I was born and raised, I look forward to the opportunity to reflect and further to assess, I hope with

accuracy, the circumstances of our times. I intend to give our new President my support, and I intend to work as a citizen, as I've worked here in this office as President, for the values this Nation was founded to secure.

Again, from the bottom of my heart, I want to express to you the gratitude I feel. Thank you, fellow citizens, and farewell.

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