About the Series

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government
agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Record Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*Editorial Methodology*

This volume is divided into three compilations: one compilation on human rights policy, one compilation on world hunger and food policy, and one compilation on population growth, water policy, international health, and international women’s issues. Within each compilation, documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the
time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.
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The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2011 and was completed in 2012, resulted in minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 7 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record—given the limitations of space—of the Carter administration’s policy toward human rights and humanitarian affairs.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.  Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
General Editor  The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
August, 2013
Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. This volume documents human rights policy and significant humanitarian affairs from 1977 to 1980, focusing on the institutionalization of human rights policy within the United States Government; world hunger and food policy; international health, water policy, population growth, and international women’s issues. It does not include documentation on specific human rights problems; for U.S. human rights policy with a particular country or region, readers should consult the relevant geographically-focused volume of the Foreign Relations series. Readers interested in the intellectual foundations of U.S. human rights policy should consult Foreign Relations, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. For information on North-South relations, economic summits, and overall U.S. trade policy, see Foreign Relations, Volume III, Foreign Economic Policy. Readers should also consult Foreign Relations, Volume E–7, Documents on United Nations; Law of the Sea for documentation on other transnational global issues, including space and telecommunications, trust territories, narcotics, and the Olympics.


This volume documents the Carter administration’s efforts to define and implement a broad-based human rights policy. It also illustrates various steps undertaken by the Carter administration to ameliorate hunger, launch a global health initiative, and advocate for women’s rights. The section on human rights focuses on overall human rights policy, including the establishment of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the Department of State, the creation of human rights coordinating and review groups, issuance of a Presidential Directive on human rights, institutionalization and standardization of human rights reporting, and pursuit of human rights within the United Nations and other multilateral venues. The section on world hunger and food policy documents efforts to revitalize the Food for Peace program (Public Law 480) and connect it more firmly to human rights concerns, the establishment of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, the administration’s support for both domestic and international grain reserves and a food corps, and the U.S. re-
sponse to famine in Kampuchea and East Africa. The international health, population growth, and international women’s issues compilation chronicles the administration’s efforts to initiate a global health program emphasizing food aid, nutrition, family planning, community-based health care, and disease prevention and treatment. It documents the U.S. global population strategy, a strategy that advocated women’s rights, improved living conditions, and integration of family planning in community life. The compilation also illustrates the administration’s efforts to implement the recommendations generated as an outgrowth of the 1975 International Women’s Year conference and details the U.S. preparations for the 1980 United Nations World Conference for Women. Other issues documented in this compilation include U.S. support for the United Nations Water Decade and the preparation and release of the Global 2000 Report, which assessed current environmental and global trends and posited probable outcomes by the century’s end.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ceri McCarron, Albert Nason, Brittany Parris, and James Yancey of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library; David Langbart, Don McLwain, and Herbert Rawlings-Milton of the National Archives and Records Administration; and Deborah Miller of the Minnesota Historical Society. The editor would also like to thank former Vice President Walter F. Mondale for granting permission to use documentation from his files at the Minnesota Historical Society. The Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency helped to arrange access to CIA files.

The editor conducted the research for this volume and selected and annotated the documentation under the supervision of Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Chief of the Global Issues and General Division, and the direction of Susan C. Weetman, the former General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Dean G. Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division Carl Ashley. Erin F. Cozens and Thomas I. Faith performed the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber Inc. prepared the index.

Kristin L. Ahlberg, Ph.D.
Historian
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Sources


The presidential papers of Jimmy Carter are the best source of high-level decision making documentation on human rights and humanitarian affairs from 1977 to 1980. A number of collections from the National Security Affairs (NSA) files are relevant to research in this area. Within the NSA files, the Brzezinski Material (especially the Subject File), Brzezinski Office File (particularly the Subject Chron File), and Staff Material collections yield important documentation. The Staff Material is of particular note, as it contains the files of the National Security Council’s Global Issues Cluster, which assumed responsibility for human rights policy and related issues within the NSC. The Global Issues files contain memoranda prepared by NSC staff members Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Leslie Denend, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, and Gerald Oplinger, including the Evening Reports prepared each night for President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski. The NSC Institutional Files contain records related to the issuance of Presidential Directives.

The Carter Library also holds a number of other significant collections essential for research on world hunger and international health. The Office of the Staff Secretary, President’s Handwriting File contains copies of various memoranda associated with the establishment of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, including Carter’s handwritten comments on the size and composition of the Commission. Voluminous documentation on the Commission’s establishment, membership, research, and findings can be found in the records of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger (Record Group 220). The documents contained within the Staff Office Files, notably Director of the Domestic Policy Staff Stuart Eizenstat’s Files and Special Assistant for Health Issues Peter Bourne’s Files, and the White House Central Files also help illuminate the Executive Office of the President’s role in the world hunger and health initiatives.

The Department of State played a significant role in the development and implementation of human rights policy. Of particular importance are the Department’s lot files for this period. The files of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance do contain high-level documentation on human rights; however, given that Vance designated responsibility for most human rights matters to Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, Christopher’s files, available at the National Archives and
Sources

Records Administration, yield significantly more documentation on a wider range of human rights and humanitarian issues, including the deliberations of the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. The files of Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake contain briefing memoranda, Policy Planning Staff-authored studies, and the Department’s responses to the world hunger and international health programs. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs files provide the best documentation on the Bureau’s establishment and history, staffing patterns, responses to Congressional inquiries, and coordination of the annual Human Rights Reports. The files for this period contain subject files, country files, and the chronological and official records of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Murphy Derian. A number of additional Department of State lot files are also of value, including the records of Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie; Under Secretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Lucy Wilson Benson and Matthew Nimetz; and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs UNESCO and IDA files. The Department of State’s Central Foreign Policy File, consisting of D, P, and N reels, replaced the pre-1973 paper subject-numeric file. The P (Paper) reels consist of microfilmed versions of memoranda of conversation, letters, briefing papers, airgrams, and memoranda to principals.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

P Reels
D Reels
N Reels

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

HA Files: Lot 80D177
Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, 1976–1977

S/S Files: Lots 80D135 and 84D241
Records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980

S/S (I) Files: Lot 81D117
Memoranda to/from S, D, P, E, C, T, and M
HA Files: Lot 82D102
   Human Rights Subject Files, 1979
HA Files: Lot 82D180
   Human Rights Subject Files, 1980
HA Files: Lot 85D366
   Chronological files and official records of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Murphy Derian

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Lot Files
   T Files: Lot 80D72 (Entry 4)
      Records of Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Lucy W. Benson
   C Files: Lot 81D85 (Entry 75)
      Records of Counselor and Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Matthew Nimetz
   D Files: Lot 81D113 (Entry P–14)
      Records of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 1977–1980
   T Files: Lot 81D321 (Entry 108)
      Chronological Files, Speeches, and Papers of Under Secretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Lucy W. Benson and Matthew Nimetz
   IO/CU/UNESCO Files: Lot 81D337 (Entry 110)
      General subject files on United Nations issues, includes UNESCO, Human Rights, Women, Population
   HA Files: Lot 82D274 (Entry 25)
      Human Rights Country Reports and General Information, 1980
   S/P Files: Lot 82D298 (Entry P–9)
      Records of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake, 1977–1981
   IO/HNP Files: Lot 83D343 (Entry 122)
      General subject files on Health and Narcotics Programs
   IO/IDA/Agriculture Files: Lot 88D305 (Entry 126)
      Subject Files of the Food and Agriculture Organization, US Mission, International Food Organizations
   S/S Files: Lot 83D66 (Entry P–10)
      Subject Files of Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia

RG 220, Records of Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards: Records of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger
   Linowitz’s Subject Files
   Subject File, 1978–1980

Donated Historical Materials
   Vice Presidential Papers
   Mondale Papers
XIV Sources

National Security Issues Collection
Office of the Vice President

Records of the Office of the National Security Adviser
Brzezinski Material
Agency File
Brzezinski Office File
Subject Chron File
Inderfurth and Gates Chron File
General Odum File
Subject File
Trip File
VIP Visit File

Staff Material
Defense/Security
Huntington Files
Molander Files
Europe/USSR/East/West
Putnam Subject Files
Global Issues
Bloomfield Subject File
Mathews Subject File
Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File
North/South Pastor Files
Subject File
Outside the System File
Special Projects File
Owen Files
Denton Files

National Security Council Institutional Files
Presidential Determinations

Office of the Staff Secretary
Handwriting File

Plains File
Cabinet Meeting Minutes
Presidential Daily Diary

Staff Office Files
Domestic Policy Staff
Eizenstat Files
Special Assistant for Health Issues
Bourne Files
Subject Files
White House Office File on International Health
White House Office Files on World Hunger Group
White House Office of the Counsel to the President
Lipshutz Files

White House Central Files
Subject Files and Confidential Files
   HE-3: Includes general information on international health and food policy and Peter Bourne’s international health initiatives
   HU-3: Includes information on foreign human rights matters usually generated by or directed to the National Security Council staff or Zbigniew Brzezinski
   FG-311: Includes information on the Presidential Commission on World Hunger
   PC-1: Includes information related to all peace programs including Peace Corps and Food for Peace

Central Intelligence Agency
Community Management Staff
   Job 83M00171R

National Intelligence Council
   Job 91M00696R

Office of Congressional Affairs
   Job 81M00980R

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
   Job 80B01554R
   Job 80M01048A

Office of Support Services (DI)
   Job 80T00634A

Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Secretary, Executive Secretariat, 1978 and 1980 Files

Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota
Walter F. Mondale Papers
   Vice Presidential Papers
   Central Files
   AG 8: World Food Problem

Published Sources


*Chicago Tribune*
*The Christian Science Monitor*
*Foreign Policy*
*Los Angeles Times*
XVI  Sources


*The Wall Street Journal.*

*The Washington Post.*


Abbreviations and Terms

A, Bureau of Administration, Department of State
A/AID or AID/A, Office of the Administrator, Agency for International Development
AA/AFR or AID/AA/AFR, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development
AA/ASIA or AID/AA/ASIA, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International Development
AA/IIA or AID/IIA, Bureau of Intragovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development
AA/LAC or AID/AA/LAC, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for International Development
AA/NE or AID/AA/NE, Bureau for the Near East, Agency for International Development
AA/PHA, Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance, Agency for International Development
AA/WID or AID/WID, Office of Women in Development, Agency for International Development
A/S, assistant secretary
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACDA/IR, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union
ACTION, federal agency created by the merger of VISTA and the Peace Corps
AD, Adolph Dubs
ADB, Asian Development Bank
ADF or AFDF, African Development Fund
Adm., Admiral
Adn., addition
AECD, Arms Export Control Board
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/C, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/E, Office of East African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/EPs, Economic Policy Staff, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/I, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/NSC–IG, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/S, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/W, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AI, Amnesty International
AID, Agency for International Development
AID/AFR/DR/ARD, Agriculture and Rural Development Division, Office of Development Resources, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development
AID/ASIA/TR/RD, Agriculture and Rural Development Division, Office of Technical Resources, Bureau for Asia, Agency for International Development
AID/DS/POP, Office of Population, Bureau for Development Support, Agency for International Development
AID/GC, Office of the General Counsel, Agency for International Development
AID/IIA A/IIA/UN R, United Nations Relations, Office of International Affairs, Bureau of Intragovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development
AID/LACDR, Office of Development Resources, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for International Development
Abbreviations and Terms

**AID/MP/A**, Office of Management Planning, Bureau for Program and Management Services, Agency for International Development

**AID/NE/TECH**, Office of Technical Support, Bureau for Near East, Agency for International Development

**AID/OPA/PP**, Press and Publications Division, Office of Public Affairs, Agency for International Development

**AID/PDC**, Bureau for Private and Development Cooperation, Agency for International Development

**AID/PPC**, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development

**AID/PPC/PDPR**, Office of Policy Development and Program Review, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development

**AID/TA/AGR**, Office of Agriculture, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development

**AMGT**, subject tag for management operations

**AP**, action program

**ARA or ARA/LA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State/Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development

**ARA/CCA**, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/CHP**, Office of Congressional, Human Rights, and Public Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/ECP**, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/ECP/FDA**, Finance, Development, and Analysis Chief, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/PPC**, Office of Policy Planning, Public, and Congressional Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ARA/RPP**, Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

**ASAP**, as soon as possible

**ASEAN**, Association of Southeast Asian Nations

**BHN**, basic human needs

**BIFAD**, Board for International Food and Agricultural Development

**BUCEN**, U.S. Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau)

**C**, Counselor of the Department of State

**C–130**, four-engine, turboprop military transport aircraft

**CA**, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State

**CAE**, Central African Empire

**CARE**, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

**CAS**, Corps D’Alimentation du Sahel

**CBS**, Columbia Broadcasting System

**CCC**, Commodity Credit Corporation

**CDC**, Centers for Disease Control

**CEA**, Council of Economic Advisers

**CEQ**, Council on Environmental Quality

**CERDS**, UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

**CFA**, Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs

**CFS**, Committee on World Food Security

**CGFPI**, Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment

**CGIAR**, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

**Cherokee**, special telegraphic channel for Department of State messages
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEC, Conference on International Economic Cooperation
CINCEUR or USCINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCPAC or USCINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCSO or USCINCSO, Commander in Chief, Southern Command
COB, close of business
CPD, congressional presentation document
CPR, consolidated policy recommendations
CRV, Cyrus R. Vance
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSW, Commission on the Status of Women
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CUPs, currency use payments
CV, Cyrus Vance
CWM, Charles William Maynes
CWS, community water and sanitation

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; also, Democrat
D/HA, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of State
D/HA/HR, Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of State
D/HA/ORM, Deputy Coordinator for Refugees and Migration Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of State
D/HA/PW, Deputy Coordinator for POW/MIA Matters, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Department of State
DA, David Aaron
DAC, Development Assistance Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
DAP, Development Assistance Program
DAS, deputy assistant secretary
DB, Douglas Bennet
DC, Domestic Council; also, Denis Clift
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCI/IC, Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
DCM, deputy chief of mission
Del, delegate
Deloff, delegation officer; delegation official
DFL, Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party
DG, Director-General of the Foreign Service, Department of State
DINA, Direccion de Inteligencia Nacional (Chilean secret police under Pinochet)
DL, development loan; also, Denis Lamb
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
Dols, dollars
DPC, Domestic Policy Council
DR, Dominican Republic

E, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
XXII  Abbreviations and Terms

EA/EP, Office of Economic Policy, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/J, Office of Japan, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/NSC–IG, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/PRCM, Office of People’s Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EAID, subject tag for foreign economic assistance
EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/ICD/CPD, Commodity Policy Division, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD/ODF, Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD/OIA, Office of Investment Affairs, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/OFF or EB/ORF/OFF, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/OFF/FFD or EB/ORF/OFF/FFD, Food for Freedom Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/OFF/FPD or EB/ORF/OFF/FPD, Food Policy Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/ORF, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/ORF/ICD, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/ORF/ICD/ISM, Industrial and Strategic Materials Division, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/PAS, Planning and Economic Analysis Staff, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC, European Community
EC–9 or Nine, reference to the nine member states of the EC: Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
ECE, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
EDs, executive directors of the International Financial Institutions
EE, Eastern Europe
EEZ, exclusive economic zones
EM–9, Emergency Measure 9 (South Korea)
EO, Executive Order
EOB, Executive Office Building
EOP, Executive Office of the President
EPA, Environmental Protection Agency
ERDA, Energy Research and Development Administration
ESCAP, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific
ESCR, economic, social, and cultural rights
Abbreviations and Terms  XXIII

ESF, Economic Support Fund
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/NSC–IG, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/PP, Special Assistant for Policy Planning, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RPE, Office of OECD, European Community, and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EWS, early warning system
EXDIS, exclusive distribution
Ex–Im, Export-Import Bank

F–5, light, supersonic fighter aircraft
FAA, Foreign Assistance Act, also, Federal Aviation Administration
FAC, Food Aid Convention
FAM, Foreign Affairs Manual
FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FAO/EWS, Food and Agriculture Organization’s early warning system
FFP/AID, Office of Food for Peace, Agency for International Development
FM, Frank Moore; also from
FMS, foreign military sales
FODAG, United States Mission to the United Nations Agencies for Food and Agriculture
FP, family planning; also, Frank Press
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSI, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State
FSO, Fund for Special Operations, International Development Bank; also, foreign service officer
FSP, Food Stamp Program
FSR, Foreign Service Reserve
FVN, Frank V. Nash
FW, Frank Wisner; also, forward
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

G–7, Group of 7 (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States)
G–77, Group of 77 (group of developing countries established at the conclusion of UNCTAD in 1964)
GA, United Nations General Assembly
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP, gross domestic product
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GNP, gross national product
GOA, Government of Argentina
GOES, Government of El Salvador
GOG, Government of Guatemala; Government of Guinea
GOI, Government of India; Government of Indonesia
GOP, Government of Paraguay
GSP, generalized system of preferences
XXIV  Abbreviations and Terms

GORM, Goals, Objectives, and Resource Management

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/AH, African Affairs, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/AR, Inter-American Affairs, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/E, East Asian Affairs, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/EU, European Affairs, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/HR, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/HR/CRP or HA/CR, Country Reports Project, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/NEA, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/OR, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/P, Public Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HEW or DHEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HEW/OIH, Office of International Health, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HHH, Hubert Horatio Humphrey
HIRC or HCIR, House International Relations Committee
HLG, high level group
HLT, health
HO, Henry Owen
HR, House Resolution; also, human rights
HRC, United Nations Human Rights Commission
HRCG, Human Rights Coordinating Group, Department of State
HRD, United Nations Human Rights Division
HRF, Human Rights Foundation
HSTF, Hunger Staff Task Force

IADB or IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF, Inter-America Foundation
IAG, inter-agency group
IAGHRFA or IGRFA, Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (Christopher Group)
IAHRC, Inter-American Human Rights Commission
IBM, International Business Machine Corporation
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA, International Communication Agency
ICCP, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ICJ, International Commission of Jurists
ICP, Industry Cooperative Program, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
Abbreviations and Terms

**IDC/AID,** Office of Interagency Development Coordination, Agency for International Development

**IDCA,** International Development Cooperation Agency

**IDCA/PO,** Planning Office, International Development Cooperation Agency

**IDLI,** international development lending institution

**IDS,** international development strategy

**IEFR,** International Emergency Food Reserve

**IFAD,** International Fund for Agricultural Development

**IFC,** International Finance Corporation

**IFIs,** international financial institutions

**IFPRI,** International Food Policy Research Institute

**IG,** interdepartmental group

**IGA,** International Grains Arrangement or Agreement; also, Inter Agency Group

**ILO,** International Labor Organization

**IMCO,** Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization

**IMET,** International Military Education and Training

**IMETP,** International Military Education and Training Program

**IMF,** International Monetary Fund

**IMV,** Office of Assistant Director (Motion Pictures and Television), United States Information Service

**INA,** Immigration and Naturalization Act

**INM,** Bureau for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State

**INR,** Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/DDC,** Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/DDR,** Deputy Director for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/DDR/GIS,** Global Issues Staff, Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/DDR/REC,** Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/DDR/RGE,** Office of the Geographer, Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/REC/CDC,** Commodity and Developing Country Division, Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INS,** Immigration and Naturalization Service

**IO,** Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/AGR,** Agency Director for Agriculture, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/DHP,** Agency Director for Development and Humanitarian Programs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/EX,** Office of the Executive Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/EX/OB,** Director, Office of the Budget, Office of the Executive Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/HDC,** Agency Director for Health and Drug Control, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/HNP,** Agency Director for Health and Narcotics Programs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/HR,** Office of Human Rights Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
XXVI  Abbreviations and Terms

IO/IEP, International Economic Policy Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/IWP, Agency Director for International Women’s Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/ML, Office of Multilateral Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/PPR, Policy Planning and Reports Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNA, Washington Office of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNESCO, Agency Director for UNESCO Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOP/P, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency
IPPF, International Planned Parenthood Foundation
IPS, Office of Assistant Director (Press and Publications), United States Information Agency
IRA, Irish Republican Army
IRG, interdepartmental regional group
ISTC, International Science and Technology Center; also, Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation
IUD, intrauterine device
IVS, international visitors
IWA, International Wheat Agreement
IWC, International Wheat Council
IWY, International Women’s Year

J or JC, Jimmy Carter
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JT or JTM, Jessica Tuchman (Mathews)
JW, Jenonne Walker

KCIA, Korean Central Intelligence Agency

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/EB, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/HR, Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/OES, Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans, International Environmental, and Scientific Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/PM, Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/UNA, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LACIE, Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment
LANDSAT, land + satellite (satellite imagery program)
LB or LWB, Lucy Wilson Benson
LDC, lesser developed country
**Abbreviations and Terms**

LIG, legislative interagency group  
LIMDIS, limited distribution  
LOS, law of the sea  

M, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management  
M/EEO, Equal Opportunity Office, Department of State  
M/FSI, Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State  
M/MO, Management Operations, Department of State  
M/WCW, Office of the Secretariat of the World Conference for the Decade on Women  
MA, Michael Armacost  
MAAG, military assistance advisory group  
MAP, military assistance program  
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions  
MDB, multilateral development bank  
MFN, most-favored nation  
MIA, missing-in-action  
Misoff, mission officer  
MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
MN, Matthew Nimetz  
MS, Mark Schneider  
MT, metric ton  
Mtg., meeting  
MTNs, multilateral trade negotiations  
MWRA, married women of reproductive age  

N/S, north/south  
NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People  
NAS, National Academy of Sciences  
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NATO/CCMS, NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society  
NBC, National Broadcasting Company  
NCC, National Council of Churches  
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State  
NEA/NSC–IG, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State  
NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State  
NGO, non-governmental organization  
NIACT, night action  
NICHD/CPR, Center for Population Research, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, National Institutes of Health  
NIEO, New International Economic Order  
NIH, National Institutes of Health  
NIO, National Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency  
NODIS, no distribution  
NRC, National Research Council  
NSC, National Security Council  
NSCWGP, National Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Population  
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum  
NSF, National Science Foundation  
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum  
NVA, North Vietnamese Army
XXVIII  Abbreviations and Terms

OAS, Organization of American States
OASIA, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury
OAU, Organization of African Unity
OBE, overtaken by events
ODA, official development assistance
ODAP, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/CP, Coordinator for Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/E, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment, Health and Natural Resources, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/ENP, Office of Environmental and Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/ENP/EN, Directorate for Environmental Affairs, Office of Environmental and Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/ENP/PO, Directorate for Population Affairs, Office of Environmental and Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/ENR, Office of Food and Natural Resources, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/PAS, Policy Assessment Staff, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OES/S, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OGCR, Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research, Central Intelligence Agency
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
ORPA, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency
OSACA, White House Office of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSRO, Office for Sahelian Relief Operations, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
OSTP, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

P, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
PA, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PAK, Paul A. Kreisberg
Pan-Am, Pan-American Airlines
Para, paragraph
PARM, policy analysis resource memorandum
PB, Peter Bourne
PBS, Public Broadcasting System
PC/ACTION, Peace Corps, ACTION
PCWH, Presidential Commission on World Hunger
PD, Presidential Determination or Directive; also, Patricia (Patt) Derian
PDC/FFP, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Private and Development Cooperation, Agency for International Development (after mid-1978)
PDRY, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
Abbreviations and Terms  XXIX

PEN, international organization of poets, playwrights, essayists, editors, and novelists
PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PGOV, subject tag for internal government affairs
PHA/aid, Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance, Agency for International Development
PHA/pop, Office of Population, Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance, Agency for International Development
PL, Public Law
P.L. 480, Public Law 480; Food for Peace
PLO, Palestinian Liberation Organization
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/ dca, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
POL, political officer; also, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PORG, subject tag for policy relations with international organizations
POW, prisoner of war
PPC/wid, Office of Women in Development, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development (after mid-1978)
PPOM, Presidential Policy Options Memorandum
PRC, People’s Republic of China; also, Policy Review Committee
Prepcom, preparatory committee
Pres, President
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum
PT, Peter Tarnoff
PVO, private voluntary organization
PWB, program of work and budget
RB, Reginald Bartholomew
R&D, research and development
Rept, report
RCA, Radio Corporation of America
Ref, reference
Ref tel, reference telegram
Res, resolution
RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RG, Record Group
RHOB, Rayburn House Office Building
RI, Rick Inderfurth
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROKG, Republic of Korea Government
RP, Office of Refugee Programs, Department of State
S, Office of the Secretary of State; also, Senate
S/AA, Ambassador at Large Alfred Atherton
S/AG, Ambassador at Large Arthur J. Goldberg
S/AO, Ambassador at Large Henry L. Owen
S/MS, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State Marshall Shulman
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Office of the Secretary, Department of State
S/R, Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/SN, Personal Representative of the President Sol Linowitz
S/S–O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
XXX  Abbreviations and Terms

SA/DDCI, Special Assistant, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAO or SO, Steven A. Oxman
SAVAK, Farsi language acronym for Iranian National Bureau of Security and Intelligence
SCA, Bureau for Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SCC, Special Coordinating Committee
Secdef, Secretary of Defense
Septel, separate telegram
Sess, session
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHUM, subject tag for human rights
SIG, senior interdepartmental group
SSA, security supporting assistance
STADIS, distribution within the Department of State only
STR, White House Office of the Special Trade Representative
SWAPO, South West African People’s Organization
SYG, United Nations Secretary-General

T, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology
TAGS, traffic analysis by geography and subject
TCDC, technical cooperation among developing countries
THP, The Hunger Project
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts series
TL, Tony Lake
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from Washington

UAW, United Auto Workers of America
UDHR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UFW, United Farm Workers
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNA, United Nations Association
UNCSTD, United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
UNEP, United Nations Economic Programme; also, United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA, United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
US, United States
USA, United States Army; also, United States of America
USAF, United States Air Force
USC, United States Code
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USDA/FAS, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
USDA/IDS, International Development Staff, Department of Agriculture
USDA/OICD, Office of International Cooperation and Development, Department of Agriculture
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIA/IOP, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency
USICA, United States International Communications Agency
USINT, United States Interests Section
USIS, United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaty
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VA, Veterans’ Administration
VC, Viet Cong
VISTA, Volunteers in Service to America
VOA, Voice of America
VP, Vice President

WC, Warren Christopher
WCARRD, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
WEOG, Western European and Others Group, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFC, World Food Council; also, World Food Conference
WFP, World Food Program
WG, working group
WHIGA, White House Intergovernmental Relations Office
WHO, World Health Organization
WHWG, World Hunger Working Group
WOLA, Washington Office for Latin America
WPPA, World Population Plan of Action
WR, weekly report to the President
WRC, Water Resources Council
WTC, Wheat Trade Convention

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)
Z/R, Zionism/Racism
ZB, Zbigniew Brzezinski
ZBB, zero-based budgeting
Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981
Abourezk, James G., Senator (D-South Dakota) until January 3, 1979
Albert, Eddie, actor
Albright, Madeleine, Congressional Relations Officer, National Security Council Staff, from March 1978 until January 1981
Aldrich, George H., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State; Deputy Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference and Deputy Chief of the Delegation
Allen, James B., Senator (D-Alabama) until June 1, 1978; member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Allende Gossens, Salvador, former President of Chile
Amin, Idi, President of Uganda until April 1979
Anderson, David, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Executive Secretariat staff
Anderson, Edwin M., Colonel, staff member, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Andrew, Robert F., Agency Director for Health and Drug Control (later Narcotics), Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until 1979; alternate delegate, U.S. Delegation to the 30th session of the World Health Assembly, 1977
Andrus, Cecil D., Secretary of the Interior from January 23, 1977, until January 20, 1981
Angarolaza, Robert T., General Counsel, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy; Assistant Director for International Affairs and Legal Counsel, Domestic Policy Staff
Armacost, Michael H., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; member, East Asia/China Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977, until July 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Pacific, and Inter-American Affairs from July 1978 until January 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from January 1980
Arthur, Lawrence L., Refugee and Migration Officer, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; Asylum Officer, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, from 1979; Chief, Asylum Unit, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, from 1980
Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until April 13, 1978; Ambassador at Large from April 11, 1978, until May 22, 1979; Ambassador to Egypt from July 2, 1979
Atkinson, Richard C., Acting Director, National Science Foundation, until May 1977; Director from May 1977 until June 1980
Atlas, Liane W., Co-Director, Office of Developing Nations Finance, Department of Treasury; alternate, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy
Atwood, J. Brian, legislative assistant to Senator Thomas Eagleton until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Legislative Officer for Atomic Energy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Legal Adviser, from 1977 until 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, from August 3, 1979, until January 14, 1981

XXXIII
XXXIV Persons

Averch, Harvey A., economist; Assistant Director for Science Education, National Science Foundation, until June 1977; thereafter Assistant Director for Scientific, Technological, and International Affairs; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Baer, Bernice, member, National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year task force, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State until late 1978; thereafter Office of International Women’s Programs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs

Baker, John A., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs, Department of State, from August 26, 1979, until October 30, 1980; thereafter faculty, Naval War College

Baldwin, Roger, founder, American Civil Liberties Union

Bandaranaike, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka until July 23, 1977

Barney, Gerald O., physicist; Study Director, Global 2000 Report

Barry, Robert L., Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Development Policy, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, from 1978 until 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1979

Bartholomew, Reginald H., Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January until November 1977; member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from November 1977 until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1979, until January 21, 1981

Bastian, Walter M., Jr., Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency

Baum, Samuel, statistician, Census Bureau, Department of Commerce

Beckel, Robert G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Legislative Officer for OES and LOS, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Special Assistant, Foreign Policy (House and Senate), White House Congressional Liaison Office

Beilenson, Anthony C., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-California)

Bell, David, Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Agency for International Development during the Johnson administration; Executive Vice President, Ford Foundation, until 1980

Bell, Griffin B., Attorney General from January 26, 1977, until July 19, 1979

Bellmon, Henry L., Senator (R-Oklahoma); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry


Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., Staff Director, Senate Budget Committee, until 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs from March 18, 1977, until August 2, 1979; thereafter Administrator of the Agency for International Development

Bennett, Frank C., Deputy Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, 1978


Bente, Paul F., Jr., ecologist; Senior Staff Member, Council on Environmental Quality; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy
Bereuter, Douglas K., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Nebraska) from January 3, 1979


Bergsten, C. Fred, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs; member, Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, President of Pakistan from 1971 until 1973; Prime Minister of Pakistan until July 5, 1977

Bingham, Jonathan Brewster, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)

Birnbaum, Philip, Assistant Administrator for Programs and Policy, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, until June 1977; Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Intragovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development, 1978

Blackwill, Robert, member, West Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from September 1979 until January 1981

Blaney, Harry C., III, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from June 1979 until August 1980

Blumenthal, W. Michael, Secretary of the Treasury from January 23, 1977, until August 4, 1979

Boeker, Paul H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, until 1977; Ambassador to Bolivia from September 15, 1977, until February 17, 1980; Director of the Foreign Service Institute from March 9, 1980

Boerner, Michael P., Deputy Director, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State; Director, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs; Director, Office of Investment Affairs, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, from 1978; also Department liaison officer, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Boettcher, Robert, staff assistant to Representative Donald Fraser

Bond, Stephen, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Bonker, Don L., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington)

Borg, C. Arthur, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State, until April 15, 1977; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Vienna

Borlaug, Norman, Director, Wheat, Barley and Triticale Research and Production Programs at the International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Bosworth, Stephen W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs; Ambassador to Tunisia from March 27, 1979

Bourne, Peter, adviser, Carter-Mondale campaign, 1976; President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues from 1977 until July 20, 1978 and Director, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policies from June 1, 1977, until March 31, 1978; Chairman, World Hunger Working Group from mid-1977 until July 20, 1978; thereafter, Executive Director, United Nations Development Programme and coordinator, United Nations Water Decade

Bova, Michele M., acting Director, Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1977; Economics and International Financial Institutions, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979
Bowdler, William G., Ambassador to South Africa until April 19, 1978; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from April 24, 1978, until December 17, 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from December 17, 1979, until January 16, 1981

Bowie, Barbara, Economics, International Financial Institutions, and Central America, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1979

Boyle, John A., Chief, Food Policy Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Bray, Charles W., III, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; thereafter Deputy Director, United States Information Agency (International Communication Agency after March 27, 1978)


Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry), Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Oslo until 1979; thereafter Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State


Brezhnev, Leonid, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brizill, Dorothy A., Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1977 until 1979

Bronheim, David, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Intragovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development, from 1979 until 1980; Associate Director for Policy and Budget, International Development Cooperation Agency, from January 1980

Brooks, D.W., former chairman of the policy committee, Goldkist Corporation; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Brown, Frederick Z., Director, Office of Press Relations, Office of the Secretary of State, 1977; Director, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Brown, Garry E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan) until January 3, 1979; member, House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee

Brown, George S., General, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 20, 1978


Brown, Leslie H., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from 1977 until 1979; thereafter Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Brown, Samuel W., Jr., Director, ACTION, from March 2, 1977

Bryant, Cornelia A., Commercial Coordinator, Economic Policy Staff, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
Bryant, John H., Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Health and Director, Office of International Health, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, adviser to Jimmy Carter during the 1976 campaign; thereafter President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs


Bukovsky, Vladimir, Soviet dissident

Buncher, Judith F., Policy Reports Officer, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from 1978

Bushnell, John A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1977

Butcher, Goler T., Chairman, Democratic Study Group on Africa; Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development, from June 1976

Butler, Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Administrator with responsibility for the Office of Intragovernmental Affairs, Bureau of Intragovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development, from 1977 until 1979; also Deputy Executive Director, Development Coordination Committee; Planning Office, International Development Cooperation Agency, from 1979

Butler, William J., President, American Association for the International Commission of Jurists

Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D-West Virginia); Senate Majority Leader

Byrnes, Paul J., Agency Director for Agriculture, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State until 1978; Director, Office of International Conferences, Office of the Executive Director, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, from 1979 until 1980; member, U.S. Delegation to the 3rd session of the World Food Council, 1977


Callaghan, Lord James, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until May 4, 1979

Canner, Stephen J., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Carter, James Earl, III (Chip), son of President Carter

Carter, James Earl, Jr. (Jimmy), President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Carter, Lillian, mother of President Carter

Carter, Rosalynn, First Lady from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Case, Clifford P., Senator (R-New Jersey) until January 3, 1979; member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission) until January 3, 1979

Cavanaugh, Caramel R., Food for Freedom Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Cederberg, Elford A., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan) until December 31, 1978

Celeste, Richard F., Director of the Peace Corps from January 1979

Chapin, Harry, recording artist, founder of World Hunger Year; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger
XXXVIII Persons

Cherne, Leo M., Chairman of the Board of Directors, International Rescue Committee; Chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and member, Intelligence Oversight Board, until 1977; member, Citizens Commission on Indochinese Refugees

Cheshes, Martin L., Office of International Narcotics Control, Department of State, until 1978; alternate director, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs from 1978

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 26, 1977, until January 16, 1981; Chairman, Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (Christopher Committee)

Church, Frank F., Senator (D-Idaho); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 3, 1979

Civiletti, Benjamin R., Deputy Attorney General from 1978 until August 1979; Attorney General from August 16, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Clapp, Priscilla, Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

Clark, Richard C. (Dick), Senator (D-Iowa) until January 3, 1979; member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry until January 3, 1979; member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission) until January 3, 1979; U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs from May 1 until November 1, 1979

Cleveland, Paul M., Deputy Director, then Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, from 1977 until 1979; Director, Thailand Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from 1979 until 1981

Clift, A. Denis, member, National Security Council Staff, from 1974 until 1977; thereafter Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Cohen, Roberta, Non-Governmental Organizations, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from late 1977 (added International Organizations to portfolio in late 1978)

Cohen, Steven B., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1978

Collins, Steven, Office of Intragovernmental Affairs, Agency for International Development

Colombo, Emilio, Italian Foreign Minister

Congden, Michael B., International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, until 1978

Cooper, Richard N., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 7, 1977, until January 19, 1981

Cossiga, Francesco, Italian Prime Minister from August 1979 until October 1980

Costello, Daniel S., Major, General and Organizational Policy Division, J–5 Directorate, Joint Staff; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Costle, Douglas M., Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency from March 4, 1977

Cranston, Alan, Senator (D-California) and Democratic Whip from 1977

Creekmore, Marion V., Jr., Director, Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development; Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, from 1978 until 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Development Policy, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, from 1979

Cruit, Anthony, agricultural economist, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture; member, U.S. Delegation to the 3rd session of the World Food Council, 1977

Curtis, Carl T., Senator (R-Nebraska); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Cutter, Curtis C., Legislative Management Officer for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Bureau for Congressional Relations, from 1977 until 1978; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, 1978

Cutter, W. Bowman, Executive Associate Director for Budget, Office of Management and Budget

Daft, Lynn M., Associate Director for Agriculture and Rural Development, Domestic Policy Staff

Dalley, George, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs from 1977

Davies, Richard T., Ambassador to Poland until February 5, 1978

Denend, Leslie G., member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from July 1977 until June 1979; Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1980 until January 20, 1981

Denlinger, Nelson, staff assistant, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

Denver, John, recording artist and co-founder of The Hunger Project; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Derian, Patricia Murphy (Patt), Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, from June 10, 1977, until August 17, 1977; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until January 19, 1981; Executive Branch Commissioner, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission)


Desai, Morarji, Indian Prime Minister from March 24, 1977, until July 15, 1979

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary

Dole, Robert J., Senator (R-Kansas); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; adviser, U.S. Delegation to the Food and Agriculture Organization meetings, 1977 and 1979; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger; member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission)

Donovan, Hedley, Editor-in-Chief, Time Magazine; Senior Adviser to the President from August 1979 until August 1980

Downey, Arthur, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade

Drinan, Reverend Robert F., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) until January 3, 1981

Duffey, Joseph D., member, Carter-Mondale transition team; Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs from March 30, 1977, until March 21, 1978; thereafter Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities

Duncan, Charles W., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977, until July 26, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Dworkin, Douglas A., Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1978

Dyess, William J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until August 1980; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Eastland, James O., Senator (D-Mississippi) and President pro tempore until December 27, 1978; Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee; member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Eckholm, Erik, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Edgar, William, Director, Office of International Economic Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Ehrlich, Thomas, Department of State consultant, 1979; thereafter Director, International Development Cooperation Agency and Chairman, Development Loan Committee and Development Coordination Committee
Eilberg, Joshua, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Pennsylvania)
Eisele, Albert A., Press Secretary to the Vice President
Eizenstat, Stuart E., President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the Domestic Council
Ely, Michael E.C., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; Director, Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, from 1977 until late 1978; thereafter Director, Office of Monetary Affairs, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs
Erb, Richard D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Developing Nations
Ericson, Richard A., Jr., Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Ambassador to Iceland from November 21, 1978
Falcon, Walter, Director, Stanford University Food Research Institute and Professor of Economics and International Agricultural Policy; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger; member, Research Advisory Committee, Agency for International Development
Falkner, William, Office of Development and Humanitarian Programs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Fallows, James, White House Chief Speechwriter
Farrar, Curtis, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development; member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1978 until 1979
Fascell, Dante B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida); chairman, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission)
Fazio, Victor H., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California) from January 3, 1979
Feary, Robert A., Special Assistant to the Coordinator of Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
Feinberg, Richard, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1980
Ferch, John A., Director, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Mexico City; member, U.S. Delegation to the 3rd session of the World Food Council, 1977
Fill, Gerald A. (Jerry), Assistant to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues; Study Director, White House International Health Assessment Staff; Study Director, World Hunger Working Group
Findley, Paul, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)
Fleisher, Eric W., Directorate for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State and special assistant for intelligence to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Foley, Thomas S., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington) and Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture

Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States from August 9, 1974, until January 20, 1977


Frank, Charles R., Jr., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Development Policy, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, from 1977 until 1978

Frank, Jane, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet until June 30, 1978

Fraser, Arvonne, Coordinator, Office of Women in Development (stand-alone office until 1978; thereafter Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination) Agency for International Development; member, U.S. Delegation to the 1980 United Nations World Conference on Women

Fraser, Donald M., member, U.S. House of Representatives (DFL-Minnesota) until January 3, 1979

Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture from January 21, 1961, until January 20, 1969; thereafter Chief Executive Officer, Business International Corporation; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger


Frobe, Louise C., Staff Assistant, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; thereafter Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat

Frosch, Robert A., Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration from June 21, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Fuertth, Leon S., Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant for Policy Planning, Bureau of European Affairs, until late 1978


Gandhi, Indira, Indian Prime Minister until 1977

Gardner, Richard N., Ambassador to Italy

Garment, Leonard, Special Consultant to the President; Acting Counsel to the President during the Nixon administration

Garten, Jeffrey A., Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978

Gates, Robert M., Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from April until December 1979; Director, Strategic Evaluation Center, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency, from late December 1979 until January 1980; thereafter Executive Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Gathright, Wreatham E., Staff Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until January 1977; thereafter member, Policy Planning Staff

Gelb, Leslie H., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from February 23, 1977, until June 30, 1979

Giffler, Lydia K., demographer, Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Gilligan, John J., former Governor of Ohio; Administrator of the Agency for International Development, from March 30, 1977, until March 31, 1979; Chairman, Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment Corporation; Chairman, Development Loan Committee

Gillman, Benjamin A., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New York); member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Gleysteen, William H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from January 1977 until July 1978; Ambassador to Korea from July 24, 1978

Gold, Ruth S., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs


Goldberg, Ruth, Office of People’s Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Goldklang, Jack M., Office of the Legal Counsel, Department of Justice

Goldschmidt, Neil, Secretary of Transportation from September 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981


Goott, Daniel, Special Assistant for Labor and United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until 1980

Graham, Russell F., Economic and Commercial Officer and Human Rights Coordinator, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Grant, Lindsey, Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Environment and Population Affairs until 1978; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Granum, Rex, White House Deputy Press Secretary

Green, Marshall, Coordinator for Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, until early 1979; Chairman, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy; agency representative, White House International Health Assessment; Senior Adviser for preparations related to the 1980 United Nations World Conference on Women

Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Foreign Minister

Grose, Peter B., Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Gussow, Jean Dye, food historian and nutritionist

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until April 1, 1978; thereafter Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State on Caribbean Issues

Hallquist, Jo Ann, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture; member, U.S. Delegation to the 3rd session of the World Food Council, 1977

Hamilton, Lee H., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana)

Handler, Philip, President, National Academy of Sciences

Handwerger, Gretchen, Director, Office of Management, Office of International Operations, ACTION

Hanley, Mary F., Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1978
Hannah, John, Administrator of the Agency for International Development during the Nixon administration; Executive Director, World Food Council

Hansell, Herbert J., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from April 8, 1977, until September 20, 1979

Hansen, Roger D., member, National Security Council Staff

Harden, Richard M., Special Assistant to the President for Budget and Organization until December 28, 1977; thereafter Director, White House Office of Administration and Special Assistant for Information Management

Harrington, Michael J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) until January 3, 1979

Harrington, Richard J., Special Assistant to the Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Harris, Patricia Roberts, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from January 23, 1977, until August 3, 1979; Secretary of Health and Human Services from August 3, 1979, until January 20, 1981

Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until June 8, 1977; Ambassador to France from July 7, 1977

Haslam, Charles L., General Counsel, Department of Commerce

Hathaway, Dale E., Director, International Food Policy Research Institute until March 1977; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs (title elevated to Under Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs following passage of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978); member, Board of Directors, Commodity Credit Corporation; member, U.S. Delegation to the 3rd session of the World Food Council, 1977; Head, U.S. Delegation to the 20th session of the Food and Agriculture Organization Conference, 1980

Hawkins, Gerald S., Science Adviser to the Director of the United States Information Agency; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Hayakawa, S.I., Senator (R-California); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

Healey, Denis W., British Chancellor of the Exchequer until May 4, 1979

Helman, Gerald B., Director, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, from 1978 until 1979; U.S. Representative to the European Office of the United Nations from December 6, 1979

Helms, Jesse R., Senator (R-North Carolina); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

Henze, Paul B., member, Intelligence Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Herman, Alexis, Director, Women’s Bureau, Department of Labor; member, U.S. Delegation to the 1980 United Nations World Conference on Women


Hesburgh, Reverend Theodore, Chairman, Overseas Development Council; member, Interreligious Task Force on World Food Policy; Chairman, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy; Senior Adviser, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Pledging Conference on Refugee Relief, 1979

Hewitt, Warren, Director, Office of Human Rights Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Hidalgo, Edward, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), from April 25, 1977, until October 24, 1979; thereafter Secretary of the Navy


Hill, Raymond, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from 1979

Hinkley, David, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Amnesty International, U.S.A.

Hjort, Howard W., Economic Adviser to the Secretary of Agriculture and Director for Agricultural Economics (title later changed to Director, Economics, Policy Analysis and Budget), Department of Agriculture, from March 10, 1977; member, Board of Directors, Commodity Credit Corporation; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Hokin, Mary E. (Mary Lib), Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State


Hollick, Ann L., Director, Policy Assessment Staff, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, from 1980

Holloway, Anne, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Holly, Sean, Regional Labor/Social Affairs Advisor and Narcotics Coordinator, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Horbals, Koryne K., Vice President of the American Contracting Corporation, Minneapolis; member, National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; Chairman, Women’s Caucus, Democratic National Committee; U.S. Representative to the Commission on the Status of Women of the United Nations Economic and Social Council; member, U.S. Delegation to the 27th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, 1978; member, U.S. Delegation to the 1980 United Nations World Conference on Women

Hornt, Robert D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from October 1979

Hornblow, Michael, Acting Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from January until May 1977; thereafter Country Officer, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Houdek, Robert G., Deputy Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of African Affairs, from late 1978 until 1980

Howard, Lee M., Director, Office of Health Services, Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance (Bureau for Development Support after 1978), Agency for International Development; member, U.S. Delegation to the World Health Assembly; agency representative, White House International Health Assessment

Huberman, Benjamin, member, Science Cluster, National Security Council Staff; Associate Director, National Security and International and Space Affairs, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until March 14, 1977; Ambassador to Pakistan from June 28, 1977
Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1965, until January 20, 1969; Senator (DFL-Minnesota) until his death on January 13, 1978; member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry until January 13, 1978

Hunt, Gordon E., Program Analyst, Policy and Program Planning, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Hunter, Robert, member, West Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until August 1979; member, Middle East/North Africa Cluster, September 1979 until January 1981

Huntington, Samuel P., member, National Security Council staff, National Security Planning, from February 1977 until August 1978; thereafter Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs

Hutcheson, Richard, White House Staff Secretary

Hyde, Henry J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)

Hyland, William, member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, January until October 1977

Imus, Richard H., Office of Economic Policy, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Inderfurth, Karl F. (Rick), Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1977 until April 1979; Deputy Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1979 until 1981

Inouye, Daniel K., Senator (D-Hawaii); Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, from January 3, 1975, until January 3, 1981; Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Appropriations Committee

Jackson, Henry M. (Scoop), Senator (D-Washington); Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Jacobs, Martin, Office of Multilateral Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political and Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Jacobs, Robert L., Politico-Military Affairs and Security Assistance, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, 1979

Janeway, Michael C., Special Assistant to Secretary of State Vance from 1977 until 1978

Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R-New York); member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission), from 1979 until 1981

Jayawardene, Junius Richard, Sri Lankan Prime Minister from July 23, 1977, until February 4, 1978; thereafter President

Jayne, Edward Randy, member, Defense Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January until May 1977; thereafter, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget

Jenkins, Kempton B., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and Legislative Officer for Nuclear Non-Proliferation until 1978; staff member, Foreign Service Institute, from 1978 until 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for East-West Trade from 1980; also Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from 1976 until 1977

Jennette, William, Chief, Title I Division, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Private and Development Cooperation, Agency for International Development

Johnson, Joel L., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1978

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, President of the United States from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969
Johnson, Stephen T., Food for Freedom Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Political Officer in Bucharest from March 1979

Johnston, Ernest B., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, until mid-1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, from 1979 until 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1980


Jordan, Amos A. (Joe), Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance; then Acting Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance until 1977

Jorgenson, Raymond C., Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Joseph, James A., Under Secretary of the Interior

Joyce, John M., Special Assistant to the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State from 1977 until 1979

Kahn, Louis E., International Economic Policy Staff, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Kampelman, Max, Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Madrid CSCE Review Conference

Katcher, David A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from 1978 until 1979

Katz, Julius, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs; member, Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Kaunda, Kenneth, President of Zambia

Keatley, Anne G., Senior Policy Analyst for International Affairs, Office of Science and Technology Policy; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted), Senator (D-Massachusetts)

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 20, 1961, until November 22, 1963


King, Donald, Director, Office of Environmental Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State

King, Mary, Deputy Director of ACTION

Kirillin, V.A., Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and Technology

Kissinger, Henry A., former Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Klutznick, Philip M., Secretary of Commerce from January 8, 1980, until January 20, 1981

Knoche, E. Henry (Hank), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until August 1, 1977

Koch, Edward L., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)

Koirala, Bishweshwar, former Prime Minister of Nepal

Kosminsky, Richard, member, Council of Economic Advisers; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Korey, William, Director, Department of International Policy Research, B’nai Brith

Kratzer, Myron B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Technology Affairs, Department of State, until 1977

Krebs, Juanita M., Secretary of Commerce from January 23, 1977, until October 31, 1979
Kriebel, P. Wesley, Director, Office of Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Kriesberg, Martin, Coordinator, International Organization Affairs, Office of International Cooperation and Development, Department of Agriculture; member, U.S. Delegation to the 20th session of the Food and Agriculture Organization conference, 1980

Krim, Arthur, entertainment lawyer; President and later Chairman of United Artists; adviser to President Johnson

Krimer, William D., interpreter, Department of State

Krystynak, L.F. (Krys), Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; staff consultant, World Hunger Working Group; director, Health/Manpower Working Group, White House International Health Assessment Staff

Kuropas, Myron, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs, White House Office of Public Liaison, until January 1977

LaFalce, John J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York); member, House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee

Lake, W. Anthony (Tony), Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Lamb, Denis, Deputy Director, Office of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Executive Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the European Communities at Brussels, from 1978

Lamberty, Gerald P., Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Lancaster, Carol J., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1980; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1980 until 1981

Lance, Thomas Bert, Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 24, 1977, until September 24, 1977

Langenberg, Donald N., Acting Director of the National Science Foundation from July until December 1980

Leahy, Patrick J., Senator (D-Vermont); member, Senate Appropriations Committee and Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee; member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission); member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger


Leigh, Monroe, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until January 20, 1977

Levin, Sander Martin, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Population and Humanitarian Assistance (Bureau for Development Support after 1978), Agency for International Development; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Levine, Daniel B., Associate Director for Demographic Fields, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Levitsky, Melvyn, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Lewis, Samuel W., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until April 13, 1977; thereafter Ambassador to Israel
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Lewis, William H., Director, Office of Inter-African Affairs and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until late 1978

Linowitz, Sol M., Ambassador-at-Large and Co-Negotiator, Panama Canal Treaties; Chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger; Personal Representative of the President from 1980

Lipshutz, Robert J., White House Counsel

Lister, George, Special Assistant and Human Rights Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1980

Lissy, David, Associate Director of the Domestic Council for Education, Labor, and Veterans and Special Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ford administration) until January 1977

Lollis, Edward W., II, Deputy Director, Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Long, Bill L., Office of Environmental Affairs, Environmental and Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, until 1979; thereafter Director, Office of Food and Natural Resources, Environment, Health, and Natural Resources, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Long, Clarence D., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Maryland)

Long, Russell B., Senator (D-Louisiana); Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance until January 3, 1981

Lord, Winston P., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State until January 20, 1977

Lowenstein, Allard K., former member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York) and head of Americans for Democratic Action; consultant to the Department of State; head of the U.S. delegation to the 32nd United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting, from February until March 1977; alternate U.S. Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs from 1977 until 1978

Lowenstein, James, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until 1977; thereafter Ambassador to Luxembourg

Lowrance, William W., Special Assistant to the Senior Adviser on Non-Proliferation, Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from 1977 until 1978; agency representative, White House International Health Assessment

Luers, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1977 until 1978; Ambassador to Venezuela from October 9, 1978

Lugar, Richard G., Senator (R-Indiana); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

Luzzato, Francis, Director, Office of Multilateral and Special Programs and Acting Director, Office of Special Affairs, ACTION

M’Baye, Keba, Chief Justice of Senegal; Chairman, United Nations Commission on Human Rights

MacLaine, Shirley, actress; humanitarian activist

Macias Nguema, Francisco, President of Equatorial Guinea until August 1979

Mahler, Hafdan, Director General, World Health Organization

Mahon, George H., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas) until January 3, 1979; Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations

Marcos, Ferdinand, President of the Philippines
Marks, Leonard H., former Director of the United States Information Agency during the Johnson administration; Chairman, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Fund; President, International Rescue Committee until 1979

Martens, Robert J., Director, Office of Regional Affairs and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until late 1978; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission U.S. Embassy in Stockholm

Martin, David A., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1979

Martin, Edwin M., former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations; consultant, Presidential Commission on World Hunger


Mayer, Jean, President, Tufts University; Vice Chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger; member, Food and Agriculture Organization-World Health Organization Joint Expert Committee on Nutrition


McCall, Richard L., Jr., legislative aide to Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Muriel Humphrey from 1977 until 1978; professional staff member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1978 until 1979; Deputy Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1979 until 1980; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from June 10, 1980

McDonald, John W., Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, detailed to the International Labor Organization as Deputy Director General from 1974 until 1978; coordinator, United Nations Water Decade U.S. follow-up activity

McEldowney, Frederick, Food Policy Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State; member, U.S. Delegation to the 3rd session of the World Food Council, 1977

McGovern, George S., Senator (D-South Dakota); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs until January 3, 1979; member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission) from 1979


McHugh, Matthew Francis, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)

McIntyre, James T., Jr., Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, from February until September, 1977; thereafter Director

McMahon, Pat, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1961, until February 29, 1968; President, World Bank and International Monetary Fund

McNutt, Louise, United Nations Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Meeker, Leonard, former Legal Adviser of the Department of State and Ambassador to Romania; Director, International Project, Center for Law and Social Policy
L Persons

Melcher, John, Senator (D-Montana) from January 3, 1977; member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Chairman, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, from 1979 until 1980

Meyer, Cord, Jr., Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence


Michel, James H., Assistant Legal Adviser for Poltico-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Miller, Arthur, American playwright

Miller, J. Erwin, industrialist, Cummins Corporation; founder, National Council of Churches; former Chairman, National Council of Churches Commission on Religion and Race

Mink, Patsy T., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Hawaii) until January 3, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from March 28, 1977, until May 1, 1978

Minish, Joseph G., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New Jersey); member, House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee

Molander, Roger C., member, Defense Coordination Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Momjian, Set Charles, Ford Motor Company marketing executive; public member of the U.S. Delegation to the 35th session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, 1979

Mondale, Walter F. (Fritz), Senator (DFL-Minnesota) until December 30, 1976; Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Montgomery, G.V., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Mississippi); Chairman, House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia

Moore, Frank, Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison

Moorhead, William S., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Pennsylvania); member, House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee

Moose, Richard M., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from March 18 until August 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from July 6, 1977, until January 16, 1981

Moran, David R., Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Moran, Theodore H., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978

Morgenthalau, Ruth, Professor of Political Science, Brandeis University; U.S. Representative on the Commission for Social Development of the United Nations Economic and Social Council


Moyers, Bill, White House press secretary during the Johnson administration; host, Bill Moyers' Journal (Public Broadcasting Service); editor and chief correspondent, CBS Reports

Muller, Steven, President, Johns Hopkins University; vice chairman, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D-Maine); thereafter Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 18, 1981

Myerson, Bess, former Commissioner of Consumer Affairs for New York City; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger
Nachmanoff, Arnold, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Developing Nations; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy; agency representative, White House International Health Assessment

Nash, Frank V., Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Neidle, Alan F., Director and Special Assistant, Policy Planning and Reports Staff, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Multilateral Affairs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Neitzke, Ronald J., Consular Officer, U.S. Embassy in Belgrade until 1978; Special Assistant to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1978 until 1980

Nelson, Clifford R., Director, Office of the Coordinator for Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, until late 1978

Nelson, Theodore C., Office of the Coordinator for Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State

Newman, Frank, Justice of the California Supreme Court

Newsom, David D., Ambassador to Indonesia until October 6, 1977; Ambassador to the Philippines from November 11, 1977, until March 30, 1978; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978

Nimetz, Matthew, Counselor of the Department of State from March 30, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs from February 19 until December 5, 1980; also, Acting Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, 1979

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974


Nooter, Robert H., Assistant Administrator, Agency for International Development, until June 1977; thereafter, Deputy Administrator

Nordhaus, William D., member, Council of Economic Advisers, from 1977 until 1979; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Nowak, Jan, former Director of Polish Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe

Nye, Joseph S., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from 1977 until 1979; Chairman, National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Oakley, Phyllis E., Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Office of Policy Planning, Public, and Congressional Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until 1979; Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa from late 1979

Oakley, Robert B., member, National Security Council Staff, until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1977 until 1979; Ambassador to Zaire from November 6, 1979

Odom, William E., Lieutenant General, USA, Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981

Ogden, Richard M., Chief, Food for Freedom Division, Office of Food Policy and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1978; Chief, Industrial and Strategic Materials Division, Office of International Commodities, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, from 1978 until 1980
LII Persons

Oksenberg, Michel, member, East Asia/China Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until February 1980


O’Neill, Thomas P., Jr. (Tip), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) and Speaker of the House of Representatives

Onek, Joseph, Associate Director for Health and Human Resources, Domestic Policy Staff, thereafter Deputy Counsel to the President

Oplinger, Gerald G., Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; thereafter member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from July 1979 until January 1981; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Orfila, Alejandro, Secretary-General, Organization of American States

Ortiz, Francis V., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State; thereafter, Ambassador to Barbados and Grenada from July 29, 1977, until May 15, 1979; Ambassador to Guatemala from July 17, 1979, until August 6, 1980

Overly, James E., Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Owen, Lord David, British Foreign Secretary from February 21, 1977, until May 4, 1979


Owen, Roberts B., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from October 4, 1979

Oxman, Stephen A., Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1977 until 1978; Executive Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1978 until 1979

Packer, Samuel H., Rear Admiral, USN, staff member, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Palmer, Stephen E., Jr., Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Director, Country Reports Project, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, from 1978 until 1979; Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, U.S. Mission in Geneva, 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1979; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs during late 1980 and early 1981

Palmeri, Robert J., Economic Adviser, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Palmieri, Victor H., Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, from December 27, 1979, until January 21, 1981

Park Chung-hee, President of South Korea until 1979

Parker, Daniel, Administrator of the Agency for International Development and Chairman, Development Loan Committee, until January 19, 1977

Pascoe, B. Lynn, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Pastor, Robert A., member, Latin American/Caribbean, North/South Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Patton, James M., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Peterson, Ernest G., Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs, Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) until 1979; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Pezzullo, Lawrence A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs; Ambassador to Uruguay, from August 10, 1977, until May 29, 1979; Ambassador to Nicaragua from July 31, 1979

Pfeiffer, Jane Cahill, Chairman, National Broadcasting Company; member, Board of Directors, Radio Corporation of America

Percy, Charles H., Senator (R-Illinois)


Perry, Jack R., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1979

Pickering, Thomas R., Ambassador to Jordan until July 13, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from October 10, 1978; Chairman, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Pinochet, Augusto Jose Ramon, General, President of Chile

Pisano, Jane, Congressional Liaison Assistant (White House Fellow), National Security Council Staff, from January until August 1977

Poats, Rutherford M. (Rud), Senior Adviser for Economic Affairs and Executive Assistant, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, until 1977; Senior Vice President, Acting President, and member, Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter member, International Economics Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Pol Pot, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (Cambodia) until 1981; also, Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) until January 7, 1979

Power, Sarah Goddard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; member, U.S. Delegation to the 1980 United Nations World Conference on Women

Preeg, Ernest H., Director, Office of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development; Executive Director, Economic Policy Group, White House Staff, 1977; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Lima from 1977 until 1979

Press, Frank, Special Adviser to the President for Science and Technology and Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, from June 1, 1977

Quandt, William, member, Middle East/North Africa Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until August 1979

Rafshoon, Gerald, Assistant to the President for Communications from July 1, 1978, until August 14, 1979

Randolph, A. Philip, civil rights leader; founder, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

Read, Benjamin M., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from August 1977 until January 1981 (title changed to Under Secretary of State for Management in October 1978)

Reimer, Reynold, Planning and Economic Analysis Staff Director, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
LIV  Persons


Reuss, Henry S., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); Chairman, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs

Reuther, David E., Country Officer for Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Executive Secretariat Staff from 1978 until 1979; Economic Officer, People’s Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from 1979

Reuther, David E., Country Officer for Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Executive Secretariat Staff from 1978 until 1979; Economic Officer, People’s Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from 1979

Richmond, Julius B., Assistant Secretary of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare and Medical Director in the regular corps of the Public Health Service, from July until December 1977; thereafter Surgeon General of the United States

Rizik, Philip, Deputy Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

Rockefeller, John D., III, Chairman, Rockefeller Foundation and Chairman of the Board of the Population Council

Rockefeller, Nelson, Vice President of the United States until January 20, 1977

Rodino, Peter W., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New Jersey); Chairman, House Judiciary Committee

Rogers, Kenneth N., Deputy Director, Country Reports, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1979 until 1980; Consul General, U.S. Embassy in Tangier from June 1980

Rogers, William D., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until December 31, 1976

Romero, Carlos Humberto, General, President of El Salvador from 1977 until 1979

Ronald, John, Director, Center for International Policy

Roosevelt, Eleanor, former First Lady of the United States and delegate to the United Nations General Assembly; U.S. delegate to and Chairman, United Nations Commission on Human Rights

Rose, Robert, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from 1980


Rubenstein, David, Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy

Runyon, Charles, III, Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Rupprecht, Erhardt, Office of Agriculture, Bureau for Technical Assistance, Agency for International Development

Ryan, Leo J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California) until his death on November 18, 1978

Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich, physicist and Soviet dissident; recipient of the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize

Salmon, Charles B., Jr., Director, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1978

Saltzburg, John, special consultant in human rights, House International Relations Committee
Sanders, Edward G., Deputy Associate Director for International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Saouma, Edouard, Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization

Sartorius, James R., Office of Environment and Health, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State

Saunders, Harold H., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until April 10, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Schaufele, William E., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until July 17, 1977; Ambassador to Poland from February 3, 1978, until September 11, 1980

Scheuer, James, member, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council Staff; Press Officer and Associate Press Secretary from January 1977 until February 1980

Schlossberg, Stephen I., Director of Government and Public Affairs, United Auto Workers of America

Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Schneider, Howard, Director of the Institute of Nutrition, Consolidated University of North Carolina; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Schneider, Mark L., Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State until August 1977; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1977 until 1979

Schuker, Jill A., Special Assistant, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

Schultze, Charles L., Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1977 until 1980

Schwartz, Alan U., Counsel, International Freedom to Publish Committee

Schwartz, Elliot, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs

Schwebel, Stephen M., Deputy Legal Adviser for Special Problems and member, International Law Commission, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Sebastian, Peter, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Seelye, Talcott W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until 1978; thereafter Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Damascus

Seitz, Raymond G.H., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Sergeant, William C., Country Officer for Venezuela, Office of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1978 until 1979; thereafter Office of the Coordinator of Population Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Shakow, Alexander, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, until June 1977; thereafter Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination

Shaughnessy, Daniel E., Associate Coordinator, Office of Food for Peace, Agency for International Development, until 1977; Deputy Coordinator, Office of Food for Peace, Bureau for Private and Development Cooperation, Agency for International Development, from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Executive Director, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Shear, David, Director, Office of Sahel and Francophone West Africa Affairs, Agency for International Development

Shestak, Jerome, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Human Rights Commission from December 1979; President of the International League for Human Rights

Shlaudeman, Harry W., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, until March 14, 1977; Ambassador to Peru from June 28, 1977, until October 20, 1980; Ambassador to Argentina from November 4, 1980
LVI Persons

Shriver, R. Sargent, first Director of the Peace Corps from 1961 until 1966; Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from 1964 until 1968; Ambassador to France from 1968 until 1970

Shulman, Marshall D., Special Adviser to Secretary of State Vance

Shultz, Carl, Director, Office of Population Affairs, Department of Health, Education and Welfare; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Shurtleff, Leonard G., Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, from 1979

Sieverts, Frank A., Deputy Coordinator for Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Matters, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, until August 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Coordinator for Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Matters, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, from 1977 until late 1979; Director, Country Reports, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979


Simmons, Adele Smith, President, Hampshire College; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Singletary, Raymond C., President, Blakely Peanut Company; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Sirkin, Abraham M., consultant, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Smith, Roberts, Vice President for Development, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Sneider, Richard L., Ambassador to Korea from 1974 until 1978

Sober, Sidney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Somoza, Anastasio, President of Nicaragua

Sorensen, Roger A., Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until 1977; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Geneva from 1977 until 1979; member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; thereafter Minister-Counselor for Food and Agriculture Organization Affairs, U.S. Mission to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome; alternate member, U.S. Delegation to the 30th session of the World Health Assembly, 1977; member, U.S. Delegation to the 20th session of the Food and Agriculture Organization Conference, 1980

Sparkman, John J., Senator (D-Alabama); Co-Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until January 3, 1979

Spear, Moncrieff J., Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, until mid-1977; member, Panama Canal Treaty Task Force, from mid-1977 until 1979

Speth, James Gustave (Gus), co-founder and staff attorney, National Resources Defense Council; member, Council on Environmental Quality, from 1977 until 1979; Acting Chairman from April until August 1979; Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, and Chairman, Task Force on Global Resources and Environment, from August 2, 1979

Spiegel, Daniel L., Special Assistant to Secretary of State Vance from 1977 until 1978; member, Policy Planning Staff, from 1979 until 1980

Spiegel, John W., Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1978

Stahnke, Paul K., Legislative Officer for Economic and Business Affairs, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State, until 1978; thereafter, Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Stanton, Frank, former President and Vice Chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System
Stanton, John William, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Ohio); member, House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee

Stevens, Sayre, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until October 11, 1977

Strauss, Robert S., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from 1977 until 1979; Personal Representative of the President from April 1979

Stockwell, Eugene L., former Associate General Secretary, Division of Overseas Ministries, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Stone, Richard B. (Dick), Senator (D-Florida) until December 31, 1980; member, Commission on CSCE (Helsinki Commission) until December 31, 1980; member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry until December 31, 1980

Strausz-Hupe, Robert, Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until April 20, 1977

Suslow, Leo A., Director, International Affairs Department, United Auto Workers of America

Swift, Ann H., Legislative Management Officer for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Missing in Action, and Human Rights, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978

Talmadge, Herman E., Senator (D-Georgia); Chairman, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

Tanco, Arturo, Jr., Philippine Agriculture Secretary; President, World Food Council, 1977

Tapa, Sione, President, World Health Assembly

Tarnoff, Peter, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981

Tate, Daniel, Associate for Congressional Liaison

Teitelbaum, Mike, Staff Director, House Select Committee on Population

Thomas, Frank H., Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Thompson, Barbara F., Women’s Program Coordinator, Equal Employment Opportunity Office, Bureau of Personnel, Department of State, from 1979

Thompson, James M., Brigadier General, USA, Office of Policy and Plans, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Thompson, Warren E., chemist, National Science Foundation; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Thornton, Thomas P., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; thereafter member, South Asia/UN Matters, North/South Cluster, National Security Council Staff

Thurber, James P., Chief, Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency; thereafter Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy in Islamabad

Tice, Donald C., Special Adviser for Political Affairs and Special Assistant, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State until 1978; Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1978 until 1979; Department of State Inspection Corps from 1979 until 1981

Todman, Terence A., Ambassador to Costa Rica until January 24, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress from April 1, 1977, until June 27, 1978; Ambassador to Spain from July 20, 1978

Torres, Esteban E., U.S. Permanent Representative to UNESCO

Toth, Csanad, Special Assistant, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
LVIII  Persons


Treverton, Gregory F., member, West Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until August 1978

Tuchman Mathews, Jessica, member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until June 1979; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Turner, Stansfield, Admiral, USN, Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Vaky, Viron P. (Pete), Ambassador to Venezuela until June 24, 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 18, 1978, until November 30, 1979

Van Boven, Theodore C., Director, United Nations Human Rights Division

Van Dusen, Ann, Human Resources Division Chief, Office of Policy Development and Program Review, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development

Van Dyk, Frederick Theodore, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Intragovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development; also Executive Director, Development Coordinating Committee

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 28, 1980

Vanden Heuvel, William, U.S. Representative to the U.S. Mission in Geneva and Vice President, International Rescue Committee; Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations from September 1979

Vanik, Charles, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ohio)

Veliotes, Nicholas A., Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until January 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from January 1977 until 1978; Ambassador to Jordan from September 17, 1978

Vest, George S., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until March 27, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1977

Vogelgesang, Sandra, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979; Special Assistant for Policy Planning, Bureau of European Affairs, from January 1979

Votaw, Carmen Delgado, Co-Chairman, National Advisory Committee for Women; member, National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; U.S. Representative to the Inter-American Commission on Women; thereafter President of the Inter-American Commission on Women; member, U.S. Delegation to the 27th session of the Commission on the Status of Women, 1978

Waldheim, Kurt, United Nations Secretary-General

Wales, Jane MacGregor, Special Assistant, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

Walker, Jenonne R., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Walker, Lannon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Warren, Charles, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, from 1977 until 1979

Watson, Alexander F., Special Assistant for Congressional and Public Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Director, Office of Development Finance, International Financial Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, from 1977 until 1979; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in La Paz
Watson, Jack, Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs and Secretary of the Cabinet until June 1980; thereafter White House Chief of Staff
Wattenberg, Benjamin J., former Johnson administration official and political analyst
Weaver, James H., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Oregon)
Weddington, Sarah, General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, from 1977; Special Assistant to the President from October 22, 1978; Co-Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the 1980 United Nations World Conference on Women
Weil, Frank A., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business and head of the International Trade Administration from 1977 until 1979
Weston, Thomas G., legislative management officer, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
Wexler, Anne, White House Assistant for Public Outreach from May 1, 1978, until January 1981
Whalen, Charles W., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Ohio) until January 3, 1979
Wharton, Clifton R., Jr., Chancellor, State University of New York system; Chairman, Board for International Food and Agriculture Development; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger
White, John C., Deputy Secretary of Agriculture from March 1977
White, Robert, Ambassador to Paraguay from November 30, 1977, until January 27, 1980; Ambassador to El Salvador from March 11, 1980
Whiting, John D., Multilateral Affairs Officer, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
Whitman, Marina, Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, until 1979
Wilhelm, Harry, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, Department of Agriculture; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy
Wilson, Charles (Charlie), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas)
Wilson, James M., Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, until April 28, 1977
Winder, Joseph A. B., Director, Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Office of Monetary Affairs, from 1977 until summer 1978; Director, Office of Multicultural Development, Department of the Treasury, from summer 1978 until 1980; thereafter, Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Jakarta
Wise, Phillip J., Jr., Deputy Appointments Secretary to the President, from August 1977 until May 1978; thereafter, Appointments Secretary to the President
Wisner, Frank G., II, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1977 until 1979; Ambassador to Zambia from August 28, 1979
Witt, Lawrence W., Commodity and Developing Country Division, Office of Economic Research and Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Witteveen, Johannes H., Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
Wittwer, Sylvan, Director, Agricultural Experiment Station, Michigan State University; member, Steering Committee, National Research Council’s World Food and Nutrition Study
Wolf, John S., Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
Wyman, Thomas, Vice Chairman, The Pillsbury Company; member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger
Yost, Nicholas C., General Counsel, Council on Environmental Quality and Director, President’s Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment
Young, Andrew J., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 30, 1977, until September 23, 1979
LX  Persons

Young, Charles William (C.W. or Bill), member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Florida); member, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, House Appropriations Committee

Young, Milton R., Senator (R-North Dakota); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry until January 3, 1981; President Pro Tempore, from January 3, 1979, until January 3, 1981

Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); Chairman, House Committee on International Relations

Zak, Marilyn, inspector, Coordination and Review Staff, Office of the Inspector General, Department of State; Office of Evaluation, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, from late 1978

Zia-ul-Haq, General Muhammad, President of Pakistan

Zitter, Meyer, Chief, Population Division, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce; member, National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Zorinsky, Edward, Senator (D-Nebraska); member, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Human Rights

1. Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) to All Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Parker)

Washington, January 5, 1977

SUBJECT
Guidelines on U.S. Foreign Policy for Human Rights

Observance of internationally recognized human rights is important, both in the general formation of US foreign policy and in specific implementation of recent US legislation. In order that the Department may proceed most consistently and effectively in promoting progress in this area, a set of guidelines has been drafted on “US Foreign Policy for Human Rights.” These are intended to formalize and make more systematic our ongoing procedure for dealing with human rights matters.

Should you wish to provide written comments and suggestions on the attached set of guidelines, I would appreciate receiving them by COB, Wednesday, January 12.

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Guidelines on US Foreign Policy for Human Rights

General Policy

Progress toward full observance of internationally recognized human rights throughout the world is one of the central goals of U.S. foreign policy. To help achieve that objective, we seek social, economic, and political conditions in all countries which foster observance of human rights and encourage attitudes within each country that contribute to progress in this field.

Pertinent Legislation

The Congress has recently enacted legislation designed to help assure the observance of human rights abroad, in the context of certain U.S. bilateral and multilateral relations:

—The Harkin Amendment to bills authorizing increased US participation in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and initiating US participation in the African Development Fund (ADF) requires that the US Executive Directors to those banks vote against any loan or grant to any country that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people of the country.”

Similar provisions have been incorporated into the legislation authorizing foreign development assistance.

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2 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.


—The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976\(^5\) states that the US should not provide security assistance “to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” and that whatever security assistance is provided should “promote and advance human rights and avoid identification” of the United States with governments that deny their people human rights. The Act calls on the Secretary of State to provide “full and complete” reports on the human rights practices in each country receiving security assistance.

**Checklist for Guidance**

Judgments about human rights are necessarily difficult. The Department cannot provide one set of definitive guidelines for all cases. We think it necessary, however, that our personnel at least ask the same questions and proceed as consistently as possible on the basis of comparable data and standards.

To that end, Department officers—whether preparing reports in the field or making findings in Washington—should proceed with the following sequential checklist of questions:

1. What information is available? Embassy investigative reporting, while essential, is not enough. Department officers should seek out evidence provided by the intelligence community, non-governmental organizations, multilateral organizations and Congressional hearings and weigh carefully the reliability of these varied sources. Such data should provide the basis for answering the questions in the following paragraphs.

2. Are there violations of “internationally recognized” human rights? The prime point of reference for this determination, in the view of the Department and the Congress, is the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The main focus for purposes of both field reporting and Department decision-making should be on crimes against the person as described in Articles III, V, VIII, IX, X, and XI of the Universal Declaration. (See attachment.)\(^6\)

3. If there are such violations of “internationally recognized human rights,” were those violations “gross” in nature? Present legislation makes clear that primary attention centers on government-perpetrated or tolerated torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-

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\(^6\) Not found attached.
ment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial to the right to life, liberty, and the security of person.

4. If there are such "gross" violations, is there a "consistent pattern" of same? Since no mathematical formula is appropriate to the wide variety of existing cases, Department personnel should look instead for regular recurrences (for regional, class, ethnic or political patterns), and for changes in the extent of violations over time. The numbers of violations in each category should be reported as precisely as possible.

5. If there does appear to be a case of "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," what is the role of the government in question? Department personnel should try to provide documentary evidence such as laws, decrees, directives on internal security, etc. showing whether the government itself, through acts of commission or omission, bears responsibility for violations against human rights; whether the government has taken steps to improve the protection of human rights; and whether that government has cooperated with outside inquiries on human rights.

6. Finally, what special circumstances should the Department, in consultation with the Congress, consider as it formulates policies for achieving progress on human rights? Our efforts in behalf of human rights may require us to weigh the following: the degree and character of other U.S. interests in the country; the degree of U.S. influence in the country; likely third-country reaction to U.S. action or inaction on human rights; reaction of democratic elements in the country concerned to possible U.S. actions; and possible retaliation by the host country against U.S. positions on human rights. We may also take into consideration the past and present legal and cultural environment of a given country, the existence of an internal or external threat to national security, the violent or non-violent character of the government and its opposition. However, with specific regard to implementation of legislation governing development assistance and international financial institutions, the only exception to making judgments wholly on the basis of observance of human rights is for situations on which assistance goes directly to "needy people."

Procedure

The above guideline questions for thinking and acting in behalf of human rights are part of a continuing Department effort to assure greater progress in this area. To help assure specific implementation of this goal, the following actions will be taken:

1. In complying with human rights legislation relating to U.S. participation in international financial institutions, the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs will provide a schedule of pending loans together with information on whether the Harkin amendment is applicable to the loan or not.

   D/HA in conjunction with appropriate geographic bureaus and H, L, EB and S/P will review this material to determine whether, in cases that do not fall under the "needy people" provision of the Harkin amendment, there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
Should this review result in agreement, D/HA will so notify the Deputy Secretary, who will make the final decision. Should there be disagreement, there will be a meeting of the Assistant Secretaries concerned with the Deputy Secretary, who will either make the final decision or refer the matter to the Secretary.

2. In the case of human rights legislation regarding AID’s development assistance programs, necessary steps will be taken by the AID Administrator, in coordination with D/HA and the concerned bureaus in the Department, to take the foregoing criteria into consideration in reaching necessary determinations.

3. In the case of security assistance, the foregoing criteria will be applied in the development and review of program proposals by D/HA and concerned bureaus of the Department through the regular processes of the Security Assistance Review Committee and any successor organizations.

2. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Lewis) to the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson)¹

Washington, January 14, 1977

SUBJECT
Guidelines on U.S. Foreign Policy for Human Rights

I have the following comments and suggestions on the set of guidelines circulated with your memorandum of January 5, 1977.²

Generally the guidelines would be much improved if they gave greater prominence, other than the single reference in the first question of the checklist, to multilateral organizations. I think special treatment is due to multilateral organizations because of the extensive human rights activity in which the three principal ones, the Council of Europe, the OAS and the UN, are engaged. This activity is usually well publicized and is well known to those in Congress who are interested. We should, therefore, take special pains to canvass thoroughly the devel-


² See Document 1.
developments in that broad field because of the readily available evidence they will supply of the human rights posture of many governments. An important byproduct would also be the greater assurance that our official positions in multilateral forums will be coordinated with those taken bilaterally and with the Congress. I think the problem of coordination between the multilateral and bilateral in our international human rights posture will be assuming greater importance as the reporting under the new legislation grows and more of the reports are publicized.

The basic standard discussed in the guidelines is that of a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” This key standard had its origin in the United Nations in the human rights framework, namely, in ECOSOC Resolution 1503 which established the new procedures for dealing in the United Nations with private human rights communications. Practice in the United Nations in applying this standard certainly should be consistent with our application of the same standard in our bilateral relations, particularly in our reporting to the Congress, and the guidelines should provide for this. I would therefore suggest as a minimum the following amendments to the guidelines:

1. In the sequential checklist of questions, there should be added a question which would assure a determination with respect to a particular country’s general posture on human rights questions in international forums, e.g., the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, or the United Nations. This would include the government’s support for effective measures through these organizations to render their human rights activities effective, support for multilateral human rights conventions and their measures for implementation, and of course information on instances in which a particular government may be the object of charges of human rights violations. In the latter case, it would be important to assure that account was taken of the substance of the government’s response to the allegations, as well as the extent of cooperation by such government in procedures undertaken by the organization concerned to study or investigate the allegations.

2. In questions 2, 3, 4, and 5 specific reference should be made to possible United Nations actions.

3. Under the section on procedure in paragraph 1, IO should be included among those bureaus which will play a role in reviewing the material relating to compliance with human rights legislation. This

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would be of particular pertinence in cases involving a judgment as to the existence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. An IO role in this procedure would also be important to assure that the positions taken by the United States representatives in the United Nations and other international human rights forums with respect to particular countries would reflect and be consistent with the determinations made by the Department in complying with the requirements of human rights legislation.

3. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs-Designate (Brzezinski) to Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, January 17, 1977

SUBJECT
Human Rights

Please start giving some thought to how we might inject, in a realistic fashion, greater concern for human rights into our foreign policy initiatives. I do not want human rights to become merely a slogan or a contentious issue between the Executive and Legislative branches.

Accordingly, you might give some thought both to substantive proposals as well as to procedural initiatives within the government.

You might review the existing state of affairs regarding the above, as well as develop some initial thoughts, and be back to me by Monday next week.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 7, Human Rights (HR): 12/75–1/77. No classification marking.
² January 24.
4. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, January 24, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

Attached is an initial summary of policy options in the area of human rights. It pretty well covers the ground of those actions recommended by members of congress and by various interest groups, and of course, those deadlines set by law which the Administration must meet in the near future. There is virtually nothing innovative in it, but it does contain enough substance so that if Administration action were taken on some or all of these options it would amount to a very major initiative on the President's part.

On rereading it, I find one major weakness which concerns South Africa. I am very concerned that in the process of making major decisions on resolving the crises in Rhodesia and Namibia, that the U.S. not become locked into a South African policy which precludes us from exerting major pressures on that nation. Our past support of South Africa in the UN is viewed by many as our single most repugnant policy in the area of human rights. Continuing that posture—particularly if the violence in South Africa continues to escalate—might negate every other human rights initiative the Administration takes. This issue obviously requires much more thought—soon.\(^2\)

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2 Brzezinski added a handwritten note at the end of the memorandum: "re: # 9 Could he say anything he hasn't said in his B'nai B'rith speech? You might organize a meeting with your interagency counterparts to discuss this memo—or to develop a program or a PRM. Let me know by mid-next week. ZB." Reference is to Presidential candidate Carter's September 8, 1976, speech at the National Convention of B'nai B'rith, held in Washington, wherein he commented that the United States "cannot look away when a government tortures people, or jails them for their beliefs or denies minorities fair treatment or the right to emigrate." (Charles Mohr, "Carter Suggests That U.S. Foster Rights Overseas: Sees Foreign Policy as Lever to Aid Others," The New York Times, September 9, 1976, p. A–1)
Human Rights

Attachment

Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, January 24, 1977

SUBJECT
Human Rights

Background

The pattern of Congressional–Executive relationships in the area of human rights is probably the best example of what happened during the last Administration when congressional concern met executive disdain—with results that satisfy no one. When all other efforts to influence Administration policy proved useless, Congress used its ultimate weapon and attempted to write into law human rights guidelines for military and economic foreign assistance. Recognizing the Executive’s prerogative in this area, Congress attempted to keep its language flexible enough for appropriate diplomacy, with the result that the Administration completely ignored it. Forced to the wall, the Congress responded by limitations or outright prohibitions of aid to certain nations.

Kissinger was then free to make the case that the only alternative to his own quiet and effective diplomacy was ineffective and inflexible Congressional action. At no time in the past eight years, could Congress elicit from the Administration any action on—or even recognition of—the policy alternatives that lay between these two extremes, including: restricting the amenities of normal diplomatic intercourse; public statements by American Ambassadors, the Secretary of State, or the President; initiatives taken in international forums and support by the U.S. of initiatives taken by others; and Sense of the Congress Resolutions supported—rather than undercut—by the Administration.

International human rights is an issue on which the new Administration has one of its best opportunities to radically improve executive–congressional relations. Any action which the Administration takes in the direction of Congressional concerns will be warmly welcomed, particularly by the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, which fully recognize the inappropriateness of congressional attempts to manage foreign policy.

3 Limited Official Use. Tuchman did not initial the memorandum.
Possible Early Actions

1. Military Aid.

The Administration will have to submit its Fiscal ’78 budget request for military aid under the Security Assistance Act in March. Section 502(b) of this Act (enacted last summer), requires that no security assistance be provided to any government “which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” except under extraordinary circumstances. Because of this provision, and the last Administration’s flagrant violation of it, the content of these budget requests will be taken as the single most important signal of this Administration’s policies on human rights.

In Fiscal ’77, Congress cut off all military aid to Chile and Uruguay, and attention is now focused on a total prohibition of military aid to Argentina (current level: $49 million) and a cutback for South Korea, as well as on Iran, Indonesia and the Philippines. Although time is extremely short, if decisions can be reached quickly enough, there is some opportunity for quiet diplomacy to show results by March, or at least before Congressional action occurs. For example, a government’s willingness to allow field visits by representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations and to provide all data requested by them, might be taken to weigh significantly in favor of continuing security assistance.

Another option—going one step further—would be to cut from the requests of the worst violators, anything that might be directly used for maintaining a repressive regime in power. In other words, to distinguish between items necessary to maintaining internal security and those used for external defense.

Simultaneous with the budget request, the State Department is also required by Section 502(b) to send up reports on the status of human rights in each country for which a budget request is made. In the past, these reports have become another bone of contention because they have been intentionally incomplete and evasive. If this Administration is serious about human rights, a major effort should be taken to see that these reports are as honest, complete and unclassified as security requirements allow.

In sum, Congress—if kept informed—will welcome a gradual implementation of Section 502(b) as long as the Administration shows its clear intent to support the spirit of the language. On a case-by-case basis (no attempt should be made to establish global guidelines) the Administration can request signals from the more extreme violators which would indicate their willingness to improve the human rights

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4 See footnote 5, Document 1.
situation. Congress will understand that because time is so short, little concrete evidence of change can be expected, but the Administration can make clear its intention to monitor the situation in the coming year, and its determination to take more serious action next year if there is no improvement.

2. Economic Aid.

The situation is very similar to that outlined above. Budget requests must be submitted in March for economic aid under the Development Assistance Act, and this Act contains language similar to Section 502(b).5

In the case of more extreme violators, the Administration might recommend that no new programs be initiated unless there is an overriding humanitarian consideration, and that existing programs be phased out unless they can be shown to (a) be directly beneficial to people in need, and (b) provide minimal support to maintaining a repressive government in power. In a more positive sense, priority can be clearly assigned to those governments in the third and fourth worlds which respect international standards of human rights.

3. Food Aid.

Under the past Administration, the Food for Peace program (PL–480, Title 1)6 was frequently used to bolster the foreign exchange positions of several extremely repressive governments through the congressional loan program. The worst instances were South Korea and Chile which received disproportionate amounts of Title 1 aid. A thorough review of this program, whose purpose purports to be humanitarian, is needed.

4. International Organizations.

There are some immediate steps the United States could take in the UN to signal its intent to take serious action on human rights. The first would be ratification of the Genocide Convention of 1949,7 and the second would be ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social

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5 Presumable reference to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 (P.L. 94–161) and Section 116; see footnote 4, Document 1.

6 The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), signed into law by Eisenhower on July 10, 1954, established the Food for Peace program. Under the provisions of the law, the United States could make concessional sales of surplus grains to friendly nations, earmark commodities for domestic and foreign disaster relief, and barter surplus for strategic materials. Title I authorized concessional sales.

and Cultural Rights. Both of these covenants were written in 1966, and have now acquired more than the required number of 35 ratifications to bring them into force. All of these actions require a two-thirds vote by the Senate which in turn requires active support and lobbying by the Administration to push them through.

The UN Commission on Human Rights will meet in February–March, 1977. If possible by that date, consideration should be given to U.S. initiatives to strengthen the working procedures of the Commission and other UN affiliated bodies concerned with human rights, as well as substantive initiatives on international efforts to prevent torture, and arrest and detention without charge or trial.

Finally, to bring the U.S. into line with established UN policy, the Administration should work for repeal of the Byrd amendment, and consider a change in U.S. policy toward South Africa, particularly concerning U.S. investment there.

5. Multilateral Banks.

Currently the multilateral banks show small regard for human rights in deciding on financial support to particular countries. The Inter-American Bank, (which greatly increased its support for the Chilean junta over what had been given to the Allende government) is particularly at fault here. The Harkin amendment to the Inter-American Bank Authorization Act requires the U.S. delegate to the Bank to vote against loans to repressive regimes. However in practice the Administration has flouted this requirement by making sure that a particular loan has enough votes to pass, even while the U.S. delegate formally votes against. Also, the Latin states are strongly opposed to U.S. actions to influence the Bank’s actions in this way. In the World Bank, however, many of the European delegates have been actively...

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8 The UN opened both covenants, which were first presented to the General Assembly in 1954, for signature on December 19, 1966. The first covenant commits signatories to respecting the civil and political rights of individuals, including the right to life; freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly; and right to due process and fair trial. The second covenant upholds an individual’s economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), including self-determination, participation in cultural life, and the right to work. (A/RES/2200(XXI)A) For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 381 and 393.


pressing for greater consideration of human rights. Therefore one policy option for the Administration would be to take an active supporting role of European efforts in the World Bank, and an initiating role in exploring with Latin American delegations how human rights considerations can become an integral factor in the Banks’ decisions.

7. **Executive Branch Organization and Personnel.**

The greatest need in this regard is for the appointment of individuals who will act as strong advocates for human rights. In particular, the office of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department should be given department-wide influence and direct access to the Secretary, and be filled with an individual of recognized commitment to these concerns. A list of possible nominees is attached. Interest in human rights should be a consideration in the appointment of ambassadors to countries which take the lead on international human rights actions (UK, Sweden, Tanzania, Netherlands) and to countries which have serious human rights problems (South Korea, Philippines, Haiti, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Iran, etc.).

8. **Influencing Communist Nations.**

While one can make a convincing case of our right as a nation to decide how we are going to spend our money in assisting other nations, the situation becomes much more complicated when we consider those nations—particularly in the Communist bloc—which we do not support, and over whom we exercise very limited influence. The more the Administration pushes its concern over violations of human rights by rightist regimes, the stronger will be the reaction in Congress (and outside it) over what will be pictured as an emerging double standard, and Administration “countenancing” of massive violations of human rights by Communist nations. In this regard, the Administration must make two important decisions:

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11 Wilson, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, served as the Department’s Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs from April 1975. (Memorandum drafted in D/HA, March 1976; Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files; Lot 80D177, AMGT—Establishment of Office (HA)) In November 1976, pursuant to P.L. 94–329 (see footnote 5, Document 1), Wilson’s title became Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; he served in this position until his retirement on April 28, 1977. In a January 26, 1977, memorandum to Vance, Christopher recommended that Patricia Murphy Derian serve as Coordinator upon Wilson’s retirement: “I believe she would serve with great imagination and distinction, with high appreciation for the importance of human rights in foreign policy decisions, but also with an understanding that other considerations may sometimes prevail.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Early Efforts)

12 Attached but not printed. Tuchman listed the following names: Don Ronard, John Salzberg, Don McHenry, Leonard Meeker, and Goler Butcher.
—There is strong sentiment in Congress that the Jackson-Vanik amendment\textsuperscript{13} has been counter-productive, and that something should be changed, although no one knows exactly what. I hear phrases like: “step-by-step dismantling”.

—The administration must also decide what it intends to do by way of implementing “Basket III” of the Helsinki Agreement.\textsuperscript{14} This decision must balance the need to avoid a double standard, with a realistic appraisal of what we can in fact accomplish.

9. \textit{Presidential Speech.}

Because this is an issue on which Administration policy may differ radically from past policies, President Carter may want to consider making a major speech on this issue in the near future. Such a speech would not only serve as a signal to the Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the American public of the President’s new policies, but would also be an important tool in informing foreign governments of the Administration’s serious intention to see that human rights are served by more than rhetoric.

10. \textit{Congressional Coordination.}

The Administration will enjoy much greater flexibility and cooperation from Congress if efforts are made from the very beginning to undo past damage and to keep the key Congressional leaders on this issue fully informed. They are, in the House: Democrats Fraser, Lee Hamilton, Koch and Drinan; and Republicans Buchanan and Whalen. In the Senate: Jackson, Humphrey, McGovern, Cranston and Kennedy and Republicans Percy and Javits.

\textsuperscript{13} During the spring of 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee initiated hearings and markups on the Nixon administration’s trade legislation. The House version of the legislation (H.R. 10710) contained an amendment introduced by Vanik, which prohibited most-favored nation (MFN) status to Communist nations unless the President certified to Congress that the recipient nation had not imposed restrictive emigration policies. Jackson introduced similar legislation in the Senate. On October 18, 1974, the Ford administration and the Senate reached a compromise. Jackson offered an amendment to the bill that allowed the President to waive the ban on MFN and export credits for 18 months if Ford could report to Congress that the Soviet Union had made progress in relaxing emigration curbs. Both houses of Congress approved the Trade Act of 1974 (H.R. 10710; P.L. 93–618; 88 Stat.178) on December 20, 1974. Ford signed the bill into law on January 3, 1975. (\textit{Congress and the Nation}, Volume IV, 1973–1976, pp. 129, 131, and 133)

\textsuperscript{14} Reference is to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Final Act, or Helsinki Accords, comprised of four “baskets” or categories. For the text of the Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975, see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. Basket III emphasized humanitarian cooperation, human contacts, freedom of information, and cultural and educational exchanges.
5. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Executive Secretary of the Department of State C. Arthur Borg on January 27, 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance devoted a portion of his first "large" assistant secretaries meeting on January 25 to outlining the responsibilities of Deputy Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher, the functional assistant secretaries, Department Counselor Matthew Nimetz, and Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake:

"After introductory remarks conveying his sense of pleasure of becoming Secretary, Secretary Vance set forth his view of the role of the Seventh Floor Principals. He said that Mr. Christopher would be his 'alter ego in every respect' and that Christopher should receive all paper that comes to the Secretary. Christopher will attend all meetings if he so desires. He will have direct responsibility for overseeing Law of the Sea matters, human rights questions, International Women's Year and the Board of the Foreign Service and he may be given additional special assignments in the future. The Secretary said that P, E, and T would have the 'usual responsibilities' except that T would also have the responsibility for 'oversight and integration' of non-proliferation policy as well as arms transfer questions. The Secretary said that the Counselor would assist him in many areas as a 'trouble shooter.' He has been given two specific assignments at the outset: the Greece, Turkey and Cyprus complex and the Micronesian Negotiations. The Secretary noted that a Cyprus fact finder would be designated later in the week and that the Counselor will accompany that individual on a fact-finding mission to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

"With regard to 6th floor responsibilities, the Secretary said that Tony Lake would be responsible within the building for coordinating the preparation of responses to Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs). Secretary made the general comment that all Assistant Secretaries have direct access to him whenever they feel it is necessary and he wants them to use their prerogative. He stressed that the Principals perform an oversight function but that this will not interfere with their access to him." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840101–0910)

In his memoirs, Vance further explained the extent of Christopher’s role in the formulation and management of foreign policy:

“I wanted Warren to have the same relationship of mutual trust and confidence that I had enjoyed with [former Secretary of Defense] Bob McNamara, and he did. He was truly my alter ego, and his decision on any issue was the equivalent of mine. When I traveled, Warren was fully in charge of the department. I did not want to try to manage
the State Department from an airplane in the middle of hectic travels and intense negotiations.

“In day-to-day activities Warren was to play a leading role in many areas, including human rights policy, ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, passage of legislation governing our relations with Taiwan after we normalized relations with China, critical Central American issues and, of course, the Iran hostage crisis, when he finally received the long-overdue recognition of his great skills.” (Vance, *Hard Choices*, page 41)

6. Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) to the Deputy Secretary of State-Designate (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, February 2, 1977

D/HA Monthly Report

*Human Rights Reports for the Congressional Presentation Document*—In accordance with legislative requirements, unclassified human rights reports have been prepared on all countries proposed for security assistance programs in FY 1978 for submission to Congress as part of the annual program presentation. The 79 reports have been cleared at the Assistant Secretary level in the geographic bureaus and are now ready for the printers in DOD.

*Evaluation of Human Rights Reports on the Philippines Declassified*—At Congressman Don Fraser’s request, the Department agreed by letter of January 19 to declassify its evaluation of two human rights reports on the Philippines by Amnesty International and Major Religious Superiors, which the Department had earlier submitted to Congress in classified form. Fraser’s House Subcommittee on International Organizations plans to distribute the evaluations to interested human rights organizations, but not to release them to the press.

*Human Rights Contacts with Congress*—On January 5, in response to an invitation, I briefed staff members of the House International Relations Committee on human rights work in the Department. The

meeting was cordial and there was a good exchange of information and views. On January 13, Congressman Fraser held an informal meeting to discuss ratification of the international human rights instruments. I and other representatives from the Department who attended pointed out some of the problems which will have to be faced in submitting these to the Senate.

_Indo-Chinese Refugees_—The flight of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos continues. There are now almost 80,000 refugees in Thailand and more than 2,000 Vietnamese who escaped by small boat with temporary safehaven in countries around the periphery of the South China Sea. We are providing financial support (More than $11 million in 1976 and $10 million planned for 1977) to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) program of care and maintenance for those in camps. We also plan to participate in the UNHCR international resettlement effort by admitting up to 100 “boat case” refugees per month plus dependents under the conditional entry provisions of the immigration act. But first the Government of Hong Kong must be persuaded by us and the UNHCR to permit those selected for admission to the U.S. under this program to be given centralized final processing in Hong Kong. With such approval, we will begin moving approved refugees without dependents as soon as U.S. private voluntary agencies find sponsors, and will move refugees with dependents as soon as non-preference numbers are available. Alternative plans to the use of Hong Kong are also under consideration in the event we get a turndown.

_Admitting Soviet Refugees from Italy_—The “drop out” rate in Vienna of Soviet refugees with exit permits for Israel has continued to hover for some time near 50 percent. Since many of these refugees wish to come to the United States, this has resulted in a mounting backlog (now about 3,000) of such refugees in Rome, where they apply for immigration to the U.S. To cope with this at our recommendation the Attorney General on January 13 approved use of the “parole” provisions of the immigration act. The program is supported by Jewish resettlement agencies and on Capitol Hill. Not included are those Soviet refugees who had previously proceeded to Israel and subsequently went to Rome with hopes of immigrating here. These are not considered refugees since they could return to Israel without persecution.

_Haitian Asylum Seekers_—Haitians are the most numerous single group of asylum seekers. Our advisory opinions to INS recommend against granting asylum to most, on the grounds that they seek economic betterment and would not suffer persecution if returned to Haiti. In January, responding to a recommendation from the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Judiciary Committee, we sent an officer to Miami and to Port au Prince for a review. With the agreement of the
Haitian authorities procedures were set up with cooperation from the Haitian Red Cross for review of persons deported to Haiti to insure they are not subjected to persecution.

We are also drawing on the experience of the Canadians, who have had a similar Haitian problem, and have instituted a procedure whereby representatives of the UNHCR will review all Haitian asylum requests we receive and give us advisory but non-binding opinions.

**Southern African Refugees**—One million dollars in refugee emergency funds was approved on December 28 for help to southern African refugees through the UNHCR. We are consulting with our mission in Geneva and concerned posts regarding the adequacy of the overall UNHCR program.

**Parole for Refugees from Latin America’s Southern Cone**—A parole program for 400 Chilean detainees and their families is finally near completion, with 365 cases (more than 1,100 persons) now in the U.S. and a sufficient pool to fill the remaining spaces. The parole program for 200 refugees from Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia and their families, approved in October, now has 106 active cases being processed by the UNHCR and our Embassy in Buenos Aires. Most of the 200 cases will be from the ranks of refugees in Argentina; a few will come from detainee cases in Chile. Representatives of U.S. voluntary agencies and the INS will be in place very shortly to provide assistance. Both programs constitute the U.S. contribution to international appeals made by the UNHCR. Pressure is mounting in Congress to establish a program for admitting Argentine political detainees and for Argentine refugees in other countries who seek resettlement.

**MIA’s**—Deputy Coordinator for POW/MIA’s Frank Sieverts represented the President and the Secretary at a meeting of the National League of MIA Families Jan. 27–28, marking the fourth anniversary of the Paris agreement on Vietnam. The families were reassured by the President’s and the Secretary’s statements giving priority to the MIA problem in any contacts with the Vietnamese, and they hope for a meeting soon with the President. The President met January 31 with Rep. G. V. Montgomery, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, which filed its final report December 15. According to Montgomery and the NSC staff, the President said he considered the MIA question to be a primary aspect of our relations with the Vietnamese. Montgomery advised the President against appointing a new Presidential Commission on MIA’s and recommended that he act soon to resume contacts with the Vietnamese.

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2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Montgomery and other members of the House Committee from 11:38 a.m. to 12:06 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found.
7. Memorandum From Robert Gates, Center for Policy Support, Central Intelligence Agency, to Acting Director of Central Intelligence Knoche, the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Stevens), and the Deputy Director for Operations (Wells)¹

Washington, February 3, 1977

SUBJECT

Brzezinski Meeting on Human Rights

Summary

1. Dr. Brzezinski and Jessica Tuchman, NSC Staff Member for Global Issues, convened an interdepartmental meeting on 2 February² to discuss translating the President’s commitment to promoting human rights abroad into “consistent and responsible” action. A list of participants is attached.³ In his opening remarks, Brzezinski referred to recent “complications” (the State Department pronouncements on Czechoslo-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A: Box 11, Folder 6: SA/DDCI (Lew Lapham) Chrono. Secret. Sent through the Acting Director of the CIA’s Center for Policy Support. Forwarded to Knoche under cover of a February 10 memorandum from Lewis Lapham. (Ibid.) A February 15 memorandum from Knoche to Brzezinski noted that Meyer would serve as “the Agency’s principal referent on matters concerning Human Rights in the international field.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 41, Presidential Determinations, Directives, and Review Memoranda [II]: 1/77–5/80)

² On February 1, Tuchman transmitted the proposed agenda to members of the National Security Council Staff and invited those with an interest to attend. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North–South Pastor Files, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights: 1–5/77) Tuchman transmitted a brief synopsis of the meeting in the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s February 2 evening report to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2–4/77)

³ Not printed. Participants included Brzezinski, Tuchman, and Kimmitt (NSC); Sanders (OMB); Lamb, Ericson, Jenkins, Vogelgesang, Lowenstein, Leurs, Preeg, Holbrooke, Derian, Gleysteen, Wilson, Patton, and Holloway (State); Bergsten and Richard Erb (Treasury); Weil, Downey, and Haslam (Commerce); Gates (CIA); Thompson (Defense); Packer and Anderson (JCS); Birnbaum (AID); Bastian (USIA); and Tyson (USUN). A February 10 routing sheet described why Gates was selected to represent CIA at the February 3 meeting: “Gates was apparently chosen to represent the Agency because of his past NSC service, rather than by virtue of his current assignment which is concerned with Soviet/East European affairs.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01048A: Box 11, Folder 6: SA/DDCI (Lew Lapham) Chrono)
vakia and the USSR), but said that the President specifically told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin last week that the US would be raising such issues again in the future.

2. After lengthy discussion, summarized below, the following major points emerged:

—A Presidential Review Memorandum concerning human rights probably will be issued this week. It will direct an examination of immediate actions the Administration can take to signal its intentions to the Congress and foreign states with respect to human rights and foreign policy, and will call for a longer range study reviewing all the issues, complications and options relating to human rights considerations and measures in framing US foreign policy. The first part of the study will have a very short deadline, probably next week. The second will be due in March or April.

—No tasks were assigned at the meeting pending issuance of the PRM. While State, Commerce and Treasury will have the leading role in responding to both parts of the PRM, CIA probably will have a part to play primarily in the longer range study.

—Following the meeting, Dr. Tuchman indicated to me that, at the outset, the Agency might give attention in its reporting to human rights problems and conditions abroad and probably will have a role in the PRM and other interagency forums in analyzing the effectiveness of measures under consideration or already taken. She admitted that a clearer role probably will emerge as the Administration’s policy develops.

—Tuchman said that the importance the White House attaches to the human rights question abroad is demonstrated by the President’s designation of Brzezinski as the White House contact on foreign human rights questions, a position filled in recent years by domestic advisers such as David Lissy, Myron Kuropas and Leonard Garment.

—Brzezinski told the participants that similar interagency meetings are likely to be called in the future for discussion of human rights issues and US policy. (It would seem appropriate for CIA to designate

4 On January 27 the Department released a statement regarding Soviet treatment of Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov, concluding that “any attempts by the Soviet authorities to intimidate Mr. Sakharov will not silence legitimate criticism in the Soviet Union and will conflict with accepted international standards in the field of human rights.” The previous day, the Department had issued a statement regarding the harassment of Czechoslovakian citizens following their petition to the government to guarantee their rights under the ICCPR, ICESCR, and Helsinki Final Act, which reads in part: “All signatories of the Helsinki Final Act are pledged to promote, respect, and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. We must strongly deplore the violation of such rights and freedoms wherever they occur.” See Department of State Bulletin, February 21, 1977, pp. 138 and 154.

5 Carter and Dobrynin met on February 1; see footnote 3, Document 18.
a senior officer to serve as the Agency’s representative at these meetings, and to coordinate Agency participation in preparation of the PRM and subsequent intelligence support.)

The Discussion

3. Discussion at the meeting centered on three problems: how to proceed organizationally, signals to the Congress versus effective action abroad in promoting human rights, and the necessity of making a distinction in our human rights policy between Communist and non-Communist states.

How to Proceed

4. A key consideration determining the need for prompt action is that final decisions on the FY 78 FMS (foreign military sales) budget—the most convenient and obvious means to signal both the Congress and foreign countries of Administration intentions vis-à-vis human rights—must be made within two weeks. Therefore, there was general agreement that any study must involve examination both of short-term options and a longer-range, comprehensive review of the problem. Brzezinski and Tuchman left us with the impression that a PRM will be issued in a day or so calling for proposed options for action within five to ten days. The PRM will also call for a longer range study of the problem to be due later in the spring.

Signals to Congress Versus Effective Action Abroad

5. This subject dominated the meeting, with the NSC Staff more concerned for the near term with signalling the Congress of serious Administration intentions than with effective action abroad. The most obvious means proposed to send such signals immediately is to cut the FY 78 FMS budgets of offending countries, although Brzezinski was interested in other options. State informed the other participants that Secretary Vance has decided, on the basis of human rights considerations, to recommend reduction of FY 78 FMS to Argentina by 50 percent, elimination of FMS assistance to Uruguay, and elimination of MAP to Ethiopia. He did not cut Zaire or Korea, the latter because it will be severely attacked by so many others. The Department of State participants added, however, that this represents a very weak signal inasmuch as only one country—Argentina—out of 79 reported “sinners” is being cut. (Uruguay had already been tapped for loss of FMS and Chile had earlier been cut; other considerations as well as human rights influenced the decision on Ethiopia.)

6. Brzezinski said he was uneasy about singling out one or two countries for cuts. A State Department participant expressed particular concern that Latin America is being singled out because there are so few conflicting US interests and the decision therefore seems easy. Sev-
eral participants pointed out that FMS cuts would have little effect in the countries concerned and, in fact, could prove counterproductive—for example, in Korea. Others expressed concern that cutting FMS would neither satisfy the Congress nor be effective abroad.

7. The NSC representatives asked for options other than cutting FMS to demonstrate our concern for human rights and there was some discussion of juggling PL–480 funds, economic assistance and multilateral initiatives. Representatives from State and the US Mission to the UN urged a serious effort to obtain US ratification of the Genocide Treaty and the International Covenants on Human Rights, as well as repeal or amendment of the Byrd Amendment.6 These, they argued, would be effective, early signals to the Congress that would buy time for study of the problem and US options in a rational way. It was agreed that the PRM would address these and other possible options.

Human Rights Policy Toward Communist Versus Non-Communist States

8. The NSC Staff was concerned about the existence of a double standard in US human rights policy between Communist and non-Communist countries—i.e., that we take firm action against non-Communist countries while merely tut-tutting Communist states. The State Department participants asserted that, in fact, there is no pressure from the Congress to have a single approach to both Communist and non-Communist countries and that there is recognition on the Hill of the existence of a double standard. State contended that public pressure or actions against the USSR would doom to failure efforts to promote human rights there. Kempton Jenkins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, added that there is considerable disenchantment in the Congress with the Jackson/Vanik Amendment7 and a desire to find a way out of the problems it has created. (Tuchman noted that the President has made no decision whether to break with the Jackson/Vanik Amendment, although he has decided to go “all-out” on the Byrd Amendment.) The discussion of this aspect of the human rights problem closed on an inconclusive note.

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6 See footnotes, 7, 8, and 9, Document 4.
7 See footnote 13, Document 4.
8. **Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts**

Washington, February 3, 1977, 1635Z


1. Action posts are accredited to governments of states members of the UN Commission on Human Rights, which will meet in regular annual session in Geneva February 7–March 11, 1977. The U.S. Government attaches importance to our participation in this Commission. President Carter has stressed the high priority which his administration will attach to the promotion of human rights. Prior to the Commission’s opening, Dept considers it would be useful if appropriate officials in host governments were apprised of the elements of the overall approach to international human rights matters which the Carter administration intends to follow. In discussion with appropriate host government officials, posts should be guided by paras 2–6.

2. In presenting the following outline of the emphasis and directions to be followed by the Carter administration in the field of promoting international human rights, posts should stress our desire that the renewed impetus which we hope to bring to human rights programs through the United Nations will be a collaborative effort carried out in close consultation with other governments. We will be fully receptive to new ideas which these governments may propose. We hope to work closely with them in the appropriate UN organs to maximize the opportunities which we feel are present in these bodies to strengthen respect for human rights in the world.

3. Throughout his campaign President Carter placed priority among his concerns that of human rights, not only for the American people but for the peoples of the world. A human rights theme flowed through the President’s inaugural address, as exemplified by his statement that “The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Peoples

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\(^2\) Telegram 13714 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, January 20, emphasized the desirability of communicating U.S. policy regarding human rights to the EC–9 political directors, who were scheduled to meet in London January 25–26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770022–0119)
more numerous and more politically aware are craving and now demanding their place in the sun—not just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but for basic human rights.\textsuperscript{3}

4. At his news conference held on January 31,\textsuperscript{4} Secretary Vance discussed the issue of human rights as follows:

Qte. On the issue of human rights, the President has often expressed his deep concern in this area, and has reaffirmed that deep concern in the inauguration address.

"We will speak frankly about injustice, both at home and abroad. We do not intend, however, to be strident or polemical, but we do believe that an abiding respect for human rights is a human value of fundamental importance, and that it must be nourished. We will not comment on each and every issue, but we will from time to time comment, when we see a threat to human rights, when we believe it is constructive to do so. Unqte.

5. Reflecting the high priority which has been assigned to human rights, we will be developing new policies and seeking new opportunities for the promotion of human rights in the world through the UN Human Rights Commission and other UN organs dealing with human rights questions, such as ECOSOC and the General Assembly. Our policies will be based upon the principle of equal rights for all peoples everywhere. We must avoid selective application of this principle in the United Nations.

6. We are conscious of the Charter commitment of all United Nations members to promote respect for basic human rights. While we recognize the virtues of diversity and do not expect uniform acceptance of our own standards, we cannot in any case ignore such basic transgressions of internationally recognized human rights as genocide, apartheid, torture, jailing of people for their beliefs, denials of fair treatment to minorities and denials of the right to emigrate and the right to worship, or denial of many other basic rights and freedoms. Basic civil and political human rights reinforce and promote basic economic rights and needs of peoples, and vice versa. Consequently, we will also seek to provide leadership in the pursuit of measures to alleviate suffering and deprivation due to lack of food and economic opportunity, to environmental abuses and to deficient health care. And finally, we will firmly and vigorously advocate the concept of majority rule in places such as Southern Africa where that concept is not yet realized.


\textsuperscript{4} For a transcript, see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, February 21, 1977, pp. 137–146.
7. For Damascus: You may wish to tailor the presentation to reflect recent developments in Syria.

8. For Bonn, London, Ottawa, Rome, Stockholm and Vienna: Supplementing discussion points as presented in reftel, posts should in addition to paras 2–6 above include the following in their presentation. In his inaugural address President Carter stressed the interrelationship of national and international freedom and respect for international human rights as follows: Qte. Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the faith [fate] of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clearcut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights. We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear that a world which others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people. Unqte. In the coming months we will be seeking to develop with those governments that share our human rights traditions programs which we hope will make more effective international efforts through the United Nations to cope with those situations of serious human rights abuses. There is an impression of a vacuum in leadership in this field in the United Nations. We stress the urgency of our belief that the vacuum needs to be filled by our countries working together. Unless we do act with increased vigor and determination forces which deny the basic values which we share will fill that vacuum.

9. For Bonn and Rome: While we assume that UK presidency passed on to other EC–9 members points and views covered in reftel, suggest that in discussion of this message with host government officials posts also cover reftel issues (as supplemented by USUN 152 and Geneva 412, repeated to you).  

Vance

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5 Telegram 152 from USUN, January 19, indicated that the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) of the Human Rights Commission had met in order to discuss strategy for the upcoming HRC session and had reviewed the provisional agenda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770021–0174)

6 Telegram 412 from Geneva, January 21, reported on a U.S.-hosted luncheon of the WEOG and described possible agenda items and approaches related to the upcoming HRC meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770023–0319)

7 In telegram 2217 from Bonn, February 4, the Embassy reported that the West German Government looked forward to “closer consultation” with the United States regarding international human rights matters. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041–0087)
Human Rights

Issue for Decision

Interest in human rights continues to grow. A PRM on human rights may result from an interagency meeting convened by the NSC, February 2. Brzezinski’s stress there on finding a “constructive way to infuse human rights into foreign policy” reflects a gathering belief that one of the main questions before the Carter Administration is, not whether we will help promote human rights, but how. This memorandum thus suggests both short- and longer-term measures for implementing the President’s commitment to internationally recognized human rights.

Background/Analysis

The Administration’s strong interest in human rights is clear. The President’s statements on this subject reflect the expressed will of the Congress, specific US endorsement of the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the belief that there is a connection between what we believe at home and what we do abroad.

How to act on the President’s statements is, of course, less clear. Implementation depends on our designing an overall strategy—with a coherent set of goals, sense of priorities, and assessment of US leverage. The State Department now lacks such a strategy. Attempts to deal with pending problems are often uncoordinated. There is no focal point for considering future initiatives or establishing a general context that could reduce the need for tough decisions in other areas under crisis conditions.

Several approaches (singly or in combination) could help:

1. Agenda for immediate consideration. Although we would caution against rushing into word or deed without more careful review of our overall objectives in human rights, there are some steps that could be taken quickly. Such measures could give immediate substance to state-
ments from the Carter Administration without constraining later choices. Among items for your priority consideration are the following:

a. Expedited announcement of well-known and well-qualified coordinator for the human rights office (D/HA). The authority of that person and his/her access to you would be a useful signal to the Congress and elsewhere and a needed channel for in-house decision-making.

b. Authorization for the Deputy Secretary to establish an ad hoc Human Rights Coordinating Group, administered by D/HA and to include, as appropriate, representatives from P, T, L, H, S/P, IO, PM, EB, and the regional bureaus—initially at the Deputy/Assistant Secretary level. Such a mechanism could help assure Department-wide consensus and coordination on cross-cutting issues in the human rights area. Among matters for immediate attention: the security assistance package due for Presidential decision next week, votes this month in the Inter-American Development Bank, agreement on general guidelines for press inquiries, and reference to human rights in PRM’s and other interagency exercises.

c. Recommendation that the President declare US intention to sign UN human rights covenants. Since the President is already on record in behalf of ratifying the genocide convention, the convention against racial discrimination, and the two covenants on political and economic rights,3 and since the next session of the UN Human Rights Commission convenes February 7, the time may be ripe for the State Department to support a Presidential push for ratification of all four. Although L’s study on this subject is not finished, preliminary findings suggest that we could defuse Congressional opposition by indicating that we would accompany signature and ratification with appropriate reservations and statements of understanding on points where there is incompatibility between these instruments and the Constitution and relevant US legislation and court decisions.

d. Action on bilateral issues. The Department will be under increased pressure from the Congress (most predictably, in upcoming hearings before the Humphrey Subcommittee)4 to explain how we factored human rights into our positions on security assistance. Given the imminence of a Presidential decision on the security assistance package next week, we should urgently consider our public position on the human rights aspects of the package and how decisions on individual countries could be best communicated, perhaps by the Deputy Secretary, to the countries concerned and to the Congress. There will also be several Harkin Amendment votes this month in the Inter-American Develop-

3 See footnotes 7 and 8, Document 4.
4 Reference is to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Humphrey.
ment Bank which could involve comparably difficult decisions and similar needs for communication.

e. Consultations with the Congress. You could talk with several leading Congressional advocates of human rights—both in the near future and after the completion of the Department’s overall review of human rights policy. In your early meetings with such Hill representatives, you could seek out their views, promise close cooperation, and report on the first steps taken by this Administration. Other Department officers could meet with members of Congress and staff to seek ideas for our own policy review.

2. Development of longer-term strategy. Although we do not advocate prolonged study, we do see value in putting specific decisions into a larger and more balanced context. We believe that either State Department studies or any possible PRM’s on human rights should avoid precipitate recommendations and instead stress formulation of a more general framework for US decisions. We therefore suggest consideration of the following:

a. Formulation of overall policy strategy. Such an exercise should include general principles, factors to be considered on a case-by-case basis, the range of available responses, potential risks and/or limits to human rights initiatives, and elements of a proposed strategy. (See Tab A for draft S/P outline for human rights strategy paper.) S/P could take the lead on this exercise, in conjunction with D/HA and the relevant bureaus. An initial draft could be available for review by the Deputy Secretary this month.

b. Statement of criteria for implementation of human rights provisions in current legislation. Because there is so much confusion about what constitutes a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” (basis for decisions on US economic assistance, security assistance, and loans to some international financial organizations), the Department of State, in consultation with the Congress, should try to clarify criteria so that we can be more responsive, both to the Hill and overall US foreign policy objectives. S/P, in consultation with D/HA, has taken a preliminary cut at this problem (see Tab B). We could refine a draft for review by the Deputy Secretary.

c. Drafting and coordination of bureau strategy papers. Papers, to be done in parallel with the above, could help provide balance between, on the one hand, stress on human rights and Congressional concerns and, on the other, broader regional/functional foreign policy concerns. They should concentrate on identifying those national governments

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6 Printed as the attachment to Document 1.
permitting or perpetrating a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, suggesting what US actions could help or hurt the situation, and how such actions might affect other US national interests.

d. **Proposal for Presidential attention.** At some later point, you may want to encourage the President to complement his already considerable support for human rights with such initiatives as a major foreign policy address (dealing entirely or in part with human rights) or a well publicized meeting with outside spokesmen/experts on this subject.

e. **High-level speech on human rights.** In the not-too-distant future, you could make a speech or present a statement before the Humphrey hearings in early March.⁷

f. **Consideration of change in current legislation.** Working together with the Congress on promotion of human rights may lead to opportunities to amend some current legislation which either does not serve the intended purpose of furthering human rights or runs counter to other foreign policy objectives—or both. In addition, we may find more ways to shift from legislation with a punitive cast to more positive measures that reward nations improving their observance of human rights.

**Recommendations for Action**

1. Authorize the Deputy Secretary to establish an ad hoc Human Rights Coordinating Group, as described above.⁸

2. Instruct the Deputy Secretary, with or without the Coordinating Group, to consider the action items noted above.

3. Mandate S/P, together with D/HA and other interested bureaus, to draft (as per above and Tabs A and B):

   a. overall strategy paper;
   b. guidelines for implementation of human rights provisions in current legislation.

4. Sign the memorandum on human rights at Tab C.⁹ Attached for your information at Tab D are the instructions on regional strategy papers on human rights to be issued by the Executive Secretary.¹⁰

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⁷ In a February 9 action memorandum to Christopher, Jenkins proposed that Christopher testify before the Humphrey subcommittee, owing to Christopher’s eventual “direct supervision over the [Department’s] Office of Human Rights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770043–2533) For Christopher’s March 7 subcommittee testimony, see Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1977, pp. 289–291 or Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session on Human Rights Issues and Their Relationship to Foreign Assistance Programs, March 4 and 7, 1977, pp. 62–69.

⁸ Vance’s special assistant Jacklyn Cahill initialed Vance’s approval of all four recommendations on February 11.

⁹ Attached and printed as Document 14.

¹⁰ Attached and printed as Document 15.
Tab A

Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff\textsuperscript{11}

Washington, undated

Draft Outline for
A Human Rights Strategy for the United States

BACKGROUND
I. Justification for a Human Rights Policy
   A. Moral reasons
   B. Legal justifications
   C. Political advantages

II. General Implementation Principles
   A. Posture of general concern re all human rights violations on a universal basis and of special concern re gross violations
   B. Need for long-range objective of gradual raising of world standards
   C. Avoidance of tone or implications of US moral arrogance
   D. Realization of the complexities of issues involved and need for careful and coordinated handling of all responses
   E. Impossibility of uniform, automatic responses to specific violations and consequent need for case-by-case responses
   F. Need for common and coordinated approach of all relevant elements of US Government
   G. Need to establish credibility with US Congress and public for the Administration’s efforts
   H. Preference, wherever possible and appropriate, for multilateral and cooperative international and regional efforts

III. Factors to be Considered in Each Case
   A. Factors relating to the human rights situation itself
      1. Nature and extent of violations
      2. Level of political development
      3. Direction of human rights trend
      4. Degree of governmental control and responsibility for violations
      5. Validity of internal and external security justifications

\textsuperscript{11} No classification marking. Drafted by Sirkin on February 2.
B. Other factors affecting potential US response

1. Range and significance of other US national interests involved
2. Nature of US association with regime
3. Degree of estimated US influence on human rights behavior of regime
4. Attitude of internal democratic opposition, if any, and of potential alternative political leaders to any particular US response
5. Degree of US Congressional, media and public interest in situation
6. Attitudes and roles of other governments
7. Estimate of likely consequences of any US response in terms of human rights conditions and of other US interests

C. Regional factors

1. In Latin America
   a. Historic sensitivity to US penchant for interventionism
   b. Need for balanced approach to regimes of different political and ideological orientations

2. In Africa
   a. Overriding interest of countries in racial issues
   b. Sensitivity of leaders to any statement or action which may appear to have colonial overtones

3. In Soviet Bloc
   a. Potential impact of US response on issues of world peace
   b. Potential impact on Eastern European volatilities
   c. CSCE considerations

4. In East Asia
   a. External and internal security factors
   b. Current intractability of communist regimes

5. In Near East and South Asia
   a. Problem of even-handedness among traditional adversaries
   b. Impact on oil supplies

IV. Choice of Available Responses

A. What are the objectives of any US response?

1. To help individual victims?
2. To raise general human rights standards in a country?
3. To dissociate the US from repressive policies and regimes?
4. Or some mix of the above?

B. Choice of appropriate responses from a range of options between:

1. quiet diplomacy and publicized approaches or statements
2. symbolic acts/statements and substantive measures
3. negative measures and positive statements or moves to encourage favorable trends
4. multilateral and bilateral approaches

V. Potential Risks in Human Rights Policy

A. Possible consequences of impinging on sovereignty sensitivities of individual countries

1. Strained US relations with regime leaders, with possible negative impact on other US national interests
2. Opportunities for regime leaders to arouse popular nationalistic support for resistance to foreign interference
3. Possible counterproductive results of US response leading to more severe repression

B. Possible negative consequences for human rights efforts generally

1. Widespread loss of faith in human rights efforts if expectations are raised too high in this relatively intractable area and results are meager
2. Loss of impact of public statements if employed too frequently, with the US ultimately ignored as a tiresome (and ineffective) international scold
3. Danger that authoritarian regimes in a region, or around the world, will join forces, especially at the UN and OAS, to resist large-scale, across-the-board human rights campaign
4. Inhibiting effect on whole effort if one or two major fiascos occur—such as replacement of authoritarian regime by one more repressive following US criticism

C. Problem of inconsistencies in US responses

1. Likely pressure for US to be obviously even-handed in treatment of human rights violations in strong and in weak countries, in left and in right regimes, in allied and in adversary states
2. Difficulty of demonstrating even-handedness if quiet diplomacy is used in some cases and publicized approach is used in others of an apparently similar nature
3. Use of argument about inevitable inconsistencies (“lack of balance,” “double standard”) as excuse for US not taking action in this field at all

D. Risks of inaction

1. Continued erosion of politically valuable US image as supporter of freedom everywhere
2. Injury to US interests and loss of US influence in a country whenever its authoritarian regime, with which the US is identified, is swept away
3. Loss of opportunities to identify with future leadership elements in many countries
4. Weakened US posture in ideological contest with totalitarian adversaries
5. Prospect of growing preponderance of nations in the world that do not share our values and consequent danger to our own values at home if we fail to oppose this trend

6. Loss of US public and media support for US foreign policy

7. Continued loss of Executive Branch initiative to Congress on important aspects of foreign policy

RECOMMENDED STRATEGY

I. Procedural Steps

A. Development and approval of a carefully considered strategy and detailed plans to implement a more vigorous national policy to advance human rights around the world, including special implementing strategies for each geographic region to take common regional factors into account

B. Public announcement and clarification of US policies in statements that establish a general US posture of concern for human rights, but which present some of the complexities involved, which avoid raising unrealistic expectations and which allay fears that we are embarked on a crusade to drastically alter or topple 100-odd governments around the world

C. Common and coordinated line on human rights by all US agencies operating overseas so that diplomatic efforts of US missions are not undermined by contrary signals from other US sources; reexamination of US contacts with repressive internal security elements abroad and their implications for human rights

D. Establishment with Congress of Department’s credibility on human rights policy to permit Executive Branch to regain initiative in this field and to have more flexibility on use of levers such as aid and arms policies, public reporting on human rights conditions, and voting in international financial institutions, all of which are now mandated by the Congress

E. Establishment in Department of procedure for making recommendations to Secretary on major decisions on human rights issues, whether in bilateral context or in multilateral framework so that impact on all Departmental elements can be carefully weighed—including P, T, Regional bureaus, L, H, D/HA, S/P, IO, PM, and AID

F. Internal Departmental information program to clarify role of missions in human rights efforts and to train junior and mid-career officers to understand complexities

G. Initiation of needed studies to analyze usefulness of various diplomatic tactics, symbolic gestures, substantive actions and multilateral approaches in achieving favorable results

II. Substantive Measures

A. Steps to put our own house in order by moving forward on ratification of pending UN covenants, by legislating more generous ref-
ugee, asylum and visa policies, and by making more emphatic representations on behalf of US citizens adversely affected by repressive measures abroad.

B. Employment generally of unpublicized diplomatic approaches in dealing with human rights problems and development of procedures and tactics which make such diplomatic efforts as effective as possible.

C. Selection of, and concentration on, a limited number of “worst” cases—perhaps one or two in a region—on which to focus in the hope of gathering the largest possible number of allies, including milder authoritarian regimes in the “Third World,” in a common attempt to raise international standards gradually from the current “bottom” of official murder and torture. Such an effort might typically have two phases:

1. Intensive discussions with “target” regimes to press for improvements in their practices, and clarification, wherever appropriate and possible, of the minimum steps that are sought from them if they are to get off the hook (to reduce the paranoia and sense of siege which dominate some of them and motivate their extreme measures).

2. If such tactics fail, shift to public statements and other more intensive measures, both to bring added pressure and to dissociate US clearly from a repressive regime.

D. Employment of diplomatic style that reduces symbols of US embrace of authoritarian regimes and serves to communicate various degrees of disapproval of repressive measures and appropriate degrees of detachment from repressive regimes.

E. Promotion of positive short-range programs to applaud and encourage favorable human rights trends and long-range technical assistance and cultural exchange programs to help foster growth of political institutions and practices that favor protection of individual rights.

F. Strengthening of US role in international bodies dealing with human rights, use of multilateral approaches to human rights situations in individual countries, and enlistment of help of like-minded countries in bringing pressure to bear on human rights violators wherever the indications are this tactic might be effective.
10. Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) to the Deputy Secretary of State-Designate (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, February 4, 1977

**SUBJECT**

S/P Human Rights Memorandum to the Secretary

The S/P memo to the Secretary of today’s date\(^2\) was read but not commented on by this office in view of S/P’s insistence on sending it forward immediately. No other interested bureaus have seen it. Our preliminary views are as follows.

**General:** We agree that action needs to be taken soon on a number of important pending issues and most particularly, as I indicated to you earlier, that an in depth study be undertaken at once by S/P, either internally within the Department or as part of a broader interagency PRM. If the latter, it should be kept under the Department’s lead.

**Short-term Actions**

—Ms. Derian should be consulted on the need to go beyond recent press reports to push for an official announcement on her appointment before her clearance.

—The proposal for an internal Coordinating Committee at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level appears premature and probably unnecessary. Ms. Derian must be given a chance to see how she wishes to proceed in the future and to decide what mechanisms will be most helpful to her.

—We have already recommended favorable action on the human rights conventions and covenants. The President may want to announce his intentions at Monday’s press conference.\(^3\) Alternatively it may be better to wait until further checks can be made with Congressional leaders.

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\(^2\) See Document 9.

\(^3\) Carter held his first news conference as President on February 8. For his remarks, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 92–100. Later, the President noted, “I had my first press conference. I felt completely at ease and leveled with the press the best I could, describing frankly some of the crucial issues that face our country. The major emphasis was on SALT talks and human rights. I spelled out in general terms our positions on these issues and intend to keep the press conferences on schedule and not evade issues any more than necessary for national security.” (Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 17–18)
On bilateral issues the Secretary is understood to be handling security assistance levels directly, and T, H and DOD need to be consulted on the advisability of releasing figures on individual countries ahead of the Congressional presentation. Subject to H’s views, selective consultations with key Congressmen are probably an essential ingredient depending on the nature of the President’s final decision. The Harkin amendment problems are urgent but need careful consideration by E and the interested bureaus before we decide on Congressional moves.

H has already recommended that the Secretary see the human rights advocates on the Hill before he leaves on his trip. We also have some ideas on how you could help as well.

Long-term Strategy

The “guidelines” paper on criteria for implementation of current legislation is being reviewed now and should be made available to you and the Secretary for decision now—not in the longer term—just as soon as it can be finally processed.

Bureau strategy papers strike us as being something that should be incorporated in the longer range policy study. Indeed the excellent draft outline of the proposed long-term policy study includes such sections, and in other new country and regional PRM’s (Korea and ARA, e.g.) human rights sections are already in preparation.

I doubt if either the President or the Secretary should make a full scale speech on human rights until the policy paper is completed and approved. They are doing fine now with short interpolations of principle and objective, without getting into much more difficult and sensitive details.

Certainly work is needed on new legislation, but this too must await the development of basic follow on policy decisions.

Finally, there are a number of other points which need to be considered in our view—generally those contained in my earlier January 21 memorandum to you on possible initiatives. We also need to get reports from other bureaus, particularly H, PM, EB and the geographic bureaus.

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4 Jenkins made a formal recommendation to Vance on February 10; see Document 13.
5 Tab B to Document 9 and printed as the attachment to Document 1.
6 Presumed reference to the draft Policy Planning Staff outline for the human rights strategy paper, Tab A to Document 9.
7 Not found.
11. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 8, 1977

PARTICIPANTS
Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn)
Lucy Wilson Benson—T
Robert Boettcher, Fraser’s Staff
John Salzberg, Fraser’s Staff
Ann Swift—H

SUBJECT
Human Rights and Security Assistance

Mrs. Benson called on Rep. Donald Fraser at his request to discuss the security assistance program and human rights. After a brief discussion of Mrs. Benson’s new responsibilities, the conversation turned to the Carter Administration’s ongoing consideration of security assistance levels.

Rep. Fraser agreed that the Administration was making a good start in the human rights field; but voiced his concern that unless human rights concerns are somehow institutionalized into the system, the initial momentum of the new Administration will be lost and the bureaucracy will return to its old habits. It is easy to talk about human rights, but many of the decisions stemming from human rights concerns, such as program level cuts, are very hard to make. Officers at the lower levels of the Department must be willing to push human rights.

Rep. Fraser said he would like to see the Administration take a zero-base-budget type of approach to the security assistance levels. He suggested that since country figures submitted in the CPD are not firm anyway, that a CPD could be submitted with only an overall request and a statement that the new Administration was reviewing the security assistance program levels with several considerations in mind, including human rights, and that country levels would be set after these determinations had been made.

Mrs. Benson discussed generally the Administration’s commitment to human rights and said she would like to see the development

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2 An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence that begins with “of the new Administration” and wrote in the margin: “I resent!”

3 An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
of an overall consistent strategy. She would like to see some sort of rational criteria developed which could be applied across the board so you were not faced with situations where we cut aid to Argentina with one hand, and did nothing to Iran with the other. Mrs. Benson said she realized that development of a broad human rights policy would be difficult, but that the Secretary was serious and would make certain the word reached both our Ambassadors and our people at all levels at State. We were no longer faced with a situation where the Secretary of State was unresponsive on human rights matters.

Turning to specific actions on the security assistance program, Rep. Fraser asked what would be happening in specific areas, such as Argentina. Mrs. Benson replied that the study was still going on but that State had recommended cuts in certain countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Ethiopia, and of course Chile. We had not cut Indonesia and Thailand since EA had argued persuasively against this and since grant aid was scheduled to be cut out of both these programs in 1979.

Rep. Fraser at this point indicated some unhappiness with the slow speed of the Indonesian prisoner release program and stated firmly that he would object if the Thai program included increases in either grant or FMS. He said he felt that one of the motivations behind the Thai military takeover from the democratic government was the military’s feeling that this way they would get more aid. They certainly should not be rewarded. Fraser said he knew the Korean situation was very complicated and he was glad to hear that it was under review, as a thorough study of all aspects of the situation was needed.

Bob Boettcher, following on from Rep. Fraser’s agreement that military assistance cuts were not a very effective human rights weapon, said that there was a whole range of alternatives between “quiet diplomacy” and aid cuts which can be more profitably used to encourage human rights. Secretary Kissinger, however, had always insisted there were only two alternatives: “quiet diplomacy” or cuts. Rep. Fraser added that quiet diplomacy had proved ineffective (if it had ever been used), and no cuts had ever been made except at the Congress’ insistence.

As an amplification of Rep. Fraser’s zero-based-budgeting approach, Boettcher suggested the Administration consider putting for-

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4 In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s February 7 evening report to Brzezinski, Tuchman noted that the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights had apparently prompted Suharto to comment that “in view of the emphasis on human rights in Carter’s inaugural and other statements, that the GOI’s program to resolve its political detainee problem must be accelerated.” Tuchman concluded, “Thus, even a non-program human rights program can have an impact.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2-4/77)
ward its figures to Congress with a statement that it had not had time to make a thorough study of levels, and that it would be reviewing all levels and would consider withholding aid from countries on various grounds, including human rights. This would give the Administration time to work with various governments to get them to improve their human rights records before putting any assistance cuts into effect.

12. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State-Designate (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, February 9, 1977

SUBJECT: Human Rights

At your request, Tony Lake prepared the attached memorandum on human rights. Patt Derian and I reviewed the memorandum with Tony. We are in basic agreement with him that the Department should:

—Move rapidly to pull together our best thinking on pending decisions with human rights implications.

—Begin to bring human rights considerations to bear on the full range of foreign policy issues and be prepared to lead a PRM exercise on human rights.

—Establish as orderly a process as possible for dealing with human rights matters.

However, it seems to me that the way to begin this process is for me to call together the ad hoc Departmental group that Tony recom-

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2 Not attached. Lake’s memorandum is printed as Document 9. According to Borg’s February 9 minutes of the “large assistant secretaries” staff meeting, held on February 8, Vance “stressed the over-arching importance of the human rights question to the new Administration. He said it was one of the most important issues we must face but noted that we have not yet ‘come to grips with the fundamental problem.’ Phil Habib asked about the status of the S/P study on this subject, and Tony Lake confirmed that the memorandum would be coming forward later in the day. He said he would be meeting with Pat Derian, the new Human Rights Coordinator, right after the staff meeting to discuss the content of the memorandum. (Ms. Derian was introduced to the staff meeting at this point.)” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840101–0914)
mends we set up, and to involve its members in deciding on next steps, particularly:

—How best to prepare for pending decisions; and,
—The scope and content of the regional strategy papers.

Therefore, my suggestion to you is that you approve Tony’s recommendations. I plan to convene the group on Monday, February 14, so that we can move forward promptly on intra-Departmental strategy papers.

3 Vance placed a check mark next to this paragraph and initialed. Cahill added the following handwritten notation: “done 2/11.”

13. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Jenkins) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, February 10, 1977

Call to Congressional Human Rights Leaders

In the attached memorandum, we recommended you meet with Congressional human rights leaders. However, from your schedule it is apparent it would be difficult to arrange this meeting before mid-March. As we do not wish to lose the chance to have an early meeting with these Congressmen to solicit their ideas, I suggest you ask Warren Christopher to hold the meeting as soon as possible in your stead. So there is no misunderstanding that Mr. Christopher is acting on your behalf, I strongly recommend you make a personal call to Cranston, Fraser and Kennedy before you leave to inform them you have asked Mr. Christopher to get together with them.


2 There is no indication that such a meeting took place. The Secretary visited Israel (February 15–17), Egypt (February 17–18), Lebanon (February 18), Jordan (February 18–19), Saudi Arabia (February 19–20), and Syria (February 20–21). For the Secretary’s remarks and transcripts of press conferences during this trip, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1977, pp. 209–23.
**Recommendation**

1. That Warren Christopher meet with Congressional human rights leaders on your behalf.³

2. That you call Cranston, Kennedy and Fraser before your trip to inform them of this.⁴

**Attachment**

**Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Jenkins) to Secretary of State Vance⁵**

Washington, February 3, 1977

Meeting with Congressional Human Rights Leaders

Principal congressional Members interested in human rights, Don Fraser in the House and Senators Kennedy and Cranston in the Senate, although pleased by the Administration’s public stance on human rights, are becoming increasingly restive about not being consulted on how it will be put into practice. This restiveness will increase if, lacking a full understanding of what the Administration proposes to do in the human rights field, they judge program levels for security assistance as the sole indicator of our human rights policy. I suggest an early meeting with them before your Middle East trip.

I believe the meeting should be an exploratory session. You could reiterate the Administration’s commitment to human rights without getting into specifics and draw the Congressmen out as to the ideas they have in the area—and they have many. In the process we would hope to reassure them of our determination to move on this matter. We would also hope to channel their energies into a constructive search with us for effective ways to bring about improvements in the protection of human rights, and to steer them away from a sterile sniping at

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³ Cahill initialed Vance’s approval of this recommendation on February 11. A stamped notation reads: “Feb 14 1977.”

⁴ Cahill initialed Vance’s disapproval of this option on February 11. A stamped notation reads: “Feb 14 1977.” At the bottom of the memorandum, Christopher wrote: “1) Question trying to meet with all three together. 2) Know all of them quite well, so your call may be unnecessary. 3) This might be occasion to introduce Derian to Cranston & Kennedy.”

⁵ Limited Official Use. Drafted by Pezzullo; concurred in by Wilson. Ortiz initialed the memorandum. A notation in Cahill’s handwriting on the first page of the memorandum reads: “Treat as original.”
security assistance levels. (Fraser has already been in touch with Lucy Benson, obviously because of his concern about decisions on Security Assistance. She will meet with him, but avoid discussing the Administration’s position on Security Assistance levels.)

If you agree, we will arrange for the preparation of a briefing book covering, among other things, (a) a willingness on your part to be selective in assigning Ambassadors to those countries with human rights problems and, further, to instruct all Ambassadors on the importance of human rights to this Administration; (b) a study currently in process by S/P to look thoroughly into the human rights area and explore methods by which we can have the greatest effect on human rights violators; (c) the possibility of using international forums to gain support for human rights observance; (d) possible support for the international covenants on economic, social and cultural rights, on civil and political rights, and on the genocide treaty.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize me to arrange for a meeting with the above-named Congressmen before you leave for your Middle East trip.6

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6 Cahill placed a check mark on the disapproval line and added: “no time before trip. H to resubmit at later date. JCahill 2/9.”
14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to All Assistant Secretaries of State

Washington, February 11, 1977

Human Rights

The President has stressed this Administration’s strong commitment to the promotion of human rights. The Department of State must help implement this goal of US foreign policy.

To carry out a policy which is constructive for furthering both human rights and our other national objectives, we need an overall human rights strategy and internal mechanism for helping assure balanced decisions in this area. To that end, I have taken the following actions:

—Asked the Deputy Secretary to establish an ad hoc Human Rights Coordinating Group, administered by D/HA and to include, as appropriate, representatives from P, T, L, H, S/P, IO, PM, EB, AID, and the regional bureaus—initially at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. The HRCG will be the forum for coordination of human rights policymaking within the Department.

—Requested the Policy Planning Staff, in consultation with D/HA and cooperating with other interested bureaus, to formulate a broad human rights policy for my review.

In addition, I am now asking that regional bureaus develop strategy papers focused on key human rights problems under their purview and tactics for dealing with them. Following the first meeting of the Human Rights Coordinating Group, detailed instructions will be issued by the Executive Secretary.

Cyrus Vance

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, NODIS. No classification marking. Another copy is attached to Lake’s February 4 memorandum to Vance (see Document 9).

2 See Document 9 and footnote 8 thereto. Saunders and Watson sent Christopher action memoranda on February 14 and 18, respectively, requesting INR and SCA representation on the Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG). Christopher approved these requests on February 16 and 21, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770030-2329 and P770034-0581) Christopher later approved D/HA’s request for USIA representation. See Document 29.

3 See Document 9 and footnote 8 thereto.

4 See Document 15.
15. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 
Department of State (Borg) to All Regional Assistant 
Secretaries of State

Washington, February 15, 1977

SUBJECT
Guidelines for Preparation of Regional Strategy Papers for the Promotion of 
Human Rights

As the Secretary directed in his memorandum of February 11, the 
regional bureaus are to prepare papers which propose human rights 
strategies appropriate in their regions. These strategies should con- 
tribute to the overall human rights policy being developed by the 
Policy Planning Staff.

Each regional strategy plan should cover the following points:

1. General considerations affecting the human rights situation in 
the region as a whole.

2. Description of conditions in the countries with the most serious 
problems. (Generally the human rights violations with which we are 
most urgently concerned involve widespread gross violations directed 
against the person, such as officially sanctioned murder, torture and 
prolonged imprisonment without fair trial.) These descriptions should 
be brief summaries and not detailed material of the type included in the 
security assistance reports.

3. A strategy for dealing with these worst cases which should in- 
clude such items as:
   a. What specific actions would we like the governments to take 
      and how should this be communicated to them?
   b. What leverage can and should be used?
   c. What favorable response should we be prepared to give if the 
      governments accept our suggestions?
   d. What are the necessary limits of our possible efforts and why?
   e. Are there multilateral channels that might be used to affect the 
      situations favorably?

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770038–0022. 
Confidential.

2 See Document 14.
4. Description of human rights situations of a less egregious character in other countries that we may be able to affect favorably and suggested tactics for dealing with them.

5. Steps the United States may take that would favorably affect the human rights situation in individual countries or the region as a whole.

Even though the preparation of these papers is intended to proceed in parallel with the work on the overall strategy paper, serious divergences are not expected since the overall paper will be developed in close cooperation with the relevant bureaus.

The regional papers should be submitted to D/HA by COB February 22. Direct any questions on format or the Department’s overall strategy exercise to Mr. Spear (extension 21181).

C. Arthur Borg

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3 Copies of the Regional Strategy for Human Rights papers are in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, NODIS.

4 Borg initialed “CAB” above his typed signature.
16. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 18, 1977

SUBJECT
Human Rights Proposal

As I reported in yesterday’s evening report2 the President has directed that we proceed on his initiative to sign and urge the ratification of: The International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Genocide Convention; and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.3 Lipshutz and I agreed to meet with Pat Derian who has been appointed Commissioner of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at State, and Jim Fallows to discuss what should be done. I mentioned to him that I thought that the UN might be the best possible forum for such a speech.

In the course of the past few days I have been doing some reading and a lot of talking with different people on the subject of human rights, and have come up with a proposal which I think merits some consideration. In brief, it is that President Carter use this opportunity (announcement of the four treaty actions) to make a major speech at the United Nations.

Here are the reasons why, and some thoughts on what such a speech might include.

—One of the problems that comes up again and again is American hypocrisy in this area. Our protracted failure to ratify the Genocide and Racial Discrimination Conventions and even to sign the international covenants, has in large part prevented us from using the United Na-

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives, 1/77–10/78. Confidential.
2 The NSC Global Issues Cluster’s February 17 evening report is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2–4/77.
3 See footnotes 7 and 8, Document 4. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination committed signatories both to condemning racial segregation and apartheid and undertaking a policy designed to eliminate racial discrimination in all forms and promote understanding of all races. On December 21, 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention and opened it for signature. For the U.S. position on the Convention at the time of its adoption, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 375.
tions as a forum to speak out on human rights because of our quite appropriate fear of being embarrassed by the charge of hypocrisy. Thus the President’s intention to take these actions is not only a major step in itself, but opens the door for many other U.S. actions on human rights.

—With his appointment of Andy Young, Carter has signaled that he intends to make the United Nations a more important force in U.S. foreign policy. No other national or international organ has the same potential as the UN to advance the cause of human rights. (I stress potential—how much depends on the changes proposed below.)

—There is a lot of debate about the value of words on this issue. On the one hand, we hear lots of comment about when is the President going to stop talking about human rights and actually do something. On the other hand, Intelligence reports from various countries show that Carter’s words—particularly in his Inaugural Address—have already had a significant, positive effect on the policies of some other nations. However too many words (particularly when addressed to individual cases) carry the potential for all kinds of trouble: too many of them rob each one of its force; individuals abroad may be provoked into actions designed to elicit American response; damage to bilateral relations, etc. This speech would allow the President to enunciate strong U.S. principles on human rights, but in a manner completely divorced from any individual case or nation. It would set the context in which other American statements and actions could follow. A speech at the UN would demonstrate that the U.S. is willing to say these things on the record, and in a forum where we may take some heat as a result.

In his speech I would propose that the President—in addition to announcing the four treaty actions—make the following points and proposals:

—We reject the policy of remaining silent in the face of terrible abuses of human rights because of a fear of embarrassing our friends or ourselves because of our own lesser violations of human rights. All nations, including the U.S. have been guilty of this. We all sin but that need not silence us about the worst sinners.

—A gentle but moving call to try to create in the UN a political forum to respond to human sufferings.

—There are many in this country as there are in other nations who have become disillusioned with the United Nations. But it is still important—vital—to building and maintaining a peaceful world order. The way to disarm that disillusionment is to make the UN work better.

—Therefore I propose some major steps to strengthen the UN mechanisms on human rights. Specifically, urge the creation of an of-

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4 See footnote 3, Document 8.
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (see note #1).5 Secondly, move the entire UN Human Rights Division from Geneva back to New York where the most active human rights nongovernmental organizations are situated, and where the permanent press corps with its proddings and its disclosures can stimulate a more positive UN role. With good reason, a high UN official has acknowledged that the reason for the transfer from New York to Geneva was that the Human Rights Division “would be more asleep” in Geneva. Third, propose certain mechanisms to strengthen the workings of the UN Commission on Human Rights, its Sub-Commission on Discrimination and the recently created Human Rights Committee.

—The President might then make some attempt to define what are—in the view of the United States—the most basic human rights. I would suggest that they are those which concern the sanctity of the person: detention and arrest without charge, torture, killing, etc. This would of course raise many problems, (e.g.—is the right to emigrate one of the most basic?) but it does seem possible to me that some agreement might be reached on this, and that these constitute a category that can be set apart.

—A rejection of the trade-off often advanced by the LDCs between human rights and human needs.6 The often aching need for economic development cannot be accepted as a reason for violating these other rights. The President could point out that the U.S. does nevertheless understand that “human rights begins at breakfast” and therefore

Note #1 is at the end of the memorandum. In a February 23 memorandum to Tuchman, Henze expressed agreement with Tuchman’s proposal but added that he was “more skeptical of the likelihood” that the United States could obtain consensus on the UN human rights measures: “This is not a reason for avoiding proposing some of the measures you outline but we should be careful not to get hung up on pushing them, because I fear that a majority of UN members will find various reasons to oppose the creation of an Office of UN Commissioner for Human Rights. The Soviets will see it as an American attempt to create a new platform for meddling in their affairs; the Chinese can hardly support it; most Africans will be fearful of it; many Latin Americans and Asians too.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 37, Human Rights: 2–3/77)

Hansen, in a February 23 memorandum to Tuchman, indicated that he strongly disagreed with this statement as it dichotomized the two types of rights and prioritized one set of rights over the other. He continued, “The crucial issue for the President is whether or not he wishes to continue this stalemated debate with developing countries or reach out for some broader understanding; if you will, toward the creation of a ‘universal norm’ which both North and South could subscribe to in the area of human rights. If he doesn’t, his policies vis-à-vis most developing countries will get off to a bad start in a crucial area of North-South relations. So I plead with you not to advise a rejection of the trade off idea, but to suggest a reconceptualization of it that says quite straightforwardly ‘We are prepared to recognize that the Universal Declaration contains two general types of human rights issues, and we are prepared to move forward on both of them with equal degrees of commitment.’ That would be a new note in the heretofore squalid North-South shouting match, and should capture the attention of all the countries of the world.” (Ibid.)
might also choose to use this occasion to make a proposal or announce U.S. initiatives in the field of economic and social development. For example, he might announce the World Health Initiative (recently proposed by Peter Bourne and approved by the President), a call for action on and U.S. contribution to the creation of international food reserves, or some other proposal concerning general economic development, following up on the Kissinger proposals to the Special Session last year.

—The President might then choose to make a few points on what U.S. policy will be. First, that the United States does not believe that human rights is a purely domestic matter, and accepts the opinion of the International Court of Justice (1971) which held that in ratifying the United Nations Charter, member states have undertaken legal obligations in the matter of human rights, and their actions are therefore a matter of appropriate concern to the entire global community. The President might reassert that the United States will carry over its concern with human rights into its bilateral relations, either using the positive language he employed in the Inaugural (societies which show “an abiding respect for individual human rights” will receive a “clearcut preference”) or a tougher posture concerning possible sticks we might use (security assistance, multilateral loans, etc.).

This is of course only a rough outline of such a speech and some of it is (and is intended to be) highly controversial. However, in my discussions with people about the PRM, I have discovered that there is wide confusion over what even the most basic elements of U.S. policy on human rights should be. I believe therefore that the exercise of writing such a speech as is proposed here—with the President’s close personal involvement—might provide the basis for proceeding to develop a coherent policy of how to implement the various incentives and sanctions at our disposal.

Note #1. This proposal was first made by Costa Rica in 1965. Writing about it Bill Korey notes that the Commissioner would have “access to the complaint communications and, with tact and ‘quiet persuasion,’ could attempt to remedy serious grievances. He would also assist and provide advice to various UN organs on human rights matters. As envisaged by the Costa Rican delegation and its supporters, the person chosen by the Assembly for the position of High Commis-

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7 Bourne’s response to Tuchman’s proposal is Document 21.
sioner would be one whose integrity and prestige is so great that his relative independence from the buffeting political winds at the UN would enable him to function effectively in a difficult job. But it was precisely such a potentially effective institutional device which aroused powerful resistance and endless postponement.

17. **Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts**

Washington, February 19, 1977, 0112Z

38407. Pass to PAOs. Subject: Human Rights Reporting to the Congress. Refs: (1) State 307523, Dec. 76; (2) State 5158 (Notal).3

1. The human rights provisions of current security assistance legislation (Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) call for two different kinds of reporting to the Congress.

2. The first are reports under Subsection (B) of the law, which are part of the annual security assistance presentation to the Congress.5

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770060–0446. Confidential. Drafted by Spear; cleared by Tice, Derian, Whiting, Lister, Harris, Goot, Runyon, Michel, Swift, Vogelgesang, Silverstone, and Gamble; approved by Christopher. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro on March 18. (Ibid.)

2 Telegram 307523 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, December 20, 1976, provided a status report on all human rights reports prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760467–0483)

3 Telegram 5158 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 10, 1977, further updated the status of the ARA human rights reports. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770009–0771)

4 See footnote 5, Document 1.

5 Vance provided an overview of the administration’s foreign assistance program, including security assistance, to both Senate and House Subcommittees on Foreign Operations on February 24 and March 2, respectively. Vance also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on March 23. The advance versions of Vance’s statements are printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1977, pp. 236–242; March 28, 1977, pp. 284–289; and April 11, 1977, pp. 336–339.
Nearly 80 of these have been completed, are being printed and should go to the Congress in a few weeks as part of the regular security assistance congressional presentation. They reflect developments as of December 1976; an introductory statement notes that there have been significant changes in some countries since that time. The reports are unclassified and may well be published by the congressional committees to which they are submitted. Copies of the individual country reports are being or have been sent under separate cover to posts concerned. They should not be shown to host governments at this time. At the time they are released to the Congress, posts will be advised and may then, at their discretion, bring them to the attention of host governments. Posts not wishing to do so, should advise the Department.

3. In discussing these reports with local officials, posts should note:
   A) That they are required by law.
   B) They cover all countries for which the U.S. is proposing security assistance (including FMS cash sales); the fact that a country is reported on does not mean that it is necessarily on any sort of human rights "blacklist."
   C) The reports seek to be factual and do not reach any conclusion on whether a country engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or not.
   D) References to reports by nongovernmental groups such as the International Commission of Jurists, Freedom House, Amnesty International, etc. and international organizations like the International Red Cross, the UN and OAS Human Rights Commissions are required under the law.

4. The second category of reporting is statements, called for under Subsection (C)(1) of the law. Either house of the Congress or its Foreign Relations Committee may request a statement on the human rights practices of any security assistance recipient country. This must be submitted within 30 days of the request or assistance must cease until it is provided. To date, statements have been requested on Argentina, Haiti, Peru, Iran, Indonesia and the Philippines. These were provided in clas-
sified form initially. Subsequently, the Department was asked for and provided unclassified versions of these statements. The Congress can be expected to ask for statements on a number of other countries on which reports are submitted under para 2 above. Posts will be notified when reports are requested.

5. Several points should be noted about these statements:

A) The countries were selected by the congressional committees, not by the Department. The Department has not been informed of the basis for selecting these particular countries.

B) As in the case of the Subsection (B) reports, these Subsection (C)(1) statements make no determination regarding a country’s human rights practices—a point frequently missed in media stories which characterized the statements as State Department condemnation of the 6 countries.

C) On the basis of the facts on human rights practices and the justification for security assistance set out in the statements, the Congress may then decide to enact legislation to terminate, reduce or continue assistance to a country.

6. Finally, Section 116(D) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides that the annual AID presentation to the Congress include a full and complete report on steps taken to insure that devel-

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7 In telegram 307523 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, December 20, 1976, the Department indicated that earlier that fall, Fraser had invoked Section 502 (B) and had requested human rights statements for Argentina, Haiti, and Peru. The statements were designed to provide Congress with information about human rights in the country specified, steps the United States had taken to promote human rights within the country, and a justification for security assistance programs. The Department sent confidential copies to Fraser in October; Fraser then requested that these be declassified. In addition, Humphrey had requested copies of 17 reports, including those for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The Department sent copies of the reports to Humphrey’s subcommittee staff, commenting that the reports “will remain confidential.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760467–0483) In an October 12, 1976, letter to Jenkins, Fraser explained that his purpose in requesting the reports was not “exclusively for the use of Members and Staff of the Committee on International Relations. It is important for the American public to have access to this information and to have the Department ‘on the public record’ with respect to its own evaluation of the human rights situation in the country concerned.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760163–0838) In telegram 5158 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 10, 1977, the Department noted that unclassified versions of the Argentina, Haiti, and Peru statements—in addition to ones for Indonesia, Iran, and the Philippines—were given to Fraser on December 29 and were subsequently published by the House Committee on International Relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770009–0771) Ultimately, Humphrey’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance released 82 reports on March 12. (Don Oberdorfer, “State Dept. Lists Rights Conditions In 82 Countries,” The Washington Post, March 13, 1977, p. A–1 and Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Says Most Lands Receiving Arms Aid Are Abusing Rights,” The New York Times, March 13, 1977, p. A–1)
development assistance is not given to any government engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless it will directly benefit the needy people of the country. Under Section 116(B), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House International Relations Committee may require information from the AID Administrator demonstrating that assistance to a country will directly benefit the needy people in that country.

7. To assist the AID Administrator in complying with these requirements, the Department is seeking information on human rights practices from posts in countries which receive development assistance, but not security assistance (for which reports have already been prepared). The studies based on this information will be used internally by the Department in providing guidance to AID.

Hartman

18. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, February 21, 1977

The President’s recent actions in the field of human rights, in particular the letter to Andrei Sakharov, have to be seen in the broader context of President Carter’s well-known intention to try to make foreign policy reflect this nation’s commitment to the personal freedoms that are the lifebeat of our form of government.

It should be clear that our purpose in making these statements is not to embarrass any particular government or to espouse any indi-

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 7, Human Rights: 2–3/77. No classification marking. Brzezinski initialed and placed a check mark at the top of the page, indicating that he had seen the memorandum.

2 Reference is to an exchange of letters between Sakharov and Carter. Sakharov’s January 21 letter to the President and Carter’s February 5 response are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VI, Soviet Union. They were published in The New York Times on January 29 and February 18, 1977, respectively.
individual cause, but to do what we can to advance the cause of human rights everywhere.  

We cannot do everything and we will not try to. We obviously cannot speak out at every abuse, but these public statements will not be our only tool. We will use quiet diplomacy in those cases where that would seem to work best. As the President said in his Inaugural Address, we will show a clear-cut preference in our bilateral relations for those nations which share our respect for human rights. We will in time make clear to those to whom we provide assistance, what we expect from them in return. And of course we will do what we can to encourage respect for international treaties and commitments.

In closing let me say that all our actions in this field are based on the conviction that human rights is never purely a domestic matter. There are human ties and concerns that transcend national boundaries, and bind individuals together whatever their form of government. The President believes that every responsible member of the global community bears certain obligations to the rest, and a decent respect for human rights is one of these.

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3 Presumable reference to two statements released by the Department of State in late January; see footnote 4, Document 7. During the course of his January 31 news conference, Vance also discussed the administration’s decision to publicly address cases like the Sakharov one; see Document 8 and footnote 3 thereto. In recounting the substance of a February 1 meeting with Dobrynin, the President informed Mondale that the United States would not “back down” on support for human rights in the Soviet Union. (Murrey Marder, “Carter Firm on Human Rights Stance,” *The Washington Post*, February 2, 1977, p. A–9) The memorandum of conversation of the Carter–Dobrynin meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume VI, Soviet Union.

4 See footnote 3, Document 8.
Meeting at NSC on Human Rights Problems

Marshall Shulman and I, accompanied by Mark Garrison, met with Brzezinski, Aaron, Schecter and Hyland on February 18 to discuss coordination of tactics in handling human rights problems. Without attempting to reach decisions, we discussed the following points:

—A possible Administration statement, with a worldwide gloss, suitable for use in lieu of addressing specific questions each time a new one arises. No agreement on venue or timing, but a consensus that it would be useful to produce a draft to look at (our contribution is at Tab 1).

—In any case, there was a general feeling that we should try to move away from reacting to every new human rights development, provided that is the President’s desire. Zbig thought the President would listen to advice on this point.

—The Bukovsky meeting at the White House (the Vice President, possibly a handshake with the President at that time). Consensus: Bukovsky will make a media circus of it and will probably criticize any effort to come to terms with the Soviets; it would be unwise to tangle with him publicly at that time.

—The President’s press conference, sometime this week: Bukovsky and the Sakharov correspondence will probably be major items.

—We need some human rights initiatives not related to the Soviet Union (Warren Christopher has a project under way to accomplish this).


2 Reference is to Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, who was released from a Soviet prison camp in December 1976. For information concerning the meeting with Bukovsky at the White House, see footnote 12, Document 38.

3 The President’s press conference took place on February 23. For a transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, February 28, 1977, pp. 242–48. For additional information about the Sakharov correspondence, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 18.
—Agreed that Schechter could be the contact point for assuring a coordinated public reaction—or non-reaction—when new developments arise.

—Consensus that we should push for favorable handling of our own US-interest emigration cases, and consider what can be done to help the most urgent of the dissident cases (specifically Kovalev, the one singled out by Sakharov).

Tab 1

Draft Administration Statement

Washington, undated

In recent weeks, the attention of our country and the world has focused again on the issue of human rights. This Administration, reflecting the deeply held views of the American people, is putting into practice what the President said in his inaugural address: “because we are free, we cannot be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”

In this imperfect world, we cannot comment on all the wrongs done to individuals, much less hope to correct them all. But no one can now be in any doubt where we as a government and as a people stand regarding injustices, whether perpetrated at home, in those countries which share our values and aspirations, in those countries where hunger and poverty are the most pressing concerns, or in those societies which do not share our basic view of the rights of man.

In pursuing “a just and peaceful world that is truly humane,” our efforts include the negotiation of agreements which advance our national interests, including verifiable and enforceable agreements on the limitation of armaments. Success in these endeavors can also play an important role in establishing a climate in which the best of human aspirations can more successfully be encouraged. And as the President said, success in arms limitation negotiations can mean life instead of death. Maintaining life is fundamental to morality.

\footnote{No classification marking.}
20. Action Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs-Designate (Derian), the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

Proposed Reply to Congressman Reuss on Human Rights

*Issue for Decision*

Congressman Reuss, in a letter dated February 15, 1977 (Tab 2),\(^2\) forwarded to the Secretary a copy of legislation he proposes to introduce governing the U.S. vote in international financial institutions regarding loans to countries in violation of human rights.

We need to respond promptly as Congressman Reuss has stated he intends to introduce the legislation not later than March 1.

Our proposed reply (Tab 1)\(^3\) asks Reuss to hold off further action.

*Background/Analysis*

The Harkin Amendment to legislation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Fund (AFDF) now requires us to vote against loans to a country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.

The Reuss bill would:

—Introduce Harkin-like restrictions in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (in addition to the IDB and the AFDF).

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770036–0118. Unclassified. Drafted on February 25 by Thomas; cleared by Stahnke, Spear, Preeg, Vogelgesang, and Runyon and in substance by Lake. Thomas initialed for the clearing officials, with the exception of Vogelgesang, and for Bennet. The memorandum was drafted on February 25. A handwritten notation by Ortiz at the top of the first page reads: “2–28 FO.” Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, WC—Official Chrons—Jan/Dec 1977.

\(^2\) Not attached. Reuss’ transmittal letter is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770024–1395. Regarding the bill he introduced in March, see footnote 35, Document 29.

\(^3\) Not attached. A handwritten notation on a signed copy of the February 26 letter from Christopher to Reuss indicates that Thomas hand-delivered the original. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770036–0116)
—Delete the exemption which, under the Harkin Amendment, authorizes us to support aid programs for needy people, and
—Require the Secretary to prepare and transmit to Congress a list of countries engaged in gross violations of human rights.

Bureau Views

We oppose the Reuss proposal. We are taking steps to develop a comprehensive, broad-based policy on human rights. Our initiatives vis-à-vis the international financial institutions must flow from this overall strategy. In this connection we plan to contact key governments and the management of development banks and ascertain how best to relate our overall human rights objectives to the lending policies of these multilateral institutions. We have cited this initiative in the proposed reply to Congressman Reuss. The thrust of the letter is to convince Reuss that we are taking strong steps to support human rights, we need time to develop a comprehensive strategy which has an appropriate role for the multilateral institutions and, therefore, we want him to hold off further action on his bill.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter (Tab 1) to Congressman Reuss and personally call him to underscore the rationale for our reply.4

Talking points you may wish to use when calling Congressman Reuss are at Tab 3.5

4 According to a stamped date, Christopher initialed his approval of this recommendation on February 26. He bracketed the phrase “and personally call him to underscore the rationale for our reply” and added a notation in the margin: “Could Doug Bennet call, saying that I went to Brazil after signing letter.” Reuss responded to Christopher in a February 28 letter, proposing that he and Christopher meet with Harkin, Fraser, and Gonzalez to discuss human rights matters. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770038–2341) Jenkins provided Christopher with a copy of Reuss’ letter under a March 3 action memorandum, which included a recommendation that Christopher agree to the meeting. Christopher approved the recommendation on March 4 and added the following handwritten comment: “Should Cooper also be present? Derian?” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P77038–2337)

5 Attached but not printed.
21. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, February 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights Proposal

I like the Human Rights Proposal and agree very much with your rationale. I think the concept of balancing a call for human rights with a discussion of his concern about human needs is very valid. As far as specifically addressing the health issue I see pros and cons. I like the idea of having health talked about in that forum because the potential attention and high visibility that it might get. My reservations are that, (1) We are losing an opportunity to have the President get attention twice on a significant global issue by lumping them both together in one speech, (2) the health issue may just get lost in the speech because of the overriding interest in the human rights issue. Kissinger gave a similar speech to the U.N. on human rights and threw in the health issue announcing a new U.S. initiative to deal with Schistosomiasis that affects 200 million people in the world. The health issue was totally lost when the speech was reported.

I recommend the following; that we include a statement on health but use the speech as an opportunity to announce a future major unveiling of a new role for the U.S. in the international health field, and have him say that he has directed a reassessment of our foreign assistance policies with regard to international health and that in several weeks he would be ready to announce the details of such a major new initiative. In that way we could balance the human rights issue with concern for human needs especially health in the U.N. speech, and at the same time avoid getting the issue lost by combining it with more headline grabbing statements.

As far as the speech as a whole is concerned it might be a good idea for him to emphasize what he will do as President to strengthen human rights in the U.S. This might include the formation of a citizens advisory panel to make recommendations to the President. There is I think

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2 See Document 16.
3 Reference is to Kissinger’s September 23, 1974, address to the UN General Assembly entitled “An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community.” For the complete text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1974, pp. 498–504.
considerable risk if we seem to be preaching to the rest of the world when our domestic human rights situation is not that great.

22. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 28, 1977, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Human Rights PRM Meeting, 28 February, 4:00 PM

The following issues were discussed:

1. Procedure—Ms. Tuchman stated that she is committed to providing Brzezinski with a PRM draft on Friday, 4 March, and that the PRM would be distributed in final form next week to member agencies. She will attempt to get her final draft to us by 2 March but hopes to avoid further changes.

2. NSC Draft vs State Department Draft—The two State Representatives, Derian and Vogelgesang, attempted to persuade Ms. Tuchman to substitute the State draft (see attachment) for the NSC version. They took the position that we should avoid trying to define human rights, but rather outline a general approach and an action program. Tuchman took the position that some definition of the basic human rights involved was necessary and she made it clear that she was not prepared to accept the State draft, but would make changes in the NSC draft based on the discussion at this meeting.

3. Third World Reaction—Baker of State and Birnbaum of AID emphasized that third world countries are more concerned with economic rights than they are with civil rights and that our approach would have to take their point of view into account. Birnbaum went on to stress that cutting off economic aid was not necessarily the best way of improving

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files, Box 5, Folder 12: Human Rights. Confidential. Drafted by Meyer on March 1. Attached but not printed are a list of attendees and agenda items, a routing slip, and a copy of Knoche’s February 15 memorandum to Brzezinski (see Document 7 and footnote 1 thereto).

2 The State Department draft is attached but not printed. The undated draft lists five discussion items: objectives of U.S. policy on human rights; general guidelines for U.S. policy; specific factors to consider in individual cases/countries; tactics and initiatives; and questions and proposals requiring further study. Also attached are Defense and USIA responses in the form of memoranda to Tuchman, both February 28, to the draft PRM. The NSC draft was not found.
human rights performance and he used as an example of what could be
done the progress that has been made by quiet persuasion on the popu-
lation problem.

4. Problem of Conflicting Interests—Erb of Treasury made the point
that in a number of cases our own national security interests might be
in conflict with pressure to improve human rights performance of indi-
vidual countries and he urged that some consideration of this problem
be included in the redraft. He specifically called for the establishment
of some procedure whereby the issue of human rights could be intro-
duced into the decision-making process so that a conscious decision
could be made between competing U.S. interests.

5. Existing Human Rights Agreement, Charters and Conventions—
Goldklang of Justice stressed that the U.S. is a party to a number of
overlapping international agreements affecting human rights, in-
cluding the UN Charter, the Genocide Treaty, the OAS Agreement on
Human Rights, the Helsinki Declaration, etc. He pointed out that the
legal basis for taking action in a specific case would depend upon what
agreements have been ratified by the country in question.

6. Communist vs Non-Communist Countries—There was an incon-
clusive discussion of the need for making a distinction between Com-
munist and non-Communist countries in our policy approach. Derian
argued strongly against such a distinction but Tuchman and the ma-
jority seem to feel that it was necessary to draw this line.

7. Intelligence Contribution—Tuchman felt that a section of the PRM
should specifically call for an intelligence contribution and she indi-
cated she would introduce such a paragraph into the redraft. Baker of
State and I pointed out that the CIA Stations did contribute to the Em-
bassy reporting to Congress on the human rights situation as required
by law.

8. Belgrade Conference—There was general agreement that there
was need for clarifying U.S. policy towards the Belgrade Conference³
and this item will be covered in Tuchman’s redraft.

9. At the end of the meeting I had a chance to chat briefly with
Tuchman and suggested that we get together to review the present
status of Agency production in this field and she indicated that she
very much wanted to do so and would be in touch with me.⁴

Cord Meyer, Jr.

³ Reference is to the CSCE Review Conference, scheduled to take place in Belgrade,
Yugoslavia, in October 1977.

⁴ According to Lake’s March 25 memorandum to Vance (Document 29), the NSC
cancelled the human rights PRM. Tuchman, during a May 24 Interagency Working
Group meeting, indicated that the NSC had rejected her draft PRM outline in March (see
Document 50). The final version of the PRM, as approved by the President, is printed as
Document 46.
23. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 9, 1977, 8:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Foreign Assistance

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary Vance
Secretary Blumenthal
Secretary Bergland
Director-designate Gilligan
Senator Sparkman
Senator Inouye
Senator Humphrey
Senator Long
Senator Case
Senator Young
Speaker O’Neill
Congressman Mahon
Congressman Zablocki
Congressman Harrington
Congressman Long
Congressman Cederberg
Congressman Stanton
Congressman Foley
Congressman Reuss
Congressman C.W. Young
Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

The President opened by stating that he was willing to take a large share of the political heat for this year’s foreign aid bill because of its importance to our foreign policy at a critical moment. We have new opportunities for gains in Africa and Latin America if we have the flexibility to deal with them. OPEC is willing to help. We must back up our human rights commitment.

Secretary Vance then outlined the components of the $1.7 billion increase—$1.3 billion for IFI’s, of which $1 billion is callable capital being appropriated for the first time.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 3/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 8:15 to 9:06 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Hormats transmitted it to Brzezinski under a March 16 memorandum indicating that the Department’s notes on the meeting “essentially square with my own.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 3/77) Hormats also sent copies to Thornton, Tuchman, Hansen, Pastor, and Schecter.
The President then acknowledged difficulties with the aid program in the past which have become important symbols: World Bank salaries, the fact that 40 per cent of IDA funds go to India alone, the over-concentration of administrators who live in relative opulence in Washington and other capitals. The Administration is seeking to address each of these issues.

Congressman Reuss agreed on the need to support IFI’s. He volunteered the desirability of a “Congressional declaration supporting the Administration view that human rights are important and that we will use our vote and any other leverage in the IFI’s to advance human rights.” The Administration faces a moment of truth tomorrow on two multilateral loans to Argentina.

The President replied that the Administration would “err on the side of human rights” decisions involving multilateral loans. He stated, however, that there can be no absolute standards as the Korean case shows. A declaration by Congress with regard to human rights in the IFI’s would be fine, the President said, as long as it left the Administration some flexibility.

The President noted that the IFI’s have exerted “conservative lending pressure” on borrowers which has been healthy for inflation control.

Senator Humphrey noted that while India gets 40 per cent of IDA loans, it is not at the top of the list on a per capita basis. The President stated that India had made remarkable progress recently not only because of good crops, but in human rights as Mrs. Gandhi has taken steps away from totalitarianism.

Senator Case switched the discussion to his concern that foreign assistance decisions should not be contingent upon any U.S. domestic pressures. It has been argued, he said, that U.S. assistance is actually spent in the U.S. and benefits American industries, that P.L. 480 helps American agriculture, and so forth. In the long run, it would be better to separate our parochial interests from our foreign policy objectives to achieve flexibility in meeting the latter. Congressman Long nodded ap-
proval throughout Case’s remarks. Senator Humphrey subsequently noted that Case’s position was not realistic politically because much of the support for our aid program came from farmers, for example, who perceived the benefits of P.L. 480.

Senator Inouye noted that the Senate had supported foreign aid vigorously for the last four years but expressed several concerns of his own:

—U.S. IFI contributions should be no more than 25 per cent. The President subsequently agreed that this was a desirable policy objective, but as Secretary Blumenthal concurred, it would take several years to achieve.

—We are picking up 70 per cent of the cost of the U.N. drug agency whose work is largely devoted to Europe and which has a very small impact on heroin imports to the United States.

—While others charge that we contribute only .26 per cent of our gross national product to aid, that figure covers development assistance alone, does not include military assistance (including aid to Israel), callable capital, Ex-Im Bank loans, P.L. 480, etc. Nor does it include the fact that we spend 6 per cent of our GNP for defense while nations like Japan, whom we in fact defend, are spending less than 1 per cent. Senator Humphrey observed that the figures can hardly be tallied since the Ex-Im Bank is a money maker, the callable capital hasn’t been called, and P.L. 480 does as much good for our farmers as its beneficiaries.

Chairman Mahon stated that foreign aid in general was highly unpopular in Congress and that it passed only because of the Middle East package. The House will not approve a $7 billion package, he predicts. Chairman Zablocki, Congressman Cederberg and Congressman Long agreed. The President reiterated the Administration’s intention to deal with Congressional concern, but also stated that the public will support a cleaned up program adequately focused on human needs.

Congressman Long expressed concern about contradictions he perceives within the Administration’s position. The same Administration which preaches openness wishes to turn over a larger share of aid dollars to international institutions which escape Congressional control, whose operations are secret, and for which no adequate audit is available. This is why he opposed the 40 per cent increase in aid to multilaterals.

Secondly, he said we preach reduction in conventional arms availability at the same time we give countries (who are spending their own resources for arms) IDA loans which are virtually free.

From these contradictions, Congressman Long concludes that our best option is to improve our own already excellent bilateral aid program and reduce emphasis on IFI’s.

Congressman Cederberg supported Reuss’s initiative to retain the President’s flexibility on IFI’s. Congressman Stanton emphasized the
Human Rights

need to reach new members of the affected committees to build up support.

Secretary Blumenthal stated that we are appointing strong new directors to the IFI's who, he hoped, would be able to deal with many of the concerns that had been raised. Achieving the 25 per cent limit would require time, and he hoped it could be done by getting contributions increased from others.

24. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

SUMMIT MEETING
London, May 7–8, 1977

I. U.S. Objectives

We should use this meeting to explain the Administration's human rights policy and its importance, and to seek our allies' understanding and support for our efforts. We should reassure them that this will be a realistic, sustained, cooperative effort; that we are not engaging in a single-handed moral crusade.

—If our consultations with the Congress permit it by this time, we might use this meeting to inform our allies of our intention to press for U.S. accession to and ratification of the UN human rights covenants, the convention on racial discrimination, and the genocide convention.

—To the extent we have general agreement by early May, we might also advise these governments that we hope to develop a consensus among the members of the international financial institutions on

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how to handle loan proposals for governments that do not respect human rights and will be pursuing the subject with them bilaterally.

II. CSCE Human Rights

Since there will probably be a NATO Summit meeting right after this session, that would be a more appropriate forum for discussion of CSCE human rights questions.3

III. Anticipated Reaction

All participants in the Summit are likely to accept more or less willingly an exchange of views on human rights and may be willing to accept some general communique language on the importance of the subject. However, most will oppose efforts to reach agreed policies on human rights.

UK and to a lesser degree Canada will welcome discussion of human rights at the Summit.

France will probably oppose such discussions as serving no useful purpose and possibly embarrassing the French Government.

Germany and Italy will be cautious about human rights discussions because they consider other issues more deserving of attention in this forum. The Germans have expressed concern over the impact of human rights activities on their Ostpolitik efforts. Both countries will listen carefully, but will be unenthusiastic at best.

Japan looks forward to the Summit primarily as an opportunity to discuss economic and trade issues, but will be willing to discuss human rights in a general context without reference to specific countries or cases.

If the European Community (EC) Commission participates, it will remain in the background.

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3 After the Summit, the President traveled to Geneva and Berlin, then returned to London to attend the May 10 North Atlantic Council meeting. He delivered prepared remarks to the NAC meeting on May 10 and referenced the upcoming CSCE Review Conference, noting that the United States intended to support a review of progress made by all countries in implementing each provision of the Helsinki Final Act. Carter added that the U.S. human rights policy “does not reflect a desire to impose our particular political or social arrangements on any other country. It is, rather, an expression of the most deeply felt values of the American people. We want the world to know where we stand. (We entertain no illusion that the concerns we express and the actions we take will bring rapid changes in the policies of other governments. But neither do we believe that world opinion is without effect.) We will continue to express our beliefs—not only because we must remain true to ourselves but also because we are convinced that the building of a better world rests on each nation’s clear expression of the values that have given meaning to its national life.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1977, p. 599)
IV. Cautions

Discussion of human rights in this forum will be a sensitive matter both in terms of East-West détente and North-South relationships.

Developing countries regard emphasis on individual human rights as an excuse for not acting on the economic and social rights which are their priority interest.

Any public announcement on human rights should be general and avoid giving the impression that the meeting coordinated the human rights policies of the industrialized nations.

25. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 21, 1977

Human Rights

1. Your recent and continuing initiatives on Human Rights have basically dispelled most initial skepticism about the seriousness of your commitment. The uncertainty that exists now is mainly over what your real motivation is and what lengths we will go to, particularly in straining relations with the USSR.

2. Our survey around the world shows differing but not unexpected reactions in various areas:
   a. In the Soviet Union, over and above the obvious reactions you have had, they are perturbed at the lack of similar criticism of China and they are worried about how hard we will come down on Basket 3 in the CSCE Conference in Belgrade this June. Still, the Soviets are basically playing a defensive game, trying to counter our human rights moves without irrevocably damaging our bilateral relations.

   b. They are particularly anxious to disabuse us of any notion that our emphasis on this question will help the Soviet dissidents.

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80B01554R: DCI Misc Files, Box 33, Folder 11: (UAIUO) Reminder Memos/Memos for Record, March 1977. Secret; Noforn. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The date is hand-stamped.

2 The “you” is a presumable reference to the President.

3 A preparatory meeting for the October CSCE Review Conference was held June 15–August 5.
c. East Europe: There is considerable puzzlement in Eastern Europe as to what we\textsuperscript{4} are about—perhaps because many of these countries are very interested in the forthcoming Belgrade Conference. They tend to worry as to what the impact of this U.S. emphasis on human rights is going to be on that forum. They clearly also are concerned as to whether we will move the Soviets away from détente and perhaps put more pressure on them.

d. China: The Chinese are generally pleased with our stand because they read it as a toughening of our position toward Moscow. They seem blithely unconcerned about any vulnerability of their own position on human rights.

e. West Europe and Japan: There is generally broad approval for taking this stand with the general inclination to favor tempering our position with considerations of practicality. Basically they also tend to look at the issue more in their own parochial and regional terms than they do in vocal [local?] ones. Specifically the impact on East/West/Central relations. They are very worried at a deterioration of those relations since they normally prefer flat behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

f. Latin America: They are nearly unanimous in denouncing these new pressures. Clearly this is the strongest in the countries that feel most challenged, like Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador and Chile. They think and complain, as usual, that we aren’t making allowances for their special problems nor giving them the special attention that we should to a neighbor. It particularly galls some of them that we appear not to be willing to make exceptions for them as we are doing for South Korea, in their view.

g. There is a developing cohesiveness of support for each other in their defiance of Washington on this issue.

h. In the rest of Asia,\textsuperscript{5} other than Japan, there is a general lack of enthusiasm one would expect in totalitarian states like South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan.

i. In Africa, reactions have been varied. The Ethiopians feel they are being singled out unjustly. The Black African States applaud the effort as long as they don’t look past its implicit support for Black majority rule.

j. Much the same in the Middle East where again the Arabs applaud our position as long as it is discussed primarily in terms of the rights of the Palestinians. Iran is sensitive, vulnerable and worried about the long-term impact on their relations with the United States.

\textsuperscript{4} An unknown hand inserted the word “we” before “are.”

\textsuperscript{5} An unknown hand crossed out “the area” and wrote “Asia,” above it.
26. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, March 21, 1977, 1853Z

62223. Subject: UN Address by the President.2

1. First major foreign policy address by President provides opportunity to initiate dialogue with host government on issues which will be major emphases of new administration, and to note administration’s commitment to work on these issues in multilateral context. Text of address carried on Wireless File. Following guidance suggests points which should be stressed in discussions with host government.

2. Importance of United Nations. Decision to deliver first major foreign policy speech at United Nations underlines major importance administration attaches to UN system. Speech follows highly successful visit to Washington by SYG at invitation of President to discuss major international issues (CFR no. 9 of March 2). President emphasized that all nations had responsibility for supporting ideals of UN which he described as commitment to freedom, self-government, human dignity, mutual toleration and peaceful resolution of disputes.

3. Peace and security. President’s remarks briefly highlighted problem areas of the world. On Middle East, he called for a flexible framework for a just and permanent settlement. On Southern Africa, he pledged US to work for majority rule through peaceful means, noting that Congress repealed Byrd Amendment this week, bringing US into full compliance with UN sanctions against Rhodesia. (President signed

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770156–0808. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Kriebel; cleared by Shurtleff, Frederick Brown, McNutt, Tuchman, Perry, Hill, Phelps, Phyllis Oakley, Goott, Sebastian, Gold, and Congden; approved by Baker.
3 The President met with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim at the White House on February 25 from 11:15 a.m. to 1:12 p.m., a visit that included an arrival ceremony, an exchange of remarks, a meeting with UN and U.S. delegation members, and two luncheons (one hosted by the President for Waldheim and the other hosted by First Lady Rosalynn Carter for Mrs. Waldheim). (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) The text of the President’s and Waldheim’s remarks is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 245–246. The memorandum of conversation of their meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 2/77. Briefing memoranda for Waldheim’s visit are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 14, United Nations: Secretary General Waldheim, 2/25–26/77: Briefing Book and Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 14, United Nations, Secretary General Waldheim, 2/25–26/77: Cables and Memos.
He called for strengthened US relations with Latin America and Southeast Asia, improved relations with former adversaries and further development of our relationship with PRC in spirit of Shanghai Communiqué.  

4. Arms control. Discussion of US-Soviet relations focused on vigorous pursuit of SALT talks, leading to deep arms reductions as well as strict controls or even a freeze on new types and generations of weapons. Alternatively we are prepared to explore a more limited agreement, based on elements on which there is consensus, setting aside for prompt subsequent negotiations the more contentious issues. He called for exploring total cessation of all nuclear testing, noting that it was not necessary that all nuclear states immediately adhere to such an agreement. He called for discussion with both the Soviet Union and with other states on control of conventional arms transfers. He said we would explore with the Soviet Union mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean and emphasized that the US intended to make a strong and positive contribution to the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.  

5. International economic issues. The US is sympathetic to the problems of developing world and the government has asked for 7.5 billion in foreign assistance for the coming year. It has asked Congress to increase the US contribution to the UN Development Program and to meet our pledges to international lending institutions par-

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4 Public Law 95–12 (91 Stat. 22–23), signed into law by the President on March 18, reinstated the embargo against the importation of Rhodesian chrome and other strategic minerals. The bill, however, retained the substance of the Byrd amendment, in terms of barring the President from refusing to import strategic materials from other non-Communist countries. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, p. 47) Earlier, on February 10, Vance and Katz had testified in support of the bill (H.R. 1746/S.174) before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on African Affairs, asserting that its passage would help restore American credibility, permit the United States to fulfill its obligations under the UN Charter, and aid in a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian situation. (Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1977, pp. 170–174) For the President’s remarks at the signing ceremony, held in the Cabinet Room, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 451–452. See also Austin Scott, “Embargo Restored on Chrome Import,” The Washington Post, March 19, 1977, p. A–2 and Charles Mohr, “President Pledges Foreign Aid Changes,” The New York Times, March 19, 1977, p. A–4. Carter noted that he believed that the bill would “be of help to us in southern Africa. I have the authority to reestablish the purchase of Rhodesian chrome whenever I choose, so this would give us some leverage perhaps over the Rhodesians and complete the long struggle for majority rule.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 34)  


6 The tenth UN Special Session on Disarmament was scheduled to take place during May and June 1978.
particularly IDA and the World Bank. The President has committed the US to an open international trading system but one which does not ignore domestic concerns in the US. He said we were willing to consider negotiation of agreements to stabilize prices of individual commodities, including a common funding mechanism for financing buffer stocks where these are negotiated.

6. Human rights. Since all the signatories to the UN Charter have pledged to observe and respect basic human rights no UN member can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely within its own jurisdiction and no nation can avoid the responsibility to speak out when freedoms are eroded anywhere in the world. We acknowledge our own deficiencies, but are committed to deal with them quickly and openly.7 He said US would sign UN Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and seek ratification of them along with Conventions on Genocide and on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. He called for strengthening of the UN human rights machinery, endorsing idea of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, suggesting that Human Rights Commission meet more often and that it be brought back to New York where its work would receive more publicity. (US did not favor 1972 move of UN’s human rights division to Geneva.) He declared that HR were important in themselves and should not affect actions in other important areas which also had their own importance.

7. Action requested. Posts are requested to call President’s speech to attention of host governments as appropriate at earliest opportunity using the preceding paras as appropriate and drawing on speech more extensively in areas of particular interest to host governments. While governments, drawing on media reports or reports from their UN Missions, may seek to stress one aspect or another of the President’s speech, posts should emphasize that the foreign policy emphases, maintenance of peace, reducing the arms race, a more cooperative international economic system, and human rights will all be pursued with vigor by the administration.

8. For Peking. You may deliver by note.

Vance.

7 In his remarks, the President asserted: “The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights. The United States has a historical birthright to be associated with this process. We in the United States accept this responsibility in the fullest and the most constructive sense. Ours is a commitment, and not just a political posture. I know perhaps as well as anyone that our own ideals in the area of human rights have not always been attained in the United States, but the American people have an abiding commitment to the full realization of these ideals. And we are determined, therefore, to deal with our deficiencies quickly and openly. We have nothing to conceal.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 450)
27. **Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, March 21, 1977

**SUBJECT**

NYT Editorial on UN Covenants

“But he also added the United Nations’ Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on Civil and Political Rights—documents that the United States has refused to sign because their provisions seemed to justify denials of rights that Americans deem important. Mr. Carter in fact reversed the policies of a decade without a word of explanation.”

The statement is invalid in several respects:

One article in each of the Covenants *implies a potential restriction of free speech*. Just as in every other treaty, these would be dealt with by the appropriate reservation. The specific language of both Articles and the proposed (by State legal office and Justice) reservations are supplied in the attached memorandum. In fact, both Covenants require substantially fewer reservations than, for example, the Treaty on Racial Discrimination, which the Editorial accepts without comment. Virtually every international treaty requires some reservations to make it consonant with the American Constitution and with our laws—there is nothing in any way different here.

Regarding the assertion that this is a change in “the policies of a decade”, the State Department is unaware of any previous statement by an Administration stating or implying that these Covenants are unacceptable. The policy has simply been one of inaction.

All in all, the editorial is a cheap—and ill-informed—shot.

You might also be interested in the summary judgment of State’s legal office after fully studying these treaties:

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3 Attached but not printed are two undated memoranda containing the proposed reservations to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning free speech.
“The Carter Administration has every reason to approach the problem of U.S. adherence to the principal U.N. human rights conventions enthusiastically. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are in the finest traditions of Western liberal thought and action. Their reflection of U.S. Constitutional doctrines is clear. One can fairly say that these two treaties, taken as a whole, represent a triumph of the Western ethics and legal concepts, which we should be profoundly pleased that the world community has embraced (if not in deeds, then at any rate in words). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is also in the progressive, democratic mainstream.”

28. **Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts**

Washington, March 23, 1977, 2250Z

64799. Inform Consuls. Subject: USG emphasis on human rights.
Refs: (A) Warsaw 1521, (B) USNATO 1226, (C) State 49664.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Early Efforts. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Pascoe, Hansell, and Schwebel; cleared by Derian, Baker, Sebastian, Holmes, Aldrich, McNutt, Lister, Shurtleff, and Harrington; approved by Christopher. Schwebel and Derian had sent Christopher a draft of the telegram under a March 17 action memorandum, requesting that he approve it; Ortiz noted on the memorandum that the cable was sent on March 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770047–1967 and P770047–1969) Another draft of the telegram is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights—Legal Aspects.

2 In telegram 1521 from Warsaw, March 3, Davies requested that the Department provide a “series of high level statements” regarding the linkage between the expression of human rights concerns and “interference in the internal affairs” of states and the legitimacy of human rights as a subject of international law and international discourse. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770047–1967 and P770047–1969)

3 In telegram 1226 from the U.S. Mission to NATO, March 7, Strausz-Hupe expressed his agreement with the sentiments transmitted in telegram 1521 from Warsaw (see footnote 2), underscored that the Helsinki Final Act placed human rights on the international agenda, and added: “I nevertheless believe that to set the record straight on the legal aspects of the human rights question would have a salutary effect on thinking in Western capitals.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

4 The Department transmitted an advance copy of Christopher’s remarks, which he was slated to deliver to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on March 7, to all posts in telegram 49664, March 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770077–0054)
1. You will have seen statements by President Carter and Secretary Vance\(^5\) making clear that a firm commitment to the promotion of human rights is an integral part of US foreign policy. Posts have also received texts of Deputy Secretary Christopher’s March 7 testimony on human rights.\(^6\) You should, of course, draw on them in discussions of this issue.

2. The Soviet Union and some other countries have attacked our recent expressions of concern over human rights violations as interference in their internal affairs. Soviet reasoning has no basis in international law—emphatically do have the right to make these statements. Posts may, as appropriate, draw on following to counter claims that USG statements on human rights constitute interference or intervention in internal affairs in other countries:

—As President Carter said in his March 17 speech to the UN,\(^7\) “All the signatories of the UN Charter have pledged themselves to observe and respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation of freedom occurs in any part of the world.”

—The UN Charter legally obligates UN members as well as the organization itself to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Articles 55 and 56).

\(^5\) Presumable reference to remarks made by Vance at his January 31 press conference; see footnote 3, Document 18. During his February 4 press conference, Vance commented: “Sometimes we will speak out in public, believing that to be the most appropriate and forceful way to make our position clear. In other cases, as I have indicated before, we will use quiet diplomacy, and it will be a mixture that will have to be determined by us on a case-by-case basis.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1977, p. 277) In response to a question asked during his February 23 press conference (see footnote 3, Document 19) regarding assistance to victims of political repression, the President noted: “So, I think that we all ought to take a position in our country and among our friends and allies, among our potential adversaries, that human rights is something on which we should bear a major responsibility for leadership. And I have made it clear to the Soviet Union and to others in the Eastern European Community that I am not trying to launch a unilateral criticism of them; that I am trying to set a standard in our own country and make my concerns expressed throughout the world, not singled out against any particular country.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, February 28, 1977, p. 245)

\(^6\) See footnote 4 above. The text of Christopher’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 21, 1977, pp. 289–291. A February 18 Policy Planning Staff draft narrative outline on human rights, which Vogelgesang prepared in advance of Christopher’s appearance, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 2/16–28/77.

\(^7\) See Document 26.
—Other important treaties in the area of human rights include the Genocide Convention, the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights. The USSR is party to all of these treaties. President Carter has pledged to seek prompt Senate consent to these treaties in order that the US also will become a party to them.

—The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, while not a treaty, is an authoritative statement of the human rights which the Charter is meant to promote.

—The Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Co-operation\(^8\) provides “In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating states will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants of Human Rights, by which they may be bound.”

—When a state’s practice is inconsistent with its international human rights obligations set forth in the above treaties, it may not, of course, legitimately complain that the practice is an internal affair on which others may not comment. (Addressees should also be aware that it has been the long-standing USG position that statements by one government about the affairs of another, even in the absence of treaty obligations, do not constitute unlawful intervention under international law.)

3. You should also point out as appropriate that the USG monitors, evaluates and criticizes when necessary our own human rights performance. The US Commission on Civil Rights, an independent agency of the USG, is charged with the responsibility to encourage constructive steps toward equal opportunity for minority groups and women. It investigates complaints, holds public hearings, and collects and studies information on denials of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Voting rights, administration of justice, and equality of opportunity in education, employment and housing are among the many topics of specific Commission interest. Recent studies by the Commission cover the following areas of civil rights:

—Education: desegregation in schools; equal educational opportunities for minorities; problems particular to minorities including isolation, performance, language barriers.

—Employment: unemployment and layoffs; equal opportunities for employment; affirmative action programs.

\(^8\) The text of the Helsinki Final Act is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.
—Discrimination: problems of the aged; sex and racial discrimination in employment.

—Housing: urban problems and ghettos; housing for low income families; racial discrimination.

—Minority cultures: unemployment and equal opportunity; problems particular to each minority culture in the United States; education and language; political participation.

4. The Commission makes findings of fact but has no enforcement authority. Findings and recommendations are submitted both to the President and the Congress, and more than 60 percent of the Commission’s recommendations have been enacted, either by statute, executive order, or regulation. The Commission evaluates Federal laws and the effectiveness of government equal opportunity programs. It also serves as a national clearinghouse for civil rights information.

5. Other official USG bodies which continually examine and attempt to improve US human rights performance include courts, congressional committees, the civil rights division of the Justice Department, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity.

Vance

29. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, March 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Attached Action Memorandum on Human Rights

The attached memo tries to pull together in one place (1) our general approach on human rights and (2) a nine-point agenda for specific action. We hope that it helps fulfill the following purposes:

—Apprise the Secretary of items needing his approval/guidance and the range of activities underway.

—Set the framework, substantively and bureaucratically, for follow-up action by the Department’s functional and regional bureaus (in most cases getting them to provide solid specific programs for review by the Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG) which you chair).

—Provide a still-shot for all bureaus concerned with human rights of what’s being done and how their human rights efforts relate to the whole.

The memo tells the Secretary that numerous efforts are in train, many of which require your action or review. The following is a checklist of those action items requiring your attention, which D/HA and S/P will help staff out:

—Request regional assistant secretaries to follow-up on previous strategy papers with specific courses of action for all individual countries (page 5).

—Meeting of the HRCG to decide follow-up on several nations for which the bureaus have already prepared illustrative Country Action Programs (page 5).

—Establishment of HRCG core group (page 6).

—Your chairmanship of interagency working group (page 6).

—Help in expediting confirmation of Patt Derian as Human Rights Coordinator (page 6).

—Request AID, together with other concerned bureaus, to devise more means for donor-nation cooperation on human rights (page 9).

—Request status report and action plan to improve women’s rights (page 9).

—Provision for assuring implementation of present human rights legislation and working effectively with the Congress and other agencies on use of international financial institutions (page 10).

—Request IO to provide “Agenda for US Action on Human Rights at the United Nations” for HRCG review (page 15).

2 Christopher placed an asterisk next to this paragraph and noted at the bottom of the page: “Need to have comprehensive statement for testimony or speech, building on Tab 2.”

3 Christopher placed a check mark to the left of this point.

4 Christopher wrote in the margin to the left of this point: “Early April.”

5 Christopher bracketed this point and wrote: “OK informal”

6 Christopher placed a question mark next to this point.

7 Christopher placed a check mark next to this and the two subsequent points.

8 Christopher bracketed this point and wrote: “Ann Swift at work.”
—Request ARA to provide “Agenda for US Action on Human Rights in the OAS” for HRCG review (page 18).
—Request PM and T to draw on “Program for US Use of Security Assistance to Further Human Rights” for HRCG review (page 19).
—Follow-up on Executive Branch action, legislation, and necessary administrative procedures to modify Section 212 (a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, expand refugee and asylum policies, and protect US citizens abroad (page 20).\(^9\)
—Request for HRCG review of action plans by CU, USIA, and PA (page 21).

Attachment

Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) and the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs-Designate (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance\(^10\)

Washington, March 25, 1977

US Foreign Policy on Human Rights:
General Approach and Specific Action Program

Issues for Decision

The Carter Administration has moved fast to establish its *bona fides* on human rights. Problems—most notably, an impression of inadequate coordination within the Executive Branch and backlash from abroad—remain. We now need to assure that our policy for furthering human rights is as effective as possible and that it relates to the full range of US diplomatic objectives. This memorandum thus requests your approval of a general statement of US policy on human rights and specific actions for implementation of that policy and provides you with an overview of programs underway.

1. *Statement of General Policy*

The world now knows that Jimmy Carter thinks human rights are important. Many—not just representatives of foreign governments and

\(^9\) Christopher bracketed this point and also placed a check mark next to it, next to the three points above, and the one below.

\(^{10}\) Secret. The date is hand-stamped. Neither Derian nor Lake initialed the memorandum. Sent through Christopher and Habib. Drafted in S/P on March 24; concurred in by Nimetz.
journalists, but also our own personnel—do not know what he means by “internationally recognized human rights,” which human rights are to get priority US attention, and what criteria we plan to apply in individual cases. We therefore believe that a clearcut statement of US policy on human rights should stress the following:

—“Internationally recognized human rights” are those set forth in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Tab 1)¹¹ The 30 articles of that document express rights which enjoy international consensus (adopted by the UN General Assembly), encompass concerns specified by the Congress (e.g., the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended), and reflect traditional American values.

—There is an important relation between the political/civil liberties¹² and the economic/social rights specified in the Declaration. We cannot pursue our commitments to both economic development and political freedom if we give one set of rights priority over the other.

—Although our long-range goal is to help raise the standards of national observance of human rights around the world, we may have to set more selective priorities in the short-term. Thus, in addition to continuing pursuit of economic development, social well-being and political liberty, we will take most vigorous action, when constructive for the case at hand, with regard to crimes against the person:¹³ i.e., officially-sanctioned murder, torture, or detention without fair trial (Articles III, V, VIII, IX, X, and XI of the Universal Declaration).

—Our criteria for formulating and implementing this general policy in individual cases will include consideration for the following:¹⁴

- Nature and extent of violations—contravention of the Universal Declaration? Recurring regional, class, ethnic, or political patterns to violations?
- Direction of movement—situation improving or deteriorating? For example, we need a particularly sophisticated and nuanced approach for countries which, while still serious violators of human rights, are moving to improve their performance in this area.
- Tradition or level of development—realistic, for example, for US to promote Anglo-Saxon precepts in tribal or feudal society?
- Validity of security justification—is an emergency abrogation of rights needed to meet an internal or external threat that could not be otherwise contained?

¹¹ Attached but not printed.
¹² Christopher inserted the word “personal/” before “political/civil liberties.”
¹³ Christopher underlined the phrase “crimes against the person.”
¹⁴ Christopher placed a vertical line in the margin next to the first two bulleted points below and wrote: “These need to be added to my hurried ‘6 questions’ testimony. Perhaps next testimony can be 10 questions—and some answers.”
- Openness to outside inquiry—is the country in question willing to permit investigation by such public international organizations as the UN or such respected non-governmental organizations as the International Commission of Jurists?

- Extent of other US interests/leverage—the degree and character of US influence in the country? Likely third-country reaction to US action or inaction on human rights? Reaction of democratic elements in the country concerned? Possible retaliation by the host government against US policies on human rights (such as recent renunciation of military assistance by several Latin American nations or possible cut-off of oil elsewhere)?

**Action Requested**

—That you authorize a general statement of US policy on human rights which is: premised on the UN Universal Declaration, balanced with attention for both political/civil and economic/social rights, most concerned in the short-term with improving performance by those governments commiting crimes against the person, and based on consideration of the criteria set forth above.

—That you authorize dispatch of guidance, to the field and for reference within the foreign affairs agencies in Washington, which reflects this general policy. (Tab 2)

2. **Action with Individual Countries**

We continue to resist the idea of a country “hit list.” It would not reflect the *universal* dimension of our policy—i.e., general concern for all rights everywhere and working with all nations. And, it might be counterproductive—i.e., needlessly antagonize some nations, while giving others a free ride. Flexibility is in order—both for defining the *continuum* of countries of most concern to us and in discerning what approaches [public or private, bilateral or multilateral, symbolic or substantive, positive or reactive, etc.] could be most useful.

However, while stressing the fundamental global character of our program, we will inevitably focus on some nations more than others—identifying or responding to particularly egregious cases of murder,

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15 Christopher inserted the word “personal/” before “political/civil.”

16 Christopher bracketed this point and wrote in the margin: “Tab 2 is a good start.” Christopher initialed his approval of the request on March 27.

17 Tab 2, an undated “General Statement for U.S. Policy on Human Rights” paper, is attached but not printed. Christopher wrote above this paragraph: “This is a good start. Q & A could be incorporated into text of next testimony—WC at HIRC [House International Relations Committee] (?).” Christopher drew an arrow from the disapproval line to the approval line and wrote: “To be reviewed after general statement prepared. Note telegram I sent last week,” a presumable reference to Document 28.

18 Brackets in the original.
torture, or detention; weighing those cases where US action on human rights *per se* could endanger other objectives (such as disarmament) which, in fact, serve or complement the cause of human rights; or seeking out like-minded democracies for positive initiatives in the United Nations.

Given this range of considerations, we need to augment material now available to help identify upcoming opportunities to advance human rights; deal with specific countries which, for a variety of reasons, may pose more immediate problems for the United States; and avoid overloading the human rights circuit by appearing to single out one country or doing too much at one time. Further, we should pay particular attention to finding *positive* ways to foster human rights (such as using public statements by the Administration and the Congress, bilateral and multilateral loans, etc.). And, although it is hard to know in advance all the costs of advocating human rights, we must try to identify possible short-term problems and monitor the consequences.

*Actions Being Taken*

—The Deputy Secretary is asking regional assistant secretaries to follow up on previous strategy papers with specific courses of action for all individual countries.\(^{19}\)

—The Deputy Secretary is planning to convene the Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG), by April 15, to review action for several illustrative countries needing prompt attention.\(^{20}\)

3. **Executive Branch Coordination**

Measures to strengthen coordinated direction of US policy on human rights should include:

— *Expediting confirmation of the Coordinator for Human Rights.* Patt Derian remains a “closet” Coordinator.\(^{21}\)

— *Enlarging the D/HA Staff.* Although five new positions have been approved for the Office for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (D/HA), no assignments\(^{22}\) have been made and expansion of that staff is vital if the Department is to monitor our overall human rights policy.

— *Providing training.* The Foreign Service Institute should expand efforts to stress human rights as a factor in US foreign policy.

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\(^{19}\) Christopher bracketed this point and wrote in the margin: “Please prepare memo.”

\(^{20}\) Christopher bracketed this point and wrote in the margin: “Early April.”

\(^{21}\) On March 5, the President announced Derian’s nomination as Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, p. 327)

\(^{22}\) Christopher underlined the phrase “no assignments” and wrote in the margin: “This is in process—PD [Patt Derian] has Deputy [illegible].”
—Expanding the scope and effectiveness of the Human Rights Coordinating Group. This group—which you set up recently,23 chaired by the Deputy Secretary and including Deputy Assistant Secretary-level representation from all Department bureaus concerned with human rights—should meet at least once a month to project pending issues and determine matters for decision by you or the Deputy Secretary. A smaller core group—to include D, P, IO, H, L, and S/P—should be available to meet, at Assistant Secretary level, for fast-action items.

—Assuring interagency coordination. The State Department should take the lead in helping assure a coherent line on human rights by all concerned parts of the Executive Branch (most notably, Defense, Treasury, CIA, USIA, AID). In lieu of the now-canceled PRM on human rights,24 this effort will require action by the Deputy Secretary through an interagency task force or ad hoc group.

Actions Requested:

—That you inform the President of the policy being implemented by the State Department and propose the use of an interagency ad hoc group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary to help assure Executive Branch coordination. (See Tab 325 for proposed memorandum from you to the President.)26

—Authorize the Deputy Secretary to expedite confirmation of Patt Derian as the Coordinator for Human Rights.27

—Authorize the Deputy Under Secretary for Management to detail five Foreign Service Officers to D/HA by April 1.28

—Request that D/HA, assisted by S/P, provide you with a brief status report (due by the first day of each month) on items proposed in this memorandum and subsequent initiatives on human rights.29

24 See footnote 1, Document 22.
25 Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from Vance to the President. The final version of this memorandum is printed as Document 48. Christopher wrote in the margin next to this point: “Do we want to get a lot of others involved; will it dilute effort and hamper flexibility? Is coordination worth it?”
26 There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved the recommendation.
27 Christopher initialed his approval and added: “Bennet should be asked to check on hearing date.” Derian’s nomination was subsequently submitted to the Senate on April 29. Her formal swearing-in ceremony took place at the White House on June 17. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 746 and 1131–1132)
28 There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved the recommendation. He bracketed this point and wrote in the margin: “question necessity if PD can build permanent staff.”
29 There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved the recommendation.
4. Economic Assistance

US use of economic assistance—whether bilateral or through international financial institutions (IFI's)—is another means to promote human rights. It fosters economic and social development which is itself a plus for general human rights and a basis for better observance of political and civil liberty and provides a specific tool (positive or reactive) for dealing with individual country performances on human rights.

A. Bilateral Programs. The US Government needs to take several general steps to assure that economic assistance reinforces respect for human rights.

—AID country programs should be consistent with other US efforts (security, information) in a given nation. We should not, for example, withdraw economic assistance on human rights grounds at the same time USIA praises the human rights record of the host nation.

—Since promoting human rights is a long-term process, we must resist quixotic fluctuations in our use of economic assistance to further human rights.

—We could help human rights and economic development by increasing participation by the poor in both the direction and benefits of US programs for development aid.

Specific action programs which merit attention include:

—Follow-up and expansion of AID's program for “New Initiatives in Human Rights.” Launched by the then Administrator in 1975 as a complement to the Agency’s “New Directions” program for stress on the poor,\(^{30}\) this effort has foundered on lack of staff, meager encouragement from high levels of the State Department, and specific resistance from certain regional bureaus within the Department. The AID program could address the following: increased cooperation with international and regional organizations, help for the rural and urban poor in gaining effective access to rights and protections provided for them under the law and in development programs, and sponsorship of studies and conferences on human rights problems and their relation to economic development.

—Increased consultation with other industrial nation donors. The US Government should follow up on a proposal made last year by the then UK Minister for Overseas Development to confer on best means to wed

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\(^{30}\) Section 102 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (see footnote 4, Document 58) on Development Assistance Policy, contains the provisions of the “New Directions” mandate, which focuses on functional categories such as population planning and agricultural production as criteria for foreign assistance. (Congress and the Nation, Volume IV, 1973–1976, pp. 851–852)
concern for human rights and economic assistance. Possible approaches: Make this idea an agenda item for talks with visiting senior officials from the OECD area or propose it as a topic for consultation at the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. With the ground prepared for talking with the British and Scandinavians, the US could be in a position to have the AID Administrator make a major presentation at the next session of the high-level DAC.31

—Further efforts in behalf of women’s rights—since available information suggests that women suffer more violations of basic economic, social, and political rights than do men.

Action Requested

—Authorize the AID Administrator to follow up and expand on the “New Initiatives” program, with the first step, formal presentation of an action plan and stipulation of resource needs to the HRCG by May 1.32

Actions Being Taken

—The Deputy Secretary is asking D/HA to follow up with AID on ways to increase consultations on human rights with other industrial nation donors. One end product: a cable to the field, with input from EUR and EA, indicating how the US plans to work with the other industrial democracies to further human rights.33

—The Deputy Secretary is asking AID and IO, in conjunction with D/HA and S/P, to draw up a status report and action plan to improve women’s rights. (Due for review by the HRCG by May 15.)

B. Use of International Financial Institutions (IFI’s).34 The so-called Harkin Amendment, which injects human rights considerations into the bills authorizing US participation in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Fund (ADF)—together with the recent Reuss bill35 and Humphrey proposal extending human rights considerations to all the IFI’s—present us with a difficult

31 The 1977 DAC High Level Meeting adopted a “Statement on Development Co-operation for Economic Growth and Meeting Basic Human Needs.” It emphasized that meeting basic human needs was an essential component of economic growth.
32 Christopher initialed his approval.
33 Christopher bracketed this point and the one below and wrote in the margin next to each: “ok, WC.”
34 Christopher placed a vertical line in the margin next to this paragraph and added: “This point needs more study—Ann Swift is supposed to be preparing paper.”
35 Reuss introduced H.R. 5262 in the House on March 21. A section of the bill required the United States, “in connection with its voice and vote” in the international financial institutions to “advance the cause of human rights, by seeking to channel economic assistance to governments that do not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”
On the one hand, we want to comply with current legislation, thus giving it a chance to affect observance of human rights and demonstrating our willingness to work with the Congress in this regard. On the other hand, we want to avoid turning our advocacy of human rights into a point of useless political contention within the IFI’s—thus feeding confrontation along North-South lines, fostering even more politicization of the IFI’s, and undermining the legitimate role of these institutions.

Our present approach is to make a good faith effort to fulfill the spirit and letter of Harkin. At the same time, we remain open to Congressional initiatives which might allow more flexibility for Executive Branch use of the IFI’s as one of several means to promote human rights. To facilitate adequate implementation of this approach:

—EB must provide all relevant members of the HRCG (D/HA, E, ARA, H, L, and S/P) with prior notice of US decisions on Harkin Amendment votes.

—In addition, EB should draw on previous analysis of human rights and the IFI’s to provide a policy paper for HRCG review by April 15. That paper should include evaluation of such approaches as using US votes to register disapproval of human rights violations, encouraging the institutions themselves to further human rights, and placing priority emphasis on promotion of economic rights.

—H must make special provision for use of the IFI’s in its Congressional human rights strategy (see below).

—E must alert the Deputy Secretary to any inconsistency in State-Treasury-NSC positions on human rights in the IFI’s.

**Actions Being Taken**

—The Deputy Secretary is mandating the above four steps.37

5. **Cooperation with the Congress**

Present US policy is in tune with what most on the Hill want. The next step—since some Congressmen fear that we have a helter-skelter approach that could dissolve in the face of Realpolitik—is to demonstrate to the Congress that our human rights program is serious, coordinated, and related to other US national interests.

Our strategy for Congressional relations on the human rights question need not be so much a “strategy” as an attitude. That attitude should start and end with the determination to work with the Congress—not, as sometimes alleged in the previous Administration,

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36 See Document 33.
37 In the left-hand margin next to the previous paragraph, including the four points, Christopher placed a parallel line and added: “Ann Swift working on paper.”
contravene legislative intent or use Congress as the culprit in advocating human rights abroad. Hopes that human rights would go away as an issue or efforts to block growing Congressional determination to promote human rights led to the frustration which, in turn, prompted legislation which may or may not be the most useful way to further human rights.

Given that backdrop and present political intent on the Hill, the Executive Branch approach to the Congress on human rights should include:

— *Extended Contacts with the Hill.* Close contact and consultation with both members of the Congress and their staffs are important. Such consultations should not be limited to human rights interest groups on the Hill and D/HA in the Department.

- Each regional bureau and concerned functional bureau, in consultation with appropriate officers in H and D/HA, should work out a regularized schedule of informal contact with Congresspersons and staff in their areas to explain specifically *upcoming* decisions or problems.
- Such consultations should cover the spectrum of members and issues. For example, as we develop our policy on human rights toward Korea, EA, in consultation with D/HA and H, should consult with interested and key members of Congress.

— *Top Priority Items.* The following items are of particular immediate concern to the Congress and should therefore figure prominently in the Department’s six-month Congressional action plan on human rights.

a. Harkin Amendment on the International Financial Institutions and Bilateral Economic Assistance. (Follow-up on productive consultations with Congressmen Reuss, Harkin, Fraser, Gonzalez, et al.)

b. Security Assistance

- *General:* Executive Branch to review all country programs before September 30, making allowance for changes in human rights performances. *Specific* consideration should focus on minimal programs in Latin America, especially Central America, and grant security assistance to Indonesia and Thailand.

c. UN Human Rights Covenants and Conventions. (Follow up on President’s March 17 UN speech)\(^{38}\)

d. Korea, Philippines, East Timor

e. Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia

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\(^{38}\) See Document 26.
—Cooperation with Human Rights Lobby. Since there is an increasingly active, vocal, and influential human rights lobby operating on the Hill, the Department should complement its efforts with the Congress with efforts to meet and talk with representatives of the more important human rights organizations in town: the new Washington office of Amnesty International (AI), the Washington Office for Latin America (WOLA), the National Catholic Conference, B’nai B’rith, and the Coalition for a New Foreign Military Policy.

—Use of Fellowship Program: Encourage State Department recipients of Congressional Fellowships to work with known Congressional advocates of human rights such as Fraser, Koch, Harkin, Reuss, Cranston, Kennedy, etc.

—Two Caveats. First, no strategy of consultations will be effective unless we have a consistent policy to explain. Second, we must stress promotion of human rights as a joint Executive-Legislative Branch enterprise. Since there may well be short-term costs (at home and abroad) for this policy, we will want Congress aware of potential costs, ready to share responsibility with us during rough periods, and thus able to provide the most enduring consensus for our human rights policy.

Action Being Taken

—H—assisted by D/HA, L, and S/P—following up on the above outline with a six-month plan for working with the Congress to promote human rights. (Due to the Deputy Secretary by April 10.)

6. Multilateral Diplomacy

The US should put increased effort into working with other nations and using multilateral mechanisms to further human rights. Dealing through multilateral channels has the advantages of reducing the image of the US as the moralistic mother-in-law of the world and enlisting the force/leverage of international opinion behind the cause.

At the United Nations, our general approach should include:

—Factoring human rights into all US activities at the United Nations, not just for those occasions (such as meetings of the Human Rights Commission—HRC) when it is specifically on the agenda.

—Determining before both the convening of a new session of the General Assembly and each major UN conference, a few priority human rights issues for special US attention—ones either important to us or ripe for forward movement.

—Consulting early and often with close allies and, when possible, with non-aligned nations, to identify issues of shared concern and forge appropriate coalitions.
—Seeking greater collaboration with Third World nations by stressing the relation between promotion of all human rights—political, civil, economic, social, and cultural.

—Continuing to involve Congress in the preparation for and participation in UN meetings.

—Concentrating US efforts on the worldwide problems of crimes against the person.

—Trying to assure even-handed study and statements on country and area human rights situations so that not just a few targets (such as Chile, Israel, and South Africa) are singled out without significant reference to other gross violators.

Specific recommendations for US action on human rights at the United Nations should include:

—Pressing for US ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the covenant on political and civil rights and the covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights (as noted in the President’s UN speech, March 17).

—Preparing immediately a human rights strategy for the Spring Session of ECOSOC (New York, April 12–May 13), the September 1977 UNGA and, if and when announced, the Special Session for the North-South dialogue.

—Seeking ways to eliminate the racism-Zionism issue in order to allow full US participation in the international struggle against racism and racial discrimination.

—Considering the selection of one of the USUN ambassadors as US Representative to the HRC. That would facilitate continuity in the US statements and actions at the HRC, ECOSOC, and the General Assembly, and provide one known full-time US spokesperson at the UN. That individual could be charged with factoring human rights considerations into US participation in UN meetings on economic and social development (important for greater cooperation with the LDC’s) and maintaining closer contact with non-governmental organizations which form an important part of the human rights constituency and which lobby actively at the United Nations.

—Finding ways to strengthen the Human Rights Commission, such as following up on the President’s proposal for more frequent meetings of the HRC, returning the Commission to New York, and increasing its mandate with the appointment of a UN Human Rights Commissioner. We should also use the HRC to preserve and defend the Commission’s procedures for dealing with private complaints on human rights.
Action Being Taken

The Deputy Secretary is asking IO to expand on the above for an “Agenda for US Action on Human Rights at the United Nations.” For HRCG review by April 5.39

At the Organization of American States (OAS), the US should capitalize on the significant potential of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC). ARA has come up with the following proposals.

a. Budget Increase. The IAHRC would develop a program justifying a supplementary budget increase request from the OAS to increase substantially its present annual funding of around $463,000. OAS funding of the proposal would be far preferable to another US contribution since it would strengthen the multilateral credentials of the IAHRC and avoid the procedural problems which endangered acceptance this year of our special contribution.

b. Program of Annual Visits. The IAHRC should use much of the money, members, and staff to schedule an annual visit by a member-staff team to almost every OAS member country. Obviously, visits to countries from which there are few if any complaints would be largely pro forma. If such a visit became an annual practice (at least while the present high level of human rights violations continues), the nations that are serious violators could not refuse to receive or cooperate with the investigating team on the basis that they are being singled out unjustly. We have checked with the Legal Adviser’s Office and confirmed that the US can and should cooperate with an IAHRC investigation of human rights complaints in the United States and such constituent territories as Puerto Rico and possibly the Canal Zone.

c. Annual Investigations of Human Rights Complaints Against Cuba. For reasons of equity and to counteract the argument of right-wing governments that left-wing violators were being ignored, we would encourage an annual investigation of human rights complaints against Cuba. Of course, a visit to Cuba by the IAHRC would presumably be impossible as long as Cuba remains a non-participating member of the OAS.

d. Annual Debate on Human Rights Situations. We would push strongly for debate on the human rights situation in each country reported on in appropriate OAS bodies, especially in this June’s annual General Assembly. Our OAS delegate would take care to acknowledge improvements, as well as to denounce violations.

e. Educational Programs. We will push and flesh out a program of Inter-American education in the human rights area which we plan to

39 Christopher bracketed this point and wrote in the margin: “ok, WC.”
propose at the next meeting of the Inter-American Education, Science, and Cultural Council.

f. Attention to Terrorism. Since mounting terrorism has recently contributed to worsening human rights situations, we would support broadening the mandate of the IAHRC to investigate the link between abuses of human rights and terrorism. Such an initiative would appeal to the conservative Latin American regimes and thus contribute to multilateralizing support for the IAHRC.

g. Affirmative Reaction Program. A promising approach to the human rights problem, which we could recommend informally to the Commission, would be to emphasize the more positive features of the Commission’s role to study and recommend to member states innovative procedures that safeguard human rights, rather than concentrating on its potential to isolate and shame offending regimes.

h. Unresolved Issue. Should the Commission appear to be developing into a tribunal, able to make judgments and level sanctions on individual governments, present support for strengthening its investigative machinery would wane. The dilemma is how to make the Commission a powerful instrument to monitor human rights performances without raising the spectre of political interference in the name of human rights. Southern Cone States are acutely sensitive to US pressure to clean house and are likely to react to that pressure by spreading the idea that our concern with human rights is just another version of “Yankee interventionism” aimed at disrupting Latin solidarity.

i. Pending Questions. Should the State Department submit information concerning violations to the IAHRC? Should the US lobby strongly for the ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights? If the OAS threatens to narrow the mandate of the Commission, or to emasculate it by other means, should the US counter, either by threatening to reduce its budgetary contributions or to withdraw from the Organization? etc.

j. High-Level Speeches. The Department will be providing language on human rights for the President’s speech before the OAS Permanent Council, April 14. You may also want discussion of human rights in your speech before the OAS General Assembly this June.40

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Action Being Taken
—The Deputy Secretary is asking ARA to pursue the above proposals and report to the HRCG by May 1.41

7. Security Assistance

The problem of relating security assistance to human rights has both a procedural and a substantive aspect: we must ensure early introduction of human rights considerations into our decision-making and must weigh our special responsibility to respect human rights in countries receiving security assistance or buying arms from the US against other American national interests. See Tab 4 for elaboration of these procedural and substantive guidelines.42

Action Being Taken
—The Deputy Secretary is asking PM and T, with assistance from D/HA, H, and S/P, to draw on the “Program for US Use of Security Assistance to Further Human Rights” (at Tab 4) for presentation of a detailed six-month action plan to the HRCG by May 1.

8. Protection of US Human Rights

The US should take several steps to put its own human rights house in order. In addition to prompt ratification of the relevant UN instruments, we should:

—Visa Policy: Proceed with new legislation and more flexible administration of US visa policies which can eliminate political tests for visitors—which reduce US influence among foreign intellectuals and present us with needless vulnerability in the CSCE.

—Refugee and Asylum Policy: Encourage legislation and necessary administrative action to expand our refugee and asylum policies in order to permit entry into the United States of more victims of repressive regimes.

—Protection of American Citizens Abroad: Strengthen our representations on behalf of American citizens adversely affected by repressive measures in foreign countries.

Actions Taken
—Interagency study on visas, chaired by SCA, completed March 21.43

41 Christopher bracketed this point.
42 Tab 4, an undated “Program for US Use of Security Assistance to Further Human Rights Procedural Guidelines” paper, is attached but not printed.
43 Study not found.
—Deputy Secretary is mandating D/HA—assisted by SCA, H, L, S/P, and other concerned bureaus—to assure follow-up on Executive Branch action, legislation, and necessary administrative action to modify Section 212 (a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, expand refugee and asylum policies and protect US citizens abroad.

9. Public Diplomacy

In the best of all worlds, promotion of human rights should stand on its own merits and speak for itself. We can, however, maximize impact and understanding for US policy on human rights by taking the following actions:

—Mandate representation by USIA on the Department’s Human Rights Coordinating Group. Both PA and CU already participate.

—Authorize preparation of human rights action plans by CU, PA, and USIA and subsequent review by the HRCG. See Tab 5 for illustrative outlines of such programs by CU and USIA.44

—PA should be tasked with preparing a plan which helps you and other senior-level officials of this Administration explain US policy on human rights. That plan should include projection of major speeches to be made (with an eye for optimal timing and impact vis-à-vis other contemplated measures on human rights) and preparation of materials for mailing to important opinion leaders/groups and use by State Department employees speaking throughout the United States. A special effort should be made to encourage influential US intellectuals to speak out in behalf of human rights.

—Authorize one member of the D/HA staff to be the point of coordination for those elements of the foreign affairs agencies dealing with human rights via press/media statements, programs for information, cultural or academic exchange, etc.

Actions Being Taken

—S/P is drafting a speech on human rights as a possible presentation for your “Law Day” appearance in Georgia, April 30.45

—The Deputy Secretary is asking CU and USIA, with the cooperation of other concerned bureaus, to draw on the action program outlines at Tab 5 for final HRCG review by June 1.46

44 Not found attached. The undated “CU Action Program on Human Rights” and “USIA Action Program on Human Rights” papers are attached to an undated version of the memorandum delivered to Habib’s office. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770118–2014)

45 Christopher bracketed this point and wrote in the margin: “I am back-up in case Secry c/n attend.”

46 For Christopher’s requests to the functional bureaus regarding preparation of a human rights action plan, see Document 52.
—The Deputy Secretary is asking PA to prepare a comparable plan, as outlined above, for HRCG review by April 15.

—D/HA, on behalf of the Deputy Secretary, is asking USIA to participate in the HRCG. 47

47 Christopher bracketed this paragraph and added “ok.”

30. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, March 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ms. Tuchman and Mr. Kimmitt on Intelligence Support in the Human Rights Field

As requested, I delivered to Tuchman and Kimmitt ORPA’s proposed schedule of analytical studies in the human rights field and examples of reporting and analyses that the Agency published in the last month. 2 We then covered the following subjects:

1. As regards to ORPA’s proposed schedule on human rights-related work in progress, Tuchman stated that she hoped that two studies could be speeded up. Specifically, she asked that the study entitled Soviet Perceptions of Dissidence and the Helsinki Accord be available by the end of April and similarly that the study entitled Soviet Policy and Tactics for Belgrade also be available by the end of April. 3 She explained that these issues would come up at the NATO Summit in early May and that it would be very important to have in hand these two studies in order to prepare for the discussion of the human rights issue at the NATO Summit. She also asked that the study entitled Impact of the U.S. Stand on Human Rights be made available as soon as possible. 4 In discussing this proposed schedule, Tuchman also asked that I provide her


2 Not found and not further identified.

3 “The Soviet View of the Dissident Problem Since Helsinki” and “Soviet Objectives and Tactics at the Belgrade Conference,” both dated May 1977, are in the CIA Electronic Reading Room.

4 Document 42.
with the names of the action officers on each study, which I agreed to do.

2. **Status of PRM on Human Rights**—Tuchman reported that after much discussion Brzezinski has decided that what was needed in the first instance was a joint State/CIA report updating and describing the human rights situation in each country where there is evidence of major violations. She said she hoped to get out a notification on the need for this study within the week and there would probably be a two-week deadline for completion. On the basis of the response to this requirement the NSC Staff will then draft a PRM calling for a longer range study of the policy implications and options.

3. **The Effect of Congressional Legislation Requiring Public Reports from the State Department on the Status of Human Rights in Countries Receiving Military Assistance**—Ms. Tuchman commented that this legislation passed in 1976 had been ill-conceived and was causing more problems than it solved. She expressed the hope that on the basis of the Administration’s performance in this field that Congress could be persuaded next year to remove this requirement.

4. In the course of the discussion it became apparent that Tuchman and Kimmitt are closely following DDO reporting on reactions to the President’s human rights policy. Tuchman specifically noted that the reporting on Eastern European reactions has been good, but that she was puzzled by the lack of reporting from Soviet sources of reactions within the Soviet Union. She asked me to look into this problem and to let her know whether sufficiently high priority was being assigned or whether there was some other explanation for the lack of such reporting. I said I would do so.

    Cord Meyer, Jr.
31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal

Washington, April 1, 1977

SUBJECT
Decision-Making on Human Rights Issues as They Relate to Foreign Assistance

We are bound to be faced with a large number of issues involving the interrelationship between human rights and our foreign assistance program. It would be helpful to set up a small interagency group to examine our bilateral and multilateral aid decisions as they relate to human rights, to provide guidance regarding specific decisions on bilateral and multilateral loans and to ensure proper coordination of a unified Administration position. This group should be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and in addition to a representative of the Secretary of the Treasury should include officials of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council Staff, and the Agency for International Development.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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2 In an April 6 note to Brzezinski, Vance expressed agreement with the establishment of an interagency group. (Ibid.) In an undated handwritten note to Lamb, Christopher indicated that he would be “glad to head up [the interagency group] if Secy thinks it is inevitable.” (Ibid.)
SUBJECT

Human Rights

I am increasingly concerned that we are all over the lot on this issue. Note the attached item from this morning’s intelligence summary. I believe the only answer is a Special Coordinating Committee Working Group on the human rights issues. It would handle both substantive activities relating to human rights and the coordination of our legislative effort. It should therefore consist of both a substantive officer from each agency and a legislative liaison person. I suggest we chair but an alternative would be to have State do it. My concern with State, as indicated in the attached, is that they don’t know what they are talking about half the time.

Recommendation

That we prepare a memo to the President seeking his approval for an SCC Working Group to coordinate human rights activities.

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1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Materials, Mondale Papers, David Aaron, Box 214, [Aaron, David]: Chron File, 7/1977 (Classified). Secret, Exdis. Aaron did not initial the memorandum.

2 Not found attached.

3 There is no indication as to whether Brzezinski approved or disapproved the recommendation.
33. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, April 13, 1977

SUBJECT

Proposed Administration Position on Human Rights Amendments to International Financial Institution Legislation

Summary: Recent Congressional actions have placed the Administration in a difficult position on human rights. The House has taken a strong position, adopting the inflexible language of the Badillo Amendment by voice vote on April 6 despite Administration support of the more flexible Reuss Amendment. History could repeat itself in the Senate unless the Administration voices its strong support for the more flexible Humphrey language and its clear opposition to inflexible Badillo-Harkin language.

We face a real dilemma: while we do not like any of the amendments, we must voice support for the more flexible amendments (Humphrey, Reuss) or we will appear to be weakening our strong human rights position.

In the House we did voice our support for the Reuss Amendment. However, we did not at the same time voice our opposition to the inflexible language of the Harkin and Badillo Amendments. (The Harkin

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2 In March, Badillo had offered an amendment to the Reuss-sponsored H.R. 5262, based upon Harkin’s language, requiring the U.S. representatives to the IFIs to vote against loans to countries designated as human rights violators. The House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee rejected the amendment and reported the bill to the House on March 31. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, p. 43) In an April 6 briefing memorandum to Vance, Bennet noted that the “human rights forces, led this time by Congressman Badillo, managed to attach Harkin-type amendments to international financial institutions as the bill passed the House today.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Harkin)


4 A copy of Humphrey’s amendment is attached to an April 13 memorandum from Lamb to Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I)
Amendment, which is law, directs the U.S. Executive Director in the Inter-American Development Bank to vote against extending international financial assistance to countries that engage in consistent human rights violations unless such assistance directly benefits “the needy people in such country(ies).” The Badillo Amendment closely parallels the Harkin language, extending the Harkin provisions to all IFI’s.)

The Senate will be considering this issue next week in Committee. Senator Humphrey is sponsoring language that closely parallels the Reuss language, allowing greater flexibility for the Administration than the Badillo Amendment. Senator Humphrey believes that his language will pass the Senate only if it receives strong Administration support.

NSC, State, AID, Treasury and Export-Import Bank representatives met on April 11, to discuss ways to improve our increasingly weak and defensive posture on the Hill. There was consensus at the meeting that the major reason for the defeat of the Reuss language and the adoption of the Badillo Amendment was that the Administration never adopted a strong clear position during the debate.5

There was also consensus at the meeting that the Humphrey language is far preferable to the Badillo language and that in order to achieve success in the Senate, the President will personally have to voice both his support for Humphrey and his opposition to the Badillo-Harkin approach.6

Attached at Tab A is a Treasury paper which outlines the proposed Administration position on Human Rights amendments, citing arguments for the Humphrey amendment and against Badillo-Harkin language.

5 In an April 11 action memorandum to Christopher, Bennet described the inter-agency meeting and added: “The consensus of the group was that the Administration can not afford to go any farther than the Humphrey amendment, and that the Administration should support Humphrey, and oppose Badillo-type amendments. Treasury, which has the lead on this bill, is (a) leading an inter-agency effort to prepare a cogent and simple argument for this position, and (b) checking out the possibility of floor amendments.” (Ibid.) Tuchman also provided a synopsis of the meeting in the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s April 11 evening report to Brzezinski. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2-4/77)

6 In his April 6 briefing memorandum to Vance, Bennet commented that the Badillo amendments “were as popular as motherhood and passed as voice votes. Reuss was not able to stave off a Rousselot–Badillo squeeze from right and left. If we had been prepared to take a firmer stand against Harkin rather than simply supporting the committee bill, it is possible that we could have avoided any amendments. I continue to believe, however, that the damage to the President’s credibility as a human rights champion would have been very substantial, and that our chances of removing the language in conference are substantial.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Harkin)
Recommendation

That you approve the strategy outlined above which will require you to voice support for the Humphrey Amendment and opposition to Badillo-Harkin language in some forum which will be determined in the near future.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of the Treasury

Washington, undated

Administration Position on Human Rights Amendments

(1) The Badillo Amendment undermines the ability of the United States to promote human rights objectives effectively in the international financial institutions.

(a) Its automatic “no” votes destroy any negotiating flexibility on our part.
(b) Therefore, neither donor nor recipient countries have any incentive to work with us on improving the human rights situation.
(c) Furthermore, virtually all loans would go ahead over our objections, thereby revealing the ineffectiveness of such an automatic approach for all to see.
(d) The result is that we would be locked into a sterile, ineffective position.
(e) Indeed, we can become isolated in our efforts and thereby reduce our effectiveness in mobilizing support from other nations for better human rights conditions.

(2) By contrast, the Humphrey Amendment would enable us to significantly advance the cause of human rights.

(a) Our ability to support, expedite, or oppose specific loans and bank policies would give us considerable negotiating leverage.
(b) For example, we could “ransom” some prisoners or reduce other offensive practices by calibrating our positions on particular loans—even if the offending country maintained some offensive practices.
(c) We could work with other donor countries, getting their support for our initiatives in return for our taking positions “less offensive to the integrity of the institutions.”

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7 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. According to an April 13 memorandum from Bennet to Christopher, Bergsten sent Bennet a copy of the Treasury paper under an April 13 memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I)
(d) In short, we could work effectively to advance our interests with both donor and recipient countries—since we would have a major bargaining chip in the use of our “voice and vote.”

(3) The Badillo approach is also undesirable because it undermines the integrity of the institutions. Indeed, both donor and recipient countries have expressed to us the view that it would represent “unilateral amendment of the bank charters.” Our major policy interest in enhancing the role of the banks would be set back severely if Badillo were adopted.

(4) Furthermore, the automaticity of the Badillo approach ignores other U.S. policy objectives which can be promoted through our position in the banks. The timing and intensity of our efforts on human rights must constantly be weighed against other U.S. objectives and therefore calibrated carefully. Badillo permits no such flexibility.

(5) Advancing our human rights concerns in the development banks must be seen in the context of overall U.S. policy toward human rights. The issue is how to advance our human rights objectives most effectively.

(a) It is completely appropriate to adjust levels of military assistance and security supporting assistance for this purpose.

(b) It is also appropriate to amend our levels of bilateral economic aid.

(c) Diplomatic initiatives must be a major part of any overall approach.

(d) Policy in the development banks must therefore be calibrated in light of these other channels, and our other objectives toward the banks.
34. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, April 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Attached Memorandum on Human Rights

As per your request at your luncheon, April 2, we have redrafted the S/P–D/HA Action Memorandum of March 25² to proceed as a memo directly from you to the Secretary.³

We have adjusted the previous draft in accordance with your comments and suggestions. At the same time, we have preserved most of the original thrust and text which you approved.

The result is a comparatively lengthy document. It is, however, one which we believe is valuable, not only for the Secretary’s reference but also—and this may be crucial for bureaucratic follow-up—as a clear statement to the building of our overall policy and program design. It is, in effect, the bureaucratic or structural companion piece for the much longer S/P background paper on human rights (which itself is based on input from throughout the building and due for wide distribution within the foreign affairs agencies in Washington and to all US posts abroad). We have attached the latter in uncleared form for your reference at this time. (See attachment B.)⁴

We have retained reference to your interagency coordinating role in both the attached overall memo to the Secretary and the memorandum we propose he send to the President. Since we appreciate your concern about a formal interagency mechanism, we have left the lan-

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 4/1–4/15/77. Confidential. Drafted by Vogelgesang on April 6. Kreisberg wrote on the memorandum: “MAC—what has happened to this memo? did the attachment go to Secy? Did memo go to President? PHK.” Lake sent a draft of the memorandum to Habib, Cooper, Benson, Nimitz, Hansell, and Derian under cover of an April 7 memorandum, indicating that Christopher had approved its substance. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, D Meeting on Human Rights)

² See Attachment, Document 29.

³ Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from Christopher to Vance.

⁴ The S/P background paper is not attached. Sirkin drafted the paper in S/P on February 26 and circulated it to the regional and functional bureaus on March 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Early Efforts) The final version of the paper, April 25, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: State Department Mid-Course Assessments: 5/77–11/78.
guage loose enough to give you latitude in implementation. In light of
the recent NSC memo requesting interagency coordination on foreign
assistance and human rights, the procedure suggested may be the least
that the State Department should do in this regard, unless we are pre-
pared to have others assume our legitimate role.

We continue to work on other points raised at your luncheon,
including:

—Encouraging D/HA to dispatch tasking memos to the regional
and functional bureaus so that we can get moving on our full agenda
of strategy papers and action plans.

—Sending you, following receipt of final clearances from the re-
gional bureaus, S/P’s final incarnation of a human rights background
paper and a guidance cable for dispatch to the field.

Finally, we have attached for your possible use a brief cover note
from you to the Secretary so that he can be alerted to the major thrust of
the long memo and action requested.  

6 See Document 52.
7 See Document 51.
8 Attached but not printed. The undated covering memorandum from Christopher
to Vance, drafted by Vogelgesang on April 6, indicates that the longer memorandum
“tries to pull together in one place (1) our general approach on human rights and (2) an
agenda for specific action.” (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—
4/15/77)
35. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, April 15, 1977

SUBJECT
International Financial Institutions Authorization Bill

Summary
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will mark-up the international financial institutions (“IFI’s”) authorization bill on April 19. The issue for your decision is whether we should (a) vigorously support the human rights language reported by Senator Humphrey’s Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and (b) oppose the Badillo Amendment which requires the U.S. to vote against any loan to countries where human rights are violated. I recommend that we do so, and make your views known through a letter to Humphrey (draft at Tab 1). The recommended approach has been approved by Humphrey.

Background
On April 2, 1977, you wrote Congressman Henry Reuss a letter applauding his Committee’s action in adding a human rights title to legislation authorizing U.S. participation in the IFI’s. As you will recall, the Reuss approach provided broader discretion than the restrictive Harkin Amendment. On April 4 the House adopted two Badillo Amendments (Tab 2) to the Committee language. The first (Section 601 (e)) severely restricts U.S. discretion by requiring that we vote against any loan to a country where human rights are violated unless such assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve the basic

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2 Not attached. A copy of the draft letter to Humphrey is attached to an undated draft Presidential form letter, along with an undated paper outlining the administration’s position on the Badillo and Humphrey human rights amendments and a copy of an April 2 letter to Reuss, in which Carter expressed his hope that “H.R. 5262 will be passed by the House of Representatives as soon as possible.” These materials were collated in D in advance of an April 14 interagency meeting on human rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I)

3 The President’s April 2 letter to Reuss is attached to an April 13 memorandum from Lamb to Christopher transmitting materials for the April 14 interagency meeting. In his letter, Carter communicated his support for Reuss’ bill and the flexibility it embodied. (Ibid.)

4 Not found attached. See Document 33 and footnotes 2 and 5 thereto.
human needs of the citizens of the country in question. A second, and potentially useful, Badillo Amendment (Section 602) requires the Secretaries of State and Treasury to initiate international consultations “to develop a viable standard for meeting basic human needs and the protection of human rights,” and a mechanism to reward those who seek to achieve those standards.

Meanwhile, on the Senate side, Humphrey’s Subcommittee has reported Reuss-type language (Tab 3)\(^5\) to the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee which will mark-up on April 19. Our latest indication is that Humphrey will go all out for passage of this language, provided the Administration supports him.\(^6\) The full Committee is likely to adopt Humphrey’s language. Prospects on the floor are uncertain, however. There is a substantial possibility that a coalition of liberals and anti-IFI conservatives will succeed in attaching Badillo-type language to the bill.

I think the Humphrey language represents a positive approach which permits us to maximize our influence for human rights within the banks and with the recipient governments. By contrast, I believe the Badillo language represents too wooden an approach to the problems it addresses and that the Administration should not support it. Although the Badillo Amendment contains an exception for assistance specifically directed to basic human needs, we believe that the practical difficulties of interpreting and applying that exception on a case-by-case basis would be enormous and the exception would ultimately prove counter-productive. An elaboration of the arguments against the Badillo Amendment is set forth in a Treasury paper under Tab 4.\(^7\)

Your strong support of Humphrey’s language and explicit opposition to Badillo-type amendments will not necessarily guarantee success

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\(^{5}\) Not found attached. See Document 33 and footnote 4 thereto.

\(^{6}\) Katz, in an April 7 briefing memorandum to Vance, reported on a conversation he had with Humphrey that afternoon concerning agricultural policy. When Katz inquired about the Badillo amendment, Humphrey indicated that he “intended to fight” for his amendment, which contained similar language to the Reuss bill, during the impending SFRC markup session. Humphrey added that he “expected to be criticized as anti-human rights for his sponsorship of the Harkin repeal, but he was prepared to take the heat.” Katz then commented, “I understand that supporters of the Harkin amendment are preparing a major lobbying effort in the Senate. If Senator Humphrey is going to battle them, it seems to me that the Administration must take an unequivocal position on the issue and throw its weight squarely behind him. We should not leave him exposed on this controversial and emotional issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I)

\(^{7}\) Not found attached. According to an April 19 memorandum from Christopher to Vance (see Document 37), the Department of the Treasury had prepared a memorandum subsequent to the one Bergsten transmitted to Bennet (see Tab A, Document 33), presumably the one to which Vance is referring.
on the Senate floor. However, I think that this is the right position and that, even if we fight and lose, our human rights commitment will look stronger than if we stand aside.

I believe that endorsement of the second Badillo Amendment providing for consultation may improve the prospects of winning, and I so recommend. Senator Humphrey agrees, and this point is incorporated in the draft letter to him.

I think the most effective means of presenting your position will be a letter to Senator Humphrey, copies of which will go to the full Committee. I also urge that your position be presented to the leadership at breakfast on Tuesday, April 19.

Recommendation

That you send to Senator Humphrey the letter attached under Tab 1, copies of which would be sent to all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as to the Speaker.8

That you state your position at the leadership breakfast next Tuesday.9

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8 Although there is no indication that the President approved or disapproved this recommendation, Carter sent Humphrey a letter on April 18, outlining his support for Humphrey’s approach. (Graham Hovey, “Senate Committee Backs President On Aid to Nations Observing Rights,” The New York Times, April 20, 1977, p. A–5) A signed copy of this letter, which Brzezinski and Moore sent to Carter under an April 16 covering memorandum recommending that he sign the letter, indicates that it was hand-delivered to Humphrey on April 18. (Carter Library, Staff Secretary, Presidential File, Handwriting File, Box 18, 4/18/77 [5])

9 There is no indication whether the President approved or disapproved this recommendation. On April 19, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the Badillo-Harkin language in favor of language directing the United States to use its “voice and vote” in the IFIs. (Graham Hovey, “Senate Committee Backs President on Aid to Nations Observing Rights,” The New York Times, April 20, 1977, p. A–5)
36. Memorandum From the President’s Counsel (Lipshutz) to President Carter

Washington, April 17, 1977

SUBJECT

International Financial Institutions Authorization Bill

Reference is made to the April 15 memorandum from Cyrus Vance to you regarding this matter. I recommend strongly that you withhold action on his two proposals until you have reviewed observations which both Frank Moore and I wish to make. Further, I suggest that you meet with representatives from Treasury, State and NSC, along with Frank, myself, (perhaps) Senator Humphrey, and such others as you deem advisable; at such a meeting all points of view can be fully aired and debated.

I personally wish to present a perspective in this matter which, in several ways, is different from that presented heretofore. I believe that Frank Moore will emphasize other factors of importance.

1. Should we oppose the substance of the “Harkin Amendment,” (i.e., mandatory action on our part based upon carefully described conditions and according to properly established procedures) we well might undermine much of our credibility in our espousal of Human Rights as a fundamental cornerstone of our foreign policy.

As I understand the situation, we have only a few means of implementing this policy: speaking out consistently (which we certainly are doing); diplomatic actions (which I understand we also are doing); overt physical actions (which we properly have discarded); and financial leverage (which is the subject of this pending legislation).

I was concerned to note in staff memos prepared for Zbigniew and forwarded to you, a statement that “... we do not like any of the amendments ...” (Harkin, Badillo, Humphrey, Reuss). The perception which I received from this was that we should give only lip service and diplomatic efforts to the goal of Human Rights.

2. We can support the substance of the Harkin Amendment—mandatory action—and still retain:

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Counsel’s Office, Robert J. Lipshutz Files, 1977–1979, Box 19, Human Rights (Re International Financial Institution Legislation), 4–8/77. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original.

2 See Document 35.

3 Presumable reference to Brzezinski’s April 13 memorandum to the President, printed as Document 33.
a. A clear definition of what constitutes a consistent pattern of deprivation of these rights (torture; inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without charge; flagrant denial of the Right to Life, Liberty, and the Security of Person; and providing refuge to individuals committing international acts of terrorism.)

b. An established and fair procedure for ascertaining facts, for rebuttal, and for removing valid charges against a proposed borrower, all in advance of voting against a loan application.

c. Adequate flexibility to protect our national interests and further our foreign policy goals. The Harkin Amendment still would have a “needy peoples” exception available for the President to use at his option. Bilateral agreements would be available. And of course in “important” or “urgent” matters, Congressional-Presidential action always is available.

3. A number of statements made in memoranda advocating opposition to the Harkin Amendment are presented as though they were unquestionable conclusions of fact. Actually, several of them are no more than arguable opinions and should be considered as such. Examples are:

a. Treasury memo of April 14:4 “...no real economic pressure since other governments will not vote with us and most loans will be approved ...” (except IDB FSO, which is subject to U.S.A. veto).

“... automatic ‘no’ votes would eliminate any negotiating flexibility on our part, reducing any incentive ... to work with us on improving human rights situations ... sterile, ineffective position ... isolating ourselves from other governments ...”

[But, note: Zbig refers to “our voice and vote” as a major bargaining chip.]

b. Same Treasury memo: “… (such human rights violations considerations) are inconsistent with the IFI charter requirements that lending decisions shall be made only on the basis of economic considerations ...”

[Note: If this is accurate, then presumably the U.S.A. could never consider Human Rights violations relative to a loan application—whether our vote was mandatory or discretionary under our law.]

c. Same Treasury memo: “Badillo approach ... undesirable ... it undermines integrity of the institutions ... would represent unilateral amendment of the bank charters. Our major policy interest in enhancing the role of the banks would be set back severely ...”

[Note: the foregoing statement contains three “conclusions” stated as “facts”: “… it undermines integrity ...”; “… unilateral amendment ...”; and, “our major policy interest ...”]

Finally, the Treasury memo points out what percentage of loans in the past would not have been approved had there been such a law on the books. Its representatives pointed out that Congress would be sorely tempted to reduce appropriations to these banks if we elimi-
nated a significant number of borrowers who “consistently deprived their people of basic human rights.”

This argument seemed to suggest that not only was the past practices of the banks inviolate, but also that the reduction of their budget was inconceivable.

Summarizing, I again urge that these observations, along with those of Frank Moore, et al., be considered prior to your final decision.

37. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Call to President Regarding Lipshutz Opposition to the IFI’s Bill

Zbig’s office tells me that he spoke to the President this morning about Bob Lipshutz’s opposition to the Humphrey approach to the IFI’s bill. The President said he would re-read Lipshutz’s memo. Zbig suggests that it is important for you to “weigh-in” with the President today, if possible.

Robert Lipshutz’s April 17 memorandum to the President (Tab 1) sets forth a number of arguments which appear to favor Administration support for the Harkin Amendment. Apart from the substance, the timing of Lipshutz involvement presents important procedural and credibility problems. He began asking questions after the President’s press conference remarks endorsing the Humphrey approach (Tab 2).

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memoranda to the Secretary—1977. No classification marking. Christopher did not initial the memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it.

2 Attached; printed as Document 36.

3 Attached but not printed is an undated excerpt from the press conference, which took place on April 15. In response to a question regarding administration support for the Harkin amendment, the President asserted, “I think the Harkin amendment is a mistake. The Reuss amendment and the Senator Humphrey amendment, which are the same, provide me with an adequate authority to deal with the question of human rights as it relates to international and regional lending institutions. To have a frozen mandatory prohibition against our nation voting for any loan simply removes my ability to bargain with a foreign leader whom we think might be willing to ease off on the deprivation of human rights. But when the requirement is frozen into law, there is simply no reason for a foreign leader to try to comply. I think we need to have the flexibility that we proposed. My
A reversal by the President on this issue would be harmful in his relationships on the Hill; the delay may already have been costly. On the substance, I am setting forth below a point-by-point rebuttal of Lipshutz’s arguments (using his paragraph numbers and letters).

1. Lipshutz suggests that opposition to Harkin might “undermine much of our credibility in our espousal of human rights as a fundamental cornerstone of our foreign policy.” This is erroneous because the reason for opposing Harkin is not that the Administration should moderate its position on human rights, but rather that the Harkin Amendment will prove weak and ineffective and thus will impede the Administration’s efforts to promote human rights. Lipshutz observes that a recent Brzezinski memorandum casts aspersion not only on the Harkin Amendment, but also on the Badillo, Humphrey, and Reuss Amendments, and deduces from this that Brzezinski would have us “give only lip service and diplomatic efforts” to human rights. Whatever Brzezinski’s position may have been, it was made quite clear in your memo to the President of April 15 that we enthusiastically favor the Humphrey language and also favor the second section of the Badillo Amendment (requiring the Secretaries of State and Treasury to initiate international consultations) (Tab 3). Thus, we are proposing far more than “lip service.”

2. (a) Lipshutz states that the Harkin Amendment permits us to retain a “clear definition of what constitutes a consistent pattern of deprivation of human rights.” To the extent that a “clear definition” is feasible, the Humphrey Amendment affords the same opportunity.

2. (b) Lipshutz argues that the Harkin Amendment does not really tie our hands because it will be possible for us, before voting against a loan application, to ascertain through an established and fair procedure, the facts pertaining to human rights charges against a prospective borrower. This view rests on an unduly optimistic assumption about the speed and certainty with which facts may be gathered and deter-

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4 Vance underlined this sentence and placed a vertical line in the margin.

5 See Document 33.

6 Vance underlined a portion of the sentence beginning with the word “we” and ending with the word “Amendment.”

7 Attached; printed as Document 35.

8 Vance underlined the second clause of this sentence.
mired. In any event, application of Harkin would require us to develop a “black list” which would have many undesirable overtones."

2. (c) Lipshutz also argues that the “needy people” exception in the Harkin Amendment provides adequate flexibility, but it seems clear that the process of interpreting and applying that exception on a case by case basis would be difficult and time-consuming and would be likely to lead to erratic results. For example, would money for completion of a factory producing construction materials (undertaken perhaps with prior IFI loans) come within the exception? Similarly, Lipshutz’s argument that Harkin does not rule out bilateral agreements or “Congressional-Presidential action” as to “important” matters suggests that Lipshutz himself sees the need to avoid the Harkin strait-jacket.

3. Lipshutz next selects a number of excerpts from the draft Treasury memo that was attached under Tab 4 of your memo of April 15 and argues that they represent “opinions” rather than “facts.” It should be noted that the Treasury memo was only a draft prepared hurriedly the day before your memo to the President and your memo did not vouch for all of the Treasury arguments. Nevertheless, I will comment briefly on Lipshutz’s points, in case the President raises them.

a. Lipshutz claims some inconsistency between arguing, on the one hand, that most loans will be approved over our veto and that “no” votes will eliminate negotiating flexibility and, on the other hand, that using our “voice and vote” for human rights as provided by the Humphrey language is, according to Brzezinski, “a major bargaining chip.” Perhaps Mr. Lipshutz sees some inconsistency between these arguments, but I certainly do not.

b. The Treasury paper contained a statement that most donor and recipient nations would view automatic “no” votes on human rights grounds as inconsistent with the IFI charter requirements that lending decisions should be made only on the basis of economic considerations. Lipshutz attacks this as proving too much, in that it would also prevent us from even using our voice and vote for human rights. It is not clear where the argument leaves Mr. Lipshutz since if in fact human rights considerations may not be taken into account, then it would avail us nothing to have the Harkin Amendment on the books.

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9 Vance underlined the remainder of the sentence beginning with the word “application” and ending with the word “overtones.”
10 Vance underlined the phrase “needy people.”
11 Vance underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “seems” and ending with the phrase “time-consuming.”
12 See footnote 7, Document 35.
c. Lipshutz then selects an excerpt from the Treasury paper and attacks it apparently solely on the grounds that the statement contains three conclusions stated as facts. He does not, however, challenge the validity of the conclusions, namely that Badillo would undermine the integrity of the IFI’s, would represent unilateral amendment of the bank charters, and would severely harm our policy interest in enhancing the role of the banks. While these arguments may have been somewhat overstated and could stand some fleshing out, I think they are basically sound.

d. Lipshutz then attacks the Treasury memo’s conclusions that a certain percentage (42 percent) of loans in FY–1976 would not have been approved by us had the Harkin Amendment been on the books. The Treasury paper also observed that Congress might reduce the appropriations to the IFI’s by an amount commensurate with the loans which we would vote against under Harkin. Lipshutz interprets these points as suggesting that the past practices of the banks are inviolate and that a reduction in the banks’ budgets is inconceivable. Again, Lipshutz is straining to make an argument that leads nowhere. It is not necessary to justify the past practices of the banks or to argue that their budgets ought not be reduced in order to decide the question presently on the table. That question is simply whether it makes any sense to adopt legislation which may have the effect of causing Congress to reduce by almost one-half the level of U.S. funding for the IFI’s.

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38. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

I. Major Actions So Far and How They have been Decided

   1. Repeal of the Byrd Amendment²—This decision was formally reached in PRM–4,³ enjoyed unanimous interagency support, was well

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lobbied on the Hill (with a particularly crucial effort by Andy Young) and was successfully achieved well ahead of schedule.

2. UN Speech—This was an NSC initiative. The human rights language including the specific proposals was entirely drafted here by Tuchman and later approved by State. It is worth noting that in State’s original draft of this speech there were no human rights initiatives, and very little attention paid to the issue at all.4

3. International Treaties—The proposal to sign and seek ratification of the four international treaties was suggested by me in a memorandum to you on January 24th,5 and soon thereafter urged by Andy Young in his first meeting with the President after the Inaugural.6 The President delegated responsibility on this to Lipshutz who has held several State/Justice/NSC meetings to decide on a course of action. Several weeks ago, State and Justice lawyers reached agreement on language for reservations, but there is disagreement between Lipshutz and the agencies on whether to use one general reservation (“subject to the laws and Constitution of the United States”) or whether to take the more usual diplomatic course of specific reservations.7 Mondale is apparently now involved in discussions with Congress on which approach would be preferable politically, and a final decision is still pending. However, the substantive work is done, and these treaties could go forward to the Hill within a few days of a final decision.

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4 Reference is to Carter’s March 17 address to the United Nations General Assembly; see Document 26 and footnote 2 thereto. Documentation concerning Department of State and NSC efforts toward preparing the President’s address is in the National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot S2D298, Box 2, TL 3/1–3/15/77; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights: 2–4/77; and Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security Huntington, Box 37, Human Rights: 2–3/77.


6 Young, Vance, and Brzezinski met with the President on January 29 in the White House Oval Office from 10 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) In an undated memorandum prepared prior to the meeting, Brzezinski summarized several agenda items suggested by Vance, including the signing of the human rights covenants, and provided talking points for Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 16, State Department (State): 1–3/77)

7 In a March 28 memorandum to the President, Lipshutz indicated that he had received final drafts of “alternative reservations” to the four treaties and that the Department of State had prepared a summary of “pros and cons” related to the use of general reservations. Carter inserted a handwritten comment at the top of the memorandum: “Bob—A) My suggestion is that we have general reservation ‘subject to U.S. Constitution’ & add specific reservations that conflict [unclear] US Law. B) Let V.P. handle this (with you)—J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 11, Human Rights: Treaties: 3/77–10/78) Additional documentation regarding the drafting of reservations designed to protect the legal position of the United States is ibid.
Within the last few weeks, Bob Pastor was responsible for the initiative in adding the Inter-American Treaty to the original four and this has been announced as policy in the OAS speech. Work is now proceeding on the specific reservations required.

4. Security Assistance—The issue of cuts in security assistance because of human rights violations came up during the early budget review. Within the State Department cuts were considered for such major violators as Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, and a few African nations. However, the formal department position recommended cuts only for Uruguay (which Congress had already cut by law) Argentina, and a small cut for Ethiopia. OMB favored additional cuts, and you and the President were involved in the decision not to propose additional cuts, both because of a disinclination to shoot from the hip, and because this Administration had not yet protested human rights violations to any of the other governments.

Pursuant to other requirements of the same law, country-by-country reports on the human rights status in 82 nations have been prepared and submitted to Congress. Both the preparation (which is done largely through Embassy channels) and publication of these reports has caused substantial consternation and resentment in many of the violating nations. They object to US unilateral judgments on their behavior.

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8 In an April 13 memorandum to the President, Brzezinski indicated that the Department of State, Lipshutz, and the NSC Staff had all recommended that Carter announce in his Pan-American Day speech his intention to sign and seek ratification of the American Convention on Human Rights, negotiated in 1969. Carter approved this recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North–South Pastor Files, Subject File, Box 55, Human Rights: 1–5/77) An undated draft of Brzezinski’s memorandum to Carter and an April 8 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski setting out the Department’s rationale are ibid. The President announced in his April 14 address that he would sign the Convention, and he signed it on June 1. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977: Book I, pp. 614 and 1050–1051) See also Document 47.


10 See footnote 6, Document 17.
5. Economic Assistance—No cuts were proposed in development assistance for FY '77 because of human rights violations. Christopher testified on this issue in the Senate.11 There has been little controversy.

6. Sakharov Letter and White House Meeting with Bukovsky—You are better informed on this than I, my impression is that these decisions were made entirely within the White House.12

7. UN Human Rights Commission Meeting in Geneva—The US delegation was headed by Allard Lowenstein. I don’t know who was responsible for his appointment, but it was a good one, notwithstanding Brady Tyson’s remarks on Chile (Lowenstein did not see or approve Tyson’s remarks).13 Lowenstein took the unusual course of not assuming at the beginning that our efforts would be doomed to failure, and succeeded remarkably well in energizing the meeting and changing its tone. There were two votes on which even such traditional clients as Cuba and Syria refused to support the Soviet position limiting human rights investigations. Lowenstein has real potential in this area. He is completely unfettered by the pervasive defeatist attitude at State and is both deeply committed and realistic. His talents should be made use of.

8. Planning for ECOSOC and the 1977 UNGA—So far only State has been involved. Their proposals center on trying to avoid a reversal on issues which we won at Geneva and to begin efforts to enact the President’s proposals made in the UN speech.14 State has developed a pro-

11 See footnotes 4 and 6, Document 28.
12 Reference is to an exchange of letters between Sakharov and Carter; see footnote 2, Document 18. Telegram 3046 from Moscow, March 7, reported that the Embassy had received another letter from Sakharov addressed to the President and transmitted the text. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770001–0766) Bukovsky met with Carter, Mondale, and Brzezinski in the Roosevelt Room of the White House on March 1 from 3:30 to 3:37 p.m. Clift, Eisele, Levitsky, and Krimer also attended this meeting. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found. See also Bernard Gwertzman, “Carter and Mondale See Bukovsky, a Soviet Dissident,” The New York Times, March 2, 1977, p. A–1.
13 During a March 8 session of the UN Human Rights Commission meeting, Tyson asserted that the U.S. delegation would be remiss not to “express our profoundest regrets” for the role U.S. officials and others had “played in the subversion of the previous democratically elected Chilean Government that was overthrown by the coup of Sept. 11, 1973.” The Department of State responded, indicating that Tyson’s statement was unauthorized and did not reflect the official views of the United States. (“U.S. Official Expresses ‘Regrets’ For Role in Chile but Is Disavowed,” The New York Times, March 9, 1977, p. A–1) Carter addressed the issue during his March 9 press conference, commenting that the remark “made by the delegate concerning our past involvement in Chilean political affairs was inappropriate. I didn’t know about it ahead of time. It was a personal expression of opinion by that delegate.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1977, pp. 305–06)
14 Tuchman, in the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s April 5 evening report to Brzezinski, noted: “The State Department feels, for a variety of reasons, that the major thrust of the forthcoming ECOSOC meeting may be a concerted effort on the part of certain nations to undo the relatively modest gains we made on this issue in the recent Geneva
posal which seems to me a good one, that there be a second month-long meeting every year of the UN Human Rights Commission, and that the second meeting be held in New York. This would partially implement two of the President’s proposals, and appears to be a good compromise position that might gain acceptance. However there has been little integration of human rights objectives with other kinds of objectives for this meeting.

9. **International Financial Institutions**—This has recently blossomed into the issue of greatest concern. Basically what happened was that in the House, the Administration, understandably unwilling to respond to its first Congressional test by opposing a human rights initiative, took a wishy-washy position. During the course of both Committee markup and Floor debate, the Administration never expressed its opposition to the Harkin language although it did support a rather convoluted compromise amendment which Chairman Reuss introduced and pushed through Committee. The House took the very unusual step of dropping the Committee’s proposed amendment and adopting substitute language (Badillo-Harkin) by voice vote.

During the past week, a series of interagency meetings have been held to develop a strategy in order to avoid a repetition of the House defeat in the Senate. Senator Humphrey is a much more enthusiastic supporter of the more flexible language than was Reuss. However, the Administration has weakened its position by a series of changes in position of which Humphrey’s staff (which favors the stricter language) is fully aware. The amendment was unanimously adopted in Committee, but there is consensus among all departmental Congressional liaison offices and friendly Hill staff, that success in the Senate will depend on a vigorous Administration lobbying effort and clear opposition—such as was expressed by the President in last week’s press conference—to the Harkin approach. So far, no Administration representative has made a compelling case, mustering the real arguments, in opposition to the Harkin amendment. One problem has been that Derian really believes in the Harkin approach. However I think that’s now resolved.

If the Humphrey language succeeds on the Senate Floor, the crucial fight will be in Conference. The key determinant will be who gets appointed as House Conferees. My suggestion to Christopher, which he likes, is that the Administration should make every effort to try to get Congressman Fraser appointed. He is the most widely known and

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meetings. Efforts are underway to try to consolidate those gains and to identify and lineup possible supporters. This effort—to preserve what we just won—may undermine efforts to move ahead on the proposals the President made in his UN speech.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2–4/77)

15 See footnote 3, Document 37.
respected member on this issue, and apparently supports the Administration’s position. If Fraser got appointed and agreed to argue the Administration’s case, we could get at least a split House vote in Conference and come away with either the Humphrey language or a watered down Harkin. All of this however demands a vigorous, coordinated and well-handled Administration lobbying effort, such as we have not yet seen.

This issue has importance far beyond the IFIs. This language is now in both the military and economic assistance acts. If it gets added to the IFIs bill, there will be efforts to also include it in trade, monetary and food for peace legislation. If we lose it now these efforts are very likely to succeed.

II. Pending Actions

1. International Treaties—Decision needed on general vs. specific reservations. Immediately thereafter these should be sent to the Hill so that the President can go a little on the offensive, prodding Congress for action on these treaties in order to demonstrate their seriousness on this issue.

2. Coordinated Planning for ECOSOC and UNGA—As described above, more work is needed, particularly in integrating human rights with other objectives.

3. Decisions on and implementation of Visa study.


5. Congressional lobbying on Harkin.

III. Principal Actors

The major actors on this issue so far have been the President, yourself, Andy Young, Patt Derian (Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at State), and Warren Christopher, to whom Vance has delegated the authority for the interagency group created in response to your memorandum. Also, Fred Bergsten has been actively involved in the IFIs issue. Various assistant secretaries at State, notably Holbrooke and Todman (ARA) have testified on this issue as it affects their regions.

Both Derian and Young are pretty unpredictable. Derian has been talking to all the fanatics in Congress and in the NGOs, and has therefore absorbed a pretty lopsided view of things. Christopher is just getting into this, and it is difficult to assess either his interest or feelings on it. Bergsten is tough and clear on the IFIs issue. Assistant Secretaries at State often confuse the issue through testimony which serves their in-

16 See Document 31.
terest but directly conflicts with what other witnesses are saying. For example, during testimony on economic assistance to Korea and the Philippines, Holbrooke said that cuts in the program “would not lead to an improvement in the human rights situation”, implying that such an approach was “self-defeating”. This was just after Vance had testified in support of military assistance cuts, on the grounds that they would cause an improvement.

No one is in a leadership position on this issue. Derian is not in a position to do so, either bureaucratically or personally. Perhaps Christopher is, but I have some doubts. Most important, no one has taken any steps to recruit the potential supporters in Congress—particularly Fraser, who has just published a good piece on this issue in Foreign Policy (Tab B)—note the last paragraph. It could be enormously helpful for you to ask him to come in, and to begin to establish a close working relationship with him. He is a thoughtful and intelligent man who has been involved in this issue for years. He would be more effective in making the Administration’s case in the House than ten lobbyists.

IV. Broader Issues

At this time my judgment is that the Administration’s policy on human rights amounts to: “the President is deeply committed to promoting human rights wherever possible”—and nothing more. There is no agreed conception of how human rights fits into the fabric of foreign policy, its trade-off value vis-à-vis other issues (economic cooperation, national security, etc.), no idea of how to present and defend a policy that is not 100% moralistic (in fact there appear to be some who favor a totally pure policy). Nor is there a strategy for stopping the Congressional bandwagon or breaking up the ultra-left/far-right coalition that was responsible for our defeat in the House. It is important to note that it was conservatives who want no foreign aid who gave the Harkin language the necessary votes.

Beyond a recognition of his deep personal commitment, there is also considerable uncertainty both within the Administration and among his supporters in Congress over what the President really wants. He has taken several different positions. For example, at a recent

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17 Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary-designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on March 10. Holbrooke’s prepared statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1977, pp. 322–326.

18 Presumable reference to Vance’s February 24 testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee; see footnote 9 above.

19 Not found attached. Presumable reference to Donald Fraser, “Freedom and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, Number 26 (Spring 1977), pp. 140–156.
Congressional meeting he expressed support for the Harkin amendment, then opposed it at the press conference.\textsuperscript{20} This contributes to the drift in the bureaucracy.

Finally, there is no forum in which all this can be straightened out. I have attached at Tab A a revised draft of a PRM on this subject\textsuperscript{21} which I believe would go a long way toward providing the necessary focus. Although we run the obvious risk of getting worthless mush out of it, I believe that it would be useful to force even the more philosophical issues onto paper. Otherwise we will constantly be responding to issues as they arise in an ad hoc manner and will probably continue to drift into the kind of mess we are now in on the IFIs.

Among the questions this draft addresses are: whose conception of human rights are we going to be concerned with (ours which is mostly political, or the developing world’s which is primarily economic and social); how do we define gross violators and can we realistically draw up guidelines for making such determinations; how good are we at actually finding out what is going on and monitoring changes made in response to our pressures; what concrete initiatives are available; and, most important, what are our goals and what can we expect to accomplish within 4 or 8 years.

\textsuperscript{20} Not further identified.
\textsuperscript{21} Not found attached. According to the minutes of the April 25 Cabinet meeting, Brzezinski “said that he believes we need a Presidential review memorandum on human rights policy, and that he plans to have a proposal to the President on the subject this week.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 1/24/77–5/23/77, Box 7)

39. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, April 30, 1977, 214Z

98034. Inform Consuls. Subject: Secretary’s Human Rights Speech. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770151–0364. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Grose; cleared by Janeway, Neidle, and in S/S, and in substance by Robert Oakley, Thurber, Holly, Seeyle, Derian, Todman, and Hartman; approved by Christopher.
1. USIS Wireless File 4/29 will provide complete text of Secretary’s human rights speech to be delivered 4/30 (1600Z) at University of Georgia Law School. This is not only his first major speech in office, it is also comprehensive administration statement of the President’s determination to place human rights considerations at the center of US foreign policy.

2. This speech should be given broad distribution to public and press (where possible) and to host country officials at all levels. Posts may wish to supply high-ranking contacts with full text at time of delivery or shortly in advance. Department will obviously be interested in receiving reactions.

3. Speech indicates policy will be implemented by positive steps, such as encouragement through public statements and economic assistance, or other measures, such as public or private expressions of concern and withholding aid when necessary. Mission representations can emphasize our interest in seeing practical results.

4. Human rights considerations will enter into our overall foreign policy, but policy implementation will be flexible, depending on details of each specific case.

5. While entire speech obviously merits careful review, high points are:

   A) Human rights are defined as:

      1) The right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person, such as torture, etc;
      2) The right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education; and
      3) The right to enjoy civil and political liberties, such as freedom of thought, etc.

   B) Our policy is to promote all these rights. While there may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve, we believe that, with work, all of these rights can be complementary and mutually reinforcing.

   C) US policy will be implemented on case-by-case basis, according to sets of criteria and questions spelled out in text.

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2 Vance’s April 30 address at the University of Georgia School of Law, entitled “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,” is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1977, pp. 505–508, and is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

D) We will seek implementation through multilateral agencies as well as in bilateral relations. Secretary specifies that it is not our purpose to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but as the President has emphasized, no member of the United Nations can claim that violation of internationally protected human rights is solely its own affair. Our policy is to be applied within our own society as well as abroad. We welcome constructive criticism, at the same time as we offer it. Declassify upon receipt.

Christopher

40. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, May 2, 1977

Procedure for Implementing Human Rights Policy in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

Issue for Decision

The existing inter-agency procedure for reviewing individual IFI loan proposals does not provide adequate lead time to implement a consistent coherent human rights policy in the IFIs. In our judgment a new procedure is required. I recommend you write Mike Blumenthal expressing concern about the present procedure and suggesting a new one be established.

Background/Analysis

The National Advisory Council on the international monetary and financial policies (NAC) reviews each IFI loan proposal from an economic policy perspective before the Secretary of the Treasury provides instructions to the Executive Director. This review occurs approximately one week before formal Board action although informal Board discussions may take place a day or two after the review. As we saw in the case of the recent export credit to Brazil, this review often occurs too late for us to give thorough inter-agency consideration to human rights

aspects of the proposal. In addition, it is far too late for us to influence the progress of the loan in the Institution if we have reason to do so on human rights grounds.

The problem of a timely review of IFI loans from a human rights perspective is becoming increasingly acute. The President has written Senator Humphrey expressing support for the position that we should use our voice and vote in the IFI to attempt to influence human rights in developing countries. Over the next 60 days, the World Bank Board of Directors will consider over 100 loan proposals, many of which have human rights implications. Therefore, we need a mechanism for systematic reviewing of these proposals at an early stage.

In our view, what is needed today is a new inter-agency mechanism which would review individual IFI loan proposals well in advance of the time they are submitted to the Board of Directors for approval. We are now working with Treasury to devise a system to ensure that we receive timely notification of all pending loan proposals. The NSC Human Rights Working Group which you chair would in our view be an appropriate vehicle for reaching decision within the U.S. Government on the human rights aspect of IFI loans.

As part of the new procedure, we would suggest a Subgroup of your Working Group, chaired by the Department at the Office Director level. This Subgroup would have responsibility for examining each loan proposal to see if an inter-agency consensus exists that there are no human rights grounds for delaying or opposing the proposal. If such a consensus could not be reached, the Subgroup would refer the proposals to your Working Group for decision. We in EB would be happy to chair this Subgroup should you so decide. We follow the IFIs closely and have a strong institutional link with the Treasury Department. Further, we have no particular bias with regard to human rights situations in any particular country.

In addition to this procedure, we clearly need a series of country strategy papers which will enable us to examine individual IFI loans in context of our overall human rights policy, vis-à-vis that country, and in the light of other measures we may be taking to promote human rights.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached letter to Treasury Secretary Blumenthal.

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2 See footnote 8, Document 35.
3 There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved this recommendation. Not found attached. An undated and unsigned draft letter from Christopher to Blumenthal is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770108–1975.
2. That you establish a Subgroup of your Human Rights Working Group which would have the responsibility of examining individual IFI loan proposals.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved this recommendation.

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41. Memorandum From Jane Pisano of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, May 6, 1977

SUBJECT

Interagency Group on Human Rights

Substituting for Jessica Tuchman, I attended a meeting today of the interagency group chaired by Warren Christopher. Treasury, State, DOD, AID, and NSC were represented.\(^2\) Virtually 80 percent of the discussion was about specific loans which will be considered by IFI’s next week.

Specifically, we discussed loans to Paraguay, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Malawi and El Salvador, which are summarized at Tab A.

The discussion left me uneasy for several reasons: (1) We were deciding the U.S. position on individual loans

—in the absence of country studies (which will, when completed, include U.S. objectives and outline the range of foreign policy instruments at our disposal.) Without these studies, there may be a tendency to rely too heavily on voting in IFIs, which may not be the best means of influencing a state’s human rights performance.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights, 5/77–11/78. No classification marking. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Tuchman. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “DA [David Aaron] has seen.” Inderfurth also initialed the memorandum.

\(^2\) A 4-year listing of Christopher Committee meetings and countries discussed, prepared in 1980, indicates that the Committee met for the first time on May 6. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, IAGHRFA—History & Organization)
— in the absence of explicit criteria for assessing human rights performance. I understand that guidelines are being prepared in light of Vance’s recent speech. This will help. However, we also need to be clear about whether we are going to evaluate trends in human rights performance (if so, over what period of time) and/or overall level of human rights violations. (I know that we want to maintain our flexibility on this point, but our internal discussions should not be fuzzy).

—in the absence of criteria for defining minimum human needs projects. The State staff recommendation on loans for Ethiopia, for example, was to vote “yes” on an agricultural irrigation project and “no” on a rural roads project on grounds that the former met minimum human needs while the latter did not. This distinction escapes me. (As far as I know, State is not yet addressing this problem).

While I have no doubt that these problems will eventually be resolved, we will in the interim be making ad hoc decisions which may set precedents for further decisions. And while flexibility is important, we have to be careful not to make arbitrary decisions, justified in the name of human rights or basic human needs. If that happens, Congressional support will surely dwindle—as it did for bilateral assistance in the early 1960’s when we justified giving aid to whichever countries we wanted by citing one of several aid rationales.

(2) For future meetings we will be informed in advance of the cases to be considered. NSC regional staff should participate, along with Jessica, when important loans to countries in their region are being discussed.

Procedures for examining impending loans were presented briefly by Treasury and will be reviewed at the next meeting. The procedures should be considered in light of the PRM on Human Rights, assuming the proposal is approved.

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3 See Document 39.
Tab A

Paper Prepared by Jane Pisano of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

Paraguay. Two loans: industrial credit and rural development. The U.S. will support the loan proposals because of recent improvements in human rights and because one (rural development) meets minimum human needs criteria. State will, however, call in the Paraguayan charge to express our interest in their favorable response to a visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

Philippines. One loan which meets minimum human needs. The U.S. will support the loan because it meets human needs and because of recent improvements in human rights. We will inform Philippines that we are watching human rights carefully. Treasury should brief Don Fraser.

Ethiopia. Two loans: irrigation; rural feeder roads. The decision was deferred until Christopher could talk to Habib and the African Bureau.

Malawi. One loan: water supply. U.S. should vote affirmatively but communicate our concern about human rights performance to Malawi government.

El Salvador. $90 million IDB loan for hydroelectric power. U.S. has veto power. After extended discussion of the deteriorating human rights performances and consideration of the precedent that would be set by U.S. veto of a loan to a country which is not among the worst human rights violators, it was decided to postpone indefinitely consideration of the loan. Also a factor: NGOs are planning a campaign against this one and there may be substantial Congressional pressure to turn down the loan.
IMPACT OF THE US STAND ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Initial international skepticism about the seriousness of the Carter administration’s commitment to the fostering of human rights has been dispelled by presidential statements and US initiatives in bilateral relations and international forums. Considerable confusion and suspicion over US motives persist, however, and despite recent statements by Secretary Vance and other officials there still is apprehension over the lengths to which the US may be prepared to go in pursuit of human rights objectives. This memorandum surveys reaction to the US stand. A regional listing of significant developments is provided at annex.

Introduction

The US stand on human rights has prompted a number of governments to move toward bettering their human rights performance. This has occurred principally where the regime has been anxious to preserve cooperative relations with the US, has not felt publicly challenged or specifically prodded by Washington, and is relatively confident about its internal security situation.

Even in these cases, however, there has been a notable reluctance to accept the US stand at face value. Public expressions of understanding about US concerns have been matched by private assessments of Washington’s emphasis on human rights as a ploy designed to pressure other countries into comporting themselves in accordance with US policies generally.

Attribution of such ulterior motivation, the connection of human rights to other issues, and a marked propensity to interpret US pronouncements and actions in egocentric terms have been characteristic

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reactions of countries with the most cause for unease over the US stand. Repressive practices have intensified in some cases, and bilateral relations have suffered in a number of instances.

There is strong public endorsement of the principles that underlie the US stand in some countries, but in many cases it is coupled with considerable worry over the potential for adverse international political consequences. Applause for Washington’s espousal of human rights principles, therefore, is not always accompanied by approval of specific US initiatives. A broad range of political relationships important to the US thus has been complicated by the addition of what many foreign observers view as a new element of uncertainty in international affairs.

**The Communist World**

The Soviets, perplexed and concerned over Washington’s human rights initiatives, tend to view the US stand as aimed primarily at them. Even sophisticated Soviet observers reportedly suspect US actions are part of a campaign to undermine their political system. The Soviets reportedly have been concerned over the potential implications of heightened activity by intellectual dissidents if they attempt to combine with existent popular dissatisfaction over food shortages and managerial deficiencies. Worry about the economy is likely to continue to figure in Moscow’s tendency to magnify the threat posed by dissidents and to react strongly to foreign encouragement of domestic criticism.

The Soviets have protested vehemently about unacceptable interference in their internal affairs, and there have been numerous warnings that bilateral relations could suffer as a result of the US stand. Soviet propaganda on human rights has shifted from a generally defensive to a somewhat more accusatory posture since late April, but Moscow has generally limited itself to reactions deemed sufficient to make its points without jeopardizing its ties with the US.

Hints at the possible spillover of Soviet displeasure into SALT, for example, continue to be accompanied by explicit signals that SALT is a separate issue where progress can be achieved. Nevertheless, at least for tactical reasons, the Soviets are likely to continue to point to the US human rights stand as a major impediment to progress on the whole range of bilateral issues.

Moscow is anxious to disabuse the US of the notion that public urgings on human rights will help Soviet dissidents and to convince the dissidents that pleading their cause to the West will be counterproductive. Soviet authorities significantly increased pressure on the dissidents early this year, and attempts to intimidate them through arrests and threats almost certainly will continue. Some of them reportedly are encouraged by US initiatives despite the fact that they anticipate fur-
ther intensification of repressive measures in the immediate future. But there also are indications of disheartenment among the dissidents, and some of them have called for a return to “quiet diplomacy.” Approval of US human rights activism among Soviet citizens interested in bringing about changes in their society tends to be strongest among those who feel most alienated from the system.

The Soviets have been concerned that the revolution’s 60th anniversary in November could be tarnished if the West vigorously presses the issue of “Basket III” (human rights) implementation at the Belgrade CSCE meeting that begins in June. Efforts to stifle dissident activity before and during the CSCE sessions are coinciding with the dissidents’ own realization that it is a propitious time internationally to promote their various causes. As of now the Soviets have managed to suppress the most publicized manifestations of the human rights movement. They are likely to employ a variety of tactics—including selective emigration and expulsion—to confine the movement within the circumscribed limits that obtained before the recent upsurge of Western support.

A serious worry for Moscow is that agitation over human rights could exacerbate existing or anticipated control problems in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, and to a lesser extent in East Germany. Like the Soviets, the East European regimes have been puzzled by the US stand and somewhat off balance as a result. Party officials reportedly met recently to discuss the long term impact of US initiatives and concluded that a continuing international focus on human rights could erode the loyalties of important segments of their populations, especially intellectuals and young people.

There is no evidence so far that the US stand on human rights has had a significant impact on the East European regimes’ tactics for dealing with dissidents. Even before recent US initiatives there was disagreement within and among the East European regimes on how to handle the serious wave of dissident activity that has developed over the last several years—activity that may become bolder as the CSCE meeting approaches. Those with the least serious dissident problem (i.e., Hungary) or which believe a hard line would be counterproductive in their particular circumstances (i.e., Poland) reportedly have been defending their moderate approach. Thus far, the Soviets appear to be tolerating some diversity in handling dissent.

The East Europeans have shown concern over the possibility that US human rights initiatives could provoke Soviet movement away from détente, and over the adverse implications such a development

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3 Preparatory discussions for the CSCE Review Conference were scheduled to take place in Belgrade June 15–August 5.
would have for them both economically and politically. The East European press has been highly critical of the US stand and has counterattacked with condemnations of alleged injustices in the US and US disregard for “economic and social” rights.

China is the only Communist country that seems to have derived some satisfaction from the US stand. Peking clearly has taken heart from recent difficulties in US–Soviet relations, and the Chinese see Washington’s attitude on human rights as possibly signaling a toughening US stance toward Moscow generally. The Chinese are ostensibly unconcerned about their own vulnerability on the human rights issue, but Peking probably has some private misgivings on this score. This may explain the failure of Chinese media to highlight the human rights controversy despite Peking’s penchant for emphasizing US–Soviet differences.

*The Industrial Democracies*

There is broad approval in principle of the US human rights stand in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. But leaders of these countries tend to define international issues on which the US takes a comprehensive global approach in more parochial terms. Thus, the Europeans see the human rights issue mainly in terms of East-West relations, while the Japanese are primarily concerned with how the US stand will affect US policy and Japanese interests in Asia.

The Europeans are concerned that US human rights initiatives risk causing a deterioration in East-West relations that would have a more damaging impact on Western Europe than on the US. As a result, government leaders have displayed a decided preference for pursuing human rights objectives with quiet diplomacy and behind-the-scenes approaches.

Britain’s Prime Minister Callaghan may have indicated to the Soviets that Foreign Secretary Owen’s strong speech on human rights did not herald a major change in UK policy. French officials are reportedly worried about preserving what remains of the Franco-Soviet “special relationship,” and they are eager to maintain a friendly atmosphere for Brezhnev’s coming visit to Paris. In Germany, Chancellor Schmidt has declared that Bonn will seek to advance the cause of human rights in its

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own low-key way. Among the smaller West European nations, willingness to be outspoken on the human rights issue seems to vary inversely with physical proximity to the Soviet Union.

**Latin America**

US human rights initiatives have aroused considerable resentment in several Central and South American countries ruled by military regimes that have felt directly challenged. They have denounced US statements and actions as unwarranted and unacceptable interference in strictly internal affairs.

Argentina and Uruguay rejected all US military assistance after Washington linked aid cuts to human rights violations in those countries.\(^6\) Brazil, already angered by US pressure to modify its nuclear deal with West Germany,\(^7\) condemned the State Department’s preparation of a report on its human rights practices as an affront to its sovereignty and renounced the 1952 military assistance agreement.\(^8\) Guatemala and El Salvador have also rejected military assistance conditioned on US judgment of their human rights situations.

The Latins are angered by what they regard as US failure to understand and make allowances for their political and internal security problems. The Southern Cone military regimes, especially, are convinced that their countries’ experiences with political disintegration, insurgency, and terrorism fully warrant tough internal security measures. The Argentines, for example, insist that they will not deviate from the practices they deem indispensable in their continuing war with leftist terrorists no matter what outside criticism they incur.

The Latins are also resentful over the fact that they were not considered important enough to US interests to be treated specially (like South Korea). They have questioned US qualifications for making international moral judgments and have voiced suspicion that the US has ulterior motives for its human rights stand. The latter view is particularly strong in Brazil, where the human rights issue is viewed as an adjunct to US pressure on nuclear matters.

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\(^6\) See footnote 2, Document 23.

\(^7\) In June 1975, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany negotiated a technology agreement with the Government of Brazil, in order to sell Brazil a “complete nuclear fuel cycle,” including an uranium enrichment facility, a fuel fabrication unit, reactors, and a facility for reprocessing spent fuel into plutonium. The Ford administration pushed for both nations to agree to a treaty, prior to the sale, that would prevent the Brazilians from using the system to produce nuclear weapons. (David Binder, “U.S. Wins Safeguards in German Nuclear Deal With Brazil,” *The New York Times*, June 4, 1975, p. 16 and Craig R. Whitney, “Brazilians and West Germans Sign $4-Billion Nuclear Pact,” *The New York Times*, June 28, 1975, p. 2)

The Southern Cone regimes have been commiserating with each other, and they reportedly are considering joint moves to convince the US that it has seriously underestimated the costs of alienating them. The Latins undoubtedly would prefer to forgo polemics and halt any deterioration in their relations with Washington. But the military regimes are determined not to take any action that could be construed as caving in to US pressure.

Latin reaction to the US stand has not, of course, been entirely negative. Venezuela and Costa Rica, two of Latin America’s few remaining democracies, have strongly endorsed US initiatives, and expressions of support for the US stand have also been received from Mexico and Bolivia. Prisoner releases in Paraguay and Peru were directly responsive to US concerns.

East Asia

The US stand has been met with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm in most of East Asia, where with the exception of Japan all states are ruled by authoritarian regimes that impose significant restrictions on human rights. The nations with the closest political, economic, and security ties to the US—those that feel most vulnerable to US pressure—seem to have the most negative attitudes.

South Korea’s sensitivity on the issue is reflected in a trend begun last November selectively to ease pressures on dissidents and reduce overt police surveillance. The press is enjoying greater latitude in its handling of foreign news, prison conditions for key political figures have improved, and the government has forgone punishment for a number of protestors. A spate of arrests in mid-April probably was meant as a warning to those inclined to increase anti-government activity during the independence day period, and most of the dissidents already have been released. A number of President Pak’s advisers reportedly have told him that he should make a major political move in response to US human rights concerns. But Pak apparently remains determined to do so only at a time and in a manner of his own choosing. He is convinced that a strict authoritarian style of rule is needed to ensure stability in the face of the North Korean threat.

The Marcos government in the Philippines is quite concerned over the potential implications of the US emphasis on human rights. Manila’s vulnerability on the issue is one reason Marcos would like to receive rent payments for US bases rather than payment in the form of military assistance subject to annual congressional scrutiny.

Indonesia initially seemed anxious not to let the human rights issue disrupt relations with the US, especially the continuance of military aid. Government officials publicly expressed understanding of US initiatives, and Jakarta announced an accelerated timetable for the re-
lease of political prisoners. Privately, however, the Indonesians interpreted US emphasis on human rights as one ploy in a series designed to force their country to support US policies generally, and they expressed resentment over interference in their internal affairs. There recently has been a perceptible stiffening in Indonesia’s attitude, accompanied by hints that Jakarta has alternative sources of military hardware.

The government of Taiwan is trying to avoid giving the US cause to focus on human rights practices there, but the mainland Chinese political establishment remains determined to suppress ethnic Taiwanese opposition. Taiwan will undoubtedly be tempted to try to turn the issue to its own advantage by calling attention to the human rights situation in the People’s Republic of China.

Africa

Almost every African government is vulnerable to criticism on the human rights issue, in part because African standards of conduct differ markedly from “internationally accepted” conceptions of human rights. The most negative African responses to the US stand have come from Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia.

Idi Amin’s dramatically hostile reaction stemmed partly from President Carter’s statement about human rights violations in Uganda.9 The South African reaction was discreet and cautious at first, but has become outspokenly critical as the US stand has increasingly been seen as demanding that whites change their way of life. The radical Ethiopian dictator Lt. Colonel Mengistu has cited a human rights-related cutback in US aid as one reason for his recent anti-US actions, but the anti-US trend in Ethiopian policy predates US emphasis

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9 At his February 23 press conference (see footnote 3, Document 19), the President noted that there had been a “substantial move” regarding global concern for human rights and discussed several problem cases: “In Uganda, the actions there have disgusted the entire civilized world and, as you know, we have no diplomatic relationships with Uganda. But here is an instance where both Ambassador Andrew Young and I have expressed great concern about what is there. The British are now considering asking the United Nations to go into Uganda to assess the horrible murders that apparently are taking place in that country, the persecution of those who have aroused the ire of Mr. Amin.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, February 28, 1977, p. 244) With regard to the President’s claim that the United States did not have “diplomatic relationships” with Uganda, the White House Press Office subsequently released a statement: “While the United States has withdrawn its mission from Uganda and has no direct diplomatic representation there, U.S. affairs in the Republic of Uganda are carried out through the West German Embassy and the Republic of Uganda has an operating embassy and chargé d’affaires in Washington.” (Ibid.) See also “Carter: Uganda Actions ‘Have Disgusted’ the World,” The Washington Post, February 24, 1977, p. A–8.
on human rights. It is rooted in a strong commitment to domestic socialism and a desire to win favor with the Soviets.

Several black African countries have applauded the US stand largely because they believe it implies US support for majority rule in southern Africa. Some have also quietly welcomed US criticism of the situation in Uganda. US initiatives have been warmly received in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gambia. Senegal, the Central African Empire, Zambia, and—in a recent shift—Ghana have also endorsed the US stand. Togo recently released some political prisoners partly out of a desire to improve relations with the US, but another group of persons was arrested for political reasons shortly thereafter.

**Middle East**

The Arab states tend to define human rights strictly in terms of concern over Israel’s settlement policy in occupied territories, the fate of Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, and recognition of the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” They will react positively to the US stand so long as its principal effect in the Middle East is the focusing of US attention on such issues, rather than on human rights practices (especially the treatment of minorities) in Arab countries.

The Israelis, of course, are concerned over the possible implications of increased US interest in their treatment of Arabs in the occupied territories. On the other hand, the Israelis apparently believe the US will be inclined to support initiatives they may take to focus international attention on Soviet harassment of Jews who have asked to leave the USSR.

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10 On April 23, the Ethiopian Government ordered the closure of five U.S. installations in Ethiopia and Eritrea—including the Consulate General in Asmara, the communications station in Kagnew, and the USIS office, Military Assistance Advisory Group, and Navy Medical Research Unit, all in Addis Ababa—and repatriation of American staff members. The United States subsequently ended weapons shipments to Ethiopia. See “Ethiopia Orders Five U.S. Facilities Shut, Staff Out,” *The Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 1977, p. A–1; Geoffrey Godsell, “Soviet Ethiopian gain could be short-lived,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 25, 1977, p. 1; and Peter Osnos, “Ethiopia Forms Alliance With Soviets, Capping Visit,” *The Washington Post*, May 7, 1977, p. A–9. During his May 4 news conference, Vance noted: “As you all know, the Ethiopians have asked us to withdraw a number of our people and from a number of facilities, which we have done. We had previously indicated to the Ethiopians that we had already decided that we were going to close down our communications facility at Asmara and, at the same time, to reduce our military assistance mission in Ethiopia.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1977, p. 519)

11 The NSC Global Issues Cluster’s March 22 evening report to Brzezinski reported: “*Some good news:* Gambia has expressed its ‘genuine pleasure’ with Carter’s stand.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2–4/77)
Prospects

The impact that US human rights initiatives will have over the next several months will depend in large part on how the US chooses to press the issue. Repeated protestations as to the universality of US concerns are in any case unlikely to dissuade most of the vulnerable governments from continuing to interpret even general US actions or pronouncements as being directed particularly at them.

The Soviets will be continuing their efforts to convince West European leaders that degeneration of the CSCE meeting into an acrimonious exchange of charges on implementation of the Helsinki final act would be a severe setback for détente. There are indications that some Europeans are already worried on this score and do not want the Soviets to be “put in the dock” at Belgrade. The Soviets may, in fact, believe that the asymmetry of US and West European perspectives on human rights can be exploited to create controversy and tension within the Atlantic Alliance.

In any case, the Soviets undoubtedly have compiled lists of countercomplaints on Helsinki non-compliance, socio-economic inequities and alleged injustices in US society, and discrepancies between US actions and the administration’s stand on human rights. Soviet propaganda organs have made it clear that Moscow is prepared to respond in kind if its human rights practices come under attack at Belgrade.

Other countries that have reacted most negatively to US human rights initiatives seem to be hoping for a “cooling off” period that would permit a resumption of less antagonistic bilateral relations and allow them to develop strategies for coping with the new situation. This is especially the case in Latin America, where recent congressional testimony by State Department officials and Secretary Vance’s Law Day Speech have been interpreted as signaling that the US is in the process of moderating its tactics for pursuing human rights objectives.12 Disappointment of such expectations would give added impetus to discussions among the Southern Cone countries about convincing the US that they are vitally important to its interest.

Criticism of alleged US disinterest in the world wide advancement of social and economic justice is likely to increase if the less developed countries conclude that the US plans to link human rights to interna-

12 Reference is to congressional testimony given by Todman and Derian. On April 5, Todman testified before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs and Derian before the HCIR’s Foreign Assistance Subcommittee. For Todman’s testimony, see Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1977, pp. 444–46. A draft of Derian’s statement is in the Department of State, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files: Lot 80D177, PGOV—Congressional. Regarding Vance’s April 30 Law Day speech, see Document 39.
tional economic issues by seeking to further its human rights objectives in international financial institutions whose charters call for loan decisions to be made strictly on the basis of economic considerations. The “North-South” dialogue, moreover, could become considerably more contentious generally if controversy over human rights were to severely damage US relations with nations (like Brazil) that have played significant moderating roles in the articulation of LDC demands.

43. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter

Washington, May 12, 1977

I have just reviewed the proposed ten goals for foreign policy suggested by Zbig and would like to make the following points. The proposals make a good deal of sense to me and I think will be of great value in guiding our policies and measuring our success. I believe they ought to be stated in public very generally, because they are ambitious goals and it will be difficult to fully succeed on all of them within the four-year time span.

I think it is important that our pursuit of human rights stand on its own ground. We pursue that course not for other political reasons, but because we believe in human rights. In Objective 4, we say, “We should match Soviet ideological expansion by a more affirmative American posture on global human rights,” and on Objective 7, we propose progress on human rights “in order to stem continental radicalization and to eliminate Soviet-Cuban presence from the Continent.” Both formulations suggest that a major motivation for our espousal of human rights is based on a tactical advantage against the Soviet Union. I think

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Office of the Vice President, Box 205, Memos from the VP to the President [2/3–6/30/77]. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Brzezinski.

2 According to Brzezinski’s memoirs, he had suggested to Carter in January 1977 that the NSC Staff produce a briefing book containing the 4-year goals of the Carter administration. Throughout the spring of 1977, the NSC Staff began preparing extensive documentation outlining the 10 primary foreign policy goals of the Carter administration, culminating in a 43-page paper. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 52–53) The paper is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. In an undated memorandum to the President, Brzezinski summarized the overall concept of the activity and listed the 10 major objectives. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 27, Goals/Initiative: 4–5/77)
that is true, but I believe the basis of our support of human rights should be that we would espouse them and support them even if it were an asset to the Soviet Union, which, of course, it isn’t. I think that human rights, if pursued in a sophisticated but committed fashion, could be the most important contribution that the Carter Presidency will make to foreign policy. I think it is already showing fruits and I think you are the first President to be able to pursue this policy effectively without being charged with hypocrisy either personally or in terms of the American society.

I note the attached editorial in this morning’s *New York Times*, which is beginning to question our commitment. We cannot permit that to happen. (“Hands have no tears to flow”)

The last phrase in Objective 10 worries me because, unless defined, it sounds like Viet Nam. It reads “to develop capabilities, to deter or counter the Soviet military intervention in the third world . . .” Of course we must. I am not arguing with the objective here, but I do think we should not mechanically pursue a global policy to counter Soviet intervention. Sometimes that intervention is more of a trap for them and an asset to us. As we have shown in Zaire, if we are careful, others will do it and, as we involve ourselves too much in some of these disputes, we undermine the capability of the indigenous forces to defend themselves. We look negative.

On page 6, we cast our definition of human rights by a way of remedies to nudge or force violating societies to improve, and I have no objection to that, but I think an equal part of our effort should be to honor societies which are making progress on their own, for example, Spain, Portugal, India, Peru. That aspect of our human rights policy is not reflected either on page 6 or pages 36 and 37. I think it should be.

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3 Not printed. Entitled “The Power and the Pity,” the editorial referenced Carter’s apparent restraint in either identifying specific countries as human rights violators or speaking out for the rights of dissidents. Noting Carter’s willingness to advocate for Welsh poet Dylan Thomas’ commemoration in Westminster Abbey’s Poet’s Corner, the *Times* editorial staff commented, “Washington’s present restraint on the subject of repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is an accommodation that Dylan Thomas would have understood.” (*The New York Times*, May 12, 1977, p. 26)

4 The “Hands have no tears to flow” line Mondale references is taken from a Thomas poem that Carter used as an epigraph in his 1976 book *Why Not the Best?*

5 The complete text reads: “To maintain a defense posture capable of deterring the Soviet Union both on the strategic and conventional levels from hostile acts and from political pressures. This will require the U.S. to modernize, rationalize, and reconceptualize its defense posture in keeping with the broad changes in world affairs that have already been noted, to improve NATO military strength and readiness, and to develop capabilities to deter or to counter Soviet military intervention in the Third World.” (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 27, Goals/Initiative: 4-5/77)
I find the analysis of so-called “regional influentials” to be very interesting, but the separate analysis does not deal with the status of human rights and how the violation of those principles by some of those countries affects our relations, which I think is the really tough point. Unless we include that aspect in the approach, I fear we will be pursuing improved relations and implying a disregard for human rights at the same time—for example, Brazil.

44. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

PERSPECTIVES—Human Rights Worldwide (Approved by Department of State, 17 May 1977)

1. In recent months there has been considerable commentary on the global nature of human rights violations, with emphasis that these abuses have not been confined to any one geographic area or political philosophy. The character of violations has varied from country to country as has the degree of sensitivity vis-à-vis U.S. policy interests. U.S. and Western European leaders have registered increasing concern over human rights abuses and have argued for a general campaign to counter this phenomenon throughout the world. President Carter’s position on human rights has received world-wide attention, and U.S. human rights policy is being advanced by various levels of the U.S. Government in its relations with other countries.

2. Stations are encouraged to apply their regional expertise and feel for the local scene to promote human rights locally and internationally. [12 lines not declassified]

3. [1 line not declassified] it is suggested that you draw upon the following concepts, which have been approved by the State Department.

A. Mention legal and international commitments to honor human rights. Most of the offending governments are parties to such United Nations resolutions as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (approved in 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M00980R: Subject Committee Files, Box 27, Folder 13: Covert Actions. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
Rights (adopted in 1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966). Discuss the guarantees which these documents provide.

B. Remind contacts of the essentially apolitical nature of the concern for human rights. Offending regimes often try to smear human rights activists at home and abroad as subversives seeking the downfall of the ruling government or ruling political philosophy.

C. Observe that the abuse of human rights and the failure to honor pertinent laws and international agreements may create obstacles to the achievement of the foreign policy objectives. Third World leaders may be particularly susceptible to damage to their country’s self-image which would amount to losing face before the international community.

D. Indicate that abuse of human rights will negatively affect the character of relations between the U.S. and foreign governments in all areas.

45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights PRM

Attached at Tab A is a human rights PRM2 which has been the subject of substantial interagency—and intra-NSC—discussion. After preliminary meetings, several concerned agencies were asked to submit drafts of a human rights PRM. These were coordinated and a redraft in-

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1977. Confidential. Sent for action. Tuchman sent Brzezinski the memorandum under a May 17 covering memorandum, which Inderfurth asked her to prepare on May 13, recommending that Brzezinski forward the memorandum to Carter. Handwritten notations by Inderfurth and Hormats on the covering memorandum read: “This PRM is now ready to go. I suggest, however, that a length limitation—say 25 pages—be placed on the response. RL.” and “I agree with Rick on length. Jessica should ride this one clearly lest it turn into treatise on the issue. RH.” (Ibid.)

2 Printed as Document 46.
corporating many of their ideas was produced and debated at a meeting of about a dozen NSC staff members.³

The resulting PRM is intended to elicit a review that would provide a sound theoretical and analytical base for a human rights policy, while at the same time avoiding the risk of philosophical debates. More specifically, the review will define (for the first time) exactly what our objectives are in pursuing this policy. It will attempt to deal with the realities imposed by existing law, and provide us with the basis for deciding whether such legislation can in fact be honestly implemented. It will evaluate the full range of policy tools available to the government (both unilaterally and in multinational forums) and will analyze their pros and cons. It will review important national security tradeoffs, and will propose a strategy for improving Congressional relations on human rights. Finally, the study will examine bureaucratic obstructions to pursuing a successful human rights policy, and will propose bureaucratic changes (reorganization, policy guidance needed in the field, etc.) that appear necessary.⁴

Recommendation:

That you approve issuance of the human rights PRM at Tab A.⁵

³ Not found and not further identified.

⁴ Brzezinski added the following handwritten notation: “Please note that I have deliberately placed the review—a truly interagency matter—under SCC (and not under PRC-State).” In a May 17 note to Brzezinski, Treverton commented, “At issue [with the PRM] is whether the review will be chaired by State in the PRC or done directly by the NSC; as DA [David Aaron] recommended—meaning, I presume, you effectively as chairman. GFT.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1977)

⁵ The President placed a check mark on the approval line and added his initial at the bottom of the memorandum.
46. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–28

Washington, May 20, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT

Human Rights

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee undertake a review of U.S. policy with respect to human rights. The review should:

1. Define U.S. objectives in the area of human rights, including, where appropriate, the timeframe for achieving such objectives.

2. Identify what constitutes “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”, listing those nations which currently fit this definition.

3. Evaluate actions which the U.S. could take to improve human rights conditions. Consideration should be given but not limited to the following:
   a. Diplomatic actions, public statements, and various symbolic acts.
   b. Changes in levels of security and economic assistance and food aid—as both sanctions and incentives.
   c. Initiatives in International Financial Institutions of which the U.S. is a member.

d. Use of overseas radio, and later television, broadcast facilities.  
e. Improved access into the U.S. for refugees and dissidents, with an evaluation of the relevant sections of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.  
f. Substantive and procedural initiatives the U.S. could take in various international forums.  

4. Review national security aspects of U.S. policies on human rights, including consideration of their impact on: U.S.–Soviet détente; friendly states and allies; and other areas of major strategic concern such as the PRC and the Koreas.  

5. Propose actions which can be taken to give authority and bureaucratic access to those charged with the responsibility for integrating human rights considerations into U.S. foreign policy, including in U.S. missions abroad.  

6. Develop a strategy to improve the Administration’s relations with Congress in this area.  

The review should be completed by July 1, 1977, and should be no longer than 30 pages.  

Zbigniew Brzezinski

47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, May 23, 1977

SUBJECT

Signing of the American Convention on Human Rights

In your Pan American Day speech, you made two specific commitments—to sign and seek the ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco\textsuperscript{3} and of the American Convention on Human Rights.\textsuperscript{4} The most prevalent reaction to your speech by Latin Americans was whether you would follow up on your promises, and this will undoubtedly be a question Mrs. Carter will hear on her trip.\textsuperscript{5} Therefore, I would recommend that you try to sign both treaties before or during her trip.

The Mexicans will be bringing Protocol I with them for their Cabinet meeting in Washington on Thursday, May 26,\textsuperscript{6} and it would be appropriate to sign it with Mrs. Carter present, before your flight to St. Simons Island.\textsuperscript{7}

As far as the American Convention, it would seem particularly appropriate if you could sign that on May 31, when Mrs. Carter arrives in Costa Rica, where much of the discussion will probably be focused on human rights issues.

The State Department Legal Adviser and Bob Lipshutz believe that we can have all the necessary documents ready by late this week. Since the Convention is deposited at the OAS, you would have to sign it there. I believe the event would give added meaning to Mrs. Carter’s visit in Costa Rica.

\textsuperscript{3} The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), which prohibited and prevented the development, testing, use, or manufacture of nuclear weapons, contained two protocols. Protocol I committed countries outside of the Treaty zone to undertake obligations of the Treaty with respect to their territories within the zone. Protocol II, which Vice President Humphrey signed on behalf of the United States on April 1, 1968, called upon states possessing nuclear weapons that agree to respect the obligations in the Treaty to not use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. For additional information, see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1964–1968, volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 226.

\textsuperscript{4} The OAS adopted the American Convention on Human Rights at San José, Costa Rica, on November 22, 1969. In a May 31, 1977, briefing memorandum to Christopher, Hansell indicated that the Convention “treats in detail a wide range of civil and political rights, and establishes both a Commission and a Court to consider complaints of violations of human rights protected by the Convention. The great majority of the provisions of the Convention are entirely consistent with the letter and the spirit of the U.S. Constitution and laws.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770103–1218)

\textsuperscript{5} Reference is to First Lady Rosalynn Carter’s goodwill trip to Jamaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela May 30–June 8.

\textsuperscript{6} Minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1977–1980, volume XXVI, Arms Control.

\textsuperscript{7} The Carter family planned to depart for Musgrove Plantation, on Saint Simons Island, the afternoon of May 26 in order to spend Memorial Day weekend in Georgia. Mrs. Carter left for Jamaica on May 30; the President and Amy Carter returned to Washington on May 31. (Carter, \textit{White House Diary}, pp. 57–60)
Recommendation

That you sign Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on May 26 in Washington, before flying to St. Simons Island, and that you sign the American Convention on Human Rights at the OAS on May 31.8

8 Carter placed a check mark on the approval line and added a handwritten note: “Can’t it be brought to me?” The President signed Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the White House on May 26 and the American Convention on Human Rights at OAS headquarters on June 1. For his remarks at each signing ceremony, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 1027 and 1050–1051.

48. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, May 23, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Human Rights

This memorandum (1) provides a brief status report on measures being taken here to assure that our human rights policy is effectively implemented and (2) requests that you approve a means for interagency coordination on human rights.

1. To implement our human rights policy, we have organized a broadscale effort involving all relevant bureaus of the Department as well as all U.S. posts abroad. As part of this program, we have directed the following:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Tasking Memos. Confidential. Another copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 122, Vance, Misc. Communications with: 5/77. In the same file is a May 3 memorandum from Christopher to Vance specifying the actions that Christopher had taken or planned to take “to insure that our policy is implemented in the full range of U.S. diplomatic efforts.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Tasking Memos) Christopher’s memorandum is an updated and expanded version of both Lake’s March 25 memorandum requesting that Christopher approve various action items (see Document 29) and the redrafted version of the March 25 memorandum, which is attached to Lake’s April 14 memorandum to Christopher (see Document 34).
—Specific proposed courses of action with respect to each country, with consideration to be given to each of the available approaches to encourage recognition of human rights.
—Strategy papers and action plans on how best to use security assistance, bilateral economic aid, and U.S. participation in international financial institutions to promote human rights.
—Action plans on more creative use of public diplomacy (e.g., through USIA’s efforts) to further human rights.
—Action plans for using multilateral institutions to promote human rights.
—More effective cooperation with the Hill and the growing numbers of human rights lobbies.

In addition, I have directed circulation throughout the Department and to all U.S. posts abroad of important statements on human rights made by you and senior Administration officials, including of course the Law Day speech. I have also appointed Warren Christopher as Chairman of the Department’s Human Rights Coordinating Group which oversees all major human rights decisions within the State Department, AID and USIA.

2. To enlist fullest possible support for our human rights policy, coordination throughout the Executive Branch is necessary. Many decisions in this area require collaboration with, for example, the Department of Defense, the Treasury, and the National Security Council.

In one particular area—decision-making on human rights issues as they relate to foreign assistance—interdepartmental coordination is already being provided by an interagency group formed pursuant to an NSC memorandum of April 1. That memo specified that the group should be chaired by my representative, and earlier this month I designated Warren Christopher as Chairman.

I believe that the coordination should now be broadened to include Executive Branch efforts on all fronts. The State Department is prepared to take the lead, if you agree.

Recommendation

That you direct the State Department to coordinate Executive Branch efforts affecting the promotion of human rights abroad.

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2 See Document 39.
3 See Document 14.
4 See Document 31.
5 There is no indication as to whether the President approved or disapproved the recommendation. A handwritten notation on another copy of the memorandum reads: “No Record in White House per WH Suspense. OBE.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770144–0667)
49. Memorandum From the Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider) to the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian)\(^1\)

Washington, May 23, 1977

SUBJECT
PRM Meeting

1. **Primary Goal:**
   Retraction of PRM on basis that all or virtually all objectives are now in process of being resolved.

2. **Strategy:**
   (a) Define interface between on-going activities and PRM;
   (b) Emphasize overall coordination will be hampered by interfering in process already set in motion by NSC April 1 memorandum calling on State to establish inter-agency committee\(^2\) (in place).
   (c) Recommend reporting by inter-agency committee on weekly basis of actions undertaken—but by agency representatives to their respective agencies based on D/HA summary of inter-agency meetings.

3. **Interface between on-going activities and PRM:**
   (a) First objective is “Define U.S. objectives in the area of human rights, including, where appropriate, the timeframe for achieving such objectives.”

**RESPONSE:** The Deputy Secretary was charged by the Secretary with following up on the NSC Memorandum of April 1. On that basis, country action plans are currently being drawn up which focus on specific U.S. objectives.\(^3\) These plans, as well as objectives in such functional areas as International Organizations (UN, ILO, etc.) are soon to be available. Those objectives, spelled out along with summary of current conditions, will be provided through the inter-agency committee.

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\(^{2}\) See Document 31.

\(^{3}\) In a May 12 memorandum to Holbrooke, Christopher directed EA to develop country-specific action plans and submit them to Schneider and Vogelgesang by June 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830106–1949)
to other departments. The directions include requiring, in the case of specific countries, 3, 6-month and 1 year and beyond time frames.

(b) Identify what constitutes “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”, listing those nations which currently fit this definition. The proverbial “hit list”, it is the single area in the PRM where no formal action has been undertaken.

However, at the same time, it should be noted that D/HA has been in touch with the authors of the language and with legal scholars to provide a tentative analysis of the words involved.

(c) Evaluate actions, etc.:

1. “Diplomatic actions, public statements, and various symbolic acts.”

   RESPONSE: All of these elements are contained in the directions previously submitted by D/HA to regional bureaus for consideration in preparation of country action plans.

2. “Changes in levels of security and economic assistance and food aid—as both sanctions and incentives.”

   RESPONSE: Again, specifically cited in directions to Bureaus in preparation of country action plans. Inter-Agency Committee and Arms Export Control Board now engaged in developing procedures for consideration of existing programs, loans, grants and sales under those programs, and future budget proposals.

3. “Initiatives in International Financial Institutions of which the U.S. is a member.”

   RESPONSE: Inter-Agency Committee has not begun to deal with current loans in IFI’s but to establish procedure for early action within IFI’s to link loan activity to promotion of human rights.

4. “Use of overseas radio, and later television, broadcast facilities.” Preparation of specific human rights action plans by USIA, CU and PA will be completed for consideration by Coordinating Committee and by Inter-Agency Committee.

5. “Improved access into the U.S. etc.”: Previously mandated and recommendations submitted. Being considered by White House. Although, if the last recommendation from State was negative on amending the law, perhaps this can be viewed as the basis for a new evaluation.

6. “... international forums.”

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4 On May 13, Schneider provided the regional bureaus with guidance concerning the preparation of action plans. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Tasking Memos)
RESPONSE: Being undertaken by IO with results to come before Coordinating Group in State and then Inter-Agency Committee.\(^5\)

4. “Review national security aspects, etc.”:

As it relates to “friendly states and allies” part of the country action plans. Similarly, as it relates to Korea. PRC action up in the air.

5. “Develop a strategy . . . relations with Congress . . .”:

RESPONSE: Initially undertaken through the Inter-Agency Committee as it related to IFI’s and through SAPRC with regard to security assistance. H in process of preparation following Christopher to Vance memo,\(^6\) although actual tasking memo not yet approved.

\(^5\) See Document 52.

\(^6\) In Christopher’s May 3 memorandum to Vance, he commented that the administration’s “strategy for Congressional relations on the human rights question need not be so much a ‘strategy’ as an attitude. That attitude should start and end with the determination to work with the Congress.” He indicated that in addition to promoting cooperation between Congress and the Department of State, he had instructed D and D/HA to meet with representatives of the major Washington-based human rights organizations. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Tasking Memos)

50. Memorandum for the Record\(^1\)

Washington, May 24, 1977

SUBJECT

Initial Meeting of Interagency Working Group for PRM–28 (Human Rights), 24 May 1977

1. Cord Meyer, SA/DDCI, and [less than 1 line not declassified] represented CIA at a 24 May meeting at EOB of an Interagency Working Group to prepare PRM–28 (Human Rights). The meeting was temporarily chaired by Ms. Jessica Tuchman, Chief of NSC’s Office of Global Issues, until the arrival of the permanent Chairperson, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91M00696R: Subject Policy Files Box 1, Folder 3: Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM/NSC) 1977. Confidential; CIA internal use only. Prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis on May 25.
2. Ms. Tuchman organized the meeting to consider the suitability of her draft outline for the PRM, dated 20 May, and already “approved” by President Carter. (copy attached)²

3. Ms. Tuchman delivered an illuminating sketch of the previous history of the PRM. Apparently, a draft outline that she prepared in February was rejected by the NSC in March.³ Because the Human Rights aspect of US approval of loan decisions of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) required immediate attention, an Interagency Working Group on Economic Assistance and Human Rights was set up. NSC, State, Treasury, Commerce (?), and later DOD, were members. This group is now replaced by the larger group invited to the meeting (which in addition to CIA, now also includes Justice, USIA, AID and a representative of the Ambassador to the UN). State has the largest representation: the Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights (Ms. Derian, Mr. Schneider) and Policy Plans (Ms. Vogelgesang).

4. Early in the meeting, each member was asked to list the papers on human rights of his unit that could be made available to the group. In the course of the discussion, Ms. Tuchman praised the usefulness of CIA’s 11 May Memorandum “Impact of the US Stand on Human Rights,”⁴ and indicated that President Carter continues to read CIA’s weekly report on human rights.

5. Ms. Derian referred to Secretary Vance’s 30 April speech on Human Rights Policy⁵ as a major policy directive. Ms. Tuchman, however, characterized it as a great speech, but not a policy, and said that this was the President’s view of it as well.

6. Ms. Derian talked about the activities of her expanding office, in terms of Action Plans on Human Rights for each country and for International Organizations (including IFIs) as well. She apparently indicated that there was a need to move quickly to stay ahead of Congress’s measures restricting loans and military sales to poor performers in the human rights area. She indicated that many decisions were already being made with the human rights criteria in mind.

7. The actual discussion of the 20 May outline was brief and somewhat confused. Most participants wanted to discuss the means at hand to implement US policy. [name not declassified] indicated that it would be helpful if the objectives of the policy were discussed first, so that means and implications (the section of greatest concern to CIA) would be placed in a more meaningful perspective.

² Attached but not printed. PRM–28 is printed as Document 46.
³ See footnote 1, Document 22.
⁴ See Document 42.
⁵ See Document 39.
8. Deputy Secretary Christopher seemed to endorse this suggestion, as he adjourned the meeting more or less in midstream. The next meeting will discuss specific tasking for the PRM. It appears that the bulk, if not all, of the PRM will be drafted by State.

[name not declassified]

51. **Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts**

Washington, May 28, 1977, 2122Z

124544. From Deputy Secretary for the Ambassador. Subject: Priority Attention to Human Rights.

1. In his speech at Notre Dame, the President reaffirmed that our commitment to human rights is “a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.” To insure that the priority which the President and the Secretary place on human rights is fully reflected at your post, I request that you continue to give human rights matters your personal attention and you direct the Embassy’s work on human rights. Your personal involvement will insure that appropriate attention is given (a) to analysis and reporting on human rights practices; (b) to compliance with new and existing legislative provisions, particularly those bearing on our foreign assistance program; and, (c) in countries that share our respect for human rights, to encouraging international cooperation to protect and promote basic rights.

2. To support your efforts, basic documents in this field will be pouchied to you shortly. A follow-up cable will contain general guidance on our agenda for action on human rights and request specific post contributions to our overall action program.

Vance

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2 Reference is to the President’s May 22 commencement address to graduates of the University of Notre Dame, printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 954–962; and scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
52. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Maynes)

Washington, May 30, 1977

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy on Human Rights: Actions to be Taken

I have sent the attached memorandum (Tab 1) to the Secretary outlining a broadscale effort to implement our human rights policy as effectively as possible. That effort, which involves all relevant bureaus of the Department as well as AID, USIA and all U.S. posts abroad, is premised upon the comprehensive statement of policy set forth in the Secretary’s Law Day speech (Tab 2). That policy was recently amplified by the President in his speech at Notre Dame where he identified our basic commitment to promote the cause of human rights as the first of the cardinal premises on which our foreign policy rests.

In a related development an interagency policy review is under way under the aegis of the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) of the NSC. I will chair the SCC for the purpose of this review, which is designed to produce a concise paper and specific policy recommendations for the President. The review will further develop and refine the policies already enunciated by the Administration. The May 20 memorandum from Dr. Brzezinski setting out the terms of reference for the review is attached at Tab 3.

As you will see from my memorandum to the Secretary, one of the principal components of our effort is the development of an “Agenda for U.S. Action on Human Rights at the United Nations.” I would like you to undertake preparation of such an agenda for submission to the Human Rights Coordinating Group.

The agenda should encompass consideration of at least the following:

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2 Not found attached. Reference is to Christopher’s May 3 memorandum to Vance. See footnote 1, Document 48.
3 Not found attached. See Document 39.
4 See footnote 2, Document 51.
5 Not found attached. Reference is to PRM–28 (see Document 46).
(i) determining before the convening of each new session of the General Assembly and each major UN conference the priority human rights issues for special U.S. attention;

(ii) consulting early and often with close allies and, when possible, with non-aligned and third world nations, to identify human rights issues of shared concern and forge appropriate coalitions;

(iii) seeking ways to eliminate the racism-zionism issue, and trying to assure even-handed study and statements on country and area human rights situations so that not just a few countries are singled out;

(iv) following up on the President’s proposals for strengthening the HRC by more frequent meetings, by returning the Commission to New York, and by increasing its mandate with the appointment of a UN Human Rights Commissioner, and also to take steps to preserve the Commission’s procedures for dealing with private complaints on human rights.

Please do not feel constrained to limit your proposals to these five areas.

Paragraph 3(f) of the memorandum requesting the PRM seeks an evaluation of substantive and procedural initiatives the U.S. could take in various international forums to improve human rights conditions. The agenda I have requested above will clearly be of major assistance in preparing a response to paragraph 3(f). Since paragraph 3(f) is not limited to the UN, however, I would appreciate it if you would prepare a draft response to paragraph 3(f) setting forth any substantive and procedural initiatives you would recommend that the U.S. take in the UN as well as any other international forums to improve human rights conditions.

I think it is important to note, as you prepare your paper, that in his Law Day speech the Secretary (1) specifically defined the human rights which are the subject of our policy, (2) set forth in detail the questions to be considered as we determine whether and how to act with respect to human rights, and (3) stated that once we choose to act, the means available range from quiet diplomacy in its many forms, through public pronouncements, to withholding of assistance.

In addition to the above described action agenda, I would like you to prepare, in consultation with AID, and with clearance from D/HA and S/P, a status report on the observance of women’s rights as well as an action plan designed to foster greater observance of such rights. You may wish to consider the following in your paper: cooperation with U.S. women’s organizations; greater emphasis on women’s rights in the implementation of current U.S. legislation on development assistance; ways to follow-up on International Women’s Year.

Please have your staff contact Mr. Schneider of D/HA (Room 7802, x21181) for further details on substance, for information on format and
procedures, and, as needed, for copies of tasking memoranda sent to other bureaus in connection with this effort. Your papers should be submitted by close of business June 15, except that I would like your draft response to paragraph 3(f) by close of business June 7. A Human Rights Coordinating Group meeting will be scheduled after June 15 to discuss your proposals.

53. Note From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 6, 1977

Cy:

I plan to meet this week with the bureaus and agencies in the Department to discuss questions and problems they may be encountering in responding to the tasking memos they have received, which are referred to in the attached report.

To keep pressing forward but also to be coherent and responsible is a difficult balance, especially with a PRM in the works. I want to be sure the bureaus and agencies have an opportunity to express their concerns.

Warren

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Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 1, 1977

Status Report on U.S. Policy on Human Rights: Actions Being Taken

Since May 3 the following actions have been taken in accordance with the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary.

1. Communication of Policy to All Posts

A. The Atlanta Law Day speech was dispatched to all posts. Ambassadors and Embassy personnel informed the highest level of host governments of the speech and of U.S. human rights policy and reported on the reaction.

B. A cable has been sent to the posts directing the Ambassador to take personal responsibility for human rights reporting and for assuring Embassy personnel awareness of our human rights policy developments and of recent legislative and international legal developments in the human rights field.

C. The results of the policy review memorandum process now underway will be communicated to the posts at an appropriate time.

2. Action with Respect to Individual Countries

A. All regional assistant secretaries have been requested to submit draft reports on human rights conditions and appropriate recommendations for achieving human rights improvements. Each region is currently preparing three draft reports for submission by June 15 with the remainder due on July 1. Bureaus will both prepare draft reports for comment by individual posts and in other instances permit posts to prepare the initial report for review and comment by the bureaus.

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3 See footnote 1, Document 48.

4 See Document 51.

5 See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 49, and Document 52.
B. This process of defining conditions, obligations, and recommendations in accordance with the directives enunciated in your Law Day speech and the President’s Notre Dame speech appears the best way to avoid the concept of a country “hit” list since it will provide positive individual human rights strategies for each country rather than a pariah list.

3. Coordination of Policy

A. The State Department continues to maintain overall direction of the human rights policy coordination within the executive branch. The Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, which the Deputy Secretary chairs, met several times with full representation from other agencies to consider issues involving human rights and the International Financial Institutions.

B. A special coordinating committee, which the Deputy Secretary is chairing, has been designated by the NSC to complete a policy review memorandum (PRM 28) on human rights and foreign policy. The Department is taking the lead in developing a response to the PRM with initial drafts due June 7, committee review by June 15 and final review by June 22.

C. Internally the HRCG, which you previously established and which the Deputy Secretary chairs, has met to review action on human rights and IFIs prior to their consideration by the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.

D. An ad hoc working committee which D/HA and EB co-chair has been formed to provide initial recommendations to the HRCG and ultimately to the interagency committee, on bilateral and multilateral assistance issues relating to our human rights policy. In addition to co-chairing this group, D/HA also provides staff support to the HRCG and the inter-agency committee and acts as secretariat for those entities.

E. In the area of security assistance policy, D/HA has been named a full member of the proposed Arms Export Control Board and its

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6 See footnote 2, Document 51.

7 See Document 41. A 4-year listing of Christopher Committee meetings and countries discussed, prepared in 1980, indicates that the Committee met on May 6, 18, and 19. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, IAGHRFA—History & Organization)

8 See Document 46.

9 The Department of State’s outline for the response to PRM/NSC–28 is printed as Document 54.

10 See Document 14.
various working groups. Policy guidelines can be discussed in this setting prior to further consideration of human rights and security assistance issues within the HRCG and the interagency committee.

F. D/HA has cooperated with the Foreign Service Institute in organizing the first seminar on human rights and will collaborate with the institute in future efforts to strengthen the understanding of our human rights policy within the Department and receive the counsel of on-line foreign service officers as to how best to implement that policy.

4. Economic Assistance

A. AID will be submitting drafts of its “New Initiatives in Human Rights” program as part of its response to the PRM, with a final report by mid-June.11

B. D/HA has met with the representatives of several other industrial nations, to discuss ways of cooperating on human rights. The consultation process will be continuing and will be bolstered by the recommendations from appropriate posts on how to accomplish this goal.

C. AID is drawing up a program covering what has been done and what will be done to promote women’s rights.12

D. With regard to multilateral programs:
   (i) a procedure ensuring long lead time notice for IFI loans is near completion with the previously mentioned ad hoc working committee as the first source of screening for human rights considerations.
   (ii) EB is developing a paper on the implementation of our human rights policy through the IFI’s. A summary draft will be completed by June 7 as part of the PRM exercise.
   (iii) the implementation of our human rights policy in the IFIs has gone forward at the same time as we have responded to upcoming loans in the various IFIs. In two instances (Ethiopia and Benin), we have abstained on World Bank votes on human rights grounds; in two other instances (El Salvador and Argentina) we have indicated that human rights considerations would likely produce a negative vote and suggested the appropriateness of a delay in considering the loans.13 In the case of El Salvador, the delay was requested by that government. Our Embassy reported that the IFI action had engendered the first clear recognition on the part of the GOES of our seriousness in seeking

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11 See Tab A, Document 58.
12 See Tab B, Document 58.
13 The Interagency Group reached agreement on the course of actions for these countries at its May 19 meeting. (Meeting minutes, May 20; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I)
human rights improvements. In the case of Argentina, our concern was communicated by the Secretary of Treasury at the IBD annual meeting. No final decision by the Argentine government in this matter has yet taken place.

In several other instances, demarches have been made to indicate that we are considering human rights factors as we evaluate IFI loans in keeping with the President’s stated intention of using our voice and vote in the IFI’s to promote human rights. In the case of Paraguay, the demarche produced a promise on the part of that government to respond favorably to the IAHRC request to visit Paraguay. The formal invitation, however, has not yet been offered. Other instances in which general demarches were made include Malawi and the Philippines. Other demarches are in process for Indonesia, Guatemala and Romania.

These actions have given substance to the Administration’s human rights policy in the IFIs and thereby improved the chances for the success of our legislative strategy. However, continuing evidence on this policy is clearly necessary if the legislative strategy is ultimately to be successful.

5. Security Assistance

As noted, the Arms Export Control Board is now in operation with D/HA participation and initial efforts to define policy guidelines are underway. In relation to our effort and in conjunction with the PRM, a summary statement will be available June 7. In addition, D/HA, in fulfilling its legislative requirements, has continued to advise on arms transfers to countries with human rights problems. The reports now being prepared for each country also will discuss ways in which security assistance programs can be modified in order to help implement our human rights policy.

6. Cooperation with the Congress

H has been actively engaged in security assistance, State Department authorization, IFI activities, and economic assistance legislation. In addition H has worked closely with other bureaus and the White House in pressing for the consideration of the Genocide treaty. The Deputy Secretary opened the Senate ratification hearings on the

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14 In telegram 2297 from San Salvador, May 17, the Embassy reported that the threat of a U.S. veto of an IDB loan to the Government of El Salvador had signaled a “new GOES attitude on human rights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770175-0468)

15 The eighteenth annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank convened in Guatemala City, Guatemala, May 30–June 1, 1977.
This has been part of the developing strategy for ratification for the United Nations covenants and conventions and the OAS Convention on Human Rights, which the President signed this week.\footnote{Reference is to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951. (A/RES/260(III)A) President Truman submitted the Convention to the Senate in 1949. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had favorably reported the Convention, the Senate as a whole had not given its advice and consent as of early 1977. In a May 23 message to the Senate, the President urged ratification of the Convention, noting that ratification “would be a significant enhancement of the human rights commitments of this nation, demonstrating again to the world in concrete fashion our determination to advance and protect human rights.” Carter’s message is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1977, p. 676. Christopher testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 24, asserting, “There is no valid moral, political, or legal argument against U.S. adherence to the genocide convention. There are strong moral, political, and legal reasons why we should become a party.” (Ibid., p. 678)}

While the balance sheet is still in our favor and a cooperative and friendly attitude has dominated the process, there is growing questioning among some sectors of the Congress with regard to the vigor of our human rights policy. This was most apparent in the IFI legislation in the House but has recurred on several security assistance matters. Closer coordination by D/HA and H with the more outspoken advocates on the Hill should take place. There remains a basic receptivity to our policy if a greater number of specific actions can be cited, even privately, to these Congressmen and Senators.

D/HA has been meeting with the human rights organizations in Washington on an individual basis and participated as well in NGO activities.

7. Multilateral Diplomacy

a. The United Nations

In response to the Deputy Secretary’s previous memorandum and in keeping with the PRM, IO is working actively on “an agenda for U.S. action on Human Rights at the United Nations” and has engaged in efforts to seek the appointment of a UN Human Rights Commissioner and to strengthen the UNHRC.

b. The Organization of American States (OAS)

Preparations are well underway for efforts to strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission at the upcoming General Assembly including efforts to obtain budgetary increases, increasing the number of visits, more adequate debate and broader educational programs. ARA also is preparing papers in other ways to strengthen OAS human rights activities.

See Document 47.
8. Improving U.S. Performance and Defense of American Rights

The visa policy review has not yet been completed, although a decision is currently pending by the President on this issue and on possible legislative amendment. This matter also will be treated as part of the PRM exercise.

9. Public Diplomacy

Both as part of the PRM exercise and in response to tasking memorandums within the Department, USIA, CU, and PA are exploring ways to improve public awareness and understanding of our human rights policy. The first town meeting in Los Angeles emphasized the human rights policy and upcoming town meetings will advance that effort.

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18 For the USIA proposal, see Document 60.
19 The Department’s first town hall meeting took place at the Los Angeles Hilton Hotel on May 20. At one of the sessions, Derian summarized the administration’s human rights platform and reiterated the administration’s commitment to global rights issues: “We’re really concerned about basic human rights around the world. President Carter is very serious about human rights. This is not a fad. This commitment has become a key element in the consideration of American foreign policy.” (Tendayi Kumbula, “Human Rights Stressed at L.A. Meetings,” The Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1977, p. A–26)

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54. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, June 8, 1977

OUTLINE—PRM 28 RESPONSE

I. Objectives:

A. The United States human rights policy must be consistent with existing international obligations, domestic law and our nation’s heritage. It must be reflected throughout the executive branch and be prem-
ised on an understanding of the task and the need for a long-term commitment to produce results. The overall goal is to promote the observance of internationally-accepted standards of human rights throughout the world.

1. Specific objectives (the time frame for the attainment of these objectives will depend greatly on individual country circumstances, and on the degree of coherence and persistence of U.S. human rights advocacy).

   (a) Promotion of rights of the person in all countries. The initial objective should be focused on countries with whom we have the greatest degree of involvement. Failure to see human rights improvements ultimately will jeopardize those bilateral relations.

   (b) Promotion of civil and political liberties. The encouragement of and identification of U.S. with democratic countries and those moving in that direction is a legitimate goal, and one which has direct relevance to the enhancement of rights of the person.

   (c) Promotion of such basic needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. This objective can be sought most effectively through positive support and international action.

   (d) Achievement of greater international awareness and concern in improving human rights conditions.

   (e) Reduction in the level of U.S. association with regimes which engage in gross violations of human rights of their citizens. It will demonstrate our own commitment to human rights goals, maintain public confidence in the thrust of our foreign policy, and, hopefully, influence the nation involved and other states as well.

1—Lessening our identification could reach a halt to all assistance and support if a country rejects pleas for improvements and moves along a path of institutionalizing its repressive features.

2—Disassociation involving full cut-offs of assistance would occur where any country reached the threshold defined as being engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” “Consistent pattern” would be defined in terms of period of time, regular nature and trend. “Gross violations” would focus on those rights of the person cited in current law—and derived from United Nations Resolution—“torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.”

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2 Presumable reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 3452(XXX), adopted on December 9, 1975.
3—In making that determination as well as in examining the conditions in countries which may not reach that level, similar questions would be asked in each case: the kind of violations or deprivations, the extent, the pattern, the trend, the degree of government control and responsibility and the willingness to submit to outside investigation.

(f) To demonstrate by the closeness of our relations, including special treatment in our assistance programs, our readiness to support those countries which preserve respect for human rights.

(g) Work toward the development and strengthening of international institutional protection of human rights through the ratification of relevant international covenants and treaties by the U.S. and other nations.

(h) Promote international humanitarian programs with the goal of easing conditions of political refugees.

(i) Develop public understanding and support for our policy through the involvement of non-governmental organizations and close collaboration with the Congress.

(j) Ensure that other nations know clearly our human rights policy and seek to obtain the broadest support for that policy from other democratic nations.

II. Strategies for pursuing policy objectives:

A. Available mechanisms to implement a human rights policy:

1. Symbolic acts such as public statements and personal visits represent an important declarative aspect of the policy, particularly as it relates to general goals.

2. Diplomatic actions should be an integral part of individual country strategy. These actions essentially are preliminary contacts setting the stage for an understanding by the host government of the implications of failing to improve human rights conditions. Later, such demarches can provide signals as to U.S. current sense of human rights conditions.

   (a) Defining ahead of time the likely sanctions and incentives related to human rights objectives permits other governments an early opportunity to respond privately to our concerns.

   (b) The existence of statutory restrictions on economic and security assistance on human rights should be communicated as an indication of broad support for overall human rights policy.

3. Foreign assistance as leverage:

   (a) Security Assistance (including grant MAP, FMS sales, training, size of U.S. military personnel complement in country, and commercial arms license approval) generally should be the first area of aid to a government to be reduced. Such assistance is usually viewed as linking the
U.S. most directly with a repressive regime. So far as possible, in light of 502B, the reduction of assistance should continue over a period of months during which the government is clearly placed on alert and aware of the linkage between human rights concerns and security assistance.

1—Interface between security assistance policy and human rights policy must be communicated fully to each government. Gradual action to reduce the level and kind of assistance is desirable.

2—Commercial arms licenses for repressive regimes should be used along with all other security assistance programs to communicate our human rights concerns.

(b) Economic Assistance:

1—Bilateral AID programs should be determined in light of human rights factors. At the same time, efforts should be made to respond positively to governments which act to improve human rights conditions. Additional efforts to ensure expansion of “New Initiatives”, furtherance of human rights, and establishment of women’s rights agenda.

2—Multilateral assistance:

a) Within the International Financial Institutions, the United States can promote its objectives by insuring a concern for human rights conditions, particularly as they relate to rights of the person, at every level of the IFI’s operations. Concern for these rights in the IFI’s is not only called for by the President’s policy, but it also is the likely outcome of the current IFI authorization legislative process and is consistent with the broad development purpose set forth in IFI charters.

(c) There is no other effective way to demonstrate U.S. willingness to risk costs in support of human rights objectives than to reduce or end its bilateral assistance to a consistent violator.

(d) It also is a way of inducing greatest pressure within a regime for change. The benefits of continued repression thus are outweighed by the negative consequences of reduced U.S. assistance, the possibility of similar action by other countries, and the criticism of international public opinion.

4. Greater use of overseas radio, television broadcast facilities and other educational and cultural exchange both to convey information on the human rights activities of the Administration and to report on international human rights developments.

a) CSCE compliance with cultural, journalistic and educational exchange should be emphasized.

\(^3\) Section 502(B) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976.
(b) Expanding information in developing regions can both educate and promote greater human rights observance.

5. Initiatives to promote refugee relief:
   (a) Improved access into the U.S. for refugees and dissidents by increasing conditional entry numbers and conforming definition of refugee to UN non-discriminatory language, both involving legislation.
   (b) Additionally, we might submit legislation to remove any numerical limitation on refugees the President could admit under a parole where he is responding to a legitimate international appeal or where an emergent refugee situation is of special concern to the U.S.

6. Initiatives in international organizations:
   (a) Coordinate effort to obtain a United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights.
   (b) Promote human rights in U.N. specialized agencies.
   (c) Strengthen independence and increase resources of United Nations and Inter-American Human Rights Commission.
   (d) Promote creation of African Human Rights Commission.

III. Competing Interests: National Security Considerations:

   A. The national security interests of the U.S. may be affected by decisions to promote human rights where the end result is less identification with a country engaged in human rights violations.
      1. Close identification with a repressive regime during this period also may risk longer term alienation of U.S. from the people of that country and any following government identified with democratic principles and human rights.

   B. US-Soviet détente:
      1. The overriding importance of nuclear arms control to both the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the human rights related goal of avoiding nuclear war would argue against linking this issue to specific human rights improvements.
      2. A similar argument would not hold in relation to other aspects of détente, such as improved economic relations, expansion of trade and commerce, or non-contentious relations. Linkage in these areas, privately applied, could be feasible and fruitful.

   C. Friendly states and allies:
      1. Emphasizing human rights concerns with such states in few instances could produce significant impacts on U.S. national security concerns. In fact, the failure to demonstrate those concerns in the cases of Greece and Spain may have produced a threat to maintenance of U.S. military bases in those countries.
      2. Emphasizing those concerns with friendly states and allies who are not human rights violators (Western Europe) could promote greater cooperation and joint action in this area.
3. Emphasizing those concerns with Israel would complicate relations with that country. However, it also might produce some human rights improvements.

D. Korea: Failure to improve human rights situation would produce Congressionally mandated reductions in U.S. identification with the current regime. Current planned withdrawal of U.S. troops probably diminishes leverage available in influencing improvement. However, the converse also is true in that the removal of troops places greater importance on maintenance of remaining security assistance.

E. PRC: At least the initial stages of the normalization process probably are inappropriate to press for major human rights improvements. Any hope of achieving such improvements awaits further action in the normalization process.

IV. Internal Organization of Human Rights Efforts:

A. D/HA within the Department of State is charged by law with coordinating human rights activities for the Secretary of State.

B. Within the federal government, the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by the Deputy Secretary should continue to function, although expanded to involve all human rights considerations affecting U.S. foreign policy. In defining objectives, U.S. missions abroad are vital to help define the objectives and the tactics to achieve them. Initial action in this area already is underway.

C. Crucial is full Presidential support for policy implementation within executive agencies.

V. Congressional Relations:

A. Key strategy must be to demonstrate credibility of policy, to involve the Congress in helping to develop policy and involve the Congress in the review of implementation.

B. Early and thorough involvement in establishment of policy and implementation would avoid confrontation.

C. In-depth and frequent briefing of congressional staff also should be part of the strategy.
55. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Bergsten) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, June 9, 1977

SUBJECT
Human Rights and the IFIs

From our experience thus far I strongly believe we need the following to improve the process by which we make human rights decisions in connection with IFI loan proposals:

1. timely written reports on the human rights situation in the borrowing countries in question,
2. specific criteria for judging performance and changes in the human rights situation in offending countries, and
3. a system for coordinating with other countries concerning U.S. action on human rights and foreign assistance.

Concerning (1), above, the recent case of Benin made it clear that we need up-to-date reports on the status of human rights conditions before making a decision on how the United States should vote, and on any other necessary actions. In the Benin case we abstained on two IDA credits in May, apparently on the basis of a human rights report made in January of this year.² I believe we should have an up-to-date written report on the human rights situation (including an indication of sources

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770148–1054. No classification marking. Katz transmitted Bergsten’s memorandum to Christopher under a June 21 action memorandum and requested that Christopher approve a response to Bergsten indicating that the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (IGHRFA) would, at its June 24 meeting, consider the procedural issues Bergsten raised. Handwritten notations on Katz’s action memorandum read: “OBE Per Steve Oxman Mtg Held 6/24 8/10/77” and “FW 6–23–77.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770148–1052 and P770148–1053)

² Presumable reference to early 1977 Department of State human rights reporting requirements. In telegram 14518 to multiple African diplomatic posts, January 22, the Department indicated that it was in the process of reviewing human rights conditions in the development assistance recipient countries (countries not part of the annual Congressional security assistance presentation) and asked posts to report on these conditions by January 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770023–1100) In telegram 226 from Cotonou, January 28, the Embassy described Benin as a “police state,” commenting that “rule of law is irrelevant and there are no guarantees for the protection of internationally recognized human rights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770031–0853) The Benin IDA question was discussed at the May 19 IGHRA meeting. Schneider noted that the Bureau of African Affairs felt “that the suggested approach to Benin, i.e., to abstain on two upcoming votes for the needy, is appropriate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I)
and reliability of information) in each country under consideration by the Inter-Agency Group so that all of its members can participate with full knowledge in arriving at decisions on each proposed loan. Knowledge of the specific human rights situation in each country is also important for our Executive Directors in the IFIs so that they can intelligently discuss the reasons for the U.S. positions with EDs of other countries, and with the managements of the Banks. (Our ED in the World Bank was placed in a difficult situation when other Directors questioned the validity of our view on Benin.) We should also have written copies of the proposed instructions for demarches to countries being approached in connection with human rights matters.  

On (2) above, we need a specific set of human rights criteria against which to formulate decisions on proposed loans to violating countries and to measure changes in their human rights situations. In this connection, Secretary Vance’s speech of April 30, on human rights policy—while useful—was too broad in scope for the purposes of the Inter-Agency Group. It seems to me we need to have specific criteria so that we can be absolutely clear on the type of actions to which we object, and on specific corrective measures we want to see taken before we alter our position on a particular IFI loan or loans.

On the matter of systematic and timely consultation with other countries, we found at the IDB Annual Meeting in Guatemala that a number of IFI donor countries were receptive to our general human rights position; they felt, however, that in applying our human rights policy to IFI loans we were taking a unilateral approach and were

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3 In telegram 117008 to Cotonou, May 20, the Department indicated that the U.S. Executive Director of the IBRD would be instructed to refrain from the May 24 vote on the IDA loans for Benin “because of our concern for human rights conditions in that country, particularly arbitrary arrests and imprisonment.” The Department instructed the Embassy to demarche the Beninese prior to the May 24 action. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770180–1025) In telegram 916 from Cotonou, May 25, the Embassy reported that the Chargé made the demarche. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770186–1008) In telegram 920 from Cotonou, May 26, the Chargé expressed frustration that the Embassy had not been consulted or allowed to contribute to the IGHRAJF decision concerning the abstention, adding that while “Benin’s record on human rights is far from laudable,” many of the political arrests had been linked to a January 16 mercenary attack on Cotonou. He concluded, “I believe that Benin should indeed be taken to task for its violations of human rights but I think the timing and the nature of the measures involved will greatly determine whether our actions will have the desired or the opposite effect. Even if our views on the subject were rejected we would at least have appreciated the opportunity to have our voice heard.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770189–0444) In telegram 998 from Cotonou, June 9, the Embassy reported that it was in the process of revising telegram 926, the “tone and content of which were heavily influenced by the fact that it was written 10 days after mercenary attack and at time when post-coup security measures were at their most stringent. Situation showing some signs of improvement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770205–1186)

4 See Document 39.
making arbitrary or selective moral judgments. Thus, in general, they seemed to resent our manner of handling human rights in the IFIs. We therefore need to have systematic discussions with other like-minded countries to explain our human rights position, not only on IFI loans but also concerning our approach on other forms of assistance, particularly when there appear to be inconsistencies in our position. By consulting with other countries through our Executive Directors in the IFIs and directly with their governments, we will avoid confrontations and stand a chance of building a consensus in favor of our position on the human rights issue.

I recommend that we discuss these matters in the next meeting of the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.

C. Fred Bergsten

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5 Bergsten signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

56. Memorandum Prepared by Representative Donald Fraser

Washington, June 10, 1977

Other issues.

1. There is a need for up-to-date reporting on human rights conditions. It would be desirable to make an annual report on all countries, not just on those countries to which military equipment will be sold. Raw data, of course, need not be published. Such reports provide an opportunity to show positive change without making a direct link to U.S. efforts.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Don Fraser. No classification marking. Tarnoff sent the memorandum to Christopher, Derian, Nimetz, Bennet, Holbrooke, Todman, and Maynes under a June 11 covering memorandum noting that Fraser had left his memorandum and an additional memorandum outlining country situations with Vance following Fraser’s June 10 meeting with the Secretary. Tarnoff indicated that Vance had requested a short status report on the issues contained within the two memoranda. (Ibid.) Briefing memoranda for Vance’s meeting with Fraser are in the Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, PGOV—Congressional. No record of the meeting has been found.
2. The coordinators office needs strengthening with additional personnel. In addition, full-time human rights\(^2\) offices are needed in the regional bureaus. They continue to be part-time now.

3. Attendance at political trials at the level of a political officer is needed.\(^3\) The Embassies should be informed of such a policy.

4. With respect to our participation in the international financial banks, if discretion is left to the Executive Branch in pursuing human rights concerns (which I favor), is the government developing diplomatic approaches prior to consideration of loan applications by serious violators to ensure discussion of the human rights factors in the staffs’ papers and the Boards’ deliberations?

5. In the past, the U.S. has supported and cooperated with the Southern African Program of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has given grants to the International Commission of Jurists. These actions have been helpful. The Department’s affirmative position on the UN Trust Fund and on the proposed defense and aid program for Chile have also been good,\(^4\) but I’m told the results have been poor.

(a) Could the Department look at the possibilities for initiating a worldwide UN legal defense and aid program\(^5\) with voluntary (including US) contributions?

(b) Could the Department also examine possibilities of creating a U.S. Commission which could administer a modest amount of public funds in support of programs that strengthen the role of the private sector working in human rights field. Such funding might provide for conferences on the subject of human rights, fellowships for human rights studies abroad, and studies of special human rights problems.\(^6\)

\(^2\) An unknown hand underlined “full-time human rights.”

\(^3\) An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

\(^4\) An unknown hand underlined the first half of this sentence.

\(^5\) An unknown hand underlined “initiating a worldwide UN legal defense” and “aid program.”

\(^6\) An unknown hand placed a check mark next to this paragraph and underlined the portion of the first sentence following the word “strengthen” to the end of the paragraph.
57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat)¹

Washington, June 10, 1977

SUBJECT

The Genocide Treaty

I understand that the Genocide Treaty is in pretty serious trouble on the Hill, and will not be ratified without strong help from the White House. Moreover, the human rights groups are watching what we do very carefully to see whether the Administration will push hard for this, or whether we will simply send it up and allow it to die, as has happened so many times before. Therefore, if the vote fails, the Administration will get a lot of criticism on this score, and the President will be accused again of “backing off” on human rights. Accordingly, I urge that ratification of the Genocide Treaty be accorded a high spot on our list of legislative priorities.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Human Rights, Box HU–18, HU–3—Executive, 1/20/77–12/31/78. No classification marking.
² On May 23, the President sent a message to the Senate concerning the Genocide Convention; see footnote 16, Document 53. In a June 10 memorandum to Hansell, Baker, and Derian, Atwood indicated that he had “put in motion” an effort to ascertain a “credible vote count” on the Genocide Treaty. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, Genocide—Action File) According to a June 13 note from Eizenstat to Brzezinski, ratification of the Genocide Treaty had been placed on the legislative priorities list. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Human Rights, Box HU–18, HU–3—Executive, 1/20/77–12/31/78)
Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gilligan) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, June 13, 1977

SUBJECT

U. S. Policy on Human Rights

Attached are the contributions to PRM 28 which you requested from A.I.D. These are:

—Action Plan for Expanding A.I.D.’s Human Rights Initiatives (Tab A)
—Status Report on the Observance of Women’s Rights (Tab B)
—Use of Economic and Food Assistance to Improve Human Rights Conditions (Tab C)

The last paper has been coordinated with State/EB as you requested.

These possibilities for additional action in pursuit of the Administration’s human rights objectives are appropriate for consideration at this point. No decisions should be made on them at this time, however, since their respective pros and cons cannot be reflected in a contribution of this length. Each should be more thoroughly and openly discussed, and coordinated with proposed action in other areas, to fully develop information on which final action can be based. I assume such interagency discussions will be part of the PRM 28 process as it has been for earlier PRMs.

John J. Gilligan

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development\(^2\)

Washington, undated

NEW INITIATIVES IN HUMAN RIGHTS

The A.I.D. program provides support for selective initiatives specifically addressed to human rights concerns, in the context of eco-

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\(^2\) Confidential.
nomic development. The kinds of initiatives which we have said we contemplate include, but will not necessarily be limited to:

(a) Cooperative programs with leading international or regional institutions, such as the International Commission of Jurists and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, which are specialized in dealing with serious human rights violations;

(b) Programs designed to help the urban poor and rural poor to have effective access to the rights and protections which are provided for them under law and under development programs—including arrangements for local advocacy and for nonformal education aimed at providing the poor majority with knowledge of their rights and of governmental processes which affect them; and

(c) Sponsorship of studies and conferences regarding human rights problems and their relationship to development.

The emphasis is to be on the various categories of human rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as they relate to each other.

Each A.I.D. regional bureau has proposed to follow a strategy to fit the particular circumstances and needs of the countries it is concerned with. LA has stressed legal aid and “public interest” law. NE emphasizes the need for a better understanding of local social, cultural, and political conditions. ASIA stresses the work of voluntary groups, such as the Asia Foundation. AFR intends to encourage studies and conferences, with emphasis on African participation, which focus on problems related to the development in multi-ethnic societies, the human rights aspects of local and traditional values, and the human rights consequences of economic and political change.

In actions taken to date:

—A.I.D. sponsored a one-day meeting at Johns Hopkins University of scholars, foundation officials, human rights activists, and officers from the Executive and Legislative Branch on the relationship between economic and the other categories of rights. The deliberations are summarized in the April issue of *War on Hunger*. A.I.D. also funded a conference sponsored by the State University of New York at Albany and the Irish Institute for Public Administration on the roles which legislative bodies play with respect to the various categories of human rights. A report on that meeting is available.

—A.I.D. is sponsoring a program of studies by scholars in various countries on non-totalitarian approaches toward economic growth with equity. We are contributing to a program of research on local political leadership and development programs and progress. Antedating

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3 Reference is to a monthly periodical produced by the Press and Publications Division, Office of Public Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID/OPA/PP).
4 Not further identified.
the new initiatives, it has supported a program for technical assistance to representative assemblies in developing countries, but this support is scheduled to end in 1977. We have also distributed a collection of reports dealing with Human Rights and Economic Development.

—A.I.D. supports a major American Society for International Law study of the role of public interest law as an instrument for economic and social development. We have helped a legal aid program in Chile and expect to do the same in other countries.

—We have supported conferences on social and political structures and rural equity in Afghanistan and Yemen.

—We are providing money for some leaders in the World Peace Through Law organization to visit African countries for the purpose of surveying the need for “paralegal” services. A proposal to support a conference on human rights to be sponsored by the Rwanda Government is pending.

Some of the private voluntary organizations assisted by A.I.D. have been doing work that is relevant to the new initiatives. A.I.D.’s latest report to Congress mentions legal aid and probation reform projects supported by the Asia Foundation.

A.I.D.’s human rights policy for the future will be the subject of a discussion of A.I.D.’s Senior Staff scheduled for June 10. There are a number of options which are to be considered; we will inform the Deputy Secretary of any specific results of that meeting.

Tab B

Memorandum From the Coordinator of the Women in Development Office, Agency for International Development (Fraser) to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Intergovernmental and International Affairs, Agency for International Development (Butler)

Washington, June 6, 1977

SUBJECT
Human Rights: AID Response to PRM 28

Women’s rights are necessarily a part of human rights both because women are half of humanity and also because women have frequently been considered second class citizens legally, socially and economically.

The Women’s Rights Movement has its roots in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement beginning with the abolition of slavery, running

5 No classification marking.
through the demands for suffrage and reasserting itself following the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. Legislation frequently includes both the terms race and sex. When it does not there is often parallel legislation. Likewise, many private and voluntary organizations are becoming increasingly interested in women rights. The AID Women in Development Office is seeking contact and response to requests from both the traditional women’s groups and the newer women’s rights groups concerning the women in development issue. The women in development sections of the Foreign Assistance Act both current and pending are responses to the women’s rights movement within the U.S. and International Women’s Year.

The AID Action Plan

1. Meetings, seminars and conferences with experts and other interested persons at home and abroad on the general issue of women in development and on the specific elements contained in the World Plan of Action for the Decade for Women.

2. Concentration on the Five Year Minimum Goals as set forth in the U.N. World Plan which include:
   
a. A marked increase in literacy and civic education of women through primary, secondary and vocational training to the highest level of education;

b. Participation in policy and decision making by women;

c. Recognition of the economic value of women’s work, both in traditional work (home and child care which is uncompensated) and in that work inside and outside the home done for cash or in exchange for goods or services;

d. Increased provision for health education, sanitation, nutrition, family education, family planning and other welfare services.

3. Constant monitoring of all programs, projects and activities. This monitoring to be in accordance with the current legislation, with implementation to include:


a. Evaluation by Bureaus and Missions of current and proposed programs:
— to assure that women’s needs, interests, concerns and efforts are not overlooked or ignored;
— to determine whether and how AID programs promote the Five-Year Minimum Goals in the World Plan of Action.

AID will provide operating units with simple, objective criteria for use in this assessment.

b. Allocation of funds in which central AID administrators inform the appropriate operating units of the nature and extent of efforts required to assure that programs provide sufficient emphasis on women’s rights.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Agency for International Development

USE OF ECONOMIC AND FOOD ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS

Economic assistance and food assistance are potential tools for pursuing our human rights objectives. Both have strengths and weaknesses in this regard.

— Economic assistance is perceived to be immediately responsive to policy control—the presumption is that we could cut direct financial assistance to governments pursuing policies of which we disapprove. A distinction should be made between development assistance, which is intended to benefit the poor majority, and security supporting assistance which is extended for political reasons. Manipulation of development assistance programs to achieve short-run political leverage, however, is not consistent with sound development programming since it is aimed at the needy, who may be those suffering most from denial of human rights. Security supporting assistance could and should be more responsive to short-run political considerations.

— Food assistance under PL 480 Title I is more amenable to short-run manipulation, in that it may technically be seen as balance-of-payments assistance. Such use runs the considerable political risk, however, of appearing to deny food to hungry people in order to achieve U.S. political objectives. (The domestic purposes of the program may also argue against sharp increases and decreases.) Title II,

8 Confidential.
which is programmed specifically for humanitarian purposes, ought not to be considered for human rights leverage.

Economic Assistance

A.I.D.’s legislation requires that it be sensitive to human rights considerations in the design and implementation of its programs. Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires a denial of all development assistance under the Act to governments which engage in consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless the assistance directly benefits the needy people of that country. Section 502B declares that no security assistance shall be provided to a government that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, except under extraordinary circumstances.

A.I.D. currently:

—reviews ongoing and proposed projects in each country which may be a serious violator of internationally recognized standards of human rights.

—ensures that such projects will directly benefit the needy people of the country.

A.I.D. will:

—submit assistance proposals for such countries to the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance for discussion of overriding political considerations.

—ensure, in developing its proposals for projects in developing countries in which there is a serious question about human rights, that full consideration will be given to the impact of the program on the improvement of human rights in that country.

—constantly examine the implementation of its programs in all countries to ensure that they are supportive of the Administration’s human rights objectives.

—review annually, on a country-by-country basis, its total proposed levels of bilateral development and supporting assistance to ensure that these levels are fully compatible with the Administration’s policy of positively promoting a commitment to human rights.

The strengthening of sound development policy which is necessary to reach the needy people of developing countries however, requires long-range planning. A.I.D.’s internal procedures require keen sensitivity to human rights issues, and the process described above should serve to ensure built-in responsiveness. Therefore, we hope that development assistance would not be used to send short-term signals of approval or disapproval except in extreme cases. Further, while reductions in development assistance in reaction to flagrant violations of human rights may be appropriate in extreme cases, sudden increases would be much harder to implement productively. Positive incentives should thus be limited to instances of longer-term steady improvement.
of human rights conditions rather than specific individual actions. Supporting assistance is more political in nature; this means that sudden changes are less disruptive but also that there may be overriding political arguments against using it to pursue human rights objectives.

Nonetheless, there are possibilities for additional action which could be considered.

—Automatic cutoff of development and security supporting aid to flagrant violators. This should be reserved for extreme cases only. It would not preclude humanitarian assistance to meet disasters.
—Increase development and/or security assistance to reward positive steps. It is difficult to programmatically justify short-term responses in development assistance.
—Respond to longer-term human rights trends by raising or lowering programmed aid levels. This is more consistent with sound use of development resources. Could be coupled with demarches in capitals to explain this policy.
—Develop projects specifically directed to enhancing the respect for rights.
—Consult with other donors to achieve coordinated action. This would require considerable time and effort, but could be effective over the longer term.

A.I.D. will continue to reflect, in its development assistance policy, continuity and perseverance of support of the respect for human rights, including the fulfillment of such basic human needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. A.I.D. will continue to examine the appropriate mix of these possibilities for additional action.

Food Assistance

The new food aid legislation pending in Congress contains a provision that no Title I assistance be provided to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights, unless the agreement directly benefits the needy. An agreement will not be considered to directly benefit the needy unless either the commodities themselves, or the proceeds from their sale, will be used for specific projects or programs which the President determines would directly benefit the needy.

The following are some additional measures which the Administration might consider for using food aid to promote human rights, together with discussions of their possible usefulness and drawbacks:

—Publicize U.S. intentions to include human rights considerations in food aid programs. Instruct Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission to inform host governments. Make the point in speeches and statements by senior officials.

9 Reference is to P.L. 95–88; see footnote 6 above.
Discussion: This initiative would help to underscore to our missions abroad and to foreign governments the U.S. intention to incorporate human rights considerations in programming food aid; the effort should increase host countries’ sensitivity to human rights problems. This is a low-cost course of action; we see no serious disadvantages.

—Use food aid agreements to seek human rights reform on a case-by-case basis. Specify during negotiations what human rights actions would be required to obtain food aid. Indicate that progress would be considered a positive factor in future food aid decision-making, while regression or continued violations would be regarded negatively.

Discussion: This procedure would give the U.S. considerable leverage to seek improvement of human rights conditions. This leverage would be hard to exercise discreetly, however, in a way which avoids forcing the recipient nation to acknowledge publicly it is a human rights violator. Not every case would lend itself to pressure through food aid. Failure to reach agreement on a food aid program due to human rights issues would adversely affect bilateral relations and could lead to charges of U.S. intervention.

—Reduce or eliminate food aid programs in countries which we believe have performed poorly in the human rights area.

Discussion: The problem with a sanctions approach is that it creates animosity without providing a positive incentive for a country to improve its human rights performance. When American food aid is withdrawn, needy people may suffer badly. While there may be regimes whose human rights performance is so repugnant as to require withdrawal of American food aid, in general it would appear desirable to avoid this action.

—Include human rights self-help measures in appropriate PL 480 agreements.

Discussion: Self-help development measures are currently included in each PL 480 agreement. The principle could be extended to human rights measures. These provisions would have to be carefully drafted to avoid giving unwarranted offense. This would be difficult to enforce and could result in limited bilateral tension, but is an option. It would be more useful in communicating concern than in securing actual progress.

—Shift our food aid programs to countries with favorable human rights performance. Announce that we will give priority to such countries and provide food assistance on more favorable terms.

Discussion: This proposal is the most forthcoming and would specifically make human rights performance a key criteria in programming food aid. Many would question such a criteria when food needs
in many countries are so great, however, and the proposal does not give the U.S. much leverage over offending countries where the need for food assistance is recognized to be great.

At a minimum, we should inform missions that we plan to give increased emphasis to human rights considerations in the allocation of food aid. We should avoid using food aid to chastize poor human rights performance but seek to encourage improved performance by recognizing progress in our negotiations. Measures beyond this should be implemented only in extreme cases, due to the high visibility, humanitarian justification, and domestic support of food aid programs.

For these same reasons, Title II should not be considered as a source of leverage to achieve human rights objectives.

59. Briefing Memorandum From the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 16, 1977

Status Report on the Main Issues of Congressman Fraser’s Memorandum

1. Annual Reporting of Human Rights Conditions in All Countries. Congressman Fraser recommends that we publish annual unclassified reports on human rights conditions in all countries. Background: We are required by law to send annual reports on human rights conditions in all countries which receive security assistance. The reports we submitted this year were unclassified. Their publication took place among cries of outrage from some of those eighty-two countries which considered themselves our friends and allies. It was widely perceived by press, public and some other nations as an example of our uneven ap-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Don Fraser. Confidential With Secret/Exdis Attachment. Sent through Christopher, who did not initial the memorandum. Christopher sent the memorandum to Vance under a June 18 covering memorandum indicating that he would be happy to prepare a response to Fraser based on Derian’s status report. (Ibid.) Derian prepared the report in response to Fraser’s June 10 memorandum (see Document 56). Attached at Tab B is a copy of Fraser’s memorandum.

2 See footnote 6, Document 17.
plication of the Administration’s human rights policy. In an effort to avoid this difficulty in the future and, as a result of his own interest in human rights conditions of all countries, Don suggests what amounts to universal reporting. (Note: we are now in the process of preparing human rights evaluations of all countries which will include problems, trends, our objectives, resources, tactics and plans. These will be used as a basic resource for decision making in the implementation of the human rights policy. There is no thought of making these evaluations public or of submitting them to any branch or agency of the government.) Positive Aspects: World-wide unclassified reporting would eliminate criticism that we were concentrating on some countries and avoiding human rights problems in others. It would widen public understanding of human rights conditions throughout the world.

There is pending legislation which will expand our reporting to include all countries which receive any kind of assistance from this government. A strong case could be made for such a practice because the citizenry has a right to know what kind of countries are receiving aid.

Objections: I am not confident that universal public reporting would further our ability to gather allies willing to work with us on improving human rights practices in the world. My guess is that universal dismay would be the most positive reaction we could expect. We have endeavored to avoid sanctimony and a holier than thou stance; such reporting would require us to spend months assuring everyone that we do not feel that we are better than all other nations.

2. Human Rights Personnel. Two additional officers and one support staff person are being recruited now. By June 30, all geographic Bureaus will have designated full-time human rights officers and functional Bureaus will have designated near full-time officers.

3. Attendance at Political Trials. I am sending a memorandum to all geographic Bureau Assistant Secretaries with an inquiry about present practices and their views on methods we might use to establish a common procedure.5

4. Discussions of Human Rights Factors in staff papers and broad deliberations of the IFI’s. I believe diplomatic approaches prior to consideration of loan applications are essential for long-range success; we address the question of how to achieve this in PRM 28. We are examining the possibility of having the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Commission report directly to the IFI’s on human rights conditions. Secretary Blumenthal and Under Secretary Cooper plan to talk with World Bank President McNamara in the near future

5 Not found.
about ways in which human rights concerns can be factored into the
operations of that bank.

5. Legal Defense and Aid Programs: (a) We support initiation of a
world-wide legal defense and aid program with voluntary (including US)
contributions. I will start exploring ways in which we can act with
L, CU, IO, H, Don’s staff and others in and out of government, in-
cluding the Lawyers’ Committee and the International Commission of
Jurists. (b) U.S. Commission for Human Rights: CU funds a wide range
of programs and projects to domestic organizations and groups, many of
which are directly involved with human rights or have human rights
concerns. It is their view that “a U.S. Commission for Human Rights
would act as a layer between the funding source and the programming
organization, and would divert resources now going directly to the pri-
ivate organizations. In light of the President’s desire to reduce the
number of advisory commissions, CU believes the establishment of a
U.S. Commission for Human Rights is not necessary at this time, since
its proposed activities are already being carried out by the institutional
funding mechanisms in CU.” Possible Recommendations: Don Fraser is
undoubtedly aware of CU’s many programs and projects; he is prob-
ably aiming for a tighter focus and a more coordinated effort. There is a
possible alternative to be found in the proposal of Hodding Carter and
Joe Duffey for a State Department-sponsored international group in
each state with an over-all board at the national level.4 I will discuss
ways and means we might employ, though I believe that Don is
thinking more in terms of a subsidy to groups like Amnesty Interna-
tional and Freedom House. Will explore in more detail with him.

Country Situations

Note: Appended at Tab A are responses prepared by the appro-
priate Bureaus on countries mentioned by Congressman Fraser in his
memo.5 Below are extremely brief comments of my own.

1. South Korea. Don has heard the case we make for Korean in-
volve ment. His memorandum conveys his continued dissatisfaction
with our policy. My suggestion is to abandon the practice of re-
sponding to each assertion and instead to outline in some detail the
specific steps we have taken. It is also important to make a special effort
to keep him informed on a week-to-week basis, if necessary, of new
representations and initiatives related to Korea. This week, we might
inform him that our “yes” vote on a World Bank Korean loan was ac-
accompanied by a public statement by the U.S. Executive Director of our
human rights concerns in Korea.

4 Not further identified.
5 Attached but not printed at Tab A are the undated Bureau responses.
2. East Timor. We will either have to change our current policy which accepts Indonesia’s absorption or will have to take the heat which may be severe. I concur with John Hays’ gloomy appraisal of Indonesian intentions to improve their human rights situation in a serious and substantive way. Perhaps I will feel differently after spending some time there.

Spanish Sahara. By virtue of U.N. adoption of two separate and conflicting resolutions dealing with Saharan self determination, the issue remains unsettled. We are still pressing for regional resolution, hopefully, through U.N. good offices. In practice, we have supported Morocco with military assistance and some may view that aid as giving comfort to Morocco/Mauritania claims over the disputed territory. Algeria is harboring refugees/guerrillas/terrorists and this is the nub of the problem. While we cannot ignore refugee needs, the Sahara is a mess we would do well to stay out of, but I am not sure we can.

3. The Caribbean and Central America. Don suggested we find some “institutional means...to make sure that the U.S. is especially sensitive to the problems of these near-by countries.” Completion of the country evaluations should provide a firm basis for a series of steps we might take to be of positive assistance and should surely heighten our sensitivity as well.

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6 The East Timor undated response reads, in part: “The previous Administration did acquiesce in Indonesia’s absorption of East Timor after the Indonesians went through an elaborate, stage-managed exercise in Timorese self-determination. We have seen no reason to question the previous Administration’s decision, especially when it is clear that there is not the slightest possibility of reversing the action—nor, for that matter, any evidence that the Timorese would be better off if the action were reversed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Don Fraser)

7 The Bureau of African Affairs undated response reads, in part: “In December 1975 the UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions, to a degree conflicting. One, which was sponsored by Algeria, called on Spain to assure that the Saharans could exercise their right to self-determination under UN supervision. The U.S. abstained on this resolution. The other, which the U.S. supported because we believed it offered the best chance of a peaceful settlement at the time, took note of the Tripartite Agreement, and called on the administrators of the territory to ensure that the Saharans would be able to exercise their right to self-determination through free consultations organized with the assistance of a UN representative.” (Ibid.)
MEMORANDUM FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (REINHARDT) TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE (CHRISTOPHER)

Washsmouth, June 16, 1977

SUBJECT
USIA Human Rights Action Proposals

In response to your memorandum of May 30, I am attaching USIA's Human Rights Action Plan. Our objective is to insure that our programs fully support U.S. policy. We will refine our efforts as the Department develops its own regional and country-specific plans this summer.

Our Deputy Director, Charles Bray, will be the USIA representative on the Department's Human Rights Coordinating Group, at least through the early stages of the effort and until the organization of public diplomacy is clearer.

While we advance a large number of programmatic ideas in the attached, we are sensitive to the need to assure that they are carefully attuned to the evolution of global policy and specific-country situations.

I plan to send copies of the attached proposal to Public Affairs Officers in selected countries abroad where human rights is a sensitive issue. Not only do I want their comments on the proposal itself but I want them to begin thinking now about specific plans for USIS support of the Department's human-rights plan for their country.

1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, IAGHRFA—History & Organization. Confidential. Reinhardt did not initial the memorandum.


3 Attached but not printed is a June 17 covering memorandum from Bray to USIS principal posts, presumably used to transmit copies of the USIA human rights action plan.
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, undated

USIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION PROPOSALS
—objectives, themes, treatment—

The purpose of the USIA plan of action is to organize Agency resources for a sustained effort in the human rights field. This plan will be coordinated with the Department’s human rights plans for individual countries as they are developed.

Salient features of the Agency proposals are:

A. Objectives

The basic objective of the plan is to advance human rights. Special attention will be given to:

—Increasing global understanding of, and support for, US policies relating to human rights;
—Strengthening understanding of the universality of basic human rights as defined in the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights;
—Providing support and encouragement, where appropriate, to individuals and groups abroad who are actively involved in promoting human rights;
—Creating an international atmosphere more conducive to extending and promoting human rights;
—Describing challenges and responses to human rights issues in the United States.

B. Themes

The following broad thematic categories will be given major emphasis:

—The policies of the Administration reflect historic American concerns.
—The American record in strengthening human rights, while imperfect has relevance to similar efforts in other nations.
—Human rights are a multilateral concern. Positive achievements within individual countries can reinforce each other in assuring a more humane world order.

4 Confidential.
—Human rights include economic and social as well as political rights.

C. Treatment

Human rights are an integral part of Agency information output, not the subject of a separate “public relations” campaign.

Programming will be reasoned rather than strident. It will emphasize human rights achievements but will not hesitate to address repressive practices by foreign governments.

In coverage of U.S. human rights developments, our case will benefit in the long run by balanced reporting of both achievements and continuing problems.

Posts will evaluate local perceptions of human rights and take these factors into consideration in their programs on this subject.

While bilateral efforts will be made to foster human rights in special cases, multilateral approaches may stand better chances for success.

In USIA programming, care will be taken to assure that human rights are considered in the overall context of U.S. political, economic and social goals.

USIA will be sensitive to the fact that, in some instances, human rights can be advanced more effectively through quiet diplomacy than through appeal to public opinion.

The following are specific responses to the subject raised in Deputy Secretary Christopher’s May 30 memorandum to Director Reinhardt:

a. Proposals for providing information and guidance on human rights to all USIS field offices.

We shall use a multi-media approach in explicating U.S. policy and promoting human rights. This includes a full range of print and audiovisual materials, together with speakers. Guidance will be tailored to statements and actions by U.S. or foreign officials, and to significant events (e.g. CSCE developments, UN Human Rights Commission meetings, etc.).

We shall periodically explore with field posts their perceptions of local human rights situations, and then develop supplemental programs which are responsive to these conditions.

b. Recommendations of specific steps USIA might take in particular countries to promote human rights.

The following specialized projects will be proposed to support USIS posts in individual countries on the human rights issue. These proposals are illustrative, not exhaustive, of the possibilities open to the Administration via USIA’s programming potential abroad.
1. USIA will provide a phased series of videotaped interviews or direct video statements by the President, Secretary of State, other cabinet-level officials, and Assistant Secretaries of State. These would provide an essential overview.

2. Agency elements and State/CU should cooperate in the conduct of at least one, and possibly more, International Visitor projects on an appropriate human rights topic. The projects and visitors would be selected on the basis of their potential for tangible follow-up programs (seminars, workshops, symposia, etc.) and other activities overseas.

3. The Agency will provide directories of major American and international human rights organizations to USIS posts and libraries for reference or for presentation to indigenous organizations.

4. We will continue Agency/CU efforts to foster inter-personal communication among officials, opinion leaders and professionals in the human rights field. Three major programs including speakers and media support will be conducted by USIS posts in the coming year:

   (a) Human Rights Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy: e.g. the impact of human rights concerns on bilateral relations; the relation of human rights to arms sales, aid, technology transfer, etc; origins of U.S. foreign policy emphasis on human rights (national beliefs, traditions, Congressional interest, public interests groups).

   (b) U.S. Challenges and Responses in the Human Rights Field, e.g.: civil rights—voting, political participation, the legitimacy of opposition, peaceful transfer of power, equal opportunity, minority rights, freedom of expression and movement; civil liberties—freedom of information, privacy, legal representation, habeus corpus; “human fulfillment”.

   (c) Human Rights Questions and Economic Development e.g.: the question of whether economic mobilization can occur without suppression of political freedoms and individual rights; North-South issues of distribution of wealth.

5. The Department and USIA should issue guidelines and provide whatever support necessary for Missions to encourage foreign leaders and internationally respected individuals to speak out in support of human rights.


7. An international conference on human rights should be proposed for September–October 1978 or in 1979. It would provide a focus for strengthening international understanding of human rights questions, reinforcing commitments to human rights progress, and providing for
followup programming overseas by US Missions with Agency and CU support.

The Conference should be structured to maximize constructive exchanges of experience and views in the human rights field, and to minimize polemical or political confrontations.

8. Establish a *Human Rights Alert Service*, which would use Agency radio and press facilities to call attention to human rights abuses and progress where and as they occur.

In order to ensure that the U.S. effort is fully implemented in the field, the Department should consider establishing a human rights coordinating committee at overseas missions. The committee would consist of representatives from the embassy’s substantive elements including USIS. Its purpose should be two-fold: (1) report on the status of human rights issues in the host country and (2) recommend programs designed to increase understanding of U.S. human rights policies (public affairs goal) and, equally important, encourage promotion of human rights in the host country (political goal). USIS posts would designate a human rights officer who would be a member of the mission’s human rights committee. This officer would help identify target audience members and organizations committed to strengthening human rights (e.g. religious groups, the bar, labor unions, political parties). The USIS human rights officer would also plan and implement public affairs efforts involving human rights.

To take advantage of audience data gained in this way, posts will be asked to broaden their audience lists to include human rights opinion leaders to be reached with program materials and through personal contact.

Specific Agency actions in particular countries will be determined by the political and other factors in the Department’s human rights plan of action for each country. Pending the issuance of these plans, the following approaches could be taken regionally:

**LATIN AMERICA**

In Latin America, the Agency will attempt to make our policies better understood, particularly in view of the bilateral disputes that have arisen over human rights between the United States and many governments in the hemisphere.

Because Latin American posts continue to have regular access to mass media outlets, the Agency will rely heavily on the press, radio and television to influence opinion leaders and the public at large. This is particularly useful in countries where the United States is engaged in human rights questions with authoritarian governments and where we may not be able openly to sponsor lectures and seminar discussions on
the subject. Paradoxically, the media in these countries are generally free to report and comment on human rights issues.

Despite potential local difficulties, posts in Central America, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil have asked for speakers on human rights while USIS posts in Guatemala and Paraguay have asked for exhibits demonstrating the historic U.S. commitment to human rights. USIS Caracas proposes a television co-production with Venezuelan national television on the Administration’s human rights policy.

In addition to these field proposals, the Agency will: (1) produce a television and radio series dramatizing human rights causes out of Latin American and world history; (2) publish a 12-page insert on human rights in the regional edition of the Agency magazine Horizons; (3) publish human rights-oriented books for the Agency’s book translation program for general distribution and introduction into school curricula; (4) recommend that high-ranking USG officials who travel to Latin America be available as voluntary speakers for human rights programming; (5) produce a radio and press series to create greater recognition and prestige for international and private organizations devoted to human rights, with emphasis on the work of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

AFRICA

African nations tend to applaud human rights concepts in the abstract but many fail to put them into practice. Most African countries are quick to condemn human rights violations elsewhere but are reluctant to make a public denunciation of misdeeds in other OAU countries.

Given such sensitivities, USIS programming in Africa must be carefully handled in order to avoid the appearance of preaching and charges of interference in local affairs. One approach will be to call on State/CU resources to arrange two-way exchanges of persons in fields of key importance to human rights, particularly in law and jurisprudence. Amnesty International and the American Civil Liberties Union should be utilized, both as resources for these visitors and as sources of speakers for overseas programming.

A second approach will be to publicize, especially through the Voice of America and through post programming in individual countries, the efforts of African countries such as Botswana, Mauritius and Gambia which have good human rights records.

Finally, through consultation with field posts, other media products will be developed to further human rights goals. Exhibits, if discreetly done, are an indispensable tool in closed societies such as Guinea and Somalia, where they are often the post’s most effective information resource.
EUROPE

USIA’s approach to promoting human rights in Europe must take into account political realities on that continent.

In the communist states, we are obviously restricted in what we can do but not in what we say. Our most important medium is in VOA. We know, for example, that our international radio programs have been welcomed by human rights groups in communist societies. Indeed, our unjammed broadcasts often have had an immediate and direct effect on the governments of these countries. Western publicity about and support for these activities have reinforced the resolve of human rights leaders in the USSR and Eastern Europe. They also appear to have had some restraining effect on the authorities. We should continue to broadcast human rights and to reject charges that this is interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In Western Europe, our objectives should be to 1) gain support for U.S. human rights policy, and 2) attempt to motivate the Europeans to become more involved in promoting human rights elsewhere. We can do so by strengthening and/or initiating ties with those European institutions and organizations which are concerned with human rights. This includes those European youth organizations whose views are similar to ours in the human rights field. Our aim should be to encourage the exchange of ideas and information between like-minded people and organizations so that we can support each other’s efforts. We should also strengthen U.S.-European parliamentary links where the subject of human rights could be discussed. This is of particular importance in view of the European Community’s plan to hold direct elections to the European Parliament in 1978. The CU exchange program should support this as one of its primary objectives.

It has been our experience that when we coordinate a particular policy with our European allies we not only get their support, but we are often able to project a common policy. For example, NATO is the forum where we have coordinated western CSCE strategy including Basket III initiatives. There is another forum where we could pursue a common human rights policy—the OECD. It is an organization comprising most of the western industrial world plus Japan where we now coordinate aid to LDCs and carry on the North-South dialogue. At a forthcoming OECD ministerial meeting, the U.S. will propose further cooperation on member-states’ unemployment policies—a subject which impacts on human rights.

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EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

The following projects for East Asian countries merit special attention.

**Philippines**—The major human rights issue in the Philippines involves political detainees. The Mission’s basic tool so far has been quiet but firm diplomacy, avoiding high profile public dialogue in favor of subtle but unequivocal pressure. The post has a program scheduled on the legal aspects of human rights and will follow-up with speakers, films and press items. Here again the key to programming is to avoid preaching and to depict candidly both the successes and failures of the U.S. efforts to protect human rights.

**Indonesia**—As in the Philippines, the major concern is political detainees. The post will continue to follow a low profile approach while discussing the issues with influential contacts and disseminating the statements of U.S. officials. It will also organize meetings and seminars for American experts who can underscore the fundamental strength of our commitment to civil liberties.

The following specific USIS programs and supporting actions are planned:

—Preparation of background papers by Embassy and USIS officers for press and electronic media representatives on the future thrust of US foreign policy. These will emphasize human rights as a key element in our policy.

—Developing library collections for “outreach” programming, documenting the fundamental concern Americans have for human rights, as well as the successes and failures of our efforts.

**Korea**—One of this post’s major program objectives addresses the human rights issue. Seminars and discussion programs planned under this objective will seek understanding of how American values are formed and expressed and establish a dialogue with Koreans on common values. ROKG sensitivities and policy guidance by the Mission will be taken into account in program planning.

U.S. concerns and pronouncements on this issue will be fully reflected in VOA Korean language broadcasts. The post will publicize such programs with the primary audience in advance of the broadcasts. Similar programs will be made available for broadcast through the U.S. Armed Forces radio stations, which have a substantial Korean listenership.

Because there are definite limits within the ROK to a full discussion of U.S. concerns on this issue, consideration will be given to organizing special seminars or symposia in the United States to which key Koreans will be invited to participate. This approach will only be effective if the scope of discussion is not confined to the problems of one
country. Multi-country participation and a broad-gauged discussion of the issues are more likely to improve understanding of the U.S. position.

NORTH AFRICA, NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Countries in this area have such varying perceptions of human rights that both the frequency and type of program approach must be tailored to each country. For example, a wide range of programs about human rights for diverse audiences would be fruitful in India, but only carefully chosen programs involving outstanding experts before small, selected audiences are acceptable in Iran. On the other hand, in Algeria, programming opportunities are rare, and even then limited to subjects related to economic or social rights.

In Iran the recent human rights dialogue between U.S. political analyst Ben J. Wattenberg and Iranian government officials apparently struck a positive chord. However, this type of programming may not be as well received by similar audiences in other NEA countries.

Examples of specific program proposals for this area are:
— expansion of USIA’s book programs to include outstanding works (foreign and domestic including translations) on human rights subjects;
— expansion of CU’s International Visitor program to involve more human rights activists; foreign journalists’ tours of the U.S. organized around human rights themes;
— more speaker and seminar programs focused on salient aspects of human rights that have relevance in specific countries or groups of countries in this geographic area.

c. Proposals for using the Voice of America, the Press Service (IPS) and other functional arms of the Agency to increase popular attention to human rights.

Agency print, radio and film/videotape will continue to report official policies, statements and other activities of Administration officials and members of Congress to overseas audiences. The Agency’s media services will also increase coverage of national and international human rights events such as the signing of the American Convention on Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights Day and the CSCE meetings in Belgrade.

Agency media will also report on private domestic and international organizations which monitor and advocate human rights (Amnesty International, ACLU, NAACP, etc.), as well as statements and activities by prominent American scholars, writers and scientists. Examples of this are the recent protests by the National Academy of Science over the arrest and torture of a group of physicists in Uruguay,
and protests by Saul Bellow and Arthur Miller concerning the harsh treatment of writers in many countries for their human rights stand.

The Voice of America will produce a series honoring human rights statesmen and stateswomen in American history. Included will be Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes; Charles Houston, the late black lawyer and leader in the civil rights struggle; Eleanor Roosevelt, Ralph Bunche and others. Such programs will illustrate the historical basis of human rights in the U.S. The Voice will produce a “VOA Forum Series” of twenty half-hour programs treating human rights. Examples of program themes will be important Supreme Court decisions dealing with human rights and the concept of due process in the 14th amendment. Prominent jurists and civil rights activists will be featured speakers for the Forum series. The Voice will also schedule prominent American and foreign speakers for interviews and panel programs.

The Press and Publications Service (IPS) will commission articles and acquire byliners by American and non-American scholars on the origins and record of human rights in the United States. IPS will produce an illustrated pamphlet on the origins and development of human rights in the U.S.

Special articles on human rights will be placed in Agency publications such as Problems of Communism, Horizons, Dialogue, Economic Impact, and Economic Portfolio. The March–April 1977 issue of Problems of Communism featured a review-essay of six books entitled “Détenue and Soviet Dissidents” by Sovietologist Harvey Fireside.

Problems of Communism has developed a distinguished world-wide reputation. We will consider initiating a new publication, perhaps to be entitled Problems of Democracy, which could afford distinguished American—and foreign—political philosophers, politicians, humanitarians a forum in which to explore the ideas, values and processes which lie beneath both liberty and democracy.

For selected audiences, the Agency’s Film and Television Service (IMV) will continue videotape coverage of official statements. It will acquire commercial films and videotapes, feature films, network specials and documentaries. Examples of acquired commercial productions are the two recent NBC programs on human rights—the recent Soviet-American debate at Georgetown University and the documentary on the Belgrade CSCE meeting. For more general television audiences, the

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Agency will increase output on human rights subjects in its current newsclip service and in its regular TV series which are seen on several hundred foreign stations. The Agency will also cooperate with foreign television broadcast companies sending production teams to the U.S. to make programs about human rights.

In the exhibits field, the Agency will highlight salient passages of the Secretary of State’s April 30 speech,\(^7\) including human rights statements by prominent American and foreign advocates of human rights.

The Agency will support multi-regional International Visitor programs, bringing human rights advocates from a number of countries together with their American counterparts. The Agency will compile a directory of American and international human rights organizations for use by the posts in providing orientation to prospective international visitors. The concept of multi-regional international visitor programs might, as suggested earlier, be expanded to the level of an International Human Rights Conference to be held in late 1978 or 1979. Such a meeting would bring together some 200–300 human rights advocates from around the world and would provide a very visible focal point for the subject.

d. Proposals for coordinating the public diplomacy dimension of human rights issues with other relevant foreign affairs agencies, particularly AID, D/HA and CIU.

We propose that the Agency’s Human Rights Advisor serve as our primary liaison with the Department’s Human Rights Coordinator’s (D/HA) staff. In this capacity he would be a participant in cooperative human rights public diplomacy efforts with members of the Department, AID and other agencies. Currently the Agency’s Human Rights Advisor is actively involved in cooperative projects resulting from attendance at weekly meetings of Department regional and functional bureau human rights officers.

e. Formal structure within USIA

The Deputy Director will be the interim USIA representative on the Department’s Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG). The Department may also wish to consider having Mr. Bray serve as the public affairs advisor to the HRCG. In this capacity he could suggest public affairs approaches as U.S. human rights policies and actions develop.

A USIA ad hoc Human Rights Coordinating Committee has been established to provide information policy guidance and review Agency human rights programming to ensure that the Agency’s effort is on

\(^7\) See Document 39.
target. The committee is a “working level” group which is chaired by the Human Rights Advisor who reports to the Deputy Director.

f. Steps USIA has already taken to achieve human rights objectives.

Human rights is a primary theme and prominent feature of Agency programs.

All Agency communications media are being used to present the Administration’s human rights policies to overseas audiences. Radio has been the primary direct channel to audiences, particularly in closed or authoritarian societies, where local media are controlled and where human rights problems are usually most acute.

In the early months of the new Administration, the Voice of America gave extensive coverage (news analyses, features and editorials) to statements by the President and other Administration officials which emphasized the heightened importance of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

Congressman Dante Fascell, Chairman, Joint Legislative-Executive Commission on CSCE, was interviewed in December on VOA’s “Press Conference-USA.” Human rights provisions of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act was a primary subject of this interview.

In the field of television placement the Agency has provided extensive coverage of official USG statements, speeches and comments on human rights and its role in U.S. foreign policy. Since President Carter’s inauguration 18 different videotapes on human rights subjects have been made available to posts. Examples are:

—Secretary Vance’s April 30 human rights policy speech before the University of Georgia Law School;

—President Carter’s March 17 UN speech,8 his April 14 Organization of American States speech9 and the recent speech at the University of Notre Dame;10

—interview by U.S. and European journalists on April 30 with Congressman Fascell;


The Agency overseas speakers program incorporates U.S. and international human rights subjects by selected speakers. For example, Allard Lowenstein, head of the U.S. delegation to the recent UN Human Rights Commission, was programmed recently in five European cities where he discussed U.S. human rights policy before selected

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8 See Document 26.
9 See footnote 40, Document 29.
10 See footnote 2, Document 51.
audiences. Mr. Lowenstein received extensive and favorable media coverage in each of the capitals he visited.

Special information kits and background papers have been provided to all posts. The kits highlight press treatment of the Administration’s emphasis on human rights and provide texts of the UN Charter relevant to human rights as well as copies of human rights covenants and conventions. The background papers present information and guidance on human rights provisions of U.S. security assistance legislation and the role of human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

61. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, June 16, 1977, 2228Z

140421. For Ambassador from Luers. Subject: Human Rights Evaluation Reports.

1. The Department is undertaking a broad scale effort to implement the administration’s human rights policy as effectively as possible. One of the principal components of this effort will be the development of specific proposed courses of action with respect to each individual country. It is not repeat not the Department’s intention to compile a country “hit list,” but these human rights evaluation reports (earlier called human rights country action plans) will enable us to determine where we should concentrate our attention. The Bureau has been requested to submit these reports to D/HA not later than July 1, except those for Brazil, Colombia and Peru, which should be submitted by June 15 if possible.

2. D/HA originally intended to prepare a cable for worldwide distribution setting forth the background for the effort and providing an outline of the required report format.² On June 8 however the decision

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770215–0996. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Lister; cleared in draft by Schneider and Devine; approved by Luers. Repeated to USCINCSO.

² In a June 2 memorandum to Christopher, Oxman noted that D/HA had prepared a draft cable on human rights reporting mechanisms and country action plans, adding that Derian and Schneider hoped that the cable could be dispatched immediately. Oxman commented that the first 4 pages of the cable required “drastic revision” and indicated that in his suggested version he had deleted references to country reports and tried to reshape the cable in an attempt to make it “consistent with the substance of the Law Day speech.” Although Schneider asserted that none of the regional bureaus expressed any
was taken to leave action up to each individual bureau. This cable will therefore set forth the background for this effort, the required format for reporting, and the specific action requested of each post.

3. Background. In his Law Day speech at the University of Georgia April 30 (copies have been forwarded to each post), the Secretary specifically defined the human rights which are the subject of our policy, and set forth in detail the questions to be considered as we determine whether and how to act with respect to human rights. Further, he stated that once we choose to act, the means available range from quiet diplomacy in its many forms, through public pronouncements, to withholding of assistance. Evaluation reports should focus on all of the means of action he indicated. Both bilateral and multilateral approaches and all forms of economic and military assistance should be considered, especially possibilities for carrying out our policy through the U.N. and the international financial institutions.

4. Evaluation reports should, in a concise manner, describe the current condition of human rights, the extent of violations, their intensity and the most recent instances, and give recommendations for both short and long-term strategies to improve the human rights situation. The following format should be used.

Outline for evaluation reports:

A. Condition of human rights in (appropriate country).

1. Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from:
   a. Torture
   b. Cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment
   c. Arbitrary arrest or imprisonment
   d. Denial of fair public trial
   e. Invasion of the home.

2. Respect for civil and political liberties
   a. Freedom of thought, religion, assembly
   b. Freedom of movement within a country, foreign travel and emigration policies
   c. Democratic processes assuring the freedom to participate in the political process.

3. Recent trends in governmental policies relating to the fulfillment of basic needs for food, shelter, health care and education.

“Strong objections” to the proposed cable, Oxman pointed out that Lamb had received several telephone calls “expressing opposition on the grounds that the cable seeks to rate countries’ human rights performance on some kind of a scale.” He added: “I don’t think that is an accurate description of what the original cable does, and I certainly don’t think my redraft seeks such a rating.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Tasking Memos)
a. Policies designed to respond to the needs of the poor and policies which tend to ignore the needs of the poor.

b. Corruption of such a nature that significant resources are diverted toward the nation’s elite and away from the majority of the population.

4. Describe the level of the government’s responsibility for the foregoing human rights record, including the extent to which positive human rights measures are articulated as public policy or violations condoned as public policy because of security or other justifications. Evaluate the genuineness of those justifications.

5. Describe the willingness and past record of the government regarding independent, outside investigation of alleged human rights violations.

B. Analysis and recommendations

1. Identify legitimate objectives over the next three, six, twelve months in relation to improving conditions in (fill in appropriate country), with respect to categories A 1, 2, and 3 above. Define in terms of (a) importance, (b) feasibility, (c) U.S. leverage, (d) likely international support and (e) provide options and recommended actions (e.g., quiet diplomacy, IFI loans, security assistance, EXIM bank credits, etc.) in terms of their usefulness and likely consequences.

2. Identify principal reactions in the host countries, pro and con, to the new U.S. human rights policies and Embassy actions and proposed actions in support of those policies, including reactions of the government, opposition leaders, church and the most influential private and intellectual groups and the general public.

3. Evaluate reactions in 2 above in terms of the implications for positive and negative changes in the human rights conditions.

4. a. Where a human rights record justifies U.S. actions, evaluate the impact of those actions on other U.S. interests in that country, i.e. political, economic, security, diplomatic (influence of the host country on U.S. interests in the region).

b. Where the human rights record is good or encouraging, indicate the likelihood of the host government’s supporting U.S. efforts to promote human rights through governmental and non-governmental organizations.

End outline.

5. Action requested: A few ARA Embassies have already received copies of the above outline by pouch. They are preparing to cable in first drafts, or have already done so. However, first drafts for most countries will be prepared in the Department and then cabled to posts for comment and suggestions. The first draft for Brazil, prepared by the
Desk, will be cabled to Brasilia upon clearance with D/HA and S/P.³ The drafts for Colombia and Peru, based largely on the drafts cabled in by Bogota⁴ and Lima⁵ will be reviewed and cleared here, and will then be cabled back to the field for still further review and comment.⁶

6. All messages on human rights should include SHUM in the TAGS line to ensure distribution to interested offices in the Department.

7. Assistant Secretary Todman’s personal comment and guidance on the above are being provided by separate cable.⁷

Christopher

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³ In telegram 204237 to Brasilia, August 26, the Department noted that the draft Brazilian human rights report had been pouch for delivery to the Political Counselor on July 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770310–1104) In telegram 7203 from Brasilia, August 31, the Embassy transmitted suggestions for revision. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770315–0838)

⁴ In telegram 5282 from Bogota, June 7, the Embassy transmitted the Colombia draft evaluation report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770202–0952)

⁵ In telegram 4544 from Lima, June 2, the Embassy transmitted the Peru draft evaluation report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770197–0770)

⁶ In telegram 263597 to Lima, November 3, the Department requested that the Embassy revise the draft evaluation report prepared in June. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770406–0099) The Department request to the Embassy in Bogota has not been found.

⁷ The Department transmitted Todman’s guidance regarding the reports in telegram 141243 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, June 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770218–1071)
SUBJECT

Congressional Strategy on Human Rights

Human rights represents the Carter Administration’s most dramatic foreign policy departure. Sustaining this leadership will require a strong constituency on Capitol Hill which understands and supports the Administration’s efforts and opposes excessively specific legislation. We are fast approaching the time when general statements of support for human rights will not be accepted as a comprehensive policy, and our credibility will be brought into question. We must be in a position to explain each specific human rights-related action as fully as possible in terms of country-by-country plans.

I. Ongoing Human Rights Issues

1. International Financial Institutions

As you know, we have been trying to shape acceptable language which will permit us to deal with human rights concerns in the IFIs without harming their overall structure. We may succeed this year in avoiding language mandating a negative vote on human rights offender countries.

ACTION: We must demonstrate that we will use our voice and vote in a consistent manner in the IFIs to gain the credibility to protect the IFIs from further attacks in the future.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770115–0474. Confidential. Drafted by Swift. Wisner initialed the memorandum on June 18. Additional notations read: “WC” and “Copy to SO.” Christopher also initialed the memorandum.

2 Reference is to the pending IFI authorization bill (see Document 35). On June 14, the Senate passed H.R. 5262, whereupon House and Senate conferees began drafting compromise language. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, pp. 42–44) During the Senate debate over H.R. 5262, Humphrey challenged an amendment introduced by Hatfield and Abourezk, which was based on the Harkin–Badillo language, asserting that its rigidity “would be of less real use” than the more flexible language adopted by the SFRC during its markup session. The Senate did approve an amendment on June 14, sponsored by Dole, which directed U.S. representatives to the IFIs to vote against any aid to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. (Spencer Rich, “Hill Steps Into Human Rights Debate,” The Washington Post, June 15, 1977, p. A–12)
2. Security Assistance

The Authorization Bill will be through both Houses by the end of June, and the main shape of the Appropriation Bill has already been drawn. This legislation came upon us too quickly this year and our efforts to deal with it have been very much of a fire-fighting operation. Our policy guidelines on how we were to apply the 502(b) human rights provision were unclear, especially in Latin America, and this, coupled with the momentum for human rights in Congress, has caused cuts in programs for Latin American countries. In Asia, however, where our policy toward Korea, Philippines, and Indonesia is clearer, we have been able to gain the Congress' trust for the time being.

ACTION: We should start planning now for what we will be presenting to Congress for FY 79. Human rights offender countries in which we have no security interest will find themselves under heavy attack not only on grant MAP but also on FMS credit and training next year unless we can demonstrate that progress has been achieved in human rights and we convince the Congress that our efforts bring results. The most vulnerable will be offenders in Latin America (including Argentina, Brazil, etc.) and Indonesia and Thailand.

3. Economic Assistance

Congress this year, with AID's agreement, has tightened the human rights reporting requirements for bilateral economic aid. This is our first concrete signal that Congress plans to pay far greater attention to bilateral economic assistance in the future. To date, efforts to cut economic aid have not been supported by the liberals as long as the aid is for the needy.

ACTION: We can expect far greater attention next year, however, to the needy criterion which AID has applied rather loosely. The warning signs are also flying that for gross violators even economic programs may not be exempt. AID's review of the total U.S. AID effort, due August 15, must deal thoroughly with human rights considerations, particularly if the Administration is to achieve increases in total U.S. assistance.

4. UN Covenants

The President has made four UN covenants an important part of his overall human rights initiative. We are moving ahead energetically on the Genocide Convention and would hope to see a vote on the measure prior to the end of this session. We are currently trying to ascertain whether we have the votes to ratify the Convention and we expect to be

3 See footnote 9, Document 38.
ready to make that determination in the next two or three weeks. The SFRC will consider the Convention in executive session on June 21, and may report it to the floor at that time. Majority Leader Byrd is expected to hold up consideration of the Treaty until we can assure him that we have the votes to (1) invoke cloture and (2) ratify the Convention.

The President has given his personal endorsement to three other human rights treaties in his speech before the United Nations on March 17. No decision has yet been made as to when to forward these covenants to the Senate. There is some thought being given to signing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at the United Nations when the General Assembly convenes in September. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was signed by the United States in 1966, but Senate approval was not sought by previous Administrations and it has yet to be transmitted to the Senate. Final decisions as to the wording of reservations to these covenants have not been made.

The President personally signed the American Convention on Human Rights at the Organization of American States headquarters several weeks ago. Preliminary work has begun on reservations to this Convention and a number of legal implications are being analyzed. One controversial provision of the Convention is a ban on abortion.

ACTION: H feels that a major effort should be made to gain Senate approval of the Genocide Convention during this session. We should be in a better position to determine whether we can move quickly on this Convention within the next few weeks. We do not expect any serious consideration of the other conventions during this session, but the Administration should be prepared to submit them in the fall.

5. Problem Countries

a. Korea—Our policy toward Korean human rights is well understood on the Hill and our determination to withdraw troops has disarmed those who would like to attack our security assistance program—i.e. Don Fraser. Troop withdrawals and the security of Korea are at present of more concern on the Hill than human rights. We can assume, however, that once anxiety over troop withdrawals dies down, human rights considerations will come to the fore again.

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4 See Document 57 and footnote 2 thereto.
5 See Document 47 and footnote 8 thereto.
6 Reference is to the President’s decision to withdraw 33,000 U.S. Army troops from South Korea beginning in 1978 and concluding in 1982 or 1983. On May 11, the Department of State announced that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George Brown and Habib would fly to Seoul on May 24 to engage in talks with South Korean officials. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. and Seoul to Start Discussion Of Troop Pullout Late This Month,” The New York Times, p. 4)
b. Philippines—Major efforts by EA in both the House and the Senate this year have saved our Philippine military assistance program from significant cuts on human rights grounds. Unless there is major progress in the human rights situation, we can expect further attacks next year against the Philippine program and against any base agreement which requires congressional approval of funds.

c. Indonesia/Thailand—These are the most vulnerable countries in East Asia as the U.S. has no major security interests in either country. EA has done a good job this year of explaining our position on human rights in both countries. Some improvements in the human rights field must occur if we hope to continue to preserve our security relationships.

d. Latin America—Unless there are major human rights improvements in most of the Latin American offender countries in the coming months, we will probably see the end of all forms of military assistance to these countries in FY 79. The principal targets this year have been Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua and San Salvador. However, we can assume that Paraguay and Haiti, and perhaps Guatemala, will join the list next year. ARA must begin now to develop a more finely tuned and credible human rights policy towards security assistance in all recipient countries. One option would be to eliminate all military assistance in Latin America, with the exception of modest training programs.

e. Africa—Congress still has a certain myopia as far as African human rights are concerned, and this has protected Africa from the sort of attack faced in Latin America. The questions of Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia are the main ones as far as Congress is concerned at the moment. We should expect increasing attention to human rights conditions in other parts of Africa.

f. Iran/Israel—Congress has avoided these two topics. We should press ahead with efforts in both countries so that we are in a good position to show that we have made real efforts should trouble arise.


There are pending in the White House several proposals to liberalize our visa policy.

The President has not decided which option to accept but is understood to be leaning toward the McGovern amendment which would

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7 See footnote 17, Document 38. While registering the administration’s concern for human rights abuses in the Philippines, Holbrooke asserted: “However, we don’t believe that security or economic assistance should be reduced because of the human rights problem. As I have noted, the Philippines has strategic importance, not only for our own country but also for nations friendly to the United States in the region, and thus we should continue our support.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 4, 1977, p. 326)
remove the Secretary from the decision process in requesting from
the Attorney General waivers of ineligibility for aliens excludable
under the Immigration Act because of political affiliation.8 A decision
on this matter awaits consultation with the two Judiciary Committee
Chairmen, Rodino and Eastland, by the Secretary and the Attorney
General.

Regarding expanded refugee and asylum policies, the Eilberg leg-
islation includes an expanded definition of refugees which the Admin-
istration supported, but the bill effectively eliminates the parole au-
thority and requires mandatory consultation for the admission of
refugees by class.9

Administratively, we are expanding our program for African ref-
ugees with enlarged assistance in the educational field.

II. Techniques for Dealing with Congress

1. Have Clear Positions on Specific Issues

As a basis for orderly policy and rational presentation to Congress,
we must develop clear policy lines which combine general objectives
and specific courses of action for each human rights issue and each
country which violates human rights. We are in the early stages of such
a policy development process. It should be completed as soon as pos-
sible and implemented before we begin the next round of authorization
and appropriation battles early next year. This will make our job with
Congress much easier. As we take our positions to Congress on each
substantive issue which arises (for instance, amendments to IFI legisla-
tion) talking points should be drawn up and given wide distribution.
Consideration should be given to the issuance of an Administration
policy statement or letter on the issue which can then be used as the
basis for calls on individual Congressmen by high and mid-level of-

91 Stat. 844–866), which the President signed into law on August 17, 1977, contained the
McGovern amendment, which sought to relax visa provisions for non-immigrant vis-
itors. In late August, the Department of State announced that an official of the French
General Confederation of Labor, which had been described as Communist-run, had been
granted a visa to attend an American labor conference scheduled to take place in New
York in September. (Graham Hovey, “French Labor Leader is Granted U.S. Visa,” The
New York Times, August 27, 1977, p. 2)

9 Reference is to H.R. 7175, introduced in the House by Eilberg on May 13, which
sought to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (P.L. 89–236). Public Law
89–236, also known as the Hart–Cellar Act after Senator Philip Hart (D–Michigan) and
Representative Emmanuel Cellar (D–New York), abolished the national origins quota
system established by the Immigration Act of 1924 and overturned many of the restric-
tions contained within the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter
on the various issues and problem countries at their convenience. This activity should be done on a routine, ongoing basis so that information flow becomes normal and is not seen as a one-time blitz on some particular special interest. We have begun doing this on some of our current issues but it has been on an ad hoc basis. We hope to regularize this in the future but it will mean earlier identification of problem areas and development of clear policy directions.

2. Regular Bureau Contacts with Congress

The bulk of H’s time in human rights questions is spent dealing with major bills on the Hill or fore-fighting human rights problems related to countries such as Korea, Argentina or Iran. We believe the Department’s credibility on human rights and other matters could be built up through some direct contact by substantive regional and desk officers with Congressmen interested in their areas. Special efforts should be made to keep Members informed on human rights questions. Strengthening of informal contacts at the desk levels would give working-level FSOs an exposure to Hill thinking and develop relationships of trust which might head off problems before they occur.

3. Contacts with Non-Governmental Agencies

H agrees that we should develop our relationship with the interested Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs) which can be of immense help to us with their influence in the Congress. (It should be kept in mind, however, that we sometimes find ourselves differing with these groups on matters of substance.) D/HA already meets with these groups frequently and on a regular basis. H feels that rather than duplicating D/HA’s work we should tag on to some of their activities. We are in the process of coordinating this with D/HA now.

4. SCA Matters

In order to keep the human rights coordinating group fully informed of legislation on visa, refugee and asylum problems, H feels it might be worthwhile to institute a brief monthly report on ongoing efforts in this field. This would be in addition to the normal coordination which occurs daily.
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Dubs) to the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian)\(^1\)

Washington, June 23, 1977

SUBJECT

PRM on Human Rights: Comments/Suggestions

NEA’s comments and/or recommended changes to specific items in the first draft PRM\(^2\) are contained in the attachment to this memorandum.\(^3\)

The first draft of PRM 28 on Human Rights is a good beginning. It does not, however, present any options, or choices, or suggested courses of action for Presidential decision. For example, the PRM could pose the option of using or not using economic—as distinguished from military and supporting—assistance as a lever to promote human rights. This would provide an opportunity to alert the President to some of the negative consequences which could flow from the denial of economic assistance that is destined for the poor and hungry.

Under Section I, the legal basis for U.S. involvement in attempts to improve the human rights condition of mankind is not spelled out. I should be asked to prepare a short brief on this subject.

In identifying U.S. objectives in the area of human rights, the statement to the effect that all governments manifest an interest in the growth of human rights is not completely true. Many states are primarily interested in economic and social rights and give personal, civil and political liberties a low priority.

Section I, page 5, talks about changing other societies. We do not believe that this should be an objective of U.S. foreign policy. While we are dedicated to improving the human rights condition in various so-

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\(^2\) Christopher sent the draft study prepared in response to PRM 28 to interagency participants under cover of a June 14 memorandum, commenting that he hoped the addressees would consider it “a chopping block and a vehicle for discussion.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Material, RC # 1126, Box 12 of 13) Dubs is apparently referring to that study.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is the undated paper entitled “Suggested Changes to First Draft PRM.”
sieties, we assume that we still want a pluralistic world in which there is room for societies which are not modeled after our own.

The objective to make “pariahs” out of “gross violators of human rights” raises the question as to whether goals are best achieved in international relations through ostracism or through having a presence by means of which some influence could be exerted. Moreover, seeking to normalize relations with human rights violators such as Cuba, the PRC and Vietnam would be excluded if we took the position that we should treat them as “pariahs”.

Some further effort should be made to define what comprises “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” together with some examples. However, care must be taken not to adopt too rigid or legalistic an approach which could restrict unduly the USG’s flexibility in dealing with human rights problems on a world-wide basis.

In this connection, it would be most useful to provide a list indicating which countries have and which have not signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the various covenants dealing with economic and social rights, civil and political rights, etc. If a nation has signed and ratified the various covenants, etc. this fact should make it more vulnerable to international criticism if it is guilty of violation in the human rights area.

In discussing carrots or sticks to be used in encouraging improvement in the observance of human rights, (page 26), care must be taken to ensure that by cutting off food aid, for instance to an offending country because of its use of torture or ill-treatment of political prisoners, the punitive action does not result in the starvation or deprivation of food to thousands of innocent hungry people who are helpless victims of their own government.

Security Assistance as either a carrot or a stick may also have its pitfalls. A recommendation to cut off or lower security assistance levels to a particular country must take into account during the decision-making process the effects such an action might have on other immediate interests such as, for example, the search for a peace settlement in the Middle East.

The suggestion to emphasize “our human rights concerns in all training programs that we conduct for foreign military personnel” (page 31) could easily be interpreted by a country as a roundabout attempt to “destabilize” its government by the encouragement of “subversion” among its military personnel.

Our recent experience in the International Labor Conference (June 1–21, 1977) indicates that whatever legal view we may hold concerning
what is “politicization” or what is not, ours is a minority viewpoint. Voting for loans or abstaining from voting in IFI’s will be, and is, regarded as a political act. Our use of political criteria on IFI loans may come back to haunt us should the Egyptians move from expressing concern about our policy in the IFI’s to taking advantage of it in an effort to deny IFI loans to Israel on human rights grounds. The Egyptians have used international organizations in the past to further their foreign policy efforts vis-à-vis Israel. Since most of the world community believes that Israel does violate human rights in the occupied territories, our effort to address human rights questions in the IFI’s may place us in an awkward and embarrassing position in the future.

If we do continue to use the IFI’s as an instrument of human rights policy we should concentrate our fire on gross offenders where we have substantial multilateral support, e.g. Uganda. We suggest a cold, hard look at the possible future consequences of this policy be taken before any recommendation is made to the President.

In connection with the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (page 56), it should be noted that the USG has, thus far, declined to take part in the Decade because of the equating of Zionism with racism. The draft PRM states that we should consult with key African delegations at the 1977 UNGA in an effort to reach advance understandings for the avoidance of the Zionism-racism issue at the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination to be in August 1978. Before even attempting this, it should be remembered that Africa also includes such radical states as Algeria and Libya and

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4 At the ILO Conference in Geneva, the United States lost a vote on a 75-page committee report that contained unfavorable references to several third world countries. In a June 21 article, The Washington Post reported that some delegates indicated that the vote might compel the United States to withdraw from the ILO. (“U.S. Loses Critical Vote in ILO, Raising Possibility of Pullout,” p. C–7) Previously, on November 6, 1975, the Ford administration had submitted a letter to the ILO giving a 2-year notice of intent to withdraw. In a January 21, 1976, letter to Ambassador to Yugoslavia Laurence Silberman, designated as Ford’s special representative to review U.S. relations with the ILO, Ford commented that recent developments within the ILO, including increased politicization and the denial of due process to member states, had resulted in this course of action. (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book I, pp. 79–80) On May 27, 1977, the White House issued a statement indicating that a Cabinet-level committee was reviewing the membership issue. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 1029) The White House announced on November 1, 1977, that the United States would terminate its ILO membership. (Department of State Bulletin, December 26, 1977, p. 912)

5 An unknown hand bracketed and starred this paragraph.

6 During its 27th session in 1972, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2919 on November 15, declaring that the Decade would commence on December 10, 1973, the 25th anniversary of the issuance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

7 Scheduled to take place in Geneva. UN General Assembly Resolution 3379(XXX), adopted November 10, 1975, equated Zionism with racism. The United States voted against the resolution.
anti-Israeli states such as Egypt and Tunisia. Therefore, the USG should not participate in the World Conference or the UNESCO Conference to draft a Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice scheduled to be held in Lusaka, Zambia in late 1977 until the connection between Zionism and racism is officially broken by a UN resolution. It should also be noted that it is conceivable that the issue of Israeli-South African relations will be brought up at the Anti-Apartheid Conference scheduled to be held in Lagos in August 1977.

A reversal of previous USG policy not to participate in the Decade or in any of its activities because of the equating of Zionism with racism could have serious domestic and international consequences.9

Our recent experience of prior consultations with African states in connection with the just completed International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 1–21, would indicate that the Africans would more than likely back away from any promises made to the USG before the conference in the face of heavy radical Arab pressure and/or monetary inducements.

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8 UNESCO adopted the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice at its 20th session in Paris in November 1978.
9 An unknown hand bracketed and starred this paragraph.

64. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) 1

Washington, June 30, 1977

SUBJECT

PRM 28 on Human Rights

I understand that Steve Oxman now has the dubious privilege of producing a coherent draft PRM on human rights. My staff tells me that

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 6/16–30/77. Confidential. Lake did not initial the memorandum. A notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: “cy also given PHK [Paul Kreisberg], PG [Peter Grose].” In a handwritten note to Lake, July 1, Oxman commented that he had found Lake’s memorandum helpful. He added: “Please note that the draft you were commenting on was a D/HA product neither Matt [Nimet] nor Chris [Warren Christopher] nor I had passed upon in any way. That draft about to be completed answers many of your substantive concerns—I think.” (Ibid.)
he and Matt Nimetz have already done an impressive job in assembling disparate materials from throughout the Executive Branch.\(^2\)

Even though I know that another draft is now in preparation, I do want to share some of my concerns about work done so far. (I should note also that we did not get a chance to see the first draft that was sent for interagency comment, which was also not cleared elsewhere in the Department.\(^3\) Whether or not S/P plays the role it is supposed to on PRM’s, it will be very important that the Assistant Secretaries affected be involved.)

The latest draft, we believe:

—Does not provide a clear consensus on what we mean by human rights or a clear sense of where differences exist. There is, in fact, a division between those who favor the broad approach outlined in the Secretary’s April 30 speech and those who opt for stress on crimes against the security of the person. That philosophical and practical divergence—from which operational decisions obviously flow—is not identified for the President.

—Still does not relate our human rights policy to our overall foreign policy objectives. The result is a discussion which skirts the key issue of costs and benefits for the Carter Administration. What will pressing for promotion of human rights mean in the short- and long-term for certain bilateral relations, security interests, dealings with the Congress, etc.? Conversely, how might a well-managed human rights program in fact reinforce goals in the North-South Dialogue?

—For those areas where there are serious splits of opinion, such as the use of security assistance or of the international financial institutions, what are the choices? The discussion of these contains a short list of belatedly inserted options. There is, however, no evaluation of those options pro and con or indication of which Department supports what and why.

—In yet other areas, such as those treating public diplomacy and bilateral economic assistance, there are allusions to ambitious programs to promote human rights. In neither case, however, is there a

\(^2\) In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s June 17 evening report, Tuchman indicated that she had met with Oxman that day to review the first draft of the PRM. She added: “Oxman is very bright and a good writer, but the PRM skims over all the tough questions, and concludes that the way State is doing things now is the right way. In many areas, particularly the IFIs, I couldn’t agree less. Other issues may raise some real problems months or years from now that might be avoidable. Fundamental assumptions that should be analyzed are not, etc.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 5–7/77)

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 63.
suggestion about a price tag. Do AID, USIA, CU, and PA plan to reallocate from among present and projected resources to emphasize human rights or to request substantial budget increases?

—More money suggests the need for Congressional concurrence. There is no flag raised for the President on the need to launch considerable campaigns on the Hill—both to achieve the kind of appropriations potentially implicit in an expanded basic human needs component to US policy on human rights or for such stalled objectives as Senate ratification of the UN human-rights-related Covenants and Conventions.

—Finally, there is no indication of follow-up. Although parts of the PRM allude to agendas for action, there is no discussion of what need there may be for “new initiatives” and specific action by various agencies of the Government.

Before the final text is sent to the White House, you may want to raise this subject at an 8:30 staff meeting and request all concerned Assistant Secretaries of State to give this document their personal attention. Further, it may be necessary and worthwhile to defer dispatch until all relevant bureaus and offices register their views more clearly. I feel strongly that PRM 28 must address the kinds of issues I have noted if we are to have a final product which both reflects broader policy concerns and provides a concise basis for Presidential decision.

65. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, July 7, 1977

PRM on Human Rights

In response to your request, we have reviewed the draft Human Rights PRM² with a view to developing comments on the main substantive points. On the whole, we found it a commendable effort to deal with a complicated subject.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770122–0733. Confidential. Drafted by Ericson.

² Presumable reference to the first draft version of the study prepared in response to PRM 28; see footnote 2, Document 63.
Our three principal comments revolve around one central issue, which the draft itself acknowledges is all but intractable. That issue involves how much weight to give human rights in comparison to other factors when we make our foreign policy decisions. We all acknowledge that our commitment to human rights is, as the PRM states, a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. But the assumption that it should drive all other considerations still pervades the paper. Specifically, in three sections of concern to PM:

—the section on specific objectives (pp 21–23) assumes that certain specific objectives have already been identified and that others will emerge as the result of a detailed analysis of the “human rights situation in other countries and the possibilities for international action.” There is no reference to a process whereby these objectives would, before adoption, be weighed against other specific foreign policy objectives in the areas concerned. We feel the PRM should outline such a process, and should not assume that the USG will be committed to unnamed specific objectives without further review.

—We recognize that the relationship between security assistance and human rights is among the most difficult of all, involving as it does a potential conflict between two of our fundamental foreign policy tenets. The suggested approach—the option addressed on pp 55–56 of the draft—would have us not provide security assistance to any country unless 1) it is essential for our national security that the assistance be given, or 2) the recipient country has or is clearly developing a good human rights record. We believe this option is so fraught with possibilities for error that it should be discarded. Who would make these determinations? And on the basis of what criteria? Would the criteria involve consideration of whether the security assistance relationship with a particular country is essential or would it involve the type of materiel to be provided? Would it mean an abrupt cessation of all security assistance to all countries which could not meet the conditions specified? Does it mean that human rights and our national security are the only factors to be considered in determining whether we should have a security assistance relationship with a given country? In sum, these criteria go much farther than those already established by the President’s new arms transfer policy (which includes human rights considerations), are too stark and restrictive to be practical, and would deprive the President of the freedom of maneuver he requires in the foreign policy field. We therefore suggest elimination of the text begin-

3 Reference is to PD/NSC–13, issued on May 13, which indicates that the United States “will give continued emphasis to formulating and conducting our security assistance programs in a manner which will promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries.” PD/NSC–13 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XXVI, Arms Control.
ning with the words “In view” on line 13 of page 55 through the option on page 56.

—Of particular concern in this context is the statement on page 121 that “when the Arms Export Control Board (AECB) is unable to reach a consensus on particular policies, programs or transactions because of differences concerning the effect on human rights of the proposed actions, it will refer the issue to the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. This will ensure overall coordination of our human rights policy as it relates to foreign assistance.” We have many objections to what appears less a proposal than a statement of established procedure. It seems to be based on the premise that human rights considerations should have primacy over all others in security assistance matters and would give final jurisdiction to a body on which several of the agencies most directly concerned with security assistance are not represented. There exist ample assurances that human rights considerations will be factored into the proceedings of the AECB at every step and will be fully reflected in the recommendations which that Board (which is an advisory, not a decision-making body) will make to the Secretary. We therefore recommend strongly that the last two sentences of the paragraph at the top of page 121 be deleted.

I am attaching a list of other specific suggestions, keyed to pertinent sections of the text, for your consideration.4

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4 Gelb’s specific comments were not attached.
Washington, July 9, 1977

SUBJECT
Recognition of Improvements in Human Rights

The following is based on a conversation I had with the President this morning:

1. As you know, the Argentine Government has stated its intention to release 342 political prisoners. The President would like you to acknowledge this and express his gratification to the Argentine Government when they have released the prisoners.

2. At the same time, the President would like the State Department, on background to the press, to acknowledge this action by the Argentine Government and express the President’s gratification.

3. The President would like it to be a matter of policy to acknowledge and express gratification for improvements in human rights once it has been determined that these improvements are real rather than cosmetic. This should be done not only with the Government concerned but, on background, with the press.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770131-1346. Confidential.

2 The President met with Brzezinski from 9 to 9:15 a.m. in Carter’s private office in the White House. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found.
67. Memorandum From the Global Issues Cluster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 13, 1977

SUBJECT
Evening Report

Daily Activities

Tuchman started a marathon day of meetings at Rand Corporation briefing for ERDA on nuclear fuel cycles—economic analysis of various possible cycles.

Tuchman attended the second plenary of the human rights PRM to hear comments on the second draft.² Most agencies felt that this was a great improvement over the first draft. Defense, however, hated it, found the security assistance sections “totally unacceptable”, and the rest of the draft “unbalanced”. I felt that most of the relatively unimportant things were improved, but that all the important issues remain.

I made the points that: (1) there is no discussion of objectives³ and that is absolutely central to everything else (the PRM defines the objective as: “to encourage the respect that governments accord to human rights” and leaves it at that; (2) it essentially considers democracy (or the approximate content of the Bill of Rights) as a basic human right, which I find completely⁴ unjustified; (3) the strategy content of 85 pp boils down to—“we have to do everything on a case-by-case basis”. I see real dangers in this. Everyone makes a point of saying that sometimes “other interests” will take precedence over human rights. This means that we will have in essence a country-by-country list of prior-

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² Reference is to the second draft of the Department of State study prepared in response to PRM–28. Under cover of a July 7 memorandum, Nimetz sent Christopher the 85-page draft, noting that he had “tried to incorporate comments and suggestions from all of the Bureaus who submitted ideas. However, it was not possible to accommodate all suggestions made. In addition, I have cut the draft considerably, although I believe that little of real substance has been lost.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary: Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official July 1977–December 1977)

³ Brzezinski underlined the word “objectives” and wrote “need” in the left-hand margin next to the paragraph.

⁴ Brzezinski underlined the word “completely” and placed a question mark next to it in the left-hand margin.
ities, and it will become clear over time that for Argentina (e.g.) human rights heads the list, while for Iran, it is down near the bottom. Can such a policy succeed over time? This is getting too long. I will do a separate memo for you and I will be submitting written comments to Christopher.\(^5\) There is an agreed need for another draft.

Later in the day, Tuchman spent a sobering two hours at the staff level meeting of the interagency group on Human Rights and Financial Assistance (i.e., the Christopher group). This was the first time I had attended the working level sessions. The discussions were alarmingly picayune—“It says here that 15 people were arrested in Togo in 1974 for distributing pamphlets, do we know what happened to them?" “No”. “Let’s find out from the embassy, perhaps we should make a demarche.” While the mechanics are vastly improved (in terms of background papers, etc.) the substance is not. Also it becomes very clear that you cannot separate financial assistance (even when you include both bilateral and multilateral) from all the other aspects of a bilateral relationship. For example, this group does not control security assistance decisions.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to human rights.]

\(^5\) Presumable reference to Tuchman’s July 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Document 69.

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68. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, July 15, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

I have been giving considerable thought to your suggestion that I write an analytical introduction to PRM–28 in defense of the human

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary: Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official July 1977–December 1977. No classification marking.
rights policy, particularly in light of our last interagency meeting on the PRM.\textsuperscript{2}

It is my view that this PRM is not an exercise in which the human rights policy ought to be re-argued as if we were writing on a clean slate. I know there are some who want to take a fresh look at the policy. Jessica Tuchman of the NSC staff holds this view. I do not believe this is a credible alternative. The President articulated a human rights policy, not once, but consistently. The Secretary has spoken with authority on the subject. Decisive actions have been taken in its name. Reactions have occurred around the world. History, as it were, has been made.

I happen to believe that including human rights as a significant factor in foreign policy decisions is correct, on moral grounds, on strategic grounds and on domestic political grounds. But whether or not one agrees with the basic thrust of the policy, the fact remains that it is firmly imbedded as a part of this Administration’s over-all foreign policy. To re-argue it now, or even to suggest, in a fundamental policy document that is bound to receive wide circulation, that the policy is open to question would have very detrimental effects. It would certainly be seen by the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world, as a tremendous victory for Moscow and a weakening of the American President’s resolve under pressure. It would cause consternation among our friends abroad, who have adjusted to our policy, and to supporters of the human rights policy in the Congress and throughout the country. It would cause bureaucratic havoc in the Department where bureaus are now beginning to work human rights factors into their daily work program. It would be a foreign policy and political disaster.

What is needed now is refinement of the policy so that day-to-day decisions can be made effectively. I believe that everyone who has thought seriously about this matter recognizes that human rights can never be the fundamental goal of our foreign policy, which must be rooted firmly in our national security interest. But it should be one of a number of important concerns around the world to be pursued over the long term. Like environmental concerns or economic development interests, the sooner we transform “human rights” from an ideological crusade to a series of working level problems, the better we will all be. We must, so to speak, tame the human rights thrust and make it work for us, and workable by us.

For these reasons, I continue to believe that the PRM memorandum should not take on an analysis of the basic policy but should take off from the unshakable premise, eloquently elaborated by the President and the Secretary, that human rights concerns will play an

\footnote{See Document 67.}
important part in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy.

69. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, July 20, 1977

SUBJECT

PRM–28—Human Rights

Attached at Tab A\(^2\) is the table of contents of the third draft of PRM–28. It runs to 32 pages single spaced. The following are the major problems I have with it.

1. **What is to be taken as a given?**

   In previous sessions, I stated my own feeling that we should approach the PRM exercise in the spirit that nothing done or said so far should be considered dogma. The first two drafts constantly resolved tricky issues by a simple appeal to authority: referring to public statements of the President and the Secretary of State as the last word. I argued that we would not have been asked to do this review in the first place if a thorough analysis (even one that raised difficult questions) was not wanted. This draft finally does face this problem head on—but not at all in the spirit I had intended:

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 44, PRM–28 [2]. No classification marking. Brzezinski’s handwritten notations on the first page read: “URGENT” and “DA [David Aaron] 1) What do you think? 2) Let me see the PRM 3) pts 6–9 more convincing than the 1–5 criticism. ZB.”

\(^2\) Not found attached. The 32-page third draft was attached to another copy of Tuchman’s memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North–South Pastor Files, Subject File, Box 55, Human Rights: 6–7/77) In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s July 22 evening report to Brzezinski, Tuchman noted that she had spoken with the “human rights expert from SP who reported that the last drafts of the PRM had been almost entirely written by Christopher’s staff (Oxman, Lamb, and Nimetz) excluding both SP and Derian’s shop. This is interesting and surprising, but I don’t know what it means. According to this source, virtually everyone outside Christopher’s office is very upset with the PRM as it now stands, and eager to make it better. That is encouraging but hard to believe.” Brzezinski underlined the phrase “Derian’s shop” and wrote in the margin “good?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 5–7/77)
"In order to be useful, this study takes as its starting point the human rights policy articulated consistently by the President since his inauguration. It does not inquire whether we should have such a policy. The fact is that decisive actions have been taken to advance this policy both by the President and in his name. The Secretary of State has spoken with authority on the subject. Reactions have occurred around the world. History, as it were, has been made."

This means that all major statements—in particular the Secretary’s Law Day Speech—are now taken as carved in granite.

2. Objectives

The PRM states that our “overall” objective is to “increase the respect that governments accord to the human rights enumerated below”. I suspect that the choice of “overall” instead of “long range” was deliberate. It suggests a broad vagueness appropriate to what is provided. This section represents probably the most serious failure of the PRM—and also the most difficult set of questions to answer. *What are we really after? Is it to change totalitarian systems to democracies? To improve the social and economic welfare of the billions of impoverished people of the world? To increase domestic support for foreign policy in general? To make ourselves feel good? etc. These are not simple questions but I suspect that a careful effort to analyze them would dictate quite different policy choices for the short term as well as the long.*

The PRM also lists six “intermediate objectives”. Of the six only one is substantive—“seek a rapid end to patterns of gross governmental violations of the person”. All the rest are entirely procedural: —“heighten international awareness”; “attract international support”; “promote and strengthen international institutions”; etc. Again, we should be thinking in much more concrete terms.

3. The Definition of Human Rights

Vance’s Law Day speech set forth three categories of human rights. State now regards these as inviolate. Let me quote them since this is a key point:

“First, the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person: such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home (‘the First Group’).³

“Second, economic and social rights: the right to be free from government action or inaction which either obstructs an individual’s efforts to fulfill his vital needs for food, shelter, health care and education

³ Aaron bracketed and starred this paragraph and drew an arrow pointing at it.
or fails adequately to support the individual in meeting basic needs (‘the Second Group’).  

“Third, the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press; freedom to take part in government (‘the Third Group’).”

The First Group should be those which are universally applicable. To my mind therefore it should not include the last two items. Denial of a fair public trial is not tantamount to a denial of justice, and invasion of the home is of questionable meaning and applicability to certain societies—particularly Asian. Both these two items belong in Group Three.

More fundamental, is the question of whether the Third Group of rights can be globally applied. Why do we assume that these rights which we hold so dear are equally valued in other cultures? The PRM’s rationale does not even pretend to grapple with the issue:

“We do not accept the charge that by promoting these rights we seek to impose 18th century western ideas on non-western societies where they have no roots or relevance. These rights have been espoused in principle by virtually all governments and are of world-wide significance as a matter of practice.”

To say that “we do not accept the charge” is not to meet it. And to appeal to the UN Charter which includes every right that anyone can think of, does not take us much further. There are major questions to be answered as to where and when and how Group Three rights are relevant and applicable. They should be addressed.

4. Priority Among the Different Groups of Human Rights

The PRM states only that “the three groups of rights should be considered equally important”. This is not self-evident. Among other options are that Group One should be considered primary, or that Groups One and Two should be considered as equally important with Group Three being applied only in certain cases.

A related issue is the question of which tools—including both sanctions and incentives—are applicable and appropriate to each of the three groups. Most sanctions, for example, seem inappropriate to enforce or punish violations of Group Two rights. But if we do not react to violations of these rights, are we then relegating them to a lesser importance? There are many other related questions to be answered.

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4 Aaron wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “Basic Human Needs.”
5 Aaron wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “Categorization by type of action or how we intend to act.”
5. *Timeframe and the Scorecard Problem.*

The discussion of this issue is cursory to say the least. The draft explains that we must “concentrate on encouraging the maximum possible evolutionary movement”. Also, that “realistic timeframes will differ by country and by the type of human rights violation involved”, and that Group One improvements can be expected in a shorter timeframe than Groups Two and Three. That is all.

We are under intense pressure from both Congress and the press to explain what our expectations are, and when we expect to be ready for an accounting. When I stress to reporters that meaningful change in societies occurs slowly, they respond, “yes, but when will you be ready to be judged on whether this policy has been a success or failure? At the end of one year, two years, four years, two terms?, etc.” This is obviously a fair question and one to which we must provide some kind of answer. The obvious temptation, to which we have already to some extent succumbed, is to produce a scorecard on shorter and shorter, and therefore less and less meaningful time-frames. If we are going to refuse to produce such a scorecard we need a rationale for doing so—one on which all Administration spokesmen agree.

6. *Priority of Human Rights vis-à-vis Other Foreign Policy Interests*

The draft states that “the task of relating human rights policy to our other foreign policy concerns has been and will continue to be a case-by-case task”. This is not good enough. In fact I am not really convinced that it is *any* kind of an answer to this question. The State Department is currently heavily engaged in producing detailed country-by-country human rights reports and program plans for every nation in the world. While these will help us make informed judgments, they in no way contribute to the establishment of guidelines and criteria through which a consistent policy can be shaped. Moreover, if priority is assigned to human rights (vis-à-vis security interests, economic interests, proliferation interests, etc.) on a country-by-country basis, the inevitable result is a situation in which human rights is the number one priority in our relations with certain countries (e.g., Argentina) while it is way down on the list (if there at all) for other countries (e.g., Iran). Can we live with such a policy? Won’t other nations point it out and resent it? This needs analysis.6

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6 Brzezinski drew a line next to this paragraph, Aaron bracketed the last three sentences of the paragraph beginning with the word “priority” and wrote in the margin: “right.”
7. Strategies

In an effort to preserve maximum flexibility, the draft addresses the possibility of formulating strategies for different types of country, by dividing the globe into three divisions—western democracies, third world nations and communist states. The total analysis is three pages. Obviously, though every country is unique, a great deal more could be done by way of categorizing nations into groups according to their human rights characteristics and situations, and suggesting strategies for each. The discussion of the Soviet Union and of the PRC (which gets one sentence) is totally inadequate.7

8. Major Problems in the IFIs

The PRM raises the point that the IFIs’ charters state that they shall:

“not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of . . . (the recipient government). Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions . . .”

Clearly, then, our actions raise the serious question of whether our human rights policy violates the charters of these banks. The PRM suggests three arguments to counter that possibility. One is a nitpicking legalism and irrelevant politically. The second—that the term “economic” might be taken to include welfare and other social concerns, and therefore human rights—is weak. The third—that disregarding human rights considerations might not be compatible with the UN Charter, and is therefore unwarranted—is highly questionable both legally and politically. Having gone to the point of raising this issue, however, the PRM does absolutely nothing by way of answering it.

9. Creating Domestic and Congressional Support

Neither of these is treated, though the Congressional Liaison Offices are working on the latter. We have already seen enough, during the debates of the IFIs, to know that human rights concerns can lead to some very counter-productive legislative results.8 The Left may increasingly restrict our relations with rightist countries, while the Right does the same against Communist regimes, to the point where our foreign policy may be severely hampered. In addition, the putative “progressive center” is often so split by ethnic lobbying (Jews, Greeks, Eastern Europeans, etc.) as not to constitute a reliable base of support.

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7 Brzezinski drew a line next to the portion of this paragraph beginning with the word “total” and ending with “inadequate.”

8 Brzezinski drew a line next to the portion of this paragraph beginning with the phrase “Neither of these” and ending with “can lead to.”
Furthermore, we already know that the extreme Right can and will use this issue to further their goal of ending all foreign assistance. A serious and well thought through Congressional strategy and public program is therefore essential to even the short term success of a human rights policy. We should not accept any draft which fails to address it.

Conclusion

I would like your guidance as to how you wish to proceed. My relations with Christopher, Nimetz and their staff have been extremely friendly, and my comments on previous drafts (which were very close to the points made here) were welcomed with sympathy, and apparent approval, by Christopher. However, they were also obviously ignored. State seems prepared to do infinite rewrites, but without a formal NSC input, I’m not sure that they are willing to do a new draft rather than a rewrite of this one. On the other hand, perhaps I am wrong, perhaps these questions are simply too hard (and too soft) to answer.

I have circulated this draft to members of the NSC Staff (Thornton, Pastor, Richardson, Hormats, Hansen, Armacost, Oksenberg, and Hunter) for comment. Attached at Tab B are some of the comments I received on the first draft,9 which I believe are very similar to what I’ll get back again. They are obviously extremely negative.

My own inclination is that we will be much better off in the future if we insist on a good interagency product, than if we accept a bad one and redo it ourselves.

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9 Attached but not printed are a June 24 memorandum from Thornton to Tuchman, an undated memorandum entitled “Some Observations on Human Rights,” a June 29 memorandum from Hormats to Tuchman, a July 6 memorandum from Richardson to Tuchman, and a June 28 memorandum from Armacost to Tuchman. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 44, PRM–28 [2])
70. **Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts**

Washington, July 29, 1977, 1943Z

178340. Subject: Communications on Human Rights Policies.

1. On July 5, 1977 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs sent the following message to the three Commanders-in-Chief in Europe, the Pacific and Southern Command and an identical memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency: Quote The President has made clear the commitment of this government to the support of human rights as enunciated in such international instruments as the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Human rights concerns are a key element in our national policies, and it is important that our military personnel abroad have a thorough knowledge of these policies. The State Department has been asked to assure that its guidance to our diplomatic missions on the administration’s policies regarding human rights is made available to the unified commands and to US military personnel in attache or security assistance offices, so that they will have the fullest possible personal understanding of the government’s position on the issue as background in their work, and for their interchanges with host country officers. End of quote.

2. I heartily endorse this proposal. I have asked that outgoing Department messages concerning general human rights policies and issues be copied to all commands and that messages dealing with regional or country specific human rights issues which may be of interest be copied to the concerned commanders. Country Teams are requested to do the same. Moreover, Chiefs of Mission are requested to discuss appropriate ways of assuring that all members of Country Teams including the military components have prompt access to general policy pronouncements and discussions of human rights issues relevant to their countries and regions, including those which are received through United States Information Agency channels. All elements of the Country Team should be informed on human rights policy in order to be in a position to respond intelligently to questions on the subject and to support US policy as appropriate subject to guidance from the Ambassador. Addressees should also share messages concerning

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274–0270. Unclassified. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Leslie Brown, Holly, Ericson, ARA, Fuerth, Shurtleff, Martens, USA/IOP, DOD/OSD, and Spiegel; approved by Derian. Also sent to USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, USCINCSO. Sent to Harold Brown for information. Sent to military addressees for POLAD.
human rights problems and issues in their countries with neighboring posts as appropriate.

Vance

71. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Bergsten) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, August 1, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights and the IFIs

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance reexamine, on a regular basis (say quarterly), the human rights situation in countries for which we are awaiting responses and results of demarches already recommended by the Group. My concern is that we will approve IFI loans to a country even in the absence of some action by the country to improve its human rights situation.

Under current practice, the Working Group calls to our attention cases of proposed foreign assistance to countries which had not been considered by the Group earlier. As a result, the Group has recommended (1) abstention on IFI loans to Argentina, Benin, and Ethiopia, (2) withdrawals of IFI loan applications by El Salvador and Paraguay, and (3) demarches or other diplomatic approaches to Afghanistan, Brazil, Guatemala, Indonesia, Korea, Malawi, Nepal, The Philippines, Romania, Thailand and Yugoslavia.

Since the last meeting of the Inter-Agency Group on June 24, the Working Group has reviewed IFI loans coming up in August and September for the following countries which had been considered by the Inter-Agency Group earlier: Afghanistan, Brazil, Haiti, Indonesia, Korea, Nepal, The Philippines, and Thailand. (The new IFI proposals for these countries are listed in the attached table.)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770149–2361. Confidential.

2 Attached but not printed is an undated 6-page table entitled “Proposed IFI Loans to Countries Considered Earlier of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.”
For each of these new proposals, State representatives in the Working Group have recommended approval of loans with a “wait and see attitude” without time limit, pending results of demarches and other approaches approved by the Inter-Agency Group.

I strongly urge that henceforth our review at Inter-Agency meetings include not only new situations but also reports from the Working Group updating human rights trends in countries for which the results of demarches are pending (particularly for countries in which IFI loans come up frequently and for large amounts—e.g., Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, and The Philippines). The absence of such a follow-up might well lead to a situation in which loans continue to be made to major human rights offenders, thus counteracting the Administration’s human rights objectives and possibly causing strong criticism from the Hill and the public.\(^3\)

C. Fred Bergsten

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\(^3\) In an August 19 action memorandum to Christopher, Derian recommended that Christopher sign an attached memorandum that expressed agreement with Bergsten’s recommendation. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, IAGHRFA—History & Organization) Christopher sent Bergsten a different version of the memorandum on September 6, both expressing agreement and underscoring the Department of the Treasury’s cooperation in promoting the IAGHRFA’s efforts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770140–2360)

### 72. Memorandum for the Record\(^1\)

Washington, August 2, 1977

**SUBJECT**

PAID Assessment of Intelligence Production in Support of US Human Rights Initiatives

1. (U) On 2 August 1977 the undersigned met with members of the NSC staff, together with a representative of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to obtain their views concerning the adequacy of Intelligence Community products concerning human rights. Present

from the NSC were Robert Pastor, Latin America, Mike Oksenberg, Far East, PRC, Mike Armacost, SEA, and Richard Feinberg from the Policy Planning Staff.

2. (C) As users of Intelligence Community products, these NSC and State Department representatives rated Community output on human rights as good to excellent and of considerable value in the formulation of US foreign policies. While expressing general satisfaction with Community products, suggestions were offered for future production along the following lines:

- Evaluations concerning how foreign leaders, both parties in power and opposition groups, rank the human rights issue in order of importance against other issues pertinent to the relevant geographic area.
- Additional reports to assist in determining the degree to which non-governmental entities may be committing human rights violations on behalf of foreign governments, such as recent allegations involving right wing groups in El Salvador.
- Specific information upon which to base evaluations of allegations of human rights violations received from non-governmental groups such as Amnesty International.

3. Both Messrs. Oksenberg and Armacost expressed concern that the injudicious use of clandestine collection resources could have negative overall effects upon US relations with countries targeted for collection. Both recommend that overt resources be used, to the maximum extent possible, in satisfying national requirements on this topic, although it was recognized that clandestine collection can provide perspective and balance when gaps exist in overt reporting. It was generally agreed that the Intelligence Community and users of intelligence products should identify base line information requirements on human rights with respect to individual geographic areas to conserve clandestine collection capabilities.

4. On the basis of our discussion, there appears to be some disparity in the extent to which NSC and State staff members who support policymakers have become knowledgeable concerning the structure and capabilities of the Community through prior work experience or other means. Selected staff members at the NSC, State, and elsewhere might usefully be provided with an overview.

[name not declassified]
73. **Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance**

Washington, August 15, 1977

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC–28: HUMAN RIGHTS

This study is submitted in response to the NSC memorandum of May 20, 1977, requesting a review of United States foreign policy with respect to human rights. The major sections of the study are keyed to the NSC memorandum.

This study takes as its starting point the human rights policy articulated consistently by the President since his inauguration. Decisive actions have been taken to advance this policy both by the President and by the Secretary of State. Reactions have occurred around the world.

Day-to-day decisions which must be taken to advance the cause of human rights will require a careful weighing of the circumstances in individual countries. The study refines the overall thrust of our policy, evaluates the instruments at our disposal to carry it out, and considers costs, risks, and tradeoffs.


A. Overall Objective.

The overall objective of our human rights policy is to increase observance of human rights by governments.

1. Definition of Human Rights.

Generally accepted expressions of these rights are found in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948. To maximize our effectiveness, our policy should be directed to the most fundamental and important human rights, as set forth below, and should include the

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2 See Document 46.
right to enjoy them without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion:

First, the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person: such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home (“the first group”).

Second, economic and social rights: the right to be free from government action or inaction which either obstructs an individual’s efforts to fulfill his vital needs for food, shelter, health care and education or fails adequately to support the individual in meeting basic needs (“the second group”). Fulfillment of these rights will depend, in part, upon the stage of a country’s economic development.

Third, civil and political liberties: these include freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press; freedom of movement both within and outside one’s own country; and freedom to take part in government (“the third group”).

The President and the Secretary of State have expressly included the second and third groups within the general purview of the Administration’s human rights policy. The rationale and the implications of including these rights merit discussion.

Incorporation of the second group of rights in our policy has particular implications for its application to the Third World. A policy which subordinated these rights would not only be inconsistent with our humanitarian ideals and efforts, but would also be viewed unfavorably in those countries where the tendency is to view basic economic and social rights as the most important human rights of all.

As for the third group—civil and political rights—a policy that ignored them would be so narrow in construction as to sacrifice overall coherence. It would also be untrue to our heritage and basic values. We do not accept the charge that by promoting these rights we seek to impose eighteen century, Western ideas on non-Western societies where they have no roots or relevance. These rights have been espoused in principle by virtually all governments and are of worldwide significance as a matter of practice. There is no necessary inconsistency between political and civil rights on the one hand and economic development on the other.

Reliable and lasting protection against violations of the first and second groups can only come with the development of institutions that protect broadly defined civil and political liberties. To stop the torture of one person or to alleviate hunger in one family is important. To build institutions that safeguard against torture and provide a steadily improving standard of living must be our long-term goal. In espousing the third group of rights, there is a particular need, however, to avoid parochialism. Our goal is to enhance basic human rights in diverse so-
cies; we do not seek to destabilize governments or remake societies in our image.

The three groups of rights should be considered equally important. However, that does not mean that, as a practical matter, they will be pursued in the same way or over the same time span. In countries where the first group of rights is denied or threatened, the protection of those rights has obvious priority, since human life and fundamental human dignity are threatened. In countries where the first group of rights is generally observed, but political and civil rights are abridged or non-existent, our policy should emphasize our support for those rights. Promotion of economic rights is, for the U.S., primarily a matter of helping to stimulate economic development. This includes cooperation with and contribution to bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance efforts as well as other measures (e.g., in trade and finance) designed to strengthen the world economy. We should also encourage other countries to follow policies which will advance their economic and social development.

2. Timeframe.

In seeking greater respect for all these rights we must keep in mind the limits of our power and the intractability of the problem. Our ability to change human rights practices in other societies is limited, even if we exert substantial efforts. Thus, our expectations must be realistic, and we must concentrate on encouraging the maximum possible evolutionary movement. There will, of course, be certain exceptional circumstances in which we will seek dramatic improvements, as in our efforts to promote majority rule in Rhodesia.

Realistic timeframes will differ by country and by the type of human rights violation involved. The timeframes within which to expect improvements in group one rights should, in general, be considerably shorter than those in groups two and three.

B. Reasons for Pursuing the Overall Objective.

There are sound reasons, based in national interest as well as our moral tradition and legal obligation, for encouraging an increase in the respect that governments accord to human rights. Pursuit of this objective:

(a) helps fulfill a moral obligation that we have incurred by virtue of our heritage and values and our legal obligations under the United Nations Charter;

(b) strengthens the rule of law and respect for agreements by promoting the authority of the human rights recognized in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki
Final Act\(^3\) and other international instruments and by furthering the goal contained in U.S. laws authorizing foreign assistance that our foreign policy promote increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries;

(c) substitutes, in determining our attitude toward Third World governments, a standard based on governmental behavior toward people for an increasingly outmoded Marxist-non-Marxist standard, and assists in the philosophical debate with the Soviet Union over the type of society worth developing;

(d) strengthens domestic support for our foreign policy by reflecting the moral and ethical values of our people;

(e) promotes the fundamental long-term American interest in a world of nations whose systems of government and societies reflect individual freedom and dignity.

C. Intermediate Objectives.

In order to attain the overall objective set forth above, we should seek to achieve the following broad intermediate objectives:

(a) heighten international and national awareness of human rights concerns in order to steadily increase the norms of acceptable conduct in the human rights field;

(b) attract international support for our efforts;

(c) demonstrate that countries which violate basic human rights do so at a cost in their standing in the international community. Conversely, that countries with positive records or significant improving performance benefit tangibly and intangibly from their efforts;

(d) promote and strengthen the efforts of international institutions as well as non-governmental organizations to protect human rights;

(e) ensure that our own conduct measures up to the same standards we apply to others;

(f) seek a rapid end to patterns of gross governmental violations of the person, particularly murder, torture, and lengthy imprisonment for political offenses;

(g) seek to increase U.S. resources available for alleviating human suffering, particularly with regard to refugees.

D. Specific Objectives.

Achievement of the overall objective and the broad intermediate objectives set forth above will entail pursuit of specific objectives in particular countries and international institutions. The identification of these objectives requires detailed analysis of the human rights situa-

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\(^3\) See footnote 14, Document 4.
tion, as well as other relevant factors, in other countries and of the possibilities for action. This effort is presently underway at both the Department of State and posts abroad.

While certain specific objectives are already apparent—such as an end to the state of siege in Chile, the release of the Myongdong defendants in Korea, majority rule in Rhodesia, increased emigration of minorities from Eastern Europe—others will only emerge after additional analysis. The pursuit of certain human rights objectives, such as majority rule in Rhodesia and implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, will also serve to enhance political and other policy goals.

E. Recognizing the Costs of a Human Rights Policy and Relation to Other Foreign Policy Objectives.

As the promotion of human rights becomes one of our basic foreign policy tenets, we are faced with the task of relating human rights policy to our other major foreign policy concerns. It has been, and will continue to be, a difficult task. For we are adding an emphasis on human rights to an already wide range of policy goals, many of which, in the nature of things, come into conflict with one another at times.

Day by day, country by country, human rights considerations are being weighed against other foreign policy objectives, such as the maintenance of NATO strength and solidarity, strategic arms limitation, peacekeeping in the Middle East, control of nuclear proliferation, and normalization of relations with the PRC, Vietnam and Cuba.

While there is no necessary inconsistency among these objectives, they will, on occasion, compete for primacy. Resolution of the conflict between or among them will depend on the facts of the situation at hand, which should be addressed with openness and candor. There will clearly be instances in which efforts to achieve our human rights goals will have to be modified, delayed or curtailed in deference to other important objectives. But by the same token, making human rights a principal goal of our foreign policy means that promotion of human rights will not be viewed as a lesser objective. Even when other objectives outweigh human rights, our policies will be implemented in a manner that promotes human rights to the extent possible.

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4 Reference is to 13 Catholic priests and dissidents detained by the South Korean Government in order to head off anti-government protests. The announcement of their detention was made on March 1 during Mass at the Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul. (“South Korea Detains 13 Catholic Priests, Dissidents in Crackdown,” The Los Angeles Times, March 2, 1977, p. B–7) The Department of State issued a press release on December 31 indicating that the ROK Government had released all but one of the Myongdong prisoners. The remaining prisoner—former Presidential candidate Kim Dae-jung—had been moved to a hospital for medical treatment. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1978, p. 39)
Adoption of an affirmative human rights policy will carry with it a variety of risks, choices, tradeoffs and potential costs:

—Our actions and statements regarding human rights objectives may involve criticism of conditions in another country, which may be viewed as either offensive or threatening by the government concerned and, in certain cases, by some segments of the population. The resulting strain in our relations with that government may have a negative impact on other objectives. The sensitivity of the Soviet Union to our human rights initiatives represents a manifestation of the possible risks involved, in this case a strain in crucial East-West relations. Nevertheless, in many countries, positive responses to our human rights initiatives have occurred, are occurring, or are possible. As they do, relations will improve.

—Since some Western democracies, while supporting our general principles have not agreed with us on certain tactics, there is a risk that certain of our initiatives, if not properly coordinated, could lead to differences with our NATO allies. These differences could, of course, be exploited by the Soviet Union.

—Our criticism of human rights violations may provoke a greater degree of repression by a government, either because it fears our initiatives will encourage dissident groups to act with boldness or because it wants to demonstrate disdain for our policy. Of course, such a reaction bears its own internal political cost.

—Our methods may adversely affect multilateral institutions or ongoing programs, particularly in the economic area, which have their own U.S.-endorsed objectives. In particular, using our vote in international financial institutions to encourage respect for human rights might lead others to seek to block assistance on other and purely political grounds. On the other hand, failure to raise human rights concerns could jeopardize domestic support for these institutions. More broadly, we will have to remain alert to possible costs in terms of developing country cooperation on North-South issues.

—Inevitable inconsistencies in our human rights policy around the world will expose us to criticism. Allies such as Korea, Iran and the Philippines, for instance, cannot be immune from some application of the policy without endangering the integrity of the policy; neither can powerful adversaries like the Soviet Union. But whatever qualifications on the application of our policy toward these or other nations we deem necessary will invite charges that our policy lacks credibility.

—The implementation of our policy is likely to provoke reciprocal criticism of domestic conditions in this country, not only from communist nations but also from friends. Our response should be to welcome constructive criticism, noting that our system provides many remedies for social and economic ills.
—The pursuit of our human rights objectives will in some cases result in reduction of security assistance to, and cooperation with, offending governments. In some instances where our own defense posture is involved, U.S. security interests may be adversely affected.

—The human rights effort could involve significant dollar costs. While our commitment to a substantial increase in economic assistance is not solely a function of our human rights policy, it does relate to our commitment to the enhancement of economic and social rights.

F. Strategies for Pursuing our Human Rights Objectives.

Our human rights objectives obviously cannot be pursued everywhere, at once, and in the same manner. While no two countries’ situations will ever be identical, there are certain logical groupings of countries which can be useful for analysis and discussion.

1. Western Democracies.

We should support and reinforce human rights values in the Western industrial countries (including Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) and encourage these countries to support our human rights initiatives. We are now at a historic point at which all NATO and Western European countries are democracies, and a major effort should be made to reinforce democratic tendencies, particularly in countries that have only recently established or re-established democracy, such as Turkey, Greece, Portugal and Spain.

2. Third World Nations.

Efforts should be made to reinforce positive human rights and democratic tendencies in the Third World, particularly in states that already have demonstrated good or improving human rights performance. This support is particularly important with respect to countries that are vulnerable to external or internal threat, or which face severe economic problems. We should provide increased symbolic support as well as increased economic assistance, as appropriate, and cultural, educational and scientific exchanges. We should also seek support for U.S. human rights initiatives by these countries.

Our efforts with respect to Third World nations where a human rights tradition has been disrupted should seek to encourage return to former norms and to discourage the arbitrary use of power. In such societies, the populace may be receptive to various forms of assistance geared to support human rights values. Educational and cultural programs directed to human rights supporters might be especially effective.

In Third World nations where human rights values have never taken firm root, we should discourage the arbitrary use of power and promote a more equitable and humane social and economic order. In some cases, it will be more realistic to expect concrete achievements
with respect to the first and second groups of rights than with respect to the third.

An important aspect of our policy should be to ensure that our relations with countries that continually violate human rights are correct, in keeping with our other interests, but not close. The tone we set in our relations is important to the credibility and thus to the success of our overall policy.

3. Communist States.

With respect to the communist countries, our human rights effort should remain firm and consistent but non-polemical. We should recognize that major changes in communist regimes and their human rights practices will not take place in the short term; they are only likely to occur, if at all, gradually as the basic political and social structures of these countries change. On the other hand, we believe that U.S. and world opinion and U.S. actions can positively influence trends in the long term and encourage improvements in limited but important areas in the short term. We should make it clear that our commitment to human rights is basic to our foreign policy. This view should be communicated to the people of these countries as well as their governments. We should emphasize implementation of the Helsinki Final Act.

Because of its pivotal importance, the Soviet Union is a special case meriting a separate word. Soviet governmental response to our emphasis on human rights has been negative and increasingly sharp, explicitly suggesting that détente is threatened by our policy. To what extent the Soviet leadership truly feels their system and their hold in Eastern Europe is endangered is unclear; but their objective appears to be to bring about a significant decrease in our public advocacy of human rights, thus reducing its most embarrassing aspects for them, on the pretext that a “one-sided” U.S. advocacy of human rights and respect for state sovereignty cannot co-exist.

There is no evidence that the U.S. human rights policy has affected Soviet bargaining positions in important negotiations, even if the atmosphere surrounding negotiations is tense. Our substantive position on arms control has and likely will continue to determine the Soviet response on this critical issue. Similarly, we believe that the Soviet Union will continue to pursue its perceived interests in arms control, trade, scientific and cultural exchanges and other areas of our bilateral relations, regardless of our advocacy of human rights. The inevitable strain of a massive arms race, the need to take increasing consumer demands into account, and the potential for unrest in Eastern Europe means the Soviet Union cannot easily pull away from MBFR or SALT negotiations, technological transfer agreements or commercial credit arrangements.
The USSR is continuing efforts to cooperate with the U.S. private sector, despite the Jackson-Vanik amendment.\(^5\) This indicates that the Kremlin may implicitly recognize that Soviet economic concerns will make it difficult to delay forward bilateral movement for long periods of time because of U.S. human rights advocacy.

With proper management, our security interests and our human rights concerns both can be accommodated in our relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, failure to execute an appropriate human rights strategy with proper balance will detract from the political value of our human rights policy elsewhere in the world.

The potential normalization of relations with China and Cuba will place some strain on the credibility of our human rights policy, for in both cases other considerations are likely to govern in the short term. As relations are established, we will be expected to take human rights initiatives. We should now be examining the methods we will utilize to achieve specific human rights goals. These would probably fall, at the beginning, in the areas of family reunification and, with respect to Cuba, the treatment and disposition of political prisoners. We should recognize that with respect to human rights we will have little, if any, leverage or influence with the PRC at this stage.


Governments that have a consistent record of gross violations of human rights should be dealt with as special cases, and our policy should generally be to bring to bear international opinion and concerted action by the world community to bring about improvement. Obviously, this should be done only in flagrant cases after attempts to encourage evolutionary improvement have been spurned. Even in such cases, however, there is no necessary reason why formal diplomatic relations should not be maintained.

II. Identification of “a Consistent Pattern of Gross Violations of Internationally Recognized Human Rights.”

The phrase, “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”\(^6\) derives from terminology in Resolution 1503 of the UN Economic and Social Council, dated May 27, 1970,\(^6\) and has been used in Sections 116 and 502B (a) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 28 (a) of the Inter-American Development Bank Act, and Section 211 (a) of the African Development Fund Act. The general purport of all these statutory provisions is that we should not provide assistance to governments that engage in such conduct.

\(^6\) See footnote 3, Document 2.
The legislative history of our statutory provisions does not indicate the meaning Congress attached to the concept of a “consistent pattern,” and there are no judicial decisions interpreting the phrase. By its terms the language excludes isolated events and incorporates the dimensions of time as well as repetition. Thus, frequently repeated actions over a relatively short period of time would appear to be covered as would somewhat less frequent but regular violations over a relatively long period of time.

While “internationally recognized human rights” would include, inter alia, all of the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it appears from the legislative history that in using the phrase and combining it with the concept of “gross violations,” Congress intended to cover mainly the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person, i.e., the first group of rights discussed above.

Once a determination is made that a country has engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, certain important questions arise. For example, is the determination binding as to future decisions with respect to that country? If that would depend on whether there had been substantial intervening events, by what standard ought those events be judged? Further, would a determination as to one country have precedential effect as to other countries?

These are not easy questions. While answers can no doubt be devised, the questions point up the limitations in the human rights context of requiring uniform actions pursuant to a statutorily-prescribed standard of conduct. There are vast differences among human rights conditions in various countries, and what may rise to the level of offensive conduct in one country may not be properly so characterized in the setting of another country with different circumstances, a different history, and a different trend. To be realistic and effective, our policy must take account of such differences. That will therefore be difficult if we are required to take the same action—e.g., a “no” vote on an IFI loan—with respect to different countries, even though our own best assessment of the circumstances in such countries might indicate that the mandated action would be inappropriate or that other actions should be taken instead.

III. Evaluate Actions Which U.S. Could Take to Improve Human Rights Conditions.

The range of actions we can take to advance our human rights objectives is examined below. Of primary importance is the need to evaluate the human rights situation in individual countries and to consider the various policy instruments at our disposal in the light of our own foreign policy objectives in those countries. These evaluations, which
are underway, will apply the factors Secretary Vance cited in his April 30, 1977, Law Day speech as important to the determination of human rights policy in particular instances.

A. Diplomatic actions, public statements, and various symbolic acts.

Diplomatic exchanges, ranging from informal talks with officials or government leaders to formal demarches, are a valuable tool. Through them we can make our human rights policy understood by other governments and provide notification of the sanctions or incentives that may flow from our policy. As a general proposition, our actions with respect to the human rights conditions in any country ought to begin with such approaches.

Diplomatic actions, of course, extend beyond demarches. In flagrant cases we may find it advisable and effective to reduce the level of our presence in a given country.

Public statements can also promote our human rights goals. By conveying publicly what we have previously said privately, they add the force of world opinion to our efforts. Statements can be critical of particular violations or general attitudes, or they can commend positive conduct or attitudes. Critical statements will be used sparingly to preserve their effectiveness. A constant stream of criticism of foreign governments may cause the U.S. ultimately to be ignored as a tiresome and ineffective international scold. While public statements are an extremely important tool, they must be used with skill and discrimination.

Symbolic acts can in certain circumstances be even more effective than public statements and may not present the same risks. They can encourage countries with good human rights records to persist. Invitations to make state visits, Presidential letters, goodwill missions, special visitor programs and the like are highly valued abroad. Directing them to countries with good or improving human rights records will send a very effective signal.

There will clearly be circumstances in which we should use symbolic acts to identify the U.S. with representatives of human rights organizations, or with the victims of human rights abuses who seek or would welcome such identification. We not only demonstrate thereby our concern and communicate our support, but we may also add an element of protection to the organizations and individuals involved. Of course, there will be circumstances in which such symbolic acts on our part would actually increase the risks to such organizations and individuals.

B. Changes in Levels of Security and Economic Assistance and Food Aid.

If we genuinely seek to promote economic and social rights, we should work to meet the Administration’s objective to increase sub-
stantially both bilateral and multilateral foreign economic assistance by 1982.

Where the promotion of human rights is concerned, increases or reductions in the security and economic assistance (including food aid) that we provide to individual countries are more decisive and visible measures than diplomatic actions, public statements or symbolic acts. However, because of the sensitivity of recipients and the unpredictability of their reactions, reductions in aid ought not be considered lightly or until less drastic measures have been taken. Ideally, we would like to be perceived as working closely with the developing nations that are pursuing equitable growth policies which protect and promote human dignity. To the extent we are so perceived, our human rights policy will be strengthened.

Obviously we do not write on a clear slate when we consider reductions in assistance in view of the various statutory provisions which direct that assistance be used to promote human rights, and except in certain exceptional cases, be withheld when a consistent pattern of gross violations emerges.

Our military and economic assistance is generally valued highly by recipient governments. Thus it is appropriate, circumstances permitting, that we should seek to obtain improved human rights conduct in return. It should be noted that in many cases aid is extended in return for other considerations, e.g., in some cases it is called for by base rights agreements. In other cases, our assistance may be small in amount and thus easily dispensed with or replaced from other sources. In such cases our aid may afford us only limited leverage on human rights issues.

Certain general costs and benefits apply to the use of both military and economic assistance as sanctions and incentives with respect to human rights. The benefits include underscoring the seriousness and determination with which we are pursuing our human rights objectives, avoiding where feasible the inconsistency of providing substantial material assistance to repressive governments, and demonstrating tangibly that it can be costly to violate human rights and valuable to respect them. The costs include possible damage to U.S. national security interests, and to our general political and economic interests; disruption of established assistance relationships; curtailment of activities directly supporting the second group of human rights; possibly penalizing groups of individuals who bear no responsibility for the abuses of their governments; and the risk that some recipient governments from whom we withhold assistance may be in a position to retaliate by withholding resources that we vitally need.

As a very general proposition, reductions in military assistance ought usually to precede reductions in economic assistance. Con-
versely, increases in economic assistance ought usually to precede increases in levels of military assistance.


Our military assistance is a matter of great sensitivity both to the governments that receive it and to those segments of the American public and the Congress who watch it closely as an index of the priority we place on human rights objectives in relation to our other foreign policy concerns. Moreover, under Section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, we have a legal obligation to ensure that our security assistance programs are formulated and conducted in a manner that will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the U.S. with governments that violate human rights.

Perhaps more than any other single factor, U.S. military assistance is seen as implying U.S. support for the governments that receive it. To be perceived as supporting a repressive government inevitably exacts costs in terms of the consistency and the credibility of our human rights policy. Moreover, some types of arms we provide, finance or license can be used by a recipient government to carry out or undergird repressive practices. (Although such use is prohibited by U.S. law, our ability to prevent it is limited.)

A full discussion of the criteria for providing military assistance is beyond the scope of this study. However, we should remember that most countries (certainly including our own) believe strongly in the right to an adequate defense. A careful evaluation of the interests at stake, and the potential benefits to be gained, is needed in each case. Where there are vital national security interests at stake which require a continuing military relationship between the U.S. and the recipient, and where the recipient’s human rights record is considered to be acceptable or improving, we should consider sympathetically approving arms transfers that are consistent in other respects with the President’s arms transfer guidelines. Conversely, where those factors are not present, we should view such requests unsympathetically.

Military assistance can be used as a sanction or incentive to promote human rights by altering the size or functions of our military advisory contingent; by altering the level of training grants; by altering the quantity of arms transfers; and by altering the types of arms transferred. Reduction or elimination of military assistance may have little direct impact on a country’s human rights performance; in many in-

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7 Security assistance includes grant material aid, grant military training, FMS and licensed commercial arms sales and FMS financing of arms sales through credits and loan guarantees. (Security supporting assistance is discussed in the section on bilateral economic assistance below.) [Footnote in the original.]

8 See footnote 3, Document 65.
stances the country will be able to turn to an alternate supplier. However, when a decision is made to reduce military assistance as part of an overall strategy, with advance warning communicated through diplomatic channels, some improvement of human rights performance may be possible in specific countries. Governments and military forces in many regions desire close relations with the U.S., and a firm human rights policy, which demonstrates that benefits such as military assistance are placed at risk in the absence of human rights progress, will be a continuing element in their decision-making.

Some argue that the strongest signal that could be sent to offending governments would be to alter the relationships that have been built up over the years between our military and the military of other countries, some of whom are responsible for repressive practices, by reducing the size of our military contingent and our training (IMET) grants. They do not believe such action would impair our security interests; indeed, they argue that we do not have legitimate security interests in many of the 57 countries that receive our military assistance. (46 of the 57 countries receive IMET assistance.) Others believe that reducing our military presence will reduce our ability to communicate with and influence segments of the governments whose policies we are trying to change. They believe we should increase the IMET program on a worldwide basis, particularly in certain selected countries now prohibited from participating in it, because they believe IMET has proven successful in fostering pro-U.S. attitudes in foreign military students. This complex issue requires further study.

2. Bilateral Economic Assistance, Trade and Investment Programs.

U.S. bilateral economic assistance is provided in several forms. It includes direct humanitarian assistance (disaster relief and PL 480 Title II), assistance programs directed primarily to benefit the needy, other economic development programs which benefit the poor majority less immediately, food aid given to support development (PL 480 Title I), and security supporting assistance (assistance extended for primarily political reasons in the form of grants, budget support, commodity loans and development projects).

Humanitarian assistance, such as International Disaster Assistance and PL 480 Title II, is designed to alleviate human suffering by responding to emergencies caused by manmade or natural disasters. As such it directly promotes the most basic human right—that of survival—and should not be considered for use as leverage in supporting broader economic, political or social rights.

The basic objective of our bilateral assistance program continues to be to meet the needs of the poor, even in those countries where serious human rights problems exist. This policy is reflected in law—the original Harkin Amendment—which states that AID programs do not have
to terminate in such countries where AID assistance “directly benefits needy people”.

As a result of the “New Directions” in development assistance, mandated by Congress, the focus of regular U.S. bilateral economic assistance has increasingly been directed to meeting the basic human needs of the poor majority in the developing countries, such as nutrition, health care, education and human resource development, and less on large-scale capital transfers for major infrastructure development. Such programs, which assist the poor majority in developing countries gain access to participation in decisions which shape their lives, strongly and independently promote group two economic rights, as well as create a climate supportive of a broader observance of political and social rights.

As a rule then, bilateral development assistance which directly benefits the needy should not be used as a policy instrument to sanction a government for its human rights violations. (Where assistance benefits the needy, but a country’s human rights record is poor, we should consider the extent to which our aid is or can be provided through non-governmental institutions thus reducing our identification with the government.) There may be instances, however, in which a particular government’s human rights violations are so flagrantly gross and systematic that the need to disassociate from that government outweighs the development assistance goals in that country. Such a balancing of considerations will require case-by-case analysis.

Reducing economic assistance that does not directly benefit the needy is a more appropriate means to disassociate the U.S. from a repressive or corrupt government, but such bilateral programs are now the exception.

Security supporting assistance is extended to a limited number of countries in which the U.S. has special interests of high political priority. Currently, 80% of our security supporting assistance goes to Israel and the three confrontation states in the Middle East. Food assistance under PL 480 Title I can also be used to leverage human rights improvement. However, the distribution and terms of Title I aid have traditionally been affected by political factors. In addition, its use would entail the considerable political risk of appearing to provide or deny food to hungry people in order to achieve U.S. political objectives.

An increase in aid that directly benefits the needy can be an effective way to encourage positive human rights conduct. Such increases directly promote our overall human rights objectives by contributing to

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9 See footnote 4, Document 1.
10 See footnote 30, Document 29.
the fulfillment of vital human needs. In addition, assistance programs designed to encourage wider participation in the economic life of a nation can encourage creation of an underlying climate supportive of a broader observance of human rights. Increasing assistance within existing budget levels to support countries with improving human rights records is possible, but difficult to accomplish. We would expect such increases to be made very selectively. Increases in bilateral economic assistance on human rights grounds should normally be considered on an annual basis to support long-term improvement in human rights conditions and to meet legitimate development needs. In shaping the overall bilateral aid budget, the pattern of allocation should reflect our human rights policy as well as more traditional economic development criteria.

3. Trade and Investment Programs

The U.S. is a strong proponent of liberalized trade, most importantly because discriminatory arrangements established by other major trading countries generally damage U.S. trade. The power of the President to use trade measures to favor or discriminate against a country on human rights grounds is limited by international and domestic legal obligations to grant non-discriminatory treatment to most nations. Moreover, singling out particular countries for punitive action is very difficult to accomplish “cleanly”. Other countries’ trade and economic interests almost inevitably become involved, risking a chain reaction which may adversely affect our economy. Only where there has been a broad international consensus that a country is guilty of particularly egregious conduct have a sufficient number of countries coordinated their trade sanctions so as to have a significant economic impact on the offending regime.

Most Favored Nation Treatment. Under current U.S. domestic law (19 U.S.C. 1202), all non-communist countries, as well as Poland and Yugoslavia, are accorded most-favored nation (MFN) tariff treatment. There is no existing domestic legal authority to withdraw MFN tariff treatment from any of these countries, although section 301 of the Trade Act authorizes applying discriminatory duties to an individual country in response to a proven unfair trade practice.

Furthermore, such a sanction, even if authorized by U.S. law, would violate our international obligations if applied to any of the forty-three countries with which we have treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation or any of the one hundred six countries which are parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or to which that agreement is applied de facto.

Beyond these legal limitations, we believe that our trade policy interests, as well as practical considerations, militate strongly against using withdrawal of MFN treatment as a sanction against human rights
violations. Withdrawing MFN would set a damaging precedent. It is conceivable that some countries, faced with domestic pressures for increased protectionism, might cite foreign policy objectives as a convenient justification for discriminatory restrictions.

**Generalized System of Preferences.** The United States accords preferential treatment (i.e., duty-free entry) for certain products of about 100 developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) authorized by Title V of the Trade Act of 1974.11 Under the Trade Act, the President has the authority to designate any developing country meeting certain requirements as a beneficiary of GSP. He also has the authority to terminate GSP benefits for any country upon sixty-days notice. The benefits of GSP are a unilateral grant authorized by a GATT waiver and are not subject to the same rights of compensation or retaliation provided in the GATT with respect to MFN treatment. Consequently, the President could use the GSP as a human rights sanction without obtaining new legislation and without violating our international obligations.

Denial of GSP benefits as a sanction would not entail nearly the same adverse trade policy consequences as in the case of the long-enshrined MFN principle. The denial of GSP to Uganda, in part because of human rights concerns, generated no adverse reaction. However, since GSP benefits are limited, it remains to be seen whether the threat of termination or denial of benefits would induce greater respect for human rights. Widespread denial (or withdrawal) of GSP benefits might call into question our trade commitment to a generalized system.

**Export-Import Bank and OPIC.** Government programs supporting U.S. exports are administered by the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im), while the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) encourages U.S. private investors to invest in developing countries through its political risk insurance and finance programs. Ex-Im and OPIC can be distinguished from bilateral assistance programs in that they facilitate U.S. business activities in foreign countries. In some cases Ex-Im does deal directly with foreign governments. OPIC does not provide financial subsidies to LDC governments, but does enter into umbrella agreements with them. OPIC insures U.S. private investment in LDCs, particularly the lowest income LDCs, thereby complementing the development assistance objectives of the U.S.

Ex-Im and OPIC programs normally will not be appropriate vehicles for influencing changes in the human rights practices of governments. In cases of gross violations, where we do not wish to be associated with the government in question, it may be desirable to curtail

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11 The Generalized System of Preferences allowed the President to eliminate tariffs on imports from LDCs.
them. In the rare cases where we might resort to curtailment, our action could have a significant impact on the government in question.

C. Initiatives in International Financial Institutions.

U.S. concern with promoting human rights through the international financial institutions (IFI’s) became explicit last spring with the passage of the Harkin Amendment to the authorizing legislation for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Fund (ADF). That amendment requires that the U.S. vote “no” on loans or assistance to a country that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.”

The Harkin Amendment will in all likelihood soon be replaced by language on this year’s IFI authorizing legislation. As it emerged from conference, the legislation instructs the USG through its Executive Directors to seek to channel assistance away from countries whose governments engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights or provide refuge to airplane hijackers; to use our “voice and vote” in seeking to channel assistance towards projects which address basic human needs; and to consider a number of factors related to human rights concerns e.g. specific actions taken on bilateral assistance on human rights grounds, extent to which the assistance benefits needy people, status of a country regarding nuclear proliferation, and responsiveness of governments in providing better accounting of MIAs.

Where other means have proven ineffective, the legislation requires us to oppose loans (i.e., vote “present,” abstain, or vote “no”) to countries which engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless such assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of the citizens of such countries or unless the President certifies that the cause of international human rights would be more effectively served by actions other than voting against such assistance.

This legislation is fully compatible with our policy to use our membership in the IFIs to promote human rights.

The new IFI legislation also specifies “the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall initiate a wide consultation designed to develop a viable standard for the meeting of basic human needs and the protection of human rights and a mechanism for acting together to insure that the rewards of international economic cooperation are especially available to those who subscribe to such standards and are seen to be moving toward making them effective in their own systems of governance.” We will need to develop a strategy for implementing this requirement.
While most of the discussion to date concerning human rights and the IFI’s has focused on particular loans and votes, it is also important to develop a long-term approach whereby we seek an overall reduction in IFI lending to countries that consistently violate human rights, excepting loans for the needy. Our policy in this regard should parallel our bilateral aid policy (see pg. 20, para. I).12

Support from the other industrialized democracies for our efforts to use our voice and vote in the IFI’s to promote human rights has been minimal to date: only Canada and Sweden have indicated some support. A number of leading LDCs—including Egypt and India—have questioned the legality of U.S. actions on human rights in the IFI’s.

The articles of all the IFI’s contain a provision not different in substance from the following language in the World Bank’s articles: “The Bank, its officers and employees should not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of . . . (the recipient government). Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions . . .” (Art. 10, Sec. 10). The Legal Adviser of the State Department believes that the prohibition against interference in the “political” affairs of members may be interpreted validly as not applicable to the consideration of human rights factors, particularly group one rights, which are more fundamental than “political” matters and therefore not within the scope of that term. The injunction to weigh only economic considerations in making decisions can in many, if not most, cases be satisfied by relating the human rights situation in a country to economic issues. For example, welfare and other social concerns are, broadly speaking, economic as well as human rights considerations.

It is only fair to state, however, that other IFI members may very well resist this line of reasoning. Some may argue that our negative vote or abstention on human rights grounds raises serious questions of compatibility with an IFI charter. Others may be encouraged to condition their participation on what we would consider to be “political” grounds, citing our action as a precedent. For example, the Arab countries might raise matters concerning the Palestinians or the allegations they have made elsewhere concerning Israel’s human rights practices in the occupied territories. We should consider whether or not it would be possible and in our interest to seek amendments to the charters to include human rights considerations.

Our interest in promoting human rights will be best served by adherence to the following guidelines:

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12 Presumable reference to the last paragraph in section III(B)2. above.
—There is a presumption that our votes in the executive boards of the IFI’s in support of our human rights policy should be used sparingly and designed to advance the overall strategies we will work out for individual countries.

—When we plan to cast a non-affirmative vote or make a statement of concern for or condemnation of human rights practices in the IFI’s, we should apprise other nations of the rationale for our proposed action and seek their understanding and cooperation.

—The information on human rights which the U.S. uses to arrive at its judgments should be available to other IFI members to the extent possible.

—in the longer run we should develop a consensus among IFI member governments in support of our human rights policy and seek to persuade these governments that IFI managements and members should give great weight to human rights factors when assessing the suitability of proposed loan programs.

D. Use of Overseas Broadcast Facilities and Cultural and Educational Programs.

International awareness of the effort to preserve and extend human rights will, in itself, contribute to the success of our policy. That awareness can be increased by appropriate use of the facilities and programs of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the State Department’s cultural and educational programs. Domestic awareness and understanding of our policy can be promoted by the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs.

1. USIA.

USIS posts abroad offer important opportunities available to the U.S. for the creation of intellectual, philosophical and (to at least a limited degree) political “infrastructure” in support of human rights. USIS posts are engaged in dialogue with influential elites and “establishments”—as well as the next generation of leadership. Seminars, symposiums, relations with editorial writers, bar associations and the like offer important opportunities to kindle and sustain the spark of concern for group three rights, in particular.

The USIA, through its radio broadcast facilities, in print and via television, can present and elaborate our human rights concerns directly to audiences abroad. Although all communications media can and should be used, radio is our primary direct channel to mass audiences. Where other media are controlled, radio is particularly important. Coordinated, balanced and consistent future programming should develop the theme that human rights is a universal human aspiration, not an American idiosyncracy, and should cover positive
human rights developments, particularly outside the U.S., as well as the record of continuing violations of human rights.


RFE and RL have played a key role in the rising awareness that has accompanied the expanding human rights movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Human rights activists in Moscow, Warsaw and other cities frequently cite RFE/RL’s extensive coverage as a vital source of information. In the future, the Radios will utilize the expansion of their technical facilities which has been proposed by the President to extend their human rights coverage to larger audiences. Another priority is to augment news-gathering and research capabilities, especially in Western Europe, for more detailed reporting of CSCE developments. The Radios also seek to give increased attention to human rights developments affecting the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union.

3. Cultural and Educational Exchange.

The international exchange of persons program administered by the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) conveys a human rights message to all foreign leaders who participate in it. Experience indicates that the overwhelming impression left with most visitors to this country is that the American people do care about human rights and that the United States does seek to protect and foster them. CU intends to give additional, more specific attention to human rights concerns. Objectives could include encouraging increased international activity among American non-governmental groups which have an interest in human rights, especially groups from the academic and journalistic communities, and strengthening CU relations with activities of the legal profession in international human rights endeavors.

E. Improved access to the U.S. for refugees and dissidents.

In keeping with our overall objectives, we should demonstrate a generous, humanitarian policy of providing refuge to victims of repression. We should continue to support provisions in H.R. 7175 that would increase the authorized global number of conditional entries

13 In a March 22 message to Congress transmitting a report on international broadcasting required by Section 403 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1977 (S. 3168; P.L. 94–350; 90 Stat. 823–850), the President noted that his review of U.S. international broadcasting efforts led him to conclude that current efforts were “inadequate” and that VOA and RFE/RL required 16 additional 250 KW transmitters for broadcast to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in addition to 12 VOA transmitters for broadcast to Asia and Africa. (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 28, 1977, pp. 423–24)

14 See footnote 9, Document 62.
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) from 17,400 to 20,000 and admit additional refugees in emergent situations as conditional entrants, permitting them to adjust their status to that of permanent residence after two years.

We should oppose provisions in H.R. 7175 that would impose numerical limitations on the numbers of such refugees who may be admitted by the President in emergent situations under certain circumstances and the requirement that other countries must accept resettlement of their fair share of the refugees involved before the admission of such refugees into the United States.

We recommend a more liberal use of the Attorney General’s authority to admit individual refugees and groups of refugees who do not qualify under the INA. Specifically, we believe that the Attorney General and the INS in considering applicants for parole into the United States should be more forthcoming with respect to innocent victims of authoritarian regimes. Such a change in policy would be a concrete demonstration of the sincerity of our commitment to human rights. While the process of consulting with Congressional leaders before using the parole authority is not required by law, we would want to notify them before liberalizing our policy. There is likely to be some negative Congressional reaction to a liberalized parole policy.

Dissidents in repressive countries, to the extent they may be able to proceed to free countries, should generally be considered as refugees. Most such dissidents would qualify as refugees under the new definition of refugees contained in the pending legislation that we support.


There are important advantages to pursuing our human rights objectives through multilateral institutions. Because of the clearly defined human rights responsibilities of multilateral organizations, examination of the human rights practices of all countries can be properly pursued and, since the responsibility for initiatives in multilateral bodies is shared, individual country situations can be considered in a manner less likely to bring the U.S. into direct confrontation with the country concerned.

Increased use of multilateral institutions will improve their capacity to deal effectively with human rights problems and enhance public support for them.

1. The United Nations.

The United Nations can be a valuable forum for developing multilateral cooperation on behalf of human rights. It has broad representation and mechanisms for protection of human rights. Specific documents such as the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the UN
human rights conventions express concerns and commitments in this field. Accordingly, we should expand and intensify our efforts at the UN and support and carry through on them in our bilateral relations and by ratifying promptly those conventions we support.

We should give careful consideration to taking the following human rights initiatives in the UN:

— UNESCO Executive Board Session (September–October 1977).

Develop broader support for human rights issues by establishing an independent Expert Review Committee.

— 32nd Session of the UN General Assembly (1977).

Conduct a major effort, in close consultation with other interested governments, to secure approval for the establishment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Propose the establishment of a special ad hoc Expert Committee on Torture to identify serious instances of torture worldwide.

— Next Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (Spring 1978).

Propose measures to strengthen procedures for instituting studies of situations involving consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally-recognized human rights. Press for an additional annual session of the Commission, to be held at UN headquarters in New York.

— Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

Continue to consult with key African delegations to help break the pattern whereby they link Zionism and racism. Our objective is to reach understanding on that issue before the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination so that the U.S. can attend that meeting, scheduled for August 1978.

2. Organization of American States.

The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, an independent agency of the OAS, is playing an increasingly central role in the struggle to defend human rights in the Western Hemisphere. We are working to increase the staff and budget of the IAHRC to cope with mounting human rights complaints. We shall submit the American Convention on Human Rights, which President Carter signed, to the Senate for approval.

IV. National Security Aspects of U.S. Policies on Human Rights, Including Consideration of Their Impact on Friendly States and Allies; and Other Areas of Major Strategic Concern Such as the PRC and the Koreas.

Section I(F) includes a brief discussion of the direction our policy should take with various groups of countries, including allied nations and Third World countries. The thesis underlying much of the discus-
sion there and elsewhere in this study is that the shape that our policy ultimately takes with respect to individual countries will depend on our evaluation of (1) the human rights situation, (2) the full range of our interests, and (3) the leverage we have to encourage change where change is desired.

Invariably, working out our human rights approach in individual countries will require a careful balancing of considerations. The summary analysis of the impact of our human rights policy on our relations with the Soviet Union contained in Section I above concludes that we can pursue our human rights concerns and our security interests, which include maintaining a credible deterrent while pursuing arms control and arms reduction, in our long-term relationship with the Soviets. Full country evaluations are in preparation for the Soviet Union, the PRC, and South Korea, as well as other countries.

V. Action to Promote Integration of Human Rights Considerations into U.S. Foreign Policy.

The Executive Branch has already taken important steps to help assure implementation of the Administration’s focus on human rights, but needs to do more. Steps taken so far include:

Interagency: Establishment of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, pursuant to an NSC memorandum dated April 1, 1977.15 Chaired by the State Department, this group includes representatives from the NSC, State, Treasury, DOD and AID. Its mandate is to coordinate the development and implementation of U.S. human rights policy as it relates to bilateral and multilateral economic and security assistance programs. With respect to security assistance, the recently-created interagency Arms Export Control Board will take human rights factors into consideration in its deliberations.

State Department: The Office of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has been expanded. A Human Rights Coordinating Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, functions to provide balance and consistency for all aspects of U.S. policy on human rights.16 All U.S. mission chiefs have been instructed to give their personal attention to furthering observance of human rights in their host countries, to provide frequent reporting on human rights, and to assure full mission involvement in the implementation of our human rights policy.17 Priority attention, here and at posts abroad, is being given to the collection and analysis of comprehensive data concerning human rights conditions in all countries, as well as the development of country

15 See Document 31.
16 See Document 14.
17 See Document 51.
strategies. Fulltime human rights officers in each of the Department’s regional bureaus and full or near fulltime human rights officers in each of the Department’s functional bureaus have been designated. They are responsible for monitoring human rights concerns within their bureaus, coordinating with the Department’s Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and relating bureau actions on human rights to actions taken elsewhere in the foreign affairs agencies.

Next steps could include expansion of the mandate of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance to include all aspects of our human rights policy, not simply foreign assistance. That expanded purview would promote greater coordination of our human rights policy within the Executive Branch.

VI. A Strategy to Improve the Administration’s Relations with Congress in the Human Rights Area.

A separate analysis of this important issue is being prepared by the Congressional Liaison Offices of the agencies involved with the Congress on human rights questions.

74. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to Representative Donald Fraser

Washington, August 20, 1977

Dear Don:

Between his return from the Mideast and his departure for China, Cy asked me to give you an informal status report on some of the issues raised in the two very helpful memoranda you provided during your discussion with him in June. We hope you will continue to keep us apprised of your views and suggestions.


\[2\] Vance visited the Middle East, July 31–August 11, meeting with governmental officials in Egypt (August 1–3); Lebanon (August 3); Syria (August 3–5); Jordan (August 5–7); Saudi Arabia (August 7–9); Israel (August 9–11); and Jordan, Syria, and Egypt (August 11). Vance also visited London from August 11 through 13. For the text of Vance’s news conferences and remarks and an August 14 statement issued by the White House, see Department of State Bulletin, September 12, 1977, pp. 329–355. Vance also met with Chinese officials August 20–26; Christopher served as acting Secretary in his absence.

\[3\] See Document 56 and footnote 1 thereto.
Your memoranda were sent around to the bureaus for study. We have already made progress in some of the areas you mention. Patt DeRian’s shop has taken on more personnel, and we now have full-time human rights officers in each of the geographic bureaus as well as near full-time human rights officers in each of the functional bureaus. As you know, we are moving ahead on our policies within the international financial institutions. We are also studying various approaches for gaining support within the banks for taking human rights concerns into account when loans are in the planning stages.

Embassy officers are now attending political trials, and we are looking into this to see if we can establish a common procedure worldwide. Human rights reporting on a worldwide basis is a question which has received much thought, and of course under the new AID reporting requirements, our list of human rights report countries is very comprehensive. Whether reports on the remaining countries would serve a useful purpose is a question which you might wish to discuss in greater depth with Patt. We like the idea of a worldwide legal defense and aid program. Patt is looking into this question and your suggestions of establishing a U.S. commission to support private-sector human rights programs.4

With respect to the issues you raised concerning particular countries and regions, Cy has asked Patt to have her staff brief your staff on developments. Let me say that we have the problems you discussed very much in mind and that they are receiving continuing attention. In general, I think we are making progress in building legitimacy for the human rights issue and for the idea that a nation is not truly strong unless it protects the welfare of its citizens in all fields.

We look forward to hearing from you again. The pursuit of a successful human rights policy is not easy, and we appreciate all the assistance that is offered.

Sincerely,

Warren Christopher5

P.S. I thought you might be interested in the speech I gave last week in Chicago at the ABA Convention concerning the implementation of our human rights policy. A copy is enclosed.6

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4 See Document 59.
5 Christopher signed “Warren” above his typed signature.
75. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, August 26, 1977

SUBJECT

Working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance

The group met to consider PL–480 in general, a $480,000 preinvestment technical assistance grant to Ecuador, and the agenda for the upcoming Interagency Group meeting. USDA and AID/Food for Peace, as well as the regular members of the group, were represented.

PL–480

AID/Food for Peace made a presentation on Title II, disaster relief, and Title I programs. After the Title II discussion, the group agreed that because Title II activity was almost always confined to instances of severe humanitarian need, and because food under Title II was usually distributed directly to needy and often starving people, the group would recommend to the Interagency Group that PL–480 Title II activity not be routinely reviewed by the working group. The group felt that by its very nature, PL–480 Title II activity directly promotes human rights.

A similar determination was made in the case of AID disaster relief activities. Once again, disaster relief, by its very nature, directly promotes human rights. Further, it has been USG policy to provide disaster relief whenever requested. Nelson Coar pointed out that the IFIs on occasion become involved in disaster relief; the group made the same determination on multilateral disaster relief that it did on bilateral relief.

Most of its discussion at the meeting, which lasted for two hours, dealt with Title I. The discussion began with a presentation on the general workings of the Title I program. It was pointed out the Title I served many objectives in addition to, and on occasion apart from, providing humanitarian aid. Title I provides budget and balance-of-payments support to host governments, it is used to promote the development of free markets in recipient countries, and it indirectly subsidizes American farmers. The extent to which each of these purposes is served by the Title I program in a given country will largely de-

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2 A notation in an unknown hand next to this paragraph reads: “Ecuador was O.K.”
termine the degree of effectiveness which can be expected from using the Title I program to affect the human rights situation in that country.

USDA and AID/Food for Peace stressed that planning Title I sales was a lengthy and involved process which could not be turned on and off very easily; they also stressed that the success of the program rested in part on the ability of customers to be able to rely on the program from one year to the next, and that the program also had an important domestic constituency. Longstanding group members, including EB and D/HA, responded that implementing the link between human rights and our bilateral and multilateral assistance programs had created planning and continuity problems for other parts of AID as well as for the international financial institutions; that we were actively and continuously seeking ways to improve our procedures; and that the group endeavored to take operational program requirements and constraints, and other relevant factors, into account without sacrificing progress towards our policy goals. The point was also made that our human rights policy would be viewed as arbitrary and inconsistent, and therefore be jeopardized, if, for example, we were exerting pressure on a country in the IFIs and through non-PL-480 bilateral aid at the same time that we were allowing to proceed without hindrance highly concessionary program aid through PL-480 Title I.

It was pointed out that introducing the Food for Peace program into our human rights policy might not satisfy human rights-related requirements of the new Food for Peace legislation. AID/Food for Peace assured the group that it was in the process of drawing up comprehensive regulations which would meet all the requirements of the legislation. After reviewing the new legislation and a verbal summary of AID/Food for Peace’s plan to implement it, the group was satisfied that it need consider only how to tie implementation of our human rights policy to PL-480 Title I.

The group decided to recommend to the Interagency Group that the following procedure be adopted with respect to PL-480 Title I: When AID/Food for Peace and USDA, along with other agencies, begin the process which eventually culminates in a Title I agreement with a country, AID/Food for Peace will inform D/HA and EB that the process is underway. D/HA and EB, in consultation with other interested offices and agencies, will be able to determine whether the anticipated PL-480 program might become a useful tool of our human rights policy in the relevant country, and will inform the group, whenever it is considering actions to improve the human rights situation in a country, of any pending PL-480 Title I activity in that country.

AID/Food for Peace requested some indication of countries in which it might expect its Title I activities to be affected by human rights policy. EB and D/HA responded emphatically that any such list could
be construed to be a “hit list.” It was pointed out that human rights situations are constantly evolving; that progress in countries which still have a long way to go will often receive a positive response from the U.S. because we want to respond positively to positive trends; and that in general the form of our human rights initiatives in different countries will often turn on tactical considerations which can only be evaluated in the context of a variety of rapidly changing factors. D/HA agreed to indicate informally a few countries slated for PL–480 Title I which had human rights records such that barring a drastic transformation no attempt to influence the human rights situation in those countries through assistance was envisaged at this time. It was made emphatically clear, however, that any countries not so mentioned, which included by far most Title I recipients, did not represent a group of countries in which any action was being contemplated. It was pointed out that most of the countries in the remaining group also would not experience any reduction in bilateral or multilateral assistance due to the U.S. human rights initiative and had not in the past. There was some concern that this rendered the list basically useless for Food for Peace’s purposes, but as this was the objective sought by EB and others at the meeting, the issue was allowed to rest.

After the meeting, representatives from EB, D/HA, Treasury ARA, and AF discussed the agenda for the Interagency meeting. It was agreed that in addition to the PL–480 recommendations, the agenda would consist of the following items:

Argentina: The country evaluation plan on Argentina will be cleared by the meeting and will be distributed with the agenda. The gathering decided to recommend that rather than continue to flatly oppose Argentina’s IFI program, a positive step might be to allow some of the program to come forward if Argentina will grant the “right of option to seek asylum” to political prisoners, or take even more significant steps. ARA stated that it was likely that the right of option would most likely be reinstituted soon anyway, and it was felt that allowing movement on the IFI program in response to the reinstatement would demonstrate our willingness to cooperate and respond positively to positive trends.

Nicaragua: There was no discussion of Nicaragua because the country evaluation plan was not ready.

Ethiopia: While it was anticipated that the decision on the AID loans will have been made by the meeting, an AFDF loan will come up on September 19th in the AFDF Board. D/HA will recommend abstaining; Treasury, EB, and AF favored a “yes” vote, perhaps with a statement. It was decided not to make a recommendation to the Interagency Group.
A final topic on the agenda will be “procedures.” The discussion should be a continuation from the previous meeting.

76. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, September 12, 1977

You asked what we have done on Human Rights, and why we have had no initiatives. I, for one, believe that many key issues were raised in the PRM 28 effort, have been waiting for some reaction or guidance from you on those questions. I sent over a suggested PRC agenda paper and a draft PD four weeks ago and have heard nothing more about them.2

In the planning document we were asked to submit last Tuesday3 I made a suggestion concerning the President’s first human rights goal—ratification of the Genocide Treaty.4 I suggested that we make an all out effort (including Presidential calls for the first time), to ratify the treaty during the fall session, in order to demonstrate that the extreme right wing is not invincible. I made this suggestion in the context of helping the Panama Canal Treaty get ratified but it obviously has a dual purpose. I still think this is a good idea.

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2 In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s August 15 evening report, Tuchman indicated that she had drafted the agenda paper that day. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger–Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 8–10/77) She transmitted the agenda paper to Brzezinski under an August 15 covering memorandum and sent a draft human rights PD to Thornton, Pastor, Richard, Hormats, Hunter, Armacost, and Huntington under an August 19 covering memorandum. Both are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Huntington, Box 38, Human Rights: 8–9/77. In an August 30 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor commented that although he did not have much time to comment on the draft PD, he “wanted to pass on to you that I thought it was excellent.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North–South Pastor Files, Subject File, Box 55, Human Rights: 8–10/77)

3 September 6. The planning document was not found and not further identified.

4 See footnote 16, Document 53.
SUBJECT

Presidential Talk on Human Rights

There still seems to be public misunderstanding of what our human rights policy actually comprises; how we are trying to implement it; and—perhaps most important—how it fits in the President’s overall foreign policy design. Many still seem to think we are talking only about violations of the person and of political rights, and that our criticism of foreign governments on that score may interfere with our other goals.

We think a Presidential talk on the whole range of human rights issues would be useful later in the year, or early next. It should be in the more relaxed and reflective “fireside chat” format rather than a formal speech.

Its purpose would be to explain how “human rights” is a thread that runs through everything the President is doing, and indeed gives coherence to his varied initiatives. To that end, it would:

—Include our definition of “human rights,” as in your Law Day and Warren Christopher’s Bar Association speeches.

—Explain how our North-South efforts (including the basic human needs emphasis), and our attempts to help bring racial justice to southern Africa (and perhaps the Middle East and Cyprus) are fundamental parts of the “human rights” policy.

—Make clear the relation of these initiatives to American security interests: insofar as we can alleviate the causes of tension and discontent, we will deny opportunities to would-be trouble makers and reduce the risk of wars, thus contributing to a world in which Americans can live in peace and prosperity.

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2 See footnote 6, Document 74.
—Be sober about the limits of American power and influence, but explicitly and firmly reject the notion that because we can’t do everything, we should do nothing.

—Talk quite specifically about how we are trying to use different sources of influence (quiet and public diplomacy; the aid program; conventional arms transfers); how effective we can reasonably expect to be; and what progress we think we already have contributed to.

—Emphasize our efforts to work through international institutions, because long-term positive changes in international respect for human rights are more likely to come when we add our influence to that of others.

—Acknowledge the dilemmas our complex definition of human rights will get us into when, for instance, we must decide whether a particular aid program or loan will do more to help the poor or to prop up a dictatorial regime.

This speech would also enable us to make clear the direct relation between the President’s foreign and domestic initiatives, and specifically what he is doing to complete the unfinished “human rights” business at home. Domestic programs such as welfare reform, efforts to reduce youth unemployment in the cities, new guidelines for the FBI and CIA, should obviously be talked of as ends in themselves, but also as essential to America’s prestige and influence in the world and its right to talk about the human rights performance of others.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached Tarnoff to Brzezinski memorandum, recommending that we begin working on such a talk.

3 Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski.

4 There is no indication as to whether Vance approved or disapproved the recommendation.
78. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, September 27, 1977

SUBJECT
Commodity Credit Corporation and Human Rights

Issue for Decision
You are being asked to decide whether Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) extensions of credit should be subject to review on human rights grounds. D/HA and S/P believe they should be so reviewed. The Agriculture Department and EB disagree.

Essential Factors
CCC credits are an official mechanism for facilitating the export of American agricultural commodities. They are designed to serve commercial objectives, but have at times been used to pursue political objectives as part of our foreign policy. No mechanism now exists whereby they are routinely reviewed for human rights considerations.

Narrative arguments from both points of view are contained in an attachment.\(^2\)

Options
1. That the Department adopt the position that the extension of CCC credits not be subject to human rights review.

Pro
—CCC is a commercial mechanism; its manipulation for political purposes can only erode our export efforts.
—The law establishing the CCC makes no reference to foreign policy considerations or to a role for the Secretary of State in the administration of the program.


\(^2\) The undated “CCC and Human Rights: Background and Issues” paper is attached but not printed.
—The interest rates on CCC credits are set at commercial levels and must be above the cost of money to the Treasury. The repayment period can be as long as three years. The CCC program is designed to meet the competition of the government entities which control trade in other major exporting countries and to maintain and expand American agricultural exports in the face of their competition.

—In times of short supply CCC credits may be particularly beneficial to a potential importer. In such circumstances decisions regarding extending credit have occasionally included political considerations. Given the present situation of an abundant American and world food supply, however, we can gain no political leverage with CCC credits. If we withhold them, a potential importer will merely turn to one of our competitors.

—We now have large agricultural surpluses in this country. If our human rights efforts were seen to be interfering with export efforts, it would be likely to cause a domestic political confrontation between advocates of human rights and agricultural interests to the detriment of the Administration’s overall political position.

**Con**

—CCC credits are provided by a United States Government corporation, established by action of the United States Congress. They are an official international activity of the United States Government. Human rights is a central goal of American foreign policy and, therefore, must be taken into consideration in CCC decisions.

—CCC credits are at least partly concessional in nature and are viewed by other governments and by their publics as an element of American assistance, denoting a favorable political attitude.

—The timing, amount and nature of any extension of credit is a foreign policy act. We should at least consider therefore, whether on balance it serves our interests, including our human rights interests.

2. That the Department adopt the position that all extension of CCC credits will be reviewed through the working group and the Interagency Committee for their influence on human rights.

**Pro**

(Con argument for Option 1 and the following)

—This option permits the Interagency Committee to view all aspects of government-related economic relationships and human rights policy.

—Human rights is the only aspect not reviewed by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies.
Con

(Pro argument for Option 1 and the following)
—Human rights has been established as a major policy objective by this Administration but it is not overriding in every circumstance.
—By extending human rights criteria to the commercial arena we are inviting a backlash effect which could harm the cause of human rights.

3. Subject to procedures to be worked out between the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, where a country to which CCC credits may be extended is designated by any relevant bureau or department as raising exceptional human rights concerns, the situation thus presented will be submitted to the working group and the Interagency Group for recommendation.3

Pro

(Same as Option 2 and the following)
—This process now is in place for the consideration of ExIm Bank commercial loans for non-strategic materials.

Con

(Same as Option 2 and the following)
—The CCC’s primary purpose is to promote agricultural exports. Foreign policy considerations, while sometimes a factor, will only very occasionally be of significance.

Recommendations

That you approve Option 1, which is favored by EB and the Agriculture Department, that CCC credits not be subject to human rights review.

Alternatively

That you approve Option 2, which is favored by D/HA, that all extensions of CCC credits be reviewed through the working group and the Interagency Committee for their influence on human rights.

Or

That you approve Option 3.4

3 Christopher bracketed this paragraph and wrote in the left-hand margin: “revised in D.”

4 Christopher added “as revised by the Deputy Secretary” at the end of the sentence. He initialed the approval line on November 4, according to a stamped date.
79. Editorial Note

At United Nations headquarters in New York on October 5, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both covenants had been open for signature at the United Nations since December 19, 1966, and Carter, in his March 17, 1977, address to the United Nations General Assembly, had asserted his intention to seek ratification of these and other covenants and conventions:

“To demonstrate this commitment, I will seek congressional approval and sign the U.N. covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights, and the covenants on civil and political rights. And I will work closely with our own Congress in seeking to support the ratification not only of these two instruments but the United Nations Genocide Convention and the Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as well. I have just removed all restrictions on American travel abroad, and we are moving now to liberalize almost completely travel opportunities to America.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pages 444–451)

In remarks made at the October signing ceremony, held in the Economic and Social Council Chamber at United Nations headquarters, Carter explained the significance of the administration’s actions:

“By ratifying the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a government pledges, as a matter of law, to refrain from subjecting its own people to arbitrary imprisonment or execution or to cruel or degrading treatment. It recognizes the right of every person to freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the rights of peaceful assembly, and the right to emigrate from that country.

“A government entering this covenant states explicitly that there are sharp limits on its own powers over the lives of its people. But as Thomas Jefferson once wrote about the Bill of Rights, which became part of our own American Republic, and I quote again from Thomas Jefferson: ‘These are fetters against doing evil which no honest government should decline.’

“By ratifying the other Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, a government commits itself to its best efforts to secure for its citizens a basic standard of material existence, social justice, and cultural opportunity.

“This covenant recognizes that governments are the instruments and the servants of their people. Both of these covenants express values in which the people of my country have believed for a long time.
“I will seek ratification of these covenants by the Congress of the United States at the earliest possible date.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pages 1734–1735)

Following the signing ceremony, the President hosted a working luncheon for officials of Asian nations. The text of the President’s remarks at the luncheon are ibid., pages 1735–1737. The President summarized the event in his diary: “I met privately with [UN Secretary-General] Kurt Waldheim [and] signed the Human Rights Covenants, then had a reception with the specialized agency heads, a very good group who do tremendous work around the world but are often not recognized as being part of the UN. They help with health, refugees, civilian air safety, atomic energy supervision, and so forth. We probably waste a lot of money and effort in our own government by not coordinating better with these standing groups, where more than 85 percent of the UN budget goes. The only part we hear about are crazy resolutions pushed through the General Assembly.” (Carter, White House Diary, page 114)

80. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, October 10, 1977

SUBJECT
Possible Human Rights Initiatives

(1) Creation of a Human Rights Foundation

This would be modeled on the Inter-American Foundation which is a quasi-governmental organization that receives its money through Congressional appropriation, but has very loose ties with the gov-

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives: 1/77–10/78. No classification marking. Tuchman did not initial the memorandum. Tuchman sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under an October 11 covering memorandum; Brzezinski wrote the word “urgent” on the covering memorandum and added: “I think this is pointed in the right direction. 1) I suggest you quickly talk to a few NSC staffers (Hunter, Huntington, Armacost) to get their reactions. Also maybe Owen. 2) Give me a memo to the President, suggesting these [unclear] for his approval, or a modest human rights program. ZB.” (Ibid.)
ernment, and makes its own policies.2 This foundation could: 1) funnel money to the international human rights organizations and to national human rights organizations operating in other countries (as well as to American human rights groups), based on the value of their work; 2) provide much needed support for refugee resettlement efforts, including the retraining (language, professional standards, etc.) and placement of professionals (doctors, lawyers, scientists, etc.) who are political refugees. In particular, the Foundation could finance the resettlement of such key individuals—not in the US where their talents are wasted—but in other third world nations badly in need of these skills. This would redirect the classic “brain drain” in the interest of promoting both human rights and economic development; 3) support the work of NGOs in the multinational organizations particularly the UN, where they are the source of crucial data on human rights conditions; 4) set up and award an annual human rights prize, with a sizeable award comparable to the Nobel, to recognize an outstanding contribution to human rights anywhere in the world.3 The Foundation could probably employ (depending on the legislative terms of its creation) foreign nationals who could provide essential expertise in certain areas, and would give it a slightly multinational image.

(2) Reapportionment of Support from the Violators to the Violatees

The Administration could publicly announce that it was rechanneling certain funds which would have gone to governments guilty of human rights violations, and would spend it instead on those who had suffered from these violations.4 This would obviously have to have Congressional approval, but if it were announced in this way, it would probably get it. These funds might either be spent directly by the government, or could be redirected through the Foundation or to an international body of some sort, for example, the UN Commission on Refugees. (In view of last week’s Congressional denial of the funds needed to support the additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees paroled earlier this summer, this may prove to be the only way we can get help to these people.)5 This policy would be closely linked to:

2 Brzezinski wrote “good idea” in the margin next to this sentence.
3 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the margin next to the portion of this sentence that begins with “source” and ends with “Nobel.”
4 Brzezinski drew an arrow in the margin pointing at the beginning of this sentence and wrote “interesting but needs development.”
5 Presumable reference to the passage of H.R. 7769 by the House on September 27. H.R. 7769 allowed Indochinese refugees (classified as parolees) who had resided in the United States for 2 years to apply for permanent resident alien status, extended the federal resettlement aid program (which would temporarily expire on September 30), provided for a general phase-out of the program, and allocated $25 million for job training and placement programs. The Senate subsequently passed a companion measure on October 10. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, pp. 46–47)
(3) Targeting of Foreign Assistance to Countries which Respect Human Rights

The relevant statutes prescribe certain rules which must be followed in allocating US foreign assistance (including SSA, AID programs, PL–480), and political-military interests impose additional constraints, but within these limitations there is still latitude to target money and aid to countries where there is a good, or improving, human rights record. The problem is that in a sense we would be further punishing the needy who live under a bad regime in doing this. However, the reality is that there are more than enough needy people to go around, and so it can be argued that in this way we provide an additional incentive to bad governments to change (and for people who live under these governments to unseat them). We follow this policy now in theory—but certainly not in practice. The country-by-country ZBB process simply does not provide for such kinds of tradeoffs. We should be able to point to clear trends—decreases for violators, increases for others—rather than increases for Indonesia and the Philippines, Nicaragua, etc.6

(4) Overt Criticism of Offenders

The President or Andy Young7 could speak out against gross violators.

—Uganda: The President might suggest, in some very low key manner, that Americans might want to organize an informal, voluntary boycott of Ugandan coffee (à la grapes and lettuce).8 We could arrange that the NGOs and civil rights groups would pick up this ball and run with it.

—Cambodia: strong public criticism in a major forum. Might we raise this issue with the PRC, the only country with diplomatic representation in Cambodia? We could use their public support of our human rights policy to gently suggest that their support of this vicious regime is inappropriate, or that they should use their influence to stimulate improvements.

—Vietnam: there is much public criticism of the fact that this Administration has not spoken out against what is going on in Vietnam. We could push for human rights improvements both publicly and privately with the government.

6 Brzezinski’s handwritten notations in the margin adjacent to this paragraph are illegible.

7 Brzezinski circled Young’s name, drew a line from it to the margin, and commented “or maybe the V.P.?”

8 Presumably reference to grape and lettuce boycotts either organized or supported by United Farm Workers (UFW) founders César Chávez and Dolores Huerta during the 1960s and 1970s.
(5) Improvement of Relations with Congress

The mess with the IFI bill, and the recent refusal to fund 15,000 more Indochinese refugees, is evidence of the severe problems in Congress at both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The human rights leaders in Congress are perfectly aware that the Right is using this issue to end all foreign aid, but because of their criticism and lack of trust in the Administration’s policies, they are in a box, and a coalition of the Administration with those who should be its natural allies on this issue is much more distant now than it was last January. Before relations deteriorate further, we should make a determined effort to turn things around by initiating a series of working meetings—chaired by the Vice President with Christopher also present—with the prominent members on this issue from both Houses and both parties. The agenda should be set by the Congressmen (through staff consultations) but should include one meeting devoted to bilateral assistance policies (economic and military), and one to the IFIs, with explicit discussion of what Congress wants and expects from the US delegations. There should also be a meeting devoted to policies toward the USSR and Eastern Europe, where a consensus might be built about the Jackson-Vanik problem. These meetings would provide a reasonably quiet and apolitical forum for the Administration to try to explain why it has taken some of the actions it has, (for example, on the recent Nicaraguan decisions). This would be helpful for us too—if our policies cannot be rationalized in this forum then they will obviously never work on the Hill.

(6) In the UN—Fight Efforts by the USSR, Argentina, Chile, etc., to Remove the Consultative Status of the NGOs.

This move is apparently afoot—I have not yet heard about it from USUN—but it is widely worried about elsewhere. We should be in the lead of those fighting it.

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9 Presumable reference to the administration’s late September decision to extend a military aid agreement with Nicaragua, while simultaneously withholding economic aid, following President Anastasio Somoza’s lifting of a 3-year “state of siege.” (John M. Goshko, “U.S. Decides to Aid 2 Nations,” The Washington Post, September 29, 1977, p. A–3 and Karen DeYoung, “Nicaragua Denied Economic Aid, Gets Military,” The Washington Post, October 5, 1977, p. A–10). At the September 28 IAGHRFA meeting, the members considered several AID loans and opted to support only those that involved grants to voluntary agencies. The Group decided “to take no action for the time being with regard to other AID loans, and to try to seek a delay in the consideration of the IDB loan so that the group could consider it at a subsequent meeting after more time had elapsed so that it could better access the effects of the lifting of the state of siege in Nicaragua.” (Meeting minutes of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights—II)

10 Brzezinski underlined the phrase “is apparently afoot” and wrote in the margin: “? is it or isn’t it?”
(7) In all Multinational Forums—Recognize and Promote the Power of Words

Nothing could demonstrate more clearly than the Helsinki Final Act, the unexpected and unpredictable power of “mere words.” Eleanor Roosevelt’s insistence on including human rights language in the UN Charter was of course greeted by roars of cynicism—and yet now they have in many respects achieved the status of international law. It was not the US, but the Helsinki Monitoring Groups in Eastern Europe and the USSR, which turned the Helsinki agreement from a Western loss into a triumph. We should learn from this lesson the potential for exploitation of any international document which the Soviets sign. There is no reason to allow them to continue to get credit for signing documents to which they do not even pay lip service. We might start by reminding the world at Belgrade, that on August 8, 1975, Izvestia hailed the Final Act as “a new law of international life” thus discrediting subsequent claims of “interference in domestic affairs.”

(8) Get the Genocide Treaty Ratified

This was the President’s first human rights goal, and yet we haven’t yet succeeded—because we haven’t really tried. People are beginning to notice and to criticize—“talk is cheap.” Signing all the international human rights treaties does us little good in international forums if we can’t get them ratified, and the Genocide Treaty is where we must begin. I still believe that this should be tried before the Panama Treaty. If successful, it would aid that effort by demonstrating that the Right wing can be defeated. Only about five votes are needed.

(9) Find a Way to Use Allard Lowenstein’s Talents

Unfortunately we cannot make him an Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, but we should find some way to make better use of his abilities than his current job (US Representative to the UN for Special Political Affairs) or to use his current post for some major initiative. All of his energy, eloquence and idealism are exactly suited to this issue (matched with lots more political savvy than others now involved).

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11 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the margin next to the portion of the sentence that begins with “should” and ends with “life” and wrote “fine but need more concrete expression.”

12 Brzezinski’s handwritten notations in the margin adjacent to this paragraph are illegible.
81. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Counsel (Lipshutz)¹

Washington, October 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Creating a Human Rights Agency

Attached is the paper I promised you when we talked a few weeks ago about the desirability of giving permanent form to the Administration’s human rights concerns by creating a human rights agency. The paper attempts to lay out the reasons—which are largely political—for creating such an agency and to identify the functions it could perform. It also describes, as you suggested, alternative organizational locations for such an agency.

The important thing, as I see it, is to enable the President to maintain his commitment to human rights, on the one hand, and yet not have him under the gun of having to produce every week a new "human rights victory" in order to demonstrate the strength of that commitment. Creation of a human rights agency would ease the pressure on him and at the same time create a body which could work effectively for human rights over the long haul.

I would welcome the chance to discuss with you your reactions to the arguments advanced in the paper.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Huntington, Box 38, Human Rights: 10–12/77. Confidential. Huntington did not initial the memorandum. Huntington sent an earlier version this memorandum to Tuchman, prompting Tuchman to respond in a September 26 memorandum: “Basically my problem is that I don’t really see that this would fill a need that is not now being met. The argument that institutionalizing the issue in this way would preserve human rights under an Administration hostile to these concerns seems to me pretty unconvincing since the new entity would be ignored and its recommendations defeated in any case (c.f., ACDA under Nixon).” (Ibid.)
WASHINGTON, October 5, 1977

THE NEXT PHASE IN HUMAN RIGHTS

I. Human Rights as an Issue

Human rights is, in many respects, the distinguishing hallmark of Carter Administration foreign policy. It epitomizes a fresh approach to foreign policy, the effort to base foreign policy in morality, and the effort to restore pride and confidence of Americans in the goals of their foreign policy as well as in the government that conducts it. In other areas, such as SALT and the Middle East, the Administration has adopted new approaches to old issues. With human rights, the Administration has moved a new issue to center stage and focused attention on that issue as its issue.

In so doing, the Administration has created high expectations as to the role which moral considerations can play in foreign policy. It has also, of course, encouraged other political forces and groups which have their own interest in promoting human rights, at times in ways and to extremes which differ from those of the Administration.

The human rights issue has been a major asset of this Administration. It needs to be conserved, nurtured, developed, and, most importantly, prevented from turning sour or rotten. The identification of human rights with the Administration can, however, give rise to some problems.

1. Pressures—many of which are inevitable and some of which are desirable—have developed to “ease off” human rights so as not to complicate or discombobulate relations with key countries, such as Iran, Brazil, South Korea, and, most importantly, the Soviet Union. And some downgrading of the importance of human rights in various bilateral contexts undoubtedly is necessary and desirable.

2. Even without these pressures to “accommodate to reality”, human rights cannot indefinitely remain the distinctive focus of US foreign policy. Other issues will crowd it and demand attention. While the President has made clear to everyone the extent and depth of his commitment on this issue, it is, nonetheless, most unlikely that human

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2 Confidential. A handwritten note at the top of the paper reads: “Uncorrected.”
rights will occupy as much of Presidential time in the first six months of 1979 (or even of 1978) as it did in the first six months of 1977.

3. As human rights appears to decline in centrality and as realities impose compromises, delays, and defeats in the achievement of human rights goals, a reaction of cynicism and disillusionment about Administration intentions is likely to set in. People will ask: “Whatever happened to the Administration’s great crusade on human rights?” There is a much greater potential for this type of disillusionment with an issue like human rights, which does involve morality and principles, than with bread-and-butter economic issues or balance-of-power military issues.

4. One of the great attractions of human rights as an issue has been its broad appeal: liberals espouse it, thinking of Iran, Chile, and South Korea; conservatives see it as a weapon for use against the Soviet Union. The problem is not only to maintain human rights as an issue, but also to maintain its equal appeal to both liberals and conservatives. There is thus a need to develop an approach to human rights which both liberals and conservatives can support.

More generally, the above considerations suggest the need to avoid in fact and in appearance an Administration abandonment of human rights as a central concern.

II. Human Rights Actions

A related set of problems concerns the ways in which this government can promote human rights. With some exceptions, the actions which the USG has so far taken and can take to promote human rights fall into two categories. First, the leaders and agencies of the USG can articulate and dramatize their interest in advancing human rights. This can be done either through “diplomatic actions, public statements, and various symbolic acts” or through the “use of overseas broadcast facilities and cultural and educational programs” (to use the language of PRM/NSC–28). Second, the US can act or threaten to act to deny economic assistance, loans, arms transfers, or other benefits to governments which violate human rights (“changes in levels of security and economic assistance and food aid” and “initiatives in international financial institutions” in the language of the PRM). While the US can also work through the UN and other multilateral institutions to promote human rights and can take measures on its own (such as admission of refugees), the two main methods of promoting human rights remain exhortation and penalties.

Each of these undoubtedly has its place. But each also has its limitations. Exhortation reaches only so far, and its effectiveness declines

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3 See Document 46.
over time. Penalties—that is, denials to other countries of the means to promote other goals we support (e.g. economic development, collective security)—obviously conflict with our efforts to achieve these other goals. They also obviously have a particularly irritating impact on our relations with the particular countries concerned. In effect, the penalties approach requires us: to rate, publicly, other countries in terms of their human rights performance; to identify those countries which don’t measure up to some standard; (e.g., are manifesting “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights’); and then to deny to these countries some benefit which we would otherwise extend to them in order to achieve some other goal of national policy. The promotion of human rights thus comes to involve the curtailment or cancellation of efforts to achieve some other goal.

Exhortation and penalties are at times necessary and even productive. But the sustained effective promotion of human rights requires something more. Neither exhortation nor penalties constitute a positive program of actions to promote human rights comparable, let us say, to the program which AID has to promote economic development. To supplement exhortation and penalties, a positive program of human rights actions is required.

III. A Human Rights Agency

The needs to maintain the broad support and appeal of human rights, to institutionalize the concern of the Carter Administration with respect to human rights, and to develop more effective action programs to promote human rights can be most effectively met by the creation of a distinct government agency which had the promotion of human rights as its principal objective. Such an agency would constitute the institutional embodiment of the Carter Administration’s concern and its permanent legacy to the future. It would be a human rights initiative which both liberals and conservatives would have reasons to support. It would also help ease the extent to which the promotion of human rights (particularly through the imposition of penalties) directly conflicts with the advancement of other policy goals. The creation of such an agency would underline the extent to which human rights are not simply a passing fancy but rather a long-term commitment.

The creation of such an agency would be a natural outgrowth of what the Administration has done to date in the human rights area and would parallel for the Carter Administration what other Administrations have done in other fields. The major foreign policy interests of the Kennedy Administration were embodied in the Peace Corps, AID, and ACDA, all of which were created in 1961–62. A Human Rights Agency would be the comparable institutional embodiment of a primary foreign policy concern of the Carter Administration. It would be the
source and the stimulus for action programs in support of human rights which went beyond exhortation and penalties.

IV. Functions of a Human Rights Agency

The overall purpose of the agency would be to support overall US foreign policy objectives through the promotion of human rights on a global basis.\(^4\) It could, presumably, assume some human rights functions already being undertaken by other agencies, but it could also undertake additional programs and activities which could make new positive contributions to the furtherance of human rights. Among other things, the agency could be authorized to:

1. Plan, devise, develop, and execute programs which would further global human rights in accordance with US foreign policy objectives.

2. Work with other US government agencies, foreign governments, private organizations, and international organizations for the expansion of human rights.

3. Provide assistance to private individuals and organizations, public and private international organizations, and other governments for programs which promote human rights.

4. Periodically study the condition of human rights globally and in specific societies and assess trends affecting human rights (possibly assuming here responsibilities assigned to the State Department under existing legislation).

5. Undertake research on human rights issues and the ways of more effectively expanding human rights.

6. Monitor US government policies and actions which affect human rights, assess their effectiveness, and make recommendations to the appropriate executive and legislative bodies.

7. Prepare and disseminate information on human rights in order to promote public understanding of human rights issues and support for human rights in the US and abroad.

\(^4\) Some might ask: Why should this agency only attempt to promote human rights abroad? Shouldn’t it also promote human rights in the US? The answer is that it should not. And the reason is twofold, but simple. First, fewer violations of human rights occur in the United States than in most other societies. Second, far more people and organizations—official and private, national and local—are concerned with the protection of human rights in the United States than in other societies. As a result, the ratio of organized concern to actual or potential violations of human rights is far higher in the US than anywhere else in the world. There is thus far greater need for the human rights agency to focus on the global condition of human rights than on their condition in the US. To become involved in the latter would also clearly distract it from the former. The agency should, consequently, become concerned with aspects of human rights in the US only insofar as these impinge directly on the condition of human rights abroad. [Footnote in the original.]
8. Award, as appropriate, a human rights prize (comparable to the Nobel Prize) to an individual or group which has made an outstanding contribution to human rights.

The above is only a general outline of some of the functions which a human rights agency might perform, but it does give some idea of how the current concern with human rights could be institutionalized and made permanent and of the ways in which more positive programs might be developed to supplement existing activities.

V. Organization and Location of a Human Rights Agency

Such an agency could occupy several different locations and have a variety of different relations to other executive agencies. Three distinct possibilities stand out.

1. The agency could be created as an office in the Executive Office of the President. This would be in keeping with direct interest which President Carter has in this issue and would insure the agency of the clout which comes from a close relationship to the President. On the other hand, however, if the agency had the functions indicated above, it would also be an operational agency, and there are good general reasons for not locating operational agencies in the EOP. If a future President did not have the same personal interest in human rights that President Carter has, the influence which comes from an EOP location would be diminished in any event. In addition, even if the agency were located elsewhere, it would always be possible for the President, if he so desired, to give its director an additional “hat” in the White House as his Special Advisor on Human Rights.

2. The agency could be created as an autonomous entity but subject to the policy guidance and direction of the Secretary of State. In varying degrees, AID and ACDA occupy this type of position now. Such a position would insure a distinct identity and program but would also insure that the activities of the agency would be compatible with overall US foreign policy objectives. The disadvantages of this location are that it could lead to the subordination of human rights objectives to other goals and to the undue influence of traditional Foreign Service and bureaucratic concerns in the operation of the agency. Presumably, however, these could be guarded against by careful drafting of the legislation and by recruitment of the staff of the agency from appropriately diversified sources.

3. The agency could be created as an autonomous agency, part of the executive branch, but independent of direct control or guidance by any other executive branch agency. In this case, one form the agency might assume could be a government corporation, with a board of private citizens and government officials, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The closest model here
would be the Inter-American Foundation. Such an organization and location would insure the independence of the agency and would promote its sustained commitment to its original goals. It would also, however, tend to separate it from other executive branch agencies concerned with human rights and would probably reduce its ability to influence US policy more generally.

Each of these possible organizational locations thus has its advantages and disadvantages. Any one could provide an acceptable format for the performance of the new programmatic functions related to human rights. The alternatives do, however, have different implications for the extent to which existing offices and functions concerned with human rights would be absorbed in the new agency or would remain separate. At present, for instance, in the State Department human rights matters are handled by the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Office of the Deputy Secretary, by the Counselor’s office, and by the Assistant Legal Advisor for Human Rights in the Office of the Legal Advisor. If the second alternative were adopted, presumably some of the positions and functions now in the State Department would be moved to the new agency in the Executive Office, but some would also probably remain in the Department. If the third alternative were adopted, the changes in the existing offices and functions in the Department would probably be relatively minor.

VI. Creating a Human Rights Agency

A proposal for the creation of a human rights agency would be an appropriate part of the President’s legislative program for the 1978 session of Congress. Congressional interest in and support for such a proposal would probably be extensive. In addition, there is a growing and increasingly self-conscious and articulate human rights constituency, involving, in a variety of ways and degrees, groups which are both centrally concerned with the issue, such as Freedom House or Amnesty International, but also larger and more politically influential groups, including labor, church organizations, the press, Jewish groups, and others. As a result of the broad constituency for human rights, the Administration is now cross-pressured by liberals who want action against one set of countries and conservatives who want action against another. Creation of a human rights agency would be one cause which both liberals and conservatives could support.

5 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (H.R. 14580; P.L. 91–175; 83 Stat. 805) established the IAF as an independent foreign assistance agency of the United States Government that provides grants for development programs.

6 An unknown hand wrote “uncorrected” in the margin next to the end of this paragraph.
82. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 20, 1977

SUBJECT
Weekly Report

[Omitted here is a summary of activities and accomplishments.]

Human Rights

This week, Huntington advanced the view that increasing the human rights policy has been reduced to “exhortations” and “penalties” in dealing with the rest of the world.² That means the President will not be able to talk as much about human rights in 1978 as he has in 1977. To avert a reaction of cynicism by the public, Huntington proposed that some kind of human rights organization be established, which can carry the human rights policy for the President. He asked for my critique of his proposal, both the concept and three alternatives for the organization.³ The concept is an excellent one, which I fully support, but I am not convinced that the President should talk less about human rights. He should talk more but differently on the subject. The case for this approach follows.

Although it is probably going to be true that the President will talk less about human rights in 1978 and 1979, it also is possible for him to talk more about the policy in a more flexible and effective way. It is true that two main methods have become the essence of our promotion of human rights: exhortation and penalties.

The policy is doomed to become a millstone if these remain the main methods. Three other ways, far more important and effective, are (1) the mere presence of the U.S. example, (2) creating cooperative and constructive international relationships, such as those in the tri-lateral area, which provide a climate in which human rights flourish, and


² Reference is to Huntington’s paper proposing a human rights agency, which is printed as an attachment to Document 81.

³ Odom offered Huntington his comments on the proposal in an October 17 memorandum, noting: “I am compelled by your case for an agency to keep the human rights policy alive. Among your alternatives for an agency, the third, an independent executive organization, is the best choice.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Huntington, Box 38, Human Rights: 10–12/77)
(3) preventing war and aggression which threaten and lessen human rights.

In dealing with governments where human rights are grossly violated, it is not useful for the U.S. either to exhort or penalize as the main effort to execute a human rights policy. Rather it is crucial that we do not condone or approve the behavior of those governments although we find it necessary and useful, in the search for peace and prevention of aggression, to make deals, supply arms, sign treaties, and so on. Morality in foreign policy is a matter of taking responsibility for the real choices we have. We do not have the choice, short of initiating a major world war, to free all the political prisoners in the USSR. We do have the choice, however, to make it known that while we are abiding by agreements and seeking new ones with the USSR, we are not, through silence, accomplices to the crimes of that regime. If the Shah of Iran buys our arms, we can justify that as a measure toward stabilization of the region, (certainly a gain for some human rights) but we should not let anyone believe that such sales mean U.S. moral approval of SAVAK’s actions.

We got into trouble in Vietnam precisely because at each decision point we did not make explicit to ourselves and the public where we stood on the iniquities of the Saigon regime. Very soon, our own iniquities and those of the Saigon regime were sufficiently gross to rival the VC and NVA crimes and to undercut domestic U.S. support.

Many cases will not be clear. The overall advantages for human rights to be gained from a security arrangement with a repressive regime versus the improvement in the rights of subjects of that regime through U.S. leverage on its leaders—e.g., South Korea—must be reassessed from time to time by public debate. The mood of the country must govern here. Unpopular security commitments are unviable commitments in the event of war.

The same kind of periodic reassessment of every formal or tacit arrangement we have with the Soviet Union is equally essential. Any SALT treaty, trade agreement, or cultural agreement with the Soviet Union which is achieved through calculated silence and thus tacit approval of Soviet repressions of individuals and nations is of no value to this country unless the popular sentiment understands and supports it as a pragmatic step taken in full consciousness of the moral implications.

In many respects, Lenin solved this problem for Soviet policy with his treatise, “Left Communism: An Infantile Disorder.” Both the cynics and the crusaders for the President’s human rights policy are guilty of the ideological confusion which Lenin pointed out in the ranks of the Left Communists. There is an ironic symmetry here: the U.S. like the USSR, must have correct interstate relations but also pursue the intema-
tional human rights struggle. We must do it because that is the dynamic nature of this society; and we must do it because the Soviet Union accepts us only in this broader context of the international class struggle. As every Leninist knows, revolution cannot be exported. As every clear-minded human rights supporter should know, human rights cannot be exported. Revolution and human rights thrive only on the domestic conditions and dynamics of a society. That does not, however, relieve either the Soviets or us of cheering for the social values and forces we prefer in the other’s society. And it obligates us to use our power—military, economic, political, and moral—in pursuit of our ideological ends with the greatest skill and pragmatism possible.

There is no reason why the President cannot continue to talk about human rights as the backdrop for pragmatic conduct of our foreign policy. The establishment of an “agency” strikes as a very important tactic for extracting the President from the “exhortation and penalty” syndrome. Such an agency could take that role. But the President, if he is to avoid the reaction of cynicism in the country to his policy, must continue to talk about it, to relate it to our foreign commitments and to the East-West competition. Given our power, our values, and our choices, does it make sense to continue to defend South Korea? That is a fair question, and it can be answered, “yes” even if Park puts innocent people in jail. But the “yes” is never final. It must be answered again periodically, and the answer may be reversed.

83. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Bergsten) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, October 21, 1977

SUBJECT

Implementation of New Human Rights Legislation

Title VII on human rights of Public Law 95-118\(^2\) raises certain questions that I believe should be considered by the Inter-Agency Group on

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights Interagency Group V. No classification marking. Oxman sent a copy of the memorandum to Christopher under an October 28 covering memorandum and attached an October 29 letter thanking Bergsten for his memorandum, which Christopher signed. (Ibid.)
Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. In particular, the following two issues need our prompt attention.

1. *Channeling assistance toward countries other than those that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.* The Secretaries of State and Treasury are to submit annual progress reports to the Congress on implementation of this mandate.

The Congress intends to use human rights as a means of allocating available resources. The human rights PRM states that “efforts should be made to reinforce positive human rights and democratic tendencies in the Third World, particularly in the states that already have demonstrated good or improved human rights performance.” The PRM also supports incentives as well as sanctions as a means of advancing the cause of human rights. For example, in referring to incentives, the PRM proposes goodwill missions, Presidential letters, and public statements in support of countries with good or improving human rights records. For the most part, however, the PRM does not provide guidance for implementing a policy of incentives.

Any process whose aim is to channel multilateral assistance away from offending countries towards recipients where the human rights conditions are good is not likely to be achieved quickly. However, the process should be initiated as soon as possible. In implementing such a policy, it will be necessary to determine which countries the U.S. considers to be serious problems or gross offenders, at the same time we select countries that can be considered exemplary.3

2. *Initiation of wide consultations designed to develop (1) a viable standard for (a) meeting basic human needs, and (b) the protection of human rights and (2) a mechanism for acting together to insure that the rewards of international economic cooperation are available to those who subscribe to such standards.*

By including this provision, the Congress is no doubt seeking to encourage us to get support from other countries for our human rights

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2 The President signed H.R. 5262 into law on October 3. The legislation, P.L. 95–118 (91 Stat. 1067–1072), authorized U.S. contributions to IFIs during FY 1978 and outlined factors for the consideration of loans. Earlier in July, House and Senate conferees had reached a compromise position on IFI loans and human rights, proposing that U.S. representatives to the IFIs would be required to oppose loans to countries in violation of human rights norms but would not be required to vote against these loans. Likewise, U.S. officials would not be required to oppose loans if the President certified that opposition would not advance human rights in that country. However, the full House rejected the compromise in September, returning to the Senate an amended H.R. 5262, which required U.S. representatives to oppose loans or aid to any country that violated human rights standards unless the assistance directly benefited the needy. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, p. 44)

3 Christopher bracketed the portion of this paragraph that begins with the word “policy” and ends with the word “exemplary.”
objectives. The provision conveniently coincides with the Administration’s interest in internationalizing our efforts, which will be indispensable to success of our policy and will at the same time obviate the need to be out front, as we are now, in exercising human rights initiative through the IFIs. Having already done some initial work in establishing standards for human rights performance and for meeting basic human needs, we should, of course, take an active role in multilateral efforts in this regard.

In referring to the reporting requirements on progress made on “internationalization” of our human rights policies, the Congress recognized in Sec. 703(b) that the achievement of this goal would be gradual. The stress in the legislation on this effort is on “initiation” of a wide consultation. A necessary first step to comply with this provision would be to consider mechanisms for a general approach to internationalization and vehicles for initiating international consultations.4

As indicated at the outset, I believe that the Interagency Group should address both issues promptly. To start the process, Treasury will prepare proposals5 for dealing with both the substantive and procedural aspects involved. We will submit drafts to the Group as soon as possible, for review and discussion by the several agencies concerned.6

C. Fred Bergsten

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4 Christopher placed two parallel lines in the left margin of the portion of this paragraph that begins with “The stress” and ends with “consultations.”

5 Bergsten sent a copy of the Department of Treasury’s initial proposals, entitled “Human Rights Objectives: Strategy for Implementing Title VII, PL 95–118” and “Basic Human Needs: Strategy for Implementing Title VII, PL 95–188,” to Christopher on December 6. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, IAGHRFA—History & Organization)

6 Christopher placed two parallel lines in the left margin of this paragraph.
84. **Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**

Washington, October 28, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Human Rights Reporting

As you know, we are beginning the final chapter of revisions of the human rights country evaluation papers and, at the same time, requesting the bureaus to prepare the unclassified human rights descriptions for submission to the Congress.

With your approval, the attached memorandum will set two specific dates on a timetable which will permit us to meet our Congressional obligations. The human rights descriptions will be the same for the Section 116 and Section 502B requirements.

In addition, this will assure cleared versions of the country evaluation papers available by that same date, since the descriptive portion of those documents will be the basis for the preparation of the report to the Congress.

**Recommendation**

That you sign the attached memorandum.²

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² Oxman initialed the memorandum on behalf of Christopher and indicated that the memorandum had been revised and retyped in D. A stamped notation reads: “4 NOV 1977.”
Attachment

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to All Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)

Washington, November 4, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

HA—Ms. Derian
EA—Mr. Holbrooke
EUR—Mr. Vest
NEA—Mr. Atherton
ARA—Amb. Todman
AF—Mr. Moose
S/P—Mr. Lake
PM—Mr. Gelb
L—Mr. Hansell
H—Mr. Bennet
EB—Mr. Katz

SUBJECT

Human Rights Reporting

Section 116 and 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, call for the submission by the Secretary of State to the Congress of reports on human rights conditions in countries for which security assistance programs and economic aid programs are being proposed.

—Section 116(d) (1) calls for submission by January 31 of each year of “a full and complete report regarding . . . the status of internationally recognized human rights . . . in countries that receive assistance . . .”

—Section 502B(b) provides that as part of the presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for each fiscal year, the Secretary of State shall transmit “a full and complete report, prepared with the assistance of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights” including “(1) the relevant findings of appropriate international organizations, including non-governmental organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; and (2) the extent of cooperation by such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation by any such organization of alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights.”

3 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Copies were sent to Gilligan, Habib, Benson, and Nimetz.
The human rights “country evaluation papers” currently being prepared provide a useful vehicle for developing the reports to Congress required by these statutory provisions. Specifically, Section A of those classified papers should be prepared in an unclassified form suitable for use as the required human rights report to Congress. These reports will form a key part of the Congressional and public perception of the commitment of this Administration both to its human rights policy and to an open foreign policy. They should therefore be as full and complete as possible without revealing classified information.

Currently, HA and S/P are meeting with relevant personnel in your bureaus to review necessary changes in the country evaluation papers. The Deputy Secretary has requested that the revision of those papers and of the unclassified versions of Section A (cleared by P, L, H, S/P and where indicated, PM, EB, and AID) be submitted to HA by November 22. Dissenting views should be stated if necessary. It is important that as many of the papers as possible be submitted to HA well prior to that date, so as not to overburden HA at the last minute.

The final versions of the country evaluation papers and of the unclassified versions of Section A of those papers, with appropriate clearances, should be submitted to S/S by HA no later than December 15. Again, it is important that a significant number of these papers be provided well prior to that date.

Peter Tarnoff

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85. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, October 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights Agency

1. I attach a draft memo from you to the President proposing the creation of a human rights agency.²

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Huntington, Box 38, Human Rights: 10–12/77. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Tuchman.

2 Attached but not printed.
2. This follows on a series of steps relating to this issue, including:

(a) our discussion in July of the desirability of proceeding with something along this line;
(b) my memo to you and Jessica of September 17th, on “The Next Phase in Human Rights”, discussing the need for and alternative ways of organizing such an agency;3
(c) Jessica’s memo to you of October 11th, which included this along with other human rights initiatives and where you again endorsed this initiative as a “good idea”.4

3. I submitted a draft of the attached memo to Jessica. She had one specific reaction to point (1) on page two which I have attempted to meet with a change in language.5

4. Jessica is, I understand, working on a broader range of human rights initiatives, including this one, in accordance with your response to her October 11th memo. Given your consistent positive endorsement of this idea dating back to our discussion in July, as well as its current timeliness, it nonetheless seemed to me worthwhile to suggest the enclosed memo as one way of promptly moving ahead with this critical initiative, without prejudice to other desirable ones in this area.

Recommendation: That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.6

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3 The September 17 memorandum is an earlier draft of Huntington’s October 5 paper, which is printed as an attachment to Document 81. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe/USSR/and East/West—Putnam Subject File, Box 31, Human Rights Agency: 9/77–1/78)
4 Tuchman’s October 10 memorandum, sent to Brzezinski on October 11, is printed as Document 80.
5 Huntington submitted a copy of the draft Presidential memorandum to Tuchman under cover of an October 25 memorandum, to which Tuchman responded in an October 26 note, indicating her preference for a “corporate structure that maximizes the distance between this entity [the proposed human rights foundation] and the Government.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Huntington, Box 38, Human Rights: 10–12/77)
6 There is no indication whether Brzezinski approved or disapproved the recommendation.
86. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Nooter) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**

Washington, November 9, 1977

**SUBJECT**

PL 480 Title I—Human Rights Reporting Requirements

**Issue for Decision**

The issue is when and how PL 480 Title I agreements should be amended to require that the food or proceeds directly benefit the needy. There basically are three possibilities: 1) apply this additional requirement only to countries specifically identified as gross human rights violators; 2) apply it to a limited number of human rights problem countries; or 3) apply it in all future Title I agreements.

A related but separate decision is what procedure should be followed for review of proposed Title I allocations.

**Essential Factors**

The issue arises due to the inclusion in PL 480 legislation of a new Human Rights amendment (Section 112). That provision states in part that “no Title I agreement may be entered into with a country that engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights . . . unless such agreement will directly benefit the needy people in such country.” This will not occur “unless either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their sale will be used to directly benefit the needy” and finally “the agreement shall specify how the projects or programs will be used to benefit the needy people.” Congressional committees may require the President to demonstrate that specific agreements will directly benefit needy people, and the President must submit an annual report to the Congress on steps taken to carry out Section 112. The statute refers only to agreements with governments en-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Human Rights—P.L. 480. Confidential. Drafted by Bova, Silverstone, and Ogden on November 5; concurred in by Schneider, Shakow, Butler, and Creekmore. Ogden initialed the memorandum on Katz’s and Creekmore’s behalf; Schneider initialed the memorandum on Derian’s behalf. Attached as Tab 5 to a November 23 memorandum from Oxman to Christopher.

2 Reference is to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, signed by the President on August 3, 1977 (P.L. 95–88; 91 Stat. 533).
gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations, but the requirement could of course be imposed in agreements with any government.

All Title I agreements already include general “self-help” provisions under which recipient countries agree to undertake agricultural development projects and programs. Legislation directs the Executive Branch to consider particularly the extent to which self-help efforts “contribute directly to development progress in poor rural areas and to enable the poor to participate actively in increasing agricultural production.” Annual reports on self-help progress are required from recipient governments, and some monitoring of self-help project expenditures occurs. We do not, however, require recipient governments to demonstrate how food or proceeds will specifically help the needy.

EB View (supported by USDA)

EB believes that only agreements with countries identified as consistent and gross violators should be amended. Its reasoning is as follows:

—This is what Section 112 of the PL 480 Act requires. It is not necessary or desirable to go beyond the law to add reporting requirements for countries which are not gross violators.

—Some have argued that additional reports are needed to meet Congressional intent, and to indicate to Congress that the Administration takes the amendment seriously. EB does not agree. There is a clear division in Congress between human rights advocates and farm bloc Congressmen interested in expanding U.S. farm exports. This split on the issue creates a different, and more controversial, human rights climate for PL 480 than for other assistance programs. On the specific amendment in question, many Congressmen had serious reservations about including it in PL 480 and would not favor Administration action to apply it liberally. This being the case, EB does not believe any clear Congressional intent exists regarding implementation. The Administration can demonstrate to Congress other, more effective, actions to use PL 480 to promote human rights. These include, for example, the review process already initiated, appropriate demarches linked to Title I programs etc.

—Too many reports already are required under the PL 480 program, which take up a significant amount of staff time. In addition to “self-help” reports mentioned above, there are shipping and commodity arrival reports, new reports required regarding storage facilities and production disincentives, quarterly reports to Congress on planned programming, an annual report to Congress on global food assessments etc. Another reporting requirement will only add to the burden.
—EB’s primary concern, however, is that new PL 480 human rights reporting requirements will create serious new bilateral problems with recipient governments. If new reports are required of just a few human rights problem countries, we risk creating a “hit list” which would hurt our relations with those nations. Some recipient governments, knowledgeable about the legislation and Section 112, may not accept the additional reporting requirement as a condition for PL 480 assistance. This would place the United States in the awkward position of either having to agree to omit the report or to terminate PL 480. The HA position that agreements should be amended for all countries would be extremely inefficient and unfairly penalize innocent governments. In addition to adding to a reporting burden which already is excessive, it would likely complicate and delay PL 480 programing. This would adversely affect recipient country food distribution programs and lead to widespread criticism domestically and abroad.

—To be effective, reports on how food programs benefit the needy would have to be based on careful monitoring of recipient country food distribution and local currency allocation priorities. This would require a significant increase in AID mission activity in this area beyond what exists in most countries today. Such an expansion would represent a major departure from our current policy under which AID seeks to reduce its role in recipient country currency allocation decisions. AID’s experience, particularly during the period of local currency sales programs, has shown that such involvement can hurt our political and developmental objectives and lead to undesirable friction. EB does not believe we should go down that route again.

—Finally, EB has a continuing interest in Title I programs used for budgetary and/or balance of payments support purposes. Most programs promote these objectives to some extent; a few are implemented specifically for such purposes. Recent examples include allocations for Jamaica and Portugal to alleviate the difficult financial situation which those countries face. Requiring all, or even a few, governments to document that Title I directly benefits the needy would undermine this key aspect of the program.

In sum, EB shares AID’s view that a new requirement for all Title I agreements would be highly undesirable, but believes that new requirements for just a few problem countries would be equally bad. Our conclusion, noted above, is that the special requirement should be applied only when Title I food assistance is provided to a country identified as a gross human rights violator. In that case, the special provision and report are required by Section 112 of the PL 480 Act and we must, of course, comply.

*AID View*

AID believes applying the Section 112 requirement, that food or local currencies directly benefit the needy, to all Title I agreements,
would not be a workable solution. It would strain our political relations with recipient countries, overburden the administrative systems of countries which do not have human rights problems, and could threaten the continuation of large and important programs such as Egypt.\textsuperscript{3}

At the same time, AID recognizes HA’s argument that it would be difficult to limit the application of Section 112 to governments that are found to be consistent violators without establishing a “hit list”. The Administration could therefore reasonably apply Section 112 more broadly to governments about whose record there is a serious question. This is the standard now being applied by AID in its review of Development Assistance programs.

AID therefore proposes that when the Christopher Committee reviews PL 480 allocations at the beginning of each year it determine which governments are in the questionable category. PL 480 Title I sales agreements with those governments will then be written to include the conditions required by Section 112. Their wording would be carefully drafted to avoid accusations and yet make clear the intent of the legislation.\textsuperscript{4}

Section 112 requires much more than reports from purchasing governments with human rights problems: the commodities or local currency proceeds must be used for specific identified projects and programs which directly benefit needy people, and the agreements must say how the projects and programs will do that. This directive is substantially different from current legal requirements and policy relating to Title I sales in general. Under that policy, as laid down by Congress, “emphasis” is to be placed on reaching needy people. We have not insisted that transactions be identified with specific programs or projects where a direct benefit to needy people can be shown. This approach allows an important degree of flexibility in programming for various purposes, within the basic stipulation that there be a needy people emphasis.

With the new Section 112, Congress clearly had the new requirements in mind only for governments where serious human rights problems

\textsuperscript{3} Christopher bracketed this paragraph.

\textsuperscript{4} Following the October 14 meeting of the Interagency Group, at which the members discussed the P.L. 480 Title I reporting procedures, AID officials began drafting the AID response to the new reporting requirements. (Meeting minutes of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights—I) Shakow sent Schneider an undated memorandum entitled “P.L.480 Title I—Human Rights Reporting Requirements” under an October 16 covering memorandum. The AID Food for Peace Office sent Oxman a copy of Shakow’s memorandum under an October 26 note. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Human Rights—PL 480 II)
problems exist. An attempt to apply the requirements to all agreements would require substantial changes in the terms now in general use in Title I agreements, reduce AID’s flexibility in negotiating these agreements, and create a significant impediment to the sale of American agricultural commodities which Congress did not contemplate. On the other hand, until specific violators are designated, the EB proposal will look like an inadequate response to Congressional intent.

As a practical matter, moreover, it is not possible to reserve judgment until after agreements have been entered into on what reports will be required from the purchasing governments. The governments can realistically report only on the basis of accounting systems set up and made operational well before the commodities are distributed or the proceeds generated.

The proposal to include the Section 112 provision in all agreements seeks to avoid public identification of troublesome countries and to permit the U.S. to use PL 480 to show displeasure with a lack of progress on human rights after an agreement is signed. The AID recommendation also allows these objectives to be met. By focusing on troublesome governments, the Executive Branch will not designate violators, and we shall always have ways of indicating displeasure—including, if necessary, adding Section 112 requirements to new PL 480 agreements that might be negotiated.

There is no approach open to the Executive Branch which will guarantee the secrecy of human rights problems of governments with which we deal. The problem-governments are aware that they have a problem. Congressional hearings and other public testimony, as well as press reports, will make it clear which countries are troublesome. In any case, the Executive Branch must account for measures it takes at least once a year.

The all-agreements proposal could raise public and Congressional suspicions about the Administration’s good faith in carrying out human rights measures. At a time when MODE restraints and AID “effectiveness” are important issues, it would further clog the system with additional manpower requirements and paper. The AID proposal, on the other hand, would impose an additional but manageable workload on purchasing governments, AID missions, Embassies, and Washington review offices by limiting the requirements to cases where a real effort must be made to assure adherence to the legislation.

**HA View**

While the current law requires that it must be demonstrated only in the case of gross human rights violators that the food or proceeds go to the needy, the Congress has made it clear that emphasis should be placed on the use of Title I proceeds to benefit the needy. It would,
therefore, not be inconsistent with this general Congressional concern for the needy to require an accounting in all countries.

To single out only certain countries for application of Section 112 would signal to all that these are countries with serious human rights problems and thus create a “hit list” which would have repercussions in other policy areas and limit the Administration’s overall flexibility in pursuing its human rights strategies.

Using a Section 112 provision only for governments whose records are known to be troublesome at the time of negotiations could make it difficult to adjust to subsequent changes in the other countries. We might find ourselves in a position of not having required reports from a government where the situation has deteriorated, and we might have to explain this failure to Congress.

Imposition of a detailed reporting requirement in all agreements would place a heavy burden on AID missions and purchasing governments. It is, therefore, suggested that AID place a clause in all agreements requiring that the food and/or proceeds derived from the sale thereof be used to directly benefit needy people. To implement this provision, AID would tell most governments that only general statements are required. Our missions could be asked to evaluate these statements based on their general observation and knowledge of the programs.

In the case of governments with serious human rights problems, however, it could be decided in Washington at any time in the year that their human rights situation is sufficiently serious to demand a more detailed accounting. This could be done not only in the legislated area, relating to countries engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, but also with regard to other countries where serious human rights problems exist. Determinations on whether demands should be levied for these more detailed reports could be made through the mechanism of the Interagency Group, and eventually through the country evaluation plans.

Allocation Decisions

The Interagency Group reached a consensus that PL 480 Title I allocations should be reviewed by that group before the quarterly submissions to Congress.\(^5\) In addition, as agreements with human rights

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\(^5\) According to the October 14 minutes of the Interagency Group meeting: “With regard to the review procedure to be followed in the case of PL 480, Title I, it was suggested that the working group should review allocation lists on a regular basis prior to their submission to the Congress. At the time of review, the working group would be asked to identify potential problem cases. It would then be agreed that a subsequent review by the Inter-Agency Group must take place before agreements to these problems countries could be signed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights—II)
problem countries come up for negotiation during the year, the Inter-
agency Group may be asked to review them for consistency with 
human rights criteria.

The Group strongly recommended that PL 480 allocations be con-
considered as soon as possible in relation to other policy levers in the con-
text of individual country evaluation plans.

Recommendations

Statutory Requirements

Option 1 (EB and USDA supports)
That only Agreements with countries identified as consistent and 
gross violators should be amended.

Option 2 (AID supports)
That Agreements be drafted to include the Section 112 require-
ments only for those governments about whose human rights record 
there is a serious question.6

Option 3 (HA supports)
That all Agreements be drafted to include the Section 112 require-
ments, but that implementation of the requirement that purchasing 
governments make reports to the U.S. be done on a selective basis to be 
determined as a result of interagency review of specific countries 
where serious human rights problems exist.

Allocation Procedure:

That the Interagency Group review allocations to all countries on a 
quarterly basis and, for individual countries with problems, again 
when agreements come up for coordination by the Interagency Staff 
Committee on PL 480.7

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6 Christopher initialed his approval of the second option. A stamped notation 

7 Christopher initialed his approval. A stamped notation reads: “NOV 9 1977.”
87. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, November 10, 1977

Status Report on U.S. Policy on Human Rights

This will bring you up to date on actions which have been taken in pursuance of our human rights policy, in response to the Deputy Secretary's memorandum of May 3 requesting me periodically to prepare such a summary for you.2

Summary

—Personal visits abroad by Department principals have resulted in high level discussions of our policy with many governments.
—The fundamental human rights documents and policy statements have been sent to all our posts and the unified military commands.
—Preparation of both classified and unclassified human rights reports is well advanced.
—High level “quiet diplomacy” and public actions regarding security assistance and aid programs as well as public diplomatic efforts may have contributed to significant human rights actions and initiatives in countries such as Haiti, Nicaragua, Korea, the Philippines, El Salvador, and Iran.
—The Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights has reviewed and made recommendations on numerous loans both in the framework of the International Financial Institutions and our own AID programs.
—The Arms Export Control Board, chaired by Mrs. Benson, has incorporated human rights considerations into the whole range of its policy actions with respect to security assistance programs and individual arms export proposals.
—HA, with legislative liaison officers in State, Treasury, Export-Import Bank and the Department of Defense, helped shape current legislation and answer many Congressional inquiries.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—Status Reports. Confidential. Sent through Christopher, who initialed the memorandum. Drafted by Schneider on November 9. Sent under cover of a November 19 note from Oxman to Daniel Spiegel indicating that Christopher had received the memorandum that day. Oxman added that the memorandum was “unduly long;” however, he suggested that Vance might want to review it in connection with his trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, November 20–23. Spiegel returned the memorandum to Oxman, adding to the November 19 note: “Steve: CV did not review on way to Latin America. How shall we handle? Do you want to resubmit. Dan.” (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 1, Document 48.
—IO, our missions in New York and Geneva, our mission to the OAS and HA have been working together to strengthen the international institutional framework.
—The President’s signature of the two human rights covenants was a major step forward.

STATUS REPORT

1. Communication of Policy to all Posts

A. The Deputy Secretary’s ABA speech was dispatched to all posts.

B. In trips by you, the Deputy Secretary, Ambassador Young, Assistant Secretaries Todman, Maynes, Moose, Holbrooke, and myself, the human rights policy has been communicated in the countries visited. We have begun a series of airgrams to all diplomatic posts transmitting information about the recognized non-governmental organizations in the human rights field.

C. A packet of materials has been prepared for distribution which provides an up-date on current human rights legislation; a special Library of Congress study on the status of international human rights agreements; and a USIA set of human rights documents.

D. Human Rights officers have attended regional consular officer conferences in Latin America and Africa.

E. HA has been meeting with Ambassadors and political officers and DCM’s while they are in the Department, on a regular basis.

2. Actions with Respect to Individual Countries

A. Initial drafts of the country evaluation papers from the geographic bureaus have been received and reviewed. Final versions of the classified country evaluation papers and the unclassified report on human rights conditions for submission for the Congress are being prepared for submission to me by November 22 and to the Deputy Secretary by December 15.

B. Particularly in Latin America, the recent trips by Department spokespersons have produced greater awareness of the Administration’s policy and varied forms of response: Ambassador Young’s trip (accompanied by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America and Assistant Administrator for AID) resulted in agreement to sign the American Convention of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Barbados.

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3 See footnote 6, Document 74.

4 An August 19 synopsis of Young’s trip, prepared by Schneider, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Interviews/Bios.
In Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, the visits of Ambassador Lowenstein, Assistant Secretary Todman and myself were preceded or followed by government announcements designed to reflect improved human rights situations.\(^5\) The actions ranged from purely cosmetic to steps which were real but limited in scope. All indicated a desire to diminish the U.S. focus on their repressive practices.

Haiti—Haiti agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and to sign the American Convention on Human Rights and released several prisoners on the list that Ambassador Young turned over to them during his trip there.\(^5\)

Argentina—Argentina has rejected our condition on the sale of eight helicopters—a statement that they would not be used for internal security. In addition, arms transfers for internal security purposes have been prohibited. Other arms transactions have been approved or delayed on a case-by-case basis.

Uruguay—General agreement has been achieved within the Department and with the Ambassador not to move forward on internal security arms transfers and to review all others on a case-by-case basis with agreement that the only issues to be decided relate to spares.

Nicaragua—An initial decision to withhold approval of the FY 77 FMS credit agreement was followed by the GON lifting the state of siege.\(^2\) The Government of Nicaragua has been informed that implementation is dependent upon continued improvements in human rights. Two AID loans have been deferred for later consideration by the Interagency Group. Additional arms transfer requests remain under review.

Guinea—The GOG stated a willingness to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit. Sending military assistance (patrol boats) has been under review because human rights problems are serious. The Guinea PL 480 program is also under review.

Indonesia—Agreement apparently has been reached with the ICRC for the reinstatement of its visits to prisons in Indonesia although no movement has occurred with regard to visits to East Timor. In addi-


\(^6\) Schneider, testifying before Fraser’s House International Relations subcommittee on October 25, indicated that Indonesia, Iran, and Haiti would now permit the ICRC to inspect their prisons. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Reports Political Prisoners Freed Abroad,” *The New York Times*, October 26, 1977, p. 3)

\(^7\) See footnote 9, Document 80.
tion, the Government has reaffirmed its intention to release 10,000 detainees this year. We have urged again that consideration be given to accelerating that process and to permitting detainees to be reintegrated into Indonesian society rather than placed in relocation camps. GOI has agreed, but with restricted movement for a year.

Korea—A demarche has been made with regard to IFI loans and our human rights policy. A proposed commercial arms sale of small arms was delayed earlier this summer on the same basis because of the arms going to Korean police. Additional requests for arms transfers to Korean police are under review on human rights grounds.

Iran—Improvements in the civil-judicial procedure have been proposed in legislation expected to be enacted shortly and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and ICRC have been given assurances of full cooperation in conducting their activities in Iran. The ICRC is now visiting Iranian prisons for the third time. Nevertheless, pending arms transfer proposals with regard to police, particularly with tear gas and internal security equipment, raise serious questions.

Dominican Republic—During the Young visit, the DR informed us of their intention (now fulfilled) to become signatories of the American Convention on Human Rights and, in addition, to release political prisoners (subsequently freed) mentioned to them. They also gave assurances with regard to the openness of the forthcoming presidential election.

Honduras—During the deposit of the ratification documents to the American Convention, the President of Honduras also announced that legislation would be enacted before the end of the year providing a specific date for open democratic elections.

Bolivia—Three prisoners had been released following visits by Assistant Secretary Todman, myself and the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs. Also, during the bilateral talks with the President, Banzer stated that he would give personal attention to the remaining prisoners who fell within the categories of being ill, facing minor charges, having already served more time than the minimal sentence would provide for or who had suffered mental and physical deterioration as the result of the prolonged detention. Parents of the U.S. prisoners sharply criticized Department’s efforts in Senate testimony.

El Salvador—In the aftermath of the discussions with the Salvadoran Ambassador and host officials, steps were undertaken by the

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8 The President met with Banzer and Bolivian officials in the Cabinet Room at the White House on September 8 from 1:33 to 2:25 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) Banzer traveled to Washington to attend the ceremonies marking the conclusion of the Panama Canal treaties. Carter noted that he had met with Banzer, “who repeated that they [Bolivia] are moving toward civilian rule in 1980.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 94)
Romero government to provide protection to the Jesuits. Additional positive actions by the El Salvador government also resulted in a U.S. decision to support a previously delayed IDB loan. Nevertheless, harassment continues to be reported by priests and three Catholic lay leaders were killed by police in late August.\(^9\) Terrorism also increased with killing of the former Rector of the University of El Salvador. We have not reinstated previously delayed commercial arms sales and use of prior-year FMS credits.

3. Coordination of Policy

A. The Deputy Secretary completed the initial PRM 28 process with the submission of a completed State Department response to the NSC.\(^{10}\) There remains a possibility for a PRC meeting on issues raised in the PRM 28 paper. This process involved several meetings of the Human Rights Coordinating Group, the PRC chaired by the Deputy Secretary, and an enormous amount of time and effort by the staff.

B. The Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance as of September 1 had met 5 times since its creation. It has taken action on 56 loans, including recommendations of 6 abstentions, and 23 demarches. Its proceedings resulted in the withdrawal or delay of 10 loans to countries against whom negative votes otherwise would have been cast on human rights ground.

C. The Inter-Agency Committee and the ad hoc staff working group which reports on it have considered loans coming before all international financial institutions, AID FY 77 projects, Ex-Im proposals, OPIC agreements, and have begun the process of considering PL 480 requests. With regard to AID FY 77 programs, two loans to Chile were deferred. The Chilean government ultimately rejected these. Demarches were requested with regard to ten programs, and seven AID loans and grants were delayed.

D. FY 79 budget proposals of AID including PL 480 were reviewed by HA as a part of a comprehensive policy review by H, S/P and other concerned policy bureaus. Recommendations have been forwarded to Governor Gilligan including cuts in budget increases for certain human rights problem countries.

E. The working groups of the Arms Export Control Board, with HA participation at each step of the FY 1979 Security Assistance budget process, considered recommendations from the Department of Defense and the regional bureaus for Under Secretary Benson to put forward to

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\(^{10}\) See Document 73.
the Secretary as a part of his submission to OMB. HA recommended cuts in MAP, FMS credits and IMETP programs for human rights problem countries.

In addition, HA has participated in several decisions involving individual arms sales both in the framework of the Arms Export Control Board and otherwise. HA reviews all arms export policy papers and its input is invariably included, when necessary.

An agreement has been reached between the Under Secretary for Security Assistance and the Deputy Secretary to ensure that, in the event of a disagreement over security assistance decisions in which the Office of Human Rights believes the decision goes contrary to our human rights policy, an appeal can be taken to the Deputy Secretary.

4. Economic Assistance Actions

A. In addition to the decisions made with regard to the International Financial Institutions and AID FY 77 programs within the Inter-Agency Committee, HA has engaged in discussions with Ex-Im Bank to permit our comments concerning the human rights situation in a particular country to be taken into account by Ex-Im Bank in their decision-making. A similar process is being developed with regard to OPIC.

In that regard, Ex-Im, after discussions with our front office and consideration at the Inter-Agency Committee, determined not to lift an existing limitation on available credits for Chile. OPIC similarly determined not to go forward with a country agreement with Uruguay pending improvements in the human rights situation.

Part of the rationale of those two institutions was that such consultation and cooperation with the Department was necessary in order to carry out the spirit of provisions of recently-enacted statutes affecting their programs.

In addition, a pending Commodity Credit Cooperation loan to Chile for $10 million was delayed by mutual consensus at the initiation of our office.

B. In addition to previous actions, the overall development of AID’s future programs has focused on basic human needs and other positive aspects of the human rights policy. However, this positive side to the policy still is not fully understood by the public or the Congress as integral to our overall approach. Some of the unused funds for FY 77 by AID may be reallocated to countries with grave poverty problems and improving or exemplary human rights records.

5. Security Assistance Action

A. In considering requests from countries with serious human rights problems for FMS cash and credit sales or commercial license ap-
proval, a general trend has been developing, based on our individual
decisions, to rule out weapons which could be used for internal secu-
ritv purposes. In addition, weapons going to police and civil law en-
forcement forces of such countries have been particularly suspect. Re-
strictions thus have been placed on arms transfers to Argentina,
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Uruguay. Some commercial license ap-
provals for weapons to Korean national police were deferred for sev-
eral months on human rights grounds. Weapons for the Indonesian
prison guards were specifically denied.

However, substantial amounts of military equipment continue to
be sold to regimes which engage in serious violations of human rights
and which deny to their people the ability to participate in government.

If there is one aspect of our policy that is sure to draw, and has al-
ready drawn, criticism from human rights advocates of the Congress
and among the human rights constituency, it is military assistance and
sales. For that reason, it seems appropriate to examine much more vig-
orously proposals for arms transfers to countries with serious human
rights problems even where a judgment has not been made that a par-
ticular country falls within the parameters of Section 502(B).

An additional criterion which is being used at times in examining
arms transfer requests relates to whether the equipment desired is le-
thal or non-lethal.

B. After discussions, the Departments of State and Defense both di-
rected by telegram that all human rights policy cable exchanges be
made available to the appropriate military attaches, Security Assistance
managers, and to the appropriate unified military commands.11

6. Cooperation of Congress and NGOs

A. Together with H, we have been involved in attempting to obtain
the most effective legislation dealing with human rights.

B. Foreign Assistance Act amendments of 1977 did not signifi-
cantly alter the human rights provisions of Section 116 although addi-
tional human rights reports covering all economic assistance recipients
are now required.

C. After considerable pulling and tugging, language was adopted
in the conference on the international financial institutions authoriza-
tion bill which modifies the Harkin amendment slightly and extends its
reach to all international financial institutions.12

11 See Document 70.
12 See footnote 2, Document 83.
D. The Export-Import Bank legislation\textsuperscript{13} as well as the PL 480 provision of the Foreign Assistance Amendment\textsuperscript{14} were altered to require consideration of human rights factors. Foreign Assistance amendments have been signed into law; however, the Export-Import Bank legislation still is awaiting conference.

E. State Department authorization legislation changed the title of the Coordinator for Human Rights to Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs but retained responsibility for all human rights recommendations and for matters affecting refugees and POWs within this office.\textsuperscript{15}

F. While the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill was pending conference,\textsuperscript{16} HA worked with H and appropriate bureaus in developing the Department’s position on these provisions. Most of the provisions involve ear-marking of funds, denying those funds for particular countries. Given the Administration’s desire for additional flexibility, the general principle which we adopted was to oppose such ear-marking but to limit our lobbying to prevent undermining the credibility of our human rights commitment.

G. The efforts to secure ratification of the genocide treaty have continued although the focus of attention on the Panama Canal Treaty ratification presumably has delayed the Senate’s consideration of the treaty at least for several months.\textsuperscript{17}

7. \textit{Multilateral Diplomacy}

A. United Nations: Continuing consultations by Ambassador Young and others have been aimed at separating the Zionism/racism language to permit the United States to participate fully in the Decade against Discrimination. In addition, those consultations have been designed to enhance the possibility of adoption of the Costa Rican resolution creating the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. At the very least, the effort this year is designed to establish a substantial foundation which would permit us to accomplish this goal at an early subsequent session. We also have been pressing for the creation of an ad hoc committee on torture as an effective step to follow up

\textsuperscript{13} Presumable reference to H.R. 6415, which sought to extend and amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 and require the Ex-Im Board of Directors to consider the observance of and respect for human rights with regard to the extension of loans and guarantees. The President signed H.R. 6415 (P.L. 95–143; 91 Stat. 1210–1211) into law on October 26.

\textsuperscript{14} See Document 86.

\textsuperscript{15} Reference is to P.L. 95–105; see footnote 8, Document 62.


\textsuperscript{17} See Document 57.
the 1975 Declaration Against Torture. While perhaps less effective in the long run in directly improving human rights conditions than the establishment of a High Commissioner, this proposal or a similar one would seem to be less controversial and, therefore, more likely to gain approval in this session. The Third Committee currently is considering proposed resolutions on this subject.

The office worked closely with the United Nations Mission in encouraging and then cooperating with the Secretary General of the United Nations in his effort to secure a resolution of the sit-in by families of disappeared persons in Chile, an effort which ultimately was successful.

President Carter on October 5 signed the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Liberties and Social and Cultural Rights.

HA and IO are working to protect NGO’s from attack during UNGA. There is some effort by the Southern Cone Latin American countries to have the credentials of some NGOs challenged.

B. The Organization of American States: Following the OAS General Assembly at Grenada, our efforts to support and strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have yielded agreement from Haiti, Paraguay and El Salvador to permit visits by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to their countries to evaluate human rights conditions. In addition, the momentum generated by the President’s signing the American Convention on Human Rights in June has influenced a half dozen additional countries to sign, bringing the total number of countries which have either deposited their signatures or agreed to deposit their signatures to 16. In addition, six countries have now ratified the Convention including Costa Rica, Colombia, Honduras and Venezuela. A good working relationship also has been developed with the Inter-American Commission such that an exchange of information has been possible on an informal basis (this should be held confidential). The accessions to the American Convention on Human Rights and agreements by several countries to permit visits by the IAHRC undoubtedly will place a greater focus on that Commission’s activities, ultimately strengthen it and make it a more active instrument for the promotion of human rights in the hemisphere.

C. UNESCO: The preparatory conference met early in August to refine the proposals that were presented to the UNESCO Board in late September and early October, and to establish formal human rights

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18 Reference is to the “Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1975. (A/RES/3452(XXX))

19 See Document 79.

20 See footnote 8, Document 47.
machinery to receive complaints in the areas of UNESCO jurisdiction. A final decision will be delayed until next year. The U.S., with Tom Buergenthal leading our delegation, was a key mover in developing both the machinery and the proposed resolution.

D. International Legal Defense: In conjunction with L, legislation is being drafted to establish the mechanism to support and finance legal defense efforts in other countries. An action proposal on this subject should be available next month. Substantial interest has been expressed both in the House and the Senate, particularly from Congressman Fraser and Senator Cranston, with regard to this matter.

8. CSCE

HA has continued to be involved in the process of defining the policy objectives, strategy and tactics for the CSCE conference. Recommendations for accelerated bilaterals with East Europeans, an Inter-Agency Committee to assess U.S. implementation and respond to complaints, and agreement for the U.S. to play an active leadership role in the forthcoming conference, both the plenary and working group, were initiated by this office. Our involvement results both from my being named as State Department representative on the CSCE Commission and from HA’s appropriate role in human rights as it relates to multi-lateral activities.21

9. Public Diplomacy

As always the most effective communication of our policy has been the actions taken by the Administration. Decisions restricting arms transfers are particularly persuasive. The reports of an emphasis on human rights by Department officials during their trips have a similar effect. Ambassador Young’s trip through the Caribbean and my trip to Argentina are examples. In addition, we have continued to participate in the Public Affairs activities of the Department and to communicate directly with non-governmental organizations both in Washington and at their annual conferences in other locations. The recent surveys of public attitudes on U.S. human rights policy continue to show growing public support for this policy even when in competition with other interests.

21 The President, in June, named Derian the Department’s representative to CSCE.
88. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

**Washington, November 22, 1977**

**SUBJECT**

PL-480 and Human Rights
The Story Behind the *Washington Post* Story\(^2\)

As you know, PL-480 consists primarily of two separate programs—Title I and Title II. Under Title II, food grants are made through private agencies, through the UN/FAO and other multilateral programs, and through friendly governments to help the needy for emergency/disaster relief and other purposes (maternal/child health, school feeding, etc.). Because of the nature of these programs, the Inter-agency Group decided that no human rights review of recipient countries was necessary.

Title I (which is the subject of the article) is a very different story. Title I was originally conceived as a means of disposing of US farm surplus. It primarily provides budget and balance-of-payments support to recipient governments, indirectly subsidizes American farmers, and sometimes promotes the development of free markets in recipient countries. It has often been abused in the past and used for blatantly political foreign policy purposes. For example, in 1975, the government proposed using 85 percent of the Latin American allotment for Chile, and in 1976 proposed that Chile get 93 percent—despite the fact that Chile has the fifth highest per capita income in Latin America, and is not on the UN’s MSA list. Thus there is a valid question of to what extent Title I loans should be subject to a review of the human rights practices of the recipient. This concern was seconded and in fact superceded by the enactment of Harkin language in the FY ’78 Title I legislation. Like all the other Harkin amendments, this stipulates that no Title I support can go to a country which engages in a “consistent and gross pattern of human rights violations”—unless the food itself, or the proceeds from the sale of the food, directly benefit the needy people of that country.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 49, PL 480: 11/77–1/80. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Schecter.


\(^3\) Brzezinski placed a parallel line next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with the words “of Harkin language” and ends with the words “of that country.”
Thus the preliminary FY '78 allotments (which are informally presented to Congress at the beginning of each fiscal year), had to be reviewed to test their consistency to the new legislative directives, as well as to Administration policy. The review took some time since a number of difficult questions had to be answered including:

—Should any Title I assistance be provided to a country which is judged to be a gross and consistent violator of human rights?
—Should Title I assistance be diverted away from gross and consistent violators or lesser violators and toward those nations which make progress or have good human rights records?
—How do we avoid creating a “consistent and gross violator” hit list?
—Should all Title I agreements, or just agreements with consistent and gross violators, be amended to require host governments to report on the use of Title I food or proceeds; or, alternatively, should some other method be sought to guarantee the human rights provisions of Title I legislation are met?

In order to avoid the designation of any country as a consistent and gross violator, it was decided (essentially by Christopher) to review Title I allotments for all countries and to require “troublesome” countries (as defined by the human rights working group) to provide additional reporting showing that the aid is indeed reaching the needy.4

In order to avoid a possible leak (there have been many from the Christopher group) the list of those countries being considered as troublesome was not presented to the interagency group. Instead, consultations were to be held with the interested parties. Apparently State got so hung up in internal debate on the list, that they never got around to consulting NSC. I have spoken to Oxman about this and will talk to Schneider also. It appears to have been an honest mistake made under severe time pressures.5

As to the current state of things, instructions have been issued to 4 of the 29 Title I countries to begin negotiating the FY '78 Title I Agreements. All four of these—Korea, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Guinea—are considered of concern on human rights grounds, and will therefore be required to provide the new reporting showing that the aid benefits

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4 See Document 86.
5 Brzezinski underlined the word “State” and the fragment “to consulting,” added three parallel lines next to the portion of the paragraph that begins with “debate on the list” and ends with “severe time pressures,” and wrote: “Please let me know if this has been ironed out—We should be involved. Check with pertinent NSC staff. ZB.” Tuchman sent an action memorandum to Armacost, Pastor, Richardson, and Thornton on November 23, summarizing her November 22 memorandum to Brzezinski and requesting that they inform her of any opposition to the countries in their portfolios appearing on the “troublesome” countries list. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Public Law 480, 11–12/77)
the needy. An additional 9 countries are on the troublesome list—Philippines, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, and perhaps Senegal.

It should be noted that most of the delay this year in beginning these negotiations was not due to the human rights review per se, but to other technical problems with the Agreements (questions about the repayment terms, etc.). This is demonstrated by the fact that the agreements for the 16 non-troublesome countries have not yet been sent out. Also, the Interagency meeting on this subject was originally scheduled for September 28, and was put off at Agriculture’s request—not State’s. Even if there had been a delay, I think it would be not unexpected considering that there is a new policy, a new set of concerns and new legislative requirements.

Conclusion

The message of this story—that human rights concerns have held up food for starving people—is false. Most (though not all) of the delay has been due to unrelated technical problems. Most of the concern comes from Congressmen who are not concerned about starving people, but about growing surpluses driving down farmers’ prices in their districts.

The decisions that have been made as to how to implement the new Congressional requirements are, I believe, basically sound. However, there may be some objections here to the inclusion of particular countries on the list. I will circulate the names to the relevant NSC staff.

89. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 23, 1977

SUBJECT

USIA’s Suggestions for Human Rights Week—Your Query

Reinhardt suggests (Tab B) that the President’s greatest source of support on human rights comes from people rather than from their

governments. Everyone I have talked to and everything I have read in the past months confirms this. Each of the President’s speeches and statements in this area has captured much attention and generated additional support, which eventually percolates back to governments. Thus I think that Reinhardt’s suggestion for a Human Rights Week speech addressed to people all over the world is an excellent one.2

You may remember that after the last UNGA speech, we got many reports of reactions expressing disappointment that the President had not once mentioned human rights.3 Some interpreted this as a backing off from the policy (this isn’t serious—it’s a press obsession that will be with us until the policy is no longer new). We even got some indications of disappointment from governments who were expecting some general words of praise for the positive steps that have been taken in many places. Thus there is substance that can usefully be said in such a speech, and I think we can be confident that the market has not been saturated with talk of human rights: I am a little leery of Reinhardt’s suggestion that the speech address “the place of the individual in society” which could easily get too philosophical and ethnocentric, but I believe that it would be well worthwhile to take a look at his draft.

Rick informed me yesterday that a proposal for a 3–4 minute Human Rights Week statement is already in the system. Obviously we would not want to do both. I would suggest that it be expanded into a 10–12 minute speech.

I have no particular comments on Reinhardt’s proposals Two and Three other than that we should take a look at his material. I have drafted a note for a reply to Reinhardt’s memorandum along these lines—it is at Tab A.4

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2 Brzezinski placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to the portion of the paragraph that begins with “eventually” and ends with “one.”

3 Reference is to the President’s October 4 address before the UN General Assembly, which is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1715–1723, and is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

4 Attached but not printed is a signed copy of Brzezinski’s memorandum to Reinhardt, dated November 25. In it, Brzezinski commented: “I found both your analysis and proposals interesting. Regarding a ‘State of the World’ message, and your thoughts on the FY ’79 budget for ICA, I hope you will forward the materials you mention to me. We are giving serious consideration to your proposal for a Human Rights Week speech—there are the inevitable schedule problems as you know. While I can make no commitment at this time that the speech will be given, I would like to see a draft of what you have in mind.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1977)
Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.
That you approve a 10–12 minute speech rather than a short statement for Human Rights Week.  

Tab B

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 16, 1977

As the end of the Carter Administration’s first year in office approaches, I have engaged in some preliminary New Year’s ruminations and reflections on the experiences of several months at USIA. The Agency’s Deputy Director, Charles Bray, has just returned from a two-week visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, Nigeria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel, and the impressions he gathered in discussions with intellectuals, academics, media, government and opposition leaders in these countries furnished more material for thought. Several common themes concerning the atmospherics within which we operate abroad emerged from our analysis.

—In much of the world, the intellectual discourse appears to proceed not from firmly held tenets about the future of a given society, but rather from questions about the direction in which societies are headed, questions about the place of any society in the community of nations and about the place and role of individuals within societies. Perhaps it has always been thus, but questions surely outnumber answers in today’s world. In this psychological climate, the President’s emphasis on human rights has struck a responsive chord with peoples, if not always with governments. Their interest appears to lie less in the policy implications of the President’s views than in what is perceived as a powerful affirmation of basic human values.

Brzezinski placed a check mark on the approval lines of both recommendations. His handwritten comment on a line for “Further Action” is illegible. The President did not deliver a human rights speech as requested but offered comments regarding human rights policy at a December 15 news conference. For additional information, see Document 99.

No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote the following handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum: “Ri [Rick Inderfurth] Give me rest. WR [Weekly Report] idea?” A November 21 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Tuchman transmitting Reinhardt’s memorandum and requesting that Tuchman provide him with a “quick reaction” to the proposal is not printed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1977)
—To a remarkable extent, given the traumas of U.S. society in recent years, other societies continue to look to the U.S. as a model—not a perfect model, to be sure, but the most relevant model available in an imperfect world. Our ideas, techniques, values and institutions are perceived as workable. The substantial Nigerian investment in the American educational experience (anticipated to exceed $135 million annually by next year), the Egyptian reopening to the Western market economy, the overwhelming German celebration of our Bicentennial, are simply examples.

—The reverse side of the coin is the tendency on the part of many to dismiss the USSR as an irrelevant model, bankrupt of values, and essentially unworkable.

In light of the foregoing, I recommend to you and the President for consideration three specific proposals:

First, Human Rights Week (December 10–17) affords the President an opportunity to address domestic and foreign constituencies simultaneously, with a discussion of the place of the individual in society, his relationship to government and economy, the sources of our societal values, their relevance to others. I would like to submit a draft speech for consideration within a short time if you give preliminary endorsement to this recommendation. USIA could facilitate live international TV coverage by satellite; at a minimum we could place the text in the hands of a very large number of important foreigners. We assume, of course, that the President would deliver the speech before an appropriate specific audience or as an Oval Office address to the nation.

Second, assuming the President plans a year-end “State of the World” message to Congress, the content and tone could usefully reflect some of the foreign preoccupations which the foregoing suggests. I will forward, by November 28, some specific suggestions in this regard.

Third, the foreign environment we think we perceive has important implications for the new International Communication Agency. We gather the President will be reviewing the FY 1979 budget on December 6. I would like to send you background material and a few informal proposals before that meeting.
90. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, November 25, 1977

SUBJECT
PL 480, Title I

This memorandum is intended to apprise you of the steps we are taking to comply with the new amendment of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 which became effective on October 1, 1977. The amendment provides:

"Sec. 112. (a) No agreement may be entered into under this title to finance the sale of agricultural commodities to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such agreement will directly benefit the needy people in such country. An agreement will not directly benefit the needy people in the country for purposes of the preceding sentence unless either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their sale will be used for specific projects or programs which the President determines would directly benefit the needy people of that country. The agreement shall be used to benefit the needy people and shall require a report to the President on such use within six months after the commodities are delivered to the recipient country.

"(b) To assist in determining whether the requirements of subsection (a) are being met, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives may require the President to submit in writing information demonstrating that an agreement will directly benefit the needy people in a country.

"(c) . . .

"(d) The President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate, in the annual presentation materials on planned programming of assistance under this Act, a

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Human Rights—PL 480 II. Confidential. Vance’s initials appear in the lower right-hand corner of the page. A notation in Vance’s handwriting on the first page of the memorandum reads: “See p. 3,” a reference to his handwritten comment noted in footnote 6 below. In a note attached to another copy of the memorandum, Christopher wrote: “Cy, We should discuss this subject today or tomorrow. W.C.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memoranda to the Secretary—1977)

2 See Document 86 and footnote 2 thereto.
full and complete report regarding the steps he has taken to carry out the provisions of this section.”

Twenty-nine countries are scheduled to receive PL 480, Title I assistance during FY 78. They are listed under Tab 1.³ State, AID and Agriculture are complying with the new statutory requirement set forth above by seeking to include a new provision in the FY 78, PL 480, Title I agreements with certain countries. The new provision, calling for assurances that the food or the proceeds therefrom are used for needy people, is attached under Tab 2.⁴ (With Herb Hansell’s help, we are preparing a simplified version of the requested assurances.)⁵

In considering which of the 29 recipient countries ought to be asked to agree to the new provision, we assessed the possibility of only including countries engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (“gross and consistent violators”). However, of the 29 countries on the overall list, none has thus far been formally determined to be a gross and consistent violator. While some of the countries on the list are arguably in that category, it has been our view that a formal designation to that effect is not a particularly useful policy tool and has many obvious disadvantages. Yet any effort to confine our application of the new statutory provision to gross and consistent violations would almost certainly result in the designation of several of the 29 countries. Accordingly, we concluded it would be a mistake to ask only countries designated gross and consistent violators to agree to the new provision.

As another possibility, we considered seeking to include the new language in the agreements with all 29 countries. The claimed benefit of this approach was that it would avoid singling out any countries as human rights violators. However, AID and Agriculture were strongly opposed to this course of action because of the considerable additional

³ A listing of countries, entitled “Countries Scheduled to Receive PL 480, Title I Assistance During FY 78,” is attached but not printed. The countries included Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zaire, and Zambia.

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “New Provision for Inclusion in Certain FY 78, PL 480, Title I Agreements.” The provision required an accounting of self-help measures and the ways in which such measures stood to benefit the needy and committed the recipient government to report on progress concerning implementation of programs and projects.

⁵ In a November 10 memorandum to Schneider and Silverstone, Michel put forth L’s approach to implementing Section 112, one that “accommodates the major concerns of both D/HA and AID.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Human Rights—PL 480 III) In a handwritten note attached to the memorandum, dated May 29, 1978, Oxman asked Michel: “Jim—Did anything ever come of this?”
burden, expense and possible delay that it would entail, not only in the negotiating process, but also in the efforts required to monitor compliance with the new provision. Moreover, inclusion of all 29 countries would not be a faithful construction of the terms of the amendment.

The third approach we considered—and the one we chose—was to seek to include the new language in agreements with those countries as to which there are serious human rights questions. Such an approach avoids the principal disadvantages of the two extreme courses discussed above. It does not, at this point, stigmatize any country as a gross and consistent violator, but nevertheless enables us to comply with the statute. Moreover, this approach will prove useful when we report to Congress on our compliance efforts, as required by the statute: we will be able to report that all countries about which there is a “serious question” complied with the “needy people” requirement of the statute, and yet we will not have to brand any country as a gross and consistent violator. On the other hand, this approach avoids the onerousness of including all 29 countries, thus permitting AID and Agriculture to operate without undue disruption of the PL 480 negotiating and monitoring process.

Having chosen the middle course of including only countries with seriously questionable human rights records, we determined after wide consultation within State, AID and Agriculture that, of the agreements which are ready to be negotiated, those with Indonesia, Korea, Bangladesh and Guinea should include the new language. Negotiating instructions to our personnel in Indonesia, Korea and Bangladesh have been sent out, and those for the Guinean agreement will be dispatched on Monday.

The instructions state that the negotiation of these agreements should be given top priority and that every effort should be exerted to conclude the agreements within ten business days. If it should appear that efforts to include the new provision will make it impossible to conclude the agreement within that period, we will communicate a possible fallback position to the posts, e.g., a side letter or memorandum of intent. (We are receiving quite understandable complaints from the posts and bureaus on this matter, but the problem stems from the statute itself and our need to implement it with fidelity to our human rights policy.)

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6 Vance wrote in the margin next to this sentence: “I approve.”

7 November 28. According to telegram 281260 to Conakry, November 24, the Department had approved the negotiating instructions for the $5.5 million P.L. 480 Title I agreement and would send the negotiating agreements in a separate telegram. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770436–0045) In telegram 295461 to Conakry, December 10, the Department indicated that the negotiating instructions had been sent on December 9 in an AIDAC cable. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770459–1187)
Negotiating instructions were also sent out earlier this week to our personnel in six other countries—and on Monday will be sent to our post in a seventh—whose human rights records were not determined to be seriously questionable: namely, Afghanistan, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Egypt and Sri Lanka.

For technical reasons unrelated to human rights, the remaining 18 agreements are not ready to be negotiated at this time. We are considering within the Department which of the 18 countries are regarded as raising serious human rights questions. I am attaching, under Tab 3, a supportive editorial from yesterday’s Washington Post8 and two earlier Washington Post stories,9 apparently inspired by the Department of Agriculture.

Warren Christopher10

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8 Attached but not printed. The November 24 Washington Post editorial, entitled “Food for People,” highlighted the Department’s efforts “to try to pick its way through the minefield of the new law. It is the law. And it’s good policy. Among all the categories in which aid is given, food is one that deserves to be treated in terms of enlightened humanitarianism.” (Food for People,” The Washington Post, November 24, 1977, p. A–22)


10 Christopher signed “Warren” above his typed signature.

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91. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts1

Washington, November 25, 1977, 2107Z


1. Summary: New legislation amending Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) requires SecState to provide to Congress an annual report on status of human rights in all countries receiving development assistance. FAA already contained requirements for such a report on countries receiving security assistance. Reports on both development and

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770439–0217. Limited Official Use. Drafted in HA/HR; cleared in draft by Swift, Collins, Runyons, Clapp, Martens, David Moran, Fuerth, and Lister; approved by Schneider. Also sent to CINCPAC, CINCEUR, SecDef, JCS, and CINCSO.
security assistance countries will be submitted to Congress by January 31, 1978. Posts in recipient countries are required to inform host governments of new reporting requirement and/or to remind them of previous requirements. End summary.

2. On August 3, 1977, the President signed the “International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977.”2 Section 111 of this act extensively revises Section 116 of 1961 Foreign Assistance act. Section 116 now reads as follows:

Quote

Sec. 116. Human rights. (A) No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.

(B) In determining whether this standard is being met with regard to funds allocated under this part, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives may require the administrator primarily responsible for administering Part I of this act to submit in writing information demonstrating that such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country, together with a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided (including the dollar amounts of such assistance) and an explanation of how such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country. If either Committee or either House of Congress disagrees with the administrator’s justification it may initiate action to terminate assistance to any country by a concurrent resolution under Section 617 of this act.

(C) In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of Subsection (A) and in formulating development assistance programs under this part, the administrator shall consider, in consultation with the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs—1) the extent of cooperation of such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights by appropriate international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, or groups or persons acting under the authority of the United Nations or of the Organization of American States; and 2) specific actions which have been taken by the President or the Congress relating to multilateral or secu-

2 See footnote 2, Document 86.
rity assistance to a less developed country because of the human rights practices or policies of such country.

(D) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a full and complete report regarding—(1) the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning of Subsection (A), in countries receiving assistance under this part; and (2) the steps the administrator has taken to alter United States programs under this part in any country because of human rights considerations.

(E) Of the funds made available under this chapter for the fiscal year 1978, not less than $750,000 may be used only for studies to identify, and for openly carrying out, programs and activities which will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in countries eligible for assistance under this chapter. None of these funds may be used, directly or indirectly, to influence the outcome of any election in any country.

End quote

3. This legislation requires the Secretary of State to transmit to Congress human rights reports on all countries receiving development assistance by January 31, 1978. In accordance with the interpretation of the provision by the AID General Counsel, the Department plans to submit reports on countries receiving assistance in FY78 and proposed to receive it in FY79. This new requirement for country human rights reports on recipients of bilateral development assistance is in addition to the annual reports the Secretary of State is required to provide to Congress on countries receiving security assistance from the United States pursuant to Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. (See 76 State 231122). The Department plans to submit the human rights reports on both development and security assistance countries by January 31, 1978.

4. Reports for both categories of countries will be identical in format and substance. They will be unclassified versions of part A of the human rights country evaluation plans (CEP) which most posts have either drafted or received from the Department for review and clearance.

3 In telegram 231122 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 17, 1976, the Department provided guidance regarding the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (see footnote 5, Document 1), which Ford signed into law on June 30, 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760353–0445)
5. The reports are now being completed and cleared in the Department. Well before submission to Congress, the Department will telegraphically provide the final texts to posts in each country for which either security assistance or development assistance human rights reports are required (refer to lists of countries in each category below). Congress can be expected to make public all of these reports immediately after their submission.

6. Action requested: Posts in countries with which the U.S. has or expects to have development assistance programs should seek an appropriate opportunity to provide host governments, at an appropriate level, with the text of human rights provisions of revised Section 116 of the FAA, and report reactions, if any. In addition, posts in security assistance recipient countries should remind host governments, at an appropriate level, of the human rights reports required under Section 502B of the FAA (refer to 76 State 231122). Posts should also advise governments that reports for countries in both types of assistance programs will be provided to Congress by January 31, 1978. Posts should avoid implying that this representation assures the provision of either type of assistance, since budget deliberations are still underway within the Executive Branch of FY79 proposals.

7. Embassies in countries which receive neither form of assistance may, at their discretion, also bring to the attention of host governments the requirements of Sections 116 and 502B of the FAA of 1961 as amended.

8. FYI. Following are countries currently receiving, or expected to be proposed for, development assistance, including those receiving assistance under narcotics programs and housing guarantee programs, and on which human rights reports will be submitted under amended Section 116.

ARA—Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay.

NEA—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Yemen (Sana).

EA—Burma, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.

AF—Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia.

9. The following countries are currently expected to be proposed for a security assistance program which will require the submission of a human rights report under Section 502B.
EUR—Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (FRG), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

NEA—Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (Sana).

AF—Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia.

EA—Australia, Brunei, Burma, Republic of China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.

ARA—Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

10. Brazil will be subject of septel.4

Vance

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4 In telegram 288192 to Brasilia, December 2, the Department indicated that it did not plan to submit a human rights report for Brazil, unless the Embassy recommended to the contrary, and added that the Embassy should inform the Government of Brazil that “inaction on our part will make Brazil ineligible for new FMS cash sales, FMS financing, grant training, and all economic development assistance in FY 1979.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770448–0518)
92. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, November 30, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting with Senator Talmadge

Mr. Christopher met this morning with Senator Herman Talmadge in the Senator’s office. The meeting began at approximately 8:50 a.m. and lasted until approximately 9:10 a.m. I was present during the meeting as were Nelson Denlinger of the staff of the Agriculture Committee and a man whom I believe was introduced as Rogers Wade of Senator Talmadge’s staff.

Senator Talmadge said he understood there was some problem in implementation of this year’s PL 480, Title I program. Mr. Christopher responded that the basic message he wanted to deliver was that the State Department is trying its best to implement the new statute and is now up-to-date on this matter. More specifically, he pointed out that 29 countries are scheduled to receive PL 480, Title I assistance in FY 78. He said that of the 12 country programs that had thus far been referred to us by the Agriculture Department, we had dispatched negotiating instructions to our posts in all 12 countries. He stated further that as soon as Agriculture apprises us that any of the remaining 17 programs are ready to be negotiated, we will forthwith dispatch negotiating instructions.

Senator Talmadge said that he interpreted this to mean that the problem was not with the State Department but rather with the Agriculture Department. Mr. Christopher responded affirmatively but acknowledged that in fact there had been some initial delay in the State Department while we attempted to bring our procedures into conformity with the new legislation bringing human rights considerations to bear on the PL 480, Title I program. Senator Talmadge said he could understand that it took some time to adjust to the new statute.

Mr. Christopher said we are aware of the need to conclude the agreements as expeditiously as possible and that we had therefore in-

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2 i.e., Section 203 of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 which adds a new Section 112 to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. [Footnote in the original.]
structed our posts abroad to give top priority to the negotiation of these agreements. Senator Talmadge said he was pleased to hear this.

Mr. Christopher went on to say that in view of the new statute, we were asking four of the 12 countries as to which negotiating instructions have already been dispatched to agree to a new provision in the PL 480 agreement. Mr. Christopher explained that we had attempted to streamline this new provision and to make it as inoffensive as possible to the countries that had been asked to agree to it. He pointed out that these countries might be quite sensitive to being asked to agree to this new provision but that we were very conscious of our responsibility to implement the new statute and felt this was the appropriate way to do it. He reiterated that we had attempted to make the provision as acceptable as possible, consistent with our obligation to apply the statute faithfully.

Mr. Christopher then handed Senator Talmadge a letter setting forth the facts he had just given orally (a copy of the letter is attached under Tab A).\(^3\) I also gave a copy of the letter to Messrs. Denlinger and Wade. Senator Talmadge and the others read the letter. He then commented that he very much appreciated Mr. Christopher's coming to see him and was grateful for the information that had been provided.

Mr. Christopher then handed Senator Talmadge a copy of the latest version of the new contractual provision we are asking certain countries to agree to (a copy of the provision given to Senator Talmadge is attached under Tab B).\(^4\) I also handed copies of this new provision to Messrs. Denlinger and Wade. Senator Talmadge read the provision and said it seemed quite sound. Mr. Denlinger commented that this language was less extensive than the provision we had originally sent out. Mr. Christopher agreed and explained that this reflected our efforts to streamline the provision as much as possible. Mr. Denlinger said he thought it was a considerable improvement.

Mr. Denlinger then turned to the question of CCC credits. He said there was a good deal of concern about bringing human rights consid-

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\(^3\) Attached but not printed is a November 30 letter from Christopher to Talmadge.

\(^4\) Attached but not printed is an undated copy of the provision, which states: "The importing country undertakes to use the commodities provided hereunder (other than any part of such commodities excluded herefrom by subsequent agreement of the parties), or the proceeds generated by their sale, for specific projects or programs which directly benefit the needy people of that country, and to furnish to the exporting country information that demonstrates how such projects or programs will benefit such needy people. Such information shall be furnished, with respect to the commodities covered by each purchase authorization issued hereunder by the exporting country, prior to the issuance of such purchase authorization. Such information shall be deemed to be incorporated in, and to be part of, this agreement. A report on such use shall be submitted by the importing country within six months after each delivery of commodities to the importing country hereunder."
operations to bear on programs that are essentially commercial in nature such as the CCC credit program. He said he understood that the State Department had been in discussions with the Agriculture Department about this matter and that there was currently an issue as to CCC credits for Chile. Mr. Christopher responded that as to strictly commercial programs such as the CCC and EXIM programs, it was our policy to convey our views and advice to the agency concerned when that agency wished to bring a problem to our attention. He said our role was advisory. He said there are some cases, such as Uganda, where we thought it clearly unwise to go forward with such programs. Senator Talmadge said he could not agree more.

Senator Talmadge reiterated that he appreciated Mr. Christopher coming to brief him. Mr. Christopher referred to the interest that some of the Senator’s colleagues had expressed in holding hearings on the PL 480 matter and said he would be happy to meet with them to provide further details. The Senator asked Mr. Denlinger which Senators had expressed an interest in hearings. Mr. Denlinger responded that 14 of the 17 members of the Agriculture Committee had sent a letter to Senator Talmadge expressing interest in hearings on this matter, but that he thought the information we had provided might make hearings unnecessary. The Senator said that in any event hearings could not be held until January and asked Mr. Denlinger to provide each of the 14 Senators in question a copy of the letter Mr. Christopher had just provided. The Senator again thanked Mr. Christopher for his time, and we departed.

In the anteroom as we departed Mr. Christopher explained to Mr. Denlinger that we hoped they would not distribute the draft contractual provision in view of the possible negative effect of such distribution on the on-going negotiations. Denlinger said he understood this risk and would therefore not distribute the draft provision.

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5 In the November 16 letter to Talmadge, members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry expressed concerns about the administration’s apparent delay in signing Title I agreements and requested that Talmadge hold hearings “in order to explore with the Administration ways to expedite the programming of P.L. 480 commodities.” Signatories included Humphrey, Dole, McGovern, Hayakawa, Allen, Bellmon, Helms, Lugar, Stone, Curtis, Young, Melcher, Eastland, and Zorinsky. Dole sent a copy of the letter to the President under cover of a November 17 memorandum requesting that Carter personally intervene in the matter. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Peace, Box PC–1, Executive, 1/20/77–1/20/81) Talmadge also sent a copy of the letter to Vance and Christopher under cover of a November 18 memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Human Rights–PL 480)
93. Memorandum From Michael Armacost of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 30, 1977

SUBJECT
PL–480, Title I: Shipments to Human Rights “Violators”

PL–480, Title I shipments to a number of countries are being held up as a result of monumental confusion in our purposes, exaggerated interpretations of the Congressional intent, and bureaucratic mis-steps by the Christopher Committee. The salient facts in this case are these:

—Section 112–A of the legislation governing PL–480 Title I programs specifies that shipments of commodities should not go to countries that are “gross and consistent violators of human rights”, except when the President determines that any commodities going to such countries will be channeled to the needy.

—There are 29 recipients of PL–480 Title I shipments. So far as we are aware, none has ever been determined to be a “gross and consistent violator of human rights”. Thus we are not legally required to withhold shipments to the intended recipients (evidently Chile has been judged a “gross and consistent violator”, but none of the shipments are planned for Chile anyway). The Christopher Committee has decided that 14 of the 29 recipients have engaged in questionable human rights practices, and the Committee has decided that our PL–480 contracts with these countries be amended to provide for additional reporting on human rights matters. Our Ambassadors to these countries have been instructed to seek host government concurrence in such amendments.

—This effort has not been crowned with great success. The Indonesian Government bristled at our suggestion and refused. Our Ambas-

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 49, PL 480: 11/77–1/80. Confidential. Sent for action. Inderfurth wrote at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: “See last paragraph first for explanation of urgency. Rick.” Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: “MA, good—OK—talked. 4 countries only [illegible] only. ZB.” Brzezinski also drew an arrow to Armacost’s name in the “from” line. Attached to the memorandum is an undated handwritten note by Brzezinski listing the four countries (Guinea, Bangladesh, Korea, and Indonesia) with the comment “all we ask for answers & for information.”

2 Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the margin next to the portion of the paragraph that begins with “we are aware” and ends with “violer of human rights.”

3 Brzezinski underlined a portion of this word.
sadors in South Korea and Bangladesh have refused thus far to raise it with the host government.\textsuperscript{4}

—Evidently new contracts must be signed next Monday.\textsuperscript{5} Thus we must either press ahead to secure these amendments in the contracts, thereby risking a repetition of our experience with Indonesia in other countries, or seek less offensive new reporting requirements, or drop for at least this round of PL–480 shipments any effort to change the contracts with recipient governments.

—This effort—which Agriculture leaked to the \textit{Washington Post} last week—has encountered a frosty reception from the Hill.\textsuperscript{6} Senator Inouye is livid about it and has indicated his belief that the Executive Branch is over-interpreting the Congressional intent embodied in Section 112–A. Senator Humphrey, we are told, is disturbed that the enormous effort that he put into the development of the PL–480 program over the years may be jeopardized by this ill-considered move. Twelve Senators have written to express their dismay that the United States would withhold food from less developed countries as a lever on human rights.\textsuperscript{7}

—Bob Bergland evidently is eager to repeal Section 112–A of the law. But that will take time and will not resolve our immediate problem.

—The continued delays in shipments that have resulted from this confusion are costly to the recipients. For example, in the seven weeks shipments have been held up, the cost of commodities desired by Indonesia has increased by $17 million.

A reasonable interpretation of the law does not require us to withhold shipments from any of the intended recipients. We believe it would be desirable to expedite early dispatch of the commodities. Since this has become a public issue, however, it would be prudent to consult with the Congressional leadership and secure their understanding that for this round of shipments we will not attempt to add new amendments to PL–480 contracts, while leaving open the future of Section

\textsuperscript{4} In telegram 9871 from Seoul, November 22, Sneider indicated that while he would carry out the Department’s instructions regarding the P.L. 480 negotiations, he wanted to express his “personal reservations” concerning the policy and its potential negative impact on U.S. relations with the ROK Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–2025)

\textsuperscript{5} December 5. Inderfurth underlined this sentence beginning with the word “contracts.”

\textsuperscript{6} Presumably reference to \textit{Washington Post} reporter Dan Morgan’s November 22 and 23 articles; see footnote 9, Document 90.

\textsuperscript{7} Brzezinski placed a vertical line in the margin next to the portion of the paragraph that begins with “effort” and ends with “rights.” Fourteen Senators signed the November 16 letter to Talmadge; see footnote 5, Document 92.
112–A and how it should be interpreted by the Executive Branch. This would allow us to move the commodities, escape from a politically embarrassing position, elude a confrontation with the Hill, and avoid the establishment of what can only be viewed as a “hit list” (the 14 countries required to send in new human rights reports as a pre-condition for obtaining PL–480, Title I assistance.)

 Recommendation: That you call Vance and discuss this matter with him, urging a resolution of the immediate problems along the lines suggested above.

 Henry Owen concurs.

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8 Such a list would have the most pernicious consequences for not only will it complicate our relations with nearly a score of countries, many of which are good friends, but will undoubtedly acquire some bureaucratic standing and legitimacy and serve as an excuse for withholding other support from these same governments, whether military or economic assistance. When that occurs, the conclusion for many countries will be inescapable: the U.S. is using human rights concerns in order to justify reductions in its assistance efforts. Guy Erb agrees that PL–480 shipments should not be held up but does not have enough information on the human rights dimension of the PL–480 program. Jessica has seen a copy of this memo, but has not had a chance to react to it. There is some urgency to this matter inasmuch as instructions are going out this afternoon to our Ambassadors in the 14 countries instructing them to negotiate changes in the contracts. At a minimum, I believe you should call Warren Christopher and ask him to hold up outgoing cables on this subject until the NSC can review it. [Footnote in the original. Brzezinski underlined the names “Guy Erb” and “Jessica” and the phrase “has not had a chance to react to it.” He also placed two parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to the last sentence.]

9 Inderfurth placed a vertical line in the margin next to this sentence and Brzezinski underlined “you call Vance.”


11 Brzezinski underlined this sentence.
Washington, November 30, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights Resolution in UNGA

Issue for Decision

Whether the U.S. should vote against or abstain on a draft resolution in the UN which sets forth guidelines for future work within the UN system with respect to human rights questions or, alternatively, join in a consensus adopting the resolution. The vote will likely take place on December 1.

Essential Factors

Under an agenda item entitled, “Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” Iran proposed a draft resolution which concentrates on collective rights at the expense of individual rights. Subsequently, the co-sponsors accepted some Western amendments, so that the present draft resolution (at Tab 1) has now gained the co-sponsorship of a few Western States (New Zealand, Finland and Sweden) and an apparent willingness to go along with a consensus by most other Western States. USUN informs us that if there were a vote, the UK, Japan, Ireland and possibly the Netherlands, would abstain, while most other Western States would vote yes. None, however, are planning to call for a vote.

An additional factor is that the vote on the UN resolution to establish the High Commissioner for Human Rights will come up immediately after the vote on the Iranian resolution. All bureaus recognize that

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2 Tab 1, attached but not printed, is a copy of telegram 5020 from USUN, November 26.
the text of the Iranian resolution will significantly influence the future mandate of the High Commissioner if that Office is established—and that the vote on the Iranian resolution may influence whether that Office is established.

We are requesting USUN to seek further amendments to the resolution, but this memorandum assumes it will not succeed.

The Options

Option 1—That we call for a vote and vote against or abstain on the Iranian resolution. While we are convinced that the resolution warrants a negative vote, it is recognized that political considerations (particularly unity with allies) might call for the U.S. merely to abstain.

Those supporting this option believe that, while the Iranian resolution has been somewhat changed for the better since its introduction, the resolution is still seriously flawed and would result in material harm to U.S. efforts to protect individual human rights and also in substantial damage to U.S. economic interests in the North/South dialogue. The most basic of the problems in the resolution which leads to this conclusion are these:

(1) The heart of the resolution is operative paragraph 1(E), which provides that future UN work with respect to human rights should “accord or continue to accord priority” to the search for solutions to “the mass and flagrant violations of human rights” affected by situations such as apartheid, colonialism, aggression and threats against national sovereignty, refusal to recognize the right of every nation to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, etc.

The following paragraph (1(F)) states that the realization of “the New International Economic Order” (NIEO) is an essential element for the effective promotion of human rights and should also be accorded priority.3

The resolution thus unmistakably provides that, by its terms, future UN work in the field of human rights would accord priority status to collective, as opposed to individual, human rights and also accord priority to the achievement of “the NIEO.” We do not subscribe to the view that the achievement of any particular economic or political program, such as the NIEO, is essential before persons are accorded the human rights which are inalienably theirs. Nor can we accept that “mass” human rights take priority over the individual human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Cov-

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3 The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was adopted on May 1, 1974, at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, which was devoted to the problems of raw materials and development. (A/RES/3201/S–6) See also footnote 3, Document 207.
enants. The view that the Iranian draft is intended to have these unfortunate results is reinforced by the co-sponsors’ rejection of most of the proposed Western amendments designed to mitigate and balance the text between references to both mass violations and violations of the person. To the argument set out under option 2 that “mass and flagrant” is the same standard as the “consistent pattern of gross violations” referred to in Resolution 1503 and U.S. legislation, it need only be pointed out that U.S. legislation speaks of such violations as torture, cruel or degrading punishment or other flagrant denial of the right to “life, liberty and the security of the person.” The thrust of U.S. legislation is thus to protect the person and a consistent pattern of violations of the rights of the person is not equivalent to the collective, or “mass” rights which are the priority aim of the Iranian resolution. The co-sponsors’ rejection of proposed amendments makes this distinction clear. (Proposed amendments sent to USUN are contained in cables at Tab 2.)

(2) Given the above, and the recognized influence of the Iranian resolution on the mandate of any eventual High Commissioner for Human Rights, the U.S. must register the strongest possible disagreement with the Iranian draft, which, particularly if adopted by consensus, would skewer the High Commissioner’s mandate so as to have that Office become another advocate of the NIEO and other favorite causes of the G–77 (colonialism, occupation, self-determination and “full sovereignty over wealth and natural resources”—the last being the code term for confiscation of foreign property), as well as causes of clear human rights concern, notably apartheid and racial discrimination. It should be noted that the NIEO is considered necessary not for the realization of full human rights but even for their promotion. The High Commissioner would thus be required to promote the NIEO as an element of the promotion of human rights.

(3) U.S. participation in a consensus for the Iranian resolution would provoke Congressional and other supporters of human rights who would see in this a marked retreat from the Administration’s position on individual human rights. This might stimulate more mandatory legislative structures, such as the recent Long amendments to the IFI legislation. Moreover, right-wing forces in the United States already are mounting a mail campaign against Senate advice and consent to ratification of the UN human rights Covenants on the ground that they do not incorporate the protection of private property of the Universal

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4 See footnote 3, Document 2.
5 Tab 2, attached but not printed, contains copies of telegram 273588 to USUN, November 15; telegram 275944 to USUN, November 17; telegram 5082 from USUN, November 30; and telegram 5020 from USUN, November 26.
Declaration. If we support conditioning progress on human rights to furthering the NIEO, we shall fuel this campaign.

(4) The proposition, in preambular paragraph 9 and operative paragraph 1 (E), that refusal to recognize a State’s full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources constitutes a “mass and flagrant violation of human rights” undercuts the U.S. position on the relevance of international law to expropriation of foreign property and runs counter to existing U.S. legislation which invokes penalties whenever international law standards are not met upon an expropriation. The U.S. voted against the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties particularly because we could not support the G–77’s view of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Support for the Iranian resolution would brand our own position on this fundamental North/South issue as being a human rights violation. To say that international law can be read into the language of the resolution is to ignore the explicit rejection of such a reading over the past years by the G–77, as well as their rejection of a proposed amendment to the resolution along these lines. (The tenth preambular paragraph speaks of the “continuing existence of an unjust international economic order.” This characterization goes far beyond what the U.S. has previously agreed to and would also have adverse implications for North/South negotiations.)

(5) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN with the abstention of the Soviet bloc. A consensus adoption of the Iranian resolution would allow its proponents to argue that the resolution has greater international support than the Universal Declaration and should govern interpretation of it.

Option 2—Accept the resolution by consensus, with a statement clarifying our position on troublesome aspects of the resolution.

Those supporting this option believe that the Iranian resolution is much improved over the original text and contains good language in support of individual human rights. Operative paragraph 1 (A), which is a perfectly acceptable statement of the U.S. position, provides:

“All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights.”

Operative paragraph 1 (C) states that all human rights and fundamental freedoms of the human person and of peoples are inalienable; and paragraph 1 (D) speaks of the “need for promotion of the full dignity of the human person.” In addition, an earlier reference to the reso-

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6 The UN General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) on December 12, 1974. (A/RES/3281(XXIX))
olution constituting a “revaluation” of UN work in the human rights area has been deleted. Thus, the resolution does not merely deal with “mass” human rights but supports individual human rights as well.

The priority to be accorded in paragraph 1 (E) would be to “the search for solutions to the mass and flagrant violations of human rights of peoples and persons affected by situations such as . . .” The operative term is mass and flagrant violations of human rights. The priority provision need not be read as being limited to the situations listed and thus, in the view of those who support this option, does not necessarily preclude other situations such as genocide or torture. It also should not be read as being confined to collective rights since the reference is to the human rights of “peoples and of persons.” In fact, it may be maintained that paragraph 1(E) essentially recognizes the existing situation in the United Nations human rights fora where the principal attention has been repeatedly given to the mass and flagrant violations of human rights such as those resulting from apartheid, racial discrimination, and colonialism. The United States itself has supported priority to this kind of human rights violation in its strong support for the so-called 1503 procedures, under which the Human Rights Commission has a special competence to study or investigate situations revealing a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. This, IO and HA maintain, is the same standard used by Congress in barring security assistance on human rights grounds in the Foreign Assistance Act.

Paragraph 1(F) would accord priority to the realization of the New International Economic Order as an essential element for the effective promotion of human rights. This paragraph does not elevate a particular category of rights over another, and merely reflects the overriding concern of the LDCs for economic development. Any problem we may have with this paragraph could be handled by an explanation of vote.

The references to the exercise of full sovereignty over its wealth and resources says nothing about the international law pertaining to expropriation situations. They can, therefore, easily be understood as being intended to apply in conformity with existing international law.

A negative vote or abstention on the resolution could prejudice the possibilities of establishing a High Commissioner for Human Rights and could displease those countries which have argued for amendments to the Iranian text to meet our concerns.

HA believes, with IO, that we can safely join in a consensus adoption of the Iranian text, which has been modified significantly to meet U.S. concerns. We can cover our remaining reservations in a statement after the resolution has been adopted. HA notes that the Iranian resolution will be adopted in any case, with the support of most countries which share our human rights positions and concerns. It need not be read as constituting the mandate for the future High Commissioner.
The resolution establishing that Office constitutes a self-contained mandate.\(^7\)

A positive U.S. gesture on this Iranian-Third World text should enhance support for what HA considers to be our primary objective, the creation of the post of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

**Recommendations**

1. That we call for a vote on and abstain on the Iranian resolution, making an appropriate explanation of vote in either case (calling for a vote precludes adoption by consensus) (supported by L and EB).\(^8\)

2. That we join in a consensus with a statement setting forth our problems with the resolution (supported by IO, S/P, USUN and HA). S/P believes our statement should place special emphasis on the overriding importance of the universal declaration of human rights.\(^9\)

3. That if others call for a vote on the Iranian resolution, we then seek a paragraph-by-paragraph vote; if it is secured, we vote for the paragraphs which we find acceptable, abstain on paragraphs 1(E) and 1(F), and abstain on the resolution as a whole. We would make clear that we were using this procedure to emphasize our view that no one

\(^7\) On December 5, the Third Committee of the General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by Cuba not to vote on the High Commissioner for Human Rights resolution, co-sponsored by Costa Rica, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, Spain and Venezuela. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, p. 724) Earlier that day, Maynes sent Young a statement, under a December 5 covering memorandum, outlining the Department’s support for the resolution and the final version of a statement concerning the Iranian resolution. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Human Rights—UN)

\(^8\) There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved the recommendation. In a December 1 memorandum to Christopher, Cooper reiterated the EB position, noting that paragraphs 1(E) and 1(F) of the draft resolution “contain economic features with which we cannot agree and on which we have taken reservations in the past.” Cooper also expressed astonishment that HA agreed to the consensus position regarding paragraph 1(E): “Except for racial discrimination this priority-setting paragraph excludes most of the human rights issues which I believe are integral to the American system of values and which I thought underlie President Carter’s human rights policy. These center on respect for the individual, especially his right to be free of oppression by others (even if they are of the same race or nation), to be physically secure in his being, and to be free to express his views. The priority-setting paragraph 1(E) downgrades the human rights issues which, in my judgment, should be paramount. I do not understand our human rights policy if this paragraph is consistent with it.” (Ibid.)

\(^9\) There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved the recommendation. However, in a December 3 memorandum to Vance, Christopher noted that Young had recommended, and Christopher and Maynes had concurred, that the United States should: “1. Abstain on the Iranian resolution if it is brought to a vote by others. 2. If others do not demand a vote on the Iranian resolution, we would not do so, but would join the consensus with a statement expressing our reservations.” Vance indicated his agreement with this scenario. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memoranda to the Secretary—1977)
category of human rights should have priority over the others. If a paragraph-by-paragraph vote is denied, abstain on the resolution as a whole (supported by S/P as a fall-back).\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved the recommendation. The United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 32/130 on December 16 by a vote of 123 to 0, with 15 abstentions, including the United States.

95. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, November 30, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President outlining a number of steps we might take in the human rights field.\(^2\) At Tab A is a new version of the PD we worked on last summer.\(^3\) It now includes a directive to channel foreign assistance, insofar as possible (i.e., within the restrictions of statute and previous Presidential directives) to countries with a good record of observing human rights. The PD is included not because it contains so much new policy, but because I have come to believe that it is important to bureaucratic morale. The lack of a PD is more and more often cited as the reason for the lack of direction in our human rights programs. In short, there is a vague feeling in the bureaucracy that something is missing, and perhaps issuance of the PD will allow us to go on from here to fill in some of the other gaps.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 19, PD/NSC–30. Unclassified. Inderfurth initialed the memorandum. Brzezinski drew an arrow to Tuchman’s name on the first page of the memorandum.

\(^2\) Tab I, attached but not printed, is an undated draft memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter containing Brzezinski’s additions to the text. The final version is printed as Document 96.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is an undated version of the draft PD. For additional information concerning the draft PD, see footnote 2, Document 76.
The reason for all the delay in getting this package to you is that I have been struggling to find some answers to what I see as the major problems of our human rights policy. We have pursued the policy on many fronts. We have:

—taken innumerable diplomatic initiatives expressing concern over general conditions or specific offenses and encouraging specific improvements (prisoner releases, elections, etc.);
—pushed countries to accept visits by investigatory or observer teams from various international agencies;
—worked to strengthen the human rights machinery of both the UN and the OAS;
—made a fairly large number of general public statements on human rights, though only a very small number of country-specific statements;
—signed three international human rights treaties (though we have done nothing on ratification of any); and
—steadily pursued an honest review of implementation of the Helsinki Final Act at Belgrade.

But without any doubt, the major instrument of our human rights policy has been our foreign assistance programs—both bilateral and multilateral, and it is here that the major problems have arisen. Even without the present statutory requirements, foreign assistance—especially through the IFIs where our vote is often irrelevant—is a crude instrument for pursuing a human rights policy. The legislation adds many complicating factors, of which the worst are: defining what makes a “gross and consistent” violator of human rights; and, deciding when aid “serves the basic human needs” of the recipients.

Because of the Administration’s reluctance to judge any country (except perhaps Chile) a “gross and consistent violator”, there has been a consistent tension between our policy and Congressional expectations. This has fed Congress’ suspicions that, but for its pressure, the Administration would renege on its commitment to human rights. (I know this is hard to believe given the President’s deep personal commitment to this policy, but it is what the human rights advocates in Congress believe.)

Rather than make a sharp and clear determination that a small number of countries are “gross violators”, the Administration has turned instead to treating a large number of grey area countries as more or less under the requirements of the law prescribed for gross violators. This leads to an uneven policy, uncertain signals being sent out, and enormous dissension within the government. It also creates a huge workload, since a policy level group must review every loan and grant
to each of more than 30 grey area countries. The group often finds itself debating whether building a particular road, for example, serves the basic human needs of the population (is the ability to get goods to market a basic human need?), or what fraction of a certain loan to Argentina is going to bring potable water to poor people in Buenos Aires versus what fraction will be spent on a computer system to improve billing. There are also more basic questions—"Is "basic human needs" the actual services (food, shelter, health care) or is it the money to buy those things? If it is the latter, then any loan which increases employment, or even contributes to long term economic development, would have to be considered to serve the basic human needs of the people.

In the absence of clear determinations or rigid criteria for ranking countries, we are inevitably led to comparisons of the countries in the grey area. But how can you usefully compare El Salvador to Romania, or Guinea to Korea? Counting instances of torture or numbers of political prisoners and executions quickly becomes ludicrous. Each country is so different in its culture, its internal and external threats, its economic status, its political traditions, its relations to the US, and its reaction to outside pressure, that the task is impossible to accomplish to anyone’s satisfaction. Finally there are questions we have not even begun to address, such as what compensating value should we place on good observance of economic rights (distribution of wealth particularly) in the same country where political rights are very poor—Korea, USSR, Iran, etc.

I have gone into this at such length because this is the aspect of our policy most visible (and sometimes most important) to other nations and most open to criticism. I can’t help feeling that until we solve these problems everything else is just tinkering at the margins.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at Tab 1 to the President.

4 The list of countries for whom assistance has been reviewed at the policy level (there is a working group that reviews every loan) includes: Argentina; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Cameroon; Central African Empire; Chile; Costa Rica; Ethiopia; Guatemala; Guinea; Haiti; Honduras; Indonesia; Jamaica; Kenya; Korea; Laos; Lesotho; Liberia; Malaysia; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mexico; Nicaragua; Niger; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Rwanda; Senegal; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Upper Volta; Uruguay; Zaire. [Footnote in the original.]

5 Aaron added the following handwritten comment: "ZB—good points. Why can’t we decide who we want to support give them 80% of our aid and divide the rest among the grey area or give nothing to the 16 baddies? PD looks all right but might be stronger on aid reorientation for the good guys. DA."
96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, December 3, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

Outlined below are several human rights initiatives for your consideration. This matter is especially timely because December 10–17 is Human Rights week (a specific proposal regarding that is made in item 4).

1. Creation of a Human Rights Foundation

   This proposed foundation would be modeled on the Inter-American Foundation which is a quasi-governmental organization that receives its money through Congressional appropriation, but has very loose ties with the government, and makes its own policies. This foundation would:

   —funnel money to the international human rights organizations and to national human rights organizations operating in other countries (as well as those in the US) based on the value of their work;
   —provide badly needed support for refugee resettlement efforts, including the retraining (language, professional standards, etc.) and placement of skilled and professional political refugees. In particular, the Foundation could finance the resettlement of such key individuals—not in the US where their talents are wasted—but in other Third World nations badly in need of these skills. Thus the classic “brain drain” would be redirected in the interest of promoting both human rights and economic development. The dimensions of this problem are formidable—reports are, for example, that 40 percent of the Argentine Physics Society has left Argentina as political refugees;
   —support the work of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the multinational organizations, particularly in the UN, where they are a crucial source of impetus and of information on human rights violations;
   —set up a data bank where the growing volume of information on alleged human rights violations (and improvements) can be collected, checked and analyzed. The resources of the data bank would be available to NGOs, governments and multinational institutions as well as responsible individuals;

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2 See Document 80.
—issue an annual study reporting on and analyzing trends in human rights conditions during the previous year. While other organizations already do this (Freedom House for example), every additional source is helpful. The lack of accurate information is still a hindrance to the programs of multinational institutions as well as to our own programs;
—serve as a central clearing house—a place for those who need help, or who have information to share, to go to;
—set up and award an annual human rights prize, with a sizeable award comparable to the Nobel, to recognize an outstanding contribution to human rights anywhere in the world.

Depending on how the legislation creating such a Foundation is written, the Foundation could have a greater or lesser degree of official status. For several reasons I believe it would be best to maximize its distance from the government. This would: provide an independent source of information from official State Department views; allow the Foundation to employ foreign nationals who could provide essential expertise in certain areas, and give the Foundation a slightly multinational (and therefore more credible) image; and protect the Foundation should any of your successors not share your commitment to human rights. The Foundation would be run by a Board of Directors including a majority of private members with some representation of the Congress and the USG, as well as some non-Americans. I visualize a relatively small staff with most of the Foundation’s program being implemented through existing organizations.

As to implementation, there are two basic approaches. Either this can be developed and presented as an Administration initiative, or we could interest a member of Congress in the idea and let him push it. The latter approach worked very successfully with the Inter-American Foundation. The idea for that Foundation was presented at an early stage to Congressman Dante Fascell, who took it over, saw to its enactment and has since zealously made sure that its appropriations come through. The disadvantage of this approach, is that you would not get credit for the idea. Hence I would recommend that it be launched as an Administration initiative.

Recommendation:

That you authorize detailed development of this proposal.

To be presented as a Presidential initiative

Find a member of Congress to father it

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3 The President placed a check mark next to this option and added: “Fritz explore.”
2. Improve Relations with Congress

Relations between Congress and the Administration in the human rights area are at a very low ebb. It is hard to accept, given your own deep commitment to this issue, but most human rights advocates in Congress believe that, were it not for their continuing pressure and vigilance, the Administration would renege on its commitment to human rights. The situation has been complicated by the fact that the Right wing has recognized this issue as a golden opportunity to turn a “liberal” issue to its own ends. It became a common pattern this year for members to be enthusiastically proposing and voting for human rights restrictions on aid measures and IFI funding bills, only to turn around and vote against final passage of the bill. Thus we face a strange alliance of both ends of the ideological spectrum that caused us so much difficulty during this past year with the IFI appropriations and other issues.

One of the main reasons we have not been able to win Congress’ trust, is that with the best of intentions, we have found it impossible to implement some of the legislation in this area. A strict interpretation of the Harkin amendment, for example, would have us create a “hit list” of “gross and consistent violators” of human rights. Congress did not think through the damage such a list would do to our overall foreign policy. This is only one example among many where both Congress and the Administration would gain from listening to the other in a quiet and apolitical forum.

Before relations deteriorate further, we should initiate a series of working meetings—chaired by the Vice President—with the prominent Congressional human rights advocates from both Houses and both parties. A specific agenda for these meetings would be set through staff consultations, but with active Congressional participation. It would be made clear to those invited that they were not being called to the White House to hear the Administration’s position, but to think through the problems involved in implementing legislation now on the books, (as well as other problems) and to actively participate in working out mutually satisfactory resolutions. As a starting point, there should be at least one meeting devoted to bilateral assistance policies (economic and military), and one to the IFIs, with explicit discussion of what Congress really expects from the US delegations. There should also be a meeting devoted to policies toward the USSR and Eastern Europe, where we might begin to build a consensus about the Jackson-Vanik problem. Such a series of meetings is most appropriate to the White House, not only because we are trying to build trust in Administration’s policies in this area, but because ultimately, we would be asking the Members to rethink their own legislation—something that could not be done effectively at a lower level.
Recommendation:

That you ask the Vice President to chair a series of meetings as outlined above, with staff help from the NSC and the State Department.4

3. Targeting of Foreign Assistance to Countries that Respect Human Rights

Existing statutes prescribe certain rules which must be followed in allocating US foreign assistance (including Security Supporting Assistance, AID programs, PL–480 and others), political-military interests impose additional constraints, as does your recent decision to target US assistance to poor people, primarily in low income countries. Nevertheless, within these boundaries, there is still flexibility to channel more money and aid to countries where there is a good, or improving, human rights record. We follow this policy now in theory, but not in practice. The country-by-country and program-by-program budgeting process has simply not provided for this kind of analysis. We should be able to look at overall assistance levels (from all programs) and over a period of years be able to point to clear trends—decreases for egregious violators, increases for others.

Recommendation:

That you approve this policy change.5

4. Speech for Human Rights Week

December 10–17 is Human Rights Week. This is an international as well as a US designation. I recommend that you deliver a short (5–7 minutes) speech on this occasion which USIA would carry to international audiences via satellite.6 Most of the support for your policy comes from people, rather than governments, and this speech would be addressed directly to them. It might briefly review human rights improvements around the globe during the past year, and then turn to the setbacks and the magnitude of the problem that lies ahead. In emphasizing the global nature of these concerns, the speech should focus on events in international forums—the UN, the OAS, and Belgrade. It might indirectly allude to the fact that in 1975, Izvestia hailed the Helsinki Final Act as “a new law of international life” thereby supporting our claim that human rights concerns transcend national boundaries. You might also want to address in personal terms, the motivations and the goals that lie behind US human rights policies. These are only preliminary ideas—if you approve the speech, I will work with Fallows on a draft for your consideration.

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4 The President approved and initialed this recommendation.

5 The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation but noted: “Fritz assess.”

6 See attachment, Document 89.
Recommendation:

That you authorize me to work with Jim Fallows in preparing a short speech draft for delivery during Human Rights Week.7

5. Ratification of the Genocide Treaty

The Administration’s first public human rights goal was the ratification of the Genocide Treaty which has been stuck in the Senate for nearly 30 years. We have not achieved it mostly through lack of effort. The NGOs waited for a sign from the White House, and the Administration waited for the NGOs to produce the votes. The result was inaction. Recently, my staff, working with NGO representatives and Frank Moore’s office, produced a solid vote count based on written answers of the Senators. For cloture, where 60 votes are needed, we have 54 solidly committed in favor, with 15 undecided or leaning in favor. On final passage where 66 votes are needed (or fewer if some members can be convinced to take a walk) we have 56 solidly committed, and 13 undecided or leaning in favor. We are beginning to get criticism for the lack of effort on Genocide, particularly because we have signed three more human rights treaties this year,8 and so there is now a total of five treaties waiting to be ratified. There has also been criticism from abroad, to the effect that the US will sign anything but then not ratify. Ratification of the Genocide Treaty must of course wait until after Panama is resolved,9 but it should be attempted as soon as possible thereafter.

Recommendation:

That you request the Vice President to review the feasibility of making the ratification of the Genocide Treaty a high Administration priority immediately following resolution of the Panama Canal.10

6. Issuance of a Human Rights PD

Attached at Tab A is a draft human rights PD. It formalizes our human rights policy as it now stands, including the positive targeting of foreign assistance to countries with good records on human rights. It also directs a detailed study of the problems connected with implementation of the Harkin amendment in the IFIs, and the problems and reac-

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7 The President approved and initialed this recommendation. At the beginning of his December 15 news conference, Carter highlighted Human Rights Week, noting that the administration was “working to advance a full range of human rights, economic and social, as well as civil and political.” See Document 99. For the complete text of Carter’s statement and the transcript of the news conference, see Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 2115–2124.

8 See Documents 47 and 79.

9 Presumable reference to the Panama Canal treaties.

10 The President approved this recommendation.
tions we have encountered in the banks over the last several months. I believe that it would be useful to issue this document, not only for the substance it contains (some of which is not new) but also for reasons of bureaucratic morale. Lack of a guiding PD is more and more often cited in the bureaucracy as a reason for the lack of direction and initiative in implementing a human rights policy.

Recommendation:

That you sign the PD at Tab A.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} Attached but not printed. The President wrote in the margin next to this recommendation: “Fritz comment.”

97. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, December 7, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights

I have reviewed the human rights initiatives proposed in Zbig’s memorandum of December 3 (Tab A)\textsuperscript{2} and, by and large, I think they are excellent. Reviewing the proposals in the order in which they were presented:

1. \textit{Creation of a Human Rights Foundation}. I see both pros and cons to this proposal and think it will require careful exploration. While I have no strong objection, I do think that we run genuine risks with such a foundation. It would have a quasi-governmental character. The government would take blame for ineffectiveness or inaction on those difficult human rights which cannot be resolved immediately. Such a foundation might do no more than duplicate the work of such organizations as Freedom House and Amnesty International.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives: 1/77–10/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Brzezinski. The President wrote “VP J” at the top of the memorandum. Another copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Presidential Directive: 12/77–12/78.

\textsuperscript{2} Not found attached. Printed as Document 96.
However, I realize that there is movement toward such a foundation, and if it is to be created, it would be useful for your Administration to play a role of leadership and to help shape its charter. I recommend that in the speech you give during Human Rights Week you state that you have directed the National Security Council to explore the possibility of such a foundation. Zbig would follow up on this by convening a meeting of Congressional leaders, scholars and representatives of private foundations to discuss the proposal. The language in your speech should be designed to identify you as taking an important initiative while at the same time leaving open the door that the decision on establishment of the foundation will depend on the results of the NSC exploratory process.3

2. Relations with the Congress. I am fully in favor of chairing a series of meetings with members of the Congress to discuss our human rights objectives and the need to shape legislation genuinely to advance our human rights goals around the world. I will immediately get to work with Zbig and his staff to set up these meetings with members of the Congress.4

3. Targeting of Foreign Assistance to Countries that Respect Human Rights. I concur with this proposal as a basic Administration objective and the language on this issue in the draft Presidential Directive attached at Tab A does a good job of stating this objective. In my opinion, it is important to keep such guidelines general.5 The Administration will have to live with them; we will be measured by our compliance with them; and flexibility will be required if we are to comply satisfactorily.

4. Speech for Human Rights Week. I fully endorse the recommendation that you deliver a speech next week on human rights. One of the real strengths of your administration has been the manner in which you have underscored repeatedly the fundamental importance of human rights and the fact that this is not an issue of passing interest. As mentioned above, in your speech you may wish to make reference to the fact that you have directed the NSC to explore the possibility of a foundation. It would also be useful to note the steps being taken to establish a High Commissioner on Human Rights.6

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3 The President wrote at the end of this paragraph: “I’m leery of this. We may publicly support a group organized privately—and privately we can help to organize or bolster one.”

4 The President wrote “do so” in the margin next to this paragraph.

5 The President underlined the words “guidelines general” and noted in the margin “I agree.”

6 The President underlined the second half of this sentence, beginning with the word “establish.”
5. *Ratification of the Genocide Treaty.* At this point, I would recommend against a hard push involving you personally for ratification of the Genocide Treaty immediately after the Panama Canal Treaties. There is a strong likelihood that we will, by the Spring of 1978, be moving from Panama to SALT in the Senate. I doubt that the Genocide Treaty would move quickly through the Senate, and I think it would be a mistake to have this the subject of a prolonged, controversial and emotional Senate debate. Further, I am not at all certain that either Americans or many people abroad see the Genocide Treaty as being crucial to the progress we desire on human rights. I would recommend that we go slow on plans to push for Senate action on the Genocide Treaty, reassessing this position if it develops that SALT will not be ready for Senate action.7 In the meantime, the Secretary of State can take the appropriate occasion to remind the Senate that we want the Genocide Treaty to move forward.

6. *Issuance of Human Rights Directive.* I concur in the desirability of issuing the proposed directive. It is an excellent idea. Looking to the implementation of the directive, I think it will be important to tighten up the interdepartmental group, to make it more assertive. This is an issue which I think might be useful to discuss with Cy at the next foreign policy breakfast meeting.8

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7 The President noted “I’ll defer to you” in the margin below this sentence.
8 At the end of this paragraph the President wrote: “Send draft around before breakfast—J” and “Fritz—You & Zbig go ahead & act—Thanks—J.C.”

98. **Memorandum From the President’s Counsel (Lipshutz) to President Carter**

Washington, December 7, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Human Rights Policy

Attached is a proposed “Presidential Decision Memorandum” which I urge you to sign.

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Counsel’s Office, Robert J. Lipshutz Files, 1977–1979, Box 18, Human Rights, 12/77. No classification marking. Sent through Brzezinski, who did not initial the memorandum.
I believe that this will be extremely helpful to you and the Secretary of State and Dr. Brzezinski as a meaningful way of reenforcing and institutionalizing within the State Department bureaucracy this fundamental policy of the Administration.

I also believe that it will be of assistance to us in our attempts to defuse the efforts by Congressman Harkins and others to attach mandatory provisions to numerous legislative bills which are coming up in the Congress, by demonstrating your determination to further institutionalize your Human Rights Policy in the State Department.

If you approve this Presidential Decision Memorandum, I will have it drafted in final form for your signature.2

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the White House Counsel3

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Presidential Determination on Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy

The fundamental premise for human rights priorities in determining United States foreign policy is the positive influence upon interstate relations resulting from greater individual government sensitivity and respect for the rights of its respective population. The reduction of domestic tension between particular peoples and their governments—a result of enhanced government acknowledgment of the rights of the governed—will bring about a consequent reduction of tensions between governments.

U.S. Government foreign policy requirements will therefore include a careful evaluation of human rights obligations accepted by all governments with which this country has normal diplomatic relations or other established ties. The Department of State will have primary responsibility for defining the legal, political and other internationally accepted obligations upon governments to respect human rights.

The official U.S. foreign policy community, under the direction of the Department of State, will establish, evaluate and review estimates of the extent the United States Government shall support human rights policies or initiatives of foreign governments. It will also determine the

2 There is no indication as to whether the President approved or disapproved the recommendation.
3 No classification marking.
need, where appropriate, for public or discreet official U.S. expressions of concern over the abuse of human rights clearly attributable to foreign governments’ policies or decisions whether tendered publicly by spokespersons for this government, by representatives in multilateral international organizations, or by diplomatic officials in the course of normal discussions with representatives of particular countries.

It shall be the responsibility of all diplomatic representatives of the United States to set forth clearly to their foreign counterparts the commitment of the United States Government to seek greater respect by all governments for the human rights of their respective populations. Where such exist, the legal, legislative, or other recognized obligations upon the United States Government to evaluate and convey its human rights concerns to other governments will be reaffirmed to representatives of foreign governments whenever matters under consideration relate to these obligations.

99. Editorial Note


“This policy has produced some controversy, but it’s very much in keeping with the character and the history of our own country. We became an independent nation in a struggle for human rights. And there have been many such struggles since then, for the abolition of slavery, for universal suffrage, for racial equality, for the rights of workers, for women’s rights.

“Not all of these struggles have yet been won. But the freedom and the vigor of our own national public life is evidence of the rights and the liberties that we have achieved. I believe that public life everywhere, in all nations, should have that same freedom and vigor.

“We have no wish to tell other nations what political or social systems they should have, but we want our own worldwide influence to reduce human suffering and not to increase it. This is equally true
whether the cause of suffering be hunger on the one hand or tyranny on the other.

“We are, therefore, working to advance a full range of human rights, economic and social, as well as civil and political.

“The universal declaration and other international human rights covenants mean that one nation may criticize another’s treatment of its citizens without regarding each other as enemies. We will continue to do this, just as we welcome scrutiny and criticism of ourselves as part of the normal dealings between nations. We have strengthened our foreign policy on human rights, and we are letting it be known clearly that the United States stands for the victims of repression. We stand with the tortured and the unjustly imprisoned and with those who have been silenced.”

The President then described various initiatives undertaken in pursuit of those objectives, including the reduction of military assistance to nations engaged in consistent patterns of rights violations, the support of international and non-governmental organizations coordinating human rights activities, and an emphasis upon human rights in relation to U.S. foreign assistance programs. Carter also highlighted U.S. support for the establishment of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The President concluded his remarks on human rights by noting successes, small and large:

“In the past year, human rights has become an issue that no government on Earth can now afford to ignore. There have been numerous instances of improvement. Some represent genuine change, some are only cosmetic in nature. But we welcome them all, because they reflect a relief of suffering people and persecuted people.

“The results of our human rights policy will seldom be dramatic. There will be tensions along the way, and we will often be perceived as either being too rash or too timid. But this is a small risk, compared to the risk assumed by brave men and women who live where repression has not yet yielded to liberty.

“My personal commitment to human rights is very strong. The American people feel as I do. Our Government will continue to express that commitment and not ever hide it. And we will always encourage other nations to join us.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pages 2115–2116)

The full record of the President’s news conference is ibid., pages 2115–2124.
SUBJECT

Human Rights and our Aid Efforts

At the risk of becoming a bore on this subject, I should like to raise with you again my concerns about the way human rights considerations are being handled, particularly in relation to our aid programs. We are injecting political (i.e. human rights) considerations into the disposition of loan requests in the international and regional banks in contravention of their charters, and despite the fact that we recently walked out of the ILO on grounds others were “politicizing” that institution. We are maneuvering ourselves into a position where we appear to the public and Congress prepared to withhold shipment of commodities of such basic importance to human welfare as food in order to advance our concepts of political and civil rights in developing countries. And this is being done by a sub-Cabinet Committee which in my judgment operates with extraordinarily sloppy procedures and without much oversight from the Cabinet members with a stake in their decisions. My specific concerns are about the procedures.

—The law requires that we not provide PL–480 to countries which engage in a pattern of gross and consistent violations of human rights. The Administration has also pledged to use its “voice and vote” to encourage International Financial Institutions to allocate funds with similar concerns in mind. Yet to my knowledge there has been no formal determination that any specific country has been adjudged guilty of a pattern of “consistent and gross violations”.

—More serious, no one in the Human Rights Bureaucracy can define with any clarity the standards by which such a determination might be made. The standards against which “consistent and gross” vi-
violations are to be judged have not been clearly specified. On the contrary, the Christopher Committee has consciously chosen to hang loose on this.

—While foreswearing any formal criteria, however, an informal “hit list” has begun to emerge. With respect to the allocation of PL–480, Title I assistance, for example, thirteen countries are being asked to accept special reporting requirements which amount to their admission that they have engaged in consistent and gross violations. The common thread that binds these 13 countries is not apparent to the untrained eye. I expect this list, designed for PL–480, will acquire a measure of “legitimacy” when it comes to determining those who are to be penalized when other forms of assistance are being distributed.

—Nor have I seen much evidence that the Human Rights bureaucracy is very interested in results. At least in the EA area my colleagues at State inform me that they are rarely questioned by D/HA about the consequences of particular measures—e.g. a statement, a loan, an arms transfer, etc.—on the human rights situation in a particular country in the mid-term. The concern of the bureaucracy seems more clearly directed at dissociating the U.S. from manifestations of what particular individuals regard as unsavory political practices in other countries, rather than achieving concrete and tangible advances in human rights within the context of what is realistic and practicable in a given country. I cannot help but wonder whether in this area we are operating on the basis of the “Me-generation”s” Golden Rule: “If it feels good, do it”—an approach which reduces foreign policy to a form of personal therapy. I believe Max Weber’s essay “Politics as a Vocation” provides a more reliable guide to responsible ethical conduct. It counsels less perfectionism and more professionalism—an effort to grasp the longer term consequences of our actions than is apparent in our current methods.

—Our expectations must be tailored to specific national situations and framed in terms of long-term trends. We cannot manage a sensible policy in terms of yesterday’s headlines. The recent decisions of the Human Rights Committee, however, are ad hoc and improvisational. Trends appear less important than current events—to wit, our abstention on the Philippine loan was explicable in terms of the Aquino sentence. Worse yet, we introduced new reporting requirements from In-

3 Reference is to German sociologist and political economist Max Weber, author of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. “Politics as a Vocation” was a lecture Weber delivered at the University of Munich in 1918 and was published as “Politik als Beruf” in Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Munich, 1921).

4 On November 25, a Philippine military tribunal had imposed a death sentence on Benigno Aquino, Marcos’ foremost political opponent. According to press reports, Marcos indicated that he was leaning toward staying Aquino’s execution by firing squad. (Jay Mathews, “Marcos Strongly Hints He Will Spare Key Foe,” The Washington Post, December 9, 1977, p. A–22)
Indonesia in the PL–480 contracts the very week that the GOI supplied us their plan for releasing 10,000 political prisoners on December 20. Our decision can only be regarded by the Indonesians as an insult—evidence that their concrete measures undertaken largely to accommodate our concerns result merely in new, insensitive, bureaucratic intrusions into their affairs. To date the Human Rights Committee has not developed much skill in developing longer term human rights objectives in relation to particular countries, or in relating its activities to longer-term trends. Our policy exhibits as a result a sporadic and punitive aspect which arouses resentment.

I understand—though I have not seen the draft—that an effort is under way to define our human rights policy guidelines in a PD. It is my own judgment that before issuing any further guidelines on the subject, it would be very healthy to have a detached outside observer of impeccable and unquestioned balance and judgment come in and undertake a quiet survey of our human rights policy. With nearly a year behind us, it is time for sober reflection and a systematic appraisal of our performance to date by someone who has no axe to grind. We need to consolidate those initiatives which have genuine promise; to weed out those practices which are harmful and mischievous; and, above all, to rationalize our procedures in ways which will assure that human rights considerations are taken into account but do not overwhelm all other aspects of our foreign policy.

I don’t have any candidates for such a review in mind, though Inis Claude has always struck me as a man who manages to combine idealism and hard-headedness. My point is not to identify the person. If you agree with the merit of such a review, I’m sure the right person can be found.

Recommendation:

That you and David meet with Jessica, Tom Thornton, Mike Oksenberg, myself, and any other interested parties on the Staff to consider procedures for integrating human rights concerns with other for-

5 The NSC Global Issues Cluster’s December 21 evening report noted that the Indonesian Government had “followed through on its pledge, and released 10,000 political prisoners who have been held 12 years without trial. 20,000 remain in custody.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 11–12/77) On December 31, the Department of State issued a press release that noted the release of political prisoners in Indonesia, South Korea, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1978, p. 39)

6 See Documents 96 and 98.

7 Reference is to Dr. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Stettinius Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia and author of Power and International Relations (1962).
eign policy considerations as well as the possible utility of an outside review of this area of policy.8

Attachment

Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)9

Washington, December 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Armacost’s Memorandum on Human Rights

I disagree with virtually all of the specifics Mike cites and believe they should all be seen in a different light. For example:

—Mike says that “We appear to the public and Congress prepared to withhold shipment of commodities of such basic importance to human welfare as food in order to advance our concepts of political and civil rights”. In fact what we are doing is precisely the opposite—adopting new procedures to try to insure that the food aid goes to the people who are really hungry, and not to speculation or to balancing trade deficits. Several talks on the Hill with both members and staff lead me to believe that (after the brief scare that our surpluses might not be shipped at all) Congress both understands and supports what we are doing.

—The decision to avoid defining precise and clear standards of what constitutes “a consistent pattern of gross violations” of human rights is not the result of sloppy procedures, but was consciously taken after much thought, including consideration at the Cabinet level (as well as an explicit directive from yourself). The reasoning was that global standards for such a thing would have little meaning and would overly rigidify our policy.

—Mike’s concern that the PL–480 list will become a de facto hit list for other programs has little grounds, since none of the other programs in which actions have been taken have acquired such standing. Why should this one?

8 Brzezinski did not indicate his approval here, but wrote at the top of the first page of the memorandum: “RI Set up requested meeting. ZB.”

9 No classification marking. Copies were sent to Armacost, Thornton, and Oksenberg. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Denend saw it.
—Mike asserts that human rights decisions should be based on long term trends. I fully agree. But the two examples he chooses to illustrate this point do not support his argument. In the case of Indonesia, we clearly ignored the short term event (release of the prisoners) and based our decision on the long term pattern. Yet Mike objects. In the Philippine case we did *not* base the decision on the Aquino sentencing (though it was probably a contributing factor in some people’s minds) as we subsequently informed the Philippines.

—On the question of whether the human rights bureaucracy is indifferent to results, I also disagree. While Derian’s staff is far from perfect, they are extremely well informed. Perhaps EA doesn’t hear from them because D/HA reads all the same cables. I don’t know. Again, however, the question of time frame is relevant here. It is questionable whether day to day events are of as much importance as longer term trends. The regional desks may have to worry about every little blip in our relations, but there should be someone who stands back and looks at the overall pattern. For example, much too much has been made, in my opinion, of Indonesia’s initial rejection of the new PL-480 reporting requirements. Indonesia has now accepted the requirements, and looking back a year from now, I suspect that the entire incident will be seen as totally insignificant—while the principle that food aid should go to people who are hungry will have been advanced.

Having said all this, I want to emphasize that—as you know—I share Mike’s unease with our policy in the IFIs and with the Harkin amendment in general. That is the reason why the draft PD calls for a rather extensive study of this issue. I would have no objection (in fact I think it would be useful) if outside people were involved in this effort as Mike suggests, though I don’t believe the study should be done wholly by outsiders.
101. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, December 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Consolidating Human Rights Policy

Our human rights policy has been in operation for eleven months. We are administering it with increasing finesse, I believe, but the shoe is pinching in a number of places. We witnessed the farm lobby’s reaction in the PL 480 case, we are hearing from districts with substantial arms industries; and within the State Department there appears to be growing restlessness as people grapple with the complexities of implementation. The AFSA President’s complaint about the human rights policy appears to have some currency among Foreign Service Officers, and I am also told that there are questions within the Department about the Secretary’s and the President’s fundamental commitment to human rights policy.

Under these circumstances, the possibility of a real-politik backlash both on the Hill and in the Department seems very real. To be sure, Congress is still prepared to vote for extreme human rights amendments. The IMF, which is hardly a viable tool for promoting human rights, will be the next target. This kind of zealotry in the cause of human rights could, however, ultimately make the policy ludicrous and accelerate a backlash.

I believe our objectives for the time being should be to:

—stabilize our present position, avoiding all new legislation;
—pursue vigorously the mandate Congress and the President have given us;
—smooth out our administrative techniques; and
—garner as much credibility for the policy as we can by broadcasting its successes.

Here are some concrete steps which might be considered:

1. Frame a legislative strategy to forestall any further human rights amendments during the next session. I have asked Ann Swift to work on this. Her effort will include a review of the Security Assistance Bill for hooks.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840088–0271. Limited Official Use; Nodis.
2. Produce a year-end summary of human rights successes, and possibly a modest set of goals for the next year.

3. Hold one meeting with Assistant Secretaries and their Deputies where you and the Secretary, working in tandem, make it clear that we not only intend to continue our efforts on this difficult policy but believe it is working. An even better alternative would be a State dining room session with the President.

4. Hold a series of human rights colloquia for Department officers who must administer the human rights policy. The target groups might include desk officers or Deputy Assistant Secretaries in regional bureaus—whoever is most likely to make or break the human rights policy in its day-to-day application.

5. Review our intra-Departmental procedures in the human rights areas to ensure that they are not generating needless friction.

6. Undertake a public relations effort to ensure that the right things are said in the year-end news wrap-ups, the State of the Union Message, etc.

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102. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, January 5, 1978

SUBJECT
Assessment of Human Rights Accomplishments

Improvements probably attributable to US policy:

—Significant changes in Iranian security and judicial system: opening of security trials to public, improvements in prison conditions, access to ICRC, right to counsel and to appeal broadened, etc.

—Indonesia: release of 10,000 political prisoners.

—Nicaragua: lifting of the state of seige.

—Significant improvements—less torture, fewer disappearances, etc., in Chile.
—General improvements in Bolivia, Ecuador and others.
—Tightening of rules regarding torture in Philippines, increased attention to human rights at the highest level, other changes likely.²

—Freedom House, in its just released annual survey, reports movement toward greater freedom in 26 countries during this year, reversing a four year negative trend.³ Freedom House attributes a great deal of this improvement to US policy—its conclusions on this issue are attached.⁴

I would repeat the comments made in my earlier year-end assessment, that without question, the major accomplishment (one that deserves to be ranked as a very significant achievement in any listing) has been to raise this issue to the forefront of world consciousness. Virtually all world leaders are now concerned with human rights. They know that now their human rights image is a significant factor in their standing in the international community—as well as in their relations to the US. In many countries where bad problems exist, human rights policy is being intensely debated within the responsible government. Reporters and editorialists write on the subject regularly. The international human rights committees and commissions have begun to be rescued from a slow death by paralysis. Just as Earth Day added new words and concepts to the language—environmental protection, ecology, etc.—so, it can be argued, has Carter’s human rights policy, just as dramatically, added a new aspect to international diplomacy.

² Tuchman, in the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s December 5, 1977, evening report, noted that Newsom had met with Marcos and “really laid out our human rights concerns. Marcos apparently feels ‘frustrated’ by the continuing charges of torture etc., but emphasized that he must keep good relations with the military, which limits his ability to interfere in particular cases. Newsom concludes that ‘the problem obviously troubles Marcos and he is looking for a way out, but is not yet ready to take steps which are necessary if regime is to be seen in different light in Washington’.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 1–3/78)


⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated statement, which reads, in part: “It is also true that very few gains have been attributed to U.S. government pressure by the political persons directly responsible for them. We could hardly expect such attribution—it would generally be neither in America’s interest, nor that of the leaders involved. Nevertheless, as we examine the reasons why favorable changes have occurred in many countries, the change of attitude of the U.S. government toward freedom has again and again been cited as one among a number of contributing factors—Iran, Thailand, and China (Taiwan) particularly come to mind, and there may even have been some moral assistance in India or Sri Lanka.”
6. PL 480 agreements. FY–1978 Title I agreements have now been negotiated and signed with nine governments, covering 2.7 million metric tons of commodities (approximately 50 percent of the total Title I program for FY–1978). Purchase and shipment of most of these commodities are expected to begin in the next several weeks. Negotiations have been authorized or are underway with another nine countries, covering nearly 750,000 tons of commodities. These negotiations should be completed in the next two weeks, with purchase and shipment to follow. Programs for 12 other countries, covering another 1.6 million tons, are still under consideration by the inter-agency staff committee chaired by the Department of Agriculture.

In light of the recent amendment that brings human rights considerations to bear on the Title I program, we have thus far asked six countries with serious human rights problems to agree to a new provision in the PL 480 agreement which, in essence, provides that the food or the proceeds from its sale will be used to benefit the needy. Following is the status of Title I programming in these six countries.

—Indonesia: The Indonesians accepted the new provision and the agreement has been signed. We are advised that they will probably start to purchase the commodities in the next few days.

—Korea and Bangladesh: The new provision has been accepted and negotiations are nearing completion. Shipments can be scheduled soon thereafter.

—Somalia: Negotiations have just begun. We believe the Somali Government will not object to the language.
—Guinea: The new provision has been accepted, an agreement has been signed, and shipments can be scheduled.

—Zaire: Negotiations are still underway, but the GOZ has not objected to the new provision.

In view of significant congressional and farm state interest in expediting this year's Title I program, we will continue to seek maximum progress in implementing the program.

Christopher

104. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Washington, January 11, 1978

Progress and Retrogression in Human Rights in 1977

Near East and South Asia

India. Following a free and fair election, the new government of Morarji Desai restored fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and freedom of the press. It has yet to repeal other measures designed to maintain internal security, however.

Iran. The military justice and penal codes were revised to provide for open civil court trials of political prisoners (formerly tried in camera by military courts). The government also liberalized restrictions on public expression and recognized the distinction between dissidents and terrorists, although demonstrators continued to be dealt with severely. In 1977, almost 500 political prisoners were released from prison, and some were pardoned.

Pakistan. Despite the introduction of martial law following the coup last year, the Zia regime's record on human rights has reflected improvement. Most political prisoners have been released, the press publishes more freely than has been allowed for years, the judiciary's independence has been strengthened, and Amnesty International has

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850109–0129. Confidential. Prepared by David Carpenter (INR/DDR/GIS) and INR/DDR/GIS analysts. According to a January 11 covering memorandum from Carpenter to Oxman, INR prepared the paper in response to Christopher's request to Saunders for material to be used in Christopher's address to the American Bar Association, scheduled to meet in New Orleans, Louisiana, in February. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850109–0129) See footnote 4, Document 117.
been invited to attend court sessions. However, elections scheduled for October 1977 were postponed until the completion of former Prime Minister Bhutto’s trials for political corruption and murder, according to General Zia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator.

_Sri Lanka._ The lifting of Mrs. Bandaranaike’s six-year-old state of emergency in February resulted in the release of many former insurgents who had been held without trial. Mrs. Bandaranaike held earlier-postponed elections in July 1977. Her successor, Prime Minister Jayawardene, fulfilled a campaign promise by releasing in November the last of the insurgents convicted in 1971; he also repealed the 1972 Criminal Justice Commission Act.

_Bangladesh._ Several thousand prisoners were released and local elections were held, although an unknown number of political prisoners remain jailed and several minor political parties were proscribed as a result of army mutinies against the martial law regime.

_Morocco._ The government continues to repress radical elements suspected of plotting to overthrow the regime, but the trend in recent months has been toward greater freedom and political liberalization. Domestic press censorship has been lifted, relatively free parliamentary elections were held in which all parties participated, and a new cabinet has been formed with multi-party participation.

_Nepal._ Political parties have been banned since 1960, and the country remains, in effect, an absolute monarchy. On the other hand, the government released virtually all political prisoners in 1977, including Nepal’s leading dissident, B.J. Koirala, who was released from jail for medical treatment in the US. Koirala was re-imprisoned on his return to Kathmandu, however.

**Latin America**

Hemispheric attention was focused on the human rights issue to an unprecedented degree as a result of a combination of domestic circumstances and pressures from outside governmental, private, media, and UN sources.

Some advances can be noted.

—Significant political releases occurred in Chile, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Peru.

—State of siege regulations were lifted in Jamaica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

—Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad, and Venezuela joined the US as advocates of human rights compliance.

—The OAS meeting in Grenada endorsed the work of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and committed the member states to renewed efforts on behalf of human rights observance.
—In Chile, the secret police, DINA, has been altered in form and its power apparently diminished, and fewer reports of abuses of the individual have been received.

—In Nicaragua, there has been a significant decrease in reports of violations of the integrity of the person.

—In El Salvador, President Romero has acted with considerable restraint and regard for human rights considerations in dealing with a potentially explosive internal political situation.

On the other hand, authoritarian regimes that have, in some cases, proven to be insensitive to human rights considerations continue to rule millions in Latin America.

—In Argentina, the rate of disappeared persons remains unchanged, reports of official torture continue to be received, and there is convincing evidence that government security personnel continue to operate in vigilante fashion—all of this in the context of a decreasing terrorist threat as a result of successful counter-terrorist action by the government.

—In Uruguay, progress continues to be blocked by the government’s unwillingness or inability to take effective measures to resolve its serious human rights problem, as manifested especially with regard to its continuing negative attitude toward a visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

—Paraguay remains an authoritarian state whose affairs are conducted in some ways at the personal whim of President Stroessner and with little regard for the rights of individuals on his part.

—Cuba continues to hold thousands of political prisoners (estimated by some to be as many as 20,000.)

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Soviet authorities made a major and rather successful effort in 1977 to weaken the dissident movement. In Eastern Europe, while the human rights picture continued to be mixed, all of the governments there remained repressive by US standards.

**Soviet Union.** Soviet tactics against dissidents minimized potentially embarrassing dissident activity during the Belgrade Conference and the October Revolution anniversary celebrations. Although the Shcharanskiy case was drawing greater attention in the West than the Soviets probably expected, they apparently were able to break up embryonic human rights movements in the Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania, and Georgia. The Soviet tactics include isolating dissidents:

—from the West, through harassment of Western correspondents, inhibiting contacts with embassy officials, and interfering with the flow of mail from abroad;
—from one another, through internal exile, voluntary and involuntary emigration, and intimidation; and
—from the Soviet public, by moves ranging from press attacks to arrests and incarceration.

Despite these measures, dissidents remain active, though some are disheartened. Others continue their personal contacts with Westerners, and new members are joining the small group monitoring the Helsinki accords.

Soviet emigration to Israel rose to 17,146 in 1977, a 22-percent increase over 1976 (14,875).

Eastern Europe. Life for non-conformists in Eastern Europe remains difficult. Some easing of restrictions has occurred in some countries, while the situation has retrogressed in others.

Polish and Hungarian authorities broadened official tolerance of diversity in 1977, and in Poland, the authorities have engaged in an increasingly meaningful dialogue with regime critics. Yugoslavia continues to maintain a relatively liberal approach to individual rights. In contrast, the official Czechoslovak approach to human rights has been extremely strict, involving trials, harassment, intimidation, and job denials. Three countries (Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania) declared broad amnesties affecting a number of political prisoners.

Most of the East European countries, however, have sought to deal with human rights concerns through a variety of expedients designed to minimize international criticism while precluding meaningful internal change. A favorite device has been to pressure dissidents to emigrate, thereby avoiding the need for further sanctions against the individual while at the same time reducing domestic dissidence.

East Asia and the Pacific

Key non-Communist countries in the area demonstrated marked sensitivity, and in some cases, responsiveness to foreign human rights criticism and pressures. The primary human rights violators in the area, however, continued to be the Communist states, particularly Cambodia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos.

South Korea. In response to international opinion and pressures during 1977, the government relaxed press censorship, improved living conditions for imprisoned dissidents, and handled student protests in October with restraint. While the government continued to arrest and try violators of Emergency Measure 9 (EM-9), by year’s end it released 16 well-known political prisoners in exchange for statements of repentance. Other EM-9 prisoners, including Kim Tae Chung, are expected to either be released or have their sentences reduced in 1978.

Indonesia. The government on December 20 carried out its pledge to release 10,000 prisoners who had been arrested and detained fol-
lowing the Communist coup attempt in 1965. Approximately 20,000 more remain in detention camps. Officials plan to release 10,000 in 1978, and the remainder by the end of 1979. There is no evidence from any source to support Amnesty International’s allegation that upwards of 90,000 political prisoners still remain in detention.

**Thailand.** The assumption of power by the Kriangsak government on November 11 brought an end to press censorship, a more relaxed attitude toward political opposition, and introduced a period of more open internal political dialogue. The new government, demonstrating increasing sensitivity to international human rights pressures, also permitted legal counsel for the 18 students now on trial for their activities at the time of the Thammasat University riots in late 1976. Approximately 3,000 other students arrested at the time have been released.

**Philippines.** Although President Marcos frequently gave lip service to his government’s concern for the rights of the individual, there was little or no progress in the human rights area during 1977. Marcos continues to exercise highly centralized control over the political life of the country through his use of martial law powers. Occasional reports of torture by security personnel continue to be received, and political opposition sources allege that few if any of the 1,000 detainees released during the summer were political dissidents. Marcos’ main political opponent, Senator Aquino, is still in prison awaiting a reopening of his trial, despite the fact that a military tribunal had earlier sentenced him to death for treason.3

**Africa**

The main human rights preoccupation of all African countries in 1977 was the intensification of repression in South Africa, which was dominated by the major crackdown on black political activity there on October 19.4 There is no evidence that any of those who were arrested at that time have been released. Despite condemnation of Africa’s racist policies throughout the world, furthermore, prospects for any significant improvement in the overall situation are dim, at best.

Many African leaders regard human rights as an essentially Western political concept which does not reflect the needs and realities

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2 An unknown hand changed “upwards” to “up to.”

3 An unknown hand deleted the word “treason” and added “murder and subversion.”

4 The NSC Global Issues Cluster alerted Brzezinski to this development in the October 19 evening report: “South Africa has begun a nation-wide human rights crackdown with bannings of the major black newspapers, arrests of black leaders, and raids, detentions, etc. This appears to be the largest effort of its kind since 1960.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 8–10/77)
of their societies at this stage of development. In common with other Third World countries, they place a higher priority on the integrity of the group as opposed to the individual, and on economic development and basic human needs as opposed to political and civil rights.

At the same time, however, some countries have reflected growing sensitivity to outside criticism and have taken steps in 1977 to improve their human rights reputation:

—Guinea announced the release of 62 political prisoners in December;
—Togo announced the release of 25 political prisoners in April;
—Ethiopia announced the release of 828 prisoners in June and 894 in September (no significant political prisoners are believed to have been included); and
—Malawi is believed to have released nearly all of its political prisoners.

On the other hand, perhaps as many as several thousand political prisoners are reported to be in prison and reeducation camps in Mozambique, and large-scale executions are reported to have taken place in Angola and Ethiopia. There is no improvement in the situation in Uganda. The situation there is of considerable concern to African political elites, however, who recognize the seriousness of the problem, even in those cases where they are reluctant to express themselves publicly about it.

105. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, January 20, 1978

The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment

The attached memorandum takes stock of the human rights policy, one year on. It begins with a description of what we have done, and es-
especially of how much the policy actually has affected our economic or military programs. This review is useful to have, but may be the least interesting part of the paper.

You might want to begin with our assessment of accomplishments (pp 5–6) and of whether there have been setbacks (to human rights, on p 6, and to other American interests, on pp 7–10). The paper then discusses the problem of consistency: ways in which we are being less, or perhaps in some cases more, consistent than we should aim for (pp 11–15).

The memorandum ends with recommendations for future directions:

—A Presidential Decision would help to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used. (A draft reportedly is with the President).²

—We badly need country strategy papers³ that will integrate our human rights interests with other American concerns in each country, and give useful guidance for coherent application of all our instruments of influence.

—Our country strategies should try to emphasize what is most likely to be effective in improving human rights situations, rather than what decisions will make us look consistent.⁴

—We need better procedures to integrate our economic with our military assistance decisions.

—We have hard choices to make on compliance with the legal requirements about our role in International Financial Institutions.⁵

—We should look for more ways to multilateralize our human rights efforts, both to reduce suspicions of a smug American moralism and to further enlist the weight of world opinion in conjunction with our efforts.

—We should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our human rights problems in this country.

² Presumable reference to the draft PD that Brzezinski forwarded to the President under cover of a December 3, 1977, memorandum; see Document 96.

³ An unknown hand circled the phrase “country strategy papers” and placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph.

⁴ An unknown hand placed a question mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph.

⁵ An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph.
—We need to do a better job of explaining, at home and abroad, the complexities of our policy and the reasons for some apparent inconsistencies.

The memorandum was written by my staff and we take responsibility for its judgments. But we have solicited the opinions of many others—in HA, D, EB, H, T, IO, the regional Bureaus, and AID. Most were eager to express what they do and don’t like about how the policy is working and the paper tries to reflect their opinions, with indications of important disagreements within this building. Some still think the overall tone and thrust are wrong. Comments range from “Pollyannaish” to “overly negative”.

We believe this memorandum might be useful at the White House, and suggest that it be sent under cover of a Tarnoff-Brzezinski memorandum.6

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance7

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment

The human rights policy is off to a good start but, to no one’s surprise, problems remain. In the following paragraphs we apply hindsight to the year’s experience, with deliberate emphasis on problem areas and what now needs to be done.

I. What Are We Actually Doing?

Human rights advocacy has become a standard, visible, and important feature of our diplomacy. The President has repeatedly emphasized that it is a cardinal tenet of his foreign policy—a theme you and other key officials have elaborated in speeches. Early in the Administration we signed the UN Covenants and the American Convention on

6 There is no indication as to whether Vance approved or disapproved the recommendation; however, Tarnoff transmitted a copy of Lake’s action memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 30 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780040–0102)

7 Confidential. Drafted by Jennone Walker on January 16. Sent through Christopher. Neither Lake nor Christopher initialed the memorandum.
Human Rights (but have yet to send them to the Hill for ratification).\(^8\) We have made scores of diplomatic demarches on the specific human rights problems of individual countries. Not least important, discussion of our human rights concerns has been integrated into all our dealings with foreign governments—from the President’s and your own private conversations, to the most routine dealings of Embassy and Department desk officers with their foreign counterparts. The very pervasiveness of such exchanges makes them hard to quantify or even summarize. But their impact in conveying our seriousness should not be underestimated.

We also have had some months of experience with using more concrete instruments of American influence: bilateral aid programs; International Financial Institutions; and security relationships. These two kinds of actions—diplomatic exchanges and use of our material support—are closely related. For example, we generally put a government on specific notice that particular human rights problems would cause us to oppose loans to it before actually abstaining or voting no. We often use the occasion of a positive vote to make some form of human rights demarche—warning that continued positive votes will be difficult absent improvement, or advising that only certain apparent or promised improvements make it possible for us to be positive.

**Bilateral Aid**

Our bilateral aid programs are designed to serve basic human needs, and so intrinsically promote human rights. Consequently, only in extraordinary circumstances have we cut or delayed programs in order to signal objection to a repressive government:

— We are suspending new programs to the Central African Empire, partly in response to Congressional pressure;

— We have been deferring decision on some loans to Nicaragua since mid-September, in order to assess what appear to be human rights improvements there;\(^9\)

— After press reports of our decision to delay some assistance to Chile, Santiago cancelled our FY 77 program and it is not in future AID budgets.\(^10\)

\(^8\) See Documents 47 and 79.

\(^9\) See footnote 9, Document 80.

\(^10\) According to an October 21 study prepared in AID by Collins and entitled “A Summary of the Decisions Taken by the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Economic Assistance, May–October 1977,” the Embassy of Chile informed the Department of State in a June 27 diplomatic note that the Government of Chile intended to “decline” the $15 million in P.L. 480 Title I aid and $12.5 million in development loans and grants extended under the provisions of the FY 1977 Foreign Assistance Act. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 21, Human Rights Interagency Group V)
—We have reduced the PL 480 allocation to Guinea,¹¹ and increased it to Peru, on human rights grounds;
—We appear to have indefinitely delayed one CCC credit to Chile, and the Interagency Group on Foreign Assistance and Human Rights is also available for advice to ExIm when the latter requests (as it has done on Uruguay and Argentina).

But most of our bilateral effort has focused not on determining who is a deserving recipient of aid, but rather on ensuring that it does in fact promote human rights:
—$750,000 was earmarked in AID’s FY 78 budget for projects which promote civil and political rights (e.g., legal aid for the poor).
—We are beginning to implement the new legislative requirement that human rights violators which receive PL 480 Title I assistance report on how food or the proceeds from its sale is used to “directly benefit needy people.” Reporting requirements have been signed with Indonesia and Guinea and negotiations are underway with Bangladesh, South Korea, Zaire and Somalia. They may begin with a few others.

Human rights concerns may cut more deeply into AID programs—including country allocations—in the future, beginning with the 1979 budget. This is a difficult and controversial business since, even though AID money can be reprogrammed to other countries, we would be reducing aid specifically designed to benefit needy people in a particular country in order to express disapproval of their government and try to influence its performance on civil or political human rights.

The International Financial Institutions

The human rights policy has had greater—and more visible—impact on our role in International Financial Institutions, especially on loans for industrial development which seldom meet the “basic human needs” criteria. Since the Carter Administration took office we have abstained from voting on eleven loans on human rights grounds (to

¹¹ At its October 14, 1977, meeting, the Interagency Group reduced the proposed P.L. 480 agreement with Guinea from $7 million to $5 million. (“A Summary of the Decisions Taken by the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Economic Assistance, May–October 1977,” October 21; ibid.) According to the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s January 16, 1978, evening report: “The human rights situation in Guinea appears to have improved significantly largely in response to American and other Western pressure. Sekou Toure ordered the release of at least 62 political prisoners during December—the largest single political amnesty in Guinea’s history. Toure apparently intends to release all political prisoners by the end of 1978.” Brzezinski wrote in the margin next to this statement, “shouldn’t we react?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 1–3/78)
Ethiopia, Benin, Argentina, the Philippines, Korea and the CAE) and voted against seven (to Chile, Argentina and Guinea).\textsuperscript{12}

We have not thus far formally opposed any loans when our opposition would have meant their defeat. We only have veto power over the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations (FSO), and in several cases we have indicated that we might oppose an FSO loan if it came to a vote; in most, the applicant government has chosen to hold it back. Some $143,252,000 worth of loans are currently being held up because of our action—to Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{13}

Few other participants in IFI deliberations have joined us in opposing loans on human rights grounds. West European opposition to loans for the Pinochet regime began before ours. Venezuela recently abstained on one loan to Chile. British and Swedish representatives in the IDB recently put on record that they would have opposed a loan to Argentina had they national votes; but the European regional group of which they are a part cast its collective vote in favor.

*Security Assistance and Sales*

Human rights considerations have become perhaps the dominant factor in arms transfers to Latin America. This has resulted from a combination of factors: Congressional prohibitions (to Argentina and Uruguay); refusals of our security assistance by Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala in response to our reporting to Congress on their human rights situations; the low risk of Soviet inroads if our arms flows are reduced; and, possibly, the relatively small economic importance to us of arms sales in the area. Most cases involving major lethal equipment to serious violators have not been approved, at least absent progress on human rights. However, some significant non-lethal items (e.g., C–130’s to Argentina) as well as some spare parts, still are approved after careful review.

The great bulk of our arms transfers, however, are to East Asia and the Middle East, and they have been only marginally affected by human rights considerations. We have, for instance, opposed economic loans in IFI’s to both South Korea and the Philippines and are including Korea and Indonesia among the problem countries which must report on their use of PL 480 Title I. But base negotiations in the Philippines and troop withdrawal considerations in Korea have thus far led us to continue very large security assistance programs to both. There has been some impact on security relations with Indonesia, where sale of

\textsuperscript{12} An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the last sentence of this paragraph.

\textsuperscript{13} An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph next to the dollar figure.
F–5 aircraft was made contingent on the actual freeing of some political prisoners whose release already was scheduled.

The East Asian record will be somewhat better in 1979. Human rights considerations have contributed to adjustments in allocations, especially for military training, for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This probably is known by the recipient governments (although they could rationalize their cuts as flowing from Congressional reduction of the overall budget). But the general public perception is likely to be of continued high levels of security assistance.

Similarly, in the Middle East, our desire to move Arabs and Israelis toward a peace settlement and the importance of Mideast oil have kept arms sales high.

Nor have the human rights considerations cut into arms transfers to black Africa, either because the amounts sold are minimal or because of an interest in supporting “moderate” governments (e.g., Morocco and Zaire).

Finally, although we are working toward a policy of reviewing straight commercial sales to police forces of items not on the munitions list, no decision has yet been reached.

II. Human Rights Accomplishments and Setbacks

What Have We Accomplished?

The human rights policy has helped us at least as much as it has produced changes abroad. Our post-Vietnam, post-Watergate image has been greatly improved. To a large degree we have taken the ideological initiative from the Soviets. This boosts our standing—and that of traditional friends—in Europe, and helps in our relations with a number of LDC’s. The policy is especially appealing—and encouraging—to many people living under repressive regimes.

This underscores what many of us frequently forget—the US is a model for many countries; our influence transcends our political, economic, and military power and is strikingly important in ethical, cultural, and value areas; other governments find themselves unable entirely to ignore the impact of US policy and actions—particularly when we join action to rhetoric.

Our championship of human rights is encouraging others to do likewise. Activity in the UN and OAS has picked up considerably, and the OAS and Red Cross human rights commissions are being allowed into countries which previously excluded them. The West Europeans are more active both in international fora and in diplomatic dialogue with problem countries. Once-lonely private activists now find themselves deluged with invitations to conferences. Some who long have been working to advance human rights have taken new hope from the
Administration’s policies; others doubtless are bandwagon-hopping. But they all contribute to a growing international lobby which combines its influence with our own.

Most important, this increased international focus already has led to human rights improvements in several countries. Significant numbers of political prisoners have been released, in Iran, Poland, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Togo, Nepal, the CAE, Guinea and Indonesia. Iran and Thailand are opening trials of political prisoners for the first time. Emigration from the Soviet Union, some East European states, and Syria, has become a little easier. In some of these countries there also has been back-sliding; moreover, we often question whether an improvement is more than cosmetic. Nonetheless, the overall balance is decidedly positive.

No authoritarian regime has fundamentally altered its political system, nor are the hard-core dictatorships likely to take action which they would perceive (in some cases rightly) as political suicide. But some political systems are becoming somewhat freer.14 The opposition in Brazil is increasingly active. El Salvador and Nicaragua have lifted states of siege. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have announced intentions to hold elections in 1978. The most notable advances in political freedom—in India, Portugal and Spain—were independent of our human rights advocacy; but democratic forces in all three seem to be taking heart from our new focus.

In sum, a trend seems to have begun which could gather momentum and which already is improving the plight of individuals—including those under some still-authoritarian regimes. And since individuals are what the human rights policy is primarily about, even the scattered and partial successes registered to date are important. Moreover, even marginal reductions in repression offer more latitude to dissidents, which in turn contributes to an internal dynamic that may produce further change.

It is neither possible nor very useful to specify the precise weight of our influence in these developments. The important thing is that we are contributing to an international consciousness-raising and a climate conducive to human rights improvements.

Are We Jeopardizing Human Rights Anywhere?

Maybe, at least in the near-term. Worry about the “destabilizing” effect of international attention to human rights may lead some authoritarian regimes to tighten domestic screws. This may already have happened in the Soviet Union and South Africa, where the governments

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14 An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin to the right of the paragraph next to this sentence.
fear that our human rights advocacy has or might stimulate critics of the regime. In both, however, many of those most affected seem to want us to continue our efforts; they apparently believe that the near-term risk is in their own long-range interest.

There may be similar risks elsewhere. In South Korea, for instance, the regime now seems eager to resolve differences with us. But it is possible that human rights behavior, combined with withdrawal of our ground combat troops and the "Koreagate" probe, could produce a seige mentality which would make easing of repression less likely, or indeed even reduce tolerance for domestic dissent.

III. Are We Damaging Other US Interests?

Not yet in any quantifiable way, although the risk always is present when we are pursuing several interests at once.

*Eastern Europe*

Soviet leaders fear the human rights policy, which they see as an effort to discredit them in world opinion and to undermine the political systems of the Warsaw Pact states. Our early high profile contacts with leading Soviet dissidents, combined with our initial SALT proposals, did badly rock the relationship. And we cannot know just how a general unhappiness with the human rights policy affects the atmosphere of Soviet decision-making across the board. But it does not, in fact, seem yet to have interfered with SALT and other arms control negotiations, or US-Soviet dealings in other areas, where the Soviets seem to be pursuing their specific interests much as usual. Indeed the improvement in US-Soviet relations following the SALT breakthrough during Gromyko’s September visit to Washington has survived even the human rights beating Moscow has been taking at the Belgrade CSCE conference. The spillover might in fact work the other way: progress on SALT may be making Soviet leaders more willing (within limits) to stomach our human rights position.

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16 See footnote 4, Document 7; footnotes 2 and 3, Document 18; and footnote 12, Document 38.

17 Additional information on Gromyko’s visit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume VI, Soviet Union.
Latin America

Several Latin American governments are at least as unhappy with our promotion of human rights as the Soviets. With some like Uruguay, Paraguay, and Nicaragua, our bilateral interests are so modest that our prime interest is human rights. This could, of course, become a situation in which the sum is greater than the parts: if enough such governments become sufficiently angry over our human rights approach, there could be a spillover effect which damaged the OAS, and our interests in it. But this is not yet the case: to the contrary, last summer’s OAS General Assembly was notable for a surge of human rights enthusiasm.

And in those Latin American countries where we have more at stake, no concrete damage seems to have been done. Our severe criticism of Argentina’s human rights record did not prevent it from agreeing to make some nuclear non-proliferation commitments during the Secretary’s November visit;18 and it is highly unlikely that Brazil would have agreed to forego its reprocessing agreement with West Germany even had we had no human rights policy.19 We cannot know what price we might one day pay for the deterioration in our once close military relationships with Brazil and Argentina. That obviously depends in part on the political evolution of the countries themselves—an evolution to which the human rights policy, if successful, could contribute positively.

Middle East

The impact of our human rights policy on US interests in Middle Eastern countries has been modest. Few of them are recipients of economic assistance and, as noted, we have not put primary emphasis on human rights considerations, in view of our other pressing interests, when deciding on arms sales or determining our approach to the area generally. The quiet diplomacy we have undertaken in the region has been palatable to the governments concerned, and shown some success (e.g., in increased Jewish emigration from Syria).

Africa

The human rights policy, far from damaging our interests with African governments, has served them. This is partly because the chief targets of our criticism have been South Africa and Rhodesia, and that greatly enhances our stature in the area as a whole. We have refrained from criticism of the human rights problems of frontline states whose

18 Vance traveled to Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 20–22, 1977, to meet with President Videla.
19 See footnote 5, Document 42.
support we want in southern Africa (e.g. Tanzania, which has more political prisoners than South Korea). Our criticism of Uganda\textsuperscript{20} is not so enthusiastically endorsed by other African governments, but certainly does not hurt us with them; that criticism, moreover, has been somewhat muted because of the American citizens who remain there.

Nor have other US interests been damaged in South Africa itself. The human rights policy does not seem to have reduced Pretoria’s cooperation on Rhodesia and Namibia, where it continues to act in consonance with what it sees as its national interests. The government’s sense of international isolation could, however, in time affect its nuclear weapons policies.

Ethiopia’s closure of US facilities and expulsion of American personnel probably stemmed more from the new regime’s desire to seek a more ideologically compatible political and military relationship with Moscow than from unhappiness with our human rights advocacy.\textsuperscript{21} And Guinea—so far—continues to deny overflight and refueling rights to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, despite our opposition to loans to it and our action on its PL 480 allocation.

In much of Africa, like much of Latin America, promotion of human rights is our chief interest. Since a number of African leaders either have good human rights records (Gambia, Senegal, Liberia) or are working actively to improve them (Rwanda, the Sudan, Nigeria, Upper Volta), our human rights policy is more often supportive of local efforts there than in Latin America.

\textit{East Asia}

The greatest risk to other US interests from the human rights policy may be in East Asia, and especially in Korea. It is possible that North Korea might miscalculate the degree of deterioration in US–ROK relations; or that US-Korean tensions (including over human rights) could make South Korea harder to deal with on a range of issues, including nuclear ones.

Other potential victims of the human rights policy could be President Marcos’ cooperative stance toward re-negotiation of our base rights in the Philippines, and our close relations with Indonesian leaders. But both governments would balance their irritation with our human rights policies against their own interest in preserving the security and economic relationships. So far, they clearly are coming down in favor of the latter.

\textsuperscript{20} See footnote 7, Document 42.
\textsuperscript{21} See footnote 8, Document 42.
More broadly in Asia there is confusion about US purposes and uncertainty about the validity of our commitments to long-standing friends. The human rights policy is not primarily responsible, but it is a contributing factor. This could in time affect our relations even with those in the region (e.g. Japan) whose own human rights practices we are not criticizing.

**International Financial Institutions**

Some believe that we also risk damaging the IFIs, by politicizing their work in violation of their charters. This did not start with the Carter Administration. We opposed loans to Allende’s Chile on political grounds, and long have used our influence to channel international lending to anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless, no country has here-tofore made non-economic considerations so consistently and overtly a factor in its attitude to IFI loans. This could come back to haunt us if other governments decide non-economic criteria should be applied to governments we want to support. (The discrepancy between our alleged politicization of the IFIs, and our departure from the ILO because others had politicized it, is widely noted.) We also are inadvertently strengthening Congressional opponents of the institutions.

West European governments have mixed feelings about what we are doing. The British, French, and West Germans have asked for advance notice of our negative votes; the EC has asked for “cooperative exploration” of how to pursue human rights concerns in the IFIs; and Sweden has asked us to consult with the Nordic Group.

Some of these requests for consultation may suggest interest in joining us; others from a hope of putting a check on what some European financial officials see as a dangerous American practice.

This survey of all the damage our human rights advocacy might have caused to other US interests—but hasn’t—is a useful reminder that other governments’ concrete interest in cooperation with us is often as great as ours with them, and sometimes greater. In the past we sometimes have made the mistake of acting as though we were the only party with much at stake in a relationship, and so must avoid giving offense. Obviously there is a point where national pride or general irritation could loom larger than practical considerations for some governments. Anticipating that point remains one of our chief tasks. But the need of others for us—in security or economic or diplomatic relations—usually is great enough to give us considerable room for human rights advocacy, without serious damage to other US interests.

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22 See footnote 4, Document 63.
Beyond the specific and quantifiable, however, there is a perhaps greater danger that we will come to be seen as the self-appointed guardian of the world’s morals, having shifted from an anti-Communist crusade to one equally sanctimonious. If our human rights policy should come to be seen as designed to further some definition of US geopolitical interests, it would not only damage our ability to press the human rights cause, but also make us suspect on other issues. This could be especially damaging to North-South relations. The same human rights policy which many in the third world admire in principle could, as it works out in practice, make us seem insensitive to LDC economic development needs as perceived by the LDCs themselves. So far, the human rights policy has gone far to reverse situations where cooperation with us was based more on need than respect. A perception of moral arrogance and/or hypocrisy in our human rights advocacy could shift the balance once again.

IV. Are We Being Consistent?

No. And we should not try to be completely so. There are times when security considerations, or broader political factors, lead us to be “softer” on some countries’ human rights performance than others. Moreover, it often is a close call just what action is most likely to produce improvement in a human rights situation. We sometimes, for instance, approve a loan in recognition of a positive trend—even though the overall situation in the country remains as bad or worse than that in countries whose loans we oppose. One of the most difficult questions in the human rights business is what actions on our part are most likely to encourage a government to believe that further progress is worthwhile, without leading it to think we believe its human rights problem is solved. This can only be done on a case-by-case basis, and some of our decisions will turn out to have been wrong.

That said, we do have potentially serious problems at least with the appearance, and perhaps with the reality, of inconsistency:

Bilateral vs. IFI Loans

We often continue bilateral aid programs to countries whose IFI loans we oppose. We understand that bilateral programs, which we control, are designed to serve basic human needs. But it can look to others as though we are only posturing when our votes will not make a decisive difference, but avoiding action which actually would deny a human rights violator any money.

Economic vs. Military Assistance

We have been far more rigorous in applying human rights criteria to economic assistance, which is designed to help poor people, than military assistance or sales, which are perceived by some as helping
governments be repressive. As noted, this is sometimes because we think our own security interests are at stake, or because sales of military equipment contribute to such vital objectives such as oil price stability, or help pay for oil imports. In Korea, it is because we are engaged in a delicate maneuver to reduce our military involvement without damaging our security interests. But the apparent discrepancies in our application of human rights criteria to economic as opposed to military decisions can give the impression that we are less interested in human rights—including economic development of the LDC’s—than in traditional cold war criteria for “friends.”

The Weak vs. The Strong

We sometimes seem to be “punishing” countries which don’t matter very much to our security or economic interests (Paraguay, Uruguay, the Central African Empire, Benin, Guinea) while glossing over the human rights record of some who do (Iran, Zaire, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the PRC, even, of late, the Soviet Union).

The charge is not always justified. In the case of Israel, our apparent leniency is in fact part of a general strategy to resolve, inter alia, its only serious human rights problem—the military occupation of Arab lands. At the CSCE, we have been harder on Moscow’s human rights failings than is generally realized. And when the charge is true, it sometimes is for the good reason that our human rights concerns are being kept in context with other important national interests, or that we are concentrating on countries where we have some hope of being effective (i.e., recipients of our aid) rather than posturing toward, for instance, the PRC. Nonetheless, we risk the unhappy image of being tougher on the weak than the strong.

Regional Discrimination

Our actions can also be read as focusing on Latin America as the best theater for human rights activity, at little risk to other American interests. As earlier noted, we have opposed or urged deferral of 22 IFI loans to Latin America; seven to Africa; and four to East Asia. Our military programs in Latin America have been massively affected by human rights considerations; only marginally so in East Asia; and not at all in the Middle East.

There are reasons for this, some better than others: we have a good deal of leverage in Latin America; more countries there are traditional recipients of our economic and military assistance than in, for instance, East Asia; our security and economic stake is less than in East Asia or the Middle East; Latin American governments are ideologically disinclined to turn to Moscow; we expect more of it because it is part of the West and therefore more culturally attuned to the claims of individual
rights; in much of the area there has been a deterioration in human rights situations; and our past support for military regimes in the area does identify us with their excesses. It may also be true, however, that some human rights activists (in and out of government) are more interested in castigating those rightist dictatorships supported by previous US Administrations than in an evenhanded application of the policy. Whatever our motives, we do risk letting the human rights policy appear to be yet another incarnation of traditional big-stick interventionism, while we shy away from more risky problems in other parts of the world.

_Sticks vs. Carrots_

We are on record as being more interested in helping governments who are trying to improve their human rights situations than in denying assistance to offenders. In practice, however, we are doing far more of the latter than the former.

Especially in foreign assistance—our chief concrete source of influence—we have been mostly responding to human rights violations. That possibly was inevitable during this first year of a new policy. We have had to decide what position to take on loans as they came forward in the international financial institutions; changing the internal focus of the IFI’s so that their lending programs would do more to promote human rights would be harder, and take a lot more time. Even in our bilateral aid programs, which we can control, it is difficult and time consuming (years rather than months) to develop and obtain local and Congressional approval of new programs. Similarly, it is easier—and makes us look better—to reduce or end military programs than to consider how or whether some of them (and especially the training programs) can be used to promote human rights. Thus across-the-board the “reward” approach is lagging well behind the punitive.

_Our Criteria: Rhetoric vs. Actions_

Finally, we say that all three aspects of human rights (integrity of the person; economic rights; political rights) are equally important. But our loan decisions are in fact much tougher on governments which practice torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and other violations of the person, than on countries where there is little political liberty. Moreover, while we try to promote economic human rights by supporting “basic human needs” loans even to most serious human rights offenders, we do not give a government’s own efforts to promote economic development or equity equal weight with its record on political liberties when assessing its overall human rights performance. (South Korea, most socialist states of Eastern Europe, and Vietnam might rank quite high if we did.)
We think this is the right approach in the IFIs. To accept a tradeoff of economic progress or equity for a government’s locking up its opposition would run counter to American principles, and could undercut public support for the human rights policy. It would mean lowering our sights and abandoning the principle that American resources should promote American values. But to go beyond our present policy, and oppose international developmental assistance to countries which do not meet our standards of political liberty (a parliamentary democracy; a free press) would be going too far toward imposing our standards on the rest of the world. This reflects the point, stated in your Atlanta speech,23 that building democracies is a longer-term proposition than putting a stop to torture.

The present approach does, however, involve problems. Some we probably have to resign ourselves to living with; others we can try to do something about.

We must expect the resentment of LDC governments over a policy which clashes with their view (and possibly that of many of their citizens as well) of the requirements of their present state of economic and political development. We will encounter charges (some specious, some sincere) of moral arrogance and of insisting, once again, that we know what is best for other people. But we need not resign ourselves to the present lack of appreciation (or even understanding) of what we are doing to promote economic human rights, especially through the basic human needs focus of the AID program. We should try harder to get this message across.

We also need to intensify our efforts to find ways of promoting political rights. As noted above, the “punitive” approach would be inappropriate here; and it is far harder to devise positive action than to react to loans on the IFI agendas. Moreover, some of the possible ways of promoting the economic pluralism that can lead to political openings (e.g., economic assistance which would strengthen the middle class or labor unions in a society that now is an oligarchy), could run counter to the basic human needs approach to AID. This might give us legal problems in dealing with some of the countries where such development might do the most good. But promotion of political rights should not take a backseat to personal and economic ones just because it is harder and because progress will be slower in coming.

V. Bureaucratic Complexities

The human rights policy is not only complicated substantively; it also is complex and difficult bureaucratically. It crucially affects our bilateral relations with foreign governments—the bread and butter of

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23 See Document 39.
State Department work—and yet it cuts across areas of responsibility which other government departments (e.g., Treasury or Agriculture) have thought of as their own. Consequently, important decisions are taken in committee sessions from which, sometimes, no one emerges entirely happy. Our case-by-case approach—the absence of clear guidelines that certain human rights violations will always receive certain treatment, much less a “hit list” of the most offending countries—further complicates the process.

For all the problems involved and the resentment of those who feel that their good advice went unheeded, we still think this is the best way to do the human rights business. The issues do go beyond the purview of any one bureau or department. It is a perhaps extreme example of the fact that key foreign policy issues these days are not bilateral or even regional, but functional. But some degree of bureaucratic resentment probably is inevitable.

VI. How Do We Stand With Congress?

Reasonably well at present, but we face potentially serious (and conflicting) pressures.

Those Congressmen most interested in human rights like what we say, but remain skeptical of our actions. Our role in legislation has so far been largely reactive, and is seen by many as damage-limiting. It is generally believed, for instance, that we would not be applying human rights criteria to economic assistance if Congress had not ordered us to do so. Our record on military assistance to human rights offenders is especially criticized.

Congressional unhappiness with perceived softness in our application of the policy, combined with the desire of many Congressmen to seem tough (especially on South Korea), could produce new proposals not only to shorten our leash in the IFIs, but also for restrictive legislation governing our participation in UN organizations or the IMF. Moves already are afloat to inject human rights concerns into appropriations for the Witteveen Facility.24 (Such efforts would of course be supported by those who don’t like the UN or IFIs for other reasons.) The major coalition of human rights groups intends to focus on security assistance to violators. Congressional unhappiness with our performance could even impede the arms transfers we want to make to South Korea in compensation for troop withdrawals.

Pressure from human rights activists on the Hill is a familiar problem. We may have a new and growing one with Congressmen who fear that our human rights advocacy will interfere with other

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24 Named after IMF Managing Director H. Johannes Witteveen, the Facility constituted a special fund designed to provide economic assistance to oil-importing nations.
American interests. The outcry over PL 480 reporting requirements could be a sample of what is to come, especially if the human rights policy does in fact do visible damage to other interests (e.g., if US agricultural exports are hurt, or if the Philippine base negotiations should go sour). The fact that we were carrying out the expressed will of Congress would not greatly lessen the wrath of some of its members who belatedly realized what was going on.

VII. The Lessons of Hindsight

Most of the problems noted above will be with us as long as we have an active human rights policy. They are part of an unavoidable balancing act. But there is room for improvement, and some hard questions need attention.

Policy Reaffirmation

A Presidential Directive would help (the human rights PRM hasn’t had one) to clarify to the bureaucracy how the President views the policy, its application, and the range of instruments being used. We understand that a draft is now with the President.

Country Strategies

We badly need country strategy papers that will integrate our human rights interests with other American concerns, and give useful guidance for applying all our instruments of influence. There is still an inclination on the part of many to fight the problem and to avert any measures which may affect countries with which they deal. Country strategy papers which took for granted the objectives of our human rights policies and outlined alternative means for achieving these ends, including both incentives, sanctions, and other approaches would vastly contribute to the process of decision making.

Senior policy officials still would have to give time-consuming attention to, for instance, individual loan proposals, in light of the human rights situation at a particular moment and what else was happening (e.g., an important visit or negotiation). But we need a better context for those decisions—general guidance as to the relative weight to be given to our different instruments of leverage in a particular country, and why, and a sense of how to phase in the use of those instruments.

The regional bureaus have most at stake here. The tenacity of this Administration’s commitment to an active human rights policy is now clear; it is in the bureaus’ interest that it be sensibly implemented. Assistant Secretaries and their Deputies (and regional experts in S/P) should consider country action strategies a matter of high priority.

Bureaucratic Gaps

Gaps in our internal procedures would inhibit implementation of coherent country strategies, even if we had them. We especially need
better integration of our economic and military assistance decisions. Good country strategies, and a better flow of information about individual decisions between the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, on the one hand, and the Arms Control Export Board, on the other, would help. Opinion is divided as to whether there should be a more institutionalized advisory link between the two. We think the various ways of establishing such a link should at least be explored.

The Foreign Assistance Group also should continue to improve its procedures for putting human rights in context of other American interests—and be seen to do so. Regional Bureau experts have recently been playing a larger role (in preparation of the Group’s agenda and in introducing issues at its meetings). That trend should be encouraged, and representatives of other Departments also urged to speak not just to a human rights situation or the basic human needs relevance of a loan, but to their view of our overall interests in and strategy toward a problem country.

**Effectiveness**

Except for countries whose human rights violations are so serious that legislation requires us to treat them in certain ways, we should try to emphasize what will be effective over what will make us look consistent. That may not prove possible. It certainly would be more time-consuming, since it would be even less clear that a certain kind of human rights violation, wherever it occurred, would require a certain response from us. A more serious problem is that country desk officers might be unable to resist the temptation to say that only quiet diplomacy could ever work in the country with which they have to deal; or, even if we overcame the temptation, we might be unable to convince Congress that we had done so. In that case, we might only provoke legislation which further restricted our flexibility. But it is worth trying to develop country strategies which emphasize effectiveness. It would be essential to consult with human rights activists and critics alike on the Hill about country strategies—not just transmit to them our finished papers—well in advance of our decisions about particular assistance programs.

**Our Role in the IFI’s**

We are required by law to use our voice and vote to promote human rights in the IFI’s, including channeling loans to countries with good human rights records; consulting with other donors about standards for meeting basic human needs and promoting human rights; and devising with them mechanisms for acting together. There are various ways (or combinations of ways) we could meet the requirement. Each has advantages and drawbacks.
—We could try to get other donor countries to join us in applying human rights criteria to their votes. That would increase the risk of politicizing the IFI’s; further complicate our relations with LDC’s who would suffer not only the onus of our opposition, but also a denial of cash; and might alarm other donors. But failure to do so might lead some Congressmen to believe that we are not serious about using the IFI’s to promote human rights, and produce further legislative restrictions on our role in them.

—We could encourage the UN and OAS Human Rights Commissions to make independent reports to the IFI’s. This would be consistent with our desire to multilateralize our human rights policy and to make clear that we are applying internationally recognized standards. But the UN Human Rights Commission in particular is likely to render judgments which we—and Congress—could not accept as objective.

—We could try to channel IFI lending programs away from human rights violators. This would meet the letter of the law. But since IFI programs are a long time in the pipeline, it could impede our ability to respond to changing human rights conditions.

—We could try to design IFI programs to meet basic human needs criteria. This might lessen the risk that our votes would politicize the IFI’s and would be consistent with the World Bank’s own stated intention. It might do more to promote human rights (especially economic rights) than denial of funds, or US opposition to loans that are approved anyway. But it would also reduce our opportunities for demonstrating our disapproval of countries’ human rights failings. That might so displease some in Congress that we would face new efforts to reduce our contributions to the IFI’s, or to require that we oppose all loans to certain countries. It also would remove a remaining source of support for capital intensive “growth” projects and run counter both to our urging the IFI’s to make loans for energy development to non-oil LDC’s, and to our argument that a commodities’ Common Fund needs no capacity to finance measures such as market development and infrastructure because the development banks meet that need.

The Perception of Arrogance

We should intensify efforts to multilateralize our human rights efforts. This would help reduce suspicions of a holier-than-thou attitude or an ideological crusade against selected states. More important, it would help the cause of human rights, by further enlisting the weight of world opinion.

We either have done or are doing most of the immediately important things to bring our human rights policy in line with international standards (e.g., signing the UN Covenants and the American Convention on Human Rights) and are working to improve the capacity of
both the UN and OAS to deal with human rights issues. We should now be consulting with others—at the UN, in the OAS, and with other regional leaders (e.g., in black Africa)—about their suggestions for effective human rights strategies in their areas, in the context of their own cultural, economic, and political situations. We also should intensify consultations with West Europeans and Canadians—private and official—about what all of us can do to promote human rights.

Perhaps even more important, we should draw more attention to what we are doing to correct our own human rights problems. The general perception seems to be that we’ve done nothing but allude to our domestic problems in a few speeches. The President’s program is better than that, but its human rights impact is dulled because we seldom talk of welfare or tax reform, or proposals for urban renewal, or for youth employment, under a human rights heading. We should make a point of stressing that these are part of our commitment to improve the lot of individual Americans.

In Sum . . .

Generalized conclusions on such a complex of issues are very risky, and certain to be controversial. But this is the balance S/P draws:

—The human rights policy may be the best thing this Administration has going for it. It has enormously improved America’s international standing and our claim to moral leadership. It already has done quite a lot to help individuals, in widely varying situations, and to contribute to political dynamics that can lead to further improvements. While the potential damage to other American interests needs to be kept in mind, no actual harm has yet been done. That suggests to us that such damage can in fact be avoided.

—Any serious human rights policy will be subject to conflicting criticisms. Limiting ourselves to rhetoric and quiet diplomacy would produce (and deserve) charges of superficiality and hypocrisy. Using material pressure (i.e., economic and military assistance) produces charges of moral arrogance. Softening our human rights advocacy in some cases to protect other American interests produces accusations of double standards. Adjusting our tactics in order to try to be effective in different situations produces accusations of inconsistency. There is some justice in most of these criticisms. Any policy as difficult and complex as this inevitably has a debit side. The balance, however, is decidedly positive, and we do not believe a major change of course is called for.

—But we have not done a good enough job of articulating publicly what we are doing, and why, and the possibilities and limits of what we can hope to accomplish. Both the policy and its execution are far more complex than we have managed to convey. Opinion shapers (in-
cluding human rights activists) here and abroad are likely to be far more responsive to candid discussions of difficulties, dilemmas, and inevitable inconsistencies, than to generalized rhetoric which seems to gloss over our problems. We have done a lot in a short time to inject new considerations into American foreign policy—to move beyond formal relations with other governments to a concern with how our actions affect people living under those governments. We have done so with encouraging success, and with little if any cost. We can expect to learn from experience and do even better next year. But it is in the nature of the problem that our performance will not become “perfect.” We should go on the offensive to convey that message, and especially a sophisticated understanding of the obstacles we confront.

106. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, January 24, 1978, 0019Z

18330. Subject: Annual Human Rights Reports. Reference: 77, State 282352.2

1. Human rights reports on countries proposed for or receiving security and bilateral economic assistance (see ref tel for list of countries) are going through final approval in the Department for submission to Congress by January 31. It is expected that Congress will immediately make these reports public.

2. Prior to submission to Congress, the Department will cable the text of each individual country report to the post concerned. In order to ensure that most government officials see the report before it appears in the press, the Embassy should make it available to the host government upon receipt. None of the versions of the reports sent to posts to date have been finally approved. Posts should be careful to wait for receipt of final versions before taking action to make them available to host governments.

3. Given the short lead time, it is preferable, in the interest of speed, to turn over the report at the post rather than in Washington. In cases,


2 See Document 91.
however, where the post itself prefers not to pass over the report, the Department can provide a copy to the host government’s Embassy here in Washington, although there is risk that the host government may not receive the report before it is made public. There may also be isolated cases where the post believes that no advance copy of the report should be furnished to the host government.

4. Action requested: Each Embassy is requested to provide a copy of the final approved text to the host government of that country’s human rights report. Posts which believe that the report on their host country should be handed over in Washington rather than abroad, or not at all, should so inform the Department immediately.

5. Embassies in countries on which no reports have been prepared need take no action.

Vance

107. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 24, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights Foundation and Other Human Rights Issues

Since our meeting with the Vice President on the Human Rights Foundation² I have discussed the idea with Bill Korey, John Richardson,³ Leo Cherne, Bob DeVechi (International Rescue Committee), Theron Van Scotter (American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service), Leonard Marks and, as you know, with Huntington,

² No record of the meeting with Mondale has been found. For his comments on a Human Rights Foundation, see Document 97.
³ According to the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s January 9 evening report, Tuchman met with Richardson that day: “Also had a long and very useful meeting with John Richardson of Freedom House focusing on the Human Rights Foundation which he thinks is not only a good idea, but terribly badly needed.” Brzezinski wrote in the margin next to the paragraph: “Good. Talk also to SPH [Samuel Huntington].” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 1–3/78)
Henze and Jan Nowak. All are unreservedly enthusiastic in their support for this idea. While I was working on this final version, I received a copy of Sam’s memo. I went ahead with this anyway because it includes some additional new ideas (not all my own), and because it specifically addresses the President and Vice President’s previous reservations about this proposal. This memorandum is designed to provide the President everything he needs to make a final decision—we need to get this idea out of limbo.

Regarding other human rights initiatives, I have consulted with State (at the Vice President’s direction) on who should be included in the Congressional sessions. A shortened version of State’s list has been submitted to Moore, and I have received comments on the Senators but not yet on the House members. I expect final word from them shortly, and will then arrange the first meeting with Clift.

On the PD, I believe that it is in your office—at least I haven’t seen it since I sent over the most recent draft.

I have commissioned and received from State, a paper on all the issues on which we are going to face problems in Congress in the next session. This paper will form the basis for a meeting of the LIG in the next 2–3 weeks.

Finally, the four recently signed human rights treaties will be sent to the President for forwarding to the Senate within the next two days.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memorandum at Tab A to the President.

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4 The January 13 NSC Global Issues Cluster’s evening report reads, in part: “Tuchman met with Huntington, Nowak et al on the Human Rights Foundation. Using everyone’s inputs, I [Tuchman] am rewriting the proposal so as to make it clear to the VP and the President why the Foundation would not be duplicative of existing groups, and why it should not pose serious problems of embarrassment to the USG. We will then mail it out for polishing to Richardson, Korey, Cherne, et al.” (Ibid.)


6 Brzezinski wrote “RI?” in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and drew an arrow pointing at it.

7 Not found.

8 Tab A, attached but not printed, is a January 24 memorandum from Brzezinski to the President entitled “Human Rights Foundation.” Brzezinski did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but a handwritten notation indicates that he signed the memorandum to the President on January 24. In a January 26 memorandum to Hutcheson, McIntyre indicated that while OMB “supports the underlying objectives” of the Human Rights Foundation, staff members had concluded that the Foundation “may not be the best way” to advance human rights policy. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives: 1/77–10/78) Under a January 27 covering memorandum, Hutcheson transmitted McIntyre’s memorandum to Brzezinski, suggesting that the proposal be revised. In the top right-hand corner of this memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “JT, please react. ZB.” (Ibid.) The revised memorandum to the President is printed as Document 114.
108. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) and the Legal Adviser (Hansell) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**

Washington, January 24, 1978

Human Rights Reports and OPIC

**Issue for Decision**

Should the human rights reports the Secretary of State will submit to Congress by January 31 include reports on five countries, including Brazil, where the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is engaged in financing, insurance or guaranty activities, but which otherwise are neither receiving nor proposed to receive assistance for which human rights reports would be required?

**Essential Factors**

**Statutory Requirements**

Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), prohibits assistance under part I of that Act to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, unless the assistance will directly benefit the needy people in the country concerned. As amended in 1977, section 116 also requires that the Secretary of State report to Congress by January 31 of each year on the status of human rights in countries that receive assistance under part I of the FAA. The question here is limited to whether a human rights report should be submitted on the five “OPIC only” countries; no decision is required as to whether any of these countries are engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations. The full text of the statute is attached at Tab 1.

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2 Section 502(b) of the FAA establishes a similar reporting requirement with respect to countries where security assistance programs are proposed. A single report will be submitted on each country either receiving assistance under part I or proposed to receive security assistance, or both. Exclusive of countries with only OPIC programs, reports will be submitted on 109 countries. [Footnote in the original.]

3 Not found attached.
OPIC

OPIC is established by title IV of chapter 2 of part I of the FAA as an agency of the United States under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State. According to the authorizing legislation, the Corporation is governed by a board of directors appointed by the President, with Senate advice and consent, and chaired by the Administrator of AID. Section 231 of the FAA provides that the purpose of OPIC is to complement the development assistance objectives of the United States by mobilizing and facilitating the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social development of less developed friendly countries and areas. The Corporation provides financing, insurance and guaranties to private U.S. investors in less developed countries with which the United States has agreements covering such programs. The government-to-government agreements (required by section 237(a) of the FAA) normally provide that projects and activities are subject to approval by the government in whose territory the project or activity will take place. (See, e.g., U.S.-Brazil Investment Guaranty Agreement at Tab 2,\(^4\) 18 U.S.T. 1807, TIAS 6327.)

OPIC does not *program* the issuance of loans, insurance or guaranties in specific countries on an annual basis. The guaranteed and insured projects are selected, developed and financed in the first instance by private investors. The Corporation provides coverage for eligible and acceptable investments, upon application by investors and payment of a premium, on a case-by-case basis. OPIC loans are also considered on a case-by-case basis. OPIC has maintained that its activities do not constitute assistance to foreign governments and, therefore, are not governed by section 116 of the FAA (except when a foreign government is directly involved in a project).

Since section 116 of the FAA was originally enacted in 1975\(^5\) OPIC has initiated steps to take human rights considerations into account in its programs. Arrangements have been made to keep OPIC apprised of actions taken in furtherance of United States human rights policy objectives. Pursuant to recommendations by the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, the Corporation suspended negotiations last year on program agreements with Uruguay and Chile.

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\(^4\) Not found attached.
Pending Legislation

OPIC’s insurance and guaranty authorities under present law lapsed on January 1. A bill pending in the House (H.R. 9179)\textsuperscript{6} which will renew those authorities through September 30, 1980, was amended on the floor to include a provision which would make section 116 of the FAA expressly applicable to “any insurance, reinsurance, guarantee or loan by the Corporation.” This amendment was adopted on November 3 following an extensive debate, during which the sponsor, Congressman Harkin, asserted that his intent was to make explicit an application of section 116 which was intended when that statute was originally enacted. OPIC supported an unsuccessful alternative amendment, sponsored by Congressman Bingham, which would have made section 116 applicable only to projects in which a foreign government participates financially.

The companion Senate bill (S. 1771), which has passed the Senate, contains no comparable provision.\textsuperscript{7} Accordingly, the Administration will probably have an opportunity in February to express its views to the House-Senate conference committee on what the law should be in this regard. This issue will be addressed separately at a later date.

Need for Decision

An immediate decision is needed on whether reports should be submitted to Congress by January 31 with respect to the status of human rights observance in those countries where OPIC had been issuing insurance and guaranties until the lapse of its authority, but which do not receive any other assistance subject to the FAA’s reporting requirements. The countries concerned are Barbados, Brazil, Grenada, Trinidad-Tobago and Western Samoa.\textsuperscript{8}

Legal Considerations

According to its terms, the reporting requirement in section 116(d)(1) of the FAA is applicable to foreign countries that receive assistance under part I of the FAA. It is clear that OPIC operates under authority of part I of the FAA; OPIC’s authorizing legislation comprises

\textsuperscript{6}Congress, in 1974, extended OPIC’s charter and ordered the corporation to turn over its investment functions to private corporations. By 1977, members of Congress concluded this provision had proved unsuccessful and introduced companion bills (S. 1771 and H.R. 9179) to reverse the phase-out of these functions and renew OPIC’s charter. The House suspended action on H.R. 9179 in November 1977 following the introduction of two amendments by Long and Harkin, yet anticipated that debate would resume early in 1978. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, p. 268)

\textsuperscript{7}Introduced by Sparkman on June 28, 1977, S. 1771—the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act—passed the Senate on October 25, 1977.

\textsuperscript{8}An unknown hand bracketed the portion of the paragraph listing these countries.
title IV of chapter 2 of that part. The inclusion of OPIC’s authorization within the chapter of the FAA entitled “Development Assistance” and the statement of its purpose in section 231 of the FAA are indications that the Corporation is intended to serve, among other objectives, the purpose expressed in section 102(a) of the FAA “That the United States, through private as well as public efforts, assist the people of less developed countries in their (development) efforts . . .”

These indications are reinforced by the relevant legislative history. The 1969 legislation which created OPIC was first considered in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Committee’s report described the Corporation as “a new instrumentality complementing other assistance programs by encouraging and promoting U.S. private enterprise in contributing to the development of less developed countries.” H. Rep. No. 91–611, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23 (emphasis added).

That Congress still regards OPIC primarily as an instrument for carrying out foreign development assistance purposes is evidenced by the Senate and House reports on the pending OPIC amendments. These provide:

“OPIC’s chief purpose is to mobilize the resources of the U.S. private sector to promote economic and social development in the developing countries . . .” S. Rept. 95–505, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).

According to the legislation authorizing OPIC, its primary goal is to encourage the flow of U.S. capital and skills into less developed friendly countries, thereby promoting the economic and social development of those countries.” H. Rept. No. 95–670, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977).

The foregoing considerations suggest that section 116(d)(1) should be construed so as to require the submission of reports on countries where OPIC is engaged in financing, insurance or guaranty activities. L believes this is the better interpretation of the law.10

However, an argument could be made that these reports are not legally required. Congress has not always been consistent in its treatment of OPIC activities as “assistance” for other purposes under the FAA and, despite Congressman Harkin’s assertion as to the intent of section 116, there is no specific legislative history on its application to OPIC. Legislation concerning OPIC which clearly addresses human rights issues is pending and, in the meantime, it is not clear what kind of reporting Congress expects or will require.11

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9 Reference is to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 (P.L. 91–175); see footnote 5, Document 81.

10 An unknown hand bracketed the portion of the paragraph that begins with “insurance” to the end of the paragraph.

Policy Considerations

The decision on whether or not to submit reports on the five “OPIC only” countries ultimately depends upon a choice between competing policy interests.

On the one hand, a failure to report would probably be criticized by some in Congress as being in violation of the law and evidence of a lack of sincerity and consistency in the Administration’s human rights policy. This could have broad undesirable consequences as further legislative proposals on human rights are considered. In particular, it might adversely affect the currently pending OPIC authorization bill. Legislation directed specifically against Brazil is also a possibility.12

On the other hand, the submission of a human rights report on Brazil would be strongly resented by the government of that country, which has already informed us that it will reject any security assistance which is conditioned upon the submission to Congress of such a report. Brazil’s denunciation of virtually all bilateral military cooperation agreements was a direct and emotional response to the FY 1978 human rights report on that country. We believe Brazil would respond similarly to a human rights report tied to any other program.13

OPIC is currently engaged only in a few projects in Brazil. Existing OPIC expropriation coverage in Brazil as of June 30, 1977, was around $200 million. Further, under present policy, OPIC would accept future applications concerning investments only in a few areas—energy and mineral resources, small business, and “exceptionally developmental” projects. The program is probably not of great importance to the Brazilian government and, therefore, might well be denounced if it became the cause for a further human rights report.14 Furthermore, the Brazilians could—and probably would—point out that OPIC’s programs in the first instance benefit U.S. investors in return for fees paid by them; the Brazilian Government would not consider OPIC programs as assistance to Brazil.15 Retaliatory action by Brazil in other fields is also possible.

12 The FY 1979 Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act (P.L. 95–148) already prohibits the use of funds for FMS credit to Brazil and other Latin American countries which have rejected U.S. security assistance in whole or in part because of our human rights reports. [Footnote in the original.]

13 An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph. For information regarding the Brazilian rejection of bilateral military aid, see footnote 6, Document 42.

14 An unknown hand bracketed the portion of the paragraph that begins with “‘exceptionally developmental’ ” and ends with “became.”

15 An unknown hand bracketed the portion of the paragraph that begins with “investors” and ends with “assistance.”
A further deterioration in our relations with Brazil over the issue of human rights could detract from our ability to deal effectively with that country on many important issues (including continuing nuclear discussions). The Brazilian Government has recently asked us for confirmation that we do not intend to submit a human rights report because security assistance will be terminated. Our reply should address whether a report will be required because of any other program, i.e., OPIC.

If a policy decision were made to defer the submission of a human rights report on Brazil and the four other “OPIC only” countries, Congress might nevertheless specifically request such a report concerning any of them. It would, of course, be very difficult and probably counterproductive to resist a specific Congressional request for a report on any country. In this regard, a request made under section 502B(c) of the FAA would have to be honored within thirty days or we would have to suspend all security assistance in the pipeline (including licensed exports under commercial contracts).

**Bureau Views**

HA, L and H favor including reports on the OPIC only countries. These bureaus believe submission of the reports is the action most clearly consistent with current law, and will avoid a potentially damaging dispute with Congress (especially in seeking a favorable outcome on the pending OPIC authorization bill). L further points out that submission of a report would remove an impediment to other forms of continued U.S.-Brazilian cooperation, including FMS cash sales of spare parts, which the Brazilians desire but which they cannot now request without openly acquiescing in a human rights report on Brazil. Once a report had been submitted, Brazil could decide what, if any, U.S. assistance it wished to request and we could decide on an appropriate response based on the merits of any proposed transaction.

(A question has also arisen as to whether failure to file a human rights report would bar Brazil from purchasing military equipment

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16 See footnote 4, Document 91. In telegram 10185 from Brasilia, December 13, 1977, the Embassy noted that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s Department of the Americas had requested written confirmation from the Carter administration that a human rights report on Brazil would not be submitted to Congress. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770464–0332) In telegram 10534 from Brasilia, December 27, the Embassy repeated the request for written confirmation, noting “further delay in responding to Itamaraty’s [common reference to the Foreign Ministry; Itamaraty is the palace that houses the Ministry] request may indicate to the GOB that the USG is still debating the consequences of a human rights report on Brazil, and that we will not honor their specific request not to be considered for security assistance.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770482–0263)
through commercial channels. The definition of “security assistance” in section 502B includes licenses for the export of commercially-sold Munitions List items, and it may be argued, as DOD does, that failure to submit a human rights report would preclude the issuance of such licenses. The better view is that inasmuch as commercial exports are not, and have not been, “proposed” as part of the annual congressional presentation materials, Congress should not be presumed to have intended such an anomalous result in the absence of clear legislative history to the contrary. Thus for example, countries receiving only commercial exports are not included in the Congressional Presentation Document. It is our considered view that section 502B does not prevent the licensing of commercial exports to a country for which no human rights report has been submitted.)

ARA and EB believe a report on Brazil should not be submitted to Congress absent a clear legal requirement or a specific request from the Congress. These bureaus believe that, because the Brazilians have gone to such lengths to remove the reasons for our submitting one (by rejecting security assistance), a voluntary submission would be interpreted as a deliberate and gratuitous offense which would do lasting harm to our bilateral relations.

OPIC’s primary concern is to avoid a Congressional objection which might prejudice its efforts to secure an acceptable human rights provision, tailored specifically for OPIC, in the pending authorization bill. OPIC believes that the reporting requirement of section 116(d)(1), referring as it does to “countries” receiving assistance under Part I of the FAA, can be read as requiring a report solely because of the availability of OPIC programs, without necessarily concluding whether, at present, section 116(a) applies to OPIC absent foreign government participation. OPIC, therefore, is neutral as to the report-filing options set forth below, as OPIC understands that each would be pursued in such a way as to avoid prejudicing issues to be resolved in the House-Senate conference on the OPIC bill.

Recommendation

That you decide whether—

(1) The Department should include human rights reports on the five “OPIC only” countries, explaining to Brazil in advance that we will do so because of OPIC insured and guaranteed projects in that country;\(^\text{17}\) or

\(^{17}\) H favors submission of reports, and has no position as to how this is handled with the Brazilians. [Footnote in the original. There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved this recommendation.]
(2) The Department should include human rights reports on the five “OPIC only” countries, explaining to Brazil in advance that we will do so primarily because we do not wish to foreclose legally the possibility of cooperation with Brazil in FY 1979 (favored by HA and L);18 or

(3) The Department should not include human rights reports on the five “OPIC only” countries, explaining to Congress, if asked, that the lack of clarity in the present law, and the fact that legislation on this subject is now under consideration in Congress warranted deferral in our judgment.19 (We would comply with any Congressional request for reports on these countries.) (Favored by ARA, EB and S/P.)20

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18 H favors submission of reports, and has no position as to how this is handled with the Brazilians. [Footnote in the original.]

19 An unknown hand, presumably either Lamb or Oxman, crossed out parts of this sentence and revised it to read: “The Department should not include human rights reports on the five ‘OPIC only’ countries, because legislation on this subject is now under consideration in Congress.” The following handwritten comment appears in the left-hand margin of the paragraph: “This is basis for Dep. Sec’s approval of option 3.”

20 An unknown hand initialed Christopher’s approval of this recommendation; a stamped notation reads: “Jan 30 1978.”
109. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moose), the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman), the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Holbrooke), the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest), and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sober)

Washington, January 26, 1978

SUBJECT
Advance Notification of Human Rights Reports

As I mentioned this morning, each regional bureau will be responsible for providing to the governments concerned advance copies of the human rights reports to be submitted to the Congress. At your discretion, this can be done in Washington, in capitals, or both. When the advance copies are handed over, I suggest that the presentation be made using the following points as a framework. The points should be adapted to the circumstances of particular countries:

—The effect of new legislation which became law last year is to require the Secretary of State to submit a “full and complete” report on the status of internationally-recognized human rights in each country which receives either development assistance or security assistance from the United States. (It may be useful to provide the text of the Congressional provision.)

—We brought this legal requirement to the attention of your government last November.

—[For countries receiving development assistance] At that time, we provided you [your authorities] with the text of the new legislation.

—109 human rights reports will be submitted to the Congress on or about January 31. We are providing you with an advance copy of the report prepared on [country].

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 15, Human Rights—Country Evaluation Papers. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. Copies were sent to Derian and Lake. Lamb sent a copy of the memorandum to Shurtleff, Lister, Martins, Fuerth, and Palmer, copying Schneider, Walker, and Oxman, under a January 27 covering memorandum with the following comment: “In connection with the attached memorandum from the Deputy Secretary to the regional bureaus, please be sure that any general instruction to the field incorporating the suggested presentation framework is discussed with HA and S/P prior to transmission.” (Ibid.) Another copy of Christopher’s memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D133, Box 8, Memoranda from WC to Bureaus—1978.

2 See Document 91.
—Congress has expressly requested that information published by international non-governmental organizations be included in the report.
—The Department of State will not distribute these reports to the press or public or otherwise draw attention to them. However, they will be made a matter of public record by the Congress and we expect they will receive attention in the press.

110. Memorandum From Michael Armacost and Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 30, 1978

SUBJECT
Agenda for Human Rights Meeting

You have agreed to meet with several of us on Tuesday, January 31, from 6:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on human rights in the Situation Room.² We suggest that the task of the meeting is to discuss the mechanisms through which our human rights policy can be best implemented. Our assumption is that the mechanisms now in place can be improved. In order to have a focused discussion, we propose that we concentrate on the following concrete agenda items:

1. Can we establish clearer priorities in our pursuit of human rights as between (a) protecting the integrity of the individual; (b) improving economic justice; and (c) proselytizing on behalf of our political ideals?

2. Through what procedures can we best define practicable and realistic human rights objectives in particular countries?

3. How can we implement our human rights approach in a way which relies less on punitive sanctions and more on positive inducements?

4. Are we in fact obliged by the language of Congressional statutes to abstain or oppose loans by IFIs or regional banks to the “trouble-


² See footnote 8, Document 100. No record of this meeting has been found.
some” countries when no formal determination has been made that they have engaged in a consistent and gross pattern of human rights violations? How can we manage our legal obligations in this respect without forfeiting a reasonable degree of flexibility?

5. How can we manage the tactics of implementing human rights objectives in a way which assures greater sensitivity to local conditions? That is, what should be the role of the regional bureaus and embassies in designing tactics?

111. Telegram From the Department of State to All African Diplomatic Posts

Washington, February 7, 1978, 0241Z


1. With the completion of the annual human rights reports for Congress, we in AF want to express our appreciation for the patience and responsiveness of posts in providing the detailed inputs to make this process meaningful and useful. On the basis of your contribution, we hope that the reporting cycle for next year’s reports will consist essentially of collecting new data, up-dating and strengthening this year’s reports, and identifying any new human rights trends.

2. This is also a good time to reflect on the reporting and information gathering process itself and to draw some tentative conclusions which might contribute to improving our end performance in fulfilling this major legal requirement.

3. The first and most obvious lesson we have learned is that the principal prerequisite for an objective report defensible to both the host government and to Congress is better information on the objective human rights situation in each African country. This calls for conscious

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780056-0946. Confidential. Drafted by William Swing (AF/C) and Shurtleff; cleared by Lewis, Derian, Lannon Walker, Lewis Junior (AF/C), Thomas Smith (AF/W), Richard St. F. Post (AF/E), and Donald Petterson (AF/S); approved by Moose. On February 6, Moose sent a version of the cable, dated February 4, to Christopher and Derian, commenting that it “represents what I think is a very commendable initiative on the part of two of our officers to build on our recent experience with human rights reporting.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 15, Human Rights—Country Evaluation Papers)
targeting on those principal areas in which official human rights attitudes, policies and practices manifest themselves: Demonstrable efforts to meet the basic needs of the poorest sectors of the population for food, shelter, education and health care; respect for the sanctity of the person; and promotion of basic civil and political liberties. We simply must know more and, in our reporting to Congress, we must refer to specific illustrative examples, including the positive as well as the negative, to support our necessarily more general reporting and analysis of the situation.

4. A corollary to better reporting is the need for comprehensive and systematic data collection on the human rights situation and issues in your country of responsibility. We must be prepared to document carefully and comprehensively each African government’s record on human rights, even in countries which do not presently receive bilateral economic or security assistance. It is no less important in cases where the government has a good record of observing human rights. The time to begin building a reporting record is now. Do not wait for us to task you with specific reporting requirements on the human rights situation in your country of responsibility.

5. We will need to expand our contacts with those individuals who are best placed to know about human rights conditions. In some cases it will be an expatriate lawyer; in others local police or attorney general, etc. Above all, these contacts can help us gain a deeper knowledge of the local judicial system which makes decisions about people’s lives.

6. Given our experience with the development of this year’s papers, we cannot rule out the possibility that there will be formal changes in the guidelines for our CY–78 papers. However, we do not anticipate any essential change in the three basic categories of human rights contained in the Secretary’s April 1977 Law Day speech in Georgia. Although difficult to identify, some thought should be given to quantifiable measures which help objectively judge human rights issues in these areas. For example: percentage changes in government funds aimed at poorest segment of population; numbers of rural health workers trained; rate of scholarization; infant mortality and other health initiatives, central budget breakdown by sector; countrywide breakdown of court cases, broken down along lines of number of acquittals, length of sentences in relation to law under which sentenced, etc.

7. We will try to give you additional grist for your side of the exchange by providing from time to time selected private organization and press reporting on specific human rights issues in Africa. This will include copies of periodic reports and occasional papers from Amnesty International, P.E.N., Freedom House, the International Commission of Jurists and other non-governmental organizations whose reporting is
widely read and influential among human rights advocates. Keep in mind that, though such reporting is often fragmentary, it is a benchmark against which our reports to Congress and public statements on human rights are measured.

8. Finally, you should, we believe, continue to bring out in your reporting the differences in the local African conceptions of human rights which focus on collective social and economic rights as compared to our emphasis on political freedoms. Your analysis of these and other normative issues is very valuable to us in Washington. We also need your judgments as to trends evolving in official attitudes toward human rights over a period of time, i.e., over periods of six to 18 months.

9. Your reactions to these general observations and suggestions, and your own ideas on human rights reporting and analysis would be much appreciated.

Vance

112. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale

Washington, February 7, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights

Attached for your consideration are redrafted versions of both the human rights PD (Tab A), and the proposal for a Human Rights Foundation (Tab B).

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2 The two tabs are not attached. Brzezinski had originally sent the President a draft Presidential Directive under cover of his December 3 memorandum (see Document 96). Brzezinski had approved a separate memorandum to the President concerning the proposed Human Rights Foundation; a revised version of the memorandum is printed as Document 114. Presumably, Brzezinski sent to Mondale the same copies of the PD and Human Rights Foundation memorandum that he had sent to the President on February 10; see Document 113.
Since our meeting several weeks ago, Jessica Tuchman has consulted with a large number of outside experts in the human rights field, as we agreed at that time. These include: John Richardson of Freedom House, Bill Korey of B’nai Brith, Leo Cherne of the International Rescue Committee, Leonard Marks, former head of USIA, Jan Nowak, and representatives of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, the Church World Service, and others. All were unreservedly enthusiastic about the idea, and were vigorous in pleading the need for such an institution on many different grounds. I have incorporated many of their ideas into this new version of the proposal. Jody Powell has seen the proposal and after some initial questions now recommends that the President approve it. OMB has some objections which are, in my view, minor and bureaucratic rather than substantive. They are addressed in the addendum to the memorandum. In that addendum I have also tried to address the reservations you raised to the earlier draft.

Nearly every day we get more indications of Congressional interest in this idea. Moynihan is apparently getting ready to introduce it on the Senate side, and there are also signs of movement from Zablocki, Fraser, Fascell and perhaps others in the House. My concern is that if this idea comes out as a Congressional initiative, it will be reported in the press as another example of the Administration’s negative and passive role on human rights, and the Congress’ active and imaginative stance. Given the number of contentious human rights issues we face in the coming session, this would be a particularly unfortunate outcome. I believe we must make a prompt decision on this, one way or the other, or face the risk of being pre-empted.

Regarding the PD, this draft has been refined with a particular view to the consequences of a possible leak. The language has been worked over and tightened, so that there should be no problem if the entire document were to leak, or if any sentence is taken out of context. I believe it is much improved.

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3 See Document 107.
4 See footnote 8, Document 107. In his January 26 memorandum, McIntyre had expressed concern that neither the Department of State nor Vance appeared to have been “adequately consulted” regarding the proposal. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives: 1/77–10/78)
5 See Document 97.
6 In a February 1 memorandum to Brzezinski transmitting a response to Hutcheson’s January 27 memorandum (see footnote 8, Document 107), Huntington, Tuchman, and Putnam noted that the “idea of a Human Rights Foundation is gaining momentum in Congress and among the NGOs.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives: 1/77–10/78)
Recommendation:

That you give your approval to both the PD and the Human Rights Foundation Proposal, and recommend same to the President.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Brzezinski added “and recommend same to the President” by hand. In a February 9 memorandum to Brzezinski, attached to a February 3 memorandum from Huntington, Tuchman, and Putnam to Brzezinski indicating that they had redrafted the January 24 memorandum regarding the Human Rights Foundation (see footnote 8, Document 107), Clift indicated that Mondale had concurred in the proposed human rights PD and continued to express reservations concerning the Human Rights Foundation. Clift suggested that Mondale’s continuing reservations be incorporated in any subsequent memorandum to Carter regarding the Foundation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Policy Initiatives: 1/77–10/78) Mondale’s concerns are reflected in the undated memorandum Brzezinski sent to the President; see Document 114.

### 113. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, February 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights

Attached for your consideration are redrafted versions of both the human rights PD (Tab A) and the proposal for a Human Rights Foundation (Tab B).\(^2\)

Regarding the PD, this draft has been refined with a particular view to the consequences of a possible leak. The language has been worked over and tightened, so as to minimize the problems that would arise if the entire document were to leak, or if certain sentences were

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1978. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The President added the following handwritten notation in the right-hand corner of the first page: “Zbig—I made substantial changes. Let me have comments from you & Cy. J.” Tuchman sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a February 10 typewritten covering note, indicating that it constituted a “redone version of the human rights package.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) Tab B is not attached but is printed as Document 107.
taken out of context. The Vice President has reviewed this draft and recommends that you sign it.³

The revised draft of the Human Rights Foundation (HRF) proposal at Tab B is the result of extensive consultations with members of the EOP, as well as with a number of outside experts, including the leadership of the prominent NGOs: Freedom House; the International Rescue Committee; B’nai Brith; Church World Service; the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service; and others. All the outside experts with whom we consulted were unreservedly enthusiastic in support of the proposal. The Vice President has studied this draft and continues to have some reservations which are reflected at Tab B. Jody Powell and Frank Moore both recommend that you approve it. We have consulted with individuals at State who are supportive of the idea, however in order to preserve its confidentiality and press value, I have not sent the proposal over for formal State approval.

There are more and more indications of Congressional interest in this idea. Moynihan is apparently getting ready to introduce it on the Senate side, and there are also signs of movement from Zablocki, Fraser, Fascell and perhaps others in the House. My concern is that if this idea comes out as a Congressional initiative, it will be reported in the press as another example of the Administration’s negative and passive role on human rights, and the Congress’ active and imaginative stance. Given the number of contentious human rights issues we face in the coming session, this would be a particularly unfortunate outcome. I believe we must make a prompt decision on this proposal, or face the real risk of being preempted by a Congressional initiative.

**Recommendation:**

That you sign the PD at Tab A and approve the proposal at Tab B.⁴

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³ See Document 112 and footnote 7 thereto.

⁴ There is no indication that the President approved or disapproved the recommendation. The final version of PD–30 is printed as Document 119. For the President’s response to the Human Rights Foundation proposal, see Document 114.
TO
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT
Human Rights

It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each individual nation, and to the significance of U.S. relations with the nation in question.

Specifically:

1. It shall be the objective of the U.S. human rights policy first of all to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g., torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial and assassination), and, secondly to enhance civil and political liberties (freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections). It will also be a continuing U.S. ob-

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5 Confidential. The President wrote at the top right-hand margin of the memorandum: “Need to include other action: a) Verbal protest (public) b) Annual report to Congress (already required) c) Utilization of OAS, UN, etc d) Work of private groups—Amnesty International e) Direct diplomatic persuasion—(private) etc—J.”

6 The President deleted the words “first of all” and wrote “numbers have little logic” in the left-hand margin of this numbered point.

7 The President deleted the comma following the closed parenthesis and deleted the word “secondly.”
jective to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and health).

2. Greater reliance should be placed on positive inducements and incentives, acknowledging improvements in human rights through, whenever appropriate and possible, preferential treatment in political relations and economic benefits.

3. To this end, countries with a good or improving record of human rights observance as defined above, will be given special consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance. Programs for each fiscal year shall be reviewed in this light.

4. In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation, and in the course of the implementation of this directive, primary emphasis shall be placed on longer term trends rather than on specific events.

5. The U.S. shall not take any action which would result in material or financial support to the police, civil law enforcement authorities, or internal security forces of governments engaged in serious violations of human rights.

6. U.S. human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine the primary U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. I therefore direct the Interagency Group to prepare a report:

—Analyzing the effects of recent U.S. actions in the IFIs:

• on the IFI’s themselves (including an assessment of the legality of our actions),
• on Congressional attitudes and prospective legislation; and
• on the advancement of U.S. human rights objectives.

8 The President rewrote this part of the sentence to read: “acknowledging improvements in human rights whenever appropriate and possible through preferential . . .”
9 The President inserted the word “substantially” after “or.”
10 The President deleted the words “as defined above.”
11 The President rewrote this paragraph to read: “In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation in the course of the implementation of this directive, primary emphasis shall be placed on longer term trends and on the cumulative effect of specific events.”
12 The President deleted the colon.
13 The President rewrote this to read: “Analyzing the effect of U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions, including:”
14 The President rewrote this bulleted point to read: “adequacy of information received from the IFI’s and the propriety and legality of action we may take;” and deleted “on” in the second and third bulleted points.
—Proposing a strategy for future U.S. actions which will place primary emphasis on the use of our “voice” rather than our vote; attempt to influence the Bank’s actions as early as possible in the loan process; seek to engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.15

7. The Interagency Group shall prepare and submit for review by the PRC/NSC, a paper analyzing the appropriateness of using other sanctions or incentives to further the goals defined in this directive.

15 The President rewrote this paragraph to read: “—Proposing a strategy for future U.S. actions which will utilize most effectively both our voice and our vote, understand and attempt to influence the Bank’s actions as early as possible in the loan process, and seek to engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.”

114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Human Rights Foundation (HRF)

1. Reasons for an HRF2

In addition to performing the important functions listed in Section 2 below, there are several good reasons for establishing an HRF as an Administrative initiative:

—in the furtherance of human rights, we have relied most heavily on exhortation and on punitive sanctions imposed through our foreign assistance programs. Though useful and necessary, these techniques often conflict with other legitimate foreign policy objectives and risk creating a climate in which American commitment to human rights is judged solely by the frequency of public denunciations or aid cut-offs.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 19, PD/NSC–30. Confidential. Sent for action. The President’s handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: “Zbig—Let’s hold this—I.” Tuchman sent an earlier version of this memorandum to Brzezinski on January 24; see Document 107 and footnote 8 thereto.

2 The President changed the article “an” to “a” and, next to the abbreviation HRF, wrote: “(spell out).”
An HRF will institute a positive, action program for human rights comparable, say, to the activities of AID to promote economic development.

—Our human rights policy generated unrealistically high expectations in some quarters. The press now reports that the Administration has “abandoned” or “sacrificed” human rights to other priorities. There is a surprising, but continuing belief on the Hill that without constant Congressional pressure there would be no human rights policy. A positive initiative such as HRF will help substantially to dispel that myth. We face many contentious human rights issues in the coming Congressional session (e.g., application of the Harkin Amendment to inappropriate institutions, more strictures on the IFIs, etc.). Any improvement in the current mood would be an important political plus. By proposing an HRF, the Administration can mobilize the heterogeneous human rights constituency behind a constructive proposal.

—While human rights is certainly not a new concern, it is a new policy issue, and it lacks the necessary solid intellectual base. Our frustrations in the PRM–28 exercise provided excellent evidence of the need for basic research on the varieties of human rights and on the most effective means of promoting human rights in diverse social and cultural contexts. Those inside the government do not have the time to develop such a base. It is best done outside the government—in academia, think tanks, etc. An HRF can provide the central direction, support and motivation for a successful, and relevant, scholarly effort.

—Human rights has been pretty thoroughly woven into our foreign policy bureaucracy, but this will not last long should one of your successors not share your concern for this issue. The new procedures could be undone as quickly as they have been created. An independent HRF, funded by Congress, is some insurance that human rights will be an enduring concern. Much as ACDA and the Peace Corps embody major foreign policy initiatives of previous Democratic Administrations, the HRF would be an important institutional legacy of the Carter Administration.

—Polls have shown that your human rights policy is strongly supported by people all over the world, even in places where the government opposes it. The lasting success of the policy will depend to some extent on our ability to cultivate that support, particularly through non-governmental and semi-governmental organizations of all kinds. While USIA can contribute to this goal to a limited degree, activities aimed at focusing

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3 Presumable reference to the Harkin amendment to H.R. 9179; see footnote 6, Document 108.
4 PRM–28 is printed as Document 46. The response to PRM–28 is printed as Document 73.
world attention on human rights would gain credibility if sponsored by an institution with some autonomy from the U.S. government.

2. Functions of an HRF

Working with private groups and national organizations in this country and abroad, as well as with international agencies, the HRF would develop ideas and programs to further the observance of human rights on a global basis. The HRF would engage in at least five major types of activities.

—Provide financial and other support to the non-governmental human rights organizations (NGOs) in the U.S. and elsewhere. For years the NGOs have operated quite effectively with little public support, and they now have the potential to do much more. They can often act in circumstances and with techniques that would be inappropriate for the USG. The NGOs need, want and deserve our support, but at the same time, they must be insulated from direct dependence on the USG.

—Foster research on human rights. We need research on the different types of human rights, their interactions, the relevance of each in different societal and cultural contexts, and which kinds of policies work best where. We also need to know much more about conditions and longer term trends in individual countries and regions. Though State has worked hard this past year to improve its data base, most of its information comes through official channels which often give a very incomplete picture. Finally, as time goes on, we need a critical assessment of how well our policies are working.

—Aid victims of human rights violations. Support is badly needed for refugee resettlement efforts, including the retraining (language, professional standards, etc.) and placement of skilled and professional political refugees. An HRF could help to arrange and finance the resettlement of such key individuals—not in the U.S. where their talents are wasted—but in other Third World nations badly in need of these skills. Equally important, the HRF can provide direct help and psychological support for dissenters within their own societies by, for example, awarding an annual prize to an artist or writer whose works are suppressed in his own country, or by helping to finance the publication and distribution of suppressed works.

—Promote efforts to multilateralize governmental human rights policies. While the primary responsibility here rests with the U.S. government, the HRF, working on its own and through the NGOs, could prove a powerful ally in such efforts as: building support for the creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; energizing the UN Human Rights Commission; evolving harmonious policies among Western nations in the IFIs; and promoting regional human rights organizations in Africa and elsewhere. Particularly in the Third World (and notwith-
standing its relationship to the government) the HRF should be able to speak with a voice independent from, and in some cases more credible than, the U.S. government.

—Keep international attention focused on human rights issues. The objective here is to generate and sustain a worldwide constituency for human rights. Activities might include:

—Supporting national and international conferences on human rights issues.
—Awarding an annual human rights prize, comparable to the Nobel, for outstanding contributions to human rights anywhere in the world.
—Serving as a central clearing house for information on human rights and on sources of assistance to victims of human rights violations.
—Serving as an “echo-chamber” to amplify the voices of individuals and numerous small groups.
—Issuing an annual report on trends and conditions of human rights globally, as well as periodic reports on particularly troubling violators of human rights.

3. Structure of an HRF

A good model for the HRF is the Inter-American Foundation, a quasi-governmental organization that receives its money from Congress but has very loose ties with the U.S. government and makes its own policies. The Foundation is directed by a seven member board, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The board includes four members from the private sector and three ex officio representatives of the Executive Branch. This arrangement has assured functional autonomy for the Foundation, while preserving a minimum degree of coordination with the U.S. government foreign policy agencies. Details of the composition of the Board of the HRF can be worked out in consultation with Congress. The important point is that the legislation can be written to reflect whatever degree of linkage is desired between the HRF and the government.

4. Objections to an HRF

In his evaluation, the Vice President raises two objections to this proposal. First, he is concerned that “such a foundation might do no more than duplicate the work of such organizations as Freedom House and Amnesty International.” After extensive consultations, I am satisfied that no one sees more clearly than do these organizations, their own limitations and the great needs left unfilled. Even if the HRF were to do no more than increase the funds available to NGOs, it would have performed a valuable service. However, as the list of ideas outlined in

5 See Document 97.
Sections 1 and 2 above indicate, there is a great deal that the HRF can do, that cannot be done by small groups working alone.

Secondly, the Vice President raised the important question of whether “the government would take blame for ineffectiveness or inaction” by the HRF. While there is no way to rule this out, I believe that our experience with the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), which has pursued a bold policy in a very sensitive region, indicates that this risk is not too large. The IAF sponsors unconventional development projects that are potentially quite controversial in the host country. Nevertheless, while a few U.S. ambassadors have complained from time to time about problems caused by the activities of the IAF, the overall record has been that of an independent entity functioning without embarrassment to the U.S. government.

Jim McIntyre has emphasized the need to avoid problems of duplication and policy coordination with the State Department. But the HRF would not be involved in the process of formulating U.S. government policy, so that it could not complicate that process. Most, if not all, of the proposed functions are best accomplished by an organization with some independence from the U.S. government. In the case of refugee programs, the HRF would be concerned specifically with victims of human rights repression, complementing but not duplicating current State Department activities. Moreover, assistance to refugees would be only a relatively modest part of the HRF’s overall program.

I can conclude only that the advantages of the HRF proposal substantially outweigh the risks.

5. Implementation

If you approve this proposal, I would recommend that we begin consultations with Zablocki, Fraser and Fascell, and on the Senate side with Sparkman, Kennedy and Case. If these prove successful, the consultations can be expanded to include the members of the Vice President’s human rights group. Once the details have been worked out, the proposal can be announced as a Presidential initiative with the appropriate Congressional support.

Recommendation:

That you approve this proposal, and initiation of Congressional consultations to be carried out by NSC in close consultation with Frank Moore.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{6} There is no indication as to whether the President approved or disapproved the recommendation; however, his handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum instructed Brzezinski to hold the memorandum (see footnote 1 above). Brzezinski resubmitted the Human Rights Foundation proposal at the same time he transmitted the final draft of PD–30 for the President’s signature; see footnote 1, Document 119.
115. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, February 10, 1978, 2150Z

36188. Subject: Release of Human Rights Reports. Reference: State 18330.2

1. The Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee released the 105 “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” February 9. A statement was issued in the names of the two chairmen which noted the legislative basis for the submission of the reports, and emphasized Congress’s role in setting “basic guidelines of America’s human rights policy”. The statement noted that “during the past two years, Congress has enacted legislation linking a country’s human rights performance to the four major types of foreign assistance: security assistance, bilateral development assistance, multilateral assistance, and PL 480 food aid. To insure that human rights considerations are taken into account in U.S. assistance policies, Congress has established certain procedures and guidelines for the Executive Branch to follow. These reports are a key element in providing Congress with the necessary information for informed judgements”. The statement continued, “Our two committees will study these reports carefully as we prepare to consider aid levels for individual countries in connection with fiscal year 1979 economic and security assistance legislation.”

2. The reports have already been the subject of a number of newspaper articles and at least one editorial, which appeared in The Washington Post February 8.3 We expect more to come.

3. The Department has ordered sufficient copies of the volume of reports to provide two to each Embassy, one for its own use and one to provide to the host government, if desired. The reports will be forwarded by pouch as soon as received from the GPO.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0667. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted by H. Kenneth Hill; cleared by Martens, Moran, Lamb, Shinn, and Shurtleff; approved by Hill.

2 See Document 106.

4. The Department wishes to thank and commend all who assisted in collecting and reporting human rights information, and drafting and clearing of reports for submission to Congress.

Vance

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Geneva

Washington, February 10, 1978, 2204Z

36220. For USDel to the Human Rights Commission. Subject: High Commissioner for Human Rights Proposal.

1. Department has reviewed current status of Human Rights Commissioner proposal and possible alternatives such as an Under Secretary General for Human Rights. We have concluded that USDel should continue to strongly support High Commissioner proposal and not repeat not endorse or pursue further consultations on Under Secretary General or other similar alternative proposal.

2. As USDel knows, President Carter expressed continued US support for a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in his speech at the UN on March 17, 1977. We have not asked or received any authorization to change that basic policy. Our goal is still to establish a strong position with a mandate guaranteeing sufficient freedom and influence to promote effectively basic human rights throughout the world.

3. We believe that an Under Secretary General would be likely to have his authority seriously circumscribed by virtue of the limitations of the UN Secretariat system. His effectiveness would largely depend on the political character of the Secretary General. There are also serious financial and structural implications for the UN system itself in creating a new Under Secretary General position.

4. Department is prepared to consider possibility of supporting alternative title for UN official with the same type of autonomy we envisage for the High Commissioner. Provided the mandate is essentially the same, we could seek White House approval for a “UN Special Rep-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0418. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information immediate to USUN. Drafted by John Tefft (IO/UNA) and Laurel Shea (IO/UNP); cleared by Rita Taubenfeld (IO/HR) and Barry; approved by Maynes.

resentative for Human Rights” or “Special Rapporteur for Human Rights” or similar title. Please advise if your consultations lead you to believe such an alternative is possible.

Vance

117. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, February 15, 1978

SUBJECT

The Human Rights Foundation

Paul Kreisberg told me of Zbig’s proposal which Jessica brought to yesterday’s meeting. I am aware of its sensitivity but thought you might be interested in my first reactions.2

I share some of the concerns that apparently prompted the proposal: emphasis on promoting human rights (rather than “punishing” violators) in different social and cultural contexts; institutionalization of American concern for human rights beyond this Administration’s span; and a less defensive and reactive posture toward human rights advocates on the Hill, are all worthy goals.

But I see some problems with the details of his proposal:

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 17, TL SENSITIVE, 1/1–3/31/78. Confidential; Eyes Only. An unknown hand circled the “Eyes Only” classification marking and added “Sensitive File” and a check mark. An additional notation reads: “To Steve.” A copy of the undated memorandum from Brzezinski to the President (see Document 114) is ibid.

2 Christopher expressed his reaction in an undated memorandum to Derian, attached to another copy of Brzezinski’s undated memorandum to the President regarding the Human Rights Foundation (see Document 114): “After I pulled myself down off the ceiling, I came to believe that this is a promising concept which needs staffing out so it will be supplementary to our (your) efforts. Strange procedure. Chris.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memoranda from WC to Bureaus—1978) Derian, in a February 28 memorandum to Christopher, indicated that she agreed with Vance’s response (see Document 121) and commented that she preferred “continued discussion and refinement of your clearinghouse idea.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Material, RC #1126, Box 9 of 13)
—No group financed and appointed by the USG (whatever the legislative/executive mix) will have credibility abroad as truly objective, or free of US policy influence. At the same time, neither will the Government be free from the policy consequences of actions, statements, and programs initiated by the foundation.

—NGOs here or elsewhere which accepted its support (and especially its money) may come to be seen as tools of US policy, and their effectiveness gravely undermined.

—The human rights awards look like gimmicks, and would be seen as self-serving public relations ploys. (Remember Doonesbury’s marvelous series last summer on a human rights award banquet?)

—A better way to aid the victims of human rights violations is through the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights. American attempts to resettle refugees in other people’s countries would be especially open to misunderstanding.

The strongest aspect of the proposal is the information-gathering, research and analysis service such a Foundation could perform. Zbig is unfortunately right that we in the government have not found time to think through the problems of understanding, much less promoting, human rights in different cultural and political contexts.

This part of the proposal is similar to your “clearing house” idea, although as I understand it you would prefer a private organization. I have mixed feelings about whether, and if so how, such a group should be linked to the government.

—A private organization would have more credibility, especially if it were not made up of Americans alone.

—A group funded and appointed by the executive branch and legislature together would do more to institutionalize human rights advocacy, beyond this Administration.

—An organization funded by several governments might offer both institutionalization and credibility, if it were not limited to

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3 Reference is to Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist Garry Trudeau’s syndicated newspaper comic strip “Doonesbury.”

4 On February 13, Christopher addressed the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in New Orleans. After providing an overview of human rights accomplishments and detailing some of the public efforts undertaken by the administration, Christopher broached the idea of a human rights database: “What is needed is an objective, widely respected clearinghouse for human rights information on all countries of the world. This would be an important resource for us and others interested in taking human rights conditions in other countries into account in policymaking. It would thus both inform our decisions and authenticate the existence and severity of human rights problems.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 1978, p. 31) The full text of Christopher’s speech is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
Western governments. But one including LDCs almost certainly would make some human rights judgments sharply at variance with our own.

In sum, Zbig’s idea certainly needs to be pursued, if only because Don Fraser will propose a Human Rights Foundation if we don’t and we both want to influence its shape, and get some credit for it. But we need to give a lot more thought to just what we want, and how to accomplish it. At this point, I think the President should endorse the idea in general (perhaps in a telephone call to Fraser) but indicate that State and the NSC would like to think through the details first within the Administration and then discuss it with Fraser and other key Congressmen.

118. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, February 15, 1978

SUBJECT
Transmittal to the Senate of Four International Human Rights Treaties

Attached for your signature (Tab A) is a letter of transmittal to the Senate asking for its advice and consent to ratification of three UN human rights treaties:

—The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, signed on behalf of the United States on September 29, 1977;
—The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed on behalf of the United States on October 5, 1977;
—The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed on behalf of the United States on October 5, 1977; and the American Convention on Human Rights, signed on behalf of the United States on June 1, 1977.

Together with your letter of transmittal, State will send to the Senate reports outlining the recommended reservations, under-
standings and declarations which the Administration believes are necessary to make the treaties consonant with U.S. law.

Perhaps the most controversial of the recommended reservations pertains to Article 4 of the American Convention. This Article deals with the right to life generally, including both abortion and capital punishment. Many of its provisions are not in accord with United States law and policy, or deal with matters in which the law is unsettled. For example, on Right to Life, Article 4 states: “Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” There are also several provisions relating to the death penalty. Consequently, a flat but straightforward reservation is recommended to the Senate, as follows: “United States adherence to Article 4 is subject to the Constitution and other law of the United States.”

In the case of the UN treaties, several reservations are included to protect possible infringements of the rights of free speech. For example, the Convention on Racial Discrimination restricts the dissemination of ideas which promote or incite racial discrimination. A simple reservation is recommended: “... nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other action by the United States which would restrict the right of free speech protected by the Constitution, laws, and practice of the United States.” Finally, there is language in the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights which extreme right wing groups in the U.S. assert could be interpreted to interfere with the private ownership of property. While this is a far-fetched argument, language is recommended which would avoid any such interpretation: “The United States understands that under the Covenant everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others, and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” In short, every effort has been made to keep the reservations simple, specific and consistent with accepted principles of international law.

Bob Lipshutz has reviewed the letter of transmittal as well as State’s detailed reports, and recommends that you sign the letter of transmittal. Frank Moore also supports this recommendation. Jim Fallows cleared the text of the transmittal.

Recommendation:
That you sign both copies of the letter of transmittal at Tab A.2

2 There is no indication as to whether the President approved or disapproved this recommendation; however, the letter of transmittal to the Senate, attached at Tab A, contains the President’s handwritten signature. For the final version of the February 23 letter to the Senate, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Volume 14, February 27, 1978, pp. 395–96. The White House sent all four treaties to the Senate for ratification on February 23. (Department of State Bulletin, April 1978, p. 48)

Washington, February 17, 1978

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT

Human Rights

*Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 41, Presidential Determinations, Directives, and Review Memoranda: [II]: 1/77–5/80. Confidential. On February 15, Tuchman had sent Brzezinski and Huntington a redrafted version of the PD, an explanation and comment sheet, and an earlier draft of the PD containing the President’s handwritten comments (see attachment, Document 113). Tuchman explained that the redrafted version integrated the President’s comments. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Huntington, Box 38, Human Rights: 2–8/78) Another copy of the explanation and comments sheet contains Bartholomew’s handwritten comments and Brzezinski’s decisions regarding the various additions and deletions made to the draft PD. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Presidential Review Memorandum–28 and Presidential Directive–30, 5/77–2/78) An undated covering memorandum from Brzezinski to the President indicates that Brzezinski planned to send Carter a copy of the revised PD—one that reflected Brzezinski’s approved changes as indicated on the comment and decision sheet—to allow Carter to accept or reject alternative language proposed in two paragraphs. According to a handwritten notation on the memorandum, the memorandum and the PD did not go forward to the President. (Ibid.) Brzezinski transmitted the final version of PD/NSC–30 to the President under a February 17 covering memorandum, requesting that the President sign the PD. Brzezinski also attached a copy of the Human Rights Foundation proposal (see Document 114), indicating that the Department had reviewed the proposal and agreed with “the general idea.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780040–0745) In an undated, handwritten note to Brzezinski, Carter wrote: “Zbig—Hold memo on Foundation.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1978) The Department transmitted the text of PD–30 to all diplomatic and consular posts in telegram 45685, February 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780083–0397)*
It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to the nation in question.

Specifically:

1. It shall be the objective of the U.S. human rights policy to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person (e.g., torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; lengthy detention without trial, and assassination) and, to enhance civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of speech, of religion, of assembly, of movement and of the press; and the right to basic judicial protections). It will also be a continuing U.S. objective to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and health).

2. In promoting human rights, the United States shall use the full range of its diplomatic tools, including direct diplomatic contacts, public statements, symbolic acts, consultations with allies, cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, and work with international organizations.

3. Greater reliance should be placed on positive inducements and incentives acknowledging improvements in human rights whenever appropriate and possible, through preferential treatment in political relations and economic benefits.

4. To this end, countries with a good or substantially improving record of human rights observance will be given special consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance, just as countries with a poor or deteriorating record will receive less favorable consideration. Programs for each fiscal year shall be reviewed in this light.

5. In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation in the course of the implementation of this directive, primary emphasis shall be placed on longer term trends and on the cumulative effect of specific events.

6. The U.S. shall not, other than in exceptional circumstances, take any action which would result in material or financial support to the police, civil law enforcement authorities, or others performing internal security functions of governments engaged in serious violations of human rights.

7. U.S. human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine the essential U.S. interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. To this end, future U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions shall seek to: utilize most effectively both
our voice and our vote; understand and attempt to influence the Banks’ actions as early as possible in the loan process; and, engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.

8. The Interagency Group shall periodically report to the PRC/NSC on the actions taken or recommended pursuant to this Presidential Directive. In particular, the Interagency Group shall, within two months, report on the effectiveness of recent U.S. actions in the International Financial Institutions, with particular attention to: Congressional attitudes and prospective legislation; views of other nations as to the propriety and legality of actions we may take; and, the effect of our actions on the advancement of U.S. human rights objectives.²

Jimmy Carter

² The Interagency Group’s report is printed as Document 139.

120. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 22, 1978

SUBJECT

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Proposal

The President’s proposal to create a high commissioner for human rights will be debated at the current UN Human Rights Commission meeting under Agenda Item 11 which is due to come up late next week. While we have support for the proposal from our western European allies and from a few of the non-aligned, Senegal, etc., overall opinion at the Commission is heavily weighted against us, and it may be better to postpone the debate on this issue to a different UN forum. The Cubans have threatened to introduce a resolution to defer consideration indefinitely, but we do not yet know whether they will act on it. India, which also opposes the proposal, has introduced its own pro-

posal to create national commissions or ombudsmen. India views the UN role as a catalyst for national (rather than international) action.

All in all, the prospects do not look very good, but we won't know until late next week what will actually happen.

121. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 26, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights Foundation

While I share the concerns that prompted the proposal for a Human Rights Foundation, I have serious doubts about it, and would prefer to see it deferred for the following reasons:

—A new US-sponsored organization would tend to duplicate and possibly confuse our present efforts.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 19, PD/NSC–30. Unclassified. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that the original was delivered to the White House on February 26 and that copies were sent to O'xman, Derian, and Lake on February 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Material, RC # 1126, Box 6 of 13) Brzezinski sent a copy to Tuchman and Huntington under a February 27 covering memorandum, attached but not printed, noting: “I attach the reaction from Cy. With OMB, State and the Vice President less than enthusiastic, I think the proposal will have tough sledding. Perhaps the most we can do is simply to encourage the Congressmen to go ahead, and give them our informal blessing, and finally hop in once the project gets off the ground and generates momentum of its own.” Brzezinski added the following sentence by hand: “But I am still trying to galvanize support from our domestic people.” A February 27 memorandum from Brzezinski to Eizenstat requesting that Eizenstat provide his reactions to the Human Rights Foundation proposal is ibid.

2 In an earlier version of the memorandum edited by Lake and Jennone Walker, February 24, Vance “reviewed” his thoughts on the Human Rights Foundation, noting: “I share the concerns that apparently prompted the proposal: emphasis on promoting human rights (rather than ‘punishing’ violators) in different social and cultural contexts; institutionalization of American concern for human rights beyond this Administration’s span; cooperation with other governments and international organizations; and a less defensive and reactive posture toward human rights advocates on the Hill, are all important goals. The human rights PD gives us new impetus in moving toward them.” Several points raised by Vance in this memorandum appear in the version sent to the President on February 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL 2/16–2/28/78)
Existing private organizations such as Amnesty International and Freedom House already do a great deal of information gathering. I question whether they would accept funds from the USG, since this might be seen to compromise their appearance of objectivity and potentially undermine their effectiveness.

Foreign governments would inevitably hold the Administration responsible for actions, statements, and programs initiated by the Foundation although its operations and statements would not be under our control.

The Foundation’s proposed role in refugee resettlement could complicate efforts of the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees and our present refugee program.

In sum, I doubt the wisdom of our establishing another government entity in this field.

122. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, undated

[Omitted here are the table of contents and Section I “Introduction.”]

II. VALUES

American values provide the base of our policy. Our concern for the welfare of others coincides with our own national interest:

—to do what we can to alleviate injustice and tension before they erupt into violence;

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 1, Envelope 12, 3/2/78, 2 Copies of Report on 1977 prepared but not released. No classification marking. Although no drafting information appears on the paper, a February 24 memorandum from Christopher to Lake, commenting upon an earlier draft of the paper, indicates that Lake prepared it. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memoranda from WC to Bureaus—1978) A handwritten notation on the first page of the paper (not printed) indicates that the report was not published. Typewritten comments on this page note that the report was “prepared at the request of Secretary of State Vance. It presents a general overview of our foreign policy: the reasons for our approach to key issues; the beginnings that were made on these issues in 1977; and the agenda for 1978 and beyond.” (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 1, Envelope 12, 3/2/78, 2 Copies of Report on 1977 prepared but not released)
— to help reduce the threat of war and the high cost of military establishments;
— to contribute to the global economic growth and equity on which our own national prosperity depends.

**Human Rights:**

The human rights policy of this Administration most clearly represents the application of our values to the practical decisions of foreign policy.

Our concern is for those human rights which have been recognized internationally—in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other UN covenants and conventions; in the American Convention on Human Rights; and in the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These documents codify the right to be free from torture or arbitrary arrest; the right to political freedom; and basic economic rights and opportunities. Our focus on these human rights is not an attempt to impose the American political system on others. These rights can be enjoyed under various political systems and in differing manner. They are rights to which all are entitled.

It is easy to be for all these rights in our rhetoric. Indeed no civilized nation has ever declared itself against them. It is more complex to take the human rights dimension into account in the major foreign policy decisions we take. We are trying to do that. That is how we view our obligations to American law and tradition.

Human rights concerns have been integrated into all levels of our dealings with foreign governments—from Presidential exchanges to the discussions of working level officials. It is clear to all governments that we consider how they treat their own people as an important factor in all our dealings with them.

We have affirmed our commitment to formal international standards—by finally signing the UN covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights and on civil and political rights and by signing the American Convention on Human Rights. We are working to improve the human rights machinery of the UN and the Organization of American States, and to secure better implementation of the human rights provisions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These multilateral efforts are important since they emphasize that America is not preaching to the rest of the world, but adding its voice to all the others who are working to improve the plight of individuals.

Words must be supported with actions. Proposals for American assistance—loans or grants through our aid program; our position on loans in the international development banks; military assistance or even sales—are carefully reviewed from a human rights point of view. This is a time-consuming process, since we analyze the human rights
situation in the country concerned, who will benefit from the assistance, and how we can effectively assist the cause of human rights and the lot of the neediest.

We have modified aid allocations on human rights grounds and we are working to ensure that our bilateral programs meet the basic human needs of the poor for food, shelter, health care, and education. We oppose loans in the international development banks to countries with serious human rights problems, unless the loans are aimed at satisfying basic human needs. We have accepted the fact that our relations with certain countries may be strained as a result of our attention to human rights. As human rights conditions improve, these strains should be eased.

It may be of interest to record some of the actual dilemmas we face, for example, in linking human rights and foreign assistance. We often ask ourselves: should we oppose a loan which could promote the economic condition of poor people, in hopes of influencing their governments to permit a greater exercise of political rights? Would withholding security aid in a particular situation stimulate a siege mentality, leading to an even harsher crackdown on dissident elements, or would its practical effect be to promote human rights? How can we best show recognition of the progress a society is making, and thus reinforce that process, even if the general human rights situation remains unacceptable?

These and other hard questions require case-by-case analysis. Some observers will find our choices inconsistent. This is because tactics should be adaptable, although our goals are not. We will take those actions we believe will be most effective in each country, and which are consistent with statutory provisions designed to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights.

We must also keep our human rights concerns in balance with other national interests. We often must determine how best to respond to the needs of individuals living under authoritarian regimes, while still retaining the necessary cooperation of their governments on security or economic matters that are vital to us. Even in striking this balance however, our broad goal remains the same: economic and security policies, as well as policy on “human rights”, are guided by a concern with the impact of all we do on the welfare of individuals.

We are embarked on a long term endeavor. Progress must be measured over the long run. This Administration will probably not see the full results—successful or not—of our efforts in this field. Nor can we claim credit for many decisions made by sovereign foreign governments. But we have contributed to an international climate in which tangible progress was made in 1977:

—Thousands of prisoners have been freed.
—Some political systems have become a little more open. States of
siege have ended and elections have been scheduled in a number of
countries.

—International human rights commissions have been permitted to
visit countries formerly closed to them.

The world was not transformed by such events. But many indi-
viduals were better off at the end of 1977 than at its beginning.

This is a sound beginning, but our experience has shown us that
there are sometimes even better ways to proceed:

—In this first year we have most often reacted to human rights vio-
lations by reducing or ending economic or military assistance pro-
grams. We wish to increasingly emphasize positive actions to help gov-
ernments which are trying to improve the lot of their own people. We
are working to find ways to use our assistance affirmatively, to pro-
mote human rights, rather than in ways which are primarily punitive.

—We must work even more closely with international organiza-
tions and foreign leaders to find the most constructive ways to advance
human rights in cultures and political traditions different from our
own.

—In our dealings with other nations and people we must recog-
nize human rights problems of our own. The President’s plans for wel-
fare reform, urban renewal, more jobs for disadvantaged youth, are all
part of a commitment constantly to improve our own human rights
performance.

In sum, there has been a perceptible change in the international
view of what the United States stands for in the world. Our most du-
rable source of strength is the symbol of individual liberty and oppor-
tunity that we represent to others.

[Omitted here are Sections III (“Peace”), IV (“Individual Economic
Well-Being”), and V (“Conclusion”).]
123. Note From Steven Oxman of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, March 3, 1978

Chris:

We have received quite a bit of comment on the clearinghouse idea.\(^2\) Most of those who write seem to be assuming that we are going to play a leadership role in establishing such a center. While I think we have to be careful about getting too far out in front, I doubt that any private group or individual is going to really take this ball and run with it unless we do a little more to inspire some such action. I plan to sit down with Tony Lake, Mark Schneider, Bill Luers and perhaps others to consider where we go from here on this clearinghouse idea.\(^3\)

Steve\(^4\)


\(^2\) See footnote 4, Document 117.

\(^3\) Christopher bracketed the portion of the note that begins with “unless” and ends with “idea” and wrote “good” in the right-hand margin.

\(^4\) Oxman signed his initials over his typed signature.
124. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 6, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights Policies and the Legislation for the International Development Banks

I want to share with you my increasing concern about our current human rights policies in the foreign assistance field.

Within a week, the Congress will begin to question the Administration on how we are implementing the human rights provisions of Public Law 95–118—on which you and I have a joint responsibility to report within the next six months. There is increasing dissatisfaction by some members of Congress that our human rights strategy is being applied inconsistently and without clear criteria.

As an example, Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, who until now has been one of our strongest supporters on the Appropriations Committee, plans to seek widespread support for a drastic cut in our requested appropriations for AID and the international development banks because of his dissatisfaction with the inconsistent application of our human rights policy. Such a result would, of course, have serious implications for U.S. foreign policy. I am afraid that a number of other members of Congress, including some of our best friends in past years, have similar feelings.

At the same time, our friends abroad, even though they share many of our human rights objectives, remain concerned about the way in which we seek to promote human rights in the international financial institutions and about the consistency of our approach. Several European governments cautioned our recent State/Treasury Consultations team that human rights sanctions in the IFIs should be applied carefully and consistently, and preferably limited to a small number of countries so as to minimize confrontation and limit the risk that others may seek to introduce narrow political considerations which might jeopardize the integrity of the multilateral institutions. They indicated

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 16, Human Rights—IFIs. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in S on March 6. Attached as Tab 1 to a March 10 memorandum from Benson to Vance and Christopher, in which Benson had endorsed Blumenthal’s suggestions concerning the human rights strategy papers. A March 20 draft response from Christopher to Blumenthal is ibid. In a note to Christopher, attached to the draft response, Oxman suggested that it “could serve as the talking points for a meeting with him.”
some willingness to cooperate with us to advance human rights in the IFIs provided we proceed quietly, selectively, and with sensitivity to the risks involved. In fact, President Giscard d’Estaing of France has personally made just these points, in setting French policy on the subject.

It is urgent, therefore, that we review our present strategy and procedures for handling human rights in the international development banks. This will implement the President’s Directive/NSC–30 that “U.S. human rights actions in the IFIs shall be designed and implemented so as not to undermine essential U.S. interests of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments.” Specifically, there is a need for:

1. Comprehensive human rights strategy papers for problem countries, which analyze the three key issues; our specific human rights objectives in such countries, the relationship between human rights objectives and other U.S. national objectives, and the array of policy instruments which can be used to further the human rights effort.

I believe that U.S. human rights objectives must be part of a comprehensive country strategy which takes into account both U.S. goals and available policy instruments. In certain countries, human rights violations may be so egregious as to overshadow completely all other considerations. But only when such a country strategy is delineated can we decide what U.S. position on prospective IFI loans (and bilateral assistance programs) is the proper one to achieve our objectives. Our current procedures focus too much on specific loans rather than on how, and with what policy instruments, we can most effectively induce offending governments to alter their human rights practices.²

2. A clearer set of criteria for invoking sanctions in the IFIs and for excepting loans which directly meet basic human needs. In my view, sanctions in the IFIs generally should be applied only after our several bilateral policy instruments have been tried.

3. Agreement to limit the use of U.S. votes in the IFIs to clear-cut situations of gross violations, where we are most likely to be supported by other members.

4. A systematic effort to keep other like-minded governments informed of our views and intentions regarding loans to countries which present serious human rights problems, and for ongoing consultations with such governments aimed at developing greater consensus on criteria and policies for dealing with human rights problems.

We need to develop a clear, consistent, and careful approach for dealing with human rights in the international development banks.

² Vance underlined this sentence.
which will engender support both from other governments and the Congress. I believe our two departments should try to develop such an approach as quickly as possible.

W. Michael Blumenthal

3 Blumenthal signed “Mike” over his typed signature.

125. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State


Summary: In terms of U.S. interests and objectives the results of this HRC session taken as a whole were notably positive. For the first time action was taken under the HRC’s confidential “1503” procedures to investigate the situation in Uganda and Equatorial Guinea and establish “contacts” with Paraguay through the Secretary-General. Bolivia, Malawi, Republic of Korea and Ethiopia will be kept under scrutiny by the HRC, while Indonesia is simply invited to continue cooperation with the commission. Uruguay has been asked to provide further information to the HRC. The “public” resolution on Chile was formulated to meet U.S. conditions for co-sponsorship, forcing out Cuban and Yugoslav cosponsorship. Moreover an implicitly critical “decision” on Cambodia was adopted which invites information from all sources on human rights conditions in that country for inclusion in a report by the UN Secretary-General. The Soviets elicited no significant support for an attempt to inject the neutron bomb issue into HRC business. On the other hand predictable resolutions were adopted on the Israeli settlements issue and Palestinian self-determination rights over U.S. opposition, although even here language in the settlements
text concerning the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention was modified to enable U.S. support. The resolutions on the Southern African apartheid issues, while unacceptable, were nevertheless purposefully moderated to enable U.S.–WEO abstentions. Useful Third World initiatives on new national and regional human rights commissions were adopted. The U.S. candidate for the HRC’s subcommission was re-elected. USDel was able to keep the idea of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights alive. Measured against Soviet wishes to extinguish the idea, this was an accomplishment. African and other non-aligned support was key to the success of U.S. and WEO efforts to achieve the positive actions recorded by this HRC session. The cooperation and skill of the Senegalese chairman was important to the success of our efforts. Just as important, however, there were clear indications of a continuing new non-aligned thrust on human rights issues that is compatible with and contributive to our policies. End summary.

1. The 34th session of the HRC, comprising 32 nation-members, ended March 10 and represented a singularly successful session from the U.S. standpoint. The following is a preliminary assessment for the Department’s possible use in transmitting to those posts we approached on HRC issues. USDel believes that the pre-session groundwork efforts at USUN and in capitals with other governments contributed importantly to the overall positive outcome of the session.

2. The conference was generally characterized by an atmosphere of principled compromise and substantive progress on most of the human rights issues before it. Confrontations were rare and when they did occur the Soviets-EE's and especially the Cubans were more often the losers than the U.S. and WEO’s.

3. For the first time meaningful follow-up action was taken under the HRC’s confidential “1503” procedures, i.e., closed debates and votes. Moreover Uganda was the first country ever to be singled out for further investigation under these procedures. A “prominent African” is to be approached to investigate conditions there. Additionally a decision was taken to require Equatorial Guinea either to respond meaningfully to the complaints against it under the confidential procedures or be confronted with a public debate at next year’s session. Solid African pressure (Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Rwanda, and especially Senegal and Nigeria) pushed through these decisions over Soviet-EE and some other Third World opposition. It was decided to ask the Secretary-General to establish “contacts” with Paraguay to obtain further infor-

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mation on the situation there. Decisions were also taken to keep the situations “under review” in Bolivia, Malawi, South Korea, and Ethiopia. Uruguay will be asked to provide additional information on “respect for human rights” and to provide “fullest possible explanation” re the “prospects for an early restoration of political rights” in that country. Their responses will be considered at the next HRC. While Indonesia, Korea and Ethiopia were treated more lightly than the magnitude of complaints against those countries would seem to merit, all will be kept under scrutiny and have been asked to continue their cooperation with the HRC.

4. Public resolutions were adopted on Chile, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, Palestinian self-determination rights, South African apartheid policies and South African-Western “assistance.” However we believe it is fair to say that when these are considered together with the 1503 decisions the HRC clearly disavowed selective morality.

5. Specifically, the Chile resolution was shaped to accommodate U.S. conditions for co-sponsorship to the extent that the Cubans and Yugoslavs withdrew their co-sponsorship in the eleventh hour. A particular point of contention was whether or not the resolution would “take note” of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission’s most recent report on conditions in Chile. This was anathema to Cuba which regards this as an implicit expression of support for the OAS.

6. As in other multilateral fora, the Soviets raised the issue of the neutron bomb under the item concerning the impact on human rights of scientific and technological development (see septels). However their efforts were only rhetorical and tentative and they did not in the end press the issue via an allegedly Polish resolution (circulated informally). Indeed the Soviets responded weakly to strong UK and U.S. statements on the issue.

7. The Arab-Israeli resolutions were tough and clearly unacceptable to the U.S. but, in light of particularly strong Arab emotions at this juncture in the Middle East dispute, they could have been much worse. Part A of one resolution condemned the Israeli settlements policy and alleged torture of “prisoners of war.” Part B of the same resolution, however, was substantively unchanged from the 1977 resolution regarding applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories, in order expressly to enable U.S. participation in a consensus. The final Arab resolution asserted a Palestinian right to self-determination to be pursued (implicitly) by armed struggle. It was sig-

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4 Telegram 2317 from Geneva, February 15; telegram 3496 from Geneva, March 6; and telegram 3792 from Geneva, March 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780069–0465; D780101–0039; and D780108–0500)
significant, however, that the tone of these resolutions was moderated to split the WEO’s between consistent U.S. and Canadian “no” votes and other WEO abstentions.

8. The HRC also adopted two South African resolutions. The first dealt with the HRC working group report on Southern African human rights violations. However, due to African desires to avoid provoking outright Western, especially U.S. opposition, it was toned down substantially and rhetorically from the counterpart resolution adopted in 1977, despite Cuban preferences and pressure for explicit endorsement of the 1977 Havana Seminar decisions on Africa. Similarly a resolution concerning WEO commercial-nuclear links with South Africa was also notably free of anti-Western verbiage. Instead the emphasis was on introducing pressures for practical application of the concept of apartheid as an international crime. This was coupled with other resolutions bearing on implementation of the Anti-Apartheid Convention and the celebration of 1978 as International Anti-Apartheid Year. It is possible that for the longer term the Africans have decided to move for increased practical pressures in UN fora rather than indulgence in emotional anti-Western outbursts.

9. UN human rights machinery: HRC actions on improving human rights reporting and procedural mechanisms were mixed but generally positive. Other Commission members were clearly unreceptive to endorsing or taking steps toward the creation of the post of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights despite our strong urging. This idea was listed along with a number of other suggestions bearing on practical aspects of the UN human rights machinery that are to be studied in an overall analysis to be presented to the next session. However, if considered against intense Soviet efforts to have the idea either disavowed or buried permanently, the fact that the concept has been kept alive and will be discussed further is significant. Clearly a lot more work has to be done with the Third World countries who seem to perceive a High Commissioner as being uniquely a high level investigator with a UN carte blanche to interfere with or embarrass member states.

10. Similarly, a Jordanian proposal to lengthen HRC sessions was not pressed to a vote, but forwarded as an idea to be considered in the overall analysis exercise, when it became apparent there was insufficient Commission support.

11. However, the Commission did adopt an Indian initiated resolution advocating the creation by all UN members of national human rights commissions. Even more significantly, the Commission adopted a Nigerian proposal calling for the creation of regional human rights commissions where none presently exist. It was stated publicly as well as privately by Third World proponents, e.g., Egypt, that the intended model for Africa is the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. We consider these ideas sound steps in the right direction and find even more significance for our long range human rights policy in the fact that key Third World countries initiated and pressed them to formal adoption. In sum, others well outside the WEO human rights “bloc” are independently moving to enhance human rights mechanisms.

12. The U.S. role as a prime mover in the HRC was preserved by the re-election of Ambassador W. Beverly Carter, Jr., (23 votes) to the HRC’s Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This body, comprising 26 members serving in a private expert capacity, is the channel through which complaints of human rights violations lodged with the UN are directed for scrutiny and recommendations for transmittal to the HRC.

13. Cambodian human rights violations were eased into the spotlight of UN attention by consensus adoption of a “decision” that asks the Secretary-General to submit the relevant records of this session’s proceedings to the Government of “Democratic” Kampuchea for its response. That response together with “all information which may be available about the situation” is to be reported back to the HRC next year through the subcommission. The decision was a compromise on a UK-initiated resolution that called for a more straightforward investigation. However, minimal as the decision was, it was implicitly critical and seems to permit the consideration by the HRC of information submitted from all sources, including the detailed charges made in the UK’s speech. Successful pursuit of the case against Cambodia will require close and careful coordination before the 1978 HRC session.

14. Additionally, the Commission was able to address, at least initially, far more agenda items than it has been able to in recent years. Results were mixed. The most notable failure was the effort to move forward on a draft declaration on religious intolerance. The draft foundered due to angry Third World opposition (Moslem and Christian alike), to Soviet insistence on language providing for the freedom not to believe in a religion. On other subjects, initial steps were taken by the establishment of various working groups to come up with proposals on measures to (a) promote rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; (b) enhance rights of migrant workers; and (c) reconsider the religious intolerance declaration. The Swedish-initiated text of a draft convention against torture was accepted as a basis for further discussion by a working group to meet just before the next HRC session. UN member states will submit comments that will be compiled for the working group’s consideration. Under the heading of the role of youth in promoting human rights, the issue of conscientious objection to military service was held over for the HRC agenda.
15. One area of particular potential concern for the U.S. emerged at this HRC: the American Indian issue. A representative of the International Indian Treaty Council spoke twice, as reported septel.5 Speaking on the item of the right of self-determination the IITC effectively presented though exaggerated the argument of consistent USG denial of this right to our Indian population. They again spoke late in the session on the topic of alleged calculated judicial prejudice against Indians and alleged brutal mistreatment of Indian prison inmates. While no resolutions were presented, the statements at this session may well be laying the groundwork for escalated action at future HRC sessions.

16. Many other delegations were favorably impressed by the USRep’s reply to the first of the above statements that we welcomed the Indians’ use of the HRC forum, and promised continued USG efforts to respond to Indian complaints. However, it was our impression that most other countries, quite apart from the Soviets-EE’s, believe the Indians’ complaints have some validity. Unless we show positive improvement in this area, we might find others raising this subject at a later time.

17. Lastly, the Commission must also be considered from the standpoint of its function as a forum to expound and exchange views, as well as to function as a mechanism. From this standpoint the U.S. also profited considerably. For example, Soviet discrimination against its Christians and Jews was raised vigorously for the first time in recent years in strong statements by U.S. Chief Delegate Mezvinsky and Congressman John Buchanan. Several Christian and Jewish non-governmental organization reps, as well as the Israeli observer del here, expressed their deep appreciation. Additionally there were several exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR, Cuban and Argentine dels. None responded and all seemed decisively outpointed when the U.S. offered to accept HRC investigation of racial ethnic minority human rights in America upon the expectation that the Soviets, Cubans and Argentinians would also open their doors to the HRC to investigate the complaints against them.

18. However, exchanges of rhetorical blows were rare. More striking, particularly in the closed session debate, was the lead in defense of respect for human rights taken by such developing countries as Senegal, Nigeria, Colombia, Lesotho and Panama. These responded strongly to reject Soviet-Cuban arguments that revolutionary situations

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5 In telegram 1941 from Geneva, February 8, the U.S. delegation indicated that Jimmy Durham, representing the International Indian Treaty Council, had delivered a statement on February 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780060–0167) In telegram 2116 from Geneva, February 10, the delegation reported that Mezvinsky had delivered a statement to the Commission in response to Durham’s earlier statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780067–0543)
“justified” the violation of human rights in the interests of the “majority.” There was also a notably high level of debate on the Southern African issues. The theme pressed time and again was that the West was “guilty” of a double standard on human rights by refusing to take practical action on South Africa. Even this debate had some comfortable moments for the U.S. when, for example, the delegate from Lesotho in tracing historic low points of man’s inhumanity to man cited “Prague, 1968.” Nevertheless, it was clear that South Africa will continue to be one of the most important measures of U.S. moral credibility in this forum.

19. Indeed the Africans throughout the HRC were the key, generally controlling factors. In particular Keba M’baye, Chief Justice of Senegal, proved himself to be a superb chairman. As Department will recall, he promised and delivered a credible and creditable session of the HRC. He was a tough and efficient manager of session proceedings and yet politically deft enough to pre-empt several developing confrontations by work behind the scenes to obtain consensus actions or at least soften the sting of decisions unacceptable to US (African and Arab-Israeli issues) and to others. USDel would strongly recommend that Department consider an appropriate expression of U.S. appreciation for M’baye’s contribution at the highest levels in Senegal. Indeed only next year when M’baye is no longer in the chair of the HRC will we be able to see clearly whether this session was a phenomenon or a step forward toward a fragile but promising new international human rights understanding. In any event this session has demonstrated that human rights objectives in the UN fora can be pursued with, rather than in spite of, the Third World.

20. The private remarks of a Soviet DelOff to one of our DelOffs yesterday suggest the Soviets are considerably less than content with this session. The Soviet observed that the U.S. should be pleased with the meeting’s result. Our DelOff remarked that share-and-share alike was presumably acceptable to any Marxist-Leninist. The Soviet response was: “yes, but not here.”

Vanden Heuvel

6 Reference is to the late August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
126. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 20, 1978

SUBJECT
Department Position on Fascell/Fraser Bill to Establish an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom

Issue for Decision
Whether the Department should support the legislation introduced by Congressmen Dante Fascell and Donald Fraser to establish an “Institute for Human Rights and Freedom.”

Essential Factors
Congressmen Fascell and Fraser introduced legislation on March 7 to establish an independent Federal agency, the Institute for Human Rights and Freedom. The Institute, modeled in part on the National Endowment of the Arts and the Inter-American Foundation, would provide financial and other assistance to private individuals and groups to “openly carry out and promote international respect and observance for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

Our support is expected on the bill. Endorsing it will yield certain advantages. Opposing it, however, will certainly entail significant political disadvantages.

To date this Administration, which has identified itself fully with a higher priority for human rights, has opposed virtually all legislative human rights initiatives since taking office, thereby raising doubts as to our intentions. The Institute bill is receiving wide support on the Hill.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780066–1957. Limited Official Use. Sent through Christopher, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Schneider on March 14; concurred in by Runyon and Hume, who did not initial the memorandum. Kreisberg initialed the memorandum on Lake’s behalf. The date is hand-stamped.

2 Fascell and Fraser introduced H.R. 11326 in the House on March 7, whereupon it was referred to the House Committee on International Relations. Zablocki, under a March 14 letter to Vance, sent a copy of the bill to the Department of State, requesting the Department’s comments on the proposed legislation. H.R. 11326 outlined the functions, bureaucratic structure, powers, and responsibilities of the proposed Institute for Human Rights and Freedom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780039–2463)
and has Brzezinski’s support (see attachment).3 It is being referred to on the Hill as being a “motherhood” Bill.) Hearings tentatively are scheduled in the House for April 5 and 6.4 The Bill is also receiving substantial support from the NGO community including church groups, the International Commission of Jurists, Freedom House, and the International League for Human Rights.

The authors of the legislation have emphasized the autonomy and independence of the Institute. It will be governed by a seven-member board of directors appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It would have a staff of no more than twenty-five members. The board members are to be chosen from among “individuals in private life with a demonstrated concern for, and experience in matters pertaining to, human rights and fundamental freedoms.” No more than four directors may be in the same political party. The term would be for six years with appointments staggered every two years. An executive director selected by the board would be the day-to-day manager.

The funding of the Institute would be through annual appropriations with a $5 million authorization for FY ’79. It would be a non-profit corporation able to accept private bequests as well.

The Bill attempts to ensure that the Institute would be aware of U.S. foreign policy concerns while avoiding the suspicion that it is an instrument of U.S. policy.

The Bill states “the Secretary of State shall keep the Institute informed on U.S. foreign policy as it relates to activities of the Institute. The Institute shall give consideration to the foreign policy of the U.S. in carrying out this act but shall not be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State in carrying out its responsibilities under this Act.”

Possible amendments to this section could range from having the Secretary’s designee sitting as an ex-officio member of the board, or, as in the case of the Inter-American Foundation, with voting powers. More acceptable to the authors might be a provision which stated that the board should maintain liaison with the Department and invite the Secretary’s designee to participate in its deliberations.

The Institute’s functions according to the legislation are to provide assistance to human rights NGO’s “by means consistent with the UN

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3 Attached but not printed. In the March 13 letter to Fraser, Brzezinski wrote: “I have learned of your sponsorship along with others of H.R. 11326 which would create an Institute for Human Rights. I heartily support you and the other sponsors in that effort. I believe that such an institute will significantly contribute on a global basis to the improvement of respect for human rights.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780066–1963)

4 The hearings began on April 13. See Document 135.
Charter and other international obligations of the U.S.”, to run or support conferences and seminars, to provide assistance for the publication of books and displays of art suppressed for political reasons, carrying out research and studies, assisting NGOs which support victims of political persecution and their families including the provision of legal aid. Such assistance can only be with the consent of the recipient and must be provided openly. If activities are carried out in a foreign country, they must be consistent with the laws of that country. One approach could be to try to restrict the Institute to informational activities, including arranging for conferences, and research on human rights, and even of publication or display in the U.S. of books and art banned abroad, but eliminate funding for organizations, individuals, and activities abroad which would provide the greatest chance of seriously embarrassing our foreign policy. The sponsors of the legislation are likely to resist such constraints strongly, however, since one of their principal motivations is to assist the legal defense of individuals and groups imprisoned or arrested on human rights grounds abroad.

Possible Options

1. Support the Fascell/Fraser Bill.

   Pro
   
   —Such an entity can be helpful in supporting efforts to improve human rights conditions abroad and in expanding our knowledge and understanding of human rights issues.
   
   —Places the USG in support of a Congressional human rights initiative.
   
   —The Institute will be a key mechanism to support those private NGOs in the human rights field and our support will be viewed favorably by that constituency.
   
   —Will expand U.S. influence with human rights constituencies overseas.

   Con
   
   —Some countries may object to activities of the NGOs which are supported by the Institute and blame the USG because of our funding of the Institute.
   
   —There would be no control over the Institute’s activities by the Department of State so that activities it undertook could cause difficulties in our bilateral relations with repressive regimes.

2. Support the legislation but endorse amendments to increase the State Department’s role in the direction of the Institute’s activities.

   Pro
   
   —It would place the USG in support of the general human rights thrust of the bill.
—It would provide for the possibility of greater State Department control over the activities of the Institute and diminish the likelihood of conflicts with U.S. foreign policy concerns.

*Con*

—The value of the Institute is in part its independence which will avoid the appearance of being an instrument of U.S. policy thus permitting activities to be undertaken that the State Department could not fund and making it more acceptable internationally.

—Since it is unlikely we would get more than one State Department board member, we would never have complete control and yet we would be held far more responsible for all of its activities by others.

3. Support establishment of an Institute but propose limiting its functions to holding of conferences and conducting of research on human rights issues, but not providing funding or grants for individuals or organizations, or sponsoring any activity in foreign countries.

*Pro*

—It would provide a basis for individuals concerned with human rights to meet regularly and exchange views and information.

—It would meet a need for clarifying some basic concepts in the human rights field, particularly economic and social human rights.

—It would eliminate the chance of serious foreign policy embarrassment as a result of disbursement of funds to groups or individuals whose activities could be strongly resented and objected to by foreign governments.

*Con*

—Would not meet the interest of the sponsors in providing funding for responsible human rights groups.

—May be criticized by some NGOs which look to the funding aspect of the Bill.

—Could be criticized as an Administration attempt to “gut” the Bill and eliminate an independent voice in the human rights field, and thus “undercut” our human rights policy position.

4. Oppose the legislation and argue that all of its proposed activities can be undertaken by existing agencies.

*Pro*

—Clearly places the Department in opposition to the creation of another agency, one whose ultimate activities through NGOs would affect conditions in other countries and U.S. bilateral interests.
—Avoid the creation of another agency while directing existing agencies, perhaps the National Endowment for the Humanities, to undertake some of its research and conference supporting functions.

Con

—It would produce a significant opposition on the Hill and in the NGO community and undercut the Administration’s human rights policy.

—It would alienate key human rights and foreign policy supporters.

—Existing agencies, including the Endowment, are both currently restricted in their funding and would find it difficult to move into this area even to a limited extent and many of the proposed activities could not be undertaken under present charters of those agencies.

Recommendation

That you endorse Option 1 (supported by HA, H and L).
That you endorse Option 2.
That you endorse Option 3 (supported by S/P).
That you approve Option 4.5

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5 There is no indication as to whether Vance approved or disapproved any of the four options.
MEMORANDUM From the Global Issues Cluster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, March 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Evening Report

Daily Activities

[Omitted here is information unrelated to human rights.]

Mathews attended a lunch sponsored by UNA where State-Treasury-NSC representatives were to brief representatives of the human rights NGOs on our efforts to broaden international acceptance for implementing human rights policy through the IFIs. This group is usually united in its criticism of the Administration’s human rights policy. After a long discussion of the issues, Nachmanoff asked those present to say how they would have voted on a recent loan to Chile which supported basic human needs. The results were little short of astounding. About half said they would have voted for that loan, and about half against. Even among those who voted the same way, the reasons were completely different. We then went around the table twice more—once on a loan for agricultural aid to Laos, and then on a non-basic human needs loan for Romania—with the same results. Everyone was sobered by this experiment. I made the plea that they would take the message to the Hill—that the Christopher Group faces a fiendishly difficult task, and that much of the recent criticism of it has been wildly inflated and irresponsible. This discussion demonstrated again that whenever outsiders sit down and force themselves to address the issues in a detailed, case-by-case fashion, they are immediately hit by the difficulties. The message certainly got through. For my part, I have never felt so good about the efforts of the Christopher Group.\(^2\)

[Omitted here is information unrelated to human rights.]

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\(^2\) Brzezinski placed a line in the right-hand margin next to the last two sentences and wrote “good.”
128. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Luers) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, March 23, 1978

SUBJECT
Institute for Human Rights and Freedom

Can we head off the Fascell/Fraser proposal to establish an “Institute for Human Rights and Freedom”? 

There is one series of arguments that just might persuade both Don Fraser and Dante Fascell to revise their proposal. It goes like this:

—We agree fully that the U.S. Government needs more program money directed overtly toward the promotion of human rights.

—We have been discussing with the Endowments for the Humanities and the Arts, with USIA/ICA, with the Library of Congress, HEW and other agencies how significantly to increase budgetary programs for conferences, publication of books, art displays and research into human rights problems.

—Our approach has been to expand the activities of existing government agencies in all these activities so as to promote an integrated human rights policy. Our objective is for all agencies of government to think human rights when they act internationally and domestically.

—Part of the problem in redirecting budgets and programs toward human rights programs has been one of mandate. How “political” should the Endowments for example become in their domestic and international funding? Another problem has been one of inertia. How to get agencies and individuals to think “human rights” when they act?

—The best approach would be for the Congress to give a clear mandate to or indeed instruct specific government agencies to expand significantly funding of the human rights programs envisaged for the “Institute”.

—The advantages of such an approach are persuasive:

... We would not create still another government bureaucracy that could consume as much in overhead as in program money.

... We would require the major government agencies to develop programs to promote human rights—thereby integrating human rights

more directly into the daily operations and thinking of the bureaucracy. Surely this is the major objective.

—We would designate a senior advisor to the President to assure that the major government agencies carry out this mandate.

—We would be prepared to give you specific draft legislation to redirect budgets of key agencies to cover virtually all of the programs envisaged by the “Institute”.

—If in two years time you do not witness a significant expansion of government positive programs for human rights we will strongly endorse your call for a separate “Institute”.

I have talked to Don and Dante along these lines and found them receptive to this line of reasoning. It may be too late to head off the enthusiasm developing for the Institute. But I am persuaded it is worth a try if the Executive Branch is prepared to demonstrate it can and will redirect existing budgets into positive human rights programs. They should be approached separately and informally.

I have also had discussions over the past four months with the two Endowments, with USIA/ICA and other agencies. I am convinced that all the major agencies would be willing and able to expand considerably their funding of human rights programs. I can provide you with a more elaborate agenda of the possible programs each of the agencies can and should undertake.

I have also been consulting outside government and have a pretty good feel for what would be acceptable in the way of U.S. Government money. Publishers, voluntary agencies, NGO’s and others in this area are quite justifiably chary of direct funding. But there are solutions and opportunities which I could suggest.
129. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider)¹

Washington, March 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Critique of Human Rights Reports by Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, Press Conference, March 22

On March 22, a press conference was held by Congressman Tom Harkin and The Human Rights Working Group of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy (a group of national church and social action NGOs) to release a critique of the Department of State’s Human Rights Reports to Congress. Substantive criticism was made of the Reports’ depiction of human rights conditions in the following 13 countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia (see attached).² At the same time, the Coalition acknowledged “vast improvements” over the Reports issued last year.

Congressman Harkin made every effort to balance the Coalition’s and his own criticism with positive comments about the Reports and State Department efforts (see attached statement).³

I am submitting the Critique and Congressman Harkin’s statement to you and would welcome your comments.

The Coalition intends to launch a major lobbying effort with Congress to oppose the Administration’s Security Assistance program for Fiscal Year 1979 as it affects these 13 countries. Congressman Harkin in particular endorsed reduction of security assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, SHUM—NGO 1979–80 HRWG Washington Coalition. No classification marking. Sent to Walker, Oakley, Luers, Sober, Cutter, Hormats, and Bushnell. Drafted by Roberta Cohen, who sent Schneider a copy under a March 23 typewritten note and indicated that the memorandum was sent out “because of the large numbers of requests for the documentation. Patt Derian okayed a similar memo to Warren Christopher (attached) and Ollie Jones has sent out a memo too (attached).” (Ibid.) The undated memorandum from Derian to Christopher and a March 24 memorandum prepared by Jones are also ibid.

² Attached but not printed is a March 22 memorandum from Cohen to Derian and Schneider summarizing the criticism and Harkin’s comments. (Ibid.)

130. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holbrooke) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, March 24, 1978

Position on the Fascell/Fraser Bill To Establish an Institute For Human Rights and Freedom

The attached memorandum (Tab A)\textsuperscript{2} recommending options regarding the Fascell/Fraser Bill (HR 11320) to establish an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom has just come to my attention. Since the establishment of a U.S. Government-funded organization to provide support for private (non-governmental) human rights activities in foreign countries has potential political consequences for our bilateral relations with a number of East Asian countries, I would like to let you know this Bureau’s opinions regarding Departmental support for the bill as it is now drafted (text of bill is at Tab B).\textsuperscript{3}

I would like to associate EA with the position taken by S/P\textsuperscript{4}—to support the bill if certain changes are made. I do believe that such an Institute could provide valuable support for the Administration’s human rights policy while enhancing the degree of cooperation with the non-governmental organizations concerned.

My reservations concern two provisions of the bill, notably a mandate for the Institute (as an agent of the U.S. Government) to disseminate material in foreign countries that has been suppressed by their governments and, secondly, the proposed charter for the Institute to operate independently of the Secretary of State. Other provisions of the bill include authorization for the Director of the Institute to “make and perform contract and other agreements with any nongovernmental person however designated” (Sec. 7.(a)(3)), authorization for the Institute to draw upon “information, services, facilities, officers, and employees” of any private or USG organization (Sec. 7.(a)(7)), and authorization for it to “make advances, grants, and loans to any nongovernmental person, whether within or without the U.S.” (Sec. 7.(a)(9)).

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780066–1955. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Martens and Frank Bennett. A typewritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: “This memo has been OBE’d. No further action will be taken at this time. Per D/S. Oxman, 4/12/78.

\textsuperscript{2} Not attached. Printed as Document 126.

\textsuperscript{3} Not attached.

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 131.
The Department, under your direction and utilizing our Ambassadors, has had success in carrying out the President’s human rights policies abroad. Essential to this has been the role the Department and our Ambassadors have played in determining the best tactics for obtaining our objectives and ensuring proper coordination of all USG agencies in Washington and abroad. We have been successful in convincing many governments of the need for them to ameliorate human rights conditions. If an autonomous agency of the USG enters the field abroad, we will face a more difficult task since there is bound to be a lack of synchronization in our actions. The effectiveness of the US human rights policy, and its credibility in this field, would very likely be diminished rather than enhanced. We will surely find, for example, that the actions of the new Institute would be seen by some governments as USG support for opposition efforts to overthrow or destabilize them.

Recommendation:

That you convene a meeting of Assistant Secretaries to discuss the Fascell/Fraser Bill.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) There is no indication as to whether Christopher approved or disapproved this recommendation.
The Human Rights Institute

The following is an additional option (option 5) to the memorandum sent you by HA, H, and S/P on March 20. It is based on a suggestion by Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers of EUR (attached).

Option 5. Propose, as an alternative to a new Human Rights Institute, that the Administration and Congress act together to increase the human rights roles of existing government entities such as the Endowments for the Humanities and the Arts, USIA/ICA, Library of Congress, and HEW. Congress would give them an express mandate, and funding, to increase their programs for conferences, publications, exhibits, and research into human rights problems. A senior advisor to the President would be designated to oversee and coordinate their human rights activities.

Pro

—Would integrate human rights more directly into the daily operations and thinking of the bureaucracy. Might do more to institutionalize a concern for human rights into American policy than creation of a separate entity.

—Would avoid the creation of a new bureaucracy which might at times be at variance with Administration policy.

—Would not risk tarnishing NGO’s with an Administration embrace.
Con

—Might lead Congress to mandate some of the specific elements of the Human Rights Institute legislation which pose foreign policy problems into the programs of existing Government agencies.

—Might be seen as Administration resistance to the idea of a truly independent voice on human rights issues.

—Might be taken by human rights activists on the Hill as an additional good idea, rather than as an alternative to the proposed Institute.4

4 There is no indication as to whether Vance approved or disapproved the recommendation, although a notation in an unknown hand written on the first page of the memorandum reads: “CV has read—action returned to S/P” with a stamped date of April 4.

132. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to President Carter1

Washington, March 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Letter from Congressional Group That Recently Visited Latin America

We have reviewed the letter given to you last week by the seven Congressmen who recently visited Latin America. Their principal claim is that we have been “overly rigid” in bringing human rights con-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Material, RC # 1126, Box 3 of 9. Confidential. Christopher, in a March 22 memorandum to Vance, indicated that he had drafted the memorandum to the President “from the two of us because he sent the Congressmen’s letter to each of us. You may prefer to respond alone. The proposed response is longer than I would like, but I think it is important for him to see the numbers and countries involved.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memoranda to the Secretary—1978)
Considerations to bear on economic assistance decisions, especially as to votes in the IFIs.²

We are committed to the proposition that it is preferable to use positive actions ("rewards") and normal diplomatic channels rather than "sanctions" in pursuing our human rights objectives. However, in addition to the general thrust of our human rights policy, we are explicitly required by a wide array of federal statutes to oppose grants or loans to human rights violators.

We have acted with moderation in these matters. Of the over 400 loans that have been voted on in the IFIs since January 1977, we have voted against only nine and abstained on only 14 on human rights grounds. In addition, we have sought to defer consideration of about 20 loans pending human rights developments in the countries in question; in several of these cases the deferrals were only temporary.

The countries that applied for the loans as to which we cast negative votes, abstained, or obtained postponements number only 13, as follows:

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<th>No Votes</th>
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We have also been moderate in withholding or delaying our bilateral economic aid on human rights grounds. Of hundreds of AID projects that have been considered since January 1977, we deferred only 22, five of which were subsequently approved. The very low ratio of deferral results from the fact that virtually all of these projects meet basic human needs. Only six countries were involved, as follows:

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² During January 1978, Representatives Moorhead, Minish, LaFalce, Wilson, Stanton, Brown, and Hyde traveled to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia to investigate IADB projects within those nations. In a March 16 letter to the President, the Representatives asserted, “in practice the Presidential and Congressional directives have been too rigidly applied. We concluded that overly rigid application of human rights position by economic sanctions through multilateral agencies are not effective and are probably counterproductive.” After offering their support for the President’s statements on human rights, the co-authors expressed their belief that the Department of State “has overreacted to expressions from the President and the Congress in a way that is not only detrimental to the United States but also to the people about whose human rights we are concerned.” The President’s handwritten notations on the letter instructed that both Vance and Christopher receive copies of it. (Ibid.)
The Congressmen allude to “conditions” in the legislation that would “permit flexible administration.” They are presumably referring to the fact that the human rights provisions apply only to governments engaged in “a consistent pattern of gross violations” of human rights and that even as to such governments the amendment permits approval if the loan or project would directly benefit the needy. However, there can be little doubt that the governments of the countries listed above are (or were at the time of the vote) engaged in serious violations of human rights, some in greater degree than others. As for the other “condition” in the legislation—the “needy people” exception—we have already put as much strain on it as it can bear.

All of our actions in this area are the result of deliberations by the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. The Group was set up last April pursuant to an NSC directive. To promote better understanding of the lengths to which we have gone to assure that our foreign assistance programs reflect our human rights concerns, we have prepared the attached summary of the Group’s background and operations (Tab 1). This summary stresses that the Group’s main purpose is to carry out the applicable statutory provisions and that it has full representation from State’s geographical bureaus as well as current information from our embassies in the countries involved.

Our human rights policy is by no means all “sanctions”. Consistent with P.D. 30, we are intensifying efforts to direct a growing share of our bilateral economic assistance to governments that show respect for human rights. We are also encouraging the IFI managements to channel their lending to countries with good human rights records and to programs that serve basic human needs. We have urged several of our allies to convey the same message to IFI managements, and we believe some of them are about to do so. (As you know, in response to P.D. 30, an interagency study is underway on the effectiveness of recent U.S. actions in the IFIs, and it will shed further light on the issues dis-


4 See Document 119.
discussed above.) In general, we believe that greater emphasis on “rewards” rather than “sanctions” can lead to beneficial results.

A proposed response to the Congressmen is attached under Tab 2.

5 The Interagency Group’s report is printed as Document 139.
6 Attached but not printed is the undated “suggested reply” from the President. The April 12 letter the President sent to Moorhead and a handwritten May 10 note from Oxman to Christopher indicating that Carter had “sent the letter we gave him, with some modifications that made it even stronger” are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Withdrawn Material, RC #1126, Box 3 of 9.

133. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moose) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, April 6, 1978

Department Position on the Fascell-Fraser Bill to Establish an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom

The March 20 Action Memorandum on the Fascell-Fraser Bill (HR 11320) has just come to my attention. Because the establishment of a U.S. Government-funded institute whose charter would include the funding of activities in foreign countries would impact on our bilateral relations with a number of African states, I believe you should have this Bureau’s views regarding the text of the bill as now drafted.

I want to associate AF with the position taken by S/P in the Action Memorandum of March 20th. Specifically, we in AF would also support the establishment of an Institute, but propose that it not be authorized to fund or otherwise carry on independent activities overseas.

I am particularly concerned with provisions of the bill that authorize the Institute (an agent of the U.S. government) to disseminate material in foreign countries and to carry on what amount to official operations.

2 See Document 126.
ations overseas independent of the Secretary of State. It seems to me that the overseas functions envisaged in the Fascell-Fraser bill are best assigned to the International Communication Agency, which is already heavily involved in supporting our human rights policy through seminars, international visitor grants and informational programs.

I also question the probity of the provisions of Section 7 (b) of the Bill, which would seem to authorize the Institute to establish branch offices in foreign countries. Such authorization, coupled with other provisions of the bill cited above, would appear to me to run counter to a long series of Presidential Directives vesting Chiefs of Mission with responsibility and authority to oversee the operations of all U.S. civilian agencies represented in the country to which they are accredited.

134. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), the Legal Adviser (Hansell), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, April 6, 1978

SUBJECT
The Human Rights Institute

Our suggested modifications to the Fascell-Fraser bill should aim at enhancing the proposed Institute’s independence of the Administration (and so limiting our responsibility for its choices of which human rights causes to take up) and at somewhat insulating the Institute itself from controversial political issues. We believe such changes would be in the interest of the Institute; the NGOs it supports; and the Administration.

This could be accomplished by the following specific changes in the Fascell-Fraser draft:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780087–0678. Unclassified. Sent through Christopher, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Jennone Walker. Kreisberg initialed the memorandum for Derian; Marks initialed for Hansell. Not found attached is a copy of the draft Fascell-Fraser bill.
—The Institute should be authorized to assist only nongovernmental organizations abroad, not individuals, (Sections 3. (a) (1) p. 2; 3. (b) (1), p. 3; 7 (a) (3) p. 7; and (7) (a) (9), p. 8).

—All of the activities and programs assisted by the Institute abroad should be through NGOs, not directly (Sections 1–7).

—The Institute should not enjoy Executive mail privileges (Section 7. (a) (6), p. 3).

—It should not have access to Government “information, services, facilities, officers, and employees” (Section 7. (a) (7), p. 8). While agencies would have the right to deny this access, doing so would put them in an uncomfortable position. Granting the access would tie the Institute too closely to the Executive.

In addition, we think either the bill itself or its legislative history should make clear that the Institute’s grants to nongovernmental organizations are to be for generic rather than specific purposes: e.g., to legal aid in a particular country, but not for defense of a specific individual. It should be clear that no arm of the USG will get into the business of deciding who is a legitimate human rights victim in, for instance, South Korea or Iran—or of telling NGOs whom to consider legitimate victims.

Most of us think the Institute should be specifically prohibited from assisting groups which engage in or support terrorism or violence. L believes this is sufficiently covered by the bill’s requirement that the Institute act in accordance with international law and the UN Charter, and that trying to define terrorism or violence would only raise problems.

Finally, we think the Institute should have offices only in the United States. While it will be operating in foreign countries, it should not set up permanent shop in any of them, lest it become directly engaged in controversial situations. (Section 7. (b), p. 8).

L sees no legal obstacle to the Institute’s providing legal defense to human rights victims, via NGOs, as envisioned in the draft bill.

Recommendation:

That the Deputy Secretary propose these modifications to Fascell and Fraser when he calls them to say he is willing to testify on the Hill.2

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2 There is no indication as to whether Vance approved or disapproved the recommendation, however, a typewritten note on the first page of the memorandum reads: “This memo is OBE’d. Meetings were held with Mr. Fascell, et al., in which the subject was discussed. No further action will be taken. Per D/SO 5/8/78.”
135. Memorandum From Roberta Cohen of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider)

Washington, April 17, 1978

SUBJECT

Congressional Hearings on Human Rights Institute Bill, April 13, 1978

Hearings on the Fraser-Fascell bill to establish an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom began April 13. They were held jointly by the Subcommittee on International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations.

Five witnesses were heard and all testified in favor of the bill. They were: Frank Newman (Justice, Supreme Court of California); Alan U. Schwartz (Counsel, International Freedom to Publish Committee); Leonard Meeker (Director, International Project, Center for Law and Social Policy); Stephen I. Schlossberg (Director of Government and Public Affairs, UAW, accompanied by Leo A. Suslow, Director of International Affairs Department, UAW); and Jan Nowak (former Director of Polish Broadcasting, Radio Free Europe).

Functions of the Institute (Section 3 (a))

Several amendments and suggestions were made with regard to the functions of the Institute:

1) Conferences and Seminars—One amendment was the deletion of the provision that the Institute support or sponsor conferences and seminars on human rights (3 (a) (2)). Frank Newman argued that there had already been too many conferences and seminars. If the provision were not deleted, it should be re-worded to provide for conferences and seminars that “would not just talk about human rights” but give serious consideration to “how to promote increased respect for and observance of human rights.”

In contrast, Jan Nowak proposed that in addition to the holding of conferences and seminars in the United States, they should be held around the world in order to encourage the establishment of an International Institute on Human Rights.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 15, Human Rights Center. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Derian, Morin, Jennone Walker, Oxman, and Runyon. David Kenney (H) also prepared a synopsis of the hearings in an April 19 memorandum, which he sent to Bennet, Derian, Oxman, and Walker. (Ibid.)
2) Inclusion of Domestic Human Rights—It was proposed that the Bill refer to domestic human rights. It was felt that either the Institute support domestic human rights programs or that reference be made to the fact that this problem was being handled elsewhere. Otherwise, the Bill would create the impression that the U.S. was interested in promoting human rights “in foreign countries” but not at home, in contravention of its commitments under the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

Frank Newman proposed that the Preamble refer to human rights and fundamental freedom “for all” so that the Bill could not be construed to focus exclusively on foreign countries.

Alan Schwartz noted that because only limited funds were available ($5 million), it might be more appropriate to strengthen the Civil Rights Commission or create a new institution; however, reference should be made to domestic human rights in the Bill. If a larger appropriation were forthcoming, some of the funds could then be donated to organizations for domestic human rights purposes. Stephen Schlossberg concurred with this view.

3) Economic Rights—It was proposed that the promotion of economic rights (in particular health care, trade union rights, etc.) should receive adequate emphasis in the programs funded by the Institute; civil and political liberties should not be the sole focus. (This point was made by Stephen Schlossberg—UAW).

4) Creation of New Institutions and Procedures—Attention should be paid to the creation of national and international machinery and procedures (e.g., 1503 procedures) which would fill gaps in existing international human rights protection. Frank Newman\(^2\) said that much could be learned in this regard from the civil rights and civil liberties movements in the U.S. He criticized the State Department for placing insufficient emphasis on the creation of institutions. He objected to its treatment of human rights as “diplomacy” which bargained human rights away. The Department, he said, was focusing too heavily in its speeches on whether prisoners had been released. Warren Christopher’s clearinghouse proposal, he said, was a step in the right direction, but a very small one.\(^3\)

5) Human Rights Awards—Jan Nowak proposed that the Institute make annual awards to individuals who made an outstanding contribution to international human rights or for the articles or books they published. This would protect individuals and also mitigate the effects of censorship.

\(^2\) An unknown hand underlined Frank Newman’s name.
\(^3\) See footnote 4, Document 117.
6) **Assistance to Organizations and Individuals in the U.S.**—Alan Schwartz noted that the Bill specifically mentioned organizations “in the U.S.” only once (Sec. 3(a) (6)). He urged that the Bill ensure funding to groups in the U.S. promoting international human rights and to individuals and their families residing in the U.S. who were the victims of violations, for example, who had been stripped of their citizenship while visiting the U.S.

**Financial Assistance Provided by the Institute (Section 3 (b))**

The following recommendations were made with respect to financial assistance provided by the Institute:

1) **Providing Assistance Openly**—Leonard Meeker proposed the deletion of the phrase “only with the consent of the recipient” from the provision: “Financial or other assistance may be provided under this Act only with the consent of the recipient and shall be provided openly.” (Section 3 (b) (3)). He said its inclusion implied that the Institute might try to provide assistance without the recipient’s consent. He furthermore noted that in some cases, consent could not be gotten. He considered sufficient the phrase “shall be provided openly”. Jan Nowak concurred with this deletion and further proposed the deletion of “provided openly.” He argued that this provision could endanger victims of political oppression; they would be perfectly free to refuse help but should not be involved beyond this point.

Alan Schwartz’ testimony to the contrary stressed the necessity for providing assistance openly. In his opinion, while the Bill’s requirement of complete disclosure of grants of the Institute “may well foreclose the possibility of having grants made to those who require anonymity in order to protect their own security and that of their families, this limitation is far outweighed by the need to have all of the activities of the Institute placed on a fully open basis . . . To permit any covert operation in this area, regardless of the motive, would be counterproductive to the objectives of the Institute.”

In this connection, Mr. Schwartz furthermore proposed that the “detailed report” to be submitted by the Institute to the President and Congress be a published report (Section 9). He noted that whereas Section 4 on Public Information specifically referred to the publication of Institute grants, Section 9 could imply a covert relationship between the Institute and the President and Congress, harmful to the independence of the Institute and to the NGOs and individuals it would support.

2. **Consistency with Foreign Laws**—Leonard Meeker proposed the deletion of the phrase “Assistance provided under this Act for use in a foreign country must be consistent with the laws of that country” (Section 3 (b) (4)). He argued that this phrase would encourage gov-
ernments to find reasons for discouraging assistance, i.e., they would claim that grants made by the Institute violated internal laws. Secondly, he argued, it would be too difficult to determine what was consistent with the laws of another country, and the Institute was not the appropriate body to interpret and apply foreign laws.¹

Jan Nowak concurred; so did Alan Schwartz but he proposed amending the wording to read that assistance provided for use in a foreign country should be consistent with “the various constitutions or other governing documents of that country.” He noted that repressive regimes were “notorious in their desire to put high-flown and democratic phraseology into their constitutions.”

3) Jan Nowak proposed that the Institute “match” privately-raised funds to NGOs in order to enhance and stimulate public support for human rights projects rather than replace it.

Relationship to United States Foreign Policy (Section 5)

Most witnesses stressed the necessity of Institute independence from the U.S. Government. In this connection, Leonard Meeker proposed the deletion of this entire Section. (The Section reads: “The Secretary of State shall keep the Institute fully informed on United States foreign policy as it relates to the activities of the Institute. The Institute shall give consideration to the foreign policy of the United States in carrying out this Act, but shall not be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State in carrying out its responsibilities under this Act.”)

Leonard Meeker further proposed for the same reason that the Institute should not be allowed to avail itself of “the use of information, services, facilities, officers” etc. of the U.S. abroad (Sec. 7 (a) (7)).

Alan Schwartz’s testimony to the contrary supported Section 5 on the grounds that it gave the Institute governmental “clout” with foreign governments and at the same time enabled it to retain its independence.

Management of the Institute (Section 6)

The following amendments were made:

1) Politicization of the Institute—To ensure that the Institute would promote human rights globally and not become the tool of either the right or left (a point raised by Congressman Fraser), Frank Newman proposed that the preamble of the Bill refer to “universal” respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and that Section 6 (Management of the Institute) read that the Board of Directors have a demonstrated concern for, and experience in matters pertaining to “universal

⁴ An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph.
respect for” human rights and fundamental freedoms. This, he commented, could help ensure that issues such as preventive detention in the Federal Republic of Germany, race relations in the U.K. and migrant labor problems in Europe be given adequate attention.

2) Alan Schwartz proposed that all members of the Board of Directors should not be appointed by the President; some should be appointed by Congress. This would ensure that the body which created the Institute would have a continuing voice in its composition.

3) Alan Schwartz further proposed that the Executive Director’s term of office be limited to 4 years with the right to have his term renewed. (The current Bill places no limit on the term.)

4) It was pointed out that the Board should not get locked into trying to give equal attention to all NGOs. Careful criteria should be developed for making grants. Emphasis should be on funding projects that would increase the protection of human rights and not on funding “pet” NGOs.

Corruption of NGOs

Congressman Fraser raised the problem of whether furnishing Government funds to NGOs would “corrupt” them. The general response was no. Some organizations (e.g., the ICJ) already accepted U.S. Government funds and this had not prejudiced their policies, programs or effectiveness. In Alan Schwartz’s view, Government financing would give greater “leverage” to private groups in their dealings with foreign governments. It was noted that in some cases, this problem would not arise because certain NGOs as a matter of principle would reject Government funds. If corruption took place, it would not be on the part of the NGOs but on the part of the Board of the Institute for trying to control the NGOs.

Relationship of the Institute to the Clearinghouse Proposal

Alan Schwartz in his statement seemed to feel that the clearinghouse was in essence created by the establishment of the Institute, since the Institute would coordinate human rights information.

Jan Nowak questioned whether the clearinghouse would have more credibility “if taken over by the Institute assisted in this task by information resources of the State Department” or if it were directly “carried on by the U.S. Government.”
136. Memorandum From Steven Oxman of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, April 28, 1978

SUBJECT
Fraser Amendments

These materials describe the four Fraser amendments to the foreign assistance authorization bill.² The materials also describe L’s preliminary views on the amendments (set forth as Administration positions).

We should aim for having a position by Monday morning,³ H tells me, since the mark-up will resume on Tuesday morning and both Fraser and Zablocki will want to know our position at least a day ahead of time.

I have discussed the amendments with Tony Lake. He feels we should not support them but neither should we spill blood opposing them. Rather, we should explain that we think they raise serious problems. S/P will be giving us a memorandum detailing their views.⁴

My view is that we need not affirmatively support the amendments, but that we should be quite careful in the way we articulate our problems with them and in proposing revisions. In capsule form my views on each of the amendments are as follows. The Tab 1 amendment is palatable and opposition to it would be very hard to explain to the public or the human rights lobbies.⁵ We can say, however, that we think


² Reference is to the FY 1979 international security assistance bill (H.R. 12514), which, in addition to funding MAP, sought to amend certain provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act relating to security assistance and human rights. Members of Congress intended to transfer the security supporting assistance provisions from H.R. 12514 to the FY 1979 international development and food assistance bill (H.R. 12222); however, this did not occur until FY 1981. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, pp. 57–58)

³ May 1.

⁴ Christopher bracketed this paragraph and added the following handwritten notation in the left-hand margin: “Steve, This seems right to me.” The Policy Planning Staff memorandum is printed as Document 138.

⁵ Tab 1, a paper prepared in L that contains a description of the amendment and the Executive Branch position, is attached but not printed. The amendment sought to amend Section 502B(a)(2) of the FAA to ensure that “except under extraordinary circumstances,” the United States would not provide security assistance to any nation engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights.
the current statute is adequate. The Tab 2 and Tab 3 amendments go too far. They would be palatable only if an “extraordinary circumstances” exception were added to them, but in that event they would be unnecessary since the Tab 1 amendment would suffice. The Tab 4 amendment imposes additional reporting requirements: monthly rather than the current quarterly reports and identification of end-users. I think we should take the position that quarterly reports should suffice but that we would be willing to provide end-user information. The L paper at Tab 4 says it would be infeasible to provide such information but I have pressed L on this, and they concede it could be done without much difficulty.

PM and the regional bureaus oppose the amendments. HA supports them but would not object to the modifications I have adumbrated above.

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6 Christopher underlined this sentence and added in the margin: “and preferable. I hesitate to abandon willingly the little flexibility we have. Discuss with Doug how best to support Zablocki.”

7 Tabs 2 and 3 are attached but not printed. The amendment at Tab 2 sought to amend Section 502B to provide that “under no circumstances” would the United States provide international military education and training to any nation engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights. The amendment at Tab 3 prohibited the extension of security assistance to forces performing “police, intelligence, or other internal security functions.”

8 Tab 4 is attached but not printed. The amendment at Tab 4 sought to amend Section 502B in order to accelerate the reporting schedule on Munitions List items and on “FMS ‘exports’ to forces performing ‘police, intelligence or other internal security functions.’ ”

9 Reference is to the section of the paper (see footnote 8 above) summarizing the Executive Branch position on the reporting requirement: “While the Executive Branch is prepared to accede to such reporting requirements as the Congress may impose, reports based solely on the identity of the end-user of exported or sold items are inherently infeasible, especially in the case of commercial exports of Munitions List items, where the licensing system has long been premised not on the identity of the ultimate end-user but on the country of destination and the nature of the item sought to be exported.”
WASHINGTON, APRIL 29, 1978

SUBJECT

Fraser Amendment on 502B

The following are the reasons why HA believes that the Administration’s position should be to support the Fraser Amendment or to adopt a position of not being in opposition to the amendment.2

First, opposing the amendment would place the Administration in the awkward position of opposing a strong human rights condition on security assistance. We would have to defend the position of desiring to provide weapons to governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations.

Second, historically this language is identical to language adopted by the Congress in 1976 and then vetoed by President Ford. It clearly was a position adopted by a Democratic Congress.

Third, contrary to the L/PM argument, the amendment does not require a formal determination that a particular country is engaged in a consistent pattern. We would simply be carrying out the same analysis that we now undertake with regard to the IFIs and AID.

Fourth, the amendment does not alter the “extraordinary circumstances” exception and thus flexibility is maintained.

Finally, the amendment would have the desirable effect of establishing the same psychological circumstances which now govern our analysis of economic instruments. The end result, therefore, should be a far better balance between economic and security assistance decisions in the human rights area.


2 Presumable reference to the first Fraser amendment referenced in Oxman’s memorandum to Christopher; see footnote 5, Document 136.
Washington, April 29, 1978

SUBJECT

The Fraser Amendments

I believe we should express serious reservations about the three Fraser amendments which would put further restrictions on our security assistance.

Following the proposed injunctions might not change our specific decisions. But having to respond to Congressional queries about why we had permitted assistance to certain countries, including whether we considered their governments to be engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations, would further complicate our dealings both with foreign governments, and with Congress. In general, I think we should try to avoid any new legislative restrictions on the human rights policy. But our expression of reservation should stop short of strong opposition to bills which are deemed likely to pass anyway.

If we cannot prevent the amendments, we should try hard to get “extraordinary circumstance” language added to the proposed IMET amendment and that on security assistance to police, intelligence, and other security services. We also should try to get the following language added to the “extraordinary circumstance” clause in all three amendments: “including when designed to promote fundamental improvements in a human rights situation.”

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot B1D113, Box 16, Human Rights—Don Fraser. Limited Official Use. Lake’s Special Assistant Ronald Neitzke initialed the memorandum on Lake’s behalf. Drafted by Jenonne Walker on April 28. Wisner initialed the memorandum on April 29. Attached but not printed are copies of the three security assistance related amendments that were also attached as tabs to Document 136.

2 An unknown hand underlined “serious reservations.”

3 An unknown hand bracketed the last two sentences of this paragraph.

4 An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph. Zablocki and 12 co-sponsors introduced H.R. 12514 in the House on May 3. Ultimately, the Senate version of the bill (S. 3075) was passed in lieu of H.R. 12514. The President signed the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95–384; 92 Stat. 730–748) into law on September 26. The act provided that security aid could be denied to any nation that violated human rights unless the Secretary of State could certify that extraordinary circumstances existed that required a continuation of aid and demonstrated that it was in the interest of the United States to maintain such aid. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, pp. 58–59)
Washington, April 30, 1978

REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Pursuant to PD/NSC–30, the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance submits this report on the effectiveness of recent U.S. actions in the international financial institutions (IFIs) concerning human rights. As provided in the PD, this report deals specifically with:

—Congressional attitudes and prospective legislation;
—views of other nations as to the propriety and legality of our actions; and
—the effect of our actions on the advancement of U.S. human rights objectives.

Before examining these particular subjects, it will provide context to take an overall look at the human rights actions the U.S. has taken in the IFIs since January 1977 and to consider briefly the process by which these actions have been determined.

I. Overview

In general, we have been moderate in using our voice and vote in the IFIs in behalf of human rights. Of the over 500 loans that have been voted upon in the IFIs since January 1977, we have voted against only 10 and abstained on only 17 on human rights grounds. All of these loans were approved over our objection, although in a few cases we received support from other countries. In addition, we have sought to defer consideration of about 20 loans pending human rights developments in the countries in question; in several of these cases, the deferrals were only temporary. That the number of loans the Interagency

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North–South Pastor Files, Subject File, Box 55, Human Rights: 1–5/78. Confidential. Under an April 27 covering memorandum, Oxman sent a copy of the report to the members of the Interagency Group, directing the members to forward any agency comments to him by May 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot B1D113, Box 18, PD 30—Response (final)) Dodson also sent copies to Mondale, Vance, Harold Brown, Blumenthal, Bell, Kreps, McIntyre, Young, Gilligan, George Brown, Turner, and Reinhardt under a June 9 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 119.
Group has recommended for approval greatly exceeds the number as to which abstention or opposition has been recommended results from three principal factors: (a) many proposed recipients of IFI assistance have good or improving human rights records; (b) a large proportion of IFI assistance is designed to serve basic human needs; and (c) we have confined the use of our vote to instances of serious and continuing violations.

The countries that applied for the loans as to which we cast negative votes, abstained, or obtained postponements number only 13, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Votes</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
<th>Postponed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (3 loans)</td>
<td>Argentina (5 loans)</td>
<td>Argentina (2 loans, on both of which we subsequently abstained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (2 loans)</td>
<td>Benin (2 loans)</td>
<td>Chile (2 loans, one of which we subsequently voted against)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay (2 loans)</td>
<td>Central African Empire (1 loan)</td>
<td>El Salvador (1 loan, which we subsequently voted for)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen (1 loan)</td>
<td>Ethiopia (3 loans)</td>
<td>Korea (1 loan, on which we subsequently abstained)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (2 loans)</td>
<td>Guinea (1 loan)</td>
<td>Nicaragua (5 loans, one of which we subsequently voted for)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korea (2 loans)</td>
<td>Paraguay (8 loans, one of which we subsequently voted against)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines (3 loans)</td>
<td>Uruguay (2 loans, both of which we voted against)</td>
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</table>

While this report pertains to our actions in the IFIs, it is important to note that we have also taken steps on human rights grounds with respect to bilateral development assistance, PL 480 food aid, security assistance, export licenses for commercially supplied military equipment, Ex-Im financing, OPIC activities, and CCC credits. In addition, of course, we have used the full range of our diplomatic tools, including
direct diplomatic contacts, public statements, symbolic acts, consultations with allies, cooperation with non-governmental organizations, and work with international organizations. These steps have involved the 13 countries mentioned above, as well as others. There is usually a variety of views within the Interagency Group on whether the mix of our actions concerning any particular country has been optimal.

We are committed to the proposition that it is preferable to use positive actions (“rewards”) and representations through normal diplomatic channels rather than “sanctions” in pursuing our human rights objectives. Along this line, we are intensifying efforts to direct a growing share of our bilateral economic assistance to governments that show respect for human rights. We are also quietly encouraging the IFI managements to channel their lending to countries with good human rights records and to programs that serve basic human needs. We have urged friendly nations to join us in conveying this message to IFI managements. These nations also consider this approach to be preferable to invoking sanctions. The absence of universally agreed upon criteria, the long lead time for project development, and some resistance on the part of bank managements and some members indicate that channeling IFI resources on the basis of respect for human rights and meeting basic human needs will be a long-term process, the result of which will not be evident for some time.

While we believe that greater emphasis on “rewards” rather than “sanctions” can lead to beneficial results, the fact remains that, in addition to the thrust of our human rights policy, we are explicitly required by federal statutes to oppose certain grants or loans to human rights violators.

II. Process

Our efforts to implement this human rights policy and legislative requirements are the result of deliberations by the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. The Group has met regularly since April 1977 when it was established pursuant to a NSC directive.

As set forth in that directive, the Group has been chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State (i.e., the Deputy Secretary) and has included representatives of the Treasury Department, the Defense Department, the NSC staff, and the Agency for International Development. Participants in the Group’s deliberations have also included representatives of the Agriculture Department, the Commerce Department, the Ex-Im Bank, and OPIC. In addition, Treasury’s representatives have usually been accompanied by the U.S. Executive Directors to the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Thus, several agencies, each with an interest in the subject matter, are represented at every meeting.
The Group is aided significantly by its staff-level working group. The working group screens all upcoming bilateral and multilateral programs and loans for their human rights implications, including whether they would benefit the needy. The working group recommends approval of the vast majority of the matters it reviews, either because of the proposed recipient’s favorable or improving human rights record or because the proposed assistance would benefit the needy. When there is disagreement on these issues or where there is consensus that the human rights record of a proposed recipient is so bad as to warrant opposing or deferring the assistance in question, the working group refers the matter for review by the Interagency Group. (The Interagency Group also has the option of reviewing matters which the working group has recommended for approval.)

Prior to each of its meetings, the Group receives extensive agenda materials. These materials include detailed descriptions of the loans or grants to be considered, including consideration of whether the proposed assistance would benefit the needy. The agenda materials also include extensive information on human rights conditions in the countries proposed as recipients of assistance. In addition, other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to the country in question are described since the Group pays close attention to the relationship of our human rights concerns to other critical U.S. objectives. The agenda materials also include a list of other U.S. or multilateral assistance to the proposed recipient which is likely to be presented for decision in the near future, as well as a description of previous U.S. actions concerning the human rights situation in the country in question.

At the Group’s meetings, each loan or grant on the agenda is separately considered. The representative of the relevant State Department regional bureau leads off the discussion with an assessment of our bilateral relationship with the recipient country, of the human rights situation there, of our human rights and other objectives, and of the role our position on the loan or grant under consideration might play. In short, the regional bureau representative sets forth a strategy for dealing with the country in question and suggests tactics that would carry out that strategy. Comments are then called for by other participants. Typically, the discussion will focus not only on the current situation but also on whether there is a genuine trend toward or away from improvements in human rights conditions.

After discussion, the Group frequently recommends that the loan or grant should be approved: because human rights conditions in the recipient country are good or are authentically improving; because other means can and should be used for the time being to indicate our human rights concerns; or because the assistance will benefit the needy. When appropriate, the Group may advise that the approval should be
accompanied by a diplomatic demarche explaining our human rights concerns and making it clear that we are seriously taking human rights considerations into account in our foreign assistance decisions. In general and where possible under applicable law, we prefer to discuss our human rights concerns through diplomatic channels before taking any steps with respect to foreign assistance.

When the human rights situation in the proposed recipient country is poor and not improving, the Group may recommend that the U.S. not support the proposed assistance. This will particularly be the case where the assistance will not be likely to benefit the needy. In these circumstances the Group will frequently recommend that a diplomatic demarche be made to the government concerned, explaining our position and urging human rights improvements.

The Group stays abreast of human rights developments in the countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance and has on a number of occasions recommended approval of loans or programs as to which it had previously recommended opposition, abstention or deferral.

Needless to say, for a variety of reasons, including the range of human rights violations, no automatic formula can be applied to decide how to vote on particular loans to particular countries, and inevitably seeming inconsistencies will appear. But the Group has learned that the diversity of cultures, the different stages of economic and political maturity, and the range of fundamental U.S. interests make it essential to treat each country on the merits of its own situation and not to attempt to pursue our human rights objectives in precisely the same way as to all countries. Within the limits of applicable law, we are primarily concerned with taking steps that are most likely to promote human rights in a particular situation. In short, tactics must differ from country to country, but our goal—to enhance respect for human rights—remains constant as to all countries.

The Group is continually examining its own procedures to determine how best to improve its operation and effectiveness. The Group is conscious that in systematically bringing human rights considerations to bear on the range of our foreign assistance decisions, it is performing a new function. Inevitably, performance of this function has at times been controversial, as the various participants grow accustomed to the new situation. Nevertheless, we believe it is an important function that must be performed if we are to comply effectively with statutory commands and to be true to our human rights commitments.

With respect to possible improvements in the process, the Treasury Department believes it would be useful to attempt to develop comprehensive human rights strategy papers for some of the major human rights problem countries. In Treasury’s view, such papers could analyze three key issues: our specific human rights objectives in such coun-
tries, the relationship between human rights objectives and other U.S. national objectives, and the effectiveness of the various policy instruments which can be used to further the human rights effort. Treasury stresses the importance of making individual decisions on whether the U.S. should support or oppose prospective IFI loans in the context of a comprehensive strategy and believes this can produce more options for influencing situations well in advance of a specific IFI vote. While agreeing on the importance of strategies to guide particular decisions, some other members of the Group, including the State Department, believe that human rights situations in other countries are so constantly in flux that written studies quickly become outdated and are therefore not as useful as the oral strategy presentation noted above.

To minimize seeming inconsistencies in our use of sanctions in the IFI’s, Treasury notes the desirability of being more selective in opposing loans by establishing a clearer set of criteria (e.g., confined to rights of the person) for invoking those sanctions and for excepting loans that meet basic human needs, and by limiting the use of our opposition to clear-cut situations of gross violations where the U.S. is most likely to be supported by other member governments. In the State Department’s view, the criteria governing decisions to abstain on or vote against IFI loans on human rights grounds are those set forth in the statute and they must be applied in a manner that takes into account the differing circumstances of, and our multiple interests with respect to, individual countries. (It should be noted that in the case of each abstention or no vote there were significant violations of the rights of the person in the proposed recipient country.) As for the criteria for defining loans that serve basic human needs, they are being evolved on a case-by-case basis, in light of the legislative history of the relevant statutory provision concerning basic human needs. With respect to limiting the use of sanctions to certain countries, the State Department believes there can be little doubt that the governments of the countries listed above (p. 2) are (or were at the time of the vote) engaged in serious violations of human rights, some in greater degree than others.

Finally with respect to the Group’s process, it has become increasingly clear that when a convincing case is made that a given loan or project will directly benefit the needy by serving their basic needs, assistance should be approved in all but the rarest instances. Since we consider each loan and project on its merits, we see no need to exclude the possibility that extraordinary circumstances might warrant the delay or possible disapproval of a basic human needs loan, but this would clearly be the exceptional case. At the same time, it is essential that other countries understand (and we are so advising them) that our approval of basic human needs loans is not an expression of approval for the human rights practices of the recipient government.
III. Congressional Attitudes and Prospective Human Rights Legislation

There is broad support in Congress for giving human rights concerns a high priority in our foreign policy. A growing coalition of liberals and conservatives is prepared to push new human rights initiatives. The liberals have a concern for human rights and basically support the IFIs and foreign aid. Some of the conservatives, while also concerned about human rights, are essentially anti-IFI and anti-foreign aid and many see human rights legislation as an indirect means of reducing aid.

There are no signs that Congress is having second thoughts about the Harkin Amendment which requires that the U.S. oppose IFI loans to governments engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless such assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of the citizens of such country.

At the same time, there has been some confusion in Congress as to the Administration’s efforts to carry out this legislation and as to the Administration’s human rights policy generally. A common criticism on the Hill is that the Administration has been inconsistent in applying its human rights policy, giving harsher treatment to small countries where we have little security or economic interests, while applying a different standard to those countries which are important to us. Another argument heard on the Hill is that our human rights policy is jeopardizing “more important U.S. interests.” Some members have argued that moral suasion and arousal of world opinion are more effective in achieving human rights progress than “sanctions,” including opposition to IFI loans. Others are troubled about how our human rights policy is applied to a particular country or region, even though they support its application elsewhere. In connection with these criticisms, many questions have been raised as to the mandate and functions of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.

In response to this situation, we have in recent weeks made a concerted effort to explain our human rights actions more fully to the Congress. We have sent to large numbers of interested congressmen and senators a detailed memorandum on the Interagency Group. This memorandum sets forth the statutory framework within which the Group operates, explains the mandate and composition of the Group, and describes the Group’s proceedings. Congressman Zablocki has had this memorandum printed in the Congressional Record and, in general, we have had a very favorable response to it. In addition, we have

3 See footnote 3, Document 132.
begun a series of consultations with Congressmen particularly interested in human rights issues. In this connection, we have arranged small breakfasts and luncheons where relevant human rights issues, including our actions in the IFIs, can be fully discussed.

In our consultations with Congress, we have explained that in view of the diverse circumstances of the countries proposed as recipients of assistance—as well as the diversity of our foreign policy interests—it is inevitable that we will pursue our human rights objectives in somewhat different ways as to different countries. As for the claim that we have been too prone to use “sanctions,” we have explained the facts set forth above which show that we have been quite moderate in the use of “sanctions.” With respect to objections from Congress about our treatment of particular countries, we have made a special effort to explain our rationale and actions to the members who have raised a question. While it would be inaccurate to say that our explanations are always considered satisfactory, it has been our experience that a sincere effort to explain our position fully has led to increased understanding.

Concern has also been expressed in Congress about the Administration’s efforts to block certain restrictive human rights amendments. Some members feel the Administration’s efforts have been too late and poorly coordinated. Several members have indicated that they do not plan in the future to support the Administration’s efforts to block popular human rights legislation since they think those efforts are likely to be futile. We have been advised by one congressman who is a strong supporter of our human rights initiatives that it would be preferable for the Administration to deal with proposed human rights amendments while bills are still in committee or in conference rather than when they reach the floor. He argues that once the bills reach the floor, it is much more difficult to defeat an amendment. Thus, he has urged that the Administration should let human rights supporters in Congress know as soon as possible which amendments or parts of amendments the Administration can and cannot live with. We believe this is sound advice and are taking steps to implement it to the degree feasible. It must be noted, however, that in a variety of instances in the past we have made our views clear in committee—and worked out desirable language there—only to have such understandings rendered moot by floor revisions.

We have been advised that a great many human rights amendments may be offered this year in committee or on the floor. Thus far, however, there have been only a few proposed amendments and initiatives as set forth below. Some of them pertain to the IFIs; others to other forms of U.S. assistance:
—The Young Bill (H.R. 11098). On April 5 Congressman Bill Young of Florida, the ranking minority member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, introduced a bill requiring that the U.S. seek to modify the charter of the IFIs to require that each institution establish a human rights standard to be considered in connection with every application for assistance. The bill would also require the President to report to Congress within three months actions taken to gain acceptance of such amendments of the IFI charters. It is not clear how much support this proposal will receive in Congress. On the merits of the proposal, we believe any such effort to amend the IFI charters would arouse enormous controversy within the institutions and generate great bitterness towards the U.S. Under present arrangements, U.S. efforts to bring human rights considerations to bear in the IFIs, while resented by several IFI members, are not being actively opposed, and in some instances they are being actively supported by likeminded governments. If, however, the U.S. takes the major step of seeking an amendment in the IFI charters, what is now tacit opposition from some governments would likely become vigorous and sustained opposition that could have a deleterious effect on the functioning of the institutions. The fact that some IFI members would oppose any such effort is not dispositive. But since it is not apparent that such charter revisions are necessary in order to take human rights actions in the IFIs, there would appear to be no countervailing benefit in the course the Young bill requires.

—Human Rights Reports: We have reason to believe that several conservative members of Congress will introduce legislation requiring that the Administration submit reports on human rights conditions in all countries that receive IFI loans (currently we are required to submit such reports on countries that receive bilateral U.S. economic and military assistance). Approximately 50 additional reports would be required. Some countries, especially Brazil, would be likely to react quite negatively to our submission of such a report. The Administration has opposed this legislation.

—Harkin Amendment: Witteveen Facility. Over Administration opposition, the House passed on February 23 by a voice vote a Harkin amendment to the Bretton Woods Agreement Act. The amendment

4 The bill was referred to the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Young subsequently introduced identical versions of the bill—H.R. 12660 and H.R. 13161—on May 10 and June 15 respectively. Each bill, in turn, was referred to the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs.

5 H.R. 9214, introduced by Representative Stephen Neal on September 20, 1977, and reported to the House from the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on January 27, 1978, authorized a $1.7 billion U.S. contribution to the IMF’s Witteveen Facility. The amended H.R. 9214 passed the House on February 23, 267 to 125.
would require the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to initiate consultations to encourage the IMF to formulate stabilization programs which foster investment and employment, especially where designed to meet basic human needs. The U.S. Executive Director would also be required to take all possible steps to see that the Witteveen Facility does not contribute to the deprivation of basic human needs and the violation of basic human rights and to oppose any loans that would contribute to such deprivations or violations. Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury would be required to prepare an annual report evaluating the effects of the Witteveen Facility on the ability of the poor to obtain (a) an adequate supply of food, (b) shelter and clothing, (c) public services, including health care, education, clean water, energy resources and transportation; and (d) productive employment that provides a reasonable and adequate wage.

The Senate version of this legislation has been reported by the SFRC and the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. The bill includes no human rights provisions at present, although a Harkin-type amendment could be added on the floor. State and Treasury are currently reviewing what position to take if such an amendment is introduced, as well as what position to take in conference.

—Harkin Amendment: OPIC. On February 23, 1978, the House added a Harkin amendment to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) Act of 1977, by a vote of 191 to 76. The report, including the entire Harkin amendment, was adopted by the Senate on April 5 and by the House on April 11. The amended OPIC legislation was signed by the President on April 24.6

The principal effect of the Harkin amendment is to apply Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act to OPIC. Section 116 requires that no assistance be provided to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless the assistance would directly benefit the needy. The amendment also calls for OPIC to take into account in the conduct of its programs in any country (in consultation with the Secretary of State) all available information about the observance and respect of human rights in such countries. Finally, the amendment establishes the following new reporting requirements. First, OPIC must include a description of any project for which it has refused to provide insurance, reinsurance, guarantee, financing or financial support because of the human rights provisions of the amendment. Second, OPIC must include a description of

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6 Reference is to H.R. 9179, the OPIC extension legislation, which the House revisited on February 23; see footnote 7, Document 108.
any project for which it has approved such assistance due to a determination that the project either meets basic human needs or because the President has decided that approval is in the national security interest of the United States.

—I Institute for International Human Rights. Congressman Dante Fascell and Donald Fraser have introduced legislation establishing an independent federal agency—the Institute for International Human Rights. The institute would primarily provide financial and other assistance to private individuals or groups working to promote human rights, including individuals or groups in foreign countries. Specifically, the institute would provide financial support for a number of non-governmental organizations and individuals for such purposes as conducting conferences, publishing books and articles, carrying out research and studies, and supporting legal defense for victims of political persecution. The bill is expected to receive wide support. The Administration has expressed the view that such an institute, if carefully structured, could make a valuable contribution to efforts on behalf of human rights but that certain questions must be seriously addressed in considering creation of such an entity.

—Humphrey Bill. The bill to establish the International Development Cooperation Administration (or Humphrey Bill) as introduced by Senator Sparkman on January 30, 1978, includes with no significant changes the human rights provisions of Section 116 of the existing Foreign Assistance Act (i.e., no aid to gross and consistent violators unless it would benefit the needy). The human rights provisions in the bill are intended to apply to all forms of foreign assistance covered by the bill. While the Administration will be making a variety of proposals and suggestions related to the purposes of the Humphrey Bill, it does not presently appear that these will pertain to the bill’s human rights provisions.

—The Tsongas Amendment to the Ex-Im Reauthorization Bill. On April 13, the International Trade Subcommittee of the House Banking Committee adopted the Tsongas Amendment to the Ex-Im Bank Reauthorization Bill. The operative language of the amendment reads:

“in no event shall the bank guarantee, insure, or extend credit or participate in any extension of credit to the Republic of South Africa unless and until the President determines that significant progress toward majority rule has been made in the Republic of South Africa and transmits to the Congress a statement describing and explaining the determination.”

See footnote 2, Document 126.
See footnote 17, Document 245.
It is not unlikely that the amendment will be accepted by the full Committee and ultimately on the House floor.9 The Administration, which already has the authority to do what the Tsongas amendment directs, opposed the amendment on foreign policy flexibility grounds. What position the Administration should now take is under review.

IV. Views of Other Nations on the Propriety and Legality of our Actions

Other nations have commented on U.S. human rights actions in the IFIs during normal diplomatic contacts, as well as during special consultations on this issue that we have conducted with the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium, Japan, Australia, and India, and with the European Commission. We hope to have consultations of this kind in the near future with other governments, including Senegal, Kenya, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and others.

IFI donors have reiterated several themes when discussing human rights and the IFIs with us. There is agreement among those consulted thus far that human rights concerns should be taken into account in the IFIs. They place the same high value on human rights as we do. With different foreign policy agendas, however, no two countries will always make the same choices between human rights and other pressing concerns.

There is also agreement that the manner in which human rights concerns are taken into account in the IFIs should not endanger the integrity or viability of the institutions. There is concern that unless the human rights issue is handled carefully, it could cause the IFIs to become highly politicized and to lose their effectiveness in promoting development.

There is also concern that human rights not become a North/South issue. Towards this end, we and other donors agree that it would be desirable to have consultations with LDCs such as those we have held with the donor countries. As noted above, we plan to have consultations on this subject with certain LDC’s in the near future. Other donors have also suggested that discussions on human rights among executive directors in the IFIs should be held outside of the IFI board meetings in order to minimize confrontations.

Several countries with whom we have consulted noted the desirability of not letting the IFIs become the “cutting edge” of human rights

9 Tsongas’ amendment was retained in the versions of the Ex-Im extension legislation passed in the House on May 4 (H.R. 12157) and the Senate on May 15 (S. 3077). Owing to veto threats by the administration, the House and Senate leadership opted to jettison H.R. 12157 and S. 3077 and add “non-controversial” Ex-Im provisions, including Tsongas’ prohibition against lending to South Africa, to a more-encompassing international financial institutions bill (H.R. 14279), cleared by Congress for the White House on October 15. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, pp. 63 and 256–258)
policy. Canada, the UK and the FRG cited the need for actions in the IFIs to be consistent with a country’s bilateral assistance program, and France pointed to advantages of using bilateral contacts first. German officials noted the results of pursuing human rights issues in such fora as the UN, the Council of Europe, and CSCE.

Some other governments said there may appear to be inconsistencies in their actions in the IFIs because of the varying interests they have in their relations from country to country. Some of the governments noted that actions toward different countries which may appear to be inconsistent if only human rights conditions in the countries are compared, may actually be consistent if a broader spectrum of foreign policy interests is considered.

The more narrow legal issue of whether IFI charters allow human rights to be taken into account in the IFIs has been raised both in direct consultations and in other ways. While donor countries with whom we have consulted often raised the issue, it seems clear to us that the broad concerns outlined above—rather than questions of legal interpretation—would be the underlying reasons why other countries might curtail the extent to which they would take human rights concerns into account in the IFIs. On the merits of the legal issue, they appeared to share our view that human rights concerns can legitimately be taken into account because economic development necessarily includes questions of equity, welfare and social justice. Consulted donors appeared to be concerned with the legal issue mainly because affected LDCs might seize upon it.

In general, it is still too early to know whether other donors will significantly increase the relative weight they accord to human rights considerations in the IFIs. Some members of the Interagency Group believe there is cause for optimism on this issue; others are not optimistic.

We have seen some evidence that some LDCs consider our human rights initiatives in the IFIs to be both improper and illegal. They believe it is improper because it introduces a new and extraneous issue which could lead to confrontation as well as jeopardize country program levels. They argue that introducing human rights concerns violates IFI charters and thus is illegal. They claim the issue threatens the basic integrity and apolitical character of the IFIs, making it difficult to discuss development issues rationally and without posturing between donors and recipients. The issue has generated considerable contro-

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10 The Charter of the IBRD provides in pertinent part that the “Bank, its officers and employees should not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of . . . [the recipient government]. Only economic considerations should be relevant to their decisions . . .” The charters of the other IFIs contain comparable provisions. [Footnote and brackets in the original.]
versy within the institutions, including accusations that the U.S. is polit-
icizing them. Korea and the Philippines have considered sponsoring a
“motion of regret” in the ADB Board over U.S. human rights initiatives
in that bank. Nigeria and India have questioned the use of IFIs as a tool
to bring about human rights improvements. Argentina may seek a legal
opinion from the IDB on whether charter provisions prohibiting politi-
cization are violated by our human rights initiatives. There have been
indications that other LDCs may take similar steps.

While we believe it is legitimate to bring human rights consider-
ations to bear in the IFIs, the reaction of various LDCs makes it clear
that we must handle the issue with great—Treasury would say
greater—sensitivity to ensure we do not alter the apolitical characters
of the IFIs and impede their effectiveness in promoting development.
Towards this end, we think it desirable to the extent feasible to imple-
ment our policies discreetly by working behind the scenes rather than
generating open confrontation in the bank boards. Thus, in opposing a
loan because of human rights violations, we have been making our
reasons clear beforehand to the government of the borrowing country
and its executive director, as well as to other governments with whom
we are consulting, but have generally refrained from mentioning
human rights at the board meetings.

To increase the likelihood that other countries will support us, we
will be intensifying our efforts to consult with them on how to reflect
human rights considerations in long-term bank lending programs in
ways which would reduce the number of cases where an opposition
vote of the U.S. would be required. We will also help to achieve this
goal by relying increasingly on “rewards” rather than “sanctions” in
furthering our human rights objectives in the IFIs over the longer term.

Some LDC’s also have argued that donor emphasis in the IFIs and
elsewhere on human rights and basic human needs is, in actuality, both
moral imperialism and an excuse for reducing aid. Frequently LDC’s
have claimed that human rights initiatives stress observance of
“Western-style” human rights, i.e., the rights of the individual and po-
litical rights. They claim this ignores basic economic rights, such as the
right to be adequately clothed, fed and housed, the right to education
and to adequate medical care, etc.

We believe our human rights initiatives do not warrant this criti-
cism. We have repeatedly taken the position that our human rights
policy seeks to promote economic and social rights as well as rights of
the person and civil and political liberties. Our support of bilateral and
multilateral assistance for the needy in countries with questionable
human rights records demonstrates the importance we attach to eco-
nomic and social rights.
Some LDC’s have argued that the emphasis of our assistance programs on basic human needs is designed to impede Third World industrial development. To the extent our human rights policies stress basic human needs assistance, they attract the same criticism. Needless to say, what underlies our approach is not a desire to forestall economic competition from LDCs, but rather a conviction that a stronger emphasis on basic human needs will enhance our effectiveness in promoting overall economic development.

V. The Effect of Our Actions on the Advancement of U.S. Human Rights Objectives

The United States has used a variety of policy tools to implement its human rights policy. The use of our “voice and vote” in the multilateral development institutions is only one of these tools, but one which, in certain circumstances, has been influential. IFI-related actions have normally been taken in conjunction with or subsequent to other forms of action or representation. Thus, actions in the IFIs have not become the “cutting edge” of our human rights policy.

Since, as noted above, our concept of human rights encompasses economic and social rights, we have in most instances continued to support IFI loans to countries with serious human rights problems when the loans are directed at meeting the basic human needs of the poor; at the same time, we have opposed loans to such countries for large capital and infrastructure projects. We have explained this distinction to recipient governments. In our representations we have emphasized our belief that policies which foster human rights contribute positively to economic and social development.

As for the economic impact of our actions in the IFIs, no loan has failed to be approved because of our opposition, although efforts described above to encourage other donor support may lead to the actual disapproval of loans. However, when countries have withdrawn or delayed applications for loans in anticipation of U.S. opposition, there has been a direct economic impact. (The value of all loans that have been postponed is approximately $385 million. Of that amount, loans totaling approximately $250 million were subsequently approved by the IFIs.) There has also been an economic effect in those few instances in which countries, anticipating U.S. opposition to a proposed loan, have switched the loans from the Inter-American Development Bank’s “soft lending window” (i.e., the Fund for Special Operations), where the U.S. has veto power over loans, to the bank’s “hard lending window,” where interest rates are higher and maturities shorter. U.S. actions in the IFIs on human rights may also in certain cases affect a country’s credit-worthiness in the eyes of commercial lenders.

As our actions in the IFIs are almost always accompanied by other actions or representations, a direct relationship cannot be shown be-
tween our actions in the IFIs and specific human rights developments in other countries. More basically, we have generally tried to avoid linking particular actions on our part—in the IFIs or in any other context—to particular human rights improvements in the recipient country. This kind of *quid pro quo* approach to human rights, while it has a superficial appeal, would in our judgment tend to permit and perhaps even encourage other countries to engage in cosmetic human rights changes designed to fetch a particular response from us. If, for example, we made it plain to a country that we would support IFI loans if a substantial number of political prisoners were released, it is possible that the country would detain prisoners for the purpose of subsequently releasing them in order to satisfy the condition we had laid down. This type of manipulation is an inherent risk of a *quid pro quo* approach.

This is not to say, however, that because we have resisted the notion of trading specific actions on our part for specific human rights improvements elsewhere, any particular actions on our part can fairly be characterized as ineffective. It is necessary to consider all the steps we have taken to promote human rights. We think it is clear that the totality of our actions—including our actions in the IFIs—has increased the costs of repression and helped to create an atmosphere in which human rights progress is more likely to occur. Our actions have brought about a very substantial increase in world awareness of human rights issues. This new consciousness not only helps curb existing human rights abuses; it also acts as a deterrent to new violations.

While it is not possible to say that any particular step we have taken has led to any particular result, it is probably the case that if we appeared to be reluctant to bring human rights considerations to bear in a prominent context—such as the IFIs—we would call into serious question the depth of our human rights commitment. Thus, if we are going to continue to be effective in raising human rights consciousness and nurturing an atmosphere in which human rights progress is more likely to occur, it is important that we continue to bring human rights considerations to bear in a conscientious, coherent way on all of our bilateral and multilateral assistance programs.

Even though no one-to-one relationship can be shown between our actions in the IFIs and specific human rights developments, it is useful to consider developments in each country as to which we have taken some IFI-related actions on human rights grounds. A country-by-country synopsis is included in Appendix A.\(^\text{11}\) While improvements

\(^{11}\) Appendix A, “Synopsis of IFI-Related Human Rights Actions by Country,” is attached but not printed.
are noted for most of the countries in question, human rights problems persist in all of the countries.

With respect to possible means of enhancing our effectiveness, Treasury believes there should be a presumption that in the IFIs we will limit the use of sanctions to promotion of the “first group” of rights, i.e., rights of the person. In Treasury’s view this approach will be more likely to win support from other governments, since they will not see themselves called upon in a multilateral context to pass judgment on the political organization and structure of another government. With such added support, Treasury believes this approach could be more effective in bringing about human rights improvements in the recipient country. It will also be more effective, in Treasury’s view, because violations of rights of the person can be more readily curtailed than other types of human rights violations.

The State Department believes that to focus in the IFIs solely on violations of rights of the person would put too narrow a construction on the statutory language. It would also unduly downgrade the gravity of violations of economic and social rights and of political and civil rights. PD–30 makes it clear that all three categories of rights are the subject of our human rights policy. To downgrade these violations in the IFIs but not in other multilateral contexts would not be understood, in State’s view. State believes other countries are willing to support a human rights policy that addresses all three groups. In addition, State believes it is not possible to make meaningful generalizations about whether particular types of human rights violations are more readily remediable than others. In some cases, for example, it may be that violations of political and civil rights can be stopped more expeditiously than violations of rights of the person; in other cases, the reverse may be true.
140. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Wisner)\(^1\)

Washington, May 1, 1978

SUBJECT

AID Budget Review

AID’s proposed FY 80, 81 and 82 budgets call for sizeable increases over levels requested in past years. HA believes that the United States should do much more than it has in the past to help meet basic human needs throughout the world. This office is concerned, however, that in developing its strategy, AID take adequately into account the human rights records of individual countries. This will mean tailoring allocation levels and program content to reflect human rights considerations.

HA is not arguing that countries with bad human rights records should not receive any bilateral U.S. assistance. We are arguing that greater attention should be given to countries whose governments have demonstrated a real commitment to fostering the rights of their peoples. It is conceivable that there will be instances where such a government abuses political and civil rights but still has a commitment to fostering social and economic rights. In such cases, steady levels are the most which should be provided, but they should be based on a very strict project by project review to make certain that their impact will be to foster greater equity and not to reinforce a repressive political structure. In the absence of such a commitment, AID projects become stopgap humanitarian gestures with no real impact on development and too often are anti-developmental in the sense that they help to prolong the life of a repressive or apathetic regime. In the absence of a host government’s commitment to increasing the socio-economic participation of its poor, only those AID projects which can be shown to act as catalysts which, in a sense, challenge an inequitable economic structure, should be funded.

In addition AID should become actively involved in designing and funding programs geared at preparing people to participate in the legal and political process and training experts to defend and foster constitu-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, AID. No classification marking. Derian did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Bova on April 29. The date on the memorandum is handwritten.
tional and other guarantees designed to accord due process to all, but especially to the underprivileged, who are so-often excluded from fair and impartial treatment. Greater emphasis should be placed on programs that work directly with lower income groups, e.g., co-ops, land tenure, para-legal and para-medicine, basic education. For example, our Embassy in Rwanda has recently come in with a very interesting proposal to fund para-legal training. It's exactly the kind of thing AID should be doing. Much can be accomplished by increased funding to private voluntary organizations, both international and national in origin. Indeed, in countries with serious human rights problems, we can lessen direct links with the Government but continue to assist the needy by using pros.

HA has consistently fought efforts to create human rights violator hit lists. We believe that to be effective we must approach the situation in each country on a case-by-case basis tailoring the use of available policy tools to a variety of circumstances. To list in this memo a group of aid recipient countries where we believe FY 80 programs should remain at current or lower funding levels would be to take the real risk of creating just such a list and having it circulate. We are prepared, in the course of the overall budget review, to make recommendations with regard to specific country programs. Our recommendations will reflect concerns over funding levels and our desire to examine closely individual projects in problem countries to ensure that they maximize overall human rights/human needs objectives.

HA has no objection in listing countries where we would recommend increases in FY 80 program levels above and beyond that envisioned under the overall program. These countries are: Gambia, Senegal, Botswana, India, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Jamaica.
141. Memorandum From Robert Maxim of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian)¹

Washington, May 1, 1978

SUBJECT

AID and Implementation of Section 116 (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act: Derian-Moose Meeting with Governor Gilligan

The following are suggested talking points for your meeting today with Governor Gilligan:²

—To date there has not been one single project implementing Section 116 (e) of the FAA for Fiscal Year 1978 which provides for $750 thousand to be spent in development assistance programs “which will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights”. A record of non-accomplishment that is potentially highly embarrassing for an Administration that has placed human rights at the center of its foreign policy. (About $100–200 thousand will be given to a South African legal defense fund but this is not an AID-originated activity.)

—After weeks of discussion a request for ideas was sent out on April 22 (attached)³ by AID’s African bureau. We are unaware if other geographic bureaus did even this much. Although this message did endorse an Embassy Gaborone (Botswana) it was a proposal submitted months ago.⁴

² Minutes of this meeting have not been found.
³ Attached but not printed is telegram 102727 to multiple African diplomatic posts, April 22.
⁴ Reference is to telegram 3067 from Gaborone, December 5, 1977, wherein the Embassy transmitted various proposals “to accord positive recognition to Botswana for its outstanding human rights record,” including an invitation from Carter to President Khama to visit the United States in 1978; a visit to Botswana from a “well-known USG official or legislator”; the endowment of chairs in political science and law at universities; establishment of scholarships at American universities for students from Botswana; procurement of funds to purchase a “mobile movie theater and library” dedicated to showing human rights films; an endowment to establish a room at a local university “equipped and staffed to assist in study” of civil and political rights; funding of a human rights lecture series; and financing of a study group of citizens from Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa charged with devising a human rights-based curriculum development project. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770453–0249)
—The basic problem seems to be that here, and in the field, AID’s second-level leadership and below are either uneasy with or opposed to an explicit human rights aspect to development assistance.

—Apparently it is either feared that recipient countries will object or that this kind of focus is alien to AID’s operations. (The latter is as much an obstacle as pointed up by AID inaction on a Rwandan Government proposal for AID training of judiciary cadres (low level magistrates). Embassy Kigali has stressed repeatedly the importance of responding to something proposed by, not imposed upon, Rwanda.)

—While AID now seems to be looking at ideas, given the time consumed by actual project formulation it may well mean that we reach the end of the Fiscal Year (September 30) without more than a token project or two, if any, having been actually implemented.

—The language of 116 (e) is broad enough to cover a broad range of possible activities, but they should have at least an indirect or contributory bearing on civil and political rights. It would not be appropriate to label a refugee assistance or other economic-social assistance activity as filling the bill.

—You would appreciate Governor Gilligan checking into this personally in view of the congressional interest in the matter.

5 An unknown hand added the period at the end of the sentence and the closed paren.

142. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, May 3, 1978

SUBJECT

Fascell’s Hesitation on the Human Rights Institute

John Richardson called today to say that Dante Fascell has been contacted by representatives of OMB indicating that the President is

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights: 5/77–11/78. No classification marking. Outside the System. Sent for action. Printed from a copy that bears Bartholomew’s initials. A handwritten notation indicates that a copy was sent to Huntington on May 4.
opposed to the Human Rights Institute bill.\textsuperscript{2} Previously, Christopher had testified before the Committee indicating Administration neutrality on the issue,—a neutrality stemming in part from the President’s policy against the creation of new agencies. Given the phone calls from OMB, however, Fascell is now uncertain whether the Administration is still neutral or is now opposed to the bill. Before pushing ahead with the bill, he would like to be reassured that the Administration does not oppose it. John suggested that it would be most desirable (and, indeed, perhaps critical to the success of the bill) for you to call Fascell and reassure him on this point. I second his recommendation.\textsuperscript{3}

In calling Fascell I think the best tack to take would be to emphasize that the Administration viewpoint is contained in Christopher’s statement and not in phone calls from OMB. In addition to reiterating your own personal support for the bill, you might wish to call his attention to two key statements in Christopher’s testimony:

“In pursuing our human rights policy we are receptive to new and creative endeavors. If properly structured . . . the Institute envisioned in your bill could make a valuable contribution to efforts on behalf of human rights.”

“. . . Creation of the Institute through Congressional initiative would be viewed as a reaffirmance of our national commitment to the promotion of human rights. The bipartisan nature of this commitment, and the breadth of its support, are prerequisites to the success of our efforts in behalf of human rights.

Recommendation

That you phone Congressman Fascell assuring him that Administration does not oppose Human Rights Institute.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{2} Inderfurth underlined a portion of the sentence beginning with the word “indicating” and ending with the word “bill.”

\textsuperscript{3} Inderfurth added the following handwritten comment: “I third it. I think you should also call McIntyre. Rick.”

\textsuperscript{4} There is no indication as to whether Brzezinski approved or disapproved the recommendation; however, Brzezinski did write the word “done” and place a check mark on the first page of the memorandum.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, May 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights Reports

As you know, Representative Clarence Long has written a letter requesting State to send the Congress human rights reports on those countries which were not the subject of human rights reports required by the Security Assistance Act. Similarly, Congress is considering amendments to the Export-Import Bank Act which would require State to file human rights reports on all those countries which receive Export-Import Bank credits. Finally, a new OPIC act has passed Congress which also requires human rights reports. It is unclear whether such reports are required for countries which receive new OPIC insurance or for those which have received OPIC insurance in the past.

The President is concerned about the reporting requirements cited above. With respect to Congressional action, the President stated that we should hold firm on this, including the possibility of a veto.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
144. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State
(Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, May 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Improved Coordination of Decisions on Economic and Military Programs in
Light of Human Rights Considerations

Cy:

This memorandum analyzes the problems we have discussed concern-
ing the lack of coordination in our decision-making on economic and
military assistance issues as affected by human rights consider-
ations. It then proposes a remedy which I think will be effective and
ought to be implemented promptly.

The Problem

There is a pressing need to assure greater coordination of our deci-
sions on economic and military programs in light of human rights con-
siderations. Under current procedures, human rights review of eco-
nomic programs is essentially divorced from human rights review of
military programs. Moreover, such human rights review as does occur
as to both types of programs has not always entailed coordinated con-
sideration of our other fundamental foreign policy interests, in addi-
tion to human rights.

More specifically, under current procedures, on military assistance
PM conducts a case-by-case review of military issues raising human
rights concerns. This review is conducted in accordance with proce-
dures developed by the Arms Export Control Board (AECB) which pro-
vide for full participation by HA, S/P, the relevant regional bureau,
AID, and ACDA (when the transfer has significant arms control impli-
cations). Where differences of view on human rights issues cannot be
resolved through these procedures, the matter has been decided
through appeal to T and then, if the dispute persists, through Action
Memoranda to the Secretary (or the Deputy Secretary if he is acting for
the Secretary in the matter). Attempts to resolve the differences at the
Bureau level have sometimes produced lengthy delays.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of
No classification marking. Christopher sent the memorandum to Vance under a May 23
covering memorandum, indicating that in light of discussions held on May 22, he
thought “the best course will be for me to put the attached memorandum back in my
drawer for the time being.” (Ibid.)
As for economic assistance, the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, which I chair, currently brings human rights considerations to bear on bilateral and multilateral economic assistance programs. (The Group includes representatives of State, Treasury, DOD, AID, and the NSC staff, as well as participants from Agriculture, Commerce, OMB, Ex-Im and OPIC. State’s participants include HA, EB, S/P, L, H, E, P, C, T and each of the regional bureaus.) The Group is authorized, under a recently adopted procedure, to consider military programs, but only after any dispute as to them has gone through the usually quite time-consuming PM and T review set forth above, and upon referral from you. As a result, the Group is not likely to be seized of military issues in a timely fashion.

In short, we have a situation in the human rights area in which: (a) decisions on economic matters concerning a particular country are isolated to a very substantial degree from decisions on military matters concerning that country, and (b) the full range of our fundamental interests with respect to a particular country is not clearly brought to bear in the decision-making process. The disadvantages of this anomalous situation are quite substantial. The risk of making inconsistent decisions is plain. The Congress is particularly aware of the disjunction in our current procedures.

The Recommended Solution

To remedy this situation, it is proposed (a) that the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance should also review military issues as soon as it appears that there is an inter-bureau or inter-agency dispute involving the human rights implications of the issue in question, and (b) that when the Group is seized with an appeal on economic or military programs for a given country, the regional bureaus should present for discussion by the Group an overall strategy for coordinated use of economic and military programs for that country.

Under the proposal, PM would continue to conduct its case-by-case review of military programs, but as soon as any bureau or agency raised a human rights objection to the case in question, the matter would be referred to the Interagency Group. (T is currently represented on the Interagency Group; a PM representative should be added under this proposal.) The Group would promptly review the matter and make a recommendation to the Secretary. As part of this consolidation, the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology would become Vice Chairman of the Interagency Group. (Let me say that while I do not covet regularly chairing the group for both economic and military matters, I think it would be best if I do so, for two reasons. First, economic and military issues will have to be considered together as part of a countrywide approach, and it would not be practical to alternate the chairmanship as one or the other type of issue
is raised in the course of a single meeting. Secondly, there would be great bureaucratic resistance—both within the building and from other agencies—to the alternating chairmanship approach.)

In addition under the proposal, the regional bureau’s representative at the Group’s meetings would set forth—either orally or in writing—the range of our fundamental interests with respect to the country in question and would state the bureau’s views as to the means by which we can most effectively pursue those interests over time. This presentation would have to include a complete, detailed inventory of all impending decisions as to economic and military matters, including decisions as to particular transactions as well as planned programs and allocations for the next fiscal year and the next budget. To provide context, the regional bureau’s presentation would also have to include a detailed specification of relevant decisions of this kind in the recent past.

In particular, this inventory—which the regional bureaus would be responsible for preparing in advance for all countries likely to be reviewed by the Interagency Group—should include comprehensive data on the following programs and relationships:

**Economic:**
- AID development assistance
- PL 480 food aid
- IFI loans
- OPIC programs
- CCC credits
- Tariff treatment
- US stockpile management
- International agreements, e.g., civil air
- Other

**Military:**
- FMS (credit and cash)
- IMET
- MAP
- Export licenses for munitions list items
- Other

The regional bureau’s presentation would then be discussed by the Group. Differences of opinion would be fully aired. After full discussion, the Group would make recommendations on the particular matters under review. To the degree feasible, the Group would seek to make recommendations that applied to categories of transactions and programs and that covered the foreseeable future, thus providing adequate guidance to obviate the necessity for frequent meetings of the Group to consider the same country.
In conclusion, I would note that the proposals set forth above do not entail a net expansion of functions. Rather, they bring together in one entity a number of functions that are currently being performed disjointedly but which must be coordinated if they are to be performed effectively.

If you agree with the proposal, it will be necessary for you to discuss it with Lucy.

145. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, May 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights and the IFIs

Two issues which surfaced at your lunch with Tony Solomon and Fred Bergsten deserve further attention: the allegation of inconsistency between our bilateral assistance programs and our voting record in IFIs; and the question of whether we should ever oppose IFI loans which meet the basic human needs criteria.

The record to date on the “inconsistency” charge is attached for your use in future such conversations, or perhaps distribution to the Interagency Group. You will note that the best possible face is put on things, especially military transfers. Nonetheless the overall record is a good one and we should call attention to it.

The question of whether we ever should oppose basic human needs loans is more difficult, and controversial within this building. All agree that we usually should support such loans. But HA believes that we should leave ourselves the option of sometimes opposing them. This might sometimes be done to disassociate ourselves from the inhumane excesses of a particular regime (e.g., Argentina) or because of our past identification with a major human rights violator (e.g., Chile). HA makes a distinction between abstaining and voting no on IFI loans,

pointing out that abstention is a method of distancing ourselves from a repressive regime, while not actually voting no on aid for the needy. The abstention option does not exist for bilateral assistance.

More often, however, opposition to a needy loan would be for tactical reasons: because it seemed the course most likely to produce improvements in a particular human rights situation. This approach is supported by individuals in other Bureaus. At the moment, for instance, our Ambassadors in Chile and Uruguay are recommending that we oppose all loans to those countries, whether or not they meet the needy standard. Each believes that our hard line policy may be beginning to show results, and thinks we should keep up the pressure. Ambassador White in Paraguay recently urged opposition to all loans there, not because the hard line is beginning to pay off but because he feels that the GOP does not appreciate the distinction between needy and non-needy loans and so is getting confusing “signals” from us which make human rights improvements less likely.

S/P believes we should always support IFI loans which would serve basic human needs. If the political situation in a country is such that the benefits of an assistance program would not actually reach the needy, the proposal should not reach the Interagency Group; if it does, that Group should oppose it. But we should have a clear and consistent record of support for programs which we believe would actually meet the basic human needs criteria.

S/P believes that to preserve our credibility in the IFIs, we need to be able to demonstrate that the only difference in our attitude to their loans and to bilateral programs has to do with the kinds of loans brought forward. Such nuances as a reduction in some bilateral programs, or a decision not to begin further new ones, are likely to be lost on those who see some bilateral programs continuing while we oppose similar programs in international institutions. (The statement in the attached talking points that “we have signed no new bilateral AID agreements” in Ethiopia may be a useful debating point; but the reason is Ethiopia’s unwillingness to sign agreements with us. We have been trying to continue bilateral aid programs in order to preserve some links with the country, despite our opposition to its basic human needs loans in the IDA.)

A more consistent record of support for humanitarian loans in the IFIs might also help encourage other donor countries to factor human rights considerations into IFI operations; several of the European governments already consulted have suggested that the IFIs are too much the cutting edge of our human rights advocacy.

S/P further believes that consistent support for humanitarian loans in the IFIs is important to our longer-range human rights efforts. We need to be able to demonstrate that our quarrel is not with any
people (whatever our differences with their government). In some cases humanitarian assistance will be the only practical human rights help the international community can give to people living under a repressive regime. Finally, it is important to make clear that economic human rights are as important to us as any other category, and that we are not sacrificing their promotion in pursuit of others. When we oppose a genuinely basic human needs loan in an IFI, we give ammunition to those (in LDC governments generally as well as the particular applicant country) who charge that we are trying to impose Western-style political values on them at the expense of their economic needs.  

P.S. Fred Bergsten has read this memo and supports S/P’s position.

Attachment

Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

TALKING POINTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: THE CONSISTENCY QUESTION

We have a good record of consistency in application of human rights considerations to bilateral assistance programs on the one hand, and our role in the IFIs on the other.
—We almost always support economic assistance programs which serve basic human needs, whether bilateral or multilateral. We define “basic human needs” as food; shelter; health care; and education. We also consider that assistance programs with major job-creating potential in areas of high unemployment meet the basic human needs standard, since we would rather put people in a position to purchase essential goods and services for themselves.
—When applying the basic human needs standard, we look closely at the specific situations. Will a construction loan build hotels for the tourist industry, or housing for the poor? How many jobs will an industrial or mineral development loan create? Will an energy loan increase the number of households that have electricity, or increase

2 Lake added the following handwritten notation: “(In addition, I believe strongly that it is simply wrong to harm (or fail to help) the immediate economic prospects of needy people for the sake of possible gains with their governments regarding political human rights.) TL.”

3 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the talking points.
crop yields of poor farmers by providing irrigation? Will an animal health loan improve nutritional standards in a country, or only help prosperous beef exporters? Will a road building loan do more to help farmers get their crops to market, or the military to tighten its control over the population? Will a loan to an intermediate lending institution ultimately reach small businessmen, or the already prosperous? Such questions as these, applied on a case-by-case basis, are more important in our decisions than rigid guidelines.

—Any apparent inconsistency between our attitude toward IFI loans, and toward bilateral aid programs, stems from our ability to design the latter to ensure they meet the basic human needs criteria. We must react to IFI loans, on the other hand, as they are presented to us.

—Our support of loans which directly benefit the needy, even in human rights problem countries, is reflected in our record in the IFIs. We have, for instance, opposed loans to Paraguay for highway development in the IDB and IBRD, but supported loans to it for agricultural education (IDB) and rural water supply (World Bank). Similarly, we have opposed IFI loans to the Philippines which would not serve basic human needs (ADB loans for hydropower development and to the Philippine Development Bank, and a World Bank loan to the Philippine Investment Services Organization) but supported those which met the needy criteria (a World Bank loan for tree farming, and IBRD loans for educational radio, irrigation, and to the Philippine Development Corporation). We opposed an IDB loan to Uruguay for coastal roads, but will support one on May 30 for vocational training. We are supporting a World Bank vocational training loan to El Salvador, but will oppose a World Bank telecommunications loan and an IDB loan for cattle development, if they come to a vote absent human rights improvements.

—On rare occasions we have opposed IFI loans which met the needy criteria, to express extreme concern about a human rights situation. But we have never done so when bilateral programs remained unchanged. We abstained on an AfDf education loan to the Central African Empire, but are making no new bilateral AID agreements with it either. We voted against an IDB rural public health loan to Chile, but it has been eliminated from bilateral programming. We abstained on an AfDf loan to Guinea for hemp production, but also reduced its proposed PL 480 allocation. We abstained on IDA loans to Ethiopia for irrigation and rural roads, but during the same period have signed no new bilateral AID agreements there. We voted against an IDA agricultural loan to the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen, but have no bilateral relations with it. (We also were uncertain that any assistance, however described, actually would reach needy people in Ethiopia or the PDY.)
—Human rights considerations are affecting bilateral economic aid more than our role in the IFIs. This is because AID itself is factoring such considerations into its country allocations. In 1978 the Central African Empire and Uruguay were deleted entirely; levels for Paraguay were lowered; and allocations to Costa Rica and India were increased, all on human rights grounds. Human rights concerns are likely to show up even more in AID allocations in the future, since PD/NSC–30 directs us to intensify efforts to channel assistance to countries with good or improving human rights records. This will mean reduced assistance to human rights problem countries, even though assistance could be designed to benefit needy people there. But these shifts will not be reflected in interagency group decisions, because fewer assistance proposals for human rights problem countries will be forwarded by AID to that group.

—if asked we are working on ways to better factor human rights considerations into military assistance and sales, and to integrate our decisions on military and economic assistance. This is difficult, because important military relationships have been designed to serve our own security interests as well as that of the recipient country. But even here, the record already is better than it sometimes is made to seem. Of the twelve countries whose loans we have opposed in IFIs, we either had no security assistance programs, or have eliminated or sharply reduced them, to all but three: South Korea; the Philippines; and Zaire. South Korea faces an active external threat, and our military assistance is designed to enable it to defend itself without the presence of American combat troops. Zaire also faces an external threat, from Cuban-assisted guerillas operating from Angola. Because of human rights and other considerations, however, our military assistance to it is limited to non-lethal materiel. And military assistance to the Philippines is important to our security interests in the Pacific. The human rights policy, moreover, has ended or reduced security assistance programs to some countries whose IFI loans (including non-needy loans) we routinely support (e.g., Brazil and Guatemala).
146. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State and the Mission to the United Nations

Geneva, June 9, 1978, 2123Z


1. At the IO Chiefs of Mission meeting, we discussed the possibility of a strategy session on human rights so that policies and objectives could be formulated in support of President Carter’s initiative at every possible level. It is not too early to begin planning our concerns for the 35th Human Rights Commission session, especially as its agenda relates to ECOSOC and the General Assembly.

2. I suggest that we take advantage of Ambassador Young and Wells’ presence in Geneva during July to convene such a strategy session. We should plan several days, understanding that only part of those days will be available for our discussions because of other ECOSOC and Mission responsibilities. The dates should be set in terms of the convenience of Ambassadors Young and Wells, as well, and after consultation with other key suggested participants, such as, Assistant Secretary Maynes (and/or George Dalley), Representative Mezvinsky, Assistant Secretary Derian, Ambassadors Torres and McGhee. I would also suggest that the presence of Warren Hewitt, Brady Tyson and the White House representative concerned with human rights would help the accomplishments of such a meeting.

3. Among the agenda items, I would suggest the following:

A. The possibilities and limitations of the UN and its specialized agencies in the human rights field,

   (1) The UN Human Rights Commission and the UN Human Rights Division,
   (2) UNESCO,
   (3) WHO and ILO.

B. The U.S. proposal for a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights—is this idea still worth fostering after fifteen years of effort, or should we think in terms of an amended proposal and a different strategy?

C. How can we enhance human rights by greater accountability and enforceability in national and international institutions?

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780244–0486. Limited Official Use.

2 The meeting took place in Washington May 15–17.
D. Political limitations on U.S. objectives because of Senate inability to ratify human rights commitments.

E. Accepting U.S. commitment to cultural, economic and social rights as parts of human rights, how can we identify the fora for these various rights and how can they best be defined and defended?

F. Should we not be working more diligently for regional institutions for the protection of human rights? Does OAS give us an example of such a regional approach?

G. Should the U.S. Government recommend programs of technical assistance in the human rights field?

H. How can we better support non-governmental organizations in the human rights field and what new initiatives might we propose to strengthen their objective intervention in this problem area?

4. There are clearly many other items that could be discussed in such meetings, such as, our strategy regarding a convention on torture, but I would appreciate your advice as to the concept for such a meeting and if you approve the appropriate time.

Vanden Heuvel

147. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, June 19, 1978

SUBJECT
Improving Human Rights Reporting and Planning

We seek your early approval of a phased process which is designed:

—to ensure we have adequate and timely information on hand for a thorough consideration of human rights concerns during the FY 80

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780122–0799. No classification marking. Schneider did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Palmer and Schneider. According to a stamped notation, the memorandum was received in D on July 3.
security and economic assistance budget review process which is scheduled to begin this month.\(^2\)

- to build on the already expanded reporting from most posts and provide some stimulus to the posts when added reporting on human rights matters might be desired.

- to encourage the further development by the Regional Bureaus and field posts of human rights programs in countries receiving U.S. assistance.\(^3\)

- to ensure a mutually supportive relationship between bilateral efforts and our use of and participation in international organizations, including regional organizations.\(^4\)

These objectives are treated in the attached memorandum.

A schedule for the orderly preparation of the 1979 Country Reports is to be the subject of a subsequent tasking.\(^5\) We intend to recommend an earlier start and a less onerous production schedule for the Country Reports than was the case last year, using our last year’s experience as a guide.

The Regional Bureaus and INR agree with these proposals.\(^6\)

I recommend you approve the attached memorandum.

Approved
Approved with change(s) indicated\(^7\)

Let’s discuss

\(^2\) An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph.

\(^3\) An unknown hand underlined the phrases “encourage the further development” and “of human rights programs.”

\(^4\) An unknown hand placed two vertical parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

\(^5\) An unknown hand bracketed this sentence.

\(^6\) An unknown hand bracketed and underlined this sentence and added “IO” following “Regional Bureaus.”

\(^7\) An unknown hand placed a check mark next to this option and changed it to read: “Approved as revised in D.”
Attachment

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to All Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)

Washington, July 3, 1978

TO
AF—Mr. Moose
ARA—Mr. Bushnell, Acting
EA—Mr. Holbrooke
EB—Mr. Katz
EUR—Mr. Vest
H—Mr. Bennet
HA—Ms. Derian
INR—Ambassador Bowdler
IO—Mr. Maynes
L—Mr. Hansell
PM—Mr. Gelb
S/P—Mr. Lake
NEA—Mr. Saunders

SUBJECT
Improving Human Rights Reporting and Planning

In order to continue the recent improvements in human rights reporting from posts abroad and to use this reporting effectively in implementing our human rights policy, the Deputy Secretary has asked that the following steps be taken:

—that INR should prepare by August 1 brief summaries of significant human rights events since January 1, 1978 in countries selected by the Regional Bureaus in coordination with HA. IO and the relevant Regional Bureaus should inform INR of any significant actions taken in multilateral organizations since January 1 with respect to the human rights situation in the selected countries.

—that the Regional Bureaus, in coordination with HA, INR, IO, and L should review their posts’ human rights reporting and provide posts with additional guidance and feedback to close significant gaps. The need for periodic reports should be considered, particularly where

8 No classification marking. Drafted by Palmer and Schneider on June 16; cleared by Shurtleff, Lister, Cleveland, Fuerth, Carpenter, Hewitt, Runyon, James Ruchti (M/MO), Jennone Walker, David Moran, and Constantine Warvariv (IO/UNESCO). Palmer initialed for all the clearing officials.
human rights conditions are changing, where such conditions are a significant impediment in our bilateral relationship, or where reporting has been minimal. Posts should also be asked for their views on what can realistically be expected in the way of human rights improvements. Posts should be encouraged to solicit the views of AID and ICA personnel abroad on human rights conditions. Any additional instructions should go to the field by July 20.

—that the Regional Bureaus in consultation with the relevant functional bureaus should provide to HA by August 13 a one or two page summary for selected countries of steps taken and planned for integrating human rights concerns into the development and implementation of our economic, security, cultural and other bilateral and multilateral programs and policies for those countries. The Bureaus may suggest formats they deem most appropriate for these summary programs.

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva and the Mission to the United Nations


1. I appreciate your taking the initiative to follow up on the consensus of the IO Chiefs of Mission meeting that we needed to do more to ensure that our multilateral efforts in the human rights field adequately reinforce our bilateral policy efforts. In this light, the Department therefore welcomes your proposal that we make an intensive effort to further integrate our bilateral and multilateral human rights efforts.

2. At the same time, I believe that it will be very difficult to hold the meeting you suggest in Geneva. Throughout the summer, IO has a very carefully balanced series of trips planned as part of our pre-General Assembly consultation effort with other member governments. It would

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memoranda to Bureaus—1978. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Maynes; cleared by Derian and Lamb; approved by Maynes. Christopher sent a copy of the telegram to Maynes under a June 25 handwritten note, commenting: “Bill—This is a very good way to handle this. Thanks. Chris.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 146.
be extremely difficult to peel off senior officers in IO and HA during the period in question to attend a human rights strategy session lasting several days in Geneva.

3. I would suggest, therefore, that the best way to address the legitimate problem you raised would be for us in State to prepare a strategy paper examining the human rights initiatives we might undertake in the UNGA, the forthcoming UNHRC and how those relate to our bilateral human rights actions. This paper could be sent to you in Geneva for comment and you could take advantage of the presence of Ambassadors Young and Wells to formulate comments which, in turn, could be incorporated before we produce a final document. In the meantime, we would welcome your thoughts on some of the issues that you identify in ref tel. In particular, we would welcome your comments on the possibilities and limitations of the Human Rights Commission and UN Human Rights Division.

Vance

3 See Document 155.

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149. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, the Embassy in Austria, and the Embassy in Cameroon

New York, June 23, 1978, 2231Z


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2 See Document 146.

3 In telegram 9185 from Geneva, June 16, the Mission communicated Van Boven’s concerns regarding the staffing and status of the UN Human Rights Division. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780252–0579)
1. USUN agrees with ref tel A that a strategy session sometime this summer with at least the presence of Young, Wells, Maynes, Dalley, Vanden Heuvel and Mezvinsky would be helpful. Obviously, the presence of Hewitt, Tyson, Matteson and the human rights officer from US Mission Geneva and perhaps someone from US UNESCO office would be helpful, also. (Ambassador Young is now tentatively scheduled to be in Geneva July 3 to July 12.) This message is an attempt to place such a strategy meeting in the context of 1) a proposed general strategy, 2) a series of initiatives in which the US could participate and 3) preparatory meetings and consultations both before and after the session in Geneva.

2. As a general US human rights strategy in UN forums, USUN suggests that given the overall desire of the US to continue to build deeper and broader contacts with key non-aligned nations in both the political and human rights fields, the US should focus on initiatives which can be promoted with non-aligned as well as Western support. It appears to us that the major tasks at this time are: A) the building of a human rights alliance with key non-aligned nations (especially India and Nigeria) and supporting their human rights initiatives. B) Consolidating the recent increased interest in human rights and the recent advances under 1503 in the Human Rights Commission (HRC) by strengthening, upgrading and expanding the Human Rights Division (HRD) staff (see reftel B), and developing plans for an improved UN human rights organization and program to be presented to the next session of the HRC, which will probably be devoted largely to the overall analysis; and C) developing some positive US responses to the non-aligned aspirations expressed in 32/1304 for a greater concern with economic, social and cultural rights without sacrificing commitment to civil and political rights.

3. Perhaps the major task of the next few months is the development of a USG model of an ideal human rights program and organization to be the basis for our proposals and responses at the meeting on the “over-all analysis” of the HRC next February–March. It is here that the proposals for a High Commissioner, Regional Commission and Commissioners, Coordinator of Human Rights Programs and Activities with the rank of Under Secretary General, an enlarged commission, two sub-commissions, an International Court for Human Rights, etc., must be evaluated, integrated, and put into a package.

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4. As some specific initiatives upon which to begin and in addition to the items contained in refelts A and B, USUN would suggest the following:

A) Proposal for a new agenda item for the General Assembly: “improving the coordination and communication among UN agencies in the struggle to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.” (This would include reports on human rights procedures and activities from ILO, UNESCO, WHO, regional human rights commissions, etc.) This proposal originated and is being developed by IO/HR.

B) A proposal for the General Assembly to authorize and fund a resumed session of the HRC in 1979 should the HRC decide that it cannot adequately complete the “overall analysis” of United Nations human rights programs in order to report to the General Assembly in 1979 (as mandated by 32/130).

C) A proposal (see reftel B) to upgrade the HRD to a department, to expand the staff of the HRD to include at least the following: four more officers in the field of private communications, a regional human rights field officer attached to each of the headquarters staffs of the regional economic commissions, and an additional officer in the New York liaison office.

D) A proposal to the Third Committee that the panel of experts created in 1969 be updated, and that its mandate be expanded to include human rights good offices missions as directed by the SYG, and that funding be allotted for such missions.

E) A strategy of presenting (or stimulating the presentation) to the sub-commission all the available documentation on the three or four most serious human rights national problems, in such a list seeking both ideological and geographical distribution, and seeking to expand the number of 1503 cases to include the worst human rights problems, such as Equatorial Guinea and Argentina.

F) Evaluation of the FRG proposal for the creation of an International Court of Human Rights, that could receive complaints from national tribunals or commissions, and perhaps the sub-commission.

G) Emphasis on the promotion of local, national and regional commissions.

H) Two meetings of the HRC per year, with a differentiated agenda, alternating meetings between New York and Geneva.

I) Discussion of methods to streamline the General Assembly to avoid current duplication in plenary, Third and Fourth Committees on such topics as the Middle East, South Africa and self-determination.

5. In addition to these specifics, USUN also sees some other general problem and or opportunity areas:
A) We need an initiative on racism and racial discrimination that will outflank 3379,\(^5\) and help us maintain our credibility in this area.

B) We need some initiatives in the area of economic human rights. Perhaps the food corps idea\(^6\) can be proposed this year.

C) Perhaps we should consider introducing again the US initiative on torture, calling for a special working group of experts to report each year to the General Assembly. This idea, which was originally developed by IO/HR two years ago, complements the process of drafting the convention.

6. USUN believes that the time is ripe for a series of coordinated human rights initiatives in the UN. The prerequisites to success in these efforts are: 1) staff preparation in-depth on each of the proposals selected, 2) continuous coordination and communication among IO, Geneva, and USUN, 3) coordinated and selective consultations with other governments in Washington, New York, Geneva and capitals. The Geneva strategy meetings can play an important role in an ongoing and open-ended process.

7. We agree with Mission Geneva (ref B para 7) that it is basic to the success of any initiatives to strengthen human rights machinery for Van Boven to enforce discipline on his own staff and gain major improvements in productivity. Only then can a demonstrable need for expansion be successfully carried. Secondly, despite the difficulties entailed in guidance furnished him by the UN Controller, USUN considers it essential that Van Boven scrupulously eschew any hint of legerdemain in seeking to justify staff increase (para 1 and 2, ref B). Weak or questionable evidence will merely invite highly effective Soviet attacks in UNGA Fifth Committee.

Leonard

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\(^6\) See Document 236.
SUBJECT

Human Rights and OPIC

The Problem

Although the Christopher Committee was created as an inter-agency group, Christopher has more and more used the Committee in a purely advisory capacity, making all the decisions himself. I have not objected to this development since it didn’t seem to me that the group was likely to do a better job than Christopher has alone, however in this case, Christopher is leaning towards a decision with which I, and most of the NSC staff, strongly disagree. The issue is an important one. The purpose of this memorandum is to acquaint you with it, and to request your intervention to prevent a bad decision.

A month or so ago, Congress added the basic Harkin language to OPIC’s authorizing legislation. The law now requires OPIC, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to bring human rights considerations to bear on its programs, and specifically to deny insurance for investments in countries which engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, unless: (1) the investment will directly benefit the needy; or, (2) the national security requires OPIC to support the investment.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights: 5/77–11/78. No classification marking. Sent for action. Printed from a copy that bears Inderfurth’s, Bartholomew’s, and Dodson’s initials. Brzezinski wrote on the memorandum: “W.C. will send me the text of the proposal implementation with memo (worked out with OPIC). P[lease] review + let me know. ZB.” Tuchman Mathews attached the following typewritten note to the memorandum: “Zbig: In my view this is an issue of prime importance to our ability to develop a rational human rights policy for the long term. Henry Owen agrees—he wanted to write you a note on this but is out of town for the week. He agrees with the approach suggested here, as do Guy Erb (who is also on leave) and all NSC regional people who had an interest in the subject. JTM.” An earlier version of the memorandum, which Tuchman Mathews distributed to the NSC Staff on June 14, and Armacost’s June 15 response to the memorandum are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 4/77–7/78. Christopher’s response is printed as Document 151.

2 See footnote 6, Document 139.
Three weeks ago the Christopher Committee grappled for the first time with implementing the new provision. A lengthy discussion revealed that it is going to be extremely difficult to implement it in a sensible and consistent manner. Christopher postponed a decision, saying that he wanted to think about it. I subsequently made clear to his staff that NSC should be consulted in advance of any final decision. The key considerations are these:

—OPIC and its programs are designed to help American business: not the country in which the investment is to be made.

—In most cases, the government of the country in which the investment is to be made is not involved in the project in any way.

—An OPIC decision not to insure an investment in a particular country is often viewed as a signal that the US considers that country to be politically unstable. Thus a negative decision could lead to disinvestment, greater economic instability, growing political unrest, and a general worsening of human rights conditions.

—Since most OPIC-supported projects are designed to be profit-making, the needy people exemption is very rarely applicable.

—The legislative history of the new amendment indicates that an exception can also be made where there is an indirect benefit to the needy, but this is extremely hard to calculate. The SFRC Report suggested such factors as “the appropriateness of the products which they promote for local mass consumption, performance in the training of workers and managers, behavior with respect to social policy and wage rates”; etc., as criteria for making this judgment. Clearly, if the Committee were to try to apply such standards, we would be adopting a standard which we do not apply to business here at home. That is hard (if not impossible) to justify.

—If the Committee were to take such detailed factors into consideration, the final results, and the overall policy as perceived by everyone outside the government, would probably appear even less consistent than it now does.

The Options

As I see it, there are two options:

1. Implement the law literally. This means applying the needy people exemption—for both direct and indirect benefits—including consideration of the nature of the project, the social behavior of the company in-

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3 In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s June 2 evening report, Tuchman Mathews characterized the Christopher Committee meeting that day as a “wrenching session” with regard to implementing the new OPIC legislation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 4–6/78)
involved, its wages, training policy, etc. It also means applying the amendment to the group of 40–50 “grey area” countries which have serious human rights problems. (This is the group which has been considered by the Committee at one time or another—it substitutes for a hit list of “gross and consistent” violators.) In sum, it means implementing the amendment very much as we do the similar Congressional language limiting assistance in the IFIs.

2. Implement the law narrowly—perhaps not as Congress intended—but in the light of our own view of the wisdom of the amendment. This would mean that except in very rare instances the needy people exemption would be considered inapplicable, and the Committee would therefore not request supportive background detail from OPIC on company behavior, wages structures, etc.

It would also mean limiting application of the amendment to those projects where the government of the recipient country is involved in the project. This would immediately rule out about 80% of all OPIC programs. Unfortunately, determination of government involvement is not a yes-or-no question. After consulting with OPIC, I would suggest that the primary criterion for determining involvement be that the government be either an equity holder in the project, or that it have provided a significant portion of the financing for it. At a decidedly secondary level, a government might be considered to be involved in a project: (1) when it was to be a major beneficiary either from tax revenues or production sharing; or, (2) where the project was of extreme size or political significance for the country involved.

Finally, this approach could mean limiting application of the amendment to a smaller group (say 10–15) of the most egregious human rights violators. While this limitation would be consistent with the overall approach, it would entail major problems in agreeing on which countries are the worst offenders (after eliminating Uganda, Cambodia, Chile, etc., with which OPIC does no business). If such a group was agreed on there would always be the danger of leaks—even if nothing were put on paper.

The Decision

Christopher has very nearly settled on a final decision for Option 1, while I believe we should follow Option 2. The NSC staff also strongly favors Option 2, as does OPIC itself. You should note however that Option 2 might not be very popular on the Hill. If we were to follow this approach we should brief key members, being quite straightforward in

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4 Bartholomew underlined the phrase “social behavior of the company involved,” drew a horizontal line next to this portion of the paragraph, and wrote “absurd” in the left-hand margin.
explaining the discussions we have had, the internal contradictions in the amendment, and the difficulties and inconsistencies likely to emerge from a broader application of it. I also believe that as soon as our Congressional relations allow, we should attempt to get this amendment repealed—but not before next year.

If you agree with my suggested approach, we can proceed in one of two ways. I could draft a memorandum for your signature addressed to the Secretaries of State and Treasury (as was the original memo setting up the Christopher Committee) directing that the OPIC human rights amendment be implemented along the lines of Option 2. Or, you could chair a small meeting with State, Treasury, and OPIC that would end in the same result, but could save Christopher from feeling that he was being totally preempted. I favor the meeting—Henry Owen favors a memorandum.

Recommendation:

That you approve Option 2 as the general approach for implementing the new human rights language for OPIC.

That you direct me to set up a meeting to resolve this issue with attendees from State, Treasury and OPIC.6

5 Document 31.

6 Bartholomew placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to the second recommendation and added the following handwritten comment: “Option 1 would be an unmitigated disaster—harm human rights, Admin. prerogatives etc—can’t understand Christopher. But he’s extended, so you should do it through a meeting—unless you want to try turning him around with a phone call. Reg.” Brzezinski did not indicate his preference for either option; however, according to an attached NSC Correspondence Profile, Brzezinski approved the second recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights: 5/77–11/78)
151. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, July 3, 1978

SUBJECT

OPIC and Human Rights

Pursuant to our telephone conversation this morning, I am attaching a copy of the arrangements we worked out with OPIC in early June for bringing human rights considerations to bear on OPIC programs. These procedures were designed to be responsive to the spirit and letter of the new human rights provisions in the OPIC legislation (copy also attached),\(^2\) while at the same time preserving flexibility and permitting us to avoid publicly identifying other countries as gross and consistent human rights violators.

You will be particularly interested in the last three sentences of the procedures.

Since agreeing upon these arrangements, we have reviewed a number of OPIC programs. We have recommended approval of a total of 18 programs involving 13 countries, and have thus far not recommended disapproval of any programs.

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State\(^3\)

Washington, June 2, 1978

Informal Procedures
For Bringing Human Rights Considerations
To Bear on OPIC Programs
(Not for Distribution)

1. OPIC support of a private investment in a country will be withheld when the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign As-

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed are the relevant portions of P.L. 95–268.

\(^3\) Confidential. Brackets are in the original.
sistance (chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State) recommends, and the OPIC Board of Directors agrees, that OPIC should not provide the proposed support because the host government is engaged in extensive and extremely serious violations of human rights. OPIC will include in its Annual Report to Congress appropriate information on projects for which OPIC assistance is refused on account of human rights considerations or provided despite such considerations, with appropriate general explanations.

2. In order to give the Interagency Group an opportunity to make its recommendation, OPIC will submit to HA [the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs] a summary of each project which OPIC proposes to assist. If HA has reservations about a project, it will refer it to the Interagency Group. In addition to human rights conditions in the country involved, there are a variety of important relevant factors to be considered in determining what recommendation to make concerning OPIC support. They include the relationship between the project and the government of the host country. (This relationship might be gauged by such factors as host government involvement as a lender or equity holder; fiscal impact of the project; size or political symbolism of the project.)

152. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, July 5, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights and OPIC

The package at Tab A\(^2\) from Christopher arrived this morning. It says virtually nothing. Nothing is said about when the needy people exemption might be considered applicable and by what standard the “benefit” would be judged. Nothing is said about what information would be requested from OPIC in order to judge a particular project, especially as regards the social behavior of the company involved. It


\(^2\) Not attached; printed as Document 151.
states that “in addition to human rights conditions in the country involved, there are a variety of important relevant factors to be considered in determining what recommendation to make concerning OPIC support”, but gives no clue as to what these factors might be. Even on the standard for judging government involvement, the memorandum hedges by saying that “This relationship might be gauged by such factors as . . .”

In short, it is a bare bones outline of Option 1, preserving maximum “flexibility” to implement the amendment in the broadest possible manner. The memorandum was drafted more than a month ago, and reflects none of the developments in Christopher’s thinking since then.

Recommendation:

That you direct me to set up a meeting to resolve this issue.4

Henry Owen has seen and concurs.

3 The options are set out in Document 150.
4 Brzezinski placed a check mark on the approval line.

153. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, July 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights and OPIC

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum I sent earlier explaining the problem. It outlines the arguments and presents an alternative (Option 2) to Christopher’s plans. OPIC agrees with that suggested alternative, as does Henry Owen who feels very strongly on this issue.

Brzezinski’s response to that memorandum was to talk with Christopher who promised to send over a memorandum outlining his posi-

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1978. Confidential. All tabs are attached; Tab A is printed as Document 150 and Tab B is printed as Document 151.
tion. Christopher’s memorandum is at Tab B. As you will see, it says absolutely nothing. It was a strange response to a call from ZB to send over a memorandum that was more than a month old, and already OBE.

Attendees at this meeting will be: Christopher and Steve Oxman; Poats and Ambassador Smith from OPIC; Henry Owen and myself.2

The key issues to resolve are: should the amendment ever be applied when there is no government involvement in the project?; how should the needy people exemption be applied?; should indirect benefits to the needy be considered, and therefore, should the social behavior of the company involved be considered? The NSC view on each of these is succinctly stated under Option 2 on page 2 of the memorandum at Tab A.

I suggest you begin by asking Christopher to outline his position and then ask OPIC followed by Henry Owen to respond. I will have briefed OPIC.

A copy of the statute itself is at Tab C for your review.

2 No record of this meeting has been found.

154. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1

Geneva, July 25, 1978, 1046Z

11400. For Asst Secy Maynes from Young and Vanden Heuvel.
1. July 21 meeting with members of our staffs resulted in our mutual agreement on the need for joint USUN NY/US Mission Geneva/Department consultations on U.S. strategy in human rights. In our view, consultations should focus on the following issues:
   A. Strategy concerning proposal for UNHC for HR;
   B. Restructuring of the UN Human Rights Division;
   C. The convention against torture;
   D. U.S. ratification of human rights conventions;

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780305–0664. Limited Official Use. Sent for information to USUN.
E. Process for U.S. handling of human rights communications and other requests for information;

F. Procedures for governmental and nongovernmental preparation of human rights complaints in various international fora.

2. In an effort to encourage improvement of U.S. image in the UN regarding ratification of human rights conventions, we believe it would be useful during the consultations, to make an all-out effort with key congressional members, to bring about a better understanding of the need for a better U.S. posture on human rights conventions.

3. As for timing of consultations, we believe they should be scheduled in Washington during the period August 8–11 since Vanden Heuvel will be in the U.S. for ILO meetings.

4. Would appreciate receiving your views on this suggestion and any assistance you can lend in arranging the consultations.

Vanden Heuvel

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva and the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, July 26, 1978, 1838Z


1. As promised ref tel, I am sending at the end of this message a draft scope paper which is intended to lay out our strategy on human rights issues for the 33rd UNGA. It builds upon some suggestions and discussions we have had in IO, including input from USUN. This is not a final draft. It needs your scrutiny from the vantage point of Geneva, and we will appreciate greatly all comments you may care to make. I have noted that the paper omits an action proposal covering the field of economic and social rights and we are working on an amendment to highlight a key basic human right in this category, such as the right to food.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780306–1079. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Hewitt; cleared by Dalley; approved by Maynes.

2 Not found.
2. For USUN: The draft reflects the valuable contributions which we have had from USUN. Any additional comments or suggestions will be welcome.

3. Since we want to come up with a final version in IO as soon as possible, hope to have all comments by the end of this week from Geneva and USUN.


The Setting

The preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the 33rd UN General Assembly contains a standard number of human rights items (14, with a number of sub-items). Many of the items are repetitive, having appeared on the agendas of the past several UNGA sessions. The totality of the items will reflect somewhat more heavily than usual the theme of racial discrimination, with a major focus being the report on the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. A special item marking 30 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is scheduled for plenary discussion. This item on the 30th anniversary, as well as the items (A) on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and (B) alternative approaches and ways and means within the UN system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights stand out as being of special interest to the United States. Another repeated item with important human rights content will be the report of the Economic and Social Council. Under this item the question of Chile will be considered, as well as almost any other human rights issue which members of the General Assembly may choose to raise.

Factors Limiting U.S. Positions

With respect to a number of the items, the ability of the United States to take a positive position is circumscribed in advance:

A. The two related items on implementing the program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and the report on the World Conference—the United States is a non-participant in the Decade and the World Conference.

B. The item dealing with adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of assistance given to Southern Africa will feature a final report by a special rapporteur—the earlier drafts of this report have been strongly critical of the Western group of nations, which in turn have opposed the Special Rapporteur’s findings and conclusions.
C. The item dealing with the report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination—the United States is not a party to this Convention and is therefore ineligible to participate in the work of the Committee.

D. The status of the Convention on the Crime of Apartheid—the United States is not a party to this Convention and was one of the two governments to vote against it.

E. The item on self-determination—resolutions under this item regularly endorse the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and condemn the policies of NATO members, thus assuring a U.S. negative vote.

F. The item relating to the report of the Human Rights Committee under the international covenants on human rights—the United States is not a party to these covenants and is therefore precluded from participating in the work of the Human Rights Committee.

G. The item on alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights will focus upon a progress report from the Human Rights Commission—since the substance of this item, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights proposal, is still being studied by the HRC, no useful initiative by the United States with respect to any specific related proposals is likely to be possible.

H. The item on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance—the drafting of a declaration is still proceeding at a snail’s pace in the Human Rights Commission; no realistic alternative drafting body is available.

I. The item on freedom of information—an impasse in the drafting of either a declaration or a convention was reached many years ago, with majority sentiment clearly in favor of letting this matter continue to lie undisturbed.

J. The item relating to Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the Occupied Territories (to be considered in the Special Political Committee)—the United States rejects a priori the findings of human rights violations made repeatedly by the UNGA and the Human Rights Commission because of the unacceptable nature of the fact-finding mechanism.

U.S. Goals

This year’s UNGA agenda of human rights items offers less scope certainly than that of the last session for U.S. initiatives and positive

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5 See footnote 3, Document 16.
input. In too many instances, we will not be able to avoid a negative or muted stance. Because of our strong support for the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter and our interest in making the United Nations a more effective instrument for the promotion of human rights, we must seek to highlight those items on the agenda which offer opportunities for positive participation by the United States. The administration's commitment to human rights requires that the United States delegation to the 33rd General Assembly continue to work for the advancement of human rights, pursuing goals in line with our own national concept of human rights and, wherever possible, encouraging and joining with governments of all regions of the world in taking actions consistent with our goals.

The limitations inherent in the provisional agenda for the 33rd UNGA suggest the conclusion that it would be in the United States interest to propose additional matters, either through a new agenda item or under existing agenda items, for consideration. In determining the substance of such initiatives, we should use as a principal guideline the program for action sketched out by the President in his address to the United Nations on March 17, 1977. In this address, President Carter called for a strengthening of the international machinery for protecting human rights and, in particular, he suggested (A) that the Human Rights Commission be prepared to meet more often with all nations being prepared to offer their fullest cooperation; (B) the move back to central headquarters of the United Nations Human Rights Division, and (C) renewed attention and support for the proposal for a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Specific Action Proposals

In line with our overall goal of promoting human rights and taking account of the complex of human rights issues which will appear in the provisional agenda of the 33rd UNGA, the U.S. delegation should seek to carry out the following actions:

A. Deliver a major statement during plenary consideration of the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights assessing the record of the United Nations in the human rights field and describing our hopes and concerns for the future.

B. Consult with other key delegations with a view to proposing a new item for the provisional agenda with the title “Coordination and review of the human rights program and activities of the United Nations system and of other international organizations.” We should proceed with this new item only if our consultations reveal an adequate amount of support.

C. Under the item on torture, prepare a proposal along the lines of that informally discussed with delegations at the last General Assembly for the establishment of an expert group to survey and report upon the problem of torture as it may exist in the world today.

D. In the context of the resolution which the UNGA will consider with respect to the report of the Human Rights Commission on its overall analysis of alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights, propose with other co-sponsors a provision authorizing the Human Rights Commission to hold a resumed session in 1979 to be held at UN headquarters, in case the Commission does not complete the overall analysis at its regular 1979 session. This would be an initial step in achieving the President’s aim for more frequent annual sessions of the Commission. In any statement under this item, the U.S. delegation should express our continuing interest in further consideration of the High Commissioner for Human Rights proposal.

E. Consult with other delegations in advance of the 33rd UNGA session with a view to identifying possible actions which might be taken at the 33rd UNGA to strengthen and expand the staff of the Human Rights Division, including the New York liaison office. This will require adequate budgetary resources which must be shifted from another part of the overall UN program.

F. Consult with other delegations with a view to the formulation of a proposal for the establishment of a panel of experts to be used by the Secretary-General in carrying out a good offices role with respect to human rights problems. The panel would be made up of persons named by member governments.

Specific Cases of Human Rights Violations

The provisional agenda contains the usual items dealing with violations of human rights in Southern Africa and the Israeli-occupied territories. The question of human rights violations in Chile will be considered under the report of the Economic and Social Council. Other cases involving allegations of serious human rights violations, Democratic Kampuchea, Uganda, and Argentina, are not specifically identified on the agenda but could be subsumed under the report of ECOSOC.

A. Southern Africa

While our differences with African governments over the advisability of economic sanctions will doubtless be highlighted in the discussion of the item dealing with adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of assistance given to Southern Africa, our stance on Southern African questions need not be negative. We should be pre-
pared to present our case in defense of our refusal to support the imposition of economic sanctions, our commitment to peaceful change and our assistance to and encouragement of investment efforts in majority ruled countries in Southern Africa. At the same time we should be prepared to rehearse and expect full credit for the positive accomplishments which have occurred in Southern Africa, in Namibia, chiefly through the efforts of U.S. and other Western governments.

B. Israeli-Occupied Territories

We must stress the need for an overall settlement, which is the only way finally to solve this problem. In the meantime, we should highlight our support for the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories, and the encouraging progress being made by the ICRC in dealing with the treatment of prisoners problem.

C. Chile

Discussion of the human rights situation in Chile will center upon the report of the Human Rights Commission’s ad hoc working group, which has finally been able to visit Chile. As a co-sponsor of the resolution on human rights in Chile at the last General Assembly, the United States should be prepared to engage in consultations on a resolution at the 33rd General Assembly which will be responsive to such developments as may be reported by the ad hoc working group.

D. Democratic Kampuchea

The focus of attention in the United Nations with respect to the human rights situation in Democratic Kampuchea will be the 1979 session of the Commission on Human rights, which responded to the United Kingdom initiative at its 1978 session by deciding to discuss the question at its 1979 session. We understand that the UK Government desires that nothing be done at the UNGA to shift the focus from the Commission on Human Rights. The United States delegation should be prepared to make appropriate references to our concern over the situation in Democratic Kampuchea, both in the speech to be delivered during the general debate as well as in the statement we may make on the human rights record presented by the report of ECOSOC. The U.S. delegation should also consult further with the UK and other WEO members of the Human Rights Commission, both to encourage them to maintain their active interest in this matter and to explore the possi-

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8 See footnote 3, Document 125.
9 Reference is to A/RES/32/118, Protection of Human Rights in Chile, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 16, 1977.
bility of proposing to the UNGA a procedural resolution expressing support for the action taken by the Human Rights Commission in deciding to look into the situation in Democratic Kampuchea. The outcome of the discussion of the question by the Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities at its 1978 summer session in Geneva will be relevant to the content of any such resolution.

E. Uganda

In any statement to be made by the United States delegation on the human rights record under the report of ECOSOC, reference should be made to our concern over the human rights situation in Uganda, as well as to our strong support for measures presently under way in the Human Rights Commission to deal with the situation in that country.

F. Argentina

At the last session of the Commission on Human Rights, the U.S. representative, in a general statement on human rights throughout the world, included a reference to our concern over the human rights situation in Argentina. It is probable that a visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to Argentina will be arranged and/or take place during the period when the UNGA is in session. The U.S. representative should be prepared to make appropriate reference to the Argentine human rights situation and to any developments in the OAS in his statement reviewing the human rights record under the report of ECOSOC. Should it happen that no movement will have occurred with respect to a visit of the IAHRC to Argentina during the period the UNGA is in session, the possibility of proposing some form of action by the UNGA on the Argentine question should be explored at that time.

Christopher

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10 Reference is to the ongoing human rights abuses perpetrated by President Idi Amin. During the summer of 1978, members of Congress sought to ban all imports from Uganda.

11 In telegram 3416 from Geneva, March 4, the Mission indicated that Mezvinsky planned to deliver a prepared statement on human rights during public debate at the HRC session and transmitted the proposed text of Mezvinsky’s statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780099–0305)
156. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Bergsten) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**


**SUBJECT**

Procedures for Handling Human Rights

This is a follow-up to your discussions of this subject with Under Secretary Solomon and me in May. Our executive directors have again reviewed ways of obtaining from bank managements information on prospective loans far in advance of their consideration by the Board so that there is ample time to consider human rights objectives. Based on their views, I suggest the following procedure as a means of making more effective use of our voice and vote in the international development banks.

Treasury will provide for each of the banks a list of projects likely to be presented to the Board during the coming year, accompanied by brief project descriptions to provide a general idea of the nature of the proposed project.

Such a list will be provided for each problem country—currently 13 whose loans we have been opposing. See the attachment for a sample. We would be prepared, however, to obtain similar information whenever it is decided that a country should be shifted from the “watch list” to the “active list.”

With lead time of up to a year, we would have ample time to consult with like-minded governments to seek support for parallel actions on their part. This is what the Secretary suggested to Chancellor Denis Healey in his recent letter. We would then be in a better position to in-
fluence the human rights policies of the governments concerned and the lending policies of the banks.

The Interagency Group should consider our policy toward problem countries in terms of an entire year’s pipeline of MDB projects. U.S. bilateral assistance programs, economic and military, and financing programs such as FMS, Exim Bank, OPIC, etc., should also be considered along with MDB loans. Such a review would decide how best we can seek to achieve defined objectives with the various policy instruments available to us, yet keeping in mind our other interests. Once the most fruitful strategy has been agreed upon for each problem country, we would then bring our influence to bear and there would be time for countries to effect improvements. Such changes would be taken into account in deciding our assistance policies to these countries.

I hope you find these suggestions useful as a way to proceed.

C. Fred Bergsten

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Bergsten signed “Fred” above his typed signature.

157. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, August 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights “Sanctions”

We continue to believe that case-by-case decision making holds the best hope of making our human rights policy effective in varying situations, and of keeping it in balance with other foreign policy interests. But we also see a need for agreement on some general principles which would help guide individual decisions.

Three issues of special concern to us are whether we ever should deny IFI loans which serve basic human needs to countries under re-
pressive regimes; whether to use economic sanctions to press for political change as well as for respect of rights of the person; and how to coordinate all our levers of influence with a given country.

You have our memorandum of last May on the first issue. The attached paper addresses the second and touches on the third. (Other work on the third is in train: the Interagency Group meeting planned for later this month to look at assistance programs a year ahead, and the papers now being prepared on actions taken or planned to integrate human rights advocacy into all our relations with selected countries).

The attached memorandum argues S/P’s case for:
—A strong policy bias against opposing IFI loans except in response to gross violations of rights of the person;
—Limiting restrictions on programs designed to help American exporters and investors to the minimum required by law;
—Distancing ourselves from the security forces of countries which deny freedom of expression;
—Channeling more of our bilateral economic assistance to countries with a good or improving record in political as well as personal human rights.

HA has seen this memorandum in draft and will be sending you a separate paper detailing their agreements and disagreements with it.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, August 10, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights “Sanctions”

The Issue

Successes of the human rights policy to date may now confront us with a new problem: whether to continue denying economic and security benefits (opposition to IFI loans; restrictions on bilateral economic and security programs) to a country if arbitrary arrest, torture, and other violations of the person are ended but there is no meaningful

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2 See Document 145.
3 Not found and not further identified.
4 Confidential. Drafted by Walker on August 9.
progress on political rights and the legal and institutional instruments of repression remain.

Discussion

We believe there should be a strong policy bias against opposing IFI loans except in response to gross violations of rights of the person and that in general we should limit programs which are designed primarily to help American exporters and investors (ExIm, CCC, OPIC) only to the extent required by law. The latter would mean no limits on CCC credits (since there is no applicable law), and might mean using the language of the ExIm legislation (to “take into account” human rights situations “and the effects such exports may have on human rights”) to deny credits only if the particular export in question might be used in human rights violations or if chances were high that denial might actually produce improvements in rights of the person.

This would be consistent with laws which specifically cite violations of the person as those which require denial of US assistance. It reflects various policy statements, beginning with the Secretary’s April 1977 Law Day Speech in which he said we can justifiably seek a rapid end to violations of the person but that promotion of other human rights may be slower to show results. And it reflects both laws and policy directives (and common sense) which call on us to consider human rights trends rather than demand sudden transformations in authoritarian societies.

We can imagine exceptions which we might advocate to this guideline. We might not, for instance, want to vote in one of the Banks for a major non-bhn loan to a country when its military had just overthrown an elected government, even if that move did not include arrests of opposition leaders. Exceptions, however, should be used to express concern about a human rights deterioration or the reversal of a trend—not to maintain maximum pressure until all serious problems are solved.

Chile could be the hardest test of the policy we are advocating. Violations of the person have virtually ended, in part as a result of our pressure. There is a good chance that continued pressure from us could contribute to further progress toward restoration of political freedoms. The latter would, inter alia, be the best long-range guarantee of rights of the person. Chile’s democratic traditions, moreover, make it hard for that regime to argue that our pressure for a restoration of democracy reflects cultural arrogance. And our own role in its recent history makes it impossible for us to be neutral: to begin now to support IFI loans to it, or to open up ExIm credits, would be seen (in Chile and abroad) as prematurely rewarding Chile. Finally, those Congressmen who care about Chile are urging that we intensify pressure until and unless democracy is restored.
Thus the arguments for keeping the heat on are strong. Similar cases can be made elsewhere.

Nonetheless we believe that the human rights policy, and American interests in general, ultimately will benefit if we do not seem to be using economic pressure to bring down a particular government. Repressive governments will be more likely to improve their performance if they believe something short of suicide will bring a lifting of economic sanctions. Other IFI donors will be more likely to join our efforts if we do not seem bent on using those institutions not just to work for an end to torture and arbitrary arrest worldwide, but to topple a particular government of which we most strongly disapprove. And in this country, a sense that the human rights policy was hurting American exports (and jobs) could begin seriously to undercut support for the policy itself.

The strongest argument seems to us to be one of principle. To deny a country access to international financial support in order to try to force political change on it is not qualitatively different from the Nixon Administration’s efforts to “destabilize” the Allende government. We have not been as successful in cutting off Pinochet’s financial sources as Nixon was in doing the same to Allende, and our efforts have not included jawboning commercial banks. But the difference is of degree rather than of kind.

In practice of course we cannot suddenly resume economic business as usual with Chile. Chile is an emotional issue and our attitude toward it is, rightly or wrongly, a symbol to many of our human rights commitment. Moreover, present sanctions are also aimed at getting Letelier’s alleged murderers extradited.5 But if the Letelier issue is satisfactorily resolved and there is no regression on rights of the person, we should begin phasing in some ExIm and CCC financing and supporting bhn loans to Chile in the IFIs, carefully explain both to the Chileans and to human rights activists in this country what we are doing and why, and test the political waters for the feasibility of beginning to support some non-bhn loans.

Promoting Political Rights

Our position is only tenable, however, if we can also demonstrate that we are working to promote political rights by other means.

We should avoid supplying the internal security forces of governments which deny freedom of expression to their critics, whether or not those governments find it necessary actually to lock the critics up. Here too there might be occasional exceptions. The recent approval of a sale of handguns to South Korea’s Presidential guard, even while denying a similar sale to its regular police, is a case in point. But in general we should reverse the past practice in which economic assistance has borne the brunt of the human rights policy, while sales to police (and military) forces remained relatively unscathed. When there is an improving but still unsatisfactory overall human rights situation, we should lift economic sanctions first while continuing to distance ourselves from the security forces of a repressive regime.

Bilateral economic assistance might be adjusted to particular situations. You know S/P’s aversion to denying assistance which furthers the economic human rights of poor people who have the misfortune to live under a repressive regime. Nonetheless there are more needy people worldwide than we have resources, and the President has directed us to channel bilateral assistance to countries with a good or improving human rights record. Moreover, there is a significant difference between bilateral programs which we can control and adjust, and IFI loans, on which we usually must vote when and as they are presented to us. Thus, we could reprogram aid levels away from repressive regimes and toward governments showing more support for political freedom, rather than continuing to use the IFIs to pressure countries which have ceased violations of the person.

Finally, we need to do more about the positive promotion of human rights. For all our rhetoric (in speeches and in PD–30) about preferring positive approaches to sanctions, our policy in practice still is skewed toward the latter. That is understandable since we have to react to IFI loans and arms sales requests as they come to us, while devising positive approaches appropriate to cultures different from our own requires effort and imagination. Some of our Embassies (e.g., Djakarta, Seoul, Nairobi) have volunteered interesting suggestions, based on extensive personal experience in those societies. But too many in the regional bureaus still see the human rights policy as a “problem” of sanctions; if that threat is removed they seem to think no active human rights policy is required of them. If we are going to lift sanctions on governments which still deny political freedoms it will be essential that we demonstrate (not least to human rights activists on the Hill) what we are doing instead to promote the expansion of those freedoms. The reports now being prepared on steps taken and planned to integrate

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6 See Document 119.
158. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, undated

Human Rights “Sanctions” Memo of S/P\(^2\)

Introduction

We concur with S/P’s desire:

— to explore new ways to reinforce positive human rights records, e.g., by channeling AID funds to governments with positive records; and

— to distance ourselves from security forces of governments which deny freedom of expression. (Here we would, in addition, adopt the same stance toward regimes which violate other civil and political liberties as well.)

However, we disagree with S/P’s proposals for general policy bias which would:

— restrict human rights evaluation of CCC, Ex-Im, and OPIC programs to the minimum required by law; and

— adopt a bias against taking human rights into account on IFI votes, once violations of the person have ended.

There is no easy way to assure a balance between our human rights objectives and other foreign and domestic policy considerations. But we believe that the undiscriminating sweep of the S/P approach would unnecessarily restrict our flexibility in devising the most appropriate human rights strategy. In contrast to the broad new\(^3\) policy urged by S/P, we favor continuing to apply the guidelines already in PD–30 and applicable legislation on a case-by-case basis. This is more likely to permit decisions to be made in a manner sensitive to the distinction be-

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\(^2\) Attached to Document 157.

\(^3\) An unknown hand circled the word “new.”
between countries and the multiplicity of factors that affect our national interest.

Do our Actions Constitute “Sanctions?”

A decision to alter assistance programs, to consider our votes in the IFI’s and to administer government-supported investment and export programs in light of human rights policy objectives, among other foreign policy interests, is not a “sanctions” approach.

We are not obligated to support the transfer of public resources or to extend U.S. government assistance to investments or exports to every country in the world. We have a sovereign right and limited funds to condition our assistance on policy judgments which conform to our statutes and international standards of conduct. To do so openly, based largely on international obligations to promote human rights—including the freedom to participate in government (Article 21, Universal Declaration; Article 25, International Convenant, Article 23, American Convention)—is a far cry from seeking to prevent a democratically elected President from taking office or of adopting a covert policy of “destabilization”.

While it is true that Nixon also denied CCC and Ex-Im credits and worked in the IFIs to deny loans, we also went far beyond these actions by interfering with private commercial credit and conducting extensive covert political activities within Chile, including massive subsidization of the political opposition. Moreover, the anti-Allende program was conducted in secret while we were maintaining a public posture of correct relations; in contrast, our current policy toward Chile is open and scrupulously above board.

In addition there is an internal inconsistency in the S/P memo on this issue. S/P argues on page four that we should channel programs of bilateral assistance to countries with a good or improving human rights record, and, therefore, presumably away from countries with a bad record. If this is proper, then what difference is created when the program involves bilateral export credits which also contain concessional elements and whose availability is limited? This inconsistency is highlighted by the fact that Ex-Im and CCC are the upper-tier LDCs’ equivalent of bilateral economic assistance, from which they are being graduated.

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4 An unknown hand placed an open bracket before the word “Ex-Im.”
5 An unknown hand placed a close bracket after the word “graduated.”
Restricting Human Rights Evaluation of Ex-Im, CCC, and OPIC Programs to the Minimum Required by Law

The S/P memo admits that the “minimum” approach would mean carte blanche for CCC credits—presumably nothing would prevent them from going to Cambodia or Uganda under this theory. It also would as a general rule exclude Ex-Im loans from human rights considerations. An Ex-Im loan could be denied only if violations of rights of the person were involved and only where the particular export could be used in such violations.6 Even if a denial was viewed as a positive step to convince another regime to restore freedom of expression, that judgment would not be allowed to affect our recommendation to Ex-Im.

In addition, other governments, the U.S. Congress and the American public view decisions to extend Ex-Im, OPIC and CCC loans to another country as a reflection of our relationship with that nation’s government. To argue that we should do the minimum required by law ignores the fundamental political nature of these programs.

The Argentine deputy foreign minister did not argue that the Allis Chalmers’ loan was vital economically. Rather, he said the GOA wanted the Ex-Im loan as an expression of U.S. political support.7 Starting up Ex-Im loans, OPIC and expanding CCC credits to Chile, or voting for bhn loans in the IFI’s would also communicate a signal of U.S. political support.

Adopting a Policy Against Taking Human Rights into Account on IFI Loans, once Violations of the Person Have Ended

Where an assessment of all factors in a given country convinces us that restricting a U.S. Government program is an appropriate and effective element of a strategy to promote respect for civil and political liberties, we should not be barred from that action. Even more important, where we believe that such action, (e.g. voting for an IFI loan to the Government of Chile) will undercut the policy objective of seeing democracy restored in that country, we should not be prevented by a broad policy guideline, from opposing that loan.

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6 An unknown hand placed a horizontal line and wrote “not so” in the left-hand margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with the word “export” and ends with the word “denial.”

7 Reference is to the Department of State’s veto on human rights grounds of an Allis Chalmers Ex-Im-financed loan to Argentina to enable the Government of Argentina to purchase turbines for a hydroelectric project. In telegram 161509 to Buenos Aires, June 24, the Department reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Allara met with Newsom and Schneider in Washington on June 23. With regard to the veto, “Allara mentioned Eximbank cases involving Boeing and Allis Chalmers, commenting that Argentina can finance its needs but that Eximbank policy has ‘profound political significance.’” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780263-0255)
The problems inherent in S/P’s broad-brush approach are exemplified by the one specific case in which S/P attempts to apply its proposed rules—that of Chile. Aside from the political outcry, voting for IFI loans for Chile would create a serious moral dilemma. We have opposed such aid to Pinochet’s regime because it has committed numerous violations of rights of the person and civil and political liberties, including the torture and summary execution of many hundreds of political opponents. Violations of rights of the person have subsided, as Pinochet has stated, because “the national security no longer requires them.” In other words, they have fallen off because sufficient numbers of political opponents have been killed, terrorized or driven into exile. It would be ironic if our logic led us automatically to respond favorably to such “success” by supplying export credits and voting for IFI loans. This is particularly disturbing since the institutions of repression remain essentially in place.

Rights of the Person vs. Civil and Political Liberties

Rights of the person would become the only “legitimate” category of human rights violation which justifies a negative vote in the IFI’s or any restrictions on U.S. Government-financed economic programs. Yet this position conflicts with the PD, the PRM and, contrary to the memo’s assertion, it conflicts with the view of the British and the Scandinavians as to human rights and the IFI’s. A key element in their judgment is whether the country is one where democratic traditions and institutions have been voided. Down-playing civil and political liberties does not accord with the Secretary’s speech and our policy, or with the British and Scandinavian policy. Again, while it may take longer for changes to occur in the area of civil and political rights, that judgment does not mean we should handcuff ourselves in the use of those diplomatic tactics—including restrictions on aspects of our bilateral relationship—which we judge will promote the realization of those rights sooner rather than later.

Other S/P Arguments

The other arguments that S/P offers to support its restrictive guidelines are tactical in nature.

For example, S/P argues that “repressive governments will be more likely to improve their performance if they believe something short of suicide will bring a lifting of economic sanctions.” Translated, the argument amounts to this: “A government is less likely to stop violations of the person, if it believes that economic aid will be restored

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8 An unknown hand bracketed the portion of the paragraph beginning with the word “The” and ending with the word “loans.”
only when it also adopts democratic institutions." This translation reveals a hidden premise in the argument—that if a government stops category one violations, but has not restored political rights, then the U.S. will not make any positive response to the improvements. In fact, we can and do respond in positive ways. Our exact stance will be a function of the degree to which the institutions of repression remain intact, the history and traditions of the country, and other factors associated with the specific case. All of this illustrates why this tactical argument calls for continuing to make decisions on a case-by-case basis, taking human rights into account, rather than adopting a general rule against doing so. The point is that we need not, in every case of this sort, adopt a general rule against taking human rights into account in every case when category one violations have ceased.

With respect to export credits, there is no doubt about the validity of S/P’s argument that denials on human rights grounds have aroused some business opposition to the human rights policy, especially in the wake of the Ex-Im disapproval of the Allis Chalmers loan. HA is both aware and concerned that the human rights policy be implemented in a way that does not erode crucial domestic political support for it. But we need to recognize that positive action on the Allis Chalmers loan would have aroused complaints from Congressional supporters of the human rights policy. We need to continue to monitor this situation closely. However, it is premature, at this point, to conclude that the domestic political problem is so serious that we should totally eliminate the human rights consideration from export credits for the minimum required by law.

When a decision is made to restrict an Ex-Im, OPIC, or CCC program, we believe a full oral briefing of a high official of the company in question should be conducted detailing the human rights violations which have prompted our actions. We should take the initiative to explain our decision.

Internal Security Forces

The S/P memo argues for a general avoidance of supplying the internal security forces of governments which deny freedom of expression to their critics. The concept is correct; the narrow delineation of only one relevant civil and political liberty is not. It conflicts as well with PD–30 and implies that security forces of governments which deny other democratic institutions beyond speech and press, should not be generally excluded from receiving U.S. material and financial support.

9 Reference is to the first of the three categories of human rights violations that Vance set forth in his Law Day speech; see Document 39.
We are directed to avoid identification with repressive regimes by statute. A supply relationship with the local secret police or military forces which run the repression conflicts with the policy structure. It also conflicts with PD–30, paragraph 6.

Positive Promotion of Human Rights

We concur with S/P’s view that more should be done to promote political freedom through positive legislation revising the foreign assistance program, a separate fund which would be identified as a “Special Development Fund” which would be restricted to countries which consistently respect human rights, including fundamental freedoms, or those which have taken far-reaching strides recently to institutionalize the protection of the full range of human rights. Some portion would be discretionary to permit the Administrator to respond during the year to significant developments.

159. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, August 12, 1978, 1914Z


1. ASAP after receipt of this telegram, Ambassador or Charge should, at his discretion, deliver aide memoire along following lines to the Foreign Minister or most appropriate senior Foreign Ministry official:

“The World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, convened by the United Nations General Assembly, will meet in Geneva August 14–25. The United States will not participate in this Conference. Our decision not to participate was reluctantly taken, but we had no choice in view of our total and firm opposition to the action taken by the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 1975, determining that ’Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.’ The Assembly adopted this resolution notwithstanding the fact

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780330–0994. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Hewitt; cleared by Maynes and Dailey and for information by Harris, Cheshes, Goot, Lister, and Veliotes; approved by Newsom.

2 See footnote 5, Document 149.
that the Jewish people embrace many races and colors and themselves uniquely suffered from the evils of racism. More than any other action, this decision served to shake the faith in and support for the United Nations on the part of the American people. Our Congress, in particular, unanimously adopted a resolution requesting that all U.S. participation in the Decade Against Racism cease until the link between Zionism and racism and the Decade was severed.

“The United States Government wholeheartedly supports the unrelenting efforts being made by United Nations organs to combat the evils of racism and racial discrimination as these terms were understood when the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination was launched in 1973. We earnestly hope that these crucially important efforts in the struggle to promote human rights will not be upset or diverted by decisions taken at the World Conference. Therefore, on the eve of the opening of the Conference, the United States Government appeals to your government to use its influence in order to prevent any action by the Conference which either explicitly reaffirms the Zionism-racism decision or could be understood as having such an effect. This appeal rests upon the firm conviction that the resurgence of the Zionism-racism decision at the World Conference will not only grossly undermine United Nations efforts to cope with the serious problems of racism and racial discrimination which exist throughout the world, but will further seriously shake the confidence which the American people, and people of good will everywhere, have in the United Nations organization as an instrument for the establishment of peace based upon justice for all people. It comes, however, when strong efforts are being made to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.”

2. For EC–9 posts: EC post capitals all strongly opposed the GA’s decision on Zionism-racism. However, in intervening period Africans succeeded in subsequent GA resolutions in watering down references to Zionism-racism to indirect mention of “relevant resolutions.” This permitted Arabs to say relevant resolutions meant Z–R and for Europeans to say it did not. Europeans have thus continued to participate in activities of the Decade such as the upcoming World Conference by interpreting indirect references as sufficient to break the linkage while U.S. and Israel have insisted that Z–R resolution be specifically repudiated. At recent Havana and Belgrade meetings of NAM, however, the NAM endorsed direct reference to Z–R and urged that it be raised at the World Conference Against Racism. EC participants are therefore faced with possibility of reaffirmation of the 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism by direct reference and capitals should be made aware of the need to develop a strategy to prevent such explicit reference.
3. In delivering foregoing message to the Foreign Minister, you should accompany your delivery by expressing the hope that the delegation of host government will make known to the key African participants at the World Conference, who are likely to be most desirous of avoiding a reemergence of the Zionism-racism issue at the Conference, that any action taken by the Conference to reaffirm the Zionism-racism decision will create serious problems for the Conference. We would hope the WEO countries will make it clear they are prepared for a walkout if necessary to forestall any explicit reaffirmation of the Zionism-racism decision.

4. You may have noted that the German Chairman of the European Community at the Conference and the Italian Chairman of the WEO caucus have informed us, that on behalf of the EC–9 and the WEO group, they have told the ranking Secretariat official at the Conference that “the participation of the European Community in the Conference is based on its ‘old program’ and that any introduction of elements causing Zionism and racism to be related could only have a destructive impact on their participation in the Conference.” We greatly appreciate the firm line that Geneva representatives are taking and hope that explicit instructions from capitals will back up this strong position.

5. For Amman, Cairo, Jidda, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Khartoum, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Tel Aviv. Separate instructions have been sent to you for action. This message is for information only.

6. For Damascus and Tripoli: This message is for your information only as we anticipate host governments will co-sponsor effort to inject Zionism-racism issue into World Conference.

Christopher

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3 Not further identified.
For Dr. Brzezinski Only

Since your remarks to me2 a week ago about how our human rights policy has ruined our relations with Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, I’ve been ruminating on how we got where we are now. I don’t think that the policy has ruined these relations, or even that they are ruined, but I do think that we have a very serious problem.

Most of it arises from trying to implement ill-advised Congressional directives, particularly, the human rights provisions that have been attached to OPIC and Ex-Im legislation. (As you may remember, I argued that we should oppose each of these as strongly as we could, and in the OPIC case, I later urged that NSC take the lead in directing State to use the most limited interpretation of the law in implementing the human rights amendment.) The crux of the problem is that we have been consistently unsuccessful in defeating these Harkin amendments on the Hill, and I think the reason for that is that you cannot lead from behind.

The only way for the Administration to influence Congress towards more responsible action is for Congress to perceive the Administration as exercising leadership on this issue. Instead Congress sees itself as the promoter and defender of human rights concerns. They believe that if they were to stop pushing, the Administration would assign a drastically lower priority to human rights or abandon the policy altogether. Recent examples such as the Uganda trade embargo and the Human Rights Institute only serve to illustrate the general pattern that in most cases Congress has led and the Administration has followed. The statement on Cambodia is the only small exception I can think of.3
I don’t see much hope that we can influence Congress in a more constructive direction until we’ve taken some initiatives ourselves. Certainly however it does seem as though abandoning or weakening the policy is not the answer. We have always recognized that human rights is a high risk policy because it can so easily be used as a tool by both political extremes, and we are finding our expectations on this to be then fulfilled. We don’t yet have many of the substantive or political answers to the difficulties, but I think we can conclude that the blame for some bad statutes now on the books lies with the Congress, but the blame for allowing the Congress to get into its present frame of mind on this issue lies with the Executive Branch.

161. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, August 23, 1978

SUBJECT
The OAS and Human Rights

Attached at Tab A is a letter to the President from Secretary General Orfila officially informing him of the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights and thanking him for his attendance at the OAS meeting.\(^2\) We believe that no reply is necessary.

In sending the letter to State for comment, we also asked for suggestions of steps which could be taken by the Administration to encourage Senate ratification of the OAS Convention. Now that the Convention is officially in force, thanks in large part to our efforts, we look a little silly in not being able to take part in its implementation since we have not ratified. State discussed ratification with Church’s staff and reports that prospects are not bright. The Convention contains many

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed. In the July 19 letter to the President, Orfila referenced the Government of Grenada’s actions in bringing the convention into force and effect by the deposit of its instrument of ratification in Washington on July 18.
controversial provisions including those on abortion and capital punishment, and there is also the question of whether the Genocide Treaty and other UN documents should be handled first. State’s assessment, with which we agree, is that nothing could be accomplished unless we assign ratification a relatively high priority and in particular, unless we enlist the vigorous support of the human rights community—of whom many have a special interest in Latin America.

If you approve, we intend to work with State and Madeleine Albright in undertaking additional informal consultations with Senate leadership and staff concerning the possibilities of moving ahead with ratification. In parallel, we would also meet with the human rights community, and would then submit a suggested priority assignment for ratification.

It doesn’t appear at first glance as though ratification of all the human rights treaties is a terribly important issue, but as the current Pravda propaganda campaign illustrates, our failure to ratify these international documents makes us vulnerable to the argument that our human rights policy is “solely for export”. It is incongruous when set alongside our aggressive human rights policy.

Also, the Senate’s failure to act provides the President with a potent argument against those who maintain that Congress is the chief actor on human rights. In this case at least, the President has taken important solid initiatives which the Congress has failed to follow through on. This is an argument we should make much better use of, and we will think about ways to do so.

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3 In telegram 19745 from Moscow, August 17, the Embassy reported that Pravda had capitalized upon an August 9 speech Young delivered in New York, in which he referenced the failure of the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention as “the taking off point for an aggressive attack on the administration’s human rights policy.” The Embassy summarized an August 17 Pravda column, noting that Pravda’s Washington correspondent had asserted that “Americans are beginning to understand, however, that the human rights policy proclaimed by the administration is intended exclusively ‘for export’ and has no influence in the U.S. itself.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780338–0997) In telegram 19933 from Moscow, August 21, the Embassy noted that the Soviet press “continues to belabor propaganda theme that the U.S. abuses human rights at home while promoting them for selfish (usually anti-Soviet) purposes abroad.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780341–0955) In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s evening report for August 21, Tuchman Mathews referred to the “propaganda campaign” and the failure to ratify various human rights agreements, adding: “but it is clear that the continuing failure to ratify does not comport well with an aggressive policy on our part. This argument falls on receptive ears in many Third World countries and it is therefore perhaps worth considering whether to raise the priority of these agreements in next year’s legislative reports.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 7–8/78)
Recommendation:

That you agree that no response to Orfila’s letter is necessary.
That you approve our proposed plan of action to explore the possibilities of securing ratification of the pending human rights treaties—especially the OAS Convention—during the next session of Congress.  

There is no indication that Brzezinski approved or disapproved either recommendation.

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva and the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, September 7, 1978

226448. Subject: Human Rights Initiatives at the 33rd UNGA.

1. On August 9, 1978 there was a meeting in the Department chaired by Assistant Secretary Maynes to discuss the human rights scope paper that was circulated in July. All of the IO agency directorates were represented, as were the Office of the Legal Advisor, the Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs, Mission Geneva, and USUN. The following items were discussed, with decisions reached to move forward on some initiatives and to further explore the feasibility of others. The United States overall position is to build upon and preserve the positive accomplishments which have been made during the past year, both at the last UNGA session and especially at the 1978 Human Rights Commission session. We hope that the discussion of the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is to be considered in plenary meetings, will be the occasion for a general stock taking on the part of all members and serve as the platform for renewed efforts at international cooperation in promoting human rights.

2. The scope paper was endorsed as a sound approach for the U.S. at the General Assembly. It was determined that it could be strengthened, however, by adding an initiative concerning the development of

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780366–0860. Confidential; Stadis. Drafted by Dalley; approved by Maynes.
2 See Document 155.
3 See Document 125.
social indicators to enable better measurements of human rights progress.

3. We decided that an initiative on the “boat” people should be explored, leading perhaps to a resolution calling upon the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to draw up a proposed code of conduct for all ships at sea who encounter boat refugees, and for nations upon whose shores refugees land. We will also explore the possibility of a resolution speaking to the problems of relocating refugees to receiving nations.

4. To strengthen our initiative in the social development area, we will explore a resolution to establish the struggle against hunger as a major human rights priority of the General Assembly and urge consideration of the establishment of an international volunteer food corps.4

5. We decided that the torture initiative should be strengthened by the proposal of a resolution establishing torture, missing persons and the treatment of political prisoners as major priorities for consideration by the General Assembly and the formation of a committee of experts to report each year to the General Assembly on urgent measures and problems, with recommendations to the General Assembly.

6. Concern was expressed that in responding to Southern African initiatives, the United States finds itself reacting negatively on matters which are of great importance to Africans and the majority of the United Nations. In addition to determining what it is in such a resolution that we cannot accept, alternate language should be developed on such resolutions to propose positive approaches compatible with U.S. goals and interests. In this regard, the questions of endorsement of the Sullivan Code and the closing of the Rhodesian information office should be reopened. Because of our inability to participate in the activities of the Decade Against Racism, we should be aggressively searching for other means of participating domestically and internationally in the effort to combat racism and apartheid.

7. On the anticipated resolutions condemning Israeli practices in the occupied territories, it was generally recognized that there will be a more rigid position on both sides at this UNGA, making it more difficult to negotiate acceptable language in resolutions directed against Israeli practices in the occupied territories. It was decided that a paper should be developed addressing itself to likely alternatives available to the U.S. in approaching such anti-Israel resolutions.

8. Although the discussion at the UNGA on Chile may be influenced by the report of the working group sent to Chile by the Human Rights Division, it is thought unlikely that the report will be ready for distribution before the end of October. When the report is submitted,

4 See Document 247.
there will be a debate over whether the working group should be continued, replaced by a rapporteur or abolished. The issue of a special human rights trust fund for the families that have disappeared in Chile will be before the UNGA. The U.S. objects to the formation of such a fund which singles out the human rights victims in Chile, but we should review our policy and decide whether we want to develop a U.S. proposal for the creation of a trust fund for the victims of all human rights violations.

9. There will be increasing pressure for the United States to “do something” in the UNGA concerning the human rights violations in Kampuchea. There will be no resolution on this subject introduced by Western European nations and the question is whether the United States should take action unilaterally at the UNGA against Kampuchea. The consensus decision was to limit our efforts at this point to making the case against Kampuchea at the Subcommission on Discrimination Against Minorities which is presently meeting in Geneva. The U.S. has submitted over 300 pages of material on human rights violations in Kampuchea to the Commission and Ambassador Carter believes there is sufficient evidence before the Subcommission to justify a recommendation by the Subcommission to the Human Rights Commission concerning follow-up action to investigate the allegations against the government of Kampuchea. Ambassador Vanden Heuvel’s suggestion that the material be distributed to all members of the Third Committee was endorsed.

10. Regarding Uganda, it was agreed that if Uganda reneges on its earlier agreement to permit a representative of the Human Rights Commission to enter Uganda to investigate allegations of human rights violations there, it will be necessary to “do something” about Uganda in the upcoming General Assembly.

11. On Argentina, there was advocacy for specific reference to human rights violations in Argentina because of the seriousness of the continued and persistent violations. This was generally resisted on the grounds that we should focus our efforts on attempting to strengthen the objective human rights machinery of the UN and resist the political pressures to single out nations individually for condemnation. The allegations of violations in Argentina are before the Organization of American States and there are current negotiations to secure the admission of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. In addition, there is pending jurisdiction over Argentina by the UN Human Rights Commission; so it was decided that an Argentinian initiative would not be productive in the upcoming General Assembly.

12. There was substantial discussion of the continuing need to develop an improved procedure for responding to human rights communications sent to the United States by the United Nations. We are not
presently responding adequately to communications in the human rights area and need to develop a means of obtaining assistance of experts from other Federal agencies and the private sector to respond to questionnaires and other requests for information as well as individual complaints alleging violations of human rights. Ideas explored include contracting for expert assistance with individuals, developing a working relationship with the international law and criminal justice human rights committees of the American Bar Association, and establishing formal relationships with other Federal agencies under which they will agree to provide responses for the Department of State to forward to the UN. It was also agreed that we need to investigate the establishment of a more effective means of monitoring U.S. compliance with the human rights conventions.

13. It was recognized that U.S. human rights initiatives will be inevitably undermined by the U.S. failure to ratify most of the existing human rights conventions. It was agreed that a paper should be developed to urge the administration to make ratification of the Genocide Convention an immediate priority for the next Congress.

14. We decided that the U.S. should participate fully in the 30th anniversary commemoration of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A prominent U.S. citizen active in the U.S. civil and human rights movement will be invited to deliver the U.S. address during the commemorative meeting that will be presided over by the Secretary General to celebrate the 30th anniversary in December. We will submit U.S. nominees for the award of the UN human rights prizes in connection with the commemoration, and will be participating in the 30th anniversary seminar on national and local institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights in September. Plans for an appropriate national commemoration, possibly involving the President, are being developed.

15. This summary of the decisions taken regarding possible human rights initiatives at our August 9th meeting to review the human rights scope paper is provided for your information and comment only and does not constitute instructions to pursue the initiatives discussed. Specific instructions will be developed and sent following receipt of your comments and the preparation of the final draft of the scope paper containing the final decisions on human rights initiatives.

Christopher
163. Editorial Note

In July 1978, the Working Group on Communications of the United Nations Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities received a communication from the Memphis, Tennessee, Committee on Human Rights, the Bridgewater Shelby County NAACP, and Church of Human Development alleging that African-American residents of Memphis and Shelby County had been subject to discrimination by the Memphis police and denied due process. Such an allegation meant that the United States was cited as a “gross and consistent” violator of human rights under ECOSOC 1503 procedures. The National Security Council Global Issues Cluster’s August 30 evening report noted that the Working Group voted unanimously to cite the United States for violations. In the report, National Security Council Staff member Leslie Denend indicated that the United States, the Soviet Union, Colombia, Nigeria, and Pakistan comprised the Working Group membership, adding: “Ambassador Carter, our expert on the group, is the only member who carries such a direct link to his government and who is not able to follow developments in this forum full-time because he is our current Ambassador to Liberia. Once the current situation is resolved, we should give this staffing arrangement a careful review.

“State is hard at work preparing our case for the Sub-Commission on September 11. According to Mezvinsky who sat in on these proceedings last year, even if Ambassador Carter reverses his position and makes a strong presentation on behalf of the US, the Sub-Commission is likely to forward the working group recommendation to the full Commission. The problem is that it will be very difficult to turn around a unanimous working group recommendation. (Even Argentina only received a 3–2 vote.)

“All the outcomes I envision from this entire process have negative consequences for the President and the policy. Although we have been trying to strengthen the UNHRC process, we should be prepared to step sharply away from it if the Sub-Commission cites the US and moves the case to the full Commission.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 7–8/78)

In telegram 221106 to Geneva, August 30, the Department of State responded to the complaint, received in the Department on July 26, terming the citation against the United States as “surprising” and indicating that a formal response to the Working Group, then meeting in Geneva, would be forthcoming. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780354–1098) In telegram 224200 to Geneva, September 2, the Department indicated that the response would be sent via
separate telegram and requested that the Mission delay transmission of the report until September 6, as Department officials planned to discuss the substance of the report with Department of Justice officials on September 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780360–0276) Telegram 224205 to Geneva, September 2, transmitted the draft text of the U.S. response, which stated, in part: “The United States seriously questions whether a single complaint which makes reference to only a few specific allegations, all of which are claimed to have occurred in a single city, which have been and are being investigated by Federal, state, and local officials, and which are the subject of amelioratory action, can meet the standard required by resolution 1503.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780360–0288)

In telegram 13482 from Geneva, September 8, the Mission provided the Department with the version of the response delivered to the Director of the United Nations Human Rights Division, Theodore Van Boven, on September 5. The response summarized efforts taken to investigate police brutality and drew attention to the anticipated September 6 release by the Tennessee Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights of a report entitled “Civil Crisis—Civic Challenge: Police-Community Relations in Memphis,” which purportedly would refute the allegation that there had been no response to the complaints. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780366–0460)

Prior to the Subcommission’s consideration of the U.S. response, National Security Council Staff member Jessica Tuchman Mathews communicated with U.S. Representative to the UN Human Rights Commission Edward Mezvinsky and U.S. Representative to the Mission at Geneva William vanden Heuvel concerning Ambassador Beverly Carter’s actions as a member of the Working Group. In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s September 5 evening report, Tuchman Mathews commented that she had spoken to Mezvinsky regarding the citation issued against the United States, which she believed was “potentially devastating to the [administration’s human rights] policy,” noting, “we can’t pursue an aggressive human rights policy until our own house is basically in order, which means ratifying the major international covenants and treaties, and staffing our UN missions so that we avoid shooting ourselves in the foot at regular intervals.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 9–12/78)

Tuchman Mathews again expressed concerns to Vanden Heuvel on September 6, as she informed the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Vanden Heuvel is in a very delicate situation in that the Sub-Commission is supposed to be composed
of uninstructed experts and therefore we can’t lobby openly. However, he will talk to some key delegates with whom he has personal relationships, and he is more optimistic about the outcome than I had expected. I assured him of the White House’s strong support for the most vigorous possible efforts to avert a negative vote against the U.S. (despite State’s lukewarm approach to this mess) and promised to talk with him after the vote (Monday) about changes in staffing and procedures that will avoid this kind of thing in the future.” (NSC Global Issues Cluster September 6 evening report; ibid.)

The Subcommission considered the complaint against the United States during a September 11 closed meeting. In telegram 13662 from Geneva, September 12, the Mission reported that the Subcommission voted not to elevate the communication regarding the United States to the UN Human Rights Commission by a vote of 5–5 with 11 abstentions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780370–0575) Tuchman Mathews and Denend summarized the outcome in the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s September 15 evening report: “The vote of the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission on whether the US should be cited as a gross and consistent violator of human rights was as close as it could be 5–5 with 11 abstentions. The tie means that we will not be cited. However the incident reveals many things that need changing, particularly our staffing of these Commissions (it is a contradiction in terms to have an FSO, not to mention an Ambassador, functioning as an ‘uninstructed expert’). Also our procedures for responding to complaints against ourselves and for helping others to file complaints (e.g., against the USSR) are woefully inadequate. The incident also revealed a profound difference of opinion within the government (and the NSC staff) as to what our posture should be with respect to our own human rights record. At our request, Ambassador Vanden Heuvel, who did an excellent job in dealing with this problem will be sending in his suggestions for steps that should be taken.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 9–12/78)
164. Memorandum From Guy Erb of the National Security Council Staff to Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, September 13, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights

Jessica’s remark in her nightly report about her “shock” at yesterday’s discussion of human rights prompts me to caution both of you against an overreaction to the events in Geneva and likely comment in the Press. Sure, we will be criticized by Errors and Nofax and others of their ilk but that in itself should not determine our own actions.

The President has never said that the United States has a perfect human rights record. Our current performance is flawed and in any historical perspective we are no better than many other countries.

I am sure that, if confronted by this issue, the President could turn it to our advantage, stressing his own commitment to improvement of all countries’ human rights performance. We should advise him along those lines, rather than treating this episode as some sort of disaster that requires a defensive response. Above all, we should avoid any tinge of self-righteousness, a reaction that may have delayed HA’s reply to communications from Geneva on this issue.

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2 In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s September 12 evening report, Tuchman Mathews and Denend both described the events at that day’s NSC North/South meeting. According to Tuchman Mathews, the attendees participated in “an absolutely shocking discussion” of the issues surrounding the Memphis complaint. Denend noted that the meeting was “dominated by a heated discussion about the relative harm of the US being cited by the UN Human Rights Commission for human rights violations.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 9–12/78)

3 Reference is to syndicated political columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak.

4 Tuchman Mathews highlighted this sentence and added a handwritten postscript at the end of the memorandum: “Guy—I still find this shocking. To recognize the virtues of our own system in no way minimizes or discounts its past and current failings with regard to blacks or others. But I can not imagine any historical perspective in which it would not be accurate to say that the US is far superior to most other countries in all areas of human rights and freedoms (civil, social, economic, religious etc). All of this aside it should also be obvious that enormous political damage would result from being cited by the UN as a gross and consistent violator. We could certainly kiss our human rights policy good-bye—just as a beginning. Nobody is pretending we are perfect, but that’s a far cry from being put in a category with the likes of Uganda, Cambodia, Argentina, Nicaragua, the USSR, Equatorial Guinea, etc etc. Where would you rather live? JTM.”
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, September 18, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights PRM

I believe I have identified a good and finite subject for a PRM on Human Rights. It is the issue of the Human Rights Conventions and Institutions and what our strategy is going to be in regard to them.

Bill Maynes pointed out to me that the Soviets are staffing up these new Human Rights Institutions (the ones designed to “implement” the various Conventions—genocide, political and civil rights, economic and social rights, etc.). The net result is that we can expect to be called on the carpet much more frequently and to be condemned, etc., for systematic violations of some of these rights simply because the deck is stacked against us.

I have suggested to Bill the possibility of a PRM which would look at:
(1) the problems associated with signing the Human Rights Conventions and whether we can go forward with a major effort in the next Congress;
(2) our strategy in dealing with Soviet efforts to put us in the dock;
(3) what we can do to put the Soviets in the dock and what aspects of human rights we ought to emphasize and how we can go about it.

Please follow up with Bill Maynes.

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Materials, Mondale Papers, Office of the Vice President, David Aaron, Box 216, [Aaron, David]: Chron File, 9/1978 (classified). Confidential. A copy was sent to Brzezinski, who added the following handwritten notation: “D.A. Good focus. Plse speak to me about this issue. ZB.”

2 Aaron added “followup” by hand at this point.

3 In the October 11 NSC Global Issues Cluster’s evening report to Brzezinski, Tuchman Mathews indicated that she had met with Maynes and other Department of State officials that day concerning subjects for a possible PRM, “including strengthening our ability to use the UN and other multilateral forums to promote human rights objectives.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 9/12/80)
166. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 20, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights and The Olympics

In winning their bid to hold the Olympics in Moscow the Soviets scored a great potential coup for both their foreign exchange earnings and international prestige and propaganda interests. However it is also a big risk, for the spotlight could easily shift from the Games to the human rights issue. I believe we should be looking at ways to exploit that risk, and to exact the highest possible price in terms of advancing our own human rights interests.

—There are already rumors in the USSR that Jewish emigration will be cut off some time before the Games. Some believe that the high current rate of emigration is designed to ease the tension before the Games (though visas are being granted only to first time requesters and not to any refuseniks or to any prominent dissidents). Are there ways to exploit this situation: Can we accelerate emigration between now and 1980? Should we suggest to the Soviets that they grant visas to a particular list of individuals who are of concern to us, with the quiet implication that otherwise these individuals will be a focus of attention at the Games? Are there other ways to reach the same end?

—What about access to Russian citizens by press and athletes during the Games? Should we be pushing for maximum access in the true Olympic spirit? What are the terms of the NBC contract? After paying through the nose (a record high price) for the broadcast rights has NBC insisted on anything in the way of freedom of coverage or will they only be allowed to film designated glories of Soviet culture? If you watched any of the last several Olympics you will remember all the “color” stories—scenes in Munich beer halls, the quaint beauties of Innsbruck, Canadian folk dancing, etc., etc. There will be an even greater incentive to do such coverage of a country that is of such great interest to Americans about which they know so little. Should we be offering NBC any help in these negotiations and in their subsequent planning? For example, if they do a piece on Soviet ballet, should they also

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1978. Secret. Copies were sent to Bartholomew and Schecter. Aaron wrote the following handwritten notation in the top right-hand corner of the first page: “ZB, She is getting better on this issue. DA.”
have film (taped in advance) on the stories of Nureyev, the Panovs, etc.?\(^2\) The same with music, science, etc.\(^3\)

—What will be our policy if RFE/RL are denied press credentials? What about other individual press? Should we quietly encourage the media to send a few of their Soviet experts—perhaps including individuals who were earlier asked to leave the USSR? What about denials of visas to individual spectators? In short, should we push the USSR to the maximum extent to live up to the spirit in which the Games are supposed to be held and to the promises they must have made to the International Olympic Committee, or should we just accept the fact that these Olympics will be different from those held in the West? I think we should push.

—What will be our policy if the Israeli team or the South African team is banned from the Games—especially if the Soviets announce the decision at the last minute?

—What will we do during the Games if an American or other participant gets into trouble of some kind that relates to human rights (e.g., press interview with a forbidden dissident) and gets deported? If we can develop an answer should we inform the Soviets in advance so that they will have no doubt as to how we would react?

—Should we do anything in the way of informing American participants about this issue—perhaps briefings made available to those who are interested? Or perhaps that is going too far.

—Finally, beyond the human rights issue, what about the intelligence opportunity? With security and administrative forces strained to the limit—or beyond—and so many people in Moscow, there are bound to be opportunities that are not otherwise available. Are we prepared to exploit this to the maximum?

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\(^2\) Reference is to Soviet ballet dancers Rudolf Nureyev, Valey Panov, and Galina Ragozina.

\(^3\) Brzezinski drew an arrow in the margin from this paragraph and wrote: “Convene an inter-agency meeting to discuss—then let’s decide if a PRM needed or WG instead. Good idea. ZB.” In August 1979, Bloomfield, who had inherited Tuchman Matthews’ human rights portfolio upon her departure from the NSC Staff (see footnote 2, Document 188), indicated that he planned to meet with Shulman and Brement regarding the Moscow Olympics. Bloomfield intended to discuss the feasibility of using an existing interagency committee on Soviet policy “to have an airing of the lists of opportunities and hazards concerning the Olympics (you had asked Jessica last fall to convene an interagency meeting to decide if a PRM was needed).” (NSC Global Issues Cluster August 15, 1979, evening report; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4-8/79) No PRM on the Olympics was issued.
Recommendation:

That you give me some guidance on this. Do you feel these issues should be pursued? What about a PRM? Other?4

4 Aaron added the following handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum: “I say unleash Tuchman! Play the Olympic card! DA.”

167. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, October 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights: Country Reports, the UN Treaties and a New Strategy

The Foreign Assistance Act requires the Department of State to submit reports by January 31 of each year concerning “the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights” in every country proposed as the recipient of either economic or security assistance. The amendments requiring these reports were enacted before this Administration took office.2 Last year’s reports covered 106 countries.

In 1976 we submitted reports drafted by the Ford Administration since they were due one week after the Inauguration. These reports were widely attacked as inaccurate, a sham and a whitewash.3 Last year the reports went to the opposite extreme. Christopher insisted that they be detailed and that serious problems be treated with candor. Publication of the reports caused many problems. On the whole they were praised at home—favorable comparisons were drawn with the 1976 reports—but there were many objections from abroad.4 The Greece-


2 See footnote 4, Document 1.

3 See Document 17.

4 See Document 115.
Turkey-Cyprus reports were a particular source of trouble. So was the report on Israel (the West Bank). And there were several others.

The Administration is caught in a Catch-22. If the reports are honest enough to satisfy the domestic constituency, they will disturb important bilateral relations. If they are diplomatically drafted, they will be attacked in Congress as coverups. This year, in my judgment, the countries which clearly are sensitive, or may be so (depending on events between now and the end of the year), include: Zaire, Ecuador, Nicaragua, South Korea, Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran and Israel.

I have two concerns: the immediate problem of how to approach this year’s reports; and the longer range question of what our policy should be towards the enactment of statutory reporting requirements?

With regard to this year’s reports, I recommend that the NSC ask to review State’s semi-final drafts before they are sent back to the embassies for comment. This may be sensitive since the documents will not yet be cleared and will be the subject of hot intra-State controversy, but if we wait until the end of the process it will be too difficult to make major changes. The schedule is as follows: The embassies have until October 13 to return their reporting (detailed questionnaires covering every aspect of human rights). The regional bureaus at State have until November 1 to comment on them. The Human Rights Bureau (HA) has until November 20 to comment on those drafts. Then INR, together with the bureaus and HA puts together semi-final drafts for Christopher’s final cut by December 20. I recommend that we ask to see the drafts by the end of November, i.e., after HA has worked over the regional drafts.

Regarding the more general problem, I can sympathize with Christopher’s conclusion of last year that we had to make the reports as thorough and accurate as possible in order to meet Congressional criticism of Administration weakness on human rights. To a certain degree we are still in the same position vis-a-vis the Congress this year, but I think the time has come to adopt a more sophisticated policy. Specifically, I recommend that this year we link (1) an aggressive (and if need be a critical) stance urging Congress to take meaningful action on human rights by ratifying the 5 international treaties which lie before it; with (2) a campaign to stop and then reverse the trend of enacting mandatory reports on the human rights behavior of foreign countries. (This year two new reporting requirements were added—to OPIC and Ex-Im

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5 Inderfurth added the following handwritten notation in the margin: “I agree. RI.”
6 An unknown hand underlined the second half of this sentence, beginning with the phrase “the time has come.”
legislation. Next year there could be more.) I suggest that these be linked so that there will be no question that in opposing the reporting requirements the Administration is really trying to back away from human rights. We need to be taking positive actions while we are pushing this “negative” action.

Our effort on the treaties should begin with the Genocide Treaty since it has seniority and the most support. Once that hurdle is passed, and sufficient strength has been demonstrated by the pro-ratification forces, it may prove much easier to ratify the others. Ratification is certainly possible. Last spring, I organized an Administration-NGO group which undertook a vote count on this issue. Letters were sent to every Senator, and only an explicit answer was counted as a positive vote. The result was 53 solid votes for cloture (60 votes required), 11 leaning towards, and 5 undecided. For final passage, (67 votes required) we counted 55 solids, with 14 undecided or leaning towards. Garnering 7 votes for cloture and a maximum of 12 for final passage (absentees lower the total required), should not be very difficult. The elections will change these counts to some degree, but we are clearly almost there.

Our job can be made easier by keying it to the observance of the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10). In recognition of this event, the public interest groups, led by the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, are launching an effort this fall to build public support for the Treaties and Covenants—the first such public effort. See Tab A for the first publication of many. It occurs to me that a good day for the President to make his first statement would be October 11, Eleanor Roosevelt’s birthday. The whole effort could be made a tribute to her memory, which would popularize it and perhaps help to get active support from women’s groups, civil rights groups and others. If we miss the October 11 date, the anniversary of her death is November 7, election day this year and therefore appropriate since it is in a sense the birth day of the new Congress that would vote on the Treaties.

On the negative side, our effort to stem the tide of mandatory reporting requirements would center on the argument that the information can be made available on request to any member (or on request by a relevant Committee, depending on how tough we want to be), but that wholesale publication of these types of reports does not promote

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7 See footnotes 6 and 9, Document 139.
8 An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
9 Inderfurth added the following handwritten notation in the left-hand margin: “An up-to-date head count is necessary. RI.”
10 Not attached and not further identified.
11 Inderfurth added the following handwritten notation: “too soon.”
the observance of human rights in particular, or US foreign policy interests in general. One of many good examples is the break with Brazil which was the direct result of the publication of the 1976 report.\textsuperscript{12} If we make a firm decision to adopt this strategy, I believe we can make a convincing case that these kinds of public reporting requirements accomplish little and are often actively counterproductive. But this time we have to be united in what we are doing and not apologetic about appearing to “oppose human rights”.

The most limiting factor in this strategy is timing. There is an obvious gain to be had from taking advantage of the UN anniversary of the Treaties, but more important is the fact that the groundwork must be laid now so that the issue can be taken up \textit{first thing} in the next session. Otherwise it will get hung up behind SALT and they won’t get to it for yet another year. Committee consideration of the Treaty should take very little time (SFRC reported it out last year), and the floor debate could then be scheduled while the Committees are having extensive hearings on SALT.

\textbf{Recommendation:}

1. That you approve a formal Dodson-Tarnoff request for NSC clearance on the draft country reports before November 30.\textsuperscript{13}

2. That you give me guidance on the proposed longer term strategy.

Do you like the idea?

Do you want a memo presenting it for the President’s approval?\textsuperscript{14}

3. It would be possible to make a strong effort on the treaties without trying to revoke the reporting requirements.

Do you prefer this option?\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Inderfurth placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with the word “available” to the end of this sentence and added: “We should catalogue other such examples if we intend to make this fight. RL.”

\textsuperscript{13} Brzezinski placed a check mark on the approval line. Bartholomew added the following handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum: “I think this is first class and strongly support Jessica’s line!”

\textsuperscript{14} Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove either of these recommendations.

\textsuperscript{15} Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove this recommendation.
168. Memorandum From the Global Issues Cluster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, October 20, 1978

SUBJECT
Priorities

HUMAN RIGHTS

Priorities

—Raise global awareness of human rights so that the issue is a regular concern of all governments and an expected component of relations both with other countries and with the international community. Met.

—Organize U.S. foreign policy making so that human rights concerns are taken into account in all relevant decisions including foreign assistance, political actions and economic benefits. Partially Met—excessive delays and inconsistent decisions persist, mostly from uncertain direction at the top.

—Begin the lengthy process of strengthening the international institutions (including the UN and its Commissions, the IFIs, and the regional human rights organizations) so that ultimately they can become the primary focus of international human rights activity. Partially Met—UN and OAS Commissions are vastly improved, some progress in gaining support in IFIs, long way still to go.

Our greatest weaknesses have been in the multilateral forums, particularly in coordinating those activities with bilateral policies, and making our level of representation in these forums commensurate with their growing importance. Increasingly in the months ahead we can expect to be attacked for hypocrisy in pursuing an aggressive human rights policy while we have still not ratified any of the many major international HR treaties. The Soviets will lead the way on this, followed eagerly by others whose pride has been hurt by our policies.

Consequently, as outlined in an earlier strategy memorandum,\(^2\) we see two key initiatives for the next year: ratification of the Genocide


\(^2\) Presumable reference to Tuchman Mathews’ October 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, printed as Document 167.
Treaty with preliminary hearings on the UN Covenants and the Racial Discrimination treaty; and, a campaign to repeal those HR amendments we feel are counter-productive, namely the public reporting requirements and the OPIC amendment.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to human rights.]

169. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, October 30, 1978

SUBJECT

1979 PL 480 I Agreements—Human Rights Language Requirement

Issue for Decision

Which PL 480 I agreements should contain a human rights clause ensuring that the commodities provided or the proceeds derived from their sale will directly benefit needy people?

Essential Factors

Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 was amended by Public Law 95–88 of August 3, 1977 by adding Section 112 which states:

No agreement may be entered into under this title to finance the sale of agricultural commodities to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such agreement will directly benefit the needy people in such country. An agreement will not directly benefit the needy people in the country for purposes of the preceding sentence unless either the commodities themselves or the proceeds from their sale will be used for specific projects or programs which the President determines would directly benefit the needy people of that country. The agreement shall require a report to the President on such use

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780176–0654. Confidential. Drafted by Bova on October 25; concurred in by Zak, Jennette, Shurtleff, Buncher, Lister, Cleveland, Graham, and EB/OFP. Schneider initialed for Derian. An unknown hand initialed for the clearing officials.
within six months after the commodities are delivered to the recipient country.\textsuperscript{2}

In response to this requirement, the Department, in consultation with AID, made a determination that for Fiscal Year 1978, language in accordance with the above requirement would be placed in agreements with countries where serious human rights problems exist or are widely perceived to exist by the public or Members of Congress. This liberal application of the statute would ensure compliance while avoiding the creation of a public “hit-list” which could follow from a narrower interpretation. It would also, on the other hand, minimize the accounting workload placed on our AID Missions and Title I recipient governments. Accordingly, language was placed in one third of the Fiscal Year 1979 Title I Agreements and specifically in agreements with the following countries: Bangladesh, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Zaire, and Korea.

The PL 480 I list for Fiscal Year 1979 has recently been submitted to the Congress. It contains twenty-nine countries. Consensus has been reached within the Department to maintain language in the agreements with the following countries on that list: Guinea, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Philippines and Zaire. There is also a consensus to maintain the language through the side-letter arrangement with Indonesia and Korea as long as it is not necessary to negotiate new agreements. There is also a consensus, in view of changing circumstances, to drop the language from the agreement with Somalia. HA proposes maintaining language in the Title I Agreement with Bangladesh and adding language to the Title I agreements with Pakistan, Syria and Tunisia. All four were Title I recipients last year. The NEA Bureau is opposed to re-inserting language in the Bangladesh agreement and to adding language in the other three.

New agreements under PL 480 Title III will be negotiated with Indonesia and Bangladesh later in the year. With HA consensus, language was not included in the 1978 Title III agreement with Bangladesh. Title III by its nature ensures that the assistance provided is used to directly benefit the needy and, accordingly, it is questionable whether separate human rights related language is required. AID’s General Counsel has been asked to provide guidance on this point. If needed, a separate memo on this issue will be provided subsequent to the receipt of this legal guidance.

[Omitted here is information concerning specific Bureau positions with regard to the Title I agreements anticipated for Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia.]

\textsuperscript{2} See footnote 6, Document 58.
The Options

1. Add the language to the FY 1979 Title I agreements with Pakistan, Syria and Tunisia and maintain the language in the Title I agreement with Bangladesh. Papers describing the human rights situation are attached.\(^3\)

Advantages

—This approach will ensure continued compliance with the legislative requirement.

—The language reinforces the Administration’s efforts to make Title I more directly benefit the poor.

Disadvantages

—Addition of the human rights clause could cause friction with recipient governments and lead to delays in negotiating Title I agreements.

2. Do not include language in the FY 1979 Title I agreements with Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria and Tunisia.

Advantages

—This approach would not jeopardize our bilateral relations programs as indicated above, nor would it delay the negotiation of the agreements.

—The Department would be in compliance with the letter and spirit of the legislation by excluding countries which do not engage in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”

—We would avoid confusing the leadership for countries where there has been progress in human rights observance.

Disadvantages

—Non-inclusion of language in all but the most serious cases might give the impression that a “hit-list” has been created.

—The accounting workload of our AID missions would not be minimized although, with the exception of the mission in Dacca, neither would it increase.

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\(^3\) The human rights papers on Syria, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Tunisia are not attached.
**Recommendation**

That you authorize inclusion of the human rights language in Title I agreements with all or some of the four countries discussed.

Bangladesh

Pakistan

Syria

Tunisia

Somalia

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4 Christopher indicated his approval and added his initials and the date “11/6.” According to an additional stamped notation, Christopher approved this option on November 16.

5 Christopher indicated his disapproval on Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia on November 16.

6 Christopher added Somalia to the list by hand and indicated his approval on November 16.

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**170. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Leslie Denend of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, November 20, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Human Rights Meeting—November 22

**Genocide Vote**

We now see 62–63 clear votes for cloture. Final confirmation of that number will be available in a week or two as a result of contacts now

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 16, Human Rights: Genocide Treaty: 11/78–4/80. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Schecter and Albright.

2 Notes of the November 22 meeting are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Inderfurth and Gates Chron File, Box 3, Inderfurth Chron: 11–12/78.
being made by the Ad Hoc Committee for Ratification of the Genocide Convention (a group of NGO organizations). The count is 47 certain, 16 probable, and 8 undecided. A list is attached.\(^3\)

We cannot expect an absolutely firm count until the decision is made to go ahead, since there is a chicken-and-egg problem for many Senators—they will not make a commitment until they are sure that the Administration is committed, and vice versa. Nevertheless, if this count holds up in the preliminary contacts, I would argue that there is no question but that we should try for ratification early next session. With cloture in hand, the remaining four or five votes will come easily. The issue may require a half dozen phone calls by the President, but no more.

What is most often forgotten in the debate on this subject is that a win on Genocide will be an important victory for the President, and will therefore strengthen his position on SALT, and help to erase the press view that this is a much more conservative Congress than the last. If he wins on this, Carter will have achieved something that 5 previous Presidents have tried and failed to do, and that’s a powerful argument.

*Thirtieth Anniversary Speech*

Our thinking on the speech has been that it should announce the Genocide effort as its primary press hook. It could also reiterate the importance of the other international human rights treaties—the UN Covenants, the American Convention and the Helsinki accords, among others—and from there naturally lead into a discussion of the importance of the international fora in promoting human rights, and a brief review of the significant steps that have been taken in this area in the past year.

State has suggested two other initiatives that might be mentioned. The first is to propose that the jurisdiction of the US Civil Rights Commission be expanded to include human rights obligations, including those stemming from international commitments. The name of the Commission would be changed to the Human Rights Commission. This linkage of human rights to civil rights will strengthen the already existing ties between human rights and civil rights groups, and should increase domestic support for the human rights policy. State discussed this proposal with the Commission last year. They reacted positively, but urged that it be put off until this year, after their authorization was extended by Congress. The extension was successfully acted on last session.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is the list entitled “GENOCIDE VOTE COUNT As of November 16, 1978.”
State’s other suggestion seems to me a little off the wall, but perhaps warrants closer examination. The proposal is a call for a worldwide amnesty for prisoners of conscience. If one ever tried to actually implement it, it would be a nightmare. Who would decide who is a prisoner of conscience? Are the Wilmington 10?4

One additional important announcement could be included, dealing with refugees. Vance and Bell are now engaged in discussions on a possible new parole that Newsom would announce in Geneva on December 11. If they reach agreement (and OMB approves) this could mean 15,000 additional spots for Indochinese and 15,000 for Cambodian refugees. This would also be worthy of major press attention. Bell would have completed necessary Congressional consultations beforehand.

Finally, we have suggested that the speech conclude with the awarding of the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Roger Baldwin and to A. Philip Randolph. An award to Randolph would return to the theme of the congruence between human rights and civil rights. Baldwin’s credentials are obvious.

The appropriate audience for such a speech would include not only representatives of the NGOs and religious groups active in human rights, and the obvious Russian and Eastern European groups, but also black, Hispanic and others. Joe Aragon has strongly suggested, and Pastor has tentatively supported the idea, that released Cuban political prisoners also be invited. We need your views on this. The audience would of course also include appropriate members of the Congress and the press.

I have already met with Anne Wexler on setting up the meeting. She will take prime responsibility on the invitation list (we and State will submit suggestions). Her staff is already at work.

Public Relations Campaign

We suggested in the schedule proposal5 that the event begin with a briefing by Vance and yourself on the Administration’s human rights policy. To the extent it is possible (without infuriating other governments by implying that decisions they took were made under US

4 Reference is to 10 individuals arrested, tried, and convicted on arson and conspiracy charges in Wilmington, North Carolina, in February 1971. At the time, African American students in Wilmington had instituted a boycott against the city’s schools in response to attacks on African American students prompted by desegregation of the school system. The boycott precipitated various acts of violence, culminating in the firing of shots at firefighters attempting to extinguish an arson fire. The “Wilmington 10” were implicated in this action, despite the lack of evidence regarding involvement, and, as a result, were perceived as political prisoners and thus deprived of their human rights. Eventually, the case against the Wilmington 10 was overturned in 1980.

5 Not found and not further identified.
pressure) this briefing should be used to demonstrate what the US policy has accomplished. With press in attendance, it can be used to kickoff an Administration effort to take more credit where credit is due, and possibly (if desired) to tactfully draw attention to unwise statutory requirements which have recently been enacted.

171. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Senior Deputy Assistant of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats)

Washington, November 21, 1978

SUBJECT
Human Rights and A.I.D.

This Administration’s commitment to working for human rights improvements is founded upon the established premise that as the richest nation in the world, the United States should use its vast resources to promote the economic and social rights of all people. Toward this end the USG has provided sizeable amounts of assistance to their nations. However, when considered as a proportion of our national wealth, our contributions lag far behind those of many governments. To insure that the U.S. comes closer to meeting its responsibility for promoting a more equitable international economic order, the Carter Administration has undertaken to increase international and bilateral economic assistance to poor countries.

The Secretary articulated the administration’s aid policy when, in a 1977 address, he told the American Bar Association: “The United States looks to the use of economic assistance—whether bilateral or through international financial institutions—as a means to foster basic human rights”. In my own efforts to promote human rights, I have consistently and publicly endorsed the President’s stated commitment to

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, AID. No classification marking. Drafted by Bova. Hanson’s initials are on the memorandum. Bova subsequently sent a copy of the memorandum to Derian under cover of a November 30 memorandum, referencing Derian’s upcoming meeting with Vance regarding the OMB decision to cut the FY 1980 Agency for International Development budget. (Ibid.)
doubling the bilateral development assistance budget by 1982. Thus I am particularly concerned that efforts to cut back bilateral development assistance may be underway. The level agreed upon for Fiscal Year 1979 and proposed for Fiscal Year 1980 are already well below those originally deemed necessary to the President’s commitment. Further cuts would seriously jeopardize the effort to reach the level set for 1982. Failure to reach our assistance goals would have seriously adverse repercussions for our human rights policy.

Development assistance is the most visible of our aid policies. To other donor countries, to the Third World, and to critics such as the USSR, U.S. commitment in this area is seen to indicate that the U.S. is or is not ready to put its “money where its mouth is.”

Furthermore, development assistance more than any other assistance program, succeeded in channeling resources to encourage human rights progress. It has responded more directly than any other program to President Carter’s Directive (PD 30, No. 4) that “...countries with a good or substantially improving record of human rights observance will be given special consideration in the allocation of U.S. foreign assistance, just as countries with a poor or deteriorating record will receive less favorable consideration. Programs for each fiscal year shall be reviewed in this light.”

We are making ourselves effective by “rewarding” governments which have shown a commitment to promoting the broad range of human rights of their people. Conversely, by cutting back some programs, we have materially decreased our identification with repressive governments and have encouraged them to consider our cuts as an added cost of continuing their repressive practices. Through the design of projects, the development assistance program also has been our most effective way of encouraging recipient governments to bring equity and grass roots participation into their own programs.

I have one further concern, which is couched in specific rather than general terms. The latest review of FY 80 aid levels leads me to suspect that any further cutback would most seriously endanger the India program as well as those hard fought for Latin American programs designed to encourage certain countries in their efforts to restore human rights protections and democratic institutions. Cutbacks in either area would destroy the precarious balance we have achieved between political, human rights and other development related objectives in the FY 80 budget.

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2 See Document 119.
172. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Inderfurth) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, December 1, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights Performance

For background purposes I have prepared the attached unclassified paper on “Human Rights Performance: January 1977–December 1978.” It is based on CIA’s “confidential” study which the Agency (Bob Bowie) refused to declassify.\(^2\) I suggest that you—and others—use this information to background the press on human rights improvements during the Carter Administration. We do not want to appear to take credit for all such improvements, but the fact remains that the President’s human rights policy has made the world a better place to live in and he should get some of the credit for this.

In addition to discussing worldwide improvements (and regressions) in human rights, you might also use the following, which is based on an earlier memo from Jessica.\(^3\)

The Carter Administration has three human rights objectives:\(^4\)

—To raise global awareness of human rights so that the issue is a regular concern of all governments and an expected component of relations both with other countries and with the international community.

We have met this objective.

—To organize U.S. foreign policy making so that human rights concerns are taken into account in all relevant decisions including foreign assistance, political actions and economic benefits.

We have partially met this objective. Excessive delays and inconsistent decisions still persist.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Inderfurth and Gates File, Box 3, Inderfurth Chron: 11–12/78. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Schecter and Tuchman Mathews. Brzezinski wrote the following handwritten notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: “RI, good, put in folder for the meeting. ZB.”

\(^2\) Presumably reference to a CIA study of the same name prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center in September 1978, which Inderfurth forwarded to Oksenberg under an October 27 memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Inderfurth and Gates Chron File, Box 3, Inderfurth Chron: 10/78)

\(^3\) See Document 168.

\(^4\) An unknown hand drew an arrow from the margin to this sentence.
To begin the lengthy process of strengthening the international institutions (including the UN and its commissions, the IFIs and the regional human rights organizations) so that ultimately they can become the primary focus of international human rights activity.

We have partially met this objective. The UN and OAS commissions are vastly improved and some progress has been made in gaining support in the IFIs. There is still a long way to go.

Recommendation:

That you use the attached paper to background the press at the time of the December 6 White House human rights event.\(^5\)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council\(^6\)

Washington, undated


Over the past two years the human rights situation worldwide has improved but in several countries deteriorated. Worldwide trends indicate significant patterns of change. Since January 1977 there have been human rights improvements in 41 countries where 2½ billion people live. Most of these countries, however, still have less than good human rights records. In at least 10 countries, the standards of human rights have declined, affecting almost half a billion people. On a regional basis, these changes have been noted:

—Yugoslavia’s human rights record is by far the best in Eastern Europe and it has improved in the last year. Hungary has improved on such issues as emigration, family reunification and travel. Human rights abuses have increased in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union’s record has deteriorated, although the regime has apparently liberalized its Jewish emigration policy.

—There have been a few changes in human rights practices in the Middle East over the past two years, although some improvements have been noted in Morocco, the Sudan and Syria.

—Although many of the nations of East Asia and the Pacific region have found themselves at odds, to varying degrees, with U.S. human rights policy, improvements have been evident in South Korea, the Phil-

\(^5\) See Document 176.

\(^6\) No classification marking.
ippines, Indonesia, the Republic of China (ROC), and Thailand. In addition, there have been indications of improvement in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Conditions have deteriorated in Vietnam and continue to be deplorable in Cambodia, where Western influence generally has made no impact.

—In South Asia, India’s return to constitutional practices dramatically improved its human rights record. Conditions have also bettered in Iran due to the Shah’s program of liberalization. Bangladesh has seen some improvement. The human rights situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated since the April 1978 military coup.

—Over the past year human rights practices in some African countries have improved, including Benin, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. Nigeria has welcomed the U.S. emphasis on human rights and has proposed a regional UN human rights commission for Africa. There have been some improvements in Rhodesia but no real change in South Africa. Uganda and Equatorial Guinea remain two of the worst violators in the world today.

—Of the 26 countries in Latin America, human rights progress has been made in 12. There has been a marked decrease in the worst kinds of abuses, such as officially condoned killings, torture and prolonged and illegal detention. International and regional human rights organizations have taken a more active role in the region and have been receiving cooperation from many governments. Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil have all taken steps toward more constitutional procedures. Improvements have been noted in Chile, Uruguay, Honduras and Guatemala. Recently there has been a deterioration in Nicaragua.

—In Western Europe there have been two positive developments. Spain’s overall human rights rating has clearly improved. A new constitution, soon to be submitted for ratification, contains comprehensive guarantees of democratic freedom. In Cyprus, the human rights situation has improved markedly during the past 18 months.

The causes of the changes cited above are complex. Increased U.S. attention to human rights practices have contributed to a global climate of greater sensitivity to the issue and to the heightened concern of a large number of countries. In a number of cases, U.S. bilateral representations have been an important factor in the improvements noted. In other cases, governments that have rebuffed direct U.S. initiatives as interference in their internal affairs have, as a compensating action, permitted Amnesty International or some regional human rights organization to conduct its own investigation.

In many cases, however, especially where substantial and far-reaching improvements have taken place (for example, India and Spain), these changes have reflected dramatic internal political developments. Similarly, the several instances of retrogression can be ex-
plained largely by internal dynamics, though at times fear or traditional resentment of international pressures have played a part.

173. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Assistant for Communications (Rafshoon) to President Carter

Washington, December 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights Speech

With the possible exception of peace in the Middle East, no aspect of your foreign policy is more popular or more widely known than human rights.

Although you have frequently commented on human rights, you have never delivered a major, prepared address devoted exclusively to this vital subject. We believe the time has come for you to do so.

The 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights offers the kind of opportunity that will not recur during your first term. You can use this opportunity to put your views about human rights on the record in a careful, comprehensive way.

We strongly recommend that you deliver a major address on human rights to the audience that will assemble in the East Room on Wednesday. We also recommend that you speak from a prepared text, and that the text be distributed to the media in advance. Along with our guidance, this will alert the press to its importance, and will make it very likely that the New York Times and other newspapers will print it in full—with major positive impact on an important national elite and media audience. ICA will see that the text receives extensive international distribution.

This draft is designed to be philosophical, and at the same time strongly committed in tone. It is designed to reaffirm the human rights

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1 Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 111, 12/5/78. No classification marking. The President wrote “Jerry” and his first initial in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. An unknown hand added “Wednesday, 12/6/78, noon” to the subject line.

2 The President wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.

3 Attached but not printed is a draft copy of the speech, December 4, and talking points prepared by Presidential speechwriter Hendrik Hertzberg.
policy; to outline its successes and its hopes; to show how your personal commitment to it arises from your personal experience; and to place it in the context of both American and world history.

(The sentence about “messiahs” on page 3 is, of course, a response to the Jonestown horror. It is designed to exert moral leadership by getting down to the fundamentals: whatever the cause, the murder of children is unacceptable.)

NOTE: As an alternative to a prepared speech, we have also attached talking points.

4 Reference is to the mass suicides committed at the Peoples’ Temple, a religious commune led by Jim Jones, in Jonestown, Guyana, in late November 1978. The Peoples’ Temple had come under scrutiny by relatives of sect members, who alleged that Jones had enslaved and mistreated many of his followers. Leo Ryan, a Democratic Representative from California, flew to Georgetown, Guyana, on November 14 in order to investigate conditions in Jonestown. Several of Ryan’s aides, Department of State officials, U.S. journalists, and families of sect members (hoping to aid in the defection of their relatives) accompanied Ryan. Ryan, three journalists, and a defector were killed and seven others injured as they attempted to leave Port Kiatuma, where the delegation had chartered two planes to return to the United States. Following the ambush, Jones instructed commune members to commit suicide by drinking a cyanide-laced beverage. See David Binder, “Coast Congressman Believed Slain Investigating Commune in Guyana,” The New York Times, November 19, 1978, p. A–1 and “Guyana Official Reports 300 Dead At Religious Sect’s Jungle Temple,” The New York Times, November 20, 1978, p. A–1.

5 Attached but not printed. Brzezinski added the following handwritten notation: “A speech would have much more impact. ZB.”

174. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, December 5, 1978

SUBJECT

The President’s Meeting with Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Patt Derian on the Human Rights Policy, Wednesday, December 6, 1978, at 10:30 a.m.

The President will meet with Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Derian to discuss the Administration’s human rights policy. They


2 The memorandum of conversation of the December 6 meeting is printed as Document 175.
will want to review briefly the guiding principles of the policy as it has developed over the past two years, the effectiveness of tools we have used to implement it, the impact it has had in the United States and abroad, and our outlook for the future.

The Guiding Principles

—We are concerned with all three categories of fundamental rights: the right to be free from governmental violations of the integrity of the person; the right to fulfill one’s vital needs such as shelter, food, health, and education; and civil and political rights.

—These rights are internationally recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, and other international instruments.

—We prefer to use positive measures to promote human rights in other countries, but where these have no effect we will not shrink from consideration of sanctions or other ways to distance the United States from human rights violations abroad.

—We apply our human rights concerns flexibly and realistically to the particular circumstances presented by the country in question, taking account of our interests with respect to the country and the historical and cultural conditions involved.

—We encourage other countries that share our human rights values to join us in our efforts to promote human rights.

Tools for Advancing the Human Rights Policy

—Private diplomatic discussions with virtually all countries.

—The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by Warren Christopher, which brings human rights considerations to bear on our foreign assistance projects in accordance with legislative restrictions on providing assistance to countries with serious human rights problems, and in keeping with the Presidential directive to adjust our assistance levels to reflect positive or negative human rights performance.

—Symbolic acts, such as meeting with opposition leaders or inviting foreign leaders to visit the U.S.

—Public comment, for countries such as Uganda and Cambodia, where our private diplomatic efforts are unavailable or unavailing.

—Approaches in multilateral bodies, such as the UN, the OAS, the multilateral development banks, and the Belgrade conference to review implementation of the Helsinki accord.

Impact of the Human Rights Policy

—There has been an increase in awareness of human rights issues throughout the world, which helps to curb existing abuses and acts as
an important deterrent to new violations. There have been releases of many political prisoners in over a dozen countries and movement toward restoration of democratic rule by a number of military regimes. We do not take credit for particular improvements but believe we have helped to create an atmosphere in which human rights progress is more likely to occur.

—At home, the human rights policy is very popular with the public. It is seen as a personal initiative of the President and a strong plus for the Administration. There has been some criticism of the policy from segments of the business community who are concerned that the policy might interfere with trade. Labor is strongly supportive of the policy. Other criticisms sometimes heard are that we concentrate on right-wing, anti-Communist governments and that we do not apply the policy forcefully enough in countries where we have important security interests. The Congress continues to be generally supportive, with the exception of some members who are responsive often to particular business interests among their constituents.

**Efforts in the Period Ahead**

—We will continue to implement the policy in accordance with the principles that have guided us thus far. We will work to articulate the basis for the policy to international and domestic audiences.

—We will address problems that have emerged in implementing the policy to date. Two particular concerns will be our failure to ratify the Genocide Convention and our efforts to improve our ability to respond to complaints and questions about human rights conditions in the United States.

Peter Tarnoff

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3 Wisner signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.
175. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Summary of the President’s Meeting on Human Rights Policy

PARTICIPANTS
President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ms. Patt Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights
Leslie G. Denend, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

Assistant Secretary Derian began the meeting by reviewing implementation of the policy over the past two years. She stressed the sustained high level of public support for the policy, and the importance of including an adequate assessment of the human rights situation particularly in decision papers to the President concerning military exports. The President indicated that he felt he was receiving this kind of information particularly in sensitive cases. Secretary Vance confirmed this procedure to the President. The President cited Argentina as a clear case where his approvals are specifically designed to encourage progress in human rights. He went on to describe the support of the European and Japanese leaders for human rights.

Ms. Derian indicated that the policy is misunderstood by some and wondered if it would not be possible to release an unclassified version of PD–30 which is now classified Confidential. The President thought the idea had merit and directed Dr. Brzezinski to review PD–30.

The President then turned to the role of diplomacy in advancing the cause of human rights. Using the example of the Soviet Union, he indicated that he had learned a great deal about Soviet reactions to U.S. human rights initiatives and felt that more had been accomplished recently in the emigration of Soviet Jews, for example, through quiet diplomacy than through more public measures.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 12/78–1/79. Secret; Outside the System. Drafted by Denend. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office.

2 Denend sent Brzezinski a copy of the memorandum of conversation under a December 7 covering note, indicating that he would review PD–30 and coordinate with Schecter on developing a statement on PD-30 for release to the public. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Policy: 10–12/78)
Ms. Derian responded by characterizing her meetings in Singapore and the Philippines. The President reflected Senator Inouye’s concern that our more confrontational approach in the Philippines had set the U.S. back there. Secretary Vance said that he would follow that point up with Senator Inouye and attempt to allay his concern.

The President reiterated his view of the value of quiet diplomacy citing our recent experience with Libya. He offered support for Ms. Derian’s efforts and encouraged her for the future. Secretary Vance emphasized the President’s observation, noting that where we could talk to people there was a chance to influence their behavior. He felt that was an argument for universal diplomatic recognition.

The President asked Ms. Derian to prepare a brief report outlining recommendations for possible changes in our human rights approach to those countries where she thought it might be improved.

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176. Editorial Note

Following their December 6, 1978, meeting on human rights (see Document 175), President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian participated in a White House East Room ceremony commemorating the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Approximately 250 representatives from domestic and international human rights organizations attended the ceremony, which took place from 11:58 a.m. to 12:22 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)

After a short statement by Vance, Brzezinski indicated that he would devote his remarks to the introduction and development of three basic propositions regarding human rights. Brzezinski’s first two propositions focused upon the historical inevitability of human rights and the centrality of human rights in America’s relevance in a “changing world.” In describing the third—the indication of progress in the enhancement of human rights—Brzezinski asserted:
“Last year has seen some tangible progress in the human condition. There are different ways of assessing that progress. There are different groups which, from time to time, make estimates. Collating some of these reports together, we do have the impression that not because of our efforts, either alone or at all, but because of this increasing relevance of the human rights condition which we have helped to stimulate, there has been progress in a number of countries.

“It is difficult to measure it but as a rough approximate estimate I would say in at least 40 countries around the world in which two and a half billion people live there has been tangible progress—in some cases more, in some cases less, in some cases certainly not enough, but progress nonetheless. And it has expressed itself in even greater respect for rights or less oppression of political opposition or in the release of victims or in a generally more sensitive attitude toward established procedures.

“This is something of which we can be proud, though of which we should not take credit. We are part of the process. We are part of a political and historical process, and we live in a time which is often short in hopeful perspectives in the future. I would submit to you that this is one of the more important reassuring ones because it tells us something about what a human being is. It tells us that ultimately the human being in whatever the social, economic, or cultural conditions, yearns for something transcendental, yearns for some self-definition with respect to his uniqueness, yearns for something which dignifies him as a spiritual being. And if that, in fact, is increasingly the human condition, it ought to be a source of tremendous pride and reassurance to us as Americans.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 1979, pages 5–6)

Derian attempted to address four major questions associated with human rights policy, including the rationale for policy, means of implementation, achievements, and sincerity of conviction. In discussing the question of policy implementation, Derian sketched out the various mechanisms employed by the United States, noting:

“Our approach has not been limited to quiet diplomacy. We have practiced vigorous diplomacy in which all available instruments are used. They include symbolic affirmations of our concern. The President says something, the Secretary says something, it is in a speech, it is in a press conference, it is in a press release, it is in a casual comment, it is in a letter, it is whatever way you can find at some point when it seems like the right instrument to have a strong public gesture. When there is no response to quiet expression of human rights concerns and when there is no response to a symbolic speaking out, our law and our policy demand that we examine our assistance relationships, both economic and military.
“We will continue to assert human rights concerns as vigorously as we have during the past 2 years in our dealings with all governments. The fundamental objective of this policy is to do what we can as a government and as a people to improve the observation of human rights by governments toward their people. That is essentially what it is that this policy is to do, and we do that in all the ways that you know.

“At the same time, the human rights policy has another important effect; it strengthens our position and influence in the world. Human rights is an area where our ideals and our self-interest strongly coincide.

“The fact of it is that that is a side effect and the only way we really get that side benefit is to be as straight as it is possible to be with our policy implementation. That is our intention. That is our endeavor. That is our constant struggle, because I don’t need to tell anyone in this room that it is also incredibly complex to balance all of the things that are of great concern to the United States with all the other things. Human rights now sits at the table and that is a change.

“Our well-being and security are enhanced when there is greater respect for human rights in the world. Our policy is important to the health and integrity of this society within the United States. Support for or indifference to oppression in other countries weakens the foundation of our democracy at home.

“We have increased awareness of and concern for human rights among governments and peoples throughout the world and in international organizations such as the United Nations.

“Finally, besides growing awareness, there are indications of concrete progress for many regions. The U.S. Government is careful not to claim credit for influencing specific steps. When a country is making improvements, it is the result of decisions made by its government and people. And how many events would have occurred in the absence of U.S. human rights policy, we have no idea. But the policy has helped to create a climate in which such changes are more likely.” (Ibid., pages 6–7)

Following Derian’s remarks, President Carter reaffirmed his previous public statements regarding human rights, asserting: “As long as I am President, the Government of the United States will continue, throughout the world, to enhance human rights. No force on Earth can separate us from that commitment.” After highlighting his administration’s redoubled focus on rights, Carter expressed his hope that Congress, during the next legislative session, would ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, noting that the United Nations had adopted it at the same time it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that 83 nations had ratified it during the intervening 30 years. The President also
pledged to support Indochinese and Lebanese refugees and Cuban political prisoners. Describing the accomplishments related to the centrality of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, Carter opined:

“The effectiveness of our human rights policy is now an established fact. It has contributed to an atmosphere of change—sometimes disturbing—but which has encouraged progress in many ways and in many places. In some countries, political prisoners have been released by the hundreds, even thousands. In others, the brutality of repression has been lessened. In still others there’s a movement toward democratic institutions or the rule of law when these movements were not previously detectable.

“Those who doubt the wisdom of our dedication, I say this: Ask the victims. Ask the exiles. Ask the governments which continue to practice repression. Whether in Cambodia, or Chile, in Uganda or South Africa, in Nicaragua or Ethiopia or the Soviet Union, governments know that we in the United States care; and not a single one of those who is actually taking risks or suffering for human rights has ever asked me to desist in our support of basic human rights. From the prisons, from the camps, from the enforced exiles, we receive one message—speak up, persevere, let the voice of freedom be heard.

“I’m very proud that our nation stands for more than military might or political might. It stands for ideals that have their reflection in the aspirations of peasants in Latin America, workers in Eastern Europe, students in Africa, and farmers in Asia.

“We do live in a difficult and complicated world—a world in which peace is literally a matter of survival. Our foreign policy must take this into account. Often, a choice that moves us toward one goal tends to move us further away from another goal.

“Seldom do circumstances permit me or you to take actions that are wholly satisfactory to everyone. But I want to stress again that human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States. Our human rights policy is not a decoration. It is not something we’ve adopted to polish up our image abroad or to put a fresh coat of moral paint on the discredited policies of the past.

“Our pursuit of human rights is part of a broad effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world—a world in which human beings can live in peace, in freedom, and with their basic needs adequately met. Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy. And I say this with assurance, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.” (Ibid., pages 1–2)

The President concluded his remarks by referencing the 1978 Bill of Rights Day and comparing the 187-year history of the Bill of Rights with the 30-year history of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, underscoring:
"I do not draw this comparison because I want to counsel patience. I draw it because I want to emphasize, in spite of difficulties, steadfastness and commitment.

"One hundred and eighty-seven years ago, as far as most Americans were concerned, the Bill of Rights was a bill of promises. There was no guarantee that those promises would ever be fulfilled. We did not realize those promises by waiting for history to take its inevitable course. We realized them because we struggled. We realized them because many sacrificed. We realized them because we persevered.

"For millions of people around the world today the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is still only a declaration of hope. Like all of you, I want that hope to be fulfilled. The struggle to fulfill it will last longer than the lifetimes of any of us; indeed, it will last as long as the lifetime of humanity itself. But we must persevere. And we must persevere by insuring that this country of ours, leader in the world which we love so much, is always in the forefront of those who are struggling for that great hope, the great dream of universal human rights.” (Ibid., page 2; the President’s remarks are also printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 2161–2165)

177. Memorandum From Leslie Denend of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, December 15, 1978

SUBJECT
Public Statement of US Human Rights Policy

As a result of the President’s meeting with Patt Derian, I have begun the review of PD–30 to develop a version for possible release to the public.


2 See Document 175.
The draft at Tab A is a minor rework of the PD which softens the language slightly and places it in the context of an ongoing policy. Jerry Schecter and Madeleine Albright’s comments were that the draft seemed fine but they advised against a release now because of the delicate situation in Iran.

I agree with the implicit thesis in Madeleine and Jerry’s comments that without a recognized event or reason for the release, the media will invent one which may work against our original intentions for a public statement.

Therefore, we will continue to look for an appropriate way to make the policy better understood by the public.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

DRAFT

PUBLIC STATEMENT ON US HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

As a major objective of US foreign policy, the US seeks to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. This policy is applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each nation, and to other fundamental US interests with respect to the nation in question.

The US seeks to reduce worldwide governmental violations of the integrity of the person and to enhance civil and political liberties and continues to promote basic economic and social rights.

The full range of diplomatic instruments are used in promoting human rights including direct diplomatic contacts, public statements, symbolic acts, consultations with allies, cooperation with non-governmental organizations, and work with international organizations.

The US attempts to place the greatest reliance on positive inducements and incentives acknowledging improvements in human rights, whenever appropriate and possible, through preferential treatment in

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3 An earlier version of the condensed and reworked PD, which Denend sent to Albright and Schecter under cover of a December 13 memorandum is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Mathews Subject File, Box 10, Human Rights: Policy: 10–12/78.

4 No classification marking.
political relations and economic benefits. To this end, countries with a good or substantially improving record of human rights observance are given special consideration in the allocation of US foreign assistance just as countries with a poor or deteriorating record receive less favorable consideration. Programs for each fiscal year are reviewed in this light. In the evaluation of the human rights condition of a foreign nation, primary emphasis is placed on longer term trends and on the cumulative effect of specific events.

Except in exceptional circumstances actions are not undertaken which would result in material or financial support to the police, civil law enforcement authorities, or others performing internal security functions of governments engaged in serious violations of human rights.

US human rights actions within the International Financial Institutions are designed and implemented so as not to undermine the essential US interest of preserving these institutions as effective economic instruments. To this end, US actions seek to: utilize most effectively both our voice and our vote; understand and attempt to influence the Banks’ actions as early as possible in the loan process; and, engage the support of other nations and multilateral organizations.

178. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to William Butler, David Hinkley, and Jerome Shestack

Washington, January 22, 1979

Gentlemen:

It is with great pleasure that I reply to your letter of December 1, 1978 to President Carter concerning ratification by the Senate of the International Covenants on Human Rights.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790018–1909. No classification marking. Drafted by Roberta Cohen. According to a Department of State Executive Secretariat transmittal form, the Department sent a copy of Derian’s letter to Brzezinski on January 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790018–1908)

2 In their letter, Butler, Hinkley, and Shestack impressed upon Carter the need to make the ratification of the human rights covenants and treaties a goal of his first term and urged the President to sign the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790018–1914)
We could not agree with you more that Senate ratification of these treaties is imperative to the pursuit of a persuasive and constructive human rights policy. As President Carter stated in his letter submitting the Covenants to the Senate for ratification in February 1978: “While the United States is a leader in the realization and protection of human rights, it is one of the few large nations that has not become a party to the three United Nations human rights treaties. Our failure to become a party increasingly reflects upon our attainments, and prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law of human rights.” The President concluded his letter of transmittal by recommending “prompt consideration” by the Senate of ratification of the Covenants as well as the UN Convention on Racial Discrimination and the American Convention on Human Rights. He said this would “confirm our country’s traditional commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights at home and abroad.”

In furtherance of this action, the President, on the occasion of Human Rights Day, issued a Proclamation stating that “there could be no more appropriate gesture to mark the anniversary” of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights than Senate ratification of the Genocide Convention and “early hearings” to permit adherence to the Convention and other remaining human rights instruments. The President once again spoke out on behalf of ratification of the international human rights treaties at the special White House Commemoration of the 30th Anniversary. He urged the Senate to ratify the Genocide Convention “at the earliest possible date” as the first step toward the ratification of the Covenants and other human rights instruments.

The President, thus, has expressed clearly and emphatically that one of the goals of his Administration is the ratification by the Senate of the Covenants and other international human rights treaties in support of our commitment to promote human rights internationally.

With regard to the signing of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, we agree with you that the right of individual petition is essential for the safeguarding of human rights. It is in fact the cornerstone of redress for human rights grievances. For this reason, the United States played an important role in the drafting

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3 See footnote 2, Document 118.


5 See Document 176.
of the Optional Protocol and voted for its adoption by the United Na-
tions in 1966.\footnote{See footnote 8, Document 4. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant was adopted and opened for signature (by any party that had signed the covenant), ratification, and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI) of December 16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23, 1976.}

The United States decided it advisable to address itself first to the Covenants’ ratification before considering the Optional Protocol. At that time, we would expect to sign and submit it to the Senate for ratification.

The President in his statement commemorating the Universal Declaration’s 30th Anniversary, highly commended the work of your organiza-
tions, the leading ones in the field of international human rights.\footnote{The President stated: “The reports of Amnesty International, the International Commission on Jurists, the International League for Human Rights and many other nongovernmental human rights organizations amply document the practices and conditions that destroy the lives and the spirit of countless human beings.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 1979, p. 1)} Part of your efforts have included the launching of campaigns to stimulate broad public support for U.S. ratification of the human rights treaties. We hardly can emphasize enough the importance of your ini-
tiatives and of your constituencies’ making their views known to members of Congress on the crucial need for U.S. adherence to the human rights treaties.

This Administration strongly supports your endeavors with re-
gard to ratification and would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you further ways in which we could be helpful in achieving our mutual goal of adherence by the United States to the international human rights treaties.

With warm personal regards,

Cordially,

Patricia M. Derian\footnote{Printed from a copy with this typed signature.}
Human Rights and Multilateral Development Banks: Procedures for Securing Support from Other Governments for U.S. Positions

**Issue for Decision**

Governments of several major countries acknowledge that human rights are a legitimate concern in consideration of MDB projects, yet we have had only partial success in securing their opposition to specific projects we oppose on human rights grounds. The issue for decision is whether, beyond notification of an intent to oppose a loan in a reasonable number of instances, we should seek the support of like-minded governments in opposing such loans.

**Background/Analysis**

Over the course of the past two years, we have opposed about 48 loans to 15 countries for human rights reasons. These actions are in accord with our Congressional mandate and with Administration policy. In our Congressional presentations a year ago we asserted that the Administration actively had pursued its human rights objectives, including in the MDBs, and had made a start in attracting international support.

Other countries have joined us in opposition on approximately 25 loans to five countries. In only one case, however, have we received enough support to have a loan withdrawn by the African Development Fund to Equatorial Guinea. With regard to assistance financed by the Inter-American Development Banks’ Fund for Special Operations, over which the U.S. holds a veto, the U.S. has been able to keep certain loans from coming forward. Also, it is probable that loans to Chile have not come forward in the World Bank because of the belief that U.S. and other donors would disapprove them. To the degree that increased in-

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2 An unknown hand placed parentheses around the phrase “by the African Development Fund to Equatorial Guinea.”
ternational support can be generated and other countries also demonstrate their opposition to particular loans, it will strengthen the message of concern with human rights communicated to the violating governments, underline our concern to bank managements about the flow of resources to the government, and enhance Congressional appreciation of our efforts, reducing the likelihood of additional legislative requirements.

Consultations by State and Treasury officials with counterparts from other countries on human rights and foreign assistance including an extensive exchange of views in Paris last month (reporting cable at Tab 1) have revealed several points:

1. Major industrialized and some developing members of the MDBs are committed to trying to enhance respect for human rights throughout the world and agree that human rights is an appropriate and legitimate consideration on decisions concerning foreign assistance, including MDB projects.

2. In factoring human rights concerns into their decision on specific MDB projects, the industrialized countries want to avoid a “hit list”.

3. Other governments make their decisions on a case-by-case basis and, in determining whether to support or oppose a specific project in a country with gross human rights violations, they weigh the seriousness of the violations against the extent to which the project will contribute to the country’s development. This criterion is less narrow than our basic human needs exception and, therefore, leads them to consider opposing fewer projects. Moreover, they seem willing to consider opposition only to projects in countries in which the more egregious human rights violations have occurred. In some cases, however, they will oppose even bhn projects because of the seriousness of the violations.

4. They are very concerned about undermining the apolitical and developmental integrity of the MDBs. Their caution in this regard also leads them to limit, at least initially, the number of countries for which they will oppose MDB projects.

5. All agreed that consultations were useful but that they should be principally bilateral and that those on specific projects should take place as far as possible before the projects are brought before MDB boards. They observed that our present procedure of advising them of the U.S. position on projects shortly before their consideration by the boards did not allow them sufficient time to formulate their own positions. Our interlocutors agreed that lack of detailed information on projects until only a few days before board decisions was a serious

3 Attached but not printed is a copy of telegram 49899 from Paris, December 14, 1978, reporting upon a December 12 meeting at the Embassy among U.S., UK, Canadian, West German, Dutch, Swedish, and Japanese representatives concerning human rights, foreign assistance, and the MDBs.

4 An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with the word “seriousness” and ends with the word “violations.”
hardship, but suggested that perhaps we could obtain from MDB staffs preliminary or working documents which would provide enough information for our purposes.5

(6) They also want to know when we are seeking their support because of the depth of our concern as opposed to simple notification.6

(7) Most other governments do not examine documents on MDB projects as carefully as we do; nor do they have coordinated procedures for consideration of human rights issues. Consequently, in order for our solicitations of support to be effective, they must include more complete information on our analysis of projects and human rights conditions.7

Given the reluctance of other governments to oppose projects except in the most serious cases, we must select very carefully the instances on which we will solicit their support. Of course, we should continue to advise them when we decide to oppose a project even if we do not explicitly seek their support for our position. Once others become accustomed to opposing projects, we may wish to solicit their opposition on a broader range of projects. As our embassies approach governments on specific projects, we also should advise relevant executive directors at the MDBs and perhaps their embassies here and even in the prospective recipient countries.

At Tab 28 is a list of forthcoming MDB projects in countries with serious human rights problems. We could select a few of these now and begin to collect information and prepare our analysis for presentation to other governments. Since we have already decided to oppose the IBRD Railways II loan to Argentina and its consideration by the Board has been postponed until January 30, EB, HA, S/P and Treasury believe that it might be a good first case. This is particularly so, since even our simple notification drew preliminary positive responses from the UK9 and the Scandinavian countries.

ARA, however, believes that this case is not an appropriate one on which to solicit support by other countries as the U.S. is only abstaining rather than voting no.

5 An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with the word “brought” and ends with the word “purposes.”

6 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “because” and ending with the word “notification.”

7 An unknown hand underlined the last sentence of this paragraph and placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

8 The undated list, entitled “Upcoming Multilateral Development Bank Assistance to Selected Countries with Human Rights Concerns,” is attached but not printed. Christopher bracketed the word “Concerns” and wrote “Problem” next to it in the margin.

9 An unknown hand corrected “UN” to read “UK” and placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to the portion of the paragraph that begins with the word “governments” and ends with the word “no” in the following paragraph.
Recommendation

That you authorize the Working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance:

(1) to select from the list at Tab 2 several MDB projects (subject to your approval), including the IBRD Railways II loan to Argentina, which the U.S. will oppose; and

(2) to prepare comprehensive descriptions of our views on them\(^{10}\) for presentation to a few governments in an effort to solicit their opposition to them. (This recommendation is strongly supported by the Treasury Department.\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\) An unknown hand underlined the phrase “comprehensive descriptions of our views on them” and placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this and the preceding numbered point.

\(^{11}\) Christopher initialed his approval on February 5, noting that he approved “as modified—see note attached.” The attached note has not been found.

180. Memorandum From the Global Issues Cluster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^{1}\)

Washington, January 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Evening Report

[Omitted here is information unrelated to human rights.]

*Human Rights Country Reports.* Over the weekend and this morning, we finished up all 115 country reports. On the whole I’d say (recognizing the inherent difficulties of this public, sensitive kind of reporting) that the quality is very good.\(^{2}\) Certainly much better than the two previous years. There are striking inconsistencies between reports which derive from three main sources: very different amounts of access and knowledge; political importance of the country to the U.S.; and personal interest in a particular country (positive or negative) by a


\(^{2}\) In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s January 24 evening report, Tuchman Mathews commented, “NSC staff have now reviewed about 70 of the 114 country reports. They are much improved over last year’s.” (Ibid.)
powerful individual somewhere in the process. In the most difficult cases, the problems between competing interests were solved by balancing every negative statement with a positive statement, resulting, particularly in the East Asian reports (Korea, Philippines and Indonesia) in extraordinary length. In the Korean case for example, the report goes into ridiculous detail about Korean educational, welfare and health programs (down to numbers of people covered), blowing the ROK’s horn, in order to balance everything HA wanted in. Some of the Latin American reports are also unbalanced—reflecting greater personal interest than exists say for African countries. Nevertheless, the process is clearly maturing, and we can be satisfied that a balanced serious effort was made to produce honest reports without trodding on sensitive toes in other capitals.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to human rights.]

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181. **Paper Prepared in the Department of State**

Washington, January 31, 1979

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Thirty-Fifth (1979) Session
Scope Paper

Pursuant to Article 68 of the United Nations Charter, the Commission on Human Rights was established in 1946 “for the promotion of human rights.” Our overall purpose at the 35th session will be to lend all appropriate support to the achievement of this objective. Our participation will be guided by two basic assumptions: (a) the human rights to be promoted are those possessed by all the peoples of the world, not those of a select few, and (b) our aim will be truly effective action through the United Nations, so that the situation of the particular peoples concerned will be improved. We want to encourage the devel-

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, PORG 1979 35th UNHCR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hewitt. A copy of telegram 13295 to Geneva, January 18, which transmitted the summary of objectives the U.S. delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights session planned to pursue, is ibid. According to Tuchman Mathews and Denend’s February 9 evening report, the NSC Staff had requested that the Department prepare the scope paper. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issue—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37: Evening Reports, 1–3/79)
opment of a less selective approach by the Commission so that it will focus its attention upon a wider range of serious human rights violations in the world.\(^2\)

In determining our positions on individual issues our own concepts of basic human rights, as enshrined in our Constitution and developed from the beginnings of our nation, will provide the controlling guidelines. This does not mean, however, that we will seek to achieve uniform acceptance of our own standards. We recognize the virtues of diversity and will actively seek to learn, understand, and to take account of the points of view of other governments represented on the Commission. In particular, this will mean that our concern for the promotion of human rights will include the whole gamut of internationally recognized standards referred to under the headings civil and political and economic, social and cultural. We will acknowledge our acceptance of the proposition that basic civil and political human rights reinforce and promote basic economic rights and needs of peoples, and vice versa.

The 35th session will have the usual overly long agenda, of which probably not more than half will receive detailed consideration. Our principal concern at the outset, therefore, will be to assure that those items to which we attach special importance are so placed in the agenda which the Commission adopts that adequate discussion of them will be assured before the close of the Commission session. Since the crucial recommendations on the order of the items are made by the Commission’s Bureau (the Chairman, three Vice Chairmen and Rapporteur), we must conduct early consultations within our own regional group to assure that the regional group representative on the Bureau this year (who will be the Commission Chairman) will act appropriately to assert group interests in the order of the agenda items.

Among the matters to be discussed by the Commission the following will be of greatest interest to us and will present opportunities for achieving specific goals:

1. Question of the Program and Methods of Work of the Commission; Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under this item we must assure the adoption of a balanced, constructive plan for the future work program of the Commission as well as for United Nations human rights activities overall. We will seek to advance as far as possible certain of the suggestions made by President Carter in his United Nations address of March 17, 1977, viz., another regular annual session of the Commission on Human Rights took place in Geneva February 12–March 16.
Rights; move back to United Nations Headquarters the UN Secretariat component, the Human Rights Division; and the establishment of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Particularly with respect to the High Commissioner proposal, in consultation with other supporters, we must develop tactics to assure that its essential elements remain unchanged so that the proposal can again be considered by the General Assembly, if possible at its 1979 session. We must also assure that the United States sponsored item at the 33rd UN General Assembly on review and coordination is adequately highlighted in any proposals for strengthening United Nations human rights machinery.\(^3\) 

Finally, under this item or under a related item on the agenda which deals with the Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights, we will be seeking to encourage greater utilization of and expansion of the United Nations Advisory Services Program.

(2) Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, in particular: Draft Convention on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. We expect to participate actively in the working group which will be set up to draft the Convention on Torture and we will seek to achieve as much progress as possible in completing the drafting exercise at the 35th session. We will carry on consultations already pursued under the aegis of the Council of Europe with a view to assuring the inclusion in the Convention of effective implementation provisions.

(3) Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Areas and Territories, Including: Study of Situations Which Reveal a Consistent Pattern of Gross Violations of Human Rights. This item presents the greatest challenge of any item on the agenda since here will be discussed the cases referred to the Commission under ECOSOC Resolution 1503. Our support for the 1503 procedures has been strong since they were approved in 1970 because we have seen in these procedures the principal means whereby the focus of the Commission could be turned away from the traditional three cases (occupied Arab territories, Chile and South Africa) which have received repeated attention toward the examination of other instances of gross violations of human rights. Experience has shown that the Commission approaches its responsibilities under the 1503 procedures with exaggerated caution and concern for the sensitivities of the governments involved. Our goal will be to encourage decisions for study or investigation of all those cases in

which governments failed to produce convincing evidence that the alleged violations are being corrected. Foremost among the cases which will command our attention is that concerning the human rights situation in Uganda. Action which we will support on the Ugandan case will depend largely on recent developments which will be reported to the Commission by the Secretary-General. Other serious cases requiring adequate action will be Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, and Uruguay.

In addition to the confidential 1503 procedures, there will be discussed in public forum the situation of the violation of human rights in Democratic Kampuchea. We must assure that appropriate action is taken by the Commission to follow-up its decision to look into the matter which was taken at its last session.

(4) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and on Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. We intend to give our strong support to the achievement of forward progress in the drafting of the Declaration, which has been proceeding much too slowly. We will emphasize our belief that the issue of religious freedom is among the most important human rights issues in the world today and requires effective attention by the Commission.

(5) Study of Reported Violations of Human Rights in Chile. We intend to assure the maintenance of adequate monitoring by the Human Rights Commission of the human rights situation in Chile. As proposed in the resolution adopted by the 33rd UN General Assembly, we will support the substitution of a Special Rapporteur for the Ad Hoc Working Group and the establishment of machinery to deal with the problem of disappeared persons in Chile.4

(6) Report of the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Because the Subcommission plays a key role in the implementation of the procedures established in ECOSOC Resolution 1503 and because much of its expert work provides an essential basis for follow-up recommendations by the Commission, we must assure that adequate time is allocated for discussion of the Subcommission’s report. The Subcommission has been improving in effectiveness and therefore has drawn upon itself undue criticism by governments (such as Argentina) which have been the object of its attention at recent sessions.

4 “Protection of Human Rights in Chile” (A/RES/33/175), adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 1978.
(7) *The Problem of Disappeared Persons*. As a follow-up to the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, we will be consulting with the resolution’s original sponsors, Canada and the United Kingdom, with a view to the establishment by the Human Rights Commission of an effective mechanism for dealing with the problem of disappeared persons throughout the world.

(8) *Importance of National Institutions in the Field of Human Rights*. We want to give every encouragement to the initiative being pursued by the Indian delegation to strengthen the role which can be played by national institutions supporting the international human rights activities of the United Nations. A related area which we will also seek to promote will be the establishment of regional human rights organs.

*Tactical Situation*:

In pursuing the goals which we have set for ourselves in the 35th session of the Human Rights Commission, full account must be taken of the setting. The Commission operates pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissions of ECOSOC and it takes decisions by majority vote. Of the 32 members on the Commission, 8 are from African states, 6 from Asian states, 6 from LA states, 8 from WEO states, and 4 from the Socialist States of Eastern Europe. Of the present membership, the following have been the object of formal complaints of human rights violations which have been before the Commission in recent years: Brazil, Iran, Burundi, Uganda, and Uruguay.

To achieve a working majority in the Commission our contacts must take account of the key position occupied in the Commission by the countries of the Third World. It is only from the members of this group that we can hope to find the support which we will need if we are to achieve our goals through the adoption of resolutions by the Commission. In the consultations which we must carry out before the opening of the Commission session as well as during the period of the session itself, we must identify at least 8–10 of the Member States from the Third World with which we must work to develop common positions in pursuit of our objectives.

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5 “Disappeared Persons” (A/RES/33/173), adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 1978.
182. **Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State**

**Geneva, February 15, 1979, 1553Z**

2571. For Deputy Secretary, Counselor Nimetz, and Assistant Secretaries Maynes, Vest and Derian from Mezvinsky. Subject: (C) Human Rights Commission: Genocide Report.

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Having been in Geneva only a few days for the 35th Human Rights Commission (HRC) session which opened February 12, I have become even more acutely conscious of the serious implications which will flow from the position the U.S. delegation will take when the Report on Genocide, which has been endorsed by the Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities, is considered by the Commission. The agenda item under which this report will arise is scheduled to be taken up by the Commission during the latter half of the week of March 5. I understand that the issue is now being considered in the Department on the basis of the draft position paper prepared in IO and supported by HA. The position paper contains all relevant background details of the simple issue of whether or not the U.S. delegation will publicly state that the Genocide Report should have retained in it an appropriate mention of the massacre of Armenians as having constituted the first instance of genocide in the 20th century. I note that this simple reference does not assign blame for the genocide to any government.

3. Included as a valued member of the U.S. delegation to the 35th session of the HRC is Mr. Set Momjian, a public member designated by the White House. Mr. Momjian, who arrived in Geneva February 13, reports that he has already received numerous queries from Armenian leaders in Europe and in the United States concerning the position the USDel will take. He also tells me that there appeared in last Sunday’s

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, Genocide—Action File. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

2 Not found and not further identified.

3 In telegram 2775 from Geneva, February 20, the Mission noted: “USDel has also been informally informed that delegations of Cyprus, France, Uruguay, Austria, and the USSR represented on the Commission as well as observer delegations from Greece and Argentina are planning to make statements in support of the position that mention of the Armenian massacres as a form of genocide should have been included in the Special Rapporteur’s report.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790078–1091)

In telegram 45276 to Geneva, February 24, the Department provided Mezvinsky with the text of a statement for use during the HRC deliberations. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, Genocide—Action File)
issue of the “Washington Post” a full page appeal addressed to members of the U.S. delegation to the Human Rights Commission regarding this issue. Mr. Momjian informs me that over 10,000 letters have been sent to the White House on the issue and that congressional interest in it is building up to a high point. Statements in support of the Armenian position are expected to be issued soon by a number of NGO’s in Europe. Other delegations here in Geneva are expressing an interest in the matter.

4. Needless to say, I strongly support the position advocated in the draft position paper prepared in IO, and I am firmly convinced that the position represents the absolute minimum which the USDel should follow if we are to assume a credible posture in a discussion in the Human Rights Commission of the question of genocide. This is a basic human rights issue which still besets the 20th century world and it is one which cannot be usefully discussed without reference to factual situations as they have occurred during this century.

5. I urge that a decision be made soon and that the USDel be fully and promptly informed of that decision as well as of all relevant developments on this issue, such as congressional interest and letter writing and publicity campaigns. Mr. Momjian has expressed to me his special personal concern that the U.S. position be decided soon. Obviously, his future role on this delegation will hinge upon the nature of the decision which is to be made.

Vanden Huevel

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4 The full-page advertisement, paid for by the Armenian National Committee and Armenian Rights Council, appeared in the February 11, 1979 issue of The Washington Post on page L–4. The advertisement noted that Paragraph 30 of the Special Rapporteur’s report had been omitted and called upon the President to “exercise the power of your office to demand the rejection of the United Nations Human Rights Commission’s Report on Genocide until Paragraph 30 is reinstated.”
Memorandum From Michele Bova of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to John Spiegel of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

Washington, March 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Suggestions for Improving the Procedures of the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance

Mr. Vest’s recent memo reiterates some of the problems and frustrations faced by your office, our bureau and all those involved in the interagency review process of human rights and foreign assistance. The problems are not new. Some of them can probably never be resolved satisfactorily. Others can. From the perspective of someone who has been dealing with this process since its inception and who will soon be leaving for another tour, I would like to offer some frank suggestions on what can be done and some observations on how to minimize dissatisfactions with what will always be a less than perfect procedure.

This is not an official memo. I have not cleared it with anyone and it is not in the “system”. The principals in my own bureau would probably not agree with some of my points. I offer it as the last salvo of a departing bureaucrat who has seen much progress in implementing a new, controversial and broad reaching policy but who is also disappointed that so much of what has been done depends on the initiatives of individuals rather than the existence of institutionalized procedures or the inadequacy of those which have been established. This lack is not fair to busy men like Mr. Christopher and it is not good for the human rights policy.

If you conclude that some of the suggestions which follow should be implemented, I believe the most effective way to achieve this end would be for Mr. Christopher to direct that they be done. If you would like a more democratic approach to be followed I suggest that an ad hoc group be called which would be tasked with preparing a paper on methods of improving current procedures. Such a paper should represent the consensus of the group and should not take the form of yet another Solomon’s choice options memorandum. The attached list of sug-

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, EAID IAGHR 1979. Confidential. A handwritten notation in the right-hand corner of the first page reads: “BB [Barbara Bowie]—FYI (This was never distributed beyond MS [Mark Schneider] + John Spiegel). Michele.”

2 Not found and not further identified.
gestions, or a modified version thereof, could serve as the starting point for discussion.

One last observation is that we have a sound procedural basis on which to build—i.e. the Working Group, the Inter-Agency Group, and the close consultation and information transfer process already established with Treasury and A.I.D.

Suggestions for Improving the Procedures of the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance

— The Working Group should identify upcoming projects at least two months before action is due to be taken to implement them. (In the case of MDB projects this will result in some inefficiencies as projects identified even this close to Board action will sometimes slip or be re-structured).

— The State Department should develop action plans on a quarterly basis which include current assessments of the human rights situation and set forth recommendations on appropriate action on all upcoming assistance for the following quarter. Such action recommendations will be based on an analysis of tactical and legal considerations, both bilateral and global. Action plans should be prepared on all countries to which the U.S. has opposed assistance over the past two years as well as those countries which have come up consistently for review by the Inter-Agency Group for the Word Committee.

— The Inter-Agency Group should review projects identified by the Working Group in the context of the State Department’s Action Plans. In the case of MDB projects, the group will make a recommendation on appropriate USG action, at least one full week in advance of Bank Board consideration.

— In cases where dates for project consideration by MDB Boards slip into the timeframe of the next quarterly review of the action plan, and if there is no State Department consensus as expressed in the action plan to support the recommendation of the Inter-Agency Group, the Working Group shall re-submit the project for Inter-Agency review in accordance with the above delineated time constraints. Other agencies participating in the Working Group can also recommend re-submission to the Inter-Agency Group.

— In those few cases where major and essential changes occur in the human rights situation in a country prior to Bank Board consider-

3 The countries involved are: Argentina, Central African Empire, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Korea, Laos, Mozambique, Paraguay, Philippines, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen (PDR), Nicaragua, Haiti, Afghanistan, Zaire, Romania. [Footnote in the original.]

4 Presumably Bova is referring to the Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance; the phrase “for the Word Committee,” is an error.
ation, if a Group member believes that the decision reached is no longer justified, that Group member shall initiate an action memorandum, and clear it with all interested Group members. This memorandum must reach the Deputy Secretary at least one full week and preferably two weeks before Bank Board action.

—A.I.D. or Treasury\(^5\) will be designated to recommend whether a project meets BHN criteria in time for this determination to be included on the agenda of the Inter-Agency Group.

—The BHN determination will be based on information available at the time. Treasury will cooperate by obtaining information from bank staffs if necessary. (This will have the added spin-off of sensitizing the Banks to the USG interest in questions of equitable development and greater attention to meeting basic human needs, a stated goal of Treasury in its policy speeches and reports to the Congress. If, however, Treasury wishes to minimize the need of going directly to Bank staffs, an alternative would be to have the Banks submit final project papers to all Executive Directors at least four weeks prior to Board consideration. Currently, there is a ten working day rule in the World Bank and the IDB. Often lesser lead time is available in the ADB and we usually can’t get information in the AFDF until the last minute).

—In the absence of sufficient data to support the conclusion that a project meets the BHN exception provided in the law, the recommendation of the designated agency (A.I.D. or Treasury) will be that the BHN exception does not apply. Such a project will be considered by the Inter-Agency Group as if it were a non-BHN project.

\(^5\) A.I.D. is bureaucratically the most appropriate agency to review projects on BHN grounds. It has the most expertise in this area and it is a less interested party than Treasury. If Treasury was tasked with the responsibility of making BHN recommendations on all controversial projects, however, it can be assumed that, since Treasury may have to defend such determinations before Congress when it goes up for MDB appropriations, it will be judicious in its application of BHN criteria. [Footnote in the original.]
184. Telegram From the Mission at Geneva to the Department of State

Geneva, March 17, 1979, 1225Z

4619. Subject: (C) Human Rights Commission—35th Session Wrap-up.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: In comparison with sessions of the past few years, this session was more confrontational and political, but it must be judged against the background of unsettling events occurring simultaneously in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. The Arab group became more militant, the Non-Aligned wanted to avoid an airing of the Southeast Asian situation, and the Africans remained silent as one of their worst human rights violators, Uganda, was invaded by a neighbor. From our perspective, a larger number of cases were handled under the confidential 1503 procedures, with Equatorial Guinea later being discussed publicly. Progress was made on the drafting of legal instruments such as the torture convention, draft declaration on religious intolerance, and a good airing by many countries of the Genocide Report took place. Helsinki monitors were specifically mentioned by name, and countries were encouraged to set up national institutions dealing with human rights. Negative aspects of the Commission’s work were the sad spectacle of cutting off debate on flagrant human rights violations in Cambodia, and the disheartening failure that no action was taken on missing persons and on the mass exodus of refugees. The consideration of overall analysis of human rights in the UN system led to adoption of a text which will hopefully strengthen the UN human rights sector and promote the objectives as the establishment of the post of High Commissioner. End summary.

3. General overview: The first two weeks of the Commission session saw more aggressive actions by Arab members on Middle East issues than in the past and a less polemical treatment of Southern Africa issues. In the succeeding three weeks the atmosphere heated up considerably as the Commission went into confidential session to deal with violations in individual countries under the 1503 procedures. The confidential sessions were followed by a final week of widespread name calling as most of the political conflicts of the moment, and some from the past, were aired and reflected in resolutions. At mid-session the Latin states seemed to be suffering the heaviest criticism and were

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, PORG 1979 35th UNHCR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to USUN.
the object of the majority of resolutions, mainly produced by Cuba. The Latin group, however, eventually began to assert itself and became active in protecting its own. Treatment of human rights cases under 1503 produced some progress on several cases and at least one precedent setting action, the decision to remove the case of Equatorial Guinea from the confidential proceedings and deal with it in public session.

4. The Commission made progress on the drafting of the legal instruments on torture and began unenthusiastically to work on a convention on the rights of the child. The West achieved some satisfaction on the drafting of a declaration on religious intolerance by forcing to a vote over strong Soviet objections the texts of the first three articles. And the Commission’s consideration of economic, social and cultural rights centered on a discussion of the right to development, a concept which the Commission referred to governments for further comment. The majority of Western, and some developing countries such as Brazil expressed uncertainty over the need to establish new “rights” but indicated they were prepared to take constructive approach. Resolutions on the overall analysis of human rights in the UN, national institutions, and the Human Rights Yearbook were also adopted.

5. One of the most frustrating aspects of the session was the failure of the Commission to take any action on Cambodia. The procedural maneuvers of this issue left everyone a loser. The Non-Aligned pushed through a motion to adjourn debate and take no action concerning the report on Cambodia, even before the debate had begun. The West objected vehemently to this move, but were overruled at the time. This imposition of a gag rule made some delegates from all groups uneasy. The silencing of the debate proved shortlived. The Chairman later allowed the representatives from Democratic Kampuchea, China, and Vietnam to speak, thus opening the way for a full exchange of insults among those three plus the USSR, Mongolia and Bulgaria. Two additional disappointments were: (1) the failure of the Canadian initiative on the causes of mass exodus, which was withdrawn in order to prevent it from being distorted with Syrian amendments, focussing the resolution on the Palestinian question, and (2) the initiative on disappeared persons which was deferred until next year. The Canadians decided to opt for deferral rather than accept a watered down result.

6. The discussion of the Report on Genocide involved the participation of a significant number of delegations speaking out in support of the original par. 30 relating to Armenian massacres. The decision ended with a statement by the Chairman of the HRC endorsing our ob-

\[\text{2} \text{ See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 182. In telegram 4442 from Geneva, March 14, the Mission indicated that Mezvinsky had spoken in favor of the reinstatement of paragraph 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790118–0129)\]
jective of securing a reexamination by the Special Rapporteur of his omission of para. 30.³

7. Political climate: A mood of political confrontation took root early in the session as the Arab group ran rough-shod over the procedures during the first day of debate on the question of the occupied territories by pushing to a vote a telegram directed against the Government of Israel. This was in spite of objections by Western and even some Latin delegates that they had not had time to consider the text. In the third week of the session as the confidential meetings on the particular countries got under way, political hostilities greatly increased. The Latin group felt suddenly betrayed and became temporarily traumatized at what they considered the failure of other groups, particularly the African group, to implement the same standards of objectivity and universality which certain Latin delegations were trying to employ. The Ambassador of Colombia openly expressed his disgust with the African delegation and the socialist bloc countries for protecting their own region and their own political self-interests, thereby preventing strong action in the case of Ethiopia, all the while pretending to take an objective stand and support firm action against Paraguay and Uruguay. In response to what he considered the double-standard, the Colombian Ambassador announced that he would no longer serve as a member of working group on communications. At the same time, the Cubans were tabling drafts for public debate on the case of Nicaragua and Guatemala, further convincing the Latins that they were the only vulnerable group for attack. Some Latins complained to us that the African group lines up with the socialist bloc for self protection against Western demands for investigation of cases such as Ethiopia while the Latins are left with no protector. However, the Latins, led by Panama, Colombia and Peru, eventually became more active and achieved what they considered more balanced results on Latin country cases. The case of Argentina is somewhat different as they continue to succeed in preventing action on violations, by seeking the help of the most hardline, non-aligned countries. The Argentine counter-amendments on disappeared persons included Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Yugoslavia as co-sponsors.

8. The highly politicized atmosphere of this session resulted in the Commission moving away from exclusive consideration of Chile,

³ In telegram 5694 from Geneva, April 3, the Mission reported that Van Boven had sent a letter to the Special Rapporteur, asking him to reinsert the text of paragraph 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790153–0262) Telegram 9134 from Geneva, May 30, noted that Van Boven had yet to receive any response from the Special Rapporteur, despite the fact that Van Boven had sent two additional letters requesting that the Rapporteur review the Genocide Report. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790247–1117)
South Africa and Israel. As previously noted, the US brought up specific cases in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, as well as mentioned problems in other parts of the world. The US was in turn criticized for our treatment of the American Indians.

9. With the present atmosphere fostering political confrontation and with the Economic and Social Council likely to expand the Commission from 32 to 43 members, we should begin early charting our course and adapting our style accordingly.

Vanden Heuvel

185. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 20, 1979

SUBJECT
Human Rights Reports

The third annual volume of public human rights reports recently was submitted to the Congress. These reports, mandated under Sections 502B and 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, have improved each year in thoroughness and specificity.

Debate over the costs and benefits of these reports has continued since the previous Administration sought to maintain them on a confidential basis and was rebuffed by the Congress.

The following benefits flow from the preparation and submission of these public reports.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Country Reports and General Information, Lot 82D274, Human Rights Reports. Limited Official Use. Sent through Christopher, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Schneider and concurred in by Jennone Walker. Attached but not printed is a March 9 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski transmitting HA’s undated report on official country reactions to the 1978 country reports. According to the March 5 NSC Global Issues Cluster’s evening report, Tuchman Matthews had requested that the Department prepare such a report on country reactions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 1–3/79)
First, the Department’s view on current human rights practices of foreign assistance recipients does provide the Congress with data to evaluate our budget requests.

Second, the preparation of the report stimulates within the Department a disciplined and regular fact-finding and analysis process which might not otherwise be present.

Third, the reports enumerate human rights practices in considerable detail, communicating to those governments our concerns with a degree of specificity which generally is lacking in bilateral consultations. Also, by being mandated by law, some of the onus for raising these specific abuses is removed from the executive branch.

Fourth, the publication of the reports at times permits information about the human rights conditions to make its way into the host country’s media encouraging human rights constituencies.

Fifth, the reports themselves provide an impetus for bilateral discussions with host governments concerning the specific abuses cited.

Sixth, the American public is better informed regarding these conditions as a result of the publication of the reports.

Finally, the reports have come to symbolize the continuing importance of human rights concerns to our foreign policy decision-making. Any Administration effort to see them removed as a requirement would be read as a lessening of that concern.

With regard to costs, the initial dire predictions of irreparable harm have not been realized. Nevertheless, the following disadvantages have been argued to exist.

First, the preparation of the reports involves a considerable expenditure of time and resources, at embassies, within regional bureaus and most particularly, within our Bureau.

Second, by limiting the countries covered to those receiving aid, as specified by statute, many countries with poor human rights records, particularly the eastern bloc governments, are not covered.

Third, we cannot control the timing of the public release of the reports and therefore the publication of the reports can conflict either with the timing of other bilateral pursuits or with the timing of the human rights strategy itself in a particular country.

Finally, the public release of the reports produces some friction in bilateral relations with some countries although the attached summary of host country reactions to this year’s submission demonstrates that they are becoming accustomed to this mid-winter ritual. It is noteworthy that all but one of the countries which initially stated they could not participate in assistance programs if reports were to be submitted on them have reversed that position.

Modifications which have been suggested include the following:
First, having such reports prepared by an independent international clearinghouse. No such international, non-governmental institution now exists. Also, U.S. human rights non-governmental organizations generally oppose removing the Department from involvement in the report preparation.

Second, altering the countries covered in the reports. A proposal to expand the list to cover all countries was rejected by the Congress last year but remains under discussion. Another alternative is for the Congressional committees to submit a list of specific countries to be covered, whether or not they receive aid. This proposal presumably would reduce the overall number of reports, omitting mini-states and countries without serious human rights problems but including many, if not all, of the communist countries.

Third, altering the timing of the reports. One proposal is for requests to be prepared on a biennial basis with annual updates on particular countries dependent on congressional requests. A second suggestion has been to have the reports prepared and submitted earlier so that they do not appear on the eve of the UN Human Rights Commission annual meetings. Another view is that flexibility in the timing of submission could be provided so that the Department would have a time period of several months in which to file the reports.

HA is following closely the hearings on the reports and our policy being conducted by Representative Bonker. Although we are not presently of the view that legislative changes are essential, we will be examining further the implications of these possible modifications and any conclusions reached by the Bonker Subcommittee.

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2 Reference is to Representative Don Bonker (D–Washington), Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
186. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State (Shulman)¹

Washington, June 8, 1979

SUBJECT

CSCE, Human Rights and the Summit

I have reviewed the talking points paper on these subjects for the Summit.² I fear if the President does not approach the human rights issue more straightforwardly, he will look weak in the eyes of the Soviets and will find it harder rather than easier to manage a sustained relationship,³ especially in so far as CSCE is concerned. Moreover, you should not underestimate the public impact of factors related to CSCE—including human rights and military security—both for important domestic groups and abroad.

The President came into office with human rights as the “soul” of his foreign policy. He has sent us all out to pursue it vigorously. If, in his one chance in four years to talk to the Soviet leadership personally, he does not mention it officially, he will demonstrate inconsistency and give the Soviets the impression that he lacks the courage of his convictions.⁴ I do not want the President to moralize or launch a propaganda attack against the foundations of the Soviet system. I do believe, however, that the President should in a plenary session, with others present, offer a non-defensive explanation of his human rights policy which ties it to a balanced approach to CSCE,⁵ including improved im-
plementation and enhanced dialogue before the Madrid meeting. If he merely expresses a few generalities privately to Brezhnev, it would seem apologetic and may be worse than not mentioning these subjects at all.

As far as the talking points themselves are concerned, I would favor an effort to explain our approach simply and in an intellectually honest way. I think the points included in the background paper on CSCE, if combined with elements in the background paper on human rights, would be appropriate. In any event, I believe strongly that you should delete the peculiar statement that human rights are “internal matters” which is contained in the summary talking points. It is our official position that matters involving implementation of international agreements like UN Covenants and the Helsinki Final Act are legitimate for discussion between states.

Concerning human rights, I think the reference to the four freedoms and jointly fighting fascism is good and I would suggest retaining it. I would also find a way to use the following contingency points, which I have altered somewhat:

—U.S. human rights policy is based on our commitment to international standards, including the joint pledges our two countries have made in the Helsinki Final Act. It is necessary and proper for one signatory of that politically and morally binding document to raise with another signatory its concern about the implementation of all elements of that agreement.

—In so doing, we are not seeking unilateral advantage from our human rights policy. There is great domestic U.S. interest in human rights throughout the world, including our own country. This attitude is based on real concern and on our belief that, to be lasting, détente must involve improvements in the spiritual and material lives, as well as the security, of ordinary people. Within the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, progress on human rights clearly strengthens détente.

Post Script: There is a section on Working Conditions for U.S. Journalists which appears too positive about Soviet behavior. I believe in

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6 The CSCE Review Conference was scheduled to take place in Madrid in November 1980.
7 The June 1979 briefing papers on CSCE and human rights are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos from WC to Offices/Bureaus—1979.
8 The talking point reads: “U.S. human rights policy has a long historical background that includes the Four Freedoms, for which we fought alongside the Soviets against the Nazis, and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” (Briefing Paper, “Human Rights”; ibid.)
9 The Working Conditions for U.S. Journalists section of the talking points paper noted “improvements in this area” since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. (Ibid.)
the carrot more than the stick, but I think it is just not right to “welcome” the improvements in this field when the period since Helsinki has seen, inter alia, legal action against journalists, backsliding in the GDR, and allegations that journalists have been poisoned and harassed.

187. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher

Washington, June 13, 1979

The Non-Governmental Community’s Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Human Rights Policy

In a series of discussions by Roberta Cohen of HA with leading human rights organizations, the following perceptions and recommendations emerged. The groups included: Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International League for Human Rights, Freedom House, the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, the UNA–USA, the Washington International Human Rights Law Group, Internet, the National Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches, the B’nai B’rith International, the United States Catholic Conference, the American Jewish Committee, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Council of Hemispheric Affairs, the American Association of Publishers, and Khronika Press. Without an attempt to screen, the following are their views:

I. Perceptions: NGO’s, while strongly supportive of the policy and the establishment and activities of the Human Rights Bureau, are deeply disturbed by what they perceive as the policy’s declining visibility. The following was cited as evidence of a clear backing away from strong human rights advocacy:

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, SHUM—NGO 1979 Programs With USG. No classification marking. Drafted by Roberta Cohen on June 14 and concurred in by Schneider and Salmon. Tarnoff initialed the memorandum. Cohen sent a more detailed version of the memorandum to Schneider under cover of a May 18 memorandum. (Ibid.) Christopher was acting for Vance, who accompanied the President to the Vienna summit.
—The failure of the Executive Branch to strongly work for the ratification of the Genocide Convention, International Covenants and other human rights agreements.

—The uneven application of the policy. When security or economic interests are involved, human rights are ignored.

—The absence of anyone in the White House or National Security Council strongly supportive of human rights.

—The continued insensitivity to and lack of knowledge about human rights by many foreign service officers here and abroad.

—Diminishing U.S. pressure on major violators, in particular South Korea, Argentina, Indonesia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Africa, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Rhodesia (Freedom House excepted on Rhodesia).

II. Recommendations: Because the Executive Branch is viewed as having passed through its "human rights phase," "triumphs" were said to be needed to demonstrate the importance of the policy and to make clear that it was not on the wane but on a new plateau.

The triumph that virtually all NGO’s recommended was ratification of the human rights treaties. Specifically, NGO’s urged intensive Executive Branch "lobbying" with the Senate to ensure prompt passage of the Genocide Convention and recommended that the Secretary formally request the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings on the Covenants.

Other recommendations were:

—A major speech by a high-level USG official (Christopher, Vance, Brzezinski, or Carter) realistically setting forth the future direction of the policy and its accomplishments and setbacks to date.

—The appointment of a human rights advocate to the White House and National Security Council.

—The enlargement of the Human Rights Bureau to enable its adequate handling of the enormous task before it.

—A massive foreign service education program aimed at institutionalizing the teaching of human rights as a regular feature of foreign service training.

—A vigorous effort to enlist Congressional support for human rights issues.

—Provision of strong support and encouragement to countries with good human rights records and those in which major advances have occurred.

—The clear reflection in U.S. aid patterns of an alliance with democratic nations or those in which such processes are developing.

—The re-formulation of the human rights policy to include: a) Greater attention to the promotion of civil and political liberties and
democratic institutions. (The policy to date, it was noted, had been implemented with prime focus on first category rights); b) A clearer statement of the correlation, or lack of, between economic and social and civil and political rights and how U.S. policy could promote both. (It was noted that countries which respected civil and political liberties did not necessarily promote economic and social rights); c) An evaluation of U.S. obligations under the proposed New International Economic Order; d) A clear statement on how U.S. military sales and aid impacted on human rights; and e) A clear definition of the kinds of police equipment the U.S. was sending abroad and how this impacted on human rights.

—The maintenance of a tough human rights stance toward major violators, in particular, Argentina and Nicaragua (where the USG is perceived as having backed down), the Philippines, South Korea (where the President’s forthcoming visit was strongly criticized, particularly in the absence of any known commitments by the South Korean Government to improve its record prior to or in conjunction with the visit), South Africa, El Salvador, Guatemala, Rhodesia and Indonesia. In the case of the USSR and CSCE, the following recommendations were made: the designation at an early stage of an Ambassador and a task force for Madrid to give focus to the forthcoming meeting; the inclusion of human rights questions on the summit agenda; the undertaking of efforts to improve phone and mail communication with the USSR; a review of the programs broadcast by Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America to ensure their adequate reflection of human rights concerns; and the adoption by the U.S. Embassy of a more open attitude toward contacts with unofficial Soviets.

—At the UN, the appointment of an individual of stature and expertise to represent the U.S. at the UN Human Rights Commission and other human rights bodies; and a more responsive position on Southern Africa, economic rights and the human rights implications of the NIEO.

—The revision of immigration policies to make them less restrictive geographically and more responsive in political asylum cases. In addition, the facilitation of the granting of visas to communist party members for visits.

—More outreach: NGO’s requested that the Department inform them more quickly about changes in human rights conditions and con-

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2 See footnote 3, Document 94.
3 Following the Tokyo Economic Summit, the President was scheduled to fly to Seoul, South Korea, to meet with President Park and Prime Minister Choi. The visit took place June 29–July 1.
4 See footnote 6, Document 186.
sult them more frequently during “the process of making a decision.” They in particular requested to be informed about pending decisions in the Christopher Committee or other fora (where private business and foreign government pressures come into play) so that their views can be considered.

188. Paper Prepared by Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, undated

HUMAN RIGHTS

I have been holding this horse for you only since Jessica’s departure; hence, I have not been deeply involved in a number of aspects of it—substantive or procedural. It is very important that you get together soon with Jessica and have her fill you in. I do have a number of observations to make however; perhaps you will find some of them mildly interesting.

Human rights is probably the main success story of this administration’s foreign policy, at least in a long-term historical view. We have developed a policy in which we can take pride. We have made human rights an issue of international standing. We have had a definite beneficial impact on the lives of thousands of people throughout the world. And we have created a basis for mutual respect with leaders such as Morarji Desai, Julius Nyerere and others who were alienated from the

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 16, Human Rights: 7/78–7/80. Confidential. In a July 3 memorandum, Brzezinski asked Thornton to prepare a “comprehensive memorandum” from Brzezinski to Bloomfield outlining Bloomfield’s new duties and responsibilities. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 59, Administration’s Policy: NSC: 1979) Thornton sent a copy of this paper to Brzezinski under a July 11 covering memorandum, indicating that he had prepared it for Bloomfield per Brzezinski’s request. According to the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s July 18 evening report, Thornton had given Bloomfield “an extraordinarily helpful briefing on the human rights and UN portfolios” that day. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4–8/79)

2 Tuchman Mathews left the NSC Staff in June. Bloomfield then assumed responsibility for human rights issues within the Global Issues Cluster. In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s August 7 evening report, Bloomfield described his press contacts for that day: “Again, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, of the Washington Post, but in her kindly capacity of passer-on of the baton.” (Ibid.)
previous administration. Most important, perhaps, we have stuck with the policy. The President continues to support it strongly (more so than many of his would-be advisers) and the administration in general has not gotten too “bored” with the issue.

Clearly, not all is roses. There are quixotic aspects to the policy and quixotic people associated with it. There has been some misdirection of our efforts. And, of course, there are many areas that we simply cannot affect.

Sometimes the quixotic elements are positive. Our single-minded voting against loans to HR violators in the IFIs has no impact on the loans since they are approved anyway. It is important, however, that we portray a picture of consistency as part of our overall campaign.

You are going to have to risk looking quixotic yourself, if you are going to do this job adequately. The human rights portfolio is an adversarial one. Your geographic colleagues will often have good political reasons not to push human rights too hard. Don’t let them get away with it. Sometimes you will have to take fairly extreme positions just to force a reasonable compromise. Your function (and this is true of non-proliferation as well) is to keep your teeth firmly dug into others’ heels. Otherwise you will be disregarded—even by people who are at least as warm-hearted as you, but who are faced with a different set of issues. And not all of them are quite that warm-hearted. There are plenty of people in State—and not only there—who consider human rights a misguided effort and play along with it only to the minimum extent necessary to humor a President who “doesn’t understand” the realities of international politics. Kissinger lives.

A major problem at the beginning of the administration was the inability of some to understand that there are different categories of human rights; that there are differences among torture, lack of free press, and inadequate access to pure water. Fairly early on, we were able to get the theoretical distinction accepted, and not too long thereafter, even Patt Derian was brought around to the belief that some violations had priority over others. It is an issue that needs to be watched constantly, however, for there are still many who simply aggregate all human rights listed in the UN declaration.

An unfortunate example (albeit one that the Administration is not responsible for) is our concentration on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. There are many worse things that happen to people in the Soviet Union than (a) being Jews and (b) having to stay there. Many much worse things happen to people outside the Soviet Union. Obviously Jewish emigration is a legitimate human rights issue. It should not, however, enjoy the priority that it gets.

An example of ineffectiveness is not hard to find. We are unable to do anything about Equatorial Guinea and never did much about Pol
Pot or Amin, although there may have been some glimmering in the latter case. The point here is that we are able to do less about countries that (a) receive no aid or other benefits from the US and/or (b) are ruthless enough to keep outsiders from finding out what is going on in their countries. Clearly Chile and Korea are less egregious offenders than Kampuchea or Eq. Guinea. But you would never know it by reading the international press or reviewing the list of US actions taken. Unfortunately, there is no ready answer to this. Nor, for that matter, to the unwillingness of LDCs to cast stones at others’ glass houses. We just have to keep plugging away.

Another weakness of the policy is that we find it much easier to punish than to reward. I know, offhand, of no case where a country has unambiguously gotten a larger aid program because it performed well on human rights. On the other hand, the generosity shown to Sri Lanka and India is not unrelated to human rights considerations. Some creative thinking about this would be very useful—assuming, of course, that we will have any money available! Another scarce but extremely important resource in this regard is Presidential attention.

About the only substantive things that I have gotten involved in at all relate to the two Presidential trips that occurred in the past month—the Vienna Summit and Korea. In both of these cases the bureaucracy was prodded to take adequate note of human rights considerations (Mark Schneider of Derian’s staff is excellent at this) and in both cases the President performed admirably, probably going beyond what anybody expected of him. This points up one thing that you should follow carefully—whenever the President is meeting with somebody who has a human rights problem, insist on getting a shot at the briefing book and talking points. See that they give the President some tough things to say, if he feels so inclined.

A large volume of work is generated by people who write letters on human rights issues—overwhelmingly Soviet cases. Generally this is handled directly by State with an info copy to us. You will want to monitor this though. Occasionally, especially on Congressionals, an answer from here is more appropriate. Don’t, however, spend too much time on it.

There are some issues that I have not gotten involved with but will concern you. One is the Madrid CSCE conference and our preparations for it. There was a lot of flak about Belgrade and Arthur Goldberg’s performance there. And, of course, the Congressional group is hovering in the wings. Another one is the Moscow Olympics—freedom of access issues, etc. There is a certain amount of file material available on this but, again, get Jessica to brief you.

There are two major operational issues. One is the annual submission of a human rights report to Congress on countries receiving US
aid. There is some attempt afoot to reform this rather dubious undertaking. I will discuss it with you. The second is the Christopher Committee of which you will be a member. It is charged with deciding how we will vote on IFI loans to alleged human rights violators. It is staffed in State and runs generally well, despite the fact that it is one of the more “quixotic” of our undertakings. It seems to meet about every two months.

There are, of course, many country-specific issues. Some of them I have not even gotten involved in myself. To the extent possible, I will fill you in when you get time.

Of all the pieces that I am passing on to you, this is the only one I regret giving up. Use it well.

189. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 16, 1979

Lunch with Henry

I noted that you will be lunching with the former Secretary. I believe you are aware that he has a disturbing tendency, particularly when in foreign lands, to make deprecating comments about our human rights policy. In Argentina, in Brazil, in Europe, and in Korea, his comments have been publicized. More important, they reinforce the belief on the part of foreign leaders that the U.S. human rights policy will depart the scene with this Administration. That message is counter-productive in terms of helping real, live human beings today. It also reflects a lack of awareness of the increased number of statutory constraints which would make it illegal for a subsequent Secretary of State to disregard human rights considerations in the implementation of foreign assistance programs.

Recommendation:

Please bring this subject to his attention.

1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, unlabeled folder. No classification marking.

1. Summary: 1979 Human Rights Country Reports will be required on all UN member countries (other than the U.S.), including by Congressional direction countries that do not receive assistance from the U.S. Government. Reports will also be provided on North Korea, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Taiwan, and Namibia, as well as on all U.S. aid recipient countries whether or not they are UN members (i.e., all those covered by 1978 reports). First drafts (in most cases provided by posts) should be received in Washington during September and October on a schedule to be established by regional bureaus, who will provide supplementary guidance to this cable by septels.

2. The 1978 Country Reports on human rights practices, which covered one hundred and fifteen countries, were a clear advance over those submitted previously. As Deputy Secretary Christopher stated in ref (A), the 1978 reports were “the most balanced and complete set of reports that we have sent to Congress.” The 1978 reports demonstrated increased recognition of the issues involved in advancing human rights and, in most cases, a more complete and objective description of the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790354–1059. Unclassified. Repeated for information to the consulates at Durban, Johannesburg, Kaduna, and Lubumbashi. Drafted by Sieverts; cleared by Derian, Schneider, Vogelgesang, Runyon, Bushnell, Paul Molineaux (M/MO), Cleveland, George Lambrakis (NEA/RA), Zak, Alden Irons (AF/I), Hewitt, John Sylvester (INR), Kenney, and Jennone Walker; approved by Christopher.

2 In telegram 37888 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, February 13, the Department transmitted Christopher’s appreciation for the collective efforts of posts in preparing the 1978 human rights country reports. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790070–1020)

3 In telegram 207310 to all posts, August 16, 1978, the Department communicated Christopher’s desire that posts produce “first rate” country reports on human rights practices for 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780335–0583)

4 The International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 (H.R. 3324; P.L. 96–53; 93 Stat. 359–378), introduced by Zablocki in March and signed into law by the President on August 14, amended certain provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, requiring the Secretary of State to transmit a full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights in countries receiving U.S. foreign assistance. The bill also required reporting on the human rights practices of UN-member nations, even if the nations were not recipients of U.S. foreign assistance. (Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002, p. 60, fn. 84)
human rights situation in the countries covered. (All posts should have copies of the 1978 reports. Any that do not should request them by cable from the Department or from a U.S. Mission closer at hand.)

3. We want the 1979 reports to be as good as posts and the Department can make them. We recognize this imposes a significant work requirement on many posts, and assure all posts in advance that their contributions to this project are essential and appreciated. This will be especially true this year for the countries on whom reports were not submitted in 1978. For those especially, we recommend that posts begin immediately to gather information for the draft reports.

4. The format and presentation of the 1978 reports is applicable to the 1979 reports and should be followed in both form and substance, with changes noted below. In most cases posts can base their 1979 report on the 1978 report as submitted to the Congress. The new reports should recapitulate information from previous reports essential to provide context for the 1979 period, and should concentrate on trends, conditions, and practices in the December 1, 1978 to December 1, 1979 period.

5. The following guidelines refer to general areas in which we would like the 1979 reports strengthened:

A) Introductory section. It is important that this section provide a brief overall human rights description of the country. While avoiding detail, it should provide a capsule assessment of the current overall human rights situation and trends. The country should be described in general terms so that the human rights situation can be seen in the perspective of such factors as the country’s history, political and educational levels, financial resources, judicial institutions, and religious or cultural context. The reader should be able to judge how well the country is doing on human rights in light of available resources and past performance.

B) In discussing political prisoners, posts should distinguish if appropriate between “prisoners of conscience” and those who have been convicted or detained because of politically-motivated acts of violence, and comment on the fairness of treatment and trials of both categories. Any other distinctions posts deem relevant should be included.

C) The existence of discrimination on grounds such as race, language, religion, economic or social class, or national origin should be described as may be relevant.

D) In preparing section 2., posts should draw on AID’s country development strategy statements.

E) We are deleting the reference to freedom of “thought” under section 3.A., since this concept does not lend itself to objective analysis.

F) Women’s rights. This needs to be covered with greater specificity in all reports. We do not wish to create a separate section for this,
so the subject should be covered as appropriate under all headings, and particularly under section 3.C. (see checklist below).

G) Labor rights. Greater attention should be paid to labor, including freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, abolition of forced labor, and the right to equal employment opportunities. This information also should be included under section 3.C.

H) Posts should consult reports on each country by responsible non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the International League of Human Rights; and by appropriate organs of official international organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Commission, the European Human Rights Commission, the International Labor Organization, and UNESCO. These reports should be quoted when that is a good way to make a point. Where there are significant charges in such reports, the charges should be reported, with comments supporting or not supporting the charges as the case may be. Country reports will be compared with NGO and other reports, and we need to be sure our reports take adequate account of what has been said in the other reports. (Country desks will have the reports and will assure posts have them if needed for drafting.)

I) Length. Reports should be concise but long enough to provide thorough coverage of the human rights situation. Final 1978 reports generally were appropriate in length and degree of specificity.

6. In preparation of the 1978 reports, the Deputy Secretary asked posts and regional bureaus to ensure that the reports were “objective, specific and responsive to the headings in the format.” (see ref (B)). Reporting for the 1979 country reports should also display these qualities. Reports must be objective and accurate, even where this may conflict with host government sensitivities. Specificity calls for serious efforts to provide specific factual information. The checklist below is designed to assist drafters in assuring that reports are responsive to the format.

7. The remainder of this telegram is a checklist developed in connection with last year’s reports, which is intended to serve as an aid for the preparation of the 1979 reports. The questions in the checklist vary in their degree of applicability and significance in different countries, but our experience with previous annual reports indicates they are relevant in most cases. In general, the complete report should be responsive to the points in the checklist, either by generalizations or by specific information.

   Begin text checklist:
   Introduction:
—Should provide brief overview of the country’s human rights situation, as well as historical, legal, cultural, religious, political, and other factors to establish adequate perspective. See 5.A above.

Section 1:
Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from:

A. Torture
Is torture prohibited by law, or custom?
—Does it occur? How frequently? What methods are used? Is torture used in interrogation? What are the sources of reports of torture? Are they credible reports?
—If torture does occur, is it authorized by the government? If not authorized, is it condoned? If it occurs without government sanction, what is the government’s response? Is anyone disciplined?

B. Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
—If such treatment occurs, when does it occur? Immediately after arrest? During interrogation? While awaiting trial? During detention after conviction?
—What form does it take?
—Are there summary executions? If so, to what extent?
—Have there been reports of prison officials using such treatment? Are they credible reports? Or police? Does government condone such actions, or does it seek to prevent them.
—What are prison or detention conditions like? Do those held have adequate health care? Is diet adequate? Are they allowed visits from family members? Attorneys of their choice? Are classes of imprisonment used, i.e., between political and ordinary prisoners?
—Does the International Committee of the Red Cross have access to detainees?

C. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment
—Are there political prisoners? (see para. 5.B. above.) How many? If our estimate differs from that of human rights organizations, can we explain this difference?
—Does the government acknowledge holding political prisoners? If it does, how does it justify their detention or imprisonment?
—Does habeas corpus or its equivalent exist? Is it honored in practice?
—Does the law permit “preventive detention?” Are there safeguards on preventive detention? Does it have a fixed term? Can it be extended?
—Are persons arrested and held without charge? How long can they be thus held?
—Are persons held clandestinely?
—Do persons “disappear” for protracted periods?

D. Denial of fair public trial
—Recognizing that legal systems vary, is a right to fair public trial provided for by law? By practice or custom? Is this right honored in practice?
—Are defendants entitled to counsel? Does counsel have free access to defendants? May consultations between defendants and counsel be held in private? Are there incidents of harassment of defense counsel by the government?
—Are defendants made fully aware of the charges brought against them? May they and their lawyers inform themselves of the evidence on which the charges are based?
—Are the courts independent of executive or military control?
—Are there special courts to deal with security or political offenses? If so, do they adhere to the same standards as control the courts considering ordinary offenses?
—Are civilians tried by military courts? If so, under what circumstances? What standards control military courts?
—Have there been summary executions? Who orders or controls them?
—On what basis if any have such practices been justified?

E. Invasion of the home
—Is the sanctity of the home safeguarded by law and/or custom? Is it respected in practice?
—Are judicial warrants required before entering a home? What standards control the issuance of warrants?
—Are there allegations of illegal entry into homes? If so, how frequent are such allegations made? Are responsible officials disciplined for unauthorized entries or are such acts condoned?

Section 2:
Government policies relating to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education
—What is the character of the country’s economy? Rural or urban? Capitalist, socialist, mixed or what? Does it confront special problems?
—What is the distribution of income? Of wealth? Of land? Are there efforts to bring about increased opportunity and equity? Is the tax system progressive or regressive?
—Is property privately owned, and is this right protected?
—Is adequate shelter a significant problem?
—Is health care available? How extensively?
—Is education free? Up to what level? Is it adequate in rural areas? What is the level of literacy?
—Is fulfillment of vital human needs hindered by corruption? If so, what is being done about it?

Section 3:
Respect for civil and political liberties, including:
A. Freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly
—Are these freedoms guaranteed by law or custom and respected in practice?
—Is there censorship? What are the subjects of censorship?
—Are the media—especially the press—subject to control? If the media are government-owned or controlled, are opposition views aired? Is criticism of the government by others permitted? Have journalists been intimidated or imprisoned? Newspapers closed?
—May religion be freely practiced? Are any sects or religions suppressed while others are unimpeded? Is there persecution or harassment of any religious groups? Are any religious groups discriminated against?
—Are there any impediments to assembly? Are certain groups allowed to hold public meetings and not others?
—Are there impediments to the freedom of association? Are particular groups or individuals denied the right to associate? Interest groups, workers, politicians? Limitations on purposes of activities?

B. Freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel and emigration
—Are these freedoms guaranteed by law or custom and respected in practice?
—Is domestic travel circumscribed or controlled? What is the rationale for such control?
—Are limits placed on travel abroad? Or the right to return? What are the reasons for limitations on travel abroad? Do excessive passport fees limit the right to travel abroad? (See answers to State 161057.)

C. Freedom to participate in the political process
—What is the character of the political system? Authoritarian, dictatorial, democratic? Multi-party, two-party, single-party? Are any parties outlawed? Do opposition parties function freely? Have they access to the media? Can they hold public meetings?

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5 In telegram 161057 to all diplomatic and consular posts, June 22, the Department referred to a study that compared American passport fees to those charged by other nations and requested that posts advise the Department concerning passport fees and expiration dates. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790326–0325)
—Is participation in the political system open to all citizens? If so, are there any groups who are denied citizenship? If some groups of citizens are denied the right to participate, what is the basis for this denial?

—What is the status of women? Are they legally equal to men? In practice, do women participate freely in social, economic and political life? Is their participation growing, or do they tend to remain in “traditional” roles? Are there social, cultural or religious factors which inhibit women from playing a larger role? Is there economic discrimination?

—Is there an active trade union movement? Is it granted by law the right to organize, strike, bargain collectively and lobby?

Section 4:
Government attitude and record regarding international and non-governmental investigation of alleged violations of human rights
—What is the government’s record and attitude regarding such investigations?
—If there have been discussions or communications with international or non-governmental human rights groups, what has been the subject and what has been their tenor?
—Has the government permitted investigations by individuals or teams sent from outside? Has it facilitated their work?

Vance

191. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Director of Central Intelligence Turner, and the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, August 21, 1979

SUBJECT
The Soviet Union and Human Rights

Two of the world’s worst human rights violators, Amin of Uganda and Macias of Equatorial Guinea, have recently been overthrown.²


² Amin fled Uganda in April 1979 and Macias was overthrown on August 3.
With their passing, increasing hard evidence is coming available of their vicious human rights performances.

Both of these regimes were heavily supported by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states. The Cubans were particularly deeply involved in Equatorial Guinea.

Now that we will have clear evidence to present, we should make every effort to ensure that this evidence is presented in a context that makes Soviet, Cuban and Eastern European complicity clear. (Complicity need not, of course, be limited to involvement in specific acts; responsibility was incurred by keeping these regimes in power.) The Soviets and others should not be allowed to disassociate themselves from their involvement in these grisly pages of history.

Would you please let me know by 15 September what steps are being taken along the above lines?

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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3 Aaron signed his name above Brzezinski's typed signature.

### 192. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

**Washington, September 17, 1979**

**SUBJECT**

The Soviet Union and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea and Uganda

Your memorandum of August 21, 1979 asked us to review how we might publicize Soviet, Cuban and East European support for the former regimes in Equatorial Guinea and Uganda which violated human rights so grossly. The Department has looked at the evidence

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to/from Tarnoff/Wisner/Perry—1979. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote Tarnoff’s name on the first page. Thornton sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under an October 2 memorandum, indicating that S/P drafted and Vance vetted the Department’s response. (Central Intelligence Agency, CADRE Files, CO3425168)

2 See Document 191.
and has concluded there is no basis for a US effort to pinpoint support by these countries for the two African regimes.³

While the Soviets provided Equatorial Guinea with military equipment and training and the Cubans at one time had as many as 400 advisors in the country (probably half of them military), the Chinese virtually dominated the local market with their goods, built major telecommunications projects and helped train Macias’ National Guard. There is even an unconfirmed report that Chinese advisors helped protect Macias from rebel troops almost up to the very end. For this reason we believe any specific criticism of the Soviet Union and Cuba for helping Macias would also implicate the Chinese. A number of African states, including Nigeria and Cameroon, also maintained friendly relations with Macias and may well be offended by a US campaign on Soviet support for Equatorial Guinea.⁴

Soviet support for Uganda is clearcut (although there was virtually no Cuban involvement).⁵ At the same time, however, a large proportion of Soviet military equipment provided to Uganda was transported through Kenya or by airlift over the Sudan. Amin remains popular in the southern Sudan, his tribal home, and according to a recent unconfirmed report, is in the southern Sudan at the present time. All Uganda’s POL, on which Amin’s regime depended, came through Kenya. The Kenyans maintained friendly relations with Amin almost to the end of his rule and consistently refused to interdict supplies to Uganda until the very end. Moreover, several US business concerns, with US Government approval, were involved in providing equipment and advice to Amin.

Both Kenya and the Sudan are, of course, among the African states most critical of the Soviet Union and of Soviet policy. We believe it would be embarrassing to both countries if their own relations with Amin, broad tolerance of his regime and facilitation of Soviet military supplies through or over their countries were subsequently to be brought to the fore in some way as a result of US efforts to increase international awareness of Soviet support for Amin.⁶

³ An unknown hand placed a parallel line to the right of this paragraph, underlined the last sentence of the paragraph, circled the words “there is no basis,” drew a line from the circled text to the bottom of the memorandum and added the following: “Not correct” and “that on balance it would be counterproductive’ (this would be more accurate formulation).”

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the last sentence of this paragraph.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

⁶ An unknown hand underlined this paragraph.
The East Europeans do not appear to have played a pivotal role in supporting either the Macias or the Amin regime (although the East Germans may have provided some arms to Uganda).

Peter Tarnoff

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7 Seitz signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.

193. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Maynes) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)

Washington, October 4, 1979

SUBJECT

United Nations to Examine United States Ratification Record of International Human Rights Treaties

The United Nations has established a working group to examine the “circumstances” preventing governments from ratifying international human rights treaties, in particular the Genocide Convention, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Racial Discrimination Convention, and various agreements on slavery.

The Secretary-General will request UN member states, which have not ratified these treaties, to inform the UN of the circumstances preventing their ratification. A working group will then examine the replies and consider ways of encouraging and assisting governments to ratify these treaties, including inviting government representatives to meetings with group members.

The resolution establishing the working group and the new procedure is attached. The working group will be composed of five members of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, Genocide—Action File. No classification marking. Drafted by Roberta Cohen.

2 Attached but not printed is a copy of the August 29 draft resolution (E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.716).
and Protection of Minorities, a sub-body of the Commission on Human Rights. The group will meet annually, beginning next summer. The resolution was adopted by the Sub-Commission September 5 and sponsored by Sub-Commission experts from France, Egypt, and Peru (who do not serve as government representatives).

To date, the United States has not ratified any of the treaties listed except the slavery conventions. We therefore can expect to receive a letter from the Secretary-General requesting an explanation, which the working group will examine next summer. We also can expect international and public spot-light on our non-ratification record in a forum where we already have been subjected to considerable embarrassment on this score. However, in the past, our record was predominantly cited in speeches by communist countries and other states seeking to discredit us. In the future, our non-ratification record will be the subject of formal UN examination and by a wide spectrum of states.

In the absence of ratification, the new procedure will tend to make it more difficult to obtain support for the human rights objectives we pursue at the UN.

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194. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, October 22, 1979

Goals and Objectives for the Next Eighteen Months

*Bureaucratic*

—Full participation for HA in the Foreign Policy decision making process. Despite the high priority the President has assigned to human

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, unlabeled folder. Secret. Drafted by Salmon and Derian. The memorandum is a response to a Department-wide effort to prioritize goals during the last 18 months of Vance’s service as Secretary, following Vance’s decision that he would not serve in a possible second Carter administration. In a June 9 memorandum to Vance, Tarnoff and Lake discussed the intellectual framework for such an undertaking. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Goals and Objectives) The memorandum is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
rights in U.S. foreign policy HA is still a very junior partner in the decision making process. We are often excluded entirely.

The rationale in some cases is that HA’s need to know disappears in any crisis and that the issues are now “political”, not human rights. We saw that in the Nicaragua special mission\(^2\) in its most discouraging form. We were routinely cut off from cables, meetings, and discussions. Frequently we are told that our views are “known” and taken into consideration. However, we don’t get to make our case. This is bad for policy. It is bad for our standing in the bureaucracy. It does not serve the President to present him papers so sanitized that there are no real choices in the human rights field. There have been some pluses for him in human rights and some severe criticisms for failures on issues which I believe he never had a chance to consider adequately. Our calling things back or raising issues again after the decisions have been made is handicapping and inefficient. We should participate in the SCC meetings on certain countries; someone should be able to make the case for human rights considerations. The result too often across the board is: “The President has decided”, when we have no sense of the human rights issue being raised and argued. Correcting this situation will require your and Mr. Christopher’s attention. It will also necessitate a more active effort by HA to overcome still formidable bureaucratic resistance to the policy within the Department and the Foreign Service.

—Adequate Staffing

From the outset HA has been hampered by too few slots and inadequate staffing. The Foreign Service personnel system has failed to produce the quality officers we require to staff our positions. Consequently our officers have been enourmously overburdened. The system is exceptionally slow in replacing officers who have completed their tours in HA. Our AF officer\(^3\) left in late June and we do not have a replacement even now. Our Security Assistance/PM officer left in January and was replaced six and a half months later.\(^4\) Our country reports officer\(^5\)

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\(^3\) Reference is to Robert Maxim.

\(^4\) Reference is to Ellis “Ollie” Jones, III. Robert Jacobs had replaced Jones by the fall of 1979.

\(^5\) Reference is to Frank A. Sieverts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Coordinator for POW/MIA Matters, who subsequently assumed additional responsibilities as the Director for Country Reports during 1979.
was on overcomplement and we didn’t get a slot for that job for many months. We are still operating with an overcomplement officer for the second country reports slot\(^6\) and it took several months for the system to produce an officer. Our asylum officer\(^7\) is said to be the USG’s foremost authority on asylum, but his rank is not commensurate with his duties or skills. He is unspeakably overworked and our only assistance to him is an erratic overcomplement system. We have had to resort to outside hires which have been a source of some criticism. Personnel must be persuaded that HA deserves as much priority in receiving qualified personnel as the geographic bureaus. Service in HA should be recognized. A number of our officers and potential officers have told us that their personnel counselors have advised them not to come to work in HA. Our officers have received good onward assignments although I was disappointed at the way HA fared in the recent promotion list.

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**Improved Human Rights Training**

This is necessary for Foreign Service officers and later for other USG officers with foreign affairs responsibilities. There has been an unfortunate tendency for some officers to disparage the human rights policy and occasionally HA in their official and unofficial contacts.

If we are taken seriously, have the quality personnel needed to staff our positions and can attenuate bureaucratic resistance to the policy, we can make more progress toward achieving our substantive goals. These are:

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**—Human Rights Strategy Papers for Problem Countries.** These should be the product of HA and Regional Bureau collaboration.

**—Senate Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties.** HA, H and Department principals should work to ensure their favorable consideration. U.S. failure to ratify the Genocide Convention, International Covenants, Racial Discrimination Convention and American Convention seriously impairs our credibility in the human rights areas.

**—Development of a mechanism to permit effective response to complaints about U.S. domestic human rights violations.** This will require close coordination between HA, IO and the Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Commission. We might consider the creation of an interagency group along the lines of the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance.

**—Closer cooperation with the NSC to coordinate the activities of and promote acceptance by domestic agencies of the human rights policy.**

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\(^6\) Reference is to the Deputy Director for Country Reports Kenneth Rogers.

\(^7\) Reference is to Lawrence L. Arthur.
—A more creative human rights approach at the United Nations including a more forthcoming position on apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa. We need a major review of our human rights policy towards South Africa in which HA, IO, AF, and S/P would participate. We must avoid a repeat of the incomprehensible decision to support seating Pol Pot’s representative.8

—Fuller integration of human rights considerations in our economic decision making (Ex-Im, CCC, etc.)

—A re-examination of our arms transfer policy with special attention to the human rights factor. Restructuring of the Arms Export Control Board (AECB) so that participants express their bureau or agency views, make proposals, vote on them and provide a record of votes and arguments to the decision makers. It is now a rubber stamp operation. There is no logical forum for all policy points to be openly discussed and considered.

—Closely related to the study of arms transfers is a special study of how to promote human rights most effectively in violating countries with which we have a security relationship (e.g., Korea, Philippines. Our record here is poor). This could be independent of the country strategy papers or incorporated in them.

—OAS. Full funding of the Inter-American Court.

—CSCE. Systematic preparation for the Madrid Review Conference requires the immediate appointment of a full-time Ambassador and staff to coordinate the process. It also will require your and Mr. Christopher’s attention to the problem of how we deal with the CSCE Commission.

—Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. Notification time between decisions and votes is variably inadequate, not providing time for explaining our position, or garnering the support of like minded states. The inevitable conclusion is that we are not serious about this human rights tool.

Overview

We have done more in human rights than any other administration and have some positive results to show for the policy. We have done less than we could or should have. Our policy is erratic and confusing. We send a mixed message; in the past we sent a consistent one, (e.g., it’s business as usual), so a mixed message is an improvement. But we should be striving for a consistent message. We could achieve that

goal. I don’t see the will to do it or to do more than coast along. I believe the perception that the President does not support the policy is wrong. I recognize that the NSC frequently is an obstacle. We could do a better job in making the case for human rights in our policy discussions with the NSC, as well as with the President, if HA were more directly involved. During this campaign, we need to help the President avoid editorials like Saturday’s (October 20) on Korea9 by advocating and explaining the human rights opportunities as well as costs.


195. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)1

Washington, October 23, 1979

SUBJECT
Christopher’s Priorities Meeting with Maynes

[Omitted here is a synopsis of Christopher’s meeting with Maynes.]

SUBJECT
Christopher’s Priorities Lunch with Derian

I am sorry they didn’t have a doggie bag for the dessert, it was fattening.2 Chris got started by asking the first question on our discussion list on page 3 and never really got beyond that, although the essential issues involved in the second paragraph of page 1 on our memo3 were batted back and forth (with Patt doing most of the batting) for nearly one hour and a half. Chris essentially listened to Patt’s complaints

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 18, Next Seventeen Mos.—Mtgs w A/S. No classification marking. Kreisberg added the following handwritten notation “from Paul” in lieu of a formal “From” line.

2 There is no indication as to when the lunch between Christopher and Derian took place.

3 Attached below.
about Vaky and Holbrooke (Moose is great, the problems in NEA are understandable and Patt sympathized, EUR is unhelpful but not hostile, Jules Katz is actively hostile but totally open in his hostility which Patt finds refreshing). Christopher was quietly resistant to most of Patt’s arguments (a good deal which was explicitly directed against what she and Mike Schneider clearly feel was a reluctance on Chris’s own part to defend HA by giving them access to information on ARA issues). The lunch went on so long, largely I think, because Chris wanted to let Patt get her frustrations off her chest. (At one point in describing her existential way of getting access to the Secretary, Patt noted that she had had a “quickie” with the Secretary last week—a metaphor I would not have urged her to repeat!) It is conceivable that Chris may do something about Patt’s concerns that HA have more access to NODIS and that its views be solicited more actively on policy issues, but I doubt it. He is clearly sensitive to the confrontational and ideological approach HA takes, and Patt’s comments at lunch underscored these, although she emphasized her own awareness of broad strategic policy issues such as Korean security several times.

The only really concrete outcome of the lunch was the clearance of the cable\(^4\) you brought in.

**Paul Kreisberg\(^5\)**

**Attachment**

**Action Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^6\)**

Washington, October 23, 1979

**Human Rights Goals and Objectives**

Patt’s memo to you\(^7\) deals with three broad issues:

1. Her belief that human rights considerations (and HA as a bureau) should carry greater weight in foreign policy decisions. She cites the Nicaragua special mission; the decision to support seating Pol Pot’s

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\(^4\) Not further identified.

\(^5\) Kreisberg initialed “PAK” above his typed signature.

\(^6\) No classification marking.

\(^7\) It is possible that Kreisberg meant to refer to the memorandum to Vance from Derian, printed as Document 194. A similar memorandum from Derian to Christopher has not been found.
representative at the UN; and South Korean policy as examples of instances when HA was cut out of the decision-making process.

We believe she is right that there is a widespread perception in the Department that the emphasis given earlier to human rights has gradually taken a backseat in Administration concerns to security factors, and therefore that neither human rights considerations nor HA need be given as much attention as formerly. This has led a number of Bureaus to downplay human rights issues and may have increased the sense of an adversarial relationship between HA and the rest of the Department on both sides of the issues. The key conceptual divergence from the bureaus is at the end of Patt’s memo where she emphasizes the need for us to convey a “consistent message” on human rights where the Bureaus argue human rights is only one of our policy interests and we must also convey other messages as well.⁸

Patt makes three procedural suggestions for better routine integration of human rights concern in decision making, all of which are at least as much complaints about what decisions are being made as how:

—Fuller integration of human rights considerations into economic decisions such as Ex-Im and CCC programs. Our sense is that these are being adequately considered in the Interagency Group.

—Restructuring the AECC. Patt’s right that there is now no systematic factoring of human rights concerns into specific decisions, as there is with the Interagency Group for economic assistance. But S/P’s attempt to assess the decision record on these issues (in February of 1979)⁹ led us to conclude that the policy is about right even if the procedures are somewhat less neat than they might be?

—Earlier notification to other donor governments of MDB votes. Patt is right that decisions a few days before major votes may reduce the seriousness with which other governments take our “consultations”. Part of the problem is the inability of the US representatives on the MDB to give us sufficient advance notice of pending loans.

2. Personnel issues, and especially better staffing of HA and human rights training for other officers.

—Too few slots. Our impression is that HA does not now have a numbers problem but that stronger management would help inside the bureau.

—Personnel’s “failure” to fill slots—quickly—with quality people; and

—Lack of interest in human rights training on the part of other FSOs.

⁸ Christopher placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. ⁹ Not further identified.
The last two issues are related. I’m not familiar with the details of either problem but suspect both relate to HA’s adversarial relationship with much of the building and the consequent reluctance of many to become more directly involved with the human rights policy. We can’t force human rights assignments, or training, on unwilling officers.

3. HA priorities.

—Strategy papers for problem countries (with particular emphasis on how to promote human rights in violating countries with which we have security relationships). The results were disappointing when we and others tried a few examples earlier in the administration. The strategy paper concept may be overly rigid.

—Senate Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties. We agree this should remain an Administration priority and you will recall it is also on Roberts Owen’s priority list for L.

—Better US human rights performance. We agree with Patt that a mechanism to permit effective response to complaints about US domestic performance would be useful, especially for the Madrid CSCE review conference. You may want to ask whether there is any mechanism for this at present. We’re less sure what she has in mind with the recommendation for closer cooperation with the NSC to coordinate activities of, and promote acceptance by, domestic agencies of the human rights policy. You may want to explore this.

—A “more creative” human rights approach at the UN. We believe HA already has an adequate voice in such decisions.

—Full funding of the Inter-American Court. We aren’t sure what’s involved here, and HA’s memorandum arrived too late for us to try to find out.

—CSCE. This will indeed be a major HA concern for the next year. We agree on the need to appoint an Ambassador promptly as does EUR and we assume Patt is aware of the state of play.

Questions for Discussion

You might want to explore the following questions with Patt and her colleagues:

—Does HA perceive that it has an adversarial relationship with the rest of the building? If so, what might be done about it?

—Can specific examples be cited of what country strategy reports might enable us to do better?

—What military assistance decisions does HA think would have been different had the procedural changes they recommend in the

10 Christopher placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
AECB been in effect? Would human rights situations actually have been improved as a result of these changes?

—Should a leadership succession in the Soviet Union affect our human rights posture toward it? What stance should we take at the CSCE review, for instance, if a new Soviet leadership is shaking itself down?

196. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

THE IMPACT ON U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTRY REPORTS

Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, direct the State Department to submit Reports on human rights practices in countries receiving U.S. security or economic assistance. An amendment adopted in 1979 expanded this directive to require Reports on all foreign countries that are members of the United Nations, as well as on all countries receiving U.S. assistance. Reports are also being written in 1979 on North Korea, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Taiwan, and Namibia.

The State Department has sent to the Congress three sets of Reports, covering 1976, 1977, and 1978. The 1979 Reports, now in preparation, will be delivered by January 31, 1980. The Reports are written by the State Department on the basis of information from a wide range of sources, including reports from our Embassies in the countries concerned and reports from official international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

In preparing the Reports, the State Department has tried to provide as complete and objective an assessment as possible of the human rights situation in the countries covered. Reports have been as specific and accurate as permitted by available information, even where this has impinged on sensitivities of the governments or countries con-

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, SHUM Annual Report to Congress 1980. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. Atwood transmitted a copy to Speaker of the House O’Neill under a November 15 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 4, Document 190.
The Reports have sought to describe the human rights situation in the context of a country’s history, political conditions, education levels, economic resources and development, judicial institutions, and religious and cultural traditions. Efforts have been made to improve the Reports each year, in terms of comprehensiveness, additional factual information, and coverage of aspects of human rights in which Members and Committees of the Congress have taken special interest.

Each year when the Reports appear, our posts give copies to their host governments, and many foreign embassies receive them in Washington. Frequently delivery of the Report leads to a discussion of the U.S. human rights policy and enables U.S. officials to call attention to the overall objectives and concerns of that policy, as spelled out by the Congress and the Administration. In many cases this dialogue continues over time in relation to specific issues, for which the Human Rights Reports provide general background. In some cases, described below, foreign countries have objected strongly to certain portions of a Report, particularly when it describes serious violations of human rights. In a few other cases, governments have objected expressly to the fact that Reports are prepared at all, regarding them as interference in internal affairs. We explain that the Reports cover a wide range of countries, that no country has been singled out for criticism, and that all are described using a standard format.

There have been both benefits and costs associated with the annual preparation and submission of these public Reports. The benefits are as follows:

First, the Department’s view on current human rights practices of foreign assistance recipients aids Congressional evaluation of budget requests, and the Reports also furnish a useful reference in Executive Branch decisions on foreign assistance.

Second, the preparation of the Reports stimulates within the Department a disciplined and regular fact-finding and analysis process.

Third, the Reports enumerate human rights practices in considerable detail, communicating our concerns with a high degree of specificity to the governments involved. The Reports themselves often provide an impetus for bilateral discussions with host governments concerning the specific abuses cited.

Fourth, the American public is better informed regarding these conditions as a result of the publication of the Reports.

Finally, the Reports have come to symbolize the continuing importance of human rights concerns to our foreign policy decision-making.

We have also experienced the following costs:

First, when the statute required Reports only on countries receiving aid, many countries with poor human rights records, particu-
larly the eastern bloc governments, were not covered. This lack led to criticism, and also deprived us of many of the benefits described above with respect to those countries. The 1979 amendment has remedied the situation.

Second, since we do not control the timing of the public release of the Reports, publication can conflict either with the timing of other bilateral pursuits or with the timing of the human rights strategy itself in a particular country.

Finally, the public release of the Reports produces friction in bilateral relations with some countries, and occasionally complicates achievement of other U.S. objectives.

In most instances, however, the impact on our bilateral relations—whether positive or negative—has been modest. A more detailed description of the impact of the reports on U.S. foreign relations is provided, region by region, in the sections that follow.

Europe and North America

Most European countries have had little or no official reaction to the Reports, and the Reports had little impact on our bilateral relations with those countries. The Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia registered minor objections to specific aspects of the 1978 Reports. France objected officially to the fact that a Report was prepared on its human rights practices. The Governments of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus each expressed displeasure with the Reports, focusing primarily on the discussion of Cyprus in each of these Reports. Since Reports on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will be prepared for the first time in 1979, there has been no reaction thus far from these countries.

Central and South America

Because U.S. policies on human rights issues are generally well-known in Central and South America, the publication of the Reports has had little impact on our relations with most nations in that region. Most host governments review them with interest but generally offer little or no official comment. In many cases, the Reports have served as a useful resource for the discussion of specific human rights issues in Latin American countries, and for internal human rights reviews related to aid decisions and U.S. votes in the international financial institutions. The Reports generally have had the positive effect of reaffirming to host governments our commitment to human rights, and of reminding individual countries of specific issues which deserve special attention.

While a few countries—for example, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Uruguay—have criticized alleged inaccuracies in the Reports, the
strongest reactions have come from governments which object to the very existence of the Reports as interference in their internal affairs. Brazil, for example, removed itself from the reporting requirement in previous years by rejecting U.S. assistance.³ (A Report on Brazil, as a UN member state, will, however, be prepared in 1979.) Most negative reactions to the Reports, however, reflect the continuing discomfort of some Latin American governments with our general human rights stance.

**East Asia and Pacific**

There has been little reaction to the Reports in East Asian and Pacific countries, from either the governments or the public, and they have had no significant impact on our bilateral relations. Some countries in this region have indicated to us indirectly that they regard the very existence of the Reports as an intrusion into internal affairs. In some cases where a Report was critical, supporters of the government concerned have attacked its veracity, while critics of the government have praised the Report or criticized it for not going far enough.

While the Philippines sent the State Department a thirteen-page response from the Philippine Solicitor General attacking the Report as a rehash of “half-truths,” our Embassy in the Philippines believes the Report has been helpful to it in representations to the Government on human rights issues. The Republic of Korea and Indonesia have not reacted officially to the Reports.

**Africa**

Most African countries had little or no official comment on the Reports. In some cases where a country’s record has been good, the Report predictably had little impact. In others, where the government has displayed little sensitivity to human rights issues, the government apparently preferred not to engage us on this subject, and the local press was not free to comment.

The Reports have, however, had a positive effect on our bilateral relations with a number of countries in the region, where they have provided a useful supplement to a continuing dialogue on human rights. One African President told our Embassy that the U.S. human rights policy was “useful” in “disturbing the conscience of government leaders everywhere.” In another country, which has had a poor human rights record, the Report contributed to an increased comprehension of the role human rights play in United States Government decisions.

In a few countries in the region, the Reports have had a negative impact on our bilateral relations. For example, one government

claimed that the U.S. placed too much emphasis upon civil and political rights and not enough on economic and social rights. In another case, officials of the host country complained that the Report failed to take into account recent developments in the country.

Near East, North Africa, and South Asia

The Reports have had little effect on our relations with countries in this area. Most governments in the region have offered little reaction. The Israeli government, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the Report, centering on the question of treatment of Arab prisoners in the occupied territories.

Several countries (Tunisia, Afghanistan, Syria, and Iran) suggested the Reports constituted interference in domestic affairs and charged that our own human rights record did not permit us to pass judgment on others. The new Iranian Government in 1979 said that previous Reports on Iran were insufficiently critical of human rights conditions under the Shah.

In two countries, Sri Lanka and Nepal, the Reports became a topic of discussion in domestic political debates, and may therefore have marginally increased local awareness of our human rights concerns.

197. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts\(^1\)

Washington, January 6, 1980, 0031Z

4020. Inform Consuls. Subject: Annual Human Rights Reports. Ref: 79 State 203431.\(^2\)

1. Entire text Limited Official Use.

2. The Department is in the process of completing the preparation of the annual human rights reports. The contributions submitted by posts abroad have been, as expected, of high quality and are appreciated. They have helped the Department in developing accurate, bal-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800011–0576. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Kenneth Rogers; cleared by Tim Dunn (ARA/PPC), Irons, Calvin Konner (S/S–O), Clapp, Rizik, Vogelgesang, Jennone Walker, Derian, and Sieverts; approved by Christopher.

\(^2\) See Document 190.
anced, meaningful and useful reports. The internal Department procedures related to the publication have progressed well thus far.

3. It has come to my attention that there have been at least two cases, and possibly others, of our personnel showing draft human rights reports to, or discussing their contents with, representatives of foreign Embassies in Washington or foreign officials abroad. I was concerned to hear this, and hope that it has not happened widely.

4. Draft reports are not to be shown to, or discussed with foreign governments or their representatives. This applies both to the report on that country, and to reports on any other countries in which a government might be interested. This is absolutely essential to the integrity of the reports. We do not, of course, “negotiate” the contents of the reports with foreign governments, and we must avoid any activity that could even suggest that we are doing so.

5. We will, as usual, inform Embassies of the reports’ publication date\(^3\) and when posts may discuss the completed reports with host governments.

Christopher

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\(^3\) In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s February 1 evening report to Aaron, Bloomfield commented: “The 150 or so country reports have all been transmitted to the Congress. When published it will constitute a very specialized kind of Statesman’s Yearbook with some authoritative descriptions, plus a set of 3-Excedrin headaches for the U.S. diplomatic machine.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 1–3/80) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee released *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979* on February 4. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, p. 59)
198. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to David 
Martin of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs¹

Washington, February 29, 1980

My Meeting With The Secretary: 
Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties

1. The Secretary said that Frank Church had not asked him to lay 
off, but rather that he would move Genocide if we could tell him with 
confidence that we had the ability to obtain unanimous consent of the 
Senate.²

2. The reason for unanimous consent is his understanding and the 
Secretary’s that, because of its placement on the calendar, it cannot be 
moved before SALT without unanimous consent. The Secretary added 
that eight or nine treaties had already been successfully moved. I don’t 
know what the chances are, but it would seem to me that a couple of 
possible objections would be inevitable. However, it is worth looking 
into.

3. He had no objection to the preliminary steps, i.e., staff work.

4. He didn’t seem to have any objection to all of us going full speed 
ahead on the lobbying campaign.

I think the thing to do is to just get going and start counting and 
seeing if there is any possibility for unanimous consent, at the same 
time pressing for the staff work to be completed and doing some good 
lobbying.

David, please give Linc Bloomfield a call. Thanks.

¹ Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 
1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, Genocide—Action File. Limited Official 
Use. Copies were sent to Bennet, Palmer, Salmon, Steven Cohen, Flood, and Roberta 
Cohen. Martin sent Derian a memorandum, dated February 28, in preparation for her 
meeting with Vance. (Ibid.)

² There is no indication as to where or when Derian’s meeting with Vance took 
place; no minutes were found. In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s March 5 evening re-
port, Bloomfield noted: “At my suggestion, Patt Derian has talked with Vance re 
Church’s problems. Turns out Frank Church told Cy he would be willing to move the 
Genocide Convention if the Administration could tell him with confidence that 67 votes 
were in hand. Cy has no objection to a lobbying campaign on the Convention. (67 votes is 
no mean feat, but the Administration was able to come up with 60 votes last year when 
Church made the same stipulation with regard to a cloture motion.)” (Carter Library, Na-
tional Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, 
Box 37, Evening Reports: 1–3/80)
199. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance wrote out a formal letter of resignation on April 21, 1980, following President Jimmy Carter’s decision to launch a rescue operation on April 24 in an attempt to free the American hostages in Iran. In his letter, Vance noted, “I know how deeply you have pondered your decision on Iran. I wish I could support you in it. But for the reasons we have discussed I cannot.” The complete text of Vance’s resignation letter is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, page 2. Vance delivered the letter to Carter the afternoon of April 21. In his memoirs, Vance stated that he “wanted to make it clear that I would resign whether or not the mission was successful.” (Vance, Hard Choices, page 411) Vance recounted: “I agreed to his request not to make my resignation public until after the rescue attempt, and to remain in my position until the mission was completed.” (Ibid.) For the text of Carter’s April 25 address to the nation, wherein he indicated that the rescue operation had been cancelled, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 772–773. On the morning of April 28, Vance met with Carter at the White House; Carter gave Vance a letter accepting Vance’s resignation. In his farewell remarks at the Department of State on April 28, Vance indicated that he would “support fully” the President’s policies related to other foreign policy issues and demurred from further discussion of the details informing his resignation. (Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, page 2)

On April 29, the President announced from the Briefing Room at the White House that he had designated Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D–Maine) as his Secretary of State nominee, touting Muskie’s “extensive knowledge of foreign affairs.” Following Carter’s announcement, Muskie offered a brief statement, remarking: “The world is in turmoil. The issues are complex. But I believe that in this instability the United States must be perceived as stable and as a source of strength in the free world. As Secretary of State, I will devote my full energies to achieve these goals. I respond to this challenge with genuine hope. America remains a land of great opportunity.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pages 791–792) The Senate confirmed Muskie’s nomination on May 7.

A briefing paper prepared by the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs on May 9 for inclusion in Secretary Muskie’s briefing book summarized the historical antecedents for the administration’s human rights policy and called for a “reinfusion of high level commitment and support to preserve and build upon the accomplishments of the past 3½ years.” The paper outlined six major objectives:
“High Level Commitment and Support

“We need soon broad reaffirmation of the policy by the President and the Secretary, along the lines of the President’s statement of December 6, 1978.

“Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties

“Five international human rights treaties are before the Senate: The Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the American Convention on Human Rights. Adopted by the UN and Organization of American States, they have been ratified by the vast majority of countries. U.S. failure to ratify the treaties undercuts our efforts in the human rights area. A strong early effort by the Secretary to persuade the Senate to act favorably would signal his personal commitment to the human rights policy and would reassure the human rights community that the policy will be pursued vigorously.

“The Genocide Convention merits top priority. Adopted by the UN in 1948, it has been ratified by more than 80 states and has deep symbolic significance. The President has strongly urged ratification, and the Administration should make strenuous active efforts to achieve this, preferably before the Madrid CSCE Review meeting in November.

“CSCE Review Conference

“The human rights community would welcome strong affirmation of our commitment to solidify human rights gains at the Madrid Review Conference, maintaining balance in CSCE with military security issues. The community and the various ethnic organizations which follow CSCE are aware that efforts to develop an allied position on military security issues have not been matched by progress in the human rights area. We must strive to eliminate the imbalance.

“U.S. Leadership Role in UN Human Rights Bodies

“Our leadership can be enhanced by adopting positions more responsive to the human rights concerns of non-aligned countries. The recent session of the UN Human Rights Commission, one of the most successful, was marked by our close cooperation with non-aligned countries. HA feels strongly that we should further strengthen this alliance by: stronger support for UN actions against apartheid in South Africa, an evenhanded position on the human rights conditions of Arabs in the Israel-occupied territories; effective efforts to respond to complaints lodged against the U.S. by Native Americans and other of our minority groups; responsive positions on economic and social rights, in particular the right to development. A strengthened alliance would
serve to isolate communist and radical (left and right) countries which seek to undermine UN human rights efforts.

"Human Rights and the IFIs"

"Under the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, the U.S. Executive Directors to the Multilateral Development Banks are required to oppose any loan to any country whose government engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. Thus, all MDB loans to all countries are screened by the Working Group of the Inter-Agency (Christopher) Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (IAGHR). To date the U.S. has opposed 87 loans to 16 countries. Concern of human rights advocates in the Congress that the review process be institutionalized has led to proposals to legislate the continued functioning of the IAGHR. HA favors the proposals. Human rights groups are watching to see if an assiduous human rights review of MDB loans continues to produce a vigorous policy and a firm U.S. stand in the banks.

"Human Rights and Security Assistance"

"We need to ensure that human rights concerns are more systematically factored into our decision-making on security assistance. HA believes military aid and sales should be screened for human rights by an interagency working group, perhaps reporting to the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance."

The remainder of the briefing paper detailed a variety of country-specific issues. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, SHUM Policies 1980)

According to a May 21 memorandum from the Executive Secretariat to all Bureau principals, at Muskie’s May 21 morning staff meeting, the Secretary had requested that each Bureau prepare a list and description of high priority items. (Ibid.) Responding to this request, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian sent forward a 1-page briefing memorandum later that day. Derian’s lead item focused on overall policy implementation:

"Institutionalization of the human rights policy—Despite extensive legislation and the President’s commitment, human rights issues are not yet adequately incorporated into decision-making. We need more systematically to apply human rights criteria to security assistance issues. HA has not been included at relevant PRCs when issues significant to human rights are raised, e.g., last week’s PRC on Argentina. The regional bureaus continue to evince excessive ‘clientitis.’ Many posts overseas fail to do their part in implementing the policy."

The remainder of Derian’s briefing memorandum discussed human rights situations in Argentina, Israel, Korea, and Liberia. (Ibid.)
Problems Over the Next Several Weeks and Months

REF: S/S Memorandum of April 29

1. Credibility of Policy. The human rights community and the public increasingly think the policy has been downgraded if not discarded. We need soon a strong Presidential statement similar to that of December 6, 1978 and an early address on the policy by the Secretary designate.

2. Over Identification with Repressive Governments. There is a growing tendency to permit other policy concerns to dilute our human rights principles and policy. I am apprehensive about the evolution of our relationships with Argentina, Zaire, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Guatemala and Pakistan. We need to examine them carefully, in terms of our human rights policy and our long term interests. We are too “close” to these repressive and unstable governments.

3. Asylum. The massive influx of Cubans and Haitians into Florida is placing tremendous stress on HA’s ability to review asylum requests. We have over 10,000 from Haitians that will have to be re-evaluated once litigation in southern Florida is resolved. All Cuban cases require case-by-case asylum review. We will be swamped. Over 175 other asylum cases (mostly Iranian) are received each week, further straining our understaffed capacity.

4. Human Rights Conventions. Passage is urgent to attenuate the criticism we will receive in Madrid for our failure to ratify.

5. CSCE. In view of the recent arrival of key players in the Madrid exercise, you personally should provide broad policy guidance for our delegation head.

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2 Tarnoff, in a memorandum dated April 29 and addressed to the regional and functional bureaus and other Department of State offices, circulated Christopher’s request that each Bureau prepare “a list of eight to ten problems which it faces over the next several weeks and months. These issues should be described briefly and could be stated simply in cases when the Bureau is confident that the Acting Secretary is fully familiar with the question. In any event, papers should not exceed two pages.” (Ibid.)

3 See Document 176.
6. Central America. The interagency working group on El Salvador was expanded into a Central America working group because of political developments in Nicaragua and the need to devise a strategy to deal with growing violence in Guatemala. Nongovernmental organizations strenuously opposed and are not reconciled to our decision to provide security assistance to El Salvador. We justify our assistance as intended to advance human rights. In view of this public commitment, and the difficult decisions to be taken HA should participate in the proposed PRC on Central America.

7. Security Assistance. We need a better mechanism to ensure that human rights concerns are factored into the allocation of security assistance and that security assistance is coordinated with economic assistance. Our first preference is for the Christopher Committee to assume this responsibility. Alternatives are the creation of a new committee analogous to the Interagency Committee or an AECB with a broadened mandate.

8. Korea. General Chun Doo Hwan’s recent press conference, and his assumption of the KCIA directorship, make me profoundly uneasy.4 We must continue to press the ROK to lift martial law and continue political liberalization. We must disabuse General Chun of incipient notions he may harbor of perpetuating the Yushin system or becoming a new Park.

9. Taiwan. We anticipate heightened interest and concern from Congress and other groups about the Taiwan authorities’ handling of the Kaohsiung incident last December.5 Eight participants received sentences from 12 years to life imprisonment. Thirty-three others are currently on trial facing lesser charges. Ten more (including the leader of the United Presbyterian Church in Taiwan) were indicted on April 29 and will be tried in a military court. The trials, while open, were a sham. Signed confessions were extracted through intimidation and torture. These trials have serious implications for Taiwan’s internal stability. The authorities have effectively removed the most potent oppositionists from the political scene and delayed progress toward the

4 During an April 29 news conference, Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, Commander of the South Korean Security Command and Acting Director of KCIA, indicated that he did not have the authority to suspend martial law in South Korea, which had been imposed following Park Chung Hee’s October 1979 assassination, and noted that it should not be lifted until the right conditions developed. Chun and several other military officers had seized power in a December 1979 coup d’état. See William Chapman, “Key Korean General Says It’s Too Early To Lift Martial Law,” The Washington Post, April 30, 1980, p. A–25.

process of political liberalization on the island. We must consider how we can reverse this disturbing trend. One possibility is review of aspects of our military sales relationship.

10. OPIC. The Department is accused of laxity in enforcing Section 239 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Only two applications for OPIC insurance have been denied on human rights grounds. While critics grudgingly accept the interpretation that OPIC will be denied only when it involves direct assistance to a violator government, we must not make any move which could weaken this interpretation. We need a better review of OPIC activities in the interagency committee.

11. DOD Activity in Human Rights Problem Countries. We need to get a handle on the myriad of DOD activities (ship visits, visits of high ranking U.S. military) in countries with human rights problems. Some bureaus approach the problem systematically. Others handle it on an ad hoc basis if at all. We need a Department-wide policy and coordination mechanism.

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201. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts

Washington, May 14, 1980, 2306Z

127374. For Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Subject: Dissemination of Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

1. At a recent conference at the Department, several reps of nongovernmental organizations reported that officers in some of our mis-

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2 Presumable reference to a conference on human rights held in the Department of State on April 29. In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s April 29 evening report, Bloomfield indicated that he had attended a meeting “organized by Patt Derian with leaders of 30 national human rights organizations. Spoke briefly, reaffirming the President’s solid commitment to his human rights policy despite other pressures, etc., etc.” (Carter Library,
sions were unfamiliar with contents of our 1979 human rights reports on their countries of assignment.

2. If you have not already done so, please ensure that mission personnel who have appreciable contact with host government civilian officials and military officers are knowledgeable about the contents of the country report. The regional bureaus will be glad to pouch additional copies if requested. Copies might be placed in the post library and be included in the orientation materials for newly arrived officers.

3. In at least one capital, host government officials and others reportedly continue to criticize the country report on the basis of distorted press or other accounts. If this is relevant to your situation, you may wish to consider making copies of your country report (a public document) more widely available.

Christopher

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202. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (Bergsten) to Secretary of the Treasury Miller

Washington, June 25, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S. Human Rights Policy and the Multilateral Development Banks

During your conversation with Congressman Wilson last week, the issue of U.S. human rights policy in the MDBs came up. The following provides background information on the key practices and issues related to that subject.

Legislative Requirement

Authorizing legislation passed in 1977 requires U.S. Executive Directors in the MDBs to oppose loans to countries whose governments engage in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights” unless the assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve basic human needs.

The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance

To provide a thorough high level assessment of possible human rights policy actions, the Administration established in 1977 the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. This group, frequently termed the “Christopher Group” since it is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, includes representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Agriculture, the National Security Council, the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, and other agencies when appropriate.

The Interagency Group reviews all proposed MDB, AID, OPIC, Exim, etc., projects and programs. It examines the human rights situation and trends in a recipient country, previous U.S. efforts to improve the situation (including actions in the bilateral assistance relationship if one exists), the likely effectiveness of various possible actions in improving human rights situation and the nature of the assistance under review (e.g., to what extent it meets basic human needs). The Group then recommends a U.S. voting position to Treasury given our responsibility for instructing the U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs.

Treasury’s Role in the Interagency Group

The Interagency Group relies primarily on the State Department’s judgment as to whether or not the government of an MDB recipient is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights.

The Treasury Department has three major goals in the subsequent Interagency deliberations:

—to insure that the MDB vote is not used as an “easy option” and in isolation of a broader USG approach to a given human rights situation. (Treasury would, for example, resist using the MDB vote if comparable actions were not being taken in our bilateral relationship with the affected country.)

—to insure that the criteria and considerations used for determining whether or not a project meets “basic human needs” (BHN) are economically sound. (In general USAID and the Human Rights Bureau at State advocate a rather narrow BHN definition, while Treasury and the Economic Bureau at State advocate a more flexible approach which takes into account each country’s unique economic, cultural and social circumstances. At the present time, the Interagency Group is operating on unofficial BHN criteria which are very close to the Treasury approach.)

—to maintain to the maximum extent possible the integrity of the MDBs as effective social and economic development institutions, and
insure that there is a basic consistency in the application of our human rights policies to bank operations.

Differences between the Departments of State and Treasury on an individual MDB loan are usually resolved prior to Deputy Secretary Christopher’s formal recommendation to Treasury. There have, however, been a few instances where we have disagreed on the Deputy Secretary’s position on whether or not a specific project met basic human needs—and, in such cases, we have always prevailed. There have been no such cases for a long time, however; none since you came to Treasury, in fact. (I came close to bringing to you the Chile loan raised by Congressman Wilson, but did not because of the egregiousness of their behavior in the Letelier case.)

**U.S. Voting**

In the period since January 1, 1977, the United States has opposed—through “no” votes or abstentions—more than 90 MDB loans to 16 countries where we considered the human rights situation severe. Our general policy has been to support MDB projects for countries with human rights problems if the project serves the basic human needs of the people in the recipient country. This avoids penalizing the poor people of countries whose governments follow repressive practices, and reflects the fact that we consider human rights to include basic social and economic rights such as adequate food, housing, clothing, education and health care.

U.S. decisions to oppose MDB loans on the basis of human rights considerations are taken only after a thorough examination of the current human rights situation and trends in a recipient country. In the past six months, we have opposed loans for Argentina, Chile, Laos, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Yemen (PDR). U.S. opposition to upcoming MDB loans to Korea is also likely given the deteriorating human rights situation in that country.

The U.S. has veto power over projects only in the FSO (IDB). In other MDBs, our opposition to specific project proposals would have to be accompanied by that of several other members before a proposal would be formally denied. Some other countries have also had human rights concerns and joined us in opposing specific MDB projects. We have not formally “voted down” a loan on human rights grounds. On several occasions, however, we have influenced the MDBs and the re-

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3 Afghanistan, Argentina, Benin, Central African Empire, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, Korea, Laos, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pakistan, Paraguay, Vietnam, Yemen (PDR)
The recipient country to restructure a project so that it meets BHN. The fact that the U.S. intended to oppose a loan project has also been responsible for loans being delayed or indefinitely deferred.

In situations where the U.S. has opposed MDB loans on the basis of human rights considerations, we have been joined by one or more donors in 10 IDB votes involving four countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and in 2 IBRD votes involving Chile.

Note: The United States continues to consult widely with other governments to explain in detail our views on human rights and basic human needs and our position that the MDBs are appropriate and effective instruments for furthering these objectives. Achieving an international consensus on human rights will, however, be a long and difficult process.

The Issue of an MDB Charter Amendment in Human Rights

In 1978, Congressman C.W. Bill Young (Fla.) proposed an amendment to the FY 1979 Foreign Assistance Appropriations (Sec. 611 of Public Law 95–481) instructing the U.S. Governor to propose and seek adoption of an amendment to the charters of the multilateral development banks, which would specifically provide that human rights should be taken into account in loan decisions. In informal discussions with other members we have sought support for the adoption of such an amendment. The reactions of other countries to our initiative were negative. Adoption of amendments to the charters of the MDB’s requires from 75–85% of the votes. Because of the high percentage of affirmative votes required, we believe that it unlikely such an amendment would attract sufficient support for passage. Moreover, other countries pointed out that if such an amendment were defeated, it would undermine our argument that the MDB charters already allow consideration of human rights performance in bank discussions.

The recently passed Authorization Bill for the regional banks also directs the U.S. Governor of the banks to consult with the other governors concerning the adoption of an amendment to the articles of agreement to establish human rights standards for assistance.

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4 Presumable reference to H.R. 3829, which Representative Henry Gonzales (D–Texas) introduced in the House on May 1, 1979. The bill passed the House on March 6, 1980; however, the passage was vacated and S. 662, introduced in the Senate by Church on March 14, 1979, was passed in lieu. The President signed P.L. 96–259 (94 Stat. 429–434) into law on June 3, 1980.
203. Memorandum From Lincoln Bloomfield of the National Security Council Staff to Roger Molander of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, July 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Briefing Paper on Human Rights and the NSC

Attached hereto is the first of several briefing memos which I am preparing for you or Jerry, as part of my orderly departure program which, albeit a failure in Vietnam and Cuba, ought nevertheless to be a success in the NSC staff.

As you know, Mary is arranging a series of luncheons in the White House Mess this month where I would like to have you (Jerry in his areas of future concern) to have a chance to meet informally with key figures with whom I have been dealing in the bureaucracy.

(Attached hereto also is a cartoon about the Carter human rights policy which delicacy forbids me from attaching to other copies of this memorandum.)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

THE NSC AND HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

You will also want to read a very thoughtful and provocative memo which Tom Thornton left for me a year ago on this subject. Philosophically it stands up well. Some of the specific policy issues, with their typically long half-life, linger instead of speedily decaying. (Perhaps the people do the decaying, while the problems remain?)

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 16, Human Rights, 7/78–7/80. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Brzezinski, Aaron, Owen, Thornton, Dodson, Oplinger, Albright, and Friendly.

2 Reference is to Oplinger.

3 The cartoon is attached but not printed.

4 Confidential.

5 See Document 188 and footnote 1 thereto.
Two facts dominate this policy scene:

1. Human rights policy has clearly represented one of the principal personal policy commitments of President Carter. Therefore it has been operationalized virtually across the board. As an outsider, I observed an explosive but somewhat unguided takeoff in early 1977. Cy Vance’s Athens, Georgia speech of July 1977 provided the needful midcourse correction, explaining that of course the policy could not be applied without modulation everywhere, at all times, friend and foe alike. When security requirements crowd in, human rights take second place, being invoked pietistically rather than operationally.

2. The other central fact is that bureaucratically, the human rights policy is somewhat of an orphan child, or maverick, perhaps because by contrast with the HAK approach it was new, and controversial. Applying the “human rights criterion” still tends to line up the bureaucracy on predictable sides. Its central agency—HA in State—is clearly not staffed by the most promising FSOs. On the contrary, under Patt Derian—an activist if there ever was one—the whole HA team soon acquired the opprobrium throughout the buttoned-down elements of the bureaucracy as “the Human Rights Mafia.”

Operationalizing and institutionalizing this new (restored?) component of policy includes codification into a variety of laws by the Congress (you will find all the legislative references on my shelves).

The Congress in a sense outdid the President by writing into law the requirement that foreign economic assistance and, to a more limited degree, foreign military assistance, could not be given to countries whose governments were guilty of a gross and consistent pattern of human rights violations. The effect is that far from consisting of optional rhetoric, each specific aid decision has to be filtered through a human rights test, with the burden legally placed on those who would award grants, loans, aid, etc. to gross and consistent violators. The exceptions in the economic case are projects that would clearly benefit basic human needs in a given country, and in some other cases (e.g. OPIC investment insurance, FMS, etc.) a certification that national security considerations override. Needless to say, recent deterioration of the security situation has made the human rights criterion secondary in several recent FMS decisions.

The instrumentality for dealing with economic assistance choices is the interagency committee on human rights chaired by Warren Christopher, involving wide representation of the bureaucracy (including myself). I have usually circularized my regional NSC colleagues to get their views on controversial cases prior to going to a meeting, and they have sometimes accompanied me. (On the military side, I have not been involved. Perhaps for that reason the system tends to operate by raison d’état and force majeure, rather than droit de l’homme.)
If Patt Derian leaves (Hodding already has), much will depend on her replacement. Her number one Deputy Mark Schneider was a very bright activist. After he went over the side he was replaced by Steve Palmer, who is much calmer and introduces a more conservative note stylistically, although he is quite committed to the cause. Chris himself is also a strong advocate of the President’s human rights policy, but so judicious in temperament that he creates the illusion that a fairly jumpy policy is in fact purring along like a well-tuned Mercedes.

Clearly the policy is not agony-free. The case of Argentina is a prime example of pulling and hauling between those pressing for letting up on the pressures on policy grounds of wheat sales, fencing off from the Soviets, hemispheric defense, et al, versus those who feel that Argentina is still an egregious human rights violator. The NGO community is much exercised about this, as is US Representative to the Human Rights Commission Jerome Shestack. (Tom Thornton and I recently recommended that State prepare a public clarification prior to Bill Bowdler’s late July visit to Buenos Aires, in order to correct distorted news stories based on leak and rumor, and also to stiffen everyone’s spine when Bill goes to Argentina so the human rights component of our policy doesn’t get lost in the shuffle. ZB and DA vetoed the idea, and doubtless Bill will make it all plain to the Argentines when he visits.)

The UN Human Rights Commission is backstopped by IO and HA in State, but Jerry Shestak has made a practice of staying in touch with me. He has a big ego, and also a long track record as an outside human rights activist. This makes his role slightly ambiguous, particularly since it has never been clear that the US Rep to the UN Human Rights Commission is an instructed representative.

As for the NGO’s, they can be an important source of support for the administration. I was astonished at their pleasure when I went over to State this spring to participate, albeit briefly, in a daylong conference of NGO leaders arranged by Patt and her staff. Any display of White House interest, however symbolic, is of value.

When we still had some leverage with Moscow, there was a fairly steady flow of Soviet dissident or refusenik cases of special concern to

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6 Reference is to Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department of State Spokesman Hodding Carter. Carter announced on May 23 that he would resign from the Department on July 1. (“Hodding Carter Resigning on July 1,” The Washington Post, May 24, 1980, p. A–4) Dyess became Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs in August.

7 Schneider left the Department of State in 1979. Derian requested that Palmer, Chief of Humanitarian Affairs at the Mission in Geneva, return to Washington to serve as the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

8 See footnote 2, Document 201.
the White House for which I would receive the visitors on behalf of the White House (sometimes with Brement present). They were often sponsored by the Council on Soviet Jewry, although other organizations have asked to visit on behalf of notable Soviet dissidents, ranging from Lev Mendlevitz, who remains in prison, along with one Christian, for insisting on practicing their religion, after the other “Leningrad hijackers” have been let out;9 to the daughter of Sakharov (for whom we were able to do very little). In one case (Ida Nudel) a personal letter from Mrs. Begin to Mrs. Carter led to my taking Mrs. Nudel’s sister to meet the First Lady. Unfortunately, we have been able to do less and less to influence or pressure Moscow with respect to tough cases. Nevertheless, I have been in occasional contact with Marina Neumeyer-Wallach, who represents the Council on Soviet Jewry, and numbers of Ukrainian, Evangelical and other national and church groupings which take an interest in those cases.

One operational demand in which we are importantly involved concerns the annual country human rights reports mandated of the Secretary of State by the Congress. This last year, instead of just reporting on conditions in countries to which the United States furnishes aid, the Congress changed the requirement to reports on all countries—154 in all. The deadline for submission to the Hill was January 31st, and I worked out with Patt Derian a procedure (which we did not formally entitle clearance) in which every report was carried to my office as soon as it had been cleared in the Department and before being put into final form. I reviewed many of them myself, particularly the sensitive ones, and in every case circulated them with a form covering note to appropriate NSC colleagues for review and comment.10 My arrangement with Patt was that I would call her directly if we had any real agony. There were a number of points that we felt ought to be taken up, and I would say we batted about .500, all in all. However, the really hot ones this year (Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Argentina, you can imagine the rest) I and relevant colleagues really labored over. In the case of the Argentine report, with Tom Thornton’s help we put in a fair amount of effort to ensure that it retained its integrity, on the ground that 153 other reports could be undermined if one were to be too badly fudged. I

9 Reference is to the 1970 attempt by a group of Soviet refuseniks to hijack a Soviet airplane and fly it to Sweden.

10 Bloomfield, in the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s January 28 evening report, highlighted his “continued intermediation between colleagues and State on especially painful pieces of country reports. (Be clear that all the reports will, when published, be embarrassing in varying degrees. Consoling thought: U.S. remains faithful to universal concern for governmental abuse of citizens.)” Brzezinski wrote the following note on the report in the margin next to this bulleted point: “careful on Argentina.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 1–3/80)
think we came out alright, and I recommend that the same kind of “nonclearance” system be arranged by December of 1980 for a fairly intensive exercise during the first half of January.

The Madrid meeting of the post-Helsinki CSCE due to take place in September\textsuperscript{11} was for a while a subject of considerable activity, in collaboration with Marshall Brement. The chief reason for wanting to go ahead with the meeting following the precipitate deterioration of relations after Afghanistan\textsuperscript{12} was, in my view and that of others, the opportunity to reaffirm our strong commitment to the human rights elements of Basket I and Basket III of the Helsinki Final Agreement. The chairman of the U.S. delegation will be former Attorney General Griffin Bell, with Washington Attorney Max Kampelman as his deputy. State has set up its operational preparations, and you will want to get involved in collaboration with Brement and Blackwill in helping to monitor the human rights elements of U.S. policy as it develops over the next few months.

One issue I would simply pass along is what strikes me as an imbalance in our tools for implementing the President’s human rights policy. The fact is that we have, both in practice and in law, a number of sticks to wield against countries which do not live up to the standards that are embodied in the international declarations and covenants on human rights, as well as our own policies. But there is a singular dearth of carrots. In this connection, I would like to see a more active policy of calibrated rewards to the list of countries we frequently boast of as having moved away from despicable practices of torture, political prisoners of conscience, an unfree press, military rule, etc. These might have the form of a special visitation (in my opinion the visit of Navy Secretary Hidalgo to Argentina in early July, apart from its potential for sabotaging a carefully crafted revised U.S. policy toward that country, was the kind of demonstration that ought to be cranked up more often for countries that have really gone the distance to stop leaning on their own people). In this connection, I am concerned with the trend that I understand Tom Ehrlich, the Director of IDCA, is pressing for a small number of a relatively large aid projects rather than a scatteration. I can appreciate his logic, but this already almost forced us to deny a tiny bit of symbolic but needful economic assistance to Equatorial Guinea, which has gotten rid of one of the bloodiest and most repressive dictatorships in modern history.\textsuperscript{13} I personally think that kind of flexibility belongs in the aid program.

\textsuperscript{11} The conference opened in November 1980.
\textsuperscript{12} Reference is to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan December 24–25, 1979.
\textsuperscript{13} See footnote 2, Document 191.
In summing up the NSC role in this area, it is important to stress the difficult but necessary line that I think has to be walked between a kind of aseptic indifference to the way the human rights policy falls so long as the paper work is in order, as against an all out advocacy of the human rights criterion in all complex policy decisions, which I think would be unbalanced and unseemly in the role a Presidential policy coordinating staff should play. The NSC role is essentially a monitoring one. However, I have often been asked by HA to intervene where the system seems disposed to downgrade human rights concerns; in consultation with my colleagues, I have done so where the arguments were legitimate. Reciprocally, I have sometimes flagged human rights aspects of issues we are dealing with at the White House level—even in the State Department—where it is not apparent that HA and its legal and policy mandates are being given sufficient attention. Frankly, it would be disingenuous not to notice that there are forces in the United States government which would be glad for an excuse to dump the whole human rights policy and get back to what they conceive to be a “realistic, national interest based” approach. I guess I would have to say that their approach seems to me, both in prospect and in retrospect, to deprive us of one of the central distinctions between the democratic system and the totalitarian system which is the foundation on which those critics think they argue. Conversely, I feel that the NGO community worries excessively that we really don’t give a damn and our policy is thus a sham. They confuse the limits of policy based on the possible with bad faith regarding the desirable. I feel the greatest service one can do at this level is to keep in a balanced overall focus the positive commitment to the advancement of human rights and political democracy to which President Carter is committed, and from which the United States has already considerably benefited in Africa and in some other formerly hostile regions.
204. Memorandum From Lincoln Bloomfield of the National Security Council Staff to Roger Molander of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, July 31, 1980

SUBJECT

Genocide Convention

The President’s firm determination that the Senate ratify the 35 year old Genocide Convention has not yet been translated into action. For various reasons it was not possible to get a renewed push by the President during the past year. Madeleine has all the facts, and Steve Simmons of DPS has been particularly interested in seeing what more we could do. I personally think it is high time we delivered on ratification of a convention drafted at the initiative of the United States which has been in effect for over 30 years, and on which we are one of the few non-ratifiers. Since the President very strongly felt that it should be, maybe something can be done at some point. The most recent (draft) file is attached.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Bloomfield Subject File, Box 16, Human Rights: Conventions: 8/79–7/80. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Albright.

2 Attached but not printed at Tab A is an undated memorandum from Bloomfield to Brzezinski, sent through Albright, requesting that Brzezinski transmit an undated memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, attached at Tab B, recommending that Carter “reaffirm” his “strong interest in seeing the Genocide Convention ratified by the Senate during the current session of the Congress.” There is no indication as to whether or not Molander forwarded either memorandum to Brzezinski.
I. Background

The international climate is going to worsen for human rights. Third World governments will feel increasingly threatened by a combination of hard times economically, internal pressures for change, and in some cases actual or feared Soviet or Soviet/Cuban efforts to exploit internal problems.

The US public is also becoming more alarmed both about security threats and about economic problems and therefore exports. This could make it harder to keep American public and Congressional support for active human rights policies.

The assumption that human rights and security interests were conflicting goals which had to be balanced against each other has always been analytically wrong. Respect for human rights is necessary to long-term stability, and therefore to US security interests. As President Carter said in his State of the Union message, “In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except violence.” Moreover, it is a concern for human rights that ties together the varied policies of this Administration: the human rights policy as such; our support for peaceful resolution of grievances in southern Africa, the Middle East, and Central America; our approach to North-South economic issues; and our strong resistance to Soviet violation of Afghan human rights.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 20. Confidential. The paper is part of a Department of State Briefing Book entitled “Five Year Project” and constitutes part XV of XVII of the larger report on U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities, 1980–85. According to an August 4 memorandum from Donovan to Brzezinski and Lake, Carter had requested that Donovan organize and edit the Objectives and Priorities report, with input from the NSC, ICA, CIA, and Departments of State and Defense. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security—Molander, Box 77, Human Rights (Five Year Goals) [7–8/80]) Earlier versions of the human rights planning paper are ibid., and in the Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D180, SHUM Policies 1980.

2 The quotation is from a paragraph of the President’s January 23 State of the Union address, which reads as follows: “In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together through open, democratic methods, the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 28, 1980, pp. 198–199)
Failure to make clear this vital link between human rights and US security interests could gravely undermine our whole human rights approach.

II. Policy Issues and Priorities

The priority goal of US human rights policies over the next five years should be to convince foreign governments, and US public and Congressional opinion, that respect for human rights is a requirement of long-term stability and therefore serves US security interests.

Three areas of endeavor will be central to this effort: development of strategies for key individual countries; strengthening regional organizations in their understanding of, and responsibility for, related regional stability/human rights problems; and demonstrating to nervous governments that the aim of our human rights policies is not their “destabilization.”

We also should use the next five years to ensure the domestic foundations of our human rights policy. Priority attention should be given to an aggressive and sustained effort to explain the connection between human rights and security interests. We also should ratify UN and OAS Charters and Covenants, and complete a body of legislation that will help ensure attention to human rights concerns by future American Administrations while allowing enough flexibility for pragmatic implementation of a policy that can maintain domestic support.

A. Country Strategies

Five-Year Goal: Especially for human rights problem countries where there are important US security interests, we need country strategies that focus not on human rights as such, or on immediate security needs, but rather on the longer-run requirements of stability and the prospects, and limits, for American influence in that particular situation.

There is no abstract formula—or choice among strategies—for convincing governments which feel threatened by pressures for change to share our view of the requirements of stability. Strategies will have to be shaped with regard to individual countries, bearing in mind the sources of internal instability, the state of its political development, and the nature (if any) of genuine external security threat, as well as the particular human rights problem.

These strategies should include not only questions of USG pressures and/or assistance, but also of opportunities to work with (or complementary to) other democracies or democratic forces. Southern European Socialists, for instance, are eager to establish links with the non-Communist left in Latin America (especially in the troubled Central America and Caribbean region). And even some European gov-
ernment leaders who are relatively unmoved by claims of human rights as such are increasingly sensitive to the dangers to stability—and so to Western economic and security interests—posed by repressive regimes.

Country strategies should also focus on how we can encourage private American groups to develop ties with foreign counterparts (press, lawyers, teachers, business) which might be forces for pluralism and peaceful political progress. Good examples include recent State Department facilitation of contacts between groups of African lawyers and American bar groups, and an AID grant to the President of the Institute for Law and Social Policy (a former US Ambassador) for exchanges with African legal groups.

Such strategies obviously would be most useful before a country reaches the explosive stage.

B. Strengthening Regional Organizations

Five-Year Goal: Regional organizations which understand the link between human rights and stability, and are willing and able to take primary responsibility for their areas.

The Andean Pact states and OAS got involved in Nicaragua, and ASEAN started cooperating on refugee problems, at least as much from a concern about regional stability as about human rights as such. African awareness of the potential danger posed to regional stability by that continent’s Emperor Bokassas or Sargent Does is one reason for tentative gropings by the OAU for a human rights policy.

We should try to build on this appreciation of the link between human rights and stability, and look for ways to strengthen efforts by all regional bodies. This would have the added benefit of further multilateralizing human rights efforts, and creating a greater sense of responsibility for them on the part of Third World nations and organizations.

Efforts on our part will need to be skillful, and carefully calculated to specific cases, to avoid smothering regional efforts with a Big Brother embrace. The OAS, for example, already has an active human rights policy. While continuing to make clear we support it, we should increasingly let Latin American states take the lead. In regional cooperation among ASEAN members there is little resonance for “human rights” under that label. What they most need from us, and other industrialized democracies, is money to help with crushing refugee burdens. The cause of human rights is likely to fare better in the OAU if we continue to let UN officials and African moderates take the lead. We can best help by facilitating the kind of contacts in individual African states sketched above, and by economic assistance to get at one of the prime causes of instability and repression.
C. Reassuring Nervous Governments

Five-Year Goal: To demonstrate—with deeds, not just words—to all governments that our aim is not their “destabilization.”

Our constant message must be that the only way to avoid further Nicaraguas or Irans is by beginning the process of liberalization when reform and compromise are still a viable alternative to revolution and radicalization . . . that the only thing more dangerous than change is refusal to change.

This argument will need to be reinforced by demonstrated sensitivity to differing situations and political perceptions.

Exchanges with Third World leaders on different forms of political expression can help convey the message that we are not trying to impose our form of government on others. ICJ-sponsored work with African officials on the nature of political competition in one-party states was useful in this regard. Direct USG exchanges would be better still in demonstrating our interest in understanding their perspectives.

We also need to re-examine the question of which USG “sanctions”—opposition to MDB loans; curtailment of bilateral aid; denial of military sales or assistance—to continue when violations of the person have virtually ended but a regime remains fundamentally repressive. Easing sanctions just because a government is not at the moment arresting, torturing, or killing its opposition could undermine our efforts for those institutional changes which are the best longer-range guarantee of continued respect for rights of the person, as well as for political liberalization. But refusal to respond concretely to non-institutional improvements could reinforce suspicions—in the country concerned and among its neighbors—that we will be satisfied with nothing less than the downfall of individuals or regimes. That could lessen chances both for immediate human rights improvements, and for persuading governments of the sincerity—much less the wisdom—of our claim that internal stability and human rights improvements are inextricably linked. We favor the second course.

D. Ensuring the Domestic Foundations of Our Human Rights Policy

Five-Year Goal: Solid public and Congressional support for the human rights policy, and sophisticated understanding of its relationship to US security interests.

Growing security and economic worries in this country could put the human rights policy in at least as much trouble at home as abroad. Two areas of endeavor can help with this problem.

(1) Making our Case

The litany of accomplishments—tens of thousands of political prisoners released in over a dozen countries; fewer “disappearances” and
reports of torture; movement from military to civilian rule in many countries; and the awareness of those tempted to overturn election results that it would cost them in their relations with us and in their broader international standing—are familiar to us but will need frequent stress to an increasingly skeptical public.

We should always, however, couple recitals of what we are doing for others with its relevance to concrete US interests:

—Support for peaceful change is support for stability.
—And it puts us in better position to work with change when it does happen. Even in countries where our human rights advocacy has strained relations with repressive governments, civilian professional and business classes—and in some cases younger military—who should always have looked to the US as a model and source of hope no longer see a disconnect between the freedoms we insist on for ourselves, and our support of dictatorships over them.

(2) The Legal Basis of US Human Rights Policy

We should soon end the anomaly of the US proclaiming itself as a leader of international human rights efforts, but not yet having ratified the basic human rights Covenants and Conventions of the United Nations and Organization of American States.

Five are before the Senate: The Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the American Convention on Human Rights. The Genocide Convention merits top priority. Adopted by the UN in 1948, it has been ratified by more than 80 states and has deep symbolic significance.

The next term should also leave a legacy of a consistent body of domestic legislation that will help ensure continued attention to human rights by future Administrations, while giving them (and ourselves) the flexibility necessary for pragmatic implementation of a policy that can maintain domestic support.

—All programs designed primarily to promote US exports should have the same human rights criteria (OPIC is now more restrained than ExIm or CCC). US policy options are to treat these as we do other forms of USG assistance, or to interfere with them only when there is a strong chance that doing so would actually lead to human rights improvements (not just for “distancing”). Given what injecting human rights into these programs already has done to arouse opposition to the policy by US business interests—and the marginal incremental effect on most human rights problems of adding use of these programs to our other pressures—we favor the latter.
Country Specific Legislation. This often has more to do with the ideological bent of certain legislators than with concern for world-wide human rights. And it can limit our flexibility to offer gradual inducement to governments which are prepared to undertake gradual reforms. But Administration initiatives to remove the country specific legislation which now exists would be seen as a weakening of our human rights commitment. Our alternatives are to make a push early in the new Administration to remove all country specific legislation, or to leave present legislation in place (absent substantial human rights improvements in the specific countries) but resist new legislation of this type. The latter probably is more feasible on the Hill.

Legal mandate for the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance. A bill to this effect may well be introduced in the next Congress, and might require that security assistance also be considered by the Group. Our options would be to oppose such legislation, on the ground that the Executive Branch should be able to establish—and change—its internal, decision-making procedures; or support it because it is effective and because anything else might signal a weakening of our human rights commitment. This is not an important substantive issue; future Administrations could keep the same machinery but make very different human rights decisions. We should stay neutral.

Present legislation governing bilateral and multilateral aid and security assistance. This has been useful in reinforcing policies this Administration wanted to pursue. It has given us enough flexibility to tailor human rights efforts to be effective in differing situations, and to protect US security and economic interests. It could be even more important in forcing future Administrations at least to consider human rights factors in assistance decisions and to justify their decisions to interested parties on the Hill. We should resist any efforts either to weaken it or to make it more stringent.
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, November 10, 1980

SUBJECT
List of Issues for Transition Briefing Papers

The perception exists that the Reagan Administration plans to reverse policies to promote respect for internationally recognized human rights. The human rights policy is based on domestic and international law and occupies a central place in U.S. foreign policy. The following list of issues will therefore require decisions during the 90-day period following January 20, 1981.

1. Bilateral Initiatives on Behalf of Human Rights\textsuperscript{2}
   —Continue prompt and vigorous diplomatic initiatives with regard to major human rights problems in communist countries. Countries requiring such action are: the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and others.
   —Continue prompt and vigorous diplomatic initiatives with regard to major human rights problems in non-communist countries. Countries requiring such action are: South Africa, Liberia, South Korea (particularly to save the life and obtain the freedom of Kim Dae Jung),\textsuperscript{3} the Philippines, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Iraq, Syria, the Israel-occupied territories and others.

Failure to take action with regard to these countries will undermine the leadership role of the United States in the human rights area, and in many cases impact adversely on our national interest and security objectives.

\textsuperscript{1}Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 16, TL Transition Folder ’80. Confidential. Drafted by Roberta Cohen. Derian did not initial the memorandum. Jennone Walker attached a handwritten note to the memorandum, which reads: “General review of h.r. policy including: 1) implementation current econ & security legislation? 2) change legislation? 3) pending international treaties? 4) [unclear] pending countries or other problems 5) role in or with international agencies, orgs. 6) Bureaucratic procedures.” (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{2}Walker inserted a handwritten point above the first one, which reads: “Key human rights problems in specific countries on which decisions & action may be necessary in early months of Administration.” She also bracketed all of the points of section 1.

\textsuperscript{3}Walker circled the phrase “obtain the freedom” and wrote a question mark in the left-hand margin.
2. Economic Assistance and Human Rights

—Continue the systematic review of economic assistance and human rights by the Inter-Agency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by the Deputy Secretary. This Committee and its Working Group regularly review bilateral economic assistance, IFI loans, Ex-Im and OPIC transactions with a view to ensuring that human rights concerns are fully taken into account in decisions made, as required by U.S. law and policy.

3. Arms Transfers and Human Rights

—Improve the mechanism in the Department of State for reaching decisions on arms transfers and human rights through the creation of a special body to systematically review such decisions, including the sale of police equipment, and ensure that human rights criteria are fully taken into account, as required by our law and policy.

4. Pending Decisions on Sales of Police Equipment and Lethal Military Equipment

—Decide on pending sales of police equipment to the following countries with serious human rights problems: the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Yugoslavia, Israel (West Bank).

—Decide on pending sales of lethal military equipment and expanded military sales to the following countries with serious human rights problems: Haiti, El Salvador, Paraguay.

5. Multilateral Initiatives

—Insist on full review of implementation of Basket III (human rights and humanitarian) issues at the Madrid CSCE Conference and promote the establishment of more effective machinery to implement the Helsinki Final Act.

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4 Walker bracketed the portion of this sentence that begins with “Continue” and ends with “by” and substituted the phrase “Operation and mandate for.” She also placed a check mark next to this insertion.

5 Walker bracketed this sentence.

6 Walker bracketed the portion of this sentence that begins with “Improve” and ends with “on” and substituted the phrase “Policy on.”

7 Walker added “and key pending issues” following “human rights.” She also drew a slash through the entire bulleted point.

8 Walker drew a slash through this and the previous bulleted point.

9 Walker wrote “handled in CSCE paper” and an “x” in the left-hand margin next to this bulleted point.
—Continue to strengthen international machinery for dealing with human rights issues (United Nations, Organization of American States, International Labor Organization, UNESCO) and promote the creation of regional human rights bodies.\textsuperscript{10}

6. Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties\textsuperscript{11}
—Complete U.S. adherence to six major international human rights treaties through ratification. The six treaties currently before the Senate are: the Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

7. Non-Governmental Organizations\textsuperscript{12}
—Continue to cooperate with private non-governmental organizations engaged in programs and activities to strengthen the protection of human rights internationally.

8. Asylum Policy\textsuperscript{13}
—Strengthen the asylum unit to enable it to deal with a rapidly increasing number of cases, for example Iranian, Nicaraguan and Cuban cases, among others.

\textsuperscript{10} In this point, Walker deleted “Continue to” and substituted “review US action/efforts in,” added a question mark and a check mark in the left-hand margin, and bracketed the words “and promote the” and wrote “and” above the brackets. She also placed a check mark in the margin next to this insertion.

\textsuperscript{11} Walker placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this point. She also drew a slash through it.

\textsuperscript{12} Walker added “Relations with” to the heading “Non-Governmental Organizations” and drew a line from it to the word “engaged” in the first sentence. The portion of the sentence leading up to the word “engaged” was deleted. She also added a question mark and a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this bulleted point.

\textsuperscript{13} Walker added “Policy toward” to the heading “Asylum Policy” and placed a check mark in the left-hand margin.
World Hunger and Food Policy

207. Memorandum Prepared by Cyrus Vance

New York, October 24, 1976

[Omitted here is information unrelated to food policy.]

L. Economic Assistance.

Here again, the new Administration will be faced with immediate and difficult budgetary and political questions. As you know, economic or so-called development assistance falls into three categories: US bilateral economic development programs administered by AID and the Peace Corps, and multilateral development programs, which receive US funding through the World Bank, regional banks and various United Nations agencies. A second category is political economic assistance. A third category is straight humanitarian or relief assistance. There is also military assistance, which has often been bracketed with, but in fact is not, development assistance.

The first question is who should receive economic assistance. Here, I believe that we should continue to make economic assistance available to both the least-developed and the middle-level countries, as it is at present. I believe it would be unwise to adopt a rule that only very poor countries will receive US bilateral economic assistance. Not the least important of the several advantages favoring this suggestion is the fact that the other course of action would make most Latin American countries ineligible for development aid.

A second issue is whether economic assistance should be denied to countries that flagrantly violate human rights. Current aid legislation prohibits economic assistance to those who violate human rights, unless the President can demonstrate that such aid gets to the poorest

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1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Odds & Ends From the Transition. Sensitive. Sent to Jack Watson under an October 24 covering memorandum, in which Vance commented: “I am sure that never before has there been so much excellent work done in advance of the election. In the meantime, we are all hoping and praying that things will come out the right way on November 2.” (Ibid.) According to his memoirs, Vance prepared the memorandum at Carter’s request, noting that it “was to become a kind of foreign policy road map and a standard against which I measured our success and failure in attaining the goals we ultimately set for ourselves.” (Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 29–30) The complete memorandum is printed in Hard Choices as Appendix I, pp. 441–462 and is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
people. The issue is whether this escape clause should be tightened.\(^2\) It would be a mistake, in my judgment, to do so. Conditioning economic assistance on such a policy would appear to be an intrusion into the internal affairs of the recipient countries. In addition, it would appear to be saying that in order to show our sympathy for the poor, we are withdrawing the aid designed to improve their wellbeing.

Another key question is whether economic assistance should be multilateral or bilateral, or both. I believe it should be both. We should provide capital aid increasingly through the regional development banks, while continuing to rely on bilateral channels for more technical assistance. The regional development banks are generally considered to be efficient in handling multilateral aid. However, assistance can be provided more efficiently on a bilateral basis.

Finally, I believe that economic assistance should be increased. There is an international target of .7% of GNP. Other countries are taking the target seriously and some have reached it. I am not suggesting we should attempt to go to .7%. We are currently at about .25% and should do more. Moreover, the capability of aid-delivering agencies to help host countries develop useful projects has improved over the years, while the amount of human deprivation has continued to increase.

Budgetary decisions will have to be made with respect to Fiscal 78 Budget on the funding of economic assistance programs for the next two years. The amounts involved are very large. I would recommend the so-called lower option (2-a) contained in the Development Assistance issues paper, which would provide for authorization of $3.65 billion, an appropriation of $1.26 to $1.87 billion. I think it would be impossible to get anything higher through the Congress, and even this option will be difficult to achieve. However, we must meet our obligations. Failure to do so in a responsible manner could shake the international institutions, resulting in setbacks to their current lending programs and projects. The critical item with the Congress will be the amount of the appropriation, rather than the authorization.

M. Relations with Developing Nations.

Whether we like it or not, one of the most important and difficult issues which will face the new Administration is the question of our relations with the developing nations. The developing nations have found that they can achieve political leverage by operating in concert and have made it a central focus of their foreign policies under the ru-

bric of a demand for “new international economic order.” The developing countries’ goals in this area affect trade, commodities, investment and technological transfer, monetary reform, and aid.

Our relations with the developing countries are important because without their participation and cooperation, we, as well as they, may find it most difficult to grow and prosper. They now constitute a majority in most international bodies in which global problems are dealt with. While the developing nations may not be able to force action, they can block it.

As you know, the current Administration had opposed requests from the developing countries for change in international economic systems for a number of years. This policy was changed in the speech of the Secretary of State at the 7th Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 1974. Since then, however, little of significance has been accomplished, and we face the danger of increased tensions if the ongoing discussions and negotiations come to naught.

The current outlook is gloomy. The dialogue at CIEC appears to be going nowhere. The UNCTAD meeting last spring ended without

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important accomplishment\(^6\) and little progress is being made in other areas such as Law of the Sea, food, commodities, and debt rescheduling.

Insofar as the US public is concerned, surveys would indicate that the country is ambivalent. People feel that we should help the less fortunate, but they feel, at the same time, that our aid is not getting to the poor people who really need it, and that we are taxing the American people, including the poor, to assist the well-to-do and rich in other countries. I believe, however, that our people will support a policy which they feel is practical and is properly directed toward alleviating suffering and deprivation in the developing world. More public education is needed, and it will have to come in large measure through Presidential leadership.

Among the available options concerning our overall approach to the problem, selective functional cooperation with the developing nations makes the most sense. If we chose this course of action, the US would agree to discuss in good faith all the issues being raised, looking where possible to strike bargains where gains for both sides can be assured, but refusing to agree to proposals which we believe are economically unsound or politically unacceptable. This would serve to diffuse the danger of growing confrontation between the North and the South. It would also put the US in a position of leadership it has not had since the early 1960’s.

Turning briefly to specific issues, the first key issue is trade. What the next President does about the Tokyo Round\(^7\) is extremely important: If you follow the course of action suggested earlier in this paper, I believe you will be on solid ground. The problem of commodities is incredibly complex. The preferred solutions will vary among different commodities and positions will vary among the developing countries. The use of buffer stocks should be approached with caution. Perhaps more can be done quickly by increasing US strategic stockpiles in the metals area, than can be done by the use of buffer stocks. Attempts to hold prices on raw materials at artificially high levels do not make sense. But it is true that volatility of commodity prices is to many countries an obstacle to economic development.

I have already commented on the question of development assistance and it need only be noted further that after trade, concessional aid


\(^7\) Reference is to the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1973–1979), held in Geneva, Switzerland.
is the single most important issue you will have to address from an economic standpoint in the North-South relations.\textsuperscript{8}

Space does not permit adequate discussion of international debt service by developing countries. Suffice it to say that the better-off developed countries do not need it and fear that it would jeopardize their credit standing. The debt issue, thus, comes down to the poor countries. Of the total amount owed, two-thirds is owed by India, Pakistan and Egypt.

With respect to monetary reform, the issue concerns the developing nation claim that they do not receive a fair deal from the IMF because of their lack of voting weight. This in turn relates to the question of special drawing rights, which are allocated on the basis of IMF quotas, which are in turn a rough indicator of the financial importance of the member country in the world economy, and thus of each member country's need for international reserves. In this connection, consideration should be given to the possibility of permitting raw materials such as copper, tin, etc., to be used as reserve currencies.

Further with respect to the question of the oceans, we have the problem of the stalled Law of the Sea Conference. It is currently stalemated primarily on the issue of deep sea mining. Here I believe that we must take a new initiative if we want to restore vitality to the negotiations. A possibility worth pursuing is a fleshed-out version of Secretary Kissinger's most recent suggestion, i.e., a two-track approach involving mining by both private interests and the public "Enterprise." Under this approach, the US and other individual countries would provide the necessary technology and know-how to the Enterprise.

With respect to food, the basic answer is increased food production in the developing countries themselves. Accordingly, there should be increased emphasis in both bilateral and multilateral efforts on increasing the developing countries' production of food. It will, however, take many years to increase food production in the poor countries. Therefore, in the meantime, it will be important to establish and maintain sufficient grain reserves in the developed countries to meet recurring needs in the developing countries.

Finally, we must continue to work on the population problem, which is inextricably linked with the problem of food and social and economic progress.

In light of the foregoing, the first and most critical task is to develop a coordinated strategy for dealing with the various issues presented. They cannot be dealt with on a piecemeal basis. Therefore, as

\textsuperscript{8} In an earlier section of the paper, Vance noted that a new administration would need to determine the position the United States would take with regard to GATT and listed several options. He indicated that he favored the middle ground: "i.e., aim for an early 1977 agreement on relatively non-controversial items."
soon as key appointments have been made, a task force should be formed to develop such an integrated strategy under a tight time schedule—two to three months. This should be done in coordination with key members of the Congress.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to food policy.]

208. Editorial Note

President Jimmy Carter intended to pursue both bilateral and multilateral approaches to solving the problem of world hunger, as he outlined in a January 20, 1977, videotaped address to the world community. Broadcast to 26 nations by the United States Information Agency on Inauguration Day, the message stressed Carter’s “desire to shape a world order that is more responsive to human aspirations.” “The United States alone,” he asserted, “cannot guarantee the basic right of every human being to be free of poverty and hunger and disease and political repression. We can and will cooperate with others in combating these enemies of mankind.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 24, 1977, pages 89–90) For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance outlined the Carter administration’s foreign assistance program, including the use of food aid, in testimony to the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on February 24, 1977. Vance explained that the administration’s foreign assistance programs “are diverse in substance, serve a variety of objectives, and are aimed at a wide range of targets.” Underscoring the interdependent world of the late 1970s and its burgeoning global concerns, Vance then commented: “We cannot effectively promote multilateral diplomacy, control the proliferation of nuclear arms, defuse international terrorism, reduce the buildup of conventional weapons, or protect our security interests in the oceans or space in a hungry, angry, and bitter world. We can achieve cooperation on these security issues only if we are doing our fair and reasonable share in the process of international development cooperation—only if we are seen as encouraging, not frustrating, the development aspirations of others.” The Secretary subsequently indicated that the administration planned to budget $1.4 billion for Public Law 480 commodities for fiscal year 1978. (Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1977, pages 236–241) For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
Vance gave similar testimony to the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations on March 2, drawing attention to the Department’s use of P.L. 480 to “relieve hunger and respond to natural catastrophes” and spur agricultural production in recipient nations. (Ibid., March 28, 1977, page 287) Carter’s March 17 message to Congress, outlining the administration’s proposals for bilateral and multilateral development assistance, security assistance, and P.L. 480, is in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 455–458.

209. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, March 1977

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KEY GLOBAL ISSUES

I. Introduction and Overview

This report assesses the significance for the US of selected global issues. It is most immediately concerned with the international political implications of recent and prospective developments in the areas of (1) energy dependence, (2) LDC demands for a “New International Economic Order,” (3) food and population, (4) terrorism, and (5) nuclear proliferation. The report is designed to assess the impact of these global issues, both individually and collectively, on general trends in international relations as well as on specific US interests. What challenges do the issues pose for the US in terms of threats and opportunities, policy constraints and choices?


2 This report is based on the following studies and working papers: World Oil Trade and International Politics: A Preliminary Study of Trends, Prospects, and Implications (March 1976, Unclassified); European Energy Politics and Atlantic Relations (February 1977, Confidential); Dynamics of “Small-State” Leverage: Implications for North–South Relations (PR 10059–76, August 1976, Secret/NF); Impact of Food Uncertainty and Scarcity on the US and the International System (September 1976); World Population Growth and US Strategy Interests (November 1976); International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis (PR 10030–76, April 1976); Managing Nuclear Proliferation: The Politics of Limited Choice (OPR–408, December 1975, Secret/NF). [Footnote in the original.]
Although the issues chosen for study are each distinctive in important ways, they do have some notable common characteristics:

— While none is a new concern in the strictest sense, all have taken on increased prominence for the US over the past decade—some dramatically so, as in the case of dependence on imported oil.

— While each is global in that it affects US relations with nearly all countries, the most immediate policy focus as a rule is US relations with nonindustrial countries (the LDCs).

— The issues all have vital economic or technological aspects.

— They represent direct or indirect challenges to the influence and freedom of action and potentially to the wealth and power of the industrial democracies and at times of the Communist powers as well.

— Since the manner in which the major countries manage these issues will affect global and regional power relationships, they also represent opportunities to optimize relative influence and freedom of action—not least for the US vis-à-vis traditional adversaries and allies.

A systematic explanation of whether and how these key global issues are either causes or symptoms of a “new era” in international relations would be well beyond the scope of this brief introduction. The common characteristics listed above, however, underscore the importance of several relatively recent and closely related developments affecting world politics, which, in turn, help to explain the prominence of the issues selected for study.

First, the industrial democracies face increased domestic obstacles to controlling developments much beyond their peripheries, especially where the use of military power overseas or large amounts of economic assistance would be required. This abatement of domestic support for an assertive foreign policy reflects (1) a decline in the perception of immediate security threats associated with the height of the Cold War, (2) disenchantment with the costs and risks of extensive overseas involvement, and (3) constraints caused by slower rates of domestic economic growth amidst intensifying demands for social and economic benefits.

Second, these domestic inhibitions on assertive foreign policies, together with the growing wealth and regional influence of certain LDCs (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Venezuela) and the rise in assertiveness concerning their “rights” on the part of LDCs generally, have contributed to a diffusion of power in international relations. Even as the wealth and military power of the industrial nations increase on an absolute scale, their ability either to control or to ignore global problems is constrained. This is manifested most clearly in the increased frequency and effectiveness with which the nonindustrial countries, individually and collectively, challenge the general authority and specific policies of the
industrial powers. The ability of certain transnational or nonstate actors (e.g., the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), terrorists, multinational corporations) to influence events augments the tendency toward power diffusion.

Domestic and external constraints to some extent affect the efficacy of an assertive foreign policy on the part of the USSR and China as well as the industrial democracies. While the Communist powers may at times attempt to take advantage of opportunities for foreign adventure (as in Angola), their cost-benefit calculations are also conditioned by domestic problems and by the diffusion of power, especially in regard to the growth of nationalism among LDCs and even within the Communist parties of many countries.

Third, the heightened sensitivity of the industrial democracies to their dependence on imported oil and other raw materials, the periodic reliance of the Communist powers on imported technology and food, and the persistent economic strains in nearly all LDCs have helped to politicize a wide range of international economic issues. The growing sensitivity to economic pressures of nearly all countries is reflected in intensive high-level “bargaining” on economic issues not only between industrial and nonindustrial nations, but also among the industrial democracies and between them and the Communist powers.

Finally, the three broad trends summarized above have produced increased complexity and uncertainty in international relations. In part, the complexity reflects the growing interconnections among global issues (for example, among energy dependence, LDC demands, and nuclear proliferation). It also reflects the strains global problems place on harmonious alliance relationships, because of the varying degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability to these issues among the industrial democracies, and on the management of crises in the Middle East and elsewhere. As a result, the difficulties of dealing with any of the global issues singly are, as a rule, magnified by the reverberations among related issues. The difficulties of attempting “national solutions” to one or all of the issues are similarly increased.

As previously mentioned, the causal relationships among global issues and international trends are difficult to align with confidence. What does seem clear, however, is that the need to manage these global issues effectively—whether to reduce risks or optimize opportunities—will remain a central challenge to US foreign policy at least for the remainder of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Such issues will represent an important part of the international agenda in their own right. In addition, as the following chapters will demonstrate, they will have an important and at times major role in shaping the character of our relations not only with LDCs but also with traditional allies and adversaries. On each of these issues, the individual industrial democracies and Com-
munist nations have their own calculations of risk and opportunity which can serve not only to frustrate immediate US objectives but also to complicate East-West and alliance relationships generally.

Despite these explicit and implied limitations to freedom of action, the US (especially in the context of basically harmonious relations with the other industrial democracies) remains the single most powerful and influential country in the international arena. Most LDCs remain poor, weak, and problem stricken and thus potentially susceptible to US influence and power when the latter are clearly delineated and forcefully projected. Countries with some of the attributes of wealth and power remain highly dependent in key areas (e.g., the oil-rich countries for technological development and military security). And while the Soviet Union is a superpower in strategic military terms, it generally cannot match potential US influence and freedom of action vis-a-vis global issues when it comes to economic wealth and power, technological prowess, and alliance and other diplomatic networks. Therefore, although the US can now rarely expect to control the outcome of complex international events to the extent it did from the late forties to the early sixties, its ability to affect how global issues will be addressed and what kinds of bargains may be struck is still impressive.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to food and population policy.]

World Food and Population Trends

Individually and in combination, food and population trends are likely to complicate the definition and pursuit of US foreign policy interests. Production increases in the last couple of years have eased the pressure on global food supplies as compared with the early 1970s. But the world is likely to remain in a period of food uncertainty—where many countries cannot be confident of consistently adequate supplies—for at least the next decade. And the US may have to decide how to distribute its agricultural bounty as against competing political, economic, and humanitarian concerns.

The discretionary allocation of food exports would probably involve opportunities to exercise international political leverage. At times, US positions on global problems might be enhanced. The utility of such leverage would depend on the interaction of a number of complex considerations, however. And during a period of food uncertainty, only rarely would it be capable of effecting fundamental changes in the basic domestic or foreign policies of other nations.

There is a small chance that several decades hence the world could move into a period of chronic food scarcity (e.g., because of climate change). The potency of US food leverage would increase dramatically if stockpiles were exhausted and food production was insufficient for a
prolonged period. But, in this unlikely event, threats to US interests posesed by the impact of food-related issues on international politics would become more intense and dangerous. Strident LDC demands for their “fair share” of a scarce resource—even the employment of terrorism and “nuclear diplomacy” to affect US decisions—might result, for example.

In addition to its impact on the precarious balance between food supply and demand, world population growth is likely to contribute, directly or indirectly, to domestic upheavals and international conflicts that could adversely affect US interests. Population growth will also reinforce the politicization of international economic relations and intensify the drive of LDCs for a redistribution of wealth and of authority in international affairs. Over the long term, the ecological and environmental consequences of population growth might physically threaten US interests. Implementation of long-term goals for slowing world population growth will at times necessarily come into conflict with such immediate requirements as maintaining stability in and effective ties with certain poor countries.

[Omitted here are two short segments on terrorism and nuclear proliferation, Chapter II: Energy Dependence, and Chapter III: LDC Demands for a “New International Economic Order” (NIEO).]

IV. World Food and Population Trends

A. The Setting

In the early 1970s, unfavorable weather, crop failures, massive Soviet grain imports, the depletion of grain reserves, declining fish catches, and skyrocketing food prices caused an unprecedented focusing of international attention on the precarious balance between food supply and demand, and politicized the issues of population growth and food distribution. As the world’s pre-eminent food exporter, the US is uniquely situated to realize significant gains—and imposing problems—from increasing international reliance on its agricultural production. This dependence could help the US manage some of the global issues discussed in this report and increase US influence over international affairs generally, but world food and population trends portend threats as well as opportunities. Interconnections between population and food-related developments and other global issues, moreover, complicate the challenges that the US will face in foreign policy generally.

B. Food: The Dynamics of Demand and Supply

Worldwide demand for food is rising primarily because the earth’s population increases by some 65–75 million each year. This increase stems in large part from the failure of birth rates in the populous LDCs
to decline as rapidly as have death rates. The tremendous reservoir of young people in these countries constitutes a momentum that will keep their populations expanding for decades even if they suddenly achieved a preponderance of two-child families, i.e., “replacement level” fertility.

Estimates of the earth’s population (now some four billion) in the year 2000 range from about six to over seven billion. Population projections vary according to different assumptions about whether, when and under what conditions fertility in the developing countries will drop to complete the so-called “demographic transition,” the movement from high to low birth and death rates. Experts disagree over the extent to which the demographic transition experienced in the past by the industrialized nations will be indicative of trends elsewhere. Population projections also are undependable because they implicitly exclude unpredictable events like massively destructive war, widespread famine, pandemic disease, and natural disaster.

Demand for food depends not only on population growth but also on individual affluence, wants, and tastes. As personal incomes rise, people tend to seek variety in their diets and to increase protein content through, for example, greater consumption of meat. The availability and price of the food items people want regulate their ability to indulge these desires. The ability of suppliers to respond to an increase in demand induced by affluence is limited by patterns of trade, economic
conditions generally, and by food-related decisions by national leaders—especially by those in charge of centrally planned economies.

Demand for food clearly is on the rise, but precisely how far and how fast it will go is problematical. Uncertainty over demand naturally complicates forecasts about the ability of food supply to keep pace.

In physical terms, there is great potential for dramatic food production increases in the LDCs. The wide gap in per acre yields between farms in the developed and developing countries can be narrowed by increased incentives to producers, expanded investment in technology and fertilizers, and more intensive cultivation.

But there also are considerable political, economic, and cultural impediments to increased production. These include the high cost of energy and fertilizer, inefficient land tenure patterns, disincentives to farm production caused by national policies aimed at keeping food prices down in urban areas, and reluctance by national leaders (who tend to equate development with industrialization) to expend limited resources on agriculture. In some instances, (e.g., Indonesia) poor agricultural practices such as deforestation and overgrazing are resulting in immediate production increases, but they are threatening the basic ecosystems upon which food production depends and are likely to have severely counterproductive consequences in the long run.

Technology and climate figure heavily in the outlook for supply, especially over the long term. New food production techniques, such as those using hydroponics and single-cell proteins, eventually could be of great importance if proven technically, economically, and esthetically feasible. A change in world climate that impacted negatively on traditional food sources, however, might more than offset any technological gains. Climatologists hold widely varying opinions on the direction, pace, and permanence of climate change, and there is no consensus about the interaction of natural and man-made causes. Most knowledgeable observers agree, though, that it would be unwise to count on an indefinite continuation of the climate of the last half century or so, which has been unusually stable and favorable for agriculture.

Food supply in any given year will also depend on the size of carry-over stocks. Generally strong world agricultural performance over the past couple of years has made some stockpiling possible, but it has also helped dissipate an international sense of urgency about the future. With immediate sufficiency in production breeding complacency about long-term trends, prospects for the establishment soon of an international grain reserve (or even an international system of nationally held reserves) are not particularly promising. Stockpiles, therefore, probably will continue to be held mainly on an ad hoc and transitory basis.
C. Food Supply—Uncertainty and Scarcity

The unpredictability inherent in each component of the balance of world food supply and demand is compounded when one attempts to project how the components will interact in the future. It is the assumption of this study, however, that the world already has entered a period of food uncertainty in which it is likely to remain for at least the next decade. The world has, to be sure, always lived with some uncertainty over food supplies. Because of its interconnection with other global issues, however, the scope and international political impact of the current situation are much greater.

A significant number of nations, to varying degrees, cannot now take for granted their ability to produce or procure enough food to meet—in the case of poorer countries—basic subsistence requirements, or—in the case of more affluent food importers—desired nutritional standards. There will of course be year-to-year variations in world food supply during the period of food uncertainty. A coincidence of good harvests will at times mean relative abundance and some stockpiling, but there may also be crop failures and famines. The extent of malnutrition and localized starvation will also fluctuate, but both are likely to be ever present.

The period of food uncertainty could continue indefinitely, or it could end in dramatically different fashions. Increased production and advances in technology might combine with a slowing of world population growth to usher in an era of assured sufficiency of supply. Should population growth and other demand factors outstrip food production and exhaust stockpiles, however, the world might move from food uncertainty to a period of chronic and widespread food scarcity that could have severe human consequences.3

Foreign dependence on US agricultural production is increasing. As long as the period of food uncertainty persists, demand for US food exports will probably fluctuate within relatively high parameters. Income from foreign food sales will contribute to US economic strength and to foreign perception of its overall strength as a world power.

The possession of plenty amidst uncertainty will also give the US an opportunity to derive political influence from the discretionary allocation of its agricultural exports, i.e., the ability to decide to whom to sell or give food. Assuming US willingness and ability to use food as an instrument in international politics (discussed below), its effectiveness as leverage will hinge on the interplay of a number of complex considerations.

3 Except in the case of a dramatic shift in climate that adversely affected production, there is only a small chance of chronic food scarcity for the next 20 years or so. [Footnote in the original.]
Foreign countries’ preoccupation with food supply and the extent of dependence on US production will vary from time to time and place to place. Food leverage stands to be more effective when applied to countries that are vulnerable, rather than merely sensitive, to an interruption in imports from the US. The distinction will be conditioned by such factors as the use to which the imports are put (e.g., the proportions used for human consumption and livestock feed), the importing country’s capacity to produce more, its wherewithal to purchase substitutes (provided they are available), and its ability to simply do without. Attitudes of national leaders toward high prices, shortages, hunger, and popular discontent could determine their judgment of how essential imports from the US are to them, and hence their country’s potential susceptibility to food leverage. In some areas in Africa and South Asia, for instance, malnutrition, starvation, and even famine might be viewed as neither unusual nor particularly disruptive politically.

The effectiveness of US food leverage during a period of food uncertainty would also depend on the attitudes or actions it sought to induce, i.e., on the degree of conflict between the outcome sought by the US and the preferences of those upon whom the leverage is brought to bear. The factors the US might want most to affect, such as political ideologies and alignments, development strategies, and population policies, might be those least amenable to outside pressure. Except perhaps for the poorest and most populous countries, needs for US food in the period of uncertainty are unlikely to be so critical that they will affect long-term nonreversible changes in basic national domestic or foreign policies. Attitudes or behavior on less fundamental issues—transitory political stands or specific tactical disputes, for example—would be more amenable to the influence of food leverage. Even in these cases, however, the US would have to take into account the cost in resentment among those on whom the leverage was applied.

[Omitted here is a chart entitled “Net Grain Trade for Regions of the World, Selected Periods.”]

The utility of food leverage would also be affected by the ability of other nations to bring countervailing leverage to bear on the US. Countervailing leverage could arise from exploitation of US dependence on such imports as petroleum, for example, or from a nation’s strategic location, political alignment, membership in the nuclear club, or status as a super or regional power.

Movement from a period of food uncertainty to one of chronic scarcity would enhance the political leverage obtainable from discretionary allocations of food. For an increasing number of countries, need for imports from the US would tend to be permanent and essential. With heightened competition for available supplies and the exhaustion
of alternative suppliers, food leverage could affect the basic national policies of a widening circle of nations.

D. International Tensions

There is, however, another side to the coin. Food and population trends portend threats as well as opportunities for the US. These trends seem likely to make the world a more turbulent setting for the conduct of foreign policy—a setting in which the definition and pursuit of US interests will be more complicated. One aspect of this complexity already is manifest in the politicization of international economic relationships and their polarization along North-South lines.

Agitation by the LDCs for more advantageous terms of trade, aid, and investment between themselves and the industrialized nations, and for a redistribution of power and authority in international affairs (as exemplified by demands for a “New International Economic Order”) is attributable partly to food uncertainty and the pressures of population growth.4

The poorer food-deficient countries view the world food problem as one of inequitable distribution and consumption as well as shortage. They claim that affluent nations’ absorption of a disproportionate share of world food resources is contributing to the problem, and their solutions are articulated in terms of “distributive justice” as well as increased production.

These countries direct most of their criticism against the industrial democracies. Colonial legacies of commercial crops, encouragement of modernization through pursuit of comparative advantage and participation in the world market economy, and the regular availability—until quite recently—of surplus US grain on concessionary terms are some of the factors they cite in support of the contention that the developing countries were misled into believing there was no need to be concerned about balancing food supply and demand within their borders.

Considerations related to food and population trends thus are spurring efforts by developing countries to improve their terms of trade and eliminate alleged inequities from international economic relationships through price preferences or structural arrangements to compensate for their disadvantageous position. US interests could be adversely affected even if the developing countries remain incapable of imposing most of their demands. Political and economic relations between the US and its industrial allies could also be seriously strained if differing degrees of dependence on the material resources of devel-

4 See Chapter III, on LDC demands. [Footnote in original. Chapter III is not printed.]
opining countries cause sharp disagreements over how their demands should be dealt with.

Should a period of chronic food scarcity ultimately occur, it would bring considerably more formidable and dangerous threats. Antipathy between rich and poor nations would intensify and the international economic order would be subjected to tremendous stress as food-deficient countries of varying economic power struggled to increase their export earnings in order to pay for agricultural imports. If spiraling prices were to force more and more nations out of the bidding for available supplies, there would be mounting pressure for the replacement of market distribution by some sort of internationally run “equitable” system of allocation.

Should anxiety over feeding expanding populations give way to desperation, the world might have to contend with international disruption caused by attempts at climate control, intensified conflict among nations, foraging populations, and perhaps even with nuclear or terrorist blackmail. The US—and perhaps other major food producers—might be the focus of an intense international struggle over food, in which it would stand to attract the enmity of others no matter how its agricultural resources were allocated.

E. Population-Related Disruption and Conflict

Food uncertainty is only one of a number of US interests that will be affected by population growth. As population pressures increase, there inevitably will be strains on existing political, economic, and social structures at the local, national, and international levels, and thus some impact upon politics within and among nations. But racial, religious, and cultural animosities, regional differences, irredentism, economic disparities, and a host of other sources of conflict between peoples and nations are almost always intertwined with demographic factors. Population growth will thus be part of a complex dynamic in which causative and contributory factors are likely to be indistinguishable.

In any case, whether population problems help precipitate sociopolitical upheaval will depend only partly on the intensity of the pressures population growth generates. Ability to deal with these pressures will be crucial, and this will hinge on the availability of resources and on the political will and managerial skill in particular countries.

Over the mid-to-long term, apathy and despair probably will prevail in some nations where resources and administrative talent are woefully inadequate to cope with population growth. But educated young city dwellers whose expectations will tend to exceed available opportunities are likely to be key destabilizing forces in many countries. Intense political turmoil and social disintegration could occur in
some cases, leading ultimately to chronic instability. Then too, population pressures probably will propel some governments to strive for greater administrative efficiency, more emphasis on food production and population control, and labor intensive economic development. Such movement probably will often be accompanied by more repressive styles of rule on the part of governments already in power and by the rise of additional authoritarian regimes.

The significance for the US of the destabilizing consequences of population growth will vary according to how the US defines its foreign policy priorities and other national objectives. Instances in which population pressures directly and immediately involve the US (for example, problems related to Mexican immigration) are likely to be few and far between in the near-to-medium term. In other cases, whether US interests are affected will depend on how they relate to the particular actors and circumstances involved, e.g., how concerned the US is with maintaining political stability and fostering economic well-being among the LDCs.

Over the very long term, moreover, the impact of population growth and the need to feed expanding populations could range beyond traditional politically defined national security considerations.

F. Ecological and Environmental Factors

The US has a fundamental interest in the health and welfare of its people and the preservation of their way of life on a planet that might eventually be physically threatened by the consequences of world population growth.

No one can say for sure how many people the earth can support. Technological innovation and man’s managerial skills will help determine the upper limit. It does seem clear, though, that population growth tends to increase the risk of ecological and environmental damage in a variety of ways. The long-run impact of the greatly increased use of fertilizer and insecticides on the environment, for example, is likely to prove highly detrimental.

The extent to which the US will be able to insulate itself from the adverse environmental and ecological consequences of population growth will of course depend on how pervasive and intense the damage becomes. This will not necessarily correlate precisely with incremental population increases, but the cumulative impact of close to 15 billion people on earth would almost certainly be considerably greater and potentially more dangerous than that of 8 or 10 billion.

Population growth is likely to impede international cooperation on matters such as resource conservation and pollution abatement. Nations with pressing needs to provide food and jobs for their people will tend to be less concerned about the long-run consequences of their agri-
cultural, fishing, or industrial activity. Food-deficient countries might attempt to link their cooperation to assurances of adequate food supplies. Developing countries, moreover, will maintain (with some justification) that the earth is threatened less by the impact of their population growth and modernization than by the consequences of overconsumption and pollution in the highly industrialized countries.

**G. Policy Constraints and Alternatives**

The ability of the US to use food as an instrument of its foreign policy depends in part on the degree to which it controls the disposition of its agricultural production. Power to apportion this production for domestic consumption, sale abroad, and foreign aid is currently shared by the government, private institutions, and market forces. The same is true for allocation among various paying customers. Moral inclinations, economic considerations, and international political challenges posed by food and population trends, however, may lead to expanded and regularized government involvement.

The prominence of food as a domestic and international issue increasingly calls into question complete reliance on the international marketplace as a mechanism to allocate food among nations; when demand exceeds supply the market takes no cognizance of moral or political considerations. There also appears to be growing interest in the idea that US farmers and consumers should be insulated from adverse effects of international price fluctuations. As principal custodian of an object of occasionally intense international competition, moreover, the US might find it necessary to guard against market manipulation and possible attempts by wealthy nations—or coalitions such as OPEC—to employ purchases, stockpiles, investments, or other devices to gain a measure of control over world food supplies.

Agreement on increased government involvement in food distribution would probably not, however, be accompanied by consensus as to what the criteria for allocation should be. Whether the US should use its unique position to maximize economic returns through sales to the highest bidders, seek primarily political gains with food as leverage, or emphasize humanitarian values with food aid could be the focus of intense domestic and international controversy.

Deciding to which nations, in what order and proportion, and on what terms agricultural exports should be allocated during an era of food uncertainty will, moreover, be complicated by the need to reconcile domestic farm and foreign food policies. As needs for imports from the US fluctuate from year to year, so too will the ease with which domestic and foreign policy considerations can be harmonized. The US may be faced in one year with having to decide which nations to feed, and in the next with determining how to dispose of massive surpluses.
The fact that key food-deficient countries have major stakes in maintaining the allocative status quo is yet another complicating consideration. Political relationships with allies and adversaries alike (e.g., Japan and the USSR) will be affected if the US moves toward greater restrictions on purchases in order to use food as leverage or to serve humanitarian ends.

Although food leverage remains a potentially powerful source of international influence, its productive use during the period of food uncertainty ahead will require selectivity and careful calculation. The negotiation of extended grain purchase agreements that assure US export markets and relieve other nations of food uncertainty for several years may be a particularly promising area for the application of food leverage. The economic and political benefits obtained from such arrangements must, of course, be weighed against the consequent reductions in future flexibility.

Long-range US policy considerations in regard to world population growth will have to be measured against more immediate domestic and international imperatives. Any US efforts to foster a slowdown in population growth are likely to be complicated by domestic controversy over the posture the US should assume toward regimes that advance population policies the US favors by coercive methods it abhors. The US will also need criteria for determining when broad population-related policies (such as a general linkage between US aid and foreign population control efforts) should take precedence over more specific shorter range considerations (e.g., maintenance of political stability in a particular country).

World food and population trends thus are adding considerable complexity to the definition and pursuit of US national interests. Clearly, though, the threats posed by these trends will have to be faced even if the US would prefer not to seize the opportunities they may offer. Earnest desires that the bounty of America’s farmers never be used as a weapon of influence in international affairs are likely to be frustrated if the disposition of this bounty increasingly becomes both a domestic and international political issue. The US may be unable to avoid having to decide how to use food leverage to help manage global issues and cope with international challenges.

[Omitted here are Chapter V: The Problem of Internationalized Terror and Chapter VI: Nuclear Proliferation.]
210. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Boeker) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper)¹

Washington, April 4, 1977

Suggested Changes in the Political Provisions of Public Law 480

Issue for Decision

OMB has urgently requested the views of the Department of State, on the Administration’s proposed amendments of PL 480 legislation. One issue still outstanding is whether the Administration should recommend deletion of some, or all, of the so-called “political provisions” of the current bill (see attachment).² It is our understanding that at the EPG, other agencies agreed to follow the lead of the Department of State on this question. Thus we need to give OMB our views. The current proposed bill, drafted by the Department of Agriculture, does not provide for deletion of any of the provisions. Therefore, I suggest you review our outline of expected Congressional reaction, telephone Senator Humphrey and obtain his views, and then inform us as to which provisions if any we should seek to have deleted.

Background/Analysis

You will recall that on February 14, we sent you a memorandum recommending that the Administration seek deletion of these so-called political provisions from the PL 480 Act.³ You supported removal of those which would not raise serious controversy or congressional opposition. We have taken some soundings along these lines and the following is a recap of our findings.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770063–0403. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Ogden and Stephen Johnson (EB/OFP/FFD); cleared by Stahnke, Alexander Watson (EB/IFD/ODF), Charles Roh (L/EB), Ferch, Imus, and Gleysteen. Johnson initialed for all of the clearing officials except for Ferch. Ortiz also initialed the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is a February 14 action memorandum from Katz to Cooper, wherein Katz discussed the limitations currently impacting Public Law 480. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770063–0406) The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) established the Food for Peace program as a temporary solution to agricultural surpluses. Eisenhower’s successors continued to support legislation extending P.L. 480 on a multi-year basis. With P.L. 480 scheduled to expire on December 31, 1977, Carter administration officials and members of Congress drafted legislation both authorizing the extension of P.L. 480 and revising several of its provisions. The omnibus Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (S. 275; P.L. 95–113; 91 Stat. 915) subsequently extended P.L. 480 through 1981, while the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (P.L. 95–88; 91 Stat. 537) placed a greater emphasis on nutrition, family planning, and the developmental aspects of aid.

³ See footnote 2 above.
Section 102—Vietnam—Prohibits the Commodity Credit Corporation from financing the sale and export of agricultural commodities under PL 480 for any exporter who trades with Vietnam or whose parent company, subsidiary or affiliates trade with Vietnam. Under the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign Asset Control Regulations, US exporters must obtain a license to export to Vietnam. It has been the Administration’s policy not to approve such licenses, and therefore, Section 102 is redundant insofar as US exporters are concerned. However, foreign trading companies operating in the US are affected by it. Section 102, in effect, requires a foreign conglomerate to choose between trading with Vietnam or having its US subsidiary trading company conduct PL 480 exports. This proposed deletion should not lead to significant controversy in Congress.

Section 103 (d)(4)—Egypt—PL 480 programming to the United Arab Republic (Egypt) unless the President declares such programming to be in the national interest. Egypt is currently our largest PL 480 customer and this provision is routinely waived by the President. Its deletion is not expected to arouse significant controversy, although staunch supporters of Israel may prefer to maintain the restriction.

Section 103 (d)(3)—Cuba and Vietnam—Restricts PL 480 programming to countries that trade with Cuba and Vietnam unless the President declares such programming to be in the national interest. This provision, too, is routinely waived by the President. In the case of Cuba, deletion of the provision would be consistent with our policy of no longer attempting to require third countries to observe our boycott. In the case of Vietnam, deletion of the provision is consistent with efforts to normalize relations with that country. EA and ARA support deletion. Our soundings indicate there could be some opposition by conservative forces in Congress to removing the Vietnam clause, but no major controversy.

Sections 103(d)(1), (2) and 103(j)—Prohibit PL 480 to Communist countries. The wording of the provisions affords some flexibility in certain cases, however, and may provide the Administration with the flexibility necessary to provide food aid to certain independent communist nations should it wish to do so in the future. Our soundings indicate Administration efforts to delete these proposals could evoke adverse Congressional reaction. Some would interpret the move falsely as a new Administration initiative on East/West matters.4

Section 411—Provides that no food aid shall be provided to Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress. Proposed deletion of the provision probably would be controversial in Congress. There is also the question of whether its deletion would be consistent with Section 109 of

4 Cooper placed an asterisk in the margin next to this paragraph. See footnote 5 below.
the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits direct financial assistance to Vietnam. EA is not now advocating elimination of Section 411. However, if Congress were to propose elimination. EA believes the State Department certainly should not object.

I believe, however, that we would have a much clearer view of probable congressional reactions to these proposed changes, were you to telephone Senator Humphrey and elicit his views. Given his membership on both the Agriculture and Foreign Relations Committees and his great interest in the PL 480 program, he is likely to be able to add considerably to our perceptions as to how these proposals could fare. We have already contacted the Senator’s staff regarding these proposed changes. They are sympathetic to them, but also recommend that you telephone him.

**Recommendation**

1) That you call Senator Humphrey and seek a direct reading from him of likely congressional reactions on these questions. 

2) If the reading is generally positive, that you authorize us to inform OMB that the Department of State favors deletion of Section 102 Vietnam, Section 103(d)(3) Cuba and Vietnam, and Section 103(d)(4) Egypt. We would not take any action now on the other provisions of the law; however, it should be understood that we might wish to go back to OMB later regarding Section 411 if our evolving relations with Vietnam so warrant.

Alternatively, that we inform OMB that the Department of State supports only deletion of Section 103 (d)(4) Egypt.

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5 Cooper placed a check mark on the approval line on April 8, according to a stamped notation, and added the following handwritten note in the left-hand margin: “Done. 4/7. HHH says clean it up by deletion, including Sec. 411. Leave * on p 2, but he may ask the Committee to take it out.”

6 Cooper placed a check mark on the approval line on April 8, according to a stamped notation.

7 Cooper placed a check mark on the disapproval line on April 8, according to a stamped notation. An additional handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum reads: “4/7—EB Dennis Jet informed. Advance copy sent to Jet. CS.”
211. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, April 9, 1977, 0128Z

80276. Rome for FODAG. Subject: Information for FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture.

1. At the request of FAO we have undertaken to try to increase the food information flow which should prove useful to both the U.S. and the FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (EWS).

2. The EWS was established by the FAO Council to collect and disseminate a variety of data on food outlook, food requirements, food crops and shortages, and food situations. Much of this data is subject to restricted distribution due to the sensitivities of some aid receiving countries to release of such information. Nonetheless, increasing numbers of such countries are joining the system, and have established units or appointed officers to collect the appropriate information and provide it to FAO via its in-country representative or other channels. FAO is preparing to provide assistance to MSA countries in establishing such early warning units.

3. FAO and/or World Food Program colleagues in the field prepare monthly food situation reports which are sent to Rome headquarters. If a potential food supply or related problem is indicated Rome headquarters requests clarification from the field or takes steps to send an evaluator for an on-the-spot assessment. Apart from the EWS, prices, freight rates, supply trends, production estimates, food aid flows, etc., are monitored by FAO through a variety of sources.

4. FAO and its members are striving to improve the EWS on a priority basis due to continuing food supply uncertainties throughout the world and especially in MSA countries. Both the FAO, EWS and the USG could benefit from sharing more information on a regular basis. Congress has repeatedly expressed interest in FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System. Efforts are being made to increase U.S. participation in the EWS. USDA works closely with the FAO and regu-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770124–1183. Unclassified. Drafted by Wolf and Rupprecht; cleared in substance by Byrnes, John Washburn (IO/ML), McNutt, David Moran, Lauralee Peters (ARA/EC/FDA), Shurtleff, J. Phillip McLean (EUR/RPE), by Melvin Schuweiler (AID/PPC), in draft by Daniel Chaij (AID/LADR), Fletcher Riggs (AID/ASIA/TD/RD), Woodrow Leake (AID/AFR/DR/ARD), Russell Olson (AID/NE/TECH), William Fradenburg (AID/MP/A), and by telephone in USDA/FAS; approved by Wolf. Repeated for information to the Liaison Office in Peking, the Interests Section in Baghdad, Vientiane, Taipei, Bucharest, Banjul, Beirut, USUN, the Mission to the OECD in Paris, the Mission in Geneva, the Mission to the EC in Brussels, the Mission to the IAEA in Vienna, and the Mission to NATO in Brussels.
larly provides Agricultural Attache and other routine reports to FAO. The FAO provides regular quarterly and monthly EWS reports to USG as well as food situation reports on specific situations.

5. Action requested. In view of the U.S. strong interest in this program missions should foster stronger cooperative relationships with FAO field officers (if any). This would increase the exchange of information necessary for the functioning of the EWS. In addition, missions, particularly those in countries facing acute or rapidly deteriorating food situations, should in course of regular reporting send information copies of unclassified cables on food production or other factors affecting food sufficiency to Rome for relay to FAO. Such cables should be addressed: Info Rome FODAG FAO/EWS. This procedure would not apply in cases where missions have specific concerns relating to the sensitivity of this data.

6. For Rome: Drawing on the substance of para 5, you may inform FAO the U.S. will be working to increase the flow of information to the EWS. To this end we are encouraging our missions to develop even closer contacts with FAO field representatives. FAO may wish to emphasize this cooperative effort through its own channels.

Vance
212. Memorandum From the President’s Science Adviser and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press) to President Carter

Washington, June 7, 1977

SUBJECT
World Hunger Problem

In December 1974, President Ford commissioned a major study by the National Academy of Sciences on World Food and Nutrition, which will be issued on June 20.

In view of its Presidential origins and in light of your comments yesterday at the Cabinet meeting about world food needs, I am bringing it to your attention. This Study describes the potential for new research initiatives to increase world food production, especially in the less developed countries. Examples of the research initiatives are:

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2]. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it; another notation in Carter’s handwriting reads: “Frank—Join Zbig, Stu, Chip, Bourne & work together. J.” In a June 4 note to Chip Carter, Brzezinski, Bourne, and Eizenstat, the President wrote: “Get together & let me know what we can do about world hunger—J.C.” (Ibid.) In his diary entry for February 9, the President noted that he had asked Press to be his scientific adviser: “In the past most of them have been physicists—in fact, the first six recommendations that I got were for physics majors—but I wanted to get an earth science professor to help me in a more general way to assess some of the questions raised by the first report of the Club of Rome [regarding the fragility of the environment]. I believe Dr. Press will be a good man.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 18)


3 According to the minutes of the June 6 Cabinet meeting, the President indicated that he planned “personally to do more work on the issue [of world hunger] and noted the natural connection between dealing with world hunger and espousing human rights.” Carter “said that AID Director Jack Gilligan and Mr. Vance are eager to help with this work and noted that P.L. 480 is very popular on the Hill and might be used effectively toward these ends. He added that the U.S. entertainment industry has adopted eradication of world hunger as its humanitarian goal.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 6/6/77–9/16/77)
- New genetic strains and other manipulations of breeding and farming practices to enhance resistance to pests, weather aberrations, and chemical variations in soils
- Increasing biological nitrogen fixation associated with leguminous plants and devising similar biological nitrogen fixation for cereal grains, to reduce dependence on chemical fertilizer
- Land management, e.g., use of ruminant livestock as foragers on uncultivable range land and on crop residues to capture one of the world’s largest wastes in food production
- Soil management practices to permit production on acidic tropical soils
- Reduction in post-harvest losses, which reach 50% in some countries due to lack of food preservation, storage, or protection from pests and rodents

The Chinese have used some of these and other methods to progress from famine to self-sufficiency in food production in 25 years. This kind of research and technology transfer could form the basis of a new thrust in our aid to developing countries.4

Do you wish a group from the NAS to present their findings to you prior to briefing Congress?
I will arrange for briefing EOP staff and Cabinet officers.5

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4 In a June 15 memorandum to Bourne, Brzezinski, Eizenstat, and Chip Carter, Press explained how transferring technological “know-how” to the developing world fit into the President’s larger human needs strategy. Press suggested that universities, government agencies, and, to a lesser extent, U.S. industry collaborate in this effort. (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2])

5 According to a June 9 memorandum from Press to Mondale, Bourne, Brzezinski, Chip Carter, Eizenstat, Lance, and Warren, Press arranged for a briefing on June 20 in the New Executive Office Building. (Ibid.) In a separate June 9 memorandum to Mondale, Press drew the Vice President’s attention to the NAS report, extended an invitation to the briefing, and commented that he would work with Mondale or his staff if the Vice President desired additional information about world hunger. (Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem) In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s June 20 evening report to Brzezinski, Tuchman indicated that she had attended the briefing, which lasted for 2 hours. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 5–7/77) No record of the briefing was found.
213. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to Chip Carter, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat), and the President’s Science Adviser and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)\(^1\)

Washington, June 11, 1977

SUBJECT

World Hunger Initiative

Background:

The President’s interest in World Hunger is very timely and needed. Recent estimates indicate that 1.2 billion people are malnourished. Malnutrition is concentrated in the poor, infants and children, and among women (particularly nursing mothers). The largest number of chronically hungry people are found in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The largest number of chronically food-deficient developing countries are found in Africa with the Sahel and Ethiopia of particular concern. Malnutrition, however, is endemic to almost all poor countries. In parts of South Asia, for example, malnutrition affects over 50 percent of the children. In Latin America, where nutrition is considerably better, malnutrition is a primary or contributing cause of almost 60 percent of the deaths of preschoolchildren. Nonetheless, experience in Sri Lanka, the State of Kerala in India, and China indicates that there is hope. Even very poor countries, if they strongly focus comprehensive social programs on the basic needs of the population, can alleviate or limit malnutrition significantly.

The food production and nutrition problem has several major international aspects. The world’s food production is now sufficient to meet the current needs, and promises to remain so in the immediate future. However, the demand for food in developing countries has been growing and continues to grow more rapidly than the supply of food distributed to those countries. Poor countries increasingly depend on food exports from the United States and a few other major agricultural exporters.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2]. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Onek. Another copy is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Box HE–6, Subject Files—Executive, 1/20/77–9/29/77.
Thus, world hunger is an explosive humanitarian and political problem, causing either directly or indirectly millions of deaths per year. In periods of widespread poor harvests and with no coordinated system of world food reserves to be drawn upon in times of need, catastrophic famines are occurring. Even worse, the distribution of available food is so poor that annually millions starve or are chronically malnourished. It is estimated that one million people died of hunger in India in 1972, and the situation that year was worse in Bangladesh.\(^2\) In this setting, the United States’ position as the world’s largest food exporter, as the largest donor in international food and agricultural assistance is highly visible and extremely vulnerable. Serious thought and strong leadership will be necessary to achieve humanitarian goals while at the same time avoiding foreign and domestic crises.

**Human Rights Discussion:**

We have stressed the need for cooperation and achievement of self-reliance in health care with developing nations. We should also, as an aspect of our overall human needs strategy, stress the need for achievement of self-reliance in food production and nutrition. We might consider the hunger issue as the touchstone of a major thrust in our foreign policy, and one in which we stress meeting human needs through increasing self-reliance in food production and nutrition, carefully integrated with health care and population policies. This thrust will complement our human rights policy, and establish a more firm foundation for it. The human right to food, similar to the right to health care, is fundamental. We cannot continue to focus on the deprivation of rights for thousands of political prisoners and relegate to back pages the unnecessary deaths of millions.

While our affirmations regarding world political rights may be occasionally elusive in terms of implementation, our specific actions in terms of social rights can be very tangible and concrete.\(^3\) We can establish broad but practical and measurable human needs goals, e.g., programs of food production and basic nutrition, development of low-cost health delivery systems, adequate maternal and child health programs, rural sanitary water supply development, humanitarian food trade policies, etc. Importantly, this must be done on a government-wide basis to ensure consistency and comprehensiveness. Implementation would then follow through the development of a comprehensive global plan, including goals for the basic human needs of life: adequate and quality food for everyone, basic health care, education, jobs.


\(^3\) Indeed, achievement of worldwide goals in food production will be more readily understood and felt by the average American. [Footnote in the original.]
Therefore, I am suggesting that as part of a human rights (social justice) strategy, we should develop a human needs policy with hunger and health as the rallying points.

Problems Associated with a World Hunger Initiative:

“There is no single cause of the world food problem. Part of the explanation is to be found in the operation of many of the world’s international systems which deprive Third World countries of the opportunities to develop the resources required to meet their own food needs. Part can be found in the distribution of available food and, in particular, the emergence of meat eating in the industrialized countries as a consequence of affluence, a development which requires an enormous indirect consumption of grain to sustain it. It is also true that many Third World countries have themselves contributed to the world food problem. In some cases they have not given domestic food production the priority it deserves, choosing instead to invest their scarce resources in their cities or in ‘prestige’ projects. They have sometimes subordinated their food needs to those of the industrialized world, using some of their most productive areas for cultivating the cash crops required by the industrialized world rather than for producing their own food. In many cases they have also failed to free the small farmer from the poverty, ignorance, exploitation and discrimination which are traditionally his lot and thus prevented him from making the major contribution to development he is able to make. They have sometimes, as a matter of policy, kept prices of farm products very low with the net result that the small farmer overwhelmingly carries the burden of development. Many have been reluctant to initiate the land reforms required to expand food production and have failed to come to terms with post-harvest food losses which, in some countries, account for 50 percent of total grain production.”

In this latter regard, the U.S. has strong but little-used leverage, e.g., favorable terms of trade and eligibility for food aid.

Given careful study and reflection, it is likely that U.S. policies, public and private, can be altered to encourage improved production and distribution at home and abroad.

While it is true that the U.S. is the world’s greatest exporter of agricultural products, we have powerful vested domestic interests which seek to maintain a consistent but complex set of domestic agricultural production policies, for there is a close relationship between world de-

mand for food and U.S. domestic food prices. Any pronounced change in prices will set in motion domestic forces, either from producers or consumers, which could give the President considerable political problems. On the other hand, the Administration has sought to develop policies which stress cooperation with developing nations, and we could do more (utilizing already substantial exhibited support at the grassroots level) to achieve humanitarian and political goals. The potential political liabilities can be avoided, but only by planning which avoids “quick fix” policy pronouncements, and by a strategy designed to gain broad-based consensus on a world food and nutrition policy among 26 Federal agencies and many private farm, labor, and other interest groups in the U.S.

Finally, we must recognize that the diet and health of our own citizens is strongly influenced by many of the same policies that affect the problem of world hunger: the food we grow, how we grow it. Our patterns of trade and aid determine in part what our own citizens pay for and find on their dinner plates. As responsible policy-makers, we must focus attention on how decisions in agriculture and foreign aid affect the health and well being of Americans.

Suggested Optional Approaches:

We should explore approaches that will accomplish these objectives:
—Place the President in a strong leadership position on world hunger.
—Develop public and governmental support for new initiatives, especially among business groups which have strong vested interest views on food policy and development assistance.
—Establish a framework for long-term follow up.

The following scenarios are suggested for consideration.

Scenario 1

Step 1: The President or a Cabinet member delivers a statement on world hunger before a world forum, such as the June 20th World Food Council meeting in Manila.5

Step 2: The President issues a statement appointing a Cabinet-level official, Presidential advisor, or distinguished American from the private sector to head up a public/private Council on World Food and Nutrition Policy. The Council would conduct regional hearings, beginning in Washington, and possibly extending overseas, to assess what could be done and recommend options for the President to consider.

5 See Document 221.
One or more members of the President’s family and other prominent figures might be involved.

**Scenario 2**

*Step 1:* The President announces a major reevaluation of food policy and agricultural development assistance, and calls for a Washington Conference on Food and Agricultural Assistance.

*Step 2:* Farm, business, labor, religious and public interests groups, foreign officials (especially representatives of international organizations) as well as Congressional and Executive Branch leaders are invited to a 3-day conference to testify before the President and Cabinet about their views. The President presides over one session each day, the co-chairman might be the Secretary of Agriculture, and Senate and House leadership. At the conclusion of the 3-day conference, the President could appoint a three to five-member Cabinet-level Executive Group (State, AID, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce) to prepare a decision document based on the findings.

*Step 3:* The President’s decisions would be made public in the form of a Message to Congress.

**Scenario 3**

*Step 1:* The President requests each Cabinet Department with responsibilities related to food and nutrition to prepare a position paper on current policy and proposed initiatives. Papers would focus on domestic and foreign policy actions to improve the world food and nutrition situation within a basic human needs framework, with attention to domestic nutritional and economic concerns.

*Step 2:* A specially convened executive group, or one of the existing Executive Office agencies such as NSC, CEA, OMB, would integrate the position papers, and prepare a decision memorandum for the President.

*Step 3:* Legislative and administrative measures would be developed to implement the President’s decisions. A message to Congress and/or a world forum speech could publicize his decisions.

An integral government-wide policy with widespread support for a major world food program is required. It is not clear that Agriculture, Treasury, State, Commerce, Transportation, and AID are together on an approach to the problems previously identified, nor is there agreement in the private sector. Therefore, it is necessary to build support and to identify opportunities for consensus if the President is to be successful in this area. A cross-cutting mechanism of some kind which bridges domestic and international interests appears essential. People I have consulted in the private sector agree with this view.
I believe something along the lines of one of the above approaches will enhance prospects for accomplishing meaningful results. In the past, efforts in this area have had mixed or poor results and public interest and action subsided because competing U.S. agency as well as private interests were not resolved.

These views are offered as a start toward the development of a joint memo to the President recommending a course of action. My assistant, Jerry Fill (ext. 6687), will serve as my representative on this issue during my vacation in England for the next 9 days.

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214. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Agriculture Bergland

Washington, June 15, 1977

SUBJECT

Your Manila WFC Meeting in the Context of Our Emerging Foreign Policy

Your presence at the World Food Council in June presents an excellent opportunity to press forward with some major Administration foreign policy themes as they relate to outstanding issues between developed and developing countries. In particular, the forum seems highly suited to expand upon the “basic human needs” theme which the President has sounded in his United Nations and Notre Dame

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 92, Food: 1977. No classification marking. Bergland served as head of the U.S. delegation to the third session of the World Food Council in Manila, Philippines, June 20–24. For additional information concerning the WFC meeting, see Document 221.

2 Under cover of a May 27 memorandum, Hansen sent Brzezinski and Aaron a copy of telegram 117059 to multiple diplomatic posts, May 20, which requested that posts deliver to the host country’s WFC delegate a copy of a letter from Bergland discussing the outcome of the May 9–14 WFC Prepcom meeting and proposing an agenda for the upcoming WFC session. Hansen noted how “swiftly” Bergland had moved “in the Basic Human Needs direction” in advance of the Manila meeting. As the administration wanted to use the upcoming OECD Ministerial to secure the BHN strategy as a major component of the OECD’s North-South program, Hansen suggested that Brzezinski stress the connection between hunger and BHN, concluding: “What a memo from you to Bergland would do is to give his effort a proper place in a far broader and more comprehensive foreign policy initiative.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 92, Food: 1977)
speeches, and which the Secretary of State has elaborated recently at the CIEC Ministerial in Paris and will be discussing further at the OECD Ministerial.

Many elements of the Administration’s approach to the “absolute poverty” problem—the basic human needs problem—are intimately related to the agenda of the World Food Conference. Since three-quarters of the world’s “absolute poverty” population lives in rural areas, and since the “life chances” of the vast majority of them are tied to increased agricultural production and programs of reform of rural health and education facilities and agricultural infrastructure, the Manila Conference is well suited to a further iteration of U.S. goals in the “basic human needs” area.

I suggest therefore that you might wish to make the following general observations in your own language.

1) While the world undoubtedly needs some form of grain reserve system, what the developing countries need most of all is to develop greater capacity for domestic food production.

2) Breakthroughs in developing country agricultural production are intimately linked to a “basic human needs” approach in two crucial ways:

   a) More food will be available to increase nutrition levels for the poorest strata of developing country populations, and
   b) More productive employment opportunities will be created for this same population group—three-quarters of whom live in rural areas.

3) The United States is aware that programs to meet the needs of the poorest do not always work the way they are supposed to; e.g., few new jobs are created if capital-intensive technologies are used.

4) Therefore, the United States hopes to persuade its OECD associates at the late June Ministerial to begin to fashion a comprehensive approach to a “basic human needs” strategy, and to present this idea for global discussion in appropriate venues within the coming year.

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3 The President addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York on March 17 and delivered the commencement address at Notre Dame University on May 22. He used both occasions to explain how “basic human needs,” including food assistance, fit within a larger foreign policy strategy. See Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 444–451 and 954–962. Both addresses are scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

5) A crucial element in this approach will be the enhanced role of the LDC’s in global food production, in ways which strengthen the basic human needs program with the support of an appropriate grain reserve program which can serve as “insurance” for those countries willing to undertake the reforms which a basic human needs approach will require.

While many of these ideas may already form part of your own thinking, I offer them simply to encourage you to use the Manila forum to demonstrate the consistency of U.S. thinking with regard to the problems of the developing countries and the global system into which we are seeking to build.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

215. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 17, 1977

Prospects for Expanded Soviet Bloc Role in North-South Problems

Summary and Conclusions

There are two contrasting motives for encouraging the Soviet Bloc to play a more active role in North-South problems, particularly in various measures for economic development, as you suggested at CIEC:2

a) to elicit a genuinely cooperative effort on the part of the Soviet Union, with the aim of maximizing the positive role they have to play in Third World development and dampening East-West political competition; or

b) to silhouette Soviet inadequacies in contributing to Third World needs, with the aim of revealing the gap between Soviet rhetoric and

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 6/77. Confidential. Drafted by Theodore Moran and Jennone Walker; concurred in by Boeker and Frank and in draft by Martin Kohn (INR/REC/CER) and Barry. Tarnoff also initialed the memorandum. The President wrote on the memorandum: “Some good ideas—J.” Vance sent a copy to him under a June 26 memorandum. (Ibid.) The transmittal memorandum is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

2 See Document 214 and footnote 4 thereto.
reality and exposing the Soviets to criticism on the part of the developing countries.

The relative weight to be accorded these motives shows up when the complex of North-South issues is broken down into its components: negotiations focusing on the *International Wheat Agreement*, other individual *commodity agreements* (except coffee), aid for basic *human needs*, and the producer-consumer dialogue in *energy* offer some promise of success in integrating the Soviet bloc into the North-South dialogue in a constructive way.³

On the Food Aid Convention, IFAD, general bilateral aid, multilateral development efforts via the UN, trade, and technology, in contrast, it will be extraordinarily hard to move the Soviets into a pattern of positive contribution.⁴ But it should be relatively easy to expose the dismal Soviet performance to Third World criticism, without our appearing to conduct an anti-Soviet campaign.

The United States need not choose definitively, between the two approaches. Rather, it can explore both options without foreclosing either.

But there are limits to how much we can expect from this effort. While some Soviet officials have recently been throwing out hints of greater interest, Moscow’s official position is that it wants no part of the “North-South” dialogue as such; that it is a false way of looking at the world and that the real division—between capitalist and socialist countries—puts them squarely on the side of the developing states.

Beyond rhetoric and ideology, the Soviets have not wanted to dilute the political impact of their assistance by subsuming it within broader efforts by the industrialized (read Western) nations.⁵ And they focus more on arms and military equipment than on economic aid. This gives them a short-run political impact disproportionate to their outlays, and leaves Western countries shouldering the more important, longer-term economic aid burden.

Finally, we should be under no illusion that LDC pressure on the West springs from a notion that the Soviets wear white hats and we black. It reflects, instead, a realistic assessment that we have most of what the LDCs need, and are more likely to give at least some of it.⁶

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³ The President placed two vertical lines to the left of the paragraph beginning with the word “negotiations.”
⁴ The President placed two vertical lines to the left of the paragraph next to the first sentence.
⁵ The President placed two vertical lines to the left of the paragraph next to the first sentence.
⁶ The President placed two vertical lines to the left of this and the following paragraph.
Thus, whether we get the Soviets to cooperate in the North-South dialogue or merely score propaganda points off them, we should not expect it to lessen LDC pressure on ourselves.

The Issues

1. Agriculture

   (a) *International Grain Agreement*

       This fall the United States wants to begin negotiations on a new International Grain Agreement. The Soviets want an agreement that will produce stable prices, but have been reluctant to sign an accord that requires reserve stocks. To ensure food security for the Third World there must be grain stocks. The Soviet Union must bear central responsibility: variations in Soviet grain production currently account for about 80% of worldwide production variations. And if history is a guide, the Soviet Union will probably encounter serious weather problems in at least one or two of the next five years. They have an interest in getting an agreement to give them some security on price. Pressing them on the need to contribute to protection against starvation in the Third World might push them over the top toward making a commitment on reserves. Probability of success: moderate.\(^7\)

   (b) *Food Aid Convention*

       This fall we shall start negotiations for a new Food Aid Convention, which will consist of pledges by member countries to donate an annual minimum amount of food aid. The Soviets have not been a member in the past. This year we could seek Soviet membership. Probability of success: extremely low. Prospects for shaming the Soviets: good.

   (c) *IFAD*

       IFAD is a fund to finance agricultural development in the Third World via projects carried out by the World Bank, regional banks, or FAO. The Soviets have not promised to contribute. We could press them. Probability of success: almost none. Prospects for shaming the Soviets: moderate.

2. *Commodity Agreements*

       The Soviets are already a member of commodity agreements—cocoa, tin, rubber, and sugar (now defunct). To have successful agreements on sugar, copper, and eventually other materials, we shall have to insist that they make their bilateral agreements public (e.g., Cuban sugar) and that they include intra-bloc trade as part of the world trade

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\(^7\) The President wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “Let them know the consequences of not cooperating also.”
for purposes of market control (e.g., copper shipments in Eastern Eu-

3. Development Assistance

(a) Basic Human Needs

There are some specific areas in which the Soviets might be able to make a productive contribution to development assistance in cooperation with American aid programs. One is the training of paramedical personnel, where the Soviets have a comparative advantage and the South has a great need. Other areas for US-Soviet bloc cooperative aid programs in the “human needs” category might include: a) water treatment; b) waste disposal; c) joint research in host countries on tropical diseases; d) responses to protein deficiency; e) immunization; f) clinics and low-cost health delivery systems. (Note: Cuba has an outstanding record in organizing and managing programs, especially rural programs, in many of these areas.)

The US Congress might not like the notion of joint ventures, especially with Cubans. It might be well to begin by adding LDC needs to the agenda of ongoing US-Soviet exchanges on, for instance, agriculture, housing, and medical subjects. Probability of success: unknown.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to agricultural issues.]

216. Memorandum From Lynn Daft of the Domestic Policy Staff to the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat)¹

Washington, June 27, 1977

SUBJECT

World Hunger as a Policy Initiative

In preparation for your meeting this Tuesday² to discuss Peter Bourne’s June 11, 1977 paper on the world hunger issue,³ here are some thoughts.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2]. No classification marking.
² June 28. See footnote 2, Document 217.
³ See Document 213.
World Hunger as an Issue

World food production is increasing faster than population, on average, yet the imbalanced distribution remains a serious problem. Between 1954 and 1975, per capita food production in South and West Asia barely held stable while in Africa it declined. As a result, many developing countries are heavily dependent on imported foods, especially grains. And current projections call for these import requirements to grow still larger by 1985. Since many of these nations will not have enough foreign exchange to fill their needs commercially, they will be dependent on some form of food aid.

In short, world hunger is an important issue and one that is likely to remain important for many years to come. Also, it is an issue that this nation is uniquely well qualified to address. And, as Bourne notes and the President remarked at the June 6th Cabinet meeting, it is somewhat of a “natural” for this Administration with its human rights emphasis.\(^4\) It is also a “natural” for the President, given his farm background. Thus, I would agree with Bourne that the issue is a prime candidate for a major policy initiative.

Activities Underway

I have serious reservations over the approaches Bourne has suggested, however. In part, these reservations stem from Bourne’s failure to relate his suggestions to a large number of activities already underway. These activities include:

- Secretary Bergland’s June 20 address before the World Food Council in Manila\(^5\) where he pledged U.S. support of an international system of grain reserves and a more reliable food aid program with greater emphasis on the use of food aid in support of development projects.

- The International Wheat Council meeting in London June 27–30 to explore a possible international grains agreement. The U.S. position was discussed at the EPG meeting of June 2.\(^6\)

- A current USDA study of foreign food assistance; final recommendations to be forwarded to the President on August 15.\(^7\)

- The Development Coordination Committee (chaired by AID) full scale review, under joint NSC–EPG auspices, of all development projects.

\(^4\) See footnote 3, Document 212.
\(^5\) See Document 221.
\(^6\) No memorandum of conversation or minutes of the June 2 EPG meeting were found.
\(^7\) See Document 223.
assistance programs, including agricultural assistance programs. The study is to be completed by September 1.\(^8\)

- A development assistance study by Brookings to be completed by mid-October, commissioned by Secretary Vance.\(^9\)
- An AID commissioned development study by Ed Hamilton to be completed by mid-July.
- A report to the President (delivered June 20th) by the National Academy of Sciences culminating a two-year study of how research can contribute to an improved world food and nutrition situation.\(^{10}\)

These activities—and there are probably others I don’t know about—need to be integrated into any Administration initiative in this field. In fact, the USDA and DCC efforts should contribute importantly to laying the foundation for such an initiative.

**Leadership**

The absence of a clear assignment of leadership on this issue is causing problems, and will cause more if it isn’t soon resolved. As you can see from the above listing of activities, USDA, AID, State, the DCC, and NSC/EPG are all proceeding down similar paths... and somewhat independently. The Bourne memo further suggests the possibility of direct White House involvement.

USDA wants the lead responsibility. Two arguments are offered for not giving Agriculture the lead: (1) that Agriculture’s interest is too narrowly focused on surplus disposal objectives, and (2) that U.S. foreign assistance has been designed on a country-by-country basis rather than along functional lines. The first argument is much less valid than it once was. The second argument raises a fundamental policy question that needs to be addressed. The major argument in behalf of Agriculture’s assuming the lead is simply that they are better equipped to carry-out the assignment than any other agency—an argument I find compelling.

Largely for the opposite reason, I would recommend against a major White House role. The White House staff, as you know, is not

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\(^8\) Documentation on the DCC development assistance review is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy. A summary of the DCC Study is attached to an undated issues paper prepared in advance of the October 11 PRC meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 65, PRC 039, 10/11/77, Foreign Assistance [1])


\(^{10}\) See Document 212.
staffed for a task of this magnitude . . . and probably shouldn’t be. In addition, the task is a continuing one that should be organized for the long-pull rather than the quick show.

Next Steps

There are several steps that could be taken, including the following:

— **Clarification of the leadership responsibility.** I am inclined to give USDA more of the action. Assistant Secretary Dale Hathaway is particularly well equipped for the responsibility.

— **Consolidation of Effort.** The various activities described above need to be tied together. Whoever is given the lead responsibility in this field should also be given this charge.

— **Presidential Message.** As a means of bringing the pieces together, we might aim for a Presidential message in the fall or winter.

217. **Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, June 27, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Some Thoughts and Suggestions for the World Hunger Meeting

This Administration has not yet developed an integrated policy on world food and nutrition. This is a difficult subject both because it is so intertwined with highly political domestic issues, and because on the foreign side it involves so many different agencies and kinds of issues. While there are no short term deadlines to force adequate attention to be paid to it, in the medium and long term there is probably no other single issue that will more affect global peace and security than the availability and distribution of food.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 92, Food: 1977. No classification marking. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "OBE." Attached but not printed are a copy of Bourne’s June 11 memorandum (See Document 213) and an NSC Correspondence Profile indicating that Brzezinski received the memorandum on June 28 and that copies were sent to Hormats.
Bourne has written a memorandum for today’s meeting (Tab A) proposing a “World Hunger Initiative”. Please read the section entitled Suggested Optional Approaches beginning on page 4. You will see that it is merely a public relations strategy—almost no substance. Scenario 3 suggests a bizarre version of an interagency process—minus the interactions. He would have each agency submit its own tunnel vision view of the problems and programs, and then have a separate Executive Office group try to mold these into a coherent policy. To my mind that is a ridiculous approach, destined to produce only a rehash of what we already know. The other two scenarios propose an outreach to the dozens of outside interest groups before a policy is developed. That makes no sense.

I have been looking at this issue for several weeks, and am convinced that a serious fairly long lead-time PRM is needed. This issue is worthy of the most serious consideration at a level which will command the best talents the agencies have to offer. Though pieces of this issue are being treated by many agencies, the threads have yet to be pulled together into a coherent policy. However I do not think that any new institutional arrangement should be set up (as Bourne suggests) until after such a comprehensive review is completed. The PRM should be done in close collaboration with OSTP, OMB and the Domestic Council. I do not think however that Bourne should be too heavily involved—certainly not in a lead position. His forays into the health field have created unprecedented bureaucratic chaos.

Regarding substance, my feeling is that Chip’s role should focus on helping to build domestic support for the concept that certain basic human needs are an integral part of human rights. Certainly nothing could be more basic than the right not to starve. As a member of the President’s family, Chip is perfectly suited to this role, and it would be a contribution not only to this issue, but to the whole spectrum of human needs concerns, as well as to the entire human rights policy. Obviously, if successful, a major effort at increasing public awareness on this issue, would help enormously in generating the Congressional support the

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2 See Document 213. No record of a meeting was found; the Cabinet meeting minutes of June 27 indicate that an “informal meeting on world hunger” was scheduled to take place some time that week. (Carter Library, Vertical File, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 6/6/77–8/16/77) According to the June 29 Evening Report prepared by the NSC Global Issues Cluster, Tuchman convened the first meeting of the “food drafting group” that day, attended by Press and staffers from Eizenstat’s and Bourne’s offices. According to Tuchman: “We are pretty well in agreement on how to proceed (procedurally not substantively) with the glaring exception of Bourne’s people who seem determined to immediately launch a major public relations initiative—before we develop a policy. Denend and Tuchman will draft a paper and the group will meet again to work it over next week. We should meet Brzezinski’s deadline to report to him by the end of the week.” Brzezinski underlined the last sentence and wrote “yes” in the margin. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 5–7/77)
President will need if he is to fulfill the promise he has made to double foreign aid by 1982.\(^3\)

One additional suggestion: The Soviets have traditionally been very difficult on this issue—refusing to participate in international conferences, etc. As you know, they have proposed three CSCE initiatives for international conferences on energy, environment and transportation. Perhaps we could respond with an American proposal at the fall CSCE meeting for a food and nutrition conference—pegged on the connection between human needs and human rights.\(^4\) This would: (1) constitute an American initiative at CSCE which the President wants, and (2) be visible evidence of the fact that the US is not backing off on human rights, without being provocative to the Soviets (at least in a way they can acknowledge). Hormats is very dubious about this idea. He feels that the LDCs would resent it as an attempt to insert a North-South issue into the East-West conflict. Perhaps some more work would define some useful variant of it.

Recommendations:

1. That you make clear at the meeting that you view this as a major foreign policy issue, on which the NSC is preparing to begin an interagency study—in which all concerned Executive Office departments will be appropriately involved.

2. That you do not think that we should start any public relations programs, such as Bourne proposes, until we have our policy pretty well worked out. Public conferences before that time would only serve to advertise and increase our present lack of direction.

3. That you suggest that Chip’s role be focused on the relationship of human needs to the global human rights agenda, and that a substantive role for him be developed on that basis. It should be emphasized that creating domestic support for this idea would be of very real value to the President.

4. That you approve further work on the proposal to suggest some kind of food and nutrition conference as an American initiative of the CSCE Review Conference.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) The CSCE Review Conference opened on October 6 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

\(^5\) There is no indication whether Brzezinski approved or disapproved any of the recommendations. According to an NSC Correspondence Profile attached to another copy of the memorandum, the memorandum was returned to Tuchman on June 29 with instructions that it was to be held. Another copy was sent to Brzezinski on July 14 for decision. The last entry in the Correspondence Profile, October 11, indicates the memorandum was OBE. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Box HE–6, Subject Files—Executive, 1/20/77–9/29/77)
SHARING THE BURDEN IN THE NEXT FOOD CRISIS

At present, countries consuming three-fourths of the world’s grain follow trade and domestic policies that magnify the impact of a shortfall in worldwide grain supplies and force larger cutbacks on the remaining nations. In the scramble for grains during the 1972–75 food shortage, some nations increased their grain use by 10 to 20 percent over their pre-crisis levels, while others were forced to decrease consumption by as much as 16 percent. This disparity raises questions as to whether there are more equitable ways to adjust to future shortfalls and reduce economic disruptions.

Contrast in Pricing Policies

When domestic grain production falls in the Soviet Union, the PRC, and most of Eastern Europe, domestic consumption is maintained by making available additional imported grain at regular domestic prices. In the EC, grain prices are kept stable even in times of world shortage through frequent changes in the tariff rate applied to grain imports (known as the variable levy). These countries use nearly half of the world’s grain, yet their policies reduce economic incentives for grain conservation.

In the LDCs, where grains constitute the major element in the human diet, most governments try to maintain stable consumer prices through direct procurement and imports. When prices rise, the governments attempt to maintain consumption levels for the poor through some form of special distribution, by absorbing some of the import and marketing costs, and by using food aid when possible. In these ways most LDCs are able to prevent sharp cutbacks in consumption levels, albeit with shifts in foreign exchange expenditures or increased indebtedness.

The burden of adjustment has fallen chiefly on countries which use the remaining fourth of the world’s grain, that is, Canada, Australia, and the United States (the three major exporters), a few other developed countries, and some of the poorest LDCs.

In contrast to Europe and the USSR, the US has permitted internal prices to vary widely. In 1974–75, as a result of sharply increased corn and wheat prices, domestic US grain consumption decreased by 38 mil-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770118–2107. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Witt and approved by Ely.
lion tons with only a 3-million-ton decline in exports (from 31 to 28 million tons). Canada and Australia, despite some protection against high prices for their wheat consumers, also showed a decline in overall grain use in the 1974 to 1976 period.

Prior to 1972, when world grain production capacity greatly exceeded normal demand, unusual demands for imports drew on excess stocks held by residual suppliers, while ample food aid was available to hard-pressed LDCs. However, with world grain supply and demand now more nearly in balance, particularly for feedgrains, a small shortfall leads to competitive scrambling for exportable supplies, sharp increases in prices, and soaring foreign exchange expenditures.

Adjustments During the 1972–75 Food Crisis

The recent crisis was generated by two very small decreases in world food production and somewhat larger decreases in per capita production:

— a 1-percent decrease in output from 1971 to 1972 meant a 3-percent decrease per capita;
— a 7-percent production increase from 1972 to 1973 meant a 5-percent increase per capita;
— another 1-percent decrease in output from 1973 to 1974 resulted in a 2-percent drop per capita; and
— a 2-percent increase in world production from 1974 to 1975 caused no change in per capita availabilities.

During the entire period, world production was at least 10 percent higher per capita than in the 1961–65 base period. Even in the LDCs, per capita production was above the base years, although it dropped from 105 percent in 1971 to 101 percent in 1972. Individual countries, of course, varied widely with changes of as much as 30 percent above or below the base period.

Grain consumption figures, although of varying reliability, illustrate the uneven adjustment to changes in world supplies. (See Table 1.)

The LDCs in the aggregate were able to increase total grain consumption during each of the years after 1972, although not on a per capita basis in 1974–75. Clearly, this was possible only because of a decrease in consumption in the developed nations, with most of the decline occurring in the US. The EC Nine also maintained consumption above the 1969–72 average by 2 to 5 percent, mainly to support a larger livestock production. To feed an even more rapidly expanding live-

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2 Table 1, “Indexes of Grain Consumption for Major Categories, 1969–72 through 1976–77,” is attached but not printed.
stock industry, Eastern Europe and the USSR increased grain consumption sharply until mid-1975; the severe 1975 drought brought distress slaughter to the USSR and forced a curtailment of consumption, despite more than 25 million tons of grain imports.

Table 2 shows the differences in consumption patterns of 22 major countries and areas. The logistical difficulties in distributing grain to combat the effects of the Sahel drought are evident in the 13-percent reduction in Central and West African consumption and the very small (3 percent) increase in the best year of the period. The remaining LDC regions show increases in grain consumption, in some cases substantial increases, partly as substitutes for other foods in short supply. Also, while obtaining more grain, many of these nations faced such economic problems as equitable internal distribution of food, increasing foreign indebtedness, and reallocation of foreign exchange earnings.

Implications

The higher prices received by growers and rising foreign exchange earnings from grain exports are a mixed blessing in exporting countries. Desperate LDCs turn to exporters with pleas (or demands) for concessional supplies. Livestock farmers in exporting countries, confronted with higher grain prices, sharply curtail the use of feedgrains and livestock production, which leads to early slaughter but subsequent shortage of livestock products. Livestock farmers, consumers, and labor groups seek action to limit price increases and control exports; these efforts handicap governments in responding to legitimate LDC pleas for more grain supplies. Wide variations in prices may also be damaging to the long-run interests of grain producers as land prices and other production costs increase. Finally, dogged pursuance of globally inconsistent efforts to maintain usual consumption levels contributes to global inflation, depletes LDC exchange reserves, and, in some circumstances, reduces world demand for other commodities.

Long-range efforts to expand food production, reduce waste, control population, and improve nutrition may affect the size of the shortfall but are relatively unimportant in dealing with a current shortage.

Of the programs to deal with grain shortages, some, such as grain reserves, must be inaugurated in advance of the shortfall, while others require adjustments in agricultural resource use and reallocations of food supplies during the period of crisis. In either case, the burden of these adjustments falls unevenly upon nations and groups within nations. It will be very difficult to spread the burden more equitably, or even to define an equitable sharing of the burden.

Table 2, “Adjustments in Grain Consumption: 1969–72 through 1975–76,” is attached but not printed.
In a world of free trade, flexible prices, and relatively adequate exchange reserves among countries, moderate changes in prices would stimulate many of the appropriate economic adjustments but not necessarily contribute to an improvement in equity. In the absence of such economic policies, remedies must be sought in other directions and will be very difficult to achieve. Some of the less difficult ones are listed below.

—The establishment of grain reserves, whether private, public, or international, can make a significant contribution to reducing the impact of a shortfall in current production. A reserve designed to stabilize grain supplies for livestock production must be much larger than one geared to stabilize foodgrain supplies for human consumption.

—More stable, possibly multi-year, food aid commitments have special significance for the lower income LDCs. Contributions by an array of the richer nations, even though they are not food exporters, can help prevent food aid from diminishing in quantity when the need is greatest.

—More flexible national policy to stimulate food-grain production through higher prices and other expansionist policies will help prevent a second or third year of food shortages.

—Provision of emergency grants and credits will enable low-income LDCs to compete more effectively in world grain markets during periods of shortages; however, this approach can be inflationary unless cutbacks are made in other countries.

Since food shortages bear most heavily on the poor, additional domestic programs are likely to be needed in individual countries to improve access to food supplies for adversely affected regions and economic groups.

More difficult measures that require considerable coordination among national policies for controlling or curtailing grain consumption include:

—Trade liberalization to extend the area of price-sensitive production and consumption.

—An insurance program sponsored by exporters, or by all high-income countries, to furnish grain to any LDC whose output falls below 3 or 4 percent of trend production.

—Measures in developed nations, including Eastern Europe and the USSR, to reduce the amount of foodgrains consumed by animals, either by switching to grass and fodder or by deliberate reduction of livestock numbers.

—Discouragement of human consumption of grain in all countries where alternative food supplies are available.
In broad terms, countries able to carry and manage grain reserves and those with a significant livestock industry have flexibilities in their food supplies that are not available to most developing nations. Adjustments to the next food crisis will be more equitable if economic policies utilize these flexibilities. Without more effective efforts to share the adjustment, the governments of exporting countries will again be under pressure to consider controls on exports in order to moderate internal price movements and placate consumer groups.

219. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman and Leslie Denend of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) \(^1\)

Washington, July 9, 1977

SUBJECT

World Food Project

The attached memorandum (Tab A) fulfills your direction to produce a joint NSC-Domestic Council-OSTP-Bourne proposal—except that Bourne’s people do not agree with it.

Since our meeting with you,\(^2\) we have held two meetings, produced two drafts,\(^3\) and incorporated two sets of comments. Throughout all this, NSC, DPC and OSTP have been in fairly complete agreement, and all are happy with the final draft. Also, throughout the whole process, talking to Jerry Fill and John Daly has been like talking

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 92, Food: 1977. No classification marking. A July 8 memorandum from Press and Omenn to Tuchman indicating that they “fully support the process, participants, and preliminary plans for the proposed PRM”; a copy of the fifth page of the “Toward a PRM on World Food Policy” memorandum (attached below) annotated by Hansen; and a typewritten note indicating that the Domestic Policy Council had approved Tuchman’s memorandum are ibid. Another copy of Tuchman and Denend’s memorandum is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, 1/20/77–9/29/77. According to the attached NSC Correspondence Profile, Tuchman and Denend’s memorandum went to Brzezinski on July 11. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 92, Subject Chron, Food, 1977)

\(^2\) Presumable reference to a meeting Daft and Tuchman planned to have with Brzezinski following the first meeting of the “food drafting group” on June 29. See Document 217 and footnote 2 thereto. No record of either meeting has been found.

\(^3\) The first draft was not found. The second draft is Tab A.
to a stone wall. Fill staged an angry walkout from the second meeting in response to some perfectly reasonable comments by one of the other participants. The core of the disagreement is that Bourne’s people look upon the substantive work that needs to be done as a minor sideshow to a major effort to build a public constituency for hunger, while everyone else believes that it makes little sense to solicit support for a policy before you know what your policy is.

Bourne’s comments (prepared in response to an earlier draft) are attached at Tab B, along with final comments by the others. Many of Bourne’s comments, such as the suggestion to add Transportation, Labor and ERDA to the list of addressees were discussed by the group and, I thought, disposed of. However, Bourne’s office declined to produce comments to the second draft.

In sum, we made a good faith effort to produce a consensus proposal—but ended up as far apart from Bourne’s office as we were at the first meeting. Frankly, all of the rest of us who participated in this effort (including Hormats, Hansen, Huberman and Denend) were amazed at Jerry Fill. I am sure he has honest convictions on this issue, but he has been totally unresponsive to our efforts to reach consensus and move forward.

I don’t know where to go with Bourne’s people from here (or even whether Fill’s convictions are shared by Bourne himself), but I believe that the attached proposal provides a sound basis to proceed with further work.

Recommendation:

If you approve of this proposal, I would suggest that we draft a memorandum to the President explaining what we have done and what we are proposing. Specifically, we would want him to understand that under this plan, major Presidential initiatives on this issue would be postponed until the PRM is completed—probably around the end of the year.4

4 There is no indication that Brzezinski approved or disapproved the recommendation.
TOWARD A PRM ON WORLD FOOD POLICY

I. The Mechanics of the Study

A. Process: We are agreed that the PRM process is appropriate for this review. The strengths of the PRM process are that it is a tested approach to problems which cut across departments and agencies, and it is respected by the bureaucracy which will delegate high-level attention to its preparation.

B. Participants: Every agency which will play a significant role in the policy implementation should be included, but every effort should be made to limit the participants to those who have a legitimate interest. Suggested participants include:

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<th>Agencies</th>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Treasury</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Domestic Policy Council</td>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Office of Science and Technology Policy</td>
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<td>Health, Education and Welfare</td>
<td>Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations</td>
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<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Office of the Special Assistant for Health (Bourne)</td>
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<td>United States Representative to the United Nations</td>
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<td>National Science Foundation</td>
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C. Chair: Since a committee cannot be successfully run by a committee, the PRM would be run under joint NSC-Domestic Policy Council management with full participation by other Executive Office of the President offices as appropriate. Serious problems have arisen in

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5 No classification marking.

6 Daft transmitted a copy of the “Toward a PRM on World Food Policy” memorandum to Eizenstat under a July 9 covering memorandum, in which he indicated that he supported “the general thrust of the proposal, though much work on the detail remains.” Eizenstat wrote on the memorandum: “Lynn: Is a jt. NSC–DC management idea feasible? Shouldn’t we defer to NSC & simply participate & let them chair? Let’s talk.” (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2])
the past due to joint management arrangements and the consequent lack of a single point man. There are strong reasons to strive for joint domestic-international management but this may prove to be infeasible. A more precise definition of who will do what can probably be arrived at during the process of drafting the PRM tasking memorandum.

D. **Timeframe:** There are several studies in progress now which bear on this review, PRM–8 (end of July), AID (September 1), Brookings (October 15). The conclusions of these studies should be digested before another is begun. Therefore, we would expect to issue the PRM in late October for a study requiring several months.

II. **A Role for Chip Carter**

A. Chip Carter, following his father’s initiative, is anxious to get started and do something about world hunger. He will be a valuable asset after a policy is defined. However, until we have a policy, his efforts should concentrate on drawing attention to the broad dimensions of the problem, and stressing the notion of a world responsibility to solve it.

B. Chip will need some staff assistance in whatever he undertakes. Given the nature of his efforts, the best points of contact are probably in the Office of the Assistant to the President for Public Liaison.

C. Specific activities might include:
   — Attendance at public hearings by various interest groups.
   — Travel as a concerned member of the “world community”.
   — Sponsorship of an information clearing house.

D. Care must be taken so that Chip is not seen as a government spokesman during the early stages. His exposure should give him credibility as a spokesman on the issue, and later, when we have a policy for him to support, he will be an effective advocate.

III. **A Focus of the Study**

A. The concern of the President and Chip Carter is hunger. We have learned through painful experience in this field that well meant efforts to produce short term benefits (i.e., by trying to directly feed people) can often produce counterproductive results. To avoid a “quick fix” solution to an emotional and pressing issue, the study must be broadened to include the full scope of international agricultural policy and many central aspects of domestic agricultural policies so that an effective long-term policy can be developed. While the issue of world

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8 See footnotes 8 and 9, Document 216.
hunger is obviously related to the whole spectrum of human needs, the scope of the study must be kept to manageable limits.

B. Consequently, our efforts should center on three sets of issues:

1. **Food Production**
   - Fluctuations in world-wide production, including climate change.
   - LDC food production.
   - Pre- and post-harvest losses.
   - Agricultural research.
   - Production incentives.

2. **Food Distribution**
   - International trade and commodity policy.
   - Domestic and international food reserves—control and access.
   - Role of food aid and grants.
   - Food distribution systems—efficiency, equity, different available mechanisms.

3. **Food Consumption**
   - Social change—land reform, urgan-rural balance, etc.
   - Economic change—purchasing power, income distribution, etc.
   - Nutrition.

These three broad areas may be well studied without in depth consideration of issues of health or population planning.

**IV. First Steps**

This paper represents a first step towards a full definition of the scope of the PRM. During the interim period between now and October, in addition to monitoring the progress of the related studies mentioned above, we will want to undertake the following:

- Lay the bureaucratic groundwork through detailed consultations with key individuals in the involved agencies.
- Continue to define the study and begin drafting the PRM.
- Collect and classify work that has been done to date in and out of government on this issue and broadly related topics.
- Develop a fairly detailed understanding of just how the many agencies involved in food participate in the policy and implementation process.
- Identify and categorize areas of persistent and acute hunger in the world by country, region, distribution methods, agricultural technology, hunger causes.
Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to the Members of the World Hunger Organizing Committee

Washington, July 7, 1977

SUBJECT
World Hunger Initiative

The following are my views on Ms. Tuchman’s discussion paper on the President’s interest in developing a World Hunger Initiative.10

I. The Mechanics of the Study

A. Process. The PRM process is an appropriate policy review mechanism for the National Security Council. It is not clear that this process, in the absence of early public involvement (i.e., a Washington Conference on Food and Nutrition), is the best approach to deal with competing domestic and international interests, both within the government and the private sector, and promote high-level attention and the attendant constituency in the development and execution of a U.S. policy. Therefore, I would propose that this initiative not be viewed as a study, but instead, a policy review which includes involvement by the private sector.

B. Participants. Several other agencies should be included in the process. Suggested additional agencies would include: Department of Transportation which effects domestic price and therefore distribution of international food commodities; the Department of Labor; and perhaps ERDA.

In addition, I believe it is sufficient to mention HEW and not also the National Institutes of Health. Also, I believe that mention of the State Department is sufficient and that special consideration of the U.S. representative to the United Nations which falls under the organizational framework of the Department of State is unnecessary.

With respect to the Executive Office, my view is that the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues should be included in the consideration of the institutional entities included as major participants in this review. The Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) is not relevant to this issue. In addition, and transcending my

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9 No classification marking.
10 See footnote 3 above. Reference is to an earlier draft of Tuchman’s PRM proposal, which has not been found.
own interest in involvement, is the concern that we have an overabundance of Executive Office representation and that this would have a tendency to detract from the Cabinet-level responsibility. Therefore, I am suggesting that a structure be developed which includes only one EOP individual within the Executive Committee level of any cross-cutting mechanism developed.

Consideration must also be given to other options which are not included in this particular discussion paper, e.g., a public/private cross-cutting mechanism, or a solely private mechanism with private leadership dependent upon the final decision.

My principal concern is that there is no mention of the public’s participation in the development and formulation of the world hunger policy of the United States government. The point was made at the initial meeting chaired by Dr. Brzezinski (and I believe agreed to by him)¹¹ that crystallizing attention on hunger and involving the public would be a useful approach for the President to mobilize constituent support for foreign policy initiatives across the board. This position is not reflected in your paper. Basically I disagree with the tactics regarding the development of this initiative where it concerns the President’s involvement.

C. The Chair. A joint NSC-Domestic Council management mechanism does not meet the need for a single individual to manage, arbitrate, and mediate the government review on world hunger. Furthermore, it detracts from the relevant Cabinet agency leadership. I believe that major visible participation by the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture and AID is essential to this review.

D. Timeframe. Should there be a policy review which involves the private sector, it would be necessary to develop guidelines for the conduct of the review that would take the better part of 8 weeks. However, it is questionable whether it would take more than that time to plan. October 15 seems later than necessary.

II. A Role for Chip Carter

I believe that it is unnecessary for Chip Carter to wait until a government policy is established. As I understand it, Chip wants to be only involved as it relates to the private sector initially. It would be inappropriate to provide him with staff assistants within the government regardless of where that assistance comes from. Therefore my suggestion is:

Not to wait until the completion of the policy, but encourage, advise, and assist Chip in the development of, for example, an informa-

¹¹ See footnote 2 above.
tion clearinghouse on world hunger, but with assistance from the private sector.

Regarding section II, C, attendance at public hearings of various interest groups seems to be inappropriate. Chip can attend any public hearing he wants to as a citizen of the United States as well as travel throughout the world. More pertinent is his participation as an active spokesman within the private sector articulating a particular point of view. We need a sound proposal for his participation within the private sector. We should encourage him to hire an appropriate consultant to work closely with him so that his efforts are productive and complementary to the activities going on within the government. This strategy will ensure that Chip not be viewed as a government spokesman in the early stages. Later, perhaps, and after the government has initiated a number of actions over the short term or intermediate term of the long-term policy that I assume would be developed, he may be more closely associated with Administration initiatives.

III. Focus of the Study

A. Again, we believe the word “study” will have a negative connotation. The Congress and the private sector have been overwhelmed by a multitude of studies for the past decade on this subject. The approach that I believe is most appropriate includes the development of a basic policy framework, within which any initiative should be developed. My own view is that the expression “international agricultural policy and domestic agricultural policies” is inappropriate. My recommendation is to conduct an International Food and Nutrition Policy Review and to characterize relevant domestic policies as domestic food policies. This approach transcends agriculture assistance, removes the connotation of welfare, and develops a posture of looking at this issue as an international economic issue. A welfare approach would be objectionable to multilateral organizations, the Congress, and the private sector.

B. I believe that the expression “food production” is inappropriate. I recommend that the category be called “food supply.” Furthermore, the statement at the end of this section that these two broad areas could be studied without in-depth consideration of domestic agricultural subsidies, health, nutrition, or population planning, I believe, is inaccurate.

I have given this issue considerable thought and would like to propose an alternative focus for the policy review conducted by a public or public/private organization as follows:

1. **Strategy:** First, the President should be able, with the assistance and advice of the various agencies in the government and key public interest organizations in the private sector, to develop a set of goals that
he wants to move toward by 1980 so that a measure of his Administration’s progress on hunger and malnutrition in foreign countries can be taken by the American public. Broadly stated, the policy review should focus on the following basic areas:

a. *Policies to provide more equitable access to available food.* People are hungry today not only because there is a scarcity of food but because many are poor; food goes to the highest bidder not the neediest person. Therefore,

—U.S. policies should be designed to encourage poor nations to become more self-reliant in the development of their own agricultural capacity.
—U.S. policies should encourage an increase in income and development for the poorest billion people on earth.

b. *Policies to increase the supply of food in relation to demand.* This includes the following types of actions:

—Policies to increase food production and rural development in the developing nations.
—Policies to encourage a higher level of food production in the United States.
—Policies to provide food security through our international system of grain reserves. Perhaps serious consideration should be given to an international insurance scheme as now being debated within the World Bank community for this particular problem area.
—Policies to eliminate the waste of food, particularly post-harvest food losses.

c. *Policies to provide food or food assistance for those unable to purchase sufficient food for adequate nutrition.*

d. *Policies to deal explicitly with the organization, management, and resources appropriate for the United States government to implement these policies.* This is a universally accepted problem of governments’ inability to come to grips with this important responsibility area.

This would lay the groundwork for a set of goals broadly stated with which the President could establish the basis for specific actions designed to move toward an action-oriented government policy. It is extremely important that we do not send a signal to the Congress or to the American people and our neighbors abroad that the most President Carter is going to do is “study” the issue. At the same time, we certainly would not want to pursue a policy of “quick fixes” as is pointed out in the first draft discussion paper outline. However, this is not to suggest that short-term, intermediate and long-term approaches cannot be developed throughout the process.

Having established a broad policy framework, the President then can decide with minimum delay what kind of measurable goals he wants to move toward so that by 1980 the public and Congress will un-
understand what he has accomplished in this critical international human needs area.

2. The following represent actions that could potentially engender the kind of position in 1980 where the President could say he has met specific milestones established in 1977 to pursue the concept of meeting international human needs in the food and nutrition area. They are as follows:

—A redeployment of U.S. foreign assistance resources that reflects the highest priority he has accorded to helping poor countries solve their most pressing food consumption problems. His redeployment might include a “food and nutrition discretionary fund” to allow quick response to crises and to targets of opportunity. It might require consolidating and rationalizing foreign aid, food-for-peace, and other legislation and agencies.

—A significant and measurable decrease in malnutrition-related child mortality in prospect in selected recipient countries as a result of this redeployment of foreign aid resources.

—A procedure to test proposed U.S. policies and programs in terms of their effect on food consumption and nutritional effects (e.g., trade policies that may encourage inappropriate food exports from food-poor countries). This test could also be applied by U.S. government representatives to policies, programs and projects of international organizations.

—A set of U.S. trade policies (e.g., sugar quotas, most favored nation treatment) that take into account opportunities for encouraging countries to adopt equitable food and nutrition policies in their own countries.

—Special food and nutrition consortia of donor countries in place and working with, say, five countries with serious nutrition problems that are committed to actions on food production, distribution and consumption policies, programs and projects.

—An efficiently operating international grain supply and price stabilization system of demonstrable benefit to the poorest countries in backing up national food reserves arrangements.

—A vigorous internationally coordinated food and nutrition research program under way in the U.S. and, especially, in developing countries dealing with those technical and scientific issues that represent potential breakthroughs toward solutions of key problems.

—Government policy machinery with public and private sector representation in place and at work in recommending and overseeing the implementation of changes in the U.S. food systems that will harmonize conflicting interests and objectives as they relate to broad pol-
icities, key commodities, and the balancing of economic, health, and social policy considerations.

Having told the agencies where he wants to be by 1980, the President must then ask them to tell him what must be done now to get there:

—Mobilize private sector efforts
—Refine the objectives
—Establish an adequate organization
—Propose legislation
—Assignment of lead agency responsibility
—Develop public understanding and support.

Attacking world hunger by mobilizing public support, setting some reasonable attainable 1980 goals (this does not take a year to decide), and assigning a high priority to this human needs initiative can and will foster support for the President’s overall foreign policy objectives.

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220. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Secretary of the Cabinet (Watson)

Washington, July 12, 1977

SUBJECT

Bergland Memorandum on Proposed Human Rights Conference on Food

At the direction of the President, Frank Press, Peter Bourne, Stu Eizenstat and myself have been involved in an effort to define a sound
approach to the problem of world hunger.2 We have been concerned both with developing the substance of a coherent Administration policy and with the related need to build public support for it. Our efforts include the definition of a role for Chip who has a strong interest in this area. At this point, our work indicates the need for an intensive interagency review before major public initiatives are undertaken. However, I should add that these proposals have not yet been submitted to the President for his approval.

I would suggest that Secretary Bergland’s memorandum be held by you for further action pending the President’s decisions on the memorandum which I will be forwarding to him shortly. Based on his decisions we can then decide how best to proceed with it. I will keep you fully informed.

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Bergland to President Carter3

Washington, July 7, 1977

RE

Proposed Human Rights Conference on Food

The availability of food and access to an adequate diet are major problems which affect nearly all the world’s people. For most of the world, the lack of enough food is translated into hunger; and for them, food is a human right yet to be realized. In the United States, hunger is still a visible problem, but it is more complex. As a nation, we do not lack enough food; more than enough is available. For some low income persons, the problem is access to adequate food, and their lack of access can translate into hunger and malnutrition. For millions of others in our population, the means to purchase sufficient food is present, but the lack of information about nutrition and health leads to increased incidence of disease and spiraling health care costs.

2 See footnote 1, Document 212.
3 No classification marking.
These thoughts have been very much on my mind since the World Food Conference in Manila,4 and have been sharpened as the likelihood of a bountiful harvest this year becomes clearer.

The time is right for a White House Human Rights Conference on Food. We possess an abundance of food, and, with your leadership, we are focusing again on human rights and our responsibilities as citizens to sustain them.

I am attaching a proposed conference agenda, and a suggested approach to organizing it.5 I will be happy to develop the agenda in more detail if you wish, and I would welcome any suggestions you may want to make.

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4 See Documents 214 and 221.
5 Attached but not printed.

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221. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 18, 1977

The World Food Council and the North-South Dialogue

Results of the Third Ministerial Session

The successful conclusion of the Third Session of the World Food Council (WFC), held in Manila June 20–24, 1977, assures the near-term viability of this organization and gives it the potential to become one of the primary fora for continuation of the North-South dialogue in food and agriculture.2 The meeting was successful not only in reaching a

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770144–0998. No classification marking. Drafted by McEldowney on July 13; cleared by Hathaway, Bosworth, Ferch, and Byrnes and in draft by Donald McClelland (AID/PPC). McEldowney initialed for McClelland; Bosworth did not initial the memorandum. According to the official report of the United States delegation to the World Food Council third session, the delegation consisted of Bergland, Hathaway, Ferch, Byrnes, McEldowney, Anthony Cruitt (USDA/FAS), Jo Ann Hallquist (USDA/FAS), and McClelland. (Official Report, January 1, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780086–0444)

consensus for the first time in the body’s history, but also in conducting deliberations in an atmosphere remarkably free of bloc politics or confrontation. The major reasons for the outcome include the strong and positive leadership role assumed by the United States, enhanced greatly by the attendance of Secretary Bergland; the dynamic involvement of Philippine Agriculture Secretary Arturo Tanco, Jr., who was elected as WFC President; the location of the meeting in a moderate developing nation interested in an amicable outcome and widespread disappointment with the Preparatory Meeting4 and previous WFC sessions where confrontation tactics were tried but failed.

Aside from the general success of the Session, the United States in large part achieved its own objectives, though they were admittedly modest and largely symbolic and informational in nature. For the first time since the 1974 World Food Conference, high-level attention, especially in developing nations, was drawn to the fact that complacency about world food problems is not tolerable. Such attention is all the more significant in view of three years of good harvests. Widespread recognition was accorded to US leadership in addressing food problems, both because of the presence of Secretary Bergland and because of recent US initiatives in food security, food aid, development assistance and other areas. Also, developing nations accepted to a significant degree the essentiality of a balance of responsibility in solving 1973–1976. The first United Nations World Food Conference took place in Rome in 1974. One of the conference outcomes was the establishment of the World Food Council.

3 Bergland addressed the World Food Council on June 20, reaffirming the global commitment to eradicating hunger and malnutrition. Telegram 9450 from Manila, June 20, transmitted the text of Bergland’s address. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770219–0672)

4 The preparatory meeting took place in Rome May 9–14. Telegram 7636 from Rome, May 10, reported on the first day of the prepcom, when debate focused on designation of food priority countries and setting of targets for production increases and country contributions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770167–0545) In telegram 117059 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, May 20, the Department transmitted the text of a letter from Bergland to the WFC delegates (see footnote 2, Document 214). In the letter, Bergland commented that the prepcom had failed to generate an agenda “deserving of ministerial action in Manila” and added: “agreement in many important areas was frustrated because of delegates’ preoccupation with phraseology and peripheral issues. Unless we can return to such areas of agreement, I question whether the World Food Council will be able to fulfill its function to provide overall, integrated and continuing attention for the successful coordination and follow-up of major world food policies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770181–0616)

food problems. Such balance is reflected in the Session’s final report\(^6\) which recognizes that developing countries must substantially increase internal investment in agriculture, provide a share of the agricultural inputs needed to sustain output increases, and incorporate nutritional well-being as a major objective in development planning. Such explicit acknowledgements have not been obtained previously.

At the same time, developing countries succeeded in using the World Food Council as a mechanism for advancing their position on food policy issues beyond results achieved at the recently concluded Conference on International Economic Cooperation\(^7\), despite widespread resistance among developed countries in earlier meetings to treating the Council as a “negotiating forum.” Thus, the Council accepted the designation of “food priority country” and advised international organizations to assist such countries to determine internal and external investment and other requirements for achieving at least a 4 per cent annual increase in food production. International organizations were also asked to determine a minimum package of agricultural inputs for such countries, a portion to be provided on concessional terms. Rice was explicitly mentioned as a possible component of a new international grains arrangement, as well as the subject of exploratory consultations proposed by WFC President Tanco to determine interest in a commodity agreement. In food aid, participants recommended that donor countries do their utmost to achieve a previously-agreed target of 10 million tons of cereal food aid in 1977/78 and that a new food aid convention be negotiated as part of a new grains arrangement with a view to contributing in an appropriate manner to a sustained achievement of this target.

**Implications for the Future**

The United States was in a particularly favorable position as a result of six months of exhaustive review of our policies, which highlighted those areas where changes were possible. The Third Session succeeded partly because there were compromises on positions taken by all sides. The United States should explicitly recognize in pre-

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\(^6\) The final report, entitled “Manila Communiqué of the World Food Council: A Programme of Action to Eradicate Hunger and Malnutrition,” consists of 22 recommendations related to increasing food production, agricultural inputs, food security, food aid, nutrition, and trade. Telegram 9792 from Manila, June 25, transmitted the text of the Manila Communiqué to the Department, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, London and Rome. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228–0118) The Department repeated the text in telegram 173872 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, July 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770265–1048) The UN General Assembly adopted the Program of Action contained in the Manila Communiqué on December 8 in Resolution 32/52. See *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, pp. 536–537.

\(^7\) See footnote 4, Document 214.
paring for future sessions that the Council can be a useful negotiating forum. Such a stance would contrast with past positions that negotiations could not take place in this forum, and that the United States could only accede to policy statements which conformed with actions already taken unilaterally. There is ample opportunity for reciprocal commitment in the important field of food and agriculture and the United States ought to be prepared to seize such an opportunity.

It is remotely possible that the Third Session's results contain wider implications for the atmosphere in which other North-South discussions are conducted. The session helped demonstrate to those developing countries which participated a feasible alternative to confrontation tactics. Although the absence of confrontation probably resulted from several unique circumstances including meeting outside Rome and the relatively high level of representation, the planning and other events preceding the WFC merit further analysis to determine if a spread of this non-confrontational experience to other fora is possible. At any rate, if a more conciliatory approach is tried again by developing countries as a result of the Third Session, it is likely to appear either within the WFC itself or in the FAO Conference, where many of the issues and the participants are the same.

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8 The 19th session of the FAO Conference was held in Rome on November 14.

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222. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat)¹

Washington, August 24, 1977

SUBJECT

Food Aid Assistance

As I discussed earlier today, I suggest we carefully examine the potential economic and political benefits of establishing a Federal purchase guarantee of five or six million tons under a new Title III of the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2]. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates that a copy was sent to Daft. Another copy of the memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770173–0348.
Agricultural Trade and Development Assistance Act (PL–480). The floor would assure American farmers, business, and government planners that this amount of grain would be purchased by the Federal Government. The budget impact is roughly $1.2 billion. This policy would include authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to decrease the floor if there was a crop failure and increase the floor if there was a bumper crop. The Secretary’s determination would require that an increase in food aid under this program would not jeopardize the price of food in the U.S. marketplace. The developing countries would be assured of a minimum available amount; this would have the potential to encourage them to meet requirements we could predetermine such as using the proceeds from the purchase of grain toward agricultural development (self-reliance criteria), showing evidence that equity was a factor in making available the grain to people and, where feasible, that government efforts demonstrated policies which encourage more small farmers to enter into the production of food.

Domestically, food policies are potentially one of the key “engines” of inflation. The President can use the guaranteed 6-million-ton floor (the average annual U.S. food aid commitment to developing countries in the last 20 years) in periods of long supply years as the past few have been as a two-edged sword to improve the psychological and economic relationship with farmers and business and at the same time encourage more food aid by Canada and Australia. It also signals others that the President means it when he speaks about a commitment to assisting in the economic development of the poor countries of the world. The insecurity and unpredictability of the present PL–480 program which requires individual determinations by the Secretary of Agriculture concerning excess commodities should be eliminated through this scheme.

This is, of course, a complex issue, one which I am still working on in connection with the President’s World Hunger Initiative which he has asked me to undertake.
223. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter

Washington, August 26, 1977

SUBJECT

Bergland Memorandum dated August 15, 1977, re Report on International Food and Agriculture

The comments contained in this memo were coordinated with the NSC, DC, OMB, OSTP, CEA, and the Cabinet Secretary.

I. Summary Analysis

Secretary Bergland’s excellent report is encouraging in that he proposes that the Department of Agriculture become a full collaborator on international food policy governmentwide, and expresses a concern for food policies which address the basic human needs of the poor in the world. The key step to take now is to establish, where possible, specific Administration goals to achieve by 1980 which will dictate the policies to pursue. The flaws in the report are the absence of specifics concerning a procedure to arrive at an Administration position, a temporary coordinating mechanism, and lack of emphasis on particular aspects of the needs of the poor in the developing world. However, this can be resolved through a deliberative forum where the views of primary departments and agencies (State, Agriculture, AID, Treasury, the Peace Corps, etc.) and the private sector (in particular, farmers, businessmen) are taken into consideration in molding Administration food policy.

II. Key Proposals of Importance

—A UN speech by the President. It was felt that the UN speech should be considerably broader than simply a discussion of the world

1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2]. No classification marking. A notation in Carter’s handwriting reads: “Stu, advise J.” A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President has seen.” An earlier version of the memorandum, prepared by Bourne on August 17; an undated draft response to Bergland; and covering memoranda attached to Bergland’s report, attached below, are ibid.

2 Comments on Bergland’s proposal are contained in an August 17 memorandum from Cutter to Hutchenson; an August 17 memorandum from Schultze to Carter; an August 17 memorandum from Eizenstat and Daft to the President; and an August 19 memorandum from Hormats to Dodson. All are ibid. In their memorandum to the President, Eizenstat and Daft noted that the proposal “represents an excellent first-cut at framing the Administration’s policy on international food and agriculture. It does a particularly nice job of tying together the several loose ends, including commercial trade policy, food assistance, and research.”
food problem, and indeed broader than basic human needs. It needs to lay out the President’s global approach, particularly focusing on the type of world we envisage in coming decades. In so doing, however, it should communicate clearly the necessity of addressing the world food problem. The view was that an early October speech would be premature and that the President should await development of specific policies first.

—An expanded role for the Department of Agriculture. This newly expanded role should be developed in close collaboration with State, AID, NSC, OMB, and the White House, also with adequate involvement of the private sector as well as Congress.

—U.S.D.A.’s approach to commercial food sales, food reserves, trade, and food aid. However, what is required is the balancing of interests in this area with other interests including ensuring more equitable distribution of food to the poor, the relationship of our present U.S. and foreign agricultural production policies to nutrition (both at home and abroad), and the institutional linkages required to bring about a coordinated policy in these areas.

—Foreign Food Assistance. Provided, however, that the emphasis is on the poor nations.

—Scientific and technical collaboration. Provided, however, that the emphasis is on useful technology in support of the poor producers. Investment in basic agricultural research both here and abroad will be necessary in order to enhance the world’s productive capacity for the intermediate and longer term. This is essential both to provide adequate food supply abroad as well as to keep food costs down domestically.

—International trade arrangements.

III. Specific Negative Attributes of the Report

—The report, though well conceived, was developed in somewhat of a policy vacuum. To the best of our knowledge, many of the principals in and out of government did not officially engage in collaborative consultation with Agriculture in developing the report. This can easily be rectified by convening a steering group made up of the principal agencies, to develop a set of governmentwide recommendations for the President to consider.

—The report lacks a budget impact analysis.

—The report lacks a specific set of measurable goals which identify what it is that all these policy initiatives will accomplish.

—Downplays the conflicting, competing, and overlapping policies now in place among the many agencies (26 agencies involved) and does not suggest how these problems will be worked out beyond consultation.
Much more is required and leadership from the Executive Office could ensure that all views were considered in a policy evaluation.

In fact, what appears to be needed is to reform the present patchwork set of authorities and functions and, during the interim, establish a temporary coordinating mechanism which ensures that the various government and private interests are taken into consideration in making and executing policy over the short run and until the reforms are implemented.

— More attention should be given to the “demand” side of hunger, i.e., the ability of people to buy food. One key element in overcoming world hunger is to promote adequate development to enable people to earn enough money to buy the food they need. Simply focusing on increased production might lower food costs, but unless the question of hunger is looked at in an overall developmental context, we will be addressing only the supply side and not the demand side. This argues for avoiding too much of a shift from AID to the Department of Agriculture in dealing with the problem of world hunger.

— There is no objective analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of policy recommendations, and no alternatives suggested. The President needs to know the political and economic implications of a recommendation and the various alternatives available before deciding on a policy. Otherwise, there is no way to judge how one recommendation impacts on overall Administration objectives in this area.

— The report does not address the OMB Food Policy Reorganization Initiative or the AID and Brookings Development Assistance studies. 3

IV. Next Steps

A. It is recommended that you send a memorandum to Secretary Bergland commending him for the very welcome, thoughtful, and innovative report. Furthermore, the letter should indicate that plans are to include Secretary Bergland as a principal participant in the international food policy issue. A proposed draft letter to the Secretary of Agriculture is attached. 4

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3 For information regarding the AID/DCC and Brookings studies, see footnotes 8 and 9, Document 216. As part of a larger review of the economic policy and analysis machinery of the Federal government, the President, in an August 25 memorandum to heads of Executive Agencies and Departments, indicated that he had directed OMB’s Reorganization Project Staff to begin a review of the organization and structure of Federal food and nutrition programs. The review would focus on seven areas: food production and marketing; regulatory activities affecting food; food research and education; international activities; commodity procurement and distribution; aquaculture activities; and conservation activities. (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents August 29, 1977, pp. 1249–50)

4 A draft undated and unsigned memorandum from the President to Bergland is attached but not printed.
B. As you may recall, you requested Peter Bourne, Zbig Brzezinski, Stu Eizenstat and Frank Press to suggest a plan on World Hunger. We have been working on this and within the next two weeks will be submitting for your consideration a memorandum that proposes some initial steps needed to develop a coordinated world food policy.\(^5\)

**Attachment**

**Report by Secretary of Agriculture Bergland to President Carter**\(^6\)

Washington, August 15, 1977

**INTERNATIONAL FOOD AND AGRICULTURE**

**Situation**

You have made clear your commitment to fulfilling basic human needs in the United States and abroad. You have emphasized that food is a centerpiece of your foreign policy. These policy positions have to be translated into action.

The United States exports $24 billion worth of agricultural products each year. Our surplus in agricultural trade is the dominant factor in our foreign exchange earnings. This Administration’s actions must reflect this economic reality.

Now that domestic farm legislation is taking shape, the Carter Administration should focus on initiatives in international food and agriculture. In this report I suggest the directions these initiatives should take.

**International Organizations**

At the World Food Council meeting in June the United States moved into leadership on problems of food in the Third World.\(^7\) This advantage will be lost unless we exercise further leadership promptly and consistently.

—I understand you are considering a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in September. This would be an excellent forum for you to specify initiatives on basic human needs, especially food, and to specify objectives we seek in international organizations.

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\(^5\) See Document 227.

\(^6\) No classification marking.

\(^7\) See Document 221.
concerned with food and agriculture. I will send you suggestions for topics to be included in such a speech.

—The meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome in November provides another opportunity for this Administration to make a positive turn in American policy. Mainly because of attitudes carried over from the past, the United States is seen as being more interested in haggling over FAO’s budget than in FAO’s real purposes. In my speech to the meeting in Rome I plan to emphasize this Administration’s commitment to the FAO as a principal instrument for progress in world food and agriculture as well as our commitment to helping improve the effectiveness of the FAO.

—In order to sustain our leadership in international organizations concerned with food and agriculture, Secretary Vance and I need to work out better means for exercising that leadership. Because of habits from the past, the Departments of State and Agriculture (and some other departments) tend to compete for leadership rather than concentrate on substance. Our working arrangements should reflect the facts that the Department of State has primary responsibility for coordinating foreign policy and that the Department of Agriculture has primary responsibility for substantive and technical decision-making on food and agriculture. I will work out necessary arrangements with Secretary Vance.

—The Department of Agriculture also needs to work closely with international development banks on agricultural projects. In 1976 agricultural projects financed by these banks amounted to about $3 billion. The World Bank has invited our participation, and we will take up that invitation.

Foreign Food Assistance

In September you will receive recommendations from the Development Coordinating Committee and the Brookings Institution about the overall shape and scale of the United States’ official development assistance. Probably you will have to choose among divergent options on substance and organization.

In my view, this Administration’s foreign assistance program should be built on effective actions to deal with malnutrition and with inadequate rates of growth of food production in poor countries. I believe there is widespread support among the American people and in the Congress for this approach. But the structure we have inherited—with its confused objectives and complicated administration—is not delivering the goods.

I will submit for your consideration:

—Proposed legislation to improve foreign food assistance now carried out under Public Law 480. The legislation would provide spe-
cific programs and specific budget items for: emergency assistance, including food-security arrangements for poor countries; humanitarian assistance directed to malnourished poor people and combined with local self-help projects for these families to raise their incomes; food for development, both to support major developmental projects such as land reform and to support long-term developmental policies by the governments of poor countries; and supporting assistance for situations, such as the Middle East, where the United States’ strategic interests are involved. The legislation would provide for multiple-year commitments and reserve stocks of American food to back up these commitments. The legislation also would provide for active participation by voluntary organizations and land-grant universities and for collaboration between the Department of State/Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture in administering foreign food assistance.

—Recommendations for introducing effective management of foreign food assistance. Now the lines of responsibility and authority in Washington and the field seem designed to maximize conflict and minimize accomplishment. The P.L. 480 Interagency Staff Committee—a group composed of non-policy-level people, many of whom have inadequate knowledge of food and agriculture and the countries to which our food assistance is directed—should be abolished. After consulting with Secretary Vance and Governor Gilligan, I will recommend to you an arrangement between State/AID and the Department of Agriculture which will establish executive responsibility for P.L. 480 and will bring together our foreign policy and developmental interests with professional knowledge of food and agriculture in developing countries.

Scientific and Technical Collaboration

On June 20 the National Research Council (NRC) submitted to you an excellent analysis of the world food and nutrition situation and recommended actions by the United States Government to deal with that situation. The NRC stressed the need to expand food production in poor countries and to improve the distribution of the benefits of that increased production to satisfy nutritional needs of the poor. The NRC also emphasized that efficient food production here and abroad requires sustained scientific and technical collaboration between the United States and other countries. In fact, such collaboration supports both our developmental interests and our commercial interests.

Already the Department of Agriculture has collaborative arrangements with some 20 countries outside the group of countries served by

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8 See Document 212.
the AID. Taking these two groups of countries together, the existing and prospective demand on the United States’ scientific and technical resources in food and agriculture is huge. These resources exist primarily in land-grant universities and the Department of Agriculture and, to a lesser but significant extent, in the private sector.

However, the United States Government is not organized to marshal these resources and put them to work. For example, except for arrangements which are fully financed by other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, and particular projects financed by the AID, the Department of Agriculture has no specific funds for international scientific and technical collaboration in food and agriculture. Although existing foreign assistance legislation authorizes funds for collaboration by land-grant universities and this Department on problems of food and agriculture in developing countries, in fact these funds are not being used. The result is piecemeal efforts far short of what the NRC recommends.

In the Department of Agriculture’s budget estimates for fiscal year 1979, I will recommend funds to be used by land-grant universities and this Department to undertake scientific and technical collaboration with other countries—both developed and developing—along the lines recommended by the NRC. These estimates will include funds for the universities and this Department to develop resources for serious, sustained contributions to developing food and agriculture in poor, food-deficit countries. I don’t propose to go into competition with the AID abroad, but I do intend to press the case for this Department’s having sufficient funds and expertise to sustain scientific and technical work on international problems of food and agriculture.

—I am designating a senior officer of the Department of Agriculture to be responsible for organizing this Department’s participation in and our arrangements with land-grant universities for scientific and technical collaboration with other countries.

International Trade Arrangements

Negotiations in the International Wheat Council (IWC) and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) will begin in earnest in Autumn 1977. Our basic objectives in these trade negotiations are to dampen wide swings in prices for producers and consumers, improve world food security, and expand trade flows of agricultural products.

The Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) and the Department of Agriculture are collaborating closely in these negotiations. This Department is providing staff to the STR and is doing substantive and technical analyses for the agricultural trade negotiations.

—I The Carter Administration should give prominence to our agricultural objectives in these multilateral negotiations, because agriculture may be the knottiest area. So you can put your personal stamp on
the negotiations, I suggest that you, Ambassador Strauss, and I meet in the White House with Congressional leaders to discuss our agricultural objectives and that you then meet with the press. This best could be done in September, before serious discussions in the IWC and the MTN begin.

—In parallel with our seeking dependable multilateral arrangements, we should make clear our intention to be affirmative marketers of America’s agricultural products. Among other things, this might impose some discipline on our competitors and encourage them to take the multilateral negotiations more seriously. In the following section I outline initiatives in commercial export promotion. We should proceed now with bilateral arrangements with centrally-planned countries which do not participate in the MTN and with other initiatives which do not conflict with multilateral negotiations.

Commercial Export Promotion

Commercial sales are by far the predominant element of our international agricultural trade. We need an effective commercial export strategy and effective program management to support that strategy. This Administration should assure that the United States is a dependable supplier of high quality agricultural products to the world.

The Department of Agriculture is taking these actions:

—We are analyzing individual countries abroad, and we are looking especially for those situations where rising economic demand can create rising markets for American agricultural products, now and in the future. Using this information, we will design three- to five-year plans with American agricultural export-promotion associations for markets in individual countries. Depending on the characteristics of each market, these plans will combine market-development activities by the private export-promotion associations, credit facilities from the private sector and from the United States Government, and commercial supply arrangements backed up by appropriate commitments from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). We intend to complete these plans for major countries by June 1978 or earlier.

—We will examine whether American agricultural cooperatives need special help from the Department of Agriculture to operate directly in foreign markets. Our international grain trade is dominated by a handful of private companies which operate as multinationals; they do not seek to optimize American exports. American cooperatives might enliven competition and expand exports of American grain. We will consult with cooperatives in order to develop definite plans by the end of 1977.

—We will design an intermediate credit program to fill in the gap between the one- to three-year credits now available from the CCC and
the 20- to 40-year loans available under P.L. 480. This new credit program would address situations, such as Korea and Portugal, where development is not a primary consideration and help us market products, such as breeding cattle, for which the CCC’s three-year credit maximum is unrealistic. The intermediate credit program will be designed this year, in time to be included in the budget for FY 1979, but probably should be held in reserve pending the outcome of multilateral trade negotiations. We will work with the Export-Import Bank in designing this program.

—In our budget for FY 1979 we will recommend establishing a first group—perhaps half a dozen—of American agricultural trade offices abroad. IBM, Chase Manhattan, and Pan Am maintain highly visible presences abroad, but American agriculture does not. These trade offices would be operated on contract in collaboration with American export-promotion associations and would bring together some activities now conducted independently by these associations and by agricultural attaches.

—We are acting to assure the quality of American agricultural exports through better inspection arrangements. These actions include tighter licensing and monitoring of inspectors, better means for fumigating stored grain and for detecting hidden insect infestation, and better testing of the protein content of wheat.

—We will work with private industry and governmental agencies to help develop storage and distribution facilities in countries whose imports are constrained by lack of such facilities. These facilities are especially important to poor, food-deficit countries.

I plan to highlight these initiatives in commercial export promotion in speeches during the coming weeks.

Program Management

Many of the initiatives I have outlined in this report interact with each other. A foreign food assistance program along the lines I have sketched requires a different approach to reserve stocks and forward planning than the United States has practiced until now. Multilateral trade negotiations interact with both our assistance to poor countries and our commercial trade. And so on. Because of these interactions, the Carter Administration needs to develop a pattern of policies and actions which links our domestic and foreign concerns in food and agriculture.

The absence of such a pattern can be painful to people in the United States and to people in other countries. For example, because our predecessors had no strategy for dealing with changes in international supply and demand for agricultural products, the United States’ trade has had to absorb most of the fluctuations in world market condi-
tions. For the same reason, food supplies for hungry people in the poorest countries were curtailed when their needs were critical.

In order to create a pattern for dealing with international food and agriculture, the Department of Agriculture is analyzing these program-management instruments and how they fit together:

—Farmer-controlled stocks to be used primarily for stabilizing domestic market conditions in the interests of producers and consumers in the United States.

—Government-controlled stocks to be used primarily for exercising the United States’ obligations in international agreements—both multilateral and bilateral—and in food-security and developmental arrangements with poor, food-deficit countries.

—Adjustments in agricultural production in the United States, through acreage adjustments and other means, to maintain appropriate supplies for stocks and for current demand.

—Bilateral and multilateral trading arrangements as they interact with the above instruments.

We intend to complete much of this analysis by the end of 1977. We expect this analysis will yield legislative recommendations.

Also, in analyzing the food and agricultural situations in developing and developed countries abroad, we are examining the range of instruments available to the United States for dealing with individual countries. Particular countries may be candidates simultaneously for food assistance, scientific and technical collaboration, commercial export-promotion, bilateral agreements, and multilateral commodity agreements. To fit this range of instruments to individual countries requires information, planning, and management which by and large have not been done until now. We also intend to complete a first round of these country plans by the end of 1977.

**Action**

I have outlined the several actions underway in the Department of Agriculture.

The FY 1979 budget and the legislative agenda for 1978 will be vehicles for your taking decisions on items which represent significant new departures or financial commitments.

Many of the items in this report should be included in formal Presidential messages at the beginning of 1978 and in speeches between now and then. My colleagues will work with Stuart Eizenstat to see that you receive recommended language for these messages and speeches.

If you agree it will be useful, I will plan to present informal reports on international food and agriculture to you and the members of the Cabinet each quarter.
224. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) and Lynn Daft of the Domestic Policy Staff to President Carter

Washington, August 30, 1977

SUBJECT

Establishment of an Interagency Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy

Secretary Bergland has recommended that you establish an Interagency Working Group to assist in the formulation of food and agricultural policy. We endorse this recommendation. We think it offers a means of more systematically involving the several agencies that have a stake in the formulation of agricultural policy. Also, we think it can be done in a way that will complement the new decision process now being developed. In addition, it underscores your commitment to Cabinet government.

Peter Bourne raised a concern regarding the role of this working group vis-à-vis Peter’s role in developing an Administration initiative on world hunger. We see no problem in that regard. We have talked to Peter and in accord with his concerns, we have modified the proposed memorandum from you to the relevant agencies to make it clear that this working group is not the Administration’s vehicle for developing a comprehensive world hunger policy. The Interagency Working Group, as we envision its operation, would concentrate on the more routine agricultural policy issues that are continually arising . . . e.g. decisions regarding loan rates, set-asides, import quotas, marketing quotas, and the like. The development of major Administration initiatives, such as the one on world hunger, would normally be handled by other means.

1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2]. No classification marking. A notation in the President’s handwriting reads: “Stu—I don’t like this—Prefer single coordinator (You, Schultze, etc) with Bourne & all others included. Sub Committees might be formed to contribute to one Ag/Food analysis. J.C.” Attached as Tab B to Document 229. Earlier versions of the memorandum are in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2] and in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, 1/20/77–9/29/77.

2 Bergland presented his proposal in a July 12 letter to the President, to which he attached a draft Presidential memorandum, which directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture. Copies of Bergland’s July 12 letter and the draft Presidential memorandum are attached to August 5 and July 14 versions of the copy of the memorandum printed here in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [2].
It is possible, of course, that this group could be asked to contribute to the development of such an initiative by assessing a part of the overall issue. But we do not see it giving rise to jurisdictional squabbles.

Frank Moore approves the proposal, but suggests that his office be given an opportunity to notify key Congressmen in advance. We think that is a good suggestion.

A proposed memorandum is attached.3

3 Attached but not printed. The final version of the memorandum is Document 230.

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225. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, August 30, 1977, 2043Z


1. There follows Undersecretary of Agriculture White’s statement of August 29 announcing the new acreage set-aside policy for wheat and domestic reserve levels for all grains.2 Comments will be transmitted septel.3

Begin quote: Acting Secretary of Agriculture John White announced today the following decisions:

1) A comprehensive plan to place 30 to 35 million metric tons of food and feed grains in reserve prior to the beginning of the 1978/79

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770314-0112. Unclassified; Priority. Drafted and approved by Ferch.

2 White and other USDA officials announced the set-aside policy at a White House briefing on August 29. In an August 29 memorandum to the President, Eizenstat transmitted a revised draft of the set-aside policy, which the Domestic Policy Staff had written and the Department of Agriculture and CEA had approved, noting that the announcement had “the positive thrust which you requested.” (Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem) For additional detail concerning White’s remarks, see Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Carter to Seek Cut in ’78 Wheat Crop; Food Reserve Asked,” The New York Times August 30, 1977, pp. 1 and 47.

3 In telegram 208552 to all diplomatic and consular posts, August 31, the Department provided additional background concerning the establishment of a domestic grain reserve designed to contribute to international food security and price stability. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770315-0579)
marketing years, including a proposal to create a special international emergency food reserve of up to 6 million tons.

2) The administration’s intention to implement a 20 percent set-aside on 1978-crop wheat.

3) An immediate increase in the loan rates for 1977-crop feed grains.

**Strategic Grain Reserves**

Strategic grain reserves will be acquired in three separate actions:

First, the administration will seek congressional approval to create a special international emergency food reserve of up to 6 million tons.4 This reserve could only be released for noncommercial food aid for world nutrition assistance and to meet United States’ obligations under a proposed international reserves agreement.

Second, the farmer-owned wheat and rice reserve program announced by the Secretary in April will be expanded to include feed grains.5 A feed grain reserve of 17 to 19 million metric tons is planned. The minimum release price for feed grains is expected to be equal to 125 percent of the loan (2.50 dollars for corn); the loans are expected to be called when the price reaches 140 percent of the loan (2.80 dollars for corn).

Under the food grain (wheat and rice) reserve program announced in April, at least 300 million bushels of wheat (8.16 million tons) and 13.2 million hundred-weight of rice (600,000 tons) will be held off the market until the price exceeds 140 percent of loan levels, and loans can be called when prices exceed 175 percent of loan levels.

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4 The International Emergency Food Reserve was established in 1975 under the UN World Food Program with initial stocks of 500,000 tons of voluntary contributions. The Senate version of the 1977 omnibus farm bill (S. 275), introduced by Talmadge on January 18, contained language that “encouraged” the President to enter into negotiations with international leaders concerning the reserve program; however, this provision was eliminated in conference. (Congress and the Nation, Volume V, 1977–1980, p. 373) On April 12, 1978, Zablocki introduced H.R. 12087, the International Emergency Wheat Reserve Act, which declared that it was the policy of the United States to develop a wheat reserve and directed the President to establish such a reserve. On August 11, Foley introduced a version of the International Emergency Wheat Reserve Act (H.R. 13835), which directed the President, through the CCC, to establish a reserve wheat stock of up to 6 million metric tons for use in emergency feeding programs in developing countries. The House Committee on International Relations reported an amended version of H.R. 13835 to the House on September 13. Neither version of H.R. 13835 nor a Senate version of the bill (S. 3460) came to the floor for a vote during the 95th Congress. (Ibid., p. 385)

5 On April 4, Bergland announced that the administration would raise price support loan rates for 1977 crop livestock feed grains and would pay farmers to establish a wheat reserve of 300 million bushels in light of 1976’s record wheat harvest. Smaller amounts of rice would also be added to the reserve. (“Support Loans for Farmers Raised And a Wheat Reserve Is Planned,” The New York Times, April 5, 1977, p. 43)
Third, some 1975-crop rice and 1976-crop wheat has or will be turned over to the government when CCC price support loans mature in coming months. This grain will also become part of the overall grain reserve.

The establishment of these reserves at this time with provisions for their orderly management are intended to meet several objectives.

—They will serve as a hedge against the inflationary effects of a poor crop in the future. Though world grain stocks have risen dramatically this past year, to the point that market prices are severely depressed, this situation could change abruptly. If we are to rebuild our stocks in a way that will help us avoid a repeat of the severe shortages and extreme price volatility of 1973–75, this is the time to do it ... when it can be done at least cost to the taxpayer and most benefit to the farmer.

—The formation of these strategic reserves and the proposed creation of an international emergency food reserve demonstrates and underscores the President’s commitment to the fight against world hunger. It is also consistent with the U.S. announced position at the World Food Council Ministerial in Manila\(^6\) this past summer and with our position in the negotiations for an international grains agreement, soon to begin at the International Wheat Council in London.

—Our domestic grain supplies are now more than sufficient to enable us to acquire enough reserves to ensure our food aid commitments to less developed countries.

**Set-Aside**

Even though Congressional action on the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977\(^7\) is not complete, I am announcing our intentions for a 20 percent set-aside on 1978-crop wheat at this time since farmers are now beginning to plant the 1978 winter wheat crop. While the program is voluntary, farmer compliance with the set-aside is a condition of eligibility for loans, purchases, and payments in any USDA commodity program. Also, designated set-aside acreage must be put into a soil conserving use.

We are not announcing a 1978-crop feed grain set-aside today; the final decision will be made after we know more about 1977 production and consumption prospects.\(^8\) However, the current feed grains produc-

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\(^6\) See Document 221.

\(^7\) The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (see footnote 2, Document 210), which the President signed into law on September 29, outlined price supports and acreage allotments for certain commodities and extended P.L. 480 through 1981.

\(^8\) Telegram 275084 to all diplomatic and consular posts, November 16, transmitted Acting Secretary of Agriculture White’s November 15 announcement of a 10 percent set-aside in feed grain acreage for 1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770425–0603)
tion estimate indicates that a 10 percent set-aside may be needed just to keep our stocks from climbing to excessive levels.

Since 1975, the world’s total grain stocks have increased from 126 to 183 million metric tons. Nearly 60 percent of the increase the past two years has occurred in the United States where stocks rose from 27 to 61 million metric tons. Two years ago world wheat stocks were 62.5 million tons and the U.S. held only 19 percent of them. Today, world stocks total 100 million metric tons and the United States holds 30 percent. In the case of feed grains, world stocks totaled 51 million metric tons last year; the United States held approximately 34 percent. This year world stocks total nearly 69 million tons of which the U.S. holds 44 percent.

Current estimates place total world stocks at 200 million tons and U.S. stocks at nearly 80 million tons by the beginning of the 1978/79 season. At this level, the U.S. would hold nearly 35 percent of the world’s stocks of wheat and approximately half of the world’s food grain stocks.

Stocks of this magnitude are quite adequate to meet our domestic and export requirements. Furthermore, the establishment of strategic reserves insures the United States commitment to world food security.

Our analysis indicates that even after we acquire sufficient reserve stocks, world production in 1978/79 under the “most likely” weather conditions will again be in excess of market requirements, causing stocks to rise even further.

If this does occur, two results are likely. First, there would be reduced incentive for other nations to participate in an international grain reserve system. Though the United States is willing to hold its “fair share” of world stocks, we expect other nations to do likewise. Second, we are concerned that with excessive stocks and low grain prices there would be reduced incentive for the developing countries to increase their own food production. Over the long-term this could have disastrous consequences. In our conversations with world leaders and world food experts, there is one issue on which all agree: the developing countries of the world must increase their food production significantly in future years to meet the demands of growing populations. Thus, in an effort to keep U.S. and world grain stocks in reasonable balance with consumption, we are implementing a modest set-aside program for 1978-crop wheat.

Since a decision to have a set-aside is an annual determination, a set-aside program for 1978 crops should not be interpreted to imply that there will be set-aside programs for subsequent crops. This is a decision made for this year alone based on the current situation.

Loan Rates

Given the severe cost-price squeeze that is now adversely affecting many farmers, loan rates for 1977-crop feed grains are being raised im-
mediately. The corn loan rate is being increased from 1.75 dollars to 2.00 dollars per bushel with other feed grains set in the proper relationship to corn. This change, which is being done under existing authority, is consistent with recent congressional actions and will return the loan rate for feed grains to its appropriate relationship to the loan rate for wheat.

The 1977 wheat loan level of 2.25 dollars will remain unchanged. We would anticipate no change for 1978 in the loan levels announced today, though they are subject to change. Holding loan rates at these levels will allow market forces to operate more freely and help maintain U.S. competitiveness in the world markets. End quote.

Christopher

226. Memorandum From Guy Erb of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, September 9, 1977

SUBJECT
Hunger Initiative

At a meeting today on the hunger initiative, Jerry Fill presented his latest draft of a memorandum from Peter Bourne to the President. Although this version still tends to confuse policymaking and the drafting of a message on hunger, it is an improvement over earlier versions. Specifically, it provides for full participation by interested agencies and can, if redrafted along the lines discussed this afternoon, allow for the preparation of, and decisions on, policy options prior to the drafting of a message.

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, 1/20/77–9/29/77. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Hormats, Thornton, Denend, Owen, and Schecter.

2 Presumable reference to the Working Group on World Hunger’s efforts to produce a memorandum for the President outlining various policy initiatives for an expanded world hunger program. An August 5 draft memorandum from Bourne to the President with an attached “Potential Goals of U.S. Food Policy” outline is in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 8/1/77–8/31/77. The final version of the memorandum is printed as Document 227.
Bourne also proposes consultations between private experts and the Interagency Working Group. If such consultations are informal and do not involve a “public review” of the options to be considered, I believe we can accept this suggestion.

In Bourne’s proposal, his office alone would chair the Working Group. I have proposed that NSC co-chair the Group in order to ensure that its work is fully related to other aspects of US development assistance and foreign economic policies. Unless you inform me to the contrary, I will continue to try to reach agreement with Bourne’s office on a co-chairing arrangement between Bourne and NSC.

We have asked AID to ensure that the redraft of the DCC study (see my memorandum on that study, PRM 8–III, and the Brookings study) take hunger issues into account. In addition, you may want to review the treatment of hunger in the President’s UNGA speech. I believe Bourne’s office might consider a reference to hunger in the UNGA speech to be premature. However, in view of the set-aside decision and our interest in seeing hunger placed in the context of the total US development assistance effort, I recommend that a statement on hunger be retained in the speech.

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3 See Document 225.
227. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter

Washington, September 14, 1977

SUBJECT

World Hunger Initiative

This memorandum was prepared by an Ad Hoc Executive Office Working Group on World Hunger, chaired by my office, with participation of the National Security Council, Domestic Council, White House Intergovernmental Relations Office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Management and Budget, Office of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, and Council on Environmental Quality.

I. Purpose

To respond to your request for ideas and policy options on world hunger and to seek your guidance on how to develop policy initiatives.

II. Background

Interest in the world hunger issue is extensive within Government agencies and throughout the private sector.

—Executive Office. Interest in and a desire to be part of the development of any world hunger initiative has already been expressed by the agencies which make up the Ad Hoc Executive Office World Hunger Working Group.

—Congress. A letter to you signed by 33 members of Congress in June encouraged a Presidential world hunger initiative. Recent legisla-
tive changes designed to make development assistance and food aid policies more human needs oriented reflect Congressional interest on which a Presidential initiative might build. A substantial number of members in both Houses plan to introduce on September 27 a resolution calling on you to establish a Presidential Commission on World Hunger. Their efforts are in principle supportive of your interest in a hunger initiative.

—International Organizations. The world hunger issue has received priority attention in recent years in organizations such as the World Food Council, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the World Bank; these and other organizations could be important vehicles for helping to implement a Presidential initiative.

—Private Sector. Interest includes both experts and organizations wishing to participate in the development of policies and to organize public support for appropriate Presidential actions once announced.

In addition, several foreign policy and food studies have been conducted or are in progress. These studies include departmental reviews, such as USDA’s International Food and Agriculture Assessment (recently submitted to you) and OMB’s Food and Nutrition Reorganization Study as well as inter-departmental and private sector reviews such as the National Academy of Science’s World Food and Nutrition Study, the Development Coordinating Committee Study on Foreign Aid, the National Security Council PRM–8, the Vance-Blumenthal Study on Foreign Aid as it relates to multilateral assistance, the Brookings Institution study of foreign aid, and the International Health Assessment (currently being conducted by my office).

3 Leahy introduced Senate Resolution 271, co-sponsored by 55 Senators, on September 27. The resolution called on the President to establish a commission on domestic and international hunger and malnutrition and directed the resultant commission to establish the causes of domestic and international malnutrition, identify and critique Federal programs related to hunger, and develop for the President and Congress initiatives designed to reduce hunger and malnutrition. (Letter from Bennet to Zablocki, October 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770175–0151) Nolan introduced a companion resolution in the House (H. Res. 784) that same day, cosponsored by 24 Representatives. The Senate approved S. Res. 271 by voice vote on October 27, and the House approved H. Res. 784 on November 1.

4 Attached to Document 223.
5 See footnote 3, Document 223.
6 See Document 212 and footnote 2 thereto.
7 See footnote 8, Document 216.
8 See footnote 7, Document 219.
9 Not further identified.
10 See footnote 9, Document 216.
11 See Document 293.
To make maximum use of this broad interest in the hunger issue, a mechanism is needed which reports directly to you and is coordinated with Stu Eizenstat’s proposed Cabinet-level Group on Food and Agricultural Policy. This would assure that preliminary planning for a Presidential world hunger initiative adequately involves the Executive Office, the line Agencies, the Congress, international organizations, and the private sector. Since Stu received your views on his proposed ongoing mechanism, we have reached an agreement with him.\textsuperscript{12} In order to ensure coordination, I should be a member of the Full Committee as well as continue to serve as White House Coordinator on World Hunger.

III. Assumptions

In developing the process for shaping such an initiative, we are making the following assumptions:

1. That you wish to demonstrate publicly in the near future your commitment to do something about world hunger—perhaps within the next 2 months. We sense that you do not want another study but prefer a series of actions.

2. That you view world hunger as a global issue, including concern for malnutrition at home as well as abroad.

3. That you intend your interest in world hunger to be understood as part of your overall concern for basic human needs, not an isolated issue. Your initiative would thus be one major further step in demonstrating concretely your commitment to improve the quality of life throughout the world.

IV. Strategy

If you agree with the above assumptions, we propose the following actions:

1. Development of a Policy Statement on World Hunger

There is broad agreement among experts in the field that one of the most important Presidential actions would be to make a crisp, concise statement of United States policy with regard to world hunger. Your involvement is critical to mobilizing national and international efforts to alleviate global hunger. Recent food-related legislation, ample current grain supplies, and the constructive developing country attitudes manifested at the June meeting of the World Food Council offer you an opportunity to play a timely leadership role.

A statement based on policy options developed by the Departments and the Executive Office of the President could specify actions such as:

\textsuperscript{12} See Document 224.
—To help developing countries accelerate their efforts to achieve food self-reliance.
—To assure adequate food aid levels on a multiyear basis for humanitarian and developmental purposes and to increase the effectiveness of such aid.
—To work with other nations to develop international food reserves for food security, emergency relief, and price stability.
—To increase access to food through special trade arrangements and other measures.
—To strengthen the capacity of multilateral food-related institutions such as the World Food Council and the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization.
—To accelerate relevant food and nutrition research activities.

Other specific policy areas could be included based on further agency inputs during the planning process.

The basic goal of these policy measures would be to help improve the nutritional well-being of the world’s hungry people. The hunger statement would also serve as a basic point of reference in the Administration’s overall human needs initiative.

The policy statement should be specific enough to define your commitment yet should avoid closing off ideas and options which might grow out of the various studies now underway. While the statement would allude to domestic food and nutrition problems and programs, its primary focus would be international. Policy options underlying a statement on hunger could be prepared by the World Hunger Working Group in 8 to 10 weeks. After choosing your preferred options, you could deliver a message describing U.S. policy actions to the United Nations, to the Congress, or in another forum of your choosing.

Decision:13

Approve
Disapprove

2. Expansion of World Hunger Working Group

The Ad Hoc Executive Office Working Group (which has prepared this memorandum and previous comments on material sent to you by

13 There is no indication that the President approved or disapproved any of the actions proposed in the memorandum.
Secretary Bergland and Stu Eizenstat) should be expanded to include direct representation from the relevant Departments and Agencies. The resulting World Hunger Working Group (WG) chaired by me would be in effect a subunit of Stu’s proposed Cabinet-level Interagency Group on Food and Agricultural Policy of which I would also be a member. The WG (subcommittee) would as rapidly as possible develop policy options and subsequently a Presidential statement on world hunger. The expanded membership of the WG may increase the difficulties of coordination; however, we believe that the participation in the process by the Agencies that would implement the initiative is indispensable.

A small task force of private consultants representing a variety of interests and expertise as well as personnel temporarily detailed from the Agencies will serve with my staff to support the Working Group.

Decision:

Approve
Disapprove

3. Preparation of Cabinet Memorandum (attached)

The World Hunger Working Group would prepare a memorandum for you to issue to Cabinet Departments and Agencies. The memorandum would announce the establishment of the Working Group and would direct Cabinet Secretaries and Agency heads to provide it with their views and recommendations.

Decision:

Approve (send attached memo)14
Disapprove

4. Involvement of the Private Sector

Private sector representatives—from agriculture, business, labor, universities, foundations, and the religious community—should be included in the above process. Informally this could be done through contacts by the Working Group with private sector individuals and organizations. On a more formal basis, private sector input could be assured by the establishment of a small but prestigious private sector Consultative Group to serve as the visible public advisory body in the development of the Administration’s world hunger initiative.

Informal consultation with the private sector could lay the basis for eventual public support, avoiding the risks of public discussion.

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14 Attached but not printed. The original text “(Prepare a memo to Cabinet)” is struck-through and “(send attached memo)” is typed below.
prior to the announcement of the policy. Use of a more formal mechanism would make for more visible public involvement in the process but might delay it and produce recommendations with which you might have to disagree publicly.

Decision:

Involve private sector informally
Establish Private Consultative Group (prepare names for my review)

5. Presidential Communication with Selected Members of Congress

Building on increased Congressional concern for world hunger, you should communicate your interest to members of Congress, including those advocating a Presidential Commission on World Hunger. The purpose would be to state your intention to launch an Administration program on world hunger and solicit their views on food policy issues. We believe that by discussing these matters with the House and Senate leadership you will engender support for the initiative and demonstrate your resolve to act. This also may develop additional support for overall foreign aid policies.

Decision:

Arrange meeting with selected members of Senate and House by early October to discuss broad issues of international food policy
Prepare draft letter to selected members of Congress on my plans in this area
Defer contacts with Congress on hunger issues

Summary of Comments on Who Should Chair the WG

The respective positions are as follows:

—NSC proposes that the World Hunger Working Group be co-chaired by my office and the NSC staff in order (1) to increase coordination necessary among members of the Working Group, and (2) to ensure that the Working Group’s work is fully related to all aspects of U.S. development assistance and foreign economic policies.15

—OMB supports NSC’s recommendation that the Working Group be jointly chaired by my office and the NSC staff. OMB contends that continuing involvement of my office is obviously needed if the Working Group is to maintain the momentum already developed by my efforts these past months; however, they contend that if NSC co-chairs the Working Group, it will ensure that the world hunger ini-

15 See Document 226.
tiative will reinforce, and in turn be reinforced by other U.S. efforts abroad.\textsuperscript{16}

—My position is that I should chair the Working Group and NSC should continue to participate fully as a key member as it has up to now. This ensures coordination with ongoing foreign policy reviews. Moreover, if NSC were made co-chairman, in the eyes of the public and Congress this would not separate hunger from NSC’s major policy responsibilities such as weapons sales, nuclear proliferation, and relations with the Soviets and Chinese.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, I was designated the lead person in the White House on this issue by you in an August Cabinet meeting.\textsuperscript{18} Changing this position may create confusion in the private sector and Congress as to your intention to crystallize public support for basic human needs using world hunger as the rallying point.

Decision:

World Hunger Working Group chaired by Peter Bourne (as stated in attached proposed presidential memorandum to heads of departments and agencies)

World Hunger Working Group co-chaired by Peter Bourne and NSC (NSC, State, and OMB support)\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} Erb sent Brzezinski a memorandum on September 13 indicating that OMB also agreed that the NSC should co-chair the Working Group. According to an attached September 15 note from Gates to Erb, Aaron had spoken to Bourne that morning concerning the chairmanship; Gates noted that the chairmanship question had not been settled. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, 1/20/77–9/29/77) In his September 15 memorandum to Brzezinski (see footnote 1 above), Erb reiterated the position that the NSC should chair the group.

\textsuperscript{17} A concluding typewritten sentence, “Stu Eizenstat concurs on this position” is struck-through.

\textsuperscript{18} Presumable reference to the August 1 Cabinet meeting during which the President noted that Bourne had assumed responsibility for the administration’s drug, world health, and hunger programs. He instructed Cabinet members to cooperate with Bourne, as he “needs to rely on staff assistance from the Departments to carry out his assignments from the President.” (Carter Library, Vertical File, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 6/6/77–9/26/77)

\textsuperscript{19} Although there is no indication that the President approved or disapproved these options, he did sign two memoranda that established the World Hunger Working Group chaired by Bourne and the Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy chaired by Bergland. See Document 230. The earlier version of Bourne’s memorandum did not contain these two options.
MEMORANDUM FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (COOPER) TO THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR HEALTH ISSUES (BOURNE)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, September 26, 1977

SUBJECT

Your Memorandum of August 24 to Stu Eizenstat on Food Assistance\textsuperscript{2}

Thank you for sharing your thoughts on possible adjustments in our food assistance program with me.\textsuperscript{3} I am sorry to be so long in replying. I agree that relative predictability in the level of our aid is something we should strive to attain.

I can see certain problems in your suggestion, however. If we really try to stick to a policy of the Government buying five to six million tons of food a year, the cost of such a program could vary considerably with changes in prices. I would anticipate that a relatively open-ended budget commitment of this nature would be opposed by the Office of Management and Budget. On the other hand, if the floor is adjusted with harvest levels, your proposal would retain some of the defects of the present system. There also might be some objection from agricultural interests to abandoning the present method in which purchasers of PL 480 Title I commodities deal directly with private American exporters for what, I infer from your memorandum, would be a system of purchasing from the Government. Notwithstanding these difficulties, I believe your proposal has merit and it should be given further careful consideration.

We might also consider using our emergency food reserve proposal,\textsuperscript{4} which was announced after you wrote your memorandum, to stabilize PL 480 program levels. Stocks for the reserve could be accu-

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\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770173–0345. No classification marking. Drafted by Stephen Johnson on September 20; cleared by Bosworth and Boeker.

\textsuperscript{2} An unknown hand corrected the date from August 22 to August 24.

\textsuperscript{3} See Document 222. In a September 6 memorandum to Katz, Johnston commented upon Bourne’s proposal: “It is not clear, but seems to suggest an annual commitment for 5 or 6 million tons of grain purchases for annual food aid disbursements. The annual amount could be varied. I cannot follow the reasoning in the bottom two-thirds of the paper, and the whole thing may, in fact, be completely overtaken by the President’s decision. However, in view of Bourne’s importance in the hunger campaign, I suggest you consider drafting a memo from Cooper, commenting on this note, since Bourne is likely to resuscitate his idea later. If you think it not worthwhile, we can forget it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770173–0347)

\textsuperscript{4} See footnote 4, Document 225.
mulated when American prices are low and released when prices are high and potential recipient country stocks are low. In this way, fluctuations in PL 480 program levels caused by domestic commodity price and availability swings could be minimized. The Agriculture Department is now preparing legislation to implement the reserve proposal.

The problems of world hunger and food aid levels are complex and I look forward to continued close cooperation with you on the issues involved.

Richard N. Cooper

229. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter

Washington, September 26, 1977

SUBJECT

World Hunger/International Food and Agricultural Policy

This memorandum will comment on the following related matters:

TAB A 1) Your request that I advise on Peter Bourne’s August 26, 1977 memorandum commenting on Secretary Bergland’s excellent August 15 report on International Food and Agricultural Policy;²

TAB B 2) Your comment on our August 30 recommendation that the Secretary of Agriculture form a working group on food and agricultural policy.³ On that recommendation you said the following: “Stu—I don’t like this—Prefer single coordinator (you, Schultze, etc.) with Bourne and all others involved. Subcommittees might be formed to

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [1]. Confidential; Not for Circulation. A notation in the President’s handwriting reads: “Stu—p 2 of memo 2nd paragraph, last sentence add (after ‘to me’) ’and to the Sec. of Agriculture.’ JC.” Earlier drafts of the memorandum with Eizenstat’s revisions and other handwritten corrections are ibid.

² See Document 223.

³ See Document 224 and footnote 1 thereto.
World Hunger and Food Policy

contribute to one Agricultural/Food analysis.”;
and

TAB C 3) Peter Bourne’s memorandum of September 14, 1977 proposing that he chair the world hunger working group.4

While in many obvious areas there is an overlap between the world hunger issue and the development of a food and agricultural policy, both foreign and domestic, there are also marked differences.

Thus, in developing a coherent national and international food and agricultural policy it seems clear to me that the Department of Agriculture should be the lead agency because of the technical issues involved—price supports, set-asides, international agricultural agreements, buffer stocks, import quotas, and the like.

With regard to world hunger and Peter’s September 14 memorandum, I have no opinion on whether the world hunger working group should be co-chaired by Peter and NSC, as recommended by NSC and OMB, or simply by Peter. Peter makes a valid point in arguing that NSC leadership would be viewed by some interests as linking the issue to military security.5

It seems to me that this working group, perhaps under Peter, might serve as a subcommittee to the broader food and agricultural policy coordinating committee. This would permit Peter to run the world hunger study but would let the broader and more technical food and agricultural policy issues follow Secretary Bergland’s lead. It would also tie the two activities together.

I have met with Peter6 and he agrees with the suggestion that you form a subcommittee on world hunger with the subcommittee reporting directly to you rather than through the overall committee. Also, I have checked this with Agriculture and they see no problem.

4 See Document 227.

5 In a September 16 memorandum to the President, Brzezinski indicated his support for creation of the Working Group on World Hunger and commented that the NSC Staff had collaborated with Bourne’s office concerning the proposals outlined in Bourne’s September 14 memorandum (See Document 227). He noted, “Since I desire to continue that collaboration most effectively, I do wish to reiterate my interest in seeing the NSC designated as the co-chairman of the Working Group. The Department of State as well as the Office of Management and Budget supports this view.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, HE–3, 9/30/77–12/31/77)

6 According to a typewritten note attached to another copy of Eizenstat’s memorandum, Eizenstat and Bourne met on September 24. (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [1]) No record of this meeting has been found.
Assuming you decide to sign the farm bill (signing ceremony now planned for 10:30 a.m. Thursday), you might want to announce formation of these groups at the signing ceremony.

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7 September 29. See footnote 7, Document 224.
8 The signing took place in the Rose Garden at the White House at 10:30 a.m. The President limited his remarks to specific aspects of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 and did not announce the formation of either the Working Group on World Hunger or the Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy. For his remarks, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents October 3, 1977, pp. 1433–1435. According to a September 29 memorandum from Fill to Bourne, Granum had asked the President if he planned to announce the establishment of the working groups; Carter indicated his preference for a press release. (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, White House Office Files on World Hunger Group, Box 50, Government Agency Hunger Reports, 9/29/77–10/21/77) Later that day, the President noted: “I signed the agriculture bill, about $600 million more than I had wanted but the best we could get. It’s far-reaching and has some very good features in it. This has been a tough one, and I’m glad we don’t have to do this every year.” (Carter, White House Diary p. 110)

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230. Memorandum From President Carter to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies

Washington, September 30, 1977

As you know, I have repeatedly emphasized as a major goal of U.S. foreign policy the importance of meeting basic human needs—in particular, the alleviation of world hunger and malnutrition. In order to develop a major initiative in this area, I have formed a World Hunger Working Group headed by my Special Assistant, Peter Bourne, to coordinate a White House study of world hunger with other U.S. domestic and international food and agricultural policies. Peter Bourne, representing the Working Group, will participate on the soon to be formed

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770172–2412. No classification marking. Another copy is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subjects Files, Box HE–6, Executive, HE–3, 9/30/77–12/31/77. Earlier drafts of the memorandum are in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, White House Office Files on World Hunger Group, Box 50, Government Agency Hunger Reports, 3/4/77–9/28/77 and Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [1].
Cabinet Level Committee on Food and Agricultural Policy, chaired by the Secretary of Agriculture.2

The Working Group consists of Executive Office Organizations—National Security Council (NSC), Domestic Council (DC), White House Intergovernmental Relations Office (WHIGA), Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of the Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs (OSACA), Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), and Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR)—as well as representation from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), State, Agency for International Development (AID), Treasury, and Commerce.

The purpose of the Working Group is to prepare a list of options to combat world hunger and malnutrition with the full participation of several departments and agencies. This analysis will be the basis for a Presidential statement outlining the following goals:

— to provide more equitable access to available food and to improve nutritional well-being;
— to increase the supply of food relative to need;
— to offer food assistance to those unable to purchase enough food for adequate nutrition;
— to assure a decision-making process, management, and resources adequate to implement these policies.

Departments and agencies affected by this memorandum should submit to the chairman of the Working Group their recommendations by close of business on October 21st.3

The Working Group will review the recommendations and develop a set of U.S. government policy options designed to make a significant impact on world hunger. Departments and agencies will have an opportunity to comment on the Working Group’s list of options before it is submitted to me.

2 In a separate September 30 memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, the President charged Bergland with establishing a Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy. The Working Group’s membership would consist of assistant secretary-level representation from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Agriculture; the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; AID; CEA; OMB; and the NSC. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770172–2419; printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1695–1696) In an October 20 memorandum to Vance, Blumenthal, Califano, Strauss, Gilligan, Schultze, McIntyre, Brzezinski, Daft, and Bourne, Bergland indicated that Deputy Secretary of Agriculture John White would chair the Group and that Hjort and Daft would share secretariat duties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770181–0569)

3 See Document 231.
I would appreciate your cooperation to enable the Working Group to complete its task on or about November 11th.4

Jimmy Carter


231. Editorial Note

In advance of President Jimmy Carter’s issuance of the memorandum creating the World Hunger Working Group (WHWG) on September 30, 1977 (Document 230), President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues Peter Bourne initiated forward planning for the completion of the Presidential Policy Options Memorandum regarding the world hunger initiative. Bourne had earlier established a Hunger Staff Task Force, headed by his assistant Gerald Fill, to manage the procedural aspects of the Working Group. In a September 21 memorandum, Lynn Daft of the Domestic Policy Staff sent President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy Stuart Eizenstat a draft schedule, prepared by Bourne, which anticipated that the WHWG would submit a formal policy options paper to the President at the end of October. Daft commented: “If his [Bourne’s] enthusiastic energy could be effectively harnessed with those who have knowledge and experience in this area, the President would be far better served.” (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [1])

In an October 3 memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland, Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps, Agency for International Development Administrator John Gilligan, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, Eizenstat, Secretary to the Cabinet Jack Watson, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Robert Strauss, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget James McIntyre, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Charles Schultze, the President’s Science Adviser and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy Frank Press, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality Charles Warren, and Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs Esther Peterson, Bourne drew attention to the first Working Group meeting, scheduled for October 7, and attached staff guidance to aid in
the preparation of individual agency policy recommendations. The guidance highlighted five priority areas for consideration and recommendations—food production and consumption in developing countries, research and technical collaboration, food reserves, food aid, and trade and investment—and suggested that agencies could propose additional areas for discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770170–1503) Bourne’s undated letter to private sector addressees also requested “recommendations on what key actions you and your associates believe the U.S. Government should undertake to alleviate world hunger and malnutrition.” (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, White House Office Files on World Hunger Group, Box 50, Government Agency Hunger Reports, 9/29/77–10/21/77) In both letters, Bourne stressed the short turnaround the Working Group faced in collating agency responses and preparing a concise statement for Presidential review. For former Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman’s response to Bourne’s letter, see Document 237. The Department of State contribution to the World Hunger Working Group is printed as Document 236.

The World Hunger Working Group prepared several versions of a draft options memorandum containing Consolidated Policy Recommendations and circulated the drafts to relevant agencies for comment, prior to the submission of a final version to the President. Copies of these undated drafts are in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne, White House Office Files on World Hunger Group, Boxes 50 and 51, Government Agency Hunger Reports, 11/77–12/77 and Government Agency Hunger Reports, 1/78–9/23/78. The Department of State response to the first draft of the World Hunger Working Group report, November 25, indicated that Bourne circulated this draft prior to November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770185–1072) The summary of the report is printed as Document 245. The final report was published as a 60-page document entitled *World Hunger and Malnutrition: Improving the U.S. Response* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
SUBJECT
1979/1980 Request for the UN/FAO World Food Program

The purpose of this memorandum is to ask that you seek the President’s approval for a U.S. commitment of $220 million to the UN/FAO World Food Program (WFP) for calendar years 1979/1980. The WFP is the principal source of food aid within the United Nations system. It was established with strong U.S. endorsement and we have been its major contributor since its initiation in 1963. Its worldwide assistance is for economic development projects (60 percent), direct feeding as a nutritional supplement (30 percent), and disaster relief (10 percent). The U.S. pledge for 1977/1978 is $188 million.

Of the proposed $220 million, $216 million would be financed under Public Law 480. No additional P.L. 480 budgetary expenditures would be incurred since virtually all of our assistance through WFP is covered by the annual minimum tonnage mandated for the P.L. 480 Title II donation program. Under the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977, the mandatory minimum tonnage for Title II has been raised from 1.3 million tons to 1.6 million tons, of which 1.3 million tons must go through WFP and the voluntary agencies. We believe the distribution within the sub-minimum of approximately two-thirds to the voluntary agencies and one-third to WFP is reasonable and should be continued in 1979/1980.


2 The Title II provision of P.L. 480 allowed the United States to donate commodities to private voluntary and religious organizations for use in their overseas feeding programs.

3 Public Law 95–88.
The remaining amount—$4 million in cash for WFP’s administrative expenses—will fall within the Foreign Assistance Act and represents a $1 million increase for the two-year period.

WFP programs are aimed at the poorest segments of developing country populations. About 75 percent now goes to the poorest countries, compared with 50 percent in 1972. WFP activities are precisely those that we have in mind when we call for multilateral institutions to focus on the basic human needs of the developing world. Developing countries long have viewed WFP as one of the major programs for development assistance, and this role was further enhanced by the 1974 World Food Conference.4 We regard WFP, which consistently has had enthusiastic support in the Congress, as a prime vehicle for our multilateral development assistance efforts.

At its October 24–November 4 meeting, the Program’s governing body must decide on a target for its calendar years 1979/1980 biennium. The Secretariat is repeating its proposal, first made last spring, that the target be $950 million (compared to $750 million for the 1977/1978 biennium). The United States (and several other major donors) objected to such a large increase at the time.

We believe that a target of $950 million is too high, but that a target of $880 million can be attained realistically and used effectively. A decision to pledge $220 million:

—would be consistent with the President’s desire to increase food aid and with Congressional intent that we utilize WFP as a major vehicle for food aid distribution;
—would enable us to maintain an influential voice in the major multilateral forum discussing food aid policy; and
—would in the short term, strengthen us tactically in our efforts to hold WFP operations to a sound, realistic level.

At the October meeting we plan to indicate that, while we are prepared to raise significantly the U.S. contribution to WFP, we cannot support the $950 million for these reasons:

—There is evidence from recent WFP project evaluations that a number of very poor developing countries have problems providing the management expertise and additional financial resources necessary to absorb significant increases in food aid.
—Although we believe the Program should grow, we want to ensure that projects are selected on the basis of development or nutritional impact and not simply resource availability.

4 See Document 221.
—WFP will need time to consider and implement recommendations that its projects be coordinated more closely with those of other development assistance donors (i.e., through joint planning with UNDP, the FAO, and the financial institutions).

However, as WFP begins to coordinate its food aid more closely with the development aid of other major donors, and if new ways are found to help the developing countries absorb higher levels of WFP assistance, we may wish authority, perhaps in FY 1980, to increase our pledge.

Warren Christopher
John C. White

5 White and Christopher signed and dated the memorandum on September 21 and October 7, respectively.

233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) and the President’s Assistant for Congressional Liaison (Moore) to President Carter

Washington, October 13, 1977

SUBJECT
Congressional Resolution on World Hunger

As mentioned in Peter Bourne’s memo of September 28, 1977, both the Senate and the House have had resolutions introduced calling on you to establish a commission on World Hunger and Malnutrition. In each house the resolution was co-sponsored by a majority of the members.

All of the key sponsors are eager to accommodate your wishes and your own initiatives and have not only consulted with us, but have

1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, HE–3, 9/30/77–12/31/77. No classification marking. Drafted by Bourne, who initialed for Moore. A copy was sent to Eizenstat. A stamped notation on the top of the memorandum indicates that the President saw it; Carter wrote “ok, C” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 Not found. Bourne did, however, reference congressional action on world hunger in his September 14 memorandum to the President (See Document 227).
modified the resolutions considerably to make them potentially vehicles to build public support for your own program rather than to initiate new studies. They are, however, unwilling to withdraw the resolutions and are pressing us for you to take a position on them. There is also a strong desire for a small delegation to meet with you to discuss this issue.

We are aware of your antipathy to establishing further Presidential Commissions and believe that if you would meet with a small delegation to convey your special interest in world hunger and your reasons for not wanting additional commissions they would be willing to stall their resolutions. With your approval we will arrange such a meeting.³

The Senate Resolution has been ordered reported out of the Committee on Agriculture. The House version has been referred to both the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Agriculture with hearings scheduled for next week.⁴

³ The President circled this paragraph.
⁴ See footnote 3, Document 227.

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234. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper)¹

Washington, October 19, 1977

SUBJECT
Some Ideas for a World Hunger Campaign

As you requested, following are our suggestions for the State Department response to Peter Bourne’s World Hunger Working Group.² In this memorandum we first examine the problem of “world hunger”; second, propose ways to make existing US policies more effective in responding to problems of world hunger; and third, propose a possible

² The Department of State’s contribution to the World Hunger Working Group is printed as Document 236.
focus for a World Hunger Campaign: an attack on the pervasive worldwide problem of malnutrition.

Behind the suggestions in this memo lie several basic considerations:

—For a World Hunger Campaign to have any meaning or importance it must represent a distinct political initiative. Patting ourselves on the back for past policies or tinkering with current policies will not provide sufficient content or justification for mounting a new "campaign." At the same time, however, any proposals we make must stand on their own substantive merits.

—Policies deriving from a World Hunger Campaign must be consistent with US agricultural policies, with US development policies, and in particular with our basic human needs orientation.

—Any new policies must strike a responsive domestic chord if they are to obtain adequate public and Congressional support.

—They must also be consistent with our domestic policies involving efforts to support the poor and, in particular, to overcome problems of hunger at home.

The Problem of World Hunger

A number of important factors bear on understanding and attacking the problem of world hunger.

—The world does not face a major problem of world hunger or starvation today; favorable weather and good harvests in most parts of the world over the last several years have replaced the shortages and hunger of 1973–4 with adequate and even surplus grain supplies in many countries. Nor is the world facing a Malthusian\(^{3}\) specter of being unable to feed itself over the coming years or decades. With normal or favorable weather conditions the world can produce more grain than it can consume in any one year. Evidence of this are the near record grain stocks building up in the US and other major grain producers (including India).

—However, the world food system is a fragile one where low stocks and only slight drops in production can send grain prices skyrocketing, as was proven in 1972–3 when world grain production fell by only 2%. Thus, while grain supplies are plentiful now and prices relatively low and stable, even a small drop in production, as could happen in an exceptional year, could lead once again to problems of hunger and starvation, particularly if stocks prove inadequate or are ineffectively controlled.

\(^{3}\) Reference is to 18th-century English political economist Thomas Robert Malthus, author of *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society.*
—Underlying the problem of hunger is the problem of effective demand among groups of people and individual countries. In periods of shortage and high prices poor people often cannot afford adequate food; in normal circumstances, they often cannot afford a nutritionally adequate diet. Poor countries often have difficulty finding the foreign exchange to finance sharply increased food import costs in periods of world shortage or when crops fail at home; and they must find expanded sources of foreign exchange to finance the expected increase over the coming decades of their grain import needs.

—Growing out of the problems of effective demand, and occasionally exacerbated by ignorance or cultural traditions, is the widespread and chronic problem of malnutrition world-wide; it is concentrated in poor countries but it exists often in large pockets in middle income LDC’s and in rich countries as well (including the US).

To these important considerations in any attack on world hunger must be added one further element: none of the problems of world hunger can be isolated from the broader context of world poverty and income distribution. Rapidly growing populations increase the need for expanding food production and distribution. An inadequate social and physical infrastructure prevents the operation of an efficient and low cost food distribution system. Agricultural pricing policies in developed and developing countries alike often discourage an expansion in food production and efficient world trade in agriculture. In addition, several regional problems exist, such as the fragile and deteriorating ecosystems in many countries (e.g., the Sahelian countries which face an ever expanding desert) where food deficits are most pronounced; or over-population in other countries (e.g., the Andes) where land tenure systems and the climate limit increases in agricultural production.

In short, the recurrence of hunger in the world and the pervasive and chronic problems of malnutrition are enmeshed in a complex of other problems which must be part of the background of an effective attack on hunger itself.

Making Existing Policies More Effective

The US has a variety of policies which are addressed to the disparate problems of world hunger. To meet the problems of instability in grain supplies and price, the US has proposed establishment of an international system of nationally-held grain reserves.4 If they can be negotiated and operated effectively, these reserves should help stabilize world grain prices and supplies. However, this reserve would not take care of the problem of production shortfalls in individual LDC’s, and the sudden and often sharp strains on LDC foreign exchange re-

4 See footnote 4, Document 225.
serves for financing needed grain imports would remain. This problem could be dealt with through the provision of food aid used countercyclically to offset crop shortfalls in LDC’s and thereby relieve pressure on scarce foreign exchange resources. The Bourne World Hunger Campaign paper might include an examination of how US food aid could be used more effectively in this way.

If an effective grain reserve system is not established, then the US could consider proposing the negotiation of a grain reserve specifically for LDC’s designed to offset world price increases for grain as well as domestic grain production shortfalls in LDC’s. (Preliminary calculations suggest that a reserve for this purpose would require around 15 million metric tons of grain—compared to estimates of 60 million tons for a world-wide reserve.)

Through its foreign assistance programs the US is also making an effort to foster growth with equity in LDC’s, with greatest concentration on expanding LDC agriculture. However, the widespread concern with the effectiveness of US aid suggests that a special effort be made to assess the past effectiveness of US assistance in fostering the expansion of LDC agriculture. Specifically, what is needed is

— a methodology for assessing effectiveness
— an examination of past experience in the context of this methodology
— establishment of regional or country agricultural growth targets for measuring future effectiveness.

Other US policies specifically aimed at expanding agriculture in LDC’s might include:

— Developing the knowledge and techniques for greater agricultural productivity world-wide: Agricultural experts have been troubled for some time at the apparent slowdown in productivity gains in agriculture and believe there is a strong case for greater government finance of basic research in this area. (This was also a conclusion of the recent World Food and Nutrition Study.)

— Delivering the research to LDC’s: This involves the time-consuming task of adapting research improvements made in the US to conditions in individual countries or regions within countries abroad. A number of LDC’s do not even have the agricultural facilities to undertake efforts at adaptation. Perhaps the 1979 Science and Technology Conference could focus on improving the delivery of agricultural technology to LDC’s and facilitate its adaptation there.

5 See Document 212.
6 The UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) was scheduled to take place in Vienna, August 20–31, 1979.
Delivering the adapted seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and techniques to farmers in LDC’s: Few LDC’s have efficient agricultural extension services, often reflecting their own budgetary and personnel constraints but also the low priority many governments place on raising the standard of living of their rural populations. There may be opportunities for AID, perhaps together with the Peace Corps, to do more in undertaking and financing the development of agricultural extension services in particular LDC’s. (This is being done to some extent already but whether it might be undertaken more widely and with closer AID/Peace Corps cooperation, could be usefully examined.)

Finally, the United States has a variety of policies aimed at helping LDC’s expand their exports, which they must do if they are to earn the foreign exchange to finance the large quantities of LDC imports projected for the coming decades. These policies include the generalized system of preferences, and the current MTN negotiations, aimed at reducing trade barriers generally—and in particular to products of importance to LDC’s. Even with these policies, however, a considerable gap is expected to develop between LDC food production and desired food consumption levels. Projected LDC grain import needs by 1985 range from 75 to more than 100 million tons, compared with just 30 million tons of LDC grain imports in 1973-4. The Bourne study could examine projected LDC grain import needs for 1985 to obtain as accurate and up to date a picture as possible of these requirements and their implications. The study could also consider how these needs might be factored into US trade and agricultural policy and whether planning future food aid programs in particular might take account of these future needs.

A Focus on Malnutrition

Food is the most basic human need. Though there is at present no widespread famine in the world, many millions of people (estimates range between 400 million and 1 billion) do not have a nutritionally adequate diet. Malnutrition reduces the mental and physical capabilities of these people, and makes them more susceptible to disease; and when it occurs before the age of 4, malnutrition can result in irreparable damage to a child’s physical and mental development.

The world-wide malnutrition problem is largely one of the inadequate income levels of the world’s poor. This problem is likely to continue as long as widespread poverty exists, unless direct action is taken.

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7 The Trade Act of 1974 permitted the President to establish a Generalized System of Preferences, which eliminated tariffs on some products imported from LDCs. Such a system promised to expand imports and improve the economic sustainability of these nations. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 223.

8 The Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations was underway in Geneva.
to improve the diets of the malnourished. An attack on malnutrition offers a logical focus for a world hunger campaign and is consistent with our aid strategy of addressing basic human needs in all countries. Moreover, it would appeal to the humanitarian instincts of the American people and generate widespread public support at home and abroad.

The major elements in a world hunger campaign focused on malnutrition should be:

1. Obtaining better information on the extent of malnutrition worldwide. Special efforts should be made to obtain accurate data in countries believed to have the most widespread and chronic problems of malnutrition, such as those of South Asia, the Sahel, the Andes or Haiti.

2. Developing targets for the improvement of nutritional levels. As a pilot project of this sort, we might want to concentrate on particular countries and especially vulnerable groups (pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 4) in those countries.

3. Expanding the delivery of high protein blended foods to target groups. (The US now provides nearly 1 million tons per year of grain and other foods for nutrition intervention programs as part of its Food for Peace Title II program). This would require greater cooperation with private voluntary agencies which now manage most of US supported nutrition intervention programs abroad. It would also lend itself to training and utilizing locally available labor, thus minimizing the American presence in the field.

4. Involving recipient governments to a greater extent in nutrition intervention programs, with the objective of having these governments eventually take over entirely these programs. There might be especially promising prospects of the US acting as this sort of catalyst in middle-income LDC’s with pockets of malnutrition (e.g., Brazil; and its northeast states) where governments could be expected to take over their own feeding programs in the near future.

5. Transferring available technology and providing necessary financing to LDC’s for developing their own high protein blended foods, based on locally available grains and other agricultural products. These countries would then avoid having to rely totally on importing such foods (often at relatively high unit prices and costly in foreign exchange) from the US.

6. Ensuring that the necessary infrastructure for nutrition intervention programs—particularly in remote areas—is adequate. Required are transport facilities, vehicles, storage, and distribution and cooking facilities.

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9 See footnote 2, Document 232.
7. Combining nutrition intervention programs with education in family planning. (This is already done to some extent; any expansion in nutrition intervention programs should be accompanied by expansion of family planning where ever possible.) Education in improving general health and nutrition standards would also be important.

8. Developing and implementing techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of nutrition intervention programs, including weight charts for recipients, incidence of disease and other longer term indicators of the impact of improved nutrition.

9. Finally, seeking the cooperation of developed and developing countries alike—including Socialist countries—to attack malnutrition problems wherever they occur. The Chinese, in particular, might have some valuable insights in combating malnutrition based on their own experience.

A program attacking problems of malnutrition at home and abroad involves a number of difficulties and these should be well examined before any decision is made to proceed.

—Such a program can be quite expensive in terms of donor and recipient resources per unit of food delivered. It is particularly costly in terms of labor and administration.

—Many LDC governments have assigned a low priority to fighting malnutrition in their countries and it may be difficult to persuade them to allocate their own scarce resources to fighting malnutrition.

—Nutrition intervention programs while responding to improving basic human needs, may make less a contribution to recipient country economic development than traditional AID activities with a heavier investment orientation. The potential trade-off there between long-term growth and immediate improvements in the welfare of the poor should be thoroughly studied before a decision is made to proceed.
235. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter

Washington, October 21, 1977

SUBJECT

Future Budget Commitment for World Food Program

In accordance with your procedures established to approve future international budget commitments, the Departments of State and Agriculture are requesting approval of a $220 million U.S. contribution to the UN World Food Program (WFP) for calendar years 1979 and 1980 (See Tab A). They wish to pledge this amount at an October 24, 1977, meeting which will set a total WFP budget target for 1978/80. By announcing the U.S. pledge now, rather than at the official pledging session early next year, the U.S. delegation hopes to influence the selection of a slightly lower target for the two year period.

Background

Established at U.S. initiative in 1963, WFP provides food grants to needy people in developing countries through projects of their governments, including food for work, school and preschool child feeding and disaster relief. The program has grown rapidly and now exceeds on an annual basis the P.L. 480 Title II feeding programs of the U.S. voluntary agencies. The U.S. share of the program has fallen from 50% to 25%. The table below shows the relevant statistics for the past two biennia and alternatives for the 1979/80 period.

1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizenstat Files, Box 324, World Hunger [1]. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. McIntyre signed the first page. According to a covering note, the NSC Staff returned a copy to McIntyre on October 24 and sent additional copies to Eizenstat, Bourne, and Brzezinski. McIntyre’s handwritten comment on the note reads: “#1 was also our recommendation. J.” (Ibid.)

2 Not attached; printed as Document 232.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975/76</th>
<th>1977/78</th>
<th>WFP Proposal</th>
<th>State/USDA Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total WFP Budget</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>880</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Contribution</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>220</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commodity costs</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>182</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freight costs</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash (for Admin)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US as a % of WFP total</td>
<td>(18%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Food and freight costs are financed under PL 480 Title II, and the cash through AID funds for voluntary contributions to international organizations and programs. (The low figure of 18% for the U.S. share in the 1975/76 biennium is explained by extraordinary Canadian and Arab contributions).

**Analysis**

The WFP secretariat has proposed a $950 million level for 1978/80, a 27 percent increase in funding. At the current 25 percent share of total contributions, the U.S. portion would be $238 million. State and Agriculture believe the proposed WFP total could exceed recipient governments’ absorptive capacity given their management constraints, and may cause WFP to lower its own programming standards. WFP’s internal capacity to manage such a rapidly growing program is also questionable.

State/USDA’s proposed $880 million program would, they believe, permit more orderly growth while demonstrating continuing U.S. support for UN food aid focused on basic human needs. The U.S. proposed $220 million share (25% of the WFP total) would be presented as a maximum dollar amount. Thus, if other countries decided on a higher total (we do not have sufficient voting power for a veto), the U.S. percentage share would decline. Because other donors will probably not wish to make up for the reduction in the U.S. share, the proposed approach has a reasonable chance of success in limiting WFP growth. The proposed increase would utilize P.L. 480 Title II tonnage, using approximately one-third of the Congress’ recently mandated increase in Title II (the remaining two-thirds would go to U.S. voluntary-agency feeding programs.)

As a third alternative, an argument could be made for limiting total WFP funding to the level of the current biennium, $750 million. The fact that WFP has not presented specific proposals for additional funding and the lack of any rigorous plan for management improvement would argue for continuing the current level.
Recommendation

OMB concurs with the State/USDA proposal. The proposed dollar increase is small, and any U.S. effort to hold to the current level would encounter strong opposition from the developing countries and possibly from Congress.

Options

1. $220 million U.S. pledge towards a $880 million WFP program (State, USDA, OMB)¹
2. $238 million U.S. pledge towards a $950 million WFP program (Likely World Food Program proposal, no agency supports)
3. $188 million U.S. pledge towards a $750 million WFP program (Current level, no agency supports)

¹ The President checked this option and initialed at the end of the memorandum.

236. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Summary

This paper is divided into three sections. The first gives background on the world food crisis and our policy response to it. The second describes the current food situation and problems, while the third gives the thrust of future policy and provides some themes for a possible Presidential speech.

Some conclusions we reach include the following: 1) the direction of the international food policies we are implementing remains valid; 2) a new world hunger campaign probably is not justified, given the lack of effective solutions and the risk of over promising; 3) a Presidential speech on food and hunger may be desirable, however and 4) we

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770193–0983. No classification marking. Drafted by Ogden; cleared by Katz and in substance by Wolf, Long, Witt, Lancaster, and Johnston. Tabs A “Relevant Production-Related Proposals Advanced at World Food Conference,” and B, “Candidate US Initiatives,” are attached but not printed. Anderson transmitted the paper to Bourne under an October 31 covering memorandum, indicating that it was the Department of State’s contribution to the World Hunger Working Group. (Ibid.)
should use a food and hunger initiative to develop public and Congressional support for increased ODA.

Section I

World Food Crisis

Food became a prominent international issue and a major theme in North-South relations as a result of the 1972–74 world food crisis. That crisis brought especially harsh consequences for the developing world. Commercial grain and food supplies contracted, sharply driving up prices to levels that eliminated many poorer countries from the market. Badly needed concessional food aid flows also dried up during this period; donor countries could not sustain food aid levels in the face of short supplies and rising prices. The threat of widespread starvation appeared a real one.

Responding to these events, the United States took the initiative to call for and organize the 1974 United Nations World Food Conference.2 There, agreement was reached on resolutions which established an integrated and comprehensive framework dealing with production, consumption and distribution aspects of the world food problem. (See Tab A) The major conclusions of the Conference, in summary, were that a) food deficits for many of the poorer developing countries could only be met through increased domestic agricultural production, and increased Official Development Assistance (ODA) should be directed toward this objective; b) an international system of nationally held grain reserves should be established to offset the impact of future short supply situations; c) increased food aid is needed in the short term to address immediate food aid needs; and d) agricultural trade should be liberalized to expand production and exports. These conclusions, in addition to providing a basis for international action on food and hunger, represent the backdrop for recent U.S. food policies.

U.S. Policy Response

The United States moved quickly to frame and implement a policy responsive to the thrust of these conclusions. United States bilateral and multilateral assistance for agricultural and rural development has been doubled. AID presently targets approximately 55% of its bilateral assistance into the agricultural sectors of recipient countries. The United States also has given strong backing to multilateral food and agriculture institutions; for example, supporting FAO and seeking rapid establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-

2 See Document 221.
US food aid levels have been increased to more than six million tons annually in recent years. This is 60% of the 10 million ton global food aid target endorsed by the Conference. Recently, the United States agreed to participate in the World Food Program’s 500,000 Emergency Food Reserve and to increase its pledge to the WFP. US food aid programs also have been made more developmentally effective. To increase world food security, the United States has formulated proposals for an international grains reserve system. In the trade area, the U.S. is actively pressing for broad based trade liberalization at the MTN negotiations in Geneva. Its GSP system offers a wide range of new export opportunities to developing countries.

Section II

The Current Situation

The world does not face a major problem of world hunger or starvation today; favorable weather and good harvests in most parts of the world over the last several years have replaced the shortages and hunger of 1973–74. Large grain stocks are building up in the US and other major grain producers (including India). However, the world food system remains a fragile one, where low stocks and only slight drops in production can send grain prices sky rocketing, as was proven in 1972–1973 when world grain production fell by only 2%. Thus, while grains supplies are plentiful now, and prices relatively low and stable, even a small drop in production, as could happen in an exceptional year, could lead once again to problems of hunger and starvation particularly if stocks prove inadequate or are ineffectively controlled.

Problems of world hunger remain deeply enmeshed in the broader issues of world poverty and income distribution. Rapidly growing populations increase the need for expanding food production and distribution. An inadequate social and physical infrastructure prevents the operation of an efficient and low cost food distribution system. Agricultural pricing policies in developed and developing countries alike often discourage an expansion of food production and efficient world trade in agriculture. In addition, a number of regional problems exist, such as the fragile and deteriorating ecosystems in many countries (e.g. the Sahelian countries which face an ever expanding desert) where food deficits are most pronounced; or over population in other countries (e.g. the Andes) where land tenure systems and the climate limit increases in agricultural production.

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3 Established in 1977 as a specialized agency of the UN, the International Fund for Agricultural Development financed development projects targeted at increasing food production in developing countries.

4 See Document 235.
There are encouraging aspects to the current world food picture, however. Higher priority is being assigned to food problems, both in developing country planning and in development assistance programs from bilateral and multilateral institutions. Also, a higher degree of genuine agreement over the sources of food problems and the best means for dealing with them has been reached in a long series of discussions between developed and developing countries. Furthermore, there is heightened domestic and international understanding of long term structural food problems, including the growing food gap in the poorest developing countries, and awareness that another crisis could occur on short notice.

There also are new and encouraging steps which the world community is taking to deal with new factors of world hunger. These include, for example, increased global awareness of the food/population problem and of the degradation of the land and resource base, reflected in recent United Nations Global Conferences on Food, Population, Water and Desertification, new “action plans” approved by nations at the Water and Desertification Conferences; and ever improving institutional and technological capabilities to apply to problems, e.g. international agricultural research institutions, evolution of the Sahel Development Program, new monitoring and assessment capabilities for food production and disease detection etc. (satellite remote sensing), and new varieties of drought resistant crops, food storage and preservation techniques, land management systems etc. These recent developments hold promise for the future.

Hunger Problems

It’s clear from the above that a wide range of problems needs to be addressed in attacking world hunger and malnutrition. A list of the most important of these might include the following:

—Increasing food production worldwide, but particularly in food deficit developing countries. Developing country food production increases in recent years have exceeded the 4% target agreed to for the United Nations Second Development Decade. This favorable performance, however, must be attributed primarily to favorable weather conditions, rather than to basic underlying reforms. Inadequate economic

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5 United Nations conferences on food, population, water, and desertification took place respectively in Rome, Italy (November 5–16, 1974), Bucharest, Romania (August 19–30, 1974), Mar del Plata, Argentina (March 14–25, 1977), and Nairobi, Kenya (August 29–September 9, 1977).

and political policies and conditions still prevent sustained food output increases in many developing countries, and in addition reduce private and public investment flowing to agriculture. There also are other constraints to expanded food output in developing countries which must be overcome such as inadequate management and shortage of trained manpower, capital shortages, inadequate and inappropriate technology, substantial post harvest losses due to inadequate storage facilities, and productivity losses due to people debilitated by hunger and disease.

—Dealing effectively with problems of under consumption and malnutrition. Though there is at present no widespread famine in the world, many millions of people (estimates range between 400 million and one billion) do not have an adequately nutritional diet. Underlying this problem is the issue of effective demand among groups of people and individual countries. We have learned that economic growth and prosperity does not necessarily produce additional benefits for the poorer members of society, including access to necessary food supplies. While the problem is focused in the poorer developing countries, it is worldwide in scope, existing often in large pockets in middle income LDC’s and in rich countries as well.

—Feeding the hungry and malnourished requires significantly improved food distribution systems both among countries and within the poorer developing nations. The food crisis of 1972–1974 evidenced many instances of localized famine in countries and regions where adequate food supplies were available, but inadequate transport systems made it impossible to deliver the food where it was needed most. Improved distribution systems mean not only getting more food to the neediest, but also ensuring better food supply/demand balance locally and regionally. Unless food imports are kept in reasonable balance with local production and purchasing power, domestic food prices and agricultural incentives may be reduced. We need to carefully review the level of our food aid and other food exports and seek to establish internal programs in recipient countries to increase productivity, purchasing power, and demand prior to and along with the arrival of imported food.

—Restraining excess population growth rates which represent a threat to long term food supply/demand balance. In this connection, responsible population growth control programs are required. Based on current growth rates, the world’s population will double to 8 billion people by 2010. Feeding this many people will be extremely difficult, with a possibility of widespread famine in years of bad harvests. Since about 80% of the projected population growth will occur in developing countries, the population problem will be compounded, even more than today, by distribution problems.
—Developing flexible policies to deal with the wide range of problems and situations faced by developing countries in meeting their food requirements. Some developing countries already have sufficient supplies and expected foreign exchange earnings to purchase all the food imports they are likely to need. Another group of countries can attain this position with a modicum of help. For some, increased agricultural development assistance can expand food production, others would benefit most from reduced trade barriers, while still others need help such as liberal credits to finance imports in short supply years. An effective U.S. and international food strategy must deal meaningfully with all these varied situations and needs.

—Finally, continuing efforts to deal intelligently and effectively with other factors affecting world hunger such as accelerating worldwide losses of arable land from mismanagement of the resource base (deforestation, over-grazing, soil erosion, salination etc.), the rising cost of chemicals and raw materials required by agriculture, and limitations on water for agriculture imposed by growing competition among nations and regions for surface and ground water.

Section III

Future Policy Evolution

We believe the broad thrust of the food policies we initiated several years ago remains valid. If the third world is to feed itself and accelerate its development through agriculture, the course followed must concentrate on a mix of agricultural development programs, increased Official Development Assistance and trade liberalization. These policies must be dynamic ones, however, adjusting to present conditions and responding effectively to contemporary problems. The future direction of our food policies is designed to do this.

Reserves

We continue to seek a viable international reserve system to stabilize prices and promote supply security. In the London talks, the United States has proposed the establishment of an internationally coordinated system of nationally-held reserve stocks, shared among all major grain trading countries. The reserve system operations, activated by movements of world wheat prices, would stabilize international prices and improve food security by shifting grain supplies for-
ward from years of excess supply to years of scarcity, and thereby provide a form of world food insurance against the unpredictable occurrences of major crop failure and adverse weather. In addition to specific obligations for reserve stocks, the United States suggested framework would also provide for the correction of adverse market conditions through such measures as the elimination of trade barriers and adjustments in the amounts of wheat fed to animals. To provide for U.S. participation in the international system, and to handle other emergency food requirements, the Administration will soon submit to Congress new legislation establishing a domestic emergency reserve of up to 6 million tons of grains.

**Food Aid**

A major element in this comprehensive policy for greater food security is the assurance of adequate and timely food assistance to the poorest parts of the developing world. To meet this objective, the United States has called for the negotiation of a new Food Aid Convention within the context of an International Wheat Agreement.8 The new convention should ensure the availability of food assistance at not less than 10 million tons on an annual basis, in accordance with the recommendation of the World Food Council. Donating countries would also take steps to improve the effectiveness of food aid flows, to improve coordination and to promote efficiency in domestic production in recipient countries. The Administration also is continuing efforts to improve the developmental effectiveness of PL 480 food aid programs. This is being done, *inter alia* by a) seeking rapid implementation of long term Title III Food for Development programs b) considering new mechanisms to assure more dependable food aid programming and c) improving donor co-ordination of food aid programs in support of development objectives. We also should examine the possibility of providing food aid *counter cyclically* to offset crop shortfalls in LDC’s and thereby relieve pressure on scarce foreign exchange resources.

**Trade**

The United States has a variety of policies aimed at helping LDC’s to expand their exports, which they must do if they are to earn the foreign exchange necessary to finance the large quantity of imports pro-

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8 The International Grains Arrangement or Agreement (IGA), promulgated in 1967 during the Kennedy Round of the GATT and entered into force on July 1, 1968, consisted of two legal instruments: the Wheat Trade Convention (WTC) and the Food Aid Convention (FAC). The FAC committed signatories to providing a fixed amount of commodities (4.5 tons) to developing nations each year. In 1971 signatories negotiated a new umbrella agreement for the WTC and FAC—the International Wheat Agreement—and renewed it in 1974, 1975, and 1976.
jected for the next decade. These policies include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and the current MTN negotiations, aimed at reducing trade barriers generally and in particular for products of importance to LDC’s. At the MTN, the United States will continue to press for the multilateral reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers—including agricultural products of particular interest to developing countries. In this connection, liberalization of trade barriers by the LDC’s themselves would not only in many cases make agricultural imports cheaper and more available, but could also in some instances encourage policies more favorable to agriculture. We also should consider whether additional agricultural commodities of particular interest to developing countries could be added to our GSP offer.

**AID**

In this area, the Administration has determined that a substantial increase in our Official Development Assistance is required to meet our international commitments and to contribute more effectively to development. The “new directions” aid effort seeks to foster economic growth with equity, and to meet Basic Human Needs of the neediest members of society. Particularly high priority is being given to increasing ODA flows to agriculture. In this connection, two areas for possible additional emphasis are the following:

*Developing the knowledge and techniques for greater agricultural productivity world-wide.* Agricultural experts have been troubled for some time at the apparent slowdown in productivity gains in agriculture and believe there is a strong case for greater government finance of basic research in this area. (This was also a conclusion of the recent World Food and Nutrition Study.)

*Delivering the research to LDCs.* This involves the time consuming task of adapting research improvements made in the U.S. to conditions in individual countries or regions within countries abroad. A number of LDCs do not even have the agricultural facilities to undertake efforts at adaption. Perhaps the 1979 Science and Technology Conference could focus on improving the delivery of agricultural technology to LDC’s and facilitate its adaption there.

**United Nations Efforts**

US support for United Nations and other multilateral institutions operating in the area of food and agriculture is being increased. Particular attention is being focused on the FAO in view of the key role which this institution plays in agricultural development efforts. The U.S. also

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9 See footnotes 7 and 8, Document 234.
10 See footnote 10, Document 73.
11 See Document 212.
continues to give full support and encouragement to IFAD which will channel additional resources to priority agricultural projects. In the future, the US may want to give added priority to international activities dealing specifically with new measures to protect and sustain the natural resource base on which food production depends over the longer term.

Focus on Malnutrition

An attack on malnutrition is one possible focus for a new world hunger initiative. While not entirely new, higher priority and emphasis on malnutrition would be consistent with our aid strategy of addressing basic human needs in all countries and should enjoy popular support in the United States. Following are some elements which might be included under a malnutrition focus:

1) Involving recipient governments to a greater extent in nutrition intervention programs, with the objective of having these governments eventually take over entirely these programs. There might be especially promising prospects of the US acting as this sort of catalyst in middle-income LDCs with pockets of malnutrition (e.g., Brazil; and its northeast states) where governments could be expected to take over their own feeding programs in the near future.

2) Expanding the delivery of high protein blended foods to target groups. (The U.S. now provides nearly one million tons per year of grain and other foods for nutrition intervention programs as part of its Food for Peace Title II program). This would require greater cooperation with private voluntary agencies which now manage most of U.S. supported nutrition intervention programs abroad. It would also lend itself to training and utilizing locally available labor, thus minimizing the American presence in the field.

3) Developing targets for the improvement of nutritional levels. As a pilot project of this sort, we might want to concentrate on particular countries and especially vulnerable groups (pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 4) in those countries.

4) Transferring available technology and providing necessary financing to LDCs for developing their own high protein blended foods, based on locally available grains and other agricultural products. These countries would then avoid having to rely totally on importing such foods (often at relatively high unit prices and costly in foreign exchange) from the US.

5) Ensuring that the necessary infrastructure for nutrition intervention programs—particularly in remote areas—is adequate. Required are transport facilities, vehicles, storage, and distribution and cooking facilities.

6) Combining nutrition intervention programs with education in family planning. (This is already done to some extent; any expansion in nutri-
tion intervention programs should be accompanied by expansion of family planning wherever possible.) Education in improving general health and nutrition standards would also be important.

A program attacking malnutrition problems at home and abroad does involve a number of difficulties which should be carefully considered. For example, such a program can be quite expensive in terms of donor and recipient resources per unit of food delivered. It is particularly costly in terms of labor and administration. Many LDC governments have assigned a low priority to fighting malnutrition in their countries and it may be difficult to persuade them to allocate their own scarce resources to fighting malnutrition. Finally, nutrition intervention programs, while responding to improving Basic Human Needs, may make less a contribution to recipient country economic development than traditional AID activities with a heavier investment orientation.

Money Is Needed

The policies outlined above represent an integrated and cohesive effort to deal with world hunger and malnutrition problems. They seek to deal with global and national agricultural production, distribution and consumption, broader development issues, international food trade, food reserves and short and long run food aid. They also include concurrent efforts in other areas such as population growth control, maintenance of the global resource base, new energy and resource saving production techniques and inputs and improvements in local science, technology, extension and management capabilities (particularly in the poorer countries).

Effective programs in all these areas require money which Congress will be reluctant to provide. In this connection, a hunger initiative could usefully be turned to our advantage. Funds to support it should be more easily forthcoming. We believe, in particular, that Congress would be more willing to support increased AID appropriations linked to this objective. We hope this important connection will be made and maintained by the Administration.

A World Hunger Campaign

While it may appear attractive, our tentative conclusion is that a major World Hunger Campaign probably is not desirable. Although reserving judgment, we doubt that the Working Group will be able to develop genuinely new initiatives providing effective solutions to the difficult food problems we face. There is the risk of over promising, with subsequent disillusionment over results. In addition, we see a distinct threat that such a campaign could lead directly to confrontation with the Administration’s human rights efforts i.e. do we assist hungry people in Uganda.
A Presidential Speech

On the other hand, an effective speech by the President on the theme of world hunger and malnutrition could be very useful. In particular, it could serve to pull together and explain our food policies for the Congress and public. This would greatly help to win support for new resources to support them. Some possible themes for a speech are suggested below:

Focus on Malnutrition

—Emphasize the importance of attacking problems of malnutrition at home and abroad. Explain what the Administration is doing in this area.

AID

—Emphasize planned increases in ODA levels and link them to the solution of world food and hunger problems. Explain that US ODA as a percent of GNP is low and should be raised to appropriate international levels.

—Build on the “Basic Human Needs” concept, relating ODA increases to helping the poorest and neediest. The overall thrust should be to remove constraints which prevent food from reaching the individuals who need it.

Population

—Dramatize the point that no solution will endure unless we can bring food production into balance with population growth and a sustainable natural resources base. Specifically highlight both the need for appropriate population policies to reduce current population growth rates; and the need to maintain the long-term productive capacity of the land and associated natural resources.

Food Reserves

—Indicate that the United States is negotiating a new international wheat agreement including an international security grain reserve component. Urge all countries to adopt the political will and flexibility necessary for a successful conclusion.

—Explain how the international reserve system would benefit all countries, but particularly the developing nations, by stabilizing price fluctuations, assuring security of food supply and reducing trade barriers.

—Emphasize the importance of the emergency food reserve bill which the Administration will soon present to Congress. Explain its dual purpose i.e. to offset emergency food shortages in developing
countries and to provide for US participation in a new international security grain reserve system.

**Food Aid**

—Announce U.S. support for a new Food Aid Convention including a 10 million ton minimum obligation for annual food aid flows.

—Emphasize U.S. efforts to increase the developmental priority and effectiveness of its food aid programs. Cite the usefulness of multi-year Title III food aid programs to support long term agricultural development efforts.

**Food Research and Technology**

—Cite U.S. commitment to strengthening the international science and technology base, particularly as it applies to LDCs, through support for international agricultural institutes, FAO and UNEP efforts, OECD food activities, Sahel Development Program.

—Announce intention to give higher priority to LDC oriented research on improved food production techniques and methods within *US bilateral* science and technology agreements and other programs; and call for similar actions by other nations and international organizations. (Potential areas for concentration are identified under Tab B.)

**Trade**

—Express the determination to achieve a successful outcome of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva. Explain how liberalization of trade could help to expand and make more efficient LDC agricultural production and encourage exports with which to pay for needed food imports.

**United Nations**

—Emphasize US support for UN food agencies such as the FAO and WFP. Express the hope that IFAD will perform a constructive role in channeling additional resources into agricultural projects.

**Domestic Food Policy**

While the above themes deal with international food issues, we believe a speech by the President also should include domestic factors which impact on them. It is clear that domestic policies and productive capacities of the United States and other current food surplus countries will be extremely significant in meeting world hunger over the near and medium terms. If a significant hunger initiative is launched, domestic food policy decisions will have to be supportive. A Presidential message in any event should highlight steps we are taking to maintain US agriculture. These might include, for example, pending revision of domestic policies, implementation of a multiple use approach to the
management of public lands, measures to protect the best agricultural land from conversion, and the high priority assigned to soil erosion control and the development of new tools for crop inventoring (LACIE remote sensing effort is an example).

Additional Initiatives

In addition to all of the above, there are several other initiatives which the Inter-Agency Working Group might usefully consider. These include the following:

—A new program of U.S. institution building and research designed to strengthen our domestic food production capacity and concurrently address global requirements. Particular priority for new Department of Energy, USDA and NSF programs aimed at reducing energy component of food production.

—Specific financial commitment to proposed Sahelian Institute ($3–5 million initial contribution).

—High priority to new U.S./Mexico cooperative program designed to protect and restore resource base and achieve agricultural potential of large semi-arid region we share. This concept emerged from UN Desertification Conference and is being developed in the State Department. The Government of Mexico and relevant USG agencies (esp. Interior and USDA) must be brought in prior to any announcement.

—Review U.S. policies and programs to determine if something can be done to expand LDC agricultural exports. Particular priority might be given to adding additional agricultural commodities of interest to LDCs to our GSP list.

—Create a new “food corps” within the U.N. system or elsewhere. Its members would be recruited to undertake grass roots projects aimed at increasing agricultural production at the small farm level.
237. Letter From Orville Freeman to the President's Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne)\(^1\)

New York, November 4, 1977

Dear Dr. Bourne:

Your October 5th letter\(^2\) was on my desk when I returned from an extended trip in Asia. I would like to respond in considerable length to all five of the questions to which you direct my attention.\(^3\) However, your letter calls for response by October 21st, so let me quickly summarize where the first four areas you name are concerned by emphasizing, as I sure others to whom you have written will do, that the key is “political.”

I could name on the fingers of one hand the developing countries where strong and determined programs to accomplish the necessary increase of food production and distribution have been carried out. Historically, few political leaders have had the will or strength to develop and carry out the necessary programs to affect the major changes that are essential if the long and complex chain of relationships, running from land ownership to finance, inputs, technology application, production, storage, processing, and, finally, marketing is to be altered in a fashion designed to accomplish the necessary increase in productivity. In my judgment, the President could do nothing more important for the food and hunger cause than to press, in every way possible and on all occasions personally, on the chiefs of state that they must put their “back” into agriculture and food development. No country in history (except a few city-states), has enjoyed marked economic progress without a vigorous and successful agricultural base. As you are well aware, only about half of the good land in the world is being used, and probably only about one third of the technology is currently effectively applied. The “makings” are all there; what is needed is the political will to put together and carry through programs (including outside support) to expand production and distribution in the country where it is needed. The political risk to do so is usually high and payoff in visible results comes slowly.

\(^1\) Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem. No classification marking. In a November 7 note to Mondale, Freeman wrote that he had sent the letter to the White House. (Ibid.) The letter is typed on stationery of the Business International Corporation of which former Secretary of Agriculture Freeman was President and CEO.

\(^2\) Reference is to an October 5 letter Bourne sent to various addressees; see Document 231. A copy of Bourne’s letter to Freeman is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem.

\(^3\) Reference is to the five “possible hunger policy areas” outlined in an attachment to Bourne’s October 5 letter. (Ibid.)
In question five, you refer to private investment in low income countries, and in the last sentence of the first paragraph of your covering letter you call for participation of the private sector.\(^4\) This is, of course, elemental, for most of the applied agricultural technology is held in the private sector and the ability to efficiently apply that technology is peculiarly within the private sector. The problem, of course, is that the risks and the potential for return are disproportionate. In a world that is largely capital and technology short, under present circumstances private sector leadership feels compelled to apply their limited resources in areas more likely to bring returns to the shareholders to whom they are responsible. Here, again, a clear, sharp, powerful commitment by the political leaders at the very highest level in the countries that are most desperately in need is necessary. Assurances that commitments made will be met, and that support committed will be forthcoming, and that cooperation, up and down the line, is assured, are necessary. Such has seldom been forthcoming, with commitments frequently breached, although solemnly entered into. I believe it can be fairly said that most multinational agribusiness companies wish to invest in less developed countries and recognize their responsibilities to contribute to the world hunger problem. Attention should therefore be given—carefully and methodically—to the conditions under which they are able to meet their responsibilities to their shareholders and still involve themselves in the hunger problem in the developing countries.

For some years I have been advocating that there should be somewhere a cadre of highly experienced and competent business political leaders who have had experience and credibility at the highest levels, in both public and private sectors. Such professionals could play the part of “honest brokers,” identifying opportunities in developing countries, and notifying companies who have the technology and knowhow to meet that need. They must, of course, be able to reach leadership at the very highest level in both government and the private sector. By definition, their credibility must be the highest, so that they can bring about a thorough examination of the potential on both sides of the project in question; i.e., in government and by multinational agribusiness companies. Once the possibilities are called to the attention of top leadership in both private and public sectors, the negotiations, looking to results, will take care of themselves. Attention might also be given to some effective backing by the US Government or an international organization so that the kind of protection that has been ex-

\(^4\)The fifth policy area listed in the attachment, Trade and Investment, posed the question: “How can U.S. trade and investment policies facilitate access of the poor to food?” (Ibid.)
tended by the US OPIC program; i.e., insurance against various contingencies, might be put in place. Some capital inputs or credit availability might also help in consummating agreements.

These are just a few observations, hastily dictated. I also presume to include an article which appeared in the United Nations publication, Development Forum, on the possibilities for reaching and training small cultivators. Many variations of this are possible.

So far as direct food aid is concerned, there are many more expert than myself. It is necessary, but very difficult to manage so that real people-needs are met without depressing prices for farm products in the marketplace. The importance of price and resulting return as an inducement to using proper technology should be given top priority. Over the years, the mistake of following a cheap food policy for humanitarian reasons, with resulting low market price and no progress on the production front has been made again and again. I can say quite factually that “I have met farmers all over the world who can’t read or write, but never one who can’t count.”

I hope this brief response to your inquiries is helpful. Good luck in your very important project.

Sincerely yours,

Orville L. Freeman

5 Not found.

238. Letter From Senator Hubert Humphrey to President Carter

Washington, December 5, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

This fall both Houses of Congress passed resolutions asking you to appoint a commission to explore initiatives through which the United States can combat hunger and malnutrition in the world. I was among the original co-sponsors of the Senate resolution because I believe such

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780008–1406. No classification marking. Another copy of Humphrey’s letter is in the Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 42, Members of the Commission [3].

a commission would provide a unique opportunity to mobilize the nation to support efforts that can substantially improve the nutritional well-being of citizens of the United States and the world.

Too often in the past, public interest in hunger and malnutrition has been aroused spasmodically, largely in times of famine, and there has been no attempt to build strong, sustained public interest in and support for, comprehensive food and nutrition policy undertakings. There is a wide and diverse constituency that will support thoughtful governmental action on food and nutrition, and a commission on hunger and malnutrition can help build that support.

I see such a commission undertaking two basic tasks. First, it would be a vehicle for public involvement and education. Through hearings across the country, people would have the opportunity to ask questions about our food and nutrition policy and present their ideas for improving it. In addition, the hearings would inform the public in a continuing way about the problems of hunger and malnutrition, at home and abroad.

Second, the commission would analyze general economic and agricultural trends in the developing world, particularly with respect to changes that will take place because of the rise in energy prices, and determine how our current policies will affect nutritional wellbeing in this changing context. It is imperative that this two-fold evaluation be done on a continuous basis if we are to avoid policies that do more harm than good, and if we are to establish a clear recognition of the connection between problems of food and nutrition in the United States and such problems abroad.

There is always the question of whether commissions are really useful. It has been my experience that the benefits of a commission are in direct proportion to the strength of its mandate, the quality of its membership, and the level of support it receives. May I also suggest that Dr. Jean Mayer, President of Tufts University, who organized the 1969 White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health, could be an excellent chairman.  

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3 In May 1969, Nixon announced that his administration planned to devise solutions to the problem of domestic hunger and retool Federal hunger programs. He subsequently appointed Mayer his special consultant and tasked him with organizing various working groups and task forces in advance of the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health, held in Washington December 2–4, 1969. For additional information concerning the conference’s goals and outcomes, see White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health Final Report (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1969). Carter later appointed Mayer to the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, whereupon Mayer assumed responsibilities as one of two vice chairmen.
I understand your staff is exploring steps you might take to address hunger and malnutrition, and I think that the appointment of a commission would be an extremely important first step.4

Respectfully,

Hubert H. Humphrey

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4 Bennet responded to Humphrey on December 23, noting that the President would receive an action memorandum "proposing possible United States initiatives" related to world hunger in the near future. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780088–1402)

239. Memorandum From Guy Erb of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, December 8, 1977

SUBJECT
Congressional Resolution on World Hunger

The Congress has passed resolutions calling on the President to create a Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. (The House version is attached at Tab A.)2 An effort to head off the resolutions in October came to naught when it proved impossible for the President to meet with the key sponsors as Frank Moore and Peter Bourne had suggested. (See Tab B).3

Together with Bourne I am now trying to ensure that the Congressional interest in world hunger be linked to the Administration’s objectives regarding bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance programs.4

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, HE–3, 9/30/77–12/31/77. No classification marking. Sent for information. Inderfurth’s initials appear on the memorandum. Copies were sent to Owen, Thornton, and Tuchman.

2 Attached but not printed.

3 Not found attached; printed as Document 233.

4 Brzezinski added the following handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum: “OK, let me know what assistance is needed. ZB.”
240. Memorandum From Jeffrey Garten and Carol Lancaster of the Policy Planning Staff to Acting Secretary of State Christopher

Washington, December 30, 1977

SUBJECT
Peter Bourne’s World Hunger Initiatives

We know Tony has been discussing the Bourne initiatives with you and we wanted to keep you posted in his absence.

On December 23, we received a draft memorandum for the President on the World Hunger campaign (see attached). Bourne’s staff has requested comments by January 3. We understand that EB has arranged for an extension for State. But work on a response has not yet begun.

Bourne’s memo raises several major problems:
— it poses the option to the President to reorganize AID by establishing a separate “Ministry of Development”, an International Research Foundation, etc., proposals which are under consideration in the Henry Owen circuit and by no means ready for decision now.
— it asks the President to commit the US to eliminate poverty in the world by the year 2000, the feasibility of which is highly questionable and needs close examination.
— some of the proposals are unclear (e.g., seeking legislation to make food aid more human needs oriented) or insufficiently considered (e.g., offering financial assistance to an International Food Corps).
— some of the options presented to the President could imply large budgetary expenditures; yet no estimates of budgetary costs are available for any of the options.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL 12/16–12/31/77. No classification marking. Drafted by Lancaster. Sent through Kreisberg, Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff. Vance accompanied President Carter to Poland (December 29–31), Iran (December 31–January 1), India (January 1–3), Saudi Arabia (January 3–4), Egypt (January 4), and France (January 4–5). Vance then traveled to Hungary (January 5–7) and Ireland (January 7) before departing for Washington. Christopher served as acting Secretary in Vance’s absence.

2 Not attached. A copy of Bourne’s December 22 draft decision memorandum, sent to members of the World Hunger Working Group, is attached to a January 7, 1978, covering memorandum from Tarnoff to Bourne transmitting the Department of State’s comments on Bourne’s draft. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of International Organization Affairs/International Development Assistance/Agriculture Division, Subject Files of FAO, US Mission, International Food Organizations, Lot 88D305, Box 2, World Hunger Initiative)
—finally, the President is provided no pros and cons on which to make judgements on the individual options.

We know that one of Tony’s concerns has been that State has been quite negative in its responses without offering alternative approaches. To ensure a timely, effective and constructive State reply to Bourne’s memo you may wish to talk to Jules³ or Dick Cooper and suggest their personal attention to this issue. You may also wish to see the State comment before it is forwarded.

³ Reference is to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Julius Katz.

241. Memorandum From Guy Erb of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 17, 1978

SUBJECT
Draft Report of World Hunger Working Group

Some time ago Peter Bourne circulated a draft of the report of the World Hunger Working Group,² an inter-agency body staffed by private experts and government officials. The report’s findings are critical of many current US food and agricultural programs: the report cites the lack of research priorities, inadequate implementation of development goals, deficiencies in organization and management within the government, and a frequent conflict between U.S. foreign investment and food and agricultural needs of developing countries. The report makes a large number of proposals but does not set priorities. Most government agencies were not pleased by the report. Since a considerable amount of line-by-line editing would have been required to pull the re-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1978. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Owen and Thornton. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates Brzezinski saw it. Inderfurth also initialed the memorandum. Another copy is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Confidential, HE–3, 1/20/77–1/20/81. According to an NSC Correspondence Profile attached to this copy of the memorandum, Brzezinski noted it on January 18.
² See Document 231.
port completely into line with current agency policies, such an effort would have deprived the report of much of its "punch" and antagonized food activists. After considering the report, Owen, Thornton and I decided to focus on the draft decision memo for the President that Bourne and Fill were preparing.³

A preliminary version of that memo included options which repeated those that Henry Owen and I will address in the NSC memo on foreign assistance organization (to be considered by the PRC and then forwarded to the President).⁴ Owen and I met with Bourne and Fill and recommended that all decision options related to the organization of foreign assistance be referred to the NSC memo and that questions relating to the Administration's hunger initiative remain in the Bourne memo. We now await the next version of the memo on which I expect NSC and other agencies will have a further opportunity to comment before it goes forward.

³ Presumable reference to Bourne’s draft decision memorandum to the President. See footnote 2, Document 240.

⁴ A note at the conclusion of Bourne’s December 22 draft memorandum reads: “I recognize this area overlaps with the foreign aid organization paper now being prepared by Henry Owen, and therefore it will eventually require a consolidation of views. However, it is included in this document at this time in view of the President’s mandate to the World Hunger Working Group to recommend policy options which ‘assure a decision-making process, management, and resources adequate to implement these policies.’ This also provides those members of the World Hunger Working Group, members of Congress and staff, and the private sector who are not participating in the preparation of the Owen paper to have their views reflected in this important area.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of International Organization Affairs/International Development Assistance/Agriculture Division, Subject Files of FAO, US Mission, International Food Organizations, Lot 88D305, Box 2, World Hunger Initiative)
242. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter

Washington, February 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Meeting with Congressional Delegation Concerning a Presidential Commission on World Hunger, February 3, 1978, 9:45 AM, Cabinet Room

I. Purpose

These are the key sponsors of the resolutions passed in both Houses calling on you to establish a Presidential Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. The purpose of the meeting is to allow them the opportunity to convince you to act on the resolutions and establish such a commission.

It is also an opportunity for you, whether or not you are willing to establish the commission, to reaffirm your deep interest in the problem of world hunger.

II. Participants, Background, Press

a. Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry L. Bellmon</td>
<td>Anthony Beilenson</td>
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<td>Dick Clark</td>
<td>Paul Findley</td>
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<td>Bob Dole</td>
<td>Thomas Foley</td>
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<td>Patrick Leahy</td>
<td>Donald Fraser</td>
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<td>George McGovern</td>
<td>Benjamin Gilman</td>
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<td>John Sparkman</td>
<td>Richard Nolan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard (Dick) Stone</td>
<td>James Weaver</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1978. Sent under cover of a February 9 memorandum from Erb and Thornton to Brzezinski and a February 3 note from Inderfurth to Erb instructing Erb to “send Brzezinski a recommendation by the early part of next week.” (Ibid.) A notation in the President’s handwriting reads: “Bob—Peter—Stu—Zbig, Have me a final option paper to set up Commission within 2 weeks—J.C.” Another copy of the memorandum is in the Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 71, 2/3/78. The final version of the options paper is printed as Document 244.

2 The meeting took place on February 3 in the Cabinet Room from 9:47 to 10:10 a.m. Following the meeting, the President met privately with Dole in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) Minutes of the meeting were not found.

3 See footnote 3, Document 227.
Harry Chapin—Rock Singer, who was largely responsible for lobbying the resolution through the Congress.

Peter Bourne  Richard Harden  Frank Moore
Charles O’Keeffe  Bill Cable
Gerald Fill  Dan Tate

b. Background

During the last session, the Congress passed resolutions calling on you to establish a Commission. Passage was unanimous in the Senate and 364–38 in the House.

On January 14 you received a letter from 114 members of the House requesting you to take action by establishing the Commission. Senator Humphrey wrote to you on December 5 urging you to establish it.

The Commission they seek would:

1. Examine existing programs and studies related to hunger.
2. Develop policy and legislative recommendations.
3. Stimulate public awareness of the problem

Our position during the last Congress was that we had “no objection.”

c. Press—photo opportunity

III. Talking Points\(^7\)

—The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization estimates 1/2 billion people lack minimum nourishment.\(^5\)

\(^4\) The President placed check marks next to Leahy’s and Nolan’s names and placed an arrow in the margin next to Chapin’s. According to the Digest of Other White House Announcements, Chapin also attended the February 3 meeting. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 277)

\(^5\) Presumable reference to a January 24 letter from Nolan and Gilman to the President, in which they emphasized congressional initiatives regarding establishment of a Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Nutrition and stressed their displeasure regarding what they considered to be insufficient White House attention to the issue. They, and their 112 bipartisan House cosponsors, encouraged Carter to “give full personal consideration to why the House (and the Senate) passed the resolution by an overwhelming margin” and encouraged the President to meet with the major sponsors and the congressional leadership. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box FG–224, Executive, FG–311, 1/20/77–10/31/79)

\(^6\) See Document 238.

\(^7\) The President wrote in the right-hand margin: “Harry Chapin.”

\(^8\) The President underlined “1/2 billion” and “lack minimum nourishment.”
The issues involved are complex and require priority attention. Among them is the relationship between worldwide hunger and malnutrition and the maldistribution of worldwide food resources.

It is in our interest and that of the entire world to address the problem. Better food populations have less incentive for conflict and greater capacity for economic development which makes them better trading partners.

In order for us to make our contributions toward alleviating hunger most effective, we must have a well-defined and coordinated food and development policy reflecting the relationship between domestic and international hunger and malnutrition.

Reaffirm your deep interest in the problem of World Hunger. On June 4 of last year you instructed Chip, Zbig, Stu and I to get together and let you know what could be done. A White House Working Group was formed and its recommendations will be submitted to you within the next two weeks. You have directed the Secretary of Agriculture to form a working group on Food and Agricultural Policy comprised of State, Treasury, AID, OMB, NSC, and the Council of Economic Advisers.

They will want you to agree to set up the Commission. I feel it would be an important vehicle for mobilizing public awareness and support for a U.S. effort to deal with world hunger and an important mechanism for building broader support for foreign aid as you recommended in the development assistance memo, including involving entertainment and other public figures including your mother who is working with Richard Harden on the issue. Our working group will recommend creation of the Commission. I understand your reservations in general about establishing commissions, but believe this is one which should be established.

9 The President underlined “malnutrition” and “maldistribution.”
10 See footnote 1, Document 212. The President underlined the names and changed the typewritten word “I” to “me.”
13 According to a December 9, 1977, memorandum summarizing a White House meeting on world hunger, Lillian Carter—the President’s mother—and actress Shirley MacLaine had previously met and “recounted their experiences about living in poverty in India.” MacLaine expressed interest “in lending her talent and status to raising consciousness about the problem of world hunger, its causes and some possible solutions.” (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box HE–6, Executive, HE–3, 9/30/77–12/31/77)
SUBJECT

The Food Aid Convention


The United States must determine its contribution to the new Food Aid Convention. Under this Convention, the U.S. and other countries commit themselves to a minimum annual quantity of food aid to developing countries for the next several years.

The 1971 Food Aid Convention is an agreement by which nine countries pledge minimum annual contributions of food aid to developing countries. Total contributions under the current Convention are 4.226 million tons of wheat and coarse grain, of which the U.S. share is 1.89 million tons or 44.7%. As shown in Table 1, U.S. food aid flows have been much greater than our current FAC commitment.

During 1972–74, when grain prices were very high, the U.S. sharply reduced its food aid primarily in order to hold down budget costs and inflationary pressure. However, in these “world food crisis” years the developing countries had the greatest need for food aid. I believe that the U.S. should strive to avoid a repetition of the 1972–74 pattern. Our program of grain reserves, especially the proposed Interna-

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1 Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 73, 2/15/78. No classification marking. Transmitted to the President under cover of a February 14 memorandum from Eizenstat and Daft to Carter, recommending that Carter approve the negotiating positions. (Ibid.) The President appended a handwritten note in the corner of the covering memorandum: “Stu—Get max p.r. benefit. J.” A February 15 memorandum from Hutcheson to Mondale, Moore, Powell, Watson, McIntyre, Schultzze, Brzezinski, and Bourne that reads: “Secretary Bergland will be informed of the President’s decision by us” and a February 15 memorandum from Hutcheson to Bergland that indicated that the President had reviewed and approved all three of Bergland’s recommendations are ibid.

2 The President underlined the phrase “1.89 million tons.”

3 Table 1, “Volume of P.L. 480 Wheat and Coarse Grains and Products Shipments, FY 1955–1979,” is attached but not printed.
tional Emergency Wheat Reserve,\(^4\) will help ensure that the U.S. can maintain its level of food aid even in years of high grain prices and tight supplies. By accepting a larger obligation under the new Food Aid Convention, the U.S. would commit itself internationally to do so.

At the World Food Conference of 1974 and subsequent meetings of the World Food Council and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the U.S. has endorsed a world food aid target of 10 million tons of grain per year. In the International Wheat Council discussions prior to the upcoming negotiations, the U.S. has proposed that, in accordance with this target, the new Food Aid Convention should ensure the annual availability of 10 million tons of food aid.\(^5\) The U.S. has emphasized that responsibility for food aid must be widely shared among donor and potential donor countries.

**Recommendations**

The size of the U.S. contribution to the new Food Aid Convention has been discussed by the Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy.\(^6\) Based on these discussions, I am submitting three recommendations which involve progressively increasing levels of U.S. commitment to provide food aid.

*First, I recommend that, at the upcoming negotiations, the U.S. should make a minimum commitment to contribute 4.47 millions tons annually under the new Food Aid Convention.*

This quantity represents a U.S. share of the 10 million ton target which is equivalent to our 44.7% share of the current Convention. To commit less than this quantity would be inconsistent with our support for the 10 million ton target. In making this commitment, it would be assumed that the new Convention would allow similar financial terms for aid as the current Convention.

The budget impact of this commitment depends on grain prices. Currently programmed food aid quantities and budget outlays for FY 78 and FY 79 should be adequate to meet a commitment of 4.47 million

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4 See Document 225 and footnote 4 thereto.


Of course, if grain prices rise above projected levels, this FAC commitment would require that the U.S. increase its budget outlays for food aid rather than reduce the quantity below this level. For each 10¢ per bushel increase in the price of wheat and corn, food aid costs for FY 79, which would be the first full year of the Convention, would increase by about $16 million. However, if grain prices do rise, budget outlays for farm income support now anticipated for FY 79 would fall sharply.

This recommendation has been considered by the Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy and is concurred in by all members present.

**DECISION**

Second, I recommend that, if useful in obtaining the contributions of other countries toward the 10 million ton target, the U.S. negotiator should be authorized to offer that the U.S. would increase its contribution above 4.47 million tons so that the U.S. share would be no less than 50% of total contributions—up to a maximum U.S. contribution of 5 million tons.

In other words, if the contributions of other countries exceed 4.47 million tons, the U.S. would match these contributions on a ton-for-ton basis until the 10 million ton target is achieved. Such a conditional offer would provide an incentive for other potential donors to increase their contributions.

In making this offer, the U.S. would first assure that its Currency Use Payments (CUPs) for certain Title I agreements would not make those agreements ineligible under the FAC. In this way, almost all of our current Title I agreements could be counted toward fulfillment of our FAC contribution, as shown in Table 2.

Currently programmed food aid quantities and budget outlays for FY 78 and FY 79 should also be adequate to meet a commitment of 5 million tons under the FAC, although the exposure to potential increases in budget costs would be correspondingly greater.

The commodity coverage of the FAC will be negotiated. If rice or other commodities are included in the FAC, it will be easier for the U.S. to meet this 5 million ton commitment, as shown in Table 2.
This recommendation has been considered by the Working Group and supported by all members present.

**DECISION**

Third, I recommend that, at the upcoming negotiations, the U.S. propose a new provision for a “callable food aid commitment” which would set rules for sharing responsibility among all food aid donors for increasing food aid during periods of special need by low-income developing countries.

In times of production shortfalls, a sharp increase in food aid may be required by the poorest developing countries. Historically, the U.S. and other exporters have been expected to respond to such special needs. I believe that the new Convention should establish rules for sharing responsibility for such increased food aid.

In general, the U.S. would propose that, whenever foodgrain production in the low-income developing countries is more than an agreed percentage below trend, all donor countries would meet to consider jointly increasing food aid by up to an agreed percentage of each country’s basic contribution under the Convention. Specific guidelines for such a proposal have been developed by the Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy.

The potential budget impact of such a proposal depends on the maximum size of the U.S. callable food aid commitment and the probability that the criteria for calling up this additional food aid would be met. I recommend that the U.S. negotiator be authorized to accept a callable food aid commitment for the U.S. up to 1.0 million tons—that is, up to 20% of 5 million tons—provided that the percentage shortfall from production trend which would trigger consideration of such additional food aid would have an estimated probability of less than one-fourth in any one year. Thus, the potential budget exposure of the U.S. would have an upper limit.

This recommendation has been considered by the Working Group and is supported by all members present.

**DECISION**

Bob Bergland

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10 The President checked his approval and initialed this recommendation.
11 The President checked his approval and initialed this recommendation. On March 3, the White House announced that the President had instructed the U.S. officials attending UNCTAD to pledge 4.47 million tons of grain annually to the FAC. For the text of the announcement, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 455–456.
244. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Bergland, the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne), the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (Schultze) to President Carter

Washington, February 17, 1978

SUBJECT
Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Background

During the last session, the Congress passed a resolution calling on you to establish a Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. Passage was unanimous in the Senate and 364 to 38 in the House. At a meeting on February 3 with key Congressional sponsors of the resolutions you announced that you planned to establish such a Commission. Following that meeting, you asked us to prepare an options paper on the subject.

Commission Objectives

The first and most important step in charting the course of the Commission is to identify its objectives as clearly and completely as possible. Most of the remaining decisions regarding the make-up and operation of the Commission are largely dependent on the task assigned the Commission. Commissions can and are called upon to serve a variety of different purposes ranging from issue definition and basic...
fact-finding to the promotion of public awareness through public relations activities.

We are persuaded that the Hunger Commission must be designed to pursue several related objectives including:

- the development of a solid factual base that identifies the causes of the problem,
- identify existing authorities and programs, public and private, and national and international, and
- assess the programs to determine which are working, which are not, and why.4

These objectives are generally consistent with those in the Congressional resolutions. Such data gathering and analysis has not been done on a comprehensive basis. Until it is, there will be no clear view of the problem nor will we know the magnitude of present world-wide efforts and how the problem can be dealt with more effectively. Before launching an aggressive effort, we must know where we are and how we got here. Much of the analysis has already been done through the World Hunger Working Group, and their report, a summary of which is being sent to you separately today,5 can serve as a basis for their work. This Commission provides a unique opportunity to assemble free of institutional constraints, a comprehensive and in-depth review in a thorough and integrated way.

Once the factual base is developed, we hope this could be accomplished during the first 6 to 9 months, the Commission would then prepare an options paper on actions to be taken. Any initiatives requiring legislation should be prepared in time for possible inclusion in the Administration’s 1979 legislative package. At that point, we would see the Commission turning to the promotion of improved public understanding and awareness of the issue and the role of the United States in helping alleviate the problem.

The key decision then, as we see it, is the extent to which we rely on the Commission to help develop hunger policies and design programs or whether the Commission is used primarily to promote public awareness and generate support. The major argument in favor of using the Commission as a principal means of fashioning policies and programs is that the assembly and assessment task requires concentrated effort by a staff unencumbered by other duties. The central drawback to using the Commission in this capacity is that given its independent status vis-à-vis Presidential control, its conclusions and recommendations will not necessarily correspond with those of the Administration. In fact, to the extent we succeed in obtaining a dynamic, well-balanced

4 The President placed check marks in the margin next to each of the three bulleted points.
5 See Document 245.
membership, one can almost guarantee there will be strong differences of opinion and dissension within the Commission. But this can be useful and requesting an options paper minimizes the risks. We recommend that you look to the Commission as one mechanism for identifying and assessing hunger policies and programs and presenting options for consideration. Certainly it will provide an important information base whether or not you accept all their recommendations.

Bourne and Brzezinski feel the the emphasis of the Commission should be primarily on building public attention and support for this issue rather than too heavy a focus on conducting additional studies.6

**DECISION**

Focus primarily on conducting study and policy formulation.

Focus primarily on building public support with policy formulation secondary.7

As described in the Resolutions, the Commission would focus on hunger in the United States as well as internationally. We question the advisability of attempting to deal with the fundamentally different issues of domestic and world hunger within the confines of a single commission. For this reason, we recommend that the Commission concentrate on world hunger,8 but that domestic policies and programs be assessed so this experience can, where applicable, be brought to bear. Some of us feel (Bourne and Brzezinski) that the Commission should informally9 broaden its scope to serve as a vehicle for building support for foreign assistance in general, consistent with your decision memo on that subject,10 and the evolving program to gain public support in this area. This broad approach might not be acceptable to some of the Congressional sponsors, if it was explicit. However, the choice of chairman can be an important factor in the focus the commission adopts.

**DECISION**

Emphasis on world hunger (Bergland, Eizenstat, Schultze)11

International and Domestic Hunger

World Hunger and General Foreign Assistance (Bourne, Brzezinski)

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6 The President wrote in the margin: “Collate studies already done.”
7 The President approved this option.
8 The President underlined the phrase “world hunger.”
9 The President underlined this word.
10 See footnote 12, Document 242.
11 The President approved this option and wrote in the margin: “will obviously have to include a) domestic food & hunger plus b) assistance.”
Mechanism for Establishing the Commission

Two choices exist for establishing the Commission

(1) Executive Order

A Commission authorized by Executive Order can be initiated immediately with a prescribed membership; be given carefully prescribed responsibilities; and operate under a statutory base for agency funding and manpower sharing. This approach would clearly define Presidential interest, allow more direct control over the Commission by the White House; and provide a test of public reaction and interest before the Administration modifies programs or requests legislation. Such authorization, however, would still require an appropriation from the Congress. To enable the Commission to be established immediately, some money could be allocated from the President’s Discretionary Account while an appropriation was being sought.

(2) Executive Order Accompanied by a Message on World Hunger to the Congress

This variation of the Executive Order mechanism offers the advantage of option (1), but also provides an opportunity to communicate the recommendations of the World Hunger Working Group, to broaden the framework within which the Commission will conduct its work and offers an opportunity to make near-term changes in existing programs. Perhaps most important it provides a very appropriate opportunity to lay out your overall world hunger policy, without having to wait until the Commission completes its report. To wait that long without any major statement from you might be too long. Such a message could also contain a request for an appropriation for the Commission.

DECISION

Executive Order Only

Executive Order and Message to Congress¹²

¹² The President approved this option. On March 17, Bourne provided members of the World Hunger Working Group with copies of a draft message to Congress and a draft charter and executive order establishing the Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780067–1963) Executive Order 12078, signed by the President on September 5, created the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pp. 1498–1499) See also Document 251.
Budget

We recommend a budget of $2 to 2.5 million per year for each year of the Commission’s operation. There are three options for funding:

(1) **Funding by the Agencies**

Utilizing funds from agency budgets is difficult because most funds are already committed. In addition, present interagency conflicts might be aggravated as the agency contributing the bulk of the support could feel it had a preemptive right over the work of the Commission. A small amount of funds from the agencies might, however, be added in the early months to those from the Presidential Discretionary Account to allow the rapid implementation of the Commission.

(2) **Congressional Appropriation**

Members of Congress who have sponsored the resolutions could be asked to sponsor legislation to provide funds for the Commission. However, this would open the opportunity for Congress to specify the form and operation of the Commission more narrowly than we prefer.

(3) **Supplemental Appropriation Submitted by the Administration**

This option is favored by OMB. While it might be slower than option (2), it would allow us to maintain control over the Commission as a Presidential initiative. We recommend this option with a funding level at $2 to 2.5 million per year for 2 years. Approximately $100,000 would be sought from the Presidential Discretionary Account and from existing agency budgets to allow the Commission to begin operating until Congressional action is completed.

**DECISION**

Funding by the Agencies

Congressional Appropriations

Supplemental Appropriations (recommended)

**Duration of the Commission**

The Congressional resolutions call for the Commission to have a life of two years. This is probably reasonable. A shorter period of time would make it difficult to staff-up and carry out the kind of activities planned.

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13 The President underlined this phrase and wrote in the margin: “seems high.”

14 The President approved this option.
Size and Make-Up of the Commission

The Congressional resolution recommends that “the Commission shall be a balanced membership composed of fifteen persons appointed by the President from individuals who represent diverse backgrounds.” You are free, however, to create a Commission of any size, selected on any basis, and with or without Congressional representation.

We recommend a Commission of twenty people selected to represent a broad cross-section of interests including business, humanitarian groups, technical experts, entertainers with demonstrated interest in world hunger, with appropriate ethnic and geographic diversity. Because of the intense Congressional interest in this Commission, we recommend that inclusion of four Congressional members (two from each House and party).

Given the widespread interest in this issue and the many groups that would like to be represented on the Commission a careful selection process is required. This is particularly true with regard to the chairmanship of the Commission. Since the members depend upon the objectives of the Commission, they cannot now be selected. We suggest that the signers of this memo serve as a nominating committee and that we provide you with a list of candidates within 7 days.

DECISION

Approve

Disapprove

15 The President approved this option.
16 The President underlined the phrase “nominating committee” and added: “ok.”
17 The President approved this option and wrote: “I prefer 15.”
245. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter

Washington, February 17, 1978

SUBJECT

Report of the World Hunger Working Group

Attached is a summary of the report prepared by the World Hunger Working Group involving 26 agencies which you asked me to chair.

The report analyses the major causes of hunger and malnutrition and identifies the key elements necessary to alleviate the problem. Present United States programs are reviewed and their shortcomings identified.

The report recommends the following:

—A clear concise statement of our overall policy, rather than the inferred policy from our present fragmented programs.²

—Presidential commitment that is unequivocal, and which is communicated clearly to the leaders of food deficient countries so they in turn will give it a similar priority.³

—Increasing production through the development of national food and nutrition plans, enhanced technical assistance, a general focus on the interrelated problem of abject poverty, and reduced consumption through stabilization of population growth.⁴

—Improved research, generally as recommended in the study by the National Academy of Sciences, with a shift in emphasis towards the problems of the developing world.⁵

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¹ Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Presidential File, Box 73, 2/21/78. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. A copy of the World Hunger Working Group’s 81-page report, entitled World Hunger in Perspective, is in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne, White House Office Files on World Hunger Group, Box 51, Government Agency Hunger Reports, 1/78–9/23/78.

² The President placed check marks at the end of each recommendation with the exception of the third point. The President underlined the words “clear,” “concise,” and “statement.”

³ The President underlined the words “commitment” and “unequivocal.”

⁴ The President wrote “equitable distribution” in the right-hand margin next to this recommendation.

⁵ The President underlined the word “research.”
—Commitment to a system of international food reserves to alleviate starvation during cyclical famines, and to stabilize prices during times of shortage.\(^6\)

—Food aid. Present programs (P.L. 480) need to be revised so that they reach and have the greatest impact on the truly hungry people.\(^7\)

—Trade and investment policies need to be made more favorable to the LDC’s.\(^8\)

—Expanded private sector involvement. Ambassador Young has proposed a multinational food corps which the group supports in principle, and which is currently being reviewed by the State Department.\(^9\)

Attachment

Summary of the Report of the Interagency World Hunger Working Group\(^{10}\)

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY WORLD HUNGER WORKING GROUP

Introduction

The President’s memorandum of September 29 established a World Hunger Working Group charged with developing a set of U.S. Government policy options designed to make a significant impact on world hunger.\(^{11}\) We have actively sought the views of key agencies represented on the Working Group, the Congress, international organizations, and more than 150 individuals and institutions in the private sector, including farm, business, labor, religious and philanthropic groups. This summarizes the major findings which we hope can form the basis for a Message to the Congress at the time the President signs

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\(^{6}\) The President underlined the word “reserves.”

\(^{7}\) The President underlined the word “aid.”

\(^{8}\) The President underlined the word “trade” and the phrase “investment policies.”

\(^{9}\) The President underlined the phrase “private sector involvement.” Young delivered the 10th annual McDougall Memorial Lecture—in honor of Australian economist and FAO founder Frank L. McDougall—on November 14, 1977. After presenting a brief historical overview of food policy, Young commented: “One of the mechanisms which has emerged as a creative challenge to the problems of bureaucracy is the utilization of the volunteer. As a concept to help the agriculturally less developed nations of the world, I like the idea of national, regional, and perhaps even international volunteers for food production.” The complete text of Young’s address is printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 1978, pp. 33–36.

\(^{10}\) No classification marking.

\(^{11}\) See Document 230. The memorandum is dated September 30.
the Executive Order establishing the Presidential Commission on World Hunger.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{The Nature and Scope of the World Hunger Program}

Hunger persists in the world today despite abundant harvests in the past two years. One person in six suffers from chronic hunger and malnutrition, which directly or indirectly cause nearly twenty million deaths each year. Seven hundred million people are seriously malnourished. Nearly half of them are children. In many countries children under five make up less than one-fifth of the population but account for four-fifths of the deaths. Cyclical famines, such as that which occurred in the Sahel in 1973–74,\textsuperscript{13} take in addition the lives of millions more. The specific causes of hunger vary from one country to another, as do the potential solutions. However, there are certain underlying contributing factors that exist worldwide.

—The world’s readily arable land is reaching its limits.
—Untapped supplies of fresh water for irrigation are shrinking.
—Food production in developing countries barely keeps pace with population growth, so that most of the increases in food production are absorbed.
—Hunger is intimately linked with poverty, and only in rare instances has hunger been relieved without dealing with the general problems of underdevelopment.
—Pressure on total world food supplies is growing because of increased consumption in affluent nations.
—Distribution problems internationally and within countries are severe. Transportation systems in many developing countries remain rudimentary. Farmers in developed countries with only 30 percent of the world’s population grow 60 percent of the world’s food. Lower income groups cannot afford adequate quantities of food.
—Land tenure patterns and persistent poverty discourage improving productivity in developing nations, by making the use of expensive fertilizers (the cost of which is tied directly to rising energy costs), pesticides and machinery economically inaccessible. At the same time, land in developed countries is reaching the limit at which these agricultural aids can increase production.

\textsuperscript{12} See Document 251.
\textsuperscript{13} The six states of the Sahel (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso)) experienced severe drought and famine beginning in 1972. The FAO, through its Office for Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO), coordinated the global response to the crisis. For documentation on U.S. actions with regard to the famine and African development programs, see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Documents 5–6, 8–9, 13–14, 20, 36, 44–45, 47–49.
—Agricultural research overemphasizes temperate zone and cash crop agriculture, rather than food cropping needs in tropical zones. Also there appear to be no dramatic technical breakthroughs on the horizon to create another “green revolution”.14

—At least 15 percent of all food produced is lost post-harvest, due to poor storage and vermin.

—Optimistic projections that the seas would become an important new source of protein worldwide have been replaced by fear that we may be reaching the maximal sustainable limits, and overfishing is already starting to occur.

Solving the Problem

The problem can be solved. Reduced to a highly oversimplified form it involves the following elements:

—Although 49 countries are defined as food deficient, the majority of malnourished people in the world are in four countries (Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Solutions aimed at these countries will therefore have the greatest impact on the total problem. With the exception of certain parts of Indonesia, where the population may already be expanding beyond the limits the land can support, these countries have the potential to substantially increase production of existing land under cultivation, and to solve their own problem by establishing a stable balance between food production and adequate consumption. An annual increase of 3–4 percent in agricultural production, a comparable 3–4 percent annual increase in the GNP, and most importantly, a stabilization of population growth can help achieve the goal by the end of the century. The critical element is establishing the commitment at the highest level in the governments of these countries. The key to the solution lies in their ability to mobilize the prestige and status of the political, ethnic and tribal power systems down to the lowest level around this issue, placing it ahead of all other priorities. In many countries this will require difficult decisions to redistribute assets.

—While it has received considerable publicity, the Sahel involves a relatively small part of the total problem. Unlike Asia, the primary food source is livestock products from grazing herds that have been devastated by cyclical severe droughts which dried up the grazing land. This has been compounded by a steady destruction of the forests for firewood, leading to the spread of the desert; and the use of animal dung (which should fertilize grazing land) in place of scarce firewood. Starving nomads are migrating to urban centers that are already unable to feed their populations. The solution here, unlike Asia, cannot be ar-

14 The Green Revolution relied on the use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and improved seed hybrids to produce higher crop yields during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
rived at alone by the countries of the Sahel. A major international effort is necessary and is already underway.\textsuperscript{15} It involves reducing the devastating impact of the predictable periodic droughts by creating domestic and international food reserves, developing improved food grain production technologies for semi-arid areas, exploring for untapped deep water reserves, and developing surface water supplies, reversing the desertification process and shifting the food base away from a total reliance on grazing animals. As elsewhere, stabilizing population growth is critical.

—In many Latin American countries poverty and malnutrition surround pockets of great abundance. The problem is above all else one of internal distribution, and a need for recognition of social equality of all segments of the population. Racial, social and economic prejudice must be overcome. Overall economic growth and population control are important, but the fundamental solution again requires political will and difficult decisions.

—Increasing food supplies is almost synonymous with increasing the productivity of currently cultivated land in the developing nations. There are, however, a few places where the fertile new land can be brought under cultivation; the tsetse fly belt in Sub-Saharan Africa (assuming the tsetse fly can be eradicated), parts of the interior of Latin America, and most important, the Sudan. FAO estimates one billion hectares of “potentially arable” land. Exploitation of these resources could have dramatic regional effect since the Sudan could become a major breadbasket of Africa.

—Since World War II the United States has become the unchallenged global food supplier. While saving millions from starvation, U.S. policies may well have had the secondary effect of reducing the motivation to make the fundamental internal changes in developing countries that would lead to food self-sufficiency. In the future, food exports from the United States and the other major producers, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Argentina, should be used to deal with acute famine situations, and to stabilize world food prices. In particular, it should be used to reward those countries setting the highest priority on internal changes to increase food production.

—The ability to increase food production is not, as we have often believed in the past, dependent on either massive transfer of expensive technology with heavy energy consumption or highly trained technicians, but more upon appropriate incentives and the ability to develop

\textsuperscript{15} Reference is to the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification adopted by delegates at the UN Conference on Desertification in Nairobi, Kenya, August 29–September 9, 1977. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 32/170 on December 19, 1977, calling for implementation of the Plan of Action in the Sudano-Sahelian region.
culturally appropriate, generally village-level technology. There must be more willingness to [not?] wait for paid professionally-trained experts, even though they are important, and more emphasis upon the immediate use of simpler voluntary efforts stressing self-help and a sense of dedication similar to that which allowed the Chinese to overcome their food deficit.

**Status of Current U.S. Policies**

Our past and current efforts to address the world hunger problem have been marked largely by the lack of a cohesive policy and clear-cut goals. At the World Food Conference in 1974, we joined other food donor nations in pledging our support for a number of actions, but we have failed to do our part to provide sufficient leadership. Our problems in the past have arisen largely from our inability to separate our motivations and objectives with regard to world hunger from the domestically inspired need to dispose of large commodity surpluses.

At present our contribution to solving the world hunger problem involves five loosely associated strategies, all of which have been reasonably successful; but which have developed separately over time rather than as part of an overall policy.

- **Bilateral Development Assistance**—Aimed fundamentally at stimulating increased food production as part of overall development. Some earlier problems have been improved by the “New Directions” mandate established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which instructed the Executive Branch to:
  - give priority to programs that benefit the poor majority;
  - emphasize the needs of small farmers and activities that are labor intensive; and
  - help expand access by the poor to local institutions.

- **Multilateral Institutions**—We have supported multilateral institutions working in the areas of agriculture, food and nutrition. These include the FAO, UN Development Program, World Food Program, UNICEF, the World Bank and other international financial institutions, the World Food Council, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

- **International Food Reserve System**—We have supported a system of nationally-held food reserves to stabilize world grain prices and to promote increased world food security.

- **Food Aid Through P.L. 480**—This program has been successful in providing 265 million tons of food, valued at $26 billion, to developing

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16 See footnote 5, Document 221.
17 See footnote 10, Document 73.
nations since first implemented in 1954. However, battles over administrative control, vulnerability to domestic grain prices rather than responsiveness to world hunger needs, profiteering by the wealthy and influential of developing countries, and use of the program as a tool for unrelated foreign policy objectives have severely compromised its effectiveness in reducing world hunger.

- Negotiation of Trade Liberalization at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva—Reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers on products of particular interest to developing countries are being sought in order to help them earn the foreign exchange with which to purchase necessary food imports and promote rapid and balanced growth.

Shortcomings of Present Policies

The President’s recent decisions to double foreign aid over the next five years, and to target our assistance primarily to the poorest people throughout the world represent major steps forward in our ability to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. effort to deal with basic human needs, and particularly world hunger. However, major impediments remain.

—The longstanding and persistent intrusion of domestic agricultural and foreign policy priorities into our decisions regarding world hunger has been an impediment. While this is inevitable to some degree, at present our motivations are not only suspect but our strategy is often counterproductive.

—There has been no effective interagency coordinating mechanism for world hunger policy. There are 26 U.S. agencies involved directly or indirectly in world hunger and food issues. This mirrors the general problem of organizational structure and development assistance that Henry Owen is attempting to redress. The very serious coordination and policy formulation problems within the Executive Branch are reflected by the fact that the Congress has assumed a leadership role in this area, producing the “New Directions” mandate, and more recently, the Humphrey/Case Bill. 18

—Some international organizations, especially FAO, have been generally ineffective and poorly administered, severely compromising

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their ability to bring to bear available resources in a coordinated strategy or capitalize on world concern about hunger. In addition, the Americans that we have assigned to those organizations have not always been of the highest caliber.¹⁹

—There has been a failure by the United States and other nations to instill in the leaders of most developing countries the political will to give this problem a sufficiently high priority. This is improving, but remains the single greatest impediment to eradicating world hunger.

—The overall level of commitment of resources by the developed nations has been insufficient to meet the needs of developing countries necessary to produce the rate of change we would like to see in the well-being of the poor. The President’s recent decisions and increased commitments by West Europeans will begin to remedy this, but more should be done.

Proposed Strategies

Ideally our world hunger policy would be one that, (a) maintained our domestic farm prices at levels high enough to ensure continued expansion of production, (b) kept domestic consumer prices low, (c) enhanced our balance of payments, and (d) met humanitarian objectives in the nations where people are starving. Obviously any real policy must involve hard compromises in some or all of these areas. People in other countries understand the domestic dilemmas we face, and more than any specific commitment, they want from the United States a clear concise statement of our policy on world hunger, an understanding of the role the United States intends to play, and an affirmation of continuous and long-term U.S. support for alleviating the world food problem.

The key themes we should establish are:

- The right to food is the most basic of human rights. The President is committed to providing the leadership to see that the problem is

¹⁹ In telegram 59649 to Rome, March 8, the Department indicated that Bourne’s report had not been cleared by the individual agencies before submission to the President. With regard to Bourne’s treatment of the FAO in the report to the President, the Department noted: “There was no attempt to substantiate this paragraph and we feel it was not judicious to single out FAO. Had final draft been cleared with departments we would have suggested specific reference to FAO be deleted. Should FODAG be questioned concerning this paragraph, you should indicate we are aware and support DG’s efforts to revitalize FAO. FAO should understand that view expressed in paper does however reflect significant concern among American people (120 organizations reportedly contributed to Working Group effort) that UN programs be carefully conceived, planned and executed. It is important that agencies set quantifiable objectives for projects and show via objective evaluation that those goals being realized.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780105-0675)
eventually solved. The President invites the leaders of other nations to join in giving this issue the highest priority.

- The President is aware that this must be more than a short-term initiative, and therefore is making a long-term commitment for the United States. There is some problem because of cynicism in the LDCs about our past commitments.

- The key to solving the world hunger problem must be to increase food production in those countries where hunger exists. It is above all their responsibility to deal with their own problem.

- Hunger cannot be separated from underdevelopment, poverty, disease and the need to stabilize population growth.

- The United States will continue to provide food for the world, but will seek to do so in a way that is at a consistent predictable level, based on need and free from past vulnerability to transient political pressures.

- We will seek to use our aid in a way that provides incentives to countries which insure that food reaches those who need it rather than those who can pay for it; which demonstrate the will to make the internal changes necessary to increase agricultural production; and which implement effective programs to promote economic growth.

- We will also seek to use our food aid and contributions to international reserves in a way that will minimize wild fluctuations in international food prices.

- We will work to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the multilateral organizations in their efforts to coordinate global response to world hunger. We should encourage the involvement of third world countries that already have expertise to share.

Tactical Considerations

In considering ways to improve the effectiveness of the United States’ effort to deal with world hunger, four preliminary issues must be taken into account:

(1) Existing United States programs have been of varying effectiveness and any new initiative should emphasize strengthening and rationalizing existing efforts.

(2) The effectiveness of any future U.S. strategy to deal with world hunger is tied to a resolution of longstanding interagency conflicts, and the overall organization of our development assistance effort. Because any recommendations relating to world hunger may be superseded by recommendations Henry Owen is now working on, and by the President’s response to the Humphrey/Case Bill, we have deliberately omitted any organizational recommendations. We feel strongly, however, that a major statement on world hunger should not be delayed and made hostage to broader reorganization issues.
(3) An Administration initiative on world hunger must be tied to a major effort to build public support. The Presidential Commission will help to do this, as will Richard Harden’s efforts with the President’s mother and Shirley MacLaine.20 If done skillfully, we can gain spillover effect for the larger foreign aid issue.

(4) Although our recommendations do not address the continuing problem of hunger and malnutrition within the U.S., we feel that a world hunger initiative must be combined with stepped-up efforts to deal with the needs of the malnourished poor in our own nation. This is in part reflected by the President’s commitment to establish a Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. Nevertheless, any statement on this subject should address the domestic aspects.

**Issues and Recommendations**

1. Presidential Commitment

   Nothing is more important than explicit Presidential leadership and commitment to demonstrate political will and ensure that appropriate priority is given by the agencies to overriding development considerations, and to encourage other nations to support integrated rural development aimed at the small farmer and landless laborer. It is equally important that the President communicate the priority he attaches to this issue personally to national leaders in those countries where hunger exists. They have to believe that their stature in our eyes is tied to their willingness to deal with hunger as a priority issue and transmit the same message to other leaders in their governments.

   **Recommendation**

   Make an explicit Presidential commitment to the reduction of hunger, malnutrition and poverty as a major foreign policy initiative of the U.S., and in this way mobilize public support behind this initiative in particular, and development cooperation overall.

2. Food Production and Consumption Strategies

   Anticipating a food deficit of between 95 and 108 million tons by 1985, poor countries must significantly increase their current annual 2.7 percent food production rate. The World Food Council meeting in 197721 reaffirmed the 1974 World Food Conference’s target of a 4 percent food production growth rate in the developing world as desirable and achievable.

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21 See Document 221.
Consistent with the Congressional “New Directions” mandate and the President’s own earlier decisions in this area, we should take certain specific actions that demonstrate U.S. Government support for efforts to increase production. The President has already made the commitment to double foreign aid over the next five years. Most of what is recommended here would fall within that planned budgetary increase.

**Recommendations**

- The U.S. should demonstrate this Administration’s commitment to “New Directions” by publicly stating its support for a set of actions which will assure that the Executive Branch is moving to implement the Congressional development assistance guidelines.

- U.S. World Food Production and Consumption Strategies should emphasize and strengthen the following current elements through bilateral and multilateral efforts by:
  - supporting self-help activity at local levels in rural and community development voluntary agencies;
  - providing food development experts in food deficient countries;
  - pilot testing sustainable food cropping systems which promote rotation and pest control and reduce soil erosion;
  - stressing the need to conduct food production programs within the natural resource base of developing countries to prevent loss of soil nutrients, waterlogging and degradation of lands;
  - facilitating increased production by small farmers and fishermen;
  - providing technical and financial assistance to ensure that existing and future programs include efforts to reduce post-harvest food losses (the FY79 budget would allocate $3 million to FAO’s program on post-harvest loss);
  - improving and expanding food distribution systems including transportation, wholesaling and retailing food chains; and
  - incorporating efforts in food and agriculture with related policies designed to reduce population pressures and integrate these programs with other development efforts such as health, nutrition and education programs.

- Emphasize and assist in the development of national food and nutrition plans in low-income food-deficient countries to ensure that food production policies and actions are consistent with nutrition objectives. Such support can be made available through AID programming; the cost can be absorbed within planned budget allocations and the President’s decision on foreign aid increases.

- Declare a policy of support for countries undertaking changes in inequitable land tenure patterns. Ask also that existing international institutions examine whether they adequately encourage such changes. This policy should be further elaborated in the U.S. Government state-
ment for the 1979 FAO Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development.22

3. Research, Training and Technical Cooperation Strategies

Science and technology are essential factors in all aspects of the food system. U.S. Government expenditures for agricultural research have been estimated at about $700 million annually, with an additional $350 million for similar purposes from State governments. Of the $700 million, $120 million is reportedly used for human nutrition research, although recent Congressional scrutiny of that figure reveals that at most, $60 million annually in Federal research funds are actually used for that purpose. Although the private sector spends about as much on research as does the U.S. Government, most of it is market oriented.

The National Academy of Sciences World Food and Nutrition Study on Research reviewed this area comprehensively in a report to the President in June, 1977.23

Among their important findings they reported that less than one percent of global food research is done in the developing world. Much of the research and technology originating in high-income countries has been inappropriate for the social conditions of developing countries. Most agricultural research has been directed towards temperate zone agricultural production, and toward cash crops. There has been insufficient attention to viable nutrition and intervention programs or to local adaptation of existing technology to food production. It is generally agreed that in addition to the capacity to adapt and modify sophisticated technology to their own needs, developing countries also need research on specific common problems that are likely to generate findings which they can usefully share with each other.

Recommendations

- The report to the President of the National Academy of Sciences World Food and Nutrition Study on Research should be used as the basis for establishing a new strategy and clear priorities in research that relate directly to world hunger. Those priorities should include:
  - the encouragement of research on tropical rather than temperate zone agriculture;
  - the nurturing of indigenous agricultural research capability in developing countries;
  - the development of culturally and socially appropriate technology including focus on methods to achieve reduction in post-

22 The FAO World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) was scheduled to take place in Rome July 12–20, 1979.
23 See Document 212 and footnote 2 thereto.
harvest food loss through improved storage and low cost methods of food preservation and conservation; and

—expansion of U.S. and LDC research into food prices and grain reserve management systems with greater emphasis in general being given to the social and behavioral sciences approach.

• The U.S. should expand food and agriculture research (the NAS report recommends an amount of $120 million) targeted to developing countries needs, bilaterally and through the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research. There should also be a reallocation of funds from existing programs to those with greater impact on the hungry portions of the population both domestically and internationally.

• The U.S. Government should prepare for the 1979 UN Science and Technology Conference a proposed international set of guidelines and proposed funding for research and technical collaboration in solving problems of world hunger.

• Since the current responsibility for agricultural research of potential benefit to developing countries is diffused throughout a number of agencies (including USDA, HEW and AID), OMB should accord high priority in its review to this aspect of its reorganization study of food and agriculture policy and recommend to the President by September 1, 1978, a plan to improve coordination of research efforts in this field.

• The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should head an interagency review of all the major recommendations from the National Academy of Science’s study on food and agricultural research and submit a report accompanying the OMB paper on research organization recommended above. The results of the review should be reflected in the FY80 budget submissions of the appropriate departments and agencies.

4. An International System of Food Reserves

A food authority was discussed at the end of World War II but was not created. More recently, the 1974 World Food Conference called for the establishment of a world food reserve system. Recognizing that food reserves dropped from 90 days’ supply in 1971 to 30 in 1975

24 An initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation and supported by the World Bank, FAO, UNDP, and IFAD, the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research, at the time of the Carter administration, was a confederation of autonomous research centers and donors who supported the transmission of global agricultural research. The four major research centers included the International Rice Research Institute (Philippines), the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (Mexico), the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (Nigeria), and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (Colombia).

25 See footnote 6, Document 234.
(though current foreseeable harvests have now raised this to 45 days),
72 governments, including the United States, have endorsed the
FAO-sponsored International Undertaking on World Food Security de-
dsigned “to avoid acute food shortages in the event of widespread crop
failures or natural disasters”.26

Reserves in one form or another have been called for in various in-
ternational settings: The Seventh Special Session of the UN General As-
sembly,27 the World Food Conference, the World Food Council,
UNCTAD, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and the International
Wheat Council. In the United States last year the President signed
the Food and Agriculture Act of 197728 which has several reserve
provisions.

The International Emergency Food reserve would be a U.S. re-
source to back up our food aid program. Its 2–6 million tons of grain
(preferably 6 million) could also become the U.S. component of an
eventual world food reserve for the protection of developing countries.
Having encouraged the Administration to create such a reserve,
Congress is now considering legislation to specifically authorize it. On
August 29, 1977, the President made the decision to establish a 6 mil-
lion ton reserve.29 However, the Administration’s bill, or even the Ad-
ministration’s position on the Congressional bill, has been held up for
more than five months in interagency discussions. As a result, valuable
time is being lost and the credibility of the Administration undermined
on the Hill and in the private sector.

The domestic market stabilization reserve has also been delayed,
largely due to issues regarding the trigger mechanism for the purchase
and release of grain. As in the former instance, USDA, along with Con-
gressional, farm, industry and world hunger groups, have supported
the creation of such a reserve and have become increasingly uneasy
that the process is not proceeding with dispatch. USDA has the au-
thority to provide additional incentives to farmers to reseal their grain
under the program. The Secretary of Agriculture’s actions during the
week of February 13th, which increased incentives for farmers to par-
ticipate in this program (increased Federal storage payments), repre-

26 On November 16, 1974, the World Food Conference adopted a Universal Declara-
tion on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, which directed member-states to ad-
here to the objectives, policies, and guidelines of a proposed International Undertaking
on World Food Security. The Undertaking required all adherents to adopt various pol-
ices to guarantee a minimum safe level of agricultural stocks, primarily cereal grains.

27 See footnote 4, Document 207.

28 See footnote 8, Document 229.

29 See Document 225 and footnote 4 thereto.
sents a welcome step. However, in the absence of continuous surveillance and commitment on this matter over the next year, the Congressionally mandated minimum amounts of wheat and feedgrains required to be resealed under this program will be difficult to meet. With the time being propitious for the placing of farmer-held stocks under government loans, with world demand and prices capable of rising in the future, and with world food security still plaguing many developing countries, now is the time to act.

Many reasons are put forth for establishing grain reserves: to provide reasonable price stability for U.S. farmers and consumers; to take care of natural disasters such as the Sahel famine; to provide food security for developing countries that are trying to improve agricultural production; and to reduce price fluctuations in the world market. While all of these purposes may not be fulfilled by a single reserve system, it does not seem necessary to wait for a reconciliation of all of them before taking action on any one of them. Establishing food reserves at both national and international levels, with either centralized or decentralized management, should be included in our overall plan.

The United States now faces large surpluses in major grains and announced a set-aside of up to 20 percent of U.S. acreage planted for wheat and of various other percentages for feed grains. The 35 million metric tons of wheat alone which the United States will carry over into the next crop year represents roughly half of the total world wheat trade, more than one-third of the world’s carryover, and about 9 percent of the world’s consumption. The United States clearly has the capacity and should play a leading role in establishing and maintaining two reserves: a food-security reserve and a reserve for stabilization of the international grain market.

Recommendations

- Establish a U.S. food security reserve of up to six million tons. A draft Administration bill is already under review by the Food and Agriculture Policy Committee. A request by the President for a draft bill on his desk by March 1st will ensure no further delay.

30 Section 1101 of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (P.L. 95–113) amended the Agricultural Act of 1949 to add a grain reserve program. Under this program, farmers would receive loans from the Federal government in exchange for withholding a portion of their crop from the market. In addition, farmers would agree to store wheat and feedgrains in Federally-financed grain storage facilities for at least 3 years or until prices improved, whereupon the grains would be sold or turned over to the USDA as payment in kind. In early February 1978, Bergland had urged the President to approve an increase in the storage fee from $.20 to $.25 a bushel and a request to feed-grain farmers to plant 10 percent fewer acres. (“A Farm Program for All Seasons,” The New York Times, February 1, 1978, p. A–22 and “U.S. Takes Further Steps to Reduce Grain Brought to ’78 Market, Help Boost Prices,” The Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1978, p. 38)
• Direct USDA to follow up on the action to increase farmer incentives to assure that at least the minimum amounts of grain (wheat and feed) mandated by the Congress are under loan by the required time so that a farmer-held domestic market stabilization reserve will provide a certain amount of much needed world food security for developing countries.

• Pledge 25 percent of the next annual replenishment of the UN emergency gain reserve. The U.S. contribution would be up to 125,000 tons, and could be supplied under the emergency relief provisions of P.L. 480, Title II at no additional cost.

5. Improve the Management of Our Food Aid Program

Many Americans think of world hunger as simply a shortage of enough food, and look to U.S. food aid to provide an immediate and adequate response. Since 1954, when P.L. 480 was enacted, 265 million tons, valued at $26 million, have been made available on grant or concessional terms to various nations. There is little question that there is a continuing need for U.S. food assistance for the foreseeable future.

In recent years, as world hunger has come to be perceived as a chronic condition in the developing world, some have questioned the desirability of continued massive P.L. 480 shipments. Others feel that an expanded P.L. 480 program is needed, but much of this comes from farm groups who want to see a market maintained for agricultural surpluses. Significant legislative changes have been made in the last decade to align P.L. 480 more effectively with the needs of the hungry. Since 1974, U.S. food aid policy has moved in directions recommended at the UN World Food Conference, although still further changes are required if we are to realize progress in reducing hunger and malnutrition and answer the criticism of development advocates that U.S. food aid is no more than a commodity export program.

Major problems remain in ensuring that food aid reaches the most needy, effectively meets emergency needs, and contributes to advancement of LDC development objectives. In order to meet the President’s mandate that our aid reach the poorest people, it will be necessary to streamline the currently cumbersome decision making process used in administering the U.S. food aid program. The President has made a highly important decision in setting a minimum U.S. commitment to contribute 4.47 million tons annually under the new Food Aid Convention.31

31 See Document 243.
Recommendations

- Direct that the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee recommend administrative reforms to ensure that P.L. 480 better serve development and humanitarian purposes in chronic food-deficit developing countries. These changes should include accelerating the utilization of the Food for Development Authority (Title III),
  32 provide cash and other incentives to make food aid more developmentally oriented, make Vitamin A and iron (and technical assistance and technology) available to countries for fortification purposes, and streamline the administrative process.

- Direct the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee to recommend legislative changes to improve the development nature of P.L. 480. Simultaneously, it should also consider separate farm export legislation to ensure that market development for U.S. commodities remains a major objective, with assurances that it will be pursued in ways which do not undermine the developmental purposes of P.L. 480.

- Direct the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee to study the following issues and make recommendations to the President by September 1, 1978:

  —the costs and benefits of an expanded food aid program in relation to such considerations as U.S. domestic food prices, the need for U.S. acreage set-asides, price, support payments to U.S. farmers, and environmental effects;
  —the relative efficiency or complementary nature in the LDCs of U.S. food aid in relation to capital and technical assistance and their comparative availability vis-à-vis food aid; and
  —the value and acceptability of various schemes to deal with crop shortfalls in developing countries through food import bill insurance and the establishment of buffer stocks.

6. Pursuing Trade and Investment Policies Favorable to LDC Needs

Those aspects of the problem of hunger and malnutrition discussed in previous sections have led to recommendations for measures to improve LDCs’ lack of foreign exchange and capital to import sufficient food supplies and agricultural production inputs and technology.

The self-reliance of the LDCs depends in the long run on their capacity to earn and to attract the necessary capital resources. Interna-

32 The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977 (P.L. 95–88) revised the Title III provision of P.L. 480 to emphasize food for development. The amended Title III permitted the United States to negotiate agreements with recipient countries for a “specified annual value of agricultural commodities,” deliverable over a 1–5 year period. Recipient nations agreed to institute a variety of reforms designed to improve agricultural production. Proceeds generated from the sales of agricultural commodities financed these reform projects and were applied against the nation’s repayment obligation. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1978, pp. 36–37)
tional trade and foreign investment are the primary international economic vehicles for establishing longer run LDC economic capability to deal with their hunger problems. The magnitude of trade with and investments in LDCs far exceeds official development resources and therefore has a significant potential for contributing to world hunger solutions. Trade barriers exist which inhibit food supplies. And similar barriers exist for food imports which act to inhibit distribution of food to the poor. In addition, U.S. foreign investment by multinational corporations often conflicts with developing country needs for access to food for the poor.

The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is currently involved in negotiations of tariff reduction on agricultural and industrial products, including those from developing countries. It is expected to conclude the latter part of 1978. Despite general agreement on the importance of trade and investment to developing countries and the need to address these issues as part of a world hunger initiative, no clear direction, much less agreement, emerged from the World Hunger Working Group regarding what specific steps should be undertaken by the U.S. Government. Considerable concern, for example, was expressed by several agency representatives about the economic costs to this country of major changes in trade and tariff policies and the domestic political difficulties which trade policies favorable to LDCs would encounter.

Recommendations

- That the President direct that the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee, with other affected agencies, prepare a report for the President by September 1, 1978, which assesses the impact of U.S. trade and investment policies on hunger and malnutrition among the poor in developing countries and recommends appropriate steps to be taken by the U.S.

- In connection with the above recommendation, and following the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the Office of the Special Trade Representative and other appropriate agencies should review the implications of its outcome for developing countries and recommend additional steps in the area of trade which the U.S. should take to enhance their ability to reduce hunger and malnutrition.

7. Improving and Expanding Private Sector Involvement in Development

One of the distinctive features of American life is the ethos of voluntarism. In addressing emerging social issues, Americans generally look in the first instance to local, civic and private associations and only later to government.

Private organizations provide a major vehicle through which Americans express their active concern for meeting human needs
abroad as well as at home. Recent data indicate that Americans now contribute, for overseas relief and development to the private agencies of their choice, as much money each year as the U.S. Government provides in bilateral assistance through AID. Land grant colleges and universities, research institutions, foundations, and other private agencies have also been active in overseas efforts directed toward the needs of hungry people. People-to-people efforts have always had a special appeal to developing countries.

U.S. policy has generally sought in specific but modest ways to draw on the strength of the U.S. private sector in meeting basic human needs overseas. Recent legislation has directed the U.S. Government to facilitate the work of indigenous non-governmental groups in interested LDCs. However, the U.S. Government has been considerably less creative than other industrialized nations in supporting private sector efforts. The U.S. private sector remains one of the distinctive resources which the U.S. can make more fully available to other nations.

The establishment of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger will be an important element in creating a sense of involvement for private voluntary groups, as well as generating publicity and momentum generally.

Recommendations

- The U.S. should establish high-level focal points in USDA, AID, State and HEW for private sector involvement liaison, and enlist the participation of informed private sector representatives in periodic advisory meetings with key departmental and Executive Branch food and development policy decision-making mechanisms (e.g., the Working Group on Food and Agricultural Policy and the P.L. 480 Task Force33 mandated in recent legislation).

- The Agency for International Development should establish an information clearinghouse on all U.S. Government activities concerned with World Hunger. It should publish periodic reports for dissemination to private sector groups interested in this information.

- The U.S. should create a special grant program for U.S. PVO’s to establish voluntary activities in the developing countries which are designed to reduce hunger and malnutrition and related development problems.

33 The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (P.L. 95–113) directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish such a task force.
8. Food Corps

Last fall in a speech to the FAO meeting in Rome, Ambassador Young proposed the establishment of an international food corps. There are some problems with such a concept and an interagency committee has been meeting over the last several weeks to iron them out. The group will submit a decision memo to Secretary Vance this week.\(^{34}\) We do not want to preempt this process, but do feel the U.S. should support the general concept of an international corps of rural development volunteers, and make a commitment to provide financial assistance to those nations or multilateral organizations willing to establish indigenous rural development corps programs.

\(^{34}\) See Document 247.

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246. Memorandum From Guy Erb of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, February 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Nominations for the Presidential Commission on World Hunger

Peter Bourne has asked for my comments on the following names that are to be submitted to the President as candidates for the Chairperson of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger:

- Sol Linowitz
- James Grant
- Ted Hesburgh
- Bill Moyers
- J. Erwin Miller
- John Hannah
- David Bell
- Sargent Shriver
- Jane Cahill Pfeiffer
- John Knowles
- Nelson Rockefeller
- Frank Stanton\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1978. No classification marking. Brzezinski added the following handwritten note in the top right-hand corner: “RI, Call him re my preferences.” Inderfuth initialed the memorandum.

\(^2\) Aaron circled Hesburgh’s, Shriver’s, and Rockefeller’s names. He also drew an arrow pointing to Shriver’s and wrote: “ZB—he would be most dynamic & earn points in the right places. DA.”
In my view, only the following are strong candidates for the Chair of the Commission: Sol Linowitz, James Grant, Bill Moyers, J. Erwin Miller, and Jane Cahill Pfeiffer. Father Ted Hesburgh would be a strong candidate but is committed to the Administration’s preparation for the UN Conference on Science and Technology, as well as his numerous other activities.

Regarding possible Commissioners, Peter has suggested the following names, plus some candidates for Chairperson:

- Cliff Wharton
- Steve Schlossberg
- Marina Whitman
- D.W. Brooks
- Jean Gussow
- Eugene Patterson, Editor, *St. Petersburg Times*
- Bess Myerson
- Warren Henegar, County Commissioner, farmer, Indiana
- Dr. Eugene Stockwell

All are potentially good candidates but none represent the scientific community. Hence I propose to recommend that Peter submit to the President the name of Sylvan Wittwer, Director of the Agricultural Experiment Station, Michigan State University, and a member of the Steering Committee of the National Research Council’s recently concluded World Food and Nutrition Study. Unless you inform me to the contrary, I will inform Peter of my recommendation, by COB, Monday, February 27.
247. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Maynes) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 1, 1978

SUBJECT
Food Corps Proposal

Issue for Decision

Is the Food Corps a viable idea? If so, we should maintain the momentum accorded it by Ambassador Young’s speech. Ambassador Young has requested that this memorandum be presented to you before his March 3 departure for Asia.

Essential Factors

Ambassador Young in an address given in his personal capacity to the FAO Conference on November 14, 1977, proposed the idea, first suggested by Dr. Ruth Morgenthau, of a Food Corps, as one step toward reducing hunger. The unique features of Food Corps are its emphasis on development at the village level, through recruitment and training of specialized volunteers coming mostly from the less developed countries, the exchange of volunteers among developing countries, and management largely by LDC officers themselves.

Though the FAO delegates had no advance notice, many spoke in favor. The West Africans expressed support, but in private conversations were concerned about having an effective voice in Food Corps and not having it tied too closely to the FAO. The Philippine President of the World Food Council and delegates from several of the industrialized countries also endorsed the proposal. A few were skeptical, partic-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780051–0081. Unclassified. Drafted by Roy Haverkamp (IO/AGR), Alberto Mora (IO/AGR), and Morgenthau on February 28; concurred in draft by Holloway; Butcher; Shear; Handwerger; Luzzato; Kriesberg; Boyle; Farrar; and Vernon Johnson. Byrnes initialed for all the officials with the exception of Morgenthau and Mora. Mora also initialed for Haverkamp.

2 See footnote 9, Document 245.

3 Morgenthau, a Brandeis University political science professor, represented the United States on the UN Commission for Social Development of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In a September 6, 1977, memorandum to Vance, Morgenthau noted that she had been “exploring the idea of creating an international Food Corps during the past few months.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770175–1207) In telegram 3161 from USUN, September 20, 1977, Young indicated that the Mission had been analyzing the question of the Food Corps relationship “to existing agencies with an interest in food and agriculture.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770342–0745)
ularly the Cubans and the Chinese. The Tanzanian delegation enthusiastically wanted to push a strong action resolution through the Conference. To allow further study, they softened their position. They persuaded the African Group to sponsor, and the Conference to support, a consensus declaration asking the FAO Director-General to study the proposal and report to the 74th FAO Council in November 1978.4

To examine the proposal within the U.S. Government, IO formed a Study Group with representation from AID, Peace Corps/ACTION, Agriculture, and USUN.5 The White House, OMB, and a number of congressional staffers also participated.

This memorandum only addresses the central premise behind the Food Corps proposal. The actual structure of the Food Corps and its international acceptability will only emerge after an evaluation being conducted by the FAO and proposed consultations with interested governments.

A. The Need for a Food Corps

The inter-agency Study Group concluded that the Food Corps idea is viable. Under certain conditions, it can help reduce world hunger if enough attention is paid to the lessons of the past, both of existing volunteer organizations and of food and agriculture efforts in poor countries. This conclusion was based on the following:

—Village level impact: Local as well as international volunteers working together can promote better nutrition and higher incomes at the village level by ensuring the delivery and adaptation of technical assistance and by involving villagers.

—Effectiveness of extant volunteer programs: Existing programs are involved in various anti-hunger efforts. Unfortunately, the number of volunteers is too few and the efforts are too fragmented and seldom coordinated with local volunteer programs.

—Cost effectiveness: AID estimates that the annual cost to support a development technician exceeds $60,000. Full-time volunteers would complement and extend the work of such technicians. (Peace Corps estimates that total agency cost per volunteer is $15,000.)

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4 In telegram 19687 from Rome, November 30, 1977, the Embassy transmitted the text of the consensus declaration, adding: “We believe this successfully launches the international Food Corps idea.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770444–0385)

5 In an October 18, 1977, memorandum to Gilligan and Samuel Brown, Christopher indicated that the review of Morgenthau’s proposal would focus upon the general merits of a food corps, taking into account budgetary and programmatic issues, in addition to the program’s relevancy in light of other bilateral and multilateral development programs. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memos/Letters FM WC to Agencies)
B. Method of Operation

The consensus of the Study Group was that the corps of food volunteers should:

— Bring the best technical expertise to bear on the food and agricultural problems of the food deficient developing countries;
— Go only where they can become an integral part of on-going rural, social and economic development efforts;
— Augment, not duplicate, current national, bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental efforts;
— Operate with minimal bureaucracy by working through the existing international system;
— Strengthen the training and technical institutions of the developing countries and not drain their human resources;
— Establish stringent criteria for selection and training so that volunteers would be qualified both technically and in cross-cultural communication; and
— Work with local volunteers and provide for the orderly phase out of the non-local volunteers within a strict time frame.

C. Tasks

An international volunteer group would stimulate improved village food production, food storage, water management, fish farming, poultry production, range management, food processing, and marketing so as to improve nutrition.6

D. Cooperation between Food Corps and Existing Volunteer Organizations

The Study Group concluded that:

— Bilateral efforts are sometimes suspected of being motivated by national interest. Multilateral efforts usually best overcome these suspicions;
— The food volunteers would not compete with the Peace Corps and other such groups but could involve these groups in recruiting and perhaps training volunteers so as to engage their support, learn from their experience, and keep new costs to a minimum; and
— Joint projects could be developed to ensure that the activities and resources of the Food Corps and other volunteer programs complement one another.

Conclusions

— Volunteer programs should be seen as effective and comparatively inexpensive resources for the accomplishment of development

6 Vance underlined most of this paragraph.
programs. Volunteers, if suitably trained and technically supported, can complement and extend the work of experts. They can fulfill some of the tasks for which highly paid professionals traditionally have been recruited.

—Volunteers are motivated and adaptable. They reach into remote areas, and help link villagers to the available technical assistance.

—Food volunteers can promote technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC).

Recommendations:

1. That you endorse the Study Group finding that the Food Corps concept is viable, subject to agreement on appropriate financial and institutional arrangements.7

2. Having approved recommendation 1, that you authorize us to discuss the Study Group’s views with FAO and selected other international organizations and governments without making any commitments on behalf of the U.S. Government.8

7 Vance approved this recommendation on March 1.

8 Vance approved this recommendation on March 1. Telegram 2595 from USUN to multiple diplomatic posts, June 20, 1979, transmitted a Food Corps progress report, highlighting the creation of the Corps d’Alimentation du Sahel (CAS) and establishment of a Tanzanian Food Corps, among other projects. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790282-0364) A June 1979 “Food Corps Progress Report,” prepared by the Presidential Commission on World Hunger’s Ad Hoc Committee on Food Corps, is in the Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Box 13, Food Corps.

248. Editorial Note

Following on the recommendations of the Interagency World Hunger Working Group (see Document 245), the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues Peter Bourne began preparing a message to Congress on world hunger. Under a March 17, 1978, covering memorandum, Bourne circulated to the members of the World Hunger Working Group a draft message to Congress and a draft charter and executive order for the proposed Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. Bourne’s draft provided a historical overview of U.S. food aid, summarized current U.S. food policy, discussed the establishment of the World Hunger Working Group, and highlighted administration initiatives in the area of food re-
serves, P.L. 480, international trade and foreign investment, nutrition, and private sector involvement. Bourne concluded the draft with the following paragraphs:

"World arms expenditures were estimated at $107 billion in 1960; they are now approximately $400 billion. Thirty million people bear arms today, as compared with 24 million only a decade ago. We must begin to give food the sort of attention we have given to weapons; for our strongest weapons will ultimately be compassion and the will to help and to cooperate with those who are now less fortunate, before the problem becomes entirely uncontrollable. We need an increased and sustained debate, both nationally and internationally, on the issue of world hunger. The United States cannot alone solve these problems. But they will not be solved without us. Our leadership is needed, and our assistance is crucial if the hungry nations of the world are to become self-sufficient in food by the end of this century. That goal can be reached. It must be reached. Working together, we shall reach it, by offering other nations our unmatched agricultural skill, by working with them to adapt our science and technology methods, and to help them develop new ones suitable to local conditions.

“In the interests of our national security, and in keeping with our moral responsibility to help our fellow man, we must and we shall do our utmost to combat world hunger while there is still time to act. I ask Congress to join with me in this most important undertaking.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1978)

National Security Council Staff member Guy Erb sent a copy of Bourne’s draft to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski on April 3. In an attached covering memorandum, Erb noted that the draft message was “rather long and contains numerous weaknesses.” He added that he could handle “detailed drafting suggestions” with Bourne and his staff members but suggested that Brzezinski send a memorandum to Bourne explaining the NSC’s major concerns with the draft. (Ibid.) In an April 4 memorandum to Bourne, Brzezinski explained that the draft message “appears very long for a document intended to have an impact on Congressional attitudes toward the Administration’s hunger policies. I would suggest greatly shortening the message and moving specific requests to the Congress to the front of the paper. I understand that those requests and recommendations for U.S. trade, investment, and nutrition policies will be cleared by the appropriate agencies.” At the conclusion of the memorandum, Brzezinski stressed that Erb would provide additional detailed comments to Bourne and his staff members. (Ibid.)

In an April 5 action memorandum to Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Richard Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic and Business Affairs Julius Katz noted that Bourne’s March 17 draft message “contains a number of unrealistic or controversial proposals,” and added that it “is important that the Department clear the final version.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780068–0745) Katz also provided Cooper with a copy of the Department of State’s response to Bourne’s draft, prepared by Frederick McEldowney of the Food Policy Division, Office of Food Policies and Programs, International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which recommended that Bourne redraft the message with the Department’s assistance. (Undated Department of State Comments on Draft Message to Congress; Draft Charter and Executive Order to the Commission on Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition; ibid.) Tarnoff had sent the Department’s comments to Bourne under cover of an undated memorandum, which McEldowney had drafted on April 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780067–1963)

Cooper, in an April 11 memorandum to Bourne, referenced the Department of State’s proposed changes and commented: “The subject matter of the Working Group’s paper is obviously important and the issues associated with it are being dealt with in several fora such as the UN Overview Mechanism, the UNCTAD, and the MTN.” Cooper continued, “Because these issues bear on many important aspects of foreign economic policy—and the current draft contains major changes in them—it is vital that the Department be permitted to clear the final paper which goes forward to the President. On at least two previous instances we were told we would have the opportunity to clear on such messages, but papers went forward to the President without our having had an opportunity to review them. If there are any difficulties in reshaping the paper along the lines suggested in Tarnoff’s memorandum, please let me know.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780067–1962)

Bourne subsequently circulated a revised draft at the end of May. The Department of State’s response to this draft, which Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State David Anderson sent to Bourne on June 6, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780099–0004. In a June 21 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Charles William Maynes, Paul Brynes, Agency Director for Agriculture in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, discussed the most recent version of the proposed message to Congress:

“The latest draft message to Congress on World Hunger (late May) was on the surface a vast improvement over earlier drafts. It had, however, very little revolutionary substance, very few bold new thoughts. Previous drafts were extremely poor but at State’s insistence the im-
practical and unrealistic ideas mostly were winnowed out. The current message recapitulates the President’s intention to further focus foreign assistance along ‘new directions’ lines.

“State’s June 6 response to this draft objected only to (a) the portrayal of U.S. wheat reserves (inconsistent with legislative proposals); (b) statements on the Wheat Trade Agreement (the suggested special LDC preferences and trade stabilization proposals are inconsistent with U.S. policy); (c) a proposal to separate the Food Aid Convention from the Wheat Trade Agreement (premature). We also urged the investment section be reworked to eliminate the appearance that compulsory measures would be considered to ensure (all) U.S. multinational paid due regard to the nutritional consequences of their investments.

“OMB and NSC (Erb) have sent a stiff memo to Bourne saying the message is no good and should be scrapped in favor of a simple (yet lofty) proclamation on the new Commission. They feel, I believe rightly, the Bourne message to Congress would simply restate our good intentions without being able to commit ourselves to anything really new. With the Foreign Assistance bill at risk this seems a particularly sensible caution, since the message as now written could be criticized by anyone knowledgeable as an empty shell.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of International Organization Affairs/International Development Assistance/Agriculture Division, Subject Files of the FAO, US Mission, International Food Organizations, Lot 88D305, Box 2, World Hunger Initiative)

Ultimately, President Carter did not send a world hunger message to Congress, rather opting to issue an executive order establishing the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. For additional information about the Commission’s charter and composition, see Document 251.
249. Memorandum for the Files by Sol Linowitz

Washington, May 3, 1978

RE
President’s Commission on World Hunger

On Tuesday, May 2nd, I had a meeting with the President at the White House to talk about his suggestion that I become Chairman of the new President’s Commission on World Hunger. Earlier Dr. Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President for Health and Related Matters, had conveyed to me the President’s desire that I take on the Chairmanship and I had said I wanted to talk it over with the President.

Before the President came into the Cabinet Room in order to meet with the Time Newstour Group, I was called out to see him in his office and to talk about the Hunger Commission. I started out by telling the President that I appreciated his taking a little time to talk to me about it and he said, “You can have a couple of minutes or a couple of hours whenever you want to do it. Just pick up the phone”.

We sat down and I told him at the outset that I wanted to be helpful to him in any way I could, but that I wanted to be sure I was doing something where I might uniquely have something to con-

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1 Source: Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 42, Members of the Commission [3]. No classification marking. Drafted by Linowitz.

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation took place from 11:32 to 11:40 a.m. in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) Linowitz was at the White House for a meeting of the Time Newstour Group with the President. Following his conversation with Carter, Linowitz rejoined the group. The subsequent meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 11:40 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Ibid.) No record of this conversation has been found. Linowitz served on the Board of Directors for Time Incorporated. Time’s “Newstours” allowed U.S. business, educational, and philanthropic leaders the opportunity to assume the role of “guest journalist” in order to interview key political figures in their respective nations. Linowitz accompanied the 1978 Newstour participants on their tour of the Middle East and Africa. (“A Favorite Trouble-Shooter of Presidents: Sol Myron Linowitz,” The New York Times, November 7, 1979, p. A–6)

3 In a May 1 memorandum for the files, Linowitz noted that he and Bourne had discussed various aspects of the Commission and the proposed Presidential message to Congress on world hunger. (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 42, Members of the Commission [3]) Linowitz’ previous government service included appointments as Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS) and Representative to the Alliance for Progress’ Inter-American Committee during the Johnson administration and co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977.
tribute. I pointed out that hunger was not my area of involvement or particular expertise; that I was therefore somewhat surprised at the suggestion that I become Chairman of the Commission; that I fully recognized the importance of the subject and would do it if he really wanted me to. On the other hand I pointed out that there might be other things where I could be more helpful to him and have something unique to contribute.

The President then told me that he fully understood why I was raising the questions and said he would do the same thing if he were in my shoes. He said that he believed this was a very important program of great significance to him and that he had been trying for fourteen months to get the Commission organized and launched. He talked about the difficulty of working with the bureaucracy and said that the effort had really been a “bitch” in getting it off the ground. He said he believed he needed a strong well-known Chairman to launch the Commission and one who would be tough enough to do what had to be done with the various agencies to bring them together and to agree upon a common course of action. He said, “You would be shocked if I told you the number of hours I have personally devoted to this thing.”

He also said that he wanted issues of food and health to be major concerns of his Administration and that he had, for example, asked Joe Califano, Secretary of HEW, to go to Rome for a WHO meeting this week—the first time a Cabinet officer had attended such a session.4

The President then said that there would be other things where he would want to turn to me and that he hoped I would take on the Chairmanship in order to get the project launched. He suggested that I have a good Deputy Chairman who might be able to move in and take over if the President should ask me to undertake another mission later on—even as early as the latter part of this year.5

He pointed out that the entertainers were particularly interested in lending a hand and had made this their project—naming Eddie Albert,

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4 See Document 313.
5 Carter, in an October 30, 1979, diary entry, noted that he had “discussed the possibility of Strauss leaving the Mideast and going to the campaign, and that Sol Linowitz would take Strauss’s place as the negotiator.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 366) On November 6, 1979, Carter appointed Linowitz the Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East, replacing Strauss, who resigned his position in order to chair Carter’s re-election campaign. See Marjorie Hunter, “Strauss Reported Quitting His Post As Envoy to Head Carter’s ’80 Bid,” The New York Times, November 6, 1979, p. B–8 and Richard M. Harley, “Linowitz stresses US commitment to end world hunger,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 20, 1979, p. 4.
John Denver and others. He suggested that Arthur Krim could work in getting the entertainment industry behind this if I wanted him to.\(^6\)

I told the President that in view of what he had said I was going to take on the Chairmanship and would do it on the basis he indicated. He again emphasized that he wanted to be sure he was off the ground in the right manner with the right strength and that he then thought I ought to be sure I had a competent Deputy Chairman who could take over if that should be desirable.

We then went into the Cabinet Room together in order to meet with the Time Newstour Group.

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\(^6\) Eddie Albert, best known for his motion picture and television roles, was actively involved in Meals for Millions, the predecessor of the Freedom from Hunger organization. Carter later appointed recording artist John Denver, co-founder of The Hunger Project (THP), to the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. Arthur Krim was an entertainment lawyer, president and later chairman of United Artists, and adviser to President Lyndon Johnson.

250. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency\(^1\)

Washington, undated

MEETING GLOBAL FOOD NEEDS: MODEST PROGRESS; CONTINUING PROBLEMS

Hunger and malnutrition continue to be a problem in almost all developing areas of the world, even though world grain harvests have generally been good in recent years. The World Food Conference of 1974 urged national governments and international agencies to assign greater political priority to solving food problems within the context of domestic development and international economic cooperation. This ambitious shift in priorities has not yet taken place. In countries of particular concern to the Conference—those food deficit countries that lack foreign exchange to finance import needs—progress in stimulating food production has been slow, and population growth rates continue to exceed agricultural production growth rates.

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\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A: Production Case Files (1978), Box 4, Folder 35: Meeting Global Food Needs: Modest Progress; Continuing Problems. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of Regional Political Analysis; coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
The World Food Conference was convened by the United Nations in response to the harmful effects of the world grain shortage of 1973–74. This article reviews the status of the institutions set up as a result of the Conference and finds that limited progress is being made toward Conference goals. The World Food Council functions as a forum for an international dialogue on food and agriculture, although it is generally recognized that the Council’s limited authority is incommensurate with its responsibility for overseeing food policy and the implementation of international food programs. Negotiations continue on a new International Wheat Agreement, though at a slower pace than the developing countries would like. The OPEC- and OECD-funded International Fund for Agricultural Development went into operation in December 1977, but it is expected to disburse only a relatively insignificant amount of money in its first year.

The key finding of this study, then, is one of modest progress amid continuing problems in international efforts to cope with global food needs. Despite these problems, however, a joint effort to meet global food needs will probably be one of the few instances of productive cooperation between LDCs and the OECD states. This record of perceptible progress could serve as an incentive to keep the North-South dialogue going, even if, as now seems likely, the general tone of North-South relations becomes more strained during the coming year.

The World Food Council

The World Food Council, the food policy oversight and evaluation body for all agencies affiliated with the UN, was established in 1975 on the recommendation of the World Food Conference. After a slow start, in which ministerial sessions became mired in bloc politicking, the Council issued a comprehensive food policy statement in 1977. Both the developing and the industrialized countries consider this document, the Manila Communiqué, to be a good compromise on issues of food production, security, aid, and trade.

The Manila Communiqué recommends a commitment by the developed countries to provide $8.3 billion in agriculture production aid annually. This is the amount of external assistance that the Council Secretariat estimates is needed to achieve a 4 percent rate of growth in food production in developing countries. Traditional and potential new food aid donors are requested to increase their food aid commitment to ensure that a minimum annual level of 10 million tons in cereals is available for delivery in 1977–79. The Communiqué recommends establishing an international system of nationally held grain reserves. It calls on all countries, particularly those that are developed, to stabilize,
liberalize, and expand world food trade, and urges national governments and international agencies to give higher priority to nutrition and rural development in development plans. It also recommends that governments and international agencies support the basic human needs approach to foreign aid.3

The generally constructive pattern of the 1977 meeting in Manila, the tone and substance of the Manila Communiqué, and the election of a potentially strong Council president from a developing country (Arturo Tanco of the Philippines) raised hopes that the organization would be able to function as the world food security agency that the World Food Conference had envisaged. Basic structural problems which became especially evident at the June 1978 meeting, however, now inhibit the agency from performing a command function. In particular, the Council was not given direct authority on food policy matters over other UN entities or members, as the Conference had recommended. Although a number of UN agencies are requested to make periodic reports to it, many comply only minimally.

The fourth ministerial session of the Council was held in Mexico City from 12 to 15 June of this year. The meeting was devoted almost entirely to the line-by-line drafting of the “Mexico Declaration,” to the intense dissatisfaction of some high-level participants.4 In informal discussions in Mexico City, the ministerial and plenipotentiary-level delegates demanded fuller participation in substantive preparations for the Council’s Ministerial meetings by governments of developing countries and by regional bodies, as well as the World Bank, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the UN Development Program. They emphasized the need to develop information on internal resource commitments to increased food and agriculture production and on plans to reduce food losses due to inadequate storage facilities. They suggested that future meetings of the Council would be more productive if they concentrated on recording varying country viewpoints rather than producing a fully agreed text. If these recommendations are not implemented, it is likely that a drop in the level of representation at Council meetings will occur, thus reducing its usefulness.

Nonetheless, although there is some legitimate concern about the Council’s bureaucratic viability, and though the results of the Mexico meeting are not expected to affect directly the production, consump-

3 [2 lines not declassified] [Footnote in the original.]

4 The Mexico Declaration is a long, innocuous document that reproduces most of the substance of the Manila Communiqué, but with increased emphasis on the difficulties of increasing food production in developing countries and in formulating national food plans. [Footnote in the original. The Department transmitted the final draft text of the Mexico Declaration to Mexico City and USUN in telegram 164039, June 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780268–0008)]
tion, transfer or stockpiling of food, it was able for the second consecutive year to issue a coherent set of food policy recommendations. The developing countries continued to press the advanced countries for funds and technology, and the industrial countries continued to press LDCs to increase agricultural production. Although there was no sign of increased resource commitment on either side, there was an obvious desire to sustain a discussion. The WFC has proved to be one of the least acrimonious of forums for high-level discussion of North-South problems, and in the next year it may be the only such meeting to proceed with relative congeniality.

**Multilateral Aid for Agricultural Development**

The 1974 World Food Conference heavily emphasized the need to intensify cooperative international efforts directed toward the goal of food self-sufficiency for developing countries. Primary responsibility for rapid rural development and population control was declared to rest with the developing countries, with the industrial states providing sustained technical and financial support. The outlook for this Conference goal is not encouraging. In 1977–78, cereal imports for all developing countries are expected by the FAO to achieve record levels in excess of 65 million tons. More important, however, dependence on imports among the countries the UN considers to be “most seriously affected” by recent adverse economic conditions is projected to increase to 17.4 million tons in 1977–78, or some 7 percent above the previous year’s levels. According to the World Food Council, the growth of food production in these countries fell from 2.5 percent annually during the 1960s to 2 percent during 1970–77. While a 2 percent agricultural growth rate is historically acceptable, production has not kept pace with population growth. Per capita production growth in these countries has thus continued to decline in this decade.

External financial assistance for increasing food production is still substantially below the recommended target of $8.3 billion, but international efforts to stimulate and divert funds to food production continue. For example, among the terms of a new economic and technical cooperation agreement between the USSR and Ethiopia was the stipulation that such aid be channelled to food industries and agriculture, at least for the present. The World Food Council’s most important contribution has been its role in the creation of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), with a $1 billion commitment from the OPEC and OECD countries. The Fund will provide grants and low interest loans to stimulate food production in low income, food deficit

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5 This group of 45 countries includes India, Bangladesh, Burma, Ethiopia, and Egypt. [Footnote in the original.]
countries. The Fund’s contribution to agricultural investment, while not impressive in terms of the amounts already being spent, is expected to act as a catalyst, spurring other financial flows. Another objective of the Fund is to help the poor and landless by fostering the use of appropriate technologies and generating rural employment. So far, however, the Fund’s executive board has approved only two projects, and it is expected that less than $100 million will be disbursed in the first year of operation. IFAD commitments are expected to average less than $350 million a year, at least during the first three years.

World Bank loans for agriculture and rural development increased from $956 million in 1974 to an estimated $3.3 billion in 1978. This occurred as a part of a World Bank rural development strategy, established in 1973, which is aimed at sustaining increases in per capita output and incomes, expanding productive employment, and achieving greater equity in the distribution of the benefits of growth. For example, about 25 percent of the Mexican rural development program during 1977–79 is being financed by World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans. Most of this foreign money will go into directly productive infrastructure, such as irrigation, livestock, and development credit.

Another international activity to stimulate food production is the FAO’s International Fertilizer Supply Scheme to expand fertilizer and pesticide production in developing countries. In addition, a number of countries have informed the World Food Council that they are willing to provide a wide range of technical agricultural assistance, such as irrigation, to countries with serious food shortages.

Grain Reserve Negotiations

The most important food-related issue to developing countries probably is the attempt to establish a multilateral system of grain reserves intended to stabilize prices and assure adequate supplies even during bad crop years. Such reserves were first proposed in the 1940s, and the FAO revived the idea in 1973 when North American grain stocks became depleted, and the United States declared its intention not to build up government stockpiles again. The 1974 World Food Conference recommended the establishment of food security stocks, and subsequent meetings of the World Food Council have emphasized the importance of establishing such a system of reserves.

Extensive discussions of the subject of reserves have taken place in the International Wheat Council in London, to some extent in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, and most recently in a United Nations Negotiating Conference held in February and March 1978 to try to reach a new agreement to replace the International Wheat Agree-
The proposed agreement represents a substantial departure in concept from earlier ones, which had no provisions for price stabilization or buffer stocks. The emphasis in the current discussion is on specific obligations regarding reserve stocks or other measures to influence supply and demand on international markets, such as production adjustments and assurance that export markets remain open. Such measures are intended to meet the primary objectives of price stabilization and food security.

So far, about the only concurrence of views in these discussions has been on a target for food aid of 10 million tons of wheat and other grains annually and on the desirability of a wheat buffer stock. The Interim Committee of the Negotiating Conference, which met in June in London and in July in Geneva, has been trying to redraft the substantive economic provisions of the wheat trade convention and coarse grain trade convention; no substantive work on the food aid convention has been undertaken since the Negotiating Conference. Some progress has been made with the wheat trade convention on “trigger” price mechanisms by which decisions to release from, or add to, reserves are made, but no further progress has been made on target size and appropriate allocation of reserve stocks. The Interim Committee will reconvene on 16 October, and a full Negotiating Conference is planned for November in London, unless the Interim Committee decides further progress is not possible.

Food Aid

Food aid is a vital but relatively small element in the global food situation. Large-scale dependence on food aid is considered an inhibition to agricultural development, although there are cases, as in Bangladesh and some Sahelian countries, where food aid is necessary regardless of its effect on development. The logistics of emergency food aid are complicated by the location of cereal stocks (which are concentrated mainly in a few grain-exporting countries), by donor delay in responding to requests for food aid, by weak delivery and distribution infrastructures in poor countries, and by a tendency on the part of governments to delay official announcement of emergency situations.

The UN World Food Program seeks to stimulate economic and social development through aid in the form of food that may, for example, be used as a partial substitute for cash wages paid to workers in development projects. It also tries to meet emergency food needs. Allocations to the international emergency food reserve scheme, operated through the World Food Program, increased substantially in the last year, reaching a level of 421,000 tons of cereals, reasonably close to the

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6 See Document 243.
500,000-ton target. There was general agreement at the 1978 ministerial session of the World Food Council on the need to establish a more permanent reserve, with yearly replenishment and commitments by governments for more than one year in advance.

The Manila Communique recommended that a Food Aid Convention of the International Wheat Agreement be established to contribute to the attainment of the 10 million ton target, and that negotiations provide for an increase in the amount of food aid moved through the World Food Program. In the IWA negotiations the US has endorsed the 10 million ton target, and has proposed that a new “Special Provision for Emergency Needs” be negotiated as part of the Food Aid Convention, providing for an increase in the flow of food aid of up to 20 percent above the minimum level in times of critical or exceptional food needs in developing nations. If the Convention with this special provision is negotiated and ratified, the US would be obligated by treaty to provide at least 4.47 million tons of grains for food aid annually, and perhaps as much as 5.4 million tons under extreme circumstances. To cover this possible obligation, the Carter administration has proposed legislation that would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to buy and hold an International Emergency Wheat Reserve of up to 6 million metric tons of wheat.7

The food aid convention of the IWA is considered by the developing countries to be one of the most important elements under consideration in the political and economic dialogue between developed and developing countries. The Group of 77, the UN caucus of the developing countries, has expressed concern at the slow pace of the talks. The group suggested at the 1978 World Food Council ministerial session that, in the event a new IWA cannot be concluded by the end of this year, a food aid convention should be negotiated independently of the new trade convention, and that it be incorporated in the trade convention when that is concluded.

A major component of the world food security system is the FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture.8 This system, which operates to alert food donors to emerging critical food shortages, worked well during the recent food crisis in Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been on the FAO’s list of food-shortage countries for the last two years. In March the FAO, using data from monitoring stations it had set up in Ethiopia late last year, alerted foreign donors to the probability of a major food emergency, even though the Ethiopian Government was still issuing optimistic reports. When foreign donors responded too slowly to this appeal to be of immediate help—mostly

7 See footnote 4, Document 225.
8 See Document 211.
because they feared that the food they sent would rot on ships waiting to be unloaded in Ethiopia’s clogged port—the FAO quickly supplied an emergency 10,000 tons of cereal in early June.

Outlook

Several years of good crops and the accumulation of substantial reserves in several countries have lessened the pressure on both developed and developing countries to make the necessary changes in national and multinational policies to solve food distribution problems. Nonetheless, the world is somewhat better equipped to deal with another food crisis—in terms of food aid—than it was in 1972–74: a food policy oversight mechanism is now operating, and talks on reserves are under way. Food production in the food-importing poorer countries is growing, and some countries, such as India, have been able to build substantial reserves. Food production, however, is still generally not able to keep pace with population growth in these countries. The aid commitment by developed countries to agricultural development has increased, but a larger commitment is needed to adequately support developing country efforts toward food self-sufficiency. International financial institutions have increased their efforts in rural development, but the increase in funding recommended by the Manila Communiqué has not materialized. Most important, however, channels for international cooperation, negotiation, and discussion, laboriously set up since 1974, are now open. Progress in the coming year will be measured by developments within the IWA negotiations in London and by the World Food Council’s attempts to gain the active cooperation of governments and agencies for its programs.

In particular, further movement toward agreement in IWA negotiations, which now seems possible, might have an impact broader than just ameliorating the specific grain supply and price problems under discussion. If the industrialized countries can develop positions on those issues sufficiently of interest to the developing countries to justify convening the full Negotiating Conference in November, then this advance might encourage the Group of 77 to limit acrimony in other international forums in order to provide a cordial climate for these important talks.

251. Editorial Note

On September 5, 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12078, formally establishing the Presidential Commission on
World Hunger (PCWH). The Executive Order permitted Presidential appointment of 20 Americans from “public and private life” to the Commission and allowed the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives to appoint 2 members from each house. It also outlined the Commission’s charge: “The Commission shall develop factual data as to the causes of world hunger and malnutrition. It shall review existing authorities and programs, public and private, national and international, which seek to address the problems of hunger and malnutrition; and, shall assess to the extent to which those programs are meeting their objectives, and why.”

It continued: “The Commission shall develop recommendations designed to significantly reduce world hunger and malnutrition; and, shall develop various options for harnessing available resources to carry out those recommendations, including policy options for improving the capacity of the United States to reduce the problems of world hunger and malnutrition.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 1498–1499)

The White House announced the appointment of 14 members to the Commission on September 12. The public members of the Commission included John Denver, Harry Chapin, Sol Linowitz, Dr. Norman Borlaug, D.W. Brooks, Dr. Walter Falcon, Dr. Jean Mayer, Dr. Steven Muller, Bess Myerson, Dr. Howard Schneider, Dr. Adele Smith Simmons, Raymond Singletary, Dr. Eugene Stockwell, and Dr. Clifton Wharton. Linowitz was designated Chairman, and Mayer and Muller Vice Chairmen. (Ibid., page 1511) The President subsequently appointed Thomas Wyman and former Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to the Commission on November 22, 1978, and February 1, 1979, respectively. (Ibid., page 2069 and ibid., 1979, Book I, page 213)

Senators Robert Dole (Republican–Kansas) and Patrick Leahy (Democrat–Vermont), and Representatives Benjamin Gilman (Republican–New York) and Richard Nolan (Democratic-Farmer-Labor–Minnesota) served as the congressional members of the Commission.

In a September 12 letter to Linowitz, Commission members Denver, Chapin, Leahy, Gilman, and Nolan described what they believed should be the Commission’s guiding principles:

“The first principle is morality. It is the most fundamental right of every man, woman and child, to live free from hunger and the fear of hunger. This most basic right must be guaranteed if other human rights are to have any meaning. The Congressional Right to Food Resolution reinforces this concept. Thus all hunger, regardless of cause, must be considered immoral. There is a practical application to this principle: the old adage, that when one is in doubt, one should always do the moral thing, is the appropriate way to resolve the potential uncertainties in our deliberations.
“The second principle is the inherent value of the truth. Accurate knowledge is the first step towards the solution of any problem. Without the willingness to face the full dimensions of world hunger, the Commission will be unable to carry out its mandate. Truth has an unusually long life expectancy. Just as plants and water can crack or wear down the hardest stone, so the principle of truth can help us overcome the problem of world hunger. We should not let short-run expediencies distort our vision of what actually is, and what needs to be done.

“The third principle for the Commission is effectiveness. Our goal is to end world hunger, not to create more programs. We must establish criteria to evaluate past and present programs, and those that are ineffective should be discarded. Currently successful ones should be constantly re-evaluated; new programs should be tested against such effectiveness criteria.

“The fourth principle is direct, personal contact with the problem. The Commission should not be an ivory tower body, deliberating in Washington, D.C. and talking in purely technical terms about abject human misery. All the Commission members together should have first-hand experience of the realities of world hunger. Therefore, we recommend that there be in-the-field hearings both domestically and internationally.” (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 41, Meetings)

Carter agreed to attend the initial meeting of the PCWH scheduled for October 5, 1978. National Security Council Staff member Henry Owen, the White House point of contact for the Commission following President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues Peter Bourne’s resignation in July, provided Carter with talking points, the draft version of a formal press statement, and a list of Commission members. Owen highlighted the need for Carter’s attendance at the meeting, noting, “Media coverage has been minimal to date. Your participation in this opening session should draw greater attention to the Commission (which Sol very much wants) and underscore your personal interest in its activities.” (Memorandum from Owen to Carter, October 2; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1978)

Following his meeting with the Commission, Carter issued a general statement on October 5, asserting that the United States bore responsibility for solving the hunger problems “not only because of our humanitarian concerns but for other reasons as well. We cannot have a peaceful and prosperous world if a large part of the world’s people are at or near the edge of hunger. So long as food shortages exist in developing countries, the possibility remains of another world food crisis like that of 1973–74. Such a crisis could trigger another ruinous cycle in
food prices and thus contribute powerfully to inflation.” The President also outlined the Commission’s charge, noting that he remained “confident that this new venture, which will entail close cooperation between the private sector and U.S. legislative and executive branches of Government, will produce a notable advance in the war on hunger.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, page 1712)

Commissioners met formally in Washington on November 6. According to a draft decision paper prepared in advance of the meeting, the Commissioners first had to answer the question as to why the United States had “failed so far to turn the tide against increasing hunger in this country and throughout the world.” The decision paper then laid out the challenges facing the Commission:

“There are no limitations on the range of recommendations for action that can be made by the Commission, and we would not want to prejudge the end-product of our labors before we have begun to work.

“But the problem will be to identify a relatively few points of major focus—both to orient the work of the Commission to the highest action priorities and to avoid the familiar sin of producing a long laundry list of undifferentiated things to do. And for this purpose guidance can also be found in statements by the President and in the legislative history of this enterprise.

“For one thing, it is clear that the Commission is expected to make recommendations on how to go about putting our own house in order here in the United States. Whether it would be productive for the Commission to make detailed recommendations for structural changes in governmental organization is a matter for very careful consideration as the work proceeds. But the Commission is mandated explicitly to cope with the interrelationships and interactions of domestic purposes, policies and programs with global goals, obligations, and opportunities. To perceive the domestic and international aspects of food and hunger policy as inherently antagonistic would betray the charge placed upon the Commission—which is to formulate an approach to hunger and malnutrition which simultaneously supports domestic objectives, moral concerns, and the considerable task of helping other countries meet their food and nutrition needs with their own resources and expertise. This is extremely difficult—conceptually and in terms of both policy and operations. But it is the heart of the Commission’s task.

“Further, a major item that the President and Congress want the Commission to undertake is to find ways to engage more deeply and systematically the great resources of the American private sector to help turn the tide against hunger—from the business world through scientific and professional societies to church-related and other organizations inspired by humanistic concerns.
“The legislative record is replete with references to extremely broad public support for a war on hunger. It also includes tributes to the roles of many non-governmental organizations in waging the struggle here and abroad. Indeed, the committee hearings on the Resolution calling for the establishment of a national commission heard testimony from a number of Congressmen giving credit to outside organizations for generating Congressional action in the first place.

“This part of the Commission’s assignment is a crisp call for social innovation and creative institution-building in working out a more explicit division of labor between the public and private sectors according to their respective responsibilities and capabilities.

“If the Commission can reach conclusions on how to unite our policy objectives, integrate our operating programs and mobilize our own public and private resources, it will be responding positively to the most pressing needs of the Administration and Congress under the question of what the U.S. can do to help turn back the rising tide of world hunger. For if we are seen to be putting our own house in order, we are in an incomparably better position to ask other governments to take steps which may be painful to them. In the final analysis, it is the range of actions that are taken on an international scale that will mount the major assault on hunger.” (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 41, Meetings)

252. **Letter From Secretary of State Vance to the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger (Linowitz)**

Washington, November 6, 1978

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your October 24 letter which requested the designation of a contact person between the Presidential Commission on World Hunger and the Department of State. The letter also asked for a summary of issues which I believe most appropriate for the Commission’s attention.

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1 Source: Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Subject File, 1978–1980, Box 10, Agency Liaison Contact Responses. No classification marking.

2 Not found.
As you know, analyzing the causes of world hunger and malnutrition and finding solutions to these often intractable problems is no easy task. Both the private and public sectors in our country and in other countries have been making considerable efforts in the post-World War II period to resolve these problems. Progress has been made but, worldwide, the number of hungry and malnourished is growing. Obviously, more needs to be done and I am pleased you and the members of your Commission will assist in this effort.

Some of the most important issues which I believe the Commission should address are the following:

—Increasing food production worldwide, but particularly in food deficit developing countries. Developing country food production increases in recent years have exceeded the 4 percent target agreed to for the United Nations Second Development Decade. This favorable performance, however, is primarily attributable to favorable weather conditions, rather than to basic reforms having been made in the food and agriculture sector. Inadequate economic and political policies and conditions still prevent sustained food output increases in many developing countries, and in addition reduce private and public investment in the agricultural sector.

Other constraints to expanded food output in developing countries must also be overcome. Examples of these are inadequate management and shortage of trained manpower, capital shortages, inadequate and inappropriate technology, substantial post-harvest losses due to inadequate storage facilities, and productivity losses due to people debilitated by hunger and disease.

—Dealing effectively with problems of under-consumption and malnutrition. Though there is at present no widespread famine in the world, many millions of people (estimates range between 400 million and one billion) do not have an adequately nutritious diet. Underlying this problem is the issue of effective demand among groups of people within individual countries. We have learned that economic growth and prosperity in a given country does not necessarily produce additional benefits including access to necessary food supplies for the poorer members of society. While the problem is focused in the poorer developing countries, it is worldwide in scope.

—Feeding the hungry and malnourished requires significantly improved food distribution systems both among countries and within the poorer developing nations. The food crisis of 1972–74 evidenced many instances of localized famine in countries and regions where adequate food supplies were available, but inadequate transport systems made it impossible to deliver the food where it was needed most. Improved distribution systems also involve ensuring a better local and regional food supply/demand balance.
—Developing flexible policies to deal with the wide range of problems faced by developing countries in meeting their food requirements. Some developing countries already have sufficient supplies and expected foreign exchange earnings to purchase all the food imports they are likely to need. Another group of countries can attain this position with help. For some, increased agricultural development assistance can expand food production, others would benefit most from reduced trade barriers, while still others need help such as liberal credits to finance imports in short supply years. An effective U.S. and international food strategy must deal meaningfully with all these varied situations and needs.

—Continuing efforts to deal intelligently and effectively with other factors affecting world hunger such as accelerating worldwide losses of arable land from mismanagement of the resource base (deforestation, overgrazing, soil erosion, salination, etc.), the rising cost of energy, chemicals and raw materials required by agriculture, and limitations on water for agriculture imposed by growing competition among nations and regions.

—Finally, it is impossible to ignore the transcendent problem of population growth rates, which not only threaten the long-term food supply/demand balance, but have profound implications for a range of related factors vitally affecting life on this planet including deforestation, loss of croplands, urbanization, social unrest, and public health. Based on current growth rates, the world’s population will double to 8 billion people by 2010. Over 90 percent of the projected population increase will occur in developing countries which are most susceptible to hunger and malnutrition. Existing population/family planning programs in many countries have shown first signs of success; clearly they must be further improved and expanded if we are to avoid prodigious strains on food and other natural resources.

I hope the foregoing provides a useful list of issues for the Commission’s consideration. Michael P. Boerner, Director of the Office of Food Policy and Programs will be the Department of State’s liaison officer with the Commission. You may be assured that the Department of State will cooperate fully with the Commission in its endeavors.

Sincerely,

Cyrus Vance
WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 1, 1979

SUBJECT

President’s Commission on World Hunger

The full Commission met January 31 from 9:30–5:00 under the chairmanship of Sol Linowitz. All Commission members were present with the exception of Bess Myerson and Jean Mayer.

The Commissioners first heard from James Grant, President of the Overseas Development Council. Mr. Grant’s presentation entitled “Overcoming Hunger and Malnutrition by 2000: How Doable? What Required of the U.S.” stressed that those countries that are considered development successes coupled economic development with provision of basic human needs of their poorest people. He used the examples of Sri Lanka, Taiwan, South Korea and China. He argued that economic development should not be looked at in terms of GNP growth rates but that a life quality index should be constructed and used as an indicator of how developed a country is. The U.S. and other donors must provide massive amounts of assistance to developing countries because for many countries it is politically impossible to divert domestic resources to the development process. He estimated that the volume of concessional aid necessary by the early 1980’s is $12–20 billion and the U.S. should provide one-third of that assistance. He said that the Commission’s task should be to develop the political will in the United States so that concessional aid from the U.S. would be more forthcoming than at present.

In his discussion, Grant said that 1979 was a watershed year since there were many important international conferences focusing on development and north/south relations such as the UNCTAD, WCARRD, UNCSTD and the preparations for the Third UN Develop-
ment Decade. Harry Chapin picked this up and said that the Commissioners should be fully informed of these conferences and the U.S. position in them. Grant also suggested that as an alternative to the existing food aid program, there should be a global food stamp program. He estimated that this would cost about $5 billion.

The second agenda item was the discussion of an overview paper, which had been prepared to highlight those areas that the Commissioners believed they should address. They accepted that their overriding priority is to work for the “amelioration and eradication of hunger as experienced by the poor”. Then there was quite a bit of talk about the appropriate definition of hunger and malnutrition and whether the Commission should categorically state that the “trickle down” theory of development has been a failure.

The paper mentioned that 20 million Americans were hungry. Some Commissioners noted this and stated that the Commission should investigate hunger in the US and what official programs were addressing the problem. Senator Dole and Orville Freeman agreed that dwelling on the hunger in the US would be counter-productive, that adequate programs are available and U.S. hunger is not as serious as it once was. It was generally agreed that the Commission maintain an international focus.

In its discussion of famine, the paper suggested that the U.S. establish an International Emergency Food Reserve. Most of the group was enthusiastic about this. Orville Freeman noted that famine would be averted in many cases if a pricing mechanism were in place that stabilized the price of wheat.

The issue of whether hunger can be eradicated at this point in time became quite contentious. John Denver said that there was enough food in the world and the American people deserve to know it. Norman Borlaug and Walter Falcon stressed that Denver was missing the point, the problem is to produce where hunger is prevalent.

The paper then broke the overall problem of hunger into 4 basic components: a) production, b) accessibility, c) consumption, and d) trade.

a) Production—Borlaug and Falcon both cited the need for more research on semi-arid growing conditions. Harry Chapin brought up the issue of land reform and argued that it was the basic step in increasing production. Freeman and Falcon cautioned him that land re-

2 Not found.
form is only successful when there is a concurrent provision of supplementary services such as credit, roads, etc. Also the need for better extension service was noted.

b) Accessibility—They will focus on increasing the purchasing power of the poor and population growth rates.

c) Consumption—The paper states that the first goal is to ensure that everyone has enough calories to consume and then the Commission should worry about the nutritional make up of the diets of children followed by the nutritional make up of the diets of adults. The Commissioners agreed that quantity not quality was the first priority in eradication of hunger. This discussion went off in the direction of American companies marketing non-nutritious products in countries where there are severe hunger problems.

d) Trade—This was a very vague discussion and the Commissioners recognized that they needed a fully developed paper in this area.

The paper ended with a proposed Action Plan which the Commission would recommend to the President. As explained by Linowitz a consortia of multi and bilateral donors would be established for food aid and agricultural development assistance. An LDC would then be required to present the group with a development strategy, including the kind of investment the country itself was willing to make, and external assistance would then be tailored to the requirements of the country strategy. Linowitz was quite enthusiastic about this approach and said that it would give the USG flexibility to “tailor” program actions to the particular needs of the developing country. He said that they did this in the days of the Alliance for Progress and he felt that it worked very well. After several questions from other Commissioners, Linowitz said that the details still had to be “fleshed out” and that the Commission didn’t have to accept this type of program immediately but that it was very attractive to him.

The last item for the Commission’s consideration was the proposal that they issue two statements. One would urge the Congress to repeal

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3 In a February 16 letter to Shaughnessy, Freeman endorsed this concept: “Finally, the action plan, that is to say, trying to go country by country and work out a kind of partnership arrangement, is, I think, excellent. I have had some discussion with our chairman as to whether we have the resources to do that. But if we succeed in laying on a plan of action by midyear 1979 and have a year to work at it, and if we could get the cooperation of some of the operating parts of our government, not only AID, but the Department of Agriculture and parts of other departments so far as expertise and inputs (maybe get people on special assignments), we might work wonders.” (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 42, Members of the Commission [2])
the Helms Amendment\(^4\) and the other would encourage the Administration to upgrade the level of participation at international food and agricultural conferences such as the WCARRD and the FAO Conference. They would suggest that the US delegation be led by a cabinet level official. Orville Freeman called the FAO a “questionable agency” and said that the Director General was “demagoging unmercifully on the international scene” and “drove the ICP out of the FAO and the UN system”. He said the Director General was anti-private industry and Freeman could not support any statement that was supportive of the Director General. Steven Muller also criticized Saouma’s leadership in the FAO but said that the U.S. could be more effective there if we sent high level representatives to the larger meetings. Linowitz said that their opinion of the Director General was unimportant but they should think of the effect on the LDCs if the US sent higher level officials to the FAO meetings. The Commissioners agreed that Linowitz should scrap the idea of a statement and convey to the President the thought that a significant number of Commissioners believe the U.S. should upgrade its level of participation at international food conferences.

The Commissioners were very uncomfortable with the Helms Amendment statement. By this time the Congressional members of the Commission had departed and most of the Commissioners indicated that they would appreciate their view on this matter. Linowitz mentioned that Senator Dole had told him that the Commission should not try to lobby the Congress. Rep. Gilman’s assistant said that it was a very contentious issue in the House and that hearings on it would be held in late February or early March. He suggested that some of the Commissioners might want to testify at those hearings. It was decided that Linowitz should discuss the statement with the Congressional members of the Commission and forward their thoughts to the President.

\(^4\) In September 1978, Congress passed the FY 1979 omnibus appropriations bill (H.R. 12934), which included the Department of State appropriation. The bill included an amendment authored by Senator Jesse Helms (R–North Carolina), which struck $27.7 million from the amount the United States was obligated to contribute to the UN specialized agencies and further specified that none of the funds appropriated could be used for technical assistance by the UN or its agencies. (Don Oberdorfer, “U.N. Dues From U.S. Imperiled,” The Washington Post, October 14, 1978, pp. A–1 and A–12) Although the President signed the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1979 (H.R. 12934; P.L. 95–431; 92 Stat. 1021–1045) on October 10, he issued a statement critical of the amendment: “If allowed to stand, this action would cause the United States to violate its treaty obligations to support the organizations of the United Nations system. Withholding of, or assigning conditions to, U.S. contributions to assessed budgets of these organizations would make it virtually impossible for these organizations to accept such contributions, would seriously impair their financial and political viability, and is contrary to the policy of collective financial responsibility continuously advocated by this Government since the establishment of the United Nations system.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 1979, p. 48)
Harry Chapin announced that the Public Participation Subcommittee would hold hearings in the month of February in Dallas, Denver and Atlanta. He expressed disappointment that no full Commission meetings would be held in locations other than Washington.

254. Letter From Secretary of Agriculture Bergland to the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger (Linowitz)¹

Washington, March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I wish to pass along some additional concerns and ideas to you which I hope will enhance and complement the materials that USDA has been furnishing the Commission up to this time. As I mentioned in my talk to the Commission,² our relations with the developing nations regarding the world food situation are of particular importance. We must help these countries increase indigenous food production and also help them economically so that they become viable participants in world trade. At this time, however, I would like to stress the importance of the U.S. linkages to all nations with regard to solving the world hunger problem.

U.S. agricultural and food policy functions increasingly in an international environment. There is a growing interdependence among countries in the production, consumption, and trade of food. The U.S. economy has become more dependent on other countries as commercial markets for our food and agricultural output, and other countries have become increasingly dependent upon the United States as a source of supply for food and agricultural products.

Within the interdependent environment, important international considerations for U.S. agricultural and food policy are emerging. Especially significant are those interrelated issues that deal with domestic supply and demand, commercial agricultural trade, international agricultural development, and food security. Three areas of concern that I

¹ Source: Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Subject File, 1978–1980, Box 17, USDA. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that the Commission received the letter on March 29. An April 5 letter from Vice Chairman Muller to Bergland indicating that Muller would share the letter with Linowitz upon the latter’s return from China is attached but not printed.

² Not further identified.
wish to elaborate further on are the need for a national food policy based upon knowledge of nutrition, the need to encourage economic development in the developing countries, and the need to provide for world food security.

*A National Food Policy*

Traditionally, we have viewed food policy simply as a summation of our agricultural policies pertaining to the production and pricing of agricultural commodities. The time has come for the development of an explicit national food policy derived from knowledge of the nutritional requirements of our people. The goal of this policy should be to make available an adequate supply of safe, nutritious food at stable, reasonable prices while providing an adequate return to farmers, processors, retailers, and workers in the industry. There are, however, serious voids in our knowledge base from which this type of national food policy might be constructed. For example, we know less than we should about the nutritional status of various socioeconomic segments of our population, and the relationships between human health and nutrition. Guidance and recommendations from the Commission in these complex interrelated areas would be a valuable contribution to our approach to a national food policy.

*Economic Development Assistance*

I would agree with the following statement found in the recent Academy of Sciences study on world food and nutrition.³ “The maldistribution of food can best be corrected over the longer term by providing poor people with the means and opportunities to produce or purchase more food,” and further that, “the major immediate cause of hunger is poverty.” Poverty here is defined as the lack of resources with which to buy or produce food. This classical cycle of poverty combines insufficient food with disease, apathy, and other effects of poverty to foster malnutrition and lower human productivity which in turn result in low income levels.

As you know, the maldistribution of food is more complex than a simple classification of countries into those with more than enough food and those with too little food. What we really observe are pockets of poverty or segments of populations within countries that do not have the means to purchase adequate levels of food. In attempting to measure the scope of this problem, however, there is often a tendency to confuse need and effective economic demand. Need is based upon a minimal requirement necessary for a human being to function at some level of productive activity. Thus total need, national or international,

³ See Document 212.
is based upon this per capita requirement, however defined, times population. Unfortunately, need alone does not generate an effective means for obtaining the required food or allocating productive resources to produce food.

Effective economic demand, on the other hand, implies that income or goods or resources are available to an individual or country to use in an exchange for food or for investing in production. Therefore, I suggest that one part of the solution to malnutrition and hunger would be to transform need to demand with employment and income creating policies and programs in the developing countries.

The effective use of economic development assistance to alleviate hunger and malnutrition over the long run will depend upon the ability of donor and recipient countries to devise and implement development programs that effectively link food availability to investment in productive activity and employment generation which result in the improved nutritional status of the population.

Additionally, I believe that U.S. development assistance should have the long term goal of complementing a developing country’s own efforts towards self-reliance. Development should be directed towards building a strong and self-sustaining domestic economy able to participate fully in international trade. The concept of self-reliance should not be confused with self-sufficiency. The strategy of self-reliance would be based upon comparative advantage and would allow a country to reap the benefits of trade. This would avoid the mistake of self-sufficiency regardless of cost which, in my judgement, is not sound economic policy.

**World Food Security**

Food security, a major problem area related to world hunger, is affected not only by the size and management of reserve stocks, but also by the degree to which barriers to trade prevent trade flows in response to market prices. In the food crisis of a few years ago, trade barriers constituted a major factor in causing the adjustment impact of a relatively small shortfall in world food production to be focused on the United States, a few other major exporters, and of course, the food deficit developing countries. We see that individual nations pursuing their own self-interests at times cause many uncertainties in world agriculture. Additionally, of course, agricultural production itself is subject to large variations given the unpredictability of so many of the key variables including weather, disease, pests, and the rate of technological advance. Political and economic realities make the fine tuning of agriculture an unlikely possibility. It should be recognized that excessive year-to-year instability in food grain supplies and prices can wreak havoc with progress toward development goals and solving the world hunger
problem. There are policy actions related to reserves and food assistance that can be taken to ease chronic food shortages and severe distributional problems. I must mention here that without the political will of individual governments to recognize the problems and to agree and implement the policies designed to correct them, efforts related to world food security will not succeed.

An Additional Comment

An abundance of valuable studies have identified many pertinent issues and have made recommendations for future studies, policies, and actions. I encourage the Commission to review these studies, (especially the National Academy of Science study on “World Food and Nutrition,” and the report that I was responsible for, “New Directions for U.S. Food Assistance: A Report of the Special Task Force on the Operation of Public Law 480”) and focus its efforts on implementing these proposed ideas and solutions to the problems of world hunger and malnutrition.

The Presidential Commission on World Hunger is in a position to give great impetus to the world effort to conquer hunger and malnutrition. It has at its fingertips the resources of a plethora of concerned groups and citizens devoting their energy to this issue. It also has the ears of the administration and the public whose support is vital to the formulation and implementation of effective policies. You have my continued assurance of USDA cooperation with the Commission in its efforts to come to grips with the problem of world hunger.

Thank you for the opportunity to express the Department’s views.

Sincerely,

Bob Bergland

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4 The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish such a task force. The task force’s 128-page final report was jointly released by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the USDA and published by the Government Printing Office in 1978.
The President’s Commission on World Hunger

You asked for an update on the work of the Commission established in September 1978 and charged with developing “recommendations designed to significantly reduce world hunger and malnutrition . . . including policy options for improving the capacity of the United States to reduce the problems of world hunger and malnutrition.” The Commission is to issue a report containing its recommendations by July 30 (this may slip to September 1). It will spend the following 11 months working toward the implementation of those recommendations. The 20-member Commission, chaired by Sol Linowitz, brings together a variety of expertise and interest in the hunger problem.

The Work of the Commission

The Commission has three subcommittees: international hunger and development, domestic hunger and nutrition, and public participation. Since November 1978, the subcommittees have sponsored hearings with expert witnesses on food aid, agribusiness, world food security and international grains reserves, famine prevention, etc. The public participation subcommittee is responsible for “selling” the Commission recommendations to the public and has met with hunger interest groups around the country to mobilize support.


2 See Document 263.

3 According to an undated status report prepared by the Presidential Commission on World Hunger, the Public Participation and Communication Subcommittee, composed of Chapin, Denver, Myerson, Nolan, and Stockwell, held hearings in Washington; Atlanta, Georgia; Denver, Colorado; Dallas, Texas; and Minneapolis, Minnesota throughout the spring of 1979. The full Commission also held a public hearing in Chicago, Illinois. (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Subject File, 1978–1980, Box 16, Status Report on the Commission [1])
The Commission has agreed that the underlying cause of world hunger is poverty and that its recommendations must necessarily be development-oriented. The staff proposed that it recommend a country-by-country action plan whereby the U.S. would try to develop a consortium of donors that would meet with each recipient country and map out a coordinated food strategy for that country. However, at the May 1 session of the Commission, some of the members pointed out that the scheme would not be very different from what AID already does and that the Commission needed broader policy recommendations.

At the May 1 meeting, the individual members made statements about what priority areas and future approaches the Commission should pursue. This resulted in a long list of suggestions with an underlying conclusion that before the Commission could proceed with specific recommendations, it needed a better understanding of the hunger problem and a clearer definition of its responsibility in trying to solve it.

The staff is to provide an “underlying analysis” in the next two weeks and then target 5–20 areas where practical recommendations could be made.

Edwin Martin has recently been hired as a consultant to the Commission and he has privately expressed some concern to us that in trying to cover the waterfront of the causes and cures of hunger, the Commission may come up with a long list of unrealistic and duplicative recommendations.

A few probable recommendations emerge from the Commission meetings and staff discussion papers:

—Make alleviation and eventual elimination of hunger the primary objective of U.S. foreign assistance policy. This would involve providing a greater proportion of aid in the agricultural sector and emphasize projects supportive of agrarian reform programs.

—Support the IBRD’s inclination to develop grain storage facilities in LDCs.

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4 Transcripts of the Commission meetings are in the Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Transcripts, Boxes 30–33.

5 Martin was the former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (1962–1964), Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1968–1974), Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of U.S. participation in the 1974 UN World Food Conference, and Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Conference.
—Support resumption of negotiations of a new International Grains Agreement\(^6\) and independent negotiation of the Food Aid Convention.

—Support of an emergency food reserve. Congressman Gilman, co-sponsor of the pending emergency food reserve legislation,\(^7\) is a member of the Commission.

—Assistance for the prevention of post-harvest losses in developing countries.

—Greater flexibility in administering Title II and Title III P.L. 480 food aid agreements.

—Greater emphasis on family planning programs.

—More support for agricultural research in and for developing countries and related training programs.

—Support for a stronger U.S. assistance agency with a cabinet level administrator.\(^8\)

\(^6\) Negotiations to replace the International Wheat Agreement (including the Wheat Trade Agreement and Food Aid Convention) resumed in Geneva on January 22, under the auspices of UNCTAD, and concluded on February 14. Delegates were unable to adopt a new agreement and simply extended the existing one. (Telegram 2516 from the Mission in Geneva, February 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790070–1040) In a March 30 address before the Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging International Order in Seattle, Washington, Vance commented: “We continue to believe that an effective International Wheat Agreement, with an expanded Food Aid Convention, would help stabilize world wheat prices and strengthen world food security. We are disappointed that after more than 2 years of effort, a workable international arrangement could not be achieved at last month’s negotiations. If prospects improve for reaching an accord, we are prepared to resume these negotiations.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1979, p. 37) The complete text of Vance’s address is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

\(^7\) On April 10, Gilman introduced H.R. 3611, authorizing the President to establish an emergency stock of 4 million metric tons of wheat. Also, on April 10, McHugh introduced H.R. 3612, which also mandated the establishment of an emergency wheat reserve. Both bills were referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Subsequently Foley and cosponsors Zablocki, Fazio, and Bereuter introduced H.R. 4489 on June 15. The bill resembled both H.R. 3611 and 3612 but also contained a provision authorizing the release of up to 300,000 tons of wheat in any fiscal year for humanitarian relief in developing countries experiencing natural disasters. Talmadge introduced the Senate version of the bill (S. 1278) on June 5. For additional information, see Document 260.

\(^8\) Cooper added a handwritten comment following this point: “Nothing on nutrition!”
256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy

Washington, May 12, 1979, 1203Z

120985. Rome for FODAG. Subject: Goals and Objectives for the Office of the US Representative to the Food and Agriculture Organization. Reference: State 287307.2

1. The following identifies US interests and policy issues and states the most recent Department approved goals and objectives for US Mission to FAO:

I. US interests:

—To maintain and strengthen US role in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Food Program (WFP) and the World Food Council (WFC);

—To increase the effectiveness of those programs of the four UN agencies, particularly FAO, which are of direct benefit to US interests and to developing countries receiving US bilateral aid, but within a context of budgetary restraint;

—To increase the effectiveness of the agencies as instruments advancing economic and social development through a basic human needs approach, such as that defined in current US legislation on foreign assistance;

—To increase cooperation and coordination (A) among the four food agencies, (B) between the UN food agencies and the rest of the UN system, and (C) between the UN food agencies’ multilateral programs and the US Government’s bilateral programs.

II. Key policy issues facing the US in the next two years:

—Improvement of US relations with FAO;

—Repeal congressional legislation which currently prevents us from paying our assessed contribution to FAO;3

—Decision on replenishment of US contribution to IFAD;

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790215-0716. Confidential. Drafted by Charles Watkins (IO/EX/OB); approved by Don Eller (IO/EX).

2 Telegram 287307 to all posts, November 11, 1978, transmitted instructions for updating submissions for the U.S. Goals, Objectives, and Resource Management (GORM) FY 1981 exercise. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780466-0695)

3 Presumable reference to the Helms Amendment; see Document 253 and footnote 4 thereto.
III. Goals and objectives:

A. FAO

—Limitation of real dollar growth in assessed budgets for the 1980/81 biennium budget to as close to zero as possible;

—Closer consultation and coordination with Western members and with selected developing countries, as appropriate, on program and budget issues;

—Support FAO efforts to orient its program toward field activities and to limit headquarters staff and expenditures;

—Encourage FAO to give greater emphasis, by savings in other areas, to food consumption, nutrition and other US priorities;

—Endeavor to negotiate mutually acceptable limitations on FAO’s technical cooperation program;

—Seek to identify additional geographic and program areas in which the FAO and AID can cooperate;

—Seek to coordinate FAO/AID activities and contributions with overall US policies;

—Increase the representation of Americans in the secretariats and the use of Americans as consultants in FAO and the other Rome-based organizations;

—Play an appropriately active role in the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development and develop a policy on implementation of the resolutions of the conference;

—Encourage FAO to cooperate in efforts aimed at restructuring the UN system consistent with FAO’s responsibilities with respect to its own field personnel and financial resources;

—Report more fully on the substantive aspects of FAO’s work and urge FAO to issue better documentation describing its programs.

B. IFAD

—Encourage IFAD to concentrate on projects targeted at aiding the rural poor in the food priority countries;

—Evaluate IFAD performance and the likely future participation of OPEC governments with a view to deciding whether to replenish the US contribution in 1980;

—Continue to support a lean IFAD staff with maximum reliance on the work of other lending institutions; but encourage IFAD to direct some of its efforts to support of new and innovative approaches to the programs of small farmer development.
C. World Food Program

—Encourage closer integration of WFP projects with the development projects of other international organizations;
—Assist WFP in defending its program responsibilities vis-à-vis FAO;
—Take an active role in development of food aid guidelines and policies.

D. World Food Council

—Election of an effective president for the 1980/81 term;
—Encourage the WFC secretariat to continue its analysis of constraints on increasing flows of resources to the food and agricultural sectors within food deficit countries and to them from international organizations and donor countries;
—Encourage the WFC to proceed with its efforts on implementation of the resolutions of the World Food Conference and to facilitate more effective donor coordination in the agricultural sector.

E. Explanation of changes from last goals and objectives statement:

—The US has taken a position advocating zero net real program growth for the UN system;
—The Helms Amendment was passed in Congress;
—IFAD has been in operation since November 1977;
—The President’s Commission on World Hunger was established.

Vance
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING HUNGER FOR THE PRESIDENT’S USE AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT

I. Introduction

The countries meeting at the Tokyo Summit have the ability to do something about world hunger. Despite impressive increases in world food production, the total number of people who are chronically malnourished is greater today than a decade ago. Most of the world’s hungriest people live near the site of the Summit and in sub-Saharan Africa. Severe hunger also exists in Latin America and the Middle East, and even our own country is not immune to malnutrition.

The Commission believes that by placing issues of food and agriculture high on the Summit agenda, the participating nations have correctly accorded priority to what is perhaps the single most important task now facing mankind. Of all the challenges facing the world today, agreement on the joint actions of all countries necessary to eliminate world hunger may be the most important, and may also provide the most solid basis for other international actions to assure world peace.

After extensive study and review, the Commission’s major findings with regard to world hunger and malnutrition are:

- that the world food problem is less a matter of periodic famine than of chronic and increasing malnutrition;
- that hunger is primarily a problem of poverty rather than of food supply, at present;

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2 The G–7 industrialized nations met in Tokyo June 28–29. A declaration released at the conclusion of the Summit reads in part: “We will place more emphasis on cooperation with developing countries in overcoming hunger and malnutrition. We will urge multilateral organizations to help these countries to develop effective food sector strategies and to build up the storage capacity needed for strong national food reserves. Increased bilateral and multilateral aid for agricultural research will be particularly important. In these and other ways we will step up our efforts to help these countries develop their human resources, through technical cooperation adapted to local conditions.” The full text of the Tokyo Declaration is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 1979, pp. 8–9. For documentation on the Tokyo Summit, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy.
that massive increases in food production will be required in coming years, as incomes rise and the world population continues to grow;

- that hunger is a political problem as much as a scientific and technical problem;

- that hunger has extremely complex and interrelated global causes and consequences but that its elimination is not beyond the available technical and financial resources of the world community;

- that the attainment of long-term solutions will depend on firm commitments by the countries attending the Summit, by other donor countries, by international agencies, and by the food-deficit countries themselves.

The Commission believes it is particularly fitting that issues dealing with hunger are now being addressed at the Summit by those nations whose own resources enable them to offer assistance to others.

II. The Major Focus: Strengthening the Commitment of the United States and Others to Overcome Hunger

The U.S. commitment to overcoming hunger is based upon the belief that this problem represents the most fundamental issue of human rights and that it also represents one of the greatest potential threats to international peace and stability. This commitment includes the following elements:

- Current U.S. foreign assistance programs and other relationships with developing countries have a number of important—but sometimes conflicting—objectives, emphases and motivations. The Commission recommends that the President announce that he is prepared to make the elimination of world hunger the first priority of America’s interactions with developing countries for the decade of the 1980s. The Commission considers such an approach to be a major investment in national and international security and recommends that the other Summit nations also give first priority to this same goal. In particular, this priority can be reflected both in design and funding of foreign assistance programs as well as in the broad range of political and commercial relationships between the developed and developing countries.

- The establishment of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger is evidence of this government’s resolve to strengthen and accelerate its own efforts to assure an adequate diet for all. The Commission is examining U.S. policies and actions to determine which of those activities enhance efforts to overcome hunger, and which may, in fact, inhibit the progress of such efforts. The U.S. believes that global endeavors to combat hunger would be significantly enhanced if other
countries attending the Summit were to conduct similar self-evaluations of their own policies, domestic and international.

III. Actions for Summit Attention: Food Security and Increased Production

The Commission believes that the President should call the following issues to the attention of other countries attending the Tokyo Summit:

A. World Food Security

An effective program of global food security must be put into place. The Commission believes this goal will involve the following actions on the part of the Summit nations:

1. An International Wheat Agreement. Although negotiations to establish a new agreement were broken off in February, these negotiations should be resumed and, this time, with greater attention to the needs of the food-deficit countries.\(^3\) The abundant harvests of the past several years, and correspondingly low prices for wheat and other grains, provide an unusual opportunity for the international community to establish a truly effective system of reserves at this time. With reduced food production and reserves projected for the next crop year, finalizing a revised and effective Wheat Agreement is of utmost urgency. The negotiation of a new agreement will require additional flexibility by all participating governments, but the objective is well worth the effort.

2. A New Food Aid Convention. While it is important that negotiations on an international system of food reserves be resumed, a more immediately attainable goal is to conclude a new Food Aid Convention. The U.S. has already taken the lead on this issue, by stating that it would be prepared to make available at least 5 million tons out of a 10 million ton target for the Food Aid Convention. While previous attempts to negotiate the FAC have been tied to an overall reserve negotiation, this link is not intrinsically necessary. The Commission believes that a separate Food Aid Convention can be agreed upon relatively quickly, given the cooperation of the Summit nations.

B. Assistance to Increased Food Production

1. Research. One of the most effective uses of the resources of the Summit countries and other donors is in research activity directly related to food production problems, particularly those problems of special importance for the Indian Subcontinent and sub-Saharan Africa. At present, both the international research system and the national adaptive research networks need reaffirmed support and additional resources. The payoff on such investments has so far been very impres-
sive; however, past success should not diminish further efforts to press still harder in the direction of scientific and technical advances.

Two ways to increase resources for research on the food needs of developing countries are: a) to double present levels of funding for the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, and b) to reorient the current priorities which now prevail within the major research institutions of the Summit nations.

2. Water Resources. Water resource development and management is a particularly central issue in those regions of the world where hunger is most severe. Better water management will involve several related needs: extensive, long-term capital investments (as a recent Tri-lateral Report has pointed out);\(^4\) increased emphasis on developing new water management techniques at the local level; and international cooperation and agreement on water resource problems that affect more than one country.

3. Fertilizer. An international commitment to assure the availability of fertilizer—beginning with the Summit nations and eventually including the OPEC countries—would represent a major contribution to the food needs of developing countries. As with the case of food, fertilizer is presently available for those nations that can afford it. However, the shortage of foreign exchange constitutes a major constraint on fertilizer purchases for developing countries, particularly because fertilizer has been subject to extreme price fluctuations since 1973. Summit nations can facilitate fertilizer purchases by making substantially more concessional aid or soft money available for this purpose.

4. Developing Country Institutional Capabilities and Program Coordination. Frequent complaints are raised by donor countries and international agencies regarding the lack of institutional capabilities within developing countries to design and implement food production projects. Therefore, expanded international efforts are required—drawing upon private as well as public resources for management, coordination, marketing and project design—to increase local capabilities to prepare and implement projects in the agriculture sector. Donors and recipients can then design together (in countries where this has not already been done) a series of careful plans and targets for using their combined resources to most efficiently produce more food of the sorts most needed to meet nutritional deficiencies. The World Food Council at its upcoming meetings in July and September should be asked to coordinate such programs, and to provide the staff required for this plan of action.

\(^4\) Presumably a reference to the 1978 report by the Trilateral Commission entitled “Reducing Malnutrition in Developing Countries: Increasing Rice Production in South and Southeast Asia.” Established in 1973, the Trilateral Commission comprises leaders from the private sector in Japan, Europe, and North America.
258. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper)\(^1\)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
U.S. Food Policy Objectives and Activities

Policy Objectives

Since the 1974 World Food Conference, U.S. food initiatives have been directed toward the broad goal of world food security. The world food crisis of the early 1970’s demonstrated the need for actions to ensure adequate food supplies in the event of major crop shortfalls, either locally or globally. In 1975 the FAO estimated a food deficit of more than 20 million tons in the developing countries and that 455 million people suffered from malnutrition. For the 1990’s LDC food deficits have been projected at over 100 million tons and the number of people affected by hunger and malnutrition at one billion.

U.S. efforts to enhance world food security have three objectives:

1. improving food production in the developing countries;
2. introducing stability in wheat supplies through nationally-held reserves in developed and developing countries;
3. providing food aid to meet immediate food needs of developing countries.

U.S. Activities and Programs

1. Food Production

The U.S. has accepted the World Food Conference target of 4% growth of food output in those countries with the highest incidence of hunger and malnutrition. U.S. activities directed at that end include:

a) Bilateral assistance. Roughly half (about $600 million in FY 79) of AID’s development assistance budget is allocated to food and agriculture projects emphasizing the rural poor.

b) Food losses. AID-supported programs to help eliminate food losses from inefficient harvesting practices and poorly maintained

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Subject File, 1978–1980, Box 14, Food Production. No classification marking. Drafted by Kolar on July 26; cleared by Michael Calingaert (EB/ORF); Hart; Dane F. Smith Jr. (EB/OFP/FPD); and Parsons. Katz did not initial the memorandum.
storage facilities will amount to $35 million in FY 80. In 1979 we contributed $3 million to the FAO’s Fund for Prevention of Food Losses.

c) Agricultural Research. The U.S. provides about 25% of the resources of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). It is a network of 11 agricultural research centers located in developing countries that work on basic LDC food crop production problems. The Summit countries have endorsed greater efforts in agricultural research.

d) Multilateral assistance. With U.S. encouragement, the multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasing financing for rural development projects. About 35% of the lending by the MDBs is now dedicated to agricultural development. In FY 79 the U.S. will contribute approximately $1.6 billion to the MDBs. In addition, the U.S. contributes $450 million to the UN development organizations involved in food and agriculture. We funded 20% of the billion dollar International Fund for Agricultural Development.

2. Food Reserves

Until the February adjournment, international efforts to stabilize wheat supplies were tied to the UNCTAD-sponsored negotiations for a new International Wheat Agreement (IWA). The proposed agreement would have established an internationally coordinated system of nationally-held wheat reserves. The International Wheat Council (IWC) agreed in June that in addition to the unresolved issues which prevented conclusion of negotiations, more recent market developments (increased production costs, transportation problems in Australia and Canada, and anticipated crop shortfalls) have introduced new objective conditions which require careful study. At their November 1979 meeting IWC members will review whether the negotiations to achieve a new IWA should be resumed.

While it remains our objective to enhance world food security through an international system of wheat reserves, it may require another cycle of short supplies and relatively high prices to persuade other developed and developing countries that the costs of establishing a meaningful system would be worthwhile in terms of their own interest. In the meantime the U.S. will continue to support other international activities aimed at creation of food reserves including:

a) FAO Five Point Plan. The plan, developed in response to adjournment of the IWA negotiations, calls for best efforts by nations to:

(1) adopt foodgrain stock policies;
(2) establish criteria for management and release of national stocks;
(3) assist low-income food deficit countries to meet current import requirements and emergency needs;
4) make special arrangements for food security assistance to the developing countries;
5) promote collective self-reliance among developing countries.

Implementation of the plan can be furthered by national food sector strategy studies which the Summit countries have encouraged the IBRD and World Food Council to undertake.

b) IBRD Program for Storage Facilities. The IBRD is considering financial and technical assistance to developing countries for construction and management of a 7–8 million ton reserve storage system. The Tokyo Summit communiqué encouraged such an effort. These facilities could make an important contribution to food security in LDCs and, if negotiations are concluded, could be integrated into the IWA framework.

3. Food Aid

Food aid provides relief in emergency situations and helps poor countries and vulnerable groups meet basic food requirements which they are unable to provide for themselves. Food aid is a large component of U.S. food security efforts:

a) PL 480. The U.S. provides about 2/3 of the world’s food aid. While a large portion is devoted to emergency and supplemental feeding programs, U.S. food assistance under PL 480 is increasingly developmentally oriented. Title III (Food for Development) is programmed on a multi-year basis to support agricultural development programs in the recipient country.

b) World Food Program. The U.S. annually pledges 23% of the target of the World Food Program (WFP). The WFP provides about 15% of the world’s food assistance, mostly to support agricultural production projects and programs for increasing the nutritional status of vulnerable groups. The U.S. meets its pledge through PL 480 Title II assistance.

c) International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR). Established under the auspices of the WFP, the resources of the IEFR are used only for emergency relief. The U.S. contribution has been 25% of the annual 500,000 ton target and is carried out through PL 480 Title II assistance.

d) Food Aid Convention (FAC). The U.S. pledged 4.47 of the total 7.59 million metric tons of minimum annual cereals aid pledged at negotiations for a new FAC. The pledges were conditional upon achievement of a new IWA and are not yet in force. The U.S. pledge would be met through PL 480 assistance, which currently delivers over 6 million tons of food aid annually.

The U.S. has launched an effort to persuade other donors to complete the text of a new Food Aid Convention regardless of the status of negotiations for the Wheat Trade Convention—in essence “delinking”
the two. The U.S. has also announced that it would implement its higher food aid pledge made during the negotiation and called on other donors to do likewise. In addition, the U.S. has helped to recruit new donors to the Food Aid Convention, to make it the comprehensive instrument for achieving the 10 million ton annual cereals food aid target of the World Food Conference.

e) Food Security Reserve. The Administration has introduced into both the House and the Senate a Food Security Act which would establish a four million ton grain reserve to backstop our PL 480 programs in years of U.S. production shortfall. In addition, 300,000 tons may be made available to meet emergency requirements rapidly. Prospects for enactment this year are uncertain.

2 See Document 260.

259. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter

Washington, September 7, 1979

SUBJECT

1980 PL 480 Budget Increase

Several communications to you and OMB propose supplemental appropriations for PL 480 food aid in 1980.

1) Secretary Bergland has requested that the original PL 480 commodity volume, 6.8 million tons, planned in the 1980 budget be maintained, despite large increases in commodity prices and shipping costs.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 49, PL 480: 11/77-1/80. Confidential. The President wrote “Jim” and his first initial in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski also initialed the memorandum. None of the tabs are attached.
This would require a $346 million increase in the budgeted $1,399 million program level and an equal increase in outlays (Tab A).

2) Secretary Vance seeks an additional $41 million for Egypt added to any supplemental request to offset price increases. State indicates support for a total increase of $273 million including Egypt (Tab B).

3) IDCA Director Ehrlich favors a $206 million increase, but opposes the Egyptian add-on (Tab C).

Each proposal would call for an immediate supplemental. A January transmittal would be too late, because by the time Congress acted on it, probably next June, logistical constraints would not allow shipment of the full amount requested. Action now could also take into account that the House has added $59 million to the 1980 Title I appropriation request; there is no Senate PL 480 add-on. The appropriation bill will probably be in conference next week. By supporting the House position then, the Administration might avoid formally seeking a supplemental for the amount of the House increment.

There are strong arguments in favor of the proposals. Many developing countries, particularly the poorest, have been hard hit by rising food and oil prices this year. (USDA has provided the analysis of developing country food needs at Tab A). It will appear particularly insensitive for the United States, with good harvests and record food export earnings this year, to accept the cut in planned PL 480 volume from 6.8 to 5.3 million tons caused by higher prices. There will be strong criticism of significant tonnage cuts from both the farm bloc and from humanitarian groups, particularly those voluntary agencies implementing Title II food donations. Finally USDA points out that reductions in PL 480 will create pressure for a supplemental to finance higher CCC short-term export loans.

Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the impact of such large increases on budget restraint. Approving a PL 480 supplemental to allow for price inflation can only intensify pressures for similar add-ons to domestic programs where we have been trying to hold the line. We note that while LDC harvests overall appear down from last year, there seem to be few extraordinary shortfalls. The planned 6.8 million tons for 1980 is well above the 6.2 million tons that will be shipped in 1979 when most major needs have been met. Finally, there is a risk that a supplemental now for the popular food aid program may lead to partial offsetting reductions in regular appropriations for AID and the multilateral development banks (sharply cut by the House) during Senate committee mark-up late this month. These points lead us to conclude that some reduction in the agencies’ requests would be both feasible and desirable.
Key Issues

We believe that there are three key issues related to the proposal.

1. **Title II**—The donation program is the most purely humanitarian element of PL 480 and the main source of U.S. response to natural disasters. It has strong public support centered around the voluntary agencies and is normally backed by large majorities in Congress. As a result, a 1.6 million ton minimum annual volume for Title II is specified in authorizing legislation (subject to appropriations override). If the Administration does not propose a budget increase to maintain the minimum, Congress may well provide it. All agencies agree on an increase of $103 million to offset price increases.

2. **Additional PL 480 Aid to Egypt**—State proposes two increases for Egypt: (a) a $60 million increase in the dollar amount of the program to maintain it at the promised 1.5 million tons of wheat despite price inflation; this would be funded by either a supplemental or reduction of other country programs; and (b) $41 million for an additional 230,000 tons of wheat (about half of Prime Minister Khalil’s request last May), raising the total to 1,730,000 tons or from 25% to over 31% of the worldwide Title I concessional sales program. The issue is whether both of these increases are essential to evidence U.S. reliability in the peace process and to provide tangible reassurance to Sadat. The case for more aid is not strong on economic grounds; Egypt’s balance of payments is improving despite Arab sanctions, and it has a $550 million pipeline of AID commodity import funds.

3. **Title I Tonnage**—For the remainder of the Title I program, all agencies (State, IDCA, OMB, NSC and Owen) believe that the USDA request can be substantially reduced. The question is how much to cut back. The options are presented below. Our flexibility is limited by the facts that deeper cuts could a) limit our ability to meet pressing needs in Africa and Nicaragua not included in the original budget, b) unacceptably reduce the unallocated reserve for contingencies, $142 million at current prices, and c) create pressures for substantial reductions in the large scale programs for Indonesia, Korea and Portugal which will probably have enough foreign exchange to do without PL 480 next year.

Reductions in the latter programs could create problems because i) Indonesia believes that it has a firm $101 million PL 480 commitment based on statements made by the Vice President last year, which have been further defined by our Ambassador; ii) Korea receives PL 480 as a *quid pro quo* for voluntary textile export restraints; and iii) Portugal sees our aid as an earnest of U.S. support for its moderate democracy. USDA believes, moreover, that cuts in Korea and Indonesia shipments could endanger U.S. commercial exports for wheat and rice.
Options

PL 480 Food Aid Shipments\(^2\)
(in $ millions and millions of metric tons)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Option I</td>
<td>Option II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(USDA)</td>
<td>(State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title I</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage 842</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>1013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>(4.6)</td>
<td>(5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage 539</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Program</strong></td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>(6.2)</td>
<td>(6.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outlays</strong></td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(All options above except V include the $60 million inflation increase for Egypt. None except Option II includes the $41 million Egypt add-on. If the $41 million increment were added to other options, totals would be as shown below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(USDA)</td>
<td>(State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Program</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(7.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the options described below, we do not seek specific decisions on individual country levels except for Egypt. State requests that the $41 million for Egypt be added to any supplemental amount proposed by other agencies. If you approve this $41 million, we believe it should be additive to the IDCA and OMB/Owen options, rather than absorbed within them by cutting back other countries.

Option I (USDA)—Request a $346 million supplemental maintaining volume at the planned 6.8 million tons. While no firm country breakdown is available, some of the tonnage under the country plans in the budget would be reallocated to the neediest countries based on current crop estimates. This option would be welcomed by farm and humanitarian groups and by developing countries.

Option II (State and USDA as a second choice)—Request a $273 million supplemental maintaining the 1.6 million ton minimum for Title II, reducing Title I volume but including both requests for Egypt.

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\(^2\) Detail and illustrative country breakdown at Tab D. [Footnote in the original. Tab D is not attached.]

\(^3\) The President circled the Title II Tonnage figures under Options III and IV.
Total volume would be about 6.5 million tons, about 5% above last year. State believes that all major diplomatic and other program objectives can be accomplished with a budget increase 20 percent below USDA, but would go no lower. Tonnage cutbacks would fall on the middle income countries and on the reserve which State would reduce by one-third. State would add $35 million for Africa programs not in the January budget and strongly urges approval of the Egypt add-on.

Option III (IDCA)—Request a $206 million supplemental maintaining the Title II tonnage, holding most middle income Title I recipients to the original dollar levels, and excluding the Egypt add-on. Total volume (6.3 million tons) would be very close to the 1979 level. IDCA Director Ehrlich believes this is the maximum needed to achieve humanitarian and developmental objectives in light of budget stringencies. IDCA would cut back Korea slightly, thus extending further the past practice of stretching out the textile payments. IDCA would maintain a higher reserve than State, which would leave room for some but possibly not all of the new Africa initiatives. Ehrlich questions the need to increase the Egypt program by $60 million to maintain tonnage and opposes the $41 million add-on as turning the program away from the greater emphasis on development objectives that you previously have encouraged.

Option IV (OMB, Henry Owen)—Add $161 million to the budget by seeking a $103 million supplemental to maintain Title II tonnage and supporting the House’s $59 million add-on for Title I in the upcoming appropriations conference. Thus, the supplemental request would be limited to Title II, defensible on humanitarian grounds and meeting the statutory minimum tonnage. Total volume would be about 5.8 million tons, about 5 percent below last year. Programmatically, we would maintain Indonesia at the level that the Indonesians believe was pledged by the Vice President, accept most of the cuts proposed by IDCA, but would reduce the reserve IDCA seeks from $110 million to $80 million, taking smaller cuts in a few other countries. This would be a tight reserve for a year of rising prices. Although there would be little room for the new Africa initiatives, we believe that small cuts in a few countries, possibly including Portugal, plus a further reduction in the reserve could accommodate most of them at this total Title I level. We doubt that reductions of this magnitude would cause major diplomatic problems. This option includes $60 million to maintain the Egypt program at 1.5 million tons but rejects the $41 million add-on for Egypt. We believe that the political objectives stressed by Vance can be met by having Ambassador Atherton announce publicly that the U.S. is increasing food aid to Egypt by $60 million, reducing other countries in order to do so. This would give Sadat visible evidence of U.S. support.

Bob Strauss states that although he is not familiar with the economic considerations, if the $60 million would clearly establish that the
U.S. is doing something unique for Egypt that is not being done for other countries, he would be satisfied and would not insist on the additional $41 million. This is essentially the case, since no other recipient of Title I aid (including Israel and Jordan) would be given significant increases to offset rising prices.

NSC staff supports this option except for preferring to provide the additional $41 million for Egypt.

*Option V (original January budget dollar level)—Request no increase for the program reducing volume to 5.3 million tons.* This option would contribute most to holding the budgetary line not only in foreign aid but also, by example, for all other programs. It would still leave open the possibility of a January supplemental (though much less than the USDA request), which could be decided on in light of the overall 1980 budget situation. Because of the diplomatic costs, the necessary reductions in developmentally sound activities and the domestic political furor it would raise among farm and humanitarian groups, no agency favors this option.

**Decision**

*Option I* Accept the USDA proposal, a $346 million supplemental.

*Option II* Accept the State Department recommendation, a $273 million supplemental including the $41 million add-on and $60 million inflation adjustment for Egypt.

*Option III* Accept the IDCA position, a $206 supplemental excluding the $41 million Egypt add-on.

*Option IV*

(a) Accept the OMB/Owen recommendation, a $103 million supplemental for Title II and support of the House on $59 million more for Title I but excluding the $41 million Egypt add-on.4

(b) Add the $41 million for Egypt raising the supplemental to $144 million.

*Option V* No supplemental.5

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4 The President added 103 and 59, totaling 162, in the left hand margin next to Option IV (a).

5 The President did not indicate his approval or disapproval of any of the options but added a handwritten instruction: “To OMB/Owen add enough not to cut Portugal & to increase Egypt by 100 thousand tons. Consult with Ehrlich to bring total tonnage up to 6.0 mil. J.”
260. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, September 11, 1979

SUBJECT
Food Security Act of 1979

Issue

Background:

The Food Security Act of 1979 (H.R. 4489), introduced in April, would authorize the establishment of a wheat reserve of up to 4 million metric tons. It would be used to meet our food aid commitments to developing countries during periods of tight supplies and high prices, while avoiding disruption to normal commercial markets. It would also allow release of a small portion of the reserve (up to 300,000 metric tons) to provide urgent humanitarian relief in a developing country suffering from a major disaster.

This bill is nearly identical to the International Emergency Wheat Reserve Act (H.R. 13835) which last year cleared the House Committees on Agriculture and International Affairs. Despite the Administration’s strong support, it did not clear the Senate Agriculture Committee largely because of the concern by farmer groups that release of such a reserve would undermine wheat prices. Senator Dole proposed alternative legislation to establish a $500 million food reserve fund. The Administration opposed the Dole bill because it might be unfeasible politically and unwise to use such an emergency fund, which could drive prices higher in a tight market situation.

Progress to Date:

On July 10, 1979, the House Agriculture and Foreign Affairs Committees held joint hearings. Secretary Bergland testified in favor of the bill. Although State was not asked to testify, we support passage of this

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790149-0032. No classification marking. Drafted by John Pitts (EB/OFP/FPG) on September 10; cleared by Calingaert, Hart, and Alvin Adams (EB/IFD/BP). Adams did not initial the memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it.

2 See footnote 7, Document 255.

3 See footnote 4, Document 225.

bill as a useful means to guarantee normal food aid flows in times of scarcity and to ensure compliance with our pledge to provide at least 4.47 million tons of food aid annually.

A number of Congressmen oppose the bill questioning the possible market disrupting effects of organizing and disposing of such a reserve. There is also concern over the overall costs of establishing and maintaining the reserve.

No committee mark-up sessions have been held on the Security Act because of opposition to the measure itself and the desire of some to link this bill with measures opposed by the Administration to raise 1979 and 1980 target prices for wheat and feedgrains. Some members believe organizing and dispensing of the reserve could disrupt the market and that the costs would be high. In addition, some non-government experts believe the bill has drafting defects which could seriously limit the usefulness of the reserve.

Possible Action:

It is unlikely that the House Agriculture Committee will take further action on the Food Security Act this year unless the Administration gives concessions on the domestic price support program. USDA is now working on a set of price proposals which it plans to circulate among concerned agencies within a week or two before taking the matter to the Hill. Until USDA is ready to make its move, no action on your part is necessary.

261. Letter From President Carter to the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger (Linowitz)\(^1\)

Washington, November 16, 1979

To Sol Linowitz

I know that the members of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger share my deep concern about the tragic conditions in Cam-

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Box FG–224, Subject Files—Executive, FG–311, 11/1/79–1/20/80. No classification marking.
I also know you are trying to complete your report on the larger problem of world hunger.

However, I need the assistance of the Commission regarding Cambodia. I would like to have you periodically report to me on the status of major activities being carried out by government agencies and private and international organizations to deal with the hunger situation in Cambodia.3

I want to be assured that required actions are being expeditiously carried out and that we identify any possible delays or other problems which might hinder relief efforts.

Obviously, you will not substitute for those organizations undertaking relief activities nor for any required Congressional oversight; however, by identifying possible problem areas promptly and directly to me, we will be able to assure that essential relief measures continue.

I hope the Commission can undertake this task with minimum disruption to its already important work and I look forward to your assistance.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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2 The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in December 1978 decimated most of the rice crop, thus jeopardizing an already tenuous food supply. During 1979, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) began coordinating a large-scale humanitarian assistance program for Kampuchea on behalf of the United Nations and other concerned governments. For background information on this effort, see Nimetz’ November 8 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment, printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 1979, pp. 1–4. In a statement released on October 15, the President announced a $7 million pledge, including $5 million worth of P.L. 480 food, to assist Kampuchea. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1924–1925) Following an ICRC/UNICEF joint appeal for aid made on October 19, Carter, on October 24, directed the release of another $3 million in refugee aid funds, requested that Congress enact a supplemental Food for Peace appropriation totaling $20 million, committed $9 million in refugee funds to the Government of Thailand to support its Khmer refugee program, indicated support for Zablocki’s proposal to authorize an additional $30 million for relief efforts, and commented that he had asked the PCWH to recommend the “next steps” in meeting hunger needs. (Ibid., pp. 2011–2012)

3 See Document 266.
262. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State

Rome, December 3, 1979, 1529Z

33459. Subj: Twentieth Session of the FAO Conference: Summary Report.² Ref: (A) Rome 31311,³ (B) Rome 32037,⁴ (C) Rome 32044.⁵

1. Summary. Despite existence at outset of several contentious, and at least one potentially explosive issue, the Conference successfully dealt with its business in an efficient and business-like fashion; all issues were seemingly resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. The budget was approved by an overwhelming majority of countries, despite abstentions from a group of five major countries representing 56 percent of assessed budget contribution. The Near East Regional Office, by agreement of all countries in the region, was temporarily closed without abrogation of FAO’s agreement with Egypt. Wording was agreed on for numerous resolutions on topics from protectionism to designation of a World Food Day requiring the appending of a minimal number of reservations and interpretive statements. The Conference concluded in a spirit of amicability and essential unanimity of purpose. End summary.

2. Opening statements. As reported reftel (C), business of Conference preceded by inspirational speeches of Pope John Paul II and McDougall Speaker Kaunda, President of Zambia. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Bergland (reftel A), speaking early in list of ministerial statements stressed consistency of U.S. domestic agricultural policy with critical problem of world hunger and reaffirmed commitment of U.S. to that problem and to supporting the FAO in that effort.

3. State of Food and Agriculture. (See reftel B for detail).


³ In telegram 31311 from Rome, November 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of Bergland’s opening statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790523–0772)

⁴ In telegram 32037 from Rome, November 20, the Embassy reported on the first 3 days of debate in Commission I, focusing on reaction to the Director-General’s paper entitled The State of Food and Agriculture 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790538–1146)

⁵ In telegram 32044 from Rome, November 20, the Embassy summarized various statements made during the plenary session. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790538–1278)
Secretariat characterized situation as not offering room for complacency, particularly since per capita production in the least developed countries continues to fall, and overall, the developing countries were increasingly dependent on food imports. Many developing countries argued for more external assistance to help attain food self-sufficiency, and for a larger share in international trade so they could better afford the food imports they needed. A trade resolution with emphasis on protectionism was adopted with U.S. and other Western countries expressing reservations. Improvements in share of trade and terms of trade, were urged by many developing countries as essential elements in the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Most developed countries cited actions, mostly through MTN that could help the LDCs in their aspirations for more trade.

Concerning fertilizer situation, many developing countries cited rising costs and argued that FAO program essential to help them get fertilizers they needed at prices they could afford. Secretariat noted that while voluntary contributions to the IFS lagging, they had received contributions to begin their “options system” which would also help low income countries to get fertilizer at less cost.

Forestry discussion highlighted need for greater understanding of the role of forests as contributing to food and fuel and to conservation of croplands. Djakarta Declaration received unconditional support. Most speakers of developing countries urged strengthened FAO program in forestry.

4. Agriculture: Toward 2000. This exercise by FAO designed to provide agricultural basis for new international development strategy under preparation for the General Assembly, to meet aspirations of New International Economic Order. Assumptions and conclusions in draft document were thought by many delegates to be optimistic. Revisions planned, including a scenario with lower economic growth rates and considerations of energy costs. U.S. also questioned assumption of constant weather and constant prices in devising model.

5. Fisheries—Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Discussion reflected relative priority of aquaculture vis-à-vis new FAO program for development and management of fisheries in EEZ, and the relative priority of small scale fisheries within EEZ program. A U.S. co-sponsored resolution was approved on FAO’s program of assistance for development and management of fisheries in Exclusive Economic Zones.

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6 The Eighth World Forestry Congress, held under the auspices of the FAO, took place in Djakarta, Indonesia, October 16–28, 1978. The Djakarta Declaration endorsed an enlarged concept of multiple-use forestry in order to cultivate additional crops.

7 An EEZ is a sea zone over which a state has rights over exploration and marine resources; it extends out to 200 nautical miles from a state’s coastal baseline.
6. Program of Work and Budget (PWB) 1980–81. Discussion indicated virtual unanimity of support for the programs, policies and priorities reflected in the proposed PWB. Developing countries supported the budget at a minimum level. Ninety-six (96) countries voted in favor; 5 major contributors accounting for 56 percent of the assessed budgets (UK, U.S., Canada, FRG, and Japan) abstained, reflecting difficulty with the magnitude of the budget—dols. 278.86 million for the biennium. Mexico also abstained, but on a technicality.

7. Review of field programs. Principal thrust of Secretariat was to criticize UNDP, explicitly charging it with mal-administration in choosing non-FAO sources to execute UNDP-financed projects. Most speakers highly complimentary of Secretariat document. U.S. remarks concerned with need for more stress on needs of rural poor; small, disadvantaged farmers; and landless workers; in the design, implementation and evaluation of programs/projects. Resolution on development assistance adopted. U.S. reserved on paragraph requesting increased contributions for special action programs.

8. Medium term objectives. U.S. critique of document, while generally favorable, argued that programs should reflect deliberate shift to assisting low-income food deficit countries; comprehensive approach to nutrition, rather than stressing data collection; and added emphasis to rural employment and increasing level of participation of women in development activities and the number of rural programs benefiting women.

9. Action from World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD).

—DG indicated steps FAO has taken in implementation of WCARRD Action Program (AP). FAO actively helping develop a number of regional development centers to assist countries in the implementation of the AP. FAO staff actively engaged in reviewing current and projected field programs to make them more responsive to AP goals.

—DG presented FAO estimate that dols 20 million needed, on a voluntary basis, over next five years to finance these activities. Resolution, including target, approved by Conference. U.S. presentation strongly supportive of AP as means of reaching higher levels of equity and income.

10. Near East Regional Office. Director-General engaged in intense and prolonged discussions with both sides until eleventh hour in effort to reach compromise which would preclude a divisive vote on floor. Position of U.S. delegation throughout was completely supportive of Egypt. Compromise finally reached called for regional office in Cairo to be closed quote until decided otherwise by Conference unquote. Director-General authorized to determine which regional activities to
terminate and which to carry on from Rome or elsewhere in region. Egypt’s 1952 agreement with FAO establishing the regional office in Cairo however, was not abrogated and Egypt continues as member of Near East Region with full rights to participate in activities of region.

11. Independent Chairman of the Council. Incumbent Chairman, Dr. Bukar Shaib (Nigeria) re-elected. In acceptance speech he expressed concern for improving efficiency of Conference and proposed possible alternative format. This will be matter for future Council consideration.

12. Comment.

—In general, Conference can be characterized as success in terms of U.S. objectives. While new budget somewhat exceeds U.S. ceiling, we are in substantial accord with direction and effectiveness of FAO programs. DG’s performance in defusing Cairo office issue, while, no doubt, further strengthening his hold on the organization, must also be recognized as an important element in the positive tendencies of the organization in recent years, e.g., avoiding politicization and gradually building a reputation as an effective technical organization.

—Despite protracted friction between U.S. and FAO over budget during past year, hopefully relative accord and good will which characterized outcome of Conference can be furthered in coming months.

—U.S. delegation comprised of strong people, working effectively as a team. Particular effort should be made to continue their involvement in FAO matters and utilize the experience derived.

Gardner
SECTION I
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

A. Why Should the United States Be Concerned?

The major recommendation of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger is that the United States make the elimination of hunger the primary focus of its relations with the developing world—with all that implies for U.S. policy toward development assistance, trade, foreign investment and foreign affairs. In the Commission’s view, there are significant reasons for the United States to place the elimination of hunger at the top of its list of global concerns.

1. Moral Obligation and Responsibility

Moral obligation alone would justify giving highest priority to the task of overcoming hunger. Even now, millions of human beings live on the edge of starvation—in conditions of subhuman poverty that, if we think about them at all, must fill us with shame and horror. We see this now most poignantly in Cambodia, but it is a fact of life every day for half a billion people. At least one out of every eight men, women...
and children on earth suffers malnutrition severe enough to shorten life, stunt physical growth, and dull mental ability.

Whether one speaks of human rights or basic human needs, the right to food is the most basic of all. Unless that right is first fulfilled, the protection of other human rights becomes a mockery for those who must spend all their energy merely to maintain life itself. The correct moral and ethical position on hunger is beyond debate. The major world’s religions and philosophical systems share two universal values: respect for human dignity and a sense of social justice. Hunger is the ultimate affront to both. Unless all governments begin now to act upon their rhetorical commitments to ending hunger, the principle that human life is sacred, which forms the very underpinnings of human society, will gradually but relentlessly erode. By concentrating its international efforts on the elimination of hunger, the United States would provide the strongest possible demonstration of its renewed dedication to the cause of human rights.

Moral obligation includes responsibility. In the Commission’s view, the United States has a special capability and hence a special responsibility to lead the campaign against world hunger. The United States is by far the most powerful member of the world’s increasingly interdependent food system. It harvests more than half the grain that crosses international borders. Its corporations dominate world grain trade. Its grain reserves are the largest on earth. Because of its agricultural productivity, its advanced food technology, and its market power, the United States inevitably exerts a major influence on all aspects of the international food system.

Global interdependence in food means that two straight years of bad harvests in any of the major grain-producing nations of the world could precipitate another food crisis like the one that occurred in 1972–74. Recurrent crises of this nature could bring widespread famine and political disorder to the developing countries and would severely disrupt a fragile world economy already weakened by energy shortages and rampant inflation. U.S. policies will have a major role in determining whether or not this scenario will be played out.

American policies and resources also hold the key to solving that continuing world food crisis embodied in the swelling ranks of the chronically malnourished. To these hungry millions, it makes no difference whether such policies are made by choice or inertia, by acts of commission or acts of omission. In view of the undeniable influence that this nation’s actions will have on world hunger, the Commission urges immediate yet careful long-range planning to assure that U.S. policy truly helps rather than harms the world’s hungry people. Delay will only make the same ends more difficult and expensive to accomplish, and will not lift responsibility from the United States.
The Commission does not mean to imply that the United States alone can solve the world hunger problem. All nations, including those of the developing world, must make the conquest of hunger a common cause. However, the Commission is persuaded that unless the United States plays a major role by increasing its own commitment and action toward this goal, no effective and comprehensive global program to combat hunger is likely to be undertaken in the foreseeable future. Moreover, once its own commitment is clear, the United States will be in a particularly strong position to encourage others to do more. The Commission believes that the United States is uniquely situated to influence the fate of millions who do not get enough to eat.

2. National Security

The Commission believes that promoting economic development in general, and overcoming hunger in particular, are tasks far more critical to the U.S. national security than most policymakers acknowledge or even believe. Since the advent of nuclear weapons most Americans have been conditioned to equate national security with the strength of strategic military forces. The Commission considers this prevailing belief to be a simplistic illusion. Armed might represents merely the physical aspect of national security. Military force is ultimately useless in the absence of the global security that only coordinated international progress toward social justice can bring.

Progress with stability has always been the basic goal of U.S. foreign policy. As relations between the industrialized and developing nations deteriorate and as political, economic, resource and environmental challenges to the present order steadily mount, the Commission is firmly convinced that a major worldwide effort to conquer hunger and poverty, far from being a gesture of charity to be offered or withheld according to temporary political whims, holds the key to both global and national security.

The most potentially explosive force in the world today is the frustrated desire of poor people to attain a decent standard of living. The anger, despair and often hatred that result represent real and persistent threats to international order. The developing nations now actively involved in international affairs are resolutely determined to move into the modern world and secure its benefits for themselves. But as the aspirations and expectations of the developing world grow, poverty within it remains prevalent and conspicuous—with hunger as its quintessential symptom. As a result, hunger has been internationalized and turned into a continuing global political issue, transformed from a low-profile moral imperative into a divisive and disruptive factor in international relations. Mutual suspicion and hostility between the "North" and the "South" have been visible, corrosive and counter-
productive in international conferences or negotiations convened during the 1970s to address global problems.

Neither the cost to national security of allowing malnutrition to spread nor the gain to be derived by a genuine effort to resolve the problem can be predicted or measured in any precise, mathematical way. Nor can monetary value be placed on avoiding the chaos that will ensue unless the United States and the rest of the world begin to develop a common institutional framework for meeting such other critical global threats as the growing scarcity of fossil fuels and other non-renewable resources, environmental hazards, pollution of the seas, and international terrorism. Calculable or not, however, this combination of problems now threatens the national security of all countries just as surely as advancing armies or nuclear arsenals.

The Commission believes that stimulating an effective, cooperative campaign against world hunger would help the United States to break the impasse in “North-South” relations. For the foreseeable future, the United States is less likely than most other countries to suffer directly from a world food crisis. Despite—or perhaps because of—this fact, a concerted effort to eliminate hunger would enable the American people to demonstrate their solidarity with “the poorest of the poor,” and, at the same time, to contribute significantly toward raising living standards for poor people throughout the world.

It is the Commission’s view that hunger constitutes the central strand in the web of underdevelopment—poverty, powerlessness, low productivity, lack of education, unemployment, disease, and high rates of population growth. Malnutrition cripples the abilities of disadvantaged populations to help themselves, by preventing large numbers of citizens from working to capacity or performing effectively in school. But the reverse is also true: helping people acquire the means and skills for producing or purchasing their own food will necessarily require progress along the entire spectrum of development needs: creating more jobs in both rural and urban areas, improving basic health, and evolving higher degrees of social organization and political participation.

As both symptom and source of underdevelopment, then, hunger presents an appropriate and badly needed focus for America’s relations with the developing nations. The Commission believes that efforts stemming from this new focus would engender increasing cooperation by the developing nations in addressing the rest of the global agenda.

3. Economic Interest

The Commission also finds compelling economic reasons for the United States to focus on the elimination of hunger. The United States
can maintain its own economic vitality only within a healthy international economy whose overall strength will increase as each of its component parts becomes more productive, more equitable and more internationally competitive. To sustain a healthy global economy, the purchasing power of today’s poor people must rise substantially, in order to set in motion that mutually-reinforcing exchange of goods, services and commodities which provides the foundation for viable economic partnership and growth.

The international food system is one important component of the international economic order. The United States depends on world markets to maintain its own strong farm economy: American farmers export two-thirds of their wheat, about half their rice and soybeans, and about a quarter of their corn and other coarse grains. Although farm output makes up only three percent of the nation’s Gross National Product (GNP), it provides 20–25 percent of the exports ($32 billion in 1979) that are so essential to the U.S. balance of payments position.

Paradoxical though it may seem, the United States will continue to reap these benefits as the developing nations step up their own food production. Rising agricultural productivity will form the foundation for Third World economic growth—and for the continually rising demand for American farm products this growth is bound to create. Even assuming the most ambitious increases in local production of cereals, fats and oils, the food import needs of the developing nations will continue to rise dramatically. Higher economic growth in the developing nations has already spurred enormous increases in the consumption of both imported and locally produced food. Third World imports of food from the United States rose from $2 billion to almost $10 billion during the past decade.

However, there are also limits to how much food the U.S. itself can produce. Since World War II, the world has become accustomed to relying on the United States to serve as a cushion when food was needed anywhere around the globe. The United States had two kinds of excess capacity: grain surpluses, and arable land deliberately taken out of production to stabilize domestic farm prices. Both forms of excess capacity are now sharply reduced. Consequently, although the United States is still “the breadbasket of the world,” providing over half of all the grain imported by other nations, North America can no longer be expected to keep on generating agricultural surpluses for the world.

Some dislocations will no doubt occur within the U.S. economy as Third World nations accelerate the development of their own agriculture and industry, since by actively promoting the process of economic development abroad, the United States is helping other nations to become more competitive with domestic manufacturers and producers. Most affected will be those industries which depend on skills that can
be duplicated more cheaply elsewhere in the world, or U.S. export markets for goods which can be made or produced by former customers. The U.S. Government must anticipate and cushion these changes through trade adjustment and other programs on both the local and national level.

In long-range terms, significant efforts to improve the international economy as a whole, and measures to increase food production within the developing nations in particular, will benefit American consumers and producers alike. If higher productivity is not achieved in the developing nations, both they and the United States will pay the price in rising food costs and uncertain supplies. Recurrent disruptions in global food supply, on the scale of the 1972–74 food crisis, would cause further havoc within the international economy. Consequently all nations, including the United States, share a strong economic interest in assuring larger and more stable world food supplies.

B. How Should the United States Act in Light of Its Concern?

1. Overcoming World Hunger By Helping to Promote Self-Reliant Development

In the most immediate sense, of course, hunger can be eliminated by providing the needy with food. The Commission is convinced, however, that the long-term hope of eliminating hunger lies with prevention rather than with cure. Emergency relief programs, for example, are no substitute for the less dramatic, longer-term efforts required to make developing nations less vulnerable to catastrophe in the first place by transforming their agricultural production. Nutrition intervention and targeted feeding programs are no substitute for policies and actions that help people provide fully for their own nutritional needs.

In practice, the attainment of this goal for most countries would mean the optimal degree of domestic food production supplemented by adequate imports from other nations. Total self-sufficiency in food is seldom feasible, sensible or necessary. Few nations, developed or developing, are so favorably endowed that they can choose to remain outside the international food system. Each nation can, however, develop the political, economic and agricultural foundations to meet the basic needs of its own population. In asking the United States to make the elimination of hunger the primary focus if its dealings with the developing world, the Commission is not advocating that the United States should feed the world, but rather that the United States should help the world feed itself.

2. Broadening the United States Government’s Response to World Hunger

Current United States Government policies do not reflect America’s moral, economic and national security interests in ending
world hunger nor this country’s genuine concern for hungry people. Although one can argue that the United States gave more than its fair share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the end of World War II through the late 1950s, U.S. contributions have fallen off sharply since then as a percentage of GNP. The United States now ranks behind 12 other donor nations in this respect and would rank even lower if security supporting assistance, which is only incidentally for development, were not included in the U.S. totals. Moreover, compared to most other donors, the United States gives a lower percentage of its aid in the form of outright grants, and more in the form of debt-bearing loans.

The low priority accorded to the hunger problem is even more evident in U.S. policies and programs other than development assistance, which influence the possibilities for overcoming world hunger through self-reliant development. Development assistance flows will never amount to more than a tiny fraction of all U.S. economic interactions with Third World nations. In the long run, patterns of U.S. trade and private foreign investment, U.S. participation in international organizations, U.S. foreign policy, and domestic agricultural policies and programs are likely to have a much greater impact on hungry people than development assistance.

3. Mobilizing Public Support

The broad-based plan of action recommended in this Report cannot be carried out without a major reordering of this country’s national priorities. American concern for the hungry must spread to all spheres of Government activity if it is to obtain major results.

For such a marked shift in established practices and premises to occur, public support must be mobilized. The American public now is only dimly aware of what this country as well as others would stand to gain if people in countries which today receive foreign aid, could feed themselves, within dynamic, equitable and self-reliant domestic economies. Such a world would be characterized by a far greater degree of equity among and within nations than is apparent today. While few would oppose improving the lives of impoverished human beings, the benefits for those who are already affluent are less evident; indeed, at first sight the well-off may seem more apt to lose than to gain.

The costs and benefits of overcoming poverty and hunger are difficult to compare in conventional ways. The costs tend to be felt sooner than benefits are received. The Commission affirms its view that the long-term self-interest of the United States is linked to the fate of poor and hungry people throughout the world, that the very spirit of America is its national commitment to justice, equity and human dignity. Only in a world freed from hunger will the human community achieve the state of equality and brotherhood it dreams of now. A cam-
campaign to overcome world hunger in which the United States plays a major role would serve as a focus for the idealism and generosity of those millions of Americans who seek a national purpose that transcends material success.

It is doubtful, however, that moral factors alone can hold popular attention, or command the long-term economic and political support required to sustain such a campaign. A major reordering of this nation’s priorities is necessarily involved, and that process itself must begin with nationwide efforts to educate the public about the realities of world hunger. Despite high food prices the average American still takes food abundance for granted. The majority of Americans have never known hunger. Only a small fraction of the population is now engaged in agriculture; urban, middle-class Americans associate their food supplies with supermarkets rather than with seeds and soil. Moreover, an opinion poll conducted by the Commission reveals widespread public overestimation of the level of U.S. participation in current efforts to combat world hunger and promote economic development.3

The governments of Canada, Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands all support public education programs on Third World problems; and these education programs get results. The U.S. Executive Branch, however, is forbidden to use public funds to promote its programs among the public but it has been encouraged and funded to involve the public in deliberations of major issues like public safety and environmental protection.4

Private voluntary organizations experienced in hunger issues and programs devote most of their limited budgets to urgently needed direct-service, development and feeding programs. They are constantly engaged in raising the money to develop or conduct these oper-

3 A research firm surveyed 1,200 American adults during a 2-week period in November-December 1979. A subsequent press release reported: “Allowing for the immediacy of the intrusion of Iran into the world problem agenda, the problem of world hunger ranks behind only inflation and energy as a ‘top of the mind’ concern, a poll taken for the Presidential Commission on World Hunger reveals.” The release continued: “As supportive as they are of development assistance, Americans substantially overestimate the amount of money which the U.S. is actually spending in this area. They also strongly prefer to have ‘strings attached’ to development assistance funds. Almost everyone demands that those countries receiving aid guarantee that aid will get to the people who need it and that the recipient countries have friendly diplomatic relations with the U.S. Americans also express a preference for assistance funds to be administered by volunteer organizations rather than the U.S. Government or international organizations.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 56, Food: 5/78–3/80)

ational programs, and can allocate little of it to educational efforts not connected to fund-raising.

The Commission believes that the Federal Government must now initiate a nationwide, long-term educational effort, if the requisite public understanding and support are to be marshalled to conquer world hunger. Such an effort should include resources sufficient to implement continuing and effective public education concerning the role of the United States in a hungry world.

C. Conclusion

There are compelling moral, economic and national security reasons for the United States Government to make the elimination of hunger the central focus of its relations with the developing world. However, neither current U.S. policies nor prevailing public attitudes demonstrate an accurate understanding of the problem’s scope, urgency, or relevance to America’s own national well-being.

Cast as the dominant actor within the world’s food system, the United States has a unique opportunity and responsibility to exercise its power for the common good. Such purposeful use of U.S. power would also focus and shape the idealism and generosity that is so indigenous to the American spirit.

What is needed to assure that the United States plays its proper major role in the worldwide campaign against hunger is a major reordering of national priorities. Additional resources must be mobilized, public understanding and support must be marshalled, and the government must organize itself in ways that will enhance the U.S. ability to address this critical issue.

The Commission is convinced that the best hope of eliminating hunger lies in persuading other nations as well to make that objective a top national priority, and in promoting a substantial increase in resources that flow from the affluent nations to the developing world.

Social justice is not simply an abstract ideal. It is a sensible way of making life more livable for everyone. Thus, for the developed nations to do more to assist the developing countries is not merely the right thing to do, it is also increasingly the economically advantageous to do.

Robert McNamara
President, World Bank
May 22, 1979
CONCLUSIONS AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

I–203. The Commission shall develop recommendations designed to significantly reduce world hunger and malnutrition; and shall develop various options for harnessing available resources to carry out those recommendations, including policy options for improving the capacity of the United States to reduce the problems of world hunger and malnutrition.

Executive Order 12078. September 5, 1978

A. Introduction

The Presidential Commission on World Hunger believes that the 1980s must be a decade of concern for human life and wider participation in development. The Commission is also convinced that the most effective demonstration of that concern will be the intensification of worldwide efforts to overcome hunger and malnutrition and to stimulate self-reliant development. Of all the challenges facing the world today, agreement by the nations of the world on the actions required of all countries to eliminate hunger may be the most important, and may also provide the most promising basis for other international actions to assure world peace. By placing the elimination of hunger high on its national agenda, the United States will demonstrate a major commitment to undertaking one of the most important tasks facing mankind.

The establishment of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger is, in itself, evidence of this Government’s resolve to strengthen and accelerate its own efforts to assure an adequate diet for all. The Commission has carefully considered the reasons why the United States should be concerned about hunger. It has also analyzed the dimensions of world hunger, its causes and future implications, and the lessons learned from previous development and relief activities aimed at alleviating hunger at home and abroad. It has thoroughly reviewed other major policies and activities, such as international trade, debt, and food security. In this process, the Commission has also drawn a wide range of insights from various studies and strategies, national and international, to improve its understanding about world hunger and what is necessary to resolve the problem.

As a result of this analysis, the Commission concludes that the United States must make the elimination of hunger the primary focus
of its relationships with the developing world beginning with the decade of the 1980s and that as a step toward this new focus, a major reordering of national and international priorities is essential. This focus can be most easily demonstrated in U.S. assistance programs and policies, but to be a reality, it must include all interaction with the developing world, particularly as a major component in the continuing “North-South” dialogue and as part of our contribution to the United Nations Third Development Decade.\(^5\)

The U.S. commitment to overcoming hunger is based upon the belief that solutions to the problem of hunger represent the most fundamental assurance of human rights, and that through actions designed to help others feed themselves, the United States can make a major contribution to justice for all people.

B. Conclusions of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger

The Commission’s conviction, that the United States must devote immediate attention to the problem of world hunger and the goal of self-reliant growth, is reinforced by the following major conclusions:

- The major world hunger problem today is the prevalence of chronic undernutrition—which calls for a political as well as a technical solution. It is qualitatively distinct from the historically familiar story of recurrent famines—the local, transient and visible tragedies brought about by drought, flood, pestilence, and other calamities. The extent of chronic undernutrition is global; it is an integral part of the overriding issue of world order in the decades ahead.

- This world hunger problem is getting worse rather than better. There are more hungry people than ever before. Despite some encouraging signs of progress following the World Food Conference, at least one out of every eight people on earth is still afflicted by some form of malnutrition. Even after three successive years of good harvests, the world food situation is still precarious.

- World hunger has many interrelated causes, some of which result from scientific, technical and logistical problems. However, the central and most intransigent cause is poverty. Hunger, therefore, is primarily a political, economic, and social problem. The Commission concurs with the National Academy of Sciences that “in most countries social, economic and political measures not directly related to food are necessary to reduce malnutrition and improve health.”\(^6\) U.S. action has direct and indirect impact on many of the decisions about such measures.

- A major crisis of global food supply—of even more serious dimensions than the present energy crisis—appears likely within the next 20 years, unless


\(^6\) See Document 212.
steps are taken now to facilitate a significant increase in food production in the developing nations. Such a crisis would have grave implications for all nations, including the United States; but those nations with the largest numbers of hungry people would suffer the most. Increased food production will not occur, however, without a market and will not benefit hungry people unless they acquire the purchasing power to enter that market.

- Rising global demand for food must be met within resource limits—of land, water, energy, and agricultural inputs—which are at present little understood by most Americans. There can be no lasting solution to the world hunger problem if the world persists in current practices which have already led to increasingly serious degradation of soils, grasslands, water resources, forests and fisheries.

- The task of overcoming hunger is long-term and will require special attention, year in and year out, on the part of the developing countries themselves, as well as the international community. Neither rapid increases in food production of developing countries, nor rapid increases in economic growth rates, nor the stabilization of world grain markets will, in themselves, cure widespread undernutrition.

- The challenge of overcoming hunger requires increasing the production of food on a self-reliant basis in the developing countries. More than increase in supply is required, however. While gains in productivity will become increasingly critical in the years ahead, they must neither be mistaken for nor subordinated to the goal of assuring more equitable access to food for all. To attain this goal will involve a continuing attack on the interrelated issues of poverty, population growth, food production and distribution, employment and income, in order to generate the effective demand that will spur production.

- The containment of world hunger will require specific responses to problems that arise within diverse countries, cultures and political systems. There is no ideal food, no perfect diet, no universally acceptable agricultural system waiting to be transplanted from one geographic, climatic, and cultural setting to another. Assistance programs from developed countries and international agencies must focus on self-reliant growth and respond to the needs of each country, and not be based upon a predetermined strategy which attempts to generalize needs and requirements.

- In addition to action by the industrialized nations, decisive steps to build more effective national food systems must be taken by the developing countries, which produce most of the food they presently consume. Essential support from external donors will also be required to help attain this goal.

- As the world’s largest producer, consumer, and trader of food, the United States has a key role and responsibility in this endeavor. No significant progress is likely to be made without the active and wholehearted participation
of the United States. However, the United States cannot—and should not—try to shape the international effort unilaterally.

- Efforts to eliminate hunger can succeed. The substantial progress achieved within the United States itself, as well as other countries since World War II, indicates that public awareness, appropriate government programs and increased income and productivity do reduce poverty and hunger. The techniques, methods and lessons learned from these examples are often replicable in other countries.

- U.S. domestic and foreign economic policies, as well as private activities, sometimes hinder rather than help efforts to overcome world hunger. U.S. actions with implications for hunger overseas go far beyond the relatively small role that U.S. foreign assistance plays in the overall complex of U.S. economic interactions with the developing world. They include domestic agricultural policies and consumer practices, trade, and foreign investment, as well as arms sales to poor countries. While it would be unrealistic to assume that economic conflicts of interest can be eliminated entirely from international economic relations, the United States can take steps to reduce existing conflicts between its national goals and the needs of hungry people.

- Much progress has been made in reducing the prevalence of hunger and malnutrition in the United States over the past decade. However, some segments of the U.S. population, notably Native Americans and migrant workers, remain vulnerable to malnutrition and related diseases. Further, there is a clear and immediate need for the establishment of a permanent authority to collect, analyze and disseminate essential information relating to the nutritional status of the American population. Despite Congressional directives to Federal agencies to submit proposals for a comprehensive system for monitoring the nation’s nutritional status, little progress has been made to date.

- Federal feeding programs such as the School Lunch; Women, Infants and Children; and Food Stamp Programs have been very successful in addressing the problems of hunger and malnutrition in the United States. However, inflation and fiscal austerity policies threaten the advances that have been made to treat the symptom of hunger. Despite the successes of Federal feeding programs, modifications to improve their availability to the poor, better mechanisms for reaching such groups as the elderly and rural poor and closer monitoring of local administrative practices could lead to increased participation by those Americans in need.

- The pervasive existence of chronic undernutrition throughout the world is still exacerbated by conditions of outright starvation and food scarcity, often man-made. While improvements have been achieved in the coordination and operation of relief activities, further effort is required. However, the major impediment to effective famine and emergency relief is often the unwillingness of the governments of affected
countries to acknowledge the problem. Of critical importance is the prevention of relief assistance for political or military reasons, thereby using hunger and famine as a weapon of armed conflict or political repression.

- The outcome of the war on hunger, by the year 2000 and beyond, will be determined not by forces beyond human control, but by decisions and actions well within the capability of nations and people working individually and together.

C. Preliminary Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger

In formulating its recommendations, the Commission has quite deliberately not restricted itself to those which are the most politically attractive and feasible. We have recommended actions which flow from an analysis that is by no means new, but which—though accepted in the context of international conferences and pronouncements—has not yet emerged in the decisions and actions of governments.

These recommendations are broad in scope and will require many implementing actions. In presenting its recommendations, the Commission has avoided a listing of detailed actions; rather, it has focused on the need for major decisions and policy changes. In this preliminary Report, the Commission presents only recommendations affecting the organization of our own Government, levels of development assistance, alleviation of famine caused by war, and domestic feeding programs. However, the Commission emphasizes that the focus of these initial recommendations is only a beginning. Later recommendations dealing with world food security, trade and corporate relationships, and other U.S. policies and approaches are equally essential to a strong and balanced effort to eliminate hunger.

In this context, the Commission’s major recommendation bears repetition, particularly in a world where the self-reliance goals of the “South” continue to challenge the policies of the “North” and as the United Nations embarks upon its Third Decade of Development. The United States is an integral part of these processes; accordingly:

The Commission recommends that the United States make the elimination of hunger the primary focus of its relationships with the developing countries, beginning with the decade of the 1980s.

The Commission believes that the 1980s, the United Nations Third Development Decade, can be a time of unparalleled opportunity for more constructive cooperation between the industrialized nations of the “North” and the developing countries of the “South.” A world partnership is essential to solve such global problems as hunger, energy needs and environmental concerns, whose ramifications span national boundaries and in which the entire world has an interest.
Focusing on the elimination of hunger as a priority objective will make possible that progress towards creating a just and prosperous world economy, supportive of the self-reliant aspirations of both the developed and the developing world. The elimination of hunger is fundamental to the achievement of a just economic and social order. The United States and other prosperous nations must address the problem of world hunger through all available means, including development assistance, trade, investment and domestic economic policy. Prosperous nations must also address the problem of hunger within their own borders and act to assure their citizens adequate incomes by providing jobs or by making assistance available for those unable to work. The developing countries, for their part, will have to make long overdue changes in deeply rooted social and economic structures.

1. Organization of United States Development Assistance

Since chronic hunger is a symptom of poverty, in the Commission’s judgment, development assistance can be most effective as a catalyst for overcoming hunger in the poorest developing nations through focused efforts to increase local food production, to stimulate balanced and equitable economic growth, and to support local institutional means of increasing the purchasing power of the poor. While the major responsibility to use available development assistance resources is properly that of the recipient country, which must ensure that its own policies and infrastructure allow effective use of development aid, the organization and focus of donor activities are very important.

The Commission finds that current U.S. development assistance legislation is properly focused on areas of basic human needs by the “New Directions” approach. However, the effective implementation of Congress’ goals is seriously compromised by important institutional, financial and political constraints, either levied by Congress or complicated through administrative shortcomings.

U.S. foreign policymakers have frequently viewed “foreign aid” as an instrument for advancing short-term political interests. However, the countries most in need of development assistance seldom pose a direct military threat to national security. Consequently, the economic development of Third World societies is still not considered a priority goal of U.S. foreign policy.

Authority for the major development assistance programs—bilateral, multilateral, and food aid—is dispersed among diverse Federal bureaucracies, many of which do not have development as their primary concern. There is no voice within the U.S. Government inde-
pendent or powerful enough to defend long-term economic development goals against competing short-term political or military objectives. Hence, the relatively low priority accorded to the elimination of hunger and poverty overseas not only reflects, but also is perpetuated by the existing institutional governing structure.

The Commission is convinced, however, that raising living standards in developing countries is central to long-range U.S. political and economic interests as well as to a just world order, and that development assistance can play a more powerful role than military assistance in meeting the requirements of U.S. national security. In order to make credible the United States Government’s commitment to long-term economic development and to facilitate the full implementation of that commitment, clear authority will be required to uphold the goals of development assistance within the foreign policymaking process.

The Commission recommends that the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency be accorded Cabinet-level status, so that the objectives of equitable economic development can be more effectively integrated into U.S. national security policy and planning.

The establishment of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) in October 1979 with authority only over the Agency for International Development (AID), the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (governed by its own Board), represents a step in the right direction but does not, in the Commission’s judgment, go far enough.

The IDCA Director should have Cabinet rank and should have direct access to the President. The Director should also have direct responsibility for U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks (still largely under Treasury Department control), U.S. voluntary contributions to those U.N. agencies still under Department of State aegis, and P.L. 480 (which at present is only partially within the jurisdiction of IDCA). Moreover, the IDCA Director should also have responsibility for formulating policy guidelines affecting the concessional lending programs of the International Monetary Fund, as well as U.S. trade, commodity and investment policies which affect the ability of Third World nations to carry out their share of the measures recommended in this Report.

2. Levels of United States Development Assistance

As another reflection of the low priority accorded to economic development overseas, inadequate funding for official U.S. development assistance and competing claims upon those funds further undermine

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8 See footnote 17, Document 245.
this nation's ability to maximize its potential contribution to eliminating hunger and poverty.

Although the United States is still the world's largest aid donor in absolute terms (and is the world's largest donor of private assistance), it ranks twelfth behind other Western donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in percentage of Gross National Product (GNP). The United States defines ODA as including the bilateral programs (AID development assistance and economic support funds, food aid, and the work of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Peace Corps), U.S. contributions to international financial institutions, and U.S. contributions to international organizations. At the peak of the Marshall Plan to rehabilitate post-war Europe, America’s ODA came to 2.7 percent of GNP. Over the past 30 years, that percentage has shrunk to 0.22 percent of GNP, or less than a tenth of its earlier level.

These reductions have the most adverse impacts on the very poorest (“food priority”) developing countries, which depend on grants or highly concessional aid for 80 percent of their development capital.

U.S. educational, scientific and technical institutions constitute a unique resource for global development efforts. However, budget cuts prevent AID from taking full advantage of these facilities. AID’s institutional capacity to deliver high quality technical assistance has been allowed to deteriorate dramatically, due to a shift to outside contractors and because the Agency has not dramatically shifted the composition of its personnel to implement the New Directions strategy. Although 60 percent of its development assistance program funds are for rural development, food and nutrition, only a small percentage of the Agency’s own staff is expert in these fields.

Moreover, research in the physical, biological and social sciences as related to development is seriously underfunded. While the reallocation of existing research funds would help to accelerate the production of basic food crops in tropical zones, the long-term need is to direct a far larger share of America’s research capabilities and research budget to the task of overcoming hunger and poverty in developing nations.

In addition, U.S. development assistance legislation is burdened with requirements that prohibit assistance to particular nations, or inhibit the development of certain industries in developing countries, even though these restrictions seldom have a development rationale. These restrictive legislative provisions have especially negative effects on U.S. participation in the multilateral banks and other international organizations. In the Commission’s view, measures that allow narrow domestic economic or political interests to interfere with development assistance objectives are ultimately counterproductive to the process of development and an obstacle to the elimination of hunger.
In short, despite ringing rhetoric, legislative mandates and good intentions among development advocates, too small a percentage of U.S. resources potentially available in the war against hunger—whether in the form of capital, knowledge or food itself—actually serves to increase food consumption among the poor. Therefore, to assure that the United States accepts its fair share of the development effort:

The Commission recommends that the United States move as rapidly as possible toward the United Nations' goal of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product as this nation's net disbursement of concessional economic assistance. The Commission further recommends that this increase be limited to development (not security or military) assistance, targeted selectively at poor nations strongly committed to meeting basic human needs and rights through self-reliant development, and that appropriations for this purpose be funded on a multi-year basis, and “untied” from domestic economic or political interests.

In order to reach the target of 0.7 percent GNP as quickly as possible, the Administration must propose a substantial increase in its next fiscal year submission, with the intent of doubling economic development assistance within a few years. The Congress must be prepared to approve the request for increased funding. The Commission emphasizes that the increase must focus on the economic and technical aspects of development assistance and not on security assistance. Further, the increased funds must be targeted toward those nations willing to commit themselves to ending hunger through self-reliant development. The Commission believes that U.S. resources should be committed by using the broad intent of effectiveness criteria—the advancement of human rights and the meeting of basic needs—as overall guidelines for allocating foreign assistance, and that the bulk of U.S. funds should be specifically allocated for programs and projects designed to alleviate hunger. Such efforts should reinforce local initiatives that promote land reform, wider participation in decision-making, reduction in population growth rates, and control of damage to the natural environment.

U.S. assistance should also maximize benefits for development, including “untying” U.S. development aid from domestic interests. Moreover, as long as self-reliant development criteria are used, U.S. legislation should refrain from imposing limits on the countries or types of projects for which development assistance funds can be used. This applies not only to bilateral programs, but also to U.S. development funds allocated for international financial institutions and international organizations. In this context, continued support of such organizations as the World Bank, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development is essential.
As the National Academy of Sciences has noted, increased U.S. development assistance is badly needed to improve and expand Third World research and training programs in the physical, biological and social sciences. Particular attention should be directed at methods of inducing poor farmers to increase production, improving the management of water resources, reducing post-harvest losses in the field and in storage, and developing appropriate technology for small farmers. Further, the United States should make better use of its wealth of experience to help developing nations establish effective agricultural extension services and farmer cooperatives. In this regard, the Commission is highly supportive of the intent of the Title XII amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,9 calling on U.S. institutions to devote greater effort to solving the food and nutrition problems of the developing countries.

3. Famine Relief and Starvation as an Instrument of War

The Commission recognizes that famines will occur in the years to come, despite efforts to alleviate world hunger. The international community must, therefore, maintain mechanisms to deal with unpredictable, short-term famine caused by weather, war or human error.

The Commission lauds international efforts in recent years aimed at improving the mobilization and coordination of international famine relief. However, the Commission is concerned over the lack of resources available to help disaster-prone nations develop the infrastructure and contingency plans necessary to mitigate the worst effects of famine before it occurs. The Commission believes that it is more cost-effective to invest in pre-disaster planning and prevention assistance than simply to give emergency relief.

The Commission also is concerned that large numbers of individuals face starvation as the result of war and political decisions, as in the case of Cambodia. The recent International Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict adopted two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention which, among other things, prohibit the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (including denying sustenance to the civilian population by destroying or removing food supplies or other related objects indispensable to their survival), and

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9 The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 (P.L. 94–161; 89 Stat. 849) amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195; 75 Stat. 424) to include a Title XII provision, which called for efforts to strengthen the capacity of U.S. land grant universities to apply science to solving food and nutrition problems of developing nations.
require parties to the conflict to take various measures to facilitate relief actions designed to deal with shortages of food and other essential items among the civilian population.  The Commission strongly believes that the starvation of civilians should be outlawed as a method of warfare, and that a method should be devised to deal with famine brought on by armed conflict. Therefore:

The Commission recommends that the United States Senate ratify the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention, adopted by the International Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict.

4. Overcoming Domestic Hunger and Malnutrition Through Federal Programs

Recent findings indicate that there have been dramatic improvements in the nutrition of low-income citizens since the introduction of the Food Stamp; School Lunch; School Breakfast; Women, Infants and Children (WIC); Elderly Feeding; and Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Programs. Yet, lack of consistent nutritional information, inflation, and the rising real cost of food threaten these advances and others expected from wider access to these nutrition-support programs. Further, information on the nutritional status of American citizens is surprisingly sparse for all economic brackets, especially high-risk populations. Because the Health and Nutrition Examination Survey is a national effort, it does not disclose the full magnitude of the malnutrition problems for the elderly, the poor, migrant workers, or Native Americans. Although various Federal agencies gather supplementary data, there is no single coordination point in the United States Government to compile and analyze this information. Accordingly:

The Commission recommends that increased resources be provided to those domestic hunger programs which have a demonstrated record of success, and that a systematic effort to assess the nutritional status of Americans be undertaken.

Congress and the Department of Agriculture will have to take steps to assure that food assistance programs, particularly food stamps, respond to increases in inflation and unemployment. When food prices rise, food stamp allotments diminish in value. The Food Stamp Act currently requires that allotments be adjusted semi-annually in accordance
with changes in food prices.\footnote{The Food Stamp Act of 1964 (P.L. 88–525; 78 Stat. 703–709), which Johnson signed into law on August 31, 1964, authorized a food stamp program (FSP) to provide eligible households with nutritious foods. Recipients received a coupon allotment and used the coupons to purchase foodstuffs from retail food establishments approved for participation in the FSP. The Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 (P.L. 93–86; 87 Stat. 221–250), which Nixon signed into law on August 10, 1973, provided for the semi-annual adjustment of allotments to reflect the changes in food prices published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor, beginning with allotments issued from January 1, 1974.} Even this provision is not entirely adequate, as allotments are always 4–10 months out of date. Since food prices are subject to especially volatile shifts (as in 1973 when prices rose 22 percent in one year) a method to ensure prompt adjustment of food stamp allotments is essential. This will require Congressional action to assure necessary funding when required and flexible administrative arrangements to facilitate such adjustments promptly.

The WIC program reaches only a small percentage of those eligible. The major problem is inadequate funding for expansion to reach all potential participants. Those who have participated have shown significant nutritional improvement; however, WIC is not an open-ended entitlement program. It can serve only as many people as its funding permits. The Commission urges the Congress to assure that the legislative and financial support needed is available.

Finally, the Commission notes that existing Federal programs, however successful, do not address the primary causes of domestic undernutrition which, like its parallel in developing countries, is poverty. More far-ranging efforts will be necessary to assure adequate income and equity so that the basic human needs of all American citizens can be met.

D. Conclusion

By presenting its conclusions and initial recommendations in this preliminary report, the Commission wishes to emphasize the urgency of the world hunger problem and the necessity to begin actions directed towards the solution of that problem. Later recommendations and analysis will reinforce this view. However, action is required now and the Commission believes these findings can help to start that process.
264. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State

Rome, January 14, 1980, 1157Z

1129. FODAG. For Secretary Vance. From Ambassador Gardner. Subject: Possible Food Initiative in Conjunction With Economic Summit.2

1. (C—Entire text).

2. The juxtaposition of the recent suspension of grain sales to the Soviet Union3 and release of the preliminary [report] presents a special opportunity for action. In the report, the Commission calls for the U.S. to increase substantially our resource commitment to the world food problem; the sudden availability of grain could provide the “capital” for such action. My impression is that, from the wheat being purchased by the government and other grain already in government hands, as much as two million tons of wheat could be made available for some sort of food aid initiative—potentially a $340 million additional financial commitment to the world hunger problem.

3. Thus, the time seems propitious for a U.S. initiative which would give impetus to world food security through sponsorship of national food reserves in key developing countries. Such a proposal would:

—Demonstrate that the U.S. can use food constructively to help those of our friends who are needy, rather than just withholding it from our adversaries who are not; (A food reserve package for Pakistan, for

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800024–0229. Confidential; Immediate.

2 The sixth Economic Summit of the G–7 nations was scheduled to be held in Venice in June.

3 In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24–27, 1979, the President, on January 7, directed the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture to take immediate action under the Export Administration Act to terminate grain shipments to the Soviet Union. Export licenses could be granted to allow for shipment of up to 8 million metric tons of grain per year as permitted under a 1975 agreement between the United States and the USSR. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 32) Documentation on the Soviet grain embargo is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VI, Soviet Union.
example, if it could be pulled together, would seem to have particular appeal at this time.\(^4\)

—Lay the basis for the President to take a major food initiative on which international attention could be focused at the Venice Summit, thus reinforcing his role as a world leader.

—Constitute a political statement that U.S. is committed to doing more about world hunger.

—Help diminish resistance in our domestic farm community to continued restrictions on our grain sales to the USSR.

4. In order to get maximum impact from an initiative along the foregoing lines, I recommend that:

(A) The President announce that use of U.S. grain to improve world food reserves is under intensive study.

(B) Staff work be undertaken in Washington to ascertain the extent of resources which could be committed, emergency legislative action and/or Congressional consultation which might be necessary, and the mechanics of making grain available. Simultaneously, soundings be taken both bilaterally and also through international organizations, particularly through the FAO and World Food Council as to (A) developing countries’ receptivity, and willingness to take necessary supportive policy action and (B) other donor countries’ willingness to make financial commitments for necessary associated expenditures, i.e., infrastructure, shipping, etc.

(C) FAO Committee on Food Security meeting in late March to be utilized, with consent of FAO Director-General, as forum for further coalescing national food reserve packages.

(D) If all goes well, President Carter to announce a proposal either at, or on the eve of the Venice Summit, of a food reserve initiative, to which the U.S. would make an initial pledge of at least 2 million tons of grain.

5. I have some further thoughts on how such an initiative could be orchestrated for maximum effect, and look forward to the opportunity to explore this idea in greater depth with you during my visit to Washington, January 20 through 25.

Gardner

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\(^4\) Presumable reference to the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, straining the capacity of Pakistani refugee camps. Previously, in April 1979, the Carter administration had suspended aid to Pakistan, with the exception of P.L. 480 commodities, owing to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation laws that prohibited military and economic assistance to nations seeking to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. officials reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security and began examining ways of extending bilateral and multilateral aid. (American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1981, pp. 900–909)
265. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter

Washington, January 17, 1980

SUBJECT

International Program Uses of Excess Grain

1. Introduction. In your speech announcing the cutback in Soviet grain purchases, you said that “we will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the alleviation of hunger in poor countries”. To fulfill this pledge Cy Vance, Jim Williams, and Tom Ehrlich recommend, as do I, an increase in PL-480. OMB is opposed.

They also recommend, as do all your advisers, pressing ahead with our existing proposal to establish the Food Security Reserve, an earmarked four million ton portion of CCC holdings of wheat, for restricted use in meeting severe food supply shortages under our PL-480 food aid program.

Agriculture recommends, in addition, increasing commercial term export sales under the CCC credit program.

Memoranda from Vance, Williams, and Ehrlich on the PL-480 proposals and from Williams on the Food Security Reserve and CCC credit sales proposals are at Tabs A, B, and C, respectively. Jim McIntyre is submitting an analysis of the budget implications.

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2 The President addressed the nation the evening of January 4 to discuss the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He announced a partial embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union, stating: “I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices. We will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the alleviation of hunger in poor countries, and we’ll have a massive increase of the use of grain for gasohol production here at home.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 21–24)

3 Not attached. Williams’ undated memoranda on the food security reserve and CCC sales are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 56, Food: 5/78–3/80.

4 In an undated memorandum to the President, McIntyre indicated OMB’s disinclination to approve increased spending levels for P.L. 480, noting, “I believe as firmly as anyone that we should take the steps necessary to fulfill our commitments to agriculture that it would not bear the full burden of your embargo decision. But I do believe firmly that these steps should (1) be as programmatically intelligent as possible, and (2) not simply be excuses to reraise issues we decided in the budget process. I disagree with the issues posed to you by Secretary Vance, Director Ehrlich, Acting Secretary Williams, and Henry Owens on both grounds.” In the right hand corner of McIntyre’s memorandum, the President wrote: “See Owen memo. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 49, PL 480: 11/77–1/80)
If you approve any of these recommendations, we would like to announce on Saturday.\(^5\)

2. Food Security Reserve. All of your advisers believe that we should try to use the present situation to reinforce our previous request to the Congress to establish the Food Security Reserve.\(^6\) It would not increase the federal budget. It is a long-sought assurance of US readiness to respond to food crises and to maintain our food aid to needy countries when there is a short US grain crop. The Reserve will not work to depress US wheat prices because releases from it are restricted to situations of severe shortages.

Establishment of this reserve will not generally be seen as fulfilling your pledge to “increase amounts of grain devoted to alleviation of hunger in poor countries”; it would simply assure that we will be able to meet our minimum food aid commitments, whatever may be agricultural conditions.

3. PL–480. All of the agencies concerned, except OMB, agree that increased PL–480 food aid should be part of our disposition of the excess grain. It is important that this not be seen as reversion to the discarded policies of using PL–480 as a dumping ground; therefore the increment should be limited to clear cases of need, especially humanitarian programs and food imports that will not displace domestic production in developing countries. In order to avoid displacing grain exports by other countries whose cooperation we need in implementing the Soviet embargo, the increase in PL–480 should not radically exceed recent levels of about 6.8 million tons. Any PL–480 increase should be largely in food other than wheat, because wheat is the primary grain export of these other countries.

I believe that the 800,000 ton add-on proposed by the agencies, which would get us back to the recent level of 6.8 million tons, meets these criteria. Most of it is corn. Such an expanded program can be managed without sacrificing the PL–480 emphasis on development that you have directed. It is true that sizeable PL–480 reserves already are planned, but these reserves are for unforeseen emergencies, not for programmed needs such as proposed by the agencies.

The agencies illustrate the possible uses of this additional 800,000 tons for FY 1980 ($160 million) and FY 1981 ($200 million) by listing specific possible Title I and II FY 1980 and 1981 programs; they also suggest an FY 1981 effort to help LDCs build up national stocks, which I believe makes good sense.

The agencies' attached memorandum lists two other options which none of them recommends: PL–480 aid for Israel, which would

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\(^5\) January 19.

\(^6\) See Document 260.
displace commercial sales and lead to Israeli expectations of continuing PL–480 aid in future years; and increasing existing PL–480 programs by 1.3 (FY 1980) and 1.5 (FY 1981) million tons, instead of 800,000 tons, including a mention of possible needs in India and Bangladesh. Cy notes his objection to such an allocation; in fact, no one recommends this.

To the extent that increased PL–480 exports are additional to otherwise likely US commercial exports, they strengthen US prices and thus reduce CCC’s net grain acquisitions and outlays. I believe that at least two-thirds of the proposed add-on in FY 1980 and FY 1981 meet this additionality test: all of the Title II add-on, most of the Title I increase for poor African and Latin American countries, and the increased vegetable oil for Pakistan. Shipments for overseas food stocks in FY 1981 would also meet the additionality test. Thus, the real cost of 800,000 additional tons would be very small—perhaps $50–$75 million annually; the rest of the nominal cost would be offset by reduced CCC outlays. Unfortunately, OMB concludes that it cannot show an offsetting reduction in the CCC outlays and therefore must score 100% of any PL–480 increase as an additional overall budget outlay. This means that the course recommended by the agencies would add nominally $150 million to the FY 1980 budget and $200 million to the FY 1981 budget.

These budgetary constraints, plus the desirability of minimizing use of wheat, suggest an additional option below the agencies’ recommendation, that is, an increase of $100 million in FY 1980 and the same in FY 1981, or 450,000 additional tons annually (instead of 800,000 tons). Another reason for this more modest option is to avoid overloading the international affairs account, thus prejudicing rapid Congressional action on foreign aid, including Pakistan. This is my recommendation and Bob Beckel’s.

4. CCC Export Credits. Some of the same international considerations apply to expanding CCC credit sales as to PL–480. Budget analysis of USDA’s options here is more complex. From a foreign policy perspective, the USDA proposal contains assurances that avoid serious disadvantages. Your decision on this can be based on other considerations.

Recommendations

1. Food Security Reserve

That you reiterate your strong support for this long-standing Administration proposal and seek its early enactment. Suggested by all the agencies concerned.7

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7 The President approved this recommendation.
2. PL–480. OMB disapproves of the recommendations below.
   a. That you approve an increase of approximately 450,000 tons, $100 million, in the FY 1980 PL–480 request for such uses as those indicated in the State–IDCA–USDA memorandum, with priority for programs likely to increase US grain exports. (This is my recommendation.)

   Alternative: That you approve the State–USDA–IDCA proposal to increase the FY 1980 program from 6 million tons to 6.8 million tons. This, too, would use commodities other than wheat, where possible.

   b. That you approve an increase of approximately 450,000 tons, $100 million, in the FY 1981 PL–480 budget request, for such uses as those indicated in the State-USDA-IDCA memorandum, with priority for the emergency feeding program and the building of stocks in developing nations if feasible stocking programs can be arranged. (This is my recommendation.)

   Alternative: That you increase the FY 1981 program by 800,000 tons, $200 million, as proposed by State–USDA–IDCA.

   c. That you not now pass on the allocation of PL–480 among specific countries, but require that all such proposed allocations be reviewed by the Executive Office (OMB, NSC, and me), with any differences of view being brought to you, if necessary, for resolution then.

3. CCC Credit Sales
   a. Continue with current CCC credit program for FY 1980 as planned. (Recommended by OMB.)

   b. Provide additional direct CCC financing for additional exports to Korea and selected other countries: $150 million. (Recommended by Agriculture and opposed by OMB.)

   c. Be prepared to offer additional direct credit for financing of additional corn exports to China if this turns out to be necessary to consummate additional sales: $240 million. (Recommended by Agriculture and opposed by OMB.)

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8 The President approved this recommendation and disapproved the alternative below.
9 The President approved this recommendation and disapproved the alternative below.
10 The President approved this recommendation.
11 The President approved this recommendation.
12 The President neither approved nor disapproved recommendations b and c.
4. Announcement

That you authorize us to announce on Friday any decisions you make on the basis of this memorandum.13

Bob Beckel, Congressional Liaison, supports my recommendations.

13 The President approved this recommendation and wrote “Sat.” above the word “Friday.” At a January 19 White House news briefing, Eizenstat and Owen announced that Carter had approved the purchase of grains for inclusion in the Food for Peace program. (J.P. Smith, “U.S. Will Buy the Grain Union Refuses to Load,” The Washington Post, January 20, 1980, p. A-4)

266. Report Prepared by the Presidential Commission on World Hunger1

Washington, undated

[Omitted here are a title page and an introductory note.]

Recommendations for U.S. Actions to Help Alleviate Starvation and Malnutrition among Victims of the Kampuchean Famine2

Long-term Arrangements and U.S. Organization

Most experts agree that substantial international relief will be needed in Kampuchea at least through 1981, if hundreds of thousands of people are not to die. Such a long-term effort must be authorized, funded, and organized as quickly as possible. Current U.S. Government funding for the relief effort will suffice only until Spring of 1980.3

Also, should further military action occur on a major scale, the difficulties of dealing with famine and refugees will greatly increase, both in Kampuchea and Thailand.

Even at the present time, international relief organizations are finding great difficulty in maintaining cash flow.4 Any steps taken by the United States to make funds available quickly and to convince other

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800052–1807. No classification marking. Mayer, serving as acting Chairman, transmitted the report to the President under a January 25 covering letter, indicating that the Commission “shall continue to monitor this situation on your behalf and we hope that our recommendations at this time are helpful.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 261.

3 An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

4 An unknown hand underlined “cash flow.”
nations to “cash in” their pledges would be of critical assistance to the relief effort. Also, plans for a new pledging conference to continue the effort into 1981 must be finalized quickly, and any attempt by the United Nations to call such a conference should be supported by the United States.

The Commission cautions the international community that the relief effort itself can have a destabilizing effect on Kampuchea. As the feeding system along the Thailand border becomes more efficient, it tends to draw people within Kampuchea toward the border and may even encourage them to cross the border as refugees. Certainly the preference is to reach the hungry within Kampuchea and not add to the refugee problem.

With regard to current efforts in Thailand and Kampuchea to help refugees and other victims, it appears that the arrangements for delivery of relief as assistance are adequate, but the implementation of actual distribution of food has been ineffective in some cases. The concept of reliance on international agencies to operate the bulk of the programs and to facilitate and coordinate the efforts of non-Government agencies seems the best approach. Logistical arrangements, while periodically exhibiting great difficulties, particularly in Kampuchea, seem adequate. The food supply pipeline is in good order for the short run, and substantial quantities of food are being delivered into Kampuchea or to nearby points along the border from which they can be moved readily, once the distribution bottlenecks within Kampuchea have been resolved.

To date, food distribution within Kampuchea has not been effective, and the World Food Programme has slowed down shipments for that reason. Infrastructure requirements, including transportation and handling facilities, must be improved and augmented. Coordination of the international relief effort is difficult almost by definition because of the large number of organizations involved and the movement of refugees. The arrangements for international coordination seem appropriate, however, and are working well under the circumstances.

Arrangements for internal coordination within the U.S. Government and among private agencies, however, are only partially successful and the clear designation of a single individual as the primary

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5 The first UN pledging conference for Kampuchean relief took place in New York on November 5, 1979, garnering $210 million worth of cash and commodities. For Vance’s statement on the U.S. effort, see Department of State Bulletin, December 1979, pp. 10–11.

6 An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

7 An unknown hand highlighted the phrase “reliance on international agencies.”

8 An unknown hand highlighted the phrase “seems the best approach.”
focal point for coordination of U.S. Government actions would be helpful.

Therefore, the Commission recommends that the President designate one individual as the primary focal point for coordination of all Kampuchean assistance flowing from the United States.\(^9\)

While the Commission considers the designation of one individual to coordinate relief efforts as crucial, it is also mindful of the need for efforts to facilitate funding and organizational arrangements through international agencies at least through 1981, for continuing sensitivity to the cash flow problems of international agencies, for efforts to facilitate coordination arrangements between the United States and the international groups, and for advocating even-handed treatment of the victims of famine, regardless of the political faction they represent.

**Public Perception Issues**

The willingness of the American people to help the Kampuchean is evident at the present time. But the assistance effort will be a long one, and there is real concern that public interest in the Kampuchean famine will wane. Public funds could then cease to flow as needed.

News stories outlining alleged misuse of funds in the relief effort further erode public support for Kampuchean assistance. There is hard evidence that bad publicity about the international effort reduces public giving through private voluntary agencies. It is likely that there will be little support for Government spending as well, if news stories from Thailand and Kampuchea reflect only mismanagement and a sense of hopelessness in dealing with the problem.

A major criticism of the Thailand operation has been that many of the hungry along the border and in the refugee camps are Pol Pot supporters. Critics claim, therefore, that the relief effort favors one faction over another, and that the favored faction is led by a ruthless dictator. The Commission is convinced that in this case, the facts of geography and movement of military forces, and not the design of international agencies or the U.S. Government, have determined who has access to food supplies. The international agencies feed hungry people, regardless of their political persuasion, and are distributing food to any

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\(^9\) In a January 31 memorandum, Dodson asked Tarnoff for a brief summation of ongoing Department of State efforts related to the Commission’s recommendations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800052–1806) The Department’s February 7 response, in the form of a memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski, focused upon six of the PCWH recommendations, those related to coordination, public information, congressional oversight, appropriations, the Thai refugee situation, and U.S.-Vietnam relations. Tarnoff indicated that the President had delegated the coordination responsibility to U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Victor H. Palmieri. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800052–1803)
and all they can reach. When food can be distributed within Kampuchea, there too it will go to hungry people, regardless of their political affiliation.

The Commission cautions that statements by the U.S. Government can also have the effect of reducing public interest in helping Kampuchaneans. For example, statements alleging a lack of support from other governments tend to divert public attention from the crucial need of famine victims and from the success stories of food distribution.

The seizure of American hostages in Iran has also diverted attention away from the famine in Kampuchea, but more importantly, it could dampen the public willingness to provide assistance for any developing nation for some time to come. The public tends to lump developing nations together and see the antagonistic actions of one as indicative of all. Many Americans are now questioning whether the United States should bother to help poorer nations, when they may respond by capturing U.S. citizens and denouncing the U.S. Government. The U.S. mood to turn inward has certainly been expressed to Members of Congress during the Congressional recess, and may be reflected in Congressional action, or inaction, during the coming session.

On these and other issues, the Commission recommends that the President assure that the American public is frequently informed about what is happening in Kampuchea and Thailand, and that the information include the good being accomplished as well as the problems involved in a relief effort of this size.  

Congressional action

The Commission believes that the U.S. Congress should take several immediate actions relevant to the Kampuchean assistance effort and that the Administration should support those Congressional actions.

The Commission recommends that the Congress immediately undertake joint oversight hearings by both the House and Senate on the Kampuchean relief effort.  

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10 The Department of State outlined efforts in this area, highlighting the President and the First Lady’s participation in meetings of the National Cambodian Crisis Committee and the Department’s response to numerous public inquiries concerning the refugee situation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800052–1803)

11 Noted Tarnoff, “While we do not believe that joint oversight hearings are likely to be called, we would welcome hearings by the appropriate committees of the Senate and the House. In any event, Administration officials will be testifying on all aspects of the US refugee effort, including Khmer relief, in the consultations with Congress required by the new refugee legislation.” (Ibid.) The United States Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–212; 94 Stat. 102) was signed into law by President Carter on March 17. Among other things, the act created the position of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.
With the changing conditions in Indochina, the Commission believes that it is essential to clarify U.S. policy toward Kampuchea and neighboring states. This information, as well as details of the relief effort, should be requested in Congressional hearings. The Commission also stands ready to provide information or witnesses for such hearings.

The Commission recommends that the Congress draw out of the Foreign Assistance bill the $30 million appropriation for relief of victims of the Kampuchean famine and immediately appropriate those funds.\textsuperscript{12}

The Foreign Assistance bill appears to be stalled at the present time,\textsuperscript{13} for reasons unrelated to Kampuchea. Yet, time is of the essence and the lives of thousands depend on the availability of the $30 million for relief assistance. Some of these crucial funds have already been spent from authorized borrowings from other programs. Continued delay could also cause serious problems for those programs from which borrowings have been made.

Currently, estimates of U.S. contributions to the international relief effort for Kampuchea total approximately $106 million, or about one-third the United Nations appeal for $311 million. Of the U.N. total, about $251 million is intended for ICRC/UNICEF relief of hungry Kampucheans, primarily located in Kampuchea, and about $60 million for UNHCR activities with refugees in Thailand. The U.S. share of the relief funds is intended to be divided between the two areas, in approximately the same proportion. In practice, of course, the distinction between relief areas is not that clear. ICRC/UNICEF is financing some activities in Thailand. Imported food aid is being distributed on both sides of the Thai-Kampuchean border, although most of the food being distributed in Thailand is purchased in that country. The Commission recognizes the difficulties involved in the relief effort but strongly urges that every effort be made to distribute the food where the greatest need for it exists.

\textsuperscript{12} Tarnoff expressed the Department’s concurrence with this recommendation, adding: “The President, the Secretary of State, and other senior Administration officials have repeatedly urged the leaders of Congress to break the log-jam on these bills.” (Ibid.)

The $106 million pledged by the United States includes the following:

- $25 million P.L. 480, Title II food commodities
- 5 million cash grant to ICRC/UNICEF for start-up costs
- 15 million UNHRC
- 30 million new funds, not yet appropriated
- 30 million reprogramming authority in Foreign Assistance bill

In addition, another $925,000 has been granted to ICRC and Catholic Relief Services from fiscal year 1979 funds.

It is important to restate that the funds now available are not new money made available for relief. The funds will have to come out of other assistance programs, unless new appropriations are enacted.

Similarly, one should note that even with the recent supplemental appropriation of $50 million for the Food for Peace program, Title II is still underfunded in terms of the 1.6 million tons mandated by the Congress. If the Kampuchean assistance must come from the regular Title II program, then another $46 million are needed to meet the mandate. If the Kampuchean assistance is a special additional program, then another $73 million are needed.

The Commission therefore recommends that the Congress enact the remaining supplemental appropriation for Title II of P.L. 480.14

P.L. 480 is not tied to the Foreign Assistance bill, but rather is complicated by its relation to domestic farm legislation. That legislation sets a budget cap for Title I and Title II of P.L. 480. The cap has been calculated to be about $98 million short of sufficient funds at present prices to provide the 1.6 million tons of food mandated in legislation. The dollar shortage totals $123 million if the Kampuchean effort is a special program instead of part of the general program. The recent supplemental appropriation bill provided $50 million of the needed funds. The remaining funds could be provided through the additional supplemental appropriation and by removing the caps from Title I and Title II and allowing the Administration to shift funds between programs. As has been stated, the Kampuchean relief assistance taken from present programs means that other deserving Title II programs will have to be drastically reduced. It also places a strain on funds that may be needed for other purposes, such as aiding refugees from Afghanistan.

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14 Bloomfield, in his December 20, 1979, briefing of the PCWH (see footnote 13 above), also encouraged the Commission members to lobby Congress to enact the remaining P.L. 480 Title II supplemental. (Ibid.)
The reprogramming authority for $30 million may or may not become a matter for Congressional action, depending on the determination within the Administration as to whether funds can be made available from the general Foreign Assistance appropriation. If such funds cannot be made available from the general appropriation, then the issue of additional money must be considered along with other aspects of the long-term Kampuchean relief effort discussed earlier.

Time is of the essence in dealing with these Congressional concerns, and yet, from the Congress’ point of view, this may not seem a good time for action. Committee chairmen are reluctant to report any more supplemental appropriation bills until they examine the President’s budget proposal for 1981. Although sufficient borrowing authority exists to permit the Kampuchean effort to proceed through January, each day’s delay in authorizing funds specifically for Kampuchea limits the programs from which borrowings must be made.

Finally it should be noted that the international pledging conference for Kampuchean aid was based on eight months’ funding for UNHCR and one year for ICRC/UNICEF. There is now considerable question as to whether the $311 million in pledged funds, even if fully subscribed, will last that long. The present U.S. arrangements for Kampuchean food relief were based only on six months of operation, or through April 1980. The time for planning, funding, and implementing programs to be needed after April is becoming short.

Political and Diplomatic Actions

The crux of the solution to the famine in Kampuchea appears to be Vietnam, in both the short and long-term perspective. It seems unlikely that the Kampuchean issue can be resolved satisfactorily until Vietnam is accepted into the community of nations and persuaded to act as a responsible member of the world community. Given the history of Southeast Asia and the fact that a war is in progress, this may be difficult to achieve in time to avert starvation for hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans.

Increased U.S. unilateral arrangements with the Vietnamese should be explored as one method to reach a solution to the famine. If better understanding could develop, a short-term benefit would be to facilitate the entire Kampuchean relief effort. In the long term, a return to formal diplomatic relations could allow the United States to exert more influence in Indochina, and would provide the United States with a better listening post for local conditions.

For these reasons, the Commission recommends that the President actively explore improved official relationships with the Vietnamese Government, particularly through those countries which now have a more effective re-
relationship with the Vietnamese, in order to facilitate the provision of assistance to Kampuchea, and improved monitoring of the relief assistance our nation is providing to Kampuchea.\textsuperscript{15}

The Commission further recommends that the United States continue to show sensitivity to the difficulties placed on Thailand by the influx of nearly one million refugees, and that the United States marshall international support for Thailand in order that the country not suffer unduly from the strain placed upon it.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Tarnoff indicated that senior U.S. officials were engaged in direct contact with Hanoi on a variety of issues, including Khmer relief. (Memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski, February 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800052–1803)

\textsuperscript{16} In recognition of the Government of Thailand’s position vis-à-vis the Khmer refugee population, Tarnoff noted that the United States had “increased our monthly off-take of refugees from Thailand to more than one-half of the monthly total we resettle from all of the first-asylum countries in Southeast Asia.” Similarly, the United States had engaged with the UN, ASEAN countries, and other governments to “impress upon Hanoi and its Soviet backers the great importance we attach to Thailand’s territorial integrity and the continued safety and well-being of the over one-half million displaced Khmer now located along the Thai-Cambodian border.” (Ibid.)

267. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, January 28, 1980

Subject

Presidential Push on War on Hunger

I like your idea of proposing to the President a meeting with religious leaders on a campaign against hunger.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 6, TL 1/16–31/80. No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{2} Reference is to a January 25 memorandum from Owen to Carter recommending that Carter publicly meet with religious leaders. Owen commented that such a meeting would “be a good way to remind people that even while you are devoting increased attention to the current national security crisis, you continue to be keenly interested in such global issues as world hunger.” (Ibid.) Owen repeated his proposal in a February 8 memorandum to Carter; see Document 268.
Such a meeting might be linked to a Presidential signing ceremony of a new Food Aid Convention. If, as we hope, final negotiations are concluded around March 6, the “window” for signing now under discussion would be from April 22 to May 6. Another possibility would be to schedule the meeting to coincide with the formal presentation of the Hunger Commission’s final report, now expected at the end of February. However, the report’s recommendations will be considerably more ambitious than our current program planning. We will not want to give the impression that the President is making a commitment to these religious leaders to support all the report’s proposals.

One reason for scheduling such a meeting for late in April would be the hope that by then the hostage situation will be resolved. It is difficult at this time to gain much public interest in non-Iran/Afghanistan issues.

I would add one cautionary note. We must be careful not to imply that current augmented PL 480 levels necessarily indicate a new “floor” for US food assistance. Until the suspension of grain sales to the Soviet Union, we had intended to hold our PL 480 export volume to the 1979 level in FY 80 and 81. Should commercial grain sales return to normal, and the refugee situation not improve, we might find ourselves in the position by FY 82 of cutting back current PL 480 Title I assistance to keep Title II programs at the new levels.

Anthony Lake

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3 See footnote 5, Document 269.
4 The Presidential Commission on World Hunger released its report in March; see footnote 2, Document 272.
5 Lake wrote “Tony” above his typed signature.
Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter

Washington, February 8, 1980

SUBJECT

War on Hunger

Here is an idea for a presidential initiative in the war on hunger that would appeal to several important constituencies, cost no new money, fulfill your promise to the Hunger Commission, and give support to the aid bill and food security reserve bill on their way through the Congress:

You could use the occasion of your signing the new International Food Aid Convention, in March or April, to call in 25–30 religious leaders (as you did in 1978 when you asked them to help us pass the aid bill) plus members of the Hunger Commission, in order to:

—tell them of your intention, pursuant to the final recommendations of the Hunger Commission (due at the end of February), to wage a sustained campaign to lift the age-old threat of massive hunger from the world by the year 2000;

—cite the steps we are already taking or supporting to this end: doubling international resources for agriculture research, increasing the multilateral banks’ proportion of lending in this field, using AID to support innovative attacks on food and nutrition problems, increasing PL–480 and its support of agricultural development, and launching the ISTC research program with priority on agriculture;

—call on other rich nations to agree, as proposed by the Director of the World Food Council, to create nationally-held grain reserves dedicated to meeting emergency food needs in poor countries (we intend to create such a reserve, anyway);

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1979–1980. No classification marking. Sent for action. Sent through Wise. A notation on the memorandum reads: “redo.” Owen transmitted a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under a February 8 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Owen sent a February 5 draft of the memorandum to Brzezinski under cover of a February 5 note that indicated that the memorandum was for the President. (Ibid.)

—ask the audience for support of these actions in the war on hunger and urge that the private voluntary agencies represented step up their efforts in that war.

You would speak briefly and leave. Then Tom Ehrlich and others could take over.

Your participation would remind people that even in the midst of the Middle East crisis, you remain interested in solving long-term global problems, such as world hunger.

If you approve this idea, I will submit a list of attendees and proposed alternative dates for your approval. State, IDCA, and Agriculture concur.

Submit alternative dates and proposed list of attendees.

Forget it

3 There is no indication of the President’s decision on either of these options.

269. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy**

Washington, February 25, 1980, 1851Z

50382. Subject: Possible Food Initiative for Economic Summit. Ref: (A) Rome 4584 (B) Rome 1129.3

1. Your proposal for a food security initiative at the Venice Summit has been received with great interest. Current administration initiatives capture the essence although not the details of your suggestion that the US direct a portion of the grain freed by the suspension of sales to the Soviet Union to food aid and food security purposes.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800098–0201. Confidential; Priority. Sent for Gardner from Cooper. Drafted by Kolar; cleared by Hinton, Hathaway, Bronheim, Joel Johnson, Maynes, Poats, Raymond Hill, and Seitz; approved by Cooper.

2 In telegram 4584 from Rome, February 20, Gardner reiterated his support for a “dramatic food security initiative.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800089–0764)

3 See Document 264.
2. The administration is pressing for enactment of legislation creating a 4 million ton food security reserve. The reserve would backstop our 4.47 million ton annual food assistance pledge under the new Food Aid Convention and would be stocked almost entirely by the wheat intended for sale to the Soviet Union. To be used solely for food aid purposes, the reserve would be drawn upon when existing supply does not allow us to honor our food aid commitments. The existence of this reserve will prevent the recurrence of situations such as the early 1970s when crop shortfalls reduced our food aid programs. The passage of this legislation is by no means assured and prospects for its passage would be diminished by discussion at this time about future uses for the food security reserve other than that in the proposed bill.

3. In addition, the President has approved a dollar 100 million supplemental PL 480 request for both FY 80 and 81. The incremental food aid amounting to about 450,000 tons equivalent in each year, will largely be programmed for humanitarian and refugee purposes and will be composed of grain made available by the suspension of agricultural trade with the USSR. Some of the FY 81 supplemental food aid may be available as incremental stocks for soundly conceived food storage projects in LDCs.

4. While the Venice Summit agenda is pending future discussion with our Summit partners, internal preparations include measures bearing on world food security which contain elements of your suggested initiative. Under consideration are an expression of intention by the Summit members to establish food aid reserves and an affirmation of support for proposed World Bank investment of dollars 1 billion in the 1980’s to expand the food storage and distribution capacity of the poorest developing countries.

5. Donor held food aid reserves would isolate internationally committed food aid stocks from the market and assure the ability of donors to meet their food aid commitments even during global crop shortfalls. The IBRD-financed LDC storage program would alleviate a fundamental food security problem of lack of indigenous food storage capacity that was identified by the developing countries during the negotiations for a new International Wheat Agreement. Donor held food aid reserves and enhanced LDC storage capacity may create a basis for overcoming some of the obstacles to a viable international food reserve system.

4 Presumable reference to H.R. 4489, the Food Security Act of 1979; see Document 260.

5 Signatories approved a new Food Aid Convention in London on March 6, which replaced the FAC negotiated in 1971, as part of the International Wheat Agreement (IWA). See footnote 7, Document 236.

6 See Document 265.
6. We do not contemplate launching any food security initiatives at the upcoming session of the FAO Committee on World Food Security. By that time, we expect the release of the final report of the President’s Commission on World Hunger and the possibility of high level US statements relating to international food matters. The US delegation to the FAO Food Security meeting will be apprised of the status of various food initiatives for the Venice Summit and global negotiations.

Vance

270. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1

Washington, undated

Food and Agriculture

Events of the past year have heightened international awareness of the precarious food situation faced by some of the poorest countries. Growing food shortages and attendant malnutrition will threaten many of these countries in the 1980s unless actions are taken to enhance their capacity to supply and distribute adequate food.

In Tokyo, 2 the Summit countries called for increased emphasis on measures to overcome hunger and malnutrition in the developing countries. Summit participants at Venice should reiterate their concern about the continued existence of hunger in the world and pledge their support for concrete initiatives to realize the objectives of the Tokyo Summit.

Initiatives

LDC Food Storage and Distribution

The problem of providing continuous and adequate nutrition within developing countries is affected more by seasonal and annual variations in national food production than by fluctuations in international food prices. Adequate storage is essential to provide an uninterrupted flow of food to consumers. Storage facilities enable farmers to


2 Reference is to the 1979 Tokyo G–7 Summit; see footnote 2, Document 257.
hold stocks for local marketing and protect perishable crop production inputs such as feed and fertilizer. Storage in isolated rural areas provides a measure of security when local harvests fail. National storage capacity allows countries that rely on the international market to import basic foodstuffs when prices are low.

The types of facilities for which there is a growing need as people in developing countries move out of subsistence farming and begin to rely on purchased food include: village market facilities, financial arrangements for holding stocks, grain drying, cleaning and processing centers, transport systems, central storage and milling facilities, outlets for consumers and port facilities for export or import. The amount of food which developing countries’ food distribution systems will have to carry is projected to increase from 250 million tons in 1978 to roughly 400 million tons by 1990.

Between 1980–85 the World Bank proposes a substantial investment program to assist the poorest developing countries meet their growing food distribution infrastructure requirements. This program will increase by 20–25 million tons the capacity of these governments to assure access to food by the neediest.

The Summit members should endorse the proposed IBRD investment program to enhance the ability of the low-income developing countries to distribute a continuing flow of food to their poorest consumers. To accelerate the rate of investment, the Summit countries should commit their bilateral aid agencies to give priority consideration to specific IBRD requests for co-financing and technical assistance in projects designed to improve the food storage and distribution capacity of low-income countries. The Summit should urge other bilateral and multilateral donors to extend similar co-financing support to this significant investment in LDC food security.

Food Aid

Enhanced national food supply and distribution systems are essential to providing food security for the poorest developing countries, but many of these countries will continue to face rising food import needs beyond their capacity to pay. The Summit countries recognize this problem and have completed the new Food Aid Convention (FAC) to establish a higher floor for cereal food aid commitments. While pledges of 7.5 million tons under the new FAC are significantly higher than the previous Convention, they fall short of the international community’s target of 10 million tons. The Venice Summit should strongly urge new donors, particularly the OPEC countries, to join the new FAC in order to achieve the international goal.

The Summit countries could announce their intention to ensure their ability to meet their food aid commitments under the new FAC by
establishing food aid reserves. These reserves would approach the magnitude of their FAC pledges and would insulate minimum food assistance commitments from the commercial market. The food reserves would be released for use in non-commercial markets when international grain market supplies are short and prices are high. The existence of these reserves would guard against the recurrence of situations such as the early 1970s when food aid levels were reduced because of short supply.

Food Production

Given finite land and water resources, significant production increases in the poor, food deficit countries will depend on the application of usable technology by small farmers.

The Summit countries should note that donors have agreed to double the resources of the agricultural research centers supported by the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR). However the transferral of the technology developed by the CGIAR centers to small farmers requires strong national research institutions. These institutions must have the capability to adapt technology to local growing conditions and disseminate it to agricultural producers. The Summit countries should endorse a special meeting of donors of the CGIAR to explore the requirements for enhancing LDC indigenous research institutions.

To assist the organization of food production and consumption efforts, the Summit countries have supported the development of food sector strategies by developing countries. The Summit members should reemphasize their commitment to effective food sector strategies and urge the multilateral development banks to take the lead in providing and organizing external assistance efforts to support the elaboration of food strategies.\(^3\)

271. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, March 10, 1980

SUBJECT

Leadership in the War on Hunger

1. Sol Linowitz advised (Tab B)\(^2\) that the Hunger Commission’s final report will be ready in late March. I suggest that you reply (Tab A)\(^3\) stating your desire to receive the report at an East Room meeting designed to energize international efforts to free the poorest nations from the threat of mass hunger. Congressional, civic, and religious leaders would attend the meeting, where you would demonstrate to several important constituencies that your interest in relieving human suffering has not been submerged by current budgetary and security crises.

2. You could, at this convocation:

—sign the new international Food Aid Convention, putting a floor under food aid programs (at no additional cost to the US budget); the Convention should be completed at final negotiations in London next week;

—ask the Congress to speed enactment of your Food Security Reserve and PL–480 bills, (at no increase in our budgetary outlays);

—call on other countries to parallel this US contribution toward creating nationally held grain resources dedicated to meeting food needs of the low income countries in emergencies;

—endorse, in general terms, the food policy recommendations of the Hunger Commission report—that is, champion a strategy of concentrating international development aid on measures to free poor

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\(^2\) Not attached. A copy of Linowitz’ February 20 letter to the President is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subjects Files, Box HE–7, Executive, HE–3, 12/1/78–1/20/81. Linowitz indicated that the PCWH report would be completed by mid-March, commenting, “While I regret the delay in presenting a final document, I am convinced that the additional time will be most important in assuring a report that is as useful as the subject deserves and respects.”

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is the undated reply from the President to Linowitz.
people of the lowest income nations from the scourge of malnutrition (we will refine this strategy while assuring that it can be achieved within reduced FY 1981 US budgets for development aid);

—cite the steps we are already taking or supporting to increase food production in developing nations, i.e., our contributions to the multilateral agricultural research centers and to development bank lending for agriculture; innovative AID food and nutrition programs; launching ISTC with priority on agricultural research; and reservation of some PL–480 food for emergency stocks in vulnerable poor countries; and

—ask the assembled Hunger Commission members, religious and civil leaders and members of Congress to support this campaign; and appeal to the voluntary agencies for increased efforts in the poorest countries.

3. Such a meeting would lay a basis for our seeking international action along these lines at the Venice Economic Summit, if you wished to do so.

4. If you approve of the meeting described in paragraph 1, I will propose a list of attendees and alternative dates about the end of March.

5. OMB, State, Agriculture, and IDCA concur in the above.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the letter to Sol Linowitz at Tab A.  
2. That you authorize preparation for the meeting, including submission to you of alternative dates and a proposed list of attendees.

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4 There is no indication that the President approved or disapproved the recommendation. Brzezinski wrote in the right-hand margin: “Concur ZB.”

5 There is no indication that the President approved or disapproved the recommendation. Brzezinski wrote in the right-hand margin: “Your schedule is v. tight. ZB.”
272. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter

Washington, April 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Your Response to the Report of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger

You received with my memorandum of March 26 an advance copy of the Hunger Commission’s final report. It was not possible to schedule the meeting with you that I mentioned in that memorandum, so Sol has decided to release the report on Saturday, April 26, for publication Sunday. This release should be accompanied by a presidential statement of appreciation, coupled with your issuance of instructions for Executive Branch review of the Commission’s proposals and submission of recommendations and other views for your decision.

Attached, for your approval, are:

1. A draft presidential statement, which has been cleared by the speechwriters.

2. A directive which we would issue on your instructions, charging Tom Ehrlich, Director of IDCA, with responsibility for orga-
nizing Executive Branch review and submission of recommendations dealing with international activities.

Attachment

Memorandum From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Agriculture Bergland, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), and the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (Ehrlich)\(^5\)

Washington, April 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Review of the Report of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger

The President has requested that the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency arrange for thorough review by all directly interested Executive Branch departments and agencies of recommendations regarding international action of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. The conclusions of this review, regarding both immediate and deferred action, should be submitted by August 1, 1980. Preliminary comments should be submitted by early June, before the Venice Summit.

Jimmy Carter

\(^5\) No classification marking.
Attachment

Draft Statement⁶

Washington, undated

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE REPORT OF
THE HUNGER COMMISSION

The Report of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger represents a challenge to all Americans. I commend the members of the Commission for their comprehensive analysis and thoughtful proposals.

As Chairman Sol Linowitz has noted, few of the measures recommended by the Commission will be easy, and many of the most important will take time. Some will be difficult to implement quickly in the face of fiscal restraints imposed by our fight against inflation. But I agree with the Commission that our national security and our fundamental values compel us to mount a growing effort to build a world without hunger. I intend to make that effort.

I have today directed the appropriate Departments and Agencies of the federal government to examine promptly the Commission’s proposals and to recommend to me both immediate and longer term action. The Commission’s report will be a spur to new achievement; it will not gather dust in the files.

I intend to share the Commission’s basic message with other national leaders in June at the Economic Summit Conference in Venice, where I will make specific proposals for collective action.

I urge the Congress and all Americans to join me in a renewed commitment to mobilize the world’s resources in a larger, more effective, and continuing effort to overcome world hunger.⁷

⁶ No classification marking.
⁷ A notation at the end of the Presidential statement reads: “ok, J.” The statement was released on April 26; see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 777.
273. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

World Hunger Aspect of Your Rome Visit

Bob Bergland and Tom Ehrlich propose (Tab A) that you take the opportunity of your visit to Rome to call public attention to the advanced countries’ responsibilities and the United States’ good record in the War on Hunger. They suggest that you either make televised remarks to the four UN food agencies headquartered in Rome, or issue a press statement on this theme during your visit. I offered the former idea during early planning for your visit, but it got nowhere. I now suggest a different approach, serving the same purpose as Bergland and Ehrlich have in mind, but more likely to get media coverage here and requiring no change in your visit schedule. I suggest:

1) That you take up with the Pope and Cossiga our common concern about world hunger and, specifically, the need to translate concern into effective action in helping the starving Ugandans (whose plight

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2 Bergland and Ehrlich’s June 5 memorandum to the President is attached but not printed.

3 In telegram 15563 from Rome, June 16, the Embassy also endorsed the idea that the President should address the four UN food agencies: “It would be far more effective and dramatic for the President, in addition to discussing this issue [food relief] with the Pope, to give twenty minutes of his schedule to a meeting with these important U.N. agency heads. This in itself would generate favorable publicity. Out of such a meeting could emerge an appropriate call to action (which would include sending a senior relief coordinator to Uganda) linked with whatever additional effort the US was willing to make. The outcome could be shared with Prime Minister Cossiga if this were deemed appropriate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800293–0488)

4 In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s May 2 Evening Report, Bloomfield noted, “Even if the President is unable to make an FAO stop in Rome to deliver a talk on food, Owen, Poats, and I agree that an early occasion should be found for the President to proclaim his commitment to the anti-hunger war, in implementation of recommendations of his Hunger Commission that US AID program for ’80s adopt an anti-hunger focus. We think it would be very helpful to the President, particularly now, to have a vehicle to reaffirm his humanitarian convictions.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4–6/80)
was graphically depicted recently in *Washington Post* articles)\(^5\) and millions of other hungry people across the drought-afflicted waist of Africa.

2) That, after these meetings,\(^6\) you say to the TV-radio-press contingent outside the Vatican that:
   a) you and Cossiga agreed to invite other Summit governments to join you in providing additional food and transport funds to the World Food Program, CARE, or other humanitarian agencies attempting to bring relief to northern Uganda;
   b) you have asked the World Food Program (FYI: Will be done through our Rome Embassy shortly before your arrival)\(^7\) to rush a senior relief coordinator to Uganda and to arrange with the Government of Uganda complete security for the relief operation;
   c) the United States is preparing to join other countries in providing increased food aid to other drought-afflicted African nations during the next 12 months; and
   d) the Venice Summit will deal comprehensively with the pervasive problem of hunger in the poor countries, illustrated tragically by the East African food crisis, including additional action that the world community must take to improve food production, food security and development in these countries.

3) I would then give the press a supplemental briefing on food aspects of the Summit agenda and on your relevant decisions such as US participation in replenishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (one of the Rome-based agencies), the increased US pledge under the Food Aid Convention,\(^8\) and progress in the Congress in authorizing a 4 million ton reserve to back up our food aid programs.

The initiative outlined above is favored by State, IDCA and Agriculture. The US contributions would be within existing budget plans

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\(^6\) During a State visit to Rome prior to the Venice Summit, June 19–21, the President and Muskie met with Cossiga and Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo. The joint press statement describing the substance of the June 20 Carter–Cossiga meeting is printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, August 1980, pp. 16–17. Carter met with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican on June 21. See footnote 6, Document 274.

\(^7\) In telegram 163318 to Rome, June 21, the Department suggested that the Embassy query the WFP regarding its willingness to send a senior official to Uganda to serve as relief coordinator. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800301–0229)

\(^8\) See footnote 5, Document 269. In a May 9, 1980, message to the Senate transmitting the FAC, the President indicated that the United States intended to pledge 4,470,000 metric tons of grains. The complete text of Carter’s message is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81*, Book I, p. 865–866.
for FY 1980, assuming relevant portions of the FY 1980 supplementals are enacted, and the pending regular FY 1981 appropriation requests. OMB concurs.9

If you approve, I will work out details with the agencies, the schedulers, and Jody Powell, and I will provide a briefing paper for your use in Rome and Venice.

I believe this initiative and statement would be well received by US religious, charitable and international relations groups that are the backbone of support for our aid bills in the Congress, and by members of the US black community and press concerned with Africa.

Recommendation

That you agree to the initiative proposed above, subject to detailed interagency and OMB review. (I will report back to you if there are any problems.)10

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9 An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

10 There is no indication that the President approved or disapproved the recommendation. The Venice Summit took place June 22–23. At the Summit’s conclusion, the leaders of the seven major industrialized nations released a communique, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 1980, pp. 8–11.

274. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to President Carter1

Washington, June 19, 1980

SUBJECT

Rome-Venice Initiative and Statement on World Hunger

Here is a late entry agenda suggestion for your meeting with the Pope.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 57, Food: 4–7/80. No classification marking. Attached to the memorandum is a handwritten note from Owen to Brzezinski: “Zbig—You said that an earlier version of this memo was too late. Rud [Rutherford Foals] has redrafted it, so that it applies only to the visit to the Pope. You may want to suggest to the President that he discuss the problem of world hunger, in general & starvation in Uganda, in particular, with the Pope—& then report on this discussion to the press & TV afterward. I think it’s a good idea. You have to judge whether it’s still ‘too late.’ This has been cleared by all the relevant agencies in Washington. I believe it would be helpful—but substantively & to the President. HO.” (Ibid.)
The proposal, presented in the briefing paper at Tab A, is that you take an initiative, in your meetings with the Pope, on the immediate food crisis in Africa; you could then use that "news peg" in remarks to the press/TV/radio that would draw public attention to the broader strategy for overcoming hunger that you will chart at the Economic Summit. Such a statement (Tab B) would be appreciated by important US constituencies—religious, charitable and black groups, among others.

State, IDCA, USDA, and OMB concur in this suggestion.

Tab A

Briefing Paper

Washington, undated

Vatican Visit Briefing Paper

Action to Relieve Hunger

Objectives

(1) To enhance international recognition of US leadership in agricultural and food aid to developing nations and domestic recognition by US interest groups of your Administration's efforts in the war on hunger.

(2) To obtain Italian and Vatican support for immediate, effective measures to alleviate famine in northern Uganda.

(3) To organize broader international participation in relieving famine threatening many drought-afflicted African countries and in caring for refugees in East Africa.

(4) To take advantage of popular interest in these crises to gain attention for the Venice Summit's preventive measures in this field and for the work of four international food agencies headquartered in Rome.

Background

Rome is the world headquarters for the war on hunger because it is the site of four international agencies concerned with food and agricultural development in LDCs. Pope John Paul II and other Roman Cath-

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2 Attached but not printed.
3 No classification marking.
olic leaders equate Christian responsibility and peace with development of the poor countries.

These considerations suggest that your visit to Rome, the Vatican and Venice is a propitious occasion for mobilizing greater international effort to relieve and avert famine. Such action is urgently indicated by starvation in northern Uganda, the spreading drought across the waist of Africa, the continuing plight of some two million refugees in East Africa, Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia, and the glacial scourge of malnutrition in all poor countries.

The immediate needs of the international emergency aid agencies in Uganda are for about $1 million in cash to rent trucks and about 3000 additional tons of food.

The World Food Council meeting on June 6 concluded that most of the countries across the waist of Africa face a second crop year of drought this summer and fall. The immediate action indicated is to ask the FAO for a comprehensive analysis of the food supply outlook in the drought-affected African countries, to call for increased contributions by potential donors to the World Food Program’s International Emergency Food Reserve, and to ask the WFP to coordinate an international African relief effort beginning this fall.

The spreading food crisis in Africa dramatizes the need for comprehensive preventive action to improve food security in vulnerable countries and to alleviate chronic malnutrition among hundreds of millions of people in poor countries. This is one of the major thrusts of the draft Venice Summit declaration, your Presidential Commission on World Hunger and the Brandt Commission.

Talking Points with the Pope

—The tragic famine in northern Uganda and the threat of drought for a second year across the center of Africa are grave challenges to the international community’s conscience and vivid reminders of the need for more effective cooperation in preventing hunger.

—I understand that the World Food Program is running short of food in its Uganda relief operation, and all the agencies there urgently need cash to rent trucks at very high daily rates. I suggest, therefore, that the United States (and Italy) and Catholic Relief Services support the appeal of the World Food Program for emergency aid. We have asked the World Food Program to send a senior relief coordinator to Uganda.

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4 See Document 273 and footnote 10 thereto.
5 Reference is to the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The Brandt Commission report, entitled North-South: A Programme for Survival, was released in 1980.
—I intend to raise at Venice the need during the next 12 months for a coordinated international food aid program in drought-afflicted African nations, including relief of East African refugees.

—The African food crisis dramatizes the pervasive problem of hunger in poor countries, which we must seriously address at Venice. It is very important that we agree there on specific measures to strengthen agricultural development and food security aid to the low-income countries. I plan to highlight this long-term action in my remarks to the press before the Summit meeting commences as well as in the meeting.

Remarks to News Media

Draft remarks to the TV/radio/press contingent after your meeting with the Pope are attached.6

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6 See footnote 2 above. The President and the Pope exchanged remarks in the Papal Study at the Vatican on June 21 at 11:34 a.m. Carter noted that “America has responded generously to the men, women, and children of Kampuchea, and we are acting with justice and with charity toward those people escaping from intolerable conditions in the Caribbean. And we work with the international relief agencies, such as the Catholic Relief Services, in providing food and shelter for those who are displaced by warfare in Indochina, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 30, 1980, p. 1165) The Embassy transmitted a copy of these remarks to the Department of State, White House, USICA, and the Embassies in Belgrade, Madrid, and Lisbon in telegram 16121 from Rome, June 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800301–0385)
275. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Bergland to President Carter

Washington, July 16, 1980

SUBJECT
East African Food Shortages

Emerging drought problems and growing numbers of refugees are adding to already serious food shortage problems in East Africa. The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you to this problem since it is becoming a serious international concern.

I am enclosing a brief USDA assessment of the East Africa food situation. Given the limited amount and poor quality of data on these countries our current assessment is very tentative. However, there are several conclusions and implications that can be drawn at this time.

During the July 1980–June 1981 period, the eight countries in the East African area (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) could require between 1.0 and 1.4 million metric tons of cereal imports over and above the relatively high import levels of approximately 1.5 million metric tons for the previous twelve months. A substantial portion of these increased imports will be concentrated in Ethiopia and Somalia to primarily meet refugee needs. These two countries account for about two-thirds of the increased import requirements to the region.

Out of the 1.5 million metric tons imported by these eight countries during the last twelve months, approximately half was made available as food aid. The U.S. has supplied over one-third of the total—most of it as P.L. 480 on either concessional terms under Title I or as food donations under Title II totaling 588,000 metric tons (excluding the recent supplemental).

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1 Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem. No classification marking. According to an attached July 17 routing slip, information copies were sent to Mondale, Eizenstat, Moore, Brzezinski, and McIntyre.

2 Not found.
The recent appropriation of the P.L. 480 budget supplemental\(^3\) has greatly enhanced our ability to meet emergency needs as well as program commitments worldwide and in Africa in particular. Current projections indicate that the U.S. will be able to provide an additional 150,000 metric tons of food to most of the eight East African countries.

If Congress takes favorable action on the amended FY 1981 P.L. 480 budget you submitted earlier this year, the U.S. would be in a position next fiscal year to provide approximately 200–300,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 assistance beyond the FY 1980 level (excluding the supplemental).\(^4\) Thus, together with the 150,000 metric tons provided by the FY 1980 supplemental, the U.S. would be able to commit a total of 350–450,000 metric tons of additional food towards meeting the projected additional import need of 1.0–1.4 million metric tons over the next twelve months.

In summary, it is clear that even under the most optimistic projections, the U.S. only will be able to meet a part of East Africa’s increasing food import needs through our P.L. 480 program. Increased commitments from other donors, as well as increased commercial purchases, will be required.

Bob Bergland

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\(^4\) See Document 265 and footnote 9 thereto. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 5 in support of the administration’s FY 1981 foreign assistance programs, Vance noted: “For FY 1981 we are requesting a $1.6 billion Food for Peace program. These funds will provide an estimated 6 million metric tons of agricultural commodities. In addition, we will request through a budget amendment an addition of $100 million to make use of some of the grain which would have been available to the Soviet Union. In the distribution of our Food for Peace, priority is directed to feeding hungry people, particularly refugees in Kampuchea, southern Africa, and Somalia, and to helping reduce balance-of-payments problems in Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nicaragua, the Sudan, and other countries experiencing economic difficulties.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, p. 41)
276. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen) to Secretary of State Muskie

Washington, August 4, 1980

SUBJECT

US Initiative to Relieve African Famine

An extraordinary international effort is needed to avert extensive starvation in drought-afflicted parts of Africa and to continue aid to East African refugees. This memorandum proposes a US initiative to this end, which has been cleared in State, IDCA, AID, USDA, OMB and NSC. The announcement of this initiative could be made by the President or you; Jack Watson, Al McDonald and Phil Wise recommend that you should be the spokesman. If you agree, I hope that you will authorize State to issue the announcement at Tab A and to take necessary follow-up action.

Background

Drought is threatening to ruin a second successive growing season in almost all of Eastern Africa and in parts of Western Africa. The prospect is for widespread famine among millions of Africans whose normal lot is malnutrition. This tragedy is likely to dominate the news from Africa this Fall and to induce popular concern by religious and charitable organizations and friends of Africa in the United States.

USDA now estimates that the East African countries face an abnormal cereal import need in the next 12 months of 800,000 to 1,400,000 tons—additional to their 1979–80 import levels. Our PL–480 program can cope with only part of this estimated need: about 150,000 tons from the FY 80 supplemental just received and 200,000–300,000 tons from the pending FY 81 appropriation, in addition to previously planned food aid to these countries. Other donors, including rich OPEC countries as well as Europe, Japan and Canada, must be enlisted to provide the balance.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 6, TL 8/1–15/80. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in S/S–I at 9:45 a.m. on August 6. Another handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Action changed at request of Ray Seitz to AF/SP.” Attached as Tab 2 to an August 7 briefing memorandum from Lake to Christopher outlining subjects for discussion at Christopher’s August 8 lunch with Owen and Ehrlich.

2 Attached but not printed is an undated announcement entitled “International Action to Relieve Famine in Africa.”
We have explored with Director General Saouma of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and other food aid donors the idea of Saouma’s calling an emergency conference to start organizing a coordinated aid program. Their responses encourage us to proceed. The emergency conference would also help to broaden international participation in relief for Eastern African refugees next year. International aid pledges have met their minimum food needs this calendar year, but continuing drought will strain both local and global resources for refugee feeding next year.

Your announcement that the US is asking Saouma to call this conference would serve to give it wide public notice and would foreclose possible domestic criticism of indifference to a serious humanitarian problem.3

Recommendation

That you announce that the US Government is asking the FAO to convene an emergency meeting of countries and international agencies interested in jointly providing food and other relief to millions of Africans facing famine in drought-afflicted countries, and authorize necessary follow-up action by the appropriate State Department staff. (State, Agriculture, IDCA, AID, OMB and NSC concur.)4

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3 In his August 7 briefing memorandum to Christopher, Lake suggested that Christopher inform Owen that the regional bureaus, S/P, IDCA, and USDA “have recommended that the Secretary announce this US initiative in his speech to the UNGA Special Session, on August 25.” Lake added, “This initiative fits nicely with the general speech theme of mutual responsibility and the special emphasis on increasing food and energy production in the LDCs (which Tom [Ehrlich] strongly favors).”

4 Muskie did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. In his August 25 speech to the 11th Special Session of the UN General Assembly, he made the following announcement: “Our most urgent task is to confront the specter of imminent famine haunting Africa. This summer alone the United States has provided an additional 235,000 tons for emergency Africa food relief. We strongly urge that all nations able to contribute foodstuffs or funds join under the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization to coordinate relief to drought-afflicted regions. I am happy to note that the Director General will convene a meeting of concerned governments and international organizations in the coming weeks.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 1980, p. 77) At a meeting of donor countries and international organizations in Rome on September 20, Saouma announced that the United States, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, West Germany, Switzerland, France, and Algeria had made cash or food aid contributions. (Sari Gilbert, “U.S., 8 Others Pledge Emergency Food Aid to Africa, The Washington Post, September 20, 1980, p. A–16)
277. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (Erb) to President Carter

Washington, August 15, 1980

SUBJECT

Hunger Commission Report

As you directed, IDCA has led an interagency review of international actions recommended by the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. A preliminary report on this review was submitted to you before the Venice Summit. The attached memorandum summarizes the interagency conclusions.

Based on the review, Tom Ehrlich and I believe that the two most important steps to further the Commission’s work are these:

1. Development Assistance—We will propose in our 1982 budget submission a strategy to focus increased attention and resources, not only on meeting world hunger as the first priority, but also on targeting agricultural development assistance where it can be used with maximum effectiveness and efficiency, as the Hunger Commission proposes.

This strategy will be consistent with the Hunger Commission’s finding that to relieve world hunger and malnutrition we must attack world poverty and build effective demand for food as well as increasing food production and supply. A key element of this strategy will be assisting developing countries to increase food production. It will also include complementary efforts in energy and health/family planning which will permit us to address the broader poverty issue.

2. Public Education—As the Commission recommends, increased public attention must be focused on the importance of the United States’ cooperation with developing nations generally and on hunger particularly. We are involved in a number of efforts on this front. We hope you will assign that matter a high priority. Your personal leadership will be essential.

Tom Ehrlich has met with Ambassador Linowitz and other members of the Commission and we will work with them in the

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1 Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box FG–224, Executive, FG–311, 11/1/79–1/20/80. No classification marking. Attached is a September 11 note for the files summarizing the interagency review.

2 See the first attachment to Document 272.

3 Not found.

4 See Document 273 and footnote 10 thereto.
months ahead to assure that maximum advantage is taken of the Commission’s Report.

Guy F. Erb

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the International Development Cooperation Agency

Washington, April 15, 1980

INTER-AGENCY REVIEW
OF
THE HUNGER COMMISSION REPORT
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

The central recommendation of the Commission is that “the United States make the elimination of hunger the primary focus of its relationships with the developing countries, beginning with the decade of the 1980s.” The Commission concludes that the problem of world hunger is not limited to intermittent or particular geographic crises. It is, instead, a problem of chronic under-nutrition. The Report finds that the solution lies in attacking world poverty and in raising the incomes of poor people throughout the Third World. Thus the Commission finds a hunger strategy must address, not only food production and security, but also increased purchasing power for food through employment and higher income for the world’s poor and more equitable income distribution policies in the Third World. In the Commission’s words, “a nation’s nutritional needs cannot be effectively addressed in isolation from broader social and economic programs that increase overall productivity and the incomes of the poor.”

The interagency review found strong support for the Commission’s view that world hunger is an integral part of the broader problem of Third World development and for focusing on the eradication of hunger through an attack on world poverty as the first priority concern in terms of United States development cooperation. You have endorsed those positions on numerous occasions. Under your Administration, the elimination of hunger is a primary focus of the United States’ relations with many (though certainly not all) developing coun-

5 No classification marking. Prepared in IDCA on April 15.
tries, and our partnership efforts with those countries to combat hunger should expand during your second term.

Public Education—The Commissioners also conclude that a strong and concerted program to address world hunger requires broadly based public support in the United States and that a major public education effort is needed to gain that support. They recommend, in addition, that federal laws should be changed in order to permit the use of federal funds in world hunger-related public education.

We have already taken a number of steps, in association with Anne Wexler and in coordination with other agencies, to increase our efforts to educate the public in general, and key private organizations in particular, of the importance of our economic relations with developing nations. These steps include establishment of the high level private sector working group on foreign assistance that you have directed be formed, an increased emphasis on foreign assistance in public statements by key officials in your Administration, and specific steps to attract the interest of potential new constituencies, such as labor, business, and the financial community. We hope you will assign the effort to gain public support a high priority. Your personal leadership will be essential.

General Analysis—The Commission’s charter was to: define the causes and scope of the hunger and malnutrition problems domestically and internationally; evaluate United States programs and policies affecting domestic hunger and malnutrition; focus public attention on the problems; recommend actions to reduce hunger and malnutrition; publicize and assist in implementation of its recommendations. The Commission did not achieve full consensus in its report. Seven Commissioners filed additional statements; four of these expressed disappointment with the Commission’s evaluation of existing U.S. policies and in the progress made by the Report toward a specific plan for a national food policy.

Our review found the major strength of the report to be the analysis of the causes of hunger and malnutrition and the focus on the urgency of addressing the problem. The recent Global 2000 Report is issued by the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State provides evidence of the urgency of taking action now if we hope to reduce the prevalence of malnutrition by the year 2000.

The Commission undertook a difficult task. Having concluded that the elimination of hunger and malnutrition lies in the eradication of world poverty, the Commission made recommendations across a

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6 See Document 251.
7 See Document 343 and footnotes 1 and 2 thereto.
broad array of issues—ranging from how to distribute foreign assistance to changes recommended in trade and investment policies. We believe some areas, which the Commission did not emphasize, should be stressed in such an effort. For example, the Commission mentions, but we would stress, the need for health and family planning programs to accompany food production lest population outstrip gains made by increasing food supply. We also believe attention to energy use and supply is vital—both to reducing world poverty generally and to food production. Some agencies believe the Commission should have stressed more the importance of developing countries’ own domestic policies on food production and income distribution and the limits to U.S. ability to affect such policies.

The Development Coordination Committee’s review of the Brandt Commission Report, on which you will be receiving a memorandum shortly, reviews the work of your Administration on a range of efforts to address world poverty. IDCA, in consultation with other agencies, is preparing a broad strategy for U.S. economic relations with Third World Countries—one designed to effectively reassert U.S. leadership in responding to the development needs of Third World countries.

The following is brief summary of: key Hunger Commission recommendations; interagency reactions to those recommendations; and information on Administration action thus far.

**Development Assistance**—One set of recommendations urges increasing development assistance and targeting it to those poor nations strongly committed to meeting basic human needs and human rights. These are, we know, your own goals, though budget constraints have limited your ability to urge the substantial increases in development assistance that you might otherwise have endorsed. We will propose in our 1982 budget submission a strategy to focus increased attention and resources, not only on meeting world hunger as the first priority, but also on targeting agricultural development assistance where it can be used with maximum effectiveness and efficiency, as the Hunger Commission proposed. This strategy will be consistent with the Hunger Commission’s finding that to relieve world hunger and malnutrition we must attack world poverty and build effective demand for food as well as increasing food production and supply. A key element of this strategy will be assisting developing countries to increase food production. It will also include complementary efforts in energy and health/family planning which will permit us to address the broader poverty issue.

Currently, we are taking a number of actions in the development assistance program that accord with Commission recommendations.

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8 See footnote 5, Document 274.
Some of these were mentioned in the Venice communique.\(^9\) IDCA and AID are now working on an agricultural development plan for your next term aimed at achieving important increases in food production in key countries, and significantly reducing chronic malnutrition in a wider group of nations. AID has just completed an analysis of its agriculture staffing and is now considering ways to reverse the five year decline in these skills.

We hope to increase support for international scientific and technological research on food and nutrition, using the particular comparative advantage the United States has in this area. We have been supporting efforts for land tenure reform in some countries through AID and through our participation in the multilateral development banks.

As the Commission recommends, IDCA has given explicit attention to the importance of development and dissemination of capital saving technology. AID has launched a new program initiative focusing on small-scale enterprises. IDCA is urging the multilateral development banks and the UN agencies to give higher priority to increasing productive employment opportunities—with capital saving technology at low cost per job—in their development assistance projects.

The Commission recommends—and you have supported—extending the statutory authority that permits the least developed countries to place amounts owed to the United States into local currency accounts for development purposes to all non-oil developing nations. The U.S. Congress has thus far not appropriated funding for this purpose, even for the poorest countries.

With regard to the multilateral development banks (MDBs), the Report urges U.S. support for: Bank activities that address basic needs; restraint from restrictive amendments on types of loans and recipient countries in Bank authorizing and appropriation legislation; and increased contributions to the MDB concessional windows. These recommendations are consistent with the policies of your Administration. In congressional consideration of MDB legislation, we have not always been successful in avoiding restrictive amendments or in gaining support for the full funding needed to meet negotiated replenishments. In your next term, we will be negotiating the seventh replenishment of IDA, the World Bank concessional window, as well as presenting to the Congress a proposal for a general capital increase for the World Bank, and we will be negotiating replenishments for the regional banks.

**Trade**—The Report emphasizes the importance of trade to the world economy, and developing country growth in particular, and

\(^9\) See footnote 4, above.
makes a series of recommendations on trade and commodities. Its major recommendations are: an early reopening of the Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) with a view of reducing tariffs on labor intensive products from developing countries; extension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which allows developing countries to ship many products to the U.S. duty free, on a fixed term, multi-year basis with an expanded list of products; an active U.S. role in the continuing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations on limiting quantitative restrictions on imports; and Administration support for H.R. 1543, which would make certain changes in the current trade adjustment assistance program. These recommendations are aimed toward additional liberalization of the existing international trading system that would allow developing countries to increase their exports.

It is premature to suggest reopening MTN at this time. Much was accomplished in the MTN to benefit developing countries; for the present, we need to concentrate on effective implementation of these gains, especially the terms under which developing countries can be encouraged to join and benefit from its non-tariff codes. We should, however, attempt to use the very limited tariff reduction authority you have to negotiate bilateral tariff agreements with the developing countries by the end of 1981. In your next term, we should investigate the feasibility of seeking broader authority to negotiate tariff-reducing agreements with developing countries.

We are not yet ready for a full consideration of the GSP extension—the program does not expire until 1985. During your next administration, however, we should develop a strategy for extending GSP benefits and for further improving the program’s benefits for developing countries. For the present, we need to implement your pledge to Congress to use your existing authority to improve GSP benefits for the lesser developed beneficiaries.

As the Commission recommended, the U.S. is taking an active role in multilateral efforts to negotiate a safeguards code strengthening international discipline over actions to restrict imports. The U.S. position on safeguards is closer to that of developing countries than are the positions of the European Community (EC). Differences between the EC and developing countries continue to be the major obstacles to progress on this issue.

The Administration has not actively promoted the adjustment assistance reform bill because of budget limitations. This is an issue to be considered in your next term.

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10 Introduced by Vanik on January 25, 1979, the bill sought to improve the operation of adjustment assistance programs for workers and firms under the Trade Act of 1974.
The Commission Report supports international efforts to create price stabilizing agreements for products of particular interest to developing countries. As you know, negotiations on the Common Fund\textsuperscript{11} have just been completed, and we expect implementing legislation will be prepared and submitted to the Congress in your next term. Attempts to renegotiate the International Tin Agreement have begun, and the U.S. Senate recently ratified U.S. participation in the International Rubber Agreement.\textsuperscript{12} The U.S. is also a member of the International Coffee and the International Sugar Agreements and is participating in efforts to negotiate a new international cocoa agreement. A reaffirmation of our willingness to negotiate economically sound and mutually beneficial commodity agreements would also be appropriate at the outset of your next term.

\textit{The Food for Peace Program and Food Reserves}—Another set of recommendations focuses on the PL 480 program and making that program developmentally more effective. You have endorsed that objective and the Departments of Agriculture and State are working with us to achieve it. The Commission calls for a complete revision of the program. At this point, we are not convinced that such a revision is either needed or politically feasible. We do have underway, however, a number of steps to strengthen the program without legislation and will be reviewing the range of more extensive changes that might be undertaken. We are also taking steps to strengthen our substantive involvement in the operations of the United Nations programs and agencies working in the hunger field—particularly the FAO and its World Food Program.

Many of the Commission’s specific recommendations on measures to improve world food security are being implemented or negotiated. The United States has, for example, pledged 4.47 million tons of grain to the new Food Aid Convention and has encouraged new and increased contributions from other donor governments.\textsuperscript{13} Under the auspices of the International Wheat Council, the United States is working to develop a basis for a new international wheat agreement. We have actively supported efforts by the World Food Council to promote food sector strategies in developing countries. More than thirty food priority countries have indicated an interest in developing these strategies and have approached donor countries, including the United States, for tech-


\textsuperscript{12} The first international natural rubber agreement, which sought to establish a 550,000-ton rubber reserve, was adopted in Geneva on October 5, 1979. On May 22, 1980, the Senate voted 90–1 to ratify the agreement. (“Ways and Means Votes Against Carter’s Oil Import Fee,” \textit{The Washington Post}, May 23, 1980, p. A–6)

\textsuperscript{13} See footnote 5, Document 269.
nical assistance in preparing them. We are also playing an active role in negotiations to replenish the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Further, Congressional approval of the Food Security Act, which will establish a food security reserve of up to four million tons to backstop our food aid commitments, is expected before the end of the year.14

Other Recommendations—The Commission recommends U.S. support for the U.N. negotiations on a code of conduct for transnational corporations and for adding appropriate sections to U.S. law. The U.S. has actively participated in the U.N. negotiations for four years. From the current state of negotiations, it is doubtful that code provisions will lend themselves to being incorporated in U.S. law, but the final code will give a basis for that determination.

Several recommendations in the Report are aimed at domestic issues. The Department of Agriculture has commented directly to the Domestic Council on these matters.

Several other recommendations include increased involvement by the private sector in assisting developing countries to alleviate world hunger. We know this is a matter you endorse strongly, and we have efforts underway to meet this recommendation. The recently completed private sector agricultural mission to the Caribbean Basin is one important example.

14 See Document 260. By early 1980, Congress had yet to approve the Food Security Act of 1979. Zablocki, in February 1980, introduced the Food Security Act of 1980 (H.R. 6635), which contained a provision directing the President to develop the wheat security reserve. The House Committee on Agriculture reported an amended H.R. 6635 to the House on June 25, but the legislation did not go to the floor for a vote. McGovern subsequently incorporated the wheat security reserve language in S.2675, the Child Nutrition Amendments of 1980; however, McGovern’s bill stalled in the Senate, and the House version of the legislation passed in lieu, whereupon it languished in committee. H.R. 3765, the Agricultural Act of 1980 (P.L. 96–494), introduced by Representative Anthony Lee Coelho (D–California) on April 26, 1979, and signed into law by the President on December 3, 1980, ultimately contained the measure. Title III of the Act—the Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980—directed the President to establish and maintain, through September 30, 1985, a wheat reserve of up to 4 million metric tons. An additional 300,000 metric tons could be released in any year but only when the need was exceptional. Carter issued Executive Order 12266 on January 15, 1981, which formally established the emergency wheat reserve. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book III, p. 2911)
United Nations Water Conference

Issues for Decision

A decision must be made on the U.S. posture and level of participation in the United Nations Water Conference scheduled for March 14–25 in Mar del Plata, Argentina. The last Administration planned for the U.S. to adopt a relatively low profile at the Conference, and not to announce any major initiatives which would cast us in a leadership role.

The fact that this will be the first global forum for the new Administration requires that the strategy for our participation be re-examined. Third World countries will view the U.S. posture at the Conference (i.e., statements, commitments, level of delegation) as an early indication of how the new Administration intends to approach North-South problems. However, time is short in which to select meaningful initiatives that would enable the U.S. to assume a high profile leadership role. A decision to upgrade the nature of our substantive participation will require launching immediately an intensified interagency effort to reach agreement on U.S. initiatives; it will also require an expanded in-house staff effort.

Unusual urgency in the selection of the head of our delegation is also involved because of unique administrative and security problems connected with the Mar del Plata venue. We have been alerted to the terrorist threat in Argentina and will provide protective security for all participants. Security must be more elaborate if Cabinet-level representation is involved.

Background/Analysis

In six weeks the U.S. will participate with some 135 other nations in the UN Water Conference, the first world economic conference to take place in this Administration. The Conference will address the fundamental policy question of how the global fixed stock of water can best be managed to satisfy mounting requirements for agriculture, domestic and industrial uses. As the next in a series of world conferences under UN sponsorship, it is expected to act on water-related recommendations which emerged from the earlier World Food Conference and the Habitat Conference and will impact on the later Desertification Conference.2

The U.S. initially opposed the convening of a UN Conference on Water. After it was approved by the UNGA, however, Secretary Kissinger, in his speech to the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development on May 6, 1976 declared . . . “We will play an active role at the United Nations Water Conference—putting forward practical measures to share our knowledge and experience.”3 Preparations have been carried out with the support of the Water Resources Council, with the participation of a broad spectrum of U.S. Governmental and non-Governmental organizations with water resources interests and programs. We have participated actively in the international preparatory phase of the Conference, focusing on developing and presenting U.S. experiences and ideas relevant to priority water management problems confronting the international community.

Preparatory efforts under the former Administration were based on an interagency consensus that the U.S. should adopt a relatively low profile at the Conference. Unlike previous UN conferences (on Environment, Population, Food and Human Settlements),4 we have not planned to announce any new U.S. funding or program commitments or other initiatives. Rather, the strategy selected was one which would draw on and highlight the extensive U.S. water resources activities already underway and planned which have international relevance.

Recognizing that the new Administration may desire a more forthcoming U.S. role, we are now attempting to identify major U.S. initiatives—par-


3 Kissinger’s address, entitled “UNCTAD IV: Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development,” is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1976, pp. 657–672. Kissinger asserted that the United States “will play a leading role in applying water resources technology to such objectives as improving the quality and productivity of agriculture and developing new industry.” (Ibid., p. 667)

4 United Nations conferences on the environment, population, and food took place respectively in Stockholm, Sweden (June 5–16, 1972), Bucharest, Romania (August 19–30, 1974), and Rome, Italy (November 5–16, 1974).
particularly those which would directly address developing country needs. Without a clear signal that such initiatives are desired, the technical agencies have been very conservative in their approach. A letter from the IO and OES Assistant Secretaries on December 24 requested AID to help develop one or two possible initiatives for consideration by the new Administration (Tab 1). The reply was non-committal (Tab 2), although subsequently an initiative in the area of community water supply has been developed by AID at the staff level and endorsed by the U.S. Preparatory Committee.\(^5\) It is now being submitted to the Acting AID Administrator, but it is of relatively modest proportions, costing approximately $15 million over the next five years.

We have identified the following as areas in which significant new initiatives might be constructed: food production; community water supply; and technology transfer. Examples of the types of initiatives which could be developed include:

- New bilateral program of loans and technical assistance to LDCs to improve irrigation system operation and related infrastructure development.

- Increased support for international research on improvement of erosion control, drainage, flood control and watershed protection in tropical areas.

- Regional demonstration program on the application of remote sensing to water management as an extension of the AIDSAT satellite program.

- Bilateral and multilateral technical support to LDCs for development of plans and institutions to accelerate provision of safe drinking water to rural populations (this will require pinning down and possibly strengthening AID initiative described in the previous paragraph).

If you desire the U.S. to try to develop a higher profile role in the short time available, it will be necessary to enlist AID support. Further, such a decision would require short-term reprogramming of State personnel resources to support the necessary effort, with the possible requirement for an outside consultant.

There is an outside possibility that the Conference could become a forum to debate highly politicized North-South issues (such as those involved in the New International Economic Order)\(^6\) or such strictly political issues as the Panama Canal. A constructive posture by the developed nations might limit or avoid this possibility. At present, however, our reading suggests that no other developed nation intends to make any commitment to new water programs at the Conference. With the exception of Sweden, and Canada to a limited extent, both the Western and Eastern nations have given the Water Conference relatively low pri-
importance compared to other UN conferences. We expect that posture to continue.

There has been scattered Congressional interest in the Conference thus far. On the other hand, various U.S. non-governmental organizations are pressing for the U.S. to play a leadership role.

It appears that most country delegations will be headed at the ministerial level. The U.S. Delegation might be headed by the Secretary of the Interior (who is also chairman of the interagency Water Resources Council). This would emphasize our interest in maintaining a focus on water issues and intention to avoid extraneous political matters.

The Options

1. **Strong Leadership Position**—U.S. would use Water Conference to set forth new directions in U.S. philosophy and intentions regarding overall relations with the Third World, and would demonstrate its commitment by announcing several significant new initiatives in the water area. A Presidential statement could be read by the Secretary of the Interior as head of Delegation.

   **Advantages**

   —LDCs would react favorably to early, positive attention by Administration (which would be especially visible if other developed nations do not intend to be forthcoming).

   —Chances would be enhanced to avoid politicization of conference by LDCs, who otherwise may feel that there are no other tangible benefits to be gained.

   —Initiatives would offer positive proof of U.S. willingness to help solve specific LDC problems in businesslike approach.

   **Disadvantages**

   —Very difficult to shape meaningful and supportable U.S. policy statements and major initiatives in short time available.

   —This level of participation may be excessive in relation to modest expectations and intentions of other countries which will participate, and in relation to realistic overall conference results.

   —Meaningful initiatives could be quite costly, and there would be insufficient time to examine and have approved budgetary proposals.

2. **Medium Posture**—U.S. would focus exclusively on water resources subject matter of Conference, but adopt more forthcoming stance than previously planned. This would require support by the Administration for several water-oriented initiatives. From our conversations with AID officials we gather that initiatives of this kind could be developed whose implementation would be possible within the appropriations which AID expects to obtain.

   The Secretary of the Interior could head the Delegation and be backed by an alternate with extensive and recent experience in North-South meetings, and ability to advise and lead in this context.
Advantages

—Enable U.S. to play constructive, highly visible role while focusing on the specific subject matter of the agenda.
—Would ensure significant substantive role for U.S. in helping to solve LDC water problems.
—Would undercut any criticism that U.S. is not interested in solving practical LDC problems.

Disadvantages

—Initiatives would have future funding implications and will require an immediate intensified interagency effort to identify and develop them.
—Could raise expectations that the U.S. will step forward with new commitments every time a UN conference is called.

3. Low Profile—Continue the strategy developed under the last Administration, limiting U.S. role to exchanging experiences, views and ideas on global water problems. Several modest initiatives may well emerge from the ongoing preparatory efforts and lend additional support to our role. The Secretary of the Interior might still head the Delegation; however, in the absence of an ability to present anything new at the Conference, an Assistant Secretary of Interior could serve as head, backed by a combined team of experts on water and those skilled in international diplomacy.

Advantages

—It is consistent with original strategy.
—It will at least match the expected posture of other developed nations (since our preparations, though modest by previous U.S. conference standards, have been significantly ahead of other nations).
—Demonstrates U.S. intentions to be selective, rather than automatically responding with new funds and programs every time the UN calls a conference.

Disadvantages

—Administration might be subject to criticism at home and abroad for “not caring.”
—Conference could be politicized by LDCs in absence of any serious developed country proposal.
—Gives initial impression of negative Administration approach to North-South problems.

Bureau Views

IO and S/P recommend that Option 2 be followed given the facts that: the Water Conference will be the new Administration’s first exposure in an international forum on a subject with North-South over-
tones; and a viable, constructive U.S. role could have significant benefits in that regard.

OES concurs in upgrading the U.S. role beyond present planning to the Option 2 level, given the above assessment that the U.S. posture is important to North-South relationships and coupled with the importance of global water problems in their own right. It is recognized, however, that the new initiatives selected to support this option will not—in the limited time available—have the benefit of being thoroughly weighed against the spectrum of development assistance needs beyond the water field, and also potential Administration initiatives in other areas.

Recommendations

1. That we go forward in accordance with the second “Medium Posture” option and, accordingly, select a delegation headed by the Secretary of the Interior.

Approve

Disapprove

Prefer Option 1

Prefer Option 3

2. That you or Mr. Christopher orally inform Governor Gilligan of the political importance you attach to the Water Conference and request that AID promptly submit suggestions to the Department for significant water resource initiatives which the U.S. can propose at that conference.

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7 Christopher checked this option and initialed.

8 Christopher neither approved nor disapproved this recommendation but added a handwritten comment below the approval and disapproval lines: “Please see last paragraph of my memorandum. W.C.” Reference is to Christopher’s February 9 memorandum to Toussaint, in which Christopher indicated that he had acted for Vance in making the determination regarding U.S. participation. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memos/Letters From WC to Bureaus) The last paragraph of the memorandum states: “I wish to emphasize, however, that this approach to the Conference does not imply that the U.S. delegation should take a passive or negative role. On the contrary, our delegation should be quite positive in supporting the importance of water management and receiving ideas from other delegations or the Conference secretariat on practical means of using bilateral and multilateral aid resources and U.S. technological capacities in cooperation with the water programs of interested developing countries. We should declare our determination to obtain, through this exchange of technical experience and ideas, the basis for developing new or expanded programs of U.S. assistance. Major U.S. aid initiatives would logically follow the Conference, which is, after all, a technical one, rather than an aid-pledging session.” (Ibid.) The March 29 NSC Global Issues Cluster Evening Report to Brzezinski, which references the conclusion of the water conference notes: “The U.S. Chairman reports that: A spirit of ‘harmony, accomplishment and optimism’ prevailed, and that all nations worked extremely hard to avoid confrontation on shared water resources.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 2–4/77)
Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, February 18, 1977

SUBJECT
North-South Strategy

The President recently signed off on the World Health Initiative that we discussed and I anticipate spending a major part of my time during the next several months on this issue. While in Geneva last week I spent several hours with Dr. Tom Mahler, the Director General of the World Health Organization, discussing ways in which the relationship between this Administration and WHO could be enhanced. It has been extraordinarily poor during the last eight years, and there is ample room for improvement.

The health issue I believe has tremendous potential in connection with the North-South Strategy, and I would like an opportunity to have input in the development of that initiative. In particular, I would like a chance to impact on PRM–8 during the final drafting stage next week, if you feel this would be helpful.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 63, PRC 028, North/South Issues [1]. Unclassified. Inderfurth initialed the memorandum and wrote at the bottom: “I have sent a copy of this to Hornats. Rick.”

2 Bourne recounted his meeting with Mahler in a February 12 memorandum to Fill. In it, Bourne noted: “I had a most valuable 3 hour meeting with Dr. Thomas Mahler, Director General of the World Health Organization while I was in Geneva. This was the second time I had met with him in the last 3 months, and I laid out to him in general terms the President’s interest in the world health problem, and asked for his assistance. Mahler is a bright energetic person with whom I have a tremendously positive relationship and I feel we can develop an exceptionally positive working relationship with him.” (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 1/27/77–3/30/77)

3 See footnote 7, Document 219.
280. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the Acting Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (Hornblow)¹

Washington, April 16, 1977

SUBJECT
Retention of Interagency Task Force on International Population Policy

The Department of State suggests the retention of the existing Interagency Task Force on International Population Policy. The reason for retaining the Task Force is that there is work to be done on the population issue, work that requires organized interagency cooperation.

Background

For over ten years, the Agency for International Development has run a program of technical assistance to developing countries seeking to cope with their population problems. AID is now working to integrate its population activities into other aspects of its assistance programs. The Department of State has given increasing diplomatic attention to population issues, bilaterally and multilaterally, including the convening of the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974.² State is now considering the inclusion of the population issue as an element of the North-South dialogue. The Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA are concerned with the security implications which population growth has for our country. The Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Council of Economic Advisers have interests in the economic and food supply issues, and more recently, the Council on Environmental Quality has had an active interest because of the environmental implications involved. There is a continuing requirement for coordinating and meshing these interests and programs.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770061–0539. Unclassified. Transmitted to Tarnoff under an April 15 covering memorandum from Froebe, in which she outlined the disposition of outstanding Under Secretaries Committee items, commenting: “I’m sure you didn’t realize when you accepted your new job that one of your duties would be that of father to the Under Secretaries Committee orphans!” Froebe recommended that Tarnoff approve and sign the memorandum to Hornblow. Tarnoff added the following handwritten comment on the April 15 memorandum: “Louise: Thanks. I’m glad that most of the orphans are finding homes . . . elsewhere. Peter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P77061–0543)

Agenda

The agenda we envision if the Task Force is retained includes four basic areas:

1. Greater attention to the interaction of population and development, focusing on those aspects of economic development (income generation for lower income groups), social policy (greater opportunities for women), and political organization (grass-roots participation) that tend to reduce desired family size and improve living standards.

2. Improvement in evaluating the impact and cost-effectiveness of our present population assistance program (a requirement stemming from NSDM 314).³

3. Continuation of monitoring activities in the key large population growth countries as indicated by NSDM 314, and development of a strategy for each of those countries, engaging our diplomatic and assistance efforts.

4. Enlistment of greater support for population programs on the part of other industrial nations and international organizations (e.g., World Bank, Regional Development Banks, UN Development Programme).

Finally, a coordinated and on-going effort is needed to adjust our overall development policy in order to place appropriate emphasis on LDC self-help measures, and to improve the scope and effectiveness of population programs.

Peter Tarnoff

³ NSDM 314, November 26, 1975, specified a coordinated approach to international population policy issues. See ibid., Document 122.
281. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to the Secretary of the Cabinet (Watson)¹

Washington, April 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Cabinet-Level Task Force on International Health

Following up on our recent phone conversation, here are the basic reasons for establishing such a group:

1. Enables the President to mobilize government-wide support on a cross-cutting issue which involves 18 federal agencies and departments. The far flung nature of this area means there are various competing interests, especially between State, AID and HEW. Any study or plan conducted within or among these agencies without executive office involvement in balancing competing interests during the phase when policies are being formulated merely perpetuates and may even further polarize and diffuse interests and responsibility.

2. Improves prospects for enactment of legislative reforms and fostering balanced policies within the Cabinet thus reducing resistance in Congress.

The Congressional committee jurisdictional makeup encourages that HEW advocates will be pitted against State/AID advocates and any legislation or program proposals which do not take this into account enhances a confrontation between committees. I am interested in results and action, especially so that the President is in the position of leading and not reacting on this issue to Congressional initiatives which could emerge from four different committees representing distinct special interest constituencies, eg, those advocating a lead agency for HEW and those advocating a lead agency role for State. This is of particular significance in view of the effort by Senator Kennedy to seize the initiative of this issue from the President.

3. Helps to establish and strengthen the Cabinet structure concept in the Carter Presidency as a useful planning and decision making tool for the President.

If this Administration is to achieve a reduction in the number of special purpose entities institutionalized within EOP, and demonstrate to Congress that the Cabinet can carry out planning and analysis functions of a cross-cutting nature, then we must begin now to use the Cab-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 4/1/77–4/28/77. No classification marking.
In summary, what I have proposed to the President is to bring together a cabinet-level group which represents the agencies and Departments who impact on international health, study the issues (a great deal has already been completed in the past 8 weeks), identify problems, and opportunities, and estimate the costs of new initiatives. Upon completion of a report and submission to the President the Cabinet structure will be disbanded, and in its stead will likely be a number of ad hoc clusters who will implement the proposals accepted by the President. A government-wide report on this subject is unprecedented and has strong potential to be a major ingredient of the President’s personal diplomacy strategy for the remainder of this Administration.

Attached for your review is a scenario to initiate this effort, a draft memo which the President would eventually sign announcing and directing the report on international health be implemented, and the cabinet organizational structure.²

² The scenario, entitled “Steps to Implement Cabinet Level Committee on International Health,” is attached but not printed. Neither the draft memorandum nor the Cabinet organizational structure is attached. The President, in an August 15 memorandum to Bourne, Vance, Blumenthal, Califano, and Gilligan, instructed Bourne to undertake a study of international health problems (See Document 293).
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Environmental Quality
The Director, National Science Foundation
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT

Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for United States Security and Overseas Interests

The policy established by NSDM 314 of November 26, 1975 has been reviewed and will remain in effect. That portion of NSDM 314 assigning responsibility to the Under Secretaries Committee is hereby superseded. That responsibility is transferred to the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy which is hereby established. This Group should be composed of representatives of the addressees and will be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

This Group should report as appropriate to the Policy Review Committee, chaired by the Department of State.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 41, Population Policy: 2-6/77. Attached but not printed is a May 25 covering memorandum from Mink to Tuchman, Grant, Atlas, Rowe, Hjort, Levin, Shultz, Sanders, Levin, Palmeri, Nordhaus, Costello, Sweeney, Bente, Warren Thompson, and Press, transmitting a copy of Brzezinski’s memorandum and requesting that the agencies provide Green with the names of officers designated as representatives to the Ad Hoc Group. (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 3, Document 280.

3 In her May 25 memorandum, Mink indicated that she had delegated the chairmanship of the Group to Green and designated Lindsey Grant as the Department of State’s representative. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 41, Population Policy: 2-6/77)
The performance criteria called for by the NSC memorandum of January 3, 1977 should be prepared and forwarded to the White House by the Department of State.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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283. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Cabinet (Watson) to President Carter

Washington, May 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Formation of a Cabinet Level Task Force on International Health

I have been working with Peter Bourne regarding formation of a Cabinet level task force on international health. As in so many areas of interagency concern, the principal problem is the lack of coordination and focus among multiple departments and agencies (in this case, at least 16), with a consequent failure to maximize the beneficial effects of the dollars we have to spend.

As outlined in the attached memorandum, we propose formation of an executive overview committee consisting of State, acting as Chairman, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, HEW and AID. I will coordinate the activities of that group. Peter will chair a coordinating committee of all the affected agencies and will divide them into working groups to address the administrative and legislative policy options outlined on page 2 of the proposed memorandum. In doing the work, we

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 6/1/77–6/15/77. No classification marking. There is no indication that Carter saw the memorandum.

2 See Document 281.

3 As chairman of the coordinating committee, Bourne subsequently established four working groups: Strategy Development; Research, Development, Demonstration, and Application; Health Manpower; and Private Sector Involvement. The Strategy Development working group was further subdivided into four functional working groups: Development and Supporting Assistance; Health of U.S. Citizens and Scientific and Professional Cooperation; Commerce and Finance; and Foreign Policy and Medical Diplomacy. (New Directions in International Health Cooperation: A Report to the President, pp. XXVII–XXVIII)
will involve many private sector groups, including business, labor, foundations, universities and church groups.

In reviewing the situation, we believe that an outline of initiatives can be presented to you on or before August 15th.

Attachment

Draft Memorandum From President Carter to the Cabinet and Other Affected Agencies

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
U.S. International Health Policy

Approximately two billion human beings in Third World nations face premature death due to preventable parasitic and infectious diseases, malnutrition and lack of sanitary water supply. Similarly, in the industrialized nations of the world, many crippling and debilitating diseases continue to cut short productive and happy lives. This state of affairs has continued in the face of unprecedented advances in medical science and technology.

A preliminary assessment conducted at my request by Peter G. Bourne, M.D., found that the United States government is not building adequately on the mutual self interest of all nations to use readily available medical scientific knowledge to improve the health and well being of people everywhere. I believe that the United States government needs to take steps to improve its capacity to fight disease in partnership with other nations.

I have asked Jack Watson to organize a Cabinet-level Task Force on International Health. The work of the Task Force will be overseen by an Executive Committee consisting of the following agencies: State (Chmn.), Defense, Commerce, Treasury, HEW, AID. The White House Office of the Special Assistant for Health Issues will also be a member. Jack will serve as Executive Secretary of the Executive Committee and Peter Bourne will chair a coordinating committee which will be supported by working groups. The charge of the Task Force will be to prepare a report for me recommending government action to strengthen the U.S. government’s capacity to cooperate in health with the developing and developed nations of the world.

4 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
Specifically, the Task Force shall recommend administrative and/or legislative policy options on the following by August 15:

—More effective ways in which to facilitate greater private sector involvement in international health, including international voluntary agencies, industry, labor, foundations and universities.

—More effective measures to improve the quality and ensure an appropriate supply of health manpower in developing countries.

—Measures to improve the effectiveness of international health research in the United States, and to improve cooperation with other nations and international organizations.

—Measures to improve the organization and management of international health programs.

—A long-range strategy for United States international health policy.

I ask all affected Department and Agency heads to assist in completing this assessment.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Fill, in a June 11 memorandum to Watson, noted that Hutcheson did not think the draft should go to Carter at that time; see Document 285. According to a June 24 memorandum from Watson to Califano, Christopher, Gilligan, Brzezinski, Cutter, and Bourne, Watson had not yet forwarded the memorandum to the President by that date. (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 6/16/77–6/30/77)
1. In my first message to the Department and the Foreign Service, I mentioned population as one of those global issues of increasing concern to the nations of the world and to our diplomacy. In that connection, basic U.S. policy on international population issues, as reported in ref tel, has been reapproved at the highest levels of the new administration.

2. Most recently and most importantly, President Carter included the following statement on world population in the course of his statement of May 23 to the Congress of the United States:

"Rapid population growth is a major environmental problem of world dimensions. World population increased from three to four billion in the last 15 years, substantially cancelling out expansion in world food production and economic growth for the same period.

"Without controlling the growth of population, the prospects for enough food, shelter, and other basic needs for all the world's people are dim. Where existence is already poor and precarious, efforts to obtain the necessities of life often degrade the environment for generations to come."
“It is, of course, up to each nation to determine its own policies, but we are prepared to respond promptly and fully to all requests for assistance in population and health care programs. At my direction, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development stand ready to cooperate through international organizations, through private voluntary organizations, or through direct contacts with other governments.”

3. In his message to the World Health Assembly on May 10, 1977, the President said that he would strive personally to find ways in which our government and the private sector can better cooperate with other nations on health, population and nutritional needs.

4. Commendable progress in slowing population growth has been made in many countries in recent years, but excessive population growth continues to contribute to high unemployment and underemployment, environmental deterioration, subsistence standards of living, malnutrition, and, in a few countries, starvation and increased death rates. Increased vigilance and urgent action are needed if these trends are to be reversed.

5. Leaders of developing countries should be encouraged in their efforts to promote sound population programs. Where requested and justified, the new administration will provide continuing and even expanded support to those programs, along with other donor countries and organizations.

6. The objective of the United States in this field is to work closely with others rather than to impose our views. In our efforts we should stress the economic and social gains for the poorest nations that result from reduced population growth, maternal and child health. In all these efforts, we should recognize the basic dignity of the individual and his or her right freely to choose family goals and to have the information and means to do so. These basic rights were specifically ac-

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4 The full text of the President’s May 23 environmental message to Congress is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 967–986.

5 Bourne transmitted a copy of the President’s message to the World Health Assembly under a covering memorandum to Vance on May 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770087–1546 and P770087–1547) Bourne delivered the President’s message to Dr. Sione Tapa, World Health Assembly President, who subsequently presented the message to the Assembly, meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on May 9. The President was in London attending the G–7 Economic Summit and participating in a meeting on Berlin and arrived in Geneva later that afternoon in order to meet with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad prior to returning to London for the NATO Ministerial meeting on May 10. The full text of Carter’s message is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 839–840.
knowledged by the nations of the world at the Bucharest Conference in 1974.6

7. I will expect you to continue to give this problem your personal attention and to find suitable occasion, wherever appropriate, to convey to leaders of host countries the interests and concerns of President Carter and myself in this field.

Vance

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285. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Fill) to the Secretary of the Cabinet (Watson)¹

Washington, June 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Agency Comments on the Cabinet-Level Task Force on International Health Proposal

After reading the comments from AID, HEW, and OMB, I believe we are still on strong ground, and I disagree with Rick on not going to the President with this.² OMB endorses a coordinating committee made up of all affected agencies, joining HEW in that regard.³ HEW also asks

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¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 6/1/77–6/15/77. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Bourne and Parham. As Bourne’s assistant, Fill served as the Study Director of the White House International Health Assessment Staff.  
² In an undated typed note to Watson, Hutcheson referenced OMB, AID, and HEW opposition to the Task Force, commenting “I suggest that you work with them further in developing this idea—I don’t think it’s ready to go to the President at this stage.” (Ibid.)  
³ Cutter, in a June 10 memorandum to Hutcheson, noted that OMB had reviewed the draft memorandum and, upon Eizenstat’s request, obtained the recommendations of the Departments of State and Health, Education and Welfare, and AID. Cutter underscored that the agencies and OMB believed that it “may be premature” to establish a Task Force, but, if the President approved the recommendation, the resultant Task Force should “serve primarily as a coordinating mechanism to assure a well executed study, with specific topics assigned to the responsible agencies for analysis and draft recom-
to be co-chairman of the Cabinet-level Task Force with State, if one is formed, thus reaffirming my own judgment concerning the lack of a lead agency in this field.\(^4\) AID is the more negative, but equally equivocal as the other agencies, and concedes the need for someone at the Executive Office level to pull together a “composite report” which is precisely what we suggest.\(^5\) We have no State comments. They may not have been consulted since Eizenstat’s request went to “State/AID” according to OMB, and there is no State response included in the Hutcheson package.

My assessment has not changed one iota on this classic case of Executive Branch turf protection. HEW sees itself grabbing the international health issue and has Kennedy’s backing to grow. AID sees its prerogatives jeopardized, recognizes the low (8–10 percent of total budget) priority given to health, but wants to make its own decisions. OMB sees its reorganization assignment being crowded by a mechanism which bridges both policy and functional reorganization, domestic and international programs, and the potential emergence of another mechanism within the Cabinet to do what it perceives itself as capable of accomplishing. The Domestic Council position is much less clear; however, it seems to me that there are two factors possibly disturbing them:

1. The Cabinet structure bridges domestic and international;
2. It offers the possibility that a planning and analysis mechanism may be created which is not subject to day-to-day legislative and managerial responsibilities.

This characteristic of institutional separateness from day-to-day responsibilities would be distinct from all the major Presidential advisory structures: CEA, OMB, NSC, and the Domestic Council. OMB, for example, had to establish new layers, essentially creating a new entity outside the day-to-day operations of OMB in order to fulfill their reorganization mandate. They also felt it necessary to hire new outside staff. Interestingly, Peter has not hired one international health person, recommendations which would then be reviewed by the Task Force. If necessary, the Task Force could then make further recommendations to the President to insure an integrated U.S. international health policy.” (Ibid.)

\(^4\) In a June 7 memorandum to Lance, Califano, in addition to proposing the coordinating committee, commented: “If and when a Cabinet-level task force is formed, I believe HEW should have a more central role within the executive overview committee than suggested in Jack’s memo. At a minimum, I would like to co-chair such a committee with Cy Vance.” (Ibid.)

\(^5\) Gilligan, in a June 3 memorandum to Lance, proposed that each agency author drafts on the “parts of this exercise which fall within its own area of competence.” He added that completed drafts would be circulated to the other agencies for comment; Bourne and his staff “would then prepare a composite report to which each agency could react. The final report would then reflect agreement by all agencies, or where necessary, alternative agency views on specific points.” (Ibid.)
borrowing five people not counting me, and if we can hold them together for 2 months, we will have a decision document ready. It has cost the government zero extra dollars and created no permanent new entity in EOP. Examples abound where domestic and international interests converge and compete, e.g., energy (at least 10 agencies), world food production and nutrition (26 agencies).

It is impossible to improve on Congressional committee fragmentation unless we establish a means to mediate competing interests and develop objective options for Presidential decision. A case could be made for a Cabinet mechanism which has a separate institutional base free from day-to-day responsibilities, is a renewable entity (e.g., staff temporarily borrowed from affected agencies and rotating EO assignments) and bridges domestic and international interests.

P.S.: Peter Bourne is in England for 2 weeks, and I am filling in.

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286. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 16, 1977

SUBJECT


Background

As you know I have been consulting with a number of agencies regarding the subject proposal to obtain their views prior to submitting a recommendation to you. State, AID, HEW, and the Science Advisor were requested to comment on the concept paper² and offer their views. NASA and Transportation (FAA) were also sent copies for their information in view of their involvement with the Soviet Union in the medical scientific area.

They have all commented, and what follows is a summary of their views and my overall analysis. A copy of each agency’s comments is at

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² Not found and not further identified.
tached at Tab A; the recommended transmittal letter to the Soviet Union is attached at Tab B for your review and approval.

Summary of Department and Agency Views

1. **State supports the proposal.** They suggest that “the initial approach to the Soviets should be low key and of sufficient detail to make our intentions clear.” Further they recommend that “first contact be made through our embassy in Moscow at a high level and privately conveying a supporting statement of White House interest.” State also recommended that before a presentation is made to the Soviets that specific project outlines be developed and carefully analyzed from the following perspectives:

   — “U.S. political interest in the country or area concerned
   — “Interests of U.S. allies and other powers which are pertinent;
   and
   — “Implications of proposed activities for our involvement in WHO or other multilateral organizations.”

   They also recommend that an ad hoc interagency group be formed to develop a range of projects in adequate detail to assure technical and political feasibility. They further recommend that the overall effort be chaired by State, with my office and the National Security Council represented in all phases, and a technical sub-group co-chaired by HEW and AID to outline projects, specify candidate countries, and develop them for a steering group review.

2. **AID supports the proposal.** However, they express concern with respect to the commingling of U.S. AID funds with those of communist nations; inevitable congressional criticism of joint activities which AID is involved in that would potentially damage the bilateral assistance program in general; and also express concern about the emphasis on joint programs in the field rather than additional cooperative efforts in the research area. They also point out (as other agencies have) that it is important that there be technically sound projects that are offered so that we can assure that the program is successful.

3. **DOD supports the proposal.** They comment that the proposal may have the effect of “reducing competition in Third World countries” and

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3 Attached but not printed are agency comments on the proposal.
4 Attached but not printed is a proposed letter of transmittal to Gromyko, dated June 17, and the joint health proposal. There is no indication that the letter was sent to Gromyko. In remarks made at the annual meeting of the Southern Legislative Conference in Charleston, South Carolina, on July 21, Carter announced that the United States and Soviet Union were “seeking ways to cooperate in improving world health and relieving world hunger.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, August 1, 1977, p. 1066). In a September 27 memorandum to Christopher (see Document 298), Lake noted that the White House had approved the joint health initiative.
“can have long term humanitarian and national security benefits to the United States”. They also recommend that a strategic working group be formed with representatives from DOD, State, AID, HEW and CIA to undertake the planning for this joint project.

4. **HEW supports the proposal.** They suggest that a joint working group be charged with identifying the best means for conducting specific cooperative projects. They also pointed out that a new intergovernmental agreement with a new permanent technical working group may be necessary for some kinds of specific projects. For other projects amendments to existing bilateral cooperative agreements such as the current agreement on medical science and public health will provide a more advantageous mechanism. And finally, they suggest that some joint or trilateral projects might be best accomplished through specific agreements with multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization.

5. **The Science Advisor’s Office fully supports the proposal.** They suggest that perhaps the forthcoming meeting of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation scheduled for July 6–8 might be used as an opportunity to discuss the health cooperation agreement concept with Soviet representatives.6 The leader of the Soviet delegation will be academician Kirillin, a deputy premier and Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology. It is expected that Dr. Kirillin will meet with the President and it was suggested that this may be an avenue to present the proposal.

**Analysis and Conclusions**

The concerns of the State Department with respect to the specificity of the proposal are valid but only in the context of implementation and preplanning with respect to a joint working group. Specificity can be worked out once the proposal is found acceptable.

Two different approaches have been suggested by State and OSTP in conveying the idea of medical cooperative relationships in the Third World. State suggests that the traditional diplomatic route be followed

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5 American and Soviet officials concluded an agreement on health cooperation on May 23, 1972, during the Moscow Summit meetings. The agreement committed the United States and the Soviet Union to sharing scientific knowledge regarding the eradication of cancer and heart disease and collaborating with international organizations in the health field. The text of the Joint Communiqué, of which the agreement is part, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 899–902.

6 The Moscow Summit also yielded an agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology, which authorized the creation of a U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. (United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 852, p. 141) At the July 1977 meeting of the Joint Commission, U.S. and Soviet officials opted to renew the agreement for an additional 5 years. (United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1087, pp. 102–103)
and that the concept be conveyed through the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. The Office of the Science Advisor suggests that Dr. Kirillin be approached in July during the forthcoming meeting of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Either approach seems appropriate. My own judgment is that routine diplomatic channels seems to have the benefit of not suggesting anything extraordinary on this new initiative and would not unduly sensitize them to this proposal.

Attached at Tab B is a recommended letter from the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Gromyko and the accompanying proposal for your review and consideration.

All of the agencies who have a background in this area have had an opportunity to review and comment on the proposal both informally through a working group and formally. If you have any further questions, please give me a call.

287. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, June 30, 1977

Management of Population Issues within the Department of State

The attached memorandum on global population growth and related developmental assistance programs suggests the need for a catalyst in the Department. At present, there seems to be a bureaucratic and jurisdictional issue involved. Ambassador Green has ideas but no money; AID has money and is not always responsive to Ambassador Green’s ideas; and there are blurred bureaucratic lines between Ambassador Green, Mrs. Mink and Mrs. Benson. Thus, some of the key players have been inhibited from taking a strong stand and moving forward.

One effective way to proceed might be for you to call together a few of the key actors in this field including Gov. Gilligan, Under Secretary Benson, Assistant Secretary Patsy Mink, and Ambassador Green to

discuss where we ought to go substantively in this area and to set clear responsibilities for implementing action.

Gov. Gilligan has recently written to you and the Secretary\(^2\) about integrating our population programs with other components of our development assistance. Clearly, the responsibilities will have to be defined between AID and Ambassador Green’s office, with appropriate individuals knowing what areas or initiatives should be developed and by whom.

In addition, we would need to work with Congress and with the public to develop a better awareness of the problems of population growth, of their impact on development and of the need on the part of the US to support a meaningful and sustained program of development assistance aimed at reducing excessive population growth rates.

You may wish to assert a more direct interest yourself. Naturally, I and my staff are ready to assist you as you deem appropriate.

Attachment

Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^3\)

Washington, undated

Global Population Growth, Development for Human Needs and U.S. Policy

The following memorandum outlines current global population problems including implications for our development assistance programs. It also proposes specific steps toward a more effective strategy and suggests some North-South initiatives that we can take in the weeks and months ahead.

By the year 2000 the present world population of about 4 billion will grow to about 6.2 billion, with the developing world’s share of the total population increasing from 62 percent now to 78 percent by the end of the century, if present trends continue. Mexico, with perhaps the

\(^2\) Not found.

\(^3\) Confidential. Drafted by Blaney on June 29.
highest growth rate in the world, will double its population to 132 million. India will exceed one billion (610 million in 1976). Egypt will have 64 million (38 million today). The United States, by comparison, will have about 260 million.

Global population growth, more than any other single factor, is contributing to the lack of significant per capita income growth in the developing countries.

While per capita GDP in the LDCs grew at an average rate of 2.9 percent, the per capita increase in the lower-income countries, where 59 percent of the total LDC population lives, averaged only 0.9 percent during the 1971–75 period. Non-communist LDC per capita food production between 1961–74 did not increase at all due to population growth. There could be a doubling of food import requirements by the LDCs by the late 1980s, placing a major burden on our agricultural capabilities.

Population growth promises an even more turbulent setting for the conduct of international affairs. It also entails serious environmental costs for the entire world community, including degradation of soil, and desertification, as well as massive unemployment, and appalling living conditions for much of the developing world.

Two million people in Mexico City are living today in miserable shanty towns without sanitation and other services; and yet Mexico City, now at 11 million people, is projected to become the world’s largest urban agglomeration—32 million in the year 2000.

The sharpest reductions in birth rates over the past decade took place in LDCs that have experienced broad-based social and economic progress during the last three decades. There is ever-widening recognition that the best strategy for dealing with population growth is through a combination of family planning and other programs that tend to reduce birth rates, such as increased literacy, female education and employment, increasing farm income, community development and increased life expectancy largely through reduced infant mortality. Such components of development tend to influence people to want smaller families.

A “basic human needs” strategy on the part of the United States and other developed countries will be vitiated by population growth unless there are more effective efforts and programs to cope with the issue.

U.S. Policy

The basic U.S. policies to deal with world population are set forth in the NSSM–200 study and NSDM–314, which has now been reaf-
A key element in that policy is to concentrate our bilateral and multilateral population assistance efforts on 13 key larger and fast-growing countries of the developing world—India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, Philippines, Colombia, Turkey, Egypt, Thailand, and Ethiopia. The 13 together contribute an average of 34.3 million (or 47%) of the world’s annual population increase.

We now provide more than $140 million annually (FY–77) through AID for population assistance. This year about $103 million is going for bilateral programs in 34 countries and about $40 million is being provided multilaterally, mostly to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). But our assistance is still too little, too dispersed and not as effective as it might be. Moreover, even though we must place greater focus on supporting the population programs of 13 of the biggest LDC population countries (excluding China which has its own highly effective programs), several of those countries are uninterested or ineffective in carrying out programs and in several others our aid must be channeled exclusively through multilateral agencies.

Legislative Branch interest and support in this field is strong. Congress has also recognized (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) that “US assistance should be used in support of, rather than in substitution for, the self-help efforts that are essential to successful development programs and shall be concentrated in those countries that take positive steps to help themselves.” Congress is nevertheless sensitive about anything smacking of coercion or which relates to abortions.

An Effective Global Population Strategy

The USG Task Force on Population Policy headed by Ambassador Marshall Green has concluded that successful population programs require: (a) leadership commitment; (b) integrating family planning into community development and village life; (c) training indigenous paramedics to provide comprehensive health, nutritional and family planning services and (d) improving the status of women. Together with a developmental strategy which influences people to have smaller fam-
ilies, this approach can significantly improve the actual conditions of life of the poorest, especially those in rural areas.

Most importantly, a developmental strategy which is aimed at strengthening community structures supports a number of important goals: (a) reducing economic and social inequality, (b) fostering local democratic processes by involving community institutions in self-help programs, (c) improved health and productivity as well as (d) population growth reduction. Community involvement in such “self-help” efforts also provides peer pressures or values which promote improved quality of life and smaller families. This approach must, however, be part of an integrated national developmental plan with strong government support.

A firm commitment by the United States towards the above goals and accompanying strategy would also contribute towards a sensitive North-South plan of cooperation focusing on real needs and away from empty ideological posturing. Such a program also strengthens our human rights efforts since strong and active local communities are vital in promoting participation processes at the grass-roots level. Since the strategy also emphasizes national leadership and the mobilization of indigenous resources, it ensures that what aid we do provide fully relates to the receiving country’s own program and priorities. It also comports with the above-cited Congressional precepts.

Perhaps the key in our promoting effective population policies in the developing world is to obtain the support and commitment of their national leaders for a sustained and effective effort to reduce excessive population growth. Success in this area is vital for progress. Yet we have not always used our high-level influence to this end in many key countries.

**Action and Initiatives for the US**

We need to pursue a comprehensive and well-coordinated USG global population strategy which takes into consideration all of these problems and possible responses. There is particular need for a better coordination of our diplomatic and developmental assistance efforts. This is a matter you may wish to discuss with Gov. Gilligan as well as other key officials, followed by specific instructions to our Ambassadors and AID Directors.

At each suitable occasion, formal and informal, we should raise the population issue with LDC leaders and relevant heads of international institutions and donor programs, helping develop an awareness of the new directions in our assistance strategy. Such talks should embrace population issues, although the focus would be on all the components of development that improve conditions of life for the masses.
Special high-level initiatives by the President and Secretary would be helpful in moving forward the basic population strategy outlined above. Such initiatives could include:

—Taking advantage of meetings with other leaders to discuss this issue frankly (and perhaps informally) in order to have the benefits of their views and to see how we can be most helpful in the context of their needs, institutions and purposes.

—Pressing, in planning for the UN Third Development Decade, goals of basic health, family planning and nutritional services for the poorest, utilizing indigenous institutions and paramedical personnel.

—Proposing a major expansion of our multilateral funding of UNFPA with the understanding that the bulk of funds would be provided to key countries including India, Egypt, and Mexico. (We would, however, seek major increases in contributions from other donor countries, especially Japan and the FRG.)

—Sending a high-level Presidential or Secretarial Mission to discuss developmental and population issues with key leaders of selected LDC countries, including offers of additional long-term assistance for specific programs.

—Develop intensive “model” programs in a few countries utilizing local community structures for delivery of basic services, with minimum long-term outside help, which could be expanded in other areas if successful.

—Integrate our food assistance programs into comprehensive projects with relevance to population growth.

—Make a high-level effort with the IBRD and the regional development banks to place more emphasis on population-relevant programs including family planning.

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5 See footnote 5, Document 263.
288. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Benson)\(^1\)

Washington, July 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Focus within Department of State to Deal with International Health Issues

As you are aware, there have recently been a number of initiatives, some coming from the White House, to develop an international health strategy for the US Government. In addition, there are a number of important areas which touch upon international health such as nutrition, population and scientific cooperation which the Department of State is heavily engaged in, and in which a number of Bureaus have an interest.

At present there appears to be no central focus within the Department of State to deal in a systematic and comprehensive way with international health issues: IO focuses primarily on the World Health Organization, OES views international health from the perspective of our separate international bilateral agreements, or of international environmental dangers, the individual regional bureaus give little attention to the health problems of their regions, except when there are local disasters or plagues. AID has an Office of Health within its Bureau for Technical Assistance but its focus is primarily on bilateral aid to developing countries.

To tie these different points of interest together, a focus within the Department of State to integrate international health issues and to coordinate the various efforts into some coherent strategy should be established. Given your responsibilities for OES it might be useful to have your office act as the senior level focus for international health matters. But in addition to this, OES could be designated as the lead bureau with

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL 7/1–15/77. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Moose. At the top of the memorandum, Lake wrote: “LB—We might discuss this at a Small Group meeting, TL.” Additional handwritten notations on the memorandum read: “7/12/77 Christopher mtg.” and “Mtq with Christopher Tues. 7/12 4:00 p.m.” In a July 12 memorandum to Tarnoff and Lake, Brizill provided background information on the meeting between Bourne and Christopher to be held later that day. She also attached an organizational chart outlining the structure of the proposed Cabinet-level Task Force on International Health Policy. According to Brizill, Bourne planned to discuss “a number of international health initiatives he and his staff are considering. They include: (1) the current assessment of US international health policy being undertaken by the staff; (2) a proposal for joint US–USSR health cooperation in selected third world countries; (3) a medical cooperation program for Mozambique; and (4) White House interest in developing a world hunger initiative.” (Ibid.) No minutes of this meeting were found.
a fulltime officer for day-to-day activities and coordination. One possibility may be to designate an officer in OES to perform this function, and also to act as liaison with other agencies of the government on this issue.

289. Minutes of NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy Meeting

Washington, July 7, 1977

Minutes of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy Meeting, July 7, 1977

I. Attendance

The Chairman called the first meeting of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy to order at the State Department on July 7, 1977, and the following representatives were present:

Ambassador Marshall Green, Chairman
Dr. Jessica Tuchman, National Security Council
Mr. Lindsey Grant, Department of State
Ms. Liane Atlas, Department of the Treasury
Mr. John H. Rowe, Department of Defense
Mr. Harry Wilhelm, Department of Agriculture
Mr. Meyer Zitter, Department of Commerce
Dr. S. Paul Ehrlich, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Mr. Sander Levin, Agency for International Development
Dr. Gerry Hawkins, U.S. Information Agency
Mr. Richard Kolsky, Council of Economic Advisors
Major Daniel S. Costello, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dr. Paul F. Bente, Jr., Council on Environmental Quality
Dr. Warren E. Thompson, National Science Foundation
Mr. Gilbert Omenn, Office of Science and Technology Policy

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 41, Population Policy: 7/77–2/80. No classification marking. A directory of Ad Hoc Group members is attached but not printed. Simmons sent a copy of the minutes to Tuchman, Grant, Nachmanoff, Rowe, Wilhelm, Levine, Shultz, Levin, Sanders, Hawkins, Nordhaus, Costello, Andrews, Bente, Averch, Keatley, Mink, Van Dyk, and Froebe under a July 18 memorandum, in which he noted that he had drafted the minutes on July 8. (Ibid.)
In addition, the following were present:
Mr. Clifford R. Nelson, Department of State, OES/ENP/PO
Mr. Samuel Baum, Department of Commerce, Census
Mr. Elliot Schwartz, Department of the Treasury, OASIA
Mr. William Falkner, Department of State, IO

1. As this was the first meeting of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, introductions were made. The Chairman pointed out that the First Annual Report of the Interagency Task Force on Population Policy (now renamed the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy) was accepted by the White House,\(^2\) and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs had recently reaffirmed basic population policy as set forth in NSDM–314.\(^3\)

II. Procedural Items

2. The Chairman suggested that, given their related interests, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the International Health Office at the White House under Dr. Bourne might be included on the Task Force. There was no objection to the inclusion of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, but it was suggested that we wait on the International Health Office pending the reorganization of the White House Staff, now in progress.

3. The Chairman reminded the Ad Hoc Group that it had two basic requirements contained in the policy papers.\(^4\) One called for the development of performance criteria and the other for the presentation of an annual report on population matters. Given the lapse in meetings of the Group and its predecessor Task Force, he suggested that the Group set the end of the year as a deadline for the submission of the second Annual Report.\(^5\) The representative of the NSC Staff pointed out that there were a number of ongoing studies related to foreign assistance as well as North/South issues which would be due by the middle of September anticipating probable development-related initiatives in the early fall. At the same time, also on the basis of these studies, OMB would be making some key decisions in the Budget Cycle, and the annual report should be a vehicle for making sure population issues were adequately covered in all these efforts.

4. In describing the content of the Annual Report and his feeling that our embassies in the field should be consulted, the Chairman pointed out that it would be difficult to telescope the process too much

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\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 280.

\(^4\) Not further identified.

\(^5\) See Document 308.
and still have a useful report. The State Department representative pointed out that other ongoing studies such as the Year 2000 study of population, resources and the environment would not be ready for the fall initiatives but hopefully would be the basis for longer term thinking. The representative of the Department of Agriculture felt that there were resources in the private sector groups such as the Population Council which would make useful contributions to the Ad Hoc Group’s work.

5. The representative of AID suggested that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group should talk with Mr. Van Dyk, who is chairing an interagency development assistance study group to ascertain what role population will play in their analyses. The Treasury Department representative felt that, whatever the time frame of the report, it should be based on an evaluation of our present population assistance efforts and indicate what new directions our assistance should take to improve performance.

6. It was agreed that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group would consult with Mr. Van Dyk and other members of his Study Group and work with them to ensure proper attention to population issues in the strategies as they are being developed. The Chairman agreed to get into Mr. Van Dyk’s hands as soon as possible a paper setting forth key points for consideration by the Study Group.

7. It was also agreed that, with a somewhat shorter deadline than previously envisioned, the Chairman would draft an outline for the next annual report which hopefully could be submitted in October. He would also prepare as soon as possible a telegram asking key Embassies for responses to questions about progress and prospects in population programs. This would provide useful background for the annual report which he hoped could be more country-specific than the previous one. Several members pointed out that, if such field replies could be received in the next several weeks, they might also be of use in connection with the various interagency development studies and recommendations referred to by the NSC member. The Chairman said he would try to get telegraphic replies back as soon as possible, though he noted the inevitable delays in such matters.

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6 See Document 337.
7 Attached but not printed is a July 13 memorandum from Green to Van Dyk describing the nature of the population problem, summarizing U.S. policy, and outlining program funding.
8 Telegram 167895 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, July 19, asked for information regarding host country demographics, population programs and policies, non-population programs, and food production. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770268–0920)
III. Presidential Study on Population, Resources, and Environment

8. Mr. Lindsey Grant, the State Department representative, made a presentation on the study requested by the President in his Environmental Message of May 23. The emphasis of the study will be the relationship of population, resources, and the environment. While a prospectus has not been finalized, there is broad agreement on what should be involved. The base of the project would be population projections, changing consumption levels, and technological change. Those changes will in turn have impacts on resource requirements and the environment. Under those broad areas a variety of topics will be covered, along the following lines:

- Population and consumption levels
- Technological change (which affects resource requirements and pollution levels)

Consumption requirements:
- Food (cultivated, livestock, fisheries)
- Fibers (natural and artificial)
- Other resources

Resources and inputs:
- Farmland
- Rangeland (including semi-desert)
- Forests
- Minerals
- Water (quantity and quality)
- Energy

Waste disposal (from consumption and production—urban agriculture, industrial, energy byproducts, radioactive materials)

Climate (both as a variable in the above inputs and as it may be influenced by the activities described)

Environmental implications including:
- Atmospheric pollution
- Ocean contamination
- Resource degradation (land, forests, water, and minerals)
- Ecosystem degradation (interaction of issues above plus biotic impoverishment)
- Pollution and health

9. The procedure envisioned for the study will be the appointment of an overall Executive Director reporting to a steering group composed of the principal agencies. Each topic above will be developed by a “group captain” who will have wide latitude in developing that section of the report. While the “group captain” will probably come from a

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9 See footnote 4, Document 284.
government agency most closely involved in the topic, he can seek the assistance of others as he sees fit who have expertise in these areas. Many of the agencies represented on this Ad Hoc Group will have to be involved in various stages of the process. A key step will be the integration of all these elements and an effort to demonstrate the impact of decisions taken in one sector upon the other sectors. The hoped-for result would be to develop a regular means of increasing our understanding of the lateral implications in these important areas of decisions taken in other sectors.

**IV. Performance Criteria**

10. The Chairman then briefly introduced the materials on performance criteria which had been circulated to the members. He asked all the members of the Ad Hoc Group to study the presentation on performance criteria (which had been painstakingly worked out between State and AID in consultation with Treasury) and obtain whatever internal clearances they felt necessary. If any agency has major disagreements or proposed changes, they should be in contact with Ambassador Green’s office for a discussion of them. After a period of three weeks, if there are no major disagreements or changes, the Chairman will forward the criteria to the NSC in fulfillment of the requirement. The Ad Hoc Group will then be faced with questions concerning the application of the criteria and with what countries it should be used. At a future session, this issue can be taken up.

11. Having covered the agenda, the Chairman asked if any of the representatives had any issues to raise. There were no additional issues but the Chairman urged any members of the Group to contact him with ideas which they might have on subjects that the Group should take up.

12. It was agreed that, in order to advance the date of the annual report, there might have to be another meeting of the Ad Hoc Group later in the summer.

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10 Not found.
290. Memorandum From Harry Blaney of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg)\(^1\)

Washington, July 20, 1977

SUBJECT

Checklist of our Global Challenges

Per your request you will find below a brief summary of some of the key global issues we need to face in the next two or three years. I thought something more than a heading was required but tried to keep the description brief. Even so, to do justice to any of these subjects would require a major paper. Wreath and Sandy\(^2\) have contributed their ideas to this paper in areas of their special expertise. I suggest a meeting sometime to examine these issues with the concerned members.

Environment

This is a very broad area which has been seriously neglected by this Department with little or no supervision or oversight by our principals. The main areas needing attention and increased leadership include:

(1) Marine Pollution: Our oceans are becoming more and more polluted with oil, organic matter and toxic wastes to a point in which their ecological function may be threatened. We are actively working unilaterally and multilaterally to reduce pollution (mostly oil) from ships. There are a number of important initiatives which will require effective followup, including President Carter’s Marine Pollution Package.\(^3\) Yet more than 80% of the pollution in the oceans comes from landbased sources and this is the most difficult area to deal with. The problem is that we have not even started to focus on this problem or propose ameliorative programs. Finally, despite efforts to establish, by UNEP, a global marine pollution monitoring system, we still have not received any meaningful data and this important program is languishing. One idea

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL Papers on Specific Mtgs./Appoint 1977. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Garten, Grose, Gathright, Vogelgesang, and Theodore Moran. According to handwritten notations on the memorandum, a meeting concerning the issues raised within the memorandum took place on July 22; no minutes of this meeting were found.

\(^2\) Reference is to Wreatham Gathright and Sandra Vogelgesang.

\(^3\) On March 17, President Carter announced measures to address the risks of ocean transport of oil. See Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 458–459.
would be to have an international conference focusing on specific marine pollution problems after LOS.

(2) Upper Atmosphere Pollution: This is an area affecting weather, climatic changes (and impact on food production) and our ozone layer. Pollution comes from a variety of sources—most serious is energy. In addition, the release of fluorocarbons and other chemicals has caused serious depletion of the ozone layer with possible health consequences. Again, UNEP is supposed to monitor this problem but little has come out of this effort and almost nothing has been done about it except some efforts to exchange information. A comprehensive look at this problem and a concerted USG global strategy for dealing with it is necessary. Finally, our knowledge of this area is so incomplete, for example, that we are not certain whether the globe will become warmer or colder over the next century or so. There is room for major initiatives by the US in these fields.

(3) Toxic Substances: There has been a constant stream of new and old toxic substances into the world environment with little understanding or control by governmental bodies, national or international. The potential of major disaster exists. Among the toxic substances that are building up are various pesticides, including DDT, arsenic, cadmium and lead. There has been some international discussion of this problem and the nominal establishment of an International Registry of Potentially Toxic Chemicals under UNEP, but we still do not have a comprehensive, long-term policy or strategy. Clearly, one start would be to establish effective export/import regulations for these substances and another would be to pinpoint major users and producers of these products and develop better ways to control their release into the open environment. Since many of these chemicals originate in developed countries initially, the OECD or ECE might be a forum to start the process of developing international minimum standards for the release of these substances.

(4) Urban Problems: Cities everywhere are “problem areas” in one form or another. New techniques and technology have been developed to solve many of these problems—some with notable success. However, this knowledge is not always widely shared. There exist a number of opportunities to utilize technology better to solve our urban needs. Establishing more effective mechanisms to do so should be one of our objectives.

(5) Conservation of Resources: The world is likely to experience serious scarcity of fresh water in a number of regions in the next decade or two. Further, deserts are expanding worldwide, including in this country. Generally, the world is experiencing soil degradation and the destruction of vast natural areas which protect the earth’s plants and animals and produce food for man. Despite international attention to
these problems, little additional resources or strong leadership has been given to these problems. New long-term initiatives are needed to improve national capabilities for resource management, to monitor the problems and to apply new technology towards solving these interrelated problems. In particular, these problems have not been seen by our own decision-makers and assistance program managers in a unified way. Within State there is no focus for solving these problems. They also have political significance since conflict is likely between countries on the division of scarce water rights.

Broad environmental initiatives which the US could take include:

—Agreement on developing an international environmental impact statement for major and long-lasting changes in environmental quality with opportunity for review by countries affected.

—Upgrading our support for relevant international environmental bodies, including UNEP, NATO/CCMS, OECD, and IMCO.

—Major new effort to develop a global environmental assessment system which will report on the quality of the air, water, etc., and assess possible damages. Upgrading, where possible, should be made of existing efforts in this area such as the Global Atmospheric Research Program.

—An assessment of the extent, distribution and impact of contaminants in the world’s biological system.

—Worldwide evaluation of the marine environment including establishment of new or stricter discharge or release standards, including landbased.

Population

The problem is well known, we shall go from four billion people now to six billion by 2000, mostly from the Third World. There will be serious food, environmental and social problems. Most of the problem focuses on about 10 to 15 key countries. We are not, however, concentrating our efforts on these countries. Further, AID and perhaps the USG, has not approached this major problem with serious high-level attention. We do not have good leadership. There are a number of initiatives we can take in this field including better integration of health, nutrition and family planning programs, greater use of local community support, development of new low cost family planning techniques acceptable to LDCs and a better development assistance program relevant to population growth factors (see our memo to Deputy Secretary on this topic.)4

4 Presumable reference to Lake’s June 30 memorandum to Christopher, printed as Document 287.
OES is now undertaking with CEQ a year-long study on world population, resource and environment factors in response to President Carter’s initiative. The main problems and key issues are known (innumerable such studies have been done.) In some cases, even the technical or scientific solutions are clear. The problems are leadership, resource allocation, economic priorities and managerial innovation. We should not await the outcome of this study, but proceed now to deal with these problems.

**Natural Disasters**

There exists a vast array of scientific knowledge and technology to deal with a range of natural disasters including earthquakes, floods and tidal waves. For example, we have considerable knowledge of earthquake prediction, but this knowledge still is not applied to many areas of high risk. Also, much more can be done in the fields of warning, communications, and relief using new technology. AID focuses on LDCs, IO on the UN Disaster Relief Organization, but no one is concerned with broad international cooperation, or short and medium term cooperation to develop and deploy new techniques to deal with the full range of natural disasters. (See draft memo of Sandy Vogelgesang on this subject.)

**Energy**

There are so many areas for US action and so many problems it is hard to characterize all that needs to be done. One area certainly is the “management” of nuclear power around the world for non-proliferation, economic and environmental reasons. Increasingly, we will have to look for international “solutions”—i.e., international control over reprocessing, waste management, transportation and the full bag that comes under the term “safeguards”. One important initiative we have to examine is the potential global benefits of acceleration of solar energy research and development. A major crash program in this sector can provide a low-cost alternative to nuclear power and to increasingly high-cost imported oil especially for the LDCs. This option could provide a number of political and security benefits. It will be important to work with the new Energy Department to encourage emphasis on such new sources. But this would require major domestic en-

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5 Reference is to the May 23 environmental message; see footnote 4, Document 284.

6 Presumably reference to a July 11 action memorandum Vogelgesang sent to Christopher, wherein Vogelgesang outlined various U.S. initiatives in the area of disaster relief. According to a notation on the memorandum, all of Vogelgesang’s action recommendations were approved in August. Lake added the following handwritten comment at the top of the memorandum: “Sandy—what now? TL.” (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 7/1–15/77)
ergy decisions to increase our commitment to this energy system. Obviously revitalization of the International Energy Agency is needed along with major efforts by oil consumers at conservation.

Oceans

The issues are: the equitable allocation and conservation of resources, the support of marine scientific research and the development of a “law of the sea” which reflects modern political, economic, and technological reality. We are failing in most of these areas. Much will naturally depend on the outcome of the LOS Conference. But this conference will only establish the “bare bones”, in essence it is only the basic framework. Specific substantive solutions are required to deal with the exploitation and conservation of living and non-living marine resources, agreeing on stronger pollution discharge standards for ships, helping marine scientific research, increasing the protection of navigation and assisting the mobility of our Navy.

Antarctica

We need to examine closely the medium and long-term future of this continent. The main issue which should be decided is by whom and how should control over this continent be exercised. We are now only in a “holding pattern” but have not resolved the major issues or problems in this area. The probability of success is greater if we move swiftly while there appears to be limited desire to exploit than later when others are likely to perceive profit from unilateral action or implementation of claims.

Science and Technology

The problem is not to “get over” the forthcoming US [UN] Science and Technology Conference. The issue is how can we effectively mobilize existing relevant knowledge and technology for development purposes. One assessment is true: the world has done, up to now, a very poor job in applying state-of-the-art technology to the problems of the poor. There are so many “appropriate technologies” that are not widely available as to make any sensitive soul cry. Items: use of simplified water pumps, para-professional medical and nutritional experts, solar heaters, electricity for food preservation, telecommunications technology for educational needs, etc. Nor has thoughtful and realistic work been done in utilizing the private sector. So much “ideology” has been thrown around by both sides as to make realistic efforts difficult. Yet innovative solutions exist: creation of new funding mechanisms to facilitate purchase of new technology, manufacture locally of simple items, subsidies for transfer of private and government-owned technology and know-how, loan of specialized personnel to LDCs to manage development and distribution of new methods and technology. More in-
integration between sectors in utilizing new techniques to lower costs is another possibility.

Finally, between industrialized countries there are major issues that need examination and action: opening of trade in “know-how”, decreased restrictions on importation of foreign hardware and software, joint pooling of efforts in “public technology” R&D fields such as energy, pollution control and mass transit. Also problems in East-West transfer should be examined.

Space Technology

(1) LANDSAT: A decision will be needed concerning whether and in what way to move toward an operational LANDSAT system. The relationship between LANDSAT and other systems (such as meteorological satellites) for gathering data on various global problems will need to be considered. The possibility of a “global problems” information system should be considered. Various approaches to internationalizing LANDSAT should be considered. Also, ways should be sought to ameliorate the “analytical gap” between countries able to analyze and make their best use of LANDSAT data and those lacking such capabilities.

(2) Space Shuttle: A variety of problems and opportunities related to the space shuttle will need to be examined. These should include an examination of opportunities for cooperation and of the potential effects of the space shuttle on widening access to space.

(3) Communications Satellites: A continuing effort is needed to find beneficial ways of employing emergency communications satellite techniques.

Transborder Data Flows

The flow of data between computers across borders has presented new regulatory and privacy problems. An approach to those problems should be developed initially in concert with other industrialized nations.

International Health

This is an obvious area for a more integrated and focused US policy. The needs are many and there are a number of promising approaches, including greater use of para-medical personnel, increased preventive health programs, greater attention to tropical diseases, etc. The problem is that we do not have the managerial resources and policy capability in State or elsewhere to carry out an increased effort. Naturally, a special problem will be to integrate this field with our other efforts.

General Comments

My final observation is that we are not well organized to deal with most of these problems. We do not always have the right people. We
certainly do not have control over significant relevant resources. A main USG issue is likely to be whether the domestic concerned agencies should “go global” or whether there is a leadership, policy and coordinating role for State in these areas. Only radical surgery will do the job, not “quick fixes” or placebos.

291. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, July 22, 1977

SUBJECT
United Nations General Assembly Address

Issue for Decision
Which theme would be most appropriate for the US statement to the 32nd General Assembly, to be delivered by you or the President.2

Discussion
We have two general themes in mind. Whichever is chosen, however, an important part of the statement should be a discussion of this Administration’s attitude and intentions toward the UN, both the major organs and the agencies comprising the whole system. We should probably be in a position to state a judgment on the various proposals for restructuring the UN, now in preparatory discussion; this will also provide us with an authoritative occasion to state our arguments about our decision on the ILO3 and its relationship to our overall attitude toward UN agencies. Our continuing human rights efforts will also be featured, whichever way the rest of the speech turns.

Building on this basis, we could then focus the address on international and US peacemaking efforts, the resolution of regional conflicts, conveying the foreign policy activism of the Carter Administration. The Middle East and southern Africa will be major items on the GA

2 See Document 79.
3 See footnote 4, Document 63.
agenda, and it would be appropriate for the US to explain its policies before the Assembly as a whole. Developments between now and September could make it particularly important that these two regional issues be addressed in some depth. Cyprus is another GA perennial on which we might have some interesting things to say by September or October. By making these matters the centerpiece of our presentation, we would seem to be placing emphasis on the political/security role of the UN, rather than the economic and North-South function which we believe is often more effectively dealt with in discrete, functional forums.

Alternatively, we could go straight to the global issues, such as food, population, energy and basic human needs, which would signal our interest in pursuing North-South interdependence issues within the General Assembly, as well as the functional forums. We might be ready to come up with some specific initiatives on global issues; depending on the degree of specificity, we might be able to divert General Assembly energies away from the old New International Economic Order issues. We could give special pushes to the forthcoming UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development, as well as other development issues involved in planning the new international development strategy which will be one important theme of this GA.

We should begin comparing notes with the NSC staff, as the question of President Carter’s participation at the General Assembly could also influence the type of speech to be delivered.

Options

Stress international peacemaking.
Stress global issues.
Prepare tentative outlines on both themes, for discussion with the NSC staff.4


4 Christopher placed a check mark on the approval line beneath each of the three options. Background materials related to the President’s participation at the United Nations are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 3, President, United Nations, 10/4-5/77: Briefing Book.
292. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Fill) to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne)\(^1\)

Washington, July 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President, Friday, July 29, 1977

In order to begin to map out a strategy for your meeting on Friday,\(^2\) the following items are suggested for you to think about raising during the meeting.

1. *International Health Strategy.*
   - Decision memorandum on this subject will be ready by late September.
   - The structure has been agreed to; it has applicability to be used as a planning and analysis tool on other crosscutting issues which cover both domestic and international issues such as hunger, family planning, disaster relief, child health.
   - It has been very difficult to gain agreement on structure of all the agencies involved to procedures to follow on international health because of the competing and overlapping interests on this issue; the same problems are relevant to World Food policy which encompasses 26 Federal agencies.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 7/1/77–7/31/77. No classification marking.

\(^2\) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Bourne met with the President in the White House Oval Office on July 29 from 1:57 to 2:12 p.m. to discuss drug policy-related issues. No record of the meeting has been found, although the Diary indicates that a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) crew filmed a portion of the discussion for inclusion in a three-part series on international drug issues, scheduled to debut during the spring of 1978. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) In Carter’s personal diary, he noted: “Peter Bourne came by to go over the final drug message and to talk about his role in the White House. I want him to be in charge of drugs, world hunger, world health, and so forth, and to work directly with me.” (White House Diary, p. 74) In a July 29 memorandum to Bourne, Fill outlined his thinking regarding the benefits and problems associated with Bourne’s international role, concluding: “There is no place in the U.S. government similar to where you have placed yourself; there is no one else in the White House that has the combined relationship to the President, credentials, intellectual capacity, and openness which you bring to your position. The power of fresh, new, human needs ideas or old, good ones emanating from the White House is enormous, and may be critical to the balance which needs to be maintained between political/institutional needs and human needs.” (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 7/1/77–7/31/77)
2. World Hunger Initiative.

—The National Security Council proposes that we use the PRM review process to come to grips with this particular issue and develop a governmentwide world food policy plan, I disagree for the following reasons:

—Does not involve the private sector early.
—Does not involve the President in interacting with the private sector before the policy is developed.
—The issue has been extensively studied and a different approach, which includes a policy review should be followed.
—Does not provide the mechanism by which we develop a political constituency for this issue on the Hill.

—NSC and the Domestic Council propose that they jointly chair this initiative; this is entirely too much Executive Office involvement and detracts from Cabinet-level responsibility (State, AID, Agriculture).

—Your involvement in this issue may be an important example of your international human needs initiatives and can have the effect of mobilizing support for your overall foreign policy objectives. Thus the necessity of seeking a different format for conducting a policy review which involves substantial private sector participation.

—The difficult issue of price of food and other difficult agribusiness, farm labor, and consumer group issues may be very difficult to cope with politically, especially in the West (business and farmers), and, therefore, early involvement between the government and these interest groups will have the effect of defining the differences before the public and Congress, thus enabling you to make tough decisions which may be more politically acceptable and saleable later on in the process.

—Some things may be accomplished in this area over the next year or two like providing a set-aside contingency fund for food assistance and other visible, tangible initiatives which will have the effect of diverting attention from the emotion-charged political rights issues to the related human needs issue.

—I have been in close touch with people like Jim Grant of the Overseas Development Council, and through him an Interreligious Task Force on World Food Policy which includes Father Hesburgh; they believe your visible involvement early on will be helpful to you with Congress.

—My image as a physician and an anthropologist and the way I have been working in a cross-cutting approach, both domestically and internationally, may be a useful vehicle to mobilize the different interests on this subject.
3. Fourteen Country Diplomatic Initiative

—You have mentioned publicly your interest in improving diplomatic relationships with the 14 countries with which we do not have formal diplomatic relations.

—I have been attempting to pursue this recently using primarily medicine and health but also wildlife management to open up diplomatic relations and to follow-up your initiative in this area in a comprehensive fashion. For example:

—*The medical diplomacy initiative with Iraq.* This has recently resulted in a formal request from the Minister of Health for assistance in medical and public health despite the fact that we do not have diplomatic relations with them.

—*The People’s Republic of China.* I have been encouraging and involving the private physicians in the United States to become involved in diplomatic initiatives. Most recently, the U.S.-Chinese Friendship Association met with the Vice Minister of Health and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, and provisionally agreed to send a medical team to the United States next year.

—*The People’s Republic of Mongolia* has been quite interested in wildlife management and endangered species. I have been very quietly working with experts in the wildlife management and endangered species area to develop communications linkages directly with the Mongolian officials and through the Soviet Union.

—*Somalia.* We have been successful as the result of my discussions in Geneva in placing five U.S. Public Health Service people in Somalia to work on the smallpox eradication program.

—*Cuba.* The Minister of Health of Cuba complained about isolation from U.S. medical/scientific journals. We have been able to identify problems in the transfer of this literature; I believe we have worked out an arrangement where it will not be a problem in the near future.

4. The Soviet Proposal to Involve Them in Third World Medical Assistance Projects with the U.S.

—This proposal has been widely accepted throughout the government as a unique and creative proposal that will have the effect of reducing the competition over potentially neutral countries which are in need of medical and public health assistance. The State Department is now preparing to formally propose this proposal after months of preparation of the concept.

—To involve the Soviet Union in an international human needs endeavor with the United States will be a dramatic manifestation of the effect of your international human needs/human rights policy, and will give them an opportunity to score big internationally with you in

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³ See Document 286.
an area that they feel much more comfortable about than the political rights issue.

—This will take perhaps a great deal of time and effort but will have the effect of defusing some of the pressure on them by virtue of your human rights initiative.

5. The World Health Organization and the Visit of Dr. Halfdan Mahler

—Dr. Mahler is a very creative, innovative and brilliant thinker about the world health situation, and it is in the interests of the United States government to support his re-election candidacy next year.

—A visit to the United States and an audience with the President would have the effect of strengthening his candidacy.  

—Mention the need to continue to strengthen the WHO as an instrument of global health policy; that the problems of health transcend the capacity of the U.S. government to solve and the need to look to WHO.

6. Work Plan for the Office of the Special Assistant for International Human Needs and Health (separate sheet on this)  

7. Office staffing needs now

8. Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP)

4 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Mahler, Warren Furth, and Bourne in the Oval Office on November 18 from 9:17 to 9:32 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found.

5 Not found.

293. Memorandum From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Califano, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gilligan)  

Washington, August 15, 1977

At my request, Peter Bourne is preparing an analysis of international health problems; it will be useful in determining how we can best
help the developing countries meet the basic human needs of their people. Since I have asked Peter to finish this work by the end of September, I would appreciate your helping him in every way possible. After I receive his report I will meet with you and discuss your recommendations about the proper course of action to take.

Jimmy Carter

294. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to His Assistant (Fill)

Washington, August 24, 1977

SUBJECT
Health Policy Review

The commitment to address global human needs has become a fundamental theme of the Carter Foreign Policy. International Health is a key element in that policy. In part, because the United States has exceptional technical capability and expertise in this area to offer the rest of the world, but also because even among the range of issues relating to human needs, health is the area that is the least controversial and the most free from broader political concerns. Our study should be aimed at determining how the resources of the federal government and of the United States in general could be mobilized most effectively to make this aspect of the President’s foreign policy a reality.

Specifically, our goal should be to (1) inventory the resources of the federal government in the international health area, (2) to look for a mechanism to integrate international health concerns into the foreign policy making process, (3) to coordinate the resources of the federal government in such a way that we maximize our effectiveness and minimize duplication and overlap, (4) to establish a broad blueprint as to what the role of the United States should be in the world in carrying its share of the total effort to alleviate suffering through a coordinated global health strategy, (5) to carefully examine various new initiatives which we might be able to start that would highlight the concern that the President has in this area and also be a major new contribution on

1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 8/1/77–8/31/77. No classification marking.
the part of the United States to dealing with this problem, and (6) to examine ways in which our contribution to the global health effort can be fully integrated with the activities of other nations and of multinational bodies particularly the United Nations Organizations.

The fundamental philosophical concept that we are attempting to communicate which differs somewhat from that of other studies going on with regard to international assistance is that we should define the international health area as a global problem and not a problem exclusively of the developing nations. This will allow us to get away from the traditional dichotomy that has plagued us in the past of donor and recipient nations, in which, the United States was in the posture of giving to other countries in need without a sense of shared responsibility for dealing with the suffering of their people. Even the concept of a North-South dialogue maintains the notion of donor and recipient, the only difference being that the United States has broadened the responsibility to include other industrialized nations. But it is still a question of charity, in which the wealthier nations have some obligation to the poorer nations. We hopefully will get beyond this, and conceive of health as being something which is a responsibility of all the people of the world regardless of where they live or what diseases they are locally afflicted by. In many respects the success in dealing with the problem of smallpox is a model which exemplifies this concept. There was a joint commitment by the countries throughout the world and by the World Health Organization that together the problem of smallpox would be attacked and defeated using a model that was quite different from our traditional foreign aid effort. And on this basis the problem has largely been virtually eliminated.

Specifically our project should be aimed at the following goals:

(1) Inventory all health resources within the federal government, in detail both in terms of personnel, budget and programs, so that it is possible to rapidly assess the extent of the federal resources in terms of the effort going into a given country or diseases entity or major programs area such as research or manpower training.

(2) We should examine the organizational structure of the federal government in order to determine the manner in which the international health issue can best be incorporated into the development of foreign policy. Military power has traditionally been the key ancillary component of our foreign policy. Over the years international economic policy has been incorporated as an important consideration in foreign policy development and has been placed managerially within the State Department structure. Even though President Carter has made clear that concern with basic human needs is a fundamental element in his overall foreign policy there is currently no single mechanism within the State Department to allow for the effective incorpora-
tion of this issue in the development of overall policy. This is in striking contrast to the manner in which other countries have successfully integrated concern for human needs into their foreign policy strategy. Only in the limited role of foreign aid to developing nations has concern for human needs any real role in the conduct of our own foreign policy. Our recommendations as a result may involve organizational changes within certain departments, particularly the Department of State.

(3) We should examine various alternatives that would allow for the centralized coordination of international health policy. This might take the form of a cabinet level coordinating committee, the development of a lead agency responsibility, or a focus in the White House. Coordination of sub-functions such as research, manpower, and the relationship with the private sector needs to be considered.

(4) To establish basic health goals for the next four, ten and perhaps twenty-five years with a clear cut plan as to how the United States would contribute to the achievement of those goals. It is clear that the development of such goals would have to be closely correlated with those established already by the World Health Organization. This is a function which we would not necessarily perform at this stage, but should be clearly an anticipated responsibility which the ongoing mechanism we set up would carry out in coordination with the Institute of Medicine and other groups.

(5) Having established the basic blueprint for America’s role in international health we should examine the specific ways in which each agency would play a role in the overall game plan. As clearly as possible we should define the role and mandate of each Department and Agency. At the same time we would also examine the manner in which the private sector and multilateral organizations would interface with the efforts of the federal government towards the achievement of those common goals.

In the long run I anticipate that we would end up with a global health plan with clear objectives and specific plans for reaching those objectives. As a derivative of that global plan we would have regional plans and specific goals and timetables for Africa, Latin America, Asia and other regions of the world, and at a third level specific goals for individual countries. These countries goals obviously would be the result of a carefully coordinated consensus between the global and regional goals which we had established and the goals which health planners in each nation had themselves established. I anticipate that in the long run the inter-agency coordinating mechanism that we recommend would then on a regular basis review our global strategy, our strategy for each region and our strategy in each individual country to insure that they were consistent with an overall plan. At those meetings the participants should have the capacity to present the entire federal effort going into a
country or a region, and the policy basis on which the decisions were made to commit resources from each individual agency. After reviewing the commitments ongoing from the various agencies in a country this would be compared with the long-range objectives and should there be deficiencies plans would then be made jointly between the agencies to enhance or modify our efforts in that country to better achieve the agreed upon goals.

I believe also that we should be able to carry out a similar periodic review focusing on individual disease entities and that we should set in conjunction with WHO specific goals for the eradication and control of the remaining major cripplers and killers in the world. At a third level we should examine the major generic causes of ill health, namely lack of potable water, lack of adequate shelter, inadequate family planning and should establish for those generic areas similar goals that could be reviewed on a periodic basis by a single coordinating entity.

295. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to His Assistant (Fill)

Washington, August 29, 1977

SUBJECT
Themes for World Health

In my previous overview memo I failed to adequately stress the use of health as a way, not merely to help us restore diplomatic relations with nations we do not currently have relations with but to bring us closer together with countries such as Burma and Somalia with whom we have formal relations, but are not close. Many of those countries are ignored or given a low priority because they are militarily or strategically unimportant. Traditional use of foreign aid for this purpose has not been as useful as had been hoped because of the lack of flexibility and the severe constraints under which it operates.

As a strategic element in our overall foreign policy, health has been extraordinarily underutilized. We have seen what Cuba has done in

1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 8/1/77–8/31/77. No classification marking.

2 See Document 294.
this regard, and our initiative with the Soviet Union could be a beginning example of how health could be used more aggressively.\(^3\) We should look at a potential for health to be used as an effective tool to swing countries towards us in a way that we only do now with armaments.

The argument will be made to us that most leaders, particularly in Africa, do not really care about health. We need to refute this strongly because whereas it may have been true in the past, and many people in the foreign policy establishment still believe it, times have changed and health now has far higher priority than at any time previously. Emphasizing the clear links between economic development, political stability and health is important.

\(^3\) See Document 286.

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296. Memorandum From Harry Blaney of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)\(^1\)

Washington, September 16, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Possible Community Water Initiative—Background Paper

Attached you will find a “Background Paper” for a possible U.S. community water initiative per our conversation. Material in the paper can be used for a variety of purposes including:

—justification for the initiative;
—briefing material for an explanation of the problem and our response to it; and
—discussion of various specific ways our assistance can be utilized.

For this reason the paper is not perfect for any one of these purposes and would have to be edited or tailored for individual use. Left out of the paper, for the moment, is exactly how the initiative should be organized and followed up on. It is my view that if it is enunciated it

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 9/1–9/15/77. Limited Official Use. A copy was sent to Garten.
will require some kind of special organizational backstopping if it is not to fall into the bureaucratic quagmire and be swallowed up thereby. (That’s what happened to many of Henry’s famous efforts in speeches!)²

I particularly call your attention to the section of the paper on U.S. assistance levels. You will note that FY 79 funds for community water programs now project a severe decline in overall funding levels. Obviously this problem must be dealt with.

If you need any more information or a retailoring of the material attached, please let me know.

Attachment

Background Paper on Community Water Initiative by the U.S.³

Washington, undated

The Problem

Only about 10 percent of the population in the developing countries utilize fully protected water sources. Less than a tenth of the villages of India have access to clean drinking water. In the developing countries many large urban areas’ drinking water supplies are unsafe. There are, however, great differences between countries and particularly between urban and rural areas. World-wide, about two-thirds of the LDC population is without “reasonably adequate” water or sanitation services. However, in many urban areas and especially in rural communities organic waste is accumulating and water supplies are being increasingly contaminated. The UN Children’s Fund estimates about one billion rural people in the LDCs and 200 million in urban shanty towns must use unsafe water sources.

A UN report has stated: “. . . Few could disagree that of any single activity in these urban areas, the improvement of water supply would have the greatest impact on the prevention of disease, the improvement of living conditions, the cleaning of streets, the beautification of parks and playgrounds, and the servicing of commercial, governmental and industrial operations. Similarly, if any single action were to be taken in these rural areas with the aim of reducing exposure to the most prevalent diseases, upgrading lifestyle (particularly that of women and chil-

² Presumable reference to Kissinger. Blaney was a Policy Planning Staff member during the Nixon and Ford administrations.
³ No classification marking.
dren), catalyzing community organization and participation, and setting a basis for the development of cottage industry and community development, it would be the improvement of water supply.”

In developing nations there is even less access to safe waste disposal systems than availability of safe drinking water. The contamination of food and water by human waste is the main reason for the dissemination of intestinal diseases carried by parasites and bacteria. For example, hookworm, which infects about 700 million individuals and causes severe anemia results from skin exposure to infected human waste deposited in surface soil. Further, there is a direct relationship between deaths due to diarrheal diseases in children under five and the availability of piped water systems. Water borne diseases also combine with other factors including induced fever which interfere with the body’s use of food energy which lowers nutritional value. More than five million people die every year from water-borne diseases.

Another dimension of the community water problem is the scarcity of water for growing urban centers. Many cities in the Third World as they rapidly grow due to population increase are finding it increasingly difficult to supply their citizens with clean water. The result sometimes has been the increase in sickness, the drying up or pollution of wells and conflict over water ownership between communities.

*International Institutional Background*

The problem of potable water was examined in varying degrees at several UN conferences including those on the Environment, Population, Habitat and most recently at the UN Water Conference at Mar del Plata in March 1977. Specifically, both Habitat and the Water Conference passed resolutions or recommendations about community water with the main aim dealing with the problems of the least developed and most seriously affected countries. The Conferences called for increased financial contributions, multilaterally and bilaterally, for assisting community water supply and sanitation.

Also emphasis was placed on improvement of domestic hygiene especially through education and motivation. The application of appropriate and low-cost technology was cited as key elements in dealing with this problem. Priority was also given to immediate national planning to give high priority to projects in this sector.

Specifically the key UN Water Conference recommendations were “(a) That where human needs have not yet been satisfied, national development policies and plans should give priority to the supplying

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4 “Report on Community Water Supplies”, UN E/CONF. 70/14 19 Jan. 1977. [Blaney placed this as a footnote at the bottom of the page but did not insert a footnote marker in the text.]
of drinking water for the entire population and to the final disposal of waste water; and should also actively involve, encourage and support efforts being undertaken by local voluntary organizations;

(b) That Governments reaffirm their commitment made at Habitat to ‘adopt programs with realistic standards for quality and quantity to provide water for urban and rural areas by 1990, if possible’;

(e) That in 1980 the national programmes which have been implemented for that purpose, and the extent to which the countries concerned have succeeded in mobilizing local and national support should be reviewed by an appropriate mechanism to be determined by the Economic and Social Council and based on the use of existing machinery, with a view to attaining coordinated action toward agreed targets;”

Extent of Present U.S. Assistance Efforts

Direct AID funding for community water supply and sanitation has had an irregular pattern varying between $16 million to 79 million between FY 76 and FY 78. In FY 78 AID is funding $43 million directly for community water supply and sanitation (CWS). In addition some $29.7 million is being spent on projects in which there is a CWS component. (These are mostly well sinking and farm projects.) In addition some $96.5 million in Supporting Assistance (SA) is funded for CWS largely in Egypt for the “Canal Cities Water and Sanitation” project. ($12 million also is going to Portugal.)

However, AID is tentatively only budgeting $23.4 million in FY 79 for CWS development assistance and $60 million for SA. Funding for projects in which CWS is a component and SA programs similarly will experience a major decline. An important reason for this is the inclusion in FY 78 funds of new major projects especially those in Egypt. However, the overall marked decline projected for FY 79 will impact untimely upon total amounts devoted to this sector.

Multilateral Programs

A number of international development lending institutions (IDLIs) have programs relevant to community water systems. In particular, the World Bank has projects in water supply and sewage. They also support some programs dealing with the related problems of population and nutrition but little in other areas of health. (They only have a Onchocerciasis Control Program in West Africa.) The Bank decided not to fund health programs directly but to incorporate health questions into the basic design of projects.

Character of U.S. Initiative

In keeping with the importance of the problem for human health and productivity and in following up on the relevant UN resolutions,
the US is proposing a major concerted global effort to develop for the poorest sectors in developing countries safe drinking water supplies and safe sanitation in keeping with the recommendations of the UN conference that dealt with this problem, including encouraging countries to have plans by 1980 for the accelerated development of drinking water systems. The US is prepared to join with other countries and international bodies to supply financial assistance to sound projects and to train local personnel. We are also ready to assist where we can and where we are asked, in the design of the plans now being developed.

A Comprehensive Strategy to Improve the Quality and Quantity of Community Water Supplies

Improvement in the availability and quality of community water supplies has a number of elements which must be integrated and understood for a successful program. The United States, within the context of its initiative and its available resources supports a carefully planned and integrated approach to community water problems. This integrated approach and our assistance should include, as appropriate, the following factors:

—Assistance programs should primarily focus on encouraging local management and resource allocation to safe local water supply and sanitation. The problem will not be solved alone by outside assistance which can only be a small percentage of the total funding required. Thus strengthening and providing incentives for national and local governments to undertake their own major efforts would be the main focus for foreign assistance.

—A community water program should be integrated into other related areas such as health, family planning and nutritional efforts. Also coordination with agricultural programs, especially irrigation, etc., will be necessary if rural areas are to receive maximum benefit.

—An element in a comprehensive strategy to provide safe community water is that of education and communication. Very simple and limited basic information, if communicated to individuals can make a great difference in their nutrition, sanitation and disease situation. This is especially important for expectant mothers and those with young children. Thus a community water initiative should include an educational component.

—In this regard, a maximum utilization of existing community structures, including schools, rural extension services, health facilities and local administration. Mass media and local schools should be utilized in providing basic hygiene information.

—The interaction between large-scale water projects, community water and sanitation systems and the spread of disease should be
studied and programs developed to ensure maximum coordination to minimize the possibility of untoward health hazards.

—Primary emphasis of the US effort will be on supplying initial foreign exchange costs (for example chlorination machinery and supplies) and assisting in the development of national and local planning and management capability. This might include, for example:

—Scholarships for Environmental and Public Works Engineers.
—Support for local educational and training institutions in the fields of environmental planning, sanitation, public health and hygiene, etc.
—Foreign exchange costs of necessary equipment.
—Support of programs aimed at preventing and cleaning up polluted surface and ground waters used for community purposes. (Part of such an effort would be the early detection of such pollution and identification of possible solutions.)
—Establishment of local laboratories for the analysis of water samples to assist in preventing contamination and to warn of possible dangers to human and animal health.
—Assistance in the installation, development and research associated with low-cost waste water treatment facilities or alternative acceptable economic uses of waste which would protect community water supplies.
—To up-grade the local capability of the public health and other relevant institutions to deal with water borne diseases particularly prevention techniques.
—Promote regional cooperation in specific areas where such cooperation would increase community water quality and quantity and prevent the spread of diseases.

—In addition, the US with other concerned countries would consider supporting global and regional research and studies required to deal with specific high priority community water problems especially those affecting the spread of diseases through the aquatic environment.

—The US is prepared to work with other countries and international organizations to deal more effectively with community waste problems including specifically to increase the amount of total resources devoted to this sector and the development of international uniform methods and standards for assessing and monitoring water quality and the control of waste borne diseases. We will urge international development lending institutions to increase their efforts and to specifically assist where long-term and large scale efforts are required. In addition, multilateral institutions can promote regional cooperation in this area.
Dear John:

Many thanks for your kind words on my participation in the Asia Society Dinner on June 30. I, too, enjoyed the occasion enormously. The time and setting were right for a serious discussion of our Asian policy, and I’m most grateful for the opportunity the Society afforded me. I think the reaction to the speech was positive in just about every respect.

In population matters, there are these recent initiatives: In his message to Congress on the environment, the President pointed to population growth as a major problem of world dimensions and made plain that the United States was prepared to respond promptly and fully to all requests for assistance. I have sent a message to all our posts emphasizing my personal concern with population matters and requiring that our Ambassadors give population questions their personal attention.

As you are probably aware, the Agency for International Development (AID), at the President’s request, is now undertaking a major study on the future of US foreign assistance, and I am assured that population considerations will be part of this analysis. Long-range global population growth is also being examined in the light of its impact on environment and resources.
Like you, I want to see good intentions and words about population issues translated into actions. And I intend to see that they are. Do keep me abreast of your own thinking in this regard.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,  

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6 Printed from a copy that indicates that Vance signed the original.

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298. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, September 27, 1977

Thoughts on Policy Areas Which May Be of Special Interest To You This Year

Following up on our earlier conversation, I wanted to suggest a few areas where I think your personal involvement and leadership would be particularly important to the Department and the government. I selected the issues described below based on a sense that the Secretary will be out front on such areas as SALT, the Middle East, China, and southern Africa, and that you could usefully take charge of other issues which (a) cut across several bureaus in the Department and/or involve other government departments, (b) are of potential Presidential concern, and (c) could make a significant difference in terms of this Administration’s tangible accomplishments.

Issues for your consideration:

1. Foreign Assistance: The importance and complexity of our foreign assistance program is obvious, as is the extensive involvement of the Department, other agencies, Congress and the President. The development of a foreign assistance program each year brings together security, economic, political and humanitarian considerations. However, the process has traditionally been poorly organized, as you have be-

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 9/16–9/30/77. Limited Official Use. Attached but not printed are a September 22 draft briefing memorandum from Lake and Hormats to Vance concerning the effectiveness of foreign assistance programs, an undated draft letter from Vance to Brzezinski on the same subject, and a copy of the annex to PRM–8.
come aware in recent days. You are already heavily involved in this year’s budget submission. My suggestion is that you permanently direct this process. I frankly don’t see how else it can be rationally done. During the coming year other foreign assistance issues will arise as well, including devising a strategy to gain public and congressional support; a major review of the effectiveness of our programs (see attached draft); and the submission to Congress of a totally new foreign assistance act.

2. Energy: Again, this is a subject which is of critical importance to our security, our economy, and our foreign relations. Energy policy is spread throughout the Department and throughout the government. Your leadership in the building would insure that the State Department’s voice gets adequate hearing, especially vis-à-vis the Department of Energy. And within the energy area you could drive many specific projects, including two of particular interest to us: a comprehensive policy towards Saudia Arabia, the pivotal actor in the world energy picture in the next several years; and a focus on energy development in the non-OPEC Third World, which is something the USG has talked about but has yet to move effectively on. S/P is working on papers on these subjects.

3. Agriculture: Few areas involve more voices in the government, or better illustrate the overlap between foreign and domestic policy. There is a major need to keep an overview focus on the many efforts that are now underway in the agricultural area. These include our efforts to establish an international system for grains reserves; a revamping of our food aid program; and Peter Bourne’s effort to develop a comprehensive policy to attack world hunger. S/P has in progress a paper which looks at all of these issues in the context of a strategy for the next year. Depending upon what the paper produces, you may wish to use it as a vehicle for coordinating at least the State Department’s voice on agricultural policy as well as influencing the development of agricultural policy generally in the US Government.

4. Technology Transfer: In this area we are long on participants and short on coherent policy. Technology transfer with regard to the developing countries is a particularly weak area in the Department and the government. Currently no set of objectives exists, nor does a strategy for meeting the diverse needs in the developing countries. I believe we should use the upcoming (1979) UN Science and Technology Conference to develop a coherent technology policy. At Ambassador Wilkowskki’s request S/P is about to embark on a major review of science and technology policy towards LDCs with the idea of distilling objec-

\[\text{See Document 213.}\]
tives for the Conference itself. We expect the paper to be reviewed by Father Hesburgh, who will be chairman of the US delegation.

5. North-South Relations: There is a major need in the government to assess continually where we stand overall with the developing countries with respect to such policies as trade, foreign assistance, commodities, technology, investment, arms sales, non-proliferation, etc. (We’ve attached the annex to the PRM 8, which discusses many of these issues in detail.) In the months ahead there will be a need to reassess how we are doing and where we are going, how our various policies fit together, and what the broad implications are for specific policy choices which we will be making. This is an area where the State Department is expected to lead and where you would be particularly influential in the interagency context.

6. Other Global Issues

There are a number of other global issues or problems that cut across bureau and agency lines, and which will require high-level direction. These relate to some of the areas described above but they have a certain substantive or bureaucratic independence. They include the following:

—Implementation of our population policy and objectives. There is a need to ensure that our assistance funds are directed towards the most important population growth countries and not spread out into lower priority areas. In addition there is a need to integrate our population, health and nutritional programs so that they reach into rural areas and the poorest sectors. Close coordination between AID and State and a strong diplomatic effort will also be required to enlist the support and resources of the LDC governments. (In addition, the internal State/AID bureaucratic problems, which we once discussed, still remain.)

—The coordination, successfully, of a number of international health initiatives. Soon there will be an action memo to the President, prepared by Peter Bourne’s office, outlining a comprehensive U.S. international health strategy, probably with a number of initiatives. In addition, the White House has approved a U.S. initiative with the Soviets to jointly work together to develop health projects in LDCs. Obviously, State will be centrally involved in these areas, and we will require extensive coordination among several bureaus and AID as well as strong State leadership in the interagency process.

3 See Document 302.
4 See Document 286.
Memorandum From Harry Blaney of the Policy Planning Staff to the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Lowrance)  

Washington, November 10, 1977

SUBJECT

Review of International Health Policy Draft

I. Summary

Overall the report is far too long, lacks focus, consistency and an adequate analytical framework and its recommendations are often too general or unrealistic. Thus, I believe, the report requires a serious and thorough redrafting. I recommend the present report remain in draft form and neither be published nor go forward for detailed review by Departmental principals or by the President until it has been edited, re-drafted in parts, and reviewed by staff. Specific suggested changes in the draft are contained in the attached copy along with some minor or other comments.

II. Specific Comments

There are a number of inappropriate or incorrect statements about US “diplomatic health interests” and our developmental assistance policies which need either correction or some modification. For example, in some places we imply that we have specific “commercial interests” in our health diplomacy which gives the impression that the chief benefit of some of our humanitarian assistance is to advance our commercial interests. I believe these statements are both inappropriate and incorrect.

In addition to inaccuracies in the characterization of US policy, the report does not examine or make recommendations with respect to important international health issues which need both examination and correction. For example, improving the structure and programs of the World Health Organization is entirely missing. This organization is a major component of any international health strategy and nowhere are

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Lot 80D72, Box 1, HEALTH—Peter Bourne. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Lake, Kreisberg, Garten, and Brizill.

2 Reference is to the 570-page draft report “Foundations for a New U.S. International Health Policy: Assessment of Problems, Programs, Resources, and Opportunities,” which Bourne had circulated for agency comment.

3 An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin next to “World Health Organization.”
there recommendations about how to increase the effectiveness of its programs.

Likewise, there is almost a total absence of priority setting with respect to international health problems, particularly in our assistance programs.

The relationship of the health sector to our entire development assistance strategy seems to lack definition and analysis with respect to the interaction between various sectors. There is no real understanding expressed in the report of how, for example, health problems relate to food and nutrition and even, more importantly, to tough questions such as provision of community water services, education, and urbanization. The assumption seems to be that health is somehow overarching many of these sectors and basically subservient to them. This perspective is in part reflected by one of the recommendations in putting environment and population under a Bureau of International Health. It seems to me this is a mistaken approach since it does not give adequate acknowledgement of the variety of forces at work in the development process or indeed of the problem of political and social environmental change which is fundamental to any development strategy. Clearly, health is vital to any development strategy but it is not the sole basis for either a human needs or a human rights policy.

In this same way, there is no recognition of limits to resources and personnel that might be available to the health sector. In a period of personnel and budgetary constraint within the USG it seems to me the process of priority setting is all the more urgent but there is little recognition of that reality. Further, there is no examination of appropriate funding levels for our bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. This, together with any substantive priorities in terms of international health problems (tropical diseases, cancer, toxic substances, air pollution, etc.), makes for a very serious deficiency in the policy usefulness of the report.

The characterization of the relationship between “health criteria” and human rights in evaluating the establishment and nature of rela-

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4 An unknown hand underlined the phrase “priority setting.”
5 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “relationship” and ending with the word “strategy.”
6 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “to” and ending with the word “that.”
7 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “no” and ending with the word “programs.”
8 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the phrase “health criteria” and ending with the word “rights.”
tions with other countries needs reexamination and does not appear consistent with actual policy or practice. (See page 300.) Further, the broad characterization of the relationship between international health and human needs while fundamentally correct does not help us go very far in relating international health to other important human needs sectors such as the provision of food, shelter, family planning services, etc. There is no acknowledgement of how these different sectors can interrelate with one another or the emphasis that should be placed on one or another in our actual programming. In the harsh world of governmental decision-making it is just these trade-offs which must be taken into consideration when budgetary decisions are made. Some policy guidance in this area seems useful but certainly is not contained in the present paper.

An additional problem with this particular report is the request for additional studies such as those contemplated on pages 298–299. There are a number of other requests for reports to the President, reports to Congress, new studies, etc. It seems to me that this examination was largely meant to raise those issues, pose options and obtain decisions. I can see the usefulness of specific studies, or better specific issue papers with recommendations for action, but general calls for additional broad-gauged studies seems to me to be a waste of bureaucratic resources if they end with the same kinds of generalities and conclusions that this report presently contains.

We have to be very careful about how we characterize human rights and the provision of development assistance. In some cases we will want to relate economic and social needs with human rights while in other cases the connection may not be all that evident. For example, there are many countries where political rights and social rights are comparatively upheld by the government but what with the extreme poverty there is little delivery of health and other services. We certainly would not want to get into the position of characterizing these countries for denying basic human needs or rights to their people. In some cases almost every country could be criticized including ourselves about provision of services to our poorer people.

In addition, I think we need to examine the recommendations with respect to the role of DOD and specifically the flow [role?] of military programs in the health sector. The report recommends that military programs in the international health area be “significantly expanded”. This issue probably needs closer examination and discussion in a some-

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9 An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “military” and ending with the word “expanded.”
what wider forum. There is already a debate about the use of military sources for “civic action” type programs, now euphemistically called “nation building.” Some of these policy issues, in fact, may adversely affect what we are trying to do in many of these countries in the human rights field. There appears to be no acknowledgement of that harsh reality in the report. In addition, there are important implications for AID (let alone for our DOD budget) in some of the proposals for significant increases in military assistance and increased personnel for this sector. (See pages 306–307.)

With respect to international organizations, as noted above, the report does not really examine how the WHO and other related organizations can be improved. While the report quite correctly raises the issue of the limit of US funding for international organizations at the 25% level, it does not specify what levels would be appropriate and how they might be directed for high priority programs. The report does not raise any of the more serious and important questions with respect to our relationship to WHO and other health related organizations. For example, it does not raise the issue of what relationship WHO should have with UNDP and UNICEF.

The report rightly raises the question of the impact of health on “global systems issues” but it does not go beyond mentioning this harsh reality and relate health specifically to how these global systems issues might be resolved by specific health related programs. For example, there is no analysis of the relationship between health services, population growth and food availability. (While it mentions OSTP’s role in such global systems issues it should also include CEQ which is now coordinating a Presidential study on population and environment.

Turning to the specific recommendations of the report, the following appear to be the appropriate State responses:

*The establishment of a Bureau of International Health:* We would best note that this is an almost impossible bureaucratic and resource task and would probably be counter-productive since it would isolate health from a number of other issues. It would also create a difficult bureaucratic situation among the nonhealth constituencies that would not look with favor on placing such items as nutrition and population under health. Rather, we should support the establishment of an Office of International Health in OES and under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment and Population. In this way environmental and population health matters can be integrated at that level and related also to the entire spectrum of our foreign policy concerns.

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10 An unknown hand underlined the phrase “‘global systems issues’.”

11 An unknown hand placed a tick-mark in the margin next to this sentence.
Interdepartmental Policy Panel and the establishment of an Inter-Agency Committee to Coordinate International Health Activities: My basic feeling would be that we should not establish these organizations in quite the form recommended by the report. Better options are available including: in place of abolishing the NSC Ad Hoc Committee on Population Affairs we might consider giving to that committee responsibility for population, health and nutrition which would parallel our recent policy emphasis in trying to integrate these sectors in our assistance programs. Another alternative would be to establish a separate NSC Ad Hoc Committee dealing with health issues chaired by the Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary in OES. Finally, the last alternative could have a White House chaired committee on international health perhaps run by OSTP or Peter Bourne with the State Health Office acting as Executive Secretary.

New International Health Attache Program: I believe we should oppose the creation of this corps. We are already under-going an examination of our Science Attache program and perhaps we might look at how science attaches can increase their responsibilities in the health sector. But unless we wish to have every U.S. Government agency send attaches to every Embassy, in effect duplicating the entire U.S. bureaucracy in each capital abroad, we need to find better alternatives to the suggestion in the report rather than accept such a proliferation. We might alternatively recommend that Foreign Service personnel be trained and involved in international health policy issues in their regular assignments abroad to a greater extent than has been the case heretofore. AID itself would probably be opposed to this idea since it would duplicate their health program officials that exist in many AID recipient posts.

Annual Report on International Health: It seems to me not an unreasonable requirement, but the difficulties are that such a report could become merely an exercise in description and not a mechanism for improvement of programs. Far better would be policy papers with recommendations on specific issues rather than a pro forma report.

III. General State Position and Response to White House

Finally, I believe the report should be considerably shortened and more focussed in its recommendations. At the very least pros and cons should be set forth for various controversial recommendations or alternatives offered. A sense of realism must be incorporated with respect to resources which might be available in this area.

12 An unknown hand placed a check mark in the margin next to this sentence.
In our approach to the meeting with Dr. Peter Bourne and other agencies, I believe we should take the following basic tack:\(^{13}\)

—The present report is too lengthy and diffuse\(^ {14}\) and needs considerable reworking before it is officially reviewed or further disseminated within the United States Government.

—We make this recommendation because we strongly support a sensitive and integrated international health policy and the expansion of our efforts in this field. We fear, however, that the present report may harm rather than help this process.

—We are prepared to provide detailed comments and if appropriate a new draft of the Chapter V section: in any case it should be reviewed again by staff and then by the involved principals.

—The Department of State itself intends to upgrade our health capability but this must be from within the context of the whole range of foreign affairs issues and responsibilities, including such issues as environment, non-proliferation, population, energy, etc. We will establish a new health office in OES but a bureau is unrealistic.

—We have some serious problems with a number of the recommendations and would like to provide alternative solutions to the problems they attempt to address.

—Finally, we should look at this report in the context of the action memorandum to the President and ensure that both cover the priority issues and will reflect fully the views of the participating agencies. These documents should be reviewed together.

\(^{13}\) Presumable reference to a November 16 White House meeting chaired by Bourne and attended by representatives from the Departments of State, HEW, and Treasury and AID. Lowrance summarized the outcome of the meeting in a November 16 memorandum to Brizill, Todd Minnies (E), Patrick Kennedy (M), Blaney, Lindsey Grant, Andrew, Palmer, Joseph Montville (NEA), McNutt, Pat Hughes (EUR), Judy Kaufman (EUR), Phyllis Oakley, and Kathy Smith (AF). (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Lot 80D72, Box 1, HEALTH—Peter Bourne)

\(^{14}\) An unknown hand underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “is” and ending with “diffuse.”
300. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy (Green) to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne)¹

Washington, November 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Foundations for a New U.S. International Health Policy

Among the recommendations in the chapter on Medical Diplomacy of the subject report² is one to establish “an interagency committee to coordinate international health activities of the various agencies relating to foreign policy” (p. 329). The recommendation goes on to say: “Ideally this committee would replace the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Affairs.”

Obviously, health and population are closely related, and the delivery of integrated health, family planning, and nutrition services is the key element of any health strategy for the developing world. However, population concerns extend far beyond the health field. They relate to, and interact with, such issues as food, environment, employment, migration, the status of women, education, social security, age at marriage, village organization, and social/economic development generally. Health relates to some of these issues, but there are many divergencies and differences. Hence, I do not see how a single committee could do justice to the many facets of health and population.

Thus, while I support the establishment of an inter-agency committee on international health, I favor preserving a separate population policy committee (i.e., the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy) and would expect that there would be close coordination between the health and population committees, with each being represented at the other’s meetings.

I would greatly welcome an early opportunity to discuss this and related matters with you. Please let me know when it would be convenient.

Marshall Green

¹ Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 1/9/77–12/1/77. No classification marking.

² See footnote 2, Document 299.
301. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Nye)\(^1\)

Washington, November 22, 1977

SUBJECT
Draft Presidential Decision Document on International Health Initiatives

The problems associated with the draft decision memorandum to the President\(^2\) reflect many of the same difficulties the Department had with regard to the larger International Health Report.\(^3\) These problems include:

—*Lack of Priority Setting:* The decision document does not address itself to the very thorny but key problem of where specifically we should direct our resources in the area of international health. Should we do more in the area of infant immunization, tropical disease research, nutritional assistance, population or basic health services? What should be the relative mix in our assistance program between bilateral and multilateral programs or one form of health assistance vs. other forms?

—*Lack of Specificity and Clarity:* In many of the recommendations there is a lack of specificity with respect to who should undertake a certain action, how much a particular action would cost and what the benefits might be in return for resources employed and the role of the various agencies in supporting the initiatives. Also the report does not

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\(^2\) Under cover of a November 16 memorandum to Maynes, Lake, Mink, Saunders, Katz, Holbrooke, Atherton, Vest, Moose, and Todman, Nye transmitted a copy of a November 9 draft decision memorandum from Bourne to the President concerning international health initiatives. Nye requested that the bureaus submit comments to T by November 21 in order for T to coordinate the Department’s suggested changes to the decision memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Lot 80D72, Box 1, HEALTH—Peter Bourne) An undated memorandum from Lannon Walker to Nye, a November 22 memorandum from Brewster to Nye, and a November 22 memorandum from Hormats to Nye, all outlining specific bureau concerns with the draft, are all ibid. Bourne also sent the draft decision memorandum to Brzezinski, Eizenstat, McIntyre, Watson, Harold Brown, Kreps, and Sam Brown under a November 17 covering memorandum, in which he indicated that he had distributed copies of the draft decision memorandum at the November 16 White House meeting (see footnote 13, Document 299). Bourne asked the recipients to provide comments on the draft decision memorandum by November 25. (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 35, International Health, 11/2/77–11/30/77)

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 299.
really set forth an international health strategy which was initially the purpose of the entire exercise. The President in reading this decision paper does not, in fact, receive any analysis priorities, or basic strategy, i.e., a meaningful context in which to make decisions about initiatives and additional resource allocation.

—Lack of Analysis of the Interrelationship of WHO and Related Programs to Those of Donor Countries, LDCs and Our Own Ongoing and Planned Health Activities: The decision memo does not relate existing and planned international health programs to those of the USG. There is no reference to programs by others or ourselves to deal with specific health problems.

—Inaccurate Characterizations: In a number of cases the report characterizes ongoing policies, programs and views of USG agencies in ways which do not fully or accurately reflect the existing situation. In particular, a statement that international health activities address only agency specific missions is unsound. Nor does the report recognize that AID health and other programs in fact are increasingly focussed on the poor and the provision of basic health care. This has been the case over the last year.

—Lack of Interrelationship/Coordination: The recommendations tend to be placed in isolation from associated strategies and programs in related areas. There is no recognition of ongoing policies and studies such as those dealing with AID development assistance. We may indeed want to increase AID funding for health programs proportionately to increased overall assistance levels, but no case has been made for this recommendation.

—Creation of Overly Complex and Burdensome International Health Bureaucracy and Coordinating Mechanisms: The recommendations to establish a three-tier international health bureaucracy headed by Dr. Bourne does not seem the most efficient approach to developing and coordinating an international health strategy. A simpler structure, coordinated and staffed in the Department of State or alternatively within the White House as part of the NSC system may be more time and cost effective.

Funding Recommendations

Finally, the memorandum puts a total cost of $50 million the first year rising to $76 million five years annually from now on the overall recommendations. Unfortunately the paper nowhere indicates how much improvement in the health and well being of the very poor will be achieved by these increased figures. For example, would we not be better off in taking this money and pledging it directly to poorer LDC basic health care programs aimed directly at such diseases as schistosomiasis, malaria, or the typical childhood diseases. I suspect that the
money expended on some of these programs more directly than that proposed in the Bourne recommendations would have a greater impact on basic health needs than the recommendations set forth in the draft memorandum. A troublesome factor in the entire recommendations and the larger report is the absence of any analysis and recommendations directed at global diseases themselves and what we might be able to buy by increasing our funding for dealing with them directly. Much of the funds recommended will go to already wealthy American or foreign professionals and relatively little will find their way to the provision of on-the-ground health care which could change significantly the present dismal LDC health situation.

With respect to the specific recommendations contained in the report, our comments are attached.4

4 Attached but not printed is a 3-page paper entitled “Comments on Specific Recommendations.”

302. Memorandum From Harry Blaney and Carol Lancaster of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake)1

Washington, November 29, 1977

SUBJECT

Peter Bourne’s World Hunger and Health Initiatives

Peter Bourne, a special assistant to the President, is leading studies of world health and hunger problems, aimed at developing Presidential initiatives in both of these areas. A third study involving narcotics is also planned. This memo outlines the current status of these studies and the specific difficulties they raise. The purpose is to alert you now to possible problems in the coming weeks as these efforts of Bourne lead to decision memos to the President.

Current Status

The world hunger working group has put together a draft options memo with a wide variety of proposals drawn from suggestions from 12 Executive Branch agencies, Congressional staffers and over 100 private individuals and groups. They are currently working on a second draft of the memo which will be distributed for agency comments in the coming weeks. The State Department has submitted to Bourne an extensive set of comments on these proposals and is now awaiting Bourne’s second draft.

The world health working group has produced a long study and a 20 page draft decision memo for the President. T is now working on a reply to Bourne which will be generally negative but polite. Orally we have given to Bourne’s staff stronger indications of our unhappiness with the documents. The concerned bureaus (including S/P) provided to T detailed critical comments on these documents. Their main problem is that they do not really address actual global health problems. Benson and Nye have been involved in discussions of these papers with Bourne. Further, D has had contact with HEW and the White House on the problem. Reworked versions of the health report and the Presidential “decision document” are to be seen by us and other agencies before they go into the President.

Finally, we have been told that Bourne is interested now in the field of education and is focusing on the forthcoming UN “Year of the Child.”

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2 See Documents 240 and 241.
3 See Document 231. A summary of the final report is printed as Document 245.
4 See footnote 2, Document 301. The version of the November 9 draft decision memorandum that Bourne forwarded is 11, rather than 20, pages long.
5 See Document 304.
6 For Bureau comments on the draft decision memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 301. IO, OES, and ACTION comments on the draft report are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Lot 80D72, Box 1, HEALTH—Peter Bourne and the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 11/9/77–12/1/77.
7 Benson responded to Bourne in a November 14 letter, noting that while the draft report provided a “more comprehensive overview of this field than ever attempted before,” the administration would benefit from a more succinct draft. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Lot 80D72, Box 1, HEALTH—Peter Bourne)
8 Blaney sent a personal note to Lake on November 29, commenting: “I have been told very confidentially that there have been direct conversations between Christopher and Califano about the ‘Bourne’ problem. Also, discussions have taken place with various White House officials on this overall problem.” (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, RC 245, Withdrawn Box 1, Envelope 1: 11/29/77—From Harry Blaney (Health Program))
Problems

These studies, handled through the Bourne channel, present a number of problems:

1. Bourne is, in effect, using studies and decisions in broad functional areas to drive policies affecting a disparate set of domestic and international programs. Indeed, the scope of the recommendations of both studies go well beyond issues falling into the functional areas of health, or hunger, for example:

   —one recommendation in the hunger memo would require a radical reorganization of our agricultural trading arrangements, probably including the establishment of a government grains board to control trade.
   —the health study recommends setting up a Bureau of Health in the Department of State.

   Moreover, these recommendations are not related to other studies or efforts to develop policy elsewhere in the bureaucracy which deal with the same issues.

2. The quality of the analysis produced by both the hunger and health working groups is inadequate and, at times, dead wrong. The Department is nevertheless put in somewhat of a defensive position in having to address the analytical flaws in the studies, thereby diverting attention and energy from the recommendations and from devising new ideas in these areas.

3. These studies have thus far unfortunately produced few new initiatives which can be justified on substantive grounds. What may finally result from these efforts is a focus on existing organizations or institutional arrangements for dealing with these problems which could be futile at best and disruptive at worst.

4. The process in which these studies and recommendations have been developed is troubling:

   —these working groups threaten to short-circuit the normal policy making process (i.e., NSC, PRC, OMB, etc.) on a number of issues where a more adequate and careful consideration of the issues is planned or underway.
   —it is not always clear when final memos are scheduled to go to the President or whether agencies will have an opportunity to review them before they are sent.

Conclusion

Neither study or draft decision memo is yet complete and objectionable statements or recommendations may yet be removed. Nevertheless, at some point we may wish to attempt channeling these exercises into the PRC or other NSC mechanisms, although Bourne would probably resist this strongly.
Memorandum From the Assistant to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Fill) to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) \(^1\)

Washington, November 30, 1977

SUBJECT
A Thought re Implications of a New International Health Policy

If we established as a principle of foreign policy that we would not deny any needy nation international health assistance it would be a first in U.S. history. By establishing this moral principle we would not hesitate to award a license for lifesaving drugs to be purchased for Cuba, we would not equivocate on Iraq, we would send vaccine to Mozambique, etc.

Certainly we’ve pointed out that the field of International Health has multiple objectives, but have we established that medical diplomacy will not be used as a weapon to be offered or withdrawn depending on the political climate?

The problem as I see it is terminology. The definition of the word diplomacy is different in State from HEW’s and even AID’s. What HEW and AID are saying is let’s use medical diplomacy in a positive humanitarian sense and not in the same way we apply “diplomacy” to our arms sales decisions. We are grappling with this issue.

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\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 35, International Health, 11/2/77–11/30/77. No classification marking.
304. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Benson) to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne)\(^1\)

Washington, December 1, 1977

Dear Peter:

Since your November 9 draft of the Presidential decision document on international health\(^2\) grows out of the draft Report on which we have already commented, the remarks in my letter of November 14\(^3\) apply equally to the proposed decision memorandum.

The State Department believes that the memo to the President needs substantial revision. The memorandum will be most helpful to all of us if it asks for the charge to *explore and appraise* the possibilities instead of asking for a mandate to *establish* programs and institutions. Those of us in State concerned with health will have to negotiate carefully with our internal management offices, with AID, HEW, EPA, and other programmatic bureaus, and with the OMB. This will be true for any of the major decisions. Further, these plans cannot be made outside of the much larger contexts of the long-term planning for AID, our State Department review of the technical attachés’ program, and so on.

*State Department role (initiative 2, page 6).* The Department, as I have assured you, is firmly committed to sharpening its attention to health and related issues. Our intention is to establish a clear focal point for health in the Department, to become staffed and able to identify and seize upon opportunities as they arise, to represent the internationalist cause to the domestic agencies, and to “broker” interests in this area effectively. For the State Department to become able to do these things would constitute a major improvement.

But the leadership must be shared with HEW and the other departments and agencies. Initiatives are not likely to enjoy long-term success unless the agencies that carry the required resources and technical competence are deeply involved in their development. The State Department is evolving to take on a larger role in space policy, energy policy, environment policy, oceans and Antarctica policy, technical-development policy, and communications policy—as well as health policy. Considerations of both interdepartmental relations and internal

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\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 301.

\(^3\) See footnote 7, Document 302.
bureaucratic limitations dictate that we keep our expectations realistic. We will work closely with HEW, AID, and others to improve coordination, and we will urge those agencies to upgrade their international offices.

**Health initiatives as a primary element of foreign policy (pages 1 and 2).** A better statement of what can realistically be expected, given all the political, military, economic, and other issues that have to be attended to, is that the United States should seek to give greater emphasis to international health issues and to better integrate health considerations with those of development assistance, cooperative research and the like. To overstate will serve no purpose.

**Global Health Cadres (page 5).** Although there doesn’t seem to be much initial enthusiasm for this proposal in State, AID, or HEW, the decision memo might call for consideration of the idea by these departments. The State Department is currently engaged in a review of the technical attachés’ program (science counselors, and energy, minerals, fisheries, and other attachés) and the question of how adequate the technical representation in our embassies is. We will certainly examine the desirability of health attachés as well.

**Interagency committees (implementation Task Force, page 5; Interagency Strategic Coordinating Committee, page 6; and Executive Policy Group, page 6).** It is just too early to consider establishment of all these committees until our objectives become clear. Whatever group turns out to be necessary should probably be set up either within the NSC Domestic Council or other well-established structures.

**Major conclusions (page 3).** These are poorly worded. For instance, the first “conclusion” is of little guidance as it stands: “A new ethic is required—one of global collaboration among all nations based on humanitarian not ideological themes, asking what we can do together not how much we can or ought to do for another.”

The second “conclusion” is also diffuse, and it says that “[The President’s] basic human rights policy is an ideal framework for global health collaboration”; this should be clarified either to discuss the human rights approach to health issues (which the Report did not address very fully) or the basic human needs strategy.

The third “conclusion”—that “the full U.S. scientific and technical potential is not directed to help meet basic human needs worldwide. Significant changes are required to do so”—deserves amplification. Specifically what changes are needed? Again, perhaps the memo could elicit directions to HEW, OSTP, NSF, and others to review the long-term health-related R&D agenda.

**Priorities.** The Report neither lays down priorities nor sets forth criteria to be used in generating priorities. If in the revision process these could be accomplished, considerable guidance to the U.S. government
and health communities will have been provided. The biggest problem in this entire sector is to choose efficaciously among the many possible activities. For example, should we attack tropical diseases, or maternal and infant malnutrition, or what? If tropical diseases, which one? And by eradication of vectors, or by development of vaccines? Bilaterally, or through multilateral efforts? The Report gives little guidance. What the memo could do is call for the departments and agencies to establish and adopt explicit priorities for their international health endeavors (for example, to emphasize prenatal and infant health, or to target particular infectious diseases). Beyond that, of course, these priorities should eventually be reflected in budgets.

**Congressional relations.** The document, like the Report, needs to give much more attention to the need to work closely with the Congress, to consult early, and to design initiatives within the limits of Congressional tolerance.

**Overall tone of the memorandum.** Reference to “prevailing passivity and skepticism” pages 2 and 4) are inaccurate and gratuitous and will serve no constructive purpose. Also, the description of the failures of the “trickle down” approach to development assistance (page 2), though correct in its general criticism, does not give fair recognition to the efforts and potential of the Peace Corps and other such activities. These problems can be taken care of by editing.

**Encouraging private sector involvement** (page 5, item B). The major study of incentives of private sector involvement might be conducted better by a nongovernmental institution than by the federal government.

**Proposed Presidential Initiative** (page 5, first paragraph of item C): “The proposals which follow build on existing programs or create new ones; they would specifically place your Administration’s stamp on basic human needs in a comprehensive way which Senator Humphrey, President Roosevelt and President Truman, for example, have been trying to do since the 1940’s.” This paragraph is both surprising and unnecessary.

**AID program** (page 3). The recommendation that any increases in health, population, and nutrition in the AID budget be made proportional to any increase in the FY 79 budget needs examination. The figures may even need to be increased above that level, but such a decision should be taken as part of an overall review of health and other priorities relating to basic human needs. There is no reference to the various AID reorganization studies. Organizational decisions should not be made independently of an integrated view of AID’s future.

**Other proposals:** research and training centers (page 6); global health consortia (page 7); Fogarty Institute (page 8); Presidential Scholars (page 8); National Endowment for International Health Assistance (page 10). None of
these receives much support from our bureaus. These proposals don’t address the larger problems, they risk seeming gimmicky, and the budgets proposed are in any event far too small to make much impact.

The above statements reflect views held throughout the State Department. If these concerns are accommodated in the revised decision memorandum, international health and the Administration will be better served.

We continue to offer our assistance, and we look forward to seeing the next drafts of the memo and the Report.

My best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Lucy Wilson Benson

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4 Benson signed “Lucy” above her typed signature.

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305. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Gilligan) to the President’s Special Assistant for International Health (Bourne)

Washington, December 29, 1977

SUBJECT

Executive Branch Organization for International Health and Agriculture

You have now received comments from various agencies on your proposals for U.S. initiatives to improve world health and alleviate world hunger. I understand Secretary Califano’s comments emphasize that HEW should assume “lead” responsibility for international health, in addition to its domestic responsibilities. USDA has made a similar suggestion regarding international agriculture. While we have always encouraged greater HEW or USDA involvement in international programs, the shift they now suggest would divest AID of much of its legislated responsibility for U.S. assistance to developing countries.

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 35, International Health, 12/1/77–12/29/77. No classification marking.

2 See footnote 6, Document 302.
Their proposals raise the issue of whether U.S. assistance programs in agriculture and health—and by implication in population, education, technology, environment, and other areas—should remain principally the responsibility of one development agency or be dispersed to various government Departments. This is a fundamental question of government organization that concerns your work, the interagency study of future directions for foreign assistance, and OMB’s proposals for reorganization of the Executive Branch.

If the United States is to make a serious attack on problems of development, one agency must be the focal point for responsibility, drawing upon the best skill and experience the U.S. public and private sectors have to offer. The problems of developing countries must be this Agency’s priority concern. A long-term commitment must be made to strategies and programs that meld together various sectors and disciplines. If development assistance programs are folded into other Departments they will inevitably be given less attention than the principal programs of these essentially domestic agencies.

Meeting basic needs in poor countries—e.g., by improving health or agricultural productivity—requires approaches radically different from those required in the United States. In developing countries half of those who die are children under five, and the underlying causes of death include malnutrition, high fertility, and parasitic infection. In developed countries mortality centers in the population over 50 and arises from heart attack, stroke, cancer, and other conditions often associated with rich diets, obesity, and sedentary work habits. The solutions to health problems in developed and developing countries also differ dramatically; few LDC’s can afford per capita health expenditures of more than a few dollars annually. Thus they must rely less on hospitals and physicians and much more on paramedics and traditional healers.

Similarly in agriculture, American success derives from large farms with relatively few people but much heavy equipment, irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides, and so on. But poor food-deficit countries must rely on small farms, labor-intensive approaches, and the sparing use of capital to spur agriculture.

Furthermore, health and agricultural programs in developing countries are closely linked. Improved health depends heavily on programs in agriculture that enhance nutrition and incomes; agricultural productivity is much influenced by health programs that affect labor productivity. In general, programs in several sectors, as well as underlying economic and social policies, strongly affect the achievement of objectives in any one sector.

Effective development assistance programs thus require consideration of health, agriculture, and other problems in the framework of a
broad development strategy. This approach lies at the heart of the “New Directions” legislation underlying AID’s programs;³ it has been reinforced by the enthusiastic endorsement given the basic human needs strategy by this Administration.

AID’s job, under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, is to design and implement such programs. Fragmenting responsibility for assistance programs now among several agencies would destroy the solid base that has been built. As a practical matter, these other agencies cannot establish mini-foreign-aid offices, operate the necessary overseas staff, or coordinate international assistance efforts effectively. The inevitable result of such fragmentation would be a call for one agency to manage and coordinate assistance programs. We would have come full circle, and lost precious time in the interim.

I urge you, therefore, to resist vigorously any proposals to fragment development assistance responsibilities within the U.S. Government—especially by dispersing authority to agencies whose primary concerns are domestic.

John J. Gilligan

³ Reference is to amendments to the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 93–189; 87 Stat. 715) that added a statement of policy to the original Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195; 75 Stat. 424) emphasizing “basic human needs,” such as food and nutrition.
306. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter1

Washington, January 9, 1978

SUBJECT

International Health

On July 30th, 1977 you sent me a note referring to the issue of International Health directing me to prepare from you to key members of the Cabinet a memo “directing them to cooperate with you in doing the analysis—I can call them in later for a meeting when I understand from you what we need to do.”2 In collaboration with the involved agencies we have completed that analysis producing a 500 page report which we have circulated for comment both within the government, and in the private sector. It will be published as an administration document.3 This memo summarizes the recommendations of that report, and following your trip4 I would like to request that we have the meeting you proposed.

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 34, International Health, 1/9/77–1/1/77. No classification marking. The memorandum is mistakenly dated January 9, 1977. A draft of the memorandum, December 14, is in the Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 35, International Health, 12/1/77–12/29/77. Hutcheson sent copies of the memorandum to Vance, Blumenthal, Califano, Harold Brown, Sam Brown, and Gilligan under a January 11 covering memorandum, requesting agency responses by January 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780044–1213) In a January 13 memorandum to Moose, Todman, Holbrooke, Vest, Atherton, Maynes, Katz, and Lake, Benson asked for bureau comments on Bourne’s January 9 memorandum, commenting: “Please note that the Bourne memorandum is not a draft.” Benson also provided a copy of a January 13 draft memorandum from Benson to Bourne, prepared in OES, which offered “either minor modification or support of statements” contained in the January 9 memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Under Secretaries of State for International Security Affairs—Files of Lucy W. Benson and Matthew Nimetz: Chronological Files, Human Rights Country Files, Security Assistance Country and Subject Files, 1977–1980, Lot 81D321, Box 2, Lucy Wilson Benson Chron Jan 78) The final Department of State response to Bourne’s memorandum, sent to the White House in the form of a January 18 memorandum from Tarnoff to Hutcheson, concurred with the “general proposition” of Bourne’s memorandum but underscored that the President should not be “asked to make decisions on the recommendations” until several of the initiatives had been discussed and further refined. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780044–1210)

2 Not found. It was presumably sent after Bourne’s July 29 meeting with the President; see Document 292. For the memorandum to Cabinet members, see Document 293.


4 The President traveled to Poland, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia, France, Egypt, and Belgium December 29, 1977–January 6, 1978.
I. Goals for the Study

—To survey and inventory current U.S. government activities in the area of International Health including legislative authorities, budget allocations, policies and programs.

—To examine present goals and philosophies which currently guide our International Health activities, and to assess their effectiveness and relevance to the health needs of the world today.

—To examine the extent to which International Health is integrated with other governmental activities including the formulation of foreign policy, domestic health policy, development assistance as well as commercial and trade policy.

—To review the relationship between the U.S. Government’s International Health programs, private voluntary agencies and multilateral organizations including international financial institutions.

—To review present mechanisms for interagency coordination and for long range planning and goal setting of International Health programs.

—To recommend organizational, programmatic and legislative actions that would improve the existing use of current resources and create a sense of a new Carter initiative as a concrete manifestation of the commitment to meeting global basic human needs.

II. Findings

The United States interests in International Health involve the following: the elimination of the remaining major infectious diseases afflicting mankind (being primarily the product of poor sanitation and malnutrition, and involving for the most part the developing world), the provision of access to a basic minimum level of health care for people everywhere, the pooling of knowledge and fostering of collaborative research activities to advance medical science, the use of medicine as an instrument to form a common bond outside traditional political channels with countries we wish to draw closer to us, and the development of markets overseas for products of the American health industry.

—22 Federal agencies are involved in International Health, spending $522 million in FY 1976, under more than 100 separate legislative mandates.

—Involvement in International Health while traditionally thought of as exclusively an aspect of foreign aid, includes not only development assistance, but commercial, diplomatic, and environmental considerations with the majority of U.S. Government expenditures currently being made outside the developing world.

—There is no government-wide coordinating mechanism to establish overall policy, goals or programmatic priorities. Extraordinary re-
sources exist within the government that are not being utilized with anywhere near their full potential. New scientific discoveries are nowhere near as important as better application of current knowledge and resources.

—The allocation of U.S. resources is not currently tied to any assessment of real global health needs or priorities determined geographically, nor is it in terms of what the remaining majorcripplers and killers are as they affect lost human potential and compromised economic development. Even for a given country it is often impossible to tell which Federal agencies have programs there with no overall coordination to work towards mutually agreed upon goals.

—While both you and Secretary Vance have made repeated strong statements about the importance you attach to meeting basic human needs, there is little or no integration of International Health into the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. This is largely due to the lack of an organizational focus with technical expertise in health or other basic human needs at a high level in the State Department. It is also attributable to a traditionally held view that such human concerns are “non-conventional diplomacy”.

—Fragmentation in the Executive Branch is compounded by overlapping and competing jurisdictions among different committees in the Congress.

—The effective use of some of our greatest International Health resources particularly in HEW and DOD is currently severely compromised by specific and generally outdated legislative restrictions.

—There is a disproportionate focus on the development of high technology health care in hospitals and the training of physicians rather than upon prevention and community-based primary care programs to reach poor and rural people. Such international research cooperation as has occurred has overwhelmingly emphasized problems of developed industrialized nations such as cancer and heart disease.

—The resources committed to International Health by the private sector exceed those of the Federal Government. Academic institutions, missionary, private voluntary organizations and other humanitarian groups as well as business express a strong desire to coordinate their efforts with the Federal Government, but believe there is no effective mechanism for doing so.

III. Recommendations

We recommend that a program called “New Directions in International Health” be initiated, which could be identified as an initial fulfillment of your promise to implement a global basic human needs strategy. Consistent with your decisions in the recent memo relating to
International Health, Population Growth, and Women’s Issues  1009
devlopment assistance,\textsuperscript{5} to stress aid to the poorest people in the
world, we feel attention to this group should be given the highest pri-

ority in the International Health initiative. We recommend the fol-

lowing goals:

—To develop and pursue a strategy aimed at improving the health
status of the 1 billion poorest people in the world.

—To emphasize the delivery of community based primary health
care, cost-effective training at the most appropriate level of health per-

sonnel as near to the point where they will deliver services, and the de-

velopment of research programs which place a priority emphasis on
the remaining major health problems, especially infectious diseases, of
the developing world.

—To encourage special emphasis on dealing with the generic
problems of ill health, malnutrition, lack of clean water supplies,
over-population and poverty, putting greatest emphasis on the preven-
tion rather than the treatment of disease.

—To focus, coordinate, and when appropriate reshape U.S. goals
in International Health to achieve a government-wide coordinated pro-

gram which would reduce current fragmentation, and insure that ex-

isting resources were used more effectively.

—To strengthen existing institutions in our government which al-

ready deal with International Health problems, and build a greater
awareness of International Health and concern for basic human needs
as a more legitimate and consequential element in our foreign policy.

—To establish certain specific new initiatives with which you per-

sonally could be identified.

—To engage, through your leadership, the active participation of
nations around the world both bilaterally and through multilateral or-

ganizations, especially WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank, in this
endeavor.

—To encourage greater private sector involvement in Interna-
tional Health activities, and a closer partnership with the Federal
Government.

—To plan a more coordinated and effective use of medicine as a
tool in our overall diplomacy particularly in dealing with countries that
have not traditionally been friendly towards the U.S.

\textsuperscript{5} Presumable reference to a November 9 memorandum from Owen to Carter sched-
IV. Decisions

A. Improving Coordination and Long Range Planning

The key to a new International Health program is not the expenditure of large amounts of new money, but a reprogramming and better utilization of present resources. Establishing an effective interagency coordinating mechanism can be the difference between success and failure in this endeavor.

Apart from the fragmentation of International Health programs between 22 agencies, a major problem exists because of divided responsibility and authority among the largest agencies. A.I.D. has the bulk of the program funds, but limited technical expertise. H.E.W. has exceptional technical resources, but considerable internal fragmentation; it is legislatively restricted from engaging in international activities that do not directly benefit the U.S. population. The State Department has the formal policy making authority in this area, but currently lacks the organizational structure or technical competence at a high level to carry out this responsibility or to take the lead which theoretically it should. Treasury regularly makes major decisions, particularly regarding the I.F.I.’s, that have extraordinary impact on world health, often without any awareness of that impact. Peace Corps, NASA, DOD, the Commerce Department, C.I.A., the Veterans Administration, E.P.A. and others all have specific specialized areas of interest, but make decisions in their own interests, in isolation, unrelated to any overall coordination or policy.

Among the agencies there is general agreement that a coordinating committee, or committees, need to be set up. There is, however, disagreement as to who should have the lead responsibility. Secretary Califano states, “the chief spokespersons on International Health affairs should be the Secretary of DHEW, the Assistant Secretary for Health and the Surgeon General. Any interagency committee on International Health should be chaired by H.E.W.” This position is opposed by A.I.D. Governor Gilligan is concerned about setting a precedent that would go beyond the health area and comments, “I urge you to resist vigorously any proposals to fragment development assistance responsibilities—especially by dispersing authority to agencies whose primary concerns are domestic.”

The organizational decision paper on development assistance currently being prepared by Henry Owen may have some bearing on this area, however, in the meantime, I believe that given this conflict the most effective coordination can be achieved by:

(a) Overall Coordination—Maintaining overall coordination out of my office as we have done up till now. This would avoid some territorial problems and also would symbolically maintain your own direct
interest. It should be clear that this would not be a permanent new structure, but a short term mechanism to insure the momentum of a new initiative establishing overall policy and priorities. I believe in this way we can duplicate the highly successful coordination we have achieved in the drug area, a similarly fragmented field.

(b) **Substantive Program Planning**—Establishing a committee chaired by DHEW that would be responsible for further developing a government-wide substantive program in International Health. This would involve identifying those disease entities amenable to major assault, geographic regions or countries where U.S. resources could have a major impact, and special generic areas such as vector control, global epidemic surveillance and clean water supplies that might be appropriate to emphasize. In coordination with other agencies they would determine how the available resources could be mobilized and coordinated to deal with the priority areas they had identified. This committee would also establish sub-committees to address the setting of research, manpower development and training priorities.

(c) **Coordination with Foreign Policy**—Establishing a committee chaired by the Department of State that would review region by region, and country by country, our goals and priorities in the International Health area. The U.S. Government resources going into each country would be carefully inventoried, a determination made of whether current expenditures are adequately coordinated, and aimed at achieving agreed health goals for that country. We anticipate A.I.D. would play the major role in the review of the countries where they are involved. We are prepared to ask the State Department to begin immediately such a review of Africa, and to provide them the appropriate background material which my office has prepared. This committee would also address the issue of how International Health activities could be most effectively coordinated within our missions overseas, and how host countries could best be made aware of the range of resources, such as appropriate training opportunities, now available in the United States. This committee would also address the issue of how International Health could be better incorporated into our overall conduct of foreign policy.

(d) **Upgrading the Emphasis on International Health**—Understanding that in order to realize fully the U.S. Government’s potential in the International Health field certain internal changes need to be made within the departments. In response to the high priority you have attached to this area some of these changes already have been instituted. DHEW is completing an extensive internal review of its International Health functions, upgrading its emphasis, centralizing coordination and considering the creation of a position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Health. The role of C.D.C., which has already es-
established a worldwide reputation for excellence, is to be expanded. The State Department lacks the high level focus with technical competence to permit adequate incorporation of health or basic needs concerns in general into the formulation of foreign policy. More important, a change in philosophy is needed so that concern for basic human needs is accepted as a legitimate aspect of foreign policy. This I believe can only be overcome by clear direction from you. They are moving now to create such a competent high level focus. A similar problem exists in Treasury. The Department needs to heighten its own awareness of International Health in internal decision making. Treasury should acquaint the IDLIs with evolving U.S. policies on International Health, and encourage them to give greater priority to an appropriate role for projects touching on health among their overall development loan programs. In DOD, legislative constraints and old but perpetuated administrative decisions continue to restrict adequate utilization of our single greatest untapped resource in this field. A clear instruction from you to all of the agencies to seek ways to make their resources more readily and effectively available is important.

I believe that the steps outlined above, if you approve, would overcome the problems of fragmentation and the present lack of clearcut long range goals providing the framework for an effective Presidential initiative in this area.

**DECISION:**

B. Presidential Initiatives

In addition to the significant impact an improved and streamlined planning and coordinating mechanism would have on world health, I believe, certain specific new initiatives should be undertaken which could be identified as reflecting your personal involvement.

(a) World Blindness—More than 30 million people in the world are blind, most of them from preventable causes. A major administration effort to reduce blindness worldwide would have dramatic appeal, could be uniquely and distinctively identified with you from other present International Health emphases, would be geared to the poorest people in the world as well as being relevant to the industrialized nations including the U.S., and would not be vulnerable to the criticism that we were saving lives that would only amount to more mouths to feed. It would of necessity result in a program with special emphasis on the Middle East. It would overlap and complement, (without competing with) the World Health Organization’s highly visible Tropical Disease Research Program. I also believe it would generate strong in-

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6 The President did not indicate his decision to approve or disapprove any of the recommendations in this memorandum.
ternational and domestic support, for instance, from Lions Clubs. By re-programming existing budgeted funds, this program could be implemented immediately. An enhanced and expanded plan could be prepared for next year’s budget cycle.

DECISION:

(b) Rural Water Supply—It is estimated that by making clean drinking water readily available to all people in the world, 50 million lives a year would be saved. The World Health Organization has set this as a priority, and 1980 is the beginning of the U.N. “Decade of Water”. Following the two U.N. Conferences this year on Water and Desertification an interagency coordinating committee chaired by the State Department has been established to develop overall U.S. policy on global water supply. While less dramatic than some other initiatives, strong clear support by you of the goal of clean drinking water for people everywhere would, in the long run, probably have the most significant lasting impact on world health of anything you could do. Initiating programs that make clean drinking water available also will significantly affect, for the better, the role of women in the developing world, who spend major parts of their lives drawing and carrying water from distant sources. While the potential level of expenditure for this purpose is almost unlimited, a major start can be made now without new funds, and careful consideration can be given to expanding our programs in this area in next year’s budget.

DECISION:

(c) International Health Service Corps—There is a great deal of interest in the possibility of establishing a health oriented volunteer program that would use American volunteers at all levels of health expertise. Such a program, which would clearly be identified as your concept, would be formed building on the Peace Corps in ACTION and the National Health Service Corps in the Health Services Administration in DHEW.

ACTION currently has over 1,000 health volunteers in such service. This number could be expanded and the proportion of health professionals among them increased. ACTION should continue to increase its efforts in health programming in order to ensure effective assignment and performance of these volunteers.

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7 See Document 332.
9 See Document 296.
The National Health Service Corps can apply two of its current functions to an International Health Service Corps: (1) to recruit personnel and administer their assignment to positions programmed for them by ACTION; and (2) increase the number of Public Health Service Scholarships awarded annually allowing a like number of scholarship recipients to satisfy their scholarship payback requirements by serving in the International Health Service Corps. A slight modification to existing legislation would result in 150 to 250 scholarship recipients serving annually in the International Health Service Corps. This would have no adverse effect on domestic health manpower needs, yet would greatly improve chances to recruit health professionals for international service. As experience has shown many will eventually return to domestic health service. The Health Services Administration in DHEW could also serve as a recruiting clearing house for other government agencies in International Health and in managing development of U.S. Government personnel for careers in International Health. Estimated cost would be $3–5 million as an additional increment over present expenditures.

**DECISION:**

(d) **Up-Grading the Fogarty International Center at The National Institutes of Health**—Specific legislative authority should be developed to upgrade the existing Fogarty International Center at the National Institutes for Health\(^\text{10}\) making it a more visible focus as a center of excellence for the development of International Health policy. This action would provide needed organizational strength and authority for the center to carry out long range studies of International Health problems. It would also raise its stature in the U.S. and international scientific communities reflecting the new priority attached to International Health by your Administration. In particular, the Center would address the issue of long range manpower development, stimulating involved mobilization, and coordination of the U.S. academic medical community to build health skills in the developing world. In conjunction with A.I.D. they would work towards the development of International Health consortia among academic institutions in this country that would establish linkages with institutions in the developing world aimed at building their capabilities in research and training. These consortia could in particular address the problems of blindness and world water supplies.

**DECISION:**

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\(^{10}\) Named after late Representative John Edward Fogarty (D–Rhode Island), the Center was established by President Johnson in July 1968 in order to fund international health research as part of a larger “health for peace” initiative.
(e) Presidential Scholars in Global Health—The U.S. should establish a program for “Presidential Scholars in Global Health”. Twenty Associate Scholars, all in early stages of their careers, would be selected (by a distinguished public/private panel of scientists) to study problems of implementing change in International Health. In addition, four distinguished Senior Scholars would prepare scholarly papers on contemporary International Health policy problems; they would work and lecture at NIH, and be based at the Fogarty Center. Annual cost would be $650,000, including personnel positions to run the program.

DECISION:

(f) Expanding Private Sector Involvement—The U.S. private sector, i.e., academia, multinational corporations, labor, church-related organizations, private voluntary organizations foundations, and individuals, should be given wider opportunities to contribute to U.S. International Health activities. Their efforts have been significant among the contributions this nation has made in International Health. In many cases they can be more effective, more innovative, and more acceptable in many countries than direct U.S. Government efforts. Recent tax and foreign policy decisions, as well as inflationary erosion of their purchasing power, have reduced private sector capacity to expand or even sustain their past activities. Reversing this trend could substantially reduce the burden on direct U.S. Government expenditures. The U.S. Government should actively seek ways to capitalize on and expand the involvement of the private sector. While the organizational paper being prepared by Henry Owen will address this area within the broader context of development assistance we believe certain specific steps could be taken now to strengthen the role of private voluntary organizations in the health area:

—Strengthen and formalize the PVO-grant making activities of A.I.D. to increase PVO performance on A.I.D. projects.

—Establish an expanded PVO program which is centered in A.I.D. (A.I.D. has recently set up an Office for Private Humanitarian Assistance). It would involve all agencies with significant International Health programs who would assign a PVO liaison coordinator to work with A.I.D.

—Consideration should be given to providing 5 year care support ($1 million per year) to create a consortium of PVOs including the establishment of an Information Clearinghouse for their activities to resolve the present lack of communication and collaboration.

DECISION:

The effectiveness of the new International Health initiative is tied closely to working in a supporting and collaborative way with multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, UNICEF, and the World
Health Organization. Following your meeting with Dr. Mahler,\textsuperscript{11} we have agreed to hold meetings twice a year between top officials of WHO and key representatives of the U.S. Government. Similarly we expect to rely heavily on the continuing close relationship with the National Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences. Much of the cost of this initiative would be subsumed under the decisions you have already made to increase the foreign aid budget generally. For instance the commitment to make a commitment of $10 million to WHO’s Tropical Disease Research Program.

Consistent with your instructions on the development assistance decision memo we will seek to involve public figures including those from the entertainment industry in building public support for this initiative. We would do this as part of the overall strategy now being developed with the NSC to build public support for foreign aid in general. Focussing public attention on an issue such as health, I believe, humanizes our foreign policy and makes it personally understandable in a way that amorphous impersonal issues like SALT and the Panama Canal are not. However, I think there is a spill over benefit to these harder issues in that good will in general is generated for your foreign policy.

If you approve, in general, of the above recommendations I suggest a meeting in the next couple of weeks as you proposed previously.\textsuperscript{12} The meeting should include Califano, Vance, Sam Brown, Harold Brown, Blumenthal, Gilligan and Henry Owen. The meeting should consider the implementation of the recommendations included here. I would like then to develop a public statement for you laying out this strategy either in the form of a message to the Congress, as a separate speech, or as part of a larger statement on global human needs.

\textsuperscript{11} See footnote 4, Document 292.

\textsuperscript{12} According to a February 17 memorandum from Bourne and McIntyre to Vance, the President had “approved the broad concept” of an international health program. The full text of this memorandum is printed as Document 309.
307. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, January 25, 1978

SUBJECT


In response to your memorandum of May 17, 1977,\(^2\) and in furtherance of this Administration’s continuing efforts to improve the effectiveness of our foreign aid programs, the attached format evaluating the performance of population programs on a country-by-country basis has been developed by the Department of State, in consultation with the Agency for International Development and the Department of the Treasury, and approved by the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy.

This effort attempts to assess the effectiveness of our population assistance activities in the context of the programs of recipient governments. It attempts to estimate the prevalence of contraceptive use as a measure of the effect of a country’s overall population program in reducing birth rates, and to estimate the dollar cost per contraceptive user as an indication of the cost-effectiveness of the program. As the attached discussion of the format emphasizes, however, any serious attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of population programs must take into account the influence of other socio-economic determinants of birth rates. For this reason, the performance evaluation format calls for data on a wide range of socio-economic variables potentially affecting fertility, and incorporates this data in the final section of the format in which the overall effectiveness of the program is analyzed. Additional work must be done to improve our understanding of the relative contributions of family planning services and these other determinants of fertility reduction; as this work progresses the evaluation format will be refined by the Ad Hoc Group to increase the usefulness of these criteria and to develop new and better measures of program effectiveness.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary—Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 8, Memos/Letters FM WC to Agencies. No classification marking. Christopher sent a copy to Gilligan under a January 31 covering memorandum, commenting that he hoped “that this effort proves helpful in making future planning and budgeting decisions about our foreign aid programs and that State and AID can continue to work together in monitoring and improving the effectiveness of our aid programs in population and in other areas.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See Document 282.
The information provided by this evaluation effort will be used in deciding how to allocate funds for our population assistance and will be included in the required annual reports of the Ad Hoc Group. Priority attention will be given to the key countries established as priorities for U.S. assistance by NSDM–314.3

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State4

Description of Format for Evaluation of Population Program Performance

The attached format for the evaluation, on a country-by-country basis, of programs to reduce population growth5 has been developed by the Department of State in consultation with the Agency for International Development and the Department of the Treasury. The evaluation will be used: (1) to assess the commitment and progress of countries in controlling population growth and the effectiveness of existing population programs; (2) to assist and support decisions about future funding levels and the direction and priorities of our assistance programs.

The format calls for information and analysis in the following categories:

—basic demographic data over five-year periods or other useful intervals; especially 1965–1975;
—social, economic, and political factors affecting population programs;
—nature and extent of population programs;
—financial inputs, prevalence of contraceptive use, and cost per contraceptive user; and
—critique evaluating the overall effectiveness of the programs.

Using data from a number of sources, including AID, the United Nations system, the World Bank, the Bureau of the Census, the Popula-

3 See footnote 3, Document 280.
4 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.
5 Attached but not printed is the undated “Family Planning Performance Evaluation (Format).”
tion Council, and the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the performance evaluation effort attempts to:

—assess the impact and cost effectiveness of population programs, both national efforts and external assistance, and
—assess the effect of economic, social, and political factors which may have an influence on fertility and which provide a context for population programs.

This will involve the development of data on past, present, and projected resources dedicated to efforts to reduce population growth at country, regional, and global levels from all sources. These data will be used to examine the efforts not only of AID but also of donors receiving AID support, including the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, other external donors, and recipient governments’ own national programs. The data collected and evaluations made will be measured against specific global priorities and objectives which have been established.

I. Demographic Data

Section I summarizes the demographic situation in the host country over five-year periods (1965–1975). Most demographic data are not definitive and the range and trends are indicated. Specifics are reflected in Appendix A along with the source of the information.

II. Program Setting

Section II discusses the general setting in which the national program functions, including the socio-economic phenomena that may relate to the fertility reduction process and the various political, religious, cultural, legal, administrative, managerial, and other constraints that impede progress in developing a self-sustaining population program. Information for this section is summarized from data contained in the Development Assistance Program (DAP), AID program documents, Sector Reviews, Area Handbooks, Project Evaluation Summary, the World Bank, and the UNFPA.

III. The Population Program

Section III describes the stage of population policy development, the degree of commitment to the policy, and the establishment of demographic goals.

The national program is summarized—its administration, the rationale under which it operates, and the participation of other Govern-

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6 Attached but not printed is the undated “Selected Demographic and Social Indicators” table.
ment ministries and organizations such as education, agriculture, and health in population control activities.

Subsections cover the role of AID, donors receiving AID support (including the UNFPA), other donors, and the host government in the national program (including the percentage of the national budget designated for family planning activities).

IV. Financial Inputs, Impact, and Cost-Effectiveness

Section IV consists of three subsections:

A. Annual per capita funding from 1965–70, and subsequent years through 1976, by the category of donors and the host government. Total funding, per capita, and the percentage of financial input by each to the overall national program are summarized. Details are reflected in Appendix B.\(^7\)

It is recognized that measuring resource allocations to family planning (FP) programs by the host government is difficult, because resources come from both direct and indirect allocation of funds and in the form of infrastructure support. National budgets do not reflect actual expenditures for FP in many cases. In addition, the quantity of resources expended on FP activities does not always reflect the quality of the services. Changes in the pattern of a host government’s resource allocations can be attributed to a number of factors which will differ between countries, such as demographic factors, availability of domestic financial resources and external donor support, level of development of the health and social service infrastructure, existence of government policy, and the perceived necessity by the government for direct FP activity.

Any conclusions on host government resource support are in most cases tentative, and cross-country comparisons, while necessary, should be made only with extreme caution. It is hoped that AID will be able to improve on the uniformity and reliability of the data in the future.

B. The impact of the program is measured in part by prevalence of use—the percentage of married women of reproductive age (MWRA) or couples using a reliable method of contraception; the percentage of MWRA/couples with reasonable knowledge of a reliable method of contraception; and the percentage of MWRA/couples with reasonable access to contraceptive services.

Data on the above indicators were compiled by a number of the AID Missions last December for the AID Worldwide Population Of-

\(^7\) Attached but not printed is the undated “Annual and per capita funding per year (in thousands of dollars)” table.
ficers Conference. This performance criteria effort relies on the ability of the USAIDs to continue to collect these data on an annual basis.

Conceptually, the best measure of accomplishment of a FP program would be the difference between the reduction in fertility produced by the program and what theoretically would have been achieved in the given socio-economic conditions without any FP program. Even attempting to estimate this difference would require a much better understanding than we now have of the relationship between fertility reduction in a particular country and family planning services and other socio-economic factors.

In the absence of such multivariate analyses of the determinants of birth rates, one measure of fertility reduction is provided by the increase in the use of contraceptives obtained from public and private programs throughout the country. Based on field experience in selected countries, a rough approximation of the relationship between the crude birth rate and use of reliable methods of contraception (i.e., excluding abstinence, coitus interruptus, and rhythm) is that a two percent increase in the percentage of couples using contraception is associated with a decrease of one birth per thousand population, and that a contraceptive user rate of 60 to 70 percent is associated with a replacement level birth rate of 20 per thousand.

In measuring rates of contraceptive use, there is considerable variation among developing country FP programs in the quality and reliability of FP service statistics. Many systems generally collect only data on new acceptors, from which current use rates must be estimated through the application of method continuation rates to new acceptor data or through analysis of contraceptive distribution over time.

An increasing number of the developing countries are beginning to use prevalence of use as a measure of program impact, and AID has initiated programs to assist them with this activity. Estimates of contraceptive use and births averted can be improved by better data and more sophisticated techniques of analysis.

The responsibility would rest with AID in cooperation with the Office of the Coordinator of Population Affairs, State Department, to establish guidelines for the missions to estimate prevalence of use, and to continue efforts to develop new and better estimates of program impact.

One measure of cost-effectiveness can be obtained by dividing annual financial inputs from all sources by the number of users. These cost-per-user statistics (in dollars) are calculated for the last year in which data are available and as averages of the latest three, five, and ten-year periods.

A crucial aspect of the analysis of cost-effectiveness is the explanation of variations in cost-per-user rates. These rates tend to be much
higher in those countries where social, economic and cultural factors encourage population growth. For example, in Bangladesh, where rural societies are male-dominated, village systems are weak, adequate numbers of administrators are lacking, and rural health and educational systems are sadly deficient, costs per user are almost certain to be higher than in a country such as Thailand, where basic social, economic and cultural factors are more favorable. Hence, any performance evaluation system must take these essential factors into consideration in judging cost-effectiveness.

V. Critique

The purpose of this Section is to evaluate the overall effectiveness of a country’s population program, bearing in mind the socio-economic factors affecting the program, the leadership commitment to the program, the encouragement, especially through person-to-person contacts, of smaller families and the supply and delivery of family planning services. To the extent possible, quantitative estimates are made of the effect of these factors in reducing fertility. The critique also contains recommendations for program action and emphasis.

In order to make this overall assessment of program effectiveness, additional data must be obtained, through such means as better vital registration systems, sample surveys, and research projects. There is also the need, especially in key countries, for more sophisticated multivariate studies to quantify, as far as possible, the impact of socio-economic variables on population growth and identify more accurately the degree to which a nation’s family planning program is responsible for lowering fertility rates.

Global Policy and Program Analysis

These individual country analyses are aggregated into an overall examination of the global effort to reduce population growth. This global summary includes an evaluation of the efforts of recipient nations, the U.S., other donor countries, and multilateral and private organizations. Total funding for population programs on a regional and global basis is measured against special priorities and objectives which have been established and, where possible, progress toward specific targets is estimated.

The performance evaluations, as improved by new data and analysis, are applied on a regional and global basis to guide decision-makers with respect to the performance of US-funded bilateral, multilateral, and private population assistance. The global summary will include a projection of demographic factors and estimated impacts of alternative funding and program strategies.
308. Report by the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy

Washington, January 1978

U.S. INTERNATIONAL POPULATION POLICY
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Annual Report, agreed to by the eighteen agencies represented on the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, reviews population trends and program developments, broadly and on a country-specific basis, and reaches certain conclusions as to how to achieve better results in coping with this complex problem.

We recognize the adverse effects of current high developing country population growth which results in: possible worldwide food shortages, rising unemployment, frustrated economic development amongst poorer nations, widespread environmental deterioration, overcrowded cities where living conditions for countless millions are worsening, social unrest, and both national and international tensions. Above all, excessive population growth contributes in a major way to the suffering and poverty of countless millions and limits the prospects for a better life for their children.

While the pace of population growth seems to be slackening, it remains too high in too many developing countries, where most couples seem to desire at least four surviving children rather than the one, two, or three that would make population stabilization possible sometime in the next century.

Fortunately, there is mounting international attention to this situation, reflected in the fact that at least three-quarters of the people in the developing world live in countries whose governments have recently adopted population programs related to their economic development plans. There are also increasing amounts of donor assistance from governments, international organizations (especially the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the World Bank (IBRD)), as well as from private organizations, prominently including the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). We strongly support increasing U.S. contributions for the Agency for International Development’s (AID) population programs, which, aside from their intrinsic

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780054–1154. No classification marking. Sent under cover of a March 15 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Forwarded to all diplomatic and consular posts as Airgram A–1345, April 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780052–1723)
merit, are likely to encourage other donors to be more generous and receiving nations to apply themselves more vigorously in coping with excessive population growth.

Yet, despite all the progress achieved over the past decade, there is urgent need for a broader and more concerted effort by donors and receiving nations alike to deal with the problem.

In this situation, AID, while extending the availability of family planning services and building on that base, is now tackling the population problem along a broader front, recognizing the relevance of the many factors that bear upon fertility determination. As a result, 1977 witnessed the initiation of multi-year population strategies; the development of comprehensive performance criteria; the extension and support for low-cost and community-based delivery systems, increasingly integrated with health services; intensified research on the determinants of fertility, and more focus on motivation for smaller families. Most of these developments are described in detail in this Report. The Report also spells out how AID’s Fiscal Year 1979 Congressional population funding request for $205.4 million will enable the Agency to accelerate implementation of its broader approach, including continued major emphasis on expanding and improving family planning services and delivery systems.

We continue to believe, based on reports from our Missions in developing nations, that the most successful population programs usually depend on: (1) national leaders being clearly, firmly, and actively committed to promoting broadly based national population programs; (2) rooting family planning in communities (villages) and relating family planning to the economic interests and social development of the community; (3) training paramedics and others to provide general health services, including family planning, in communities (villages) where these people are known and trusted and ensuring that these paramedics provide personalized family planning advice and support; and (4) advancing the legal, social, and economic status of women.

Although U.S. policy requires that our leaders, Ambassadors, and others be knowledgeable on population issues and that they discuss them, as appropriate, in their contacts with key figures in other governments, particularly those in developing nations, this is often overlooked in the press of day-to-day business. Opportunities are thus lost for high-level exchanges, at least on an informal basis, on this fundamental issue.

One of the most effective ways in which we could bring our influence to bear in discussions with developing country leaders would be in encouraging and supporting them to undertake programs for enlisting the support of their own people in community or village programs. Population programs have enjoyed greater success in commu-
nities where there are strong local organizations. The stronger the community, the greater the community awareness of the need for action in limiting population growth, and the greater the opportunities for promoting peer pressures within the community for reduced fertility. In this connection, we believe there may be merit in programs of community incentives of the type now being launched in Indonesia which rewards communities most successful in reducing fertility rates commensurate with Government objectives.

In sum, the NSC Ad Hoc Group has no reason to recommend any changes in basic U.S. policy on population or on the conclusions reached in last year’s Report. We do, however, recognize the need for far greater efforts and more innovative approaches along the lines suggested in this Report, if the world is to be spared the devastating consequences of uncontrolled population growth. All nations, rich and poor, have a major stake in the outcome.

Introduction


Basic U.S. policy on international population is set forth in NSC documents as well as in the First Annual Report of the Interagency Task Force on International Population Policy of July 1976. The latter Task Force was replaced by the NSC Ad Hoc Group, but since its membership and purposes are identical, the Report submitted herewith can be viewed as the Second Annual Report on the implementation of basic U.S. policy on international population issues.

This Report is divided into the following five main sections, all largely focused on 1977 developments and their implications for the future:

I. General Trends
II. Program Developments in Key Countries
III. Developments in U.S. Population Assistance Programs
IV. Developments in Population Assistance from Other Donors
V. Conclusions

The conclusions of this Report do not alter basic U.S. international population policy as defined in NSC documents, but they do expand on existing policy in addressing a number of issues requiring attention.


3 See Document 282.
This Report (especially Section II) is more country-specific than the First Annual Report, drawing on responses to a circular telegram sent to our Embassies in major population growth countries.

This Report, like its predecessor, deals exclusively with the population problems of developing nations. While it is true that all countries, including the United States, face population problems, population growth rates in the developing world are far higher and pose a different range of issues.

We do not re-state the many adverse environmental, social, economic, and security effects of developing country population growth rates. What has been said in last year’s Report remains valid, although we believe greater emphasis needs to be placed on how high population growth rates (1) aggravate unemployment and underemployment (see Section I); and (2) adversely affect the health of women and children, contribute to high mortality rates, especially amongst those under 12 years of age, and limit prospects for a better life for the children of large families.

With regard to (2), excessive population growth contributes in a major way to the suffering, poverty, and early death of countless millions of poor people. To anyone concerned with the human condition, this must be a compelling argument for far more effective measures to alleviate tragedy on such a vast scale. Moreover, high rates of population growth also increase pressures for internal and international migration, creating severe problems in terms of deteriorating conditions of life in burgeoning urban areas of developing countries as well as in terms of relations between countries affected by the current patterns of large international migration.

The United States’ approach to world population issues is based on concern for the well-being of all people, many of whom are now in dire need, and on respect for the rights and responsibilities of each government in determining its policies and programs. We recognize, however, that a sound population policy and program is an important and integral part of the development process for many of these countries.

Population stabilization is not a goal in itself. The real goal is improving conditions of life for vast numbers of people, especially in the poorer nations; and this involves a wide range of measures, broadly distributed, of which family planning must be seen as a basic part.

In the course of his Environment Message to Congress on May 23, 1977, President Carter stated:

“Rapid population growth is a major environmental problem of world dimensions. World population increased from three to four billion in the last 15 years, substantially cancelling out expansion in world food production and economic growth for the same period.
“Without controlling the growth of population, the prospects for enough food, shelter, and other basic needs for all the world’s people are dim. Where existence is already poor and precarious, efforts to obtain the necessities of life often degrade the environment for generations to come.

“It is, of course, up to each nation to determine its own policies, but we are prepared to respond promptly and fully to all requests for assistance in population and health care programs. At my direction, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development stand ready to cooperate through international organizations, through private voluntary organizations, or through direct contacts with other governments.”

I. General Trends

Whereas current mortality and fertility in the developed regions are such that net reproduction rates are close to replacement levels, fertility rates in the developing world remain high. On the other hand, there is evidence that birth rates are beginning to decline in a mounting number of developing countries, overtaking declines in death rates. Based on U.S. Bureau of the Census data, the 1976 rate of growth of developing country population is estimated at about 2.5 percent, if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (for which no reliable figures are available) is excluded. This is a drop from a high of 2.6 percent estimated for the early 1970’s.

About four-fifths of the developing country population lives in the 13 most populous countries, i.e., those whose 1975 population exceeded 35 million. This includes, in order of size: China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Egypt. Accordingly, these 13 countries have a disproportionately large impact on average demographic trends among the developing countries. Ten of the 13 (excluding Brazil, Nigeria, and Turkey) have adopted population policies and programs to reduce fertility in the interest of national development, as well as family health and welfare.

Some successes . . . The most intensive effort in reducing excessive population growth is probably occurring in the People’s Republic of China. According to a public report from Peking, the rate of the country’s population growth has been declining yearly since 1965. Although considerable data have been reported by PRC officials, local

4 See footnote 4, Document 284.
5 The “key 13 countries” mentioned elsewhere in this Report, and in last year’s Report, include 11 of the 13 developing countries listed in this paragraph. [Footnote in the original.]
and provincial, there is no information upon which to base nation-wide estimates of the birth rate or to gauge the means whereby success in reducing fertility is being achieved.

Considerable progress has been recorded in two other Asian countries among the 13, namely, Indonesia and Thailand. The latter’s population growth rate is estimated to have declined from 3.1 percent at the start of the Third Five-Year Plan in 1971 to 2.5 percent in 1976. Progress has been made in the Philippines, although organizational and administrative problems have impeded the program’s potential. Vietnam’s—by all indications—vigorous birth control program is still too new to have produced significant nation-wide results.

There have also been encouraging developments in Mexico, Brazil, and Peru, reflecting Latin America’s increasing acceptance of population policy as a legitimate component of comprehensive national development plans. In Mexico, new organizational arrangements and program initiatives in family planning are evidence of the serious attention which the Government is now giving to the issue. Brazil, with a population policy primarily directed toward family welfare needs, has made slow but concrete progress with a decision to provide public family planning services to women at “high risk” who cannot afford to pay for them. In Peru, a Presidential decree, issued in August 1976, established a population policy based on the dual concepts of individual freedom of choice and procreative responsibility to the state.

Continued progress in reducing traditionally high fertility levels was recorded in a number of less populous developing countries. The most sizeable reductions in the birth rates over the past decade or so occurred in rapidly modernizing Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, as well as in Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, and ten or so island-nations of one million population or less.

Finally, on the positive side, special mention should be made of the increasing contribution to population programs being made by the UN system, notably the UNFPA and the World Bank. These are discussed in Section III below.

... and disappointments. Family planning programs have run into difficulties in a number of countries, particularly in the South Asian region of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan—three countries whose aggregate population surpasses that of Latin America and Africa combined. For example, there has been a slowdown in India’s family planning program which reflects public (and the new Government’s) reaction to the compulsion in sterilization activities in some areas, carried out in the last year of the Gandhi Administration. Lack of progress in certain countries (discussed in Section II below) may relate in large degree to such basic factors as male-dominated rural societies, the weakness of
village organization and lack of community participation, difficulties in program management, organization and administration, and the relatively low level of government commitment.

In Bolivia, active Government opposition to birth control continued, resulting in serious constraints on all family planning activities. The 1976 census showed a total population of one million less than had been previously estimated.

Forward movement in the establishment of family planning programs in Africa has been slow. Government programs do exist in a few countries, e.g., Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zaire, but their results have not been significant, although there are signs of improvement. However, most governments in sub-Saharan Africa do not provide family planning services in regularized national programs. A growing number do permit, and even support, the activities of private family planning associations. Family planning in Nigeria is largely provided by private institutions such as hospitals and the Family Planning Council, although the Government, through its newly created National Population Council, has begun to subsidize these activities. Togo recently joined the one or two other Francophone countries in this region which have established national family planning programs. There is widespread tradition in Africa favoring child spacing, and family planning is increasingly perceived as an important public health measure. In many African countries, the extension of health programs into rural areas, organized attempts by rural women to promote their own interests, increased school attendance, and other manifestations of social progress can be viewed as foundations on which to base future African family planning programs.

Population and development. While the pace of population growth appears to be slackening, it remains excessive in too many developing nations, substantially offsetting economic gains and reducing prospects for significant improvements in levels of living. In the poorest developing countries, the average gain in gross domestic product (GDP) between 1970 and 1975 (in 1970 prices) was a meager one dollar per person per year. This group of low-income, non-oil exporting developing countries with per capita GDP in 1970 of less than $200, contains over one billion people, or nearly 60 percent of the developing country population, excluding China.

In view of the growing focus on basic needs of the poorest strata in less developed countries, population trends are assuming greater importance in national developmental policies and plans. In earlier decades, the primary objective of development was to promote the growth of aggregate product. On the premise that the benefits would eventually trickle down to the masses, income distribution was of secondary concern. Excessive population growth impedes the attainment
of both objectives. Particularly, it thwarts efforts to distribute the benefits of growth to all segments of the population.

A principal mechanism for moderating internal imbalances in income distribution is productive employment. Yet, in the next 25 years, working age populations of all developing countries (excluding China) will more than double, with the potential of increasing mass unemployment/underemployment. Actual deterioration in the employment situation would act to deepen the maldistribution of wealth, as well as intensify social unrest and political tensions.

On the other hand, many developing countries are giving increased attention to social development, notably in health, education, and greater involvement of women in development and in decision-making processes. These programs are expected—in interaction with other components of development—to have a long-term, favorable effect on moderating high fertility, as long as they are adequately extended to rural areas and urban slums.

A list of social and economic pre-conditions for declining fertility does not imply that we know what combination of conditions triggers a sustained fertility decline or that significant declines in fertility cannot be initiated under conditions of illiteracy and high mortality. (A good example of the latter, perhaps, are recent declines in fertility on Java and Bali, Indonesia.) If we assume, however, that voluntary family planning requires:

— a conscious choice on the part of the couple (a decision preceded by a weighing of economic, social, and psychological advantages and disadvantages of another child);
— knowledge and effective use, as well as availability, of acceptable means of contraception or birth control;
then, education, adequate health conditions, rising income and expanding consumer goods and services, acceptability and availability of alternative occupations for women, etc., generate and promote both conditions.

Population and food. Between 1960 and 1975, food production in the developing market economies, as a whole, expanded at the unprecedented rate of 2.8 percent per year. However, since 1960, population and income growth in the developing countries have increased the demand for food by about 3.5 percent per year. Despite the return of overall food production to the previous high growth trend of 2.8 percent, after the lull of 1972 to 1974, population growth has held average per capita increases in food production over the 1960 to 1975 period to about 0.3 percent per year. This leaves relatively little room to reduce malnutrition, particularly when the increased per capita consumption by the more affluent in these countries is taken into account. For the poorest group of developing countries, the average annual increase in
food production has been only 2.3 percent over the past 15 years, somewhat less than their average increase in population. Per capita consumption has not increased at all, and in Africa, it has decreased by 10 percent.

About half of the present and expected future deficits are in higher income LDC’s, including a few countries without foreign exchange constraints, able to import commercially sufficient food to meet expected domestic demand. A number of other developing countries usually can do so provided they can continue to have increasing access to OECD markets for their export products.

The more intractable part of the food problem is the expanding deficit in developing countries with a GNP of less than $300 per capita. During the period 1971–1975, their annual food production increased by only 1.8 percent per year. This is well below their annual population growth of 2.4 percent. While recent harvests have improved, long-range prospects show many developing countries becoming increasingly dependent on food imports. If these deficits are to be even partially satisfied by imports, many developing nations will be forced deeper into debt, limiting their ability to finance economic development efforts, including the increase of food production.

Many views of the world food situation focus on immutable forces or circumstances (such as the limited surface of the earth, changed climatic patterns, or the fixed nature of consumption patterns) which are thought to be beyond control. However, much of what has happened in the development of the world food situation can be traced to government policies and basic human conditions (such as income distribution and poverty), and suggests that governmental and individual choices will continue to be critical in the future. The world food situation can be changed to the extent that governments and individuals see needs for change and are willing to modify those policies and conditions that influence food production and consumption.

Increasing food production in the developing countries will require improvements in basic agricultural technology and infrastructure, favorable policies, and better resource management. There is, however, no practical solution to long-term food production problems that does not prominently include accelerated declines in population growth rates.

*Longer-term demographic prospects.* There are some hopeful signs, but intensified action in policies and programs aimed at encouraging small families and providing the means of achieving them is required. Progress has been made in reducing fertility, but the gains are still too localized and some are too fragile. Changes in governments can upset programs’ efficiency. Much greater efforts will be required (1) to institutionalize small family norms (through reduction of poverty, ex-
panded educational opportunities and health services for the masses, and improvements in legal, social, and economic status of women, including greater participation of women in making decisions as to family size), as well as (2) to raise the coverage and quality of family planning services. All of these measures are necessary if past gains in reducing fertility are to be solidified and future reductions accelerated.

World Bank President McNamara observed in his recent speech (MIT, May 1977) that, if, through some extraordinary concentration of effort, the worldwide fertility rate would decline to the replacement level (NRR=1) by the end of this century, world population would ultimately cease to grow at about 8 billion. Delaying this fertility transition another 20 years would eventually produce a stable population of 11 billion. Thus, for every decade of delay in achieving replacement-level fertility rates, the ultimate size of world population will increase by some 15 percent.

[Omitted here are Section II: Program Developments in Key Countries; Section III: Developments in U.S. Population Assistance Programs; and Section IV: Developments in Population Assistance from Other Donors.]

V. Conclusions

A. Overall Strategy.

The Ad Hoc Group endorses U.S. strategy in dealing with international population issues as set forth in Section II of last year’s Report.

We continue to believe, based on reports from our Missions in developing nations, that the most successful population programs usually depend on: (1) national leaders being clearly, firmly, and actively committed to promoting broadly based national population programs; (2) rooting family planning in communities (villages) and relating family planning to the economic interests and social development of

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6 According to a May 2, 1977, editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, McNamara spoke at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) the last weekend of April, exploring the connection between population control and the status of women. ("Wives’ clubs and population warnings," p. 36) See also David R. Francis, "Social justice and economic progress . . .," The Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1977, p. 11.

7 The above population projections, developed by Tomas Frejka of the Population Council, are not intended to predict the actual situation but are meant to illustrate the enormous potential for growth built into the current age structure of much of the world’s population. It is not inconceivable, for example, that, at some point in history, average family size in countries, regions, and the world may consist of fewer than two children (i.e., that fertility may stabilize at a level below replacement of the parental generation). A sustained fertility level below replacement, however, would eventually lead to a decline in the absolute size of the population. This, to our knowledge, is not an objective of any governmental population policy and, hence, is not used—even for illustrative purposes—in this Report. [Footnote in the original.]
the community; (3) training paramedics and others to provide primary health services, including family planning, in communities (villages) where these people are known and trusted and ensuring that these paramedics provide personalized family planning advice and support; and (4) advancing the legal, social, and economic status of women.

Although U.S. policy requires that our leaders, Ambassadors, and others be knowledgeable on population issues and that they discuss them, as appropriate, in their contacts with key figures in other governments, particularly those in developing nations, this is often overlooked in the press of day-to-day business. Opportunities are thus lost for high-level exchanges, at least on an informal basis, on an issue widely seen by developing country leaders as the most fundamental one their nations face.

It is not a matter of our lecturing them or they us, but of learning from each other and discovering ways in which we can be of greatest mutual help in carrying out successful programs of development, including adequate attention to demographic issues.

These discussions should not focus exclusively on the adverse effects of high population growth rates on economic development. Our concerns relate in a major way to how high birth rates impair the health of mothers and children and limit prospects for a better life for children now, and for generations to come. This broadly relates to human rights and meeting basic human needs.

B. Strengthening Community Organizations.

Population programs have enjoyed greater success in communities where there are strong local organizations. The stronger the community, the greater the community awareness of the need for action in limiting population growth, and the greater the opportunities for promoting peer pressures within the community for reduced fertility.

Strengthening community organizations serves many purposes, including the achievement of demographic goals. Stronger village or community organization involves enlisting the support of people in self-help programs, and engendering a stronger sense of participation on the part of individuals in the communities in which they dwell. This will not occur spontaneously. Above all, it requires that national governments take the lead in strengthening local organizations, and in providing direction and assistance for mutually supportive programs at the village level whether these programs are in education, health, family planning, nutrition, or rural development, and include cooperatives or other means to expand the income of local communities.

While it is true that broad, multi-purpose programs may suffer from organizational complexity, this could be offset to some extent by greater reliance on community organizations for the execution of pol-
icies and programs established by the central government. In fact, central governments might be well advised to enlist community organizations in discussing policies and programs at a formative stage in order to ensure that the policies and programs reflect local realities and enlist community interest and support from the outset.

C. Laws and Regulations; Incentives and Disincentives.

Population programs must be supported by laws and regulations to refine, coordinate, finance, and implement the determined policy. From the viewpoints of both donor and recipient countries, legal reform is often essential, lest population assistance be negated by outdated laws. Ironically, many developing countries have retained antiquated population-related laws which they inherited from former colonial powers, and which those powers have by now discarded as being incompatible with human rights.

Although a good start has been made through the establishment of over 30 Law and Population Projects in developing countries (most funded by UNFPA) to review population-related laws and recommend legal reforms, there is need both to expand the network and to encourage the actual implementation of proposed legal reforms.

One of the most important laws affecting population is the regulation of the legal age of marriage. Most informed observers believe that Sri Lanka’s success in moderating fertility rates is related in an important degree to the relatively high age for women at first marriage.

It is a regrettable fact that few developing countries today have adequate systems for registering births, deaths, and other vital events. Not only does the dearth of such data have an adverse impact on the application of their laws affecting population, but it also makes it difficult, quantitatively, to assess the cost-effectiveness of population programs and to measure and thus give greater support to those socioeconomic factors which have the greatest impact on moderating fertility rates.

The World Population Plan of Action (paragraph 14(f)) states that it is the basic right of all couples and individuals “to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education, and means to do so.” The key words here are “freely and responsibly.” The Plan is explicit in specifying that “the responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community.” The Plan therefore recommends that a couple or individual limit the number of children if: (a) they are unable to provide adequately for the needs of their living and future children; or (b) the community cannot afford a population growth rate which would jeopardize its ability to provide adequate
food, housing, education, health care, and job opportunities for all its citizenry.\(^8\)

It has been essentially against this background that some of the most densely populated countries have applied or are now considering applying a range of incentives or disincentives to motivate people to have smaller families. Incentives have usually taken the form of inducements or rewards for those accepting sterilization. Disincentives have usually taken the form of administrative measures which have the effect of penalizing those with large families.

Incentives and disincentives have been effectively used, but they sometimes lend themselves to abuse. AID funds are not involved in the direct payment of incentives or disincentives.

Several countries are now launching, or are considering launching, programs of community incentives. For example, Indonesia has recently started a program, with World Bank support, of rewarding those villages (within certain designated districts) most successful in lowering fertility rates. Ideally, the rewards would take the form of providing prize-winning villages or communities with whatever the residents of those villages had collectively decided in advance they most wanted, meanwhile having that potential prize kept constantly before public attention.

This type of incentive has particular merit both in terms of increasing flows of assistance to villages and in terms of stimulating motivation, including peer pressures, for lowering birth rates. Although less subject to abuse than individual incentives, community incentives will require careful administration to be equitable and effective.

D. Population and Food Assistance.

As brought out in Section I of this Report, we recognize the likelihood of a growing gap between food and population in certain parts of the world, and therefore the need for actions, additional to those currently being taken, to increase food production and to lower population growth rates. The United States has a particular responsibility to support efforts to maintain a viable balance between food and population. We are the largest food exporter of the world and by far the largest supplier of food assistance, currently providing twelve times as much food aid as population assistance. Clearly, it is in our interest as a major food and population assistance donor to help ensure that (1) our food

\(^8\) See footnote 6, Document 284.
aid meets the critical nutritional needs of people in the most seriously affected countries; (2) food aid has maximum developmental impact; (3) it stimulates receiving countries to increase their own food production; and (4) our food aid and population program policies are mutually supportive.

Three specific aspects of the Food for Peace program help to further the goals enumerated in the first paragraph of this Section. Title II food commodities are provided through private U.S. organizations like CARE and Church World Service and the UN World Food Program, which run their supplemental feeding activities in the context of nutrition and health education as well as agricultural extension programs. Particularly where these food and education programs are directed at pregnant or breastfeeding mothers and young children, family planning information should be included along with nutrition education. The passage of Title III of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) furthers goal (2). Title III permits the President to forgive Food for Peace loans to those countries who have used funds generated by the sales of U.S. food commodities for development purposes including voluntary family planning. Finally, with regard to goal (4), our records show that there has been a family planning component to several Food for Work projects (e.g., in India, Egypt, and Peru); and consideration, as recommended in the Interagency Task Force’s First Annual Report to the President, should be given to expanding this approach wherever feasible.

We conclude that, where food production and population are clearly out of balance, the leaders of countries requesting U.S. food assistance should be reminded at an appropriately high level of: (1) longer-term anticipated worldwide food shortages, citing FAO and other data in that connection, including increased commercial demand; and (2) Congressional requirements that our assistance be increasingly concentrated on countries that make effective use of such assistance, including their performance in improving agricultural output and nutrition and reducing population growth. Such an intervention should be made by Ambassadors in a way that would be most likely to produce effect without causing offense.

This would also provide a useful opportunity to review what the particular country is doing to ease the food-population problem and,

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9 Title II of Public Law 480 provides for the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to private voluntary organizations and international organizations for use in foreign humanitarian feeding programs.

10 See footnote 31, Document 245.
where required, to stimulate greater attention to the food-population linkage and programs related thereto. It would have the further advantage of bringing to the attention of receiving countries the seriousness we attach to the longer-range food-population issue and the urgent need to take timely action.

E. AID Population Programs.

Despite all the progress achieved over the past decade with AID assistance in introducing and expanding developing country family planning programs, population growth rates remain excessively high, with most couples in the developing world desiring a completed family size of four or more children.

AID’s population assistance has focused strongly on extending family planning services. While building on that base, the Agency is now tackling the population problem along a broader front, recognizing the importance of the many factors that bear upon fertility determination.

As described in earlier sections of this Report, it is this broadening of approach that motivated many of the principal developments in AID’s population programs and organization in 1977.

The 1979 request for $216.4 million will enable the Agency to accelerate implementation of this broader approach so that, in addition to continued attention to the supply of family planning services, it will undertake:

(1) Development of comprehensive country population strategies and of better means to evaluate the effectiveness of population programs.

(2) Expanding integrated health services, including family planning, at low cost with maximum outreach.

(3) Improved motivation programs, especially on a personalized basis.

(4) Research which increases understanding on the determinants of fertility, particularly in key countries receiving our assistance.

(5) Improved demographic data collection, including recognition of the need for better vital registration systems.

(6) Greater attention to sound administration and logistics management.

In addition to the above points of program emphasis, AID will accelerate its efforts to enhance population programs by interrelating them to other components of development assistance which now affect population growth or which can broaden the delivery of family planning services.
AID’s internal reorganization takes the foregoing into account, as does Section 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act,11 enacted last year, which requires that all appropriate development assistance programs be developed with a view to “building motivation” for smaller families.

AID is also ensuring that service delivery programs will be organized increasingly around low-cost village and community-based systems, including training of paramedics and auxiliaries in family planning techniques, distribution, and ways to motivate people to practice contraception and otherwise to lower fertility rates.

Since the need and demand for voluntary sterilization is widespread, AID will be training doctors in new surgical techniques so that medically safe, voluntary sterilization programs can be undertaken by governments and private agencies. Also, in response to mounting requests, AID will be increasing support for developing country voluntary sterilization programs through improved biomedical research, chemical testing, training, equipment, and related services.

Continued research, carried out in the U.S. or in developing country institutions, whenever feasible, to create simple, but effective, diagnostic procedures and contraceptive techniques, is needed to improve the quality of health and family planning services. Clinical testing of research results will be done in developing countries to be sure that the new or modified methods are adapted to country-specific circumstances. Research and tests of improved IUD’s, better male and female sterilization procedures, and an early, simple, and accurate pregnancy test are among the problems to be pursued.

The collection and analysis of fertility and other demographic data are essential tools for the design of better family planning services and the assessment of a country’s population program. Trained, objective analysts and designers of data collection systems are needed to evaluate program progress against demographic goals. AID plans to continue support to a number of data collection and evaluation programs which are producing useful statistical materials and are training developing country personnel to carry out these tasks in the future.

AID will continue to give priority attention to those large, populous developing countries which contribute most to the growth of the

world population. About half of our bilateral population assistance now goes to Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. Moreover, during the past year, two additional populous countries, for the first time, received indirect U.S. assistance through private voluntary organizations. We do not believe, in priority cases like this, that the fact that they are “graduate countries” (with per capita income above the ceiling for AID assistance) should stand in the way of receiving at least indirect population assistance, where such help is needed and requested, particularly in light of the President’s commitment in his Environment Message (quoted above) to be responsive to all requests for assistance in this area.

Over the next decade, AID looks to the steady growth of more effective family planning programs, sustained and more equitable economic and social development, and the deliberate introduction of a concern for reduced birth rates into developing country development programs. If adequately supported by the U.S., international, private, and other bilateral donors, a concerted effort can accelerate the reduction in developing country population growth rates and lead to an improvement of the quality of life for the world’s poor majority.

309. Letter From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, February 17, 1978

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has approved the broad concept of an international health initiative as outlined in Peter Bourne’s memo of January 9th. The President’s State of the Union Message promises to “present a strategy this year for working directly with other nations and through international organizations to raise the standards of health and nutri-

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, White House Office File on International Health, Box 52, Chron 1–3/78. No classification marking.

2 See Document 306.
tion around the world”.³ Such an initiative, which should be an important component of the recent U.S. commitment to major increases in foreign aid through 1982, requires decisions now to develop the foundation for specific actions and programs later.

We have initiated a process to devise and implement a world health strategy. Our approach will be two-fold: first, to identify and highlight the many activities already in process and, second, to focus current U.S. Government activities in international health within a coordinated framework of priorities and goals so as to work more effectively with related U.S. Government activities, with private organizations, with other nations, and with the several international and multilateral organizations.

With regard to international health programs in the developing countries, the strategy developed should be fully coordinated with the studies of foreign aid organization and program reform currently underway.

Building on the considerable amount of work already done by the agencies in developing the strategy, the first step has been taken by Peter Bourne’s staff in preparing a report on international health. The next step is to develop a broad policy statement encompassing the humanitarian goals and identifying specific areas of Presidential interest. To this end, enclosed is a draft statement of strategy including general objectives and several proposed initiatives which were developed during the initial review of U.S. international health programs. This draft will be the basis for developing the broad policy statement. Before proceeding further, however, we need each agency’s views of the overall initiative and how it feels it can best contribute to the effort. Comments should address both the merits and problems associated with the proposed initiatives. While detailed analysis will be addressed later in the process, we seek your initial assessments as to the programmatic and budgetary implications of the proposals. Your preliminary analysis will help us to assess the likely cost-effectiveness of the several possibilities and determine which merit priority attention.

The development of the broad policy statement should be completed by April 1, 1978, in the form of a decision memorandum to the President. We have established the following schedule:

³ The President’s January 19 address on the State of the Union, delivered before a joint session of Congress, is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 90–98. The longer, printed version of the State of the Union message is ibid., pp. 98–123. Carter presented his international health proposal in conjunction with several domestic health initiatives, including a reorganization of HEW, a child immunization campaign, and a national health insurance program. An excerpt of Carter’s State of the Union address is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.
March 3 —Receipt of agency comments on the enclosed draft.
March 10 —Circulate draft decision memorandum to the agencies for comment.
March 22 —Receipt of agency comments on the draft decision memorandum.
March 27 —Circulate revised draft decision memorandum.
March 29 —Cabinet-level review, if necessary.
April 1 —Decision memorandum to the President on the initial strategy.
April —A statement of general direction and emphasis will be included in the OMB Spring Planning Review. As necessary, designate lead agencies for further program development and establish coordinating committees to develop Response Memoranda on specific issues.

To meet this schedule, we request that you forward your comments to Peter Bourne by March 3 on the proposed strategy and key issues contained in the enclosed draft memorandum, with emphasis on options available to the United States and recommendations regarding implementation or needed further analysis.

James T. McIntyre, Jr.
Peter G. Bourne, M.D. ⁴

Attachment

Draft Statement of Strategy ⁵

Washington, February 15, 1978

DRAFT

WORLD HEALTH STRATEGY

I. Background

In mid-1977, Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President for Health Affairs, began a review of international health to determine the nature and status of the United States’ programs in this area. In October 1977, a draft report was published titled “Foundations for a New U.S.

⁴ Printed from an unsigned copy.
⁵ No classification marking. Prepared on February 15.
International Health Policy: Assessment of Problems, Programs, Resources and Opportunities." This draft report was circulated to the involved Departments and agencies for their comment. On January 9th, Dr. Bourne recommended a program called "New Directions in International Health" be initiated as the first response to the President's promise to implement a global basic human needs strategy.

At present, U.S. Government international health programs are scattered among 22 agencies with various responsibilities and authorities, operating relatively independently of each other. Both domestic and international issues are involved in international health matters, which highlights the need for a flexible and responsive management structure. The Federal agencies involved in international health spent $528 million in FY 1976, under more than 100 separate legislative mandates; yet there is no government-wide coordinating mechanism to establish overall policy, goals or programmatic priorities. A central focal point is essential to achieving the full potential of current knowledge and resources and is likely to be as important to basic health needs as are new scientific discoveries.

What is needed is the allocation of U.S. resources on the basis of an assessment of real global health needs taking into account health problems which cause most damage to human potential, and most severely compromise economic development, and vice versa. Priorities must be set, working with the World Health Organization and the involved countries, and programs developed for action against the remaining major crippling or fatal diseases. Criteria must be developed for resource decisions, taking into account cultural differences, country or area priorities and levels of training and systems capacity for continuing to carry out the program at the local level.

International health has in the past been exclusively thought of as an aspect of foreign aid primarily through development assistance. However, commercial, diplomatic, and environmental avenues are also ways to approach international health problems.

Presidential endorsement and higher priority on U.S. involvement in world health matters is fundamental to a new strategy. Potential Presidential initiatives which are suggested involve impaired vision and blindness, rural water supply systems, establishment of an International Health Services Corps and other measures and changes in policy which would enhance the effectiveness of our international health program.

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6 See footnote 2, Document 299.

7 An unknown hand underlined this paragraph, beginning with the word "assessment."
II. Statement of Strategy

The basic strategy will be to highlight and focus U.S. Government activities in international health so as to work more effectively with other nations, private voluntary organizations, and international organizations, within a broad, coordinated set of program priorities and goals. Presidential participation will encourage the active involvement of all Departments within the U.S. Government and of nations around the world. International health will become an integral aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The strategy will aim at increasing awareness of world health problems and support for both ongoing and new efforts to improve world health and nutrition. It will focus on long-range planning and local capabilities for continuing health programs.

Another aim of the strategy will be to develop a mechanism for ensuring that both current programs and new directions are complementary, and provide the appropriate programmatic basis for the Presidential “New Directions in International Health” initiative.

General Objectives

Broad goals that this strategy will promote are:

—Working toward the elimination of the major infectious diseases.
—Providing access to a basic minimum level of health care for people everywhere, especially the poorest one billion.
—Emphasizing the delivery of community-based primary health care training to health personnel as near as possible to the point where they deliver services.
—Encouraging special initiatives to deal with the generic problems of ill health, malnutrition, and lack of clean water supplies, with a priority on prevention aspects of these problems.

Action Plan

The general approach to developing a world health initiative includes:

—A Presidential statement, at an appropriate opportunity, indicating a personal interest in raising the level of public and private activities aimed at improving health around the world. Emphasis would be on program development, capitalizing on current U.S. programs, and striving for increased partnership with other donor countries, as well as with receiving countries, in making basic improvements consistent with the general objectives above. Better coordination of “human needs” activities would be a central theme.

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8 An unknown hand underlined this sentence, beginning with the word “increasing.”
—A number of potential initiatives are identified in the following section of this paper. Based on comments and recommendations received from the involved agencies, these initiatives will be announced or assigned for further action as appropriate.

Further action could include assigning higher priority to an ongoing effort, assignment of the appropriate Department for preparation of an implementation plan or establishment of an interagency committee to develop a recommended approach. The most important opportunity for inclusion in the Administration’s planning is through the OMB Spring Planning Review. Therefore, it is important that general guidance with a sense of relative priorities be available to OMB by early April. This schedule does not require immediate specific programmatic recommendations or that potential organizational questions be resolved during the first phase of this review.

—The remainder of the year would be planned to accomplish the necessary studies, and to seek opportunities to encourage efforts to improve world health and to strengthen coordinative activities, including within the U.S. Government, with and between international organizations, and with private sector organizations.

Proposed Initiatives

The initial review of international health, conducted by Peter Bourne’s staff, and comments received from the relevant agencies led to selection of areas where improvements may be made in the U.S. approach to international health. Outlined below, these potential initiatives are discussed in more detail in the following section.

1. Expand U.S. involvement with health-oriented activities of international organizations.
2. Encourage and facilitate private sector involvement to complement international health programs.
3. Expand capacity for knowledge development and use.
   —Upgrading the Fogarty International Center.
   —Foreign Research and Training Centers.
   —Presidential Scholars in Global Health.
   —Global Health Cadre.
   —International Health Services Corps.
5. Presidential priorities in prevention.
   —World Blindness.
   —World Water Supply.
III. Proposed Initiatives—For Comment

In addition to commenting on the general concept of the described International Health initiative, the Departments and agencies are asked to provide comments on each of the attached draft papers.9

9 Attached but not printed are six undated draft papers on the topics of expanding U.S. involvement with the health-related activities of international organizations, encouraging private sector involvement to complement international health programs, providing for the analysis of international health needs, international health manpower, Presidential priorities in prevention of blindness and improvement in potable water supplies, and coordination of U.S. Government activities in world health.

310. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, April 8, 1978, 0057Z

1305. Subject: 27th Commission on the Status of Women, March 20 to April 5—Final Report.2

Summary. There follows a delegation evaluation of the results and achievements of the 27th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). This is in addition to a more detailed report which will be submitted.3 The Commission session began and ended with controversial issues—election of the chairman and a resolution on apartheid—but nevertheless managed to devote a large portion of its time and energy to constructive work. The US and other Western delegations worked closely with Latin, African and Asian delegations on key issues concerning the preparations for the proposed 1980 World Conference, the future of the Commission, and in putting the emphasis on


2 The 27th session of the Commission on the Status of Women took place at UN Headquarters March 20–April 5. The U.S. delegation consisted of Horbal, Barbara Good, Votaw, Galey, Arvonne Fraser, Leet, Lois Matteson (USUN), and Perman. The United Nations established the Commission as a functional commission of the UN Economic and Social Council in June 1946. (E/RES/2/11)

3 Presumable reference to an August 30 memorandum for the record prepared by Horbal and Good and entitled “UN Status of Women Activities Update.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of International Organization Affairs/CU/UNESCO General Subject Files on UN Matters: Lot 81D337, Box 5, Women Affairs; Decade for Women) Horbal and Good summarized both the March 20–April 5 CSW and spring ECOSOC sessions.
practical development issues. The Eastern European group concentrated, as expected, on exploiting political issues and on attempting to put the main focus of future work on international peace and security rather than development or equality. End summary.

1. The Commission’s agenda contained a limited number of items, but provided room for discussion of all aspects of the political, economic, social and cultural status of women. Specific items included A) international instruments and standards relating to the status of women, B) developments relating to the program of the UN Decade for Women, C) protection of women and children in emergency and armed conflict in the struggle for peace, self-determination, national liberation and independence, D) the effects of apartheid on the status of women, and E) communications concerning the status of women.

2. Program of the Decade and World Conference. The Commission spent the majority of its time on the omnibus item pertaining to implementation of the Decade and specifically on discussing plans for the 1980 World Conference. Early in the session, the Western group decided to concentrate efforts on achieving a practical development/action oriented agenda for the 1980 Conference, and to seek to mold the Conference into a working conference rather than repeat the 1975 Conference in Mexico City which was a first step in global consciousness-raising. Consultations with the developing countries showed that they shared the same concerns—that the emphasis should be placed on practical issues rather than a continuation of rhetoric. The developing countries, led by India, subsequently took the initiative in producing a resolution, eventually adopted by consensus, calling for the Conference to concentrate on the themes of health, employment and education. The Eastern group was unsuccessful in attempting to divert this effort and to give greater emphasis to peace and disarmament issues. The development issue is the area where the relations between the Western group and developing countries are closest and working relationships most successful, and the Eastern group is least able to exert influence. The US should, therefore, continue its efforts to promote the addition of agenda items relating to development in order to minimize politicization and make the most of an area in which the US has taken a strong leadership role.

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3. Future of the Commission. In view of the concurrent informal meetings of the Economic and Social Council at which the future status of the Commission on the Status of Women, as well as that of other sub-bodies of ECOSOC, was being discussed, the majority of the members of the Commission agreed that the Commission should take action to forward its views to ECOSOC to be taken into account in its deliberations on restructuring scheduled for the spring session. The US joined other delegations in taking the lead on this issue and along with Mexico, Thailand and Belgium, cosponsored a draft resolution inviting ECOSOC to retain the Commission and, at the same time, to redefine its mandate. An additional draft, cosponsored by Niger, Zaire, Senegal and France was tabled concurrently and the cosponsors of both texts combined efforts to produce a consensus text for transmission to ECOSOC. The final text followed closely the lines of the original US proposal. The exercise caused some anguish to Sweden, UK and Japan. Sweden had reservations regarding the continuation of the Commission while the UK and Japan argued that they did not wish to prejudice the results of the ECOSOC deliberations. The developing countries were solidly in support of continuation of the Commission.

4. Political issues. The agenda item entitled “Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict in the Struggle for Peace, Self-Determination and National Liberation and Independence” did not produce the expected vitriolic debate and contentious resolutions which ordinarily ensue from such items. In view of the recent Israeli actions in Lebanon,5 the Western group expected the worst on this item. The FRG, therefore, decided to take the lead and table a constructive draft resolution on this subject, which focussed on international conventions and humanitarian relief efforts. While the debate included strong attacks on Israel by the Eastern Europeans, the Arab delegates, and the PLO observer, no further resolutions surfaced and the FRG draft was adopted by consensus with only minor amendments introduced by Byelorussia and Cuba. We have no explanation as to why the Eastern European spoilers allowed this agenda item to go by without controversy, but can only conclude that they were unprepared for a Western initiative on the subject and expected the Arab delegates (in fact represented only by Libya) would take the lead.

5. The sole issue on which the US cast a negative vote at the Commission and on which the US parted company with the African group and other developing country delegations was on the apartheid issue. The African cosponsors of a draft resolution on the effects of apartheid

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on the status of women showed themselves amenable to negotiations on their text, although their proposed final version was not wholly acceptable and the US, UK and FRG prepared to abstain on the text. The introduction just prior to the planned voting of amendments by the delegation of Bulgaria led to renewed negotiations, a revised text, a hardening of the Western position and a negative vote by the U.S. African delegates reacted with both anger and understanding to the Western position. Western delegates made clear that their opposition was due to the divisive elements introduced into the text by Bulgaria and that they supported the otherwise mostly constructive text which dealt primarily with voluntary assistance programs for women in Southern Africa. The delegation of Sweden found itself in a most uncomfortable position, as the African group had earlier in the day chosen the representative of Sweden to represent the Commission at the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. This choice was made in spite of the active lobbying and efforts of the Eastern group to nominate Byelorussia. Following the vote on the apartheid resolution, the African group, at the insistence of Ethiopia and Madagascar, met to reconsider the Swedish nomination. The moderates, led by Senegal, prevailed and the group subsequently announced that the choice of Sweden to represent the Commission would not be revoked.

6. Other issues. The Commission adopted a total of 15 resolutions, approving all but two by consensus. In addition to the issues discussed above, the Commission passed resolutions in improving national machinery for dealing with women’s issues, improving relations with intergovernmental bodies outside the UN system, strengthening UN institutions for implementing the World Plan of Action, as well as resolutions on consumer protection, measures to combat prostitution, a proposal to rationalize the reporting system, and integration of women in development in international conferences.

7. Relations with other delegations and groups. The Western group met frequently to coordinate positions, although there was not always final agreement. The Western group took the initiative on several issues, as noted above, and was successful in achieving its goals on several key issues. The US and other members of the Western group which included Japan made a concerted effort to hold frequent consultations and to work closely with developing country delegations to find areas of common interest and to reach consensus on these issues. Among the developing country delegations, India, Niger and Libya exercised the strongest leadership. The African group was far more active than either the Latin or Asian group and took more initiatives to promote its own interests. Neither the Latin nor Asian groups appeared to have any group cohesion and initiatives from these delegations were due to individual delegation actions rather than concerted group ef-
forts. The Eastern and Western European groups clashed frequently, beginning with the election of the chairman with a contest between the candidates from the UK and Byelorussia which the UK candidate won in a secret ballot. Eastern European tactics were heavy-handed and transparent and generally unsuccessful until the end of the session when the Bulgarians succeeded in tampering with the apartheid resolution, creating friction between the African and Western European groups.

8. The UK Chairman’s handling of resolutions and interpretation of UN procedures was unfortunate and resulted in the session ending on a note of confusion without an adopted agenda for the 28th session. Western delegates were not entirely pleased with the Secretariat’s proposed draft agenda for the Commission’s 28th session and proposed several amendments. The Chairman, however, adjourned the session without taking action on either the amendments or the original draft.

9. Conclusion. In the delegation’s view, the 27th session produced constructive and useful results, which will be carried forward and reflected in the 1980 World Conference. This should help to determine the direction of the future work of the Commission.

Leonard

311. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, April 21, 1978

SUBJECT
Status Report—World Health Strategy

As stated in our memorandum of February 1 to you, we have circulated a draft World Health Strategy to all of the interested agencies asking for comments on the overall approach and on each of the pro-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780120–2025. No classification marking. The President initialed the memorandum. Attached as Tab C of Blaney’s July 10 briefing memorandum to Cooper, Document 314.
posed initiatives.\(^2\) Their responses indicate that work is underway and there is support for elements of the strategy; however, further analysis and joint discussion is needed to develop the program initiatives. The number of agencies involved, combined with the differing perspectives of health as a function of developmental assistance or of medical research, requires that we complete the policy review before we will be in a position to announce the details of a major initiative.

As a result of your continuing interest, the Departments and agencies have already initiated internal efforts to determine how they can support the initiatives.

—HEW is developing a draft message for Secretary Califano to deliver, as your personal representative, to the World Health Assembly in May. AID, State and others are involved in the planning.\(^3\)

—AID has issued FY80 program guidance based on its draft strategy to promote health within a basic needs framework.

—Treasury has asked the World Bank to assess the Bank’s effectiveness in the health sector, and the possibilities for future lending.

—DOD has asked the military departments to identify specific projects in the areas of education, training and research.

In cooperation with the international organizations, we plan to consider giving special attention to the following:

—Basic health, nutrition and family planning measures particularly to improve maternal and child health;\(^4\)

—Prevention of blindness;\(^5\)

—Provision of safe water and basic sanitation; and

—Development of better ways to improve health.

“Basic needs” approaches to development must include health considerations. Decent health is essential to both labor productivity and learning ability. Young children and mothers suffer particularly poor health. Yet their suffering can be substantially alleviated through inexpensive, basic health programs in conjunction with measures to improve agriculture and expand education. Most third-world families lack the simplest means or information to deal effectively with the commonest health hazards. About 70 percent of the population lacks safe water, and even more do without adequate sanitation. Approximately 40 million people in the world are blind. We believe the American people will support initiatives to help provide families in developing countries with essential and inexpensive health care and immuniz-

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\(^2\) See Document 309. The February 1 memorandum to Carter was not found.

\(^3\) The President placed a check mark next to this paragraph.

\(^4\) The President placed a check mark next to each of these points.

\(^5\) The President added next to this point: “Big prob. in Liberia.”
tions, clean water, elementary sanitation and measures to prevent blindness.

There are no immediate reorganization implications which might create potential for conflict with your decision to create a new International Development Cooperation Administration and allied coordinating mechanisms. These initiatives will be developed in coordination with these mechanisms.

The review itself has generated sufficient momentum that we should again emphasize the identification of this effort as your initiative. Your Lagos speech contributed to this momentum by putting African health initiatives in the context of a broader U.S. international health effort and indicating further cooperation on African health problems. We propose three actions:

—Emphasis on Secretary Califano’s role as your personal representative to the World Health Assembly and your endorsement of Califano’s message spelling out the U.S. role. We will have his message by April 27 for final clearance.

—Release of a Statement of Principles as the first step in a long-term effort over the next two years to establish a world health initiative. We recommend you announce this prior to Califano’s message on May 9. We have tentatively scheduled time for you in the press room.

—Completion of the policy review, with an Administration strategy and detailed program initiatives by September 1, 1978, to support the development of the FY 1980 and subsequent budgets. A schedule is attached.

6 See footnote 17, Document 245.
7 The President departed Washington on March 28 for Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, and Liberia, returning to Washington on April 3. He spoke at the National Arts Theatre in Lagos, Nigeria, on April 1, commenting: “We are giving new priority to cooperating in international efforts to improve health around the world. We would like to study with you how we can best work with Nigeria and other nations of Africa to deal with the killing and the crippling diseases that still afflict this continent.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, p. 13)
8 The President wrote “ok” next to this point.
9 The President wrote “See statement first” next to this paragraph. The White House released a Presidential statement on May 2, announcing the U.S. international health program. Califano delivered prepared remarks at the 31st World Health Assembly in Geneva on May 9. See Document 313.
10 The President wrote “ok” next to this paragraph. The April 20 “World Health Strategy Workplan Timetable” is attached but not printed.
312. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, April 27, 1978, 0307Z

107370. For the Ambassador from Sec Vance and Admin Gilligan.
Subject: Ambassador’s Role in Dealing With Pressing Global Problems—Population Growth and Adequate Food Production. Reference: State 128220.2

Summary: You are requested to establish and report on a continuing dialogue with host country leadership regarding the need for the nation to deal more effectively with population/food problems in order to meet basic needs of the poor through self-help measures and to advance their own plans and aspirations for economic development. End summary.

1. The following instructions are based upon the policies and priorities of the Carter administration as enunciated by the Secretary in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee3 and upon Sections 103(A) and 109(A) (10) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.4 The Secretary stated that the cooperation of Third World is essential in helping resolve such pressing global problems as rapid population growth and inadequate food production. The principal purposes of our assistance programs

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780180–0086. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Green and Lee; cleared by Mink, Gilligan, Tarnoff, Blaney, and Tuchman, as well as in draft by Cavanaugh and in substance by Hathaway; approved by Vance. Sent to Kabul, Dacca, La Paz, Santo Domingo, Quito, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Accra, Guatemala City, Conakry, Georgetown, Port au Prince, Tegucigalpa, New Delhi, Kolkata, Kingston, Amman, Seoul, Beruit, Bamako, Rabat, Islamabad, Manila, Lisbon, Dakar, Freetown, Mogadiscio, Colombo, Khartoum, Damascus, Dar es Salaam, Tunis, Kinshasa, Lusaka, and Lima. According to telegram 207555, August 16, the Department repeated telegram 107370 on May 5 to Algiers, Banjul, Abidjan, Bissau, Bangkok, Ankara, Asuncion, Bogota, Brasilia, Bridgetown, Cotonou, Bujumbura, Caracas, Gaborone, Lilongwe, Libreville, Lagos, Lome, Kathmandu, Kigali, Managua, Maputo, Maseru, Mexico City, Monrovia, Mbabane, Ndjamen, Niamey, Nairobi, Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Panama City, Port Louis, Sana, San Jose, San Salvador, Santiago, Taipei, and Yaounde. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780335–0936)

2 See Document 284.

3 In his March 2 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the administration’s FY 1979 foreign assistance program, Vance stated: “The cooperation of Third World countries is essential in helping to resolve pressing global problems that affect all nations: economic instability or stagnation, rapid population growth, adequate food and energy production, environmental deterioration, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and the spread of narcotics.” The full text of Vance’s remarks is printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 1978, pp. 24–30.

are to meet the basic needs of poor people in the developing world and to give them a chance to improve their standard of living by their own efforts. The Act of 1954 requires consideration of the extent to which a recipient country is undertaking self-help measures to increase per capita production, including carrying out voluntary programs to control population growth. This is consistent with and reinforces NSC approved policy concerning the Ambassador’s role in making more effective use of our food assistance in stimulating countries to deal more effectively with their population/food problems.

2. We believe it is necessary to focus host countries’ attention on this issue. We have in mind (A) long term projected worldwide food shortages, based on FAO, USDA and other data, and (B) the Congressional requirement stated in Section 103(A) that our assistance be increasingly concentrated on countries that make effective use of such assistance, including their performance in improving agricultural output and nutrition and reducing population growth.

3. This administration’s emphasis that food and other assistance serve all development interests, to which population is integrally linked, reinforces the need for these instructions.

4. As appropriate in your normal contacts with top leadership of host government, you should discuss need for cooperation of Third World countries to resolve pressing global problems that affect all nations, including rapid population growth and inadequate food production. The principal purposes of our assistance programs are to meet the basic needs of the poor people in the developing world and to give them a chance to improve their standard of living by their own efforts.

5. In your presentation, you should make clear that we are not attempting to establish a condition for U.S. assistance. On other hand, projections of food/production trends suggest that U.S. and other major food-exporting countries (of which there are only five: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Thailand) as well as EEC will not be able in the long run to meet projected world food demand. As determined by the International Food Policy Research Institute, population in developing countries (excluding People’s Republic of China and other Asian Communist countries) will exceed 2.5 billion by 1985. Of them, 2.2 billion may well be living in food deficit countries, making the present precarious situation much more alarming in the absence of corrective actions. In addition, the logistics of food transport and storage will become an increasingly difficult problem.

6. We suggest you make point that, in a situation in which supplies may simply be inadequate to meet demands, prudence suggests that we jointly cooperate with food-deficit countries to explore ways in which their domestic supply and demand can be brought into balance. Efforts to increase agricultural production are a vital part of such solu-
tion. Without control of population growth, however, any solution is temporary or partial.

7. You should adjust your presentation to particular situation in your country including population/family planning policies and programs already being implemented.

8. We would like to have a report from you of your conversations, and we would appreciate any further suggestions you may have to increase the effectiveness of our programs in this area by June 1, 1978.

Vance

313. Editorial Note

On May 2, 1978, the White House issued a Presidential statement on international health. In January, the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Affairs Peter Bourne had recommended that President Jimmy Carter use either a message to Congress or a speech to explicate the administration’s international health strategy (see Document 306). In addition to the Presidential statement, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, head of the U. S. delegation to the 31st annual World Health Assembly in Geneva, Switzerland, would formally reiterate the administration’s commitment to an increased role in international health activities. According to an April 26 memorandum from Bourne to Carter, it was necessary for the White House to release the statement on international health prior to Califano’s scheduled May 9 speech, “both to reaffirm this as your initiative, demonstrating your leadership in this vital area of human needs and also to lend weight to the message Joe will deliver. I believe both parts, your statement, and Joe’s speech are extremely timely and important to counter the criticism that we have been too long on rhetoric with regards to basic human needs, and short on specifics. It is particularly useful to do this following shortly after your trip to Africa.” (Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, White House Office File on International Health, Box 53, Principles Statement, 4–5/78)

The President used the statement to provide a brief overview of the world’s health problems and stress cooperation in an increasingly interdependent climate before outlining the administration’s proposed initiatives:
“Consistent with the announced expansion of foreign aid, and our effort to focus that aid on the poorest of the world’s people, my administration has undertaken a review of international health needs. Our aim was to determine the most effective ways in which the U.S. Government and private organizations could help reduce the personal and economic impact of widespread malnutrition, infectious diseases, and other health hazards including those associated with frequent childbirth.

“As a result of that study, I am announcing today my intention to launch a program to strengthen the participation of the United States in worldwide efforts to overcome disease and ill health.

“Our efforts will be based on the following principles:

“—A basic minimum level of health, nutrition, and family planning services should be available to the world’s poor, whether they live in rural areas or urban slums.

“—Developing nations can eventually meet their own health needs if we assist them in strengthening their institutions and building their own health systems.

“—Community-based primary health care, including the use of community resources and the training of appropriate health personnel as near as possible to where they will deliver services, is the most effective means of achieving the standard of health we desire for all people.

“Our objective is to concentrate on the prevention of disease and ill health. We will put special emphasis on providing clean drinking water, basic sanitation, basic immunizations, and efforts to prevent and treat blindness. This emphasis will be reflected in our own programs and in our support of priorities established by various international organizations.

“We will work toward the lasting control or eradication of the major infectious diseases, particularly ‘tropical’ diseases that continue to be the leading causes of death and disability.

“We will give special attention to the major causes of death in children—diarrhea and respiratory disease, particularly when aggravated by malnutrition.

“Private industry provides most of the goods and services needed to sustain the world’s health. It can play an important role by exercising initiative and careful judgment in developing needed products and in helping to make sure they are used wisely to improve health in the developing world.

“We recognize the invaluable contribution voluntary organizations have made in improving the health of people throughout the world and their special services in developing nations. We will strive to aid them in their efforts and to coordinate our activities.
“We plan to:

—Strengthen institutions in our Government which are dealing with international health problems, reemphasizing our commitment to help meet the health needs of other nations, and improve the use of existing resources through better coordination.

—Build greater awareness among the American people of the legitimacy and the importance for our foreign policy goals of improving other people’s capacity to meet their basic human needs.

—Work closely with nations around the world, individually and through organizations such as WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and the regional development banks, to improve the health of people everywhere.

—More fully involve American universities, technological foundations, and other private organizations in making U.S. scientific and professional resources more accessible to the developing world.”

The full text of the statement is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pages 816–817. In telegram 115550 to all diplomatic and consular posts, May 5, the Department repeated the text of the President’s statement with a request to “bring this statement to the attention of the Minister of Health and other appropriate officials.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193–0915)

Califano, in his May 9 address to the World Health Assembly, reemphasized many of the objectives outlined in the Presidential statement. The Secretary pledged additional resources for the combating of major infectious diseases, especially in the area of child immunization. Providing clean drinking water also existed as a high priority; to this end, Califano highlighted U.S. support for the United Nations Decade for Drinking Water and Sanitation (1980–1990). Califano also described American collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in formulation of international nutrition programs. He indicated U.S. support for WHO programs dedicated to the prevention and treatment of blindness and extension of primary health care programs, including maternal and child health services, nutrition, and family planning. In his concluding remarks, Califano asserted, “We are, as you know, a nation seeking to reassert our commitment to human rights—at home and in the world. Our participation in this organization gives us an opportunity to express that commitment not simply in words but in deeds. Together with you, we stand ready to seize that opportunity. We can, and we must, build a healthier world for all our children.”

The full text of Califano’s remarks is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 1978, pages 35–38. The other members of the U.S. delegation included Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Julius Richmond; John Bryant (Director-designate, Office of In-
314. Briefing Memorandum From Harry Blaney of the Policy Planning Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper)¹

Washington, July 10, 1978

Status Report on Peter Bourne’s International Health Review

After considerable interagency meetings, numerous lengthy drafts of reports, etc., the White House on May 2 released a Presidential Statement on International Health. (See Tab A.)² This statement generally affirmed the intention of the President “to launch a program to strengthen the participation of the United States in worldwide efforts to overcome disease and ill health.” The basic elements of this strategy included:

—concentration on prevention of disease and ill health with emphasis on clean drinking water, basic sanitation, immunization, and blindness;
—control or eradication of major infectious diseases—particularly tropical; and
—causes of death in children.

The President stated that the strategy would be developed “as part of our budgetary and legislative recommendations for the next year. Where possible, however, we will move immediately to carry out this program.” Secretary Califano elaborated on this statement in his speech to the WHO Assembly on May 9. (See Tab B.)³ The basic White House/OMB memo to the President on this is at Tab C.⁴

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780120–1998. Unclassified. Sent through Lake. A copy was sent to Garten.

² Attached but not printed. See Document 313.

³ Attached but not printed is the Department of Health, Education and Welfare copy of Califano’s May 9 WHO address. For additional information, see Document 313.

⁴ Printed as Document 311.
A World Health Strategy Group was established under Peter Bourne with four agency-led working groups.

I. Initiatives for the Developing Countries (AID-chaired)
II. Scientific and Manpower Development (HEW)
III. Multilateral Agencies (State)
IV. U.S. Commerce in International Health

The goal, originally, was to achieve a single draft document by July 14 with a final report to the President by August 25. A short draft overview and outline for the health strategy report has been circulated along with a list of key issues and revised work schedule. (See Tab D.)

These latter documents assume an increase in foreign aid and especially health as a part of our BHN strategy. No dollar figures have yet been set for the specific initiatives to our knowledge.

The main initiatives proposed include:

—Support of “Integral Health Services Systems” including Primary Health Care, prevention, health, nutrition and family planning and paramedical training;

—Action against disease control—infec-tious diseases, blindness, mental health;

—Support for water and sanitation efforts;

—NGO involvement in bilateral assistance programs;

—Helping LDC resource and institutional capacities;

—Establishing foreign centers for research and training;

—Assistance in “Leadership Manpower Development”;

—An “International Health Service Corps”;

—Extension to present ACTION authority to provide assistance to “Domestic Development Service Programs” in LDCs;

—Have UNDP earmark funds for special health programs of multilateral agencies with “minimal growth in regular budget”;

—Increase in USG agency staff responsible for health activities of multilateral agencies;

5 An unknown hand placed a question mark at the end of this point.

6 Attached but not printed is a June 29 memorandum from Lowrance to the members of the White House Review of International Health Working Group III on Multilateral Health Organizations. Lowrance indicated that Bourne had met with the Consolidation Group, comprised of members from AID, HEW, and the Departments of State and Treasury, which had assumed responsibility for budgetary, organizational, and legislative matters and for drafting an overall international health strategy report. In addition to the draft overview and outline, list of key issues, and revised work plan, Lowrance also included a 9-page strategy and initiatives paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780120-2028)
—Increased reliance on NGOs in multilateral agency activities;
—More program development grants for research to U.S. institutions;
—More PVO involvement in USG programs including more Federal funding for PVOs to coordinate work;
—Fund “U.S. Private Commerce” conference by NAS;
—Establish interagency coordination to develop policy and program design;
—New U.S. manpower clearing house for world health programs;
—Permit foreign assistance funds to be applied to international health programs outside AID, State, Treasury and ACTION.

Comment: The above illustrates the ambitiousness of the initiatives being considered. Many will be hotly debated, especially the establishment of a new International Health Service Corps. Many of the initiatives are not well defined. As there are increasing pressures against AID funds, we face difficult choices among the suggested programs or a reallocation of our assistance priorities towards “health” type activities. Some of the “priority” areas make great sense in terms of impact on health for the relative cost involved and the LDCs existing capabilities, (e.g. community water and sanitation), while others, (e.g., mental health) may prove less effective in terms of foreign assistance.

Within State, Under Secretary Lucy Benson has been the key State coordinator of our work with Dr. Bourne. (The staff person in her office is Bill Lowrance.) Bourne’s staff leader on this is Krys Krystynak. State (T) chairs the Working Group on Multilateral Health Organizations. S/P is a member of the group and assists as required.

If we can be of any further help on this matter please let me know.
COORDINATION, ORGANIZATION, STAFFING

I. Purpose. The U.S. must strengthen the means by which its several government agencies can relate and join their separate missions and activities in international health. It must do so in a way which supports and is supported by the activities of the U.S. private sector, other donor countries, and multilateral and voluntary organizations. This will require a government-wide policy on international health, interagency coordination at both policy and strategic levels, capacity for development and promotion of new initiatives, and improved intra-agency coordination.

II. Policy. Although many distinct policies exist within and among individual agencies, the absence of a government policy on international health deters the achievement of a fuller humanitarian benefit to global health. In particular, if international health is to profit more from opportunities now available in various U.S. Government departments and agencies, explicit policy detailing the nature of the relation between international health and the various agency missions and activities must be established, understood and implemented by all. That policy must stress U.S. concern for basic health needs at the highest level of government policy-making and complement the President’s human rights policy, demonstrating real and effective concern for the health of people everywhere. It would serve as a model for changes in foreign policy decision making to better support economic and social development and efforts to improve international relations. It would seek to benefit from and improve domestic health activity. It would support and seek support from international economic and commercial policy.

A clearly defined international health policy would also establish more direct guidance for U.S. relationships with multilateral agencies and international financial institutions. The policy must also recognize

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1 Source: Carter Library, Staff Office Files, Special Assistant for Health Issues—Peter Bourne Files, Subject Files, Box 35, International Health, 7/11/78–10/5/78. No classification marking. Bourne attached the issue paper, in addition to another issue paper entitled “Legislation” and four draft reports prepared by the working groups: “Report of Working Group II Science and Health Manpower Development,” “Report of Working Group III Multilateral Agencies,” and “Report of Working Group IV International Health Commerce,” to a July 11 memorandum to Benson, Califano’s Special Assistant Peter Bell, Shakow, and Jayne, in preparation for a July 18 Consolidation Group meeting. (Ibid.) No record of this meeting has been found.
and complement the unique potential of the U.S. private sector—academia, PVO’s, U.S. private business, and private individuals.

III. Coordinating Mechanisms. Twenty-two agencies engage in international health related activities. A way is needed to relate and strengthen the separate purposes and potential contributions of these agencies to the benefit of overall government goals such as those currently espoused by the President. An explicit policy will be instrumental in creating such procedures. In order to establish a government-wide policy, keep it current, and manage its implementation, the major problem of divided responsibility and authority among the largest agencies will have to be overcome.

There is general agreement among the agencies that coordination can and should be improved. Two levels of interagency coordination are required: a policy level and a strategic program level.

The policy level responsibilities include:

- the planning and evolution of U.S. Government international health policy;
- establishment of the government-wide goals and principles for agencies to use in designing international health programs;
- resolution of any impasse from the strategic level of coordination, especially regarding acceptance and assignment of lead responsibility for different international health activities;
- publication and transmission to the President and Congress of an annual report on international health activities.

Public input should be invited to assist in the performance of all these responsibilities.

Strategic level responsibilities include:

- the planning and evolution of U.S. Government international health strategy;
- interrelation of goals and activities of international health programs throughout government;
- development and promotion of international health initiatives coming from ongoing government programs, international science and health attaches (described in the following paragraphs), the U.S. private sector, foreign countries, or international organizations;
- maintenance of information on relevant governmental and worldwide international health activity.

The key issues to be considered in improving coordination for international health are: structure, lead, and relation to other related coordinating bodies.

Structure. Of the 22 agencies currently involved in international health activities, AID, HEW and State are the most directly involved, followed by ACTION, DoD and Treasury. Broad policy is most easily developed among those agencies most active in international health. Strategy and broad program coordination, however, requires wider in-
volvement of all agencies with related concerns and potentials for contribution. Ad hoc groups, such as the newly formed African Regional Health Strategy Group, can best serve immediate needs.

**Other Coordinating Groups.** Three existing coordinating groups with health related concerns are: (1) the DCC; (2) the NSC Ad Hoc Population Committee; and (3) Agriculture’s Food Policy Group. The foci and functions of these groups partially involve international health matters. However, there are significant aspects of international health which are not fully covered by any one of them alone or even all three taken together.

Any international health coordinating body will be concerned with improving health in the developing, as well as the developed world. The NSC and Agriculture groups do not address international health concerns broadly. The DCC does not address international health concerns of the United States and the rest of the developed world, nor does its mandate include advancing health science. Good coordination would be made more difficult to achieve, therefore, by parcelling out international health policy and program responsibility to these groups. Whereas population, hunger and perhaps other basic human needs activities might be most appropriately connected to one of the three groups, in the case of international health, it seems more appropriate to consider whether coordination should be separate from these three groups with significant liaison on respectively appropriate matters.

The most difficult question in this regard concerns the newly established role of the AID Administrator as the President’s and the Secretary of State’s principal advisor on development programs and policy, and as the Executive Branch’s principal spokesperson to the Congress on development assistance. In this role, the Administrator will chair an expanded Development Coordinating Committee (DCC). The DCC will deal with issues of bilateral aid, multilateral aid, P.L. 480, aid for certain international organizations, and legislative strategy and tactics. DCC subcommittees have been established on: bilateral aid loans and grants; multilateral aid including IFI and IFAD loans (but a

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2 Within the Department of State, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs remains the Secretary’s principal advisor for all foreign economic policy. [Footnote in the original.]

3 DCC membership: Agriculture, AID, Commerce, Export-Import Bank, Labor, NSC, OMB, Overseas Private Investment Council, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, State and Treasury. (Note the absence of HEW, ACTION, DoD and EPA.) [Footnote in the original.]
separate National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies will be chaired by the Secretary of Treasury and continue to advise him on policy toward the IFI’s; food aid; developmental programs and budgets of international organizations (excluding organizations now backstopped by Treasury); Human Rights and Foreign Assistance; legislative strategy (to be established); and a working group to review strategy for implementing a foundation for International Technological Cooperation.

**Lead.** State believes the lead should be shared. AID accepts State as the central point of coordination but believes AID should lead for LDC’s and HEW for developed countries. HEW believes it should lead, but underscores the need for a focal point in State and for coordination between HEW and State. Various agencies (and many nongovernment parties) want a significant White House role in the lead.

The answer to who should assume the lead for coordinating U.S. international health policy and programs will depend to a significant extent on the way in which current reorganization and coordination proposals and plans in various areas develop. The new DCC/CDPP structure will take some time to establish how its concern for development programs and policy will relate to international development assistance in health and to international health activity not primarily related to development. The proposed Foundation for International Technology Cooperation is just now into the earliest planning stage with only very little known of its relation to health. AID responsibilities are currently being considered for reorganization. HEW, DoD and others (EPA, VA, Labor, etc.) are considering strengthening their international health involvements. Congress (Javits and Kennedy) is proposing new roles and structures for the agencies in international health. OMB is moving toward a consolidated budget review for international health. The World Bank is currently reviewing its health sector policy and should be finished doing so early next year. WHO and the U.N. family in general are undergoing significant policy and programmatic reorientation. Until these and other developments take shape, therefore, it would seem appropriate to retain leadership for coordination of international health activity in the White House.

**IV. Initiative Development and Promotion.** Global health programs, projects and initiatives can and do originate in many ways, in many places, and for many purposes. They serve goals of global health (including health of U.S. citizens), foreign policy, medical diplomacy, de-

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4 The name DCC may be changed to Council on Development Policies and Programs. [Footnote in the original.]
velopmental and supporting assistance, professional and scientific exchange, and U.S. commerce and finance. At present, it is cumbersome to develop and introduce such initiatives government-wide. Coordination is ad hoc when it takes place. More systematic procedures should help to ensure an integrated, government-wide strategy to implement these initiatives in ways which best exploit government capabilities in concert with U.S. international health and foreign policies.

Development and promotion of such international health initiatives require the capacity to identify needs or opportunities for assistance or collaboration in other countries, to promote these objectives in the U.S. and host country governments, and to design and select appropriate projects and allocate responsibility for implementation among the many U.S. agencies and private sector resources devoted to international health activity.

To some extent, AID personnel perform these functions in developing AID health programs in countries that meet their criteria for assistance. Attaches of the State Department perform similar functions in broader areas related to science, technology, agriculture and commerce; but little or no direct attention is paid to health and basic human needs. Other agencies are similarly involved, e.g., HEW’s research and scientific exchange activity and VA’s technical assistance for hospital construction. But, AID’s coverage of health problems is limited to AID countries and operationally directed to its own programming needs; State’s Attaches are only minimally oriented to health; and the activities of other agencies often miss opportunities for more effective involvement, fuller U.S. participation, or more coordinated activity. Therefore, development and promotion of international health initiatives as described above requires some improvement.

In the future, such initiatives should be routinely developed and promoted through whatever means exist in the government for international health coordination. In addition, Working Group II recommends working within the State Department’s Attache system to the following extent by:

1. Creating the post of Deputy Science Attache for health in some countries;
2. Recruiting health scientists to serve as Science Attaches; and
3. Raising awareness of Science Attaches by:
   a. health orientation at annual or regional meetings of the Science Attaches; and
   b. visits to Science Attaches at their in-country posts.

Furthermore, in the case of international health initiatives with multilateral organizations—especially with WHO, the current staff at HEW, AID and IO is fully deployed and overextended. Most staff work
is performed as a part-time responsibility. A study by IO/State\(^5\) recommends increasing U.S. staff to permit better coordination in Washington and more frequent contacts with WHO headquarters and WHO regional staffs. This is all the more important as WHO is decentralizing its activities to the regions. Working Group II proposes that HEW create Health Attache positions in at least four of the WHO regions. This would work best if HEW would designate an additional three full-time WHO representatives at OIH, and if State would add an additional health officer in IO.

V. Intra-Organizational Coordination. In order to implement such a policy and coordination framework, Departments and agencies will have to establish more clearly their focal points for international health responsibility. In HEW and AID this would require significant intraorganizational coordination among functions (assistance, training, research) and responsibilities (other agency missions and international health). In State, ACTION, DoD, Treasury, Commerce, EPA, etc., this will require identification of organizational points of coordination with international health policy and program activity in their own agency and government-wide.

In the State Department, for example, it would be helpful to formally designate a focal point at which the relationship between international health and international relations would be clarified and strengthened. Because of State’s role as ultimate manager of all U.S. international relations—thus including international health activities involving other countries or their citizens, it would be most useful if this sort of focal point were to serve as State’s point of liaison for all of its activity regarding international health: representation of international health during formulation and conduct of foreign policy and vice versa; development, promotion and management (but not necessarily conduct) of international health initiatives taken primarily to improve U.S. relations with other countries; leadership in major agreements with other countries on transnational health problems with the environment, safety of goods or services in trade, etc.; and neutral broker for the relationship of international health government-wide with U.S. international policies in other areas.

In order to operate such a focal point, State will have to upgrade its organizational capacity and staff in international health. State is currently investigating on their own an appropriate way to improve their ability to meet responsibilities such as those outlined above.

\(^5\) Not found and not further identified.
Other agencies may not require as much structure as suggested above. At a minimum, however, some specific delegation of responsibility for international health matters would be appropriate.6

6 On July 21, The Washington Post reported Bourne’s resignation as Head of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy and Special Assistant for Health Issues, effective July 20. (Fred Barbash and Edward Walsh, “Carter Aid Bourne Resigns Over False Prescription,” The Washington Post, July 21, 1978, p. A–1) In a July 21 memorandum to Lake, Kreisberg, and Garten, Blaney commented, “I am very concerned that with the departure of Peter Bourne and also with the departure of Bill Lowrance in T that development of an international health strategy will fall into disarray.” Blaney suggested that either the Department of State or OMB assume full responsibility for the effort. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL Papers on Specific Mtgs/Appoint. 1978) According to an undated AID “Health Sector Review” discussion paper attached to an August 2 memorandum from Blaney to Lake regarding the UN Water Decade, OMB would now head the initiative. (Ibid.)

316. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Benson)1

Washington, July 19, 1978

SUBJECT
Issues and Options Paper for UN Water Decade

Attached at Tab 1 is a revised issues and options paper for the U.S. policy toward the UN Water Decade, reflecting comments of AID and OES as well as our own up-dating of certain data.2 We briefed OMB staff on the paper and invited their comments. However, despite general admonitions about need for fiscal restraint they have not offered us any specific thoughts.


The paper contains three basic options. We have assumed that Option 1 would be subsumed in Options 2 and 3.

1. Early provision for planning assistance to all relevant LDCs in community water sector (CWS) at $2.2 million spanning FY 80 and 81. This should not be very controversial since AID is already moving in this direction, although the extent of their intended funding is not yet certain.

2. Two medium level efforts:

   (a) US would assist a limited number of “lower tier” LDCs to develop replicable model programs and then to implement them in a limited number of countries. Estimated cost would be $2.5 to $3 billion over a decade with FY 80 funding at about $100 million development assistance (DA).

   (b) US would assist both lower and upper tier countries as in (a) above. Estimated cost: $3.75 billion over the decade.

3. US would take lead in major effort to largely fulfill the rural sector UN Water Decade goals for most LDCs reaching 1 billion people over 10 years. (Cost to US: $3.75 billion over the decade; perhaps only $150 million in the first year.)

   These figures compare with a total CWS AID development assistance in FY 78 of $73.3 million and in FY 79 of $44.6 million. Thus option 2 at $100 million and Option 3 at $150 million for the first year of the decade is not an extraordinary increase over past expenditure. In fact AID currently spends about 3% of its DA budget on CWS. Option 2 would bring this percentage to 4.35%. Option 3 would increase it to 6.5%.

   We’ve arranged with your staff for a senior level UN Water Decade coordinating group meeting to be held on August 2nd. At Tab 2 is a draft memo from you to members of the Senior Group announcing the meeting.³

   Before August 2 we would like to offer some suggestions on the meeting itself.⁴


⁴ According to an August 2 memorandum from Blaney to Lake, Benson indicated that she did not want to hold the senior-level meeting, preferring “to talk informally” with Lake that day before convening a larger meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL Papers on Specific Mtgs./Appoint. 1978) No record of the conversation between Lake and Benson has been found.
Moscow, September 14, 1978, 1154Z


1. The WHO/UNICEF Conference on Primary Health Care concluded 1800 hours September 12 with approval of Conference final report and reading of “Declaration of Alma Ata”.3 The Conference held relatively few surprises, with careful WHO/UNICEF staff preparations evident throughout and final document closely following an advance staff text.

2. The universal acceptance of the goal of making some type of primary health care available to everyone by the year 2000, with LDC recognition that each country bears prime responsibility for building a health delivery system suited to its economic and social conditions, is doubtless a milestone in international health matters. The full significance of the “Declaration”, however, will depend on how rapidly and effectively individual nations and intergovernmental organizations are able to translate the generalities of the “Declaration” into action programs.

3. As host nation, the Soviets played a generally useful and moderate role during formal Conference deliberations. Their effort to favorably impress conference participants with the Soviet health system was extraordinary. The entire city of Alma Ata and surroundings were freshly scrubbed and stocked with meat and other scarce food items (we had one report from a local inhabitant that mutton suddenly appeared on sale a few days before the start of the conference, after 18

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780373–0912. Priority; Limited Official Use.


3 In telegram 13186 from Geneva, August 31, the Mission transmitted a draft of the proposed Alma Ata Declaration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780355–1284) The final declaration, consisting of 10 points, affirmed that health was a fundamental human right and insisted that governments devise policies, strategies, and plans of action to ensure that all people receive adequate primary health care. (Primary Health Care: Report of the International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6–12 September 1978, pp. 1–6)
meatless months in the Alma Ata region.) The field trips the Soviets organized for Conference participants during the September 9–10 weekend to urban and rural Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan featured Soviet physicians and other health personnel in immaculate uniforms and surroundings reciting the usual stock phrases in praise of the Soviet system. Overstaging, and lack of visible patients, detracted from what could have been an impressive show.

4. Senator Kennedy’s address delivered to the plenary the evening of September 6 attracted wide attention, and brought warm response from the galleries packed with local Soviets. Hundreds of Soviets gathered in the square facing the conference hall to catch a glimpse of the Senator’s departure.

5. The Conference, in contrast to recent world health assemblies, was relatively free of extraneous political debate. Soviet Health Minister Petrovsky adroitly handled his duties as President of the Conference and assisted in the general move for consensus. The only political flap was created by the SWAPO delegate in the closing hours of the conference, who requested that “liberation movements” be inserted in a listing of groups supporting health care in the summary of discussions of the conference. A sharp exchange ensued with Algeria, Zambia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, GDR and the PLO registering support for the SWAPO proposal and the FRG, Canada, Australia, France, Guatemala, and Costa Rica noting opposition. The suggestion was referred to the Secretariat to work out appropriate wording for inclusion in the final conference report. Notwithstanding the heavy majority of LDCs participating, together with SWAPO and the PLO, the final conference document was moderate in tone. The racism-Zionism issue which had plagued previous WHO conferences was not raised.

Garrison

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4 Kennedy attended and spoke at the conference but was not part of the official U.S. delegation. See “Kennedy Will Visit Russia Next Week For Health Meeting,” The Washington Post, September 1, 1978, p. A–18.
Dear Mr. Scheuer:

Thank you for your letter\(^2\) and subsequent cable to Secretary Vance\(^3\) concerning the future role of the Department of State in population affairs. I am glad you have had the opportunity to discuss these matters with Assistant Secretary Pickering,\(^4\) and in Secretary Vance’s absence I would like to respond further to your concerns.

Secretary Vance and I share your high regard for Ambassador Green and your regret at his departure after three years of able and effective service as Coordinator of Population Affairs. We believe your assessment is entirely correct that under his leadership population issues have assumed a high importance in our foreign policy—a priority reflected in the President’s message to Congress in May of last

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780166–1768. No classification marking. Vance departed Washington, D.C. on October 13 for Pretoria, South Africa, whereupon he met with South African officials to discuss problems related to Namibia.

\(^2\) In a September 22 letter to Vance, Scheuer noted the heightened concern amongst members of the House Select Committee on Population regarding Green’s impending retirement from the Department and the proposed restructuring of OES. After highlighting Green’s contributions, both as a former Ambassador and as Coordinator of Population Affairs, Scheuer asserted: “His replacement by a middle-level Foreign Service Officer, with no experience whatever in population matters, cannot fail to convey to nations around the world the message that population is deemed by this Administration to be a less important issue than in the past. Such an appointment would represent a sharp downgrading of State Department commitment to the resolution of population problems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780146–2213) The House of Representatives established the Select Committee on Population in September 1977 with the intent of surveying U.S. and world population trends and evaluating U.S. population policies, as Scheuer explained in a November 21, 1977, letter to Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770181–1910)

\(^3\) In an October 10 telegram to Vance, Scheuer requested that Vance delay the final appointment of Green’s replacement until Scheuer had an opportunity to discuss the issue with the Secretary. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780172–1053)

\(^4\) According to an October 18 action memorandum from Pickering to Christopher, sent through Benson, Pickering suggested that Christopher approve a response to Scheuer affirming the Department’s commitment to population affairs. Pickering also noted that he had met with Scheuer on September 25 and affirmed the “unchanged high priority attached to population,” touted the credentials of Green’s replacement Richard Benedick, commented on the close working relationship he and Benedick would have, and noted Green’s willingness to serve as a consultant on population matters (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780166–1770)
This high priority will be maintained by the recent changes in the Department designed to build on Ambassador Green’s unique contributions and to strengthen the Department’s role in population policy. Ambassador Green’s successor now will have direct responsibility for the Office of Population Affairs and daily contact with Assistant Secretary Pickering, who will assume the chairmanship of the NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Population Policy. Under Secretary Benson and I will continue to work with the new Coordinator, as we have done with Ambassador Green, to ensure that the major developments in our population policy are brought to Secretary Vance’s personal attention. I appreciate your support for these organizational improvements.

I want to reiterate, however, the Department’s view that the appointment of Dr. Richard Benedick is not a downgrading of our commitment to population policy. Dr. Benedick is a senior career diplomat with over twenty years of experience. He has worked and published in the population and development field and was strongly recommended by Ambassador Green and others for this post. He will be supported by the continued active involvement of Ambassador Green, who has agreed to remain available as a consultant.

We are confident, in short, that Dr. Benedick’s appointment and the other organizational changes I have mentioned will enable the Department to maintain its commitment to population issues as a vital part of our foreign policy. We hope to continue working closely with you and the Select Committee on Population on these issues, and would like to express our appreciation for your strong interest and involvement in this area of great importance to the future of our nation and the world.

Sincerely,

Warren Christopher

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5 See Documents 284 and 312.
SUBJECT

U.N. Water Decade: U.S. Approach and Strategy

As a result of efforts which you helped to stimulate, and AID’s own examination of water issues, Governor Gilligan has now approved a 10-year program to support the 1981–90 U.N. Decade for Water Supply and Sanitation, and a consensus has been developed between AID, OES and S/P on our basic approach. If agreed to by OMB and the President, this program will represent a significant move towards implementation of the Administration’s basic human needs policies as well as the President’s commitment to give priority to water and sanitation in his message to the World Health Assembly. It will also provide a major impetus towards achieving the U.N. Water Conference goals of reaching 1.2 billion people by the end of the U.N. Water Decade. The 10-year program would concentrate on the rural poor and would be of great benefit in improving the health of these people, particularly by attacking diarrheal diseases among children. The development benefits—through increased productivity—will also be significant.

In essence the strategy and program aims at an expenditure of $2.5 billion during the Decade period, with funding subject to the LDCs’ own efforts, support of other donors, adequate projects and future AID budget levels. This sum could be increased later if experience shows we can do more. (See Summary of Program at Tab A.) This level of effort represents a significant increase in our support for this key area of development. Our efforts would of course be integrated with other health and rural community projects.

The next steps in obtaining the Administration’s endorsement of this strategy involve submitting the proposed 10-year program to OMB.

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2 See Document 313.

3 Attached but not printed is the undated summary of program, entitled “U.S. Rural Community Water and Sanitation Initiative (CWS).”
and obtaining Presidential concurrence. Therefore, we request your endorsement of the attached strategy and your approval for us to work with AID to obtain endorsement by OMB and final concurrence by the President. We have worked closely with Alex Shakow who concurs with this approach.  

Recommendation:

That you indicate your approval of the attached 10-year International Water Decade strategy and program and your concurrence for us to work with AID in obtaining the additional Administration support required.  

4 Attached but not printed as Tab B is a September 1 action memorandum from Shakow to Gilligan.  

5 There is no indication as to whether Benson approved or disapproved the recommendation.

320. Editorial Note

Beginning in October 1978, the Department of State Bulletin serialized three articles written by Coordinator of Population Affairs Ambassador Marshall Green and his Special Assistant Robert A. Feary and assisted by Department of State demographer Lydia K. Giffler. Entitled “World Population: The Silent Explosion,” the articles outlined the central issues of population growth and global responses to the problem. Part 1, published in October, provided a brief historical overview of the population explosion, postulated as to the distribution of the world’s population by 2000, and discussed the implications of classical demographic transition theory. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1978, pages 45–54)

The second installment of “Silent Explosion,” printed in the November issue of Department of State Bulletin, explored the negative consequences of rapid population growth upon the world food system, national economies, social services, the environment, and internal and external politics:

“The overpopulation problem is most often viewed in broad economic, social, and political terms. But it is fundamentally a problem of the frustrations, deprivation, and suffering of millions of individual human beings, predominantly in the developing countries. Millions of women are caught up in a cycle of endless childbearing, wasted health,
drudgery, and limited life expectancy. Vast numbers of children are born into a future of undernourishment, physical and mental impairment, and virtually no prospect of advancement and a better life. Multitudes of adults and youths are without meaningful employment.

“Population pressures are by no means the only cause of these conditions. Poverty and suffering existed long before there were such pressures. But the central importance of overpopulation in the syndrome of mounting demands on diminishing life support systems, and stationary or declining living standards over most of the developing world, is clear.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 1978, page 4)

Part 2 also described multilateral efforts toward curbing population growth, notably the 1974 adoption of the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA), and national efforts toward instituting family planning programs.

The December issue of Department of State Bulletin featured the third and final part of “Silent Explosion.” After offering several “priority action areas” designed to improve the effectiveness of population programs, the authors highlighted U.S. international population policies, notably the 1977 amendment of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), the establishment of the House Select Committee on Population in September 1977, and the work of the National Security Council Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy. Asserting that the world could no longer “gloss over population problems,” Green, Feary, and Giffler concluded:

“Whether world population stabilizes at 8, 11, or more billions, one thing seems clear: There will be mounting pressure on resources and environment everywhere. Awareness of this fact has been slow in coming, but there is now widening recognition that lifestyles are going to have to change. Fortunately, many religions and cultures already reflect appreciation of the intangible and spiritual over the material. But anguishing adjustments remain in store.

“The world population explosion impacts on almost all global issues—food, energy, environment, North-South disparities, and, most fundamentally of all, improving conditions of life for countless millions of people. Whether the world community can act adequately and in time to stabilize population levels will critically affect the future of mankind.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 1978, page 47)

In a November 16 action memorandum to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, sent through Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology Lucy Wilson Benson, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Thomas Pickering suggested that the Department transmit copies of “Silent Explosion” to all Chiefs of Mission. Commented Pickering, “I believe it should be required reading for all U.S. Ambassadors and
principal staff, as a useful aid in their continuing diplomatic contacts with foreign leaders, for it has been demonstrated that leadership commitment to national population programs is a vital element in their success.” He stressed Vance’s “personal involvement,” and proposed that Vance send a personal message to all Ambassadors. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780176–1158) A prototype letter, prepared in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, urged Ambassadors to “examine and use” “Silent Explosion” and offer any thoughts as to “how the United States and the international community might more effectively address this transcendent global problem.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780176–1160) According to a January 22, 1979, memorandum from Executive Secretary of the Department Peter Tar- noff to all Assistant Secretaries and office heads, the Department had sent copies of “Silent Explosion” to all Chiefs of Mission under a personal letter from Vance. (Department of State, RG 59, S/S (I): Principal Memoranda (To/From for 1979—S D P E C T M): Lot 81D117, S/S Memo File Jan–Feb–Mar 1979)
321. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 4, 1978, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Population Affairs

PARTICIPANTS
Congressman James Scheuer
Mike Teitelbaum, Staff Director for Select Committee on Population
State Department
T—Undersecretary Benson
OES—Mr. Thomas Pickering
H—Mr. Tom Weston

Due to a delay in his plane, Congressman Scheuer missed his meeting with the Secretary. Mrs. Benson explained, however, that the time had been used for discussion by the Secretary, herself and Tom Pickering about the need for a new approach on population matters. The Secretary is looking for ways to emphasize this Administration’s commitment to population issues. Scheuer noted that on several occasions, when a high-level visit to a major LDC was contemplated, he had written letters to the Secretary asking that population be raised. As an indication of the lack of proper emphasis, he had not even received responses to those letters. More to the point in Scheuer’s mind was the fact that, following the meetings, he had inquired of the State Department whether or not it had been raised. In all instances he found that it had not been. He therefore welcomed the Secretary’s commitment to new initiatives on population matters, but, citing the letter of October 24 from Deputy Secretary Christopher, expressed skepticism about the commitment of the Department. The Secretary should exercise firm leadership in this field.

Mrs. Benson agreed that not enough attention had been paid to the population problem, but added that the Secretary was committed to exercising leadership in this field. If the Secretary is to provide leadership he must have individual issues called to his attention, in this case by herself and Tom Pickering.


2 No record of this meeting has been found.

3 See Document 318.
Mr. Pickering noted that, in the meeting this morning with the Secretary, Mr. Vance had explored ways in which the prestige and entree of Mr. Benedick could be enhanced, for example, through an ambassadorial appointment. Mr. Vance also raised the possibility of bringing in distinguished outsiders to head missions in this area. Scheuer reacted with the comment that it was not a question of increasing Benedick’s prestige, rather that an essential appointment was given to a person who may be very capable, but, to Scheuer’s knowledge, had never had ambassadorial rank and had no reputation outside the State Department on population matters. Such an appointment was a clear signal to others that the United States government’s emphasis on population issues had been lowered.

Mrs. Benson pointed out the need for someone working full-time within the bureaucracy, if prominent outsiders were to be fully prepared to undertake a mission on population issues. Congressman Scheuer wondered whether a more prominent person with ambassadorial experience could be appointed to such a position. He gave as an example Ambassador Easum, now in Lagos, and emphasized that the key was direct access to the Secretary without going through several bureaucratic layers. Mr. Pickering agreed that prominent outsiders must be brought in, but added that it was very difficult to find such people willing to spend full time on these issues. This was the reason for an officer within the bureaucracy. He thought one prominent person for population missions would be Congressman Scheuer and asked for suggestions of other prominent figures. Scheuer responded that he would be available to undertake any mission at any time but that more was needed. Names of people could be obtained from the White House but he would make himself available for consultations whenever needed.

The Congressman hopes to meet in the near future with the Secretary, Mrs. Benson, Mr. Pickering and Marshall Green. He was informed that the Secretary would be calling him that afternoon (December 4) to discuss this issue further.

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4 Donald B. Easum, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, had previously served as Ambassador to Upper Volta and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

322. Memorandum From Mary Hanley of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to the Director of International Women’s Programs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Good)

Washington, January 5, 1979

SUBJECT

HA Policy Responsibilities Regarding Women

The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs is directly concerned with how official U.S. policy can better respond to the rights of women. The following are ways in which we can improve this responsiveness:

1. Section 502B and 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act call on us to submit annual reports to Congress on the human rights situation in countries receiving economic or security assistance.

Guidelines to all posts for country reporting should call for specific information re status of women. Request for such information in general terms has so far brought little success.

Until such reporting becomes routine, posts should be reminded to contact, become familiar with and receive/accept information from both government and NGO groups and organizations concerned with women’s affairs.

Constitutional provisions which in many states spell out in great detail—in far greater detail than in the U.S., in many instances—specific rights of women (right to vote, to work, etc.) should be examined for compliance and raised in the regular course of human rights representations.

2. The relevant findings of private organizations that deal with international women’s issues, gather information relating to women and are actively involved in organizing and/or implementing overseas programs for women, both privately and government-funded, should be given consideration in the preparation of our own country reports.

3. More attention should be paid to the role and status of women as a general human rights consideration during routine examination of U.S. economic security assistance, as well as development projects.

1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, SHUM Women 1979. No classification marking. Sent through Derian. Neither Hanley nor Derian initialed the memorandum.
4. Ranking women officials in other governments should be contacted regarding U.S. concerns on the subject of women presuming they are somewhat sensitized to the issue.

5. Official U.S. delegations should include more women whenever possible.

6. More women should be included in the visitors exchange program. Women candidates should be nominated as part of mixed (male-female) programs, not just as members of all-women delegations.

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323. Memorandum From Michelle Bova of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian)

Washington, January 11, 1979

SUBJECT
Green/Pickering Memos on the Plight of Women in Developing Countries

In response to the memos sent to you by Thomas Pickering and Marshall Green, respectively (copies attached), I met separately with Ambassador Green, Arvonne Fraser and Luke Lee of Mr. Pickering’s office. These meetings elicited the following suggestions for how this Administration and HA, in particular, could take a more active role in promoting the rights of women and children internationally:

1. HA should create a full time officer position which would deal with the rights of women and children internationally. Discussion: Luke Lee has done some impressive work in this area, as attested by the attached sample of writing material which he has produced. Now that Patsy Mink has left OES and Ambassador Green will be leaving, the

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1 Source: Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979 Human Rights Subject Files, Lot 82D102, SHUM Women 1979. No classification marking. Derian initialed the memorandum and added a handwritten notation: “I talked w/Tom Pickering; he’s exploring the idea of transferring the slot. You’re right; if we don’t get the slot, we won’t be able to manage to improve & enlarge our efforts—Return to me please. P.D.”

2 Pickering’s and Green’s memoranda to Derian, dated December 11 and November 30, 1978, respectively, are attached but not printed.

3 Not attached and not found.
priorities of the office have changed. Luke is no longer being encouraged to take a broad range view of the causes and less conventional cures of over population. He plans to return to academic life but would prefer to stay on at State and continue the work he has begun. Ambassador Green believes that if you speak with Tom Pickering there is a chance that he could transfer Lee’s current position in OES to HA. Another possibility lies in convincing the Inspectors of the need for such a slot in HA. I do not believe that our current staffing would enable us to take on this additional responsibility in a meaningful way. The following two recommendations are probably not feasible if this position is not created.

2. HA should recommend the creation of an Inter-Agency Group on the Status of Women and Children Internationally. Discussion: There is a need to coordinate the various programs carried out by USG agencies domestically and overseas which affect the status of women and children. A Task Force composed of representatives of State (HA and IO), AID (Women in Development), Treasury (International Development Banks), The Census Bureau, Labor and HEW could be assigned this task. Its mandate could be linked to U.S. participation in the International Year of the Child and the UN Decade for Women. In order to work it would need dynamic and experienced leadership. I believe Marshall Green would be willing to assume this task. I am certain he would do an excellent job. Sara Weddington at the White House would probably lend her support.

3. In conjunction with PA, HA should issue a booklet similar to the “Silent Explosion” (attached)\(^4\) which deals with women’s and children’s rights and needs in an international setting. This booklet would be disseminated to all our missions and used domestically to encourage outside support and other USG agency attention to the problems raised. The booklet could be sent to our missions under a covering message from you to our Ambassadors highlighting U.S. participation in the International Year of the Child and the UN Decade for Women.

4. Next year’s human rights reports should give more detailed and much more sophisticated attention to the rights of women and children. Discussion: This year’s reports mention that problems exist in general terms. We do not, however, have the data base to describe those problems in a serious and detailed fashion. This year we were able to give greater attention to social and economic rights. Next year let’s add women and children. By encouraging our posts to become better informed on these issues and helping them by providing scarce informa-

\(^4\) Not attached. See Document 320.
tion or putting them in touch with likely sources, we will encourage the
development of more information. Most importantly we will sensitize
our missions to these problems and this, in turn, will enable them to
raise the issues with host governments and develop programs for mu-
tual cooperation. Arvonne Fraser is promoting several projects which
address the need for increasing the data base on the status of women in
developing countries.

I’ve attached the Report she submitted to the Congress in August,
1978 which describes some of these efforts (see pages 159–206, an inter-
esting example is described after the heading “Country Profiles” on
page 182).5

5. HA should support increased efforts in AID and IO to develop
specific programs dealing with the rights and needs of women and
children. Discussion: HA support of programs of the Bureau of Private
and Voluntary Affairs was instrumental in maintaining higher budget
levels for that Bureau. While funding does not appear to be a problem
for the women’s programs, as we have noted in the case of the human
rights money, there is a real reluctance on the part of AID field missions
and overworked planners in the regional bureaus to develop good
projects in a field which many of them believe is peripheral to develop-
ment, or, at least, not of a high priority. HA could do more to nudge
them along.

5 Not attached. Presumable reference to Report on Women in Development: Submitted
to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and the Speaker, U.S. House of Representa-
tives in Fulfillment of Section 113 (b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, August 3,
Development, August 1978)
324. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Pickering) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to the Under Secretary of State for Management (Read)¹

Washington, January 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Women’s and Children’s Rights—New Position

We believe that the Department is vulnerable in not having a full-time, high-level position devoted to international issues pertaining to rights of women and children.² In much of the world, the plight of women and children comprises one of the most serious denials of basic human rights, as well as being a major impediment to social and economic development. Concern for these issues by Congress (especially in light of the Percy Amendment)³ and others, including humanitarian organizations, is certain to increase because of the International Year of the Child (1979) and the 1980 mid-term Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women. Further, the Department is in process of organizing an interagency task force on women and children, in which HA should obviously play a central role.

An OES officer, Dr. Luke T. Lee, FSR–2, possesses unique credentials in these fields. He has considerable academic and legal experience and is an international authority on rights of women and children. He has been involved in several United Nations projects and has published


² In an April 25 memorandum to Lake, Lee indicated that M had taken the position that HA did not require an officer for women’s issues as the Department had an Office for International Women’s Programs in IO. Lee continued, “This position is in error for a number of reasons. In the first place, socio-economic rights involve more than the rights of women; they include also the rights of the child and the elderly, as well as the rights to education, health (including family planning), employment, food and nutrition, etc., which are dealt with by IO at best on the multilateral basis. Second, even assuming the rights of women embrace the entire scope of socio-economic rights, IO’s involvement in the status of women at the multilateral level should not preclude HA’s involvement at the bilateral and other substantive levels, just as IO’s roles in multilateral population matters has not precluded OES’s role in bilateral and other substantive population issues. Third, by not linking HA to socio-economic rights, the Department’s role in human rights as a whole is apt to suffer.” (Ibid.)

extensively, including one of the most authoritative works in the field, *Law and the Status of Women.*

Dr. Lee is currently in the Office of the Coordinator of Population Affairs. Although OES has a stake in advancing the status of women, it is not appropriate for the U.S. to be arguing the case for women’s and children’s rights on grounds of their impact on fertility rates. The issues are more clearly related to concerns of HA, not OES.

We therefore recommend that a position be established in HA, to be filled by Dr. Lee, covering the international status and rights of women, children, and the elderly.

We do not believe it feasible to cut the population affairs position in order to achieve this change. The staff of the Coordinator is, in fact, being reduced from five to four officer positions. The departure of Marshall Green and his replacement by a less senior FSO has already drawn criticism from Congress and from private institutions, on grounds that this represents a down-grading of the Department’s commitment to population issues. The Chairman of the House Select Committee on Population has requested a personal meeting with Secretary Vance to press his concerns on the Department’s role and activities in this area, and the Secretary has agreed to see him. Recent reaffirmation by the Secretary of the importance of population issues in our foreign policy has somewhat mollified Congressional and other criticism, but it is obvious that the Department is being closely watched by the population community. The loss of another population position would certainly raise new questions—especially at a time when responsibilities in this area, including coordination of expanding AID and non-governmental programs, preparation and implementation of U.S. international development strategies for the Third Development Decade, and the complex interrelationships of population growth with such global issues as world hunger, the environment, unemployment, urbanization, energy and resources, etc.—are clearly growing.

Mrs. Benson agrees with these recommendations.

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5 See Documents 318 and 321.
325. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Maynes) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, May 14, 1979

Personal Message from the Secretary of State to all Chiefs of Mission on Worldwide Status and Rights of Women

Issues for Decision

As we approach the mid-points of the United Nations Decade for Women and the International Year of the Child, and the onset of the Third Development Decade (1981–1990), and the UN Mid-Decade for Women’s Conference scheduled to be held in Copenhagen in July 1980, it is essential that we and other nations intensify our efforts toward promoting the status, rights and well-being of women throughout the world. Even though women and girls represent over half of humanity, they are the most frequent victims of discrimination and deprivation.

While most of the nations of the world are committed through various UN and other instruments to uphold the rights of women and to improve their conditions, there may be a tendency on the part of these nations to regard their agreement to those resolutions as disposing of the problem. Therefore, a considered effort is needed to fulfill the letter and spirit of international obligations.

What we do at home to advance the status and well-being of women has a material bearing on our ability to influence other nations. Internationally, our Ambassadors and their staffs have a particularly important role since they are aware of conditions in the countries where they serve, can judge what can be effectively done, and are in a position diplomatically to further our policy through discussions with leaders and other influential persons in those countries. Oftentimes, this can best be done on an informal basis.

Recommendations:

Since the State Department and its overseas missions have a leading responsibility in our worldwide efforts to advance the status of women, it is recommended that:

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790085–0875. Unclassified. Drafted by Good, Baer, and Green on May 8; concurred in by Dalley, Bleakley, Goott, Montgomery, Vogelgesang, Graham, Cheshes, Schwebel, Jennone Walker, Fleisher, Schuker, Lee, Barbara Thompson, Lollis, Hanley, Arvonne Fraser, Becker, Reinhardt, and Mary King. Dalley initialed his concurrence; Good initialed for the other clearing officials. Tarnoff also initialed the memorandum.
1. You send a message (Attachment 1) to all our Chiefs of Mission, stressing the importance which you attach to this issue and enlisting their assistance in promoting accelerated progress toward goals widely approved by governments.

2. Shortly thereafter, you send a second message (Attachment 2) to all Chiefs of Mission of certain key developing countries asking for their views on and attention to these issues on the part of the host government, and (b) how we could be most supportive of individuals and private organizations working in this field in the host country.

3. A Departmental Notice on this subject (Attachment 3) be distributed to all employees in the foreign affairs agencies.

4. Responsibility for follow-up action in this field be assigned to the Ad Hoc Working Group, comprising representatives of interested bureaus of State, AID, ICA and Peace Corps which prepared this memorandum and its attachments. The Ad Hoc Group, which would be co-chaired by Ambassador Marshall Green and me, in coordinating and articulating U.S. policy in this field, will be guided by the advice of our Ambassadors and other authorities and will remain in close touch with Committees already established by our Government which have related responsibilities. Within this general frame of reference, the Working Group will draw up its own terms of reference and devise its own method of approach, all of which are subject to your final approval; it will also prepare the information brochure referred to in the cable.

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2 Vance wrote “ok” at the end of the paragraph. Attached but not printed is a draft of the telegram, prepared by Good, Baer, and Green on May 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790085–0878) A handwritten notation on the telegram reads, “Cable sent 5/30/79,” although the Department did not send a final version until May 31. The telegram, as sent, is printed as Document 327.

3 Vance wrote “ok” at the end of the paragraph. Attached but not printed is the draft telegram, prepared by Good, Baer, and Green on May 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790085–0880) A handwritten notation on the telegram reads, “Cable sent 5/30/79,” although the Department did not send the final version until May 31. In telegram 138589, May 31, to Bangkok, Cairo, Dakar, Dar es Salam, Islamabad, Jakarta, Jidda, Kingston, Lagos, Lima, Manila, Mexico City, New Delhi, Seoul, and Ouagadougou, the Department requested that the posts comment on “innovative measures and/or successful projects” undertaken in host countries that could serve as examples for other countries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790246–0830)

4 The undated Department Notice, attached but not printed, summarizes the contents of the joint State/AID/ICA/Peace Corps message and was attached to the May 8 draft telegram to certain diplomatic posts, referenced in footnote 3 above. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790085–0880)

5 Wisner approved and initialed the recommendations for Vance on May 30.
SUBJECT

U.S. Population Policy

Let me transmit some recommendations, arising out of the Third Annual Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on U.S. International Population Policy, which confirms the critical importance of international population activities to our broad foreign policy objectives. U.S. population activities should stress the factors, which the Report highlights, that contribute to declines in fertility rates. In accordance with Section 104 (d) of the Foreign Assistance Act, U.S. development assistance programs should be designed with reference to their impact on fertility rates, while responding to the economic and social development of individual countries.

U.S. officials, in their contacts with foreign political leaders and opinion-makers and at international conferences dealing with development, food, and related issues, should actively support international population activities and objectives. U.S. and other bilateral population assistance programs are a major element in efforts to implement the World Population Plan of Action, as are the programs of multilateral agencies, in particular the UN Fund for Population Activities, and private organizations.

The Coordinator of Population Affairs should explore means of encouraging other bilateral donors and UN agencies, the World Bank, and regional development banks to develop projects that reinforce national population programs where they currently exist and encourage their adoption where they do not. The Population Coordinator should work closely with the Chairman of the Development Coordination Committee in pursuing these and other objectives.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790085–0179. No classification marking. A notation in the bottom right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Recv’d in S/S–15/24/79 0930 CWMc.” Sent to all diplomatic and consular posts in telegram 140009, June 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790248–0988)

2 The Department transmitted the Third Annual Report of the NSC Ad Hoc Group to all diplomatic and consular posts in airgram A–1389, April 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790062–0013)

3 See footnote 11, Document 308.
327. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, May 31, 1979, 0242Z

138588. For Ambassadors or Chargé from the Secretary, inform Consuls. Subject: Worldwide Status and Rights of Women.

1. A key objective of U.S. foreign policy is to advance worldwide the status and conditions of women. I believe that special attention should be given this issue as we approach the mid-way point in the United Nations Decade for Women and the International Year of the Child, and as we prepare for the Second Women’s World Conference, scheduled to be held in Copenhagen in July 1980.

2. Despite the many commendable instruments and resolutions on this subject, agreed to by virtually all nations, and despite some encouraging developments in recent years, the fact remains that progress has been too slow. Women continue often to be victimized, their interests and viewpoints overlooked, their educational and job opportunities limited. Physical abuse of women persists to a shocking degree.

3. Mindful of the vital contribution which women can make to national development, the Congress in 1973 adopted the “Percy Amendment” to the Foreign Assistance Act, which requires that our aid programs encourage and promote the participation of women in the national economies of developing countries. Yet, the world community, to a distressing degree, continues to be deprived of the full participation and talents of that most-overlooked asset of nations: women. Meanwhile, urbanization and new technologies seem to create more problems for women than for men.

4. Most effective in dealing with these problems will be the efforts of women themselves, working together nationally and internationally, but they need more active support of leaders, governments, and organizations, if the spirit of internationally approved resolutions is to be translated into effective practice.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790246–0969. Unclassified. Drafted by Good, Baer, and Green; cleared by Maynes, Dalley, Phyllis Oakley, Bleakely, Cheshes, Schwebel, Graham, and Jennone Walker; approved by Wisner. In a May 25 handwritten note from Green to Newsom, found attached to the May 8 draft telegram to certain diplomatic posts (see footnote 3, Document 325), Green alluded to the lengthy process involved in preparing the Department’s statement: “I would hope that at long last we could get the message out. I have toiled on this for 2 years, fighting off efforts by IO to make this even longer, and incorporating the many additions pushed by ICA, AID and others who cleared.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790085–0880)

2 See footnote 2, Document 324.
5. I believe that you and your staffs can make a significant contribution through finding appropriate, diplomatic ways of encouraging host countries to be more attentive to this problem. You are in the best position to judge how best this can be done, bearing in mind the laws, regulations, attitudes, and circumstances of the countries where you are assigned. I am sure that you will, nevertheless, be assisted in this regard by having some basic background facts as well as the benefit of knowing what approaches have proved effective in other nations.

6. In preparing such background facts and suggestions and in order that we can all benefit from our various ideas and experiences in the field, I ask for your personal reactions and comments by cable within thirty days of receipt of this message.

Christopher

328. Paper Prepared in the International Development Cooperation Agency

Washington, undated

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

1980 Development Policy Statement

1980 will be another harsh year for poor people in the poor countries of the world. Rising petroleum prices, combined with inflation and recession in industrial nations, assure that it will be more difficult than ever for the people of developing countries to obtain food, jobs,
and adequate housing. In the current economic climate, all industrialized countries will be hard pressed to maintain development assistance at levels commensurate with increased need and their long-term interest.

The response of the United States under these circumstances will have a major influence on our industrial partners and on the North-South “global negotiations” starting in mid-1980. Some of our industrialized allies have decided to sustain higher growth rates in development aid budgets than we, despite severe budget deficits. Japan will have doubled its aid in the years 1978–80 and is projecting further increases in 1981. Germany will increase its aid budget 12.5% in 1980 and the Netherlands, France and Sweden are also planning increases in their aid contributions.

We no longer question that the development of the Third World is important to the United States. This importance relates to our moral values and our economic, political, and strategic self-interest. A combination of these factors has impelled us to promote development for the last three decades. An interdependent world, made ever smaller by increasing trade and sophisticated communications and transportation, demands that we carry on this work.

In the years ahead, to be true to our values and to achieve our national interests, at a minimum we must:

1. **Accelerate the Attack on Global Poverty**
   
   —Major changes should be set in motion to carry out the recommendations of the Hunger Commission\(^2\) by increasing the attention devoted to agricultural development and food security by international institutions as well as by our own bilateral programs.
   
   —We will increase our population and health programs, and will give priority to countries with a demonstrated commitment in these areas to help meet their objectives.
   
   —We will take the lead in encouraging the design of development plans and programs that explicitly recognize the crucial role of women.

2. **Manage Economic Interdependence with Developing Countries for Mutual Prosperity**
   
   —Programs are being designed to increase the amount of energy available to developing countries from their own resources.
   
   —The United States should cooperate with other countries and international institutions to forestall debt problems in developing countries and to respond to financing problems promptly, and with adequate re-

\(^2\) Probable reference to the preliminary recommendations issued by the Presidential Commission on World Hunger in December 1979; see Document 263.
sources to promote adjustment without political upheaval and economic stagnation.

—The United States should remain open to the exports of developing countries so that the developing countries may earn more of the capital required for development through trade.

—OPIC’s capacity to stimulate private U.S. investment in developing countries will be enhanced, and AID’s program to increase opportunities for U.S. companies abroad will be expanded.

3. Focus Special Development Efforts on Regions and Countries of Highest Concern to the United States

—A program will be prepared to accelerate the development of countries in the Caribbean Basin.

—The United States will cooperate more closely with other aid-providing countries and development institutions in dealing with the extraordinarily complex development tasks facing the governments of sub-Saharan Africa.

—The United States will give preference in its assistance allocations to countries that respect human rights as fundamental for achieving equitable development.

4. Design a Development Strategy to Meet the Challenges of the 1980s

—The United States will participate actively and creatively in designing the global agenda for the Third Development Decade which is to be adopted in 1980 and in the UN’s consideration of a round of global negotiations on international economic issues.

—With U.S. support, the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development called for the creation of a special interim fund for science and technology, to be administered by the UN Development Program (UNDP). Your initiative in proposing the new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC) will enable the United States to maintain its leadership in fostering research and development of knowledge and skills for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.

—IDCA will review the allocation of resources for the various development assistance programs that the United States now supports in order to prepare a U.S. development assistance policy for the 1980s.

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4 See footnote 6, Document 234.

5 Title IV of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 (P.L. 96–53), which the President signed into law on August 14, 1979, authorized the President to establish an Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation.
5. Increased Efficiency and Effectiveness

—In the case of AID, an increased assistance program will be carried out with reduced staff by improving the efficiency of AID’s efforts.

The International Development Cooperation Agency was created in order to construct and coordinate national policies that promote the development prospects of the poorer countries. As discussed in the remainder of this statement, the programs and policies recommended here address the most challenging problems we face. They are our agenda for 1980.

DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

Developing a country is an extraordinarily complex social, economic, and political task. The major responsibility for the task falls on a country’s people and government. Foreign donors have a limited, though important, role to play. Assisting a country’s development requires patience and varied techniques and talents. The United States has supported development efforts through the United Nations’ specialized agencies, the multilateral development banks, and our own bilateral assistance.

This document does not review and analyze those programs. Rather, it highlights our emphases and priorities for the year ahead.

1. Accelerate the Attack on Global Poverty

Agriculture

—Major changes should be set in motion to carry out the recommendations of the Hunger Commission by increasing the attention devoted to agricultural development and food security by international institutions as well as by our own bilateral programs.

In the face of rapidly increasing population and widespread malnutrition, attaining minimal levels of food production and consumption spells the difference between starvation and survival in devel-

6 See footnote 17, Document 245. In a March 7, 1979, message to Congress proposing IDCA’s creation, the President indicated that the IDCA’s Director would “report both to me and to the Secretary of State, and would serve as our principal international development adviser.” After outlining the various responsibilities accruing to IDCA, the President noted: “I believe these steps will substantially strengthen the coordination of U.S. policies affecting the developing world, and will lead to a more coherent strategy of development and the more effective use of the various bilateral and multilateral instruments by which the U.S. can encourage the growth of developing economies. I am pleased that these actions and proposals are similar to those proposed last year by the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. I look forward to joining with you to put them into operation.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 12, 1979, pp. 395–396) Carter issued Executive Order 12163 on September 29, 1979, formally establishing IDCA, which began its operations on October 1, 1979. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1792–1800)
oping countries. Millions of children die annually of starvation and a billion people suffer from chronic undernourishment. A sufficient food supply supported by a distribution of income which, at a minimum, supports food consumption is not only a developmental but also a moral imperative. The recommendations of the Hunger Commission can be carried out, but only by intense efforts.

Three major types of actions will be required in the next decade. First, food production in developing countries, especially where hunger is most severe, must be increased. Second, the earnings of the poor must be increased to permit them to increase consumption of needed food. Third, the United States must not only maintain its status as a food surplus nation, but also must continue to provide financial resources to help transfer food where it is needed and to increase production.

These actions will require a variety of specific commitments by both developed and developing nations. Developing countries must accord higher priority to agriculture and food. Three-quarters of the poor people in developing countries are engaged in agriculture. Many countries must transform their economic structures to permit broader access to productive resources, especially land and water. These nations must also increase the political participation of their people. The United States should support these efforts.

In recent years, we have increased the emphasis in our bilateral AID program on agriculture, nutrition and rural development. The level of funding has grown from $474 million in 1977 to a level of $758 million requested in 1981. In international discussions on a new food aid convention, the United States pledged to contribute not less than 4.47 million tons of grain per year for food aid. Should domestic grain prices continue to rise, a larger financial commitment for food aid will be required to maintain this volume.

The lending record of the multilateral development banks also shows a substantial concentration of resources in this sector over the past three years. From 1977 to 1979 the World Bank Group, for example, devoted more than $8 billion to projects in agriculture and rural development. About one-third of the Bank’s concessional resources were used for these purposes in fiscal year 1979. Within the sector, there has also been a greater emphasis by all the banks on lending that assists small farmers, helping them to increase their productivity and incomes.

We are encouraging the multilateral development banks and the specialized agencies of the UN to expand even further their agricultural

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7 See Document 243.
programs. Of particular interest is the future of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which will soon need its first replenishment of funds. IFAD’s initial resources came 56% from OECD countries and 43% from OPEC countries. Its lending has concentrated on expanding food production by and for the rural poor in countries with the more serious food deficits. IFAD represents a very promising prototype of OECD/OPEC/other LDC cooperation for development. Assuming continued effective performance and OPEC assistance, the United States should participate in the replenishment of IFAD’s resources.

Population and Health

We will increase our population and health programs, and will give priority to countries with a demonstrated commitment in these areas to help meet their objectives.

Development continues to be frustrated by rapid population growth. If recent trends continue, the two-child family will not become the average world-wide until 2020, and the world’s population will not stabilize until 2090—at 10 billion compared to today’s 4.3 billion.

Population is a global problem, but the effects are suffered first and most by the poor in poor countries. Reduced population growth enhances the possibility for increased investment in productive employment opportunities and reduces the demands on food, housing, health care, and educational facilities.

The United States must do more to encourage and support voluntary family planning. Requests for family planning assistance are being made by the governments of most Third World countries, representing many faiths and cultures. The United States should continue to respond favorably to their requests. Development policies and programs must be designed to make smaller families a more attractive option.

We should provide assistance not only through our bilateral programs, which have particular strengths in the improvement of family planning techniques and in service-delivery systems, but also through other donors, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities.

World Bank President McNamara recently identified population growth as the most critical of all developmental problems. He called
on member governments to undertake effective family planning services and to alter the economic and social environments that tend to promote population increases. World Bank Group lending expressly for population and nutrition in 1979 amounted to more than $114 million, an almost threefold increase over the level of $47 million achieved in 1977. In addition, the World Bank now incorporates family planning components into some of their other lending programs including those for health and rural development. The regional development banks intend to do the same.

In health we are carrying forward your commitment, first announced in May 1978 and reiterated by Mrs. Carter at the World Health Organization in May 1979, to promote health in the Third World.\(^9\) Drawing on your Statement of Principles,\(^10\) we are expanding support for primary health care and clean water/sanitation, and for control of major diseases such as malaria. Last year the World Bank group mounted a massive effort to provide much needed assistance for water supply and sewerage. From a base of $300 million in fiscal year 1977, its lending for these purposes tripled to more than $1.0 billion in 1979.

In primary health care, we have joined other nations in a major commitment at the UN Conference at Alma Ata,\(^11\) to extend basic health, nutrition and family planning services as the essential first step in a campaign to improve the health of the poor. Our bilateral aid for such programs is expanding from $125 million in 1978 to $180 million in 1980. In water/sanitation we are also working on an international effort—the UN Water Decade—and aim at providing much of the U.S. assistance through an organizational structure led by the United Nations and the World Bank.\(^12\)

**Women in Development**

—We will take the lead in encouraging the design of development plans and programs that explicitly recognize the crucial role of women.

On grounds of both human rights and efficacious development, women must receive better access to economic opportunities, education, and health care.

The United States must put greater weight behind its own commitment to women-in-development and urge others to do so as well.

\(^9\) First Lady Rosalynn Carter was scheduled to address the World Health Organization on May 7 and attend the WHO’s annual assembly on May 8. She and Amy Carter were then scheduled to fly to Rome for an audience with Pope John Paul II and a meeting with Italian President Sandro Pertini. ("Mrs. Carter, in Geneva, Calls Good Health a ‘Basic Right’" *The New York Times*, May 7, 1979, p. A–8)

\(^10\) See Document 313.


\(^12\) See Documents 316, 319, 330, 332 and 335.
1975, at the International Women’s Year Conference in Mexico, virtually all nations joined in a major effort to promote women’s opportunities in the “International Women’s Decade” of 1976–1985, taking as themes “equality, development, and peace.” Preparations are underway for a mid-term World Conference in Copenhagen next July to assist progress and discuss opportunities for action in three areas: employment, health, and education. IDCA will help in developing a U.S. position for this Conference, and will encourage the pioneering efforts of AID in the women-in-development field.

Women-in-development is not a sector, such as energy or agriculture; it is a subject that cuts across all sectors. IDCA will work to ensure that development projects are designed to benefit women. We shall continue to help focus more attention on women in the Development Assistance Committee of OECD and the multilateral development banks. There must be universal recognition that equitable development requires the vigorous participation of women, and that this participation must be an objective at the level of project design throughout the development field.

2. Manage Economic Interdependence with Developing Countries for Mutual Prosperity

Energy

—Programs are being designed to increase the amount of energy available to developing countries from their own resources.

Solutions to the energy problem are as crucial to the developing countries as they are to us. Those countries can not bear indefinitely the increasing financial burdens of importing their needed energy.

In our bilateral assistance programs we plan to increase the amount of funds spent in the energy field. In particular, we plan to begin a program for training engineers, geologists, chemists, and other scientists from developing countries to enable them to accelerate their own exploration and production. Our target is to have students enrolled in the program here by September 1981. At a recent DAC High Level Meeting, the United States urged our OECD colleagues to initiate similar programs. We will also work with the multilateral development banks and the UN specialized agencies in this area, urging that they increase the amount of funds devoted to training in the energy sector.

All of the multilateral development banks are now placing more emphasis on lending programs to expand and diversify sources of energy in non-OPEC developing countries. Over the next five years,
World Bank lending for fossil fuel development is projected to reach $5.6 billion, and to support projects totalling $18.6 billion. This volume of lending is expected to result in the production of energy equivalent to two million barrels of oil a day. When hydroelectric power projects are included, about 15 percent of overall Bank lending during the next five years will be for energy purposes.

The Inter-American Development Bank will be devoting a large proportion of its lending to develop geothermal, hydroelectric, and other energy potential in Latin America over the next several years, and the Asian Development Bank has embarked on a large lending program to finance the production of primary energy fuels. These Bank funds, moreover, should encourage additional private investment in this critical area, thus improving the oil supply situation for the world as a whole.

An interagency task force has been created under IDCA’s leadership to identify additional techniques for channeling private resources into exploration and development of new energy sources in the Third World. It will help obtain the most workable solutions from all agencies of our government and the business community in solving energy problems.

**Financing**

—The United States should cooperate with other countries and international institutions to forestall debt problems in developing countries and to respond to financing problems promptly, and with adequate resources to promote adjustment without political upheaval and economic stagnation.

Financial problems in developing nations have the potential to reduce world trade, impede adequate development, and bring instability to the private financial sector. From the development standpoint, no strict lines can be drawn between financial and other problems; when a developing country suffers a balance of payments crisis the price is paid in reduced growth.

Trends in the global economy in the 1970s have resulted in major attention being given to the issue of “debt” within the context of the adequacy and direction of financial flows to developing countries. Various actions have already been taken to help these countries. Further efforts to prevent or alleviate debt problems must recognize that crises can result from overborrowing or misuse of funds, as well as from insufficient foreign exchange receipts due to changes in patterns of trade and payments. Moreover, the solutions to the financing problems of the poorest countries, which are heavily dependent on concessional assistance, are different from those of middle-income countries, which are heavily indebted to private creditors. IDCA will
give special attention to the range of financial and so-called debt issues which are in the forefront of international discussions.

We will support stepped-up efforts to conclude studies and implement decisions regarding increased co-financing with private markets, program lending, and further cooperation between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Additionally, further study is required on how best to relate public and private credit flows to the development plans of individual countries in order to prevent financial crises from occurring.

Dependable and predictable total financial flows to finance development should be sought. This has long been a goal on the public side. Donor countries must be assured that their assistance will be used to support efficient development efforts in which private capital plays an increasing role; developing countries should consider and plan their private borrowings in order to minimize unpredictable fluctuations in the financing available for their development.

Early efforts in this direction have been unsuccessful, although great strides have been made in collecting necessary information. IDCA will support a renewed effort in an appropriate forum, such as the IMF/World Bank Development Committee, to study and agree on means to achieve this goal.

Trade

—The United States should remain open to the exports of developing countries so that the developing countries may earn more of the capital required for development through trade.

The growth of the world economy is tied to the growth of world trade. Developing country prosperity fosters our prosperity. As their economies grow they are able to buy more of our goods, and exports built on their comparative advantages lessen our own inflationary pressures. Moreover, debt crises are unavoidable—even worse, unsolvable—if developing countries cannot at least bring into greater balance their import and export accounts. In fact, the North-South dialogue emerged from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. You have determined that development issues will be considered in the framing of our trade policy, and we intend to be constructive in this domain. The review of the Generalized System of Preferences and the implementation of the codes of the MTN are two opportunities for the United States to demonstrate our enlightened commitment to interdependence.

IDCA will raise for government-wide consideration the possibility of establishing a trade alert system, so that developed countries can anticipate and plan for evolutions in product cycles that require adjust-
ment assistance to the minority of workers and owners who might lose out for the benefit of the country as a whole.

Investment

—OPIC’s capacity to stimulate private U.S. investment in developing countries will be enhanced, and AID’s program to increase opportunities for U.S. companies abroad will be expanded.

The creation of productive employment and the ability of a nation to export are both essential to development. One of the most important means to achieve these objectives is through increased private sector investment in the developing nations. We will work to expand OPIC’s abilities to stimulate increased investment in all the developing nations. Special efforts will be made to develop energy and other natural resources in these nations. In conjunction with the U.S. Trade Representative, we intend to review and seek to resolve legal and other obstacles to sound investment relationships.

Investment abroad often means exports for U.S. industry, and other benefits as the investment reaches a productive stage. In accordance with OPIC’s mandate, we will pursue investments for the benefit of poorer countries with concern for the domestic U.S. effects. Additionally, we will make a special effort to maximize the benefits for U.S. business of AID’s reimbursable development assistance program.

3. Focus Special Development Efforts on Regions and Countries of Highest Concern to the United States

Caribbean Basin

—A program will be prepared to accelerate the development of countries in the Caribbean Basin.

We will help design an overall U.S. strategy for accelerating development throughout the Caribbean Basin. This program will be aimed at ameliorating social and economic difficulties, as well as at strengthening the democratic institutions of our neighbors to the South. This program will emphasize development assistance aimed at long-term economic development, as well as funds for meeting short-term needs in both public and private sectors. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank are also committed to supporting effective development in this region. This effort will have to be coordinated carefully with policies outside the assistance field, particularly those related to trade.

We believe that a serious effort should be made to help the Caribbean nations achieve the kinds of societies that meet the aspirations of their people.
International Health, Population Growth, and Women’s Issues

Sub-Saharan Africa

—The United States will cooperate more closely with other aid-providing countries and development institutions in dealing with the extraordinarily complex development tasks facing the governments of sub-Saharan Africa.

This region provides some of the most complex development and coordination challenges that the world has faced. The number of donors and the difficulty of the problems requires that we work closely with the other countries and institutions that are determined to assist with the development of this very poor area. As a result of decisions already taken by you, we have begun the required consultative process. Very shortly, we will involve representatives of the recipient countries in planning a coordinated attack on their poverty problems.

Human Rights

—The United States will give preference in its assistance allocations to countries that respect human rights as fundamental for achieving equitable development.

The United States must continue to lead in seeking equitable development that includes protection of human rights and the growth of democratic institutions. The United States has no long-term national interest in increasing the economic strength of countries with brutal repressive political systems. Our own institutions will flourish best in a world with a growing number of countries that allow their citizens to exercise human rights.

It is, therefore, vital to the national interests of the United States to continue our efforts to protect the human rights of the citizens of the developing countries, and to encourage the creation and nurturing of democratic institutions that permit the participation of all of the people in questions involving political and economic power.

We must lead the way in stressing the fundamental concept that the basic needs of a population are met best, not by the benevolent decisions of a dictator, but by political institutions that respond to the needs of the people when they are free to express themselves. Finding solutions to the extraordinarily complex problems inherent in equitable development requires a free and open society stimulating the most inventive and flexible approach to problem-solving.

4. Design a Development Strategy to Meet the Challenges of the 1980s

Third Development Decade

—The United States will participate actively and creatively in designing the global agenda for the Third Development Decade which is to
be adopted in 1980 and in the UN’s consideration of a round of global negotiations on international economic issues.

In the months ahead the United States will be faced with extensive negotiations on development issues in the United Nations. We will be preparing for a new round of global negotiations which are likely to be launched by a Special Session of the General Assembly in August 1980 and which will deal with the full range of subjects connected to the economic health of the developing countries. We will also be participating in the drafting of a strategy for the Third Development Decade which is to be adopted by the Special Session.

It is important that the United States not view these negotiations as an unnecessary irritant, but rather as an opportunity to present our views on how the world should deal with questions concerning raw materials, energy, trade, development, technology, and finance in the decade of the 1980s. IDCA will work with other interested parts of our government to assure that on each development issue the United States will have a constructive position on how it would like to see the world economy function in the years ahead.

An important element in this effort is the design of a U.S. development strategy for the 1980s—another task of IDCA. There is no escaping the fact that, though great strides have already been taken to help developing countries, other steps will be needed in the years ahead if significant progress is to be made in reducing world poverty.

Of one thing we can be sure—the world will not be the same when the next decade ends. The question before us is how constructive a role we play in helping to shape the outcome.

*Scientific and Technological Cooperation*

—With U.S. support, the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development called for the creation of a special interim fund for science and technology, to be administered by the UN Development Program (UNDP). Your initiative in proposing the new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC) will enable the United States to maintain its leadership in fostering research and development of knowledge and skills for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.

The UN Conference on Science and Technology, held in Vienna in August 1979, set a target goal of $250 million for the UN Interim Fund for Science and Technology. The Fund, which is to begin implementing the program of the UNCSTD Plan of Action recommendations in 1980,
will have a two-fold purpose: to utilize the scientific and technological resources of the developed world to help developing countries solve urgent problems, and to help these countries develop the indigenous scientific and technological capability to solve their own problems over the long run. The Fund will coordinate its activities with those of other bilateral and multilateral programs to avoid duplication. The United States should be prepared to contribute to the Fund.

At the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development, developing countries’ representatives hailed your initiative in proposing ISTC. They saw it as a signal of recognition by the United States of the importance attached by developing countries to building the capability to solve their own problems, and of the mutual benefits to be gained from a cooperative approach to the solution of global problems.

ISTC was authorized by Congress last year. As this report is submitted, however, Congress has not yet approved funding for the Institute in 1980. Assuming that funding is available, 1980 will obviously be a year of crucial importance for the Institute. ISTC’s purpose will be to promote close relations with individuals and institutions in developing countries concerned with science and technology. Up to one-third of the members of the ISTC Council, which will advise the Director on broad policy and program matters, will be drawn from developing countries.

Scientific and technological talent is one of this country’s greatest strengths. ISTC should take the lead in mobilizing this talent for the benefit of developing countries. ISTC should be the focal point in the U.S. Government for assessing scientific research of relevance to development, and identifying for high priority topics of mutual interest that are most urgent to developing countries. In this regard, one of the first undertakings envisioned for it is a study of ongoing research activities in the U.S. Government, and an information system to keep this inventory accurate. ISTC should stimulate and assist U.S. nongovernmental scientific and technological institutions to give more emphasis to building up the scientific competence of developing countries, through joint research activities, improved training of their students, and assistance to their research institutions.

More and more countries in the developing world are reaching the “middle-income” level at which AID assistance is no longer appropriate. ISTC, with its problem-focus, could supplement the work of the multilateral development banks, and undertake cooperative work with these developing countries to deal with the development problems that remain.
Allocation of Resources

—IDCA will review the allocation of resources for the various development assistance programs that the United States now supports in order to prepare a U.S. development assistance policy for the 1980s.

The 1980 budget request calls for 35 percent of our development assistance to support multilateral efforts, with the remaining 65 percent to support our bilateral program. The 1970s have seen the creation of several new and worthwhile international funds. Donor countries have maintained their commitment to growth by their support of international development banks and institutions.

Although our bilateral program has grown, our commitment to multilateral efforts has been even greater. Regionally, also, there have been changes in the allocations of bilateral and multilateral donors—from the relatively wealthier to the poorer developing countries.

The complexity of the development task, the size of the capital requirements, and your commitment to cooperate and consult with Congress in the design and implementation of our development programs, mean that we must review now the patterns of assistance that we will implement in the 1980s.

Fundamental to these allocation questions—and to the credibility of our efforts to help alleviate Third World poverty—is the amount of development assistance we provide. In the 1950s and 1960s, we led the world and urged and cajoled the other industrial nations to follow our aid example; they rose to the challenge while our assistance efforts flagged. At 0.2 percent of GNP, our development assistance is near the bottom among the industrialized democracies. In real terms, it is lower now than in 1971. As you have pledged on earlier occasions, we must renew our efforts to reverse this decline.

5. Increased Efficiency and Effectiveness

—In the case of AID, an increased assistance program will be carried out with reduced staff by improving the efficiency of AID’s efforts.

By studying the most effective techniques used for providing assistance to countries at different stages of development, we will be able to increase the amount of assistance provided without increasing our staff. Additionally, by modifying the procedures now used in AID, it should be possible to carry out our programs more rapidly.

IDCA is preparing Development Assistance Strategies for key countries. This will enable assistance to be provided in a more rational and coordinated fashion.

Working closely with the Treasury Department and the Agency for International Development, we are reshaping an early-warning system in order to enable U.S. overseas personnel to react to the
projects of the multilateral development banks well in advance of their presentation to their boards of directors. This will enable the United States to make its views known at a time and in a manner likely to be most effective.

To achieve these results will require understanding that the most effective assistance techniques depend upon the level of development and the particular problems in each country. Careful program design will insure that maximum use will be made of the private sector, both profit and non-profit, and of our own employees.

A final word about IDCA’s responsibilities—under your Reorganization Plan—to speak to the American public, as well as to Congress. It is commonly urged that development assistance should be given in spite of public opinion that is indifferent at best and hostile at worst. Although many Americans certainly share this view, we believe that an effective public case can and should be made for financial support to developing countries.

This case is partially rooted in humanitarian concerns for poor people in those countries. The public and Congressional responses to your leadership in increasing U.S. aid to Kampuchean refugees\(^{16}\) show how deep is the compassion of the American people, and how effectively it can be channeled into action. But as I vividly saw\(^{17}\) on a recent trip to South Asia, the seldom-reported plight of millions of poor people in Dacca and elsewhere is fully as grim as that facing the refugees. If the tragedy of their lives is honestly presented, public support for increased assistance should also grow.

It is sometimes argued that Americans oppose help to developing countries because “charity begins at home.” But development assistance serves basic United States economic and political interests, as well as charitable concerns. As you well know, our international trade and investment, our energy outlook, our security concerns in many areas, and our overall objectives on scores of different fronts, all depend on our relations with developing nations. We should make clear the direct benefits to the United States of development help. Your initiative in establishing the International Development Cooperation Agency will help the United States be a constructive and creative leader in the dialogue on development at home and abroad.

The programs and policies recommended here were selected not only because they address important and challenging issues of concern to developing countries but also because they are feasible. They will be on IDCA’s agenda for 1980 and beyond.

\(^{16}\) See Document 261.
\(^{17}\) The reference is to Ehrlich.
329. Memorandum From the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (Ehrlich) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)\(^1\)

Washington, January 7, 1980

SUBJECT

NSC Ad Hoc Committee on Population

Chris—\(^2\)

As you know, we are trying to put into practical effect the President’s instruction that IDCA serve as principal coordinator and source of guidance on development policy and programs.\(^3\) In terms of specific sectors, we are concentrating particularly on agriculture, energy, population, and health.

To ensure inter-agency communication and collaboration in each of these sectors, my preference is to use the Development Coordination Committee. In the population area, however, the NSC Ad Hoc Committee on population already exists—chaired for the past few years by the State Department’s Coordinator for Population Affairs. Under the leadership of Dick Benedick, it proposes now to take a major look at U.S. population policy particularly concerning the third world, in preparation for its next annual report.

Rather than establish a separate DCC subcommittee on population alongside the NSC Committee or suggest the abolition of the NSC group, I suggest that IDCA co-chair the NSC Committee and that the Committee give the DCC full benefit of its findings. That way we can build on the useful work the Committee has done while fulfilling IDCA’s responsibility to the President. I have discussed this with NSC staff, who concur. Please let me know if this approach causes you any concern.

Tom

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\(^2\) Ehrlich handwrote this salutation.

\(^3\) See footnote 6, Document 328.
U.S. NATIONAL STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION

The Government of the United States of America is committed to playing an important part in the International Decade for Drinking Water and Sanitation and, in accordance with the Action Plan adopted by the Mar del Plata Water Conference\(^2\) and the decisions of the Third Special Session of the Committee on Natural Resources and ECOSOC,\(^3\) is prepared to share its experiences with other governments and to assist interested countries in upgrading their drinking water supply and sanitation facilities.

General

Few issues of public policy offer a greater complexity than those associated with water resources and water management. In the U.S., the availability of good quality water is considered a necessary element of an acceptable standard of living. At the same time, increasing efforts are under way to bring together science, technology, economics, management skills, and political awareness in order to assure responsible planning and management of our water resources.

The advent of the International Decade for Drinking Water and Sanitation is serving to raise the consciousness of every nation to the need to adopt not only national plans but also to examine the possibilities of regional and global cooperation in this vital sector. The United States welcomes this opportunity.

Water in the U.S.A.

In the United States, adequate safe drinking water is accessible to most of the population. The quality of drinking water is now generally high, but this has not always been the case. As recently as seventy years

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of International Organization Affairs/Health and Narcotics Programs 1980 Health Files, Lot 83D343, Box 3, HLT 80 WHO—Programs Water Decade; UN. No classification marking. Drafted in AID/IIA/1A and IO/DHP.


\(^3\) The third special session of the Committee on Natural Resources was held in March and April 1979 to follow up activities related to the Mar del Plata Conference, specifically, those related to providing safe drinking water and sanitation. At its meeting in July and August, ECOSOC took note of the Committee's report (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 671–674)
ago the United States was plagued by massive outbreaks of typhoid, cholera, dysentery, and other waterborne diseases. With the development of improved treatment techniques for sewage and drinking water supplies, including drinking water disinfection, epidemics have been eliminated.

In a 1974 law, Congress required that public water systems supply safe drinking water. Each of the fifty States had to adopt new drinking water standards at least as strict as national standards and had to conduct adequate monitoring and enforcement programs. To help the States meet their responsibilities, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was directed to provide financial and technical assistance.

The United States has recognized the importance of safe drinking water and sanitation. Through diversified programs, the problems of water pollution have been studied and solutions to solve these problems established, but the problems are not completely solved. It is recognized that more research and interagency coordination are needed. While much progress concerning water management has been made in the United States, many problems remain to be solved during the coming decade.

U.S. Policies and Programs related to Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation for Developing Countries

At the Mar del Plata Water Conference, it was agreed to “increase attention to” community water supply and sanitation for the world’s poor over the decade of the 1980’s. The U.S. has committed itself to support the principal objective of the Water Decade, which is to provide safe water and sanitation facilities for all by the year 1990. U.S. participation will be carried out both multilaterally and bilaterally with developing country governments.

U.S. participation in the Water Decade will be government-wide, involving many of the agencies and departments which have responsibility for domestic water policy as well as those principally involved in international assistance. The International Development Cooperation Administration (IDCA) will develop policy and coordinate bilateral assistance programs for the U.S. Government. The principal operational instrument for bilateral assistance, however, will be the Agency for International Development (AID).

The Peace Corps also will make a major contribution to the bilateral assistance effort. This agency has long experience working with water, sanitation and related matters in rural villages and can supply

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4 Reference is to the Safe Drinking Water Act (P.L. 93–523), which Ford signed into law on December 16, 1974.
technicians trained to work with villagers in their native language to resolve problems at the village level.

AID and the Peace Corps have agreed to consult and collaborate as closely as possible in future programs so as to combine creatively the technical resources, expertise and funds of AID and the rural community based practical experience of the Peace Corps.

The U.S. Government in its bilateral programs will focus on rural and peri-urban water supply and sanitation where it perceives the greatest need. In the U.S. view, the proper strategy is to seek to improve the availability and quality of water in conjunction with primary care and efforts to increase food supplies in order to improve both health and the general quality of life.

Accomplishment of that goal requires not only supplying funds, material and technicians to build water supply and sanitation systems. Equally important is the training of village workers and the development of community participation in the planning and management of projects so that there subsequently may be adequate monitoring and maintenance of facilities. Without such training and maintenance, expenditures on facilities may be wasted. Training in health and hygiene is another essential component if water supply development is to benefit fully the community concerned.

Also essential in the U.S. view, is that water supply and sanitation projects, whether small or large scale, should be planned carefully within the context of overall water management including supplying of water for agriculture and industrial use.

The U.S. plans to increase significantly its contributions to multilateral agencies and bilateral programs in support of the UN Decade for Water Supply and Sanitation. The magnitude and trend of existing bilateral programs reflect the strong support of the U.S. for the objectives of the Decade.

Currently, the U.S. is carrying out a broad based assistance program in water related development. Expenditures by AID for investments in water projects will increase substantially in the course of the decade. In addition to actual water supply and processing programs, the U.S. supports related programs such as water-disaster assistance; environmental health training; land conservation and natural resources management; and development of new energy technologies, including remote sensing applications. All these activities have water components and, thus, are relevant to U.S. involvement in the Decade for Drinking Water and Sanitation.

In its future assistance efforts, the U.S. will seek opportunities to promote Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. This policy will include the use of third country consultant firms to implement projects, support for training programs located in developing
countries, employment of third country nationals for water projects, procurement of materials in third countries, increased co-financing of aid projects by the U.S. and middle income countries to be carried out in third countries, and the use of U.S. owned local currencies to fund TCDC projects.

The Congress has passed legislation which calls for the establishment of a new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. When funded, this Institute plans to undertake programs of research, training, and institution building in a variety of development areas, including water resources management, agriculture, and environmental planning.

In order to increase U.S. effectiveness in assisting developing countries to develop their water supply and sanitation facilities, new approaches must be formulated, tested, evaluated, and improved. Coordination and cooperation among multilateral and bilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations and technical cooperation among the developing countries themselves can help greatly in this process. In addition to AID, other U.S. agencies carry out activities which can support the objectives of the Decade. These include: technical assistance for assessments, program planning and project development; manpower development at all levels; institutional infrastructure development; financing of materials, equipment, and services; research on implementation and evaluation methodology; collection, evaluation, selection, and dissemination of technical information; and impact studies on the relationship between water, sanitation, and health.

The United States believes that developing countries participating in the Water Decade have an excellent opportunity to improve greatly the dental health of their populations by incorporating fluoridation capability in their new water systems. The U.S. will assist governments desiring this improvement to include it in community water supply projects.

On the basis of the best available data, which are unavoidably sketchy, the UN estimates that providing a billion rural people with “safe” water and improved sanitation will cost at least $44 billion (1977 prices). Of this, about two-thirds would be provided by the developing countries themselves, while the remaining one-third would come from external sources.

The U.S., through its contribution to multilateral agencies, through its own bilateral activities and those of private organizations, plans substantial support for water and sanitation projects over the Decade,
subject to funds being appropriated by the U.S. Congress and on the as-
sumption that:

a. Developing countries accord high priority to such projects and
commit themselves to cover an appropriate share of the costs over a
sustained period.

b. Other governments and international financial institutions are
prepared to provide substantial support for these projects.

The U.S. Government believes safe water will have many direct as
well as indirect benefits, including:

—Improved health by protection from infection from ingestion of
unsafe water.

—Improved health from increased availability of water for more
frequent washing of persons, clothing, and household effects, thus re-
resulting in better home and personal hygiene.

—Better nutrition since food utilization is inhibited during diar-
rhea which often is caused by waterborne organisms.

—More productive labor and ability to work harder for longer
hours.

—Increased life expectancy because of less disease caused by con-
taminated water.

—Saving in labor and time if water is more conveniently supplied,
thus freeing people, particularly women, to do other things with their
time and thus improve the quality of their lives.

In summary, the United States stands ready to do its part. We fully
support the objectives of the Water Decade and plan to provide tech-
ical assistance and additional funds for the Decade.

1. The USG is concerned that discussions and documents regarding the preparation of a new International Development Strategy (IDS) for the Third UN Development Decade have to date virtually ignored the issue of population growth. This is of concern given broad international understanding that excessive population growth is a problem which affects every aspect of development, including nutrition, health, environment, natural resources, urbanization, unemployment, and political and social stability. As this will be the basic development strategy document for the 1980’s we believe an appropriate statement on the role of population policies would provide significant reinforcement to national leaders in initiating or upgrading population policies and programs.

2. An international consensus exists that population issues are an inseparable part of the overall problem of development. As stated by World Bank President McNamara at the World Bank Annual Meeting in Belgrade in September, excessive population growth is the greatest single obstacle to the economic and social advancement of most of the societies in the developing world. Approximately 65 different nations, representing well over 90 percent of the population of the developing world, currently have some form of policies and programs aimed at limiting population growth and/or promoting family planning, although the effectiveness of such programs varies considerably.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800038–0838. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Sergeant and Theodore Nelson; cleared by Benedick, Reimer, McNutt, Graham, Jorgenson, Cornelia Bryant, Herz, Van Dusen, IO/IEP, and Ruth Goldberg; approved by Edgar. Sent to USUN, Accra, Addis Ababa, Algiers, Ankara, Bangkok, Beijing, Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Cairo, Caracas, Colombo, Dacca, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Jakarta, Kathmandu, Khartoum, Kigali, Kinshasa, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Lima, Manila, Mexico City, Nairobi, New Delhi, Rabat, Rangoon, Santiago, San Salvador, Singapore, Seoul, Tunis, and USINT Havana. Sent for information to the U.S. Mission in Geneva. The Department repeated the telegram to the same addressees and sent it for information to all OECD capitals on February 2. (Ibid.) In telegram 56269 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, March 1, the Department explained that telegram 18499 had been repeated to all OECD posts for information, as the original telegram had been sent to a “selected list of third world countries,” and requested that the OECD addressee posts provide the same information requested in telegram 18499. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800106–1033)

2 See footnote 3, Document 328.

3 See footnote 8, Document 328.
3. The fundamental interrelationships between population matters and socio-economic development are recognized in the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) adopted by 136 countries at the World Population Conference at Bucharest in 1974. The plan recommends, inter alia, that countries wishing to affect fertility levels give priority to implementing development programs which are likely to affect fertility norms and behavior, including expanded opportunities for women in education and employment, improved infant and child health and improved family income. Moreover, all countries are urged to respect and ensure the basic human right of persons to determine the number and spacing of their children, and to make available advice, information, and the means for limiting births.

4. In 1979, the first five-year review and appraisal of the implementation of the WPPA, carried out by the UN Population Commission, was the basis last May for an ECOSOC resolution (E/RES/1979/32) containing specific recommendations for priority action by governments for national implementation of the WPPA. This resolution also calls upon the IDS Preparatory Committee to include in the new strategy “full recognition of the interrelationships of population factors and social, economic, cultural, and political development, and the need for full and urgent action to deal with population problems.” More recently, the Colombo Declaration of September 1979, adopted by the International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development, called on the UNGA 1980 Special Session to recognize the integration of population and development as a “key issue in the IDS to be adopted for the next decade.” It is believed that all G–77 members have participated in one or more of these expressions of international consensus beginning with the Bucharest Conference.

5. Prior to the 4th session of the Prepcom, scheduled for February 11–29, USUN should contact anticipated leading personalities in the G–77 who are concerned with IDS and have or will have a role in IDS negotiations, either within group or in Prepcom. USUN Mission should raise population issue with them and encourage their active support for incorporation of appropriate references to population growth in the new IDS. In addition to paras. 2–4, you may, for a full exposition of the dimensions and policy implications of the population problem, draw

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4 See footnote 6, Document 284.

5 Parliamentarians from 58 nations met in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 28–September 1, 1979, to review progress made since the 1974 Bucharest Conference. The Colombo Declaration reaffirmed the linkage of population programs to overall national development plans and recommended holding a UN World Population Conference in 1984 to mark the 10-year anniversary of the Bucharest Conference. For additional information concerning the Declaration, see Colombo Declaration on Population and Environment (New York: United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1979)
upon “World Population: Silent Explosion”, a special reprint from the State Department Bulletins of October, November and December 1978 which was distributed to all Ambassadors under cover of a personal letter from the Secretary on December 5, 1978. A limited number of copies are available in English, French and Spanish. Begin FYI The basis for the U.S. position on the IDS remains the speech given by DAS Hormats for the first session Prepcom for the IDS on April 3, 1979. End FYI.

6. G–77 countries which we believe have a particular interest in the issue based on their domestic policies and programs include Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Tunisia. In addition, USUN should encourage OECD country delegations to press importance of issue. Begin FYI Recently, in varying important fora, French President Giscard d’Estaing, German Chancellor Schmidt and Japanese Prime Minister Ohira emphasized the importance of population growth. In essence, their views coincided in calling overpopulation one of the most important concerns facing the world. End FYI. The Chinese and the Turks, habitual intermediaries with the G–77 and interested in population problems, may also be helpful. The above listing is illustrative and should not limit your contacts, as you deem appropriate.

7. Action requested of other addressee posts. Leaders of several developing nations, such as Presidents Lopez Portillo of Mexico, Zia of Bangladesh and Suharto of Indonesia, have recently emphasized the urgent priority of population policies and family planning programs aimed at lowering fertility. The Department would appreciate excerpts from policy statements or speeches by other national leaders on population issues which either demonstrate awareness of the dangers of population growth or which minimize the problem and oppose limiting fertility.

8. In addition, at discretion of Embassy, if a suitable occasion arises with appropriate officials, you may draw on this message to indicate our interest in the subject of population as related to development strategy, inform them of our efforts in New York to work with other delegations on this subject, and seek their cooperation in these efforts.

Vance

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6 See Document 320.
7 Telegram 1459 from USUN to Paris, April 4, 1979, transmitted the text of Hormats’ remarks and was repeated to the Department and the Mission in Geneva. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790155–0157)
332. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, February 9, 1980

SUBJECT
Summit Proposal for UN Water Decade—Background and Options

The 1977 UN Water Conference resolved that by 1990 everyone in the world should have reasonable access to adequate water and sanitary facilities. The UNGA subsequently declared 1981–90 the International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade.

The US strongly supports the goals of the Decade. Provision of reasonably pure and conveniently located water supplies, and of adequate sanitary facilities, can make a tangible and meaningful contribution to human well-being. It is a prerequisite of good health and is essential to the betterment of the lot of the Third World’s rural women, millions of whom must walk miles each day with heavy loads of water. Provision of potable water is consistent with our broader North-South strategy emphasizing direct efforts to meet basic needs.

The US has urged the world community to take the Decade seriously and was instrumental in arranging for a special one-day session of the General Assembly on November 15, 1980, to launch the Decade. Peter Bourne is coordinating Water Decade activities within the UN system. He is arranging for the DAC to hold a meeting of the donor community late in the summer in Geneva in order to determine (and encourage) donor commitments.

The goal of meeting the potable water needs of all by 1990 may be impractical—the capital cost of providing basic services to the 2.7 billion people who will need them (taking into account interim population growth) would be $200–$600 billion (1979 dollars), according to the World Bank. However, with strong support from donors and LDCs, it will be feasible to make a major dent in the problem. The UN calculates that one billion rural people can be provided with safe water for $44 billion (1977 prices), two-thirds of which would be provided by LDCs themselves.

The U.S. Position

In late 1978, negotiations among State, AID and other interested agencies produced an agreement that AID should provide a total of $2.5 billion over the decade in bilateral aid for rural water supplies and sanitation, with the annual disbursements rising toward the end of the decade. This figure was contingent on commensurate support from LDCs and other donors and on future absolute increases in the AID budget. AID direct spending on water and sanitation in recent years has been in the range of $150–$180 million; if this level is maintained, expenditures over the decade will total $1.5–$1.8 billion. More than two-thirds of the current annual total is accounted for by a few large ESF projects, mainly urban, in the Middle East. Urban projects had not been counted against the original target of $2.5 billion, but, given current funding prospects, will have to be included in any future announcement of a target.

In view of the uncertain funding outlook, AID now opposes announcing any spending target for the decade. AID is committed to doing more on water, which has second priority in their health sector to the broader primary health care program (which includes water and sanitation in an integrated approach). Doug Bennet agrees that the proportion going to water should increase as the total DA health budget increases. However, AID is unwilling to vitiate the primary health care program to meet a high water spending target. Whether or not the high level of ESF going into water and sanitation can be maintained will depend on funding levels, the future mix of ESF recipients, and recipients’ desires and needs for major water and sanitation investments.

AID is currently unable to project its water and sanitation expenditures for the coming decade. Over the next two months they will conduct a water policy review and will clarify their own priorities.

Other Donors

Some multilateral agencies, especially the World Bank, are gearing up for major efforts. The World Bank already spends close to $1 billion a year on water and sanitation. Its staff has drawn up and submitted to McNamara plans that would push expenditures for the 1980s up to nearly $20 billion, and increase the share going to rural areas. (Assuming McNamara approves the new water policy, we should make sure the US director endorses it.)

European donor interest, according to Peter Bourne, is high, but the willingness to commit resources varies. The West Germans and Swedes have been leaders in this area, between them helping 37 LDCs develop national plans for the decade. The British are interested but are working with a shrinking aid budget. The French are, as usual, inter-
ested mainly in former colonies and in linking aid to domestic commercial interests.

The Japanese have provided aid for a number of water-related projects but have not yet expressed a particular commitment to the UN Decade. In Canada, interest was high in the previous government, dropped off with the election of Clark, and will probably recover should Trudeau be reelected.

The EEC is enthusiastic about the decade and has promised to give it high priority, subject to the degree to which recipient countries request such aid. The EEC will try to promote the decade among member countries and will probably hold a two-day meeting in Brussels next fall to encourage and coordinate European donor interest.

All the main donors seem to accept the idea of the Water Decade as good as in principle. However, given the uncertain and unformed nature of many other summit countries’ commitments, the US would have to exert early leadership and pressure to achieve a significant result at the summit.

**Options for the Summit**

1. **Announce US commitment of $2.5 billion for the Decade, encourage others to announce comparable targets**

   A summit initiative would have maximum impact if the countries could announce high targets. Public announcement of a US target would also be a useful lever for encouraging other donors to set such goals. However, this option faces two major obstacles: 1) it will be difficult, given the fiscal climate, to gain OMB acceptance of the requisite additional funding and advance commitment of funds; and 2) it will probably be quite difficult to persuade all the summit countries to make similar announcements.

   In order to make a public commitment of $2.5 billion in bilateral aid for domestic water and sanitary projects (urban and rural) for the decade, the President and OMB would have to:

   — agree to an absolute increase in AID’s budget specifically for this purpose. The exact amount of the needed increase has not been determined but may approach $1 billion spread over the decade.

   — agree to an advance commitment of $2.5 billion for AID spending on water supplies and sanitation over the decade.

   **Option 2. Announce U.S. commitment of $2.0 billion for the decade; encourage others to announce comparable targets**

   AID and OMB may be more willing to make this smaller commitment, though even this level probably exceeds current AID spending expectations. Announcing a specific target, even if it is lower than that
agreed upon internally in 1978, provides us with greater leverage over other donors and more credibility with LDCs. A figure lower than $2.0 billion, however, might not have the same advantages, since it would represent little increase over the status quo.

Option 3. Express strong support for the Decade without announcing funding targets

The US and other summit countries could declare their strong support for the goals of the decade, and pledge to provide increased aid for water and sanitation without specifying funding levels. Some countries might be willing to say they will increase the share of their aid funds that will be devoted to these subjects.

This option would be easily achievable and would be better than nothing in terms of the decade. However, it would be a weak statement for a summit.

Conclusion

Because of the tangible human benefits that could result from a successful Water Decade, I feel we should do all we can to make it meaningful. I propose that we actively consider Option 1 for the Summit, while recognizing that there will be strong pressures pushing us toward Option 3.

An interagency High Level Group on the Water Decade was previously established by Lucy Benson and would now be chaired by Matt Nimetz. If you wish to pursue an initiative on potable water for the Summit, I’d be glad to suggest to Matt that he call a meeting of the HLG. It would be useful if you could attend such a meeting, but, in any case, the meeting would help to clarify the US position on the Water Decade.²

Memorandum From the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (Ehrlich) to the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)

Washington, March 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Summit Discussions on Population

Henry

As we discussed, I think it would be helpful if the importance of family planning is discussed, at least informally, at the Summit. I assume that the issue would not be included in the communique. But it would be a major step forward if, in informal discussions, the need for population control were expressly linked to the issue of food security. The link is obvious: no amount of additional food will solve the world’s hunger problem unless population growth is brought under control.

We can urge, as suggested in a note last month from Guy Erb to you, increased resources for family planning. (A paper I sent to the North-South group yesterday spells out a specific proposal in some detail.) In my judgment, family planning is probably the most cost effective area of assistance. The United States, by a wide margin, is the leading bilateral donor, and more support from the other summit countries would be of major benefit.

Even without additional funds, however, explicit recognition of the issue in discussions with developing countries would be useful. This issue, more than others, requires leadership from the heads of state of developing countries, and that leadership is most likely to emerge if they conclude that industrial countries are serious about the point.

Ideally, in my view, we would suggest we are considering giving priority in assistance allocations to developing countries with operational population plans. We could also emphasize that support for food security measures might depend in part on a demonstrated commitment in the population field.
In a real sense, the exact nature of the points discussed is less important than that the subject is raised, however informally.

Thomas Ehrlich\(^4\)

Attachment

Note From the Deputy Director of the International Development Corporation (Erb) to the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)\(^5\)

Washington, February 27, 1980

SUBJECT

Population Proposal for the Venice Summit

Population assistance from DAC members now represents only 2% of total flows of official development assistance (ODA). Out of $15 billion in total flows in 1977 only $326 million were allocated to population programs. The US provided almost half the DAC total, $146 million, in 1977. Sweden, the second largest donor, provided about $30 million. Among the summit countries the UK, Canada, Germany, and Japan, each provided under $20 million. France did almost nothing and Italy provided no population assistance at all, according to DAC statistics.

I recommend that at the Economic Summit the President seek from other summit leaders a commitment to double their population assistance, or, in the cases of Italy and France, to initiate or greatly increase population programs.

Because of the sensitivity of this issue I believe the communiqué should emphasize the commitment to family planning of almost all nations as expressed, for example, at the UN World Population Conference in 1974, the International Women’s Year Conference in 1975, and the Primary Health Care Conference in 1979.\(^6\) Such an approach would be preferable to a Summit exhortation to developing countries to reduce their population growth rates. The communiqué should also an-

\(^4\) Ehrlich signed “Tom” above his typed signature.

\(^5\) No classification marking.

nnounce that the Summit countries were going to increase assistance for population programs.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{Guy F. Erb}\textsuperscript{8}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{7} The Venice Declaration stressed that “high priority should be given to efforts to cope with population growth and to existing United Nations and other programmes for supporting these efforts.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800349-0815) Additional information concerning the summit is in \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1977–1980, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy.

\textsuperscript{8} Printed from a copy that indicates Erb signed the original.

\section*{334. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark\textsuperscript{1}}

\textbf{Washington, March 28, 1980, 1048Z}

82530. Please pass Deidre Ryan, ICA. Subject: World Conference UN Decade For Women. Ref: Vienna 2874.\textsuperscript{2}

1. Received your note and will begin to share preparation developments with you on a weekly or bi-weekly basis.

2. U.S. preparations being conducted in three phases. Phase I was initial briefing to over 250 women in small group sessions. Briefing focused on history of UN Decade; UN conference preparation procedures of regional conferences and the Prepcom; and U.S. outreach efforts.

3. Phase II, currently underway, is the bulk of our outreach effort. This effort involves holding five regional conferences in Federal regional headquarters cities throughout the U.S. to assess American progress in the Copenhagen subtheme areas of education, employment and health. The five two-day conferences will vary their emphases, but each of the subthemes will be highlighted at various individual conferences. Conferences scheduled and sponsored as below:

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800162-0259. Limited Official Use. Drafted and approved by Derryck (M/WCW).

\textsuperscript{2} In telegram 2874 from Vienna, March 6, the Embassy summarized the outcome of the February 25–March 5 meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women, noting that the deliberations had “not significantly altered” the agenda for the upcoming World Conference on the UN Decade for Women. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800122-0097)
4. In addition, five one-day conferences are scheduled. These one day conferences, sponsored by various NGO’s are scheduled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date     \</th>
<th>Organizing Agency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis, Minn.</td>
<td>May 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, Mass.</td>
<td>May 17</td>
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<td>Seattle, Wash.</td>
<td>May 31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas City, Ka.</td>
<td>June 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlanta, Georgia</td>
<td>June 28</td>
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5. Phase III will involve briefing and preparations of U.S. delegation to Copenhagen.

6. Kika Molgaard Antonsen, Danish journalist, will attend our Denver regional meeting as a part of her ICA sponsored U.S. tour.

7. CSW meeting in Vienna also addressed World Conference agenda items and results being repeated in Vienna 2874 (repeated Copenhagen FYI).

8. Discussion of the political items women and apartheid, women as refugees and the effects of Israeli occupation on Palestinian women, are gaining considerable attention at our regional meetings. Detailed coverage in my next communication.

9. Packet of US Secretariat materials distributed at each conference has been pouch to you.

Vance

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3 Organizers of the Seattle conference canceled the meeting, as the eruption of Mount St. Helens on May 18 complicated conference preparations and travel. Derryck sent a telegram to Nancy Helen Hunter Fisher, one of the Seattle organizers, on May 23, commenting: “Regret that volcanic eruption and subsequent slowdown in essential services resulted in your decision to cancel Seattle meeting in preparation for the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women. Appreciate your extensive attempt to mount high quality meeting. Thank you and the Seattle coalition for all your effort. Hope that the networking and new knowledge of the Decade and its goals prove beneficial to Seattle women.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800254-0029)
MEMORANDUM ON THE UN WATER DECADE FOLLOW-UP

This memorandum
—reports what went on at the Water Decade follow-up meeting convened by Mr. Nimetz on 1 April 1980,
—and is to serve as a background report for the N/S Task Force.

An interagency agreement to aim for bilateral U.S. support of the UN Decade on Drinking Water and Sanitation to the extent of $2.5 billion over the 1980’s, subject to certain conditions, has been held in abeyance for more than a year. The funding target was never publicly announced because, after it was agreed to by AID and T and the program content blocked out, the time never seemed ripe to go to OMB for approval of a long-term commitment involving some new money.2 Since the budget situation has grown worse, the current question is what emphasis the U.S. should give to the Decade and how that emphasis should be expressed.

Mr. Nimetz called a meeting of the High-Level Group on Follow-Up to the UN Water Decade to review problems, prospects, and positions in light of the complete change of people involved and the current budget situation. Those who attended are listed in Tab A. The agenda is given in Tab B.3

John McDonald, Coordinator for the U.S. follow-up activity, reviewed developments with particular attention to the activities in the UN.

The proposal for a Decade devoted to Drinking Water and Sanitation was the outcome of a UN Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in March of 1977. Planning for fulfilling the U.S. commitment resulted in setting the funding target proposal in 1978 (mentioned above) for which approval has not been sought.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 7, TL Papers on Specific Mtgs./Appoint. 1980. No classification marking. Drafted by Katcher on April 10. Notations on the first page of the memorandum read: “4/1/80 Draft report of mtg.” In an April 10 memorandum to multiple addressees, attached but not printed, Katcher reiterated that he prepared the memorandum to serve the dual purpose of recording the meeting and providing background for Cooper’s North–South Task Force discussions. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 319.

3 Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. Attendees included Nimetz, Angarola, Bennet, John Bryant, Eckholm, Guy Erb, Katcher, Lake, McDonald, Pickering, Sartorius, and John Sommer (AID).
In March 1979, the UN held its first follow-up at which the U.S. proposed:

—A UNGA Special Session in November 1980;
—National plans be developed by member states;
—In-country coordination be handled by the UNDP Resident Representatives;
—A UN Steering Committee be established composed of seven UN agencies who are in some way involved with water (UNDP, IBRD, WHO, UNICEF, UN, ILO, FAO).

These recommendations were agreed to by member states and were later confirmed by ECOSOC, WHO, UNDP, and the UN General Assembly.

The UN agency activities having to do with water, which are not inconsiderable, are given in Tab C.

The 1978 agreement on a $2.5 billion bilateral target by AID over the Decade for rural clean water had four conditions:

—LDCs must contribute their share;
—Other donor countries must put up their share (e.g. 75 percent);
—Good projects must be developed; and
—The expansion of AID funding must be done without crippling other key AID efforts which, in practical terms, meant dependence on new money.

Since the latter condition is unrealistic in today’s financial environment, most of the discussion by the Group centered on:

—What are we doing?—Is it more than the figures show?
—How important is “water” when compared with other priority emphases such as energy, food, health, and population?
—How does the “rural” bias of AID’s efforts affect the shape of the program?

On current support: The discussion made it clear that AID budget figures on water, per se, in the health sector, understate the actual contribution by the United States through other means such as components in AID housing, food, and health programs, or through the World Bank, etc. While rejuggling labels won’t change the fiscal picture into a rosy one, the Group felt that adjustments in program management and coordination could make some difference. AID agreed to the desirability of looking into this. Moreover, it should be possible to demonstrate at the UN and elsewhere that our support was institutional. Mr.

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4 See footnote 3, Document 330.
5 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “What are the key UN Agencies Doing?”
Bennet estimated water/sanitation share of AID housing program brought total bilateral AID (including SSA) to some $230 million a year.

On priority: There was agreement that “water” did not rank with energy, food, health, and population as top ranking priorities but that the Decade was a serious enterprise that deserved support. Two elements of previous strategy were questioned (which led to the change of approach from attention to budget to attention to program management):

—The realism of reaching for an unattainable target such as fixed dollar commitments for a decade, or for health for all by 2000, was questioned.

—An approach in which clean water competes with health for funds when the relationship is interactive rather than serial seemed to make no sense.

On rural bias: The group felt that the stipulation in the original agreement was overdone. However urban areas are receiving a disproportionate share of water funds. A few large urban SSA projects account for over half our bilateral aid, and the World Bank in the past lent mainly to urban water and sanitation projects.

The discussion can be summed up as follows: While no one supported announcement of a fixed dollar target, consensus did develop on managing the water programs already under way, which are considerable in extent, in a way which is more directly supportive of the Decade and LDC national interest as it unfolds and which would give evidence of the contribution of the United States. Mr. Bennet indicated he would examine the effectiveness of current AID water activities and their desirable priorities. There was agreement that reaffirmation of support for U.S. participation in the goals of the Decade was necessary and desirable but that the support not be ranked as a top priority issue with Energy, Food, Health, and Population (thus diluting emphasis on these topics), but as a component with important social and economic aspects.

In conclusion, Mr. Nimetz’ call for a memo to be written to Henry Owen and others directly involved to suggest inclusion of the issue in the Summit talks this June (Tab D), and for the meeting’s deliberations to be written up for Mr. Cooper’s use in the N/S discussions. With respect to the latter McDonald had a number of specific recommenda-

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6 Attached but not printed is an April 8 memorandum from Nimetz to Owen, Cooper, and Hormats regarding a possible Venice Summit statement on the UN Water Decade.
tions which were not discussed at this HLG Meeting but which are given as Tab E as grist for that N/S discussion.

7 Attached but not printed is an undated paper containing McDonald’s suggestions.

336. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, April 1, 1980, 1821Z

85747. Inform Consuls, for Ambassadors and heads of U.S. programs. Subject: Worldwide Status and Rights of Women. Message From Secretary Vance. I deeply appreciate the response of posts to joint cirtel State/AID/ICA/Peace Corps 138588 on ways to advance the status of women as an integral element of US foreign policy. Nearly 90 percent of posts responded with thoughtful and valuable proposals which we have summarized below.

Posts submitted some 150 examples of ways they have already found to encourage host countries to recognize the rights and advance the status of women. These examples are particularly useful and timely in view of the Second World Conference of the UN Decade for Women, scheduled for July 1980 in Copenhagen, to which each UN member nation will send a delegation to present its own national agenda. The preparations for this conference now underway in each country offer us an opportunity to raise the question of the local status of women.

I recognize that what we do in the United States is crucial to what we can do or advocate abroad. I also recognize that the status of women is a highly sensitive issue in many countries. Furthermore, there may arise or now exist extraordinary circumstances, such as marked polit-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800165–0604. Unclassified. Drafted by Joyce, Good, and Baer; cleared by Maynes, Bleakley, Schwebel, Cheshes, Overly, Fleisher, Rizik, Seitz, Phyllis Oakley, Wales, Goott, Benedick, Barbara Thompson, Lollis, Hanley, Arvonne Fraser, Becker, Reinhardt, Jennone Walker, and Celeste; approved by Vance. The Department reprinted the telegram in an April 16 Department Notice for State, AID, USICA, and ACDA employees. (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980 Subject Files, Lot 82D180, SHUM Women 1980)

2 See Document 327.

3 See Document 342.
ical instability or anti-US sentiment, when an active pursuit of enhanced women’s rights by the Country Team is not appropriate.

Recognizing these limits, there is still a wide range of opportunities for discussion, action and Country Team planning. I look to you to assure personally that your staff and relevant members of your mission consider these proposals in Embassy activities and in preparing country programs.

A. Summary of general conclusions of post responses

1. In most countries there has been at least modest and, for some, considerable progress over the last decade in advancing the rights and status of women. These rights are now widely recognized under law and by internationally approved instruments. More women are being educated and are coming to occupy more positions of influence, especially in the professions and government. New government (or private) machinery has been established in many countries to address women’s interests and responsibilities.

2. However, the implementation and enforcement of laws extending human rights to women are generally lax. In many countries, the laws themselves fail to provide women with equal civil, political and economic rights, such as those involving property, divorce, and inheritance. Inequitable rates of pay for the same work are universal, even in highly developed countries. Women everywhere predominate in menial or lower status jobs. Women are generally under-represented in such powerful bodies as labor organizations as well as cabinets, parliaments, national councils, the higher courts and large business. Even in highly modernized Western countries, traditions of male dominance persist. Rural conservatism and even conservatism of the women themselves in many countries perpetuate unjust conditions and make progress painfully slow. These attitudes are not easily eradicated, yet forces for change are reported at work almost everywhere.

3. The process of modernization, however, often affects women in adverse ways. In many LDCs women—particularly the low-income and rural women—are the primary victims of pervasive unemployment, urban migration, rapidly advancing technology, overpopulation, and the widening gap between the educated and the illiterate poor. As Embassy Ankara writes, “pressures associated with the rapid shift to an urban society have been especially acute for rural women . . . while the rise of urban middle and upper-class women have masked their problems.” The consensus is that it will take the constant, informed attention and support of host governments and citizens, of international and private organizations, to insure that women share equally in the benefits and not just the burdens of development and modernization.

4. A significant number of US missions have made sustained efforts to advance women’s status. Our joint cirtel has strengthened their
position; and has sparked, renewed interest in, and generally advanced the concept of equality for women. As presented here, the number and quality of examples of success from posts and post proposals for US action should reinforce work underway and stimulate new efforts. We expect and hope that many of these initiatives will become standard practice and a foundation for policy in missions generally.

5. The following proposals and examples for Embassy action can be applied, without additional funding, by most posts, wherever located (section B). Additional proposals for developing countries are detailed separately (section C).

B. Embassy examples/proposals for diplomatic ways to encourage host countries to advance the status of women:

1. Put “our own house in order”, specifically, put more women officers in visible, responsible positions at US Embassies. As Embassy Abidjan notes: “We must first demonstrate that we have confidence in our own women officers. When host countries see a higher percentage of women in decision-making positions in our Embassies abroad, not only are they likely to imitate us, but we ourselves will stand on stronger ground in our advocacy of women’s rights.” Posts widely acknowledge the positive effect of US women in senior positions. As a Near Eastern Embassy reports, “We are a public demonstration of the equality of women, having for years past had women as diplomatic officers on our staff in a part of the world where women are unthinkable as diplomats.”

2. Show the US commitment to human rights and equality of opportunity by increasing the number and responsibility of women nationals hired locally. According to Embassy Abu Dhabi: “Assignment of women officers, as well as secretaries, and employment of Arab and non-Arab third-country women nationals in the Embassy are more obvious examples of US use of women power.”

3. Assure that the Embassy is at all times in contact with the host country’s (A) women leaders; (B) government-established bureaus/directorates of women’s affairs; (C) appropriate women’s organizations. A significant number of Embassies report designation of a special “women’s affairs officer”. From Bonn, the Ambassador writes, “I have specifically asked a member of my professional staff to follow and report on issues of importance to women as they develop here . . . and instructed my staff to express strong US support for the significant steps taken by the German Government in recent years to improve the status of women.”

4. Reassess Embassy’s own attitudes toward women nationals (A) by reviewing Embassy’s contact lists carefully “to make sure our own unconscious biases or an assumption of local biases hasn’t led us to leave out possible useful contacts because they are women” (Em-
bassy Santiago); (B) by substituting “working dinners and luncheons for men and women” to replace “stag” functions where these are still practiced (Embassy Pretoria); and (C) inviting local women leaders to Embassy functions “for serious discussions”, not merely for social occasions (Embassy Brussels).

5. Arrange more exchanges between US and host country women individually and in groups, emphasizing the selection (A) of more women IVs (international visitors); (B) of more “top” US women as “American participants” to come to speak on US political, social and cultural issues to mixed, repeat, mixed audiences at universities, unions and at Embassy luncheons/dinners.

6. Encourage greater exchange of information on women and on women’s issues in all posts by: (A) having standard Embassy reporting include data on the local situation of women and their material contribution to host countries’ basic needs and GNP; (B) having the Ambassador take the lead in using interviews, speeches and articles to discuss US women’s status; (C) disseminating information on US women through more USICA exhibits, seminars and enlarged library collections on women, including material on women’s civil/political/economic rights, population control, child care, legal reforms, etc., and (D) stimulating cross-cultural support by putting host country women’s organizations in touch with US organizations, public and private institutions, and individuals concerned with the advancement of women.

C. Specific Embassy recommendations for developing countries.

1. Encourage host countries to arrange more training for women. Use all possible means—AID, USICA, Peace Corps, local or foreign PVOs, UN or third country agencies, private foundations. Lack of training continues as the predominant factor in women’s continued low status. Specifically, (A) expand training programs to non-traditional areas, including administration, law, labor, cooperative management; (B) make a major effort to see that women farm workers are included in all training in agricultural extension and in new farm technologies and processes; (C) to offset the frequent practice of training already advantaged women, encourage more non-formal training of low-income rural and urban women in income-producing skills.

2. Support/encourage local governments’ collection of statistical data on women—income, migration, employment/unemployment, family patterns—for use in planning development projects and in Embassy economic reports. Many LDC posts advise that lacking such data, country and US planners can make serious mistakes in program design and allocation of priorities.
3. Support/encourage surveys of women’s contribution to national food production (Embassy Bamako). Estimates indicate that from 70 percent to over 90 percent of rural women in most Third World countries engage in agriculture. However, few objective factual assessments exist of women’s material contribution to the host country’s total food supplies and GNP. Sharper studies would “raise the level of general awareness that many projects and techniques designed to increase agriculture production are based on the false premise that men do most of the agricultural work, and encourage rural development innovations designed to be implemented by women”. (Embassy Brazzaville).

4. In planning development projects, identify felt needs especially of rural women—a “rule too often neglected” (Embassy Djakarta). Embassy Bamako reports that perhaps the greatest needs include better access to wells, pumps, potable water, carts to carry water. Hauling water, often exclusively “woman’s work”, may alone take two to four hours per day. Embassy Accra concurs: “The most important single (US) step could be providing piped water or wells for each community.”

5. Encourage and where feasible plan for arranging women’s access to credit through cooperatives or otherwise, especially women farm workers, market women and artisans in handcrafts.

6. Use more effectively—and expand—Ambassadors’ self-help funds. These discretionary funds, now available to Ambassadors posted in developing countries, have “exceptional potential”, involve “minimal paper work, and (produce) speedy action” of self-help projects. Embassy Dakar urges that these funds be “constructively expanded and supplemented with additional funding especially earmarked for small projects of immediate impact on enhancing the status of women.”

7. Encourage funding of more self-help or projects by local and foreign PVOs, private foundations, UN agencies, especially where host country may be sensitive to US funding. Teaching income-earning skills is repeatedly stressed as a priority for self-help projects for both urban and rural low-income women.

8. Encourage involvement of more Peace Corps volunteers in design of development projects.

9. Use all available assistance programs of US Government. Examples: Use PL 480 funds for self-help projects; channel more Food for Peace to maternity/child care centers.

10. Help call attention to possible negative aspects of some “modernization” development programs, e.g., Embassy Banjul is attempting to help its own and host country officials “understand the social consequences” of a new river development project which will soon open vast, new areas to rice cultivation, which is traditionally women’s
work. The Embassy asks: “Will men assist women in the larger rice fields, or will already overburdened women cultivators simply face a much heavier burden?” “What will be the effects on social, family structure?”

These thoughtful proposals show that many Embassies have developed a variety of diplomatic and practical strategies for encouraging the advancement of women. Although the major responsibility for carrying out some of the proposals rests ultimately in Washington, where coordination with USICA, Peace Corps and AID is already underway, Embassies and other posts clearly have a role to play. The issue of women’s rights and status is an integral part of the human rights equation. As such, it is integral to US foreign policy. The Copenhagen Conference lends new urgency and relevance to the US role.

Vance

337. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Pickering) to Secretary of State Muskie

Washington, May 19, 1980

SUBJECT
Release of Global 2000 Study

The Global 2000 Study, which the Council on Environmental Quality and State jointly carried out at the request of President Carter, is now being printed. (A description of the study and principal findings is attached.) We anticipate that the study will be ready for release in July. Still unknown, however, is the degree of publicity the White House might wish to accord it—and also the timing of the public release—since the nature and severity of the population, resources and environmental problems the study identifies may be viewed as more “bad news” at the wrong time.

I will be participating with Gus Speth (CEQ) Tuesday (May 20) in a briefing for key White House advisers, expected to include Zbig Brzezinski, Stu Eizenstat, Frank Press, John White, Hedley Donovan, and Anne Wexler. We plan to describe the conclusions of the study, and to identify various options with respect to timing, level and type of public release. This is an extremely important study, and there is widespread public knowledge of its existence and great interest in it. I believe that it can be used in a positive manner by the Administration to demonstrate its leadership in anticipating future global challenges and also in mounting important responses to the problems. On this basis Speth and I will recommend to the White House that the President, himself, participate in a well-publicized release of the study; and also that a program of extensive briefings be conducted for the Congress, U.S. non-governmental organizations, and foreign embassy officials.

Given your past involvement in critical issues addressed by the study, and the considerable foreign policy implications involved, I hope you will be able to become involved in the release of the study. The Global 2000 Study has already been discussed during preparations for the forthcoming Venice Summit, and the draft Summit Communiqué calls for a similar report to the Summit of 1981.

We plan to arrange an (early June) internal State Department briefing on Global 2000, with emphasis on its international implications and follow-up. We will work closely with your staff to ensure that you are apprised of the status of such issues as the White House release strategy, and are in a position to decide on your own role.
THE GLOBAL 2000 STUDY

Background

The Global 2000 Study responds to a directive by President Carter in his 1977 Environmental Message. It is an attempt to project worldwide trends and conditions with respect to natural resource availability, population and environmental quality to the end of this century. It is based on extensive data collection and the application of the Government’s current modeling capability. The Study, according to the President, is also to serve as the foundation of the Government’s future long-term planning.

The Global 2000 Study is different from all previous U.S. studies of population, resources and environmental trends in that this task examines these closely related topics as a whole, rather than as separate and independent topics. In addition to describing trends and highlighting potential future global problems, the Study assesses the Government’s capabilities for carrying out projections and analyses of this type.

Findings

The Study concludes that: if present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically and more vulnerable to disruptions than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources and environment are clearly visible ahead. The Study acknowledges the existence of greatly heightened worldwide awareness of potential problems in these areas, and also the wide spectrum of new policies and programs which are being implemented to cope with them. Nonetheless, barring revolutionary

2 No classification marking.

3 The President’s directive: “Environmental problems do not stop at national boundaries. In the past decade we and other nations have come to recognize the urgency of international efforts to protect our common environment. As part of this process, I am directing the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State, working in cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and other appropriate agencies, to make a one-year study of the probable changes in the world’s population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century. This study will serve as the foundation of our longer-term planning . . .” (Emphasis added). [Footnote in the original. See footnote 4, Document 284.]
advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends. Some of the individual findings of the Study follow:

**World population** will increase some 50 percent by 2000, reaching 6.3 billion people. Ninety (90) percent of the growth will be in the LDCs, which will mean that 75 percent of the people of the world will live in the poorer nations.

**Gross National Product** is projected to increase in proportion to population increases on a world average. Economic growth in LDCs will increase somewhat, while it will slow in the industrialized nations relative to past decades.

**World food production** will increase 90 percent between 1970 to 2000. This assumes a doubling of food prices, continued increase in fish production, and ability to expand irrigation and use of fertilizers significantly (since amount of cultivated land will expand only 4 percent). However, world-marine fish catches are not projected to increase significantly beyond current levels. Food consumption (nutrition levels) will be increasingly skewed between “haves” and “have nots”.

**Energy** will be an increasingly difficult problem, and it is unclear how demand will be met. Problems of uneven geographical distribution, and economic and environmental constraints, will influence use and acceptability of coal, oil, gas, oil shale, and nuclear sources. The real price of energy will double by 2000; and the LDCs will increase energy use only slightly.

**Non-fuel minerals** will be generally sufficient to meet projected demands through 2000. However, production costs will rise rapidly.

**Water** will become increasingly in short supply on local and regional levels, as population and economic growth combine to affect both quantity and quality (through pollution).

**Forests** will continue to disappear rapidly, principally in the tropics, where 40 percent of remaining cover will be lost by 2000. Associated problems of erosion, siltation, erratic water supplies, loss of wood and wildlife and (possibly) regional and global climate change will intensify.

**Agricultural soils** will continue to degrade due to erosion, loss of organic matter, desertification, salination and waterlogging. Annually, an area of cropland and rangeland the size of Maine is becoming wasteland.

**Upper atmosphere pollution**, principally by carbon dioxide and fluorocarbons, is expected to increase at rates which (by 2000) may lock us into potentially serious problems of climate change and ozone depletion for the next century.
U.S. long-range projection capabilities need significant improvement if we and other governments are to have an adequate basis for factoring long-term trends into policy planning. There are gaps and inconsistencies in the data and methodologies used by the Federal agencies, along with important differences in assumptions.

Organizational Structure

Fifteen Federal agencies participated in the Study:

Council on Environmental Quality
State Department

Agency for International Development
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Department of Agriculture
Department of Energy
Department of the Interior
Energy Research and Development Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
National Science Foundation
Office of Science and Technology Policy

In addition, numerous officials and technical experts from a broad range of nongovernmental institutions participated in the Study design, development and review.

Mr. Gus Speth, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, co-chair the Executive Group overseeing the Study.

The Study Director, Dr. Gerald O. Barney, and a small central staff report to the co-chairpersons of the Executive Group, are housed at the Council on Environmental Quality. Ms. Story Shem represents the State Department as Executive Assistant on the Study.
MEMORANDUM

Washington, May 21, 1980

SUBJECT
Population Factors and U.S. National Security

On April 21, the NSC Ad Hoc Group met to discuss the relationship of demographic trends to U.S. national security interests. There was general agreement that several key countries and areas where the United States has important national security concerns are experiencing significant population pressures. It was also agreed that there is a lack of analysis relating to the effects of population growth on social unrest and political instability. Such analysis could be useful to the Executive Branch in foreign policy and development strategy formulation regarding specific countries, and to the Congress in its consideration of AID population funding.

Ambassador Marshall Green, consultant to the State Department, initiated the discussion. He admitted the difficulty in analyzing how excessive population growth affects national security, but emphasized that it is necessary to show how population interacts with other potentially destabilizing factors in a society. He noted that the “arc of crisis” tends to coincide with the arc of countries where there has been little success in dealing with the population problem. He suggested that the political observers in our overseas missions should be brought fully into a new evaluation of the population/national security linkage in key countries.

Several members observed that there is decreased donor interest, while at the same time there is increased interest on the part of underdeveloped countries in dealing with their population problems. There is a need for “hard” evidence about the results of population growth, which would be of use in convincing Congress of the importance of population in national security terms.

The members concluded that a core group of analysts should produce a pilot study, focusing on a specific country, in order to gain a better idea of the dimensions and possibilities for research in this new

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 35, Environment: Population 5–6/80. Confidential. Addressed to the 17 members of the Ad Hoc Group. Drafted by Sergeant on May 21; cleared by Benedick. Copies were sent to Giffler, Eckholm, and U.S. Census Bureau (BUCEN).
area. Such a core group would be interdisciplinary in nature, involving analysts from CIA’s Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research (OGCR) and State/INR, and drawing, as appropriate, on the Census Bureau, AID, Defense, and possibly other agencies. Egypt, Mexico, and Kenya were mentioned as possible initial countries for study.

As a next step, I am attaching a preliminary outline for such a study,² and would much appreciate your comments and suggestions, which can be addressed to Richard E. Benedick, Coordinator of Population Affairs, OES/CP, Room 7825.

I am also attaching for your information, as requested at the meeting, a study by OGCR on Turkey,³ which appears to contain some elements of what we are aiming at. I might also cite a book which has come to my attention, *Population Dynamics and International Violence*, (MIT, Lexington Books, 1974), by Nazli Choucri, for its discussion of the issue.

We look forward to hearing from you in the near future on the proposed outline, on possible initial countries for study, and on whether and how your agency might be able to participate in the analysis.

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³ Not attached.
339. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, June 1, 1980, 0204Z

143816. For Chief of Mission from Deputy Secretary. Subject: World Population Growth.

1. The eighteen-agency NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, chaired by the Department of State, has just released its fourth annual report, copies of which will shortly be pouch to you.2

2. Because of the important implications of world population growth for U.S. foreign policy, and the growing urgency for concerted and expanded national and international efforts to address this problem, I hope that you and your senior staff will give careful attention to the report.

3. The report notes that, during the nineteen-seventies, much of the economic gains and increased food output of the third world were cancelled out by population growth. Even allowing for continuing slowdown in the rate of growth, world population is likely to increase from the current 4.4 billion to over 6 billion by the year 2000—a growth in only two decades which is almost as much as the entire world population as recently as 1930. This is the equivalent of adding more than twenty new countries the current size of Bangladesh.

Much of this increase—90 percent—will occur in low-income countries. The proportion of industrialized countries’ population in the world total is likely to decline from 33 percent in 1950 to only 20 percent by 2000.

Many developing countries of importance to U.S. security are experiencing some combination of fast population growth, high and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800268–0174. Unclassified. Drafted by Benedick; cleared by Pickering, Houdek, Lamberty, McNutt, Laase, NEA/RA, and Bremer; approved by Christopher. Pickering distributed a draft of the telegram and copies of the report of the NSC Ad Hoc Group, executive summary, and conclusions section to Christopher under a May 22 action memorandum. According to stamped and handwritten notations on the May 22 memorandum, Christopher indicated his approval of the telegram on May 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800080–0383)

2 The Department transmitted the fourth annual report to all diplomatic posts in airgram A–1142, June 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800077–0505) In an April 18 NSC Global Issues Cluster Evening Report, Oplinger wrote that he had met with Benedick, who indicated that the President would receive the annual report in late April. Oplinger added, “As a complete tyro, I learned one first principle: you have to be a hopeless optimist to work on this problem.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4–6/80)
growing population density relative to arable land, massive rural-urban migration, and high unemployment/underemployment—particularly among urban youth. These factors add up to an increasing potential for economic and political instability, social unrest and extremism, mass migrations, and possible international conflicts over control of land and resources.

U.S. international population policy is predicated on the premise that, while the demographic situation is obviously serious, it is not hopeless. China, Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, and Mexico are among countries which have brought birth rates down through concerted policies. Yet, further fertility reduction will require considerably more intensive, and expensive, efforts in terms of education, motivation, and expansion of family planning services.

By virtue of experience and resources, the U.S. cannot relinquish the leadership role in this area. Notwithstanding current budgetary stringencies, the report renews the 1975 NSC recommendation for a “major expansion” of U.S. funding for both bilateral and multilateral population programs and for biomedical research, and recommends high-level diplomatic support for population programs.

4. Action requested: (A) I urge you to consider ways in which you and your Country Team can support national and international efforts to address the problem of excessive population growth. Those of you in donor or potential donor countries should seek ways to encourage expanded assistance to multilateral agencies such as UN Fund for Population Activities and through bilateral aid programs, as well as a greater priority for biomedical research in human reproduction. Chiefs of Mission in developing countries experiencing excessive population growth should seek appropriate ways of supporting and encouraging effective local efforts, especially in cooperation with other multilateral and bilateral donors.

(B) Department would welcome comments on the report, addressed to the Coordinator of Population Affairs. We would also appreciate regular reporting by missions of important local developments, including analysis of policy changes and statements by national leaders, parliamentarians, opposition leaders, religious leaders, etc.

Muskie

1. The Department is presently coordinating a review by the Executive Branch of the subject Convention which was adopted by consensus and opened for signature by the UN General Assembly on December 28, 1979, in order to determine whether the U.S. will be able to participate in a signing ceremony scheduled during the UN Mid-Decade World Conference to be held in Copenhagen from July 14–30, 1980.

2. Informal consultations are also underway with the U.S. human rights community and with feminists, and women’s nongovernmental organizations and other interested groups, and private citizens. The Department has received a number of communications from the private sector expressing support for U.S. signature and ratification of the Convention as a means of eliminating sex discrimination in this country and elsewhere. While the U.S. fully supports the general thrust and underlying principles of the Convention, certain preambular paragraphs contain objectionable political rhetoric. The majority of the provisions in the Convention are consistent with U.S. law and policy, and the remainder can be dealt with by means of U.S. reservations, declarations, or understandings.

3. Sweden, Poland, Rwanda, Cuba, Portugal and Guinea have already signed. The Department learned informally that the following countries are considering signing the Convention at Copenhagen: Finland, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The U.S., along with Canada and Australia’s federal system of government will undoubtedly require a “federalism” reservation to the Convention.

4. Prior to a final determination as to whether the U.S. will sign the Convention, the Department would appreciate posts querying the appropriate host country office to determine whether a final decision has been made to sign the Convention at Copenhagen.

Muskie

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800273–0276. Unclassified. Drafted by Good; cleared by Thomas Johnson (L/UNA) and in M/WCW; approved by Creekmore. Sent to Ankara, Belgrade, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, Geneva, Helsinki, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Madrid, Mexico City, New Delhi, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, The Hague, Tokyo, Vienna, and Wellington.

2 The Convention is annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 34/180 adopted December 18, 1979.
341. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (McCall) to Secretary of State Muskie

Washington, June 30, 1980

SUBJECT

Personal Message from the Secretary of State to all Chiefs of Mission Reaffirming Policy on Worldwide Status and Rights of Women

Issues for Decision

In May 1979 Secretary Vance announced a new foreign policy directive on worldwide status and rights of women (Attachment 1)\(^2\) to make this issue a part of our total diplomatic effort.

As a contribution to the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women to be held in Copenhagen from July 14–30, 1980, and as an added stimulus to our efforts at home and abroad, we believe it is important for you to reaffirm this policy as one of your first acts after taking office. Given the short lead time before the Copenhagen conference, this request is urgent.

Essential Factors

This directive has received both national and international acclaim at regional preparatory conferences around the world and also at U.S. regional outreach meetings involving American women in preparations for the Copenhagen conference.

Already responses from worldwide U.S. diplomatic posts indicate strong support and approval for the policy on women and tell of helpful initiatives developed to carry it out.

Recommendations

1. that you send this message to all our Chiefs of Mission (Attachment);

2. that this message be made available to participants at the Copenhagen conference along with the full texts of the May 1979 policy statement and the Percy Amendment;\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed is a June 14, 1979, Department Notice. The text of the message was transmitted in telegram 138588 to all posts, May 31, 1979, Document 327.

\(^3\) See Document 327 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. that a Department Notice on this subject be distributed to all employees in the foreign affairs agencies.¹

Attachment

Draft Telegram⁵

Washington, June 27, 1980

All Chiefs of Mission

The events of the past year have made us all more conscious of the risks of war, and therefore more committed to the tasks of peace.

The traditional threats to peace—violation of national borders, seizure of hostages, civil strife, terrorism—are easy to recognize. But there are other threats to the health and well-being of people and nations which can erode and ultimately destroy the chances for a peaceful and prosperous world. The condition of hungry, frustrated people, many of them torn from home, family, or country; inflation; energy shortages; drought; lack of economic opportunity—all are problems which demand our urgent attention. Discrimination against women must, I believe, be placed among these threats. It is clearer today than ever before that the advancement of women’s status is an indispensable aspect of the overall development and social and economic well-being of nations.

The United States has given prominent attention to the role of women in developing nations. The 1973 “Percy Amendment” to the US Foreign Assistance Act requires that US foreign aid programs encourage and promote the integration of women into the national economies in the developing countries. The United States was the first country with such legislation governing its overseas aid and encouraged OECD–DAC donor countries to take similar positions. Some of them now have adopted similar language governing their foreign aid programs. But the issue extends far beyond that of the developing nations. In May 1979, the US Department of State announced and issued as a joint directive to its missions in every country that “a key objective of US foreign policy is the advancement worldwide of the status and conditions of women.”

At this midpoint in the UN Decade for Women, marked by the Copenhagen conference, it is extremely important to reaffirm our strong

¹ Muskie placed a check mark on the approval line on July 3. There is no indication that the message was sent.
⁵ Unclassified.
commitment to this objective as an integral part of our worldwide diplomatic efforts. Responses from our missions abroad have already shown strong support for the policy. More than 150 specific proposals have been offered on ways to carry it out.6

Certainly, the people of each nation, women and men alike, must establish their own laws and regulations on women’s status consistent with their culture, traditions, international obligations, and the principles of human rights. The role of our representatives overseas is one of sympathetic cooperation and support in encouraging all efforts to advance the status of women. Such a role, and our renewed commitment on the occasion of this World Conference of the UN Decade for Women are consistent with the essential values and sustaining ideals we hold as a nation. They are consistent, too, with the hopes we cherish for a peaceful comity of nations which enhances and draws equally upon the strength and resources of its men and women.

Edmund S. Muskie

6 See Document 336.

342. Editorial Note

The World Conference of the UN Decade for Women took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14–30, 1980. At the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, held in Mexico City from June 19 through July 2, 1975, delegates adopted a World Plan of Action, requested that the United Nations proclaim 1976–1985 the UN Decade for Women and establish a voluntary fund for the decade, and called for a mid-decade conference in 1980. UN General Assembly Resolution 30/3520, adopted on December 15, 1975, endorsed these recommendations and called upon member states to examine the World Plan of Action and pursue the adoption of national strategies, plans, and programs in furtherance of women’s economic, political, and social equality. For additional information concerning the General Assembly’s actions, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976, Document 186. The conference was originally slated to take place in Tehran, Iran, during the summer of 1980. Following the Iranian Revolution in January 1979, the Government of Iran withdrew its offer. Eventually, the United Nations selected Copenhagen as the conference location. The Mid-Decade Forum, sponsored
by a variety of non-governmental organizations, ran concurrently with the UN conference.

In November 1979, in preparation for the conference, the Department of State established the Office of the U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference of the UN Decade for Women. Headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Equal Employment Opportunities and Civil Rights Vivian Lowery Derryck, the Secretariat conducted an expansive national outreach program by partnering with the Departments of Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; and women’s organizations to coordinate and host meetings throughout the country to discuss conference agenda items and gain insight on problems facing American women. (Department of State Bulletin, April 1980, page 69)

The Department also hosted Copenhagen 80: The Washington Conference for Women, June 12–13, featuring addresses by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian, and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Richard McCall. Derryck summarized the speeches in a memorandum of conversation transmitted via telegram 169422 to Copenhagen, June 27: “Assistant Secretary Patt Derian keynoted the Conference on a positive note when she commented on the power of public opinion and the strong influence of informed citizens on policy formulation. Assistant Secretary Richard McCall won many new supporters by addressing the group on two separate occasions. Under Secretary Newsom in his address outlined the foreign policy issues facing the US in mid-1980 in a comprehensive factual way that impressed the participants and indicated the seriousness and the respect that he held for the audience. In corridor conversations participants continued to discuss the receptivity and accessibility to high-level Department officials.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800309–1137)

According to the final Report of the United States Delegation to the World Conference on the UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace, the Secretariat prepared various scope, position, and contingency papers for use by the delegation on such topics as North/South economic issues, job segregation, reproductive health, pay equity, illegal substances, and refugees. It also assisted Department and White House officials in selecting the delegation. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry and Presidential Assistant Sarah Weddington served as the delegation co-chairmen. Representatives included Lowery Derryck, Director of AID’s Women in Development Office Arvonne Fraser, Director of the Department of Labor’s Women’s Bureau Alexis Herman, U.S. Representative to the Commission on the Status of Women of the UN Economic and Social Council Koryne
Horbal, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Sarah Goddard Power. The full 37-member delegation also included advisers drawn from Congress, other government agencies, women’s organizations, and labor unions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Unfiled Files, Box 153, Women: World Conference Report: 1/81)

Prior to the conference, the Department provided background information and objectives in telegram 166222 to all diplomatic and consular posts, June 24, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800305–0146) The telegram explained the dual purpose of the conference: “(A) To review and assess progress and obstacles in implementing the World Plan of Action; and (B) to revise the World Plan as necessary by designing a program of action for the second half of the decade.” As a result of earlier preparatory meetings and UN General Assembly action, employment, health, and education had been selected as conference subthemes and three political issues—women and apartheid, the effects of Israeli occupation on Palestinian women inside and outside the Occupied Territories, and women and refugees—had been added to the agenda. Although Department officials did not oppose the “women and apartheid,” and “women as refugees” agenda items, they did object to the Palestinian item as it would have an isolating effect on the Israeli delegation. The telegram listed nine conference objectives:

“—Keep the focus on the central themes of the conference rather than on divisive political issues. We hope this can be achieved in part by adhering strictly to the established organization of work for the conference. It is contrary to the interests of all women that the work of this unique U.N. conference be undermined by politicization;

“—Develop a strong program of action for the second half of the decade that refines the World Plan of Action by outlining concrete targets and measurable objectives;

“—Identify and support specific measures of assistance to women in South Africa and Namibia without, however, creating any new funding mechanisms in addition to those to which the U.S. already contributes (UNDP, Institute for Namibia, the Trust Fund for South Africa, U.N. Educational and Training Program for South Africa);

“—Develop and upgrade specific programs of assistance to women refugees;

“—Oppose efforts to use the conference as a forum for unfairly criticizing Israel, and oppose inflammatory resolutions on the Palestinian women’s issue;

“—Provide the conference with an accurate and balanced picture of U.S. progress in implementing the World Plan of Action;
“—Add a section to the draft program on women and access to potable water to encourage women’s participation in planning and implementing water technology and to highlight a linkage between the Women’s Decade and the Decade on Drinking Water and Sanitation;

“—Work for recognition of the economic value of women’s work not traditionally renumerated or counted in national statistics;

“—Work to assure that women and women’s organizations play an active, recognized role in the development process.”

In advance of the departure of the U.S. delegation on the evening of July 11, President Jimmy Carter issued a statement in which he noted that the conference “will provide a constructive opportunity to review the progress of women throughout the world during the past 5 years and to establish a meaningful plan of specific actions to benefit women for the coming 5 years. The work of this Conference to improve the conditions of women’s lives everywhere in the world can make a major contribution to the enhancement of human rights, a goal which has been a vital element of my administration’s policy. The United States is deeply committed to eliminating all forms of discrimination and will continue to work for equal rights at home and abroad.” The President also indicated that he had authorized Weddington to sign the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which had been adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1979. (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, July 11, 1980, pp. 1335–1336)

Following the opening plenary session on July 14, delegates established two committees for the purpose of reviewing the draft Program of Action. In briefing materials prepared for Secretary of State Edmund Muskie’s July 18 breakfast meeting with President Carter, Department of State Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff outlined the administration’s position:

“Our objective at the Conference is to keep the focus on women’s problems and to avoid contentious unrelated political issues. The US Delegation is attempting to steer the proceedings toward three sub-themes of the conference, ‘employment, education and health’ for women, and to avoid political exploitation of the three main agenda items: ‘The Effects of Israeli Occupation on Palestinian Women Inside and Outside the Occupied Territories,’ ‘Women and Apartheid’ and ‘Women as Refugees.’

“A speech by Sarah Weddington, Co-Head of the US Delegation, July 15 urging a spirit of compromise and describing the progress of women in the US was well received. Ms. Weddington also announced that the US would sign the Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
“There are, however, political issues at the conference that could lead to confrontation if moderate forces do not rally to prevent this. Cuba is attempting to include language which links Zionism with racism, apartheid, colonialism and other evils in proposed G–77 amendments to the Action program for the conference. There are also G–77 draft submissions which blame women’s inequality on neo-colonialism and an unjust world economic order. Our Delegation is working hard, with support from the conference leadership, to remove such objectionable issues from Action program drafts. Our Delegation is not authorized to threaten withdrawal from the conference if our concerns are not met unless authorized to do so from Washington. If these unacceptable political issues threaten to disrupt permanently the work of the conference, you might then want to consider recommending to the President that our Delegation withdraw. Thus far there has been no challenge to the credentials of the DK (Pol Pot) Kampuchean delegation at the conference. There have been reports that a rival PRK (Heng Samrin) delegation might attempt this.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary—Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Box 3, Pres Bkfasts Jul, Aug, Sept 1980)

Ultimately the U.S. delegation was unsuccessful in its attempt to remove what it considered inflammatory language antithetical to U.S. foreign policy from the draft Program of Action. During the first week of the conference, the Indian delegation proposed an amendment, ultimately supported by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), to the Program of Action designed to channel financial assistance to Palestinian women through the auspices of the PLO. (Telegram 4763 from Copenhagen, July 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800345–0563) Telegram 189457 to Copenhagen and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, July 18, termed the language proposed by the Indian delegation “unacceptable” and instructed the U.S. delegation to “oppose any mention of the PLO as a conduit for assistance to Palestinian women.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800346–0418)

In telegram 4960/USDEL 74 from Copenhagen, July 24, Weddington reported that the Indian delegation had presented a revised amendment that deleted reference to the channeling of financial assistance through the PLO and substituted language that called for funds to be disbursed in “consultation and cooperation with the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0371) The Department instructed the delegation “not to accept any language calling for assistance to or through PLO,” adding, “Nor can we agree to any language referring to PLO or implying that PLO is the representative of Palestinians.” (Telegram 196775 to Copenhagen, July 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central For-
According to a situation report National Security Council Staff member Lincoln Bloomfield sent to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski the evening of July 25, the Committee approved the revised Indian amendment 85 to 3 with 21 abstentions; all members of the EC–9 did not participate. Bloomfield noted, “Sarah [Weddington] is going to say publicly that the Conference is being subverted from the task at hand and that U.S. Del will be trying to get things back on the track.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Unfiled Files, Box 153, Women’s Conference: 7/80) In telegram 5014 from Copenhagen, July 26, the Embassy reported that the United States, Israel, and Canada voted against the revised Indian amendment, adding, “Second Committee vote breaks a tradition dating back to Mexico City Conference of proceeding by consensus on Plan of Action. The question for WEO del is now whether inclusion of the Indian amendment in the Draft Program will preclude their support of the Draft Program as a whole.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800359–0383)

The Department further instructed the delegation to vote against the final draft of the Program of Action following the acceptance of the Indian/PLO amendment and due to other political considerations. (Telegram 198258 to Copenhagen, July 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0382) On July 30, 94 delegations voted to approve the Program of Action. Delegates also approved 48 additional resolutions. The United States, Canada, Israel, and Australia voted against adoption of the Program of Action on the basis of three paragraphs that included references to UN documents questioning the Camp David Accords; equated Zionism with imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism; and incorporated the Indian/PLO resolution language. As the U.S. delegation’s final report, which Muskie transmitted to Carter on January 16, 1981, stated:

“However, the challenge to our foreign policy on the State of Israel was one that could not be ignored. Any other action by the United States at the World Conference would have been construed as a major change in Middle East policy; and that would have been incorrect and misleading. Our continued commitment to Israel is a long-standing matter of integrity and principle. It is very unfortunate that our negative vote has been characterized as an either/or situation, it was not and is not.” (Report of the United States Delegation to the World Conference on the UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace, page 140; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Unfiled Files, Box 153, Women: World Conference Report: 1/81)

In summarizing U.S. accomplishments during the July 30 plenary session, Weddington noted:
“Sadly, our mutual efforts have fallen far below their potential accomplishments. Those efforts have been subverted by those with a different agenda. The focus on women here was pushed aside and became a victim of those who choose instead to focus on the political polemics of the Middle East situation. We are denied a consensus not by questions of how to help women in developing areas, not by questions of what education women need, not by questions of how to support women who are discriminated against on the basis of race and sex, not by any question uniquely pertaining to women or issues viewed from a woman’s perspective. We are denied a consensus by those who want to focus a statement against Zionism, by those who want to advance their special interests in the Middle East—knowing full well that a special session of the U.N. General Assembly is already working on the highly complicated and difficult problem involved. They have not compromised as they claim; they have denied women whatever their race, religion, or national origin a unique opportunity to contribute solutions to their own issues in their own way. And the intemperate and abhorrent attacks against Israel and the Camp David process are completely false and regrettable.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 1980, page 64)


On October 28, 1980, the White House released a statement indicating that Carter intended to send the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to the Senate in early November. (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 3, 1980, page 2477). Weddington circulated copies of the White House statement under cover of an October 29 memorandum, noting that “The President and I hope the Senate will give early and favorable consideration to the Convention. I am heartened by this positive step by the United States to move the equality of women to the forefront of international issues.” (Department of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 1980 Subject Files, Lot 82D180, SHUM Women 1980) The Senate received the Convention on November 12, and referred it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by unanimous consent. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Convention in 1988, 1990, 1994, 2002, and 2010, it has yet to be ratified by the full Senate.
343. Memorandum From President Carter to Secretary of State Muskie, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre), the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (Speth), the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat), and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press)

Washington, July 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Task Force on Global Resources and Environment

Among the most urgent and complex challenges before the world today is the projected deterioration of the global environmental and resource base. Unless nations of the world take prompt, decisive action to halt the current trends, the next 20 years may see a continuation of serious food and population problems, steady loss of croplands, forests, plant and animal species, fisheries, and degradation of the earth’s water and atmosphere.

To increase our capability to respond to these problems, I am establishing a Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and Environment. I am asking you to serve as members of this Task Force and am asking the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality to serve as Chairman.

The objectives of this Task Force will be:

• to ensure that high priority attention is given to important global resource, population, and environment problems;
• to assess the effectiveness of Federal efforts in these areas; and

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800114–1715. No classification marking. Attached to a July 31 memorandum from Speth to Bergland requesting that the USDA identify “problem areas” relating to global issues. The White House released the resultant three-volume report entitled, The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century, on July 24, which the Department summarized and transmitted in telegram 195667 to all diplomatic and consular posts, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800355–0820)

• to assess ways to improve the Federal government’s ability to project and analyze long-term resource, population, and environment trends.

The Task Force will report to me as soon as possible with recommendations for problem areas needing priority attention by the Task Force. It will report to me within six months and periodically thereafter on its progress and on ways in which Federal programs in these areas can be strengthened and improved.

The Task Force will carry out its responsibilities in consultation with and with the assistance of the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the International Development Cooperation Agency, the National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and my Assistant for National Security Affairs.3

Jimmy Carter

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3 In an August 1 memorandum to Muskie, McIntyre, Eizenstat, and Press, Speth indicated that he had appointed Yost as the Director of the Task Force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800114–1700) Speth added that he had sent an attached July 24 memorandum, under the President’s signature, to Bergland, Klutznick, Harold Brown, Duncan, Harris, Andrus, Goldschmidt, Civiletti, Turner, Ehrlich, Langen-berg, Costle, Frosch, and Brzezinski. The memorandum discussed the establishment of the Task Force and directed each agency head to “cooperate with and support this important Task Force.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800114–1719) The President’s memorandum is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book II, pp. 1417–1418.
Washington, July 29, 1980

SUBJECT
Letter from Secretary to U.S. Ambassadors on Global 2000

Issue for Decision

The State Department has important Global 2000 follow-up responsibilities. President Carter has mandated our participation in the Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment; and directed us to raise the global issues internationally. For these reasons, and because of the intrinsic importance of the issues for U.S. foreign policy, the personal involvement of our Ambassadors in the next stage is essential.

The proposed letter from you (Tab 1) asks the Ambassadors to ensure that the report is discussed with key host country officials; and solicits their ideas on how we can best use the report internationally and also respond to Global 2000 issues in the planning and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Along with the letter we will transmit one copy of the Volume I Summary Report; the statements that the President, you and Gus Speth presented; and the President’s directive establishing a Task Force on Global Resources and Environment. Additional copies of the report (Volumes I and II) have been pouch to each Embassy.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached letter that we will then send to each Ambassador.
Letter From Secretary of State Muskie to All Ambassadors

Washington, August 4, 1980

Dear Ambassador

On July 24 I participated in the public release of a government study which has extremely important implications for U.S. foreign policy in the months and years ahead. The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century was prepared by the State Department and the Council on Environmental Quality at the request of President Carter. Its purpose is to assess the possible changes in the world’s population, natural resources base and environment through the end of the century.

The conclusions are sobering. If present trends in population growth, resource degradation and environmental pollution continue, the efforts of the international community to achieve higher qualities of life and expanded social opportunities will be overwhelmed. The potential for famine, economic dislocation, social disruption and political instability will increase . . . sparing neither rich nor poor from the collective effects.

Global 2000 is not a prediction. But it is a warning of the kind of future which could occur if nations do not respond in time to make a difference. The problems highlighted in the study defy easy solution; but they will yield if we have the will and commit the resources.

President Carter, in his response to the report, stated that “America must provide special leadership” if these global challenges are to be met. I could not agree more. The President also called upon the State Department to play a central role. I will be representing the Department on a Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and Environment established to recommend actions by the U.S. in areas needing priority attention. Further, the Department is directed to raise and discuss the Global 2000 issues internationally.

I hope you will give this mandate your personal involvement and assistance by bringing the report to the attention of key government officials in your country, and seeking their reactions and comments. In addition, I welcome your thoughts on how the message of Global 2000 can be pursued by the U.S. most effectively at the country and international levels; how our foreign policy should be adjusted in light of the Global 2000 conclusions; and how the Department’s own capabilities for

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4 No classification marking.
carrying out long-range policy planning and analysis might be strengthened. I can think of no other area in which the creative thinking of the U.S. foreign affairs community is so vitally needed, and in which our Department is in a better position to contribute.

With best wishes, I am
Sincerely,

Edmund S. Muskie

345. Memorandum From Hazel Denton of the National Security Council Staff to the Special Representative for Economic Summits (Owen)¹

Washington, August 26, 1980

SUBJECT
Proposal for Summit Follow-Up on Population²

Three initiatives are proposed. The background for each is set out in the following pages.

1. Increase Resources. Propose that all Summit countries make a commitment to provide significant population assistance.

   Goal. To double contraceptive usage among women in developing countries, from 25% to 50%.

2. Appoint Population Coordinators. Recommend that a senior policy level coordinator of population affairs be appointed by each Summit government to carry the responsibility for Summit follow-up.

   Goal. To coordinate efforts to increase international assistance; to highlight population issues in communication with embassies and with international organizations; to stimulate action by their governments and by the international organizations of which they are donor members.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 63, Population: 8/80. In a handwritten notation next to Denton’s name, Owen commented: “Pls see me. HO.”
² See footnote 7, Document 333.
3. **Intensify Family Planning/Contraceptive Research.** Propose that the United States, working with other international agencies, establish a series of centers in developing countries for research into family planning methods.

**Goal.** To take the contraceptive techniques developed in the United States to the field, and to undertake detailed operations research into acceptability and adaptability in differing cultural and economic environments.

**Background Information**

1. **Increase Resources**

   We are proposing an increase from the current $1 billion to $2 billion.

   **Funding for Population**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DAC Population Aid to LDCs</td>
<td>$350</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Share</td>
<td>(200)</td>
<td>(400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDC Expenditures on Population</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Contributions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The Summit countries contributed around $250 million for population assistance in 1979, with 75% coming from the United States.

   **Population Assistance from Summit Countries 1979 (million)**

   - Canada: $10
   - Germany: 13
   - Japan: 19
   - United Kingdom: 18
   - Italy: ?
   - France: *
   - United States: 185

   $245

   *less than $200,000
For tactical reasons, we probably should not mention the specific target of doubling resources because this will raise technical questions of why double (rather than some other multiple, for what, for where). Instead the emphasis should be on the unmet demand, the opportunities, and the current low level of support from Summit countries. Suggested goals could be along the lines of a minimum contribution of $25 million each per year, reaching $100 million each by 1985.

2. **Appoint Population Coordinators**

To support the call for increased resources it is important to increase awareness of the need. This awareness can be stimulated and maintained by a high-level flow of information to embassies, and by increased pressure from donors on the international organizations.

The embassies are important in that population planning is still a sensitive subject and the establishment and/or expansion of programs is effected by good communication on needs and supplies. Promotion of an international consensus will facilitate the efforts of national leaders to support population planning.

The international organizations currently place little emphasis on population. (The World Bank is lending less than 1% for family planning and related activities.) The coordinators could inform and support their representatives in pressing for more.³

International organization funding is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1979</th>
<th>(million)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>$ 112 (using contributions mainly from DAC countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPF</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td>?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The coordinators would also be tasked with follow-up on the population issues in Brandt Commission Report⁴ and *Global 2000*.

Because some of the major donors to population assistance are not Summit countries (i.e., Sweden $28 million, Norway $31 million, Netherlands $15 million), the coordinators would work with them to encourage their efforts and increase cooperation among the group.

³ In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Owen wrote: “Better phone McN.”
⁴ See footnote 4, Document 274.
3. Intensify Family Planning/Contraceptive Research

There is a need for increased funding for biomedical research; one weak link in the chain is the acceptability of contraceptive methods in different cultural and economic settings.

We propose the establishment/upgrading of research centers in the developing countries. Their focus would be operational research into usage of differing methods. A model for this type of operation is CGIAR.5

The centers would work in cooperation with established operations by other international organizations (such as WHO) where possible, and be specifically linked to research efforts in the Summit countries.

Because the United States is the only Summit country with a significant bilateral population program, the US would take the lead. These centers would be located in countries which already have an interest in family planning assistance from the United States, such as Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia, India, Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. (Three such AID-funded health-oriented efforts already exist.)

We would suggest that as all Summit countries have population and biomedical research programs, they should consider either joining the US in this effort, or establishing similar centers.

In order to upgrade and expand international efforts in biomedical research, a mechanism, perhaps under the guidance of the population coordinators (or IDCA, the DAC, UNFPA, or the World Bank) would be established. This coordination would encompass these research centers.

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5 Denton sent Owen a memorandum on September 22, informing him that she had undertaken additional work on contraceptive research. In regard to the recommendation proposing research centers in developing nations, Denton noted: “Future investigation suggests that there may be sufficient centers already in operation. What is lacking is research funds. What may be lacking is international cooperation and coordination of results.” She then recommended that the population coordinators of the Summit countries “investigate what their countries’ actual and planned expenditures are, stressing the need for increased funds.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 63, Population: 8/80)
346. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (Speth) to the Members of the Task Force on Global Resources and Environment

Washington, September 15, 1980

SUBJECT

Problem Areas Needing Priority Attention by the Task Force on Global Resources and Environment

You will recall that the President directed the Task Force to report to him as soon as possible with recommendations on problem areas needing priority attention. As you know, we have solicited the views of all affected agencies, of informed people in the Congress, and of thoughtful private citizens on this subject. We have discussed these areas at length with interested Task Force members. The enclosed draft memorandum to the President represents our considered distillation of views on the subject.

You will note a number of changes from our earlier suggestions, both adding areas thought by agencies to be of significant importance and modifying the scope of others previously identified. In describing these priority areas, we have held extensive discussions with those within the government who can be expected to lead efforts to develop recommendations in the particular areas. In some areas there are existing groups who have agreed to use their organizations and resources to assist us with recommendations (e.g., NSC Working Group on Population; Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests). In other areas permanent coordinating organizations are being formed which will assist us (e.g., interagency committee cochaired by State and Interior on endangered species). In others, efforts are under way on which we can capitalize (e.g., State’s preparations for 1981 U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Forms of Energy; IDCA’s chairing of government effort to respond to Brandt Commission). In still others we have discussed problem areas with agencies who may be expected to have the lead on an ad hoc basis using their particular expertise (e.g., EPA—toxics and pollution; USDA—food and agriculture; Commerce—conservation of marine resources; WRC and Interior—water supply).

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800131–1099. No classification marking. Speth was Chairman of the Task Force.

2 Attached but not printed is a draft memorandum in which Speth outlined nine major problem areas needing priority attention. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P8000131–1101) The final version of the memorandum is printed as Document 347.
What we have tried to do is to identify the best informed, willing people within the U.S. Government whom we may charge with the task of assembling the best, most responsible recommendations within their areas. In some areas (e.g., population, deforestation) we can anticipate, based on work that has been done so far, fairly comprehensive sets of action recommendations. In others our present lack of knowledge will result in identifying a research agenda. Therefore, the identification of a problem area as one deserving of priority means it is important (and that its absence would create a noticeable gap), but the types of recommendations which ultimately emerge will differ markedly from area to area.

We have limited our listing of problems for the President to substantive areas, each subsumed under the overall resources, environment, and population focus that was the basis of the Global 2000 Report. We have been acutely aware, and the agencies in their submission have made us more aware, of the need to address generic, cross-cutting problems. We intend to address these institutional issues as well and will shortly be in touch with you regarding them. Cross-cutting issues include the government’s data gathering, analysis and forecasting capacity; international institutional mechanisms (including the roles of the existing international organizations and U.S. policy towards them); the promotion and sharing at the international level of scientific research, data, environmental planning expertise and technology; and U.S. institutional capabilities for addressing global problems on a priority basis.

Please contact me not later than Friday, September 19 if you have any suggestions for the proposed memorandum to the President.

Thank you.
347. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Task Force on Global Resources and Environment (Speth) to President Carter

Washington, September 22, 1980

SUBJECT

Global 2000 Follow up: Problem Areas Needing Priority Attention

When you established the Task Force on Global Resources and Environment to recommend policy and program responses to the Global 2000 Report, you requested from it an early identification of “problem areas needing priority attention by the Task Force.”

We now have completed this initial task, drawing on the views of all affected Federal agencies, and on consultations with informed members of the public and the Congress. In our priority selection process we have attempted to identify areas in which there is a convergence between key problems of global significance and viable opportunities for the United States and other nations to initiate new and effective remedial measures.

Over the next several months the Task Force proposes to concentrate its efforts in the following general problem areas, with a view toward developing a series of policy and program recommendations to address specific problems in which immediate and long-term action is necessary and possible.

- Rapid Population Growth
- World Food Supply (including agricultural land conservation)
- Energy Conservation and Alternative Sources
- Tropical Deforestation
- Species Extinction and Loss of Genetic Diversity
- Environmental Contamination
- Water Supply
- Conservation of Coastal and Marine Resources
- Underdevelopment and Poverty

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800149–0022. No classification marking. Sent for information only. Attached to Pickering’s October 24 briefing memorandum to Muskie, printed as Document 348.

2 During a campaign trip to California, the President referenced the report in his remarks delivered at the San Jose City Hall on September 23, following an energy and technology briefing: “Our goals have been spelled out very clearly in the Global 2000 Report, which indicates to us the challenges to the world society unless we address these issues directly and take action to prevent the catastrophes which could occur from a burgeoning population throughout the Earth, constant depletion of our reserve supplies of oil, coal, and other fossil fuels, and a failure to move forward on technology that gives us renewable supplies of energy derived directly or indirectly from the Sun.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, September 29, 1980, pp. 1897–1898)
Responding to the *Global 2000 Report* also requires addressing two other issues that cut across the range of population, resource and environmental problems, and that will greatly influence our ability to cope with them successfully over the long term.

- The Government’s Capacity for Long-Range Forecasting and Analysis
- U.S. and International Institutional Capabilities and Arrangements for Addressing Global Problems on a Priority Basis

The Task Force is mindful of the need to keep in the forefront of its analyses and subsequent recommendations a principal theme of *Global 2000*: the close interrelationships and interactions which exist among the population, resource and environmental problems, and the collective challenge they pose for sustained economic and social development. In this context the Task Force intends to draw on a variety of recent reports and studies which impinge on *Global 2000*, in particular the Brandt Commission Report, the World Hunger Commission Report, and the World Bank’s *World Development Report, 1980*.

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3 See footnote 4, Document 274.
4 See footnote 3, Document 272.
Washington, October 14, 1980

SUBJECT
Global 2000 Follow-Up: Status and Issues (Information)

Summary: State is deeply involved in what has emerged as a major, multi-faceted USG effort to follow up on the Global 2000 Report. The following reviews our activities in direct support of the Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment (of which you are a designated member); our own international initiatives; and a number of key unresolved issues.

Discussion:

1. Presidential Task Force: The Task Force has identified eleven “priority problem areas”, and State has been tasked with lead agency responsibility for developing policy and program responses in three of them: population, energy, and strengthening international organizations (Tab 1). We share the lead with the Forest Service on tropical deforestation and with Interior on species extinction. There will also be one State representative on each of the other groups. The U.S. development assistance program is being examined within the “Underdevelopment and Poverty” context, with IDCA in the lead. Plans call for the Task Force to receive the separate sets of recommendations by November 7, and to submit a Decision Memorandum to the President be-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800149–0018. Unclassified. Sent through Nimetz. Drafted by Long; cleared by Hoinkes, Benedict, Hollick, and Eckholm, and in IO and T. Long initialed for Benedick, Hollick, Eckholm, and the clearing officials in IO and T.

2 Telegram 15676 to all diplomatic and consular posts, January 21, 1981, indicated that the Department and CEQ had released the 250-page follow-on report, entitled Global Future—A Time to Act, based on the Global 2000 recommendations, on January 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810030–1164) Upon the report’s release, Speth noted: “Our basic conclusion is that the United States must respond to these global challenges with concerted and vigorous action because our longer-term political and economic security, as well as that of other nations, is at stake.” (Philip Shabecoff, “U.S. Calls for Efforts to Combat Global Environmental Problems,” The New York Times, January 15, 1981, p. A–12)

3 Attached but not printed is a September 24 letter from Speth to Pickering requesting that the Department of State take the lead in developing recommendations for these areas. Speth noted that Benedict, Eckholm, Hoinkes, and Long would direct this work. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800149–0024)
fore Christmas. Gus Speth, Task Force Chairman, expects the President to respond “via a major speech or special message.”

2. State Department Strategy: An in-house task force, chaired by OES Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoinkes, is planning and coordinating additional Department activities. All major Department components are represented. We are focusing on (a) raising international awareness of the Report and its implications; (b) beginning a dialogue with other countries on how to attack the problems; and (c) improving our in-house capabilities for integrating long-term G–2000 issues into foreign policy.

(a) Report Distribution: Copies of the Global 2000 Report have been sent to virtually all countries and international and regional organizations through Embassy, AID and ICA channels. We have prepared Spanish and French versions of the summary volume; and are considering Arabic. Japan and Brazil are also preparing their own translations. Unofficial foreign reaction, in the press and from government officials, has been quite positive; complimentary of the U.S. effort and supportive of the call for action.

(b) International Forums: State/IO has identified a wide range of international fora in which we will publicize Global 2000 and emphasize our support for and commitment to the alleviation of these problems (Tab 2). Following your speech at the UNGA Special Session, we have raised G–2000 in the ESCAP Committee on Natural Resources; and we are planning to draw on it extensively in the ongoing UNESCO General Conference.

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4 Although the President did not address Global Future—A Time to Act publicly, he did reference the Global 2000 Report in his last State of the Union message: “The Global 2000 Report to the President, prepared in response to my 1977 Environment Message, is the first of its kind. Never before has our government, or any government, taken such a comprehensive, long-range look at the interrelated global issues of resources, population, and environment. The Report’s conclusions are important. They point to a rapid increase in population and human needs through the year 2000 while at the same time a decline in the earth’s capacity to meet those needs—unless nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends.” (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January 20, 1981, p. 2972)

5 Attached but not printed is the undated 3-page memorandum entitled “International Fora (United Nations) for Promoting and Publicizing the Global 2000 Report.”

6 Muskie addressed the 11th Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, concerning the New International Economic Order, on August 25. Summarizing the Global 2000 Report’s conclusions, he asserted: “Global 2000 is not a forecast. It is a projection of present trends. But it is another chilling reminder that our common future depends on our common success, here and throughout the complex of relations known as the North-South dialogue. We must work together to raise food production, to diversify energy sources and to use energy and other resources more efficiently, to protect our common environment, to restrain population growth, to deal effectively and equitably with mounting deficits, and to keep an open system of trade.” Muskie’s remarks are printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 1980, pp. 76–78.
(c) **Special Consultations:** We are hosting today (Tuesday) a meeting of Summit country representatives to discuss G–2000 in relation to similar studies and perspectives of the other nations. This follows up on a decision at the Venice Summit to keep these issues “under review”. Bob Hormats (USTR) and I will co-chair the session. Henry Owen and Gus Speth will be the other U.S. participants. You will be receiving a separate report on this event.\(^7\) Our plan is to work toward consensus on priority problems and the development of recommendations for cooperative action to be submitted to the Ottawa Summit next year. As a general matter, it is our intention to take advantage of each appropriate opportunity to focus attention on *Global 2000* issues. In particular, we are now undertaking to arrange a series of meetings specifically devoted to G–2000 as proposed in response to your personal letter to our Ambassadors requesting their views on how to build on the Report.\(^8\) These include briefings in Geneva for representatives of the UN specialized agencies, a meeting of representatives of Latin American countries in Panama, and a bilateral discussion with Mexican officials.

(d) **Congressional Relations:** We and CEQ have briefed an array of Congressmen and major committee staffs associated with foreign affairs and population/environment/resources matters, and have received uniformly strong expressions of interest and support. I also testified on September 4th before the Subcommittee on International Economics of the Joint Economic Committee.\(^9\) Discussions are now centering on possible additional joint Congressional hearings and a major symposium under Office of Technology Assessment auspices.

(e) **Public Affairs:** Media interest remains high. In consultation with State/PA, ICA and CEQ, an integrated series of activities, publications, films, etc., is being planned to promote greater understanding and discussion of the Report and its implications (Tab 3)\(^10\) for both domestic and foreign audiences.

(f) **State Department Capabilities:** FSI is engaged in modifying instructional materials and courses to include a focus on G–2000 issues in the Department’s training and educational programs (Tab 4).\(^11\)

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\(^7\) Not found and not further identified.

\(^8\) See attachment, Document 344.

\(^9\) During the course of his testimony, Pickering noted that Muskie had sent a personal letter to all Ambassadors underscoring the importance of the *Global 2000 Report*. He also indicated that the report had received extensive press coverage, much of it “uniformly complimentary.” (Richard L. Strout, “Congress hears more-optimistic view of gloomy ’2000’ report,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 5, 1980, p. 1)

\(^10\) The undated “*Global 2000 Public Awareness Program Status Report*” is attached but not printed.

\(^11\) Entitled “FSI Actions on *Global 2000*,” the undated paper is attached but not printed.
consideration is a 2–3 day seminar for Department officials (possibly with an initial Latin American focus) to explore how G–2000 issues will affect conditions, and hence, U.S. foreign policy decisions, at the regional and country levels over the next several decades.

3. **Unresolved Issues**: The following are key issues of both near and longer term significance that we are working to address.

   (a) What will be the scope and thrust of the Task Force recommendations to the President? We are concerned about a possible lack of focus in the Task Force efforts as they currently are being orchestrated by CEQ, and by what appears to be an attempt to do too much all at once with the Report, thereby jeopardizing appreciation of the long-term follow-up that is required to address the issues effectively. We are also concerned that the two “cross cutting” issues (the Government’s long-range forecasting and analysis capability, and the institutional ability to integrate *Global 2000* issues in decision-making processes) may not receive sufficient attention by the Presidential Task Force. Our internal State Department Task Force will concentrate on the latter issue as it relates to foreign policy decision making. I will be meeting with Gus Speth this week to discuss and attempt to clarify and resolve these questions.

   (b) How can the LDCs, and other nations, be brought into an expanded international effort to address the problems? While we have received some positive feedback to the Report, we do not yet know how other countries will react to U.S. calls for accelerated action to actually address the problems.

   (c) Can the USG mobilize the funding necessary to maintain U.S. leadership and back up our calls for action? Can public opinion be swayed to support greater foreign aid investments, and longer \([larger]\) contributions to UN specialized agencies, on the basis of G–2000 arguments? Or, should funding channels other than AID be suggested to avoid association with a “give-away” image?

   (d) How can we effectively engage the U.S. private sector in the follow-up? We and CEQ are putting this question directly to leaders of the business community, academia and private foundations.
INTERNATIONAL POPULATION/HEALTH INITIATIVE

Rationale

Even allowing for continued moderate slowdown in the rate of growth, world population is almost certain to exceed 6 billion by the year 2000, an increase in only two decades equal to the entire world population as recently as 1930. Ninety percent of this growth will occur in low income countries. With present trends, the two-child family will not occur world-wide until the year 2020, and the world’s population will not stabilize until 2090—at 10 billion, compared to today’s 4.4 billion.

The demographic situation is serious but not hopeless. Worldwide population growth rates are no longer rising. Growing evidence from disparate cultures and economies demonstrates that fertility can be reduced by determined efforts to provide family planning services and information—in conjunction with efforts to build community and family support for family planning, particularly by improving women’s opportunities outside the home. Over the past decade, understanding of the seriousness of the population problem has grown, and many countries have begun to address population issues. Indeed, for the first time LDC government requests for population assistance substantially exceed the existing contributions of population donors. The U.N. World Population Conference in 1974, Conference on Primary Health Care in 1978, and International Women’s Conferences in 1975 and 1980 all called for provision of family planning services and information to all countries. The International Development Strategy also does.

Providing family planning also improves maternal and child health. The principal threats to health in developing countries are malnutrition and common infections, particularly among young children. These threats are exacerbated by close birth spacing. Maternal mortality (and abortion) is also very high.

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1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 63, Population: 9–10/80. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Benedick and Van Dusen. Herz sent an earlier version of the paper to Denton under an August 20 covering memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects—Hazel Denton, Box 63, Population: 8/80)
The Initiative

Given (1) urgent population pressure and related health needs in many areas, (2) growing LDC requests for assistance; and, (3) the ability of the major population donors to mount effective and complementary population programs that respond to country-specific opportunities, IDCA and State propose an initiative to:

a. extend high-quality family planning and closely related maternal and child health services as a first step toward primary health care;

b. promote programs that build motivation for small families, particularly by improving opportunities for women and by giving recognition to couples that limit their family size;

c. strengthen political will by clarifying the extent and seriousness of the population problem at both leadership and community levels.

The initiative aims primarily at doubling family-planning practice in the developing countries by 1985, as a step toward lower birth rates. (It also aims at improving basic primary health care, particularly in maternal and child health.) It estimates roughly the expenditures on "population" needed to do this—assuming other development policies are conducive to smaller families and assuming adequate expenditures for other aspects of health.

At present, total spending for population is approximately $1 billion, of which $450 million comes from international donors. Of this, the United States now provides about half. At this level of spending, we know that something like 1/5–1/4 of the couples of reproductive age use some form of contraception, and that birth rates in the developing countries (outside China) are roughly 35 per 1,000. To reduce birth rates to something around 25–28 per 1,000 (still far from a two-child norm) contraceptive user rates must at least double; roughly 1/2 of couples must practice family planning. This will only happen when most couples have access to safe, effective and affordable family planning services, and when they are motivated to use them. A doubling of population resources is the minimum necessary to achieve these important targets. This would imply about $2 billion in total spending (real dollars), including at least $1 billion in assistance. (Doubling resources may not quite achieve a doubling of practice, if programs hit diminishing returns. We have already reached some of the "easier" acceptors. But programs get more effective as they go along. On balance, the marginal cost per acceptor may rise, but modestly.)

This initiative, which accords with the recent Declaration of the International Parliamentarians’ Conference sponsored by UNFPA and

2 These data take account of breastfeeding and abortion (often illegal and dangerous). [Footnote in the original.]
with a resolution just passed at the U.N. Mid-Decade Conference on Women, would require a concerted international effort supported by UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, country donors, and the concerned LDCs.

Other donors interested in increasing population assistance may wish to consider making or increasing contributions to the following institutions:

—UNFPA

The United Nations Fund for Population Activities, active in over 120 countries, has a current budget of about $150 million and a substantial backlog of projects needing support. It primarily funds government projects. As of August 31, 1980, the UNFPA had funded 2,863 projects of which 1,135 has been completed.

—IPPF

The International Planned Parenthood Federation, a private organization also active in many countries, has a budget of about $50 million annually and also a substantial backlog of projects. Like other private organizations, it specializes in innovative ways of initiating and extending family planning services, particularly where open government support is not yet appropriate. (But IPPF often works with government health programs.)

—Other private organizations such as the Population Council active in this field.

Of course several donors, e.g., the Scandinavians, Canada, and the UK, have bilateral programs they may wish to expand.

FYI ONLY: Strategic Program Objectives for I.D.C.A.

1. Sharply increase A.I.D.’s level of funding from about $200 million in FY 1979–80 and continue pragmatically on a country-by-country basis, emphasizing its strongest areas: combining supply of family planning services with support of programs aimed at building demand for those services. Such efforts principally include policy work particularly to increase LDC national leadership commitment; training especially of outreach workers from local communities, and other methods of community involvement; provision of commodities; management support; and biomedical and operations or policy research which tests practical combinations of population, health, and other development measures affecting fertility. We will press other donors—bilateral and multilateral—to support other fields of population assistance. On that basis when AID proposes efforts in those other fields, it will obviously bear a stronger burden of persuasion.

2. Within the above framework, develop and emphasize AID’s capacity for innovation and evaluation activities.

3. Infuse population concerns into all AID health activities while maintaining AID’s health initiative focusing on primary health care.
4. In other development sectors, emphasize those policies and programs that build motivation for smaller families (especially by expanding women’s employment and education opportunities). This should be a major effort of AID (required by Section 104 (d)), but it should be pursued at the UN, the MDB’s and elsewhere.

5. Encourage the World Bank to expand its projected budget for population faster, given the Bank’s strong public calls for more attention to population. Recognize that the Bank has demonstrated a strong interest in population/health infrastructure. Continue to support the Bank’s efforts to broaden the range of its population activities and to exert more leadership in consortia and Consultative Groups on population.

6. Support higher budgets for UNFPA, especially via other donors (who now channel most of their population assistance through UNFPA). Recognize that UNFPA has demonstrated a strong interest in policy development, information, and demographic activities, a sensitive issue; urge UNFPA to give greater and more effective support to a full range of family planning activities (including family planning services) wherever possible; encourage UNFPA to be responsive to opportunities in countries where other donors do not have population programs; and encourage UNFPA to help press other UN agencies to consider the effects of their programs on population.


8. Press the regional development banks to initiate substantial population assistance. (IDB expects a proposal from Brazil; ADB is interested.)

9. Encourage the NGO’s to give more attention to family planning and to the effects on population of their other programs.

10. Continue to press for more attention to population through the IDS, GA, Special Session, OECD, and such.

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Reference is to Section 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973; see footnote 12, Document 308.
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