

FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES

1977–1980
VOLUME IV

NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY



DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

Volume IV

National Security Policy

Editor James Graham Wilson
General Editor Kathleen B. Rasmussen

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government

engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1979 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. The Department's central files for 1980–1981 will eventually be transferred to the National Archives.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

This documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and

elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2015 and was completed in 2024, resulted in the decision to withhold 7 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 32 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 68 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable—given the limitations of space—record of the Carter administration's national security policy.

Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D.
General Editor

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
The Historian

Foreign Service Institute
March 2024

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the President Jimmy Carter administration. Given the interconnectedness of U.S. national security policy and the Cold War, it should be considered alongside *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume VI, Soviet Union; Volume XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation; and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980. Documentation on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its December 1979 “dual track” decision is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977–1983. The national security policy making process is documented in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume XXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, while the formulation of foreign economic policy—which was connected to national security policy—is documented in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume III, Foreign Economic Policy. As with each volume in the Carter administration subseries, Volume IV stands alongside *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume IV

The main topics of this volume are strategic modernization, comprehensive net assessment, the defense budget, telecommunications security, crisis management, emergency preparedness, and nuclear doctrine. It begins with the minutes of July 26, 1976, and January 27, 1977, meetings on defense matters that illustrate the policy and personnel differences between Presidential campaigns and Presidential administrations. On February 18, 1977, Carter approved a review of U.S. national security policy in Presidential Review Memorandum 10, “Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review,” which set into motion a series of Presidential Directives (PDs) commencing with PD-18, “U.S. National Strategy,” which Carter signed on August 24, 1977. Documentation on this review process is published in this volume and includes internal agency memoranda, minutes of interagency meetings at both the principal and working levels, and interagency correspondence. Fulfilling a campaign promise to rein in defense spending, Carter also ordered an early review of the B-1 Bomber, which he cancelled on June 30, 1977. In crafting a FY 1979 budget, Consolidated Guidance, and FY 1980–1984 Defense Program,

Carter looked toward B-52 bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB, later the "B-2") to fill the gap. Here, documentation on budget decisions reflects the Carter administration's efforts to cut spending without damaging national security.

While in pursuit of the SALT II Treaty, which he and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed on June 18, 1979, President Carter exhorted his team to come up with a survivable basing mode for the MX missile. On September 7, 1979, flanked by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Carter announced a Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) system for basing 200 MX missiles, which would be transported among 23 shelters via specially-constructed roadways in western states of the United States at a projected cost of \$33 billion. Accompanying the planned Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile, the refitting of B-52s to carry ALCMs, and the pursuit of stealth technologies, MX was intended to replace the Minuteman III as the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. The Carter administration's attempt to modernize U.S. strategic forces is in documents such as papers prepared for meetings of the National Security Council, the minutes of these meetings, and records of the Presidential decisions that resulted from them.

Dissatisfied with the implementation of National Security Decision Memorandum 242, "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," which his predecessor Gerald Ford signed on January 17, 1974, (*Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 31) Carter pressed his administration to shore up the U.S. strategic deterrent. Following an August 1978 trip to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski informed Carter of the need for significant improvements to U.S. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I). The concerns of Brzezinski and Military Assistant William Odom were heightened following the October 1978 crisis management contingency exercise, "Nifty Nugget," and were incorporated into follow-on studies to PD-18 pertaining to nuclear strategy. They also informed the national security team's reactions to the 11-3/8 series of National Intelligence Estimates, addressing Soviet intentions and capabilities.

Nuclear attack false alarms in November 1979 and June 1980 intensified the Carter administration's concerns about the need to improve U.S. C³I systems, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led Carter to withdraw from Senate consideration the unratified SALT II Treaty. In the wake of these events, Carter signed two Presidential Directives: PD-58, "Continuity of Government," on June 30, 1980; and PD-59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," on July 25, 1980. Following Carter's electoral loss to former Governor Ronald Reagan on

November 4, 1980, his administration developed an updated national security strategy document. On January 15, 1981, Carter approved PD-62, "Modifications in U.S. National Strategy." Extensive documentation on the evolution of all three PDs is included in this volume.

The central figure in the development of U.S. national security policy during the Carter administration was the President himself. As the directives, memoranda, meeting minutes, and marginalia in this volume attest, Carter took a particularly keen interest in the details of nuclear matters and national security policy more broadly. Other key figures in this volume include Brzezinski, Harold Brown, and Odom, as well as members of the National Security Council Staff such as Fritz Ermarth, Roger Molander, Victor Utgoff, and Jasper Welch. Principals and deputies expressed themselves forcefully in meetings of the Policy Review Committee and Special Coordination Committee (recorded here in minutes and summaries of conclusion) and in internal memoranda and interagency correspondence that constitute the backbone of this volume. While Secretary of State Cyrus Vance played a lead role in the negotiation of SALT II, he was much less involved in the formulation of overall national security policy. The same can be said of Edmund Muskie, who, having succeeded Vance in May 1980 following the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt, learned of PD-59 by reading newspaper coverage of it. As a result of Vance and Muskie's relative lack of influence on matters of national security, this volume contains fewer Department of State documents—such as memoranda, position papers, and telegrams to and from posts—than other volumes in the Carter administration subseries.

Acknowledgements

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, especially Ceri McCarron, Brittany Parris, and James Yancey. Thanks are also due to Nancy Smith, who served as the Director of the Presidential Materials Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration during the research of this volume, Sandy Meagher, who provided access to Department of Defense materials, and to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency were helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. The editor would like to thank Jeffery Flannery and Ernest Emrich of the Library of Congress for arranging access to the Harold Brown papers. The Office of the Historian wishes to thank the interagency declassification personnel who conducted the review of this volume, including those at the Department of State, Office of Information Programs and Services, the FRUS Coordination Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, Office of Prepublication and

Security Review, the OSD, Records and Declassification Division at the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the National Archives and Records Administration, and particularly, the Directorate of Records and Access Management at the National Security Council.

Additionally, the editor wishes to thank the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) for adjudicating the appeal of documents selected for inclusion in this volume. Keri E. Lewis provided invaluable assistance to the Office of the Historian in her capacity as FRUS Coordinator at the Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS), and in serving as the Department of State ISCAP liaison. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland.

Peter Kraemer collected and made an initial selection of the documentation to be included in this volume. James Graham Wilson conducted additional research and edited the volume under the supervision of Kathleen B. Rasmussen, then Chief of the Global Issues and General Division. The volume was reviewed by Kathleen B. Rasmussen and then Historian of the Department of State Stephen Randolph. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Heather McDaniel and Stephanie Eckroth did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

James Graham Wilson
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume IV

The Carter Library is the best source of high-level decision making documentation for U.S. national security policy from 1977 to 1980. A number of collections within the National Security Affairs files are particularly relevant in this regard. Within the Brzezinski Material, the Subject File contains documentation on strategic modernization, nuclear doctrine, arms control, missile warnings incidents, and the defense budget. A separate collection, Brzezinski Donated Material, contains additional documentation on nuclear doctrine and overall national security strategy. Within National Security Affairs, Staff Material are key documents pertaining to defense and security produced by Fritz Ermarth, Samuel Huntington, William Odom, Victor Utgoff, and Jasper Welch in response to Presidential Review Memorandum 10, "Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review," which President Carter signed on February 18, 1977. The National Security Council Institutional Files, which are also at the Carter Library, contain the minutes and preparatory staff work for meetings in advance of Presidential Directive 18, "U.S. National Strategy," which President Carter signed on August 24, 1977, and Presidential Directive 59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," which President Carter signed on July 25, 1980.

List of Sources

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

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RG 59

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National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material

Agency File

Brzezinski Office File

Country File

XIV Sources

- General Odom File
- Subject File
- National Security Affairs, Staff Material
 - Defense/Security
 - Deputy File
 - Europe, USSR, and East/West
 - Office File
- National Security Council
 - Institutional Files
- Papers of Walter F. Mondale
- President's Files
 - Plains File
 - Presidential Handwriting File
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- Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Material

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Abbreviations and Terms

AAH, Advanced Attack Helicopter
AAW, anti-air warfare
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ABNCP, Airborne Command Post
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADM, Admiral
ADP, automatic data processing
AF, Air Force
AIMS, Alternative Integrated Military Strategies
AFSAB, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
AMRAAM, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
ANMCC, Alternate National Military Command Center
APU, Auxiliary Power Unit
ASAT, anti-satellite weapon
ASD, Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AT&T, American Telephone and Telegraph, Inc.
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

B, billion
BBV, Brown-Brzezinski-Vance lunch meeting (see also **VBB**)
BMD, Ballistic Missile Defense
BMEW, ballistic missile early warning
BRICKBAT-DX, denoting highest level of priority for production and acquisition for a weapons system (DOD)

C3, Command, Control, and Communications
C3I, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CAT, Convention Against Torture
CD, civil defense
CEP, Circular Error Probability
CFV, Cavalry Fighting Vehicle
CG, Consolidated Guidance
CGN, guided missile carrier, nuclear propulsion
CI, Counterintelligence
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNA, Comprehensive Net Assessment
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CM, cruise missiles
CMC, cruise missile carrier
COB, close of business

XVI Abbreviations and Terms

COG, continuity of government
COMINT, communications intelligence
COMSEC, communications security
CONUS, continental United States
CPX, Command Post Exercise
CRAE, Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSGN, strike cruiser, nuclear propulsion (USN)
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CTBT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CV, aircraft carrier (USN)
CVN, aircraft carrier, nuclear propulsion (USN)

D, Democrat
DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DC, District of Columbia
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCPA, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
DEPSECDEF, Deputy Secretary of Defense
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDG, guided missile destroyer (USN)
DDI, Deputy Director of Intelligence
DDO, Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DEFCON, Defense Readiness Condition
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DNA, Defense Nuclear Agency
DOC, Department of Commerce
DOD, Department of Defense
DOE, Department of Energy
DOJ, Department of Justice
DOS, Department of State
DP&E, Defense Planning & Evaluation (DOD)
DR&E, Defense Research & Engineering (DOD)
DSARC, Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
DSB, Defense Science Board
DSP, Defense Support Program

EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EAM, Emergency Action Message
ECM, electronic countermeasures
ELINT, electronic intelligence
ELF, extremely low frequency
EMP, electro-magnetic pulse
EMT, equivalent megatonnage
ERW, Enhanced Radiation Weapon; “neutron bomb”
ESVN, Executive Secure Voice Network
EUCOM, United States European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EW/GCI, Early Warning/Ground-Controlled Intercept

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC, Federal Communications Commission
FE, Far East
FEMA, Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFG, guided missile frigate (USN)

FOC, full operational capability
FPA, Federal Preparedness Agency
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FY, fiscal year

GCI, Ground Control Intercept
GLCM, ground launched cruise missile
GNP, gross national product
GPS, global positioning system
GSA, General Services Administration

HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HQ, headquarters
HTC, hard target capability
HTK, hard target kill

IBM, International Business Machines, Inc.
IC, intelligence community
ICA, International Communications Agency
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IFV, infantry fighting vehicle
IIM, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
IOC, initial operational capacity
IMET, International Military Education and Training
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IR, infrared
IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile
ISA, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ITAR, International Traffic in Arms Regulation

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JSBS, Joint Strategic Bomber Study
JSTPS, Joint Strategic Planning Staff
JTF, Joint Task Force

KGB, *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (Soviet Committee for State Security)
Kt, kiloton

LNO, limited nuclear [employment] option(s)
LOC, lines of communication
LTDP, Long Term Defense Plan
LUA, launch under attack
LVT, landing vehicle, tracked

M, million; mile
MAO, major attack option
MAP, Military Assistance Program; multiple aim point (MX missile)
MAPS, Multiple Aim Point System
MBB, Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski lunch meeting
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MCI, Microwave Communications, Inc.
MD, Maryland

XVIII Abbreviations and Terms

ME/PG, Middle East/Persian Gulf
MEECN, Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MILCON, military construction
MIRV, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MM, Minuteman (missile)
MOLINK, Moscow Link (Moscow-Washington Direct Communication Link or Hot Line)
MPS, multiple protective shelters
MRA&L, Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics
MRV, multiple reentry vehicle
MSC, Military Sealift Command
Mt, megaton
MTMC, Military Traffic Management Command
MVD, Ministry of Internal Affairs (USSR)
M-X, an experimental MIRVed ICBM under development by the United States

n, nautical (miles)
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBS, National Bureau of Standards
NCA, National Command Authority
NCS, National Communications System, Office of the Secretary of Defense
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
NEACP, National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NFIB, National Foreign Intelligence Board
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NM, nautical mile(s)
NMCC, National Military Command Center
NMCS, National Military Command System
Nocontract, No distribution to contractors
Noform, No foreign distribution
NORAD, North American Air Defense Command
NORTHAG, Northern Army Group (NATO)
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NSTAP, National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy
NTM, national technical means
NUWEP, policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons

OAPEC, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OBE, overtaken by events
ODDR&E, Office of the Director, Defense Research & Engineering, Department of Defense
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/NA, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSTP, Office of Science and Technology Policy
OTP, Office of Telecommunications Policy

PA&E, Program Analysis & Evaluation Department of Defense

PD, Presidential Directive

PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

PG, Persian Gulf

PG/IO, Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean

PGMs, precision-guided munitions

PIA, political-ideological action

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

POL, petroleum oil lubricant

POM, prepositioned materiel

POMCUS, prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets

PRC, Policy Review Committee; People's Republic of China

PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum

psi, pounds per square inch

PVO, *Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona* (Soviet Air Defense Forces)

QRHTC, quick reaction hard target capability

R, Republican

R&D, research and development

RADM, Rear Admiral

RDF, Rapid Deployment Force

RDT&E, research, development, test, and evaluation

RISOP, Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan

RNO, regional nuclear [employment] option(s)

ROK, Republic of Korea

RV, reentry vehicle

S, Secret

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SAL, Strategic Arms Limitation

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAM, surface-to-air missile

SAO, select attack option

SCC, Special Coordination Committee

SECDEF, Secretary of Defense

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SIOP, Single Integrated Operational Plan

SLAC, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center

SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile

SLCM, submarine-launched cruise missile

SLEP, Service Life Extensive Program

SLOC, Sea Lines of Communication

SNDV, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle

SNI, Soviet Naval Infantry

SNM, special nuclear materials

SOSUS, Sound Surveillance System

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

SRAM, short range attack missile

SRF, Strategic Reserve Force; Secure Reserve Force; Strategic Rocket Forces (USSR)

SRG, Senior Review Group

SSBN, ballistic missile submarine, nuclear propulsion (USN)

SSN, attack submarine, nuclear propulsion (USN)

XX Abbreviations and Terms

STOL, short takeoff and landing aircraft

SU, Soviet Union

SUAWACS, Soviet Union Airborne Warning and Control System

SURTASS, Surface Towed Array Surveillance System

T-AGOS/TAGOS, ocean surveillance ship (USN)

TACAIR, Tactical Air

TACAMO, Take Charge and Move Out (survivable communication links)

TALCM, Tomahawk air-launched cruise missile

T-ARC, submarine cable repair vessel (USN)

TEL, transporter-erector-launcher

TNF, theater nuclear forces

TOA, total obligational authority

TS, Top Secret

U, Unclassified

US, United States

USAF, United States Air Force

USCSB, United States Communications Security Board

USG, United States Government

USN, United States Navy

USNATO, United States Mission to NATO

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VBB, Vance-Brown-Brzezinski lunch meeting (see also **BBV**)

VIP, very important person

VSTOL (V/STOL), Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing

WHEP, White House Emergency Procedures

WP, Warsaw Pact

WWMCCS, Worldwide Military Command and Control System

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Allen, Lew, General, USAF; Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, from April 1978 to August 1978; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, from August 1978

Aspin, Les, Congressman (D-Wisconsin)

Bartholomew, Reginald H., "Reg," Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until January 1977; Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January until November 1977; member, National Security Council Staff for USSR/East Europe Affairs from November 1977 until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1979

Bialer, Seweryn, Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

Blechman, Barry, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Bowie, Robert, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency

Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Brown, George S., General, USA; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff until 1978

Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Bundy, McGeorge, President, Ford Foundation

Callaghan, James, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from April 5, 1977, until May 4, 1979

Carter, James Earl, Jr. "Jimmy," President of the United States

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 26, 1977

Claytor, W. Graham, Jr., Secretary of the Navy from February 14, 1977, until July 26, 1979; Acting Secretary of Transportation in 1979; Deputy Secretary of Defense from August 24, 1979, until January 16, 1981

Clift, A. Denis, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Clough, Susan, Personal Secretary to President Carter

Cutler, Lloyd N., White House Counsel from 1979 until 1981

Cutter, W. Bowman, Executive Associate Director for Budget, Office of Management and Budget

Davis, Jeanne W., member, National Security Council Staff

Davis, Lynne E., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs, Department of Defense

Dinneen, Gerald P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Dobrynin, Anatoli F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary

Duncan, Charles W., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977, until July 26, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979

XXII Persons

Eizenstat, Stuart E., Organizer, Issues Staff, Carter-Mondale campaign, from 1974 until 1976; Director of Policy Planning for the Transition, from November 1976 until January 1977; thereafter Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the Domestic Council

Ellis, Richard H., General, USAF; Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, from August 1, 1977

Ermarth, Fritz, member, National Security Council Staff from 1978

Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States from August 8, 1974, until January 20, 1977

Garwin, Richard, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Gates, Robert "Bob," Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from April 1978 until December 1979

Gelb, Leslie, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

Giscard-d'Estaing, Valéry, President of France

Goldwater, Barry, Senator (R-Arizona)

Gompert, David, Deputy Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State

Hanson, Thor, Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Hill, James E., General, USAF; Vice Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command, from December 6, 1977, until December 31, 1979

Huntington, Samuel P., member, National Security Council Staff for National Security Planning, from February 1977 until August 1978; thereafter Director, Harvard University Center for International Affairs

Inman, Bobby Ray, Admiral, USN; Director, National Security Agency

Jackson, Henry M. "Scoop," Senator (D-Washington)

Jayne, Edward R. "Randy," Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget

Jones, David C., General, USAF; Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, until June 20, 1978; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from June 21, 1978

Jordan, Hamilton, Chair, Carter-Mondale campaign in 1976; Assistant to the President from 1977 until July 1979; White House Chief of Staff from July 1979 until June 1980

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Komer, Robert, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from October 1979

Lake, W. Anthony K., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Lance, Bert, Director, Office of Management and Budget, from January 1977 until March 1978.

Marshall, Andrew W., Director, Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

McGiffert, David E., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, from April 4, 1977

McIntyre, James T., Jr., Director, Georgia Office of Planning and Budget until February 1977; Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, from February until September 1977; acting Director from September 1977 until March 24, 1978; thereafter Director

Molander, Roger, member, National Security Council Staff for Defense Coordination

Mondale, Walter F. "Fritz," Senator (DFL-Minnesota) until December 30, 1976; Vice President of the United States

Murphy, Daniel, Admiral, USN; Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Murray, Russell II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation
Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D-Maine) until May 1980; Secretary of State from May 8, 1980

Nitze, Paul, member, The Committee on the Present Danger; former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Nunn, Sam, Senator (D-Georgia)

Odom, William E. "Bill," Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr., "Tip," Speaker of the House of Representatives

Perry, William J. "Bill," Director of Defense Research and Engineering (renamed Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering on October 21, 1977) from April 11, 1977

Press, Frank, Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
Price, Charles Melvin, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Illinois); Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

Resor, Stanley, U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, until 1978; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from August 14, 1978, until April 1, 1979

Rumsfeld, Donald, Secretary of Defense from October 1975 until January 20, 1977

Schlesinger, James, Secretary of Energy from August 5, 1977, until July 20, 1978

Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Schultze, Charles L., Chairman, White House Office of Economic Advisers

Seignious, George, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 1979

Slocombe, Walter, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Sloss, Leon, Study Director of Nuclear Targeting Study Phase I; Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until 1978

Stebbins, Charles, member, National Security Council Staff for Defense Coordination from May 1977 until June 1980

Stennis, John C., Senator (D-Mississippi); Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

Stoertz, Howard, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Policy, Central Intelligence Agency

Strauss, Robert S., Special Representative, White House Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations from 1977 until 1979

Tarnoff, Peter, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 4, 1977

Turner, Stansfield, Admiral, USN; Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977

Utgoff, Victor, member, National Security Council Staff for Defense Coordination

Vance, Cyrus, Secretary of State until April 20, 1980

Warnke, Paul C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 1977 until October 1978

Welch, Jasper, member, National Security Council Staff

Woolsey, R. James, Under Secretary of the Navy from March 1977 until December 1979

National Security Policy, 1977–1980

1. Notes of a Meeting¹

July 26, 1976, 3–6:30 p.m.

PRESENT

Governor Jimmy Carter, Senator Walter Mondale; Barry Blechman, Harold Brown, Lynn Davis, Paul Nitze, Walter Slocombe, Paul Warnke, James Woolsey, and Cyrus Vance; David Aaron, Stuart Eisenstadt, Richard Holbrooke, Jack Watson, and other staff members.

1. *Summary.* The meeting began at about 3:00 P.M. and adjourned at about 6:30 P.M. The discussion focused first on strategic forces, secondly on general purpose forces, thirdly on questions of efficiency in the utilization of manpower, and finally on the overall size of the defense budget. There was also a brief discussion of the benefits and risks of arms transfers.

2. *Strategic forces.* Mr. Vance spoke first. He said that all the advisors present at the meeting agreed that there was rough equivalence between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces at present. The Soviets have advantages in some measures of strategic capabilities (e.g., throw-weight), while the United States has advantages in other measures (warheads, for example). He noted, however, that there was disagreement among the group as to where present trends in strategic deployment programs were leading, and what the United States should do about those trends. He concluded by briefly reviewing recent developments in Soviet strategic capabilities.

Mr. Brown spoke next. He noted his agreement with what Mr. Vance had said and emphasized that the key question is what would happen if present trends continued into the future. He then discussed specific changes which might be made to U.S. strategic programs in response to trends in relative strategic capabilities. He particularly emphasized modernization of the bomber force as an important program, and

¹ Source: Carter Library, Jimmy Carter Pre-Presidential Papers, 1976 Presidential Campaign Issues Office—Stuart Eizenstat, Box 9, Defense, 7/27/76–8/76. No classification marking. Drafted by Blechman, who forwarded the notes to Eizenstat under a July 29 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

discussed criteria which would affect evaluations of possible follow-ons to Minuteman ICBMs.

Mr. Blechman spoke next. He emphasized the difficulty of comparing U.S. and Soviet military forces, and in particular strategic forces.

Mr. Warnke stressed that the present situation is not too bad from the United States' perspective; that the question was how to avoid a deterioration in the present strategic balance. Warnke emphasized, however, that avoiding a deterioration meant reaching further SALT agreements, not responding to Soviet strategic programs with step-ups in U.S. strategic programs. He noted that in the absence of strategic arms limitation agreements, differences in relative U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities would lead to political pressures for step-ups—both domestically and from allies, even though they would not mean anything in military terms. Consequently, if further SALT agreements were not reached, the United States would be forced to compete.

Lynn Davis spoke next and emphasized that one needed to look at the full range of strategic forces and compare aggregate capabilities, rather than focusing on one specific component of the strategic forces. She also emphasized that the statements of U.S. decision-makers had perhaps the major effect on perceptions of the strategic balance in the Soviet Union, in third nations, and in the United States.

Walter Slocombe spoke next emphasizing that it was very difficult to understand what the Soviets were doing; that is, what their strategic objectives were. The characteristics, or the numbers of weapons, or the rate of weapon deployments simply do not lead to clear indications of strategic policy. He strengthened this point by illustrating what one might make of U.S. strategic policy if one just viewed actual U.S. weapon deployments.

Mr. Nitze spoke next. He noted his disagreement with much of what had been said so far. In particular, he emphasized that he was more pessimistic than most of the other people in the room, that he thought that the existing trends were extremely negative. More specifically, he stated that if the trends were not reversed quickly, that within ten years the ratios of U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic capabilities that would survive a counter-force exchange would be most unfavorable from the U.S. perspective. He cited a recent study² in which calculations showed that following a Soviet counterforce attack on the United States in the mid-1980s, surviving U.S. retaliatory forces would be able to kill only 4.5 percent of the Soviet population. On the other hand, the study concluded, Soviet forces surviving a U.S. counterforce attack, under present plans, would be able to destroy a much larger proportion of

²Not further identified.

the U.S. population. Mr. Nitze summarized his key point as follows: the assumptions underlying statements made by the majority of the group were not supportable by the data—that, in fact, the data showed that in the future the Soviet Union would be able to survive a nuclear exchange but that the United States would not; and that, in his view, if such a situation were to develop, it would have a major impact on the two nations' respective behavior.

A discussion ensued among the advisors. Other members of the group, particularly Mr. Vance and Mr. Brown, emphasized that the calculations cited above were dependent upon assumptions such as the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense preparations and U.S. targeting policy, which would be questionable to most observers. In effect, they argued that the calculations presented a "worst" case for the U.S. and a "best" case for the U.S.S.R., both of which were unrealistic. They believed that Mr. Nitze's scenario was biased toward the Soviets, and that a more even handed approach would yield different results. Other members of the group questioned the implications of the calculations advanced by Mr. Nitze.

There was general agreement that the question was a critical one, and that there should be a thorough study aimed at testing the hypothesis advanced by Mr. Nitze.

Senator Mondale asked why the United States, after having built and deployed large missiles early in the 1960s, moved to smaller and more accurate missiles? Mr. Brown responded that the U.S. believed that the diversity and flexibility of its strategic forces was more important than sheer force. It felt that throw-weight could easily be re-built if that appeared to be necessary, but that building a lot of throw-weight into fixed-site ICBMs did not make sense because of the vulnerability problem. He also stated that mobile land-based missiles implied high costs and political problems.

The discussion continued with Mr. Woolsey, who noted that in discussing these issues it should always be kept in mind that we are not really talking about nuclear war, but about Soviet perceptions of the risks of nuclear war and its likely outcome. He then discussed the ambivalence of weapon systems, and the difficulty of inferring policy from the characteristics of weapons.

Governor Carter asked three questions. First, what is the Soviet attitude toward limited nuclear war? Second, what is the U.S. attitude? And third, what U.S. programs exist now to build-up strategic forces and what are the Soviets doing?

In response to the first two questions, there was a long discussion the upshot of which was that Soviet attitudes were mixed, that one had to discriminate between tactical nuclear wars and strategic

nuclear wars, and that it was very difficult to assess what the Soviet attitude was. Moreover, there was general agreement that the Soviet attitude was likely evolving from a point where they believed that limited nuclear war was impossible, to one where at least some Soviet decision-makers might consider it possible to control a nuclear exchange. It was also noted that the U.S. policy always has been that tactical nuclear war was possible, and indeed, that the United States might make first-use of nuclear weapons if it were losing a conventional conflict in Europe or Korea.

In response to Governor Carter's third question, Mr. Blechman reviewed current U.S. strategic programs and developments in Soviet strategic capabilities. Other members of the group supplemented the discussion.

Following a short recess, Governor Carter asked for a five minute brief on the SALT talks. Mr. Brown noted that the purpose of the talks was to achieve equivalence without building new weapons and that SALT I had resulted in an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement on offensive weapons; each of which he described in detail. Mr. Brown then discussed the Vladivostok Agreement³ and described the present impasse in negotiations toward implementing that agreement.

Governor Carter asked if the Soviets really wanted an agreement. The consensus of the group was that indeed they did, but only on favorable terms. Mr. Slocombe emphasized that questions of verification, especially for cruise missiles, were very important ones.

3. *General Purpose Forces.* This portion of the discussion was introduced by Mr. Vance. He emphasized that questions of the general purpose force structure involved a basic assessment of the purposes of U.S. foreign policy, of the roles the armed forces served in support of that policy, and of the nation's vital interests. He highlighted the following areas:

a) Europe—the key question is what kind of war, particularly what duration of war, NATO should plan to fight.

b) The Middle East—because contingency planning for what the United States might have to do in defense of Israel was not well advanced, this was an area that needed concerted planning effort. The questions are what kinds of forces would be needed to help defend Israel, and to what extent those forces would have to be additional to forces already maintained for European requirements.

³ Reference is to the November 1974 meeting in Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, in which the two leaders outlined an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT II) to replace SALT I, set to expire in October 1977, that would last until December 31, 1985. The basic framework included a cap of 2400 aggregate launchers, of which 1320 were MIRV missiles. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 83–95.

c) Asia—Mr. Vance noted that there was no question that the United States must maintain close ties with Japan, but that the U.S. commitment to Korea, and the forces necessary to maintain that commitment, were more questionable.

[Omitted here are discussions of the bilateral military relationships between the United States and Korea, and the United States and Israel.]

There was further discussion of relative U.S. and Soviet positions in the Middle East, which emphasized relative capabilities to project and sustain military power in the region. Mr. Blechman noted that although the Soviet Union was located geographically closer to the Middle East, the United States had far greater capabilities to project power into the region.

Mr. Woolsey noted his view that the links between foreign policy and force structure decisions was weaker than that implied by the previous discussion. He stated that foreign policy has much less an effect on the overall size of the defense budget than decisions on the way defense resources are utilized.

Mr. Vance disagreed with Mr. Woolsey in this regard emphasizing that even if the latter's assessment was correct, the administration should still focus on the purpose of the armed forces—that is, on the link between the military and foreign policy, and that the rest was relatively unimportant.

Mr. Brown stated that it was necessary to look at both the purposes of the armed forces and the efficiency with which resources were utilized.

Mr. Slocombe returned the discussion to NATO, emphasizing that requirements for European wars were the most important factors in decisions on the U.S. force structure. There was then a discussion of the balance in Europe, and of the European contribution to NATO defense. Mr. Blechman indicated that over the past twelve years, the states of Western Europe had increased, in real terms, the amount they spent on defense by 20 percent, and that they had kept military manpower levels roughly constant. There was some disagreement as to how well NATO would do in the event of a conventional war in Europe. Generally, Mr. Nitze took a more pessimistic view of the situation than did the other members of the group.

Mr. Warnke emphasized that an all-out war in Europe was most unlikely, but that more realistic contingencies, such as a Soviet incursion into Yugoslavia following Tito's death, were more likely and that planning should focus on these limited contingencies.

Mr. Vance emphasized that we need a thorough review of NATO plans and forces—that such a review had not been undertaken since 1967, and that in view of developments in technology and Soviet capabilities, such a comprehensive review was necessary.

Governor Carter than asked what Presidential mechanisms there were to correlate defense policy with foreign policy and changes in Soviet military capabilities. There was a lengthy discussion on this point, with the general answer being that what mechanisms did exist had not been developed very far. The previous administration's unhappy experience with the Defense Program Review Committee of the National Security Council was reviewed. Governor Carter indicated that, if necessary and desirable, he would play a direct role in causing the DoD budget to go through, a more general review process, in which both OMB and the NSC staff would play important roles.

There was then a brief discussion of the Navy and requirements for naval forces. Mr. Blechman reviewed developments in Soviet naval capabilities and problems in U.S. naval force structure and operational patterns.

4. *Manpower utilization.* There was a brief discussion of problems in the efficiency with which manpower was utilized by the Department of Defense. Mr. Vance emphasized that more than one-half of the budget went for manpower expenses and that there was lots of room for greater efficiency. He put particular emphasis on reforms in the structure and utilization of reserve forces. Mr. Blechman reviewed various measures that have been suggested for reducing the price of defense manpower and the number of people in the DoD workforce, both civilians and military. He noted, particularly, savings made possible by increasing the length of the average tour of duty, by using manpower more efficiently in the military training establishment, by reforming the military compensation system, by consolidating bases, and by eliminating duplication in logistics and headquarters' units.

A discussion ensued of the political difficulties involved in making changes in manpower policies and practices. Governor Carter emphasized that members of the Defense study group should not be dissuaded by these obvious difficulties, insofar as he believed that if the President took a direct hand in the process, it would be possible to overcome many of these obstacles.

5. *Overall size of the budget.* There was a very brief discussion on the overall size of the defense budget and of the trend implicit in the administration's program. The sense of the discussion was that it would be difficult to achieve the \$5 to \$7 billion reduction as phrased in the

Democratic platform committee.⁴ The problem stemmed from the platform's failure to note that the reduction would be one from a projected increase in the budget, that it would take time to attain such a reduction, and that the reduction would be in budget authority rather than outlays. There was a discussion of the manner in which this pledge should be treated, and of the realistic possibilities for reducing defense spending.

6. *Arms transfers.* Mr. Vance introduced this topic by noting his support for the Humphrey Amendment.⁵ Governor Carter noted that he too would have vetoed the Humphrey bill, insofar as he believes that it infringes on Presidential prerogatives.⁶ Mr. Vance noted the desirability of investigating the possibility of multilateral efforts to restrain arms transfers. There was a discussion on the pros and cons of selling sophisticated weapons to third world countries, with Mr. Nitze generally being less hostile to such arms sales than other members of the group.

7. *Conclusion.* Governor Carter concluded the meeting by noting that he would like to have follow-up sessions on specific regions and on specific types of forces with fewer people who specialized in the particular topic.

⁴ The 1976 Democratic Party platform stated: "Barring any major change in the international situation, with the proper management, with the proper kind of investment of defense dollars, and with the proper choice of military programs, we believe we can reduce present defense spending by about \$5 billion to \$7 billion." ("Excerpts From Platform to Be Submitted to the Democratic National Convention," *New York Times*, June 18, 1976, p. 12)

⁵ An amendment to the fiscal 1976 military assistance appropriation. [Footnote is in the original. Senator Humphrey's amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, postponed indefinitely by the Senate on June 14, would have set restrictions on U.S. arms transfers to foreign countries.]

⁶ On November 2, Governor Carter defeated President Ford in the 1976 Presidential election. He took the Presidential oath of office on January 20, 1977.

2. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, January 27, 1977, 10–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Defense Issues

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown
Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Enno Knoche
Mr. W. Bowman Cutter, Office of Management and Budget

OTHER ATTENDEES

DOD
Jack Quetsch, Principal Deputy Comptroller

White House
Stuart Eizenstat
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Jack Watson
William G. Hyland

NSC Staff
Edward R. Jayne
Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

—It was agreed to hold a four to five hour detailed session on the defense budget the following week with the President, members of the NSC and OMB Director Lance.

—The President asked for a written presentation prior to the meeting.

(The meeting began without General Brown)

President Carter: The purpose of this meeting is to consider changes in the FY 1978 defense budget. It should be interpreted as purely an exploratory discussion. We need to know what the issues are. I will want to get involved in the details at an appropriate time. We can set aside a Saturday or a Sunday afternoon for a detailed discussion. I realize the urgency of assimilating your recommendations. Bert Lance isn't here?

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #2 Held 1/27/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

Mr. Cutter: He is on the Hill.

President Carter: Harold (Brown), why don't you go ahead.

Secretary Brown: With regard to your comment about getting into things, I would applaud your deep participation at any time. I have made it clear both publicly and privately that these are very preliminary proposals. I need to get further reactions in my building. Unfortunately they have gotten out, but they are certainly subject to further discussion. Input from the President and from other NSC members will have a substantial effect. I am not shooting at any particular number, but I wanted to show a decrease. I have tried to find things that were being done too fast or that should not be done at all. As you know, the cut amounts to about \$2.5 billion. At the moment, of course, we are cutting the wrong things. I would expect to get most of the money from base closings and manpower adjustments, but that takes much longer. In these first few weeks, in order to get reductions, I have had to hit the procurement programs harder than I would choose to in the longer run.

President Carter: This is my first experience in a Departmental Budget and I want to learn all I can about it. I would like OMB to make a critical analysis of all expenditures. Then I want a thorough analysis of ongoing programs. There is a tendency to consider them all sacrosanct in the absence of such an assessment. I need some understanding of the manpower problems. Possibly we need more rigid entrance standards. Within a few months or a year we will have to decide whether to have some kind of conscription or even an all-out draft. Also, the ratio of combat to non-combat troops concerns me. Jim Schlesinger told me that when he was in Defense he set an overall personnel level then told the forces to increase by two combat units in their own way.

I will, of course, need and will respect your advice. But on the matter of new weapons systems—the B-1, M-X—I will have to make the decision myself. Before I make the final decision, I hope we will have some means to assess the Soviet attitude on global force reductions.

(General Brown arrived.)

President Carter: I assume NSC meetings are confidential. Cy (Vance) has an indication from Dobrynin that the Soviets would like to see mobile missiles banned in SALT. If we could get an agreement, that would be a major factor. Some elements might be decided by external events. Let's proceed with a detailed presentation to me by OMB and Dr. Brzezinski. I want to be involved in this assessment with you. There's a question at what point we bring in DOD and the JCS. In Georgia, I did an independent analysis with the budget people, then I met with the Department leaders. But I have no preconceived notion on this. I will defer to the Defense Department's judgement.

Secretary Brown: I believe our existing process works well. Most of the detailed information has to come from Defense. Our Comptroller, through me, works with OMB and the NSC staff to produce the analysis. The recommendations you get from your staff may be contrary to our recommendations, but the facts are assembled together. As a practical matter, it qualifies pretty well as zero based budgeting. I believe the Defense Department process is clearer and more along the lines you indicated than that of the other departments.

President Carter: I want the OMB budget process to be quite incisive and intrusive.

Secretary Brown: We have been through the figures with OMB and there are a few items still disagreed. At the present time, the fights between Defense and OMB have gone on before the President gets into it. If you want to enter the process earlier, we could fight better because we would have an idea of your views.

Mr. Cutter: There were 45 issues, and OMB, Defense and the Transition staffs in the two agencies each had a position on each. OMB wrote a letter to Defense defending the OMB position.

President Carter: At what point has the President been involved?

Secretary Vance: We would wrestle the issues with OMB. There would still be some unagreed issues. Then the President would sit down with OMB, Defense and JCS and make his decisions.

Secretary Brown: That should still be the case except that we would have an earlier input from the President.

Dr. Brzezinski: Both State and the NSC should have an opportunity to review the budget for political implications.

Secretary Brown: With regard to these particular budget amendments, that review will happen after the fact. In the future, it will happen in the course of developing the budget. I wanted to delay my recommendations to very near the time for decision so as to minimize the political flack. However, they began to leak, and we are already getting some flack from the Congress, and we will be hearing from some foreign countries. The longer the lapse between recommendations and decisions, the worse the effect will be.

President Carter: I want a fairly definitive presentation to me quite early. I will set out as much time as we need. I want you to explain to me how you arrived at the 45 items. Let's have a multi-hour session within the next week where I can ask questions. I don't have an adequate basis on which to reach conclusions. I don't want to interfere, but the final decision is mine. I don't like to be presented with a final product without having a more complete presentation. I may be able to help. The more I am involved, the more you will have my imprimatur and my support. There might be disagreements, but I don't look on this

process as two contending forces. You all work out a time for a lengthy session. Do it quickly. Harold (Brown), do you want to outline what you are doing?

Dr. Brzezinski: How much time do you have this morning?

President Carter: About 15–20 minutes. In a way we are really wasting this meeting, but I wanted to let you know how I viewed this.

Secretary Brown: I can summarize the proposed changes quickly. I have placed greater emphasis on combat readiness while continuing essential modernization. I have slowed down some things that I thought were going too fast.

In strategic forces, on the B–1, I have reduced the rate of production and have deferred the decision as to whether to continue the program until FY 1979. On the M–X, I have slowed major development to its original (1977 budget) pace, but have left the final question open. Developments in SALT might preclude further development of the M–X. I have left cruise missiles at their present level, but have reorganized what gets done under the program. The cruise missiles are not so far along as the B–1, but are farther than the M–X. We can't really tamper with these until we know where we are going. I'm not foreclosing any options, and we will want an in-depth review in the spring.

President Carter: We need to know how far along we are in each instance, and what would be the consequences of slowing down and trimming the programs.

Secretary Brown: On land and tactical air and mobility forces, I am changing the mix of F–15s and F–16s. We will reduce the number of high-performance aircraft and keep five wings. I would terminate A–7E production. This program is largely political. They have knocked it out every year and Congress, under pressure from the aircraft industry, puts it back.

On land forces, I am substituting two Reserve Component brigades for two late-deploying active Army brigades. I recognize there are foreign policy issues here. Also, I have stopped the non-nuclear Lance procurement. I don't think it's efficient. The Army disagrees. I suspect they may have sold its value to other countries.

On NATO and mobility forces, I have added shelters for additional aircraft and additional storage capacity and have increased the heavy-lift capacity by modifying aircraft in the civilian fleet. Congress keeps turning this program down. Naturally, the aircraft industry wants us to buy new planes rather than modify old ones.

On ship construction, we had six programs last year—I think four came from the Pentagon and two from the Hill. Except for the nuclear powered strike cruiser, which will cost over a billion dollars, the shipyards are so jammed that adding additional money doesn't get us any

more ships. I would defer one attack submarine and two patrol frigates. And I would cut back on some experimental ships.

Dr. Brzezinski: There are political reasons for continuing with the attack submarine.

Secretary Brown: In a number of cases, the political and the management/efficiency factors are on opposite sides. In this first cut, I have proceeded only on management grounds. We will get the political input later.

President Carter: I would like to make our decisions on a non-political basis, but I'm not naive. The question is how to give the nation maximum security on X number of dollars—that should be our constant, single criterion. If domestic or international political interests are involved, we need to understand when we are yielding on a political basis. That is my realm. If we yield to the Congress or to a foreign country, I need to know what the trade-off is. Let me be the one to say we can cut defense capacity on political grounds. Of course, I may have to do it.

Secretary Brown: That's why I did it this way.

President Carter: Good.

Secretary Vance: With regard to the B-1, the arms control decisions can make the case. You should look at the other alternatives before making any decision.

President Carter: That's why I need to understand the consequences of procurement, deferral or slow-down. As we talk to the Soviets, their understanding that the B-1 is still alive is a major factor. The Soviets perceive the B-1 and cruise missiles as a real threat. A commitment to the B-1 would indicate to the Soviets that we are still committed to the triple method. If I were Brezhnev, I would want to understand the ultimate intentions of the US. I plan to put all possible pressure on the Soviets this spring and summer to get substantial mutual reductions. We should keep the option on the B-1 open as long as we can. I don't know the advantages and disadvantages yet.

Secretary Vance: On cruise missiles, we are making a major commitment to go ahead.

Secretary Brown: There are 250 in the total R&D program. We are committed to developing some kind of cruise missile. But we can shift from one to another—from air to land to sea. All options can be kept open.

President Carter: Also nuclear and non-nuclear.

Secretary Brown: The non-nuclear missile is much further off. There are tougher guidance programs. We are committed to develop some but not necessarily deploy them. And we're not committed to one or another developed use. They're not unique now.

Dr. Brzezinski: And we still have the option of pulling back if there are reductions.

Secretary Brown: Yes.

Secretary Vance: What about our allies? They will expect a piece of the action—that we will provide them with these systems.

Secretary Brown: We are now supplying them with quick reaction land-based missiles. It's better to give them cruise missiles than aircraft. Aircraft are being diverted for other missions. They would be concerned if they thought we would pull out.

President Carter: Aren't our cruise missiles superior to the Russians in airframe, engine and electronic control?

Secretary Brown: Yes.

President Carter: I want to learn the details on this.

General Brown: On the point of our allies, the Germans have stressed repeatedly to us that what may be tactical to us is strategic to them. They look for deployment of land-based cruise missiles in Central Europe. But use of cruise missiles makes verification most difficult. For tactical use, whether armed or un-armed, the situation is very fuzzy.

Secretary Brown: That argues for going slowly.

General Brown: When we think about cruise missiles we tend to think too much about offense. We also have to face the challenges of defense. They would be a decided threat to the US if they are not covered by SALT.

President Carter: Our advanced stage of development is a major advantage over the Soviets. We can continue procurement and keep the advantage or reduce it as leverage.

General Brown: The same is true of the B-1.

Secretary Brown: There is one specific thing about cruise missiles with regard to SALT. The Backfire corresponds to land-based cruise missiles in Europe. They are tactical. Let the Russians know that they are something we may want to deploy if the Backfire is not take care of.

General Brown: The SS-X-20 concerns the Europeans, too. It's mobile.

President Carter: It concerns China too.

Dr. Brzezinski: Any cut-back would send the wrong signal to both the Europeans and the Chinese.

President Carter: Without cutting back, the actual numbers are not very high.

Secretary Vance: On the shipbuilding program, the Germans are very much interested in the hydrofoil program. They will take this as a signal that we are not really interested in standardization. On the heels

of the Vice President's statements in support of NATO,² we would be giving the wrong signal. The same thing would be true if we substituted two reserve brigades for active brigades. When we look at our active forces and pull out two from NATO, it will raise questions.

Secretary Brown: Your points are well taken, but they are supererogatory. They go beyond the question of what we really need.

Secretary Vance: You're degrading readiness. The reserves can't do the job.

Secretary Brown: These are late-deploying units, primarily infantry. They're relatively unimportant in NATO. It would not mean a substantial reduction in capacity. This is a separate problem from what others see.

Dr. Brzezinski: I agree with Cy (Vance) on the active brigades. Wait until our world-wide review is finished.³

Secretary Brown: You're talking about perceptions.

Dr. Brzezinski: Politics is perception.

Secretary Brown: They're two separate things.

Dr. Brzezinski: You have provided the military considerations; we will add the political. On the nuclear submarine and AWACS, we need to look at the European reaction. If we reduce our effort, they will reduce theirs.

Secretary Brown: That's an appropriate issue. If we buy more, they won't have to.

Dr. Brzezinski: We should develop a package on manpower, including base closings.

Secretary Brown: That's a good idea, but it's not new. Nothing can be done by February 15. If we made manpower cuts it should be in the tail, not in the teeth. We have been talking to Congress about this.

Dr. Brzezinski: We should get an interagency group together.

Secretary Brown: We don't need it for base closings. (to Dr. Brzezinski) I'll discuss it with you. Do you know it takes at least two years to close a base. It takes one year for Congressional consideration and another year for the environmental impact study. We started to close the Franklin Arsenal in 1965 and are still getting complaints about it.

President Carter: That's Fritz' (Vice President Mondale) favorite.

Secretary Brown: I strongly agree on manpower reductions, but the package has to be large enough so that both the fiscal conservatives and the doves will get behind it and push it.

² For Mondale's January 24 Brussels address, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 16.

³ Reference is to PRM/NSC-10, printed as Document 4.

Secretary Vance: On the Lance, I'm for dropping it, but do we have enough spares to continue our support to our allies?

Secretary Brown: I'll check.

General Brown: I know we're not here to debate the issues now, but I do want to make two points. Secretary Vance has made a very important point about the perceptions of our allies. We have been very critical of the British defense posture decisions for the last two years. We have confirmed our support for NATO and the Vice President has given them assurances. If we replace two active brigades with reserves, we will be acting just like the British. We have reached the point in trying to sustain our reserve forces where our recruitment objectives are based on what we can get, not what we need. I don't know how we would man two additional reserve brigades.

President Carter: Zbig, how soon can we get four to five hours on this? I will want a written presentation first.

Dr. Brzezinski: We'll do it next week.

President Carter: Possibly on Saturday afternoon.⁴ You can have supper with me, and we could continue in the evening.

Dr. Brzezinski: You would want (OMB Director) Lance there.

President Carter: Yes; he and I both need educating. I have no idea of excluding anyone. Set up an adequate amount of time so that I can learn and share my thoughts with you.

Dr. Brzezinski: And we will get into political issues?

President Carter: Yes. This has been a productive meeting.

Dr. Brzezinski: The press is going to want to know the subject of this meeting. I don't think we need always necessarily tell them what NSC meetings are about. I'm a little reluctant to say it was on the defense budget.

President Carter: Just tell them it was on budget issues, not defense.

⁴ Reference is either to Saturday, January 29, or Saturday, February 5. No record of a meeting on either date was found. On January 31, Carter met with his advisors in the Cabinet Room from 4:30 to 6:30 p.m. to discuss the FY 1978 defense budget. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No minutes of the conversation were found.

3. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹**

Washington, February 18, 1977

SUBJECT

FY 1978 Budget Revisions

Attached for your approval are my recommended adjustments to the FY 1978 Department of Defense budget request. I believe they accurately reflect the conversations we have had, but they should be formalized for the record.²

Harold Brown

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, February 16, 1977

Department of Defense—FY 1978 Budget Revision

Summary of Approved Issues

Budget Authority
(\$ in Millions)

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

<i>B-1 Bomber</i> —Slow down and re-evaluate program. Reduce planned FY 1978 buy from 8 to 5 aircraft.	–280.0
<i>MX Missile</i> —Defer full-scale development.	–160.0
<i>Follow-on Interceptor</i> —Defer funding of advance procurement items until FY 1979.	–26.3
<i>Minuteman III</i> —Cancel FY 1977 missile procurement except for 60 each guidance sets and stage III motors. FY 1977 savings will be reprogrammed.	(–100.0)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Budget: FY 1978 Defense Budget Revisions: 2/77. For Official Use Only.

² Carter signed his approval at the bottom of the memorandum.

³ For Official Use Only.

	<i>Budget Authority</i> (\$ in Millions)
<i>Polaris Overhaul</i> —Defer procurement of long lead items for 2 ship overhauls scheduled in FY 1979.	-27.2
<i>SRAM B</i> —Defer procurement of production missiles 1 year to match new B-1 schedule.	-23.4
Total Strategic Nuclear Forces	-516.9
<i>GROUND, TACAIR AND MOBILITY FORCES</i>	
<i>AWACS</i> —Reduce procurement in FY 1978 from 6 to 3 aircraft.	-150.0
<i>Non-Nuclear Lance</i> —Cancel FY 1978 procurement of 360 missiles. FY 1977 funds (\$64.6M) will be used for spare nuclear missiles and termination costs.	-77.7
<i>HAWK Missile System</i> —Cancel FY 1978 procurement of 6 sets of ground support equipment.	-35.3
<i>Advanced Attack Helicopter</i> —Slow development.	-100.0
<i>Cruise Missile</i> —Accelerate development of the ground launched missile while slowing the anti-ship version.	N/C
<i>F-15</i> —Reduce FY 1978 procurement to 78 aircraft from 108 aircraft.	-334.0
<i>A-7E</i> —Terminate production. Use FY 77 funds for spares.	-24.4
<i>CH-53E</i> —Delay procurement one year. Provide additional RDT&E funds to fully fund development program.	-62.0
<i>NATO Airfield Readiness</i> —Increase FY 1978 funding of aircraft shelters, passive defense measures, and facilities at collocated operating bases.	+60.0
<i>Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft (ATCA)</i> —Defer procurement program 1 year.	-276.6
<i>Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Modifications</i> —Fund 8 (vice 4) cost-shared mini-mods in FY 1978.	+15.0

	<i>Budget Authority</i> (\$ in Millions)
<i>Facilities for Prepositioned Stocks in Europe</i> —Fund additional maintenance facilities for prepositioned equipment and igloos for prepositioned ammunition.	+50.0
Total Ground, TacAir and Mobility Forces	—935.0
<i>NAVAL FORCES</i>	
<i>Nuclear Strike Cruiser (CSGN)</i> —Delete long lead funding and cancel construction of FY 1979 CSGN.	–187.0
<i>SSN</i> —Reduce FY 1978 program from 2 to 1 SSN. Production schedule will hold at 2 per year.	–230.0
<i>Patrol Hydrofoil Program</i> —Delete FY 1978 funding for the conversion of an LST to a PHM support ship. Restructure and reduce prior year program.	–43.0
FY 1977 and prior year savings.	(–144.5)
<i>Frigates (FFG)</i> —Defer 2 ships from FY 1978 construction program to later years. Fund long lead-time items to sustain deployment schedule and force objectives.	–282.0
<i>Reactor Components</i> —Reduce FY 1978 procurement recognizing adequate inventory levels funded through FY 1977.	–149.9
Total Naval Forces	–891.9
<i>MANPOWER</i>	
<i>Naval Reserve</i> —Reduces paid drill strength by 40,000, shifting reservists assigned to lower priority billets to the Individual Ready Reserve (2 week training).	–50.0
<i>Retirement Reform</i> —Delete funding for implementation of retirement reforms now delayed pending re-examination.	–25.0
<i>University of the Health Sciences</i> —Closes University.	–14.1
Total Manpower	–89.1

Budget Authority
(\$ in Millions)

OTHER INVESTMENT

<i>Construction</i> —Restore certain urgent and operationally important projects unlikely to be affected by the current base structure review.	+200.0
<i>Equipment Readiness</i> —Increase effort on ship and aircraft overhaul and equipment repair to increase the number of ships and quantity of equipment in ready-for-combat condition.	+280.0
<i>Communications and Electronics Equipment</i> —Defer procurement of communications and electronics equipment of lower priority or with high development and production risk.	−91.6
<i>Army Equipment</i> —Defer procurement of lower priority items of equipment or with high developmental or production risk.	−528.8
<i>Air Force Equipment</i> —Defer procurement and test programs of lower priority or with developmental or production risk.	−92.2
<i>Navy Equipment</i> —Reduction of procurement funds as a result of schedule slips, program cancellations and pricing adjustments.	−30.0
Total Other Investment	−262.6

OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES

<i>Intelligence</i>	−25.0
<i>Flight Operations</i> —Reductions based on improved operational efficiency without impairing readiness.	−54.5
Total Operational Efficiencies	−79.5
Total FY 1978	−2,775.0

4. **Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–10¹**

Washington, February 18, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The U.S. Representative to the United Nations

SUBJECT

Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review (U)

I hereby direct that a comprehensive examination be made of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities. This examination will consist of two parts to be done concurrently.

One part of the examination will be conducted by the Policy Review Committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense. It will define a wide range of alternative military strategies and construct alternative military force postures and programs to support each of these military strategies. Among other topics, this segment will consider: military force levels; technological developments with regard to new weaponry; alternatives to our reliance on foreign bases; deterrence at reciprocally lowered strategic levels; viability and desirability of the “triad” posture. This portion should also evaluate the relative ability of the U.S. and its allies to achieve U.S. objectives in specified military contingencies. It will identify the key issues for Presidential decisions, including the budgetary implications of each of these postures.

The other part will be a dynamic net assessment conducted by the Special Coordination Committee under the chairmanship of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It will consist of review and comparison of the overall trends in the political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and military capabilities of the United States, its allies, and potential adversaries. It will evaluate the objectives and national strategies that may be pursued by our principal potential

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 37, PRM–1 through PRM–11: 1–2/77. Secret; Exdis.

adversaries and examine the alternative national objectives and strategies appropriate to the United States.

This two-part analysis should identify for Presidential decisions alternative national strategies and the major defense programs and other initiatives required to implement them. The two parts should be carefully coordinated with one another. In order to achieve this, I have directed the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to develop additionally more detailed terms of reference for this analysis.

These terms of reference will be presented for my review by February 24.² I also want interim reports to allow further guidance as the study progresses. A summary of the entire report, not to exceed 70 pages, should be submitted for NSC consideration not later than June 1, 1977; the final version should be completed by June 15, 1977.

Jimmy Carter

² See Document 5.

5. Terms of Reference¹

Washington, undated

Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review

I. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE

A. The purpose of this undertaking is to provide a comprehensive examination of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities, particularly in relation to potential adversaries. This examination will start from U.S. foreign policy as it exists at the present time. While recognizing that U.S. relations with potential adversaries involve elements of cooperation, this study will concentrate on overall U.S. national strategies for achieving U.S. objectives in the face of foreign competition, opposition, and hostility. The study will identify alternative military and non-military strategies as well as military force postures for implementing current national objectives. The analysis will also identify

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 37, PRM-1 through PRM-11: 1-2/77. Secret.

alternative national strategies and their implications for military strategy and force posture planning.²

B. The examination will be conducted in two parts, to be done concurrently and cooperatively. Data and analysis should be made available to and between both parts of the study.

II. MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE REVIEW

A. *Purpose.* The purpose of this part of the analysis is to define a wide range of alternative military strategies, to construct force postures to support these strategies, to analyze the ability of these strategies to achieve U.S. objectives in certain key military contingencies, and to identify the key decisions required for the selection and implementation of the alternative military strategies and force postures.

B. *Substance*

1. An examination will be conducted of a broad range of alternatives to the current overall U.S. military strategy. This examination will consider the foreign policy, arms control, and force structure implications of a range of such strategies. The alternative strategies will highlight key strategy issues (such as criteria for deterrence, NATO warning time, etc.) and will include such general variations as a shift toward a “one war” strategy, a “short war” strategy in Europe, less reliance on forward-based ground forces, changes in the current objective of essential equivalence in strategic forces, and alternatives to the present “triad” posture.

2. The study should specify a limited number of key military contingencies involving U.S. strategic and/or general purpose forces and should assess for each the current relative capabilities of the U.S. and its allies to counter potential adversaries. The contingencies should include, but not be limited to:

- A major U.S./Soviet strategic nuclear exchange;
- A limited U.S./Soviet strategic nuclear exchange;
- A NATO/Pact war limited to Central Europe;
- A war in Central Europe plus a limited conflict on the flanks of Europe involving Soviet forces;
- A war in Europe plus a conflict with the USSR in other areas, including the Pacific, as part of an overall NATO/Pact war;
- A conflict in the Middle East involving limited Soviet participation;
- Intervention by the Soviet Union in relatively remote areas (such as Southern Africa); and

² For purposes of this study, national objectives, national strategy, military strategy, and force posture will be defined as indicated at Appendix A. [Footnote is in the original.]

—Conflict with third countries without Soviet forces involved (such as in Korea).

For each of these contingencies, the study should examine each side's capability to bring military power to bear. Included should be relative capabilities to mobilize, transport, sustain, and command and control forces in the combat area.

3. For each alternative military strategy, alternative force postures will be developed, with cost data provided for each one. These alternatives should again highlight key force structure issues (for example, alternative bomber forces, degree of reliance on land-based versus sea-based tactical air) and should include the current FYDP and postures fundamentally different from that plan; for example, postures involving a strategic dyad or quadrad and those making extensive use of land-based aircraft for sea control.

4. Alternative military strategies and force postures must be considered in the context of overall U.S. fiscal policy and the competing demands of non-defense programs and alternative government tax policies. The study will project future overall federal receipts and expenditures, and will explore potential tradeoffs between defense and non-defense programs.

5. The final report prepared for National Security Council review will not recommend any specific military strategy or military posture. It will provide options for each, and will indicate pros and cons for each based upon considerations such as military threat, foreign policy, arms control, political sufficiency, costs, technological risks, and specific capabilities in the contingencies outlined in paragraph 2 above. Detailed analyses of the areas studied will be included in annexes to the summary report.

C. Organization

A PRC Military Strategy and Force Posture Group will be created, chaired by DOD. A PRC Working Group for Military Strategy and Force Posture will also be created. It will be chaired by OSD/ISA and will have members from the NSC Staff, State Department, CIA, the Joint Staff, OMB, ACDA, and such other members as the Chairman or Assistant for National Security Affairs may request. Interagency task forces will be organized as directed by the Working Group, and will develop the alternative military strategies to be examined in the study. Among these task forces will be a task force to carry out military contingency assessments, as defined in paragraph 2 above (NSC chaired, to be coordinated with regional net assessment groups).

D. Schedule

1. The Working Group should submit to the PRC by April 1, 1977 an interim report:

- Outlining the military strategies being examined;
- Outlining the alternative force structures under consideration;
- and
- Providing a status report on the military contingency assessments (specified in Part II, paragraph B (2)).

2. Each task force should submit a preliminary version of its final report by May 1, 1977 and the final version on May 15, 1977. The Working Group will submit its final report to the PRC by May 25, 1977.

III. COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT

A. *Purpose.* The purposes of the net assessment are:

- To review and to analyze past, present, and probable future trends in the evolution of the principal capabilities of the United States, its allies, and its principal potential opponents;
- To analyze the objectives and strategies of our principal opponents; and
- To develop and make recommendations concerning alternative national objectives and strategies for the United States.

B. *Substance*

1. *General Questions.* The overall net assessment will include topical and regional net assessments. Each of these will attempt to answer the following general questions with respect to its subject:

- What have been the most significant trends for this topic or region in the evolution of the relative capabilities of the U.S. (and its allies, as appropriate) and the Soviet Union (and the Warsaw Pact and other potential adversaries as appropriate) over the last 15 years?
- What is the present situation with respect to these capabilities for the topic or region?
- How do our principal opponents appraise U.S. capabilities and objectives with respect to this topic or region? How do they estimate their own strengths and weaknesses?
- What are the recent, current, and most probable future objectives and strategies of our principal opponents for this topic or region? What threats do these pose to U.S. national interests?
- What factors are most likely to affect the evolution of the capabilities on both sides during the next five years; the next 10 years?
- What are the alternative national strategies which the U.S. might reasonably follow with respect to the topic or region? What are their costs, risks, and benefits?
- What will be the probable impact of these alternative U.S. national strategies on the relative capabilities of the U.S. and its principal opponents over the next 10 years and on the ability of the U.S. to achieve its national objectives?

2. *Regional Net Assessments.* Net assessments will be undertaken to provide answers to the general questions listed above with respect to specified regions. Each regional net assessment will involve a comprehensive analysis of the goals, strategies, position, influence, and

strengths and weaknesses of the United States and its principal allies and opponents in that region. It will include analysis of the political, diplomatic, economic, and military trends which will affect the relations between the United States and its principal allies and opponents in that region. For each region, the net assessment will deal with:

- National objectives and strategies;
- Military strategies and capabilities (including allied forces and the ability to project force into the region);
- Alliance cohesiveness and diplomatic support;
- Political influence and covert action capabilities; and
- Economic presence and influence.

As appropriate, the regional net assessment will draw upon the analyses prepared for the military force posture review of the ability of the United States and its principal allies and opponents to apply military force in the contingencies specified in Part II, paragraph B-2 of this memo. Regional net assessments (to be chaired by either State or NSC) will include the following regions:

- a. Europe
- b. Middle East
- c. Africa
- d. South Asia
- e. East Asia
- f. Western Hemisphere

3. *Topical Net Assessments.* Net assessment will be undertaken to provide answers to the general questions specified above in Part B-1 for each of the topics listed below. These net assessments may encompass, as appropriate, comparisons of the United States and the Soviet Union, NATO, and Warsaw Pact countries, or other selected groups of countries. The topical net assessment may also draw on regional net assessments in putting together the global assessment. The topical net assessments will include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following topics:

- a. Strategic nuclear policy and forces (DOD chaired, to draw on material developed in the military force posture study);
- b. Technology including both military-relevant technology and general technological capability (NSC chaired);
- c. Economic strategy and capabilities (NSC chaired);
- d. Intelligence capabilities (DCI chaired); and
- e. Political institutions, leaderships, and national psychology (NSC chaired).

C. *Organization.* An SCC Net Assessment Group will be created, chaired by the NSC. An SCC Working Group for Net Assessment will be also created. Its chairman will be appointed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and it will have members from

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, CIA, the Joint Staff, OMB, ACDA, and other agencies as the Assistant to the President may designate. Task forces with members from the appropriate interested agencies will be organized to undertake the topical and regional net assessments.

D. *Schedule*. The Working Group should submit to the SCC by April 1, 1977 an interim report summarizing its work to that date and outlining the principal conclusions it expects to reach. Each task force should submit a preliminary version of its final report by May 1, 1977 and the final version on May 15, 1977. The Working Group will submit its final report to the SCC by May 25, 1977.

IV. THE FINAL REPORT

A summary of the entire report, not to exceed 70 pages, should be submitted for NSC consideration not later than June 1, 1977; the final version should be completed by June 15, 1977.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Appendix A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES—Those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation—as opposed to the means for seeking these ends—toward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.

Example: The continued freedom and security of our Western European allies.

NATIONAL STRATEGY—The development and use of the political, economic, military, and psychological powers of a nation during peace and war, to secure national objectives.

Example: Pursue a strong NATO alliance. Support economic growth and strength of individual members, through various economic agreements (investments, tariffs, credits, etc.) and through combined defense programs and U.S. military force commitments.

MILITARY STRATEGY—A statement of the ways in which we intend to handle the various combinations of military contingencies that could arise in the pursuit of our national strategy.

³ Secret.

Example: Maintain conventional forces capability to halt a major Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe without major loss of territory. Maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons and, failing deterrence, guarantee an amount of economic and military damage to the Soviet Union at least equivalent to that inflicted on the U.S. and its allies.

FORCE POSTURE—The composition, basing, and readiness for combat of our military forces.

Example: Seventeen Army divisions, of which five are deployed in Western Europe, plus 26 tactical air wings, of which six are deployed in NATO, plus designated naval task force.

6. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

JCS Briefings: NSC Action Implications

This memorandum is a summary of my reaction to the JCS briefing.² It is not urgent but, depending on your comments, it could lead to some important reviews. I have tried to reduce my concern to nine basic points which now follow:

1. *Rigidity of SIOP.* I was struck by the relative rigidity of the SIOP options and by the limited choice that they leave you in the event of a major conflict. You are, in effect, left with the option of initiating a response which, irrespective of the version, amounts to at least the first phase of a massive central war. I am also struck that there seems to be limited integration between the SIOP and the proposed LNO's (limited nuclear options) and RNO's (regional nuclear options). Moreover, unless I misunderstood, retargeting for effective LNO or RNO

¹ Source: Reagan Library, National Security Council, Intelligence Directorate Files, Box WI-22, Mahley Box, FRG Nuclear Control. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner. An unknown hand wrote "2/22/77" next to the heading.

² On February 11, Carter and Brzezinski flew from Andrews Air Force Base to Warner-Robins Air Force Base aboard the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP); onboard, they participated in a briefing with Brigadier General A.W. Atkinson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary). No minutes of the briefing were found.

responses would take a certain amount of time. And planning for your advance understanding and timely selection of LNO's is non-existent.³

2. *Deterrence and Parity*. I am also struck by the fact that the SIOF provides no explicit option [7 lines not declassified].

[1 paragraph (17 lines) not declassified]

Accordingly, I would favor encouraging the Defense Department at least to evaluate the strategic consequences of adding such an additional option to the SIOF.

3. *Crisis Communication*. I was struck by the question you raised concerning our ability to make the Soviets understand the more limited character of an eventual nuclear response by us. An assessment of our ability to communicate effectively with the Soviets in the context of a crisis should be undertaken, and consideration should also be given to the possibility of a broader mutual notification of missile test firings.⁴

4. *Planning Integration and Innovation*. I was left with the impression from the briefing that regional command plans, as well as perhaps service plans, are not adequately integrated in relationship to possible crises. For example, the inter-relationship between our Atlantic war planning and our Central European war planning seems to me to be inadequate, on the basis of the evidence provided in the briefing. I also did not sense that there has been significant adjustment in our war planning and deployment because of the termination of our involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict.⁵

5. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

6. *Length of Decision-Procedures*. I wonder whether the short decision-time available (only about 5 minutes) in the event of a Soviet depressed trajectory attack on D.C. would permit you and others to follow the requisite decision-procedures.⁶

7. *Deterrence of Lower Strategic Levels*. I was impressed by your emphasis on the need to scale down the deterrence levels in the US-Soviet strategic relationship. You were very explicit in urging an aggressive attitude towards this issue, and I feel that a review of the inter-relationship between effective deterrence and lower strategic levels should be urgently undertaken.⁷

³ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this paragraph: "Work on this. Keep me informed."

⁴ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this sentence: "Pursue this."

⁵ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this paragraph: "This is true. Set up with Brown a schedule of 2-hour briefings for me."

⁶ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this sentence: "Alternative?"

8. *Impact of New Weaponry.* You also stressed the need for a long-term assessment of defense expenditures, and particularly of the trade-offs between new weapons and their possible consequences on the strategic as well as conventional US-Soviet equation.⁸

The above are simply my initial reactions. *Perhaps you could indicate on the margins whether you wish me to pursue any of them in a more systematic fashion. I would then propose NSC initiatives for your approval.*

9. Attached you will find additional material which was left out of the JCS briefing.⁹ It was forwarded to you by Harold Brown.

⁷ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this paragraph: "ok. An *early* brief analysis is needed—(2 or 3 days)."

⁸ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this sentence: "Proceed—CM's, B1, MX, etc."

⁹ Not attached.

7. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter¹**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

A National Integrated Telecommunications Protection Policy²

As you know, the Soviets are using their Embassy and other installations in Washington, New York and San Francisco, and Cuba to conduct an extensive and growing microwave intercept program targeted against US government agencies, government defense contractors, and US business and industry. The information collected by this intercept program is exploited by the Soviets to gain insight into critical US Government developments in military weapons, intelligence systems

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 40, [PRM-22 1 of 2] [1]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² For the Ford administration's approach to telecommunications security, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 175–182.

and proprietary military technology as well as to exploit the US in international trade, commodity and monetary transactions.

Some counter actions have been underway for some time. The Ford Administration took action which denied the Soviets access to the communications of some government agencies, but nothing was done about the private sector where the Soviets are increasingly focusing their intercepts.

As a result you are faced with addressing politically sensitive and potentially long-term decisions on telecommunications protection efforts. These decisions, coupled with previous actions taken and actions currently underway, have significant ramifications on the future course of (1) protecting the privacy of US citizens, business and industry; (2) denying sensitive national security information to the Soviet Union; (3) nonetheless, maintaining US intelligence gathering efforts, particularly SIGINT efforts; (4) our diplomatic relations; (5) accelerating US plans for protecting up and down link satellite transmissions as well as mobile radio-telecommunications systems and networks.

A national telecommunications protection policy is needed. Insofar as current leadership, guidance and direction are concerned, the entire program is at an impasse. Fractional, piecemeal ongoing actions continue out of their own inertia. The resolution of who's responsible for deciding those issues is as profound as deciding the issues themselves.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and sign the PRM at Tab A³ which directs development of an integrated National Telecommunications Protection Policy and a framework for its implementation under the SCC. (It has been reviewed at the senior working level within the Executive Office, within the Intelligence Community, including Stan Turner personally, and at the State Department.)⁴

³ Not found attached. PRM/NSC-22, as signed, is printed as Document 8.

⁴ Carter approved this recommendation and initialed below it.

8. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-22¹

Washington, March 24, 1977

TO

The Vice President
 The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Attorney General
 The Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy
 The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy
 The Director-designate, Office of Science and Technology Policy

ALSO

The Secretary of Commerce
 The Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
 The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT

A National Integrated Telecommunications Protection Policy (U)

I am concerned over the Soviet Union's clandestine intercept activities of our telecommunications systems and the lack of a well defined protection policy to deal with these activities in a comprehensive manner. I, therefore, direct that the NSC Special Coordination Committee undertake a thorough review of prior and contemplated U.S. counteractions to the Soviet activities, and to examine all the legal, diplomatic and technology issues involved.

1. A subcommittee of the SCC under the chairmanship of the Director, Office of Telecommunications Policy shall:

—Consider for disposition the segments of NSDM 266,² "Improved Security of Telecommunications," NSDM 296,³ "Improved Communications Security," NSDM 296 Follow-Up, "Telephone Security" and NSDM 338,⁴ "Further Improvements in Telecommunications Security."

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 37, PRM-12 through PRM-41: 1/77-11/78. Top Secret; COMINT.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976, Document 176.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976, Document 177.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976, Document 180.

—Review the unimplemented NSDM 346,⁵ “Security of U.S. Telecommunications” within the scope and framework of this PRM.

—Develop an integrated National Telecommunications Protection Policy and propose the necessary governmental framework for its implementation.

The foregoing should include, but not be limited to considerations of existing law, diplomatic factors, economics, technology social impact, executive-legislative relations, and government-industry relations.

2. The Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence should consider the diplomatic and Soviet reaction factors including:

—Soviet reactions to the various options of the OTP Plan or if the U.S. were to adopt a policy of retaliation in kind through the use of such techniques as “jamming.”

—U.S. denial of further Soviet requests to purchase additional U.S. property e.g., the Valeria Estate, the Mountain View apartment complex, etc.

3. The Secretary of Defense shall review the technology under research and development, in testing or procurement. Protected Radio Modulation for terrestrial microwave, methods for satellite link protection and critical mobile radio-telephone systems shall be included as well as:

—A complete review of the entire DUCKPINS project.

—Existing or potential legal, management or budgetary problems with the foregoing.

—Considerations of Soviet denial of U.S. intelligence “windows” in retaliation to U.S. countermeasures.

4. The Attorney General shall review Executive and Legislative authority, existing laws and National Security Council Directives including:

—The Justice Department’s anti-trust suit against AT&T.

—The government’s exclusionary dealings with AT&T in planning and technology development.

—Legal ramifications of continuing DUCKPINS and the MCI service offerings.

Recommendations for implementing a countermeasure program must include considerations for an implementing or program manager. The derived assessments, conclusions, recommendations and policy should include alternative options for dealing with the issues by the SCC, which shall evaluate these and make recommendations to me. Until such time the findings and recommendations are reviewed and

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 182.

acted upon by the Special Coordination Committee, the Director, OTP will be the Executive Branch's focal point for all telecommunications protection and related programs either recommended or ongoing. New initiatives and plans will be submitted to the Director, OTP for consideration as they may affect or interrelate with the objectives of this PRM.

The review and recommendations should be completed by July 15, 1977.

Jimmy Carter

9. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹**

Washington, March 31, 1977

SUBJECT

Our Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options and Regional Nuclear Options

Our investigation of the White House Emergency Procedures for short-warning nuclear attack has thrown up the question of our nuclear war doctrine. The SIOP, as you know, offers retaliatory options short of a full response, but they remain massive in both direct and collateral damage. NSDM 242, issued in January 1974,² prescribed new guidance for nuclear weapons employment—limited nuclear targeting—and led to considerable controversy over the design of “limited nuclear options” (LNOs). *In principle*, the new doctrine was to provide the President with options short of all-out nuclear war in crises. *In practice* it produced several problems and no solutions:

—*Policy guidance justifying planning for each LNO*: The rationale for particular LNOs has yet to be satisfactorily developed. Technically, an LNO is easy to design, but choosing *purposes* for specific LNOs is not. Progress in this area has apparently been nil although a few LNOs have received JCS approval.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO): 3/77–1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 31.

—*Limited nuclear war fighting procedures*: How and from where does the President conduct such a war? From the White House? The NEACP? The Pentagon? The underground alternate National Command Center?

—*Coordination of intelligence and operations*: Does the DCI manage post-strike assessment and other intelligence for the National Military Command Center's conduct of limited nuclear operations? How? With whose assets? What command authority?

—*Vulnerability of the National Command Authority*: The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970³ presented a disturbing evaluation of the survivability of our command and control. The National Command Authority and political succession were among the weaker links. The situation today is not appreciably different.

In view of these issues, I suggest that you ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, to:

a. Explain what they understand as our present nuclear war doctrine. They should comment on the advisability of retaining or canceling NSDM 242 and limited nuclear options.

b. Explain the procedures they envisage for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial attack phase.

c. Set forth the objectives we would hope to achieve through LNO's and the system we have for thinking through the political and military implications for executing specific LNO's.⁴

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 211.

⁴ Beneath this point, Brzezinski wrote: "If approved, I will prepare an appropriate memorandum to SecDef. ZB." Brzezinski then wrote three options: "Approve"; "Disapprove"; and "Comment." Carter checked the "Approve" option and initialed the bottom of the memorandum. He also wrote "draft" after the word "appropriate" in Brzezinski's handwritten sentence.

10. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, March 31, 1977

The President has directed me to ask you and, to the extent appropriate, the Chairman of the JCS, to provide:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO): 3/77–1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum and wrote "ok."

(a) A succinct statement of our present nuclear war doctrine. In so doing, you should comment on the advisability of retaining or canceling NSDM 242 and limited nuclear options.

(b) A brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase. This should include an indication of the command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control. In addition, please provide your assessment of the survivability of our command and control systems. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970² reached some disturbing conclusions regarding this matter.

(c) A short statement of the basic objectives to be achieved through our various LNO options, and some indication of the assumptions, both political and military, regarding the specific LNOs.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

² See footnote 3, Document 9.

11. Interim Report Prepared in the Ad Hoc Interagency Net Assessment Group¹

Washington, April 1, 1977

PRM/NSC-10

COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

PRM/NSC-10 directs that a "comprehensive examination be made of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities." The net assessment conducted by the Special Coordinating Committee is specifically asked to "evaluate the objectives and national strategies that may be pursued by our principal potential adversaries and examine the alternative national objectives and strategies appropriate to the United States." In keeping with this mandate, the main body of this Interim Report is designed:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 38, PRM-10: General: 3-4/77. Secret. Huntington sent the interim report to Brzezinski under a covering memorandum of April 1.

(1) to outline the context of this net assessment and strategic review;
(2) to elaborate some of the general issues with which the net assessment is concerned; and

(3) to present some considerations involved in formulating national strategy.

Attached to the main body of the report are:

- (1) a brief summary of the work completed to date (Tab A);
- (2) an outline of the organization of the net assessment (Tab B);
- (3) the text of PRM/NSC–10 (Tab C);²
- (4) the text of the Terms of Reference for PRM/NSC–10 (Tab D).³

II. THE CONTEXT OF THIS REVIEW

Every eight years the advent of a new Administration provides the United States with the opportunity to reconsider its national strategy and goals in relation to those of its potential opponents. The events of the past eight years—in the United States, with our opponents, and in the world at large—lend a peculiar urgency to the reconsideration this year.

This reconsideration is the latest in a series of efforts to formulate comprehensive national strategies which include:

—NSC 68, prepared in 1950, in the wake of the Soviet nuclear explosion and the Communist conquest of China, which recommended a major U.S. political economic, and military effort to combat communist expansion, including a tripling of military expenditures;⁴

—NSC 162/2, in 1953, in which the Eisenhower Administration outlined the New Look with its stress on nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical), massive retaliation, and cut-backs in conventional forces to insure U.S. ability to maintain an adequate defense for “the long haul;”⁵

—the Kennedy Administration reassessment of strategy in 1961–62, which led to a rapid build-up of the ICBM force and a substantial expansion of U.S. general purpose forces, reflected in the concepts of “flexible response” and “mutual assured destruction;”⁶

² Attached but not printed. See Document 4.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, p. 234.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, National Security Affairs, p. 577.

⁶ Upon becoming Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State in November 1961, Walt W. Rostow supervised the preparation of a series of draft studies, all entitled “Basic National Security Policy.” A February 7, 1962, draft was circulated within the Department of State only. (Department of State, S/P Files, Lot 69D121, BNSP Drafts 1/15/62 and 2/7/62). The draft is summarized in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 70.

—NSSM 3, in the first year of the Nixon Administration, which, while not challenging the basic approach of the Kennedy and Johnson Administration, shifted the planning assumption from a “2½ war” to a “1½ war” strategy;⁷

—NSSM 246, in which the Ford Administration, in its last months, provided useful analysis but no fundamentally new conclusions with respect to strategy.⁸

The strategic reviews of the last two Administrations focused almost entirely on military strategy and force posture. Yet the world has changed greatly since the early 1960s and the strategic assumptions and concepts of that decade are not necessarily relevant for this one. The times now require a broader reconsideration of national strategy, comparable to that undertaken in NSC 68, involving political, economic, technological, and diplomatic factors as well as military ones, and a new effort to define our overall national goals in relation to our potential opponents.

This reformulation of US strategy thus proceeds in the context of many constraining parameters that were largely absent during the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s:

(1) The relationship with our potential adversaries is now not simply competitive but also in part cooperative.

(2) The concerns of U.S. foreign policy are now more diverse and complex, involving not simply issues of security vis-a-vis the “Soviet threat,” but also questions of North-South relations, finance, trade and investment, nuclear proliferation and arms sales, global resources, and human rights.

(3) The relative capabilities of the U.S. compared to those of other states—allies and neutrals, as well as adversaries—have declined significantly from the days of overwhelming U.S. predominance in the 1940s and 1950s.

(4) The domestic claims on public resources are far greater, absolutely and proportionately, than they were before the mid-1960s.

Now, as in the past, the central threat to U.S. national security comes from the Soviet Union. Aspects of that threat, however, have changed. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union was seen as the center of a hemispheric bloc reaching from the Elbe to the Mekong and also as the center of a global network of communist parties dependent upon Moscow for direction and support. Since this early postwar period, significant changes have occurred in the distribution of power and in the

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 2.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 102.

alignments of power. The Sino-Soviet split has seriously weakened the Soviet alliance system. In part as a result of this, Soviet leadership of the worldwide communist movement is no longer unchallenged. For the United States, China remains in one sense a potential opponent, but in another sense parallel interests have made it almost a *de facto* ally. China's low capabilities, however, limit its role in either respect. The broader diffusion of power is reflected in the ability of other countries or groups of countries to act independently on the world scene. In most cases, such as in the Group of 77, these blocs may raise significant questions of economic policy, but thus far they have lacked the coherence and the resources directly to challenge American security interests. The growing western dependence on imported oil, particularly from the Middle East, has, however, increased the vulnerability of the U.S. and its principal allies to potential adversaries, such as OAPC, which on one occasion demonstrated that they did have the coherence and the resources to impose significant costs on the U.S. and its allies. In addition, recurring secondary threats, such as terrorism, have arisen. Nonetheless, the central but not exclusive focus for this reconsideration of strategy, as for its predecessors, must be U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

Significant changes have taken place in those relations in the past decade. On the one hand, a relaxation in the tension which characterized that relationship in the 1950s and 1960s has made it possible to discuss and, in some cases, reach understandings with the Soviet Union on matters of mutual concern, among which the SALT agreements are clearly of central importance. On the other hand, the past eight years have also seen the steady growth of Soviet military power. Since the mid-1960s the USSR has moved from a position of marked inferiority in nuclear capabilities to one of rough equivalence with the United States. Depending on the outcome of SALT negotiations and American decisions on strategy and procurement, the Soviets have the potential to increase and improve their nuclear forces to the point where they could exceed the quantity, quality, and net destructive power of American forces. Whether or not such a measure of superiority could be exploited usefully in war or in diplomatic confrontation is debatable; equally uncertain—and more significant—is whether the Soviets, our allies, other nations, and ourselves will believe that it could be so exploited. In recent years, the Soviet Union has also strengthened, modernized, and enhanced the readiness of its forces in Eastern Europe. At the same time, it dramatically increased its deployments in the Far East and, in effect, prepared for its own "2-war" contingency. The Soviet navy has matured from a weak coastal defense force into a modern global maritime power, increasingly capable of threatening

U.S. and allied sealines, challenging U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean, and gradually achieving the capability to project military power abroad.

These changes in the Soviet-American military relationship come at a time of major new uncertainties in international political alignments. Significant changes could occur in the European balance, given the potential impact of Eurocommunism, of political unrest in Portugal, Spain or post-Tito Yugoslavia, and of the difficulties in forming effective governing majorities in democratic states. Africa faces the challenge of several new self-styled Marxist-Leninist regimes, the threat of racial conflict in Southern Africa, and the appearance of secessionist, revolutionary, and interventionist forces. Regional conflicts continue in much of Africa, the Middle East, South and South-east Asia, and trends toward political fragmentation exist throughout the world. These instabilities could provide new opportunities for influence for a stronger Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet leadership also faces major domestic constraints—persistent economic problems, nationality discontent, and shifting demographic trends, which should limit both their ability to exploit their increased strength, and their inclination to become directly involved in new, costly foreign adventures.

III. MAJOR ISSUES IN THE NET ASSESSMENT

In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the overall net assessment will be broken down into a number of regional and topical net assessments. Cutting across these efforts, however, are a number of general issues which the overall assessment, as well as the regional and topical assessments, must consider. Five of these issues are identified here.

1. *The Balance of Influence.* As indicated above, the strength and the reach of Soviet power have increased significantly. To what extent does this increase in the resources of power lead to expanded political influence? The net assessment will consider:

(1) Trends in the expansion and contraction in Soviet and American influence abroad and the costs and benefits of these changes to both the USSR and the U.S.

(2) Regional priorities and targets. What is the relation between U.S. commitment or neglect and the Soviet propensity to enter a region? In which regions is the USSR likely to make the greatest gains and to suffer the greatest losses?

(3) The probable extent, timing, and strength of Soviet expansion. Is the threat greatest in the long or short term? Is there likely to be a period of "maximum danger" or a period of "maximum opportunity" in the next five to ten years?

(4) Factors that could cause the contraction of Soviet influence. Will Soviet presence provoke a backlash in the areas that they penetrate? What impact would alternative U.S. responses have?

(5) Ways in which Soviet military power determines or facilitates their involvement and influence abroad.

(6) Competing Soviet interests such as the stake in detente or non-military economic goals. How might these constrain Soviet expansive tendencies?

2. *National Psychology and Frames of Reference.* Soviet leaders do not necessarily perceive international conflict, negotiation, and accommodation in the same way as Western leaders. Both Marxist-Leninist ideology and the historic Russian legacy influence the thinking of Soviet policy makers. These influences contrast markedly with traditional liberal democratic ways of looking at the world. They have implications which affect, among other things, the prospects of success in negotiations. Relevant issues include:

(1) Soviet doctrine for nuclear and conventional war. How far do their categories of analysis and measures of significance correspond with those of the U.S. and its allies?

(2) Soviet perception of the strategic balance, Western posture and intentions, and judgments of the trends. How can we influence these? In what respects are their concepts determined by the conflict with China?

(3) Soviet views of the role of force in current and future circumstances, their understanding of the concepts of “parity” and “superiority,” and the value they place on them. How do their concepts compare with those of American leaders?

(4) Soviet views on the distinction between “internal affairs” and international relations.

(5) The adequacy of our evidence on Soviet attitudes. How well do we know what they think, and what are the consequences of uncertainty?

(6) Conditions under which the use of force, or the threat to use force—at nuclear, conventional, and diplomatic levels—will become more or less appealing to the USSR’s leadership.

3. *Potential Threats.* The growth in Soviet power poses increased military threats to the U.S. and its allies in the event of war, could raise problems for the stability of deterrence, and provides a firmer basis on which the USSR could attempt to exert political leverage in a diplomatic crisis. In addition, there are economic threats, such as might stem from dependence on imported oil. Among the most salient threats are:

(1) Strategic attack. The central threat depends on the present strategic balance, actual and perceived changes in the balance, and

prospects for change in Soviet and American nuclear doctrine. What is the significance, both to the U.S. and USSR, of asymmetries in force structure? What responses would the USSR probably make to alternative U.S. postures?

(2) Political uses of strategic forces in diplomatic confrontations. In what ways and in what types of crises might the Soviets attempt to exact leverage from nuclear capabilities or threats?

(3) Military and political uses of conventional forces, in the context of strategic parity, in regions where the USSR or the PRC can deploy substantial conventional power either directly or through proxies.

(4) Covert operations. What is their scale and effectiveness? Where are the Soviets likely to be most active?

(5) Economic threats. To what extent will the U.S. and its allies be vulnerable to acts of "economic warfare," such as resource embargoes, boycotts, debt leverage?

4. *Regional Goals and Global Competition.* The U.S. has a global interest in the balance of power with the Soviet Union. It also has other interests specific to countries and regions, such as political stability, economic development, and amicable diplomatic relations. In different regions these two sets of interests may either be complementary, contradictory, or unrelated. To assess the interaction of these aims on general strategies and specific policies, the regional net assessments consider:

(1) Which local goals are *caused* by global competition with the USSR; which need to be *modified* by global strategic considerations; which are *irrelevant* to US-Soviet competition?

(2) In which regions and in what dimensions—political, military, economic, and diplomatic—is it more and less important to counter Soviet influence?

(3) The impact of specific U.S. policies such as those on human rights, arms transfers, and nuclear proliferation on the Soviet-American interaction at the regional level.

(4) Costs and benefits with respect to the global balance of alternative American options for involvement in regional conflicts. For example, what are the costs and benefits of U.S. alignment with one side (blacks in Southern Africa); diplomatic involvement with both sides (Middle East); military supply to neither side (South Asia), one side (Zaire v. Angola), or both sides (Greece-Turkey and Middle East)?

5. *Consequences of Increasing Interaction.* As the cooperative element in US-USSR relations has become more significant in recent years, it is particularly important to assess the extent to which increased economic interaction may be desirable, and the ways in which it would affect the competitive aspects of American-Soviet relations. Trade, credits, and

technology transfer are salient issues. Topical net assessments address the following questions, among others:

(1) Overall costs and benefits, short and long term, of increased interaction. Will more transactions reduce conflict and aggressiveness, or sell the Soviets the rope with which to hang us, or have no effect at all? How would greater interdependence affect the Soviet system? Should the U.S. government encourage, subsidize, ignore, or discourage certain types of interchange?

(2) Types of exchanges most and least advantageous to the U.S. Which transactions have highly uncertain outcomes; how predictable are the results of increased trade? Which areas of exchange should, in these terms, be expanded or contracted?

(3) Criteria for evaluating changes of policy, especially in regard to issues such as computer technology, food sales, and production licensing and investment in the USSR or Eastern Europe.

(4) Mechanisms for control. How effective are current ones such as COCOM? Are additional mechanisms needed?

(5) How should the U.S. government deal with the private sector in regard to issues such as general or selective export policies and banking and credit policy controls?

6. *Transformation of alliances.* Major changes appear to be underway in the East-West alliance systems. Issues of relevance for the future are:

(1) What are the trends in the transformation of Soviet and American alliances and the costs and benefits of these for relative Soviet and American power?

(2) What impact do these changes have on Soviet and American war-fighting capabilities, especially a conflict limited to Central Europe?

(3) Which Soviet strategies might lead to the accelerated loosening of Western alliances? What would be the risks/benefits of a parallel American effort in Eastern Europe?

(4) Which factors, domestic or international, might lead to a tightening of alliances in the West as well as the East?

(5) How would broadened alliance membership or changes in the central alliance institutions affect the central US-Soviet relationship?

(6) To what extent will conflicting economic interests and nationalist demands within both alliances affect their cohesiveness for security purposes?

IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL STRATEGY

The fundamental purposes of the United States are spelled out in the Declaration of the Independence and in the Preamble to the Constitution. A basic national strategy delineates the ways of realizing those purposes in the face of foreign threats and hostility. It would be premature at this point to present specific strategies before the task force

analyses that should underpin them have been completed. Any realistic national strategy, however, must consider how to mix the following elements of policy:

1. *Cooperation and Competition.* A national strategy must set forth the extent to which the United States will attempt to achieve its objectives through cooperative arrangements (for example, arms control, increased trade) with its potential adversaries, and to what extent it will adopt a competitive posture (weapons buildup, trade restrictions).

2. *Power and Values.* National security requires maintenance of a balance of power, but national purpose requires the promotion of American values. A national strategy must provide an effective combination of both these considerations.

3. *Military, Economic, and Political Instruments.* A national strategy should provide for varying emphases on these three instruments.

4. *Structure and Flexibility.* A national strategy requires a general framework to provide structure and coherence, but it should also allow policy to evolve in phases and permit flexible adaptation to new contingencies.

5. *Self-Reliance and Cooperation with Allies.* Certain goals require strong unilateral commitments and capabilities, and others require multilateral undertakings and collective efforts with our allies. A national strategy must encompass both of these needs.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Ad Hoc Interagency Net Assessment Group⁹

Washington, March 28, 1977

PRM/NSC-10

COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT

SUMMARY OF WORK TO DATE

1. The Presidential Review Memorandum itself was prepared, circulated among the interested agencies, revised, and approved by the President on February 18th. Terms of Reference was drafted, circulated, revised, and approved by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on March 10.

⁹ No classification marking.

2. A Net Assessment Group was created composed of senior officials from the interested agencies. This group met on March 11th and discussed the major cross-cutting substantive issues which will be considered in the context of the net assessment.

3. A Net Assessment Working Group was created, which at its three meetings on March 15, 22 and 29, considered the overall organization and procedures of the assessment, task force terms of reference, and the draft interim report.

4. Eleven regional and topical task forces have been organized as follows:

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| (1) Europe | (7) Strategic nuclear policy and forces |
| (2) Middle East | (8) Technology |
| (3) South Asia | (9) Economic strategy and capabilities |
| (4) Africa | (10) Intelligence (including covert action) |
| (5) East Asia | (11) Political institutions, leadership and national psychology |
| (6) Western Hemisphere | |

Chairmen and associate chairmen have been appointed, and the membership constituted of individuals nominated by the interested agencies. All the task forces have formulated terms of reference to guide them in the preparation of their reports due May 15th. In almost all cases, work has started on the drafting of the papers which will be included in these reports.

5. A four-person central staff at the NSC has been created to direct and coordinate the activities of the net assessment and to draft the overall report. Thirteen other members of the NSC staff are participating in the assessment in one capacity or another.

6. Extensive discussions and consultations have been held with officials in State, Defense, the intelligence community, and elsewhere on the substantive issues and methodologies to be employed in the net assessment. The DOD Office of Net Assessment has been particularly helpful in this connection.

7. Efforts have been made to maintain close liaison with the Military Force Posture portion of the PRM/NSC–10 review. Several people are involved in both aspects of the review, and persons connected with the net assessment have taken advantage of the opportunity to sit in on meetings of Force Posture groups.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁰

Washington, undated

PRM/NSC-10
COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT
ORGANIZATION

I. NSC CENTRAL STAFF

Samuel P. Huntington	William Odom
Richard Betts	Catherine Kelleher

II. NET ASSESSMENT GROUP

Zbigniew Brzezinski, NSC, Chairman	
David Aaron, NSC	Anthony Lake, State/SP
Bowman Cutter, OMB	Richard Lehman, IC
Leslie Gelb, State/PM	William Y. Smith, JCS
Samuel P. Huntington, NSC	Sayre Stevens, IC
David McGiffert, OSD	Paul Warnke, ACDA

III. NET ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP

Samuel P. Huntington, NSC, Chairman	
Richard Anson, JCS	Andrew Marshall, OSD
Reginald Bartholomew, State/PM	William Odom, NSC
Robert Behr, ACDA	Edward Sanders, OMB
Richard Betts, NSC	James M. Thompson, OSD
Leslie Brown, State/PM	Victor Utgoff, OSD
Edward Jayne, NSC	John Whitman, IC
Jerome H. Kahan, State/SP	

IV. TASK FORCE CHAIRMEN AND ASSOCIATE CHAIRMEN

	Chairman	Associate Chairman
Europe:	Robert Hunter, NSC	Warren Zimmerman, State/EUR
Middle East:	Michael Sterner, State/NEA	William Quandt, NSC

¹⁰No classification marking.

<i>South Asia:</i>	Adolph Dubs, State/NEA	Thomas Thornton, NSC
<i>Africa:</i>	William Lewis, State/AF	Thomas Thornton, NSC
<i>East Asia:</i>	Robert Miller, State/EA	Michael Armacost, NSC
<i>Western Hemisphere:</i>	William Luers, State/ARA	Robert Pastor, NSC
<i>Strategic Nuclear Policy and Forces:</i>	Walter Slocombe, OSD	Roger Molander, NSC
<i>Technology:</i>	Jack Ruina, OSTP	Charles Stebbins, NSC
<i>Economic Strategy and Capabilities:</i>	David Evans, CIEP	Robert Hormats, NSC
<i>Intelligence Capabilities:</i>	[2 names not declassified]	Paul Henze, NSC
<i>Political Institutions, Leadership and National Psychology:</i>	William Odom, NSC	John Whitman, IC

12. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

New Technologies

Attached is a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense which summarizes some recent, important technological advances being

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 232, David Aaron Files, Stealth Program, 4/11/1977–10/10/1980. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Stebbins and Utgoff sent the memorandum to Brzezinski for his signature under cover of an April 11 memorandum. (Ibid.)

sponsored by ARPA, the Advanced Research Projects Agency.² Six areas are discussed: space warfare and surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, armored and air vehicles, and C³ (command, control and communications). All six represent very interesting technological advances; however, two—space warfare and air vehicles—represent technologies with truly far-reaching policy planning and force structuring implications:

Space Warfare: ARPA is to demonstrate in 1980 a very high-power laser which could be transported into space and used as an anti-satellite (ASAT) system. *Impact:* The US has no effective ASAT system at present. ARPA estimates that two of these high-power lasers, mounted in maneuverable satellites, could destroy the entire Soviet satellite population in less than 24 hours. Such a device, in orbit, would apparently not violate the 1967 space treaty which bans placing weapons of mass destruction in space.

Air Vehicles (sensitive): This fall, ARPA plans to fly an advanced design, relatively high performance aircraft which is essentially invisible to all known and projected radar systems and which cannot be tracked by heat-seeking missiles. *Impact:* Potentially enormous, both tactically and strategically. ARPA envisions using the aircraft in the battlefield area either to “roll back” enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch systems or to act as “spotter” aircraft to direct fire against ground targets. Other possible applications might be in development of a new generation of “spy” aircraft or, more importantly, in substantially improving cruise missile penetrability against highly defended targets. This latter application could, for example, have a substantial bearing on future decisions regarding the B-1. (We are seeking additional, detailed technical data and will report our findings shortly.)

² Attached but not printed is an April 1 memorandum to Carter from Brown, under which he forwarded a March 7 memorandum from the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency on “Some Current Technological Initiatives and their Related Mission Opportunities for the 1980s.”

13. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Chairman of the Special Coordination Committee (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Soviet ICBMs with MIRVs

1. At the SCC meeting on 7 April the question was raised whether the Soviets would exceed a US-proposed SALT limitation of 550 launchers of MIRVed ICBMs in the next few months.² The answer to the question depends on what rules for counting launchers as MIRVed are agreed between the two sides.

2. Judging by the recent pace of the Soviet program, the number of ICBM launchers actually equipped with MIRVed missiles is likely to grow fairly slowly, in part because the Soviets have developed and are probably deploying both MIRVed and single-RV versions of their new generation ICBMs. [3 lines not declassified]. As you know, the US has proposed counting rules [less than 1 line not declassified]. These rules would credit as MIRVed all boosters and launchers of types which have been associated with MIRVs in testing or deployment. The US has also proposed that ICBM launchers be counted as MIRVed when conversion is in initial stages.

3. Our current estimate of Soviet MIRVed ICBM deployment this year, together with the number of launchers which would be credited with MIRVed missiles under the US proposals, is summarized in the attached table.³ The table shows that we expect the number of launchers actually equipped with MIRVed ICBMs to remain well short of 550 through 1977. However, under the combination of US proposals (i.e., the launcher and booster type counting rules *plus* the proposal to count launchers under conversion) the Soviet ICBM launchers credited as MIRVed would exceed 550 by October 1977. With the counting rules alone, the number would remain below 550 through the year, although it would be considerably larger than the probable actual Soviet total.

Stansfield Turner
Admiral, U.S. Navy

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret. Copies were sent to SCC members.

² For Brzezinski's undated memorandum to Carter summarizing this meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 158.

³ Attached but not printed.

**14. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, April 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) Targeting Philosophy

This memorandum responds to your question² regarding Soviet fatalities if population were attacked directly in the SIOP rather than following current policy, which targets industry. The estimates provided are the result of manual calculations using data bases which were not designed to allow precise computation of the results of a population attack.

In the most recent dynamic Soviet/U.S. wargame simulation, the largest option in the current SIOP (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*)—primarily an industrial targeting plan) is estimated to produce Soviet fatalities of about 33 percent (84.5M) of the total population (includes estimated effects from fallout). If we were to directly target Soviet population with today's SIOP weapons, including the POSEIDON weapons committed to SACEUR and several hundred weapons now targeted on military objectives, the estimated fatalities would increase to about 44 percent (115M).

The above estimates do not reflect the range of uncertainty about fallout-related fatalities nor do they consider the possible effects of varying blast and fallout shelter postures. Preliminary analysis has indicated that direct population attacks are less sensitive to assumed population sheltering postures than are economic attacks. However, available intelligence does not permit high confidence analysis in this area.

Harold Brown

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 52, USSR: 3-7/77. Top Secret.

² Not further identified.

15. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 2, 1977

SUBJECT

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

The Navy has prepared a briefing on the Tomahawk—our sea-launched cruise missile. Harold Brown forwarded a copy of the briefing to me noting that the flight profiles and the test program indicate many important facts about the nature and verifiability of cruise missiles that have not received enough attention to date. As you know, the Tomahawk is designed to fit a standard submarine torpedo tube, but it is also capable of being launched from a variety of platforms (see Tab A).² A few highlights from the briefing follow:

—At Tab B³ is a graph depicting comparative cruise missile development for the US and the Soviet Union. Cruise missiles, by the way, go back to the German V–1 “buzz bomb”.

—The Navy’s approach to ensure Tomahawk’s ability to penetrate enemy defenses was to make it fly as low as possible and to reduce its visibility to enemy radars, visual and infra-red detection devices. Here are a few results from the Navy’s test program:

- The Tomahawk has flown in actual flight at less than [*less than 1 line not declassified*] above the terrain.

- Ground observations on the flight path were unable to see the missile until about 10 seconds before overflight. In addition, neither the ground nor air observers at the target could detect exhaust smoke from the missile.

- The ability of the Tomahawk’s anti-ship missile to attack an over-the-horizon target has been successfully demonstrated (Tab C).⁴

- An SSN in the Mediterranean simulated Tomahawk’s attacks against Soviet ships (Tab D).⁵ The tests were successful.

- The Tomahawk land-attack missile has demonstrated a range capability in excess of [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 2–6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

—According to the Navy, the principle threats to the Tomahawk missile in the early 1980s will be advanced low-altitude SAMs and look-down, shoot-down interceptors. Results of the Navy's survivability study based on these threats are found at Tab E.⁶ Harold Brown suggests we should reserve judgment on the vulnerability question since it depends in detail on defenses.

⁶ Attached but not printed.

16. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Meeting on the Force Posture Study (PRM/NSC-10) (C)

(S) This memorandum is for your information and provides a brief description of the work to date in the force posture part of PRM/NSC-10.

(S) The basic US national security objective is to preserve the US as a free nation, maintaining the nation's economic, institutional and social well-being. Fundamentally, the US must be able to deter war or, should it occur, terminate it favorably in terms of that objective. This requires deterring, in conjunction with our NATO Allies, a Warsaw Pact attack or coercion in Europe; maintaining a balance of power in Asia among the US, China, Japan and the Soviet Union; in other areas, supporting the integrity of Allies, ensuring freedom of movement in international seas and air space, and promoting access to raw materials and markets. Agreement on these general objectives, however, does not translate directly into agreement as to what US military strategy would best advance those objectives or what mix of forces best supports such a strategy.

(S) The purpose of the final PRM-10 report will be to highlight critical issues and to define alternative military strategies and force

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 31, [PRM-10 Interim Reports to President] [3]. Top Secret.

postures to assist you in the formulation of policies to guide the Department of Defense in developing its future programs and establishing a peacetime posture.

(S) Shaping an overall military strategy requires judgments about how the world is evolving politically, economically and technologically. The other part of PRM-10 (Net Assessment) is addressing this broad setting: the sources, nature and severity of threats; the political and economic health of the West; the degree and forms of competition with the Soviet Union; and the extent of instability in the Third World.

(C) Our approach to formulating alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS) is through substrategy building blocks that are interest-oriented, focusing on what the US wants to achieve as well as the threats to that achievement. Five analytical areas were defined:

TAB A: NATO-Warsaw Pact Conflict in Europe

TAB B: Non-European Operations During a NATO-WP War in Europe

TAB C: East Asia

TAB D: Peacekeeping Activities and Potential Local Wars

TAB E: US-USSR Homelands Nuclear Conflict²

(C) Military substrategies were chosen to provide a range of alternatives. Each needs to be considered as an individual, potential element in the design of overall US military strategies. The areas were chosen as sufficiently distinguishable to be analytically useful, though obviously they are interdependent. Resultant overlap will be eliminated as integrated strategies and force postures are evolved. For example:

Nuclear Forces: A major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union is addressed in the context of US-USSR Homelands Nuclear Conflict (TAB E), but strategic and theater nuclear forces are also addressed in the context of linkage to NATO (TAB A), political perceptions in China and Japan (TAB C), and nuclear proliferation in the Third World (TABS C and D).

Forces in Peacetime: Requirements for military forces are derived from wartime functions; i.e., what forces are needed to accomplish specific tasks in battle. However, military forces also serve a variety of peacetime functions, such as reassurance of allies and demonstrations of commitment. It is unlikely that forces need to be procured for those purposes that would not serve important wartime purposes. However, the peacetime functions can require some forces being deployed in different postures from those dictated by a pure warfighting perspective. Thus the peacetime functions of military force are analyzed not only in

² Tabs A–E are attached but not printed.

peacekeeping activities and potential local wars (TAB D), but also as a backdrop to diplomacy in Europe (TAB A) and in East Asia (TAB C).

Forces for Asia: Military forces in Asia are addressed in the context of maintaining a balance of power in East Asia (TAB C), of providing a capability to counter the Soviets in a worldwide war (TAB B), and of providing for peacekeeping activities or intervention in potential local wars (TAB D). If the US pursues a strategy in East Asia requiring a major military presence, the US would then have the ability to intervene in most potential conflicts, including conflict with the Soviets in Asia during a war in Europe. Conversely, if a strategy involving reduced peacetime presence in Asia were to be chosen, the US might still want to acquire deployable military forces for intervention in potential conflicts, including those in Asia.

(U) Included in the descriptions of the substrategies for each analytical area is a brief discussion of the likely political and military force implications. Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, it has been assumed that the military objectives and programs of both hostile and friendly nations will remain as described in existing intelligence projections. Thus, allied contributions and enemy threats have been taken as constant, across the spectrum of US strategy alternatives. This is an approximation that needs to be refined in subsequent study.

(U) The final chapter (TAB F)³ describes current US military strategies (or postures) and capabilities; the latter does not always correspond to the former. The next steps in the PRM-10 study will be:

- To integrate the substrategies into a representative set of alternative worldwide military strategies (the AIMS).

- To estimate a reasonable range of force postures, phased programs and funding, appropriate to each overall strategy. It should be recognized that the uncertainties or differences in judgment about what forces and programs are appropriate for which strategies are likely to be as great as the variations between adjacent strategies in the tabulation of alternative strategies.

- To assess the adequacy of alternative strategies and forces in terms of the ability of each strategy to achieve objectives. In this regard, the non-military components of national strategy (economic, diplomatic, etc.) are of major importance in determining such adequacy.

- To describe the domestic, economic, foreign policy, and arms control implications for each alternative strategy, as well as likely allied, Soviet, and third country reactions.

³ Attached but not printed.

Key Questions:

(S) Prior to the meeting, you may find it useful to focus on the following key questions which govern the development of military strategy and force postures. (Additional questions are presented at the end of the discussion of each analytical area.)

(1) NATO-Warsaw Pact: Should the US continue the current policy of urging NATO to improve its capabilities for conventional response to conventional attacks, or consider policies which would place greater reliance on nuclear weapons?

(2) NATO-Warsaw Pact: Should the US consider policies under which NATO would take the offensive against Warsaw Pact territory in response to aggression?

(3) NATO-Warsaw Pact: How much divergence should the US be willing to accept between its policies and those of its NATO Allies?

(4) Worldwide War: In a worldwide war with the Soviets, should the US be prepared to engage in operations outside of the European theater, recognizing that current strategy calls for the redeployment of some forces from the Pacific to reinforce NATO?

(5) East Asia: Should criteria for the selection of US military strategy in East Asia emphasize global containment of the Soviet Union or regional stability, which would presumably allow the Soviets more initiative?

(6) Local Wars: Should the US have military forces available to intervene in a crisis or local war situation, such as in the Middle East, without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes, such as reinforcing Europe?

(7) Homelands Exchange: To what extent should the US procure strategic nuclear forces, above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives, in order to respond to major US-Soviet force asymmetries? In other words, should we insist on perceived parity?

Harold Brown

17. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 6, 1977

SUBJECT

An Analysis of Your Upcoming Decision on Production of the B-1

This memo identifies the key factors that you should keep in mind as you think about Harold Brown's paper on the B-1.² It is based on an investigation of this issue carried out over several months by Victor Utgoff, a member of my staff. While I am not an expert on some of the more technical points raised, I support its conclusion.

The Decision

As you know, Rockwell International Corporation is tooling up for production of the B-1 at an initial rate of two aircraft per month. This effort is being made under an unusual contract in which the Air Force releases the money to the contractor on a monthly basis pending a final commitment by you to go ahead with production. This contract was written in anticipation of a decision by June 30, and contains a limit on the government's liability to the contractor if the decision is made before this date. If the decision is not made by then, the government's liability to the contractor in the event of termination might have to be determined through litigation.

While a decision could be put off further, it probably should not be, since the political and economic costs of terminating the program are rapidly increasing.

The Alternatives

There are four broad alternatives open to you:

- (1) Terminate the B-1 program completely;
- (2) Put a moratorium on production for perhaps two years;
- (3) Build up production slowly to a rate of two aircraft per month; or
- (4) Go ahead with production, building up to a rate of four aircraft.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 17, B-1 Bomber, President's File, 5-6/77. Secret; Sensitive. Special Access Required. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the first page of the memorandum: "Susan hold. J." Reference is to Susan Clough, Carter's personal secretary.

² Brown's draft memorandum to Carter, June 1, is in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B-1: 6/1-10/77.

The Analysis

There are many interacting factors bearing on your choice of an alternative. In order to make the structure of Harold's analysis and the key points as clear as possible, we have set out the high points with a minimum of detail.

Harold begins his argument by noting that the residual target destruction capability on both sides following a Soviet pre-emptive counterforce strike is projected to shift in favor of the Soviets before 1980, and will be more than 2:1 in their favor by 1985. While admitting that the real wartime significance of this advantage is uncertain, he says that perceptions of this Soviet advantage could have adverse effects, that we should do something about it, and that improvements in our bomber force are the only realistic near-term solution to the problem.

I believe that Harold is making too much of this measure. First, an assessment of the balance should compare similar things. A more appropriate assessment of the overall strategic balance would thus compare the situations in which the Soviets strike first to those in which we strike first. The Soviets' impression of the balance is undoubtedly strongly influenced by this second situation. In fact, our best estimate projections suggest that the ratio of U.S. to Soviet bomber and ICBM weapons remaining after a first strike by the U.S. is in our favor now and will be increasing in the early 80's.

Second, I question how meaningful "target destruction potential" is at higher levels. At the levels considered by Secretary Brown, we and the Soviets have long since run out of worthwhile targets. Should we spend vast sums to "make the rubble bounce?"

Finally, it doesn't seem appropriate to use any single measure as an indicator of the perceived balance. Perceptions of the balance are molded by many indicators and given current intelligence projections, we will be ahead in enough of them to be able to claim strategic parity or even some superiority for at least the next five to seven years, whether or not we modernize the bomber force.³

I would therefore argue that any need to modernize our bomber force with the B-1 requires an argument that the force we have is becoming unsatisfactory and that the B-1 is the right answer.

Harold continues by arguing that the bomber force plays an important role by hedging against possible reductions in the effectiveness of our ballistic missile forces, and by creating severe planning problems that can frustrate Soviet attempts to destroy both our bombers and ICBMs at the same time. Further, while the B-52 force is currently

³ Carter wrote "?" in the left margin next to this paragraph.

estimated to be very effective, the improvements projected for Soviet air defense by the mid to late 1980's are likely to reduce its effectiveness significantly. Thus, a significant improvement over the current B-52 force is probably required. I agree.

Examination of the backup study supporting Harold's memo indicates that arming the B-52 force with cruise missiles would significantly improve it.⁴ In particular, it would extend the period during which the B-52 can be expected to remain effective against projected Soviet air defenses. In addition, since all of the study's preferred alternatives for modernizing the bomber force include arming at least some portion of the B-52 force with cruise missiles, I conclude that *we should extend the B-52's usefulness in this way whether or not we proceed with the B-1.*

The result, however, is to also extend the period available for the production of the B-1 or the development and production of a different system. Thus, unless you believe there is a pressing need to buy the B-1 in order to improve perceptions, there is no argument forcing your hand; your decision can be made on the basis of the relative economic and political costs of the alternatives.

If you are reasonably certain that we are eventually going to build a significant force of 150 or more B-1's, the smallest political costs would probably be realized by going ahead now and building up to a production rate of two aircraft per month.

On the other hand, if you have doubts about whether or not we will eventually build a significant force of B-1's, you should probably accept the short-term penalties involved in choosing a delay. Clearly the political and economic losses involved will be much larger if we proceed with production only to discover that the B-1 will not handle the threat or that another alternative would have met our needs at considerably less cost.

Dealing with the Uncertainties

Obviously, there are large uncertainties on both scores, and a delay of several years could provide an opportunity to resolve some of them. Moreover, it is more likely than not that we will find during such a delay that building the B-1 is not a good idea.

—Specifically, we will know more about how the strategic balance, SALT, and Soviet air defenses are going to evolve. A slowdown in the evolution of the Soviet threat would militate against the B-1.

—We can also have a better idea of whether the electronic counter-measures—(ECM) that the B-1 is crucially dependent on—will work. I have reason to believe that the Soviets can build air defense systems

⁴ Not found attached.

that ECM cannot beat.⁵ At the least, we should test the B-1's ECM systems (which will be available in the fall of 1979) against our own AWAC's and look-down/shoot-down fighters, as well as against our best low altitude SAM systems.

—We can also get a better idea of how well our current cruise missiles might stand up against future Soviet air defense by testing them against our best air defense systems.

—Finally, we will know whether or not a promising new Air Force concept for building essentially invisible aircraft or cruise missiles will work.⁶ If it does, the arguments in favor of penetrating bombers may also disappear.

SALT

Another issue bearing on this decision is how it interacts with SALT, and clearly we have recognized an interaction in our efforts to preserve the option for a 2500 km ALCM. If you decide to deploy this system, we should make every effort to avoid having to count heavy bombers with long range ALCM's as MIRV's. Further, if we want to be able to eventually build a new long range cruise missile carrier, we must make certain that we have the right to define the new aircraft as a heavy bomber.

The announcement of your decision could conceivably impact on the ongoing SALT negotiations. However, the Soviets seem to have accommodated their thinking to the deployment of a long range ALCM or the B-1. Thus, unless your decision is accompanied by a claim that its purpose is to allow us to significantly raise our overall strategic capability, it probably won't have much impact on SALT.

A third conceivable interaction involves the Senate. Specifically a delay in B-1 production could raise further problems for ratification of a new SALT treaty. On the other hand, Senator Jackson recognizes that Boeing has a very good chance of winning a contract to produce cruise missiles and/or the replacement for the B-1. (He came close to opposing the B-1 during the campaign.)

One final point concerns costs. In particular, will delay of the B-1 program significantly increase its costs if we do end up building it? Harold's study suggests otherwise by showing that it is cheaper to delay production a year and then catch up by building four aircraft per month, than it is to start now and build at a rate of two aircraft per

⁵ See Tab A. [Footnote is in the original. Tab A, an undated one-page evaluation of Soviet air defense capabilities against the B-1's electronic counter measures, is attached but not printed.]

⁶ See Tab B. [Footnote is in the original. Tab B, an undated one-and-one-half page description of stealth cruise missiles along with an artist's rendering and a graph, is attached but not printed.]

month. Further, if during a delay we do find that the B-1 is not the right choice, we may avoid a 25 *billion* dollar mistake. A sum of this magnitude could go a long way toward buying a new Navy, or dramatically strengthening our conventional capabilities in Europe and thus reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

While Harold does not make a definite recommendation, he has favored the B-1 in the past, and his analysis points toward continuing with B-1 production. In view of the considerations I have outlined above, I believe that a delay in the production of the B-1 deserves the most careful evaluation.

The analysis relating to the ECM and the invisible cruise missile given at Tabs A and B is not included in Harold's memo.

18. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Political-Strategic Consequences of US Adoption of No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons Posture

This is in response to your request for my comments on this topic by COB today.

The U.S. could assume a no-first-use of nuclear weapons posture either unilaterally or bilaterally.² A posture may also be either general or qualified. The following comments are directed to four possible postures (one general, three qualified) in first their unilateral and then their bilateral versions.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO): 3/77-1/80. Top Secret. According to a typed notation on the memorandum, Richard Betts of the National Security Council Staff contributed to the memorandum.

² In theory there could be a multilateral assumption of such a posture involving the US, SU, and one or more other nuclear powers, but that *does* seem too far-fetched to discuss. [Footnote is in the original.]

*A. Unilateral Postures**A1. General No-First-Use*

The importance of declaratory policies and the consequences of changing them are often overemphasized. This could be true in this case. It is conceivable that a general US renunciation of first-use of nuclear weapons would not have much affect, for good or evil, on the actions of men and governments. Yet such a renunciation would clearly be the extreme instance of underlining the unimportance of declaratory policy. It is much more likely that US adoption of a general no-first-use posture would have significant political-strategic consequences. Presumably there would be some benefit in terms of a somewhat nebulous world public opinion concern with nuclear dangers. The principal consequences of such a posture, however, would be overwhelmingly undesirable.

(1) It would erode the credibility of the US deterrent posture in Europe and East Asia, which now benefits from benign ambiguity as to whether the US would or would not use nuclear weapons in response to major attacks on its allies.

(2) As a result, it could encourage and it certainly would do nothing to dissuade the Soviets and the North Koreans from pushing out.

(3) It could well lead to an increase in U.S. general purpose forces and a skyrocketing military budget as a result.

(4) It would produce a most unsettling “Carter-shock” for our European allies and Japan, confronting them directly with the hard choice which they have been so desperate to avoid of:

- (a) engaging in a major strengthening of their conventional forces;
- (b) modernizing (UK, France) or developing (FRG, Japan, ROK, ROC) their own nuclear weapons capabilities; or
- (c) accommodating to the Soviet Union; or
- (d) engaging in some combination of the above.

(5) It would raise doubts in the minds of PRC leaders as to U.S. willingness to oppose the Soviets in the crunch.

(6) It would generally encourage countries throughout the world to consider more seriously the development of their own nuclear capabilities.

(7) It would, presumably, remove any option for limited nuclear strikes against military targets in the context of a European conflict or otherwise.

(8) It would encourage the political forces in the US and among our allies who wish the US to take the unilateral initiative in reducing our nuclear capabilities to a minimum deterrence level. (If we’re not going to use them—except in retaliation, why do we need so much?)

All-in-all, in short, a unilateral, general no-first-use pledge would encourage our enemies, frighten our friends, and frustrate our purposes.

A2. *No-First-Use of Strategic Weapons*

The US could, conceivably, declare that it would never be the first to initiate use of *strategic* nuclear weapons. This would require weaving into the declaration a careful *definition*, contrived to fit our policy, of what systems or targets are “strategic” rather than tactical.

Such a posture could have certain advantages in terms of propaganda value. It would show that the U.S. is “responsible,” sees a middle ground between capitulation in conventional war and apocalyptic conflagration, and realizes what many believe has become obvious in the last decade: the coupling of the US strategic deterrent to European defense, when exercising it would entail the otherwise avoidable utter destruction of American society, has indeed lost much of its credibility.

The disadvantages of such a posture are, however, still major.

(1) It detracts from deterrence. By making explicit and official that the US recognizes the incredibility of strategic coupling, it gives away the advantage of the “irrationality” factor, i.e. the disincentive for a Soviet attack which flows from the possibility that the US might indeed respond to such an attack spasmodically or suicidally.

(2) It would preclude use of LNOs to counter limited conventional initiatives (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*). To define away such strikes as “unstrategic” would be unconvincing.

(3) Our allies and friends would still be greatly alarmed. NATO allies continue to prefer the coupling of the strategic deterrent to European defense and place substantial weight on retention of the US “irrationality” factor in deterrence. Moreover, the PRC might see such a pledge as weakness in American will, or a gratuitous gift to Soviet planners.

(4) The disadvantageous effects on our nuclear force-posture would be comparable to those of a general no-first-use posture.

A3. *No-First-Use Except in Defense of Self and Allies*

The US could declare that it would never use nuclear weapons first *unless* the territory or forces of the US or its allies were attacked.

This has several advantages.

(1) Who could object? Only those who seek *more* limitations on first-use, and this would make them no more unhappy than the present US stance.

(2) It would counter some of the propaganda advantage that accrues to the Soviets from their requests for a no-first-use pledge, and their portrayal of the US as more trigger-happy than they.

(3) It puts the onus on our adversaries. By making clear that we would initiate use of nuclear weapons only for defensive purposes, it highlights the fact that only Soviet (or North Korean or Chinese) aggression could ignite the nuclear powder keg. By giving our adversaries the “last clear chance,” it throws the burden of nuclear responsibility onto them.

(4) It does not detract from deterrence. Such a declaratory strategy does not constitute any concession that could be exploited in scenarios of crisis or escalation, since it does not really differ from our action policy, and because there are no plausible scenarios left uncovered in which we would want to use nuclear weapons first.

Its major disadvantage is that it doesn’t mean much. Precisely because of the last point, the pledge would seem to signify no change or compromise in our policy. Thus it could be beneficial in terms of the reactions of the uninformed, but to others it might seem to be empty rhetoric, at best, and a cynical ploy at worst.

A4. No-First-(or otherwise) Use Against Non-Nuclear Weapons States

The US could adopt the position that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. This would maintain the deterrent against the SU and China and hence not upset our major allies. It might give some encouragement to Kim Il Song to be nasty and to President Park to wonder about his own nuclear needs. But presumably the likelihood of our actually ever using nuclear weapons in Korea has never been all that great. As our current policy [*1 line not declassified*] to defend South Korea against North Korea without recourse to nuclear weapons. A pledge of this sort would also reap certain public relations advantage. In addition, of course, it would in general tend *to bolster* rather than to undermine our efforts to discourage nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, the probability that we would again use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state has not been very great for many years, and consequently this option also suffers the disadvantages of the previous one in being seen as a somewhat crude public relations ploy.

In general, no-first-use declarations if meaningful are undesirable and if desirable are not meaningful.

B. Bilateral Versions of the Above

Conceivably the US and the SU could jointly adopt one of the postures identified above. Since the adoption of any no-first-use posture involves some self-imposition of restraints, the benefits to the US of adopting any particular posture on a bilateral basis with the SU would generally be greater than going it alone. In addition, the bilateral adoption of a particular posture would furnish a commendable example of declaratory restraint on the part of the superpowers and would be

viewed as a commendable sign of improvement in SU-US relations. A bilateral approach does not, however, necessarily override the disadvantages inherent in particular no-first-use postures.

B1. A bilateral general no-first-use posture would still pose virtually all the problems for the US of a unilateral statement in terms of deterrent credibility, reassurance of allies, and nuclear proliferation. It would in fact be and would be viewed as a highly asymmetrical concession on the part of the US.

B2. A bilateral no-first-use of strategic weapons would be impossible to negotiate given the difficulties of defining what a strategic weapon is.

B3. A bilateral no-first-use except to defend self and allies would not have serious disadvantages from the US point of view, but it might give the Soviets the occasion to extend nuclear protection to other countries (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, Iraq, Libya) thereby raising the possibility of a Soviet escalatory response if these countries were subject to conventional attack by the US or *by other powers*.

B4. A bilateral no-first-use against non-nuclear weapons states would be generally harmless and could represent a significant joint effort by the US and the SU to reduce incentives towards nuclear proliferation.

Recommendation: That only options A3, A4, and B4 above be seriously considered as possible alternatives to current US constructive reticence on this subject.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Some Additional Observations On The B-1 Production Decision

In the analysis of the B-1 production decision that I sent you last week,² I sketched out what I see as the most important issues bearing on your decision. Since then, my staff has developed some

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B-1: 6/11-30/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² See Document 17.

additional observations which are summarized below. I hope you find them helpful.

Political Factors

There are at least two major political considerations bearing on this decision. First, as difficult as it might be to halt production now, halting now has got to be a far easier decision than trying to halt the program later if events unfold in such a way as to make you want to stop. Currently, we have about 35,000 people working on the B-1 and three aircraft behind us. Two years from now, if we continue, we will have more than 50,000 people working on the program and 15 to 20 aircraft behind us.

Second, a decision to halt the B-1 production program will be a tough one to sell to the Congress and the public given the current slow rate of progress in SALT and the enormous publicity that has been given to the Soviets' efforts to build up their strategic capabilities. Thus, it might be much easier to halt the B-1 production program if such a halt were accompanied by other actions designed to offset public concerns.

One package of actions that might have the desired effect was recently suggested by an OMB staffer. It consists of three elements: (1) Return the B-1 to an R&D program pending further test and evaluation; (2) Begin deployment of ALCM's on older B-52's; and (3) Begin an R&D program on a follow-on cruise missile carrier.

This package would suggest that we are responding to Soviet improvements in their overall capabilities by not only arming the B-52's with cruise missiles, but also by starting immediately on a completely new bomber system based on the ALCM. The R&D program for the new aircraft could be pursued at a relatively low and inexpensive level for several years, which might help to balance the 81 budget. This program could look at aircraft that are smaller than the 747 and would thus spread the eggs across more baskets. It could also examine the applicability to a cruise missile carrier of some of the more recent ideas for reducing radar cross section and IR signature. Finally, a more immediate prospect for a large aircraft contract in place of the B-1 might win some extra support from states with large aerospace concerns.

The Basis for the OSD Study of the B-1

In evaluating the large backup study sent over by Harold Brown,³ you should keep in mind the basis of some portions of that study. Specifically, while Harold's study is a very honest effort, it is nonetheless likely to be somewhat biased. This is because the relatively short time

³ Reference is to the "Staff Study for the Secretary of Defense: Modernization of the Strategic Bomber Force." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B-1: 2-5/77)

available for the study forced it to depend on significant portions of the analytical work done for its predecessor, the Joint Strategic Bomber Study (JSBS).⁴

The JSBS was done over three years ago by DOD at the request of the Congress. That study made a number of critical assumptions that tended to favor the B-1, and assumed the worst for the cruise missile. In fairness, this looks worse now than it did then because the cruise missile has now largely met or exceeded what were then only design goals. Nonetheless, the JSBS was sharply criticized by the Congress and by outside reviewers in the systems analysis community as being extremely biased.

Since then, various portions of the JSBS have been reexamined and in the process a great deal of bias against the cruise missile has been removed. We should not assume, however, that the cruise missile has now been given a completely fair shake. A really fair look at the relative cost effectiveness of the B-1 and the cruise missile would probably require a completely fresh start by a study team as impartial as this last one, and would probably require a year to do (the JSBS took slightly over a year). It would reexamine every assumption and would attempt to assess previously untreated effects such as the ability of large numbers of cruise missiles to attack in loosely spaced clusters and thus saturate the Soviets' air defenses.

Midcourse Threats

The OSD study argues that large cruise missile carriers could be particularly vulnerable to extended area defenses that would attempt to attack them before they launch their cruise missiles. The particular threat envisioned by the study is based on AWACS type aircraft and long range fighter interceptors.

This concept deserves careful study, particularly to determine why such a threat would have significantly more capability against a force consisting of perhaps 60 cruise missile carriers than it would against a force of perhaps 150 B-1's. (Note: Both forces carry about the same number of nuclear weapons.)

The study argues that a large cruise missile carrier would be difficult to mask with ECM; we would argue that an AWACS aircraft will be able to see either aircraft well enough to vector fighters out the bearing to the target at very long ranges.

The study also argues that because the large cruise missile carrier would present fewer targets it would be more vulnerable than the B-1. This argument implicitly assumes that 150 B-1's will be sufficient to

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976, Document 104.

saturate the defenses. However, this does not seem likely if the Soviets do develop the capability to build systems similar to our AWACS and look-down/shoot-down fighters. Our AWACS is designed to track 100 targets simultaneously. Further, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would not produce enough look-down/shoot-down fighters to insure that our force of B-1's will not saturate the defenses.

If our concept of this threat is valid, and saturation is thus not likely to be a significant problem for Soviet extended area defenses of this type, at best this type of defense will extract a percentage of whatever force attacks. In this case its impacts on the B-1 and the cruise missile carrier forces would be identical.

There are other midcourse threats that also deserve a more careful examination. As an example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is currently sponsoring a program that is looking into the feasibility of using some new developments in [1 line not declassified]. If this concept proves feasible, and we should have some indication [1 line not declassified], it could eventually become the basis of a severe threat to any of the strategic bomber systems considered in the OSD study.

In summary, we believe that the possibility of midcourse threats that could cut short the useful life of a new bomber force deserves a closer examination. Further, if worrisome threats of this type do look feasible, they may work just about as well against the B-1 as against the large type of cruise missile carrier considered in the OSD study.

20. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Mobile M–X Land Requirements

Secretary Brown has sent you a memo (Tab A) describing the status of the land on which a mobile M–X system might be deployed.² You will note that he calls attention to the politically-volatile environmental impact issue as well as the question of whether a mobile M–X is technically feasible.

Since the memo did not appear to be time urgent, my staff delayed sending it forward in order to include some additional perspectives on the M–X land requirement issue based on analyses done as part of NSC / PRM–10.³ Unfortunately these analyses were very contentious and led to the long delay in forwarding Secretary Brown’s original memo.

Secretary Brown’s memo provides a conceptual layout of 200 seven nautical mile long trenches at the Luke Gunnery Range and Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Each trench would contain one M–X. Analyses of M–X survivability undertaken as part of PRM–10 indicate that if the Soviets attacked this system (and the US silo-based ICBM force) with their projected 1986 ICBM forces in an attack designed to minimize surviving missiles, the number of surviving US ICBMs would be:

Fraction of Soviet ICBM Force Expended	Approximate Number of Surviving M–X ICBMs	Approximate Number of Surviving Silo-Based ICBMs
--	---	--

[3 columns, 3 rows not declassified]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 2–6/77. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum. Molander and Utgoff sent the memorandum to Brzezinski for his signature under a June 13 covering memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is a May 5 memorandum to Carter, from Brown, who wrote: “Here is some information on possible basing of M-X, which puts the ‘trench’ problem in context. The technical workability still needs to be argued convincingly. Moreover, environmental concerns will still exist. My evaluation: not impossible (as thousands of miles of trench in an extended publicly used area would be) but the feasibility, technical and political, is by no means proven.”

³ See Document 3.

These results assume that: (1) Soviet ICBM reliability is about 80 percent, (2) the Air Force is able to meet its goal of a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] hardness level for the encapsulated missile, and (3) an effective method can be found for nullifying the “shock tube” effect that will occur if the blast waves “get into” the tunnel. (If this occurs, the tunnel will act as a classic shock tube and propagate overpressure levels to substantially greater distances than would otherwise be possible.)

Subject to these uncertainties, the surviving ICBM forces in the above table would still have the capability to do substantial damage to the Soviet Union, but not nearly the level of damage we would prefer in each leg of the strategic Triad. Thus we will probably need more than the 1400 nm of trenches at Luke/Yuma if a trench-based M-X system is to guarantee a significant survivable ICBM force.

21. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 20, 1977

SUBJECT

B-1 Decision

I would like to add the following points to your deliberations on the B-1:

1. Attached is a memorandum from Congressman Les Aspin, prepared privately at my request.² As you remember, he briefed you before the second debate in San Francisco on defense matters.³ He is a respected defense expert with a generally liberal reputation on defense matters. For that reason his recommendation to build 90 B-1s is interesting.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 17, B-1 Bomber, President’s File, 5-6/77. Confidential; Not for Circulation. In the upper-right corner of the first page in the source text, Carter wrote, “Susan—w/ B-1 file. J”.

² Attached but not printed is a June 18 memorandum prepared by Aspin, who concluded that 90 B-1s, in addition to the existing B-52 force, would be “more than enough for any reasonable security requirements.” (Ibid.)

³ Reference is to the October 6, 1976, presidential debate between Carter and Ford.

2. During the course of other conversations with Governor Harriman Sunday,⁴ he made the following points:

a) the B-1 is an unnecessary weapons system which he has long opposed.

b) the decision on the B-1 should not be made until *after* the current SALT talks conclude because it *can* be effectively used as a bargaining chip to achieve a reduction in Russia's SS-20 missiles, because of the B-1's own throwweight.

c) the B-1 is viewed by Brezhnev as a "new weapons technology" which the U.S.S.R. would want to match, and Brezhnev's pride in achieving technology parity with the U.S. might lead him to trade postponement of the B-1's development for reductions in SS-20s. (The Soviet Backfire bomber is not a comparable plane to the B-1.)

3. As for my personal views, they were made evident during the campaign in the position we then took against the B-1. There is little reason for me as a non-military person to attempt to set forth military and cost implications with which you are more familiar. At this point I would urge you to oppose the B-1 to help maintain the credibility of your campaign promises (now extraordinarily high)—*unless* there are overriding national security implications which do not appear readily present to me.

If it is necessary to go ahead, I would hope you might consider a *very* low buy with a stretched out schedule, for use as a bargaining chip in SALT.

⁴ June 19. Reference is to W. Averell Harriman.

22. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 22, 1977

SUBJECT

Budgetary and Strategic Implications of the B-1 Production Decision

This memorandum responds to your request for a brief analysis of the budgetary and strategic implications of alternative options for modernizing the strategic bomber force. It was produced by a small working group of NSC and OMB staff members.

In moving this fast, we were forced to make some rough estimates. The information should be accurate enough to realistically appraise the relative merits of each of the options, however.

The Alternatives

Four general alternatives for modernizing the strategic bomber force were considered. These range from going ahead with B-1 production at the four aircraft per month rate that the Air Force wants, to complete termination of the B-1 program. The rationales for these options are summarized below.

—*Option 1.* Continue production of the B-1, building up to a maximum production rate of four aircraft per month by 1982. This option equips the B-52Gs with cruise missiles at a modest rate of 20 aircraft per year starting in 1981. The objectives of these conversions are to complicate the Soviets air defense problem, and to extend the effective lifetime of the B-52Gs. These objectives are not pursued vigorously, however, in view of the rapid and extensive deployment of the B-1.

—*Option 2.* This is an elaboration of Harold Brown's tentative recommendation. It slowly builds up the B-1 production rate to a maximum of two aircraft per month. It also equips first B-52Gs and later B-52Hs with cruise missiles. These conversions are pursued more vigorously than in Option 1 in order to offset the slower rate of acquisition of the B-1.

—*Option 3 (Variant A).* This is an elaboration of the two-year delay concept I suggested in my previous memos. It cuts off the current production program for the B-1, buying only three aircraft over the next three years for test and evaluation purposes. In addition, it begins an R&D program for a new cruise missile carrier. Under this variant, we

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B-1: 6/11–30/1977. Top Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote in the top right corner of the memorandum: "The President has seen."

assume that events unfold in such a way as to make the B-1 clearly undesirable. Thus this variant assumes a shift toward a pure standoff bomber force starting in 1981. This shift is accomplished by equipping the B-52Gs and some B-52Hs with cruise missiles, starting in 1981 and proceeding at a fairly high rate. Under this variant, the new cruise missile carrier is procured at a relatively slow rate which builds up the overall capability of our bomber force and allows eventual replacement of our oldest B-52s.

—*Option 3 (Variant B).* This is the other half of Option 3 and is identical to 3 (Variant A) through 1980. However, this variant assumes that events unfold in such a way as to make the B-1 clearly desirable. Thus, in 1980 it begins a buildup to a high production rate of four B-1s per month. In addition, given the high rate of procurement for the B-1, it equips B-52Gs with cruise missiles at the same slow rate assumed for Option 1.

—*Option 4.* This option terminates the B-1 program completely. As an offset, it equips the B-52Gs and some B-52Hs with cruise missiles at the same relatively high rate assumed under Option 3 (Variant A).

The numbers of forces procured or equipped with cruise missiles each year under each of these options are given in Table I. All four options retain most of the current B-52 force over the 10-year period considered. Thus, Options 1 through 3 increase the overall size of our strategic bomber force. In fact, in order to stay within the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of 2400 specified in the Vladivostok agreement, Options 1 and 3 (Variant B) must destroy about 175 off-line B-52s (we currently have a total inventory of about 525 B-52s) or an equivalent number of missiles.

Given the prospects for reductions below 2400 in SALT II, even greater numbers of older strategic systems might have to be destroyed during the next 10 years. We did not delve into the details of what might have to be eliminated; however, such reductions do not appear to impact significantly on the relative advantage of any of the four options we consider here; we carry out all the calculations given below in terms of the Vladivostok agreement.

Budgetary Implications

The investment costs for each of these options are given in Table II. These costs are reported in budget (inflated) dollars in the first four columns. The last column gives the investment costs for each option over the next 10 years, in constant dollars. These last figures reflect the real resource costs to our economy of each option.

In my view, Options 2 and 3A/B are the most practical choices. Both have considerably lower near-term costs than Option 1.

Comparison of Option 2 with Option 3A/B shows that either of the Option 3 variants will be significantly cheaper over the next five years. Further, if you choose Option 3, and by 1980 find that the cruise missile path (Variant A) is the way to go, you save a great deal of money any way you look at it. In addition, if you choose Option 3 and find you want the B-1 after all, Option 3 (Variant B) provides the entire 240 B-1s sought by the Air Force by 1987 at little or no increase in real costs.

Finally, in budget dollars, although Option 3 (Variant B) will be more expensive than Option 2 over the next 10 years by about 15%, it will produce 35% more B-1 bombers over this period.

Strategic Implications

The two most important contributions that a strategic bomber force conceivably makes to our security are:

(1) It provides an objective capability to cause great damage to anyone we attack; and

(2) it contributes to subjective impressions of the state of the US/USSR strategic forces balance.

In terms of the first contribution, the differences between the four options we are examining are not significant, at least for the next 10 years. Over that period, no matter which option is chosen, we will have far more than enough deliverable weapons to give us very high confidence in our ability to destroy virtually all of the significant targets in the Soviet Union. This will be true even if we have absorbed the most effective counterforce strike that the Soviets can make against us and even if we are caught completely by surprise.

The options may differ significantly in their impact on subjective impressions of the strategic balance, however. In order to assess this possibility, we have constructed the attached plots showing the relative numbers of deliverable inventory warheads, and amounts of deliverable inventory equivalent megatonnage and throw weight, for both the Soviets and ourselves—plots are given for each of our four bomber modernization options.

These three measures are probably as reasonable a set of determinants of the perceived strategic balance as any others. My own view is that number of deliverable warheads is probably the single most important determinant; amount of deliverable equivalent megatonnage is slightly less important. Inclusion of throw weight seems somewhat redundant since this measure is really only an indicator of each side's ability to deliver nuclear weapons or equivalent megatonnage, an ability that is included to a large degree in the first two measures. I have included throw weight, however, because it has become the focus of so much attention in recent years.

Examination of the plots yields the following observations:

—For the next ten years, we can expect to hold a considerable edge over the Soviets in numbers of warheads; they can expect to hold an advantage over us in total equivalent megatonnage; they will have an advantage over us in total throw weight unless we increase the size of our bomber force dramatically—i.e., build up to the level of 2400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

—Our advantages in warheads can be preserved pretty much equally well by either of the compromise options (2, 3 A/B).

—Only the options which add the B-1 to the B-52 force (1, 2, 3 Variant B) prevent the Soviets from widening their advantage in equivalent megatonnage.

—While the Soviets' advantage in throw weight is reduced by the B-1 add-on options, aggressive deployment of the cruise missile as done by Option 3 (Variant A) can keep this advantage from increasing significantly.

—To the extent that perceptions are satisfactory in the very near term (79), and to the extent that they are determined by these measures, perceptions of the strategic balance should remain acceptable or improve under either of the compromise options (2, 3 A/B).

—Though the delay option (3 A/B) falls somewhat behind Option 2 (Harold's tentative choice) by the very early 80s, if we decide that we need the B-1 after all, Option 3 (Variant B) can catch up and surpass Option 2 by 1984.

In summary, it appears that any of the compromise options should at least preserve current perceptions of the strategic balance; purchase of the B-1, or pursuit of even more aggressive cruise missile options than considered here, could begin to shift perceptions of the balance in our favor.

Modernization of US Strategic Forces

One argument commonly made in favor of producing the B-1 now is that if we don't, we will have no immediate answer to the modernization programs the Soviets are currently pursuing. This argument ignores several modernization programs that the US currently has underway—the Trident program, the modernization of the MM III force, and the Navy and Air Force cruise missile programs.

This argument also ignores the fact that the initial deployments of ALCMs on B-52s can be made just as rapidly as the initial deployments of B-1s even if we continue with the current B-1 production program.

Interactions with the M-X

An argument can be made that failure to go ahead with the B-1 would increase pressures to build the M-X. Perhaps so, but by the time

the Soviets deploy ballistic missile systems good enough to destroy the Minuteman force (and they have not yet), we could have a cruise missile carrier developed and ready for deployment. To the extent that improvements in our strategic bomber force can alleviate pressures to deploy the M-X, deployment of either the B-1 or a new cruise missile force should work about equally well.

A Bureaucratic Problem

Our final observation concerns the ongoing competition between the B-1 and the cruise missile advocates in the Pentagon. Because of this competition, the cruise missile programs have taken a back seat to the B-1 program, at least within the Air Force. Thus, if you choose Option 3, and thereby continue the perceived competition between the B-1 and the ALCM, the cruise missile programs will probably continue to receive less than enthusiastic support. To avoid this, you and Harold would have to show strong personal interest in these programs.

Continued Support

Your decision on the B-1 production question is clearly not an easy one—a fact that has become quite obvious to me as I have carried out my investigation of it. Though the three memos I have sent you cover what I see as the major factors bearing on your decision,² I would be more than willing to provide additional analysis if you would find it helpful.

If you would like me to subject some additional bomber modernization options to the sort of analysis presented in this memo, I can probably turn your requests around in a single day. I could also set up a small meeting to discuss the issues involved in this decision, and answer any questions you may have.

Finally, the presentation to the Congress and the public of whatever decision you make will be important not only in terms of acceptability but for what it will convey to our allies, the Soviets, the Chinese and the world at large. I believe it would be the occasion for an authoritative statement by you on how we view the strategic relationship with the USSR and how we plan to respond to the Soviet strategic programs.

In this connection, let me reiterate my strong feeling that Option 4—if that is your choice—should be related to a US-Soviet SALT bargain. Option 3-A can also be related to SALT in that it could be made clear to the Russians that as part of the three-year interim protocol we are deferring the deployment of the B-1, subject to later agreements with regard to the issues covered by the protocol. In particular, Option

² The three memos on the B-1 production decision are printed as Documents 17, 19, and 22.

3-A or 4 could ease the differences we have with the Soviets regarding ALCMs and the MIRV limits.

In any case, I do feel that either a completely negative or partially negative decision on the B-1 ought to be exploited by us in our negotiations with the Soviets, given the openly stated Soviet concern over the B-1. Otherwise, your critics in Congress will have another argument against your decision.

Operationally, the above would mean postponing any public announcement of Option 4 or being imprecise as to the duration of the stretchout in Option 3-A, pending talks with the Soviets.

Table I

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC BOMBER MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
(Yearly Production/Conversion)⁴

	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>
1. Continue current B-1 plan; Maximum rate 4/month											
B-1's	3	5	13	27	42	48	48	48	6	0	0
B-52's with Cruise Missiles	—	—	—	—	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
Cruise Missile Carrier	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2. Slow B-1 production buildup; Maximum rate 2/month											
B-1's	3	5	6	6	13	24	24	24	24	24	24
B-52's with Cruise Missiles	—	—	—	—	20	20	30	30	30	30	30
Cruise Missile Carrier	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3A. Two year delay in further B-1 production; Initiate R&D on cruise missile carrier (CMC). Assumes B-1 terminates in 1980 and production commences on CMC											
B-1's	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B-52's with Cruise Missiles	—	—	—	—	20	40	40	40	40	20	—
Cruise Missile Carrier		r/d	r/d	r/d	3	6	6	12	12	12	12

³ Top Secret.

⁴ Note that the forces procured or converted in any given year appear on-line perhaps 18 months later. [Footnote is in the original.]

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC BOMBER MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
(Yearly Production/Conversion)

3B. Two year delay on further B-1 production; Initiate R&D on CMC. Assumes B-1 production resumes in 1980 at maximum rate, and no CMC production	B-1's	<u>77</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>87</u>
	B-52's with Cruise Missiles	1	1	1	5	13	27	42	48	48	48	6
	Cruise Missile Carrier	—	—	—	—	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
4. Terminate B-1 production; Plan no new aircraft			r/d	r/d	r/d	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	B-1's	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	B-52's with Cruise Missiles				—	20	40	40	40	40	20	—

Table II

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

		STRATEGIC BOMBER INVESTMENT OPTIONS (\$ BILLIONS)					Washington, undated
		1979	1981	5 Years 1978–82	10 Years 1978–87 (Current \$)	10 Years 1978–87 (Constant \$)	
1. Continue Current B–1 Plan; maximum rate 4/month.	TOA	3.2	4.2	17.2	25.3	21.0	
2. Slow B–1 Production Buildup; maximum rate 2/month.	Outlays	2.0	3.5				
	TOA	2.2	3.7	13.1	25.3	18.9	
	Outlays	1.8	2.4				

⁵ Secret; Sensitive.

	1979	1981	5 Years 1978-82	10 Years 1978-87 (Current \$)	10 Years 1978-87 (Constant \$)
3A. Two-year delay on further B-1 production; initiate R&D on cruise missile carrier (CMC). Assumes B-1 terminates in 1980 and production commences on CMC.	TOA 1.6	2.0	7.8	16.6	13.2
	Outlays 1.5	1.1			
3B. Two-year delay on further B-1 production; initiate R&D on CMC. Assumes B-1 production resumes in 1980 at maximum rate, and no CMC production.	TOA 1.6	2.6	12.7	28.8	21.5
	Outlays 1.5	1.8			
4. Terminate B-1 production; plan no new aircraft.	TOA .7	.9	4.1	6.0	4.6
	Outlays .6	.6			

Plot 1

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

[No classification marking. 1 page not declassified.]

Plot 2

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

[No classification marking. 1 page not declassified.]

Plot 3

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

[No classification marking. 1 page not declassified.]

23. Editorial Note

On June 30, 1977, President Jimmy Carter held a news conference which he began with a prepared statement: "During the last few months, I've done my best to assess all the factors involving production of the B-1 bomber. My decision is that we should not continue with deployment of the B-1, and I am directing that we discontinue plans for production of this weapons system." Carter noted that the United States would continue the existing B-1 research and development program to learn more about the potential of the bomber and its systems, such as electronic countermeasures techniques, as well as assess the implications of the ongoing strategic arms limitations negotiations for future nuclear weapons delivering system investments. He continued: "In the meantime, we should begin deployment of cruise missiles using

air-launched platforms, such as our B-52's, modernized as necessary. Our triad concept of retaining three basic delivery systems will be continued with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a bomber fleet, including cruise missiles as one of its armaments. We will continue thereby to have an effective and flexible strategic force whose capability is fully sufficient for our national defense." For the full text of Carter's remarks, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pages 1197–1208.

24. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 6, 1977

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on PRM-10 Net Assessment, July 7, 1977

I. Purpose of the Meeting

Our goals are to get SCC

1) approval for the submission of the Net Assessment (minus the strategies, if necessary) to the President;

2) agreement on the desirability of a follow-on SCC meeting, after the PRCs on PRM-10, for further discussion of the framework elaborating national strategies.

To achieve these two outcomes, it would be useful to guide the discussion toward:

1. Consensus on the current shape of the US-SU balance as described in the Net Assessment (static);

2. Agreement on the trends in the balance which should be of concern for the US in the overall competition with the Soviet Union (dynamic);

3. Common understanding of the opportunities and strengths on which the United States can capitalize in the competition.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 27, Meetings-20: 7/7/77. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Brackets are in the original. The June 29 Overview Report prepared by the Comprehensive Net Assessment Group in response to PRM/NSC-10 is *ibid*.

The discussion at the July 7 meeting should provide an important framework for the later consideration of both national strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the key military and force posture issues to be presented to the PRC.

II. *Issues For You to Focus On*

A. *The profile of the present balance.* The Net Assessment concludes that at present (Era II), the US–SU competition shows a rough overall asymmetrical equivalence exists in military capabilities and significant American advantage in most non-military aspects of national power. This represents a shift, however, from the previous pattern (Era I) of US dominance in all areas. It results from the growth of Soviet military power, strategic and conventional, in the 1960s and early 1970s.

The assessment notes five key developments within the Era II balance:

1. The new incongruence in US–SU capabilities, given increased Soviet military strength.
2. The changing role of military force under rough parity, with conventional strength achieving added significance.
3. The certainty of political uncertainty, particularly in European politics (East and West), in Chinese relationships, and in the Third World.
4. The rise in the importance of the Middle East to US–SU competition.
5. The emergence of regionally influential Third World states which are also active in the global arena.

B. *The direction of present trends.* Current and foreseeable trends are generally less favorable to the United States. Trends in the political sphere (political institutions and leaderships, capacities for political-ideological action) and in economic productivity favor the U.S. In some other areas, such as intelligence capabilities and core alliances, the trends are mixed. And in many key areas, the dynamics either favor the SU or are against the US: strategic forces, conventional forces in Europe, mobilization and force projection capabilities, short-run economic interaction payoffs, and the diplomatic balance, especially in Africa and Latin America.

C. *The significance of present trends.* These adverse and mixed trends vary widely in significance. Categories for discussion are:

1. Trends which will be halted/reversed if planned US and allied improvements are carried out (e.g., in strategic forces, military balance on the Central Front).
2. Trends which do not yet pose significant challenges to the US (e.g., in force projection capabilities, Latin America).

3. Trends which could prove more troublesome in the next five years, without US action (e.g., in mobilization capabilities, erosion of US diplomatic position [especially if ties to local leviathans are eroded], a “one-way-street” in transfers of technology and capital to the East, covert action capabilities, Soviet action in Africa).

4. Trends on which US direct impact is limited (e.g., political uncertainty and weakness in Europe, China, Third World).

D. *The advantages on which the United States can capitalize.* There are five general areas in which the United States can exploit its opportunities to further advantage in the US–SU competition:

1. Economic strength—the general level of US productivity as well as the attraction it possesses for the East, the regional influentials, and the more developed states of the Third World.

2. Diplomatic resources—the large number of stable relationships the US has and can continue to have with the trilateral states, the local leviathans, and its regional clients.

3. Technological capacity—US technological dynamism and broad across-the-board lead in areas relevant to both the Soviet’s and Third World states.

4. Political-ideological action—the US ideological initiative and overall capacities—both public and private plus those of our allies—for influencing political attitudes and processes in other societies.

5. Force projection capabilities—the superior “global reach” of the US.

E. *Outcomes and strategies of Era II.* Given the existing balance, the possible outcomes of Era II US–SU competition can be analyzed in terms of two basic questions:

1. Whether US–SU relations become more competitive, more cooperative, or stay about the same.

2. Whether the global power balance shifts toward the SU or the US, or remains about as it is now.

The nine possible outcomes are presented in the following chart. Outcome A1 would be most desirable but probably impossible. Outcomes C2, C3, and B3 are clearly undesirable. Each of the remaining five outcomes could be feasible and could be reached by one of the alternative strategies outlined: condominium, cooperative, status quo, initiatives and preeminence.





Any discussion of these outcomes and strategies in detail is clearly premature. It is, however, appropriate to elicit agreement *now* on the desirability of attempting to develop a national strategy; presumably at a SCC meeting to follow PRC consideration of the force posture questions and packages.


III. *Pitfalls to be Avoided*


1. Extended discussion of DOD's key questions or AIMSES.
2. Specific details of the Assessment (every specialist will find something wrong in his area).
3. Queries as to why report does not cover:
 - a. Specific policy recommendations
 - b. Specification of policy options
 - c. Other global issues beyond US–SU competition
 - d. Evaluation criteria
 - e. Overlap with DOD effort.
4. Controversy about specific break-points between Era I and Era II, and relationship of these to detente.
5. Premature discussion of, and rejection of, national strategies.

CHART 1²

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF ERA II
US–SU COMPETITION AND RELATED US STRATEGIES

US–SU Relations	US–SU Power Balance		
	A More Favorable to US	B Current Balance	C More Favorable to SU
1. More Cooperative	A1 	B1— Cooperative strategy	C1— Condominium strategy
2. Current Mix	A2— Initiatives strategy	B2— Status quo strategy	C2 
3. More Competitive	A3— Preeminence strategy	B3 	C3 

Undesirable Outcomes 

Impossible Outcomes 

²Secret.

IV. Objections and Agreements to Expect

DOD/ISA

Harold Brown's position is unclear but recent protest within both OSD and the JCS has apparently caused second thoughts about pressing ahead with the AIMS concept for the PRM-10 PRC meeting. Therefore, Brown and McGiffert may be more reserved or defensive than we originally anticipated in objecting to the Net Assessment.

JCS

The JCS line will be that the Assessment is too optimistic on certain military judgments, especially the Central Front and in naval issues, but these objections are less important than their fundamental approval of the Net Assessment. They will probably agree that it should go to the President.

STATE

The State objective is to reduce the Net Assessment to insignificance and perhaps to emphasize the AIMSES of the DOD side of PRM-10. Their tactic is grudging approval of the Assessment as "useful" but complete rejection of the "outcomes and strategies" (and implicitly, the study itself) as being too narrowly focused on the US-SU competition. They will again argue the need to consider 1) other issues of global concern and 2) the need for more attention to US-SU cooperation. Reference to the PRM and to the TOR should put this to rest once again. Portions of State (PM, SP) believe that the assessment is too gloomy in its judgment of Soviet military capabilities and that the study may, if widely publicized, further exacerbate present US-SU tensions.

OMB

Basically they approve the Assessment but will probably recommend that the discussion of national strategies be omitted until these are further developed.

CIA

They will probably approve the Net Assessment and call for further work on the strategies.

ACDA

Warnke's view is unclear. He is doing his own homework and apparently is intrigued by the methodological inadequacies of the AIMSES. He should not be allowed to divert the discussion from the Net Assessment to a critique of the AIMSES. That is for the PRC on Friday!!³

³July 8.

V. Where You Would Like to Come Out

1. General consensus on the balance and pattern of trends described in the Net Assessment.

2. Agreement on the submission of the Net Assessment to the President once minor modifications are made.

3. Agreement on a follow-on SCC meeting, after the PRC consideration of the force posture study, to discuss national strategies.

25. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 7, 1977, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

PRM/NSC–10 Comprehensive Net Assessment

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Vance

Leslie H. Gelb

Defense

Secretary Brown

Charles W. Duncan

Lynn E. Davis

JCS

Gen. George S. Brown

Lt. General William Y. Smith

CIA

Adm. Stansfield Turner

Robert R. Bowie

OMB

Bert Lance

Edward R. Jayne

ACDA

Paul C. Warnke

Spurgeon Keeny

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David L. Aaron

Samuel P. Huntington

Catherine M. Kelleher

Col. William E. Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The first meeting of the SCC on PRM/NSC–10 focused on the general conclusions of the Net Assessment. Three basic issues were discussed:

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 27, Meetings–20: 7/7/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Minutes of the meeting were not found.

1. *What is the present balance of power between the US and the SU?*

—All present agreed with the conclusion of the Net Assessment that there is a rough overall asymmetrical equivalence in military capabilities and that the US remains significantly ahead of the SU in most non-military aspects of national power.

—With respect to strategic forces, it was agreed that the current situation is one of relatively stable essential equivalence, but that uncertainties exist with respect to increasing Soviet accuracy, Soviet civil defense, and the apparent asymmetry in the protection of command and control capabilities.

—On the Central Front, Warsaw Pact forces exceed those of NATO, but neither side can be confident that it will be able to achieve its objectives in a major conflict, with the principal Soviet uncertainty being whether NATO will use nuclear weapons.

—In terms of naval and force projection capabilities, the US is superior, but uncertainties exist in the eastern Mediterranean and the US and the SU have about equal ability to project forces into the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have also demonstrated their ability to support Angola-like proxy interventions.

—With respect to non-military capabilities, US advantages could even be somewhat greater than indicated in the assessment.

2. *What is the direction of current trends and how significant are these for the balance?* There was general agreement with the Net Assessment findings that:

—Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in Europe are improving significantly, and only concerted Western efforts to fulfill present improvement programs would halt (but not reverse) current trends in their favor in the military balance on the Central Front.

—The US retains a political-ideological attraction for the Third World as well as the ability to provide economic and technological benefits. Some uncertainty was expressed as to whether, as the Assessment indicates, there had been erosion in the US diplomatic standing in the past decade as a result of the increased autonomy and assertiveness of Third World countries. The point was also made that this Administration was identifying itself with a broad segment of world opinion on issues such as human rights and Africa.

The discussion also highlighted two dangerous trends which might tempt Soviet action:

—increasing political and economic uncertainties in Western and Eastern Europe which could lead Soviet leaders in the midst of a succession struggle into cautious adventurism;

—the increased dependence on the West on the Persian Gulf oil supplies.

3. *How can the United States and the Soviet Union exploit their present advantages to affect the future balance?* All agreed with the Assessment that the Soviets would now be more prone to use military power for political ends, although there was some disagreement as to:

—whether the Soviets had already been able to use their new military standing for political compellance;

—whether increased Western European (particularly German) attentiveness to Soviet concerns was a direct result of new Soviet influence, and thus represented a form of Finlandization.

All supported the judgment of the Assessment that:

—the primary US advantage lay in economic and technological assets;

—these could yield little direct leverage over Soviet behavior or influence over internal political development;

—these could be best used to constrain Soviet opportunities or reduce Western vulnerabilities in key regions (e.g., Middle East, PRC, Yugoslavia).

In addition, it was argued that the large American technological and industrial base allows the US to put competitive pressure on the USSR which could encourage Moscow to seek relief through arms control.

26. Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 8, 1977, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

PRM–10 Military Strategy and Force Posture

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President (first hour)

A. Denis Clift

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown, Chairman

Charles W. Duncan

David E. McGiffert

Lynn E. Davis

JCS

General George S. Brown

Lt Gen William Y. Smith

State

Deputy Secretary Warren

Christopher

Leslie H. Gelb

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Robert Bowie

OMB

Bowman Cutter

Edward R. Jayne II

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny

Robert Behr

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David L. Aaron

Victor Utgoff

James Thomson

Samuel Huntington

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

In a meeting to discuss the general purpose force issues highlighted in the July 6, 1977 Military Strategy and Force Posture report,² the PRC reviewed the following issues:

1. *US Strategy for Europe*. Dr. Brzezinski stated that it is not possible in the current political environment to gain support—in the US or especially in Europe—for procurement of the conventional forces required to assure that NATO could maintain territorial integrity if deterrence failed. Most participants agreed. Dr. Brzezinski proposed a “stalemate” strategy, under which NATO would fall back and stalemate the Soviets, leaving the Soviets to face the political consequences of their aggression, including a mobilized US. These potential consequences would help deter the Soviets. General Brown, however, thought that NATO could move in the direction of preventing territorial loss by maintaining

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 62, PRC 022, 7/8/77, US/USSR—PRM 10. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² The July 6 Military Strategy and Force Posture is *ibid*.

the 3% per year growth in real defense spending agreed to at the May NATO Defense Ministerial meeting. All agreed that strategy for NATO must continue to rely on a combination of strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces for deterrence, and that we wanted first to emphasize conventional force improvements. After current efforts at improved conventional capability have succeeded or failed, we may want to turn to theater nuclear policy, especially the potentially critical role of the land-based cruise missile. The group agreed that a distinction between declaratory strategy and actual capability was necessary; for example, we cannot—for political reasons—announce a strategy that includes any loss of West German territory.

2. *Operations outside of Europe during a NATO/Pact War.* There was general agreement that taking initiatives against the Soviet Union, especially Soviet territory, could have important consequences in a war: they might provide trading material, hurt the Soviets' ability to prosecute war in Europe, or divert Soviet forces. Secretary Brown, however, did not see any opportunities that would worry the Soviets enough to help in the context of a war in Europe. Mr. Aaron suggested that it may be more important to defend our access to the Persian Gulf than to take initiatives.

3. *Crisis Management and Local Wars.* The participants generally agreed that forces procured for this purpose should be added to those required for a NATO/Warsaw Pact war. The Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Korea would be the most important areas. Forces acquired for these purposes would be ample to handle contingencies that might occur elsewhere. Dr. Brzezinski suggested the creation of a highly responsive, global strike force; the Second Division might become available for this purpose after its withdrawal from Korea is complete.

4. *East Asia.* All agreed that, beyond the ground force withdrawals from Korea, the US should make no further changes in its military posture in the Far East for the time being. Some thought that a few small steps towards increasing our presence—such as filling out the fighter wing in Korea or undertaking some exercises with ground force units—might help assure Far Eastern nations that we intend to remain a Far Eastern power.

5. *Forces and Costs.* There was concern, expressed particularly by Mr. Aaron and Mr. Jayne, that the large range of forces estimated for the alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS) made it difficult to understand the cost constraint on the choice of strategy. Secretary Brown agreed to do further work on that aspect.

Minutes

Secretary Brown: I want to start with some introductory remarks. This part of the PRM-10 effort was not designed to produce specific force postures. Rather, the approach was based on creating analytical building blocks for various geographical areas of the world or fields of conflict. These were put together to create illustrative strategies, or AIMS, to see what the overall strategy would look like and the kinds of forces that would be required.

The study did not define national objectives. It did not investigate theater nuclear forces. It did not look into the problems of mobilization and industrial bases.

A set of questions emerged from the study that I want to discuss here today and that I hope to use to elicit guidance from the President. I don't believe this study provides a basis for overall military strategy and force posture decisions. We in DOD will be taking a look at where we are today, where we want to be, and what sorts of incremental changes we should be making, depending on what emerges in the future.

Let's turn to the first question. Zbig, would you like to begin?

Dr. Brzezinski: First, I would like to ask: How do the AIMS relate to the questions? I noticed that on page two the study leads off with a description of the AIMS.

Secretary Brown: Well, let's take Europe as an example. AIMS E, F and G all have the property of blunting a Soviet attack but losing territory. H and I would be more demanding; in these AIMS we would recover lost territory and would be able to sustain conflict for 90 days. In AIMS J we would sustain conflict indefinitely. And in AIMS M we would counterattack on the flanks. AIMS E, F, and G correspond roughly to what we can do today. AIMS F Variant corresponds to what we say we can do today. The rest of the AIMS are more than we can do today.

Dr. Brzezinski: Just to get things going, I think that US military strategy for Europe ought to be neither intimidation nor deterrence but some degree of ambiguity so that Soviet military planners can't calculate precisely what would happen if they attack. This implies the maintenance of our strategic forces and the current relationship of theater nuclear forces to conventional forces and strategic forces. If deterrence fails, our posture ought to be to blunt the Soviet attack. It is unreasonable to hope to restore boundaries. The Europeans simply won't spend the money to accomplish that.

Secretary Brown: How would you handle this policy with West Germany? Our present declaratory posture is forward defense.

Dr. Brzezinski: What matters is how the Soviets view this posture. If we can blunt them and stalemate the conflict, then the Soviets would

have to deal with a massive adverse political reaction, both in America and throughout the world. They would be put on the political defensive. This range of uncertainty about what would occur, including the consequences of a stalemate, is likely to deter the Soviets.

General Brown: I don't understand how you feel that a stalemate strategy will deter the Soviets. If we can't get back territory, then they would simply be able to grab it.

Dr. Brzezinski: But they would have to deal with the long-term political consequences of such an act. I'm not saying that I like this strategy, but it's the best we can do: the Allies are a problem—they won't do more—and I'm not sure we can afford a buildup, either.

General Brown: That's saying that we can't match the Soviets militarily.

Secretary Brown: We cannot match them in building up a massive military establishment.

Dr. Brzezinski: Okay. Look at AIMS H and I and see what they cost. Congress won't fund that. We simply have to hope that the long-term consequences of a potential stalemate will act as a restraint on the Soviets.

General Brown: The restraint will act on us, not them.

Secretary Brown: If we hope for a stalemate, then what do we do about sustaining capability? Zbig seems to be talking about a situation where we would rely on a massive mobilization base. We need advance planning for that and don't have it.

Dr. Brzezinski: How about 60 days? I don't like 90 days because that means a long destructive war in Europe. But 30 days is just simply too short; it's risky. Sixty days is obviously an arbitrary intermediate number. But we need some time to put pressure on the Soviets.

General Brown: The JCS starting point is NATO strategy—the military strategy that has been developed in MC 14/3. We commit forces on that basis to NATO every year. The US and the FRG are the two strong partners of the Alliance. I fear that if we begin now to take a dramatic step in new directions, we are going to have problems, especially with the Germans and especially if we appear to back off NATO strategy. The JCS think: we have to be able to stop a Warsaw Pact attack; we have to throw the Soviets back to the pre-war boundaries.

Dr. Brzezinski: But how many forces do we need for that?

General Brown: Options I, J, and M are about what we think NATO needs. Zbig's options are F, H, and I.

Secretary Brown: Zbig is talking about F Variant with 60 days.

Mr. Aaron: General Brown, what could we do today?

General Brown: The JCS judgment is shown in the study itself.

Dr. Brzezinski: Is that orderly withdrawal?

General Brown: Between just us and the Germans we could do better than that.

Secretary Brown: Essentially it's the "limit loss" strategy. Look at the chart on page III-3.

General Brown: But we don't have 90 days of sustaining capability.

Secretary Brown: But we have more than 30. We plan to keep 30 in the theater.

Admiral Turner: I want to re-emphasize David Aaron's point. The Allies can't even last for 30 days.

Mr. Aaron: NATO is like Victorian society: it's built on hypocrisy. We say we want to do one thing but we all know we can only do another. But we can't go back to a 30-day sustaining capability, nor can we talk about territorial loss because of the consequences for Germany. We might want to look at other options. For example, maybe we want to have nuclear forces in the theater that can strike the USSR. With the conventional situation being what it is, should we not put GLCM in the theater?

General Brown: That's going the other way. We want to improve conventional forces and raise the nuclear threshold.

Mr. Aaron: We are faced with a choice: more theater nuclear forces, or more conventional capability.

Mr. McGiffert: You are not describing alternatives; we can do both.

Secretary Brown: Yes. You can continue to try to improve conventional capability. Stan, what about the warning question?

Admiral Turner: We are working now on an estimate on warning, so I don't want to say more about that now, [2 lines not declassified]. Also, I worry from an historical standpoint about the idea of a short war. That's what everyone thought before World War I and World War II.

Secretary Brown: But, if you know that the other guy is going to run out of materiel, all you need to do is outlast him.

Mr. Bowie: I do not understand how a stalemate strategy will deter him.

Secretary Brown: That's what we do in Korea.

Mr. Bowie: Korea is a situation where the forces on both sides are equal. The stalemate strategy postulates weakness, however.

Secretary Brown: Because it is widely held that the defense has an advantage.

Dr. Brzezinski: George, what would it cost to do what you want to do in Europe?

General Brown: We can move toward what we want to accomplish with actions such as our current initiatives program in NATO. The

agreement with the Allies to maintain 3 percent real growth in spending, better Allied reserves, etc.

Dr. Brzezinski: You say that we can pursue H at the cost of F. I'm pleased.

General Brown: I'm optimistic that we can do much better than today if we stick with the 3 percent growth.

Secretary Brown: All these arguments rest on the premise that Bob Bowie has challenged: that the defense has an advantage.

Mr. Bowie: This takes us back to yesterday's discussion; we have a technological advantage. Let's be inventive and see if we can't counter the Soviets militarily without maximizing forces.

Mr. Jayne: How long can the Soviets sustain conflict?

Admiral Turner: [2 lines not declassified] It is obvious from this paper that we need to do a good deal more work here. I don't know how much we have done in the past.

Mr. Duncan: We need to move toward the 90-day goal in lock step with NATO. We must increase conventional capability. If we move from the goal of improved conventional capability, we will have political problems; and we will harm our deterrent, too.

Dr. Brzezinski: Are we talking about constructing a wish list for the President, or are we going to devise a strategy that we can accomplish?

Mr. Jayne: We already went to the President with a wish list. We can't do that again. The President said he wanted to get into the details, but the study's cover memo implies that we want to go over the generalities again.

Secretary Brown: But we need costs to be able to do what you propose, and the ones in the report aren't good enough.

Mr. Duncan: I wanted earlier to emphasize the importance of the first 7 to 14 days of a conflict. That means that improvements in readiness and early reinforcement come before sustaining capability.

Mr. Aaron: I endorse that.

Mr. Christopher: I want to focus on foreign policy. First, it's desirable to confirm NATO strategy as it exists today. We can't talk about giving away the FRG. But we can't talk about holding out for a year, either. I'm one of David's Victorians. It is also important not to overstate the threat. Otherwise, the analysis creates a high level of demand that appears to make the strategy unattainable. We need to keep working on the conventional deterrent.

Secretary Brown: Let's turn now to areas outside of Europe. Is it possible to hurt the USSR outside of Europe?

Mr. Christopher: We want to emphasize ambiguity. Make the Soviets think that we might do something to them.

Mr. Duncan: I agree.

Secretary Brown: However, it's not so obvious what we can do to the Soviets.

Dr. Brzezinski: You need to relate this area to the first one. Since I favor stalemate in Europe, I favor an activist strategy in other areas. For example, if there are states allied to the USSR, we can capture them and perhaps hope for a territorial trade. Cuba is an easy target.

Mr. Gelb: Would you want to buy forces for that?

Dr. Brzezinski: Yes. I think we need a global strike force. The Second Division might become part of that when it comes out of Korea.

Secretary Brown: Why not put the same capability in Europe?

Dr. Brzezinski: That's not the point where conflict is most likely to occur.

Mr. Christopher: What are the most attractive targets?

General Brown: Perhaps Soviet territory in the northwest Pacific. But that is very risky in response to something like Berlin.

Mr. Aaron: This must be seen in terms of what sort of force multipliers you can create to help yourself—northwest Asia maybe. However, we would be better off sizing our forces to help out in the Persian Gulf, which is important because of the oil. Why not size forces for Europe plus what we need for the Persian Gulf?

Secretary Brown: What would worry the Soviets most? Why would they care about Cuba, if they were fighting in Europe?

Dr. Brzezinski: It would be a political defeat.

Admiral Turner: [1 line not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski: We cannot anticipate [less than 1 line not declassified] help in such a situation. They would prefer to sit tight and watch the two giants fight it out. We might consider such actions as naval blockades.

General Brown: Yes, and we could take action against their fishing fleets.

Secretary Brown: How does this help in the context of a war for Europe? Let's move now to a discussion about local wars and crisis management. Are there specific regions of the world that we should worry about?

Dr. Brzezinski: I agree with David. The Persian Gulf, in addition to the Middle East, is an important area.

Secretary Brown: Is it likely that we need no special capability for Africa or Latin America?

General Brown: The most likely problem in Latin America might result from a failure to ratify a Panama Treaty.

Secretary Brown: The Middle East is probably the most demanding scenario, so if we have enough for that, we will have enough for anywhere else.

Mr. Aaron: There are two places we need to project our power: Korea and the Persian Gulf. The basic force sizing question has to do with splitting the difference.

Secretary Brown: But in Korea we plan to be ambiguous about deployment of ground forces.

Mr. Aaron: What is the Pacific fleet for? Ought we move it into the Indian Ocean?

Mr. Jayne: Let's look at East Asia. Why don't we get the Japanese to do more in terms of their air and naval capabilities?

Dr. Brzezinski: Japanese politics won't permit. Either we will get incremental improvements or, if there is a great political shock (such as the loss of Korea), we might get a big jump. But that shock might separate us from the Japanese.

Admiral Turner: We need crisis management forces to maintain free use of the seas and in the event of terrorism.

Secretary Brown: Divisions don't help you there. You need a rapid reaction capability.

Mr. Aaron: The problem is to maintain secrecy.

Secretary Brown: The military can maintain secrecy.

General Brown: The problem with maintaining secrecy occurs during the planning stages here in D.C. We can move a battalion out of Fort Bragg without a problem.

Dr. Brzezinski: We are talking about two kinds of force: (1) a small, long-range, rapidly deployable strike force; and (2) a larger force for intervention.

Mr. Jayne: Why does the overall Navy structure appear insensitive to the strategy?

Secretary Brown: The Navy is not immediately identifiable with any of these strategies. It's sort of an infrastructure. Also, we didn't include a war-at-sea scenario.

Dr. Brzezinski: What would it take to reconfigure the Second Division into a mobile versatile strike force for Korea, the Mideast and Europe?

Secretary Brown: A big expense is lift. Also, forces configured for one place may not be suitable for another. But it's worth looking at.

Mr. Christopher: We have not paid enough attention to Africa. It's a potential hot spot. What sorts of military forces do we need to protect the territorial integrity of states in Africa? Look how well the French did in Zaire.

Secretary Brown: I guess we all agree that these forces must be additive to the forces procured for other reasons. Let's turn now to our strategy for East Asia. We've covered much of it already.

Mr. Christopher: It's important that we continue to be an Asian power, not only for the smaller countries but for the Chinese.

Mr. Duncan: We need to maintain our current status, by, for example, staying in the Philippines.

Mr. McGiffert: I would go further and look for a few small steps we can take in the direction away from reductions.

Secretary Brown: We can fill out the wing of aircraft in Korea. That's a small plus, isn't it?

Mr. McGiffert: Very small, because aircraft can be easily moved out.

Secretary Brown: Could we leave ground forces in East Asia?

Mr. McGiffert: We might consider leaving one of the Second Division's brigades in Okinawa, although there may be real estate problems.

Mr. Christopher: I see an advantage to moving all the ground forces back here; we might want to use them somewhere else.

Dr. Brzezinski: We must maintain our military presence in East Asia for now except for the withdrawal from Korea. We need to make some moves that show that our military commitment to Korea is unaffected by the withdrawals. I am worried about that recent Chinese statement. We need to look at some positive steps: perhaps more aircraft or rotational exercises with ground force units.

Secretary Brown: Such things are part of a package that I am sending to the President. I would like to sum up now.

We talked about Europe, in particular the important difference between declaratory policy and actual capability. Few of us believe that we can match the Soviets in Europe, although some thought (George Brown) that we could work toward a strategy of minimum territorial loss if we maintained 3 percent real growth per year for NATO spending. Most believe, however, that we would suffer territorial loss in a conflict. But we must continue to work on improving the conventional link of what I call the NATO Tripod (to distinguish it from the Strategic Triad). We might have to augment our theater nuclear forces, but first we want to work on conventional force improvements. After this attempt has succeeded or failed, we will turn to theater nuclear forces; land-based cruise missiles are critical.

We talked about what we might do outside of Europe during a war with the Warsaw Pact. We agreed that additional forces that could take initiatives against the USSR to make up for European losses could be important. But it is not clear exactly what we could do.

We discussed local wars. We agreed that the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are critical, and also that the forces needed for local wars

must be additive to the forces needed for Europe. The Second Division might become available for this purpose. We touched slightly on Africa, Latin America, and war-at-sea.

We also talked about East Asia. All agreed that we should make no further changes now except for the withdrawal from Korea. There is some thought that we might augment our presence in the area slightly; for example, we might fill out the fighter wing in Korea or undertake more exercises. We might also consider stationing more ground forces outside of Korea; but there is a question of room and whether it would be better to have them at home available for other purposes.

Our next step is to discuss strategic forces next week. Then I guess Zbig will synthesize the whole thing. I believe we can take this study to the President in the present form. We can get his views on the key questions and on the size of the Defense Budget.

Mr. Aaron: Can't we get better costs? It's hard to answer these questions without understanding that constraint.

Secretary Brown: It's easy to cost-out a particular force. Our difficulty is in narrowing the range of estimated forces.

Mr. Jayne: I'm afraid if you don't narrow the range of forces now, the President will do it for you.

Secretary Brown: We will work on it.

27. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 13, 1977

Secretary Brown opened the meeting by describing its purpose; i.e., to review that portion of the PRM-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture Review that deals with strategic forces. He noted that while the subject of strategic forces was not quite so sprawling as general purpose forces, it was still not quite so simple as some, included himself,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 28, INT Documents: #5000s–#5100s: 7–8/77. Top Secret. According to the Summary of Conclusions, the meeting began at 2 p.m. and took place in the White House Situation Room. The participants were Warren Christopher and David Gompert from the Department of State; Harold Brown, Charles Duncan, David McGiffert and Lynn Davis from the Department of Defense; George Brown and William Smith from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Bowie from the Central Intelligence Agency; Randy Jayne, from the Office of Management and Budget; Spurgeon Keeny and Robert Behr from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron, Samuel Huntington, Victor Utgoff, and Roger Molander from the National Security Council. (Ibid.)

pretended. He called attention to the paper prepared on this subject that focused on US objectives for strategic forces, namely:

- Deterrence of attack on US, its forces, and our Allies.
- The control of escalation and the limitation of damage to the degree possible if deterrence fails.
- Avoiding the perception of an imbalance in the strategic forces in order to inhibit efforts at coercion of the US and its Allies.

Secretary Brown noted that consideration of how to satisfy these objectives and the accompanying illustrative forces had produced a series of questions for consideration specifically:

—To what extent should US forces be procured to achieve these objectives; in particular, to avoid perceptions of a US/Soviet asymmetry that would have no military significance but could have political significance.

—What is needed to deter Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression.

—With relation to the first and second of these questions, the degree to which the US should procure hard target kill capability and the dangers to stability which might result. This was not simply a question of all or nothing, since we could want some hard target kill capability vice an efficient hard target kill capability (i.e., the ability to put all Soviet ICBMs at risk).

—How much defensive capability to limit damage should be procured since offensive forces cannot do this job.

—The need for a strategic reserve force.

—What our declaratory policy should be with respect to strategic forces.

—The relationship between strategic and general purpose forces.

He noted that we are now talking about parity in overall US/Soviet military capabilities in contrast to the situation in the early 1960's where US had a clear strategic advantage. Among the issues that arise in the current situation are such things whether to have a Dyad or a Triad, how to respond to certain Soviet advantages, whether we should match them or somehow compensate for them, and furthermore, whether we should match them in military capability or simply in perceived capability. He noted that if we look at real scenarios, then such issues as command and control and attack assessment become as important, if not more important, than some of the actual numbers of strategic systems.

He then asked the various agency representatives what their views were of the current strategic situation and the issues under consideration.

Warren Christopher responded by focusing his comments on the political sufficiency question. He said that our goals should be overall equivalence in strategic forces, and that as long as we had overall equivalence, we could tolerate asymmetries in some particular measures. He said that in looking back to the time when we had true superiority in strategic systems, there was really no great change between that and today in terms of our ability to conduct foreign policy. This raised the question of even if we tried to buy superiority, whether it would justify the expense of buying it in terms of what it did for us. He said that the Chinese want us to be stronger, but that by and large as long as we maintain equivalence, we were able to carry out our foreign policy effectively. He noted that it was also important not to boast, but rather to be confident in proclaiming the situation of overall parity, since many countries would become concerned if we became more modest about our capabilities; therefore, we should speak confidently about them.

Charles Duncan concurred in this view and emphasized that we should have rough equivalence not only in perceived capability but in real capability—particularly in terms of our retaliatory capability in a second-strike situation. Secretary Brown noted that we all probably could agree on this general approach, but that the disagreement came in terms of how much insurance to have in some of these situations, how to count civil defense, etc.

Dave McGiffert indicated that he was particularly concerned about the question of hard target capability and the implications of our pursuing any efficient hard target capability in terms of stability. Secretary Brown noted that if the Soviets had a hard target capability, it would be destabilized. McGiffert responded that it would be more destabilizing if both had an efficient hard target capability. He noted that there were complications even if we pursued a limited hard target capability, since, even though it might be seen as limited by the Soviets, third countries may perceive it as a sign of weakness compared to the Soviets.

Secretary Brown noted that we could obtain a limited number of highly accurate weapons and not have an efficient hard target capability—which would complicate the plans of an attacker. He noted the problem, however, of how the other side might perceive the capability. [3 lines not declassified] But if the Soviets behave as we do and end up calculating 100% reliability and 100% kill probability, then in their eyes we would have an efficient hard target kill capability against their silos.

Randy Jayne noted that, as Dr. Brzezinski had mentioned with respect to general purpose forces, there was nothing wrong with having some ambiguities in terms of force capability. However, there was a question of how this was presented both internally and externally in terms of our saying what capability we do have.

Secretary Brown noted that there was a risk in overstating capability since the Soviets might respond with what they perceive to be a capability equal to our puffed-up capability and then the whole situation goes unstable. General Brown noted that he had trouble believing that the Soviets believe everything that they hear about US capabilities since they very closely follow what actually goes on in Congress and through the newspapers and that in reality we do not fool them with any public statements that might be exaggerated. Secretary Brown noted that while we do not fool them with the actual numbers, there still is uncertainty in their estimates of our capability and, in particular, how we would use it. General Brown concurred in this noting that some cases we do not even know ourselves how we would use it.

Secretary Brown then asked Robert Bowie to comment on how the Soviets see the strategic balance, how the rest of the world and, in particular, our European Allies see it, and what the Soviets are trying to do with their strategic systems. Bob Bowie indicated that the Soviets probably also think there is a rough balance in strategic systems at this time, and that our chief Allies also see the situation to be a rough equivalence in strategic systems. However, there is a strong difference of opinion on just what the Soviets are doing. He noted that the ongoing improvements in Soviet ICBM capability did not appear to us as reflecting an attitude of seeking assured destruction, but rather that they were seeking war-fighting capabilities; however, this is not necessarily how they see it. We assume that they should go for the types of weapons suitable for strategic objectives similar to ours; however, it is not clear just how they see the strategic situation.

Secretary Brown noted that if it is their idea that one must have war-fighting capability for deterrence, then they might not be deterred unless we also have war-fighting capability.

Bob Bowie noted that there are differences of views on this question. Some believe they might take more risks in their behavior if we do not counter such things as their improved war-fighting capability. Even if the Soviets achieve some superiority, they are still unlikely to see nuclear war as a desirable thing; nevertheless, from a political standpoint, they might see less risk in other activities. He noted that there are a fair number of people in the intelligence agencies who see the current situation in these terms.

Spurgeon Keeny noted that he agreed that the real purpose of strategic forces was to deter nuclear war, and the key to this was having assured retaliatory capability. At the same time, there was also a need to maintain a perceived balance in strategic forces such as currently existed. Secretary Brown injected that Soviets today had more capability in some areas. Keeny responded that both sides do—that no one is ahead in all individual categories. With respect to the Soviets' obsession

for improving their ICBM forces, he noted that some of the questions at issue went beyond assured destruction and into war-fighting capability on the US side as well. He noted that some of the Soviet talk and thinking about what we perceive as dangerous can also be found reflected in our own military forces and thinking.

Secretary Brown said that we have in our current defense guidance a directive that if deterrence fails, we should limit damage to the extent possible. He noted that our plans for damage limitation were based almost entirely upon the objective of limiting escalation. The objective is to give the Soviets an incentive not to wipe out population. However, we have no useful plan in military terms for actually limiting damage to the US. This may be true as well in the Soviet Union, but this is dubious in light of their large air defense system and their uncertain civil defense capability.

General Brown noted that the war planners would welcome some way to limit damage; however, it appears to defy solution to limit damage through weaponry given what we have and what they have. Secretary Brown noted that we are staying away from both active and passive defenses, whereas they are continuing to pursue such defenses except for ABM. However, there really may not be any significant difference in the damage limiting capability of the two sides.

Spurgeon Keeny commented that they had much the same problem as General Brown had described on their side with large yield weapons opposite them. Secretary Brown noted that our damage limiting capability was confined to limited targeting on the Soviet Union.

General Brown said that the latest C³ study indicated that the Soviets may not be able to distinguish between the limited attack and a full-scale attack on the Soviet Union. Secretary Brown offered the view that their very hard command and control indicates a concern about continuity during a war. While this would probably be useless in a full-scale war, the question is whether they think so. Spurgeon Keeny noted that we have an airborne command and control post from which someone could draw the same conclusions. Secretary Brown said that this was not meant simply to save the members of the Democratic Party. The important question was not that the Soviets would be able to succeed at saving the leadership but rather how they perceive the situation.

Bob Bowie said that he was impressed by the Soviet civil defense effort. [3 lines not declassified] the Soviets have a long-term civil defense program. [3 lines not declassified]

General Brown indicated that it was not our goal to match Soviet forces except in some areas, and that we had worked to offset certain Soviet capabilities and intended to continue to do so. He emphasized that we needed an adequate number of improved systems in order to

maintain the balance in the light of the Soviet advances in recent years. On the political sufficiency point, while there was no distinct advantage in having superiority as opposed to equivalence, if it turns around and the Soviets achieve preponderance in strategic forces, we might suffer severe consequences. He emphasized that we needed to maintain the strategic balance, since otherwise the Soviets might ask us to leave Europe. He also emphasized the importance of a strategic reserve force; however, the size was debatable in that at present, the JCS had no fixed notion of what the size of this force should be. He noted that our hard-target kill capability is important to respond to selected attacks against the US and also in terms of the capability it gives us if deterrence fails. He indicated that there were other key elements that we needed to take into account such as command and control.

David Aaron indicated that he did not share the assessment that our superiority was of no use to us in the past. He noted that in the early 1960's, we had a situation in terms of ground forces which was worse than today and, that as a consequence, our strategic nuclear superiority was an important factor.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that it was also an important factor in Cuba and permitted us to use our conventional forces with immunity. Secretary Brown noted that he was in on the Cuban situation and was skeptical as to the importance of our strategic superiority in that situation. Dr. Brzezinski questioned whether we would have gone into Cuba without such superiority and raised the question of how we would respond today if, for example, the Soviets took Berlin. Secretary Brown noted that Curtis LeMay had told the President at the time of the Cuban crisis that the Soviets would have the capability of killing tens of millions of Americans. Dr. Brzezinski responded that we could have killed 50 to 60 million Russians. The question was what would happen today if Brezhnev said he was going to take Berlin—would we simply say that we were going to talk. Secretary Brown said he continued to disagree, but that for now at least, it was simply an academic question.

David Aaron said that in the early 1960's, the strategic situation was a function of two curves that were climbing at different rates. At the time, they had very little but were increasing in capability. He questioned whether this was the same as a situation in which both have a great deal of forces and whether it is deaths that matter on the two sides or hard-target kill capability or is it really the capability to limit damage. He indicated that nuclear weapons do not help Clausowitz out very much since there is very little political utility in a major nuclear exchange. He said we need to look at specific problems such as:

- What amount of hard-target capability we should have.

- What the response should be to the increasing vulnerability of the land-based ICBM force.

—The question of command and control which could be crucial and has not been focused on enough as well.

—The question of a reserve force.

He said that once we were through with these questions, then we should ask whether forces are equivalent on the two sides.

Warren Christopher indicated that what he had questioned was whether there was enough of an advantage in superiority for it to be worth the cost.

Secretary Brown noted that a fatality level of 100 million was much more significant than a fatality level of 10 million. David Aaron said that he was not arguing about the finite detail of questions such as these, but rather wondered whether we might still have a perceptions problem even if we solve our military and strategic problems. Secretary Brown noted that even if one side suffered 10 million casualties and another 100 million, there still might be deterrence, but deterrence was not as clear and certain when there was a substantial difference in fatalities. David Aaron noted that this emphasized the need for getting a good fix on civil defense.

Dr. Brzezinski, in reflecting on the discussion in the previous two meetings, noted that while we were generally confident about being equivalent with the Soviets in a large sense at the present time, we were concerned about certain trends where we did face some dangers. This emphasized the need for long-range force projections. In addition to the deterrence of Soviet attack on the US, we also wanted to prevent the Soviets from compelling others. In this sense, we needed an umbrella under which we could conduct limited military actions. For example, in the future we might need limited hard-target kill capability in the event of some type of nuclear exchange. He noted that it was most important that we buy an effective and credible countervalue capability and that we adopt a posture which concentrates on attacking Russian countervalue targets as opposed to all targets in the Soviet Union. Secretary Brown noted that this was more selective than even the neutron bomb.

[5 paragraphs (37 lines) not declassified]

David Aaron asked whether the Soviets show any priority for protecting great Russians as opposed to others. Bob Bowie said it was hard to say about that. Randy Jayne indicated that he thought the civil defense activity correlated with new construction. Dave McGiffert said that it was the situations in which the population walks into the countryside that really affected the results.

Spurgeon Keeny said that no one had really calculated what happens in terms of fatalities after the initial exchange. Bob Bowie said that Herman Kahn had done some assessment of this problem in his Country A-Country B studies and had indicated the view that he thought

that people could survive. Secretary Brown said that was because Kahn stores his own sustenance.

Secretary Brown asked that in the time remaining that the group should talk about certain questions with respect to weapons systems, such as the question of the Triad versus a Dyad versus an augmented Triad, as well as the question of how sure we are of how our systems will actually perform. Dr. Brzezinski asked how sure the Soviets are about the performance of their systems. Secretary Brown said that both sides had similar problems in terms of the destruction of systems before launch, defensive actions, both passive and active, etc. He noted there was also the question of to what extent the creation of a new weapons system changed perceptions in a way that was favorable to us. Dr. Brzezinski raised the question whether this depends on what accuracy new systems might have. Secretary Brown noted that such questions affect both deterrence and hard-target capability.

Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that he thought that deterrence should focus on population and countervalue targets rather than on counterforce capability. He indicated that he thought that continuing to have a Triad made more sense since it permitted the US to mix the threat as well as to provide some selection in terms of lower level responses where the other side would not know where an attack might be coming from.

David Aaron asked whether the real Triad question was not simply what we should do about ICBM survivability as distinct from the hard-target question. He thought it made no sense to make a great investment in a force which was increasing in vulnerability. Secretary Brown said that in this context, a mobile ICBM made sense. In addition, as long as we get warning, the other side has to account for the possibility that we might launch under attack—systems that might not be as good because of their vulnerability were not necessarily useless. However, vulnerability does affect stability especially in situations of high tension. If both sides have good assurance that their systems will survive, then the situation is more stable.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

David Aaron wondered whether we would be satisfied with the answer of launch-on-warning in terms of stability and deterrence. There was also important command control questions. In any event, there was some question about whether it made any sense to put M-X in silos.

Secretary Brown indicated that we use to feel stronger than we feel now. In terms of Soviet actions, there was some question if the Soviets would count on us to not fire before they would take out our ICBMs. David Aaron noted that this is basically a question of the credibility of our posture.

Sam Huntington noted that our high level of readiness would tend to increase the Soviet perception that we might fire on warning. Secretary Brown agreed with this, noting that the current low state of readiness of Soviet strategic forces indicated that they are going to count on strategic warning. David Aaron indicated that there would be more value in putting our resources in better attack assessment capability or in command and control rather than put any more dollars into a force that is increasing in vulnerability.

Secretary Brown said that we could fill out the Minuteman II force with Minuteman IIIs and in 10 years probably do as well as the Soviets in terms of counterforce capability—but we are not going that way. George Brown noted that the M-X gave us advantage of not only an improvement in throw weight but also an improvement in accuracy.

Dr. Brzezinski indicated that we should look closer at the constraints that are currently in existence on US targeting. General Brown said that we are looking at 242 and the supporting documents, and that in his view the command and control side needed more emphasis. This is being done through WMCCS (Worldwide Military Command and Control System) and that we are making some progress in improving command and control—but that it is a very ambitious five-year plan that existed. Secretary Brown noted that the strategic part was only a piece of this.

General Brown indicated that WMCCS does provide some SIOP support, but that on the warning side, we did need to do more; specifically, we needed to look thoroughly at development of a capability to see at night from space.

Spurgeon Keeny said that the Soviet hard-target capability clearly is disturbing, although somewhat exaggerated. He said that hard-target capability does not buy us as much from an arms control or strategic standpoint and, that although this was a troublesome direction which Soviet forces were taking, it may be a manageable situation. In the context of the study, he tended to favor Substrategy 2 to be achieved with an augmented Dyad in which we would keep the fixed Minuteman sites but put future expenditures into our submarine-launched and airborne capability; in particular, ALCMs on aircraft and general improvements in the SLBM force. He noted that within the existing Minuteman force, we had available all the hard-target capability we would need for unforeseen contingencies and that we had the NS-20 and/or even the AIRS if we needed it. This would give us a substantial hard-target capability but not enough to wipe out the Soviet ICBM force.

Secretary Brown asked what we do when the Minuteman became 11 years old—whether we would then reopen the Minuteman line. Spurgeon Keeny responded that it would be better to reopen the Minuteman III line as opposed to building the M-X. He argued that to the

extent that the emerging Soviet hard-target capability was real, it certainly would be unwise to put M-X in silos and mobile M-X created a serious problem of acceptability in this country as well as in terms of its impact on SALT.

General Brown indicated that the alternative basing approach for M-X might be acceptable. Spurgeon Keeny noted that this approach raised serious concerns about SALT compliance.

Secretary Brown noted that the M-X mobile question needs a lot more careful examination. He indicated that he had been of each mind with respect to mobiles and really did not know where he stood on this issue right now.

Randy Jayne noted that with respect to the Triad, the three legged beast had emerged as a result of concerns about vulnerability which may have been outgrown by now. For example, there was now no Soviet ABM threat. In addition, we do have potential for developing accurate SLBMs as well as having an airborne force with a capability that will keep us comfortable for some time. Thus, it may be that we will have a mix of forces that does not have requirement for equality in the Triad.

Secretary Brown noted that if we do go to a Dyad, it is clear that the force that will be dropped would be the ICBMs. However, this force had much better command and control than the submarines. Randy Jayne noted that we might be giving up something in perceptions if we talk about an augmented Dyad as opposed to a Triad; therefore, we should not apologize for the capabilities of our Minuteman force.

General Brown emphasized that under the ABM Treaty, while deployment was severely restricted, there were no constraints on testing and that the Soviet Union had continued a vigorous programming that was a cause for concern. Secretary Brown asked whether we were concerned that they might back out of the treaty to which General Brown replied, in the affirmative.

Dave McGiffert indicated that he was sympathetic with the views that David Aaron had expressed and that he did not see how from the Soviet point of view, they would be concerned about the risk of our launching vulnerable assets on warning as distinct from launching invulnerable assets on warning. Charles Duncan raised the question of how long the Minuteman IIIs would be viable. General Brown indicated that we were finding some cracks in the engines. Charles Duncan asked whether this could be fixed through maintenance to which General Brown answered that he thought so but that in some cases we may have to build new propulsion systems which could be done.

Duncan then raised the question of what the impact would be in the future when we would not have the cruise missile advantage we have today. Secretary Brown indicated that in terms of how things would

look in 1990, the cruise missiles on B-52s would badly undercut the Soviet expenditure of 15 billion dollars a year on air defenses. Although cruise missiles do not add that much to existing bomber capability, a cruise missile force will be viable for a much longer period of time. In addition, cruise missiles on large cruise missile carriers would even further counter Soviet air defenses.

Duncan said that in the future, we would become very dependent on Trident. Secretary Brown noted that we would also be dependent on getting within 2500 km of Soviet targets with ALCMs. Spurgeon Keeny noted that these developments did not increase our hard-target capability but do increase our threat against the Soviet Union.

David Aaron asked why we don't think in terms of a five to six thousand mile cruise missile. Secretary Brown indicated that he had been looking at this option and had found that with a vehicle of about 50,000 pounds, you could deliver a few megatons to intercontinental ranges. Such a vehicle could virtually fit in a beer truck, but it is prohibited in the current Geneva Joint Draft Text. General Brown recalled that we had a couple of squadrons of intercontinental cruise missiles in Maine, the SNARK. [*1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Brown indicated that this was just one of the number of new possibilities that should be looked at carefully and that by 1990 he thought we could come up with a number of new things of interest. David Aaron noted that in SALT, we were trying to get reductions and get control of new missile systems. Secretary Brown indicated that this was because of some concern about foreclosing options that could be of interest in the future. David Aaron noted that he was impressed by our ability to backtrack on such issues.

Spurgeon Keeny said that we should look at SALT as a vehicle for limiting the threat to strategic systems.

Secretary Brown noted there was a fundamental difference between the US and the Soviet Union with respect to the cruise missiles. The Soviet Union does not need cruise missiles, whereas the US needs cruise missiles as a way of negating Soviet air defense advantages; there was no particular advantage to the Soviets in putting cruise missiles on the Bison, the Bear, or the Backfire. He noted that improvements in command and control and targeting doctrine were also additional options for the 1980's. He said that these issues were being studied in DOD, but that we would not try and subvert the process of interagency review of such issues.

Bob Bowie noted that in the longer term, we should look at the potential for Soviet actions that could be of concern.

Warren Christopher noted that from a foreign policy standpoint, that the State Department perceived some risk in moving from a Triad to a Dyad.

28. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 29, 1977, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

PRM/NSC–22: Integrated Telecommunications Protection Policy²

PARTICIPANTS

White House:

The Vice President
 Denis Clift
 Stu Eizenstat
 Richard Neustadt

State:

Harold H. Saunders
 Mark Garrison

Defense:

Charles Duncan
 Adm. Daniel J. Murphy

JCS:

Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

Justice:

Michael Kelly
 Newell Squyres

OSTP:

Frank Press
 John Marcum

NSC:

Zbigniew Brzezinski
 David Aaron
 Samuel M. Hoskinson
 Robert A. Rosenberg
 John Hewitt

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner
 [name not declassified]

Commerce:

Jordan Baruch
 John Richardson

OMB:

Randy Jayne
 James Oliver

OTP:

William Thaler
 Wayne Kay

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Vice President opened the meeting by discussing the increasing political concern over the threat to individual privacy posed by Soviet intercept activities within the U.S. In his view the legal, economic, defense, human rights and philosophical aspects of this problem all require a strong public posture. He recognized that laws exist to protect individuals from domestic interception and efforts to force the Soviets to desist could well be counterproductive, but was nonetheless very concerned about legitimate public fears about invasion of individual privacy by foreign governments. The public, he felt, must be informed about the basic facts and what the Administration is

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 41, [PRM 22, 2 of 2]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the summary next to the subject heading. Minutes of the meeting were not found.

² See Document 8.

doing about this situation. The Vice President also asked Stan Turner to continue working with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to provide them with a better understanding of the actions presently underway, the complex nature of counteractions, and pros and cons of their ultimate effectiveness.

The following conclusions were reached:

1. Not enough is known of the threat of Soviet interception to the “national interest-government” and especially “national interest-private” categories of unclassified information. There is also uncertainty about Soviet intentions and objectives. Stan Turner was, therefore, asked to assume responsibility for preparation of a risk-benefit estimate that assesses more systematically the threat of Soviet telecommunications intercept to all categories of classified and unclassified information, including that solely in the private sector, and the benefit of similar U.S. telecommunications intercepts abroad. This estimate is to be given highest priority, with a preliminary report due before the end of August.

2. The broad outlines of a National Telecommunications Protection Policy were agreed upon as follows:

- Government classified information relating to national defense and foreign relations should, as presently required, be transmitted only by secure means. NSA should continue to have responsibility for provision of adequate cryptographic security.

- Unclassified information transmitted by and between Government agencies and contractors that would be useful to an adversary (so-called “national interest: government”) should be protected. Identification of such communications should be a priority task.

- Non-governmental information that would be useful to an adversary (so-called “national interest: private”) should be identified and the private sector informed of the problem and encouraged to take appropriate protective measures. Government R&D information and protective technology should be made available to the common carriers. The additional provision, however, of government equipment and funds to the private sector would probably require legislation and raises some fundamental issues and concerns about government involvement.

- More attention must be given to the threat to strictly private communications of Americans, especially in view of public concern about the need to safeguard civil rights and to protect against black-mail. Specifically:

- The FCC should be requested to work with the common carriers to determine system capabilities to protect the privacy of individual private communications. If regulatory directives are needed to ensure

such protection, the necessary legislative changes should be made in the FCC charter.

- The Attorney General should consider a temporary modification in his current operating guidelines to permit NSA to analyze the extent to which the Soviets may be collecting and exploiting individual private communications.

3. The technology to protect terrestrial microwave circuits is continuing to evolve. As a result, protection is a complex problem with significant technical and legal aspects and relatively little is known about the cost-effectiveness of expensive alternative solutions. Nevertheless, subject to continuous review of available technology and reassessment of the foreign intercept threat, the following immediate actions should be taken:

- An R&D program covering both system and user oriented protection approaches should be funded at about \$15 million per year.

- Phases I and II of the DUCKPINS cable program should be completed as soon as possible and no later than in 1978. This program should be funded at a level of about \$4 million per year.

- DOD should have an option of selectively installing ESVN systems if a high priority requirements can be validated.

4. A special interagency National Telecommunications Protection Board should be established under the NSC Special Coordination Committee to review, assess and insure implementation of effective protection techniques for the government and maximum assistance to the private sector to enhance its protection from interception. The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy should chair the Board and head this program with the assistance of the Secretary of Commerce. At the request of DOD, the specific longer term functions of the Board will be given further review by the SCC, but its most immediate tasks should be the following:

- Develop a possible program for active interference, including the technical approach, cost and political and intelligence implications for consideration by the SCC.

- Determine the specific questions Stan Turner should address in the estimate of the Soviet intercept threat.

- Define subcategories of national interest information and establish standards for protecting those categories determined to be significant (this should go along with decisions in PRM-29).³

³ Reference is to PRM/NSC-29, which Carter signed on June 1. The Presidential Review Memorandum called for a new Executive Order to replace Executive Order 11652 governing the handling and declassification of national security information and material.

5. Frank Press, in coordination with other appropriate officials, is to prepare a public announcement for early release.

The SCC will meet on this subject again by the end of August. The agenda will include: final review of Board responsibilities, report on preliminary judgments of new threat assessment and resolution of all other remaining issues on PRM/NSC–22.

29. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 4, 1977, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

PRM–10

PARTICIPANTS

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
Dep Secretary Charles W. Duncan
David E. McGiffert

JCS

Lt Gen William Y. Smith

State

Dep Secretary Warren Christopher
Leslie H. Gelb

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Robert Bowie

OMB

Bert Lance
Edward R. Jayne II

OSTP

Frank Press
John M. Marcum

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Samuel Huntington
Victor Utgoff (first half)
James Thomson (second half)

Dr. Brzezinski began the meeting by commenting that the President had laid down four rules to be followed in subsequent NSC meetings:

1. Attendance at these meetings is limited to the principal plus one. If additional people are to attend, special arrangements must be made beforehand.

2. Extensive notes will only be taken by an NSC designated notetaker.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 58, PRM–10: (SCC 8/4/77 Meeting): 7–8/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

3. These notes will be kept on file at the NSC for review when required.

4. In the event of decisions or directions for follow-on work, the notes will be disaggregated and each of the principals will be given that part of the record on those decisions that affect him.

Mr. Gelb commented that his experience as a reporter suggested that leaks will not be stopped by these procedures. Because of these procedures we will pay a very high price: people with legitimate access to this information will not be able to get it; and the people who have been on top of the problem with the real technical expertise will be cut out of the meetings. This was a problem under which the Nixon Administration suffered.

Secretary Brown indicated that this was a reasonable step and that in fact we had no choice in the matter. Admiral Turner asked Mr. Gelb how, given his experience, he would suggest we cut down on leaks. Mr. Gelb said that in 3½ years as a reporter he never had any trouble getting any information. Thus, there is no need for extensive restrictions.

In response, Dr. Brzezinski agreed that the price could be high, but that it is very important that the leaks be stopped; and experience to date suggests that the probability of leaks is correlated with the size of the meeting.

Dr. Brzezinski then stated that the purpose of the meeting was to agree on the basic findings of the PRM-10 study, and on the guidelines and objectives that it supports. These agreements will form the basis for a Presidential Directive on PRM-10.

Dr. Brzezinski asked for comments on Section I of the August 2, 1977 Agenda Paper (attached)—*Findings*. Mr. Keeny felt that the word “many” in the third tic overstated the trends, and he also wondered what the word “areas” meant. Secretary Brown indicated that the word “areas” meant both geographical and military spheres. After some discussion, Mr. Christopher proposed that the word “many” be replaced by the word “several.” This was agreed. General Smith indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that the statement in the third tic that adverse trends “can be halted in Europe in the early 80’s if the appropriate programs are carried out” was probably too strong.

Dr. Brzezinski then turned the discussion to Section II of the Agenda Paper—*Guidelines*. Secretary Brown felt that use of the word “overriding” to modify US interests in Guideline 2 confused the sentence and gave it an interventionist flavor. Dr. Huntington indicated that, to the contrary, “overriding” was intended to qualify the statement not make it an open-ended advocacy of intervention. After some discussion the guideline was altered to read: To prevent or counter Soviet use of military force to gain influence over other societies where US interest dictate.

Mr. Gelb suggested that Guideline 5 was too open-ended. He wondered whether “values” referred to human rights. Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Brown both felt that it did. Dr. Brzezinski asked Mr. Gelb if he understood correctly that State wants us to inform the President that the State Department does not feel that human rights should be taken into account in US policy. (Laughter)

Secretary Brown felt that Guideline 6 was too restrictive; it suggested strongly that the goals of meeting our military needs is subordinate to the goal of staying within desired budgetary constraints. He said we should be thinking about balancing our military requirements against other national priorities. Language along these lines was accepted.

Dr. Brzezinski then asked whether there was any problem with the first five of the objectives stated under *Strategic Forces* in Section III. Mr. Gelb felt that in addition to reaffirming our goal of promoting nuclear stability, as in Objective 5, we should also reaffirm US policy not to acquire a capability for disarming first strike. Secretary Brown was not sure that the term “disarming first strike” was well defined; for example, some people might argue that the Mark 12A did not give us a disarming first strike capability while at the same time they might argue that the SS-18 gave the Soviets a disarming first strike capability. Dr. Brzezinski felt that Mr. Gelb’s proposal was not really an objective but rather should be part of Guideline 1 in Section II. This proposal was accepted.

Secretary Brown felt that paragraph 6A should be restricted by the introductory clause “with available forces” so that it would be clear that this paragraph did not constitute acquisition guidance. He also proposed ending the sentence with a statement similar to that at the end of paragraph 6B to the effect that the US would like to maximize resultant power relative to the enemy in a nuclear conflict. After extensive discussion on the wording at the end of the paragraph, the group finally agreed to language for paragraph 6A, stating that “if control of escalation fails, US policy is to terminate the conflict on favorable terms.”

Dr. Brzezinski then turned to the Guidance Section, paragraph III B1. Secretary Brown felt that “essential equivalence” means more than simply balancing certain key indices. He thought the problem was more than one of numbers. In particular, he felt that the guidance should read that the US would “exceed or balance the Soviet Union in certain key indices *and capabilities*.” This change was accepted.

Dr. Brzezinski then turned the discussion to paragraph III B2, in which three alternative paragraphs were displayed. Dr. Brzezinski wondered why [1 line not declassified] for destruction. Secretary Brown felt that paragraph 2A was too specific. He believed that the President

did not need to be so specific at this stage and that more work needed to be done on this question. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that paragraph 2B would be more acceptable if it were more specific: for example, it should state the sorts of targets that the Secretary of Defense should investigate; also, we should examine the utility of attacking [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Mr. Gelb pointed out that NSDM 242² does not call for [*2 lines not declassified*] targets. Dr. Brzezinski stated that the NSDM 242 guidance was exactly what he wanted to reexamine. Secretary Brown pointed out that while in the past [*2 lines not declassified*]. Dr. Brzezinski said that, while we are all uncomfortable about this problem, we cannot avoid thinking about it. He also felt that paragraph 2B should contain language specifying illustrative percents of damage that should be studied. The language should not be restrictive, rather it should provide examples. The Secretary of Defense should consider the relative strategic advantages of targeting say 70% of the economic targets, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and so forth. Secretary Brown stated that he was willing to look at soft military targets as well. Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Brown agreed that this work would be completed on about January 1, 1978. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that the NSC would provide more guidance on this study.

The discussion then turned to paragraph III B3. Secretary Brown proposed that the last sentence of the paragraph, the one reading "additional forces should not be acquired for this purpose," should be scrapped. General Smith and Dr. Brzezinski agreed; and there were no objections to its elimination.

On paragraph III B4, Mr. Jayne pointed out that the last sentence, about maintaining "at least the current level of time urgent hard target kill capability," was ambiguous. Secretary Brown interpreted the sentence to mean that if the Soviets can harden their targets more, then we will be forced to increase our capability to knock them out. In essence he thought the sentence said "don't dismantle what you have got, but don't make any big increases either." Dr. Huntington indicated that that was the intent.

When the discussion turned to paragraph III B5, Dr. Brown objected to the language of the first sentence, which he felt would keep us from defending against air attack from Cuba. We want to do more than surveillance; we want to deny the Soviets a free ride. He proposed the addition of the words "and control" after surveillance and before "of US air space." Mr. Keeny felt the statement was open-ended. But all agreed to insert the phrase.

² National Security Decision Memorandum 242, "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," was signed by President Gerald Ford on January 17, 1974. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976, Document 31.

On paragraph III B6, Dr. Brzezinski objected to the complexity of paragraph 6B. Following a suggestion of Mr. Christopher, the group agreed to add the phrase “subject to further analysis by the Secretary of Defense” before the sentence of paragraph 6A.

In discussing paragraph III B7, Admiral Turner proposed the addition of the words “and targeting capability” at the end of the sentence “The US will maintain a secure reserve force.” He pointed out that [*1 line not declassified*] after the first nuclear exchange. Dr. Press asked Admiral Turner whether he meant that we needed a damage assessment capability. In response, Admiral Turner said that you needed to know what you have done in your initial attack, what you have not done, and what you need to do with your reserve force. Dr. Brown felt that we have not even begun to think about this problem. Mr. Jayne and Mr. Keeny felt that to insert such language would be to make a major programmatic decision. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that an analysis was needed and one should be called for in the document. The NSC Staff was directed to draft appropriate language.

Having finished the strategic forces section, Dr. Brzezinski then turned to Section IV, *General Purpose Forces*. The group agreed to paragraph A1. Dr. Brzezinski said that paragraph A2 posed a difficult and serious issue. Dr. Brown explained the problem: do you buy forces separately for a contingency such as the Persian Gulf; or do you simply take the forces you need for the contingency from those you bought for NATO? But if you do not buy the forces separately, you will create a disfunction in the NATO force: that is, the NATO force will not be configured for a NATO war. In addition, just when you want to send the Persian Gulf force into action you find yourself drawing down on your NATO force at the time you least want to do it.

Mr. Gelb wondered whether it was not possible to buy some forces on a separate basis but not the others—such as logistical support, tactical air and navies. Secretary Brown felt that if you plan forces that way, you might not find much of a need for a navy. Mr. Gelb wondered whether there was not a difference between an add-on land capability and an add-on logistical or tactical air capability because the latter can be moved around much more rapidly than the former. Secretary Brown and General Smith agreed with that description but stated that there would be the risk of drawing down on forces that you required for the NATO contingency. Mr. Jayne felt that the issue was constrained by resources: we would like to have a lot of capability, but cannot afford it; we should take the issue to the President and tell him the price. Secretary Brown and General Smith felt that the price tag was not the whole story: there is the issue of how the forces are configured; for example if we want to fight outside of Europe, we don’t want all our Army units to be heavy.

Dr. Brzezinski felt that a serious issue in the future is the likelihood of our access to foreign bases. He said this might mean we need a larger air transport and naval capability than we have at present. Secretary Brown stated that such capability was included in the light intervention capability of the PRM-10 report. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that these capabilities be explicitly mentioned in the guidance, because this is an important issue over the long-term. Dr. Brown proposed the phrase "strategic mobility independent of overseas base support." This language was accepted.

Mr. Gelb asked again whether we wanted to buy extra forces for the purposes of local wars. Dr. Brzezinski thought that we did; and he proposed that the Second Division might be used for this purpose.

On NATO, Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the group agree on points IV B1 and B2.

Secretary Brown raised an issue with regard to paragraph IV B4. He pointed out that present planning guidance called for 180 days of stock. He felt that such numbers as 90 days or 180 days were meaningless unless you also specified the consumption rates. He proposed that the first sentence of paragraph 4 be left vague; "in order for the US to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its Allies, the planning guidance will be reviewed following . . ." This proposal was accepted.

Discussion then moved to Section V, *Further Studies*. Secretary Brown wondered why all of the further studies must be military studies, when the PRM-10 report covered political, economic and other aspects as well. He felt that the whole section should be eliminated. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that the section simply read "further studies would be carried out under NSC direction." Secretary Brown agreed. Secretary Brown pointed out that many of the studies would occur in any event since the Departments would want to undertake them. Dr. Brzezinski said that he took that as a given, but that the NSC may want to guide the studies. Secretary Brown felt that the studies should be listed in order of priority. He said that his Department was choking already on work. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that a working group would be convened later to discuss the matter.

In closing the meeting, Dr. Brzezinski stated that he believed it had accomplished a great deal.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

SCC AGENDA PAPER

I. Findings

The studies authorized by PRM/NSC–10 have found that:

—A rough overall equivalence with some asymmetries exists in military capabilities between the US and the Soviet Union.

—The US remains significantly ahead of the USSR in most non-military aspects of national power.

—The trends in many areas have been against the US, but significant adverse trends in strategic forces and in conventional forces in Europe can be halted in the early 1980's if appropriate programs are carried out.

—The US can capitalize on its advantages in economic power, diplomatic resources, technology, political-ideological action, and force projection capabilities, in countering adverse Soviet influence.

II. Guidelines

In view of these findings, in the current era of US-Soviet relations US strategy will be:

1. To maintain an overall balance of military power between the US and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies at least as favorable as that which now exists, taking into account the increasing relevance of conventional forces under conditions of essential strategic nuclear equivalence.

2. To prevent or counter Soviet use of military force to gain influence over other societies except where overriding US interests dictate otherwise.

3. To attempt to achieve the goals stated in paragraphs 1 and 2, in collaboration with our allies, through cooperation and agreements with the USSR when possible and through appropriate actions and programs when such agreements prove impossible.

4. To enlist the participation of the USSR in international institutions and to secure Soviet cooperation in achieving solutions to global economic, social, and resource problems.

³ Secret.

5. To take political, economic, diplomatic and ideological initiatives in cooperation with our allies to reduce Soviet influence in and control over other societies where that influence adversely affects US interests or values.

6. Within approved budgetary constraints, to direct US military strategy and forces to the following goals.

III. *Strategic Forces*

A. *Objectives*

US strategic forces will be designed:

1. To deter nuclear attack on the US, our forces, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US.

2. In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces, to enhance deterrence of non-nuclear aggression, particularly by the Soviet Union against NATO and our Asian allies.

3. To insure that the Soviet Union cannot use strategic forces for political leverage and coercion and that the state of the strategic balance will not deter the US from taking conventional military actions where its interests dictate.

4. To maintain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union.

5. To promote nuclear stability, especially in times of crisis.

6a. If nuclear conflict occurs, to control escalation, provide options for flexible and limited retaliatory responses, limit damage to the extent possible and consistent with the objectives listed above, and terminate the conflict quickly on acceptable terms.

6b. If nuclear conflict occurs, to control escalation, provide options for flexible and limited retaliatory responses, limit damage to the extent possible and consistent with the objectives listed above, and terminate the conflict quickly on terms which maximize the resultant political, economic, and military power of the US relative to the enemy in the postwar period in order to preclude enemy domination.

B. *Guidance*

1. To ensure essential equivalence with the Soviet Union, the US will maintain nuclear force levels, within the context of any SALT agreement, that exceed or balance the Soviet Union in certain key indices. The balance in these indices can be achieved either by matching the Soviet Union in those measures or by exploiting US advantages which offset those enjoyed by the Soviets.

- 2a. The US will maintain the nuclear forces to destroy 70% of all identified Soviet economic recovery resources, [15 lines not declassified].
- 2b. The Secretary of Defense will review current targeting policy and recommend targeting criteria for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. Pending the completion of this review, the US will continue to employ forces according to NSDM 242.
- 2c. The Secretary of Defense will review current targeting policy and recommend targeting criteria and acquisition policy for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. Pending the completion of this review, the US will continue to employ forces according to NSDM 242.

3. [2 lines not declassified] Additional forces should not be acquired for this purpose; forces acquired for other purposes should have the characteristics necessary to respond flexibly.

4. The specific amount of hard-target kill capability the US should maintain and for what strategic purposes should receive further study by the Secretary of Defense. This review and the recommendations flowing therefrom should be submitted for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. Pending completion of this review, the US will maintain at least the current level of time-urgent hard-target kill capability.

5. The US will maintain the capability to provide attack warning and assessment and to insure adequate surveillance of US airspace. In addition, US R&D efforts in the area of active defenses should guard against possible Soviet technological breakthroughs or abrogation of the ABM Treaty and maintain those technology programs necessary to assess and respond to Soviet strategic defense initiatives, as appropriate.

- 6a. The US will continue to maintain a diversity of nuclear forces through the three legs of a TRIAD.
- 6b. The US will maintain a high overall level of invulnerability in its strategic force posture, with a diverse mix of systems designed to provide high confidence [confidence?] of surviving attacks, penetrating defenses, and guarding against the technological breakthroughs by an adversary and unanticipated failure of one type of system to perform as required.

7. The US will maintain a secure reserve force. This force will be taken from those acquired for other purposes pending an analysis by the Secretary of Defense.

IV. General Purpose Forces

A. General

1. The US will maintain a level of general purpose forces, in conjunction with those of its allies, sufficient to wage a major conventional war with the USSR and its allies. Planning will focus on Europe, but also will provide for the defense of major US and allied interests outside of Europe, including the protection of lines of communication and access to critical raw materials vital to the economies of the US and its allies.

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| <p>2a. <i>In addition to the capability to prosecute a NATO/Warsaw Pact war</i>, the US will maintain a light intervention force with a forcible entry capability (i.e., logistical support, moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces) for use anywhere in the world. These specific forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR and based on analyses of requirements in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Korea. <i>Forces needed beyond those maintained for such contingencies</i> will be drawn from forces in CONUS that are oriented primarily toward the NATO/Warsaw Pact war but have flexibility for use elsewhere.</p> | <p>2b. The US will maintain a light intervention force with a forcible entry capability (i.e., logistical support, moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces) for use anywhere in the world. These specific forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR and based on an analysis of requirements in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Korea. Forces needed for these contingencies will be drawn from forces in CONUS that are oriented primarily toward the NATO/Warsaw Pact war but have flexibility for use elsewhere. Within these forces the US will maintain whatever special capability is required for intervention contingencies.</p> |
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B. NATO

1. The US reaffirms NATO strategy as expressed in MC-14/3.⁴ Deterrence and defense in the NATO areas will continue to rely on a combination of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. US policy will emphasize the strengthening of conventional forces for deterrence and defense.

2. Consonant with present NATO strategy, including forward defense, the US is committed to having the capability, in conjunction with its allies, to stop a Warsaw Pact attack with minimum loss of territory and ultimately to restore prewar boundaries.

3. Consistent with the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, US forces, in conjunction with those of its NATO allies, will be capable of responding to a full spectrum of hostilities—from reinforced attack to war following a period of extensive mobilization—recognizing the need to seek, within resource constraints, an optimum mix of capabilities along the spectrum.

4. The US will plan on sustaining a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies for a minimum of 90 days. The ninety day planning guidance will be reviewed following (1) an evaluation of Warsaw Pact capabilities to sustain combat, (2) consultations with the NATO allies concerning their acceptance of this guidance goal, (3) a review of the relative trade-offs between early combat capability and capability to sustain extended conflict, and (4) an examination of the implications of alternative US/NATO mobilization and industrial preparedness postures.

5. US will meet its commitment to its allies to raise the level of defense spending by approximately 3% per year in real terms.

C. Asia

With the exception of the withdrawals from Korea directed in PD/NSC-12,⁵ the US will maintain approximately the current level of forces deployed in the Western Pacific in order to preserve regional stability, to deter aggression in Korea and elsewhere, and to protect US interests and meet treaty commitments in the event of aggression.

⁴ On January 16, 1968, the NATO Defense Planning Committee adopted NATO's Military Committee's report, MC 14/3, as an overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. MC 14/3 stated that theater nuclear forces were meant to deter conventional attacks and, if deterrence failed, to respond to attacks and to confront the enemy with escalation of the conflict. (Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969* (Brussels: NATO, 1997), pp. 345–370)

⁵ Carter signed PD/NSC-12, "U.S. Policy in Korea," on May 5, 1977. (Carter Library, *Presidential Directives*, PD-12)

V. Further Studies

To provide additional guidance, further studies will be carried out. The subjects to be studied will include, but not necessarily be limited to: nuclear targeting criteria; Soviet Union efficient hard-target-kill capability and the diversity and mutual reinforcement required in US strategic forces; the strategic implications of civil defense; the requirements of a secure reserve force; the purposes and structure of US theater nuclear forces; US force requirements for local wars; Persian Gulf security; Warsaw Pact and non-US NATO capability to sustain conventional conflict and the relative trade-offs for NATO between early combat capability and the capability to sustain extended conflict; US and Allied manpower and industrial mobilization capabilities; and the requirements for US maritime forces.

30. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 17, 1977

SUBJECT

PRM/NSC-10: Military Strategy and Force Posture Study (C)

(C) As Chairman of the PRC for PRM/NSC-10, I am transmitting to you the Study on Military Strategy and Force Posture.

(C) The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with my views about what has and has not been accomplished in the entire PRM/NSC-10 effort and to outline my plans for moving forward within DOD to develop both long-range planning and more immediate force posture programs.

(S) General Reactions

The Study is this Administration's initial broad survey of alternate national military strategies. Such a broad zero-based policy review of the basic elements of the US national military posture provides an opportunity to challenge old canons and to advance new ideas.

The PRM/NSC-10 Study has made some useful contributions to this Administration's thinking on defense policy.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 30, PRM-10, 6 of 8, [1]. Top Secret.

Taken as a whole, PRM/NSC–10 made us pause and take a look at where we are and where we ought to consider going. It also makes clear that much remains to be done. The study was broad in scope; some of its limitations are a result of that. In particular, no single study can substitute for the detailed analyses that implement our particular policies. Thus, PRM/NSC–10 should be understood as a point of departure for thinking about how we should develop and use military forces and capabilities over an uncertain, complex future.

(TS) *Net Assessment*

This portion of PRM/NSC–10 focused on the trends in the long-term military, economic, and political competition with the Soviet Union. It is very useful in thinking about the broad, global issues. Its view of the *current* military balance in Europe seems to me to be too optimistic, although I think our NATO initiatives could improve this situation substantially over the next few years.

I agree with the study's general thrust that the Soviets are effective competitors only in the military dimension, and that we need to think carefully about how to deal with this fact. Further, I strongly agree that, in developing a national strategy, we should exploit those areas where we have a competitive advantage, while limiting our competitor's ability to take advantage of our vulnerabilities. In particular, we need to try to exploit our potential technological advantages in both conventional and strategic forces.

(TS) *Strategy and Force Posture Study*

This study has focused attention on the value of developing a strategy to guide the evolution of our military forces for the next decade and has raised a number of key military strategy issues.

I see the study as the first step in a process of refining our strategic choices and of eliciting initial policy guidance from you on key issues of military strategy. The study underlines the critical role of our Allies in implementing alternative US military strategies as well as potential Allied reactions to changes in US policies. This is particularly true in Europe where ours must be an *alliance* military strategy. It emphasizes the importance of concentrating not only on the early stages of conflict in Europe, but also on how long we fight and those crucial days of conflict termination. Explicit recognition is given to the possibility of a divergence in NATO and US military strategies, given the realities of NATO defense spending and the fact that NATO can currently sustain a conventional battle at projected consumption rates for less than 30 days. The study raises the question of operations outside Europe in a US–USSR conflict and highlights the peacetime functions of military forces in crisis management and local wars. The analysis of strategic

forces begins with recognition that strategic nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of US and Allied military security, and defines US objectives and establishes alternative criteria through which they might be achieved. Specific issues addressed include the requirements for political sufficiency, a hard target kill capability, various levels of retaliatory capability in the face of Soviet offensive and defensive posture, and a strategic reserve force.

The Executive Summary conveys a picture of the scope and breadth of the report, and of the issues developed.

(S) Relationship of the Net Assessment and Strategy/Force Posture Study

The two major parts of PRM-10 were performed simultaneously. The Net Assessment portion was not available for use by the Force Posture Study group. A major consequence is that the notional AIMS are not directly related either to an approved set of overall national objectives or to a national strategy derived from the Net Assessment. In fact, as a consequence of the concurrency of the two portions of the PRM-10 effort, the alternative national strategies and the notional AIMS were developed on independent analytical frameworks; so there is no systemic interconnect between the two.

(TS) Limitations

There are a number of things which this study does not do, and, for the most part, never intended to do. These include the following:

a. The breadth and scope of the study effort required a high level of conceptual abstraction which makes it useful as a vehicle for identifying and considering military strategy issues. The study is not suitable as a basis for definitive selection of any particular strategy. Because they were selected to illuminate subsets of issues, none of the notional AIMS was intended to be, nor is, appropriate as an overall strategy to meet our national security needs.

b. The approach to the force posturing and costing required simplifying assumptions and rough estimates which preclude their use in definitive program and budget decisions.

c. The complexity of the study prevented in-depth examination of some of the significant issues relating to NATO that have been raised in Congress. Assumptions were made with respect to warning time, reinforcement and readiness requirements, Soviet build-up rates and warning indicators, and "lag time" for NATO decision. The implications of a full range of these assumptions must be considered because the differences could be quite substantial in terms of force requirements and costs.

d. The contingency assessment of our current military capabilities, summarized in Chapter 11 of the report, deals only with the narrow

measure of relative force build-ups and is of limited value for predicting which force would prevail in actual combat.

e. The study did not call for the formulation of national objectives, and the response did not attempt to do so.

f. A wide range of significant military issues was not addressed, including: theater nuclear forces; strategic defensive and mobility forces; US-USSR industrial capacity/mobilization potential; and access to raw materials and energy resources.

g. Neither this study nor the Net Assessment dealt in any depth with the specific nature of the current and expected challenges from the Soviet Union. They were unable to deal, moreover, with the many uncertainties which the future competition will pose for both the US and the Soviet Union.

(S) Follow-on Work

Your guidance on the military strategy issues will provide the framework for my review of specific defense policies in the coming months. I will have begun within DOD a hard look ahead at the FY 1979 budget and will soon turn to formulate basic guidance for the 1980 budget. I am also looking at ways to strengthen DOD longer range planning. I believe we should try to add a true long-range planning function in the Defense Department. As things stand now, our horizon is limited to no more—and often less—than the service life of the major pieces of equipment we buy. We have a good idea of the next five years; things are less certain after that, and, for instance, even though the ships we buy may last for 20–30 years, we have no real plan approaching that duration. Doing so would give us the chance to be a bit less reactive to what happens in the world around us, and instead to think about where we would like to lead the world, and develop strategies to do this. We can do a better job of thinking through how we can adapt as the uncertainty of the future unfolds.

In a similar vein, just as the business world plans strategies for product markets, I think we may be able to plan strategies for the “businesses” of the Department of Defense. We will begin to look in the large for areas where we are (or could be) in a position—as the economists put it—of comparative advantage, and then try to build upon what we have today to move the competition in that direction.

In addition to initiating follow-on efforts to address the problems identified above as limitations, and developing a long-range planning function, I will also initiate study efforts to address specific topics including:

- Roles, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of theater nuclear forces;
- The forces and mechanisms appropriate for crisis management and potential local conflicts (with particular attention on potential crises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf);
- The characteristics of a US Navy appropriate for its contribution in effective competition with the Soviet Union and management of US global interests in the future;
- Warsaw Pact capabilities, doctrine, and vulnerabilities associated with sustaining conventional conflict in Europe;
- Measures NATO could pre-plan to exploit various amounts of warning time which might be available; and
- Soviet doctrine, capabilities, and vulnerabilities associated with our taking initiatives outside Europe during a war in Europe.

(C) *Beyond PRM-10*

I believe our efforts to date have served to provide the essential framework for identifying the major military strategy issues on which your guidance will set the course for our future actions. There are now being set in motion the necessary activities along the lines outlined earlier in this memorandum to address those areas requiring greater study before decisions on a comprehensive national military strategy can be made.

I am prepared to discuss with you in further detail the considerations and implications of each of the military strategy issues.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Final Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Military Force Posture²

Washington, July 7, 1977

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose. The purpose of the PRM-10 Force Postures Study is to elicit policy guidance from the President on key issues pertaining to national military strategy. The scope of this study is intentionally broad. It partakes of most, but exhausts none, of the numerous topics and factors which enter into the determination of national military strategy. It is designed to provide a solid basis for further detailed work on defense force structure and program issues, using either the interagency process or the normal PPBS decision process, as appropriate.

² Secret.

Approach. In order to develop alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS), Substrategy building blocks were constructed to identify a range of options in each of five analytical areas:

1. NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe (including the NATO Flanks and the North Atlantic).
2. Operations outside Europe during a NATO–WP war.
3. East Asia.
4. Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars.
5. US–USSR nuclear conflict.

The major issues in each analytical area, or conflict category, were isolated. Then, using this building block technique, the substrategies shown below were developed to focus on what the US should achieve as well as the threats to that achievement.

Summary of Substrategies

NATO-WP IN EUROPE	NON-EUROPEAN OPERATIONS DURING A NATO- WP WAR	PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL WARS		US-USSR NUCLEAR CONFLICT
		EAST ASIA		
COUNTEROFFENSIVE				
OFFSETTING ATTACKS				
DIRECT DEFENSE	INITIATIVES	INCREASED PRESENCE	HEAVY INTERVENTION	CLEAR SUPERIORITY
LIMIT LOSS	LIMITED ACTION	CURRENT PRESENCE	LIGHT INTERVENTION	RETAIN US FORCE ADVANTAGES
ELASTIC TRIPWIRE	MINIMAL EFFORT	REDUCED PRESENCE	LIMITED ACTION	MAINTAIN OVERALL FORCE BALANCE
TRIPWIRE		MODIFIED WITHDRAWAL WITHDRAWAL	PROXY RELIANCE	ASSURED RETALIATION ONLY

Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) were formulated from the analytical area substrategies by excluding unworkable combinations of substrategies. Eight final AIMS were selected for detailed evaluation in terms of their military, economic, political (both in technical and domestic) and arms control implications. Each AIMS addresses in a different way the major military issues facing the United States. The range of AIMS is intentionally broad so that they will provide a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluation of the major elements of defense policy.

The composition of the eight final AIMS in terms of their analytical area substrategies is shown in the table below:

ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGIES (AIMS)

AIMS	NATO/WP Conflict in Europe	Operations		Peacekeeping and Potential Local Wars		US-USSR Nuclear Conflict
		Outside Europe	US-USSR War	East Asia	Limited Action	
E		Limited Action		Reduced Presence		Maintain Overall force balance
F	Limit Loss: Hold 86-92 division threat at Weser-Lech w /30-day sustainability	Limited Action		Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
G		Initiatives		Current Presence	Heavy Intervention	Maintain Overall force balance
F (Variant)	Limit Loss: Hold 130 division threat at Weser-Lech w /90-day sustainability	Limited Action		Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages

AIMS	NATO/WP Conflict in Europe	Operations		East Asia	Peacekeeping and Potential Local Wars	US–USSR Nuclear Conflict
		Outside Europe in US–USSR War				
H	Direct Defense: Restore pre-war line against 130 division threat w/90-day sustainability	Limited Action		Reduced Presence	Limited Action	Maintain Overall force balance
I	Direct Defense: w/Indefinite sustainability	Limited Action		Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
J	Offsetting Attacks: Flank attack on Pact while holding in central Region against 130+ division threat w/indefi- nite sustainability	Initiatives		Current Presence	Heavy Intervention	Assured Retalia- tion only
K		Initiatives		Increased Presence	Heavy Intervention	Clear Superiority

Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for linking building blocks into coherent AIMS, as summarized below.

AIMS E—This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force, but the US still would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. In conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days. (A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of the Rhine River). In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F—This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military forces, but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies. US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced; all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be retained, with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. As in *AIMS E*, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to *AIMS E*, the current programmed military deployments in East Asia, less land forces in Korea, would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F Variant—This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest increase in US military capability and a substantial increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. This strategy is identical to *AIMS F* except that in a European war, sustainability is commensurate with that currently programmed for US forces, with a

requisite increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. In conjunction with the NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days, still involving loss of NATO territory. Both sides are assumed to have the capability to employ additional forces in Central Europe beyond the first month of conflict, so this AIMS requires more forces than AIMS F. AIMS F Variant requires forces at least comparable to those in the current US Five Year Defense Program, but in excess of those currently programmed by the NATO Allies.

AIMS G—This AIMS is based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold in Europe, however, might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe. As in AIMS E and F, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. Contrary to previous AIMS, however, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS H—This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere. This raised threshold is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. In Europe, and in conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced

primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS I—This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe. The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight increase in the current strategic nuclear levels. All present US strategic advantages would be retained, with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. As in AIMS H, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. (Two excursions, to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an indefinite time, but without change to combat forces during those periods, were evaluated.) In addition, the US would maintain a limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS H, essentially the current programmed military deployments in East Asia—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS J—This AIMS is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable. A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence. Thus, US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only—the capability to substantially destroy Soviet economic and leadership resources—and minimal counter-military capability would be provided, with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries in the Soviets' favor. As in AIMS H and I, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. US war reserve stocks, however, would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO's having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days. Contrary to AIMS H and I, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence in Europe. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention

capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS M—This AIMS is based on the premise that significant, sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives. US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels; US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets in all significant indices—forces, modernization, and options for major active defenses. Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage. Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur in Europe, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage. Major conventional capability is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global interests with a high probability of success. This would call for an increased military presence in East Asia and a major intervention capability in other regions.

The range of general purpose forces estimated to accomplish each AIMS is shown in the table below:³

ESTIMATED FORCES FOR AIMS

AIMS	Army Divisions	Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings	Marine Amphibi- ous Forces	Navy	
				Aircraft Carriers	Surface Combatants
E	21–22	31–37	2–4 1/3	6–18	42–310
F	21–23	33–39	3–4 1/3	8–18	100–310
F (Variant)	25–27	36–42	3–4 1/3	10–18	204–310
G	26–27	51–57	4–4 2/3	12–21	121–366
H	33–42	36–42	3–4 1/3	9–23	190–366
I	33–42	38–44	4–4 1/3	12–23	211–365
J	35–48	53–62	4 2/3–5	14–25	245–407

³ The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs that they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies. Specifically, the estimate for Pact sustainability, which was used to derive the lower bounds for US land forces, has a high degree of uncertainty. The substantive issue of non-US NATO sustainability beyond 30 days is avoided by assuming full NATO sustainability. In addition, naval forces should be structured to provide a balanced, flexible force capable of dealing with all aspects of naval warfare. [Footnote is in the original.]

M	39-57	63-74	5 2/3-6	24-28	374-454
End-FY78	24	36	4	13	195
Program					

The range of estimated five year costs (total obligational authority) for each AIMS is shown in the chart below.⁴ The high end of the range is influenced both by the high range for force estimates but also by the rate at which the forces are procured. These cost estimates do not show the total cost to achieve a force posture, only that portion of the cost which would be obligated in the first five years. Nevertheless, these costs give an idea of the expense incurred by adoption of an AIMS.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

⁴ Ibid.

31. Presidential Directive/NSC-18¹

Washington, August 24, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. National Strategy

I have reviewed the PRM/NSC-10 conclusions and the discussion of the Special Coordination Committee.² It is clear that in the foreseeable future, US-Soviet relations will continue to be characterized by

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO): 3/77-1/80. Top Secret.

² See Document 29.

both competition and cooperation, with the attendant risk of conflict as well as the opportunity for stabilizing US-Soviet relations.

In that competition, military aspects aside, the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has a more creative technological and economic system, its political structure can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies on freely given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring military power matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union continues to face major internal economic and national difficulties, and externally it has few genuinely committed allies while lately suffering setbacks in its relations with China, parts of Africa, and India.

In this situation I direct that US national strategy will be to take advantage of our relative advantages in economic strength, technological superiority and popular political support to:

- Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.

- Compete politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American commitment to human rights and national independence.

- Seek Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts and reducing areas of tension that could lead to confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

- Advance American security interests through negotiations with the Soviet Union of adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements that enhance stability and curb arms competition.

- Seek to involve the Soviet Union constructively in global activities, such as economic and social developments and peaceful non-strategic trade.

To fulfill this national strategy, the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now exists. In this connection, the United States will fulfill its commitment to its NATO allies to raise the level of defense spending by approximately three percent per year in real terms along with our allies.

To carry out US national strategy, I am also providing the following initial guidance regarding US military strategy, programs and policies.

Strategic Force Objectives

The purpose of US strategic forces is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, upon our forces, our allies and others whose security is important to the United States and, if deterrence fails, to inflict

appropriate retaliatory response on the Soviet Union. In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces, it is the further purpose of our strategic forces to enhance deterrence of non-nuclear aggression against NATO and our Asian allies.

Strategic Programs

The United States will maintain a strategic posture of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union so as to insure that the Soviet Union cannot use strategic forces for political leverage and coercion and so that the strategic balance will not deter the United States from taking conventional military action where its interests dictate.

Essential equivalence will require that advantages in strategic force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviet Union must be offset by United States advantages in strategic forces. The United States will not accept a strategic posture inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

The United States will not seek a capability for a disarming first strategic nuclear strike against Soviet strategic forces so long as the Soviet Union does not do so against us. Our posture should be designed to promote nuclear stability particularly in a crisis and to the extent possible reduce any Soviet incentive to use nuclear weapons. The US force posture should be capable of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union following a Soviet first strike.

The United States will maintain adequate command and control capability and forces to execute limited strategic employment options.

The United States will maintain the capability to provide timely strategic attack warning and assessment and to insure adequate surveillance and control of US airspace. The United States research and development efforts on active strategic defenses should be sufficient to assess and respond to Soviet strategic programs as appropriate.

Strategic Targeting Policy

If deterrence should fail and nuclear conflict occurs, US targeting plans should provide options for limited retaliatory responses designed to control escalation and flexibly respond to aggression. If control of escalation fails, US target plans should seek to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the extent possible, and to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the Soviet Union (subject to a separate targeting review), so that the conflict terminates on the most favorable terms possible.

US target plans should provide for the maintenance of a secure reserve force to be withheld for possible use subsequent to a major nuclear exchange.

General Purpose Forces

The conventional forces take on increasing relevance to the defense of US security interests under conditions of strategic nuclear equivalence. Planning for US general purpose forces will focus on dealing with the Soviet threat to Europe but will also provide capabilities for use in the defense of major US and allied interests outside of Europe. US planning for NATO and for global contingencies must take into account the heightened significance of conventional capability in the setting of strategic nuclear equivalence.

NATO

The US reaffirms NATO strategy as expressed in MC-14/3.³ Deterrence and defense in the NATO areas will continue to rely on a combination of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. To this end it is necessary in the light of advances in the military posture of the Warsaw Pact to emphasize the strengthening of NATO's conventional forces for deterrence and defense.

Consonant with present NATO strategy, including forward defense, the US is committed to having the capability, in conjunction with its allies, to stop a Warsaw Pact attack with minimum loss of territory and ultimately to restore prewar boundaries. To this end priority should be given to initial combat capabilities.

In this connection, the United States together with its allies shall maintain capabilities adequate to protect the lines of communication and access to raw materials that are vital to the economies of the United States and its allies in the event of a NATO Warsaw Pact war.

Global Contingencies

In addition, the United States will maintain a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas bases and logistical support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces. These forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR based on analyses of requirements in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea, taking into account the contribution of our friends and allies in these regions. US planning should provide that these requirements may be met by a combination of the light deployment forces, supplemented by forces in the United States, primarily oriented toward NATO defense. The 2nd Division will be oriented toward deployment in Asia but available for global contingencies as described above.

³ See footnote 4, Document 29.

Asia

With the exception of withdrawals from Korea directed under PD/NSC-12,⁴ the United States will maintain the current level of combat forces deployed in the Western Pacific in order to preserve regional stability, to deter aggression in Korea and elsewhere, and to protect US interests and meet treaty commitments in the event of aggression.

Additional Studies

The Secretary of Defense will undertake, subject to separate instructions, a review of US targeting policy, as well as other studies; recommendations on the appropriate level of US capability to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies should be coordinated by the National Security Council for my decision, as per additional instructions.

Pending the conclusion of the targeting review, the US will continue to employ its strategic forces according to NSDM 242.⁵

Otherwise, this Directive supersedes NSDM 242.

Jimmy Carter

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 29.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 31.

32. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, August 24, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-on Studies for PD/NSC-18

Concurrently with the issuance of PD/NSC-18 on US National Strategy,² the President has instructed that the Secretary of Defense will review current targeting policy and recommended targeting criteria

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 57, PRM-10, (PD-18). Top Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum next to the dateline.

² See Document 31.

for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. This review will consider the relevant political and strategic advantages of several options including among others:

—an option which would effectively target 70 percent of all identified Soviet economic recovery resources, 70 percent of all identified political recovery resources, 70 percent of all identified military recovery resources and 90 percent of all other identified Soviet military targets and related commands, control and communications facilities. It would also consider options which would preclude the Soviet Union from inflicting more fatalities on the United States than the United States could inflict on the Soviet Union, also taking into account demographic differentials. Pending the completion of this review, the United States will continue to employ forces according to NSDM 242.³

The Secretary of Defense should provide, through the NSC, his assessment of the specific amount of hard-target kill capability the US should maintain into the future, identifying the strategic purposes such capabilities would serve. No action should be taken to diminish US hard-target kill capabilities pending the President's decision.

The Secretary of Defense, together with the Director of Central Intelligence, will undertake an examination for NSC review of the war-time target acquisition capability required for the secure reserve force.

The Secretary of Defense will provide an analysis and recommendations to the NSC for the President's decision of the appropriate United States response regarding the future of the US Triad concept.

Recommendations on the appropriate level of US capability to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies should be coordinated by the National Security Council for the President's decision. This should be based on:

1. an evaluation of Warsaw Pact capabilities to sustain combat;
2. consultations with our NATO allies concerning their willingness to agree upon a uniform goal for sustained combat capability;
3. the necessity to emphasize early combat capability so as to fulfill NATO strategy and minimize reliance upon nuclear weapons and the resultant tradeoff with the capability to sustain extended conflict;
4. an examination of the implications of alternative US–NATO mobilization and industrial preparedness postures;
5. a review of the interrelationship between US global political objectives, defense strategy, and naval deployment.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

³ See footnote 5, Document 31.

33. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 3, 1977

SUBJECT

The Issue of Continuing Two ALCM Development Programs

In response to your request (Tab 3),² Harold Brown has sent you a point paper (Tab 1) that argues for continuing both the Tomahawk ALCM (TALCM) and ALCM-B development programs for the time being.

I have also had some counter-arguments developed in order to put forth both sides of the case (Tab 2).

RECOMMENDATION

As the next step, I recommend you ask Harold for some more detail as to what precisely he envisages as the next stage of development and testing, the cost implications of possible deployments, and the strategic rationale. In addition, you should ask him for his recommendation should you decide to consolidate the two cruise missile programs.

Attached at Tab 4 for your signature is a memorandum to Harold Brown requesting this additional information.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 7/77. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not printed is Brown's memorandum to Carter, July 2, in which he wrote: "Now that we have opted for the cruise missile system in preference to the B-1, I believe that it would be unwise to terminate either cruise missile program until we have achieved the operational capabilities on whose prospect the decision was based."

² Attached but not printed is an undated, handwritten note from Carter to Brown: "To Harold Brown, I am not convinced that we need both the Tomahawk and the A Force ALCM. We certainly cannot afford to waste money on duplicative systems. Please Comment—Jimmy."

Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, July 20, 1977

POINT PAPER
ON
CONTINUATION OF BOTH ALCM AND
TOMAHAWK PROGRAMS

The principal considerations are:

1. *Risk*: The risk represented by the ALCM program is different from that of the TALCM (TOMAHAWK Air-Launched Cruise Missile) program. The ALCM is less mature in its development and test program, having had only six flight tests of which four were successful, although all tests have been in conjunction with a B-52 bomber. The TOMAHAWK, on the other hand, has had 22 flight tests, 18 of which have been successful; however, it is untested and unevaluated in the context of the B-52 operational weapon system.

The cruise missile will now be crucial to maintaining the bomber leg of the TRIAD. I am therefore convinced that it is appropriate to minimize the risk by maintaining both of these programs in parallel until either or, preferably, both have completed comprehensive tests in the B-52 environment. Furthermore, cancellation now (or soon) of a cruise missile program could raise questions about the B-1 decision, and about our determination to pose a severe air-breathing threat to the Soviets into the 1990s. In the long run it may indeed prove to be economical to pick only one for the inventory, though depending on the number of different applications (ALCM, GLCM, SLCM—nuclear and/or antiship), several different designs may be appropriate for the inventory.

2. *Competition*: Continuing both ALCM and TOMAHAWK in RDT&E will create a healthy competition between the two missile configurations as strategic air-launched cruise missiles. We expect, as a result, both programs will achieve better performance and lower cost than if there were only one program.

At about \$1M per missile in recurring costs (for a buy of 3000 to 5000 missiles), even a 10 to 15% cost reduction by virtue of competition will realize a savings to the government of \$300M to \$750M. Such a savings in procurement costs, together with the importance of reducing

³ No classification marking.

risk by having a back-up program, is a worthwhile trade for the additional RDT&E expenditure required to carry both programs at least to the point of final production selection.

3. *SALT Aspects*: Dropping ALCM could result in foreclosure of air launched cruise missile options during SALT as a result of constraints on TOMAHAWK. TOMAHAWK, having an identical external configuration for SLCM, GLCM, and bomber-launch (including B-52 and cruise missile carrier) application, may create weapon counting complications. Should there be a SALT constraint on GLCM/SLCM, the bomber-carried TOMAHAWK may be also constrained. ALCM, having an entirely different configuration from that of TOMAHAWK, and not being launchable from submarines, will avoid any potential SALT entanglement between sea-launched cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile from a strategic air launch cruise missile system. Such an option should be preserved until the SALT situation is clarified.

4. *Legal Aspects*: If signed into law, the Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978 directs that: "Competitive cruise missile development programs shall continue until the Secretary of Defense certifies to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives that (1) a single airframe for the cruise missile can be selected which meets all operational requirements, and (2) cost data clearly establish that termination of the competitive cruise missile development programs will result in lower development and procurement costs for the cruise missile."

5. *Asymmetric Strengths*: The two systems have different strong points and, thus, are not 100% comparable:

a. TOMAHAWK:

- Longer range [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
- Probably cheaper in missile unit cost.
- More matured in missile tests.
- Essentially common missile for SLCM and GLCM missions.

b. ALCM:

- More matured in system test for B-52 Launch.
- Avoiding entanglement with SALT constraint which might be placed on GLCM/SLCM.
- Single-Service management and thus, better system integration.
- Compatibility with existing SRAM support equipment.

As time goes by, many of these will be resolved one way or the other, and a decision between them should then be possible for this application.

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

ISSUE: Whether to Continue Two ALCM Development Programs

Pro Arguments

(From Harold Brown's Point Paper)

Con Arguments

(From NSC Staff)

1. Risk

—Neither missile has been adequately tested in the context of the B-52 operational weapon system. ALCM-B has been tested from a B-52, but there have been only six tests (four successful), and these were of the shorter range ALCM-A. The TALCM has not been tested or evaluated for deployment on the B-52, although it has been tested 22 times (18 successful) from other platforms.

—Cancellation of one of the ALCM programs at this time could raise questions about the B-1 decision and our commitment to maintaining an “air-breathing” threat to the Soviets into the 1990’s.

—The Tomahawk cruise missile has been fully tested, including tests from aircraft. Since both the guidance and propulsion systems (the two critical development items) are common to both Tomahawk and ALCM-B, we can be fully confident about the basic performance of either missile. While there are some changes in transitioning to the B-52, these changes are well understood from an engineering standpoint (the TALCM proponents have been studying them for several years) and would not bear on the choice between TALCM and ALCM-B.

—This argument is very unpersuasive. In fact, just the opposite might be the case—choice of a single ALCM program and direction of all development funds to this program could serve to emphasize our commitment to the ALCM program.

⁴ Secret.

- In the long run, it may develop that several different designs may be appropriate for the inventory.
- While it is certainly the case that different range/payload combinations are desirable, this does not argue for having two different airframe designs—the principal difference between TALCM and ALCM-B.

2. *Competition and Cost*

- Continuing both programs will result in better performance and lower cost than if there were only one program.
- This seems highly unlikely, since the basic designs of both missiles are already well established, and their critical components (guidance and propulsion) do not differ.
- Continuing the competition could result in a 10–15% per missile cost reduction. This translates into a potential \$300–750 million cost saving on a 3000–5000 missile buy which would cover the cost of continuing two programs for a while.
- Such a cost saving is inconceivable, since there are apparently no plans for a competitive bidding on production (which might bring costs down), and the missiles differ principally only in airframe design.

3. *SALT Aspects*

- Dropping ALCM-B could result in foreclosure of ALCM options through SALT; i.e., constraints on Tomahawk SLCMs and GLCMs may preclude a long-range Tomahawk ALCM because of its identical external configuration.
- We are sensitive to this problem and clearly would not permit SLCM and GLCM constraints to impact on TALCM deployment. If the current common TALCM and SLCM/GLCM external configurations are judged to be a verification problem, we can easily take a small section out of the TALCM to make it verifiably different from Tomahawk SLCMs and GLCMs. [3 lines not declassified]

—ALCM, having an entirely different external configuration from that of Tomahawk, and not being launchable from submarines, will avoid any potential SALT entanglement between ALCMs and sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.

—While this statement is true for ALCM vice submarine-launched cruise missiles, it is not true for cruise missiles launched from surface ships or ground launchers which could have the same external configuration as the current ALCM. In addition, as noted above, the TALCM could be reduced in length (a minor engineering modification) if it is necessary to produce a unique external configuration. For example, a one-foot reduction would be readily verifiable.
[5 lines not declassified]

4. Service Problems

—Single service management of both missile and aircraft argues for the ALCM–B which is an Air Force program in contrast to the TALCM which is a Navy run program.

—The Air Force clearly is not enamored of deploying an ALCM originally developed by the Navy. However, this is a matter of service rivalry and not cost/effectiveness. Once deployment starts and the Air Force deals directly with the contractor, the “problem” of working with a Navy program manager would disappear. In fact, the success and acceptance of the cruise missile can be traced primarily to the extremely successful and well-run Navy Tomahawk program and not to the ALCM–A/B program.

Tab 4**Memorandum From President Carter to Secretary of Defense Brown⁵**

Washington, August 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

I have reviewed the point paper that you sent me on the issue of whether to continue two ALCM development programs.

Would you provide me as soon as possible a more detailed discussion of the program you would pursue for both versions (TALCM and ALCM-B), the development and testing schedules, tentative deployment plans, and cost implications. Additionally, would you provide your recommendation as to how to proceed should I decide to consolidate the two programs.⁶

Jimmy Carter

⁵ Secret.

⁶ Carter wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "P.S. At what stage, assuming tests go well, could you certify that the 1978 Authorization Act requirements have been met? J."

34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 2, 1977

SUBJECT

Secretary Brown's Memorandum on Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

Secretary Brown has responded to your request for more information concerning his proposal to continue with both the ALCM and the ALCM-B cruise missile programs. His memo (Tab A) provides information on all the questions you raised in your memo (Tab B)² except that pertaining to tentative deployment plans, which are still being worked out.

For your information, however, we have determined at the staff level that a tentative deployment plan has been proposed—to convert 150 B-52 G's into ALCM carriers by 1986. The conversion would start in earnest in 1981, building to a rate of about three aircraft per month, and would involve buying about 2400 missiles (which would allow 20 per aircraft plus an allowance for spare and pipeline missiles).

We have also determined a fact which is not stated explicitly in Harold's memo—current plans are that if we proceed to a fly-off between the two ALCM candidates, our choice of a single contractor for production will be made not just on technical factors, but also on the basis of firm production price bids.

I believe that the information at hand is as reasonable a basis for decision as can be expected in the near term; in my view the determining factors in the decision whether to have one or two ALCM programs turns on two risks—1) the risk that a technical problem will delay the program significantly and 2) the risk that production costs will be much higher than now anticipated. Here is our account of these risks.

Technological Risk. While there may be an occasional short delay in either of these programs, it seems very unlikely that any of the engineering problems yet to be solved will prove very difficult. Even in the unlikely event we were to run into serious problems, our strategic posture will not be so close to the margin that our security would be affected by a delay of even several years' duration. The issue, however, is that the political and corresponding fiscal consequences of failing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 8-9/77. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

² See Tab 4, Document 33.

to successfully deploy an ALCM in a fairly quick and orderly manner could be substantial. Specifically, there are abundant signs that the Air Force and the JCS still do not completely accept your decision on the B-1. Thus, they might seize the opportunity that would be presented by a technical problem delaying ALCM deployment to mount a campaign to get the B-1 decision reversed or push ahead with the FB-111 H.

Cost Risk. The risk that ALCM production costs might be significantly higher if a single program is pursued also seems considerable, particularly in view of the fact that, in the absence of competition, the environment may be conducive to overpricing. As Harold suggests, given a production run of 3000 missiles, a reduction of even 10 percent in the projected production costs would completely offset the additional costs of carrying both ALCM programs.

RECOMMENDATION

Cutting back on our ALCM efforts might send the wrong signal both to Congress and the Soviets. Given these considerations, I believe that we should go along with Harold's recommendation to support both programs, at least for now. I would suggest, however, that you have me instruct Harold that, while he can tentatively plan on continuing to a fly-off and cost competition between the two missiles, he should seek to resolve the major uncertainties in these programs as rapidly as possible in order to put you in the best possible position should you decide to drop one of the programs in the FY 80 budget cycle.³

³ Carter indicated his approval and initialed the bottom of the memorandum. In a September 9 memorandum to Brown, Brzezinski conveyed Carter's decision, writing that "the President has asked me to inform you that while you can tentatively plan on continuing to a fly-off and cost competition between the two missiles, you should seek to resolve the major uncertainties in these programs as rapidly as possible in order to put the President in the best possible position should he decide to drop one of these programs in the FY 1980 budget." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missiles: 8-9/77)

Tab A**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
President Carter⁴**

Washington, August 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Choosing a Single ALCM Development Program

Your memorandum of August 5, 1977, raised questions about our plans for parallel development of the cruise missiles for the B-52. As I indicated in our conversation last week, I do not believe that we are ready to select with confidence one design (and contractor) for the air-launched cruise missile mission. Nor could we defend adequately a selection of either missile and contractor at this stage. The ALCM missile has yet to be modified to its long range (ALCM-B) version. The modification is relatively straightforward, (basically “stretching” it by adding two sections). But a successful flight test of the modified missile is indicated before this missile could appropriately be selected. The TOMAHAWK (TALCM) missile has had sufficient flight tests to tell us about its flight characteristics, but has never been mated to or launched from the B-52. Again, we believe the mating is a straightforward engineering task. But until it is demonstrated, we cannot convincingly argue that TALCM is the preferred missile. To arrive at the point where we could select either missile with the required confidence will take a minimum of 6 to 9 months of testing to conduct the necessary flight tests and evaluation of each. Based on such preliminary test results, a selection could be arrived at by a year from now, in mid-1978. However, with this much additional effort required for parallel programs, I believe it will probably make good management sense to carry the programs in parallel all the way through as a carefully conducted competitive flyoff, with selection by October 1979. The savings that could be achieved by not carrying the parallel program through a flyoff is about \$200M to \$300M, depending on how soon the parallel program is terminated, and which missile is selected. The benefits to be expected from maintaining the parallel program through the flyoff are as follows:

(1) The competition can be fairly determined on an objective basis from the operational tests conducted by SAC crews on B-52s.

(2) The technical characteristics of the successful missile will probably be superior because each contractor will be working hard to maximize his “score” on the indicated performance parameters, including

⁴ Secret.

radar cross section, reliability, guidance performance (the guidance systems are only about 70% common), and operational flexibility of the technique for mounting in the B-52. The merits of a stacked rack (9 TALCM) and a rotary rack (7 TALCM or 8 ALCM) for internal carriage are debated. A competitive flyoff will let the competition settle the argument.

(3) The unit cost of the successful missile will probably be lower because of each contractor's motivation to incorporate manufacturing economies into his design.

In summary, I expect the life cycle cost of the program will be less with a competitive flyoff in spite of the increased R&D cost; as a bonus we should get maximum performance and minimum risk of contractor protests. Finally, we hedge against program disaster in the unlikely event of one contractor completely failing to meet program objectives.

You asked when we could certify to the Congress that the requirements of language in the FY 78 Authorization Bill have been met. The clearest case for assurance of meeting operational requirements and for knowledge that the termination would produce minimal cost is at the end of the flyoff in October 1979. Prior to that we could make the certification based on our internal estimates at almost any time, conceivably even before the preliminary development flight tests from the B-52 are completed for both missiles. I question, however, whether we could be convincing to the Congress. There is likely to be protracted acrimonious exchange with the defenders of the missile that was selected out; making a choice after flyoff would greatly reduce (though not eliminate) the points of argument. I have attached answers to the other questions you asked with the exception of tentative deployment plans.⁵ I assume you were asking about numbers, intended utilization, and basing. We are still sorting these out and I will provide an answer later.

Harold Brown

⁵ Attached but not printed are three one-page papers—"Cruise Missile Deployment and Costs," "ALCM Program Plan," and "TALCM Program Plan"—and a one-page chart of an overview of costs for the cruise missile program.

35. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 14, 1977

SUBJECT

The FB–111H Strategic Bomber

Background on the Issue

The Air Force has again proposed to Harold Brown that he initiate an FB–111H strategic bomber program as part of the 1978 B–1 related budget amendment—a proposal that you considered several weeks ago but finally rejected.² This new attempt by the Air Force to start up the FB–111H program has been briefed to the Congress and has found some support (Representative Jim Wright, Senators Goldwater and McIntyre). Further, the Senate Armed Services Committee reportedly plans to add a \$20 million FB–111H program for 1978. While this would only be a small step, it opens the door to a \$7–10 billion program that will be extremely difficult to stop. Unless you and Harold Brown take a strong stand against initiating the FB–111H, Congress is likely to include it in the 1978 budget amendment.

The Air Force Proposal

The FB–111H builds upon certain features of the current FB–111. However, it is essentially a brand new aircraft (new fuselage, avionics, engines). It is smaller than the B–1, would carry about half the B–1's payload, and preliminary estimates suggest that it would cost somewhat more than half the cost of the B–1.

The Air Force believes that proceeding with an FB–111H development program is a less expensive FY 1978 near term approach to retaining a penetrating bomber option than maintaining B–1 development. They would shift 1978 B–1 R&D funds into the new program.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 8–9/77. Top Secret. Sent for action. McIntyre signed for Lance. Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter under cover of an undated memorandum in which he summarized Lance's memorandum and wrote: "I believe that you should support Bert's recommendation. I would not, however, expend any significant amount of political capital in blocking an FB–111H program, given our need for support on more important issues such as the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty." Carter replied by writing in the margin: "The FB–111H program should be kept at a minimum." (Ibid.)

² On September 7, the *New York Times* reported: "The Air Force, seeking to salvage technology designed for the B–1 bomber, has urged Defense Secretary Harold Brown to revive production of the controversial FB–111 fighter and covert it into a long-range nuclear manned bomber." (Bernard Weinraub, "Air Force Urges Revival of FB–111 As a Long-Range Nuclear Bomber," *New York Times*, September 7, 1977, p. 6)

This is only half the story however. The Air Force will agree that the FB-111 would be a less effective penetrator than the B-1. Given the great uncertainty of the cost estimates for the still to be designed FB-111H, this system could easily be more expensive to deploy than an equally effective B-1 force. In addition, the probability that we will have to exercise the production option must be assessed. Thus, the appropriate question is: Is this probability small enough to make the near term savings on the option (\$200–250 M in FY 78) adequate compensation for the extra costs that we risk paying in the event that we build the FB-111H?

Arguments Against the FB-111H Proposal

A number of arguments can be made against initiation of FB-111H at this time.

- A decision to begin serious development of this system could be interpreted as essentially a reversal of your B-1 decision, since the aircraft are similar in many ways. In terms of the primary arguments made against the B-1, the only major difference is a lower unit cost. This is no justification, however, since total cost of fulfilling the required mission is what counts—not unit costs.

- The air-launched cruise missile has been out from under the shadow of the B-1 program only a few months. Renewal of the competition between the standoff and manned penetrator options should be delayed for a while to maximize the seriousness with which the ALCM program is taken.

- The FB-111H option could adversely affect our long term SALT negotiating posture, although the near term impact of starting to develop a new penetrating strategic bomber may not be great. In particular, the similarity between the FB-111H and the Soviet Backfire could lead to negotiating difficulties.

- Finally, commitment to even a very small program now is sure to generate enormous pressures for full-scale development and production within a few years. The Air Force views the FB-111H as its last chance to buy a penetrating bomber—an issue of strong emotional force with the Service. There are powerful congressional interests backing the program and unfavorable past experience with terminating the F-111 and A-7 production lines attests to the difficulties involved.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the above considerations, the B-1 option should be retained for the next year—and for this period at least, any FB-111 initiatives should be avoided. Beyond the problems the FB-111H may give us in SALT, and the fact that it is an inferior choice to the B-1, it seems premature to begin consideration of a manned bomber that is so

similar a solution to the problem of maintaining the effectiveness of our bomber force as the B–1.

I recommend that you ask Harold Brown, in his testimony before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees now scheduled for September 15 and 20, to state that the Administration does not wish to initiate the FB–111H program at this time even at a minimal level. He should support continued B–1 development during 1978 at the minimum level sufficient to provide an option for production.³

³ Carter checked his approval of Lance's recommendation. In a September 20 memorandum Brzezinski wrote Brown: "Last week OMB sent a memo to the President suggesting that you should oppose any efforts by the Congress to begin a development program for the FB–111H. Since this memo would not have gotten to the President in advance of your testimony before the Congress last Thursday, I asked David Aaron to pass on OMB's as well as my own concerns over this issue. The President has since seen the OMB memo and has indicated that if an FB–111H program is started, 'it should be kept at a minimum.'" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 8–9/77)

36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Secretary Brown's Response to Questions on Our Nuclear War Procedures and Doctrine

In the spring, in connection with a review of our "crisis management" procedures for the event of nuclear war, you asked Harold Brown to provide answers to questions about (1) procedures for the conduct of a limited nuclear war, (2) the survivability of our command and control under nuclear attack, and (3) the concept of "limited nuclear options" (LNOs). He has responded with a memorandum (Tab A), a report on our "Current Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy" (Tab B). I delayed

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear War Doctrine: Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO): 3/77–1/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Odom, who sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a September 9 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) An unknown hand wrote on the first page of Odom's memorandum: "Hand Carried to the President 9/16/77." Carter wrote in the upper right corner of Brzezinski's memorandum: "Zbig—See margin notes."

an earlier version of his report pending the outcome of PRM-10, and this second response is his revision in light of PRM-10 and PD-18. (A copy of PD-18 is at Tab H.)²

The answers to the three original questions are succinctly stated at Tabs C, D, and E. The JCS separate answers are at Tab F.

—*Procedures*. You will quickly note that the procedure for a limited nuclear operation, [2 lines not declassified], is not very realistic, especially in view of the Soviet stated preference for targeting command and control at the beginning of a conflict.

—*Command and Control*. Communications for a retaliatory strike order may be very secure, but the survivability of the NCA for conducting the war over several days or weeks and for coping with the domestic civil front is not addressed.

—*Limited Nuclear Options*. The discussion of LNOs is less useful than the appended list of presently approved LNOs which our forces could execute.

To sum up, we have a limited nuclear war doctrine and targeting capability, but we seem to lack some of the defensive capabilities that would make it practical.

The longer report, "Current Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," is an excellent essay explaining the historical process by which we arrived at our present condition, a doctrine but with only part of the capability to implement it. In particular, it recounts our changing views on what constitutes "deterrence" and how to "control escalation," if deterrence fails.

As Harold Brown points out in this memorandum, NSDM-242 specified a number of actions that have not been carried out effectively, and he recommends that we reemphasize them. (A copy of NSDM 242 is at Tab G).³ He invites you to hear a briefing on LNOs by the JCS and to visit SAC Headquarters in Omaha. I encourage you to accept these invitations because:

—As the report argues, and as NSDM 242 specified, LNOs and the SIOP require repeated interaction between the NCA and the planning process if our nuclear force planning is to reflect the policy preference of the NCA.

—The experience will improve your familiarity with the context in which our White House Emergency Procedures and IVORY ITEMS drills must fit. Recent press reporting on the subject of your readiness for handling a nuclear war emergency (Orr Kelly's piece in *U.S. News*

² Not found attached; see Document 31.

³ Not found attached; see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 31.

& World Report)⁴ makes this a matter of potential public sensitivity, not only because our procedures are mentioned, but also because Brezhnev is described as practicing frequently with his nuclear war command and control system. Our OPAL drills, your NEACP trip, and the IVORY ITEM drill are already giant strides in this area of readiness in comparison to anything since the issuance of NSDM–242 which called for similar “exercises” that never took place.

Finally, I shall consult with Harold Brown on re-emphasizing neglected aspects of NSDM–242.⁵

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter⁶

Washington, August 19, 1977

SUBJECT

US Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (U)

(TS) Several months ago, you directed Zbigniew Brzezinski to ask me⁷ several questions concerning our current nuclear weapons employment policy (NSDM–242), and the appropriateness of retaining that policy. My response to your questions was initially forwarded to the White House on June 3.⁸ At that time, however, it was anticipated that PRM–10 would likely provide additional insight with respect to nuclear weapons employment questions. As a consequence, the report was held within the NSC awaiting completion of PRM–10. The report was returned to me on July 29 to permit whatever modifications necessary to accommodate my views on the results of PRM–10.

(TS) I have reviewed my previously developed responses to your questions, and am enclosing the report, slightly altered to the above end, for your information and consideration. In addition to responding to your specific questions, the report provides additional background to help in understanding our existing policy and the complexity of

⁴ Orr Kelly, “If U.S. Comes Under Nuclear Assault,” *U.S. News & World Report*, September 5, 1977.

⁵ Brzezinski wrote below this paragraph: “I inserted 5 clips, marking items you might want to read, time-permitting.”

⁶ Top Secret.

⁷ See footnote 4, Document 9.

⁸ The June 3 memorandum is in Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 62, PRC 022, 7/8/77, US/USSR—PRM 10.

issues involving deterrence and the possible employment or threat of employment of nuclear weapons.

(TS) Clearly, the question of whether existing nuclear employment policy should be continued or modified, and if so, in what respects, is of greatest importance. In providing their comments to assist in preparing the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that the rationale used in developing current nuclear doctrine appears valid for the immediate future. They recommend that current nuclear policy as described in NSDM-242 be retained.

(TS) The analyses and discussions of PRM-10 suggest that there is still no consensus with respect to some elements of the general war targeting criteria described in NSDM-242. It is apparent that follow-on work will be required in this area, and I intend to continue such study. I am not, therefore, prepared to make a final recommendation on the ultimate disposition of NSDM-242 at this time. The attached report therefore does not present that issue for decision by you.

(S) Nevertheless, whatever judgments may ultimately be made on its details, NSDM-242 represented a major step in nuclear employment policy. It promulgated for the first time a single national policy for employment of both strategic and theater nuclear forces—i.e., for planning how our existing forces would be used if necessary. It is a major advance in providing an opportunity for greater participation by the (civilian) National Command Authorities in nuclear planning, and for rationalizing the planning process. Moreover, in addition to establishing objectives and policy for nuclear weapons employment planning, NSDM-242 also specified several tasks to be undertaken in the areas of crisis management, declaratory policy, political-military interface in the planning process, and Presidential review of the resulting operational plans. For a variety of reasons, these requirements for implementing the overall policy have never all been completely satisfied. I believe that reemphasis on these areas will now be needed regardless of the eventual judgments made on NSDM-242.

(TS) With respect to the status of current guidance, I endorse the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the policy stated in NSDM-242 appears valid for the immediate future, and I recommend that NSDM-242 be retained for employment planning purposes. I do this because even if (as is quite possible) further analysis indicates that significant policy modifications should be directed at some future point, adequate lead time will be necessary to transition to a new employment policy. Indeed, because of the complexity of the planning process, while some limited modifications might be introduced more rapidly, two or more years would be needed to develop new planning guidance and fully translate it into a new general war plan (SIOP). It would be essential

that a comprehensive policy statement be in effect in the interim to provide focus and guidance for nuclear employment planning.

(S) I further recommend that action continue under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense to refine and support implementation of NSDM-242, especially in those areas unlikely to be affected by possible future policy adjustments. Such action should include:

—Continued action to familiarize you and your senior advisors with the content, capabilities, limitations and risks of the nuclear operational plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the national nuclear employment policy, and to familiarize decision makers with the critical factors to be considered during the nuclear decision process.

—Initiation of actions needed to enhance the definition by you, with the advice of the National Security Council, of political objectives and criteria to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their preparation of military plans for limited nuclear employment options when required by the President during a crisis. We also need to assure in peacetime that in crisis and war there will be adequate interaction and coordination of political, diplomatic, and military measures (including both operations and intelligence) in any attempt to control escalation through the limited employment of nuclear weapons.

—Initiation of a comprehensive review of deterrent concepts, to include alternative strategic targeting criteria which could serve as a basis for refinement of nuclear employment planning guidance (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense.

(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed and I have reviewed a briefing on non-SIOP (i.e., relatively small) nuclear options. This briefing on limited nuclear employment options and the status of their planning was prepared as a follow-on to briefings you have received on the SIOP. I recommend that after you have reviewed the attached report, we schedule the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing for you.⁹

(S) I also recommend that you and I visit the Strategic Air Command and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff within the next two months—perhaps in late September or early in October.¹⁰

(S) I will make a further recommendation on the disposition of NSDM-242 and the appropriate policy on the issues it presents after I have completed a review of deterrent concepts and alternative strategic targeting criteria as a follow-on to PRM-10.

Harold Brown

⁹ In the right margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “do so soon.”

¹⁰ In the right margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “ok.”

Tab B**Report Prepared in the Department of Defense¹¹**

Washington, August 12, 1977

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

REPORT
BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ON
CURRENT US NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT POLICY (U)

I. Introduction

(TS) The following report responds to the President's request for information and comments on the US nuclear employment policy established by NSDM-242.

(C) It is appropriate to note that NSDM-242 provides policy for planning the employment of all available US strategic and theater nuclear weapons (except anti-submarine and anti-air defense weapons), and should be regarded as quite distinct from acquisition and deployment policies which appear in other documents and about which determinations are made separately. The operational employment plans (SIOP and other contingency plans) developed in support of NSDM-242 are capabilities plans designed to achieve NSDM-242 objectives to the extent practicable with currently available nuclear forces.

(TS) The main body of the report (Sections II-V) focuses on our present nuclear war doctrine, and the underlying observations, assumptions and rationale that led to adoption of the policy represented by NSDM-242, and discusses the advisability of retaining NSDM-242. Discussions of the more specific questions relative to: (1) procedures for conducting nuclear war, (2) command and control survivability, and (3) objectives and assumptions of our current limited nuclear options are contained in appropriate annexes to the basic report.

(C) The report draws on the current views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In its explanation of the current policy stated in NSDM-242, the report also draws heavily on the record of the NSSM-169 interagency study group on nuclear weapons employment policy¹²

¹¹ Top Secret.

¹² For the Summary Report of the Inter-Agency Working Group on NSSM 169, June 8, 1973, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976, Document 17.

whose analyses and recommendations resulted in the specific policy stated in NSDM-242. The NSSM-169 group's rationale is presented to permit a better understanding of the current doctrine and why it was adopted. A critical analysis of this rationale has not been attempted. Such an analysis is appropriate as part of PRM-10 follow-on activities.

II. *US Nuclear War Planning—Background (1962–74)*

(S) Since 1962, employment planning for virtually all US strategic nuclear forces has been contained in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Until 1976, the SIOP was prepared in accordance with the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP), developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSTAP was a JCS guidance document for military planners. There was, however, no single coherent statement or document that could be regarded as a national strategic nuclear employment policy. There was essentially no publicly stated US employment policy at all for theater nuclear forces (although US and its Allies in the Nuclear Planning Group had developed a classified body of nuclear employment guidelines for use in the NATO theater, and SACEUR had long had plans for employment of theater forces in conjunction with the SIOP). Actual theater nuclear force employment planning for the most part was limited to definition of procedures to be used by field commanders for requesting authority to selectively employ their tactical nuclear weapons prior to SIOP execution.

(TS) The fundamental planning concept of the NSTAP was to maximize US power in a nuclear exchange so as to maintain strategic superiority and thereby lead to early termination of the war on terms favorable to the US and its allies. Under the NSTAP, the basic SIOP objectives were:

—“To destroy or neutralize, on a selective basis, nuclear offensive capabilities of the enemy that threaten the United States and its allies, in order to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the extent practicable.”

—“To destroy or neutralize, on a selective basis, a comprehensive enemy military target system in order to assist in the destruction of the enemy's overall military capability.”

—“To destroy, on a selective basis and under all conditions of war initiation, the war-supporting and urban-industrial resources of the enemy.”

The NSTAP organized the SIOP into several attack options to provide a degree of flexibility to the National Command Authorities (NCA). Some additional flexibility was afforded by a built-in execution capability that permitted [2 lines not declassified]. Nevertheless, the SIOP execution options available under the NSTAP were massive by any standard with approximately [less than 1 line not declassified] being involved in even the smallest SIOP retaliatory option.

(TS) Although successive Secretaries of Defense and Presidents were familiar in general with NSTAP planning objectives and the SIOP, their statements about US policy for buying nuclear weapons frequently suggested nuclear employment doctrine and strategies that differed from the actual attacks planned in the SIOP. Strategic force sizing criteria of that era were predicated on the assumption that deterrence could be assured by threatening to destroy in retaliation about one-third of the Soviet population and 70 percent of the war-supporting economic base. Secretaries of Defense, though mentioning damage limitation as a US strategic forces objective, tended to imply that population and industry were the prime targets for "assured destruction" in retaliation to a Soviet nuclear attack against the United States. However, because forces to carry out the assured destruction policy were well hedged to cover a worst-case condition, weapons became available for targeting a comprehensive military target system. The actual employment plan (SIOP) continued to place the major weight of effort on enemy military forces to limit damage to the US and its allies, and to assist in the destruction of the enemy's over-all military capability.

III. Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Reassessment (1969–74)

(U) Overwhelming US nuclear superiority and the threat of large-scale nuclear retaliation provided a credible deterrent not only to deliberate nuclear attack throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s but also a reasonably plausible threat for response to conventional attacks. US nuclear capability continued to increase during this period with significant qualitative and quantitative improvements in US nuclear forces. Although concerns for the survivability of the US forces date back to discussion of the vulnerability of bomber bases in the late 1950s, the deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, silo-based ICBMs on constant alert, as well as an alert posture for SAC bombers greatly enhanced the survivability of the US retaliatory capability. An effective US second-strike retaliatory capability appeared secure even after having sustained a major surprise attack by the Soviet Union, and some US capability existed to neutralize Soviet nuclear forces. Nevertheless, while by most measures, the US retained strategic nuclear superiority, the Soviets were rapidly narrowing this lead. In particular, the USSR was likewise achieving a secure strategic retaliatory capability themselves by rapid deployments of ICBMs protected in hardened silos, and SLBMs under the sea.

(S) In the minds of many analysts, these changing strategic realities raised serious questions as to the continued effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. While virtually all believed our strategic forces and plans adequate to deter a major nuclear attack on the US, they were uncertain that the threat of large-scale nuclear retaliation provided the best deterrent to lesser attacks or threats to the US and its allies. Moreover, the

changing strategic balance appeared to erode US allies' confidence in the strength and credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. The diminished credibility of the assured destruction doctrine to deter attacks against Europe led Secretary McNamara to press for a flexible response strategy in NATO, eventually realized in MC 14/3¹³ in 1967.

(S) *Escalation Control*. Pursuant to the widely expressed doubts concerning the continued effectiveness of the US nuclear deterrent, Secretary Laird initiated a study in 1970. The study initially included participants from the Department of Defense under the chairmanship of Dr. John Foster. Later, in 1973, it became the NSSM-169 study, and representatives from the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the staff of the National Security Council were added (though they had been consulted informally earlier). The NSSM-169 study group concluded: (1) the threat of a massive retaliatory response is credible as a deterrent only at the upper levels of potential strategic nuclear conflict, and (2) if deterrence fails by accident or miscalculation, counterforce attacks against Soviet nuclear threats offer little confidence of holding damage to the US to a low level.

(U) The study group recommended that the US introduce limited nuclear employment options into its nuclear planning to enhance deterrence and to limit damage by controlling escalation. The National Command Authorities (NCA) would have greater flexibility in responding to a wider range of threats against the US and its allies and thereby increase the overall credibility of our deterrent and the possibility of limiting damage, if deterrence failed.

(U) The study group noted that under the previous nuclear employment policy (NSTAP), the means of limiting damage was viewed in military terms—counterforce attacks against nuclear threats. The group concluded that in a major nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union, counterforce strikes would not significantly reduce urban damage to the US and its allies. The US did not have the capabilities to effectively target the increasingly survivable Soviet nuclear forces, either preemptively or in retaliation. In addition, US strategic defense capabilities were limited. Air defense forces had been steadily declining and ballistic missile defense—not feasible for area defense in any event—was constrained by the ABM Treaty. Consequently, the group introduced the concept of limiting damage through the control of escalation. If deterrence failed, the objective would be to confine the conflict to the lowest level possible while attempting to coerce the enemy to terminate the war on terms acceptable to the US. Efforts to control escalation through the employment of limited nuclear options would show restraint. They would provide opportunities for the enemy to reconsider and to negotiate for

¹³ See footnote 4, Document 29.

an acceptable settlement (although not necessarily a settlement that achieves all of the objectives or goals desired by either side).

(U) Options to control escalation are intended to work on the will and determination of the opposing political leadership. They are not intended to fulfill a total set of military objectives but rather to:

- Reverse or stalemate the situation, at least temporarily.
- Diminish the enemy's expectation of success.
- Convince him that his limits will be exceeded.
- Present the enemy with a set of response alternatives which make it difficult for him to respond militarily in kind, and disadvantageous to escalate.
- Convince him that early termination is his most attractive alternative.

Key questions, perhaps unanswerable, are the degree to which such an approach can influence Soviet actions during a nuclear war, the means for conveying such messages (explicitly or implicitly), and the potential effectiveness of the whole approach. Even if the likely effectiveness is low, the stake is so high that in the absence of clearly better approaches, some pursuit of this one is justified.

(U) The concept of escalation control requires establishing boundaries limiting the scope, level, and duration of the violence. Planning emphasis is shifted from the traditional approach which places specific military targeting requirements (designed to secure military advantage) foremost to an approach in which political-military objectives established by the NCA (designed to terminate conflict as quickly as possible) are paramount. Special emphasis is placed on mutually supporting military (conventional and nuclear) and political measures. A high degree of interaction would be required among the NCA, the JCS, and the commanders of the unified and specified commands in selecting the details of the attack.

(U) Behind the concept of escalation control is the assumption that statesmen define some limits as to the losses (costs) they are willing to suffer to achieve their objectives. In theory, if the Soviets realize they cannot achieve their objectives quickly or easily, they will be deterred from further escalation. The options involved would be clearly below the level of a massive attack, and they would seek to coerce the enemy into negotiation for early war termination by striking relatively small numbers of selected targets and providing a deterrent to further escalation by holding forth the prospect of subsequent massive attacks on targets he values highly. If, however, there are virtually no limits on the enemy's objectives or the costs he is willing to incur, then control of escalation through limited nuclear options may not be possible, and the conflict could only be stopped by destroying his capability to achieve his objective. If deterrence fails, the essential first step would be

to assess the enemy's ultimate objectives and determine whether and where he would likely consider his costs disproportionate to any gain. Also required would be a clear understanding of our own objectives with respect to the issue at hand, and our willingness to risk a Soviet counter-limited strike in return.

(U) The NSSM 169 study group recognized that there can be no guarantee that the limited nuclear options will in fact control escalation. They believed, however, that the capability to employ limited nuclear options provides the NCA with the only means to try to control the level of violence.

General War

(S) A second focus of concern to the NSSM-169 study group was how best to deter a major attack on the US. Recognizing, however, that there was no way deterrence of a major nuclear war could be categorically assured, the group also developed targeting criteria that would contribute to the most favorable outcome possible for the US in the event deterrence failed. They concluded that the ability to deny the enemy his postwar objectives in terms of overall power and influence would be a better deterrent to a major nuclear attack than destroying what was defined in advance to be "unacceptable cost" in terms of fatalities and damage to the enemy's war-supporting and urban industrial base.

(S) Under NSTAP, the preponderance of weapons in the SIOP were aimed at military targets with attacks directed at enemy nuclear offensive capabilities, as well as attacks against a comprehensive military target system. A significantly smaller number of weapons were allocated against the war-supporting and urban-industrial targets to achieve the public strategy of "assured destruction."

(S) In place of a general war-targeting objective threatening to kill millions of people and destroy a large percentage of Soviet industry, the NSSM-169 study group recommended threatening to destroy the enemy's military and economic power and slow down the enemy's postwar recovery. [3 lines not declassified] By directly threatening the political, military and economic institutions through which they direct and control their societies, they believed the opposing political leaders' goals and values would be more directly threatened and deterrence enhanced. Moreover, the US goal of securing the best position possible for the US in terms of postwar power and influence if deterrence fails would be promoted.

(TS) The group rejected the targeting alternative which emphasized indiscriminate destruction of population for the following reasons:

—The US was limited in its ability to insure approximately equal Soviet deaths to those suffered by the US given the demographic

asymmetry (i.e., the US is more concentrated in cities than Soviet population) and the smaller yields of US warheads. (SIOP analyses in 1972 estimated 123 million US fatalities compared to 82 million Soviet fatalities in a maximum level nuclear exchange between the US and USSR, i.e., both sides fully generated with the USSR striking first.)

—The Soviets might be able to reduce the US ability to destroy Soviet population by massive civil defense programs. Although the extent and effectiveness of these programs were unknown, their existence created uncertainty in the estimates of Soviet civilian fatalities we would be able to achieve.

—The Soviet and PRC leadership might have a higher tolerance for casualties than perceived by the US, and might not be deterred by the threat to destroy the percentage of the population and industry defined by the US. Historically, the Soviets have accepted enormous human costs to secure the objectives of the communist regime. Millions of deaths are estimated to have occurred (though over years, not days) during the agricultural collectivization and Stalinist purges preceding World War II in which twenty million Soviets are estimated to have died.

—The US deterrent strategy, out of moral concern, should not emphasize the killing of non-combatants.

(TS) The NSSM-169 study group was not unanimous in believing that a threat to post-attack recovery targets would be more effective than some other targeting objective in terms of enhancing deterrence. Whether a criterion of comparable fatalities and damage was required was open to debate, and some held that the revised targeting criteria would not result in significant differences from the then currently declared threat of major retaliation against population. (This in fact, appeared to be the case when analysis of the first SIOP developed under NSDM-242 criteria showed—without considering possible Soviet civil defense—a decrease of only about two percent in expected Soviet fatalities. The political, economic, and military institutions are, in the large, where the population is). All of the NSSM-169 study group agreed, however, that the new criteria would not decrease deterrence of a major nuclear attack.

IV. Current Nuclear Employment Policy and Planning Guidance

(TS) The concepts developed by the NSSM-169 study group were incorporated in NSDM-242 issued by the President on January 24, 1974. NSDM-242 defined general employment planning objectives and broad targeting policy for US nuclear forces including for the first time, provisions for a strategic reserve force. It also established procedures for the development of further guidance and Presidential review of employment plans, as well as certain objectives and tasks for command, control and crisis management. The broad policies directed by NSDM-242 have been more definitively elaborated by the Secretary of Defense as Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), and

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their detailed planning guidance to the CINCs and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

(TS) Briefly stated, NSDM-242 and NUWEP establish that the fundamental objective of the current US doctrine of "Flexible Nuclear Response" is deterrence of conventional and nuclear attacks and attempts at coercion by nuclear powers against the US and its allies. This condition is established by an assured and evident US nuclear retaliatory capability effective across a wide spectrum of possible conflict situations. Should conflict occur, the strategy seeks to limit damage to the US and its allies through the control of escalation. This is to be accomplished by providing a wide range of employment options to the NCA for response to varying levels of provocation. These options are to be employed, in conjunction with other supporting diplomatic and military measures, to limit conflict to the lowest level feasible and coerce an enemy into negotiating a termination of the war on terms acceptable to the US and its allies. This is to be done while holding vital enemy targets hostage and threatening their subsequent destruction if the enemy fails to negotiate. The availability of such options is meant to enhance deterrence in the first place. To the extent that escalation cannot be controlled and an all-out war occurs, the strategy seeks to maximize US power relative to an enemy by destroying the political, economic and military structures supporting the enemy's status as a major power and those resources critical to his early post-war recovery, limiting damage to the US to the degree practical, and by maintaining a strategic force in reserve for protection and coercion during and after a major nuclear exchange.

(U) Present policy concepts emphasize preplanning to: enhance force efficiency and effectiveness, provide for rapid execution, and provide a solid basis for estimating consequences (expected damage levels, fatalities, risks, etc.). The full range of politico-military conditions cannot be anticipated. Past experience has shown that national decisionmakers desire a full range of options to consider in determining appropriate solutions to a crisis. It is therefore prudent and necessary to maintain the capability for responding to a wide range of hostile actions. Therefore, nuclear employment plans have been designed to allow for flexible adaptation as events unfold prior to execution. Where only general plans can be formulated in advance, dedicated organizations and specialized planning procedures have been established within the military structure of the Joint Staff and unified and specified commands for the rapid development, assessment and execution of specific limited nuclear employment options. It is assumed that there will be a high degree of control and direction by the NCA which will require close interaction between political, diplomatic, and military actions in the face of rapidly, often obscurely unfolding events. An acceptable

concept has not yet evolved of how this interaction between the NCA and other involved organizations might occur.

(U) The announcement by Secretary Schlesinger of the new US employment policy was widely interpreted as indicating that the US was shifting its nuclear targeting to a silo-busting, counterforce strategy which would require acquisition of new strategic weapon systems and capabilities. In fact, the changes in the targeting, and the additional flexibility incorporated in the employment plans have not as so far carried out entailed purchase of new systems. Schlesinger did acknowledge, however, that the doctrine would be improved if certain qualitative improvements were funded for the forces and command and control systems. The contemporaneous discussion of better US hard target capability related to a distinct issue—avoiding the perceptions that he believed would result if the USSR were thought to have a great edge over the US in any particular category of strategic capability. Neither did the doctrine represent a radical shift in targeting emphasis. On the contrary, prepared US nuclear war plans had always included options for attacking both urban-industrial and military (hard and soft) targets, but heretofore they always involved the expenditure of several thousand nuclear weapons. The concepts of NSDM-242 were meant to provide greater flexibility to the NCA by providing a wide spectrum of variously sized options from which to choose an appropriate response at any level of aggression.

(TS) In implementing NSDM-242, the Secretary of Defense's NUWEP guidance directed that Major Attack Options and Selected Attack Options (MAOs and SAOs) be included in the SIOP. MAOs provide for massive attacks against the primary military resources (nuclear and conventional), the recovery resources, and the national leadership of the USSR and PRC and their allies. SAOs provide for generally large-scale (although smaller than MAOs) attacks against selected military targets, and are target sub-sets extracted from the MAOs. SAOs contribute to the objective of escalation control by providing preplanned options within the SIOP to respond to large-scale Soviet or PRC nuclear attacks against military targets of the US and/or its allies.

(S) Limited and Regional Nuclear Options (LNOs and RNOs) were also required by NSDM-242 and NUWEP. LNOs and RNOs provide smaller, more discrete alternatives to the larger retaliatory attacks planned in the SIOP as MAOs and SAOs. LNOs are generally small-scale preplanned attacks by nuclear-capable strategic or theater forces against fixed targets. RNOs are attacks, normally by nuclear-capable theater forces, designed to counter deployed attacking enemy forces and supporting resources. These non-SIOP options, which normally vary in size [2 lines not declassified], are developed by the unified and specified commanders (CINCs) and reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. They are then incorporated in the contingency operations plans prepared by the CINCs to support defense tasks and objectives in their assigned geographic region or functional area of responsibility.

(U) For the most part, LNO–RNO development has produced options that emphasize their military utility (rather than political utility) in the defense of an area or interest believed vital to the US. While criteria for assessing military effectiveness are well developed and widely understood, and thus can be used to guide preplanning of options, definition of useful criteria for evaluating the potential political utility of LNOs and RNOs has been found to be very complex. Factors relevant to a determination of political utility are extremely subjective, and may not be adequately understood until an actual crisis begins to unfold. Thus, it has been easier to conceptualize and pre-plan limited options on the basis of their potential military utility rather than potential political contribution in the contingency situations that have been postulated. Progress is needed toward the development and statement of political objectives and criteria to enhance the military planners' capability to pre-plan, and more importantly, to translate national political objectives into limited options useful to the NCA in a nuclear crisis. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, have initiated a series of politico-military war simulations designed to raise the level of familiarization and understanding of nuclear war considerations among senior civilian and military officials. Two separate series of simulations have examined limited nuclear option concepts in crisis scenarios focused on the Mid-East and northeast Asia. The simulations have been considered very informative and useful by most participants, and should be continued. Better insight, however, still remains to be developed in the area of interfacing political objectives, requirements and criteria with military plans and capabilities. This will be particularly important in the management of an actual crisis when it will be necessary to integrate political and diplomatic measures with military activities if an attempt is being made to control escalation through the limited employment of nuclear weapons.

V. Advisability of Retaining NSDM–242

(S) The NSDM–242 nuclear weapons employment policy provided, for the first time, a nationally promulgated common policy framework for both strategic and theater forces. It remains for this Administration to determine whether or not NSDM–242 should be retained, modified or replaced.

(S) It would be inadvisable merely to cancel NSDM–242 in the absence of an equally comprehensive national nuclear weapons employment policy statement. Nuclear weapons employment planning is an immensely complex and time consuming activity. Significant

modifications to nuclear weapons employment doctrine generate literally vast adjustments not only in the targeting plans themselves, but in command and control procedures, emergency action procedures, training, intelligence requirements, as well as many other areas. Two years of intense activity elapsed between the signing of NSDM-242 and the effective date of the first SIOP developed accordingly. Consequently, transition to any new or significantly revised doctrine would require an adequate lead time.

(TS) Even though no one can say with confidence that the existence of limited nuclear options will either deter a potential aggressor in every case, or that escalation can be controlled through the employment of limited nuclear options, there is no doubt that we would wish to consider alternative options in a serious crisis. Agreement exists that the US should continue to plan for the flexible use of its nuclear weapons.

(TS) With respect to general war, we can never be absolutely certain of precisely what or how much will deter the Soviet leadership. Consequently, we cannot be confident that a massive nuclear war will not occur by either design or miscalculation. The concept of focusing our general war targeting objectives on the enemy power structure itself, and on its regenerative capacity, enables the doctrine to be related not only to deterrence, but also to US interests and objectives in a postwar world, should a general war occur. It is believed that the NSDM-242 targeting objectives currently incorporated in the SIOP are adequate for the immediate future. We intend, however, to examine alternative targeting concepts in PRM-10 follow-on analyses. It is possible that these analyses may result in recommendations for future modifications to strategic targeting objectives and priorities.

(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to provide their views with respect to NSDM-242. After review of the doctrine, they concluded that the rationale used in developing current nuclear employment policy over the past several years appears to be valid for the immediate future. They believe the doctrine expressed in NSDM-242 is responsive to the realities of current technology and the relative military power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In that its adoption has placed greater emphasis on planning for limited options, they believe it improves the capability for deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict and provides the NCA with a realistic flexible response capability. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe current doctrine for the employment of nuclear weapons, as embodied in NSDM-242 should be retained. They believe the following additional factors would support this position:

—Deterrence remains the principal objective of national policy. Intelligence analyses of current capabilities of the Soviet Union and the

projected threats indicate that the Soviet Union is rapidly closing the technology gap which will allow it to enhance its capability to wage nuclear conflict at various levels of intensity. Therefore, it is prudent to maintain US deterrent capability over a wide spectrum of possible conflict through a concept that embraces both strategic and theater nuclear weapons. This close coupling of US strategic capabilities to theater forces and the extension of the nuclear umbrella to theaters without stalwart US conventional defenses are believed to have enhanced deterrence of nuclear and conventional coercion and attack, especially in the face of Soviet force improvement.

—Targeting for an assured retaliation capability should remain focused on the postwar recovery resources and, as practical, national leadership and primary military threats. This is particularly true in light of evident Soviet hardening efforts (storage facilities, work force shelters, political/military centers, etc.) and other civil defense programs. Targeting of national leadership (includes political/military C³) and military nuclear/conventional capabilities enhances deterrence, helps limit damage to the extent practical, and denies the Soviets the capability to seize industrial resources in Europe as a basis for their recovery. Additional intelligence support is needed to provide an adequate data base which will enable recovery forecasting and improve the capability for targeting post-attack recovery resources.

—A survivable strategic reserve force is considered even more necessary as a means for the United States to deter further attack (following a major nuclear exchange) from either the USSR/PRC or other world powers, or to achieve objectives which were not fully accomplished by the initial SIOP laydown.

—Escalation control appears to be an increasingly viable concept in view of the extensive Soviet ICBM hardening efforts, the SLBM threat, and ABM Treaty agreements. Counterforce (as a damage limiting capability) has limited effectiveness, making escalation control one of the few means of limiting damage to the United States, particularly in the absence of improved US civil defense measures.

—US NATO Allies' confidence in deterrence is strengthened if they believe the United States has options that are usable and effective to defend NATO. NATO's Nuclear Operations (NOP) provide for general nuclear war attacks on the Warsaw Pact which can be simultaneously executed with the US SIOP. Included in the NOP are Selected Employment Plans (SEPs) developed by NATO which are similar in concept to US LNOs and RNOs. Any US limited nuclear capability strengthens Allied confidence in the US willingness and capability to defend NATO. Consideration of current policy must include its impact on Allied solidarity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(TS) I endorse the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the policy stated in NSDM-242 appears valid for the immediate future, and I recommend that NSDM-242 be retained for employment planning purposes. I do this because even if further analysis indicates that significant policy modifications should be directed at some future point, adequate lead time will be necessary to transition to a new employment policy. Indeed, because of the complexity of the planning process, while some limited modifications might be introduced more rapidly, two or

more years would be needed to develop new planning guidance and fully translate it into a new general war plan (SIOP). It would be essential that a comprehensive policy statement be in effect in the interim to provide focus and guidance for nuclear employment planning.

(S) I further recommend that action continue under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense to refine and support implementation of NSDM-242, especially in those areas unlikely to be affected by possible future policy adjustments. Such action should include:

—Continued action to familiarize you and your senior advisors with the content, capabilities, limitations and risks of the nuclear operational plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of the national nuclear employment policy, and to familiarize decision makers with the critical factors to be considered during the nuclear decision process.¹⁴

—Initiation of actions needed to enhance the definition by you, with the advice of the National Security Council, of political objectives and criteria to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their preparation of military plans for limited nuclear employment options when required by the President during a crisis. We also need to assure in peacetime that in crisis and war there will be adequate interaction and coordination of political, diplomatic, and military measures (including both operations and intelligence) in any attempt to control escalation through the limited employment of nuclear weapons.¹⁵

—Initiation of a comprehensive review of deterrent concepts to include alternative strategic targeting criteria which could serve as a basis for refinement of nuclear employment planning guidance (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹⁶

Washington, undated

PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING NUCLEAR WAR

(TS) *Limited Nuclear Conflict*. The primary command center for conduct of a limited nuclear conflict would be the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, operating from the NMCC, would monitor the conflict through inputs from the commanders of unified and specified commands (CINCs) and the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and

¹⁴ In the right margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "ok JC."

¹⁵ In the right margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "ok—Zbig do this."

¹⁶ Top Secret.

make military recommendations to the President. Nuclear weapon employment [5 lines not declassified] Joint Chiefs of Staff would be provided to the President for his consideration and decision. Request for employment of nuclear weapons would also come from the theater CINC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the form of a request for selective or conditional nuclear release authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would pass the request with their advice and recommendations to the NCA for decision. In the case of NATO Europe, SACEUR would submit his request through US channels concurrent with introducing it into the rest of NATO. While theater communications would be somewhat degraded it is expected that connectivity would be sufficient to permit the NMCC to receive reconnaissance data, strike reports, nuclear detonation reports, and maintain continuous interaction with appropriate theater CINCs. Based on this information and guidance from the NCA and their advisers (i.e., the NSC, and other government agency principals) the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the CINCs would develop appropriate options for NCA consideration. Such options might include additional force deployments, follow-on nuclear strikes, a review of the SIOP Execution Considerations, and a tentative execution decision as a precautionary measure should the conflict escalate to a higher level. [10 lines not declassified]

(TS) *General War*. Should the crisis lead to a major nuclear exchange, SIOP execution considerations and Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations on appropriate SIOP options would be passed to the NCA for decision. The decision would then be implemented by Joint Chiefs of Staff transmission of emergency actions messages to the SIOP forces. First priority following the exchange would be location of the surviving NCA and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or their successors. [9 lines not declassified]

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹⁷

Washington, undated

SURVIVABILITY OF US COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

(TS) Under either attack with warning or surprise conditions, analytical studies show that US C³ systems could suffer severe damage from a major nuclear exchange or a limited exchange aimed at

¹⁷ Top Secret.

command and control components.¹⁸ Most fixed, primary and alternate command centers could be destroyed [7 lines not declassified].

(TS) Since the Blue Ribbon Panel Report,¹⁹ several survivability improvements have been made in US command and control systems. [5 lines not declassified]. In summary, the potential for survivability of the US command and control system today is better than it was in 1970, with recent assessments concluding that it contributes significantly to a credible deterrence.

Tab E

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense²⁰

Washington, undated

LIMITED NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS (LNO/RNO) OBJECTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS

(U) The basic objective of non-SIOP limited nuclear employment options (LNOs and RNOs) is to strengthen deterrence across a broader range of possible conflicts by providing a series of preplanned, measured and discrete nuclear response options more applicable to situations where the deterrent threat of the large-scale options in the SIOP would be inappropriate or incredible. In the event that deterrence fails, the principal objective of non-SIOP options is to secure early war termination on terms acceptable to the US and its allies at the lowest level of conflict feasible, thereby limiting the level of overall damage. In accordance with this objective, LNOs and RNOs have been developed for a number of contingencies. These options are available for consideration by the NCA during a crisis and for use in conjunction with political and other military measures such as employment of conventional forces. Specific objectives of current LNOs and RNOs are contained in the Appendix.

(U) The basic political assumption underlying the development of non-SIOP nuclear options is that escalation control can be achieved. The fundamental assumption of escalation control is that there are limits on the risks or losses the enemy is willing to accept. Militarily, a key assumption is that the controlled, restrained use of nuclear force provides the capability to demonstrate resolve, to reverse locally a

¹⁸ Carter underlined "aimed at command and control components" and wrote next to it: "certain target."

¹⁹ See footnote 3, Document 9.

²⁰ Top Secret.

disadvantageous force balance, or to destroy specific, valued targets. When political and military efforts are combined, the assumption is that escalation can be controlled by enhancing or guiding enemy perceptions. This is done by communicating with him (communicating NATO's intentions, MOLINK, etc.) and by limiting the level, scope and duration of nuclear strikes, while achieving military effectiveness.

Appendix to Tab E²¹

Washington, undated

*LIMITED NUCLEAR OPTIONS (LNOs) AND REGIONAL
NUCLEAR OPTIONS (RNOs) OBJECTIVES (U)*

EUROPEAN COMMAND

[3 paragraphs (18 lines) not declassified]

ATLANTIC COMMAND

[2 paragraphs (9 lines) not declassified]

PACIFIC COMMAND

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

Tab F

**Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Brown) to Secretary of Defense Brown²²**

Washington, May 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine (U)

1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are pleased to provide their views on the subjects raised in the memorandum by the Assistant to the

²¹ Top Secret.

²² Top Secret.

President for National Security Affairs, 31 March 1977.²³ A more detailed discussion of each issue is contained in the Appendix.²⁴ The questions in the aforementioned memorandum are repeated below for clarity.

a. "A succinct statement of our present nuclear war doctrine. In so doing, you should comment on the advisability of retaining or cancelling NSDM 242 and limited nuclear options."

The fundamental objective of current US doctrine for the employment of nuclear weapons is deterrence of conventional or nuclear attacks and attempts at coercion by nuclear powers against the United States and its allies. If deterrence fails, the objective seeks to limit damage to the United States and its allies through control of escalation by employing first conventional and then, if necessary, limited nuclear options designed to limit the conflict and reestablish deterrence. If escalation cannot be controlled, the objective seeks to maximize US power relative to an enemy in the postwar era. This doctrine is responsive to the realities of current technology and the relative military power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its adoption has placed greater emphasis on planning for limited options, thereby improving the capability for deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict and providing the NCA with a realistic, flexible response capability. It also complements and supports NATO's strategy of flexible response. For these reasons, NSDM 242 and limited nuclear options should be retained.

b. "A brief statement of the procedures for actually conducting a nuclear war, limited or total, beyond the initial phase. This should include an indication of the command procedures for the conduct of such a war, including such operational aspects as the location and procedures for effective exercise of control. In addition, please provide your assessment of the survivability of our command and control systems. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970 reached some disturbing conclusions regarding this matter."

The key element in US nuclear war procedures is the direct involvement of the NCA in not only the initial stages but the execution of a nuclear war. The effectiveness of this participation is almost totally dependent on the survivability of command centers and reliable communications. The primary command center for conduct of a limited nuclear conflict would be the [5 lines not declassified]. In a major nuclear attack on the United States, the SIOP could be successfully executed. [2 lines not declassified]. Under the conditions of limited nuclear exchange, the effectiveness of communications with executing forces would be dependent on the intensity of the nuclear exchange and whether or not attacks were aimed at command and control components. Continuing efforts are being made to enhance the survivability and effectiveness of these systems.

c. "A short statement of the basic objectives to be achieved through our various LNO options and some indication of the assumptions, both political and military, regarding the specific LNOs."

Limited nuclear options have been developed to support generalized military campaigns within a theater of operations, complementing

²³ See Document 9.

²⁴ Not found attached.

rather than substituting for conventional forces. Real and declared capability to employ limited nuclear options has enhanced deterrence, especially in the face of Soviet force improvement. These options support the principal means to limit damage; i.e., through control of escalation. Their existence provides implicit recognition that the purpose of military power is not only to deter but also to prosecute military conflict. Political and military assumptions regarding specific LNOs are contained in the Annex. A non-SIOP nuclear options briefing, which you heard on 11 April 1977, is available for presentation to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

2. (TS) The current doctrine for the employment of nuclear weapons, as embodied in NSDM 242, should be retained. Actions should continue to refine its implementation and support its execution, including the development of a capability for comparative postwar recovery analysis; improvement of CINC ad hoc planning capabilities; additional intelligence support; and an enhancement of command and control survivability, reliability, and flexibility. To enhance implementation of nuclear weapons employment doctrine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have instituted an annual review process, the initial results of which were forwarded to you by JCSM–81–77, 15 March 1977, “Nuclear Weapons Employment Guidance (U).”²⁵

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

George S. Brown
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

²⁵ Not found.

37. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-32¹

Washington, September 30, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT

Civil Defense

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee undertake a review of issues related to civil defense in the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of this study is to analyze the strategic implications of civil defense programs in the United States and the Soviet Union, and to determine what changes, if any, should be made in current U.S. policies related to civil defense questions. For the purpose of this study, the term "civil defense" will be assumed to include all activities related to the protection from attack of population, industry, and political leadership below the level of the national command authority.

The study, to be prepared for the Policy Review Committee, chaired by DOD, is to be conducted by a working group chaired by the NSC staff (with Sam Huntington designated as chairman). This study should be completed for PRC review by February 15, 1978.

This review should include an analysis of the following issues:

—The nature and capabilities of current U.S. and Soviet civil defense programs.

—Doctrines, policies and objectives of U.S. and Soviet civil defense programs.

—The strategic usefulness of current and potential U.S. and Soviet civil defense programs.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 13, Civil Defense: 5/69-12/77. No classification marking.

—Alternative U.S. policy responses to Soviet civil defense and alternative policies for U.S. civil defense.

Attached are more detailed Terms of Reference for this study.²

Zbigniew Brzezinski

²Not found attached.

38. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 31, 1977

SUBJECT

Speech on Defense Policy

There are many reasons why you may wish to deliver a major speech on defense policy in December or early January.

1. In such a speech you could make an authoritative statement of the defense policies and programs which have been developed during the past year, particularly in PD-18² and in the formulation of the FY 1979 defense budget during the coming weeks. It would thus be the vehicle for communicating to the public the general framework and rationale for the specific program decision which will be revealed in January and would provide guidance and direction for both Congress and the bureaucracy.

2. Assuming agreement is reached on the key elements of SALT in the coming months, this speech would explain the relationship between these agreements and our own new and on-going defense programs.

3. A defense speech would strengthen the public image of you in your role as Commander-in-Chief and would help counter the arguments of those opposed to the Panama Treaty and to SALT that you have been neglectful of our defense posture.

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 64, Speeches: Wake Forest University, 10/77–3/78. Confidential. A stamped notation indicates that Carter saw the memorandum. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "OK to do a draft—Time and delivery will be decided later. J."

²See Document 31.

4. It would also answer congressional criticisms, such as those concerning the B-1 and MX in the past several weeks, that we do not have a coherent defense policy and would provide a response to arguments (such as those advanced in the attached letter from Gene Rostow) that you should provide more vigorous leadership in this area.

5. It would usefully balance your other major foreign policy speeches which have emphasized the need to control the arms race and restrict arms proliferation through United States-Soviet Union and multilateral negotiations.

6. It could also, particularly if a SALT agreement is reached, provide reassurance to our allies that we are not relaxing our determination or our ability to meet our commitments to them.

Given these reasons why such a speech might well be desirable about the first of the year, I am, unless you object, asking Sam Huntington to work with other members of the NSC Staff in developing ideas and themes for it.³

Attachment

Letter From Eugene Rostow of the Committee on the Present Danger to President Carter⁴

Washington, September 19, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

The Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger appreciated our meeting last Friday, September 16, with Samuel Huntington, of your National Security Council staff. Pursuant to your request at our meeting on August 4,⁵ he came to explain the several steps which led to your assessment of Soviet policy, and your decisions in PD-18 of August 26.⁶

After a thorough and spirited discussion of the main problems, we expressed these general preliminary reactions to him:

(1) On the basis of Mr. Huntington's exposition, the thrust and tenor of PD-18 appeared promising to us, but we believe its background

³ At the end of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "Naturally, we will coordinate with Harold."

⁴ No classification marking. A copy was sent to Huntington.

⁵ Carter and Brown met with Rostow and other members of the Committee on the Present Danger in the Cabinet Room the afternoon of August 4. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

⁶ Carter signed PD-18 on August 24. See Document 31.

and content should be explained to the American people, and to world opinion, in a major speech by you, and not through leaks to the press, or speeches by the Secretary of Defense, however constructive;

(2) We should be glad to respond to your request on August 4 for our appraisal of your assessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities, when we have studied the relevant documents, and discussed them further with your associates;

(3) We were unable to reconcile the policy of PD-18, as Mr. Huntington explained it, with other aspects of the ongoing foreign and defense policies of the Administration, including the withdrawal of conventional forces from Korea; the apparent willingness of the Administration to consider denouncing the Security Treaty with Taiwan; the positions taken in the SALT negotiations; and the contents of the defense budget, including its provisions for strategic weapons and naval strength; and

(4) We noted with interest that according to Mr. Huntington, Era II in Soviet-American relations, starting with the October, 1973, war in the Middle East, is considered to be more dangerous for us than the period which preceded it, and that the operating premise of PD-18 is that the Soviet Union will take advantage of every opportunity for the expansion of its power and influence unless deterred by unacceptable risk.

With great respect, and every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

Eugene V. Rostow

Chairman, Executive Committee

**39. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, November 3, 1977

SUBJECT

PD/NSC-18 Follow-On Studies (U)

In response to your Directive of 24 August 1977: Follow-On Studies for PD/NSC-18,² I have initiated five DOD studies:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 57, PRM-10: (PD-18). Secret.

² See Document 32.

The first is a Targeting Study which will analyze (1) the relationships between targeting (i.e., employment policy as distinct from perceived force characteristics) and deterrence; (2) plausible alternative approaches and criteria for targeting; and (3) the effects and limitations imposed by force capabilities and target characteristics. We are currently drafting a preliminary Concept Paper outlining the scope of issues to be addressed, and will pass you a copy.

The second is an ICBM Modernization Study which will seek to answer three critical questions: (1) what is the contribution of the ICBM to our strategic force posture in terms of deterrence, hedging, and warfighting; (2) what are the costs and effectiveness of alternatives for maintaining an ICBM force that will survive to be used; and (3) what are the potential uses of hard target damage capability and how does having this capability affect deterrence, crisis stability, and warfighting? We plan to complete this study by mid-January.

The third is a Secure Reserve Force Target Acquisition Study. With the Intelligence Community staff, we will begin with a review of the current capabilities of the SRF for target acquisition under different employment strategies. Then, once we have concluded the Targeting Study, we will assess the means to insure that the target acquisition capability will be available for any potential changes in US nuclear employment policy for the strategic reserve force.

The fourth is a Sustainability Study. We have completed a TOR³ for the study and are about to begin Phase 1: the accumulation of data to establish baseline estimates of (1) Soviet and Warsaw Pact, and North Korea sustaining capability; (2) US sustaining capability worldwide; (3) Allied sustaining capability; (4) interchangeability and availability of US/NATO and US/South Korean stocks; and (5) US/NATO/and other Allies capacity for industrial and manpower mobilization. This will be a massive task. We will try to complete it by 1 June 1978.

The fifth study is of Naval Strategic Planning. A special task force under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy has been working for over two months. They have defined the "Policy Tasks" of the Navy and will be looking at alternative force postures by region, the Pacific, Mediterranean, Atlantic, etc. The study should be completed by March 1978.

While the studies are just underway, I think we have spent the past weeks usefully defining the issues each study will address. The critical questions which these studies raise will have my highest priority over the next year.

Harold Brown

³ The Terms of Reference were not found.

40. Presidential Directive/NSC-24¹

Washington, November 16, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
The Administrator, General Services Administration
The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy

SUBJECT

Telecommunications Protection Policy (S)

1. The President has reviewed the results of the NSC Special Coordination Committee's consideration of the PRM/NSC-22 study and has reached the following conclusions.² It is the President's intention that this directive establish a national policy to guide the conduct of USG activities in and related to security of telecommunications.

2. The National Telecommunications Protection Policy shall consist of the following major elements:

a. Government classified information relating to national defense and foreign relations shall be transmitted only by secure means.

b. Unclassified information transmitted by and between Government agencies and contractors that would be useful to an adversary should be protected.

c. Non-governmental information that would be useful to an adversary shall be identified and the private sector informed of the problem and encouraged to take appropriate protective measures.

d. While the private conversations of U.S. citizens do not appear to be the targets of foreign intercept activity at this time, this judgment should be kept under close and continuous review and the American people informed of any change in this conclusion. As a precautionary measure, the responsible Agencies should work with the FCC and the common carriers to adopt system capabilities which protect the privacy

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 83, Communications: 8-12/77. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² For PRM/NSC-22, see Document 8.

of individual communications and to carry out changes in regulatory policy and draft legislation that may be required.

Further, the NSC Special Coordination Committee shall periodically review the extent to which the Soviets or others may be collecting and exploiting individual private communications to determine if additional surveillance or protection activity is warranted. Finally, the laws which protect against criminal domestic acts such as wiretaps or intercept shall be strictly enforced.

3. The following activities should be pursued in support of the above policy:

a. The private sector telecommunications carriers should be briefed on the nature of the threat and appropriate government R&D information shall be made available so as to help and encourage them to devise adequate protection strategies. A similar program shall be pursued for government contractors and other most likely affected industries, corporations and private sector entities.

b. The Secretary of Defense shall initiate, through the industrial security mechanism, new and improved personal and telecommunications security measures among business organizations holding classified Defense contracts.

c. All departments and agencies shall revitalize programs of security training for U.S. Government personnel who use telephones and other means of communication for both unclassified and classified purposes.

d. A permanent interagency group under the chairmanship of the Department of State shall be established consisting of representatives of the Executive Office of the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, National Security Agency and the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation to review and if necessary to deny real estate acquisitions through lease or purchase by the USSR and other Communist countries that present a serious potential threat to U.S. telecommunications security.

e. All foreign government leased or owned facilities in this country should be evaluated as to their possible use for intercept operations and appropriate investigative action undertaken in the most likely cases. Any identified intercept activities should be monitored to determine the threat posed to USG and private sector telecommunications.

f. Subject to continuous review of available technology and reassessment of the foreign intercept threat the following immediate technical actions shall be undertaken:

—The government shall conduct a multi-faceted R&D program covering both system and user oriented protection approaches funded at about \$15 million per year.

—Phase I and II of the DUCKPINS cable program shall be completed as soon as possible and no later than in 1978. This program shall be funded at a level of about \$4 million per year.

—Executive Secure Voice Network (ESVN) systems shall be installed when appropriate high priority requirements can be validated.

4. Management and policy review responsibilities for telecommunication protection shall be organized as follows:

a. The NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) shall be responsible for providing policy guidance and for ensuring full implementation of this directive, including effective protection techniques for the government and maximum assistance to the private sector to enhance its protection from interception. The SCC shall exercise this responsibility through a special Subcommittee on Telecommunications Protection chaired by the Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, with administrative support provided by the Secretary of Commerce. The Subcommittee shall include but not be limited to representatives of the following departments and agencies: State, Treasury, Justice, Commerce, Defense, Transportation, Energy, Central Intelligence Agency, General Services Administration, the National Security Agency, and the National Security Council Staff.

b. The Subcommittee shall submit a report on its activities, recommendations and findings at least annually to the National Security Council through the Special Coordination Committee. Additionally, that report shall specifically address how effectively the policy and actions specified in this directive are being implemented.

c. The Secretary of Defense shall act as the Executive Agent for communications security (COMSEC) to protect government-derived classified information and government-derived unclassified information which relates to national security. COMSEC is concerned with protective measures designed for the security of classified information and other information related to national security.

d. The Secretary of Commerce shall act as the Executive Agent for communications protection for government-derived unclassified information (excluding that relating to national security) and for dealing with the commercial and private sector to enhance their communications protection and privacy.

e. It is recognized that there will be some overlap between the responsibilities of the Executive Agents in that Defense will continue to provide some non-cryptographic protection for government-derived unclassified information as it does now, and Commerce will have responsibilities in commercial application of cryptographic technology.

The Subcommittee will review such areas on a case-by-case basis and attempt to minimize any redundancies.

f. The Subcommittee should choose a future implementation strategy based on cost-benefit analysis, legal considerations and regulatory policy. As an initial action, the heads of departments and agencies, as designated by the Subcommittee, shall assess the need for protection of unclassified information transmitted under their auspices and report their conclusions to the Subcommittee within 60 days. The Subcommittee shall then set appropriate standards for protection.

g. The heads of all departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall organize and conduct their communications security and emanations security activities as they see fit subject to the provisions of law, the provisions of this and other applicable directives, and decisions of the Subcommittee. Nothing in this directive shall relieve the heads of the individual departments and agencies of their responsibilities for executing all measures required to assure the security of federal telecommunications and the control of compromising emanations.

h. The President's Science Advisor, as Chairman of the Subcommittee, shall promptly prepare and arrange for a comprehensive briefing for the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence concerning the Administration's new Telecommunications Protection Policy.

5. NSDM's 266, 296, 338 and 346 and the 1968 NSC Communications Security Directive are hereby rescinded.³

6. The Office of Management and Budget and the Attorney General are to resolve, as a matter of priority, the necessary arrangements for funding and legal accommodation, to include appropriate legislation, if necessary, to enable expeditious implementation of actions directed above.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

³NSDMs 266, 296, 338, and 346 are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, as Documents 176, 177, 180, and 182, respectively.

41. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, November 28, 1977

SUBJECT

PD/NSC–18 Follow-on Studies

In response to your memo of 3 November on the above subject, I would like to make the following points.²

First, the study on targeting looks like it will address the issues of concern. I am assuming, however, that you will not limit the study to an examination of what we can do with the inventory of weapons that we currently project for ourselves. It is important for us to understand just how our targeting policies and their effectiveness might change as we continue with SALT. We should also consider what we could do with increases in our weapons inventories that might be driven by factors such as political sufficiency.

The second study appears to address most of my concerns about hard target kill capability and the future of the TRIAD concept. Your combining of these issues in a single study focused primarily on the future of the ICBM force seems like a reasonable approach.

The three questions you have posed for this second study seem appropriate. I assume that you will delve into the basis of requirements for the unique capabilities provided by the land based ICBM. I also assume that you will seriously consider the possibility that non-time urgent hard target kill capability in the form of (possibly improved) ALCM's can meet substantial portions of our need for hard target kill capability.

Your intentions for the third study on "secure reserve force target acquisition" sound reasonable. I agree that much of this study must await completion of the targeting study.

The substance of the sustainability study also sounds reasonable; my staff has been in contact with yours and has given them informal

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 45, PD 18: (Follow-On). Secret.

² Utgoff and Huntington forwarded Brown's memorandum, printed as Document 39, to Brzezinski under a November 16 covering memorandum, which reported: "Harold's memo shows that some progress has been made in getting these studies underway—though in general not much given the amount of time that has elapsed." Utgoff and Huntington also noted: "We have worded the comments on the Navy study in such a way as to avoid the impression that we accept this study as an appropriate response to your request. We believe that it would not be prudent to give the NSC imprimatur to a study of the missions of the Navy—done by the Navy." (Ibid.)

comments concerning what you intend to do. Your memo does not, however, explicitly address the institutional arrangements for this study. My August 24 memo to you called for the sustainability issues to be “coordinated by the National Security Council for the President’s decision.”³ I suggest that we form an interagency steering group to (1) periodically review and comment on the study’s progress, (2) handle DOD requests for external tasks (e.g. of the DCI); and (3) review, coordinate and suggest changes in final DOD drafts of your study. I am also concerned that the time allowed for the study is overly long and, as a result, the study will not affect the FY 80–84 program. If this work is to influence that program, a stricter timetable is needed. I suggest that phase 1 be completed by 1 March 1978 and that the remainder of the study be completed by 1 July 1978, in time for the President to review the study and make decisions that could be accommodated in his review of the DOD program Status Report in August.

The fifth study may very well meet our needs, but I can’t tell from the information we have so far received on it. Perhaps the best course here would be simply to delay proceeding with an NSC/DOD study of the Navy’s purposes—on the possibility that an in-depth review of the Navy’s own study shows that our needs have been met.

I look forward to seeing detailed drafts of the terms of reference for these studies very soon. Overall, your descriptions of them suggest a good focus on a number of really critical questions. I hope we can see them properly answered—my staff and I will support you in this effort in every way we can.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

³ See Document 32.

42. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SR 77–10156

Washington, December 1977

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles: Recent Trends and Prospects

Key Judgments

Total Defense Spending

Our estimates of the ruble cost of Soviet defense activities during the period 1970–76 indicate that:

- Soviet spending for defense, defined to correspond to US budgetary accounts and measured in constant 1970 prices, has been growing at an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, from 40–45 billion rubles in 1970 to 52–57 billion rubles in 1976.
- Defined more broadly, as Soviet practice might require, defense spending grew from 45–50 billion rubles in 1970 to 57–62 billion rubles in 1976.

Composition and Allocation

Ruble estimates provide insight into the resource composition of the Soviet defense effort and the trends in resource allocations among the branches of service. Analysis based on the narrower definition of defense—for which the estimates are more detailed and precise—indicates that:

- The shares allocated to investment, operating, and RDT&E remained fairly constant during the 1970–76 period. About half of total spending went for investment, about 30 percent for operating expenditures, and about 20 percent for RDT&E.
- The Soviet Navy and Ground Forces received roughly constant shares of investment and operating spending during the period. Spending for the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Forces displayed cyclical behavior, and the Air Defense Forces' share of investment and operating expenditures decreased by about one-fifth.

Economic Impact

The defense effort has had a substantial impact on the Soviet economy:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 32, East West Planning Group: (USSR Defense Spending). Secret. Prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center.

- During the 1970–76 period, defense spending consumed an almost constant share of Soviet GNP—11 to 12 percent or 12 to 13 percent, depending on how defense spending is defined.
- Defense production consumed about one-third of the final product of machine-building and metalworking, the branch of industry that produces investment goods as well as military hardware.

Prospects

The average annual growth rate of 4 to 5 percent implied by these estimates exceeds the average annual rate at which we expect the Soviet economy to grow in the years ahead. Econometric projections are that Soviet GNP will grow at about 4 percent a year through 1980, but that growth will fall off thereafter—probably to about 3 to 3.5 percent. Yet, the projected economic slowdown notwithstanding, Soviet spending for defense is likely to continue to grow at roughly its current rate into the 1980s, whether or not a SALT II agreement is concluded.

[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]

43. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 2, 1977

SUBJECT

M-X Weapons System

As you requested, I have been getting more involved in some of the military technology issues. I discussed this with Zbig, and he suggested that a vulnerability analysis of the M-X and cruise missile systems would be useful. Subsequently, I convened a panel of university and industrial experts for this purpose. I have attached the Executive Summary of the panel's report on the M-X and will send you a separate memorandum concerning our cruise missile analysis next week.

The panel examined the comparative vulnerability of the trench-based M-X system to the silo-based Minuteman and came up with several interesting conclusions:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 10/77–2/78. Secret. Sent for information.

—The threat to Minuteman is not so imminent or certain that commitment to an alternative system must be made in FY 1979.

—Minuteman will remain a significant survivable component of the US deterrent throughout most of the 1980s until the Soviets succeed in developing and deploying warheads of greatly improved accuracy.

—Due to its complexity, small area of deployment, and technical aspects of the trench design, the M–X trench system has potential vulnerabilities which require further assessment and considerable uncertainty remains in assessments of its survivability.

—In addition to novel basing systems, other less costly options for enhancing survivability of Minuteman including relatively simple defensive measures should be more fully explored.

On the basis of these conclusions, commitment to full-scale development of the M–X trench mobile system as proposed in the FY 1979 defense budget request (\$260 M) appears premature. I recognize that there may be overriding political considerations, such as the impact on the domestic SALT debate and international perceptions of US resolve, which in your judgment could necessitate support for the Defense proposal. However, on the technical merits of the issue, I would recommend that you defer full-scale development and substantially reduce funding for M–X in the FY 1979 budget, at least down to the level of effort provided in FY 1978 (about \$150 M).

The Panel also noted that a decision to develop a new missile can and should be made on considerations that are separable from those of maintaining ICBM survivability. These include the impact on crisis stability, concerns about aging of the Minuteman force, targeting requirements and political perceptions. The panel confined itself to vulnerability analysis for its initial effort, but if you think it would be useful, we will examine this broader issue as well.

Attachment

Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by the Vulnerability Panel of the Office of Science and Technology Policy²

Washington, undated

I. The proposed M–X weapons system includes a missile which is larger, more accurate and carries more warheads than Minuteman III, and a mobile basing system to make the missile more survivable.

The proposed M–X funding plan for FY 79 allocates about \$200 M to missile development. This can be viewed as a commitment to the

²Secret.

development of a substantially more capable missile. A decision to develop a new missile can and should be made on considerations that are for the most part separable from those of providing a new basing system to maintain ICBM survivability.

II. The vulnerability of Minuteman has properly been a matter of continuing concern, and it is not too soon to pursue alternatives to Minuteman silo-basing. However, the threat to the Minuteman is not so imminent or certain that commitment to the development of a specific alternative system must be made now.

III. Minuteman will remain a significant survivable component of the US deterrent throughout most of the 1980s, that is, until the Soviets succeed in developing and deploying an adequate number of warheads of greatly improved accuracy [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Such accuracy can be achieved either in a new generation of Soviet missiles, or by an upgrade in accuracy beyond that now projected in Soviet systems presently deployed. We are basing this conclusion on evaluation of the destructive interaction among attacking warheads (i.e., fratricide), which makes two-on-one attacks very difficult for purposes other than to increase system launch reliability.

IV. Conceptually, the trench-based M-X system has advantages in survivability over Minuteman III against attacks of very high accuracy. However, an assessment of its survivability can only be demonstrated through calculation and certain limited tests. Considering the complexity of the system, considerable uncertainty will remain in such assessments.

Survivability of the M-X relies on secrecy of location of the missile. If by technical or intelligence means the attacker can determine, even approximately, the location of the missile within the trench, the M-X system survivability would be severely compromised.

Whereas the vulnerability of Minuteman is particularly sensitive to achievement of high accuracies, as noted above, the M-X is vulnerable to attack by large numbers of less accurate RVs.

M-X is based on a much smaller land area than is Minuteman. Therefore, the M-X trench-based system is considerably more susceptible to "pin-down" under protracted nuclear missile attack than is Minuteman III. The vulnerability of M-X to pin-down, in combination with a possible shoot-look-shoot attack on M-X requires further assessment.

V. In addition to novel basing systems, less costly options, such as defensive measures, for enhancing survivability of existing Minuteman silos should be more fully explored, recognizing that the defended area need be only a few hundred meters across, thereby allowing the use of relatively simple protection measures.

44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 4, 1977

SUBJECT

FY 79 DOD Budget Review

As part of our review of the FY 79 DOD Budget, I have had my staff prepare a set of papers that address the budget issues with the greatest national security implications. There are two papers on the size and make-up of the overall budget, two on strategic forces issues, and one dealing with some new initiatives that could improve the effectiveness of our forces.

The first paper (Tab A) examines the question of *how big the defense budget should be*. This paper does not deal with the programmatic or resources allocation aspects, which are the province of DOD and OMB, but with the broader strategic and political issues which you need to consider in setting the overall level of defense expenditures. I believe that a reasonable increase must be made in our defense request if we are to compensate for the effects of inflation, offset the steady Soviet buildup, and maintain support for your foreign policy initiatives both at home and abroad. While Harold's proposed budget of about \$130 B is certainly too large, OMB's proposed budget of \$123–125 B is probably too low to meet your overall national security needs.

The second paper (Tab B) *compares the budget to the defense priorities established by the national security policies laid down by your Administration thus far*.² Generally, Harold has done a good job in responding to the new policies. However, there is one key anomaly that you may wish to keep in mind as you review the budget: funding for the sea forces mission continues to dominate, though the strategic concerns addressed by our defense policy indicate a need to shift priorities toward other missions, particularly toward land forces.

The third paper (Tab C) *examines the mobile M–X issue*—whether to keep this system in the advanced development stage (\$160 M in FY 79) or go into full-scale development (\$260 M in FY 79). This issue puts you in a delicate bind—there are numerous substantive arguments suggesting that full-scale development of this system is premature, yet

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 9, Budget: FY 1979 Defense Review: 12/77. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates that Carter saw the memorandum. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² Tabs B–E were not found attached.

proceeding may be necessary in order to gain sufficient support for ratification of the emerging SALT II agreements. On balance, I believe that you should hold off full-scale development for the present, and reassess your position later if the SALT situation requires it. If we are going ahead with full-scale development of the M-X, we should make the current opponents of SALT earn it.

The fourth paper (Tab D) *looks at DOD plans for replacing or complementing the B-52 force with a new strategic bomber*. Our impression is that the B-1 cancellation has created a state of confusion in Air Force planning that is far from being sorted out. Current planning places too heavy an emphasis on the possibilities of purchasing the FB-111H or a wide-bodied transport as a follow-on bomber. I believe that the appropriate course of action would be to (1) fund the B-1 and FB-111H programs at the minimum level acceptable to Congress; (2) provide just enough funding for the wide-bodied transport cruise missile carrier to establish its feasibility (\$40-45M in FY 79); and (3) provide initial funding (\$5-10M in FY 79)³ for development of an advanced strategic attack aircraft. This new initiative is militarily justifiable, could have very positive political effects, and would have low near-term costs (\$50-60M or less) in the first two years.

The final paper (Tab E) *suggests some questions you could raise in the course of the budget review to encourage the Services to work more effectively together*. We believe that the Services' reluctance to employ other Services capabilities to satisfy very jealously guarded primary missions makes them less effective than they should be, particularly in responding to crisis contingencies. We intend to address this problem in the DOD reorganization studies, and possibly in further Presidential reviews.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

Level of Defense Spending

Issue: What overall level of defense spending should your FY 79 budget call for?

³Next to the figure "\$5-10 million in FY 79," Carter drew an arrow to the figure and wrote "?" in the margin.

⁴Secret.

This is the perennial question, how much is enough? Defense approaches the problem by aggregation of specific programs, infrastructure and overhead aimed at fulfilling your strategic guidance, and the services' missions. OMB's fiscal guidance is based on a judgment of how much we ought to spend in comparison with other federal programs and where the "fat" lies in the Defense budget. I want to give you a third perspective: what level of U.S. defense effort is needed to deal with the strategic, foreign policy, and domestic political effects of the continuing Soviet buildup—particularly in light of your determination to aggressively pursue improved relations and arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union.

I am assuming that the seven alternative levels proposed by OMB, ranging from \$114 B TOA to \$136 B all encompass worthwhile programs and that the question is not waste but how large an effort we want to make. I also understand that the real range of choice involves about \$5 B out of a potential budget of \$125 B to \$130 B—about 4 percent of the budget.

The Soviet Buildup

The CIA estimate of Soviet defense spending which is commonly accepted as a comparable index of Soviet capability does not show a crash Soviet program. Rather it shows a steady average annual increase of 3–4% in real terms over the last decade and more. This growth is evident in nearly all parts of the Soviet military establishment, including investment.

The compound effect of this level of effort has been impressive:

—[4 lines not declassified] They have erased their strategic inferiority of a decade ago but show no sign of slackening efforts.

—They have reequipped their ground forces facing NATO, including a new armored personnel carrier, new self-propelled artillery, and now a new tank.

—They have modernized their tactical air forces in Europe, significantly narrowing the disparity against them in qualitative factors (range and payload) while retaining a substantial advantage in numbers of aircraft.

—They have moved their navy to sea, challenging us for control of the Mediterranean, conducting intense surveillance and operations throughout the Atlantic and in the Far East.

During the same period, US defense spending declined in real terms at a steady 4% rate from the wartime peak as the US disengaged from Vietnam. Moreover, the high rate of expenditure during the Vietnam war did not find its way into investment but was eaten up by combat operations. The result at the end of the war was low readiness, a backlog of major maintenance and obsolete equipment. Finally, in FY 76

the Defense budget was increased by 4%, followed by 5% real growth in FY 77. The FY 78 budget, recently approved by Congress, contains only 1% real growth, reflecting, in part, the cancellation of the B-1.

The broad strategic and political consequences of these unfavorable trends are increasingly obvious. In Europe open concern about Soviet military superiority has led to policies and actions to accommodate the Soviet Union that are evidence that the process of Finlandization may already be underway. In Asia the shock of Vietnam and the US decisions on Korea have led the Chinese as well as the Japanese to believe that we are moving toward a gradual pullback. At home, moderate and conservative opinion is increasingly concerned at the adequacy of our defense efforts and suspicions of the effects of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

The last point deserves some elaboration. American opinion has always swung back and forth on the issue of dealing with the Soviet Union. We are clearly in a more conservative period despite the public's underlying support for better relations and nuclear arms control. At the same time, as I have suggested, many of your initiatives are seen as "soft"—which even most of those supporting detente do not want us to be. In this context your Defense budget level takes on added significance. It could either enhance confidence that our arms control agreements are consistent with our security or further polarize Congressional and public opinion.

The NATO 3% Real Growth "Commitment"

Our PRM-10 review led to a fundamental judgment: that the trends in the East-West military balance in the last decade have been unfavorable; but that public opinion could support budget levels that would permit us to offset Soviet modernization by the mid-'80s. PD-18 emphasized the need of offset future Soviet modernization by equivalent increases in US and Allied defense spending, and called for 3% real growth.⁵

At the NATO Summit, you told the Allies that the US would make a major effort to increase the collective strength of the Alliance if the Allies would do the same.⁶ Since about 1970, Allied defense spending has increased by about 2%–3% per year in real terms, but many European countries are capable of doing more. At the Summit follow-up meeting, the NATO Defense Ministers agreed to a Ministerial Guidance (a NATO planning document that is renegotiated every two years) that included an aim of an annual increase in real terms "in the region of 3%" for the planning period 1979–1984.

⁵ See Document 31.

⁶ The NATO summit took place in Brussels May 17–18.

Though it is too early to say with certainty, it appears that most Allies will respond favorably to this aim.

—The FRG plans a 3% real increase in defense spending in 1979.

—France, which does not adhere to Ministerial Guidance, intends 7% real growth.

—However, the British, who carry one of the heaviest defense burdens in Europe (5% GNP), reduced '78/'79 spending by £ 200–300 million from their planned level, resulting in a ½% real decline.

The whole issue of how much is enough and whether we are going to respond to the long term Soviet buildup will in practical and political terms revolve around the 3% growth issue—whether we will follow that goal, how to define it and what the baseline should be. All informed opinion is aware that the Government has made such a commitment and this will be taken as a barometer of your overall attitude on security issues.

There are two issues regarding the definition of the 3% aim:

—Should the FY 79 budget request be compared to the Administration's FY 78 budget request (\$119.5 B) or to the FY 78 budget approved by Congress (\$116.5 B)?

—Should the 3% factor apply to the entire budget or to some "NATO-related portion" (OMB uses 40% of the budget)?

Different answers to these two questions result in four alternative levels (TOA \$ B):

	<i>Base</i>	+	<i>Inflation</i> ⁷	+	<i>Growth</i>	+	<i>Total</i>
(40% budget grows)	116.5		7		1.5		125
(entire budget grows)	116.5		7		3.5		127
(40% budget grows)	119.5		7		1.5		128
(entire budget grows)	119.5		7		3.5		130

The higher *baseline* would result in a request for real growth of about 5% above FY 78 appropriations in order to continue 3% growth *on the average* of the two years, since the FY 78 budget ended up providing for only 1% real growth. It also "protects" the NATO commitment from the inevitable Congressional cuts. In short, we would ask again for the money we thought we needed but that Congress cut.

On the other hand, since the NATO commitment does not apply to the FY 78 budget, there is no political need to make up for last year's cuts in this year's budget. Moreover, about \$1 B was cut at the Administration's request due to your B-1 decision.

⁷ OMB currently estimates \$6.9 B in inflation in the \$116.5 B budget. [Footnote is in the original.]

The “NATO-related portion” definition has some serious drawbacks:

—The NATO Ministerial Guidance has historically been interpreted in terms of a longstanding NATO definition of defense spending, which includes *all* defense spending. Further, Secretary Brown has publicly implied that the commitment applies to the entire budget, not a portion of it.

—There is no clearly defined “NATO-related portion” of the DOD budget. OMB’s 40% figure is taken from an analysis that OSD has provided annually to Congress since the early ’70s.⁸ It includes those general purpose forces that we would anticipate employing in Europe in a worldwide war. It does *not* include strategic nuclear forces, conventional strategic reserve forces, forces for Asia, all R&D and fixed installation costs, certain central support costs such as headquarters and personnel support. Many of these items or some fraction of them should be considered as NATO-related, especially strategic nuclear forces, given their role in the NATO Triad and the defense of Europe. In fact, we would encounter political difficulties were we to argue that strategic forces are *not* part of our NATO contribution.

—Attempting the 40% argument could hurt our credibility with the Allies and invite them to take the same approach, which would undermine the intent of the 3% goal.

—A growth definition that explicitly excluded forces for Asia would increase Asian concerns about the US willingness to defend our allies in that area.

Other Considerations

NATO considerations aside, and as I have indicated, there are important reasons for pursuing 3% real growth for the entire budget in the next fiscal year:

—Continued robust modernization of our forces is needed, as stated by PD-18, “to maintain an overall balance of military power at least as favorable as now exists” because Soviet military strength continues its steady growth of 3–4% per year in all aspects of defense spending. If we do not, we may have to cut back our new initiatives on broad programs (e.g., O+M, procurement, R&D) that would adversely affect readiness and/or our future capabilities.

—It answers any domestic and international political need to demonstrate that this Administration is taking steps to meet the Soviet “buildup.” SALT, CTB, and budget issues such as the M-X, AWACS, Navy shipbuilding, and the like, may require serious expenditure of political capital. An improved perception that you are in favor of a strong defense will strengthen your hand with Congress on these issues.

—We are not wedded to 3% real growth forever: success of your arms control initiatives or other positive changes in the international

⁸ The OSD analysis provides a range of costs, in part to illustrate the difficulty of identifying NATO-related expenditures. [Footnote is in the original.]

political climate may justify reductions in at least some parts of the defense effort.

NSC Recommendation: A Level of \$127–129 B

This level of funds can be spent effectively. It provides for a request to Congress about \$12 B above last year's appropriations, of which about \$5 B would be real growth. This 4% real increase in the total budget request will protect the 3% real increase that we need from the inevitable Congressional cuts.

In terms of the size of the DOD budget, the \$2 B difference between applying the 3% real growth factor to the entire budget or to the OMB-recommended 40% NATO portion does not appear worth the domestic and international political repercussions associated with attempting to split the budget. We would appear to be fiddling around the edges of the commitment simply to rationalize spending less. Using the entire budget as a base does not preclude the bulk of the growth in those areas most directly related to NATO.

Some may say that protecting the 3% real growth level of \$127–128 B with an additional \$1 B will bring on charges of "cut insurance," but the fact is that Congress always cuts the budget because it has a job to do, whether cut insurance is there or not. It would be unwise to assume that we could preempt Congressional cutbacks.

45. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Subcommittee Meeting¹

Washington, December 7, 1977, 9:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

PD/NSC-24: Telecommunications Protection Policy²

PARTICIPANTS

<i>White House</i>	<i>Justice</i>
Frank Press (Chairman)	John Harmon
Wayne Kay	Newall Squyers
Ben Huberman	
John Marcum	<i>Commerce</i>
Rick Neustadt	Jordan Baruch
	Henry Geller
<i>State</i>	John Richardson
Harold Saunders	
Alfred Giovetti	<i>Transportation</i>
	Richard Alfultis
<i>Treasury</i>	James Williams
Richard Davis	
Harold Paterson	<i>Energy</i>
	John LaBarre
<i>Defense/NCS</i>	Charles Brashears
Lt. Gen. Lee Paschall	
Col. Preston Hix	<i>NSC</i>
Don Lacer	Sam Hoskinson
<i>FCC</i>	<i>CIA</i>
Walter Hinchman	[2 names not declassified]
<i>GSA</i>	<i>NSA</i>
Frank Carr	Adm. Bobby Inman
Warren Burton	Howard Rosenbloom
<i>OMB</i>	
James Oliver	

Dr. Frank Press, The President's Science Advisor and Chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Telecommunications Protection convened the initial subcommittee meeting on this date. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss implementation of Presidential Directive, PD-24.

The Chairman summarized the Soviet activities and the sequence of events leading to PRM-22³ and PD-24. The essential elements of PD-24 were outlined and he reported that the Senate and House

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Welch, Box 210, Command, Control, Communications. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 40.

³ See Document 8.

Intelligence Committees had been briefed on the President's initiatives contained in PD–24.

The Chairman noted the following:

—An annual report is to be submitted by the subcommittee to the National Security Council through the SCC. The due date for this initial report to the SCC is December 14, 1978. Subcommittee members, and the Executive Agents in particular, shall be called upon to assist in the reports preparation.

—That two Executive Agents have been designated: the Secretary of Defense for COMSEC to protect government-derived classified information and government-derived unclassified information which relates to national security. The Secretary of Commerce for communications protection for government-derived unclassified information (excluding that relating to national security) and for dealing with the commercial and private sector to enhance their communications protection and privacy. The subcommittee shall resolve areas of departmental overlap, should they occur, on a case-by-case basis.

—That Colonel Wayne Kay is the Subcommittee Executive Secretary and White House staff coordinator for PD–24.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Numbering herein refers to applicable paragraphs in the PD.

—2.b. Unclassified information transmitted by and between government agencies and contractors that would be useful to an adversary should be protected.

Tasking: The nature and extent of this type information needs to be defined. The Executive Agents will investigate this area jointly, distinguish between that related to national security and that which is not and advise the subcommittee of their findings.

—2.c. Non-governmental information that would be useful to an adversary shall be identified and the private sector informed of the problem and encouraged to take appropriate protective measures.

Tasking: The Department of Commerce shall take steps to identify this type information, prepare a briefing for the private sector, review the briefing with the subcommittee prior to presentation to the private sector and review with the subcommittee their program to satisfy this requirement. The DOD shall assist as requested.

—2.d. While the private conversations of U.S. citizens do not appear to be the targets for foreign intercept activity at this time, this judgment should be kept under close and continuous review and the American people informed of any change in this conclusion. As a precautionary measure; the responsible Agencies should work with the FCC and the common carriers to adopt system capabilities which protect the privacy of individual communications and to carry out changes in regulatory policy and draft legislation that may be required.

Tasking: The Departments of Justice, Commerce and Defense shall work with the FCC in carrying out this function. The NSA is to provide technical assistance as necessary.

—2.d. [6 lines not declassified]

Tasking: [3 lines not declassified]

—3.a. The private sector telecommunications carriers should be briefed on the nature of the threat and appropriate government R&D information shall be made available so as to help and encourage them to devise adequate protection strategies. A similar program shall be pursued for government contractors and other most likely affected industries, corporations and private sector entities.

Tasking: The Executive Agents shall, as in 2.c. above, prepare a program for briefing the private sector and appropriate government contractors. They are further enjoined to work with the DOJ and FCC as necessary. The briefings are to be reviewed and cleared by the subcommittee.

REMARKS:

It was noted by the Director, NSA that thus far, 11 carriers and 17 defense contractors had been given a classified briefing. He also pointed out that the DOD Joint Logistics Commanders were presently working on proposals to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs concerning the threat and providing options to be used by Defense contractors to protect information, both classified and unclassified relating to National Security. It was not determined who would pay for implementing protection measures—an open issue which may require a policy decision.

It was also noted that while high level executives within the telecommunications companies had been briefed, it was obvious the working levels therein had not been, as evidenced by the number of requests being submitted to GSA for specialized carrier contracts for services. Further, it was the consensus of the subcommittee that classification, in large part, stifled open and honest dialogue with the commercial sector.

Did knowledge of the threat cause the commercial sector to suffer by reduced use of the phone or by modifying their information handling techniques?

Are the companies therefore put at a disadvantage in economic competition? Similarly, what will the impact be on a government agency if significantly altered information handling techniques were imposed.

Tasking: The OSTP/NSC will assess downgrade and/or declassification aspects.

Department of Commerce (covered in part under 2.c.) in conjunction with Defense prepare and submit to the subcommittee a position paper and strategy for transfer of R&D information to telecommunications carriers. Department of Defense shall also present their prepared

briefing (for carriers and defense contractors) for review and submit their program of on-going activities.

—3.d. A permanent interagency group under the chairmanship of the Department of State shall be established consisting of representatives of the Executive Office of the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Department of Defense, National Security Agency and the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation to review and if necessary to deny real estate acquisition through lease or purchase by the USSR and other Communist countries that present a serious potential threat to U.S. telecommunications security.

Tasking: The Department of State representative was requested to insure that relevant actions of this group were made known to the subcommittee as necessary.

—3.e. *[6 lines not declassified]*

Tasking: *[2 lines not declassified]*

—3.f. Subject to continuous review of available technology and reassessment of the foreign intercept threat the following immediate technical actions shall be undertaken:

—The government shall conduct a multi-faceted R&D program covering both system and user oriented protection approaches funded at about \$15 million per year.

Tasking: Of utmost concern is to avoid Executive Agent R&D duplication. It was acknowledged that R&D would be pursued within each agents sphere of responsibility. The Chairman stressed that the government R&D programs pull together, therefore, the DOD (NSA) as lead agent with full Commerce support, shall submit an R&D program package to the subcommittee for review. Furthermore, R&D dollars are to be highlighted for the President in future budgetary requests.

—Phase I and II of the DUCKPINS cable program shall be completed as soon as possible and no later than in 1978. This program shall be funded at a level of about \$4 million per year.

Tasking: It is recognized that the DUCKPINS cable program is a continuing program without a cut-off date even after full implementation. The Manager, NCS shall be prepared to provide program status at least quarterly.

—Executive Secure Voice Network (ESVN) systems shall be installed when appropriate high priority requirements can be validated.

Tasking: The Manager, NCS shall continue collection and analysis of government-wide requirements for ESVN. NSA shall continue to assist. The Committee will review and validate fully justified requirements.

—4.f. The Subcommittee should choose a future implementation strategy based on cost-benefit analysis, legal considerations and

regulatory policy. As an initial action, the head of departments and agencies, as designated by the Subcommittee, shall assess the need for protection of unclassified information transmitted under their suspicions and report their conclusions to the Subcommittee within 60 days. The Subcommittee shall then set appropriate standards for protection.

Tasking: The Department of Commerce will develop and submit for subcommittee review a technique to assess department/agency information. It will include but not be limited to:

- Kinds of information which may need protection.
- How the data is transmitted.
- Origination and distribution points.
- System nodes.
- If protection is necessary, what kind of protection and estimated cost.
- Is the cost of protection higher than the loss of data if it were compromised.

The GSA will keep the subcommittee informed on its on-going bulk encryption study for satellites.

The CIA should be prepared, if called upon, to provide a reassessment of known Soviet intentions.

The NSA shall review its past activities in these areas and provide the subcommittee a summary thereof.

Concerning the magnitude of the threat, or changes thereto, the Department of Justice (FBI) shall be the lead agent in keeping the subcommittee informed.

—5. NSDM's 266, 296, 338 and 346 and the 1968 NSC Communications Security Directive are hereby rescinded.⁴

REMARKS:

By rescinding the 1968 NSC Communications Security Directive, the United States Communications Security Board or USCSB is abolished. The policies promulgated by that board shall remain in effect until such time as the subcommittee Executive Secretary, in consultation with Defense, reviews that policy and makes recommendations concerning their disposition.

The Chairman tabled a final issue; not one contained in PD-24 but directly related to the overall subject of telecommunications protection policy and is therefore an area that may well need policy attention. The following is a summary of the presentation given by Howard Rosenbloom and deals with "public cryptography, signals intelligence and academic freedom."

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 40.

The needs of the public for privacy and protection have been recognized and publicized. This has created a market for security devices to protect:

- Banking (Electronic Fund Transfer)
- Personnel Data
- Medical History
- Data Communications
- Voice Communications

This field is called public cryptography.

The Government, to protect National Security matters, has developed and employed devices that protect a similar range of information. The methods employed for protection are highly classified because they reveal our capability to retrieve intelligence from foreign communications. Once the methods are revealed, the foreign target can thwart our intelligence gathering.

Recent academic/industrial work, stimulated by the public market, has produced a well-publicized concept for an “unbreakable” cipher system which could economically cater for the public need. The National Bureau of Standards, with classified help from the National Security Agency, has produced an “encryption” standard which is proposed for public use.

The NBS system, because of classified input, is invulnerable to mathematical attack. The public work, however, is vulnerable to attack using classified methods. The academic/industrial community is unaware of this because of classification and is unwilling to accept the restriction on academic freedom that dealing with classified information represents. The public has been suspicious of the NBS standard because the classified methods employed to test and strengthen it have not been revealed because of impact on signals intelligence and National Security.

Further, the academic community is concerned that the Government plans to inhibit their cryptologic research. They have become aware of ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulation), a regulation that inhibits export of munitions and cryptography. The U.S. controls export of cryptography to prevent the spread of good protection to those foreign targets that now yield valuable signals intelligence. The academic community wants clarification of the portions of ITAR which seem to inhibit international publication of cryptographic research and appears to infringe their academic freedom.

The following issues may need policy determination:

—Academic world needs immediate clarification of ITAR and how it affects their academic freedom.

—Government needs to clarify the relation of public cryptography to classified cryptography.

—Government needs to balance the impact on National Security of the needs for public cryptography and academic freedom.

RELATED QUESTIONS:

—How “good” should public cryptography be?

—In view of export problem

—In view of domestic surveillance needs

—How can academic freedom be provided and minimize damage to National Security?

—How will ITAR interpretation apply?

—Is new legislation needed?

—How should the Government interface with Academe/Industry in public cryptography? Should the Government support unclassified research? How can the classified work interface with the unclassified work?

—How should DOD and DOC employ classified tools for public cryptography? Should DOD “go it alone”?

—How does the U.S. Government deal with the U.K. for public cryptography? Should there be separate contact from both DOD and DOC?

—What public statements should be made? By whom? When?

The Chairman stressed the need for a mechanism to respond to academia.

Tasking: The Department of Justice is to evaluate the applicability of ITAR and its relationship to research, publications or presentations about public cryptography by the academic community; regardless of whether the foregoing be verbal or in the form of papers and whether the research is supported by private or government funds.

The Department of Commerce as lead agent, working with the NSA shall propose a position paper outlining a national policy for government use. This position paper is due to the working group comprised of OSTP, Commerce, NSA and Justice by January 20, 1978. The lead agent is enjoined to contact the National Science Foundation and Department of State who may be asked to contribute in their respective areas (State for the U.K. coordination effort). The President’s Science Advisor shall be responsible for all public coordination.

The Director, OMB and Manager, NCS shall attend all future meetings.

The next subcommittee meeting is tentatively scheduled for the week of January 23–27, 1978.

46. Memorandum From Crisis Management Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 10, 1977

SUBJECT

NSC Annual Report

This memorandum responds to your request, November 23,² for material which you may use in the NSC Annual Report.

Crisis Management at the nuclear level.

1. The situation as we inherited it.

Procedures. We found the White House Emergency Procedures neglected, rusty, and out of date. There was concern in the JCS that the NCA might not be able to respond effectively in the event of a surprise attack. The unsatisfactory OPAL III drill in March was symptomatic of the overall situation.

Doctrine. U.S. "crisis management" doctrine at the nuclear level had been evolving, particularly as a result of NSSM 169 and the ensuing NSDM 242 (promulgated in 1974) which provides for the first time a single statement of national strategic employment policy.³ The new policy was based on the judgment that (1) a massive retaliatory response is credible only at the upper levels of conflict and that (2) counterforce strikes will not reduce damage to the U.S. to low levels. A broader range of lesser responses was deemed necessary if a nuclear crisis was to be managed. Accordingly, the concept of "escalation control" at lower levels of conflict was introduced. To support it, "limited nuclear options" were required, and since 1974, a number of limited strikes have been planned and programmed. At the same time, the SIOP itself was being revised to include more than one option in line with the NSDM 242 guidance. In January the President was briefed on its "fifth" revision, SIOP-5.

2. Goals for this Administration.

The *first goal* was to put the WHEP in good order. The *second goal* was to help the President become familiar with the U.S. doctrine for

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 11, National Security Council: 4-12/77. Top Secret; Sensitive Outside the System.

² Not found.

³ NSSM 169 and NSDM 242 are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 4 and 31, respectively.

nuclear “crisis management” as it relates to the WHEP and the National Command Authority.

3. *The steps taken to implement these goals.*

The WHEP. An extensive review memorandum for the WHEP was developed in February, and after some fumbling between the NSC and the Military Office, an ad hoc group, including representatives from the NSC staff, the Military Office, WHCA, the FPA, and the NMCC, was formed. It met about once a month through mid-summer to review the remedial steps taken by its members. This phase ended when Hugh Carter held a meeting with the President to brief him on the progress and to ask his guidance on unresolved issues such as the location of NEACP and the arrangement between him and the Vice President for emergency evacuation. On July 9, an “OPAL III with destination NEACP” was executed in 19 minutes, evidence that the system had indeed been put in reasonably good order.

Procedures and Doctrine. On March 31, you sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense asking him and the JCS⁴ to explain our nuclear war procedures and doctrine, including LNOs. The response on June 3, was set aside pending the outcome of PRM 10, and the follow-on response by Harold Brown arrived on August 19,⁵ after it was clear that PRM 10 produced no definitive basis for a change.

The Defense memorandum of August 19 spelled out the recent history of our doctrinal development and procedures. It elaborated the concept of “escalation control”—in the event of the failure of “deterrence,” and stated the rationale for “Limited Nuclear Options.” Your covering memorandum to the President⁶ pointed out some doubts about the feasibility of “escalation control,” especially in view of our command, control, and communications vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, the Defense memorandum provided a concise history of our efforts 1) to define “deterrence” in operational terms for targeting guidance, and 2) our concept of how we might respond if deterrence were to fail. If the President absorbed Harold Brown’s essay, he has a fairly clear idea of where we are in our doctrine, its ambiguities and its adequacies.

The impact of your memorandum of March 31 did not end with the August 19 response. Several other things also occurred:

—The JCS began a thorough review of LNOs/RNOs to prepare a Presidential briefing and to determine where they were going with the LNO concept in general. Although Harold Brown offered this briefing

⁴ See Document 10.

⁵ See Tab A, Document 36.

⁶ See Document 36.

to the President, it never took place. A script of the briefing was submitted to the President in mid-November.

—The President accepted Harold Brown's invitation to visit SAC Headquarters. His trip there on November 19,⁷ is the first such Presidential attention to the command and control of our strategic forces on recent record.

—Most important, IVORY ITEM drills were initiated.

Although the initiative came from Defense, it seems that our activity with the WHEP, our interest in LNOs, and the doctrinal questions raised by the memorandum of March 31 gave Defense a sense of urgency about both WHEP and doctrine. In fact, several people in Defense were surprised to discover that NSDM 242 calls for frequent and repeated interaction between the military planners and the NCA to ensure that military planning does indeed support the preferences of the NCA. Apparently, such interaction never occurred under the previous Administrations although they authored and endorsed the NSDM.

4. Difficulties encountered.

The WHEP. The organization of the White House makes it very difficult for the NSC staff to control or check the WHEP. All the operational control of the assets, which are key to the WHEP, belong to the Military Office: helicopters, communications, cars, etc. The administrative demands on these assets have, at times, caused serious neglect of WHEP criteria, especially in Presidential travel. The President's emphasis on emergency procedures, however, allowed us to work rather effectively in a "staff supervisory" role with Hugh Carter whose Military Office has "operational control." Hugh and I developed a "job description" for an "emergency procedures officer" last spring in an effort to clarify who has what responsibilities. It granted the NSC only a periodic "staff review" of the WHEP. The major part of the job is reserved for the Director of the Military Office. Marty Beaman, a lawyer from Florida, now occupies that post as Bill Gulley's successor. The JCS, you recall, was extremely nervous about having no one with military and command experience in that job. Their fears are not without justification, but I have moderated them by acting as an informal go-between and by getting Hugh Carter involved and concerned with the WHEP. In other words, we have a make-shift arrangement that operates on good will between the NSC and the Military Office. Speaking candidly, there is a residue of ill-feeling over there as a result of our pushing and shoving on WHEP reform.

⁷ Carter visited Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha on October 22. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

Doctrine. I use this word in the straightforward sense of generalized and specific guidance which relates strategic concepts to operations, to the world of realities and of one's capabilities.

The initial Defense response to the March 31 memorandum promised doctrinal change and improvements as a result of PRM 10 (the Force Posture Review), but it was a false promise. The PD-18 follow-on studies reassert the promise. In truth, it seems that nobody wants to address the "escalation control" concept critically. The same is true for LNOs/RNOs. There is a reluctance to think hard about "deterrence" failing, and there is a lot of foggy thinking about how to keep it from failing. In a sense, NSDM 242 was a declaratory measure (bluff?) to make the Soviets believe we might use "limited" nuclear strikes at lower levels of crisis of confrontation. Although we have made progress in developing the operational and staffing capability to deliver limited strikes tailored to a given situation, we have done nothing to prepare our homeland for counter-LNOs. Some who realize this want to return to "minimum deterrence," or "assured destruction." Others want to build toward something like a psychologically meaningful nuclear "superiority." Still others seem to believe that arms control measures will dissolve the central dilemmas of our nuclear doctrine.

In this milieu of doctrinal confusion, it has not been easy to clarify for the President "where we are and whither we are tending" with our strategic capabilities.

5. *Accomplishments attained.*

The WHEP. It is in better shape than at any time in several years, perhaps decades. Particularly WHCA has tightened up its procedures. The interface with the NMCC is greatly improved, and it should remain so in view of the continual interaction we now have on that front. The best indication of the overall WHEP condition came with the IVORY ITEM drill in which the President participated. The OPAL III went off with precision and speed.

The real capstone in accomplishments has been the President's participation in IVORY ITEM. It has never been done before, and the event triggered revisions and changes in the SIOP based on Presidential guidance for the first time in history. Heretofore, the SIOP designers have had to imagine what the President would want to see and know in an emergency. The thick "Decision Handbook" is the product of years of speculating in J-3 about the President's needs without a single clue from a President!

NEACP, OPAL drills, and the Vice President's role have been clarified (although clarity has exposed yet new things to be done in some instances.)

Doctrine. The implications from the IVORY ITEM discussions for doctrine are monumental.

—[3 lines not declassified]

—Refinement of SIOP options continues. Although no specific changes have yet been directed, the last IVORY ITEM meeting seems likely to bring about one or two more “alternatives.”

—The President is increasingly aware of the “escalation control” concept with its inherent weaknesses, as well as those of our communications and control posture. This was clear in the last IVORY ITEM scenario discussion he held with you, Secretary Brown, et alia.

6. *Follow-on goals.*

The major follow-on concern is keeping the IVORY ITEM subject on the agenda. As the President reacts, it is clear what steps to take. If he never addresses the IVORY ITEM and WHEP contingencies, we simply cannot know where he wants to go in future developments.

7. *The next stage.*

The concept of NCA interaction with the military planners for nuclear “crisis management,” as set down in NSDM 242, is sound.

Any new PD emerging from the PD-18 follow-on studies should retain it. I am preparing a separate memorandum on this point, one based on the President’s guidance on the Defense memorandum of August 19. I do not believe we should rush ahead with it now but rather let the IVORY ITEM discussions take their course. They are providing the interaction which eventually we might want to routinize in a more formal sense.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to national security policy.]

47. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Navy Shipbuilding Plans

In the 1979 Defense budget, you deleted advance funding for a medium-sized aircraft carrier (CVV). Further, you deferred a decision on whether any carrier should be built in the next five years, pending the completion of a Defense study of the issue. That study is to be completed by the Navy in February or March, 1978.

We recommend that you call Senator Stennis and Representative Price this week to obtain their support for your 1979 shipbuilding program and their advice on longer-range shipbuilding plans. Word of your decisions is leaking out, and some people may try an end run to the Committees to get a larger shipbuilding program. The House Armed Services Committee is especially likely to add a nuclear carrier (CVN), costing \$2 billion and maybe the nuclear AEGIS ship (CGN) costing \$1.1 billion. The Senate Committee may also be leaning toward adding a carrier.

To head off this potential budget threat, a commitment from Stennis and Price to await the results of the study would be useful. They should be made aware that final decisions for aircraft carriers have not been made. Further, they could be informed that after you review the Defense study with Secretary Brown, you will inform them of your decision. Without your personal commitment to these two gentlemen, the Congress is likely to develop its own five-year shipbuilding plan which will include one or more new nuclear carriers. If they believe the program is unacceptably low, you might want to consider adding \$700 million and 2 DD-963 class destroyers to the 1979 program. These ships would be useful anti-submarine warfare assets. In addition, the Ingalls Shipyard in Mississippi, where they are built, is running out of work.

Because a carrier decision will not be made prior to completion of the Defense study, specific outyear shipbuilding plans should not be provided to the Congress with the 1979 budget. Current law, however, requires submission to Congress of:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 11, Navy Department: 6/77-12/79. No classification marking. Carter wrote at the top of the memorandum: "Jim—Price: 'ok' Stennis 'ok' J." A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "The President Has Seen."

—1980 authorization requests by May 15, 1978.

—The Five-Year Defense Program for construction of nuclear-powered major combatant vessels and an update of the previous five-year shipbuilding plan concurrent with the budget submission.

We see two ways to proceed:

Option A: Submit a 1980 Authorization and a five-year plan with no new carriers. Submit an amended budget and five-year plan, in the spring, if you decide to proceed with a new carrier.

Option B: Submit a 1980 Authorization and a five-year shipbuilding plan that specifies total dollars but not specific ships. Provide a specific list of ships for 1980–1983 when a carrier decision is made this spring.

Option A has the advantage of providing Congress with a specific shipbuilding program while reserving the option of adding a carrier later if they desired. Its disadvantage is that it implies that you have already decided against building any new carriers.

Option B leaves the decision completely open and is consistent with the way military construction authorizations are handled. Its disadvantage is that some members of Congress might consider it contrary to the intent of the laws requiring submission of future-year shipbuilding information.

Recommendation: Option B, and that you call Senator Stennis and Congressman Price this week.

Decision: Option A _____

Option B _____²

Other: _____

² Carter indicated his approval of the recommendation by writing a checkmark and initialing next to “Option B.”

48. Report by Secretary of Defense Brown to the Congress¹

Washington, January 23, 1978

[Omitted here are the cover page and table of contents.]

SECTION I

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

The President requests a defense budget for FY 1979 which entails \$126 billion in Total Obligational Authority (TOA) and \$115.2 billion in outlays. The planned outlays will constitute a 3.5 percent real increase over the spending programmed for FY 1978.

The Long-Range Projections for defense contain a real increase in TOA of about 2.7 percent a year so that, by FY 1983, the defense budget will require TOA of \$172.7 billion in then-year dollars and \$140.3 billion measured in FY 1979 prices. Assuming normal patterns of economic growth over the five-year period, we estimate that defense outlays, as a percent of Gross National Product (GNP), will actually decline from 5.1 percent in FY 1979 to 4.8 percent in FY 1983. In FY 1964, the number was 8.2 percent; in FY 1954, it was 12 percent.

The body of my annual report explains in detail the defense policies and programs adopted by the Carter administration. In this summary and opening statement, I will focus on the main reasons for the proposed modest increases in real terms in the FY 1979 defense budget and long-range projections.

I. INTERNATIONAL TRENDS AND DEFENSE

The defense budget, as you know, is shaped by a number of factors. Not the least of these is the international environment. Certain features of that environment and our relationship with it are especially worth noting.

—First, even though nearly 33 years have passed since the end of World War II, a number of territorial and other issues remain unresolved—particularly in Africa and the Middle East. There is no recognized and stable *status quo* to which all nations—or all the major nations, or most nations—adhere.

—Second, the United States is becoming increasingly dependent on this environment—in trade, in raw materials, in energy, and in a broad range of political relationships.

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 14, PD-18 [2]. Secret; Formerly Restricted Data. Brown sent the report to Carter under a January 20 covering memorandum prior to submitting it to the Congress. (Ibid.)

—Third, most of the international competition for power is conducted with peaceful instruments, and most international issues are resolved by peaceful means. But force, whether in the form of organized military power or of terrorism, continues to be a major factor in the resolution of international disputes. Military power has a substantial influence on the international attitudes of friends and adversaries during peace as well as in war.

—Fourth, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union continue to be marked by both competition and cooperation, with the attendant risk of conflict. However, there are opportunities to stabilize and perhaps to ease these relations—especially through arms control agreements.

—Fifth, where the competition between the two superpowers is non-military, the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: in industrial, agricultural, technological, and diplomatic strength; in the energy and enterprise of its citizens; in the appeal of our system—its responsiveness and plain decency; and in the support of allies and other friends who genuinely share similar aspirations.

—Sixth, the Soviet Union, by contrast, suffers from major internal handicaps—economic, political, and social—and these handicaps will probably increase with the decline already occurring in birth rates and about to occur in domestic energy supplies and rates of economic growth. The Soviets also suffer from a lack of genuinely committed allies, and they have been set back in their relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, and parts of the Middle East. Nonetheless, despite these handicaps and setbacks, the Soviets have been acquiring military power comparable to that of the United States. By some measures they are ahead; by others they are behind. (Comparative military capability also depends on such factors as the geographic location of a conflict.)

—Finally, while many trends and issues continue to develop independently of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—and require our attention and resources—the Soviet Union remains our principal national security problem: not the only one but the biggest one.

We are negotiating (and must continue to negotiate) with the Soviets for specific, equitable and adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements—agreements that strengthen international stability, curb the arms competition, and reduce armaments: conventional as well as nuclear. We should seek to involve the Soviets constructively in a number of international activities—social and economic, including non-strategic trade. We should encourage their cooperation in resolving international conflicts and reducing areas of tension that could lead to confrontation. To the degree that we can channel any United States-Soviet competition into non-military areas, we will be better off, especially considering our economic, social, and other advantages.

However, none of these efforts toward cooperation should cause us to minimize the American commitment to human rights, national independence, and democratic institutions—or to collective security with

our friends. Certainly they must not keep us, along with our allies, from offsetting Soviet military power in such vital areas as Western Europe.

The main objective of our collective security system must be the maintenance of an overall military balance with the Soviet Union no less favorable than the one that now exists. Deterrence and stability, not overbearing military power, are what we seek. To have them, and to be confident in them, we must be assured of a credible fighting capability.

The demands of such a capability are substantial. Over the past 15 years, Soviet defense spending has been gradually increasing; we estimate the average rate of increase, in real terms, at between three and four percent a year, roughly in line with growth in the Soviet GNP. For a substantial part of that same period (from FY 1964 to FY 1975), U.S. baseline budgets (with military retired pay and the incremental costs of the war in Southeast Asia excluded) have been declining in real terms. Only since FY 1976, has our defense budget been increasing in real terms. As a consequence, the Soviet defense effort now appears to exceed ours. The margin is a matter of judgment, and depends on whether the two programs are compared in rubles or dollars. Estimates of 20 percent to 40 percent for this excess appear reasonable.

On the other hand, we are fortunate in having prosperous and willing allies who can help counterbalance the Soviet effort. The Soviets are not so fortunate. Moreover, they have felt obliged to allocate up to about 20 percent of their total defense effort to the Far East and the PRC. These considerations are allowed for in our judgments on the proper size of the U.S. defense program. Nonetheless, if we and our allies are to keep pace with the Soviets and offset their military power, we must increase our own efforts.

In particular, an increasingly precarious conventional balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe is a matter of serious concern. That is why we and our NATO allies, in May, 1977, recognized the need to raise our respective levels of defense spending by approximately three percent a year in real terms. That is also why we have already launched several major initiatives to cope with short term NATO vulnerabilities, develop long term and coordinated defense plans, and achieve a greater degree of alliance cooperation in the common defense. All of us, it is now acknowledged, must expand our responses to the Soviet military buildup.

The general magnitude of the Soviet defense effort, and the continued uncertainties in international relations, account to a considerable extent for the size and composition of the U.S. defense budget. But we do not seek to create a mirror-image of Soviet military capabilities. Instead, we strive to maintain the nuclear and conventional forces necessary to deter, or if necessary frustrate, possible Soviet military actions in areas of the world that are vital to us.

Because certain deficiencies threaten to develop in our posture as a result of the recent and diverging patterns of defense spending in the United States and the Soviet Union, we need increased resources to redress them. I will discuss our main concerns here. The details of our needs will be found in the remainder of the report.

II. *THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES*

A strategic nuclear attack is the least likely military contingency we face. However, there is no task more vital than the maintenance of the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In my judgment, a rough strategic nuclear equilibrium exists between the two superpowers at the present time. Neither country enjoys a military advantage; neither is in a position to exploit its nuclear capabilities for political ends. The situation is one of standoff or stalemate. Mutual strategic deterrence and essential equivalence are in effect.

This administration is determined to continue the current state of affairs. We would prefer to continue it through equitable and verifiable agreements for arms limitations and reductions, and I believe we are making progress in that direction through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). But we will maintain it by whatever means and resources are necessary. No one should have any doubts whatsoever on that score.

I stress this determination for two basic reasons. First, the strategic balance is not static; owing to a substantial and continuing Soviet effort, it is highly dynamic. Second, the problem of coping with this dynamism is complex and demanding; there is no easy, one-shot solution to it.

The United States has not been idle in this competition; we have programs underway to modernize each element of our TRIAD. However, all of us must recognize that the Soviets continue to fund a number of large, impressive and costly strategic programs to strengthen their offensive capabilities, their active defenses, and their passive defense system.

Exactly why the Soviets are pushing so hard to improve their strategic nuclear capabilities is uncertain. What is certain is that we cannot ignore their efforts or assume that they are motivated by considerations either of altruism or of pure deterrence.

My own view is that, for many years now, we have been at the point where a full-scale thermonuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would be a disaster of unprecedented proportions for both sides. Nothing I have learned during the past year has altered that conclusion. I also believe that any use of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers against one another—whether tactical or

strategic—would carry a high risk—though not the certainty—of escalating the conflict to a full-scale thermonuclear exchange.

But if deterrence of nuclear war is our most fundamental defense objective—and it surely is—what counts is what Soviet civilian and military leaders believe. On that score, unfortunately, we face another uncertainty. What we see as sufficient for security may appear as quite inadequate to them. What would deter us might not deter them. What some of us consider credible as a deterrent, they may dismiss as a bluff.

Great caution and careful hedging are essential in the face of these uncertainties. Basically, they require us to insist on essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear forces. Because of the stakes, no lesser requirement will do.

We do not propose to plan against total irrationality. Rather, the issue is how to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot gain any military or political advantage from their strategic forces. Insistence on essential equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior—even if the perception is not technically justified.

By essential equivalence, we mean the maintenance of conditions such that:

- Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage;
- nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, is maintained;
- any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteristics; and
- the U.S. posture is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.

These conditions exist today, and our objective in the current SALT II negotiations is to maintain them in the future. But owing to the current and impending improvements in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, we will have to continue our own effort—primarily for increased research and development for the Missile-X (MX) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), development and some deployment of cruise missiles, deployment of the Mark 12A warhead, and introduction of the TRIDENT missiles and submarines.

III. *THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES*

It should be evident that, in an era of mutual strategic deterrence, we must become more concerned than ever about a number of regional balances, and about the adequacy of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities. Strategic parity has not created this problem; the United States and its allies have been at risk to Soviet nuclear attacks for many years. But nuclear parity has forced all of us to recognize that the use of the more traditional types of force by our adversaries may seem to them less risky than formerly.

A. Europe

Whether for this or for some other reason, the Warsaw Pact maintains and continues to improve its capability to launch a major attack on Western Europe. Such an attack could be nuclear or non-nuclear. It might occur after some days or weeks of mobilization and deployment by the Warsaw Pact, but we cannot rule out the possibility that the powerful Pact forces already positioned in Eastern Europe would attack without reinforcement, and with little tactical warning, in the midst of a major East-West crisis.

The United States will do its share to ensure that NATO has the capabilities—conventional as well as nuclear—to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Western Europe. We are determined to help stop any of these possible Pact attacks with a minimum loss of allied territory, and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.

Our policy is in complete agreement with current NATO guidance in its emphasis on a flexible response and on the need for conventional as well as for tactical and strategic nuclear forces in the posture of the Alliance. We also agree with our allies that, owing to the strengthening of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, NATO (including the United States) must make major improvements in the conventional capabilities of the Alliance including:

- the deployed forward defense forces in Europe and their positioning;
- the initial combat capabilities of these forward defense forces, and particularly their antitank capabilities;
- and allied rapid reinforcing capabilities.

I have already instituted a number of U.S. programs in these areas. We are substantially enhancing the readiness of the United States general purpose forces and improving our ability to provide rapid reinforcements to NATO. Currently, within 10 days, we could augment our 5 $\frac{2}{3}$ divisions and 28 tactical air squadrons in Europe by little more than one division and 40 squadrons. We plan, by 1983, to be able to add five divisions and 60 tactical air squadrons in the same amount of time.

Along with the allies, we are building up our anti-armor capabilities and adding to our war reserve stocks. During the next five years, the United States alone plans to increase its “heavied up” divisions to 11 of the total of 16 regular Army divisions, acquire about 5,000 tanks and 18,000 anti-tank guided missiles for the Army, and purchase more than 2,000 tactical aircraft for the Air Force. Our allies, in the coming year alone, will add almost 2,000 anti-tank guided missile launchers and 14,000 anti-tank missiles to their capability in Central Europe.

In December, 1977, the allies also agreed to improve war reserve stocks, increase readiness, and strengthen reinforcement capabilities. These measures, along with greater anti-armor effectiveness, will enhance NATO's capability against the possibility of a Warsaw Pact short-warning attack.

At the same time, we and our allies are working toward a greater integration of NATO doctrine, tactics, procedures, and equipment. The more that equipment, munitions, and their logistic support are interoperable, the more effectively allied forces can contain a coordinated attack. Standardized or interoperable command, control and communications and interchangeable munitions are particularly essential for this purpose.

B. East Asia

There is a rather clear dividing line in Europe between friends and adversaries. The dangers are less sharply defined in Asia. Soviet forces in Asia are directed primarily at China. North Korea continues to improve its military capabilities relative to South Korea, but the long-term overall trends clearly favor the South. The situation in Southeast Asia remains obscure, and the ultimate intentions of Vietnam continue to be uncertain.

In these circumstances, the President has reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to a position of strength in the Western Pacific. We will continue to protect our interests in Northeast Asia and fulfill all our treaty obligations. The planned withdrawal of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division from South Korea in no way alters that commitment.

We shall continue to oppose aggression in Korea. With Congressional approval of the necessary legislation, we plan to augment the combat capability of the South Korean ground forces. The major portion of the 2nd Division will remain deployed in Korea until after 1980. The Seventh Fleet, a Marine Amphibious Force with its organic air wing, and three USAF land-based tactical fighter wings will continue on station in the Western Pacific, including one in Korea.

Continuation of the close U.S.-Japanese defense relationship will further strengthen stability in Asia. We support Japanese efforts to improve their self-defense forces, particularly their recently announced plans to augment their air defense and ASW capabilities.

C. Other Contingencies

There are, in addition, a number of other regions where the United States and its allies have vital interests and where serious and potentially explosive rivalries exist. The Middle East, despite the hope

provided by recent events,² remains a source of potential conflict. United States and European security cannot be separated from the security of other critical parts of the world. Soviet control of the vital oil-producing regions of the Persian Gulf, in particular, could destroy the cohesion of NATO and perhaps NATO's ability to defend itself.

In this area, or indeed in the Far East, rival local forces might become engaged initially without external involvement. However, the Soviets could intervene in all three regions, although in some instances their forces could only be airlifted light infantry or naval and perhaps air units. Whatever the developments, and however they might occur, such clashes not only might require the dispatch of appropriate U.S. forces to the scene in support of friends; they could precede and even set off a crisis or conflagration in Europe.

Accordingly, we must continue to maintain a defense posture that permits us to respond effectively and simultaneously to a relatively minor as well as to a major contingency. We currently estimate the needs of such a posture—over and above the forces we program for a major war with the Soviet Union—as a limited number of land combat forces, in large part relatively light (though their actual configuration will depend on the nature of the forces, they might be expected to encounter), consisting of both Marine and Army combat divisions with their support; naval, amphibious lift, and tactical air forces; and strategic mobility forces with the range and payload to minimize our dependence on overseas staging and logistical support bases.

This by no means completes our defense needs. The United States is a maritime nation. Much more than the Soviet Union, we depend on access to major air and sea lanes not only to acquire critical raw materials and engage in other peaceful pursuits, but also to protect our vital interests, forces, and allies overseas in wartime.

The Soviets have developed a long-range force of aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines capable of challenging our maritime interests. We must maintain the air and naval forces necessary to deal with the challenge and project U.S. power where and as required.

Most of these various requirements can be satisfied with existing programs and forces. But in an era when wars could be short and intense, appropriate elements of our forces in the continental United States (CONUS) must be rapidly deployable to Asia and the Middle East as well as to Europe.

² Presumably a reference to Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, and the beginning of direct Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations.

IV. *READINESS*

I should emphasize that, while the prospect of short, intense wars makes it necessary to have our main conventional forces in being, that alone is not sufficient. We must also maintain a high level of readiness in our active forces. Otherwise, we will have the facade rather than the reality of collective security.

I consider our forces to be ready when they are well trained, have modern unit equipment in good operating order, hold war reserve stocks on which they can draw for the early stages of any conflict and are capable of timely response to crisis. Unfortunately, I cannot report that our forces, by this definition, are as ready as I would like them to be.

There are several reasons for the current state of affairs. Our necessary efforts to conserve fuel have meant reductions in ground combat training exercises, Navy steaming hours, and flying hours for all services (although we have been able to make some substitution for these losses, using simulators). Modernization, in some cases, has brought with it shorter mean-times to failure, longer repair times, and increased training requirements, as well as greater sophistication and capability of equipment. Inflation, increased pay, and the need to modernize our forces have meant curtailed funds for operation and maintenance.

The conventional wisdom has been that, in an emergency, the neglect of readiness can be quickly overcome by a rapid infusion of resources. Whatever merit this wisdom may have had when the United States had ample time for extended mobilization, it is now out of date.

We have not yet developed the methodological tools to show the precise sensitivity of readiness to changes in our commitment of resources. But loss of readiness is a cumulative process that takes time as well as money to reverse.

Accordingly, we must keep up our training not only because U.S. forces may be sent into action with very little advance warning, but also because we rely increasingly on the sophistication of our equipment to compensate for potential superiority in enemy numbers. It is equally essential that our war reserve stocks be maintained, mostly for our own needs, but to some degree for Asian allies as well. At the same time, we must raise the percentage of our equipment that is combat-ready because, owing to unit costs, we have less of it to bring to bear in an emergency.

To put the matter bluntly, unless we are prepared to maintain these components of readiness, collective security and deterrence will be seriously undermined. The increased resources in the FY 1979 budget will permit us to get on with the job.

V. CONCLUSION

To sum up, what we are saying with the FY 1979 budget and Five-Year Defense program is that, while there is work ahead of us, there are no grounds for panic or crash efforts. The world remains turbulent and dangerous; the Soviets, despite all their internal handicaps and external problems, have become a serious military competitor. But they have not suddenly achieved the status of a Goliath any more than we have ended up abruptly as a David at the end of an inoperative slingshot. Although both of us are heavyweights, I am confident that we remain the more agile of the two.

Perhaps the analogy of the hare and the tortoise is more appropriate as a description of the Soviet-American competition in the past. Certainly we pulled ahead in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then substantially reduced our basic effort while the Soviets continued to expand theirs at a steady pace. Now we must increase our investment in defense if we are to stay abreast.

That we have the basic strength and will for the task cannot be in doubt. That we have the prudence and patience to run at whatever pace the Soviets may choose to set remains to be seen. All I can say to you is that the FY 1979 budget and projected programs recommend what this administration regards as the right regimen for a long-distance runner.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

49. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, January 26, 1978

SUBJECT

Approval of the Cruise Missile Program as a Program of Highest National Priority

PURPOSE

This is to request that you approve the Cruise Missile Program as a program of highest national priority.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 12/77–1/78. No classification marking.

BACKGROUND

In order to meet the required Initial Operational Capability date for the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), top priority for industrial resources is essential. Your approval will allow assignment of a BRICK-BAT DX industrial priority rating to our contracts with industry.² It will assure that materials, components and other resources will be applied to the Cruise Missile program first in the event of conflict with commercial or lesser important Defense contracts.

1. *Production Leadtimes*—Industrial experience during FY 76–77 has shown that leadtimes for many materials and components, particularly aluminum ingots and electronic parts, are lengthy. Failure to apply a blanket BRICK-BAT rating to the program will make it necessary to resolve individual resource bottlenecks and conflicts on a slower and more costly case-by-case interagency basis.

2. *Relationship to Sea and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM and GLCM)*—Because many of the component parts of the ALCM, SLCM and GLCM are manufactured by the same Defense contractors, it would be more cost-effective and efficient to apply equal priority in industry for these systems at this stage in their development.

3. *Other BRICK-BAT Programs*—Programs have received this assignment in the past, generally because of key political, scientific, psychological or military objectives. Nine programs are presently in the BRICK-BAT category. Included are systems such as the M60 Tank, TRIDENT, MINUTEMAN and the Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Program.

4. *Adverse Reaction/Impact*—We do not anticipate any adverse reaction from special interest groups. Impact on industry will be minimal providing the DX industrial priority rating is assigned early in the acquisition cycle.

5. *DX Usage Limitation*—The program is estimated to cost \$999.65 million through FY 78. Of the total cost, approximately \$130 million is estimated to be for critical components and materials which will be benefited by assignment of the DX industrial priority rating.

I recommend that you approve the Cruise Missile Program as a program of highest national priority. The enclosure contains the text of a suggested reply.³

Harold Brown

² BRICK-BAT DX is the highest level of priority for production and acquisition of industrial resources.

³ Not found attached. Carter signed his name below Brown's to indicate his approval of the recommendation.

50. **Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, January 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Items of Interest from the NMCC Visit²

First, I could not hear all of the conversations but the following points emerged from what I did monitor. I put them down for our record and possible follow-up.

—The President seems not to have been aware of some of the vulnerabilities of our warning satellites (DSP). This also relates to Soviet laser R and D, as I understood this part of the discussion.

—Your question about varied Soviet attack strategies raises many questions about our command and control which have concerned me for a long time. The President responded, as I understood him, with a desire to do something about command and control as well as the vulnerability of our warning systems (doing something of course requires a large step over a number of years; it also requires a change in some of our doctrinal assumptions.)

—Harold Brown seems extremely reluctant either to announce a launch on warning policy or to allow the impression to emerge that we might have such policy. I missed other interlocutors' responses.

—I will get you some better information on the operational significance of DEFCON levels.

—Harold Brown's mention of changing Soviet strategic doctrine about limiting use of nuclear weapons raises a key issue in which we will possibly see major revisions in the next year or two. The intelligence community has a lot of work yet to be done. *[3 lines not declassified]* I have the impression that the President's view on this is taking a rigid shape. He is justified in this view, *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, but it is conceivable that they will change.

—Your question on the chances of a false warning from the various systems is being researched in the JCS. An answer will be forthcoming shortly. In this connection, I do not believe it was made clear that the DSP systems are not simply waiting for a Soviet launch. They record launches almost everyday, ours, the Soviets, and others world-wide. Thus, we have a vast experience with their reliability and sensitivities.

—Finally, the "feedback" has been very positive. General Rogers observed that had we had to go to war at this level a few years ago,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department: 12/77–1/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Brzezinski initialed the top right corner of the memorandum and wrote "good."

² Reference is to Carter's visit to the National Military Command Center on January 28. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting was found.

things would have worked rather poorly. The IVORY ITEM series has altered that situation remarkably.

51. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, February 25, 1978

You will recall that at the session in the NMCC last month² you asked for more information on what U.S. and Soviet laser capabilities are today and what they will be in the future.

The attached is a response to that request.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, undated

US AND SOVIET LASER WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

(S) The potential of laser weapons is embodied in three fundamental characteristics: delivery of energy at the speed of light, a potentially large magazine, and a wide field of fire within which the laser can switch rapidly from target to target. The US High Energy Laser (HEL) program is intended to develop the technology base for laser devices, and to demonstrate the feasibility and potential of the HEL as a weapon. We plan to assess, by the early 1980s, the viability of lasers in comparison to other weapons. Principal applications defined today include defense of aircraft, ships and ground targets against aircraft and tactical missiles. A decision to develop prototype weapons for these applications would produce laser weapons by the late 1980s. We are also examining concepts for space-based laser ASAT devices. The feasibility of such devices could be demonstrated by the late 1980s.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 124, Weapons Systems: 1-3/78. Top Secret.

² See footnote 2, Document 50.

³ Top Secret.

(TS) The Soviet laser weapons program enjoys a high priority. Several HEL ranges and test sites have been identified in the USSR, and the size and nature of these facilities indicate an annual HEL investment which is considerably higher than our own. We feel that the current Soviet laser technology level is comparable to ours. While we may tend to lead in pointing and tracking capability, the Soviets have probably achieved higher power levels. We believe the Soviets have underway a number of prototype development projects designed to assess the viability of laser weapons. Table 1 summarizes our assessment of US and Soviet laser weapon capabilities in an anti-satellite (ASAT) role. In this context, "capability" implies operational deployment in sufficient numbers to provide a meaningful effect. The US capabilities are potential capabilities—they are not capabilities which exist or are planned for implementation, but reflect what could be achieved in an orderly program without fiscal constraints. Similarly, the estimated Soviet capabilities reflect what could be achieved.

(S) Three types of capabilities are listed: "jam sensor", "kill sensor", and "kill structure". "Jam sensor", implies introducing false targets or obliterating some portion of the image. "Kill sensor", implies permanent damage to the sensor or sensing medium. These capabilities generally require the laser to be in or near the optical field of view. Finally, "kill structure" involves damage to softer structural elements such as solar arrays. The power required to kill structure is about seven orders of magnitude higher than the power required to jam sensors.

(TS) Within one year, both the US and the Soviets could jam satellite sensors (film or detector arrays) at essentially all altitudes and kill sensors in satellites at low altitudes. The US airborne laser provides a near term advantage in reducing the reaction time from command to kill. But the Soviets may have a near term advantage in the ability to effect structural damage.

(TS) By the early 1990s, the US and the Soviet Union could have the capability to jam and kill sensors on high altitude satellites. Structural kills would be limited to medium altitude unless space-borne laser weapons were deployed. While a space deployment is possible by the early 1990s, it would be a substantial technological undertaking with considerable development risk.

(S) The entries in Table 1 indicating effective altitudes were developed using simple assumptions about spectral sensitivity and damage levels. A case by case analysis could easily result in an order of magnitude variation in effective range.

(TS) US and Soviet laser weapon capabilities in missions other than ASAT are summarized in Table 2. Both US and Soviet HEL programs will be demonstrating lethality and capability from now through

the mid-1980s. We estimate that prototype air defense systems will be available in the Soviet Union by the early 1980s. Prototype US systems will be demonstrated in the mid-1980s. By the early 1990s, both the US and the Soviet Union could develop a capability for the short range point defense of ships, ground targets and aircraft. This capability could include structural as well as sensor kill devices. A US or Soviet space-based laser defense capability could defend friendly satellites against ASAT attack by the early 1990s. But development and deployment of such a capability in this time frame will involve significant risk. It is not likely that either the US or the Soviet Union will develop an effective laser ABM capability by the early 1990s.

Table 1

Table Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

		U.S. AND SOVIET LASER WEAPONS CAPABILITIES IN ANTI-SATELLITE MISSIONS						Washington, undated	
		POTENTIAL ⁵ U.S. CAPABILITY			ESTIMATED SOVIET CAPABILITY				
Time Frame	Laser Basing Mode	JAMSENSORS		KILL SENSORS		KILL STRUCTURE OF SATELLITES			
		(film, detector arrays)	(film, detector arrays)	(film, detector arrays)	(film, detector arrays)	(film, detector arrays)	(film, detector arrays)		
Now (within one year)	Ground	To geosynchronous altitudes.	Low-altitude (800 km) (Photo recon) ⁶	None	To geosynchronous altitudes. (Photo recon & launch warning)	Low-altitude (800 km) (Photo recon) ⁷	Uncertain—possible sub-system damage or degradation at low-altitude ⁸		
	Aircraft	To geosynchronous altitudes.	Low-altitude (500 km) (Photo recon)	None	None	None	None		
	Space	None	None	None	None	None	None		

⁴Top Secret.

⁵ Implementation of these capabilities is not included in current US programs. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ Reaction time limited. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ Reaction time limited. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ Reaction time limited. [Footnote is in the original.]

POTENTIAL U.S. CAPABILITY		ESTIMATED SOVIET CAPABILITY			
Time Frame	Laser Basing Mode	KILL		KILL	
		JAM SENSORS (film, detector arrays)	KILL SENSORS (film, detector arrays)	JAM SENSORS (film, detector arrays)	KILL SENSORS (film, detector arrays)
Ground	Ground	All altitudes.	High-altitude (17,000 km) ⁹	Mid-altitude (1000 km) (Photo, some ELINT, Ocean Recon, Weather) ¹⁰	Mid-altitude (1000 km)
	Aircraft	All altitudes	High-altitude (17,000 km)	Same as above with-out reaction time limits.	Same as ground based.
	Space	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Possible capability against all satellites.	Possible Capability—Capability comparable to US, but may not mirror US approaches.

⁹ Reaction time limited by number and distribution of sites. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Reaction time limited by number and distribution of sites. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ Reaction time limited by number and distribution of sites. [Footnote is in the original.]

Table 2

Table Prepared in the Department of Defense¹²

Washington, undated

(Number of weapons for a “meaningful effect”)

U.S. AND SOVIET CAPABILITIES LASER WEAPONS—OTHER THAN ASAT

Mission	POTENTIAL ¹³ U.S. CAPABILITY		ESTIMATED SOVIET CAPABILITY	
	Now	Early 1990s	Now ¹⁴	Early 1990s
Point defense—Ship (enough to equip 6 aircraft carriers)	None—technology and lethality demonstrations underway.	Sensor kill devices widely deployed—initial capability for other devices.	None ¹⁴	Ship defense system against anti-ship missiles, cruise missiles.
Point defense—Ground target (approx. 30)	None—technology and lethality demonstrations underway.	Sensor kill devices widely deployed—initial capability for other devices.	None ¹⁵	Short range (3–8 km) air defense and mobile lasers against personnel & light armored vehicles.

¹² Top Secret.

¹³ Implementation of these capabilities depends upon assessments relative to competing weapons. Assumed no fiscal constraints but conservative development approach. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁴ Believed prototype projects underway. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁵ Believed prototype projects underway. [Footnote is in the original.]

Mission	POTENTIAL U.S. CAPABILITY		ESTIMATED SOVIET CAPABILITY	
	Now	Early 1990s	Now	Early 1990s
Defense of Aircraft (several 10's if on strategic bombers)	None—technology and lethality demonstrations underway.	Short range (3–8 km) capability in large aircraft. Possible limited capability in fighter aircraft.	None ¹⁶	Short range (3–8 km) capability. Potential means of improving present aircraft deficiencies.
Space Defense (Anti-ASAT) (1 or 2)	None	Possible capability to defend all U.S. satellites from space attack.	None	Possible capability—Capability comparable to U.S., but may not mirror US approaches.
ABM—terminal intercept of RVs (perhaps 50–100)	None	None	None	None

¹⁶ Believed prototype projects underway. [Footnote is in the original.]

52. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, March 3, 1978

During preparation for your visit to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) on 28 January 1978,² I examined available SIOP targeting options for non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries. I believe the information on the effects that 'withholds' could have on fatalities and on attack effectiveness in the NSWP may be of interest to you.

[3 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

Your visit to the NMCC set a most welcome precedent. Continued practice exercises of the SIOP with your participation will prove valuable in refining that decision process.

Harold Brown

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 86, Defense: 1978. Top Secret. Outside the System. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² See footnote 2, Document 50.

53. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 10, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #50

1. *Opinion*

Last week Harold Brown discussed with you the idea of putting the M-X missile in Minuteman silos. This idea has been gaining some support lately, given the difficulties that the Air Force is having in identifying a technically feasible and reasonably affordable mobile basing scheme.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/78. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

The fact that something must eventually be done about Minuteman's growing vulnerability seems clear. We have just completed an analysis of the potential impact of extending to 1985 the current SALT II modernization limits. The results support RAND's presentation to you—Soviet difficulties in trying to achieve a high confidence attack capability against Minuteman would increase, but such limits would not significantly reduce the rate at which our confidence in the survivability of Minuteman is decaying.² And SALT II protocol limits would foreclose a matching ICBM hard-target capability raising all the political problems Senator Nunn indicated.

However, deploying the M-X missile in the Minuteman silos seems like a poor solution. While it would reduce the developing asymmetries in throw weight and hard-target kill capabilities, it also would increase crisis instability. By putting both sides' knockout punch in a vulnerable position, there would be a premium on the side that starts first. Adopting a launch under attack strategy has significant problems too. Its credibility depends on public knowledge, but public knowledge will precipitate a heated political debate over whether this strategy is possible without predelegation of your authority to order nuclear attacks—a very sensitive matter.

For these reasons many pro defense and pro arms control legislators on the Hill are united against putting M-X missiles in silos. Indeed the program has survived politically because it has held out the possibility of being a survivable ICBM. There is great reluctance to spending billions on a new missile for an increasingly vulnerable basing mode.

The Air Force is continuing studies of possible mobile basing schemes for the M-X missiles and DDR&E is examining some exotic options for protecting ICBM. But the prospect is that we will have to learn to live with ICBM vulnerability.

We do not, however, have to accept an asymmetry on counterforce. There is a way to increase our counterforce capabilities without the instabilities of developing M-X in silos: we could develop the Trident II (D-5) missile as a *survivable* hard-target weapon. This program is still in early conceptual studies, but it seems clear that a highly effective hard-target kill capability can be achieved with an SLBM.

However, at present the Trident II missile program has very modest funding. The Navy has put off the start of a serious Trident II development program because it sees the total of \$5–7 billion in required

² On February 23, Carter participated in a meeting in the White House Situation Room to discuss SALT with Mondale, Nunn, Secretary of Defense Brown, Brzezinski, Aaron, and Donald Rice, President of the RAND Corporation. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No minutes of the meeting were found.

development funds as competing with other programs the Navy leadership values more, such as building new ships or buying new aircraft.

If a serious development effort were started now, the D-5 could be initially deployed in 1987 or 88—if high priority were given to the project, deployment could probably start a year or two sooner. Such a program would be consistent with SALT II. And an announcement that we are pursuing this—even only as an option—would go a long way to defuse the “counterforce debate” that Sam Nunn believes would be so damaging as SALT II ratification.

Even if we ultimately decide to forego an increase in missile hard-target kill capabilities, development of the Trident II missile would still have advantages. The throw weight of this missile is approximately the same as that of the M-X, and deployment of it would help reduce the growing throw weight asymmetry. Further, the Trident II missile (which is significantly larger than the Trident I) would make maximum use of each submarine. Thus allowing us the option of deploying fewer submarines overall—with lower costs, at least in the long run.

In view of these considerations, we should be cautious about the idea of putting M-X missiles in Minuteman silos—and look seriously at the possibility that development of the Trident II missile or an alternative option.³

2. Facts

A Look Into the Arms Trade Future

The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a book entitled *Controlling Future Arms Trade*.⁴ The book is part of the Council's 1980's Project which is designed to identify and analyze issues likely to be of international concern during the next 10 to 20 years. A number of interesting predictions were made in the book, including:

—The pattern of transfers in the 1980's will conform less and less to the division of influence between East and West; the Soviet Union and the U.S. will increasingly sell arms to each other's clients; clients will feel free to bargain between East and West. The existence of other

³ Carter wrote beneath this paragraph: “This is something about which Harold should brief me—(by memo first) J.” In a March 13 memorandum, Brzezinski wrote Brown: “In connection with your discussion with the President of the idea of putting the M-X Missile in Minuteman silos, the President has asked for a memorandum from you about possible alternatives to M-X. Specifically, he would be interested in your views about the possibility of developing the Trident II (D-5) missile as a survivable hard target weapon. The memorandum should also surface other possible options, if any. We would also plan discussing this issue at a PRC.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2-4/78).

⁴ Anne Hessing Cahn, et al., eds. *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).

Northern arms exporters will mean even greater latitude for arms recipients in choosing among exporters. A *buyers market* will, in short, continue to exist.

—The dominant impulse of developing nations' arms plans for the coming decade is toward *arms independence*. More nations will be able to achieve weapons independence by indigenous production, although most countries will likely remain dependent on the superpowers for front-line weapons platforms such as high performance combat aircraft.

—The availability of *precision-guided munitions* (PGMs) will represent the most notable change in conventional weaponry from the 1970's. Perhaps 15 to 20 nations will become capable of producing their own PGMs.

—The international *demand for high cost, low attrition* combat aircraft such as the F-14 *will diminish significantly* in the 1980's. This reduced demand will result in part because these aircraft are too costly to risk in combat against PGMs.

—There may be a *greater willingness* on the part of many producing nations to *sell weapons abroad*, particularly if they see their reluctance as only serving the benefit of other less scrupulous suppliers. The "high-technology, high-morality" nations, such as Germany and Japan, may well become more actively involved in the arms trade in the future. But this development is not inevitable. The Swedes appear steadfast in their high-morality posture.

—The 1980's will probably see *more trade in "threshold" items* that will further blur the already vague distinction between offense and defense, strategic and tactical, nuclear and conventional, e.g., the cruise missile.

—There will be a *proliferation of "second-tier" producers*, such as Italy, Yugoslavia, Israel and growth of co-producers.

—The 1980's will see a further *weakening* of autonomous *European production* lines for combat aircraft. European industries will turn more and more to co-production and licensing arrangements with American aircraft industries. NATO standardization in the 1980's is likely to be, therefore, two-tiered, with the U.S. taking the lead in major weapons platforms and increasing European collaboration in tactical missiles and other armaments.

I think you will be pleased to know that most of the recommendations contained in *Controlling Future Arms Trade* are found either in PD-13⁵ or the guidelines you have adopted for our discussions with

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 33.

the British, Germans, French and Soviets. Those that are not will be explored by my staff, including the one that follows:

—Actively encourage the transfer of weapons and systems which would *improve defensive and strategic warning capabilities*.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to national security policy.]

54. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, March 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Consolidated Guidance

During the past four months I have been through the initial stages of producing a Consolidated Guidance for planning in the Defense Department. Heretofore there had been three separate (strategy, program, fiscal) and not always consistent guidance documents.

The process began with extensive discussions during October and November among the Chiefs, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the OSD staff, Charles Duncan and myself, of what sorts of things should be contained in a consolidated guidance. Following that, a first draft was drawn up by my staff. I made changes and sent it to the JCS and Services for comments. This was followed by another series of reviews with the Services, a redrafting, and a further examination and rewrite by Charles and myself last weekend with the benefit of personal comments from the Service Secretaries and each of the Chiefs.

The result is a 300-page document² which I am not transmitting to you. Your staff will be provided with that material for their information. But if this is to be only a staff exercise, it will fail to realize most of its potential value.

I believe instead that the next stage is to get your personal views about a few fundamental issues on which you may wish to make personal inputs, and with which you will therefore want to become more familiar. Possible—and very different—examples are: (a) strategic forces; and (b) the effects on our defense posture and capabilities ten

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 13, PD-18 [1], Secret.

² Not found.

years from now and, by implication, on our foreign policy of a change up or down in average annual level of defense expenditures by 5% either way.

To find out how you would like now to proceed, I attach a ten-page summary of what seem to me to be the major issues and the major features of the guidance.³ I also attach for your information the table of contents and two sample sections of the guidance document; the first is on strategic nuclear forces and the second on forces for NATO.⁴ I would appreciate it if you could go through the ten-page summary and indicate any issues you would like to have discussed in more depth. I will then prepare more detailed briefing documents for a meeting during which you and I can discuss them thoroughly with Charles Duncan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and a few of your other staff. We could (and I would recommend it) do this during the week of March 20th, before you leave on your overseas trip.⁵ Alternatively, you may wish to wait until May when, according to the OMB staff, you will be in a position to look at the Government-wide guidance for the FY 1980 budget.

There is one matter, however, which will not wait beyond the end of March. This is the need to submit to the Congress a five-year ship-building program. It is important that this be a program that we are prepared to stick with over a period of at least a few years, subject of course to changes that we are forced to make to account for Congressional changes while still assuring program balance. I will be ready to go over this subject with you any time after March 13th. Probably Zbig, Jim McIntyre, and I should discuss it first.

Unsurprisingly, there are a number of matters within the Consolidated Guidance that are not unanimously agreed within the Defense Department. There are therefore likely to be additional changes in it as the arguments (and the realities of Congressional action) sway me one way or the other. It begins to look as if the Congress, while making a number of changes up and down (adding a CVN and deferring a Trident submarine, for example) is at least as likely to approve a higher Defense budget for Fiscal 79 than we submitted as a lower one.

This will probably reinforce the view among my subordinates (one of their few unanimous views) that a 5% increase above what is now contained in the five-year fiscal guidance, could easily be passed if the Administration would propose it. They see this course of action as solving their most severe problems and as making the difference

³ Attached but not printed is the 10-page summary; see the attachment to Document 63.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Carter traveled to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, and Liberia March 28–April 3.

between a low-risk defense capability and a high-risk defense capability. They may even be right on both scores. You (and I) may take a different view from that one. But that imposes on us, I believe, an obligation carefully to consider the alternatives proposed by the Military Departments and the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and fully to justify the Administration's decisions. I hope that this Consolidated Guidance document and the dialogue leading to the decisions will help us to do so.

Harold Brown

55. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Alternative Ways of Answering the Soviets' Growing Strategic Counterforce Capabilities

Bill Perry, the DOD Undersecretary for Research and Engineering, recently sent Harold Brown and Charles Duncan a memo on this issue that I thought you might find interesting (Tab A). It provides some information on possible alternatives to putting M-X in silos; a more complete examination of this question is being prepared by DOD in response to your recent request.

In reading the memo, you will note the following points:

—Bill Perry seems quite concerned about the potential crisis instability problem posed by the low survivability of silos.² Nevertheless, he is examining the idea of putting M-X missiles in some of the Minuteman III silos—a seeming contradiction.

—The idea of developing a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] missile that can also serve as the M-X if we add another missile stage is very interesting. If it is possible, it significantly reduces the risk that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 3–10/78. Top Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. In the top right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Very interesting—J."

² See Document 53.

a near-term start [*less than 1 line not declassified*] would end up being wasted effort.

—“Deep silos” means perhaps 1000–2000 ft. below the surface. DOD hasn’t yet identified a good method by which the deep-based missiles might dig themselves out after an attack. Given the delays that might be encountered in digging out, such a scheme might still be useful in providing a long-term reserve force of ICBMs.

—There are a number of “Garwinian” defense schemes for protecting individual silos.³ [*2 lines not declassified*] The RVs would presumably be destroyed, or caused to detonate at altitudes at which the silo-based missiles would still survive.

Tab A

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Perry) to Secretary of Defense Brown and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan)⁴

Washington, March 15, 1978

SUBJECT

Strategic Deterrence

This is a brief status report on an ongoing analysis we are conducting on alternative ways of maintaining our strategic deterrence in the face of the growing Soviet counterforce capability.

The data available to date on the new guidance systems being tested on the SS-18 and SS-19 suggest that these systems have as their objective significant improvements in accuracy, probably reducing CEP to the dangerous area of 200m to 250m. *If* they are successful in this area, and *if* they retrofit this system on deployed SS-18s and SS-19s, they could pose a serious counterforce threat as early as 1983. This is two or three years earlier than we would have estimated if the improved guidance capability had to wait for the next generation of missiles to be deployed. [*8 lines not declassified*] The latter assumption I think is unrealistic.

Thus our land-based ICBM force not only becomes susceptible to being taken out, it could almost be considered as an invitation to attack.

³ Reference is to Dr. Richard L. Garwin, physicist and IBM Fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center in New York. Garwin was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on nuclear weapons technology. He was also a member of the Office of Science and Technology Policy panel conducting the Vulnerability Study of the M-X missile. See the attachment to Document 43.

⁴ Top Secret; Eyes Only. Outside the System. A stamped notation reads: “SecDef has seen.”

Moreover because we would recognize its susceptibility we would be tempted to launch on warning thereby putting a “hair-trigger” on our deterrence forces. In short, our ICBM force would become destabilizing. For this reason I believe it is urgent that we seriously explore alternatives so that we don’t drift into this situation by the Soviet threat developing before our response was ready.

I am exploring a number of R&D and acquisition alternatives that will provide a timely solution to this problem. Accelerating the M-X is the major alternative but one in which I still have serious concerns because of the technical problems I see and the cost problems I expect to see. We will continue an intensive effort (DRE, AF, and DSB) to develop a technically acceptable MX program. In the meantime, we are pursuing at a conceptual level alternatives to MX. These concepts, if pursued, would entail the following programatic actions:

1. Expedite the TRIDENT II program.
 - a. The TRIDENT II missile would be accelerated to allow an IOC of 1984.
 - b. The advanced development phase could be run as a design competition between the TRIDENT contractors and the MX missile contractor(s).
2. Redirect the MX missile program.
 - a. The MX missile would be a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] missile plus an additional stage [*1 line not declassified*]. It would also have a 1984 IOC.
 - b. [*1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified*]
 - c. [*1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified*]
3. Redirect the MX missile basing program.
 - a. The new MX missile would be put in some of the MM III silos, thus increasing the residual warheads after attack by a factor of three.
 - b. The balance of the silos would be replaced with deep silos [*2 lines not declassified*]
4. Consider deployment of a “thin” ABM system.
 - a. Complete development of the new light-weight non-nuclear interceptor.
 - b. Install this system for a thin defense of one MM wing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] with an IOC of 1984. System would include PARS already there plus 100 interceptors (to be compatible with SALT).
 - c. The deployed system could stop (at most) 100 RVs, but provides a base from which an effective ABM system could be made operational in a year or two from decision.
 - d. Accelerate R&D in non-conventional (Garwinian) “bloody-nose” defenses of individual silos as a backup to ABM deployment.

5. MM II

a. Left-over MM III missiles could be deployed in MM II silos (compatible with SALT restrictions) during the gap period between POSEIDON phase-out and TRIDENT phase-in. This option may be particularly important if our TRIDENT ship construction problems worsen.

b. Develop a more effective use of our SALT quota of SNDVs than the present MM II.

Some combinations of the programs just outlined would lead to a reduction of ICBM vulnerability by 1984 with high confidence because the technical risks are not high (with the exception of the ABM, which does not seem difficult but involves more unknowns). These programs in aggregate would be less expensive than the MX alternative. The cost of the ABM development is more than offset by the R&D savings effected by a single missile development. The cost of deep silo deployment is more than offset by avoiding the cost of deploying the MX trenches. Also this approach is compatible with present SALT agreements and gives us a good negotiating position for future agreements.

However the concept has a major weakness to the extent it depends upon ABM, as long as we are limited to 100 interceptors. Therefore our major objective continues to be finding a technically sound approach to MX basing. The trench looks less and less attractive and a number of other alternatives are being seriously examined by the Air Force and DSB. I will give you a status report on this effort in a week or two.

William J. Perry

56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 20, 1978

SUBJECT

Questions From Your NMCC Visit

Harold Brown has responded with written answers² to clear up the questions raised during your visit to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon.³

You need not read through the details; I have, therefore, summed up the crux of the five answers.

I. [1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

II. [1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

III. *False alarms in our warning system.*

—Since activation of BMEWS in 1960, there have been seven false alarms. The CINCNORAD “assessed confidence” was “no” in all cases.

—The last false alarm was December 1976.

IV. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

V. *Secretary Brown's communication checks with you when you are away from Washington.*

—During the first 24 hours after your arrival at a trip location, the WHCA trip officer normally gives the NMCC in the Pentagon a chance to make a test call.

—The Secretary of Defense, if he makes a test call to you in the future, will first check with your side to determine your availability.

These answers raise as many new questions as they resolve. I draw one *overall conclusion*: Our “C³ I”, that is, our command and control and intelligence warning, is not in the best shape. It needs constant review and remedial effort. Your attention keeps up the right kinds of pressure in the Defense Department.⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 86, Defense: 1978. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. The date is handwritten.

² See Document 51.

³ See footnote 2, Document 50.

⁴ Carter drew a vertical line in the right margin of this paragraph and wrote below it: “I Agree. J.”

57. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter**¹

Washington, March 20, 1978

Attached is the five-year ship construction program that I plan to send forward to the Congressional authorizing and appropriations committees. When we eliminated such a table from my defense posture statement, I told them in my testimony that they would have it by the end of March. You will recall your conversations along these lines in January with Senator Stennis and Congressman Price.²

There is also enclosed a point paper that explains the basis for the five-year ship building program. With one exception, it is the same as I showed Zbig and Jim McIntyre and to which they agreed. The exception is the substitution in the out years of two LSD-41s (Amphibious Assault Ships) for some auxiliary ships and conversions. This preserves, without irrevocably committing us to, amphibious lift at the level of 115% of a one division Marine Amphibious Force (which, given ship outages for repair, corresponds to an effective capability of one MAF). I think we may want to reexamine this one during the course of the year, but omitting it now from the program would cause unnecessary opposition in what will already be a contentious debate.

Zbig has some concerns about the rate of Trident construction as do I. He believes that the lowering of the rate from three every two years to one every year will raise some SALT issues. My view is that the corresponding decline in SLBMs, which bottoms in the 1990s, needs to be addressed, but that the best way to do so is to find a way of reducing the cost per SLBM, rather than simply to build more Tridents. This is a course of action that we should prepare in advance rather than surfacing it now.

I would not include the material in the point paper in what I send to Congress, reserving it instead for testimony. If, as a result of Congressional actions, the FY 79 program changes, corresponding alterations by us in both directions in the out years will maintain a properly balanced program.

In accord with our conversation of last Friday,³ I think it would be useful if you, Zbig and I (and perhaps Graham Claytor) could meet for 20 or 30 minutes later this week to discuss any questions you may have

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 11, Navy Department: 6/77-12/79. Secret.

²See Document 47.

³March 17. Carter and Brown participated in a tour and military exercise aboard the *U.S.S. Eisenhower*. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

before I send forward the five-year program. Such a meeting would give you the opportunity to call Senator Stennis to communicate your views on the ship building program. You could suggest to him that I meet with him, Mr. Price and Mr. Mahon together or separately to explain the program before I send it up at the end of the month.

Harold Brown

Attachment 1

Chart Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

FY 1979–FY 1983 SHIPBUILDING PLAN
(Number of Ships/Millions of Then-Year Dollars)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>Total</u>
Trident (Ballistic Missile Submarine)	1/ 1186.7	1/ 998.4	1/ 1323.7	1/ 1386.6	1/ 1626.7	5/ 6522.1
SSN-688 (Attack Submarine)	1/ 433.0	1/ 482.3	1/ 488.0	1/ 525.0	1/ 550.0	5/ 2478.3
CVV (Mid-Sized Carrier)	—	1/ 1535.0	—	—	—	1/ 1535.0
Carrier Service Life Extension Program	32.2	44.0	1/ 479.8	34.0	1/ 530.0	2/ 1120.0
CGN-42 (Nuclear Aegis Ship)	—	—	—	209.0	1/ 1111.0	1/ 1320.0
DDG-47 (Conventional Aegis Ship)	—	1/ 766.7	2/ 1480.4	2/ 1537.3	2/ 1586.3	7/ 5370.7
DDG-2(C) (Guided Missile Ship Upgrading)	151.0	1/ 348.4	2/ 369.5	5/ 789.8	3/ 319.1	11/ 1977.8
FFG-7 (Guided Missile Frigate)	8/ 1533.1	5/ 1002.9	5/ 1088.6	5/ 1138.6	3/ 728.9	26/ 5492.1
LSD-41 (Amphibious Assault Ship)	—	—	1/ 359.0	—	1/ 332.0	2/ 691.0
AD (Destroyer Tender)	1/ 318.0	—	—	—	—	1/ 318.0
MCM (Mine Countermeasures Ship)	—	1/ 117.9	—	2/ 229.0	2/ 210.0	5/ 556.9
T-AO (Oiler)	—	—	—	1/ 200.0	—	1/ 200.0

⁴ Confidential.

TATU (Tug)	—	—	—	2/ 60.0	—	2/ 60.0
TAGOS (SURTASS Towed Sonar Ship)	3/ 98.0	5/ 151.0	4/ 126.0	—	—	12/ 375.0
TARC (SOSUS Cable Layer)	1/ 191.0	—	—	—	—	1/ 191.0
	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>Total</u>
TAK(C) (Trident Missile Cargo Ship)	—	5.4	1/ 44.7	—	—	1/ 50.1
Service Craft	27.1	27.6	24.0	22.0	35.0	-/ 135.7
Landing Craft	5.6	15.8	10.0	104.7	15.0	-/ 151.1
Outfitting & Post-Delivery Costs	101.2	191.5	225.7	242.7	201.5	-/ 962.6
Cost Growth & Escalation Provision	635.5	—	—	—	—	-/ 635.5
TOTAL	<u>15/ 4712.4</u>	<u>16/ 5686.9</u>	<u>18/ 6019.4</u>	<u>19/ 6478.7</u>	<u>15/ 7245.5</u>	<u>83/ 30142.9</u>
(Service Life Extension of Existing Carriers)	(1 CONV)		(1 SLEP)	(5 CONV)	(1 SLEP)	2 SLEP
(Conversions of DDG-2s and TAK)	(3 CONV)		(3 CONV)	(3 CONV)	(3 CONV)	<u>12 CONV</u>
						69 New

Attachment 2

Point Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁵

Washington, undated

RATIONALE FOR THE SIZE OF THE SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

- Two balances to consider:
 - Total Navy vs. rest of DoD
 - Even with planned Army add-ons, Navy gets 26% more than Army over 5 years
 - Navy gets 16% more than Air Force over 5 years
 - Diverting even more from Army or Air Force to Navy would interfere with or prohibit our highest priority task in General Purpose Forces—to improve the ability of NATO to withstand a blitzkrieg attack.
 - Thus, cannot divert more funding to Navy.
 - If we increase the defense budget above what is now contained in the fiscal guidance, expansion of the Navy budget will compete with expansion of other capabilities. Such options should be considered during the budget review later this year, but not now.
 - Within Navy, near-term vs. long-term objectives
 - Shipbuilding needed to assure long-term forces
 - But, excessive shipbuilding funding can jeopardize near-term capability
 - Must operate current forces
 - Reduction of carrier force would cut o'seas deployments with serious effect on perceptions of continuing US commitment, either in Far East or in Med
 - Must maintain current forces
 - Backlog of ships awaiting o'haul excessive now—degrades readiness, causes reenlistment problems.
 - Must support current forces
 - In recent past, haven't had enough funding to buy more than about half the tactical aircraft required to support the force structure properly on a long-term basis; in FY79, won't be able to buy enough to offset peacetime accidents.
 - Thus, desire to build for future cannot be considered in isolation of pressing current needs.

⁵ Secret.

- Believe that this SCN program is the biggest we can responsibly propose
 - Predicated on rough average of percentage allocation of Navy budget to SCN during the post-Vietnam-War period, BUT
 - That high an SCN allocation hasn't allowed us to properly maintain the ships, buy enough aircraft, etc.
 - Predicated on a 3% real Growth in the budget, BUT
 - That is higher than we've had in the past.
 - Predicted on no rise in real terms of the unit cost of ships, BUT
 - Real unit costs have risen in the past
 - Predicated on ability of shipbuilding industry to deliver, BUT
 - We've run into serious problems, particularly in the case of Tridents, SSNs, CGNs, LHAs, etc.
 - Thus, we feel that this program, though smaller than we'd like to see, seems to be at the upper limit of affordability, given fiscal constraints.
- The total for the 5-year period, FY79–FY83, is \$30 billion. It provides 83 ships: 69 new, 12 conversions, and 2 SLEP (Service Life Extension Program)

RATIONALE FOR THE MIX OF SHIPS

- The lead times in shipbuilding (4 to perhaps 10 years for combatants) and service lives of ships (roughly 30 years) are so long that nobody can be absolutely sure what tasks the ships we fund today will face in the future.
- Therefore, we must strive for flexibility in the fleet
- The missions we assumed in developing this plan are substantially the same as the Navy has carried out in the recent past:
 - Maintain forward deployments in peacetime
 - The new CVV, and the SLEPs for existing carriers will allow us to continue to keep 4 carriers deployed o'seas
 - Protect the Sea Lines of Communication
 - SSNs, FFG-7s, T-AGOs, and T-ARC will improve our ASW capability, and CGN-42, DDG-47s, and DDG-2 conversions will improve our AAW capability.
 - Maintain our capability to respond to crises
 - This program will result in more than 500 active ships through the early 1990s when the last ships in this SCN plan will have been delivered.
 - By holding the SCN program to this level, we will improve our ability to maintain and operate the existing and newly finished ships.

• The allocation of funds within the \$30 billion total is, in order of magnitude:

- Roughly \$8½ billion for AAW forces, including:
 - 8 Aegis-equipped ships
 - 11 conversions, upgrading the existing DDG-2 class guided missile ships
- A roughly similar funding for ASW forces, including:
 - 26 FFG-7s
 - 5 SSN-688s (at 1/year, in view of shipyard problems)
 - 12 TAGOS ships to tow SURTASS sonar arrays, greatly improving our ability to detect and track enemy submarines
 - A TARC cable layer to support our vital SOSUS system
- Roughly \$6½ billion for strategic forces, including:
 - 5 Trident submarines (at 1/year, also in view of shipyard problems). This will require us to extend Poseidon submarine life-times to avoid substantial decrease in SLBM numbers in the late 1980's and 1990's.
 - A TAK conversion to transport Trident missiles.
- Roughly \$2½ billion for aircraft carriers, including:
 - One new CVV in FY80—to be followed by a second in the out-years
 - The first 2 SLEPs of existing carriers.
- The remaining \$3½ billion covers
 - Other ships (5 Mine Countermeasures Ships, 2 Amphibious Assault Ships, 2 Tugs, an oiler, and a destroyer tender)
 - Craft (Service craft and landing craft)
 - Provisions for outfitting and post-delivery charges, and for cost growth and escalation.
- The construction rates of both SSBNs (for strategic purposes) and SSNs are lower than we would like. But the way to improve that situation is to reduce their unit cost by reducing some of the expensive requirements, and then build more of them within the amounts shown.

THE NEED TO REDUCE UNIT SHIP COSTS

- The cost of 3 ships alone—one Trident submarine, one Nimitz carrier, and one CGN-42 class guided missile cruiser—is almost exactly equal to the entire proposed FY79 shipbuilding budget.
- It is clear that we cannot continue to build such expensive ships on the one hand, and hope for higher force levels on the other.

- This is not a new development—the trend to extremely expensive ships has been going on for more than a decade.
- The issue is the balance between the capability of individual ships and the size of the Navy.
- In our judgment, the current balance is much too far in favor of high unit capability and small forces.
- There are actions we can take to improve that balance:
 - Instead of Trident, build something similar to the SSBN-640 (Poseidon)
 - Instead of SSN-688s, build something similar to the SSN-637
 - Instead of CGN-42, build more DDG-47s
- The capability of the substitute ships is individually less than the ships they would replace, but the capability of the force built and operated for the same cost, we believe, is higher.

SUMMARY

- We believe that this SCN program:
 - Is the largest we can propose within the fiscal guidance.
 - If the Defense Budget is increased over the present guidance, other forces should compete with naval forces for the increase.
 - Strikes a proper balance between near-term and long-term needs.
 - Will help preserve enough funds to meet current commitments and keep our forces maintained and ready, while
 - Providing an increase in the number, and an even bigger increase in the capability, of our ships for the future.

58. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

JCSM-95-78

Washington, March 21, 1978

SUBJECT

SALT and Essential Equivalence (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been carefully evaluating the impact which the emerging SALT II agreement could have on essential equivalence, strategic stability, and, ultimately, the US deterrent posture. Their concerns stem primarily from past and projected force trends but are compounded by recent international events.

2. (TS) The period since the signing of the SALT I agreement has been marked by a fundamental difference in the manner in which the United States and the Soviet Union have approached force modernization within the letter and the spirit of negotiated arms control. The chart below summarizes the key trends:

STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION (1972-1977)

ICBM

USSR

- 4 new systems deployed
- Throwweight advantage further increased
- Megatonnage lead increased
- Accuracy substantially increased, reducing US advantage
- 5 new systems being developed

US

- MINUTEMAN III procurement terminated
- Hardening/accuracy improvements
- MX development slowed twice

SLBM/SSBN

USSR

- 1 new SLBM deployed
- 3 new SSBNs deployed
- 3 new SLBMs and 1 new SSBN being developed
- Marked increase in launchers

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77-4/20/78. Top Secret. The Special Coordination Committee met to discuss SALT II issues on March 6. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972-1980, Document 194.

US

- POSEIDON deployment continued
- TRIDENT I and II SLBM developments slowed
- TRIDENT SSBN development slowed

BOMBERS

USSR

- Deployment of intercontinental-capable BACKFIRE begun

US

- B-1 canceled
- Cruise missile development accelerated

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

USSR

- Vigorous ballistic missile defense (BMD) R&D
- Modernized active air defenses
- Aggressive civil defense
- ASAT capabilities developed

US

- BMD site deactivated
- Moderate BMD R&D
- Active air defenses reduced
- Quiescent civil defense program

3. (TS) During the period 1972–1977, many of the qualitative advantages (e.g., MIRVed systems and accuracy) previously enjoyed by US Forces have been eroded. Past US restraint has failed to moderate the qualitative and quantitative pace of Soviet modernization. In fact, the latest National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11–3/8–77, projects a continuing Soviet momentum during the period of the anticipated SALT II treaty.² Projections into the 1980's can be summarized as follows:

ICBM

USSR

- Continued deployment of new systems
- Accuracy comparable to US

² National Intelligence Estimate 11–3/8–77, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s,” February 21, 1978, is in National Archives, RG 263, CIA Files, National Intelligence Estimates and Related Reports and Correspondence, 1950–1985, Entry A1 29.

US

- Continued development of MX (option to deploy)
- MK-12A reentry vehicle

SLBM/SSBN

USSR

- 3 new SLBMs deployed
- 1 new SSBN deployed

US

- TRIDENT I SLBM deployed
- TRIDENT SSBN deployed
- Continued development of TRIDENT II SLBM

BOMBERS

USSR

- New heavy bomber deployment likely
- BACKFIRE available in relatively large numbers

US

- Cruise missiles deployed (possibly range-limited)
- Cruise missile carrier option
- Continued reliance on aging B-52

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

USSR

- Continued vigorous BMD R&D
- Continued improvements in active air defenses
- Expanded protection of critical facilities/personnel

US

- Continued moderate BMD R&D
- Continued peacetime airspace surveillance and control (no “unopposed access”)
- Modest improvements in civil defense planning

4. (TS) There is a particular disparity in the projected improvements for the systems not included in the 1,320 sublimit. The Soviets have extensive modernization programs across the board, in contrast to very limited US activity in this area.

5. (TS) In summary, the NIE projects that Soviet strategic forces will become more powerful and flexible than they are today and, even under constraints along the lines now being negotiated in SALT,

estimates that Soviet intercontinental offensive strength will grow in relation to that of the United States between now and the early 1980's.

6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe these trends are very serious and merit particular scrutiny in the context of other Soviet behavior. Soviet intransigence on a variety of international issues is consistent with a growing Soviet perception of a shift in the relative balance of power in their favor.

7. (TS) The Soviets appear to be actively seeking such a shift. NIE 11–3/8–77 concludes, for instance, that one of their objectives is to “insure that their strategic forces and supporting elements . . . will support the perception that the strategic balance is continuing to shift in the USSR's favor.” If this objective were to be attained, the framework of essential equivalence would be undermined. As you indicated in the Consolidated Guidance summary for the President, the consequences might well be attempted political coercion of the United States and/or US allies.

8. (U) In your annual report to the Congress on 23 January 1978,³ you specified the following four conditions for essential equivalence:

- a. Soviet strategic nuclear forces should not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage;
- b. Nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, should be maintained;
- c. Any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets should be offset by US advantages in other characteristics; and
- d. The US posture should not be in fact, and should not be seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.

9. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that satisfying these conditions would preserve essential equivalence. They believe, however, that purely statistical measures of theoretical destructive potential should not be allowed to substitute for a more comprehensive assessment of the strategic balance, including offsetting capabilities, the role of perceptions, and differences in production base. Of particular concern should be the “breakout” potential of the Soviets to expand their strategic offensive and defensive capabilities rapidly in time of crisis.

10. (TS) Any SALT agreement must be viewed in the context of the above events and trends. In addition to adequate verification, which is fundamental to any SALT agreement, a most significant measure of the acceptability of a SALT agreement must be whether it provides a framework which allows both sides to exercise rights to maintain strategic stability. The emerging agreement generally provides this framework. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned with: the additive potential strategic contribution of BACKFIRE, which may

³ See Document 48.

not be counted in the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate; the adverse strategic potential created by the Soviet retention of the asymmetrical rights to heavy ICBMs; and the disparity in the respective US and Soviet modernization programs. The strategic nuclear equilibrium in the 1980's can be made possible by an equitable and verifiable agreement, but such equilibrium can only be assured by continued force modernization under the terms of the agreement.

11. (TS) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge the following:

a. Favorable resolution of key SALT issues in line with the views expressed previously in memorandums to you and the President.⁴

b. Reassessment of the Five Year Defense Program strategic force programs in light of the latest evidence of Soviet capabilities and intentions. These programs should be structured and paced in such a manner as to offset Soviet actions projected under a SALT II agreement.

c. Adoption of a strong administration position to modernize US strategic nuclear forces to the extent permitted and required to maintain essential equivalence as you have defined it, concurrent with continued negotiations for equitable and reciprocal reductions in nuclear arms.

12. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you support their views and forward them to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David C. Jones

⁴ Attached but not printed is a list of references to prior memoranda.

59. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 22, 1978

SUBJECT

The Naval Shipbuilding Plan

As we have discussed, Secretary Brown will be sending you this week his recommendations for a 5-year (1979–1983) shipbuilding plan.² That plan, costing about \$30 billion, can be accommodated within our current long-range budget projections for Defense. *I have reviewed the plan and, while I have some reservations about it, I recommend that you approve it.* Harold's proposal does not change the \$4.7 billion shipbuilding program included in your 1979 budget. It essentially takes the Navy's long term goals and goes about purchasing the requisite ships at a slightly slower rate than that suggested in the Navy's report to Defense. The plan deemphasizes the extremely costly nuclear surface combatants favored by the Armed Services Committees. As you know, both Armed Services Committees in recent days have suggested the Administration consider a budget amendment increasing the 1979 shipbuilding program. (Both Committees recommended about a \$2 billion increase in the Defense \$126 billion total to the Congressional Budget Committees last week).

I have four specific concerns which I believe you should consider as we set our long range Navy policy:

Naval Forces Study: Secretary Brown's plan is supported by the recent Navy Forces Study.³ I found this study disappointing in that it did not question existing Navy missions or examine alternative ways of performing those missions. The Study argues for a completely flexible force in the future, making no real judgments as to the relative merits of the various competing interests within the Navy (carriers, surface combatants, attack subs, etc). The recommended building rate of approximately 14–15 ships per year would provide more than 500 ships in the 1990's. The Navy's earlier long term goal of 600 ships would not be reached, however, beyond the year 2000. Ship retirements in the Century's final decade would, when combined with the recommended annual building rate, lead to an ultimate 400–450 ship

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 11, Navy Department: 6/77–12/79. Confidential.

² See Document 57.

³ Not found.

force. In conjunction with our Allies, this force level will in our view be sufficient to assure naval superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies.

Trident: The 1979–83 plan calls for only 5 Trident submarines instead of the earlier planned 7, primarily because of construction difficulties at Electric Boat,⁴ but also for overall cost reasons. Given the potentially serious strategic signal associated with such a reduction, it may be premature to reduce the plan at this time. By rephasing Trident procurement, we could continue to plan for seven in the 1979–83 timeframe. This would avoid an alarmist reaction by those who fear that our strategic posture relative to that of the Soviets is on the decline. If you decide to continue plans for 7 Tridents, Defense is likely to request additional funds above the \$30 billion. *If you desire to keep 7 Tridents in the plan, I recommend that a rephasing such as cited below be followed, and that you ask Harold to adjust other ships to stay within your fiscal guidance:*

TRIDENT CONSTRUCTION

OPTIONS	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Total
Current Plan	1	2	1	2	1	7
Harold Brown Proposal	1	1	1	1	1	5
OMB Alternative	1	1	2	1	2	7

Cost Growth: The plan includes *no* funds for cost growth resulting from overruns in prior year programs. Over the last 8 years, an average of \$643 million has been added annually to the budget for such cost growth. Ship deliveries continue to be delayed and these delays will require more money than is currently budgeted. As a result, cost growth will continue to be present: Over the 5-year period, we should anticipate \$2–3 billion of such growth. Again, Defense is likely to press for increased funding to cover the cost increases. *We recommend that the \$30 billion plan be held firm regardless how much cost growth Defense experiences. Only in this way will adequate incentive exist for the Navy to address their serious overrun problems.*

Congressional Salability: The proposed plan is likely to encounter considerable opposition in the House Armed Services Committee. That Committee favors a greatly expanded shipbuilding program, especially more nuclear-powered ships. The Senate Armed Services Committee also is likely to favor more ships, but may support the plan if Secretary Brown forcefully argues for it.

I believe that it is important that we communicate explicitly our rationale for the lower 1979 shipbuilding level (\$4.7B) as we present

⁴ Electric Boat, owned by the General Dynamics Corporation, had its major submarine manufacturing center in Groton, Connecticut.

Harold's five-year plan (which, including cost growth, averages over \$6B annually for 1980–83). In the FY 79 Defense budget, we believe that (a) NATO-related Army and Air Forces are of first priority, and (b) the Navy's severe shipyard problems (multimillion dollar claims and delays of up to two years in many deliveries) warrant at least one year of caution as to just how many billions of dollars we can continue to channel to the problem shipyards in the midst of such difficulties. *In sum, I believe the Defense recommendation strikes an appropriate balance between long range Navy goals, mid-term fiscal constraints, and near-term shipyard problems.*

60. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Press) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 1, 1978

SUBJECT

M-X and Minuteman Vulnerability

There is growing acceptance within the Pentagon of the conclusion of our OSTP Vulnerability Panel last fall² that a commitment to full-scale development of the M-X trench mobile system would have been premature since there were major unresolved vulnerabilities in this system. A Defense Science Board task force has completed a preliminary analysis of the M-X trench system and has concluded that "it has disadvantages compared with other proposed concepts sufficient to rule it out in our view."³ As a result, emphasis in the Pentagon is shifting to other multiple aim point systems such as building a large number of silos (perhaps twenty) for each ICBM so that the Russians would have to expend a very large number of RVs to threaten our land-based ICBM force.

Like the M-X trench system, these alternatives may involve verification as well as vulnerability problems. For example, the multiple silo system would require modification of SALT limitations on numbers of launchers and on-site inspection to verify the numbers of missiles

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 124, Weapons Systems: 4-9/78. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 43.

³ Carter wrote "I agree" in the right margin next to this sentence.

actually deployed. Other alternatives such as placing a bigger missile with a larger number of RVs in current Minuteman silos; developing defensive measures for Minuteman; or shifting more of our strategic deterrent to the SLBM and cruise missile forces also need to be thoroughly examined.

Nevertheless, there may be growing urgency in reaching a decision on ICBM modernization as a result of recent flight tests by the Soviets of new SS-18 and 19 RVs which appear to have significantly improved accuracy. The degree of improvement in these new systems is uncertain since analysis of data has not been completed; however, it seems clear that Minuteman may be seriously threatened on an earlier timescale than projected in our report. As a result, I plan to reconvene my Panel in the near future to examine Minuteman vulnerability in light of these developments and to consider alternatives for ICBM modernization.⁴

⁴ Carter wrote "good" in the right margin next to this sentence.

61. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, May 5, 1978

A number of events this week suggest that public attitudes toward our defense situation, as well as our foreign policy, are changing. It also seems to me that these issues may play a larger part than usual in an off-year Congressional election, although I continue to believe that domestic economic issues, particularly inflation, will be the most important.

Three votes on the budget resolution in the House on Wednesday² are worth considering. A proposal to shift \$4.8B from Defense to other purposes lost by more than 3 to 1 (313–98). A proposal to add \$2.4B to the budget, earmarked for Defense, lost by slightly under 2 to 1 (262–142). Most significant, Congresswoman Holt's proposal to cut all the budget *except* Defense by 2% came within 6 votes of carrying (202–197).

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 87, Defense Budget: 1–8/78. Confidential. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "Harold, OK—I agree. J." Brzezinski sent Brown a copy of the memorandum with Carter's comment under a May 9 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

² May 3.

These votes are consistent with my conclusion that (1) because of inflation there is an overriding concern in the House about the size of the budget deficit, and therefore a reluctance to add to the overall budget; (2) there is greater support than ever in recent years for shifting more expenditures within the budget total toward Defense.

I note also that Joe Kraft in his column yesterday³ said that although he has long supported detente, he now is deeply concerned about Soviet military and political gains. Such a change of position is consistent with the Congressional indications. Both suggest to me that while public sentiment will still support your decisions about the level of the Defense budget over a substantial range around our level, there is now much less leeway on the down side of that level than there was a year ago.

A group of Republican Senators, after an Easton, Maryland conference, has issued a lengthy "Declaration" critical of Administration national security and foreign policy.⁴ They announced that all thirty-eight of the Senate Republicans support it, though several have not yet signed it. This looks to me like an opening gun of a major campaign. I have said to Zbig that (whether we use it now or pieces of it later) he, Cy, and I need to put together for our use and yours a response to the major points raised.

I also see a confluence of questioning and some loss of confidence among our allies which compounds and feeds back into the domestic concern about these issues.

I report these attitudes rather than analyzing their causes or suggesting detailed solutions at this point. We have had successes—the Panama Canal Treaties, the B-1 decision, the beginning of programs to revitalize NATO—and are likely to have more. I believe that most of our foreign policy and defense decisions, taken singly, have been correct and that all have been justifiable. Taken together, however, they have been distorted by some into signals of a weakening in our strength and resolve.

Part of the problem is, as we have all noted before, that the public and the Congress do not have a clear picture what we consider the relative proportions of the competitive and cooperative aspects of our relations with the Soviet Union, or of precisely where we propose to cooperate and where to compete. We should, and I will, place more emphasis on the new things we are doing in the defense area, to counter the charges that we merely kill programs. I urge that we try to present

³ Joseph Kraft, "Russia's Winning Streak," *Washington Post*, May 4, 1978, p. A27.

⁴ The resolution alleged that Democrats had supported "unilateral U.S. disarmament in the face of mounting Soviet military aggressiveness." (George F. Will, "Republican 'Sunniness,'" *Washington Post*, May 4, 1978, p. A27)

a uniform policy along the lines of your Wake Forest speech,⁵ and that our actions on foreign policy issues as well as on Defense program and budget issues be as consistent with that approach as we can make them. Visits by you to U.S. forces in Germany, and to Ft. Bragg or to Ft. Hood and Nellis Air Force Base, which I am proposing in detail in a separate memo,⁶ can reinforce this approach.

I believe it would be extremely useful for us to talk about these observations, which I take very seriously, along with Zbig, Cy, Ham Jordan, Frank Moore, or anyone else you think should be present.

Harold Brown

⁵Reference is to Carter's March 17 address at Wake Forest University. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, pp. 529-535) The speech is also printed in part in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I. Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 72.

⁶Not found.

62. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11-4-78

Washington, May 9, 1978

[Omitted here are the cover pages, table of contents, and the preface.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

1. Soviet leaders appreciate that military strength is the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower, and will remain through the coming decade the key to its prospects in the world arena. They are sensitive to the view of some Westerners that other, nonmilitary factors, particularly international economic ones, may be acquiring a dominant role, and they know that the Soviet Union has little hope in the foreseeable future of becoming truly competitive with the advanced nations

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 44, Net Assessment II: Strategic Balance, US/USSR. Secret; Noform; Nocontract. According to one of the cover pages, the Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, unless noted otherwise in the text. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Treasury, Energy, and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, also participated in the study.

of the West in economic, technological, and social-cultural sources of influence and attraction. But they are persuaded by Soviet ideology, Russian history, and by their own life experiences to see political conflict involving the use of force or conducted in its shadow as the motor driving development both within states and in the international system. Their self-interest as well as their beliefs lead them in the conduct of foreign affairs to press global and regional issues of security, in which the weight of their military power can be brought to bear to political advantage.

2. To the extent that comprehensive comparisons are possible, it is clear that the USSR on balance has overcome its past military inferiority in relation to the United States. The Soviets know the USSR still lags in many defense-related technologies. They are envious and apprehensive about the latent technological potential of the US as a military competitor. But they have learned from their long experience of military competition with the United States that powerful domestic political pressures, of a kind to which they are largely immune, reinforce American criteria of military sufficiency, which are different from their own, in inhibiting fuller exploitation by the US of its enormous military potential.

3. The Soviets judge themselves to have a robust equality with the US in central strategic nuclear forces in which numbers and some characteristics, such as missile throw weight, compensate for technological deficiencies in their forces. Most important, the buildup of Soviet forces over the past 15 years has created a situation in which the US could not plausibly attack the USSR without the virtual certainty of massive retaliation.

4. While the Soviets are aware that the converse is also true, they are conscious of emergent strategic capabilities that could by the early 1980s be perceived to give the USSR marginal advantages in a central strategic conflict—for example, active and passive defenses, a survivable command and control system, and superior countersilo capabilities. Beyond that time frame, however, they are concerned that US progress in areas such as cruise missiles and advanced ICBMs could work against them should the US successfully exploit its present technological advantages.

5. The regional military balances that most concern the USSR are with Europe and China. In both regions the Soviets are relatively confident that they possess clear military superiority, subject to important qualifications. In Europe, Soviet superiority presupposes successful conduct of a swiftly initiated offensive drive to the west that could, however, be thwarted if it triggered large-scale NATO use of nuclear weapons or if it failed to achieve victory before NATO could bring its larger economic and population resources to bear on the course of the

war. In Asia, Soviet military superiority would permit the USSR to defeat Chinese military forces in a wide range of conflict situations. But it could not at the nuclear level assuredly prevent China from striking a limited number of Soviet urban areas; nor would it permit the USSR to invade and occupy central China.

6. The Soviets have made steady progress in building naval capabilities to operate in the world's oceans beyond the coastal defense regions traditionally dominant in their planning. While this effort was driven largely by the pursuit of strategic defensive objectives in the central nuclear competition, it has carried the Soviet Navy to a role of distant area operations where showing the flag in peacetime and a contingent capability to disrupt US naval and maritime operations in the event of hostilities serve Soviet foreign policy interests.

7. Growing military aid efforts have served as the main conveyor of Soviet influence into the Third World. Under permissive conditions, Soviet military assistance and support to proxies have come to be an effective form of bringing Soviet power to bear in distant areas. Recent large-scale support to Cuban expeditionary elements in Africa has shown Soviet willingness to press forward, and to explore the limits of the USSR's ability to project military power short of direct combat involvement.

8. The irony of the Soviet military situation overall is that, on one hand, direct comparison between the USSR and its major opponents shows the USSR in increasingly favorable positions, but, on the other hand, Soviet military doctrine and security aspirations continue to present exceedingly heavy demands. Thus, in the strategic nuclear arena, Soviet doctrine posits the real possibility of a central nuclear war and of one side prevailing in such a conflict. This in turn sets to Soviet policy the task of providing effective war-fighting capabilities, beyond those of pure deterrence, that are difficult to attain against a determined opponent. Similarly, unremitting Soviet defense efforts are seen as required for confident superiority over NATO and, in less degree, over China. The military policy of the USSR continues to be influenced by a deeply ingrained tendency to overinsure against perceived foreign threats and to overcompensate for technological deficiencies. But no less than these influences, the ambitious standards of Soviet military doctrine, deriving from tenacious notions of international competition, drive Soviet military efforts and sustain Soviet anxiety about prevailing military balances.

9. The Soviets see their growing military strength in general as providing a favorable backdrop for the conduct of foreign policy. It causes the USSR to be perceived as a natural and legitimate participant in the development of global and regional security arrangements. Soviet

leaders ascribe the progress of Moscow's policy of detente since the late 1960s in large measure to the growth of their military power.

10. Where a palpable Soviet military preponderance can be achieved, the Soviets believe that it will, over time, encourage regional actors to seek security arrangements based on Moscow's good will, with attendant political and military concessions, especially as the alternatives of military self-help and countervailing alliances prove less attractive. They view this as a long-term process best promoted by persistent diplomatic efforts and the steady amassing of military strength to alter the security environment gradually while avoiding unwanted crises. But the Soviets know that this process is subject to disruption by circumstances they can neither foresee nor be wholly confident they can control. In any crises that may supervene, military power is seen by the Soviets as necessary for defending their interests and for leveraging crisis solutions in directions acceptable to them.

11. Soviet foreign policy has long displayed both conservative and assertive behavior. Soviet leaders themselves see their foreign policy as essentially revolutionary, resting on the expectation of fundamental changes in the international system and within the states that constitute it, and deliberately seeking—though cautiously and intermittently—to help bring these about. Their ideology and their experience in world affairs impart to Soviet leaders a mentality that permits near-term temperance and agile pragmatism to coexist with a deep sense of manifest destiny for Soviet power in the world. It sustains Soviet policy in steady pursuit of systemic shifts in the world through small steps, and guards its fundamental beliefs against demoralization and massive reappraisals in the face of reversals. The Soviets see the sweep of postwar international affairs as broadly confirming their convictions about the march of history. Because their beliefs about the course of world politics have deep cultural roots and stem from an ideology that confers domestic political legitimacy, even profoundly novel or disconcerting developments, such as the appearance of nuclear weapons and the defection of China, have not undermined their governing orthodoxy.

12. On balance, the performance of Soviet foreign policy under their rule is rated by present Soviet leaders as a success, and much of this success is attributed to the cumulative political impact of growing Soviet military power. This judgment is drawn in the light of a previous history of gross inferiority and desperate conditions in which options for assertive foreign policies were seriously constrained. Not only did Soviet policy succeed in averting disastrous possibilities, but it secured acknowledged coequal superpower status with the United States and moved the Soviet Union steadily into new areas at relatively low risk.

13. Although they expect fluctuations in their fortunes abroad, the Soviets still see basic trends in the world as positive for themselves and

negative for the United States. In seeking to capitalize on these trends, however, they are beset by problems of various kinds. In areas where they have actively sought to advance their influence they have suffered a number of setbacks, some of them very costly. Events of recent years in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia provide examples. Elsewhere, as in Vietnam, Angola, and Ethiopia, they have been more successful. Although not oblivious to the costs and risks incurred by these enterprises, the Soviets see them as the inevitable accompaniment of a forward policy in the Third World.

14. While the Soviets have won recognition as the strongest military power in Europe and a legitimized role in the management of European security, they have not succeeded in winning the full respect for Soviet interests and preferences that they have sought. Some domestic developments in Western Europe, particularly the rising fortunes of Eurocommunism, give new promise of weakening NATO, but at a possible cost of further diminishing Soviet influence over European Communist parties and eventually of contaminating Eastern Europe.

15. To Soviet leaders the strategic meaning of US-Soviet detente is the management of change in world politics in ways that control costs and risks while constraining as little as possible Soviet efforts to exploit fresh opportunities for gain. Such processes as the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and US-Soviet cooperation in regional security negotiations allow the superpower competition to be monitored and modulated. On occasion, they offer Soviet leaders opportunities for exerting by diplomatic means influence that might not otherwise be available or require more costly or risky measures to pursue. These processes also oblige Soviet leaders to calibrate their own competitive behavior against the risks of disrupting detente, particularly in areas where core US interests are perceived to be deeply engaged. This concern does not, however, appear to have reduced the USSR's willingness to pursue competitive advantages vigorously in areas such as Africa, where Moscow may perceive US interests to be less deeply engaged or US policy more hamstrung by domestic political constraints.

16. The Soviets probably expect to continue the military programs they have pursued in the last 10 years, with some marginal shifts in emphasis. They probably expect to improve somewhat on their present strategic relationship with the United States, at least temporarily in the period 1980-85; to keep their overall advantages in relation to China and NATO; and to make steady progress in the kinds of forces and access necessary for projection of their influence in third areas.

17. Soviet international behavior in the 1980s is likely to include a purposeful, cautious exploration of the political implications of the USSR's increased military strength. Soviet policy will continue to be competitive and assertive in most areas of engagement with the West.

In crisis situations, the Soviets are likely to be more stalwart in defense of their declared interests than they have been in the past, particularly during the Khrushchev period. They will probably continue to assert the right to experiment with unsettled political-military conditions, as they have recently in Africa, in search of enduring new beachheads of influence.

18. On the whole, such a prognosis, while projecting some increase in the assertiveness of Soviet external behavior, represents a fairly natural evolution of the USSR's foreign policy. The changes from past behavior that are implied are gradual and unbroken, and are rooted in the basic perceptions and values that have long informed Soviet policy. It is therefore essentially a prognosis of continuity, taking into account, however, the greatly enhanced military capabilities and more insistent claims to a global role associated with the USSR's emergence as a superpower.

19. Soviet leaders are aware that current trends they now discern in international relations could be disrupted by large discontinuities they can envisage but not predict. Among those that would present major challenges to their interests are: reversion of the US to a "cold war" posture, large-scale Sino-American military cooperation, new wars in the Middle East or Korea threatening Soviet-American military confrontation, and widespread violent upheaval in Eastern Europe. Other abrupt changes could present major new opportunities: Sino-Soviet accommodation, revolutionary regime changes in Saudi Arabia or Iran, and defection from the US alliance system of Japan or a major West European state. Soviet leaders probably regard their military investments as both a hedge against possible adverse contingencies and as providing options for exploitation of possible windfalls.

20. Soviet leaders are sensitive to a range of domestic problems that seem likely to become aggravated in the coming decade, but evidently do not now see them as having the potential to raise challenges of a fundamental kind to the conduct of their foreign policy. In Soviet conditions, uncertainty, if not crisis, inevitably attends political succession, which will soon be upon them. Agriculture remains a major drag on the economy, serious energy and manpower problems are looming, and Soviet economic growth has slowed to the point where it probably already lags behind the growth in military spending. Far-reaching solutions to these problems might in the future require important shifts in the pattern of resource allocations and corresponding modifications of Soviet foreign and military policies, but the Soviet leadership as yet shows no signs it is preparing for radical new departures.

21. During the coming decade a substantial renovation of the top Soviet leadership is virtually certain. While the new Soviet leaders will have been promoted from the same political and social milieu as their

predecessors, generational differences could affect their outlook in ways important for the future conduct of Soviet foreign and military policies. To a successor leadership, the USSR's superpower status may appear not so much the culmination of prolonged and costly efforts that must above all be consolidated, but as a point of departure from which to exert more pervasive leverage on world affairs. Alternatively, but less likely, younger leaders, lacking the conditioning preoccupation of their elders with the experience of confronting external threats from stronger opponents, may be inclined to give overriding priority to the solution of internal problems which their predecessors allowed to accumulate.

22. In any event, the new leaders, relatively inexperienced in managing the USSR's external affairs, will be impressionable in the early post-Brezhnev years and strongly influenced by their perceptions of the opportunities and risks of more venturesome foreign policies, on one hand, and of the costs and benefits of seeking more cooperative relations with the West, on the other. The quality and effectiveness of US international policies, particularly in areas of defense, in alliance cohesion, and in the Third World, are likely to be the principal external factor shaping the perceptions of new Soviet leaders.

The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, agrees with the general thrust of this Estimate that the USSR will continue to insist on being treated as a military coequal of the United States and that it will be no easier—indeed, perhaps more difficult—to deal with in the coming decade. However, he believes this Estimate tends to overemphasize the Soviets' perceptions of their own military power and undervalues political and economic considerations.

Specifically, the Director, INR, believes that the Soviets have a less positive, even more ambivalent view of the military balance in Europe and would be less confident of the superiority of the Warsaw Pact's forces over those of NATO than the net judgments of the Estimate suggest. INR believes that, in assessing the balance in Europe, the Soviets are very conservative in their calculations and make a number of assumptions which highlight their own weaknesses and Western strengths; the Soviets have greater fear of Western attack than the Estimate suggests. For these reasons, INR would draw the following implications of Soviet perceptions of the European balance:

—INR believes that Soviet programs to improve tactical aviation, upgrade armored forces, and enhance tactical nuclear capabilities are intended to remedy what Moscow evidently regards as weaknesses rather than to maintain or enlarge existing advantages. If so, Soviet motives would appear to be more compelling than the text suggests, and Moscow's efforts may be more intense.

—We doubt that the Soviets consider themselves to be in an appreciably better position militarily—and hence possibly more inclined—than they were 15 years ago to link a crisis in a third area to Europe. In terms of strategy, Moscow could easily manage to assemble a much superior force against the Western

garrisons in Berlin, just as it could have done in earlier decades; moreover, the Soviet reckoning of the results of escalating such a localized confrontation would not be very different from what it was before. The Soviets would still have to count on the dangers of a major engagement of large ground forces and its potential for escalation to one or another degree of nuclear warfare.

In addition, INR would note that the arms control motives attributed to the Soviets in the Estimate are essentially those which would apply to any participant in arms control negotiations. For example, they reflect a desire to prevent or slow the competition in areas where they are disadvantaged, and the desire to trade minimal restraint on their side for maximum restraint on the other. The Soviets probably see a range of potential benefits—political and economic as well as military—in arms control. At the same time, however, they also realize that there are practical limits to what arms control negotiations can accomplish.

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]

63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 9, 1978

SUBJECT

National Security Council Meeting and Lunch with the JCS—Wednesday, May 10.

You are having lunch tomorrow with Harold and the JCS, followed by a half-hour NSC meeting. The central focus of both meetings is the Defense Consolidated Guidance (CG). The lunch will also give you the opportunity to touch on some particularly sensitive matters with the JCS, especially those related to SALT and CTB; you may also want to use the lunch to cover some of the broader policy issues raised by the CG. At the NSC meeting you may want to move into some of the more important program issues raised in the CG. Your book contains back-up material and NSC analysis of the CG, though it is not essential that you read this material for these meetings.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 101, Meetings: President/V-B-B & Turner Breakfasts, Luncheons & Meeting Topics: 1978. Secret. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum and wrote at the bottom of it: "Perceptions NATO PRC—ANZUS—ASEAN—Japan—Korea MidEast/Persian Gulf Eastern Europe Turkey/Greece."

The CG is a practical document designed to produce programs and budgets. Your review of the CG is to allow you to see that major defense program guidance properly reflects your overall national security policy, early enough in the defense program/budget process so that programs can be easily adjusted to reflect your concerns.²

Since the Services are currently drawing up their programs on the basis of the CG, this is not the point to make specific decisions on weapons programs; but rather to examine the underlying policy assumptions and ensure that an adequate range of options is maintained and examined. You will have further opportunities to examine defense programs during the OMB Spring Review, your review of DOD's Status Report in September, and the final budget review in December.

I think it likely that the Chiefs will make a strong pitch for more money, based on Soviet military programs and political activity, for example in the Horn and Afghanistan. While you should take the opportunity to affirm your interest in doing what is necessary to preserve a strong defense posture regardless of cost, I don't believe you should make firm commitments at this point.

The following annotated agenda may help you structure the lunch and the NSC meeting.

Lunch

1. *CTB*. You should seek to neutralize any JCS opposition to our CTB position—a five year treaty with a review conference in the fifth year plus Senate ratification of any extension, strong safeguards and Presidential assurance that any reliability testing required after five years could be carried out.

2. *SALT/Strategic Programs*. The Chiefs will be looking for specific weapons decisions to show that SALT does not imply a slackening in US efforts to maintain strategic equivalence with the Soviets. The CG suggests that their concerns would be significantly moderated if we were to improve our air defenses as an answer to Backfire, commit ourselves to a new ICBM as an answer to Minuteman vulnerability, and establish options for a significant expansion of our strategic forces in order to maintain essential equivalence. The danger is that we could find ourselves committed to potentially open-ended programs and still face military opposition to SALT.

—On air defense, I suggest that you ask the Chiefs how much of an improvement in air defenses is needed *before* you make any commitments to air defense improvements.

—On the new ICBM, I suggest that you should not agree to proceed with full-scale development of M-X until a survivable basing

² Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to this paragraph.

mode is identified. However, you may want to reiterate your interest in examining the possibilities for a Trident II missile that can also be used by the Air Force. I would also recommend serious consideration of further improvements in systems that could make the launch-under-attack strategy a less risky proposition if we must eventually adopt it.

—On essential equivalence, I suggest that you endorse development of options to expand strategic forces, while reserving on the specifics. The current political environment would be improved by such actions; we can drop the options later if the Soviets curtail their strategic build-up.

3. *Navy*. This question involves enormously complicated issues regarding the appropriate missions for the Navy and the forces required to carry them out. It also involves important questions of foreign and domestic policy. Unfortunately, the Navy and OSD have become so polarized on this issue that neither can produce an adequate analytical basis for making decisions which will be politically credible. For this reason, I believe you should direct the National Security Council to develop a plan of action for resolving the larger Navy issues, perhaps through the PRM/SCC process or through a special NSC organized group with experts from outside the government.

NSC Meeting

Assuming that you are able to finish the above agenda during the lunch, you may want to turn to the following topics during the NSC meeting.

4. *NATO Issues*. The emphasis of our defense policy on NATO is manifested in new programs: to expand POMCUS; to increase modestly the size of the Army; to mechanize an additional infantry division; and to respond to Allied interest in long-range theater nuclear capability. Harold is seeking your affirmation of the relative priorities in the CG that motivate these programs: *NATO* over worldwide contingencies; NATO central front over the flanks; early combat over sustaining capabilities.³

—Priority on early combat capability was stated in PD-18;⁴ this priority has been reinforced by recent estimates on reduced warning time. One of the PD-18 follow-on studies is examining the sustainability issue, including the trade-off with early combat capability; it will be ready for your review in the fall. I suggest you reserve judgment on any changes in this priority until you have reviewed this study.

³ Carter underlined “NATO,” “NATO central front,” and “early combat” in this sentence.

⁴ See Document 31.

—Our studies prior to PD-18 revealed severe deficiencies on NATO's central front, while finding that the flanks could be defended, but with some loss of territory. The strategic value of France and Germany also imply a higher priority to the central front than the flanks. Though the need for some priority on the central front is established, the CG recognizes that it does not provide an analytical basis for judgments on the relative priority accorded the flanks and the central front and promises further work.

—To meet the PD-18 directive to maintain a force for global contingencies in Korea, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf, the CG asserts as tentative guidance that a corps-sized force (one Marine and 2 Army divisions) with support for 60 days would be needed.⁵ Given the fact that we have not analyzed the requirements for such contingencies, I do not believe you should go beyond the general guidance of PD-18. Several difficult questions are apparent—what political circumstances might cause us to employ military forces outside of NATO, what deterrent forces would be necessary to inhibit warfighting, and what are the political ramifications of seriously thinking about such contingencies? Cy and I need to work with Harold on these problems in the coming year so as to provide us a better basis for future force planning.

While I believe you can safely endorse Harold's programs as useful planning targets and as appropriate reflections of your defense policy, you should probably avoid blanket endorsements of the degree to which Harold has implemented these priorities: all three impact directly on the missions and required force levels of the Navy.

On theater nuclear forces Secretary Brown is directing the Air Force to plan on European GLCM deployments in the early 80s—specifically the Tomahawk, which is capable of 2500 km though this range could be shortened. He also directs the Air Force to develop a plan for a new 2000 km MRBM—which would probably be available in the late 80s. This is a crucial issue that could shape the nature of our relations with Europe for a decade. However, this guidance heavily prejudices any future decisions on NATO long-range strike capability. First, it establishes a requirement for long range capability, which you have not yet decided is needed. Second, it tilts the decision toward GLCM because (1) the new MRBM should not be available until well after GLCM, and (2) the range of the MRBM is shorter than GLCM. Nonetheless, MRBMs could have a number of military advantages compared to GLCM (speed of flight, penetration) and political advantages (fewer arms control problems, more direct response to SS-20 and therefore more difficult to propagandize against).

⁵ Carter underlined "Korea" and "Middle East" in this sentence, and wrote "PRC" below.

For this reason, I suggest that you ask DOD for a less definitive statement of a long-range requirement and a more evenhanded treatment of the hardware options, including examination of a 1500 km MRBM⁶ based on the existing Pershing system that could be available in the same time frame as GLCM; and an entirely new missile with the same range as GLCM (2500 km) that would be available later. However, you need to be careful neither to endorse a requirement for more NATO long range capability while asking for more options nor to give the impression that you oppose such a requirement.

Enclosure

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter⁷

Washington, May 5, 1978

You and I and Charles Duncan will be meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for lunch on Wednesday, May 10th. This will be followed by a meeting of the NSC (Dave Jones will be the only Chief present) to which Jim McIntyre has also been invited. The announced subject in both cases is the Consolidated Defense Guidance. I hope that the bulk of the discussion in both sessions will center on the elements of that guidance that deal with foreign policy, defense strategy, and defense programs, though inevitably the fiscal guidance portion is also likely to be touched upon.

If you care to examine some materials in advance of the meeting, I suggest that you re-read the 10-page summary of the major issues and features of the DOD Consolidated Guidance for Fiscal Year 80–84 and my accompanying memorandum to you dated 10 March.⁸ (Copies are attached.)

The Chiefs, I think, may be more outspoken than at previous meetings. My impression from their remarks to me is that they value the opportunity to interact with you, but have concluded from their past experience that these interactions have not produced decisions they consider favorable. They were particularly disappointed with the budget decisions in the Fiscal 79 budget—decisions that some of them saw as contrary to the points that they raised in their December 14th breakfast with you. They are rather pessimistic in general about the prognosis

⁶ Carter underlined the phrase “examination of a 1500 km MRBM.”

⁷ Secret.

⁸ Attached but not printed is Brown’s March 10 memorandum to Carter, which is printed as Document 54.

(from the U.S. point of view) concerning Soviet politico-military actions throughout the world. You can expect to hear that changes even since March in the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan have reinforced their pessimism. They may well raise the issue of whether we are doing enough in Defense to meet your direction in PD-18 that the United States will "maintain an overall balance of military power between the U.S. and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as now exists."

Dave Jones may note that the current *program* guidance corresponds roughly with the *enhanced* budget level of the *fiscal* guidance. After a 2% budget scrub, the enhanced level is about 5% above the five-year top line that you have approved at the beginning of the period, and about 9% above at the end of that period. This implies that at the approved budget levels for the out-years, substantial cuts in present program plans will be required. By mid-summer, after the Service requests have been submitted to me and reviewed, I expect to be able to present a clearer picture of just what each Service and the Department of Defense as a whole would be able to do with funding levels higher or lower than that now approved by you for the out-years.

Dave Jones may also want to speak to the strategic balance and to intra-theater airlift. Jim Holloway is likely to talk about the size of the Navy, and its role on the NATO flanks; Bernie Rogers may speak to the question of sustainability.

What the Department of Defense most needs from you at this point is your reactions to some of the issues raised in the Consolidated Defense Guidance Summary, particularly your views about which geographical areas we need to concentrate on and what assumptions are justified about how we would plan to support our interests in these areas.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁹

Washington, undated

DOD FISCAL GUIDANCE

If not the most important issue in the Consolidated Guidance (CG), the size of the Defense budget in FY 80 through FY 84 is certainly high on the list. In accord with an earlier agreement with the OMB, the basic Fiscal Guidance for DoD planning is based on the \$126 billion submission to the Congress for FY 79. For the five years covered in the CG, it grows at slightly less than 3% annually in terms of real TOA.

I think it is clear that the Defense program must grow in real terms, given the obvious and continuing growth on the Soviet side. The particular growth rate allowed in the CG is tied more to the commitment we have jointly undertaken with our NATO allies than it is to any firm conviction that it will assure, in the words of PD-18, that “the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now exists.” That is an important goal, and one to which I firmly subscribe. Unfortunately, it is hard to measure that balance in any precise and unambiguous way. And of course we cannot be sure as to what the Soviet forces of the future will turn out to be. Thus, there is inevitably a lot of judgment involved in deciding whether the Fiscal Guidance in the CG is or is not enough for us to be able to meet that basic objective stated in PD-18.

To further complicate the issue, it is not merely a question of whether you, or I, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the Fiscal Guidance is high enough to assure maintenance of the current balance. The perceptions of that balance—and particularly of the trend in that balance—on the part of Soviets, on the part of our allies, on the part of the third world, and even on the part of the United States public, can have a major effect on what actually happens on the world scene. So we have to judge not only how we view the trend in that balance, but also how we think others will view it.

Though there is no way to make such a difficult and critically important judgment simple, I do hope to illuminate the issue somewhat better than it has been in the past. This year, instead of asking the Services to submit only programs to match the basic level of the Fiscal Guidance, I have asked them also to submit modifications of those

⁹ Secret.

programs to meet both higher and lower spending levels. The spread on either side of the basic level will start out at $\pm 5\%$ in FY80, rising to $\pm 9\%$ by FY84. This should allow us to consider two kinds of possibilities: reallocations within a given budget level; and net changes in the total budget level. For example, if one Service should propose a particularly attractive program at its augmented level, we could consider adopting part or all of it, and selecting in compensation an offsetting amount of the other Services' programs at the decremented level.

On the other hand, we will be able to combine all the incremented programs (or portions of them) to see what larger Defense budgets would buy, or combine all the decremented programs to see what we would have to give up with smaller Defense budgets. I am sure we will be able to do that much—to describe the effects in terms of force structure. I will also do my best to describe for you what those effects imply in terms of practical capability.

Therefore, I think that then, rather than now, will be a better time for you to judge the adequacy of the Fiscal Guidance. For the moment, there are two things in this connection of which you should be aware. First, the Fiscal Guidance represents a cut of roughly 5% from the previous Five Year Defense Plan (submitted by the Ford Administration in January 1977 and revised by us in a rather pro forma manner in February of 1977). It will thus force compensating cuts in previously planned procurement, force structure, operations, R&D, or whatever. While that is hardly a palatable prospect for the Military Departments, I think it is important that the Five Year Defense Plan be kept realistic rather than fanciful.

The second point is that the current Fiscal Guidance is particularly tight in the case of the Department of the Navy. The CG notes that there is a real possibility that our current naval force structure cannot be supported for long within the fiscal limits implied by the CG. The basic problem is that the unit costs of Navy hardware as a whole—ships, aircraft, submarines—are rising faster than the Defense budget and the Navy's share of it. Three ships we are considering for the FY80 program (a Trident submarine, a nuclear-powered cruiser, and a mid-sized conventional carrier) would alone cost almost \$4 billion—not much less than our entire FY79 program (though that program is somewhat smaller than normal). In recent years the Navy has been able to buy only about half the tactical aircraft it needs to support a properly modernized force on a long-term basis; in FY79, it will not be able to buy enough aircraft even to offset its expected peacetime losses. The CG directs a 14% cut in our amphibious assault shipping force in an effort to reallocate funds to higher priority needs.

This situation faces us with something of a dilemma. On the one hand, we could decide just to do the best we can at the current level of

funding. Though I suspect we might see some reduction in near-term naval capability as a result, the full effects would manifest themselves only a decade or more from now when deliveries of the relatively small number of ships we can fund today will prove inadequate to replace the ships that will have to be retired then, and force levels will have to drop.

On the other hand, we could fund the Navy at a higher level—perhaps \$3 billion higher annually just to meet the Navy’s desired ship-building program—today. If that were done within the current DoD budget by transferring funds from the other Services, I have no doubt it would jeopardize our efforts to improve our capability (and particularly our early capability) in the Central Front of NATO—one of our most important objectives, and a key thrust of the CG (which I will discuss further below). If it were done not by transferring funds from the other Services, but by adding to the DoD budget, we would still be faced with the question of whether we would rather spend that \$3 billion that way—to maintain the Navy’s capabilities a decade or more from now—or whether those funds should not also be applied to our immediate, pressing needs for the Central Front or to ground and air forces for contingencies elsewhere.

That, of course, is a classic problem of balancing near-term against long-term goals. Though I can describe the alternatives for you, the judgment has to be subjective, and you should be aware of the problem.

I would like to turn next from the general subject of the level of the Defense budget to some other fundamental issues, starting in the strategic nuclear field with the perennial question of how much is enough. By any reasonable calculation, we are able today, and will be able tomorrow, to absorb a Soviet nuclear strike and still inflict damage in retaliation that we would consider catastrophic and intolerable for the Soviet Union. That should be enough to accomplish our ends if we have bought sufficient insurance to offset Soviet ASW, air defense, civil defense, attacks on our command and control, etc., and if the Soviet leadership viewed the world precisely as we do. But the evidence, such as it is, is that they do not. We therefore simply cannot be sure that damage predictions that we may view as awesome would, in fact, deter the Soviet leadership from nuclear attacks.

I noted above the importance of how the Soviets, our allies, the third world, and even we perceive the overall balance of military power. That applies as well—indeed particularly—to the strategic balance. Should that balance be perceived as significantly in favor of the Soviets, it is conceivable that they would be emboldened to attempt political coercion, not only of us, but of our allies, whose will to resist could well be undermined should they perceive our strategic forces to be markedly inferior to those of the Soviets.

Thus, the CG notes that the ability to inflict “unacceptable” damage in retaliation against the Soviet Union is a necessary but not sufficient criterion. It directs, therefore, that we maintain essential equivalence¹⁰ (as does PD-18). This policy has a fundamental effect on the design of our strategic forces. It is quite different from the so-called mutual assured destruction policy we had in the ‘60s, and certainly very different from a minimum deterrence policy, as indeed it should be.

The need to maintain essential equivalence leads directly into three related issues discussed in the CG: the Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC); the SLBM force; and the ICBM force. The CG directs the Air Force to program the development of a CMC based on transport aircraft, either military or commercial. We are looking at an option to deploy 100 CMCs with about 6,000 cruise missiles by FY 87, though we could deploy them more rapidly [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Thus, the CMC gives us one option to match a very considerable increase in future Soviet forces.

The SLBM force faces a more difficult problem. The Trident building program has run into serious delays. Its costs have risen to the point where the Trident program we really need is increasingly difficult to accommodate within the Navy’s shipbuilding budget without displacing other important ships (though I view no other ship as equal in importance to a Trident), and our existing Poseidon submarines are growing old. If we are limited, either by the budget or by yard capacity, to one Trident per year, and if we also find we must retire Poseidon boats at age 25, the CG shows that the number of SLBM launch tubes will begin to fall after FY87, and be smaller by FY90 than the number we have now. (The destructive capability of the force, however, though suffering a temporary dip in the early ‘90s, would continue to grow.)

These problems with the SLBM force are troubling. Because of the tightness of the Navy budget, I have told Secretary Claytor that he can consider dropping the current Trident building rate from the current 1½ per year to one per year if he feels that the budget level leaves him no other choice, but that in that case he must also address the problem of maintaining SLBM launcher levels in the early ‘90s. That means, of course, finding a way to assure that the Poseidon SSBNs can be operated beyond their planned retirement dates.

The ICBM force issue turns on the growing vulnerability of the Minuteman force to the increasing number and accuracy of Soviet warheads. By FY84, we would expect [*less than 1 line not declassified*] attrition in the silos if we decided to ride out an attack. Within the next six months or a year, we will have to decide what to do, and we are studying the issues and running tests in the field to help us with that decision. Land-mobile basing of one sort or another with either Minuteman

¹⁰ Carter underlined the phrase “maintain essential equivalence.”

or MX missiles is one possibility (MX thus far appearing to be the better choice). The questions of which basing mode looks best, and of cost, of vulnerability, of land availability, of ecology, etc., need more study. But one thing is clear: with a land-mobile system, it will take at least [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to restore the ICBM retaliatory capability, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that we have today. If we feel we must restore the balance more rapidly so as not to be perceived to be in an inferior position, we could deploy MX in silos, possibly as early as 1984. If we had to depend significantly on these missiles in retaliation, we would probably be driven to a launch-under-attack policy.

Another issue in the strategic nuclear area involves defense of the continent against Soviet bombers. Our policy in recent years has been not to invest heavily in continental air defense on grounds that it makes little sense in an era when we are defenseless against ICBMs and SLBMs.¹¹ However, we have maintained a modest force dedicated to air defense, and we would plan to supplement it in a crisis with fighter aircraft that could be made available from the General Purpose Forces in the CONUS. That policy has been likened to a “Coast Guard of the air”—the intention being to prevent overflight provocations and “free rides”, without really aspiring to substantially reduce US casualties in an all-out attack.

While the General Purpose Force aircraft that might be available are quite modern (F-14, F-15, and—soon—F-16s), the dedicated aircraft are quite old (F-101s, F-106s, and some F-4s). However, the advent of the Soviet Backfire has changed the character of the possible threat. In response, the CG now directs that the equivalent of a wing (nominally 72 aircraft) of F-15s from the Tactical Air Command be made available for a crisis. There are SALT ratification implications to this issue.

One final strategic issue has to do with civil defense. As you know, the Soviets have shown great interest and considerable activity in this field. While I do not believe that that effort significantly enhances the prospects for Soviet society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear exchange, it has obviously had an effect on international perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static civil defense program. For that reason alone, I believe at least modest efforts on our part could have a high payoff.¹²

But beyond perceptions, our studies this past summer have shown that a relatively modest program, centering on evacuation and some fallout protection, could increase US survivors from roughly a fifth of the population to at least half, given a week’s warning of impending

¹¹ Carter underlined “continental air defense” in this sentence, and drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to it.

¹² Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to this sentence.

attack (trying to protect against a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack would be immensely expensive). Whether such evacuations are really practical we cannot tell, but since they may occur spontaneously in a deep crisis, I believe some planning along those lines would be a wise precaution in any event. Accordingly, the CG directs the start of such a modest program in FY80. Its extra cost—beyond the roughly \$100 million we now spend annually—would start at about \$50 million, rising to about \$200 million a year by FY84.

These strategic issues, and more, are covered in the first of the two attached excerpts (Section B) from the CG. The second excerpt (Section C) covers the next general issue I would like to discuss—our military participation in the NATO alliance. My memorandum of December 10th to you (“NATO Initiatives and Improvements”) covers a good deal of the background, and I will not repeat that here. But the CG contains some important decisions of which you should be aware.

NATO

Planning for NATO in the last administration was based primarily on a scenario in which a) the Warsaw Pact would mobilize for 30 days prior to an attack on NATO, and b) NATO would detect and react to the Pact mobilization a week after it started, and thus have 23 days to mobilize before war breaks out in Europe. Though we might quarrel with some of the details of such a scenario, we do not question its underlying plausibility. What we do question, however, is the concept of basing so much of our planning on that single scenario, since it is but one of many equally plausible scenarios. Therefore, we now plan instead on being able to meet a Warsaw Pact attack under a variety of scenarios under the following assumptions.

We believe (and thus assume) that we would be able to detect any full-scale Warsaw Pact mobilization in one day after it starts. We next assume that, within one day thereafter, the NATO nations would begin to act on that intelligence in at least limited ways, such as increasing readiness, deploying some forces forward, etc., but not necessarily mobilizing. Obviously, mobilizing at that point would be very much to NATO’s advantage, but we recognize that coming to such a momentous decision might take time. (In Europe, mobilization traditionally bears even more ominous connotations than it does in this country.) Indeed, we do not want to plan forces that cannot tolerate any delay in the mobilization decision. Our assumption, therefore, is that that decision might take as long as four days (i.e., on the 5th day of the Pact mobilization) unless, of course, the Pact attacks sooner than the 5th day.

Though we make some provisions for earlier (and thus smaller) attacks, the earliest attack we program against is one of 40 divisions on the Central Front 4 days after Pact mobilization starts. We also specify

larger possible attacks starting after longer periods of mobilization, based on our analysis of Warsaw Pact force readiness and logistic constraints behind the inter-German border. Our objective now is to be able to cope not just with an attack occurring after one particular mobilization time (and thus of one particular size on D-Day), but rather with an attack varying appropriately in size and occurring after any mobilization time from the 4-day minimum onward.¹³

This change has had major ramifications in our planning. With 23 days to prepare before the fighting breaks out, we could do a lot with mobility forces (particularly with airlift) to move divisions to Europe and reinforce NATO for the coming attack. But when the problem gets down to much less than a week's warning, there is really only one practical solution: we must preposition equipment in Europe. We have the passenger airlift to move the troops quickly (especially by commandeering our vast commercial fleets under the CRAF program), but there is no practical way to move their heavy equipment in that short a time. (This does not mean that cargo airlift has no further utility. It is still just as important for deployments in non-NATO contingencies, for inter-theater lift, possibly even for intra-theater lift, and it is still needed for a NATO war, though we cannot count on it for our early requirements.)

The CG thus lays plans for prepositioning equipment for all the active combat divisions planned for deployment to Europe except for two very light divisions (the 82nd airborne and the 101st Air Assault) and the 2nd Division after its withdrawal from Korea.¹⁴ This is an ambitious program, and thus it is still in the tentative stage. We need further analysis of where in Europe we are going to store all that equipment; we need to make sure it's not vulnerable;¹⁵ we need to make sure our tentative plan to get all this done by FY84 is practical. Thus, what we have so far is the outline of a plan that is subject to change. But I hasten to add that this is a serious plan, and one of the key elements in improving our contribution to the alliance. Consequently in the Fiscal Guidance to the Services, I have diverted funds from the Navy and the Air Force to the Army to pay for this prepositioning.¹⁶ If later analysis indicates that the scope or timing of this tentative plan is too ambitious, I will return an appropriate amount of funding to the Navy and Air

¹³ Carter underlined "attack" and "after any mobilization time from the 4-day minimum onward" in this sentence, and drew an arrow in the left margin pointing to it.

¹⁴ Carter underlined "prepositioning," "all," "except," and "two very light divisions" in this sentence, and drew an arrow in the left margin pointing to it.

¹⁵ Carter underlined "vulnerable" and drew an arrow in the left margin pointing to it.

¹⁶ Carter underlined "diverted funds from the Navy" and "for this prepositioning" in this sentence.

Force. But for the moment, the assumption in the CG is that we will carry out this important and ambitious program.

Similar reallocations in the Fiscal Guidance have been made for two other programs to improve our NATO capability. The first is to add 9 new heavy battalions¹⁷ over the period FY80–FY82 to increase the capability of our active heavy divisions. Armored and mechanized strength is particularly important in Europe, and this is a way of adding to our real combat power without having to add the overhead involved in creating new divisions.

The other change in the Fiscal Guidance is to fund the conversion of the 9th Division from infantry to mechanized. This is still a tentative program, and we have delayed the start until FY81 to give us time to finish a study before we commit ourselves to the conversion. The issue is the proper balance between heavy and light divisions, and a major factor in that balance is what sorts of forces we need for non-NATO contingencies—the subject of the study. At present, the active force (including the Marines) consists of 8 light and 11 heavy divisions. The light divisions are preferred for jungle or mountainous terrain, and for fighting in cities. They are also more easily transported, but are somewhat less mobile on their own. Arguments for conversion of the 9th to a heavy division are that a larger number of heavy divisions would help us not only in NATO, but probably also in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf area, which are likely areas for heavy armored warfare, and in Korea where, even if the terrain is mostly mountainous, the ROK forces are likely to need armored or mechanized reinforcement more than infantry. However, I will reserve judgment on mechanizing the 9th Division. If we should decide against it, I will, of course, return the funds now set aside for it to the Navy and Air Force.

A major thrust in our NATO planning is our emphasis on early combat capability. As the CG says, “Our near-term objective is to assure that NATO could not be overwhelmed in the first few weeks of a blitzkrieg war, and we will invest and spend our resources preferentially to that end. When that assurance is reasonably in hand, we will turn our attention to whatever additional capability NATO might need to be able to fight for at least as long as the Warsaw Pact”.

That policy has important ramifications. Our emphasis on prepositioning is one such, but there are many others. We do not plan to buy ammunition to sustain our capability to fight in Europe well after our NATO allies will have run out.¹⁸ Much of our antisubmarine warfare

¹⁷ Carter underlined “add 9 new heavy battalions,” and drew an arrow in the left margin pointing to it.

¹⁸ Carter underlined “We do not plan,” “ammunition to sustain our capability,” and “after our NATO allies will have run out” in this sentence, and drew an arrow in the left margin pointing to it.

capability, which involves long lead times, is planned more against the future, when we expect to turn our attention to sustaining capability, than it is against the present, when we must first make sure that NATO is not overwhelmed even before the first convoys from the United States can arrive. The utility of low-readiness reserve units in this kind of a NATO war would be dubious at best, and we will thus try to move as much funding as we can to units that can be kept ready enough to meet our critical early requirements.

There are two justifications for this emphasis. The first is simple enough: it doesn't matter how much long-term sustaining capability we may have if we cannot hold out for the first few weeks. And we may not be able to; the current balance of forces gives no cause for complacency, so our first task is to improve it. The second reason is, I think, equally practical: our NATO allies have traditionally shown little interest in building a sustaining capability, preferring to rely on the deterrent of nuclear warfare.¹⁹ I believe they are now seriously interested in trying to improve their conventional capability, at least for the initial fighting.²⁰ But there must be real—not just planned—progress in improving that initial capability, and more confidence on their part that the Soviets can be held, before they will show any interest in preparing for a longer war. To face them with both requirements at once would increase the risk that they would do neither. And until they are ready to improve their sustainability, there would be little use in our trying to go it alone: If it's at all uncertain that the coalition as a whole can stop the Soviets, it's obvious that United States forces can't do it alone (nor should we).

I mentioned above that the balance of forces in Europe gives no cause for complacency, though the improvements we are planning will help. As things stand, it looks as if NATO will be outgunned on the ground (by one measure of firepower) by about 80% for the first 10–45 days after Pact mobilization. The offense traditionally requires a force superiority, but whether the 80% advantage is enough to tempt them to attack is unknowable. It is certainly worthy of our concern. We do hold an advantage in the air-to-ground capability of our tactical airpower, but they outnumber us in terms of aircraft that can be used in air-to-air combat.²¹

There is one other important issue in connection with NATO. We have concentrated heavily on the Central Front, yet NATO also faces threats on its flanks. Aside from military threats, the flank countries

¹⁹ Carter underlined "NATO allies" in this sentence.

²⁰ Carter underlined "now," "interested," "improve," and "conventional capability" in this sentence.

²¹ Carter underlined "We," "hold," "advantage," "air-to-ground," "they outnumber us," and "air-to-air combat" in this sentence.

face political pressures from the East. Should they lose confidence in NATO's ability to cover the flanks as well as the Central Front, they may find it more tempting to reach individual accommodations of one kind or another with the Soviet Union—to become "Finlandized". Once that process of political fission starts, it is hard to predict where it might end.

We have not neglected the flanks in spite of our concentration on the Center. However, on the Southern flank, the problems between the Greeks and the Turks, and the uncertainty of the future complexion of Italian governments make it difficult to develop any firm fundamental plans. To the north, the CG recommends planning for the augmentation of Norwegian defenses with Marine forces and Air Force tactical air, as well as planning to assure that the Soviets could not overwhelm Iceland in an effort to control the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap—the site of one of our most important barriers to the entry of Soviet air and naval forces into the Atlantic.

Nonetheless, the proper balance between attention to the Central Front and attention to the flanks is also a subjective matter. Our present concentration on the former is due to a conviction that that is where we face the greatest threat, and that that is where we risk the most serious defeat.

I cite all this not to give the impression that the cause is hopeless. I believe, in fact, that it is more hopeful today than it has been at any time in the recent past because I believe NATO is beginning to take the threat seriously, and to do something about it. The problem is soluble; it will take time, and money, and—most importantly—our leadership, but I believe we are on the right track.

Just as we have a difficult judgment to make, within our planning for NATO as a whole, as to how much of our effort and attention we should concentrate on the center as opposed to the flanks, we face a similar question as to how much of our effort and attention we should concentrate on NATO as opposed to other contingencies. There are three other geographical areas of primary concern: the Far East; the Middle East; and the Persian Gulf. With some exceptions, our analyses of potential contingencies, our understanding of the effects that different kinds and amounts of military force might have, and our exploration of the military alternatives for the United States in those areas are far less well-developed than they are in the case of the Central Front of NATO. We are working to make progress here before the issuance of next year's Consolidated Guidance.

In the Far East, the CG notes that our withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and our planned drawdown of ground forces from Korea, have led to concern on the part of nations in that area—allied with us and otherwise—as to our continued interest and commitment. The CG

affirms that, to allay such concerns to the degree we can, there will be no further withdrawals of forces from the Western Pacific beyond those already scheduled for Korea. (I might note, in that connection, the strong effect that that policy has on our aircraft carrier force level. It means that we will have to continue to deploy two carriers in the Western Pacific. Those, combined with the two deployed carriers in the Mediterranean, translate into a total carrier force requirement of 12, given practical rotation and overhaul factors. Reducing the carrier force level to less than 12 would require us to reduce these overseas deployments in one way or another.) The CG also directs the already announced increase in Air Force fighter aircraft (from 60 to 72) in Korea, planning for joint exercises in the analysis of Korean logistic requirements, and the examination of low-cost hedges against the possibility of ground force redeployment. The Far East section of the CG also discusses the issue of a Sino-Soviet war, as well as the implications in that region should we become involved in a world-wide war with the Soviet Union.

The Section in the CG on the Middle East notes that while Arab inventories of military equipment are expected to remain considerably larger than those of Israel, the ratio is improving for the Israelis, and we would expect them to prevail in any war at least through 1983. The CG also notes that the outcome of any associated naval confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union would depend heavily on the amount of prior reinforcement on either side. The normal two-carrier force we keep in the Mediterranean would have to be doubled for us to have confidence in its survival if opposed by the Soviets in the Eastern Mediterranean. [4 lines not declassified] The CG discusses both the Soviets' and our capability to intervene with military force in a Mid-East war, and directs that we maintain the capability to counter Soviet intervention.

The concern we attach to the Persian Gulf area is noted in the very front of the CG with the words: "events in the Persian Gulf could soften the glue that binds the (NATO) alliance together as surely as could an imbalance of military force across the inter-German border". The section in the CG covering the Persian Gulf outlines the military forces in the area, including the local Soviet threat, and discusses United States options, such as the possible resupply of Iran, defense of oil facilities and sea lines of communication, and even the use of US forces in the area. However, pending results of current studies, we are not at the point of being able to draw many conclusions with confidence. For the moment, the CG directs maintenance of the current Middle East Force, intermittent naval and tactical air deployments to the Indian Ocean with joint exercises, and limiting construction for Diego Garcia to that already programmed.

A final important point in the CG is the direction that we plan for "1½" simultaneous contingencies; the one refers to NATO, the half to a lesser contingency outside of NATO, such as in one of the three areas discussed immediately above. The word "simultaneous" means that we will program enough forces so that we would not be forced to abandon a non-NATO contingency, and pull out our forces, should a NATO-War-saw Pact war break out. This policy is also in line with PD-18, and its effect is that we earmark and design a portion of our forces especially for such contingencies. For planning purposes, the CG identifies those forces as a Marine Division/Wing team, two Army divisions (one light and one mechanized) with appropriate support including a heavy brigade, three Air Force tactical wings, and three Navy carriers and accompanying support. (Though earmarked for non-NATO contingencies, these forces could be used in Europe as well.)

Further details on all these and other matters, of course, will be found in the Consolidated Guidance.

64. Summary of Conclusions of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 10, 1978, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense Department Consolidated Guidance

PARTICIPANTS

The President

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan

JCS

General David Jones

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

OMB

James McIntyre, Director

Randy Jayne, Associate Director

NSC Staff

Reginald Bartholomew

Victor Utgoff

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Navy Carrier Force Levels

For planning purposes, we should assume a continuation of the current force level of 12 carriers.

Navy Shipbuilding Problems

OMB is to study the possibility that changes during construction are responsible for much of the cost overrun problem that has been experienced in Navy shipbuilding. OMB is to carry through an analysis of the data detailing the history of the construction process for several of our ships, and prepare a report on its findings for discussion in a meeting with the President and concerned parties in the Navy and Defense Departments.

The Mission of the Navy

Dr. Brzezinski is to prepare terms of reference for a PRM on the Navy's missions. These terms of reference will be discussed with Secretaries Vance and Brown and subsequently forwarded to the President for approval.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #10 Held 5/10/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. No minutes of the meeting were found.

Congressional Session on Foreign Policy

Dr. Brzezinski is to arrange for a Presidential session on foreign policy with selected Senators and Congressmen for the second week in June.

NATO Center vs. NATO Flanks

There was a general consensus that the balance in emphasis between the Center and the Flanks is about right. Secretary Brown noted that while we cannot do much more on the Southern Flank, because of its political weakness, the Northern Flank could be helped by earmarking for it the Marine forces General Haig now carries as a strategic reserve.

Congressional Support for NATO

Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance are to work up a strongly worded draft resolution of Congressional support for NATO.

NATO Prepositioning and Storage

There was a discussion of NATO prepositioning and in particular the problem of finding storage space for equipment within the FRG. It was agreed that the storage question would be raised during the NATO Summit or in the July meeting with Schmidt.

Persian Gulf Contingencies

Secretary Brown is to do a paper for consideration by the SCC on the following three questions:

1. To what extent could or would the Iranians and Saudis help each other in various military contingencies, including a Cuban assault on Saudi Arabia from South Yemen?
2. What might we do in the event of an attack by 10,000 Cubans from South Yemen against Saudi Arabia, acting on our own? and
3. What would the Egyptians and Saudis have had to do and what kind of backing would we have had to provide if they had been willing to intervene in the Ogaden war?

This contingencies issue is especially sensitive and should be treated accordingly.

Simpler Weapons Systems

There was a brief discussion of the possibility of placing more emphasis on simpler weapons systems. It was agreed that a paper would be provided on this subject, looking to future discussion.

Process for Review of DOD Budget

Secretary Brown and Jim McIntyre are to provide a memo to the President delineating an improved process for review of the DOD budget.

Zbig Brzezinski

65. **Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, June 15, 1978

SUBJECT

SAC/NORAD Trip

My recent trip to SAC and NORAD turned up a menu of concerns too great for a single memorandum. Here is a selected number of items, that should become part of your awareness:

- The C³ problem.
- Secure Reserve Force planning.
- Thinking about LNOs.
- IVORY ITEM impact.
- NORAD reorganization.

The C³ Problem

The latest RISOP–SIOP analysis (that is, a Soviet attack on the U.S. and a U.S. response at the SIOP level) has been reported to us largely as dynamic interaction between weapons inventories on both sides. Another aspect of the analysis has not been highlighted: Soviet doctrinal concern with attacking C³ with a higher priority than attack on U.S. nuclear delivery systems. I have generally been aware that our C³ is designed to get off a retaliatory response [*11 lines not declassified*].

This, of course, raises doubts about our ability to ride out an attack and then retaliate. Paul Nitze's scenario,² where we lose our ICBM force to a Soviet first strike and then would not want to retaliate because the Soviets could then attack our cities, [*5 lines not declassified*].

To put it in a different way, it is usually argued that "stability" exists when neither side can expect to attack and greatly limit damage to itself. [*5 lines not declassified*]

Secure Reserve Force Planning

The SAC staff is fairly candid about its lack of attention to and its long neglect of how to plan and use a reserve force. Attention has been so fully concentrated on the SIOP spasm response that little planning

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20–21/78 Brzezinski Trip: 7–9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: "pp 2, 3. ZB."

² See Document 1.

has been devoted to the next steps, i.e. what we do thereafter. For example, how do we assess the results of our attack on the USSR? We have these tidy criteria—[1 line not declassified] but no way to know if we achieved even part of that outcome. At what will we shoot reserve weapons?

[2 lines not declassified] They want an LNO capability without a war fighting doctrine. Their logical escape from this paradox is to accept an “assured destruction” doctrine, but they do not want that. Moreover, they are slowly beginning to realize that Soviet changing capabilities may be eroding a de facto “assured destruction” capability (e.g. a C³ attack combined with a political and diplomatic gambit that undercuts both our capability retaliate and our desire to retaliate.)³

Thinking About LNOs

[1 paragraph (21 lines) not declassified]

IVORY ITEM Impact

The impact of IVORY ITEM drills has been far-reaching. It has forced the CINCs at SAC and NORAD to take a very close look at the short warning situation, C³, and Soviet doctrine. General Hill at NORAD made me sit down in his chair at the NORAD command center and go through a drill to appreciate certain artificialities IVORY ITEM places on him in answering questions from the President. In working out his own role in such a personal way, he has, I believe, become aware that we are indeed on a threshold of change from the old view of the SIOP execution to⁴ a new view of a much more complicated world of command and control.

The same development has occurred at SAC in a different form. The new concerns with C³, less than SIOP exchanges, have derived in no small part from the IVORY ITEM experiences. Several of the generals at SAC simply admitted that they have not worked into these areas sufficiently. They are breaking ground, but they are nervous about how far to go because of the enormous doctrinal, forces structure, and budget implications. They know that they cannot lead in the doctrinal development. That must finally come from the NSC and the Secretary of Defense.

NORAD Re-organization

General Hill is terribly concerned that the Air Force will combine the [2 lines not declassified]. I know nothing of this proposed re-organization,

³ Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this paragraph and one in the right margin.

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the preceding sentence and this sentence up to this point and wrote: “What are they?”

but clearly it is a concept that should be considered thoroughly before taking action.⁵ Do you and the President want the SAC commander both assessing the attack and also commanding the forces for a U.S. strike? In principle that would allow him to bias the attack development either way: under-estimating the warning because he has a subjective hesitation about executing our SIOP *or* over-estimating the warning because he is itching for a fight. I am inclined to favor the preservation of an independent CINC with only one task: judge the seriousness of our warning data in deciding whether to sound the alarm.

An Afterthought

[1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

⁵ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the preceding two sentences and wrote: "Why."

66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 23, 1978

SUBJECT

Memo from Harold Brown on M-X/Trident II Commonality Study

In response to the request you made during the OMB Spring Budget Review, for information on the feasibility of developing a common M-X/Trident II strategic missile, Harold Brown has sent you the memo at Tab A. The main points made in the memo are that:

—Taking all factors into account, a common missile appears to offer a significant net savings, and

—A detailed study to determine performance specifications and costs is already underway and should be completed this August.

Harold's memo, the ongoing study it is drawn from, and feedback my staff is getting from the Pentagon all suggest that the common missile option is getting the high-level attention it needs if we are to overcome Service biases against the common system.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 3–10/78. Secret. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

Tab A**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
President Carter²**

Washington, June 17, 1978

SUBJECT

M-X/TRIDENT II Commonality Study (U)

We are conducting a detailed study to determine the extent of commonality we should require in the M-X missile (currently in the advanced development phase) and the TRIDENT II missile (currently still in the design phase). There is a significant difference in the performance and physical characteristics of these missiles as they are now envisaged. *[5 lines not declassified]*

The estimated developmental cost of each of these missiles is about \$6 billion. If we developed only one common missile we could achieve a savings of 3 to 4 billion dollars in R&D and about 10 to 15% in unit cost because of the larger production run. On the other hand, our total M-X system costs would probably increase because we would have to deploy more of the common missiles than of the M-X missile if we believe we have to provide the same total throwweight as now planned for the M-X. On balance it appears that the common missile would offer a significant net savings, but the study has not yet determined either the cost or performance details.

I will keep you informed as the study progresses; we expect to have final results by this August. Enclosed for your information is a status report on the study. It includes the study ground rules, a listing of the baseline missile parameters, and some preliminary conclusions.

Harold Brown

² Secret; Formerly Restricted Data. A copy was sent to Press.

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, undated

M–X/TRIDENT II Commonality Study

1. Major design considerations for a possible common missile
[5 paragraphs (26 lines) not declassified]
2. Study Ground Rules
 - Common missile to meet all key requirements per above.
 - [1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]
 - [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]
 - Management plan to be based on one service taking the lead, with its existing organization, to develop the system and be the acquisition agent. Each service will have its respective weapon system integration responsibilities.
 - System cost-effectiveness evaluation to be consistent with evaluation methods for baseline, dedicated missiles.
3. Study Output
 - Common Missile Definition
 - Assessment of Expected Accuracy
 - Cost and Performance Comparisons
 - Technical, Schedule and Management Plans
 - Identifications of Technical and Management Problems
4. Common Missile Parameters
[2 columns (16 lines) not declassified]
5. When the common missile study is completed, we will consider variations which would involve modifying the common missile (e.g., extra stage, new stage, liquid bus) for the M–X application, thereby achieving additional payload at a relatively small increase in developmental cost. This probably will be necessary (and possible) to avoid major degradation in M–X potential capability.

³ Secret; Formerly Restricted Data.

67. **Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)**¹

Washington, July 15, 1978

SUBJECT

Planning and Coordination: Crisis Management

This is in response to your memorandum on planning and coordination which requested a list of issues for discussion. The following issue areas are appropriate for crisis management:

I. *White House Emergency Procedures.*

General: This area is in reasonably good shape, but it is important to have another IVORY ITEM exercise sometime before late fall.

Plan D: This concerns successors and continuity of government. It is a travesty of neglect. Mitchell, Director of FPA, has discovered this and wants to do something. So does OMB. Short-term "fixes" may be possible this fall, but a larger solution is possible as FPA goes into the new Federal Emergency Management Agency. By late summer I hope to have a scheme for launching a major but closely held review of these Plan D deficiencies.²

C³I: This area is the revolutionary front. The DOD is beginning to wake up to it. I get into it through both WHEP and telecommunications policy. How we approach C³I will be indicative of how we intend to structure our forces, strategic and general purpose, for the rest of the century. It will also be indicative of continuity or change in our military doctrine. Presently, our C³I vulnerabilities are staggering, even for only a retaliatory doctrine. This year's C³I budget issue review is an upcoming opportunity to do something in this area. I am working with Utgoff on it.

II. *Telecommunications.*

General: This has been a quiet front. OSTP has the emergency preparedness management functions [6 lines not declassified]. Possibilities are:

—Leasing satellites for DOD instead of buying them.

—Tactical radio systems and Commerce's role in setting the standards.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 15, Crisis Management; 8/77-10/78. Top Secret. Outside the System.

² An unknown hand drew two vertical lines in the right margin next to this sentence.

—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

III. *Terrorism.*

General: Things are in overall good shape. That is, we have a structure in place. The way it works is not always satisfactory. The following list identifies some of the problems:

—We have a new Executive Committee Chairman, Tony Quainton, at State. This is a promising change.

—DOD now has a rather impressive military capability but how it will be tied to the other elements in an incident is not all that well worked out. McGiffert and others in DOD, including the General Meyer, cry out for national level exercises, CPXs. I have been less enthusiastic for this before DOD decides its own internal questions. For example, does the Secretary of the Army have the executive agent responsibility as he does for “domestic order”? Or is the link to Harold Brown and the JCS? Justice has procedures for working with the Army but not with JCS. I will be pressing on this front.

—Responding to foreign requests for counter-terror training. This one may get sticky. CIA already has its own rather broad program which is not understood by State. Quainton, following Isham’s lead, wants State to “coordinate” our counter-terrorism foreign training policy. Quainton has asked for all agencies to report what programs they have abroad. This is leading to a possible clash between State and CIA. I am in touch with Henze to try to prevent it.

—Intelligence for terrorism. The Executive Committee is believed by many to handle counter-terrorism intelligence. I set it up so that an informal sub-group of the committee can do so. The only problem is that when something like the question of aid for Italy comes up, I am not kept abreast of what you and Hunter are doing. Thus, things were not always under control, and the agencies gradually learned that we were not tied together properly at the NSC. The impression of disconnection got as far as some of the Senate Intelligence Committee staff apparently. I would like to pull intelligence for terrorism together. I have pushed the CIA to stop taking a purely passive attitude to intelligence on terrorism and to look for positive ways to use what we know more effectively. Their reaction is favorable, but they hesitate about how to respond. After a day with the DDO, the IAD chief, and the head of terrorism group, I came away with a better, but not encouraging, sense of the realities out there. I greatly need your support and backing in this area, and I would like to push it.

—A related item, not terrorism but intelligence, is the beginning of a coordinated CI effort on our embassy construction in Moscow. Sam

Hoskinson expressed unusual enthusiasm for some of my schemes in approaching this task. I did the background work for that SCC item, learning that in fact my schemes are feasible and highly desired by the agencies. Unless they are laced together by a small group—one representative from CIA, State, DOD, and the NSC—they will not succeed, and only then will they succeed if they are executed with full awareness of all other US-Soviet activities.

IV. *Net Assessment.*

I am back into this area for the update of PRM 10.³ The need for a net assessment capability on the NSC was not apparent to me for some time. Now I see why it is. Without it, our intelligence appreciation for longer run policy and strategy will be no better than the PDB, NID, and the INR Summary, i.e., current events. I don't know where you want to go in this area, but it merits some thought. Some practical examples:

- Awareness of the oil technology transfer issue to the USSR comes from net assessment.

- Sensitivity to the C³I vulnerabilities comes from net assessment.

- The DOD targeting study flounders because it is not driven by net assessments.

- Where we go with the PRM-31⁴ results will depend on continuing net assessments which exploit the directed new FBI and CIA attention to technology.

V. Crisis management at the in-between-levels (i.e., between SIOP and the small terrorist event).

General: Our ad hoc system works reasonably well I suppose, but it could have more rigor. I would prefer to talk rather than write about this one.

³ See Document 4.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Document 13.

68. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 28, 1978

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #68

1. Opinion

SALT Support Strategy

After meeting with Hamilton, Jody and Frank Moore, I met with Harold Brown and Charles Duncan to see how our defense decisions could be coordinated to build a more positive Congressional climate for SALT. Harold welcomed this initiative and, together, we have identified the following issues which will shape public and Congressional perceptions of our defense posture and the acceptability of a SALT Agreement.

—What should we do about the vulnerability of our land-based missile force; deploy new systems (such as MAP or some other mobile missile) or switch our doctrine away from the Triad?

—What do we do about increasing Soviet lead in counterforce capability; deploy a hard-target MX, Trident II, or a hybrid? Would improving our ICBM survivability suffice?

—What do we do about a future manned, penetrating bomber? (I understand Zbig has talked to you about Air Force ideas on this.)

—Harold also feels that the overall size of the budget is important—in particular, the size of the component devoted to strategic forces.

As you can see, these involve some of the most difficult strategic decisions this country has ever faced. Ideally, we would want more time to decide them, but SALT is forcing our hand. Some policies, such as whether to try to maintain a survivable ICBM force, we might only decide in principle leaving our hardware options (e.g., MAP, Mobiles) open. At the minimum, we will have to identify those issues which might be decided early-on to shape public opinion and those which should be reserved for later to have more direct impact on SALT acceptability in Congress.

The following are the key decision events.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7-9/78. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the memorandum in the upper right corner.

—Your mid-term review of the Defense budget in late August/early September.

—The Defense review of MX and MAP in October.

—The Defense budget decision in December/January, and

—The Secretary's Posture Statement in February 1979.

The August/September budget review emerges as particularly important. Harold suggests that it provides an opportunity for you to announce some general lines of policy that would start creating a more positive atmosphere on defense issues. He also feels it would be extremely helpful if you could indicate at least privately to him the direction you are inclined to take on the key MX/MAP/bomber issues. This would enable him to better control the Defense bureaucracy and project a more orderly and systematic image to enhance confidence in our decision-making process. It also might be desirable to be more open about the decisions that we make along the way so as to pre-empt the inevitable leaks. Harold recognizes that this procedure might conflict with OMB's prerogatives but emphasized that the more guidance he can get the better, even if actual formal decisions are not taken until later.

We agreed that I should draw up a draft "scenario" for coordinating Defense actions in support of SALT which I will clear with Harold for presentation to you prior to your August/September budget review session.

2. Alert

Defense Budget Status

On the basis of the Consolidated Guidance (CG), the military services submitted draft five-year programs in their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). In the spirit of ZBB, the CG called for three programs—basic, decremented and enhanced. The CG basic program implies Defense TOA of roughly \$138.4B for FY 80; the decremented and enhanced levels were set at $\pm 5\%$ around that level.

The POMs reflect a good deal of "goldwatching" by the Services, especially the Air Force. "Goldwatching" is the label given the long-standing Service device of protecting or beefing up their budgets by structuring them in such a way that programs of special importance for the civilian authorities require net additions to the budget. Thus, in the current POMs, many programs have been placed only in enhanced program or are not in any program at all. Examples are M-X/Trident II, ALCM, Cruise Missile Carrier, strategic mobility programs, and GLCM. As a consequence, most of the OSD staff alternatives appear to add to the basic level of the budget.

This poses Harold with a difficult problem. Your tentative budget target for Defense is \$135.4B (0.6% real growth). Thus Harold will

have to remove \$3B, while adding back many of the expensive “gold-watched” programs. We can expect some tough infighting that is likely to spill out into public view—with a possible adverse effect on the image we want to create in Defense for SALT (see item one).

3. *National Security Affairs Calendar* (See Tab A)²

² Attached but not printed is a calendar for national security affairs in August and September.

69. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, July 31, 1978

SUBJECT

The Diminishing U.S. Lead in Total Number of Strategic Warheads

These are some thoughts to bear in mind as we think about the future strategic balance and about the importance of SALT limits on RV fractionation.

Our projected lead throughout the 1980s in total numbers of strategic warheads is based on intelligence estimates that assume very little increased fractionation by the Soviets. You should realize that there are few data to support that assumption. In the absence of SALT fractionation limits, it is quite possible the Soviets may deploy, or at least test, modifications of ICBMs and SLBMs with much higher payload fractionations than those of current systems. Even with SALT limits they can make considerable progress in this direction. They might do so (1) in order to eliminate our lead in the perceptually important number of warheads, (2) because of a “technological imperative” to go beyond what they have now, or (3) to make MAP less attractive by forcing it to absorb more attackers—or for a combination of these. Looking at past estimates, one sees that until testing began the intelligence community projected the number of RVs on follow-on ICBMs (those we now call SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) to be generally lower than now

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 218, Official Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jones, Box 60, SecDef Memo Jul 78. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, Seignious, and Turner.

accepted (3 predicted, 4 actual; 6 predicted, 10 actual; 3 predicted, 6 actual; respectively). Therefore, the number of Soviet missile warheads could increase substantially by 1985.

The United States at present has about a 2:1 advantage in total strategic warheads [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. The NIE Best Estimate (assuming a SALT II agreement with a 1,200 MIRV limit) projects a U.S. advantage of about 1.5:1 (roughly [*less than 1 line not declassified*]) by 1985. This estimate assumes an SS-NX-18 and Typhoon missile with three and four RVs, respectively. The Soviets recently demonstrated a potential capability to deploy seven RVs on the SS-NX-18: at least two tests released four RVs and simulated three additional releases. With seven RVs per SS-NX-18 and Typhoon missile the Soviets would reduce our advantage to about 1.3:1 in 1985. Putting the situation in another way, our lead could be eliminated entirely if, for example, the Soviets increased the number of RVs on the SS-NX-18 and Typhoon missile to 14, or on the SS-19 from six to 16. These fractionation levels would probably be feasible on follow-ons to existing missiles and on the new Typhoon SLBM.

The ban on increasing numbers of RVs on existing types which we have proposed in SALT would make this erosion of our lead far more difficult because it would prevent fractionation of the payloads of existing types. However, even our current SALT fractionation proposal (limiting new ICBMs to 10 RVs and new SLBMs to 14 and freezing fractionation of current ICBMs and SLBMs) still permits the Soviets eventually to catch up with us in warhead numbers by replacing all existing systems with permitted new types with the maximum permitted RVs (e.g., by increasing the SS-19, SS-NX-18 and Typhoon to 10 RVs). Soviet tests of existing systems with more RVs before signature would pose a problem (though formally our position takes the pre-April 15, 1978 level as the base).

We should therefore recognize that our lead in strategic warheads could largely dissipate by 1985, or even disappear altogether if the Soviets chose that course. This capability could be delayed by SALT but is unlikely to be blocked entirely. Our ability to claim future strategic equivalence on the basis that their lead in throw weight is offset by our lead in warhead numbers, is thus fragile.

We do, however, have several options available to counter a Soviet push to close the gap in numbers of warheads. The Cruise Missile Carrier (CMC) program provides an option for a major and rapid increase in strategic capability. For example, a deployment of 100 CMCs. [*2 lines not declassified*] This deployment level could be achieved by FY 1987 with an orderly program, and earlier if extraordinary effort is deemed necessary. The current U.S. SALT position would count each CMC as one in the 1320 aggregate. The Soviets have proposed a limit of 20 cruise

missiles per aircraft. As you are aware, Secretary Vance recently presented our position that there could be no limitations on the number of cruise missiles per CMC as long as there are no limitations on air defenses.

Another alternative is the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) for which we currently have very tentative plans for initial deployment in 1982. Those plans involve deployment of 500 to 600 missiles, each with a variable yield warhead up to [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. If we have to respond quickly to a rapid Soviet buildup in total RVs, this program, or a similar one involving surface-ship launch, could be quickly and greatly expanded. The production rate can be rapidly multiplied, and is not restricted by SALT after the Protocol expires (though it could pose other political problems).

In sum, we must be aware that the Soviets could largely negate our lead in warheads by 1985. However, there are SALT-permitted options available to maintain our lead in strategic warheads, if we so desire.

Harold Brown

70. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency²

SR 78-10136

Washington, August, 1978

[Omitted here are the cover pages and table of contents.]

Estimated Soviet Defense Spending

Trends and Prospects

Key Judgments

Total Defense Spending. Our estimates of the ruble cost of Soviet defense activities during the 1967–77 period indicate that:

- Soviet defense spending, defined to correspond to US budgetary accounts and measured in constant 1970 prices, grew at an average

²Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 53, USSR: 8–9/78. Secret. The CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center prepared the assessment. Carter initialed the cover page.

annual rate of about 4 to 5 percent—from 35–40 billion rubles in 1967 to 53–58 billion rubles in 1977.

- Defined more broadly, as Soviet practice might require, defense spending grew from 40–45 billion rubles in 1967 to 58–63 billion rubles in 1977.

Economic Impact. The defense effort has had a substantial impact on the Soviet economy:

- During the 1967–77 period, defense spending consumed an almost constant share of Soviet GNP—11 to 12 percent or 12 to 13 percent, depending on how defense spending is defined.

- Defense investment consumed about one-third of the final product of machinebuilding and metalworking, the branch of industry that produces investment goods as well as military hardware.

- Between 65 and 75 percent of the males reaching draft age were conscripted into the Soviet armed forces. Uniformed military servicemen and civilians working for the Ministry of Defense constituted 3 to 4 percent of the total labor force.

- Defense takes a large share of the economy's best scientific, technical, and managerial talent and large amounts of high-quality materials, components, and equipment.

The armed forces accounted directly for a small share of total Soviet energy consumption. Less than 5 percent of the refined petroleum and less than 5 percent of the heat and electricity consumed by the USSR went to the armed forces.

Composition and Allocation. Ruble estimates provide insight into the resource composition of the Soviet defense effort and the trends in resource allocation among the services. Analysis based on the narrower definition of defense—for which the estimates are more precise—indicates that during the 1967–77 period over one-half of total spending went for investment, a little over one-fourth for operating expenditures, and over one-fifth for research, development, testing, and evaluation.

Examination of defense spending according to service indicates that:

- The Air Forces and the Ground Forces received the largest shares of investment and operating spending. The share going to the Air Forces increased during the period as a result of increased spending for Frontal Aviation. The Ground Forces' share was relatively constant.

- Spending for the Navy and the National Air Defense Forces grew more slowly than defense spending as a whole. As a result, the shares of investment and operating spending going to these forces were smaller in 1977 than in 1967. Most of the growth in spending for the Navy was allocated to ballistic missile submarines, while most of the growth in spending for the Air Defense Forces was allocated to interceptor aircraft.

- The Strategic Rocket Forces received the smallest share of investment and operating spending among the five services. Spending for the SRF was primarily determined by deployment cycles for ICBMs

and fluctuated more than that for any other service. By the end of the 10-year period, spending for this service was only slightly higher than in 1967.

Examination of defense spending for intercontinental and regional forces indicates that:

- Spending for intercontinental attack forces subject to SALT II limitation constituted a little over 10 percent of total defense spending and grew at a slower pace than the total.
- Spending for Ground Forces and Frontal Aviation in the NATO Guidelines Area constituted less than 10 percent of total defense spending but grew at about twice the rate of the total.
- Spending for Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border constituted a little over 10 percent of total defense spending and grew at more than twice the rate of the total.

Prospects. Soviet economic growth has been slowing in the 1960s and the 1970s, and we forecast a further slowdown in the 1980s. Nonetheless, all of the evidence available to us on Soviet defense programs under way and planned suggests that the long-term upward trend in allocation of resources to defense is likely to continue into the 1980s. There is no indication that economic problems are causing major changes in defense policy. The atmosphere in Moscow with regard to the economy, however, is one of concern, and the Soviet leaders could be contemplating modest alterations in military force goals. But even if such alterations were undertaken, the rate of growth of defense spending over the next five years or so probably would slow only marginally.

- For the next two or three years, Soviet defense spending will continue to grow. Because some current ICBM, ballistic missile submarine, and fighter aircraft programs are nearing completion, the annual rates of growth in that period probably will be slightly lower than the long-run average.
- During the early 1980s we expect the Soviets to begin testing and deploying a number of the new weapon systems under development. This probably will cause the annual rates of growth in defense spending to increase to a pace more in keeping with the long-term growth trend of 4 to 5 percent a year.
- Conclusion of a SALT II agreement along the lines currently being discussed would not, in itself, slow the growth of Soviet defense spending significantly.

[Omitted here are the preface, the body of the assessment, and an appendix.]

71. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 1, 1978

SUBJECT

PD/NSC-18 Follow-On Study on Nuclear Targeting Policy²

In general the DOD report provides an excellent description and critique of existing targeting policy and appropriately sets forth the major issues deserving of top-level consideration and decision. I have only a couple of comments on the report and on the Utgoff/Molander review of the report.³

Two basic issues runs through the report.

The first is the need for a much higher degree of flexibility in targeting policy than has previously been the case. Options for the limited employment of nuclear weapons should be multiplied; political considerations should play a greater role in the selection of targets; and, since no plan—particularly in these uncharted waters—can anticipate what will be needed in a given contingency, a high capability for Presidential flexibility and improvisation in a nuclear confrontation should be built into our command, administrative, and technical institutions. On these points, I think there is general agreement among Utgoff/Molander, the authors of the report, and myself.⁴

The second basic issue relates to the relative priority we should give to targeting war-fighting capabilities compared to war-recovery capabilities. Here for a variety of reasons the report criticizes what it perceives to be our current emphasis on war-recovery resources and recommends greater emphasis on war-fighting capabilities. Victor and Roger are dubious about this conclusion; I support it.

The question of war-fighting vs. war-recovery comes up in two contexts. The report emphasizes the extent to which Soviet doctrine and practice differ from the US. This is, I think, accurate and valuable. The report points out that the intelligence community now agrees that the Soviets believe that "a superior war-fighting capability, including what

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 64, [PRM-32]: 8/78. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Utgoff and Molander.

² See Document 32.

³ Not found.

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with "particularly" and ends with "and myself."

US strategists would call counterforce and damage-limiting capabilities, is the best type of deterrent.” Vic and Roger argue that one cannot extrapolate from what the Soviets see as necessary to deter a US attack to what may be necessary for the US to have to deter a Soviet attack. Their argument, however, presupposes a disjunction in Soviet thinking which certainly doesn’t exist in ours and which is psychologically and politically most improbable. We know that the Soviets stress C^3 and military capabilities, offensively and defensively, at the conventional and theater nuclear levels as well as at the strategic level. Surely, US ability to destroy substantial portions of Soviet C^3 and strategic offensive forces (before *or* after a Soviet attack) will weigh much more heavily with the Soviets as a deterrent than US ability to destroy a few more cities.⁵

The question of war-fighting vs. war-recovery also comes up in the section on “General War Objectives.” The description of current policy in this section was, for me, the most startling and disturbing segment of the report. The report cites the 1974 NUWEP⁶ as identifying four principal targets for destruction: economic and military recovery resources; C^3 ; nuclear offensive forces; conventional forces. Current policy sets forth the priorities in the allocation of weapons against these targets under conditions of day-to-day alert and generated forces as follows:

Table 1
Weapons Allocation Priorities⁷

Targets	Current Policy		Desirable Policy	SU Strike	US Strike
	Day-to-day alert	Generated forces			
1. Recovery resources	1	1	4	1	3
2. C^3	2	2	2	4	1
3. Nuclear offensive forces	4	3	1	2	2
4. Conventional forces	3	4	3	3	4

⁵ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence and wrote: “Why?”

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, footnote 4, Document 31.

⁷ Brzezinski added the columns labeled “SU Strike” and “US Strike” by hand.

In both cases, under current policy sufficient weapons will be allocated to destroy Target 1 (recovery resources), before they are allocated, with decreasing emphasis, to the other targets in the order indicated.

The paper makes the point that this order of priorities applies only to the allocation of weapons, not to the temporal order in which the targets might be attacked. It does, however, also seriously question the current emphasis on targeting recovery resources. I would underwrite that concern in spades. The high priority currently given recovery resources surely puts the cart before the horse. If we should get into a general nuclear war, the first priority has to be the destruction of those enemy forces which have the capability to do serious damage to ourselves and our allies. We ought to take every measure we can to protect ourselves so that we survive in the best possible shape before we begin trying to prevent our opponent from recovering after the war. Recognizing that the characteristics of our weapons may limit the number we wish to direct towards military targets, nonetheless, it would still make much more sense to reorder the priorities as indicated in the third column of Table 1, so as to give top priority to enemy nuclear forces and C³, while relegating recovery resources to a residual fourth place.⁸

⁸ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this paragraph and wrote below it: "Who strikes first?"

72. Memorandum From Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 2, 1978

SUBJECT

PRC Meeting on Civil Defense

You should read the Summary for a quick survey of the major issues and options. This memo covers some of the politics and arguments lying behind them.

The Agenda Paper sets forth three topics for discussion.

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Deputy, Meetings File, Box 7, PRC Meeting: 8/3/78. Secret. The PRC met on August 3 to discuss PRM/NSC-32.

1. *Review the PRM/NSC–32 conclusions on the scope, nature, and effectiveness of US and Soviet civil defense programs.*

The conclusions on these topics set forth in the Overview Report and the Summary are generally agreed to by all agencies, except for ACDA which dissents vigorously from almost everything, and possibly State, which questions many things in more muted fashion. The basic facts in Chapter II on Soviet civil defense come from the IIM on this subject; the basic facts about the US program are also not in dispute. What these mean, however, is highly contentious.

ACDA makes four principal points.

1. Civil defense is meaningless because the amount of protection that any CD program can provide will be minor compared to the absolute levels of destruction resulting from a nuclear war. *In fact*, however, everyone is guessing when it comes to estimating the amount and character of the destruction resulting from a nuclear war, and it is better to provide some modest protection on the assumption that it may work, than do nothing at all. In addition, there is interagency agreement (set forth in Table S–2 on page 6 of the Summary and Table III–1 in the Report) that feasible and modest civil defense measures can make a difference in terms of tens of millions of lives. ACDA will then say that the survivors of a nuclear war will envy the dead; and the answer to that is that that is something for the survivors, not us, to decide.

2. ACDA will argue that the Report and the Summary neglect the longer-term effects (after 30 days) of a nuclear war. *In fact*, however, these are not neglected; they are referred to in both the Report (page III–2) and Summary (pp. 4–5), but they cannot be described because any judgment as to what the world will be like 30 days after a nuclear war has to be 90 percent conjecture. The response to the previous point applies here.

3. ACDA will argue that the Report overestimates Soviet civil defense capabilities in that it makes a “best case” assumption that Soviet CD will work the way in which it is planned to work. *In fact*, with respect to some issues this is the case, and both the Report and the IIM, on which it is based, make that clear. On the most important issue, however, of population protection, the IIM and the Report (pp. II–10–14) emphasize how dependent the Soviet program is on warning time; they provide evidence for a variety of scenarios.

4. ACDA will say that unlike the Soviets, the US need not plan for population relocation because in the event of a crisis, Americans in target areas will hop into their automobiles and head for the hills as they do on the Fourth of July weekend. *In fact*, some spontaneous evacuation in a crisis undoubtedly will occur, and all the figures in the Report and

Summary on US population fatalities assume a 10 percent spontaneous evacuation of urban population in addition to that resulting from any planned CD program. Also, however, evacuation is relatively meaningless unless evacuees go to host areas which are prepared to house them, protect them (against fall-out), and feed them for up to 30 days. That is what the proposed Program 3 is designed to do.

Most importantly, there is interagency agreement on the broad difference which civil defense makes in terms of population survival. Given current US and Soviet programs, in the mid-1980s, a major nuclear exchange would probably leave the US with 35–65 percent of its population initially surviving, while 80–90 percent of the Soviet population would initially survive. In short, to take the median figures in those estimates, 50 percent of the US population would immediately survive as against 85 percent of the Soviet population.

2. *Review alternative US civil defense policies and make recommendations to the President.*

Four policy options are set forth in the Summary (pp. 8–10) and Report (pp. V–8–12):

- (1) *The myth of civil defense*, i.e., civil defense is useless.
- (2) *Insurance*, which has been the prevailing US approach, and which can run from low cost/high risk insurance to high cost/low risk insurance.
- (3) *Equivalent survivability*, which says that the proportions of US leadership, population, and economy surviving a nuclear war should be roughly equivalent to those of the USSR surviving the war.
- (4) *Equivalent program*, which says that the US should essentially duplicate the Soviet civil defense program.

ACDA will probably opt for the Myth of Civil Defense; State and OMB will probably go for Insurance; virtually everyone else (i.e., JCS, DCPA, FPA, CIA, and NSC) opted (at least in the Working Group) for Equivalent Survivability. Since the NSC originated the concept of equivalent survivability and developed the arguments for it (Report, pp. V–10–12), I hope you will be persuaded by its logic!

One option which is likely to come forward in the discussion of policy options is simply to make no decision on policy and to proceed directly to a decision on program. Policy, after all, it can be said, is simply rhetoric, it's program that counts. Policy is also much more contentious than program. A no-decision outcome on policy could become unavoidable, but it is also undesirable because:

- (1) It will provide no basis for rationalizing program decisions or linking them to broader strategic issues. It will not provide a means for either the NSC or DOD to exercise any policy guidance over the new Civil Emergency Preparedness Agency and, as a result, that agency will

undoubtedly follow its natural tendencies to give priority to its natural disaster functions rather than to its civil defense functions.

(2) It will open the way for OMB to undermine a decision in favor of Program 3 by pleading the need to cut costs and maintain only the present level of spending when budget time comes. A decision in favor of Equivalent Survivability as a policy would prevent this, since existing programs and spending levels quite clearly do *not* provide equivalent survivability.

3. Review alternative US civil defense programs and make recommendations to the President.

Five alternative programs (one of which has two variants) are set forth on pp. 10–11 of the Summary and in Chapter VI of the Report.

Two of them (Programs 4 and 5) involve such substantial increased expenditures that they are undoubtedly not politically feasible, and Program 5 is undesirable in any event. One thing which might be worth suggesting, however, is a study of the longer-term desirability of a program like Program 4, that is, incorporating shelters into new construction. This is what the Soviets are doing; it is also what the Germans and some others are attempting to do. It would not be a pleasant situation to be in if by the year 2000 we were the only major country which did not have a shelter capability for a substantial segment of its urban population.

Program 1, Minimal Civil Defense, can also be excluded, since no one except ACDA is likely to support it and since the President has already said that he is in favor of a strong civil defense.

The differences between Programs 2a and 2b are relatively minor, involving the extent to which, within existing funding levels, efforts are concentrated on population relocation planning. In terms of output, under Program 2a existing planning activities would be completed in the mid-to-late 1980s; under Program 2b they would be completed by the mid-1980s. Under both programs, there would have to be a surge period of about one year to implement the plans. State is likely to support either Program 2a or Program 2b. OMB will definitely support Program 2b with the argument that there are a lot of kinks and uncertainties in relocation planning which should be worked out before it would be worthwhile to embark on Program 3.

All the other agencies will support Program 3. Harold Brown has, indeed, already endorsed the population relocation segment of this program within the DOD, and DCPA is, presumably, going ahead implementing this decision. In effect, PRC approval of Program 3 will ratify Harold's decision on an interagency basis and thus help DOD ward off the OMB budget cutters this Fall. The other smaller segment of Program 3 is devoted to continuity of government and is designed

to enhance our currently very weak and fragile leadership protection programs.

All told, Program 3 will involve expenditures of \$193 million in FY 1980 as compared with \$140 million for Programs 2a or 2b. Over the next five years, total expenditures for Program 3 would be \$1,625 million, as compared to \$700 million for Programs 2a or 2b. This increased expenditure, however, will buy a major increase in civil defense capabilities:

—In a major nuclear exchange in the mid-1980s, 60–90 percent of the US population would immediately survive, as against 35–65 percent (and the percentage of survivors with Program 3 is likely to be much closer to 90 percent than 60 percent; ACDA insisted on the low lower bound). Just taking the median figure in these estimates, 75 percent of the US population would immediately survive with Program 3, as against 50 percent with Programs 2a or 2b. That's about 55,000,000 additional survivors.

—The survivability of US leadership goes from low to probably high.

—Of great importance, the surge time required to achieve the above results declines from one year to one–two weeks. Unless we can assume that the Soviets will give us a year's warning the next time they plan to spring a Berlin blockade, Berlin wall, Cuban missile deployment, or October War on us, this reduction in surge time is absolutely essential to having a meaningful civil defense program.

Attached is a table indicating probable agency positions as they have manifested themselves in the Working Group.

PROBABLE AGENCY POSITIONS ON CD POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

	<u>Myth</u>	<u>Insurance</u>	<u>Equivalent Survivability</u>	<u>Equivalent Program</u>
1	ACDA			
2a		State?		
2b		OMB		
3		DCPA (2)	DCPA (1), NSC, FPA, JCS, CIA?	
4				
5				

Attachment

Summary of a Report Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

PRM/NSC-32 CIVIL DEFENSE

OVERVIEW REPORT

Summary

This summary is not designed to be a section by section precis of the Overview Report. It is rather designed:

1. to present a brief summary description of current US and Soviet civil defense programs;
2. to provide answers on the basis of the Overview Report to the key questions posed at the beginning of that report;
3. to lay out briefly the options for US civil defense policy and programs set forth in Chapters V and VI of the Overview Report.

I. US AND SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

US strategic doctrine has consistently emphasized deterrence of nuclear war, rather than effective defense. The US civil defense program has been viewed as insurance providing some capability to enhance population survival should deterrence fail, thus fulfilling the government's statutory responsibility under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (as amended).³

The Soviets integrate civil defense into an overall scheme of the likely origins, course, and consequences of nuclear war. Soviet strategy relies on convincing potential enemies that they cannot win a nuclear war against the USSR. Should nuclear war occur, civil defense is meant to help: (1) maintain a functioning logistical base for operations by their armed forces to "win" the war; and (2) enable Soviet recovery from war damage, to improve their postwar position vis-a-vis the US and other adversaries.

At the present time US civil defense efforts are directed primarily to population and leadership protection. These programs, currently divided among several federal agencies, are now scheduled to be

² Secret.

³ The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 replaced the 1947 National Security Resources Board and expanded civil defense in the context of possible nuclear conflict.

consolidated with natural disaster functions in an independent agency.⁴ Civil defense responsibilities are shared with state and local governments. The population protection program is slowly being modified to shift the emphasis from reliance on in-place fallout protection to crisis relocation planning for high-risk areas. Either program would take about a year's "surge" preparation during a crisis period to reach full effectiveness. Essential governmental functions will be protected by dispersal of personnel, some by relocation to hardened facilities; the hardened facilities are relatively few in number and relatively vulnerable to direct attack. Minimum efforts are being directed to the protection of industrial plants and equipment and to preparations for rehabilitation and recovery. Federal expenditures for the above programs are about \$140 million per year; state and local governments spend an additional \$80 million.

Soviet civil defense efforts are much more comprehensive. The Soviet program has established ambitious goals to protect the civilian leadership, shelter a portion of the essential industrial labor force, and evacuate the urban population. The program is centrally administered under military leadership, and civil defense goals are influenced by military objectives. The activities of the Soviet civil defense organization include: the development of evacuation and shelter plans; training for civil defense units, leadership and the population at large; coordination of civil defense exercises; testing and evaluation of command and control; shelter construction; and implementation of general directives from the central leadership. The effectiveness of Soviet civil defense measures is highly dependent on the amount of warning time available. Soviet civil defense doctrine also espouses effective protection of industry through hardening and dispersing, but such measures are being implemented slowly or, in some cases, not at all. It would cost about \$2 billion per year to duplicate the Soviet civil defense program in the United States; about three-fourths of this amount would be for personnel.

The most probable results of a massive US-USSR nuclear exchange in 1978 involving an initial Soviet counterforce/countervalue attack on the US and a US counterforce/countervalue response are set forth in Table S-1.

⁴ Reference is to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), established April 1, 1979, under Executive Orders 12127 and 12148. The establishment of FEMA merged federal planning for both natural disasters and civil defense.

Table S-1
 EXPECTED RESULTS FROM MASSIVE US/USSR
 NUCLEAR EXCHANGE, 1978

<u>Population Survival</u>	<u>US (In-Place)</u>	<u>USSR (Evacuated)</u>
Initial Survivors (%)	35–65%	80–90%
Immediate Fatalities (10 ⁶)	72–137	23–50
<u>Leadership Survival</u>		
Personnel Uninjured	Less than 40% ⁵	High
Facilities Undamaged	Less than 20% ⁶	High
<u>Economic Survival</u>	Low	Low

II. KEY QUESTIONS

A. What is the Role of Civil Defense in Strategic Policy?

Significant differences exist as to the role of civil defense in relation to strategic policy. Some analysts argue that civil defense capabilities influence an opponent's perception of the strategic balance and may, in the extreme, reflect on the credibility of a deterrent. They further contend that the lack of population protection could reduce stability and inhibit decision-making.

This argument rests on the following assumptions:

1) Defensive as well as offensive capabilities contribute to the strategic balance. Civil defense will therefore be calculated into the balance of forces.

2) The effectiveness of population protection will figure into the cost/risk thinking of an opponent.

3) There is a positive correlation between surviving population and a nation's ability to recover.

4) Deterrence rests, in part, on a willingness to act. An inability to protect a population will inhibit decisions to act, by inducing doubts and increasing the perception of risks.

5) The Soviet ability to provide civil defense might put them in a position to coerce the United States. An asymmetry in civil defense capability will undercut US confidence in a crisis and will encourage Soviet risk-taking and intransigence.

In contrast, others contend that civil defense plays no role in the perception of a nuclear balance. They argue that the population protection that civil defense can provide is insignificant in light of the magnitude of destruction following a nuclear exchange. They argue that civil defense gets no consideration in crisis decision-making and has no

⁵ Assuming Emergency Operating Centers are not targeted. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ Assuming Emergency Operating Centers are not targeted. [Footnote is in the original.]

impact on stability. Moreover, willingness to act will be influenced by a variety of political and military factors; uncertain estimates of population survival will play a relatively minor role in such a decision.

This argument is based on the following assumptions:

1) Given the magnitude of offensive power passive defense will receive little or no consideration in calculating the strategic balance and the absence of ABM defenses further undermines potential effectiveness of passive defenses.

2) Given the massive levels of destruction contemplated, the amount of population protection will be insignificant in an estimation of costs and risks.

3) There is no demonstrable correlation between population survival and national recovery.

4) The ability to protect a population has had little impact in calculating the potential willingness to use a deterrent. In past crises the availability of civil defense has had no influence on crisis decisions or the willingness of US leaders to act.

5) The absence of a US civil defense effort would not pose a threat significant enough to inhibit or coerce policy-makers.

Still a third group argues that civil defense contributes to the instability of the nuclear balance by fostering among policy-makers the illusion that the destruction resulting from nuclear war can be limited and hence encouraging them to take greater risks of nuclear conflict. This argument rests on the assumption that a major gap will exist between civil defense capabilities in reality and the perceptions of them by policy-makers. Carried to the extreme, unrealistic claims for the effectiveness of civil defense could have a more adverse effect on perceptions—and thus on stability—than could a civil defense program itself.

B. Can civil defense measures make a significant difference in the outcome of a nuclear exchange?

There remains considerable uncertainty as to the extent that civil defense measures would make a difference in the outcome of a nuclear exchange. Questions center on each nation's ability to fully carry out plans in times of crisis and on the longer-term prospects for recovery and reconstitution. Civil defense measures would not prevent massive damage to each nation's economic, political, social, and military structure, given the immense nuclear arsenals possessed by the US and USSR and the immovable physical plant associated with each of these areas in a modern industrial society. Civil defense measures designed to improve immediate population, work force and leadership survival through a combination of dispersal and fallout protection would be effective to the extent that plans could actually be implemented (attack timing, availability of transportation, etc., are uncertainties). In-place shelters hardened against blast and fallout would provide good

protection unless directly targeted. Spontaneous evacuation, a phenomenon often postulated for the automobile-rich US, could reduce immediate casualties if the net result was movement out of risk areas. Long-term prospects for the immediate survivors in both nations would be uncertain and would depend not only on the availability of subsistence levels of food, medical supplies, etc., but also on how quickly they could adapt to what would probably be a radically unfamiliar environment and severely damaged social structure.

Specifically, properly implemented civil defense measures could:

(1) *enhance population survival against the immediate effects of a nuclear attack (blast, radiation, fallout)*. Given sufficient warning time (about a week) and a successful evacuation (80% was used in the analysis) from urban industrial targets, the majority of each nation's population would survive the immediate effects of a massive US/USSR nuclear exchange. For a mid-1980's massive nuclear exchange, analyses of the attack-related effectiveness of civil defense show that:

a. In the US, successful population evacuation (for which the US does not now have plans) would provide for initial survival of 60–90% of the population, compared with 35–65% survival for the population in-place and protected only from fallout.

b. In the case of the USSR, survival levels would be about 80–90% with the population evacuated, for which the USSR does now plan, compared to 60–80% survival with population in-place. The differences between estimated US and USSR population survival rates are due primarily to the differences in megatonnage assumed to be delivered by each nation.

(2) *enhance work force survival against the immediate effects of nuclear war*. Losses among those remaining in industrial target areas during an attack would be high; however, the losses among those who had been evacuated out of target areas would be low. In one sample of Soviet industrial facilities, however, hardened shelters existed for 12 to 24% of the peacetime work force. As in the case of a general population evacuation, the US does not currently have an operational plan to protect its work force through either evacuation or hardened shelters.

(3) *enhance leadership survival among those elements of national/local leadership not directly targeted*. Leadership in shelters identified and targeted directly would not be expected to survive; however, leadership in shelters not targeted and reasonably hardened (as in the Soviet civil defense program) would have a good chance of surviving.

On the other hand, civil defense measures *would not*:

—prevent massive damage to each nation's economic, political, social, and military structure, that is, damage levels of 70–90% against the identified industrial target base of each nation. Protection of industrial and most military facilities against nuclear attack is virtually impossible or prohibitively expensive. Only in the case of extremely

hard facilities (ICBM silos, for example) or highly mobile units can a nuclear target maintain a chance of survival. Protection of some critical economic equipment and supplies might be feasible and might aid in postwar recovery. However, such efforts would be effective only in peripheral areas, not in areas directly attacked.

Combined analytical results for a massive nuclear exchange occurring after the current US and Soviet civil defense programs are projected into the mid-80s and implemented as planned (i.e., Soviet evacuated and US in-place, with 10% spontaneous evacuation) are summarized below in Table S-2. A US evacuation scheme is expected to increase initial survivors to 60–90%. Spontaneous evacuation out of risk areas in excess of 10% would lower US in-place casualty figures.

Table S-2

MID-80s CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

<u>Population Survival</u>	<u>US (In-Place)</u>	<u>USSR (Evacuated)</u>
Initial Survivors (%)	35–65%	80–90%
Immediate Fatalities (10 ⁶)	75–145	25–55
<u>Leadership Survival</u>		
Personnel Uninjured	Low	Probably high
Facilities Undamaged	Low	Probably high
<u>Economic Survival</u>	Low	Low

C. What civil defense measures appear to be most useful? Can these measures be countered by altering the attack?

Civil defense measures that attempt to reduce vulnerability through in-place hardening (rather than by redistribution, which proliferates potential targets and increases the cost, in terms of weapons required, significantly for attaining a given level of damage) tend to be less effective and more sensitive to changes in the attack lay-down. For example, in-place sheltering and hardening measures can be overcome by changes in the type and/or number of weapons used against a given target, changes in weapon height-of-burst, etc., or by targeting such in-place hardened elements, if they were not already targeted. As noted previously, only through extreme hardening, concealment, or mobility can a resource remain a target and maintain a chance of survival.

Civil defense measures that distribute leaders, people, and industrial resources, as significantly to reduce the efficiency with which these elements can be targeted, are the most useful and less susceptible than other measures to being overcome by alternatives in the attack laydown. For example, population evacuation that significantly reduces the number of people at risk to a given nuclear weapons not only enhances population survival against an economic attack, but also

retains significant effectiveness should an attacker re-target to kill population *per se* (see Table S-3).

Table S-3

IMMEDIATE SURVIVORS OF A MAJOR NUCLEAR EXCHANGE
IN THE MID-1980S (% OF TOTAL POPULATION)

<u>Population Status</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
In place and targeted	25–40%	50–65%
In place and not targeted	35–65	60–65%
Evacuated and not targeted	60–90	80–90
Evacuated and targeted	50–70	70–80

If the US launched an attack at the mid-point of a Soviet evacuation, it would cause 30 million more fatalities than an attack when evacuation was complete. The use of large yield weapons would also increase blast and residual damage and consequently increase fatalities. Detonating weapons on or near the ground could result in an additional 15 million fatalities in the Soviet Union due to early fallout.

There is uncertainty about the feasibility of sustaining population evacuation for a long time (more than about a month), either in a continuing crisis with no nuclear attacks or one with nuclear attacks repeated every few days. Soviet evacuation planning aims to keep industry in operation, but some feel the discomfort and inconvenience of temporary housing and the transportation problems engendered in moving workers to and from their factories would lead to great inefficiencies, low national morale, and eventual economic stagnation. Adopting a repeated attack policy would require alterations in current US employment plans.

D. What important aspects of civil defense and attack strategies remain unexamined?

The relationship between survival and recovery poses unexplored questions. Some argue that initial survivability is not a good measure of longer-term recovery and reconstitution, and that, for example, a large initial surviving population would quickly deplete strategic stockpiles and may so overburden the severely damaged medical and industrial resources of a nation's postwar economy that recovery could be hindered rather than helped. Others contend that manpower is the most basic of a nation's recovery resources and military strength, and that initial differences in leadership and population survivability will probably be translated into similar differences in reconstitution.

Another question concerns the relationship between initial survival and longer-term survival. Some contend that longer-term problems and "neglected" effects will be so severe that many initial survivors will

not live to usefully contribute to postwar recovery. Others contend that the great majority of initial survivors have a good chance of eventually returning to useful work.

The role and significance of civil defense for escalation control, in the event deterrence fails, needs further examination. In addition, uncertainty exists about the feasibility of sustaining population evacuation for a long time (more than about a month), either in a continuing crisis with no nuclear attacks, or one with nuclear attacks repeated every few days or weeks and so forcing population to remain sheltered.

Finally, this assessment of civil defense is based on calculated assumptions about the size, extent, nature, and impact of nuclear exchanges between the US and the Soviet Union. A number of potentially important alternative possibilities have not been carefully examined. They include:

- 1) The nature of protracted nuclear campaigns;
- 2) The effects of forward based systems, reserve forces and/or third country forces;
- 3) Major differences in weapons yield and level of attack from those we postulated.

These issues will require further study before their implications for civil defense can be determined.

III. US CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY OPTIONS

Civil defense policy sets forth the assumptions, goals, and rationale underlying program choices. Four alternative policies were identified in the analysis and are briefly summarized here.

1. *The Myth of Civil Defense*: This policy option is based on the assumptions:—that civil defense would be ineffective in protecting population, given the characteristics of the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals and the longer-term effects of a massive US-Soviet nuclear exchange; that civil defense is neither a significant element of the strategic balance nor a significant factor during a crisis; and that there are no indications that the civil defense postures of the superpowers have a significant effect on the perceptions by other countries of the strategic balance.

For some, the implications of adopting this policy go beyond merely eschewing a civil defense program. They would claim that the analytical results presented in Table S-2 are dangerous because they could lead to false conclusions about limiting casualties and thereby weaken deterrence. They would prefer declaratory policy stressing that the massive absolute levels of destruction expected in a nuclear exchange, coupled with the longer-term effects, make recovery and survival of the two societies a moot question. Such a declaratory policy could also assert the US intention to monitor closely the Soviet civil defense program and to make adjustments in our offensive forces or

targeting policy in order to negate Soviet future civil defense improvements as necessary.

2. *Insurance*: This policy is based on the assumption that the government's statutory responsibility to protect its population and enhance national recovery, coupled with the chance that a large number of initial survivors might live long lives thereafter, is adequate justification for making the modest investment in a workable program to increase the number of initial survivors among the US population. In the same light, it is argued that, because initial survival of federal leadership and related continuity of government functions will likely enhance population survival in the longer term, a small investment to enhance leadership survival is also prudent. This policy of "insurance against the failure of deterrence" assumes that civil defense will have neither a positive nor negative effect on deterrence nor a significant impact on crisis management. It also assumes that there is no need to relate US civil defense policy and programs to those of the Soviets. Instead, decisions on the scope and character of the US program should be made, like decisions on insurance generally, on the basis of: (1) the type and severity of the damage that could occur; (2) the probability of the damage occurring; and (3) the costs of the insurance. Different judgments on each of these factors can lead to different conclusions as to what insurance is desirable. The insurance rationale was used to support both the FY 1962 Kennedy program (\$550 million in FY 1979 dollars) and as well as the modest Nixon program of FY 1974 (\$115 million in FY 1979 dollars).

3. *Equivalent Survivability*. Equivalent survivability exists if the proportions of the leadership, population, and economy of the USSR surviving a nuclear exchange are roughly equal to the proportions of the leadership, population, and economy of the US surviving the exchange. This policy starts from the finding that at the present time US policies and programs do not provide for equivalent survivability. Such a goal is, however, in US national interests and is a necessary corollary of US strategic forces policy. Achievement of that goal requires new civil defense measures.

Current US strategic policy is directed towards the maintenance of essential equivalence. A marked asymmetry in the vulnerability of strategic forces would be incompatible with this goal. So also is marked asymmetry in the vulnerability of leadership and population, which would make it difficult or impossible for the US to achieve an outcome of a nuclear exchange "on the most favorable terms possible" or one likely to maximize US postwar power relative to the enemy. Marked asymmetries in survivability could also undermine the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent with our NATO and Japanese allies. Inasmuch as the Soviets believe that effective defenses are essential to deterrence,

a marked difference in the potential survivability of US and Soviet leadership and population might also lead them to doubt the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Equivalent survivability as a policy does not necessarily imply similar or equivalent programs since survivability is also a function of the nature of the society and of the attack directed against it.

4. *Equivalent Programs*: This policy is based on the assumption that US civil defense can assure adequate security and contribute effectively to deterrence and crisis management only if it is substantially similar to and equal to the Soviet civil defense program. While it is essential to have equivalent survivability in terms of outcome indices, it is equally important, given the uncertainty about exactly how offsetting US advantages might be perceived, to have equivalent programs in terms of input indices. A marked unfavorable discrepancy in programs would lead the Soviet and others to question the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.

IV. US CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM OPTIONS

The following represent five alternative civil defense programs (one with two variations) ranging from the very austere to the very comprehensive. Material on the relation between these programs and the policy options, the costs of these programs, and their effectiveness is provided in Tables S-4, S-5, and S-6.⁷

Alternative 1: *Minimal Civil Defense*. Maintain little or no civil defense (e.g., warning only) for population protection, and combine and curtail other civil defense activities

Alternative 2a: *Current Level and Program*. Maintain a modest base of civil defense activities with dual use applications. Continue current modest start on evacuation planning, with plans to be developed by the mid- to latter 1980s. Supporting systems needed for effective evacuation operations would not be enhanced, and a "surge" period of one year would be required to implement plans.

Alternative 2b: *Current Level with Emphasis on Evacuation Planning*. Maintain a modest base of civil defense activities with dual use applications. Reorient program, within current ceiling, to complete evacuation plans by the mid-1980s, with a surge period of one year still required to implement plans.

Alternative 3: *Enhanced Population Evacuation/Continuity of Government Capability*. Increase capabilities for crisis relocation and for continuity of government so as to expand substantially protection of population and leadership and so as to be able to implement plans

⁷ Attached but not printed.

on one-two weeks' notice. This capability is to be obtained by the mid-1980s.

Alternative 4: *Major Civil Defense Capability (Long Term)*. Over the next two decades, develop and maintain a capability that matches the civil defense program of the Soviet Union, through the systematic incorporation of fall-out and blast shelters in new construction.

Alternative 5: *Major Civil Defense Capability (Short Term)*. Over the next five years, develop a civil defense capability that matches or surpasses that of the Soviet Union, by the construction of blast shelters (100 psi) in risk areas and of fall-out shelters in non-risk areas.

73. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 5, 1978

SUBJECT

Civil Defense—PRC Minutes

Attached at Tab A are the minutes of the Policy Review Committee meeting on PRM-32, Civil Defense. They are fairly detailed, following the discussion in its several digressions, zigs and zags, but I decided that it is better to error in the direction of completeness because of the contentious nature of the discussions.

Upon review, it is striking how an inchoate consensus favoring an explicit policy on civil defense developed toward the end.

—Brown admitted that “equivalent survivability” is difficult to reject but fears putting it on paper.

—Christopher would follow the Congress if Congress wants a big program; he acknowledges “equivalent survivability” can be attained several ways, not only with big programs, i.e., implicit support for the concept.

—Gelb sees civil defense as part of the strategic equation.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Civil Defense: Policy Review Committee: 9/77–8/13/78. Secret.

—Tirana explains that Brown's preferences for "no policy" but a larger program will be implicitly understood by Congress and the public as "equivalent survivability" and a belief that civil defense is effective.

—Your "crisis management" argument stirred strong support from Mitchell of FPA.

—Bill Smith, of course, came down clearly for "equivalent survivability," the JCS position, by calling for a reduction of the present asymmetries between U.S. and Soviet civil defense.

—Only Spurgeon Keeny was adamant in opposing "equivalent survivability," but even he admitted a need to give people some increased probability of surviving.

Tab A

Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting²

Washington, August 3, 1978, 3–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Civil Defense

PARTICIPANTS

State

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Leslie Gelb, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)

David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

Lynn E. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs

Bardyl R. Tirana, Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

JCS

Lt. General William Y. Smith

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director

[*name not declassified*], Office of Strategic Research Analysis

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director

Al Lieberman, Chief, Office of Operational Analysis

²Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

OMB

Bowman Cutter, Executive Associate Director for Budget

Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

Federal Preparedness Agency

Joseph Mitchell, Director

Dalimil Kybal, Assistant Director for Research, Development and Program
Coordination

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC

Samuel Huntington

Reginald Bartholomew

Colonel William E. Odom

MINUTES OF MEETING

Harold Brown opened the discussion by observing what we do in civil defense to some extent is driven by what the Soviets do. He then asked Admiral Turner to comment on Soviet programs.

Admiral Turner said the Soviets are investing in a large civil defense effort sheltering all of the leadership and a small portion of the population. The remainder of the population is to be protected by evacuation. A full seven-day evacuation effort would protect about 75 percent and would reduce expected casualties by about 50 percent. If the evacuees dig elementary shelters, casualties could be reduced by another half. In the first six to thirty-six hours of an evacuation, however, a U.S. strike on the Soviet Union could increase the casualties slightly. From the second day on, the number would drop rapidly. Admiral Turner also mentioned two large uncertainties. First, we are not sure how long the Soviets could remain in an evacuated posture. Second, we cannot say what the impact of weather conditions would be on civil defense effectiveness.

Harold Brown asked when and how we would know about Soviet evacuation if it took place. Stating that the evacuation rate would be two million people per hour for the first two days, Turner ventured that satellite and other intelligence systems would detect such movement. Some skepticism was expressed about detection of such a slow rate of evacuation.

Keeney insisted that the Soviets would make a public broadcast if they evacuate. Challenged on his report of the two million per hour evacuation rate, Admiral Turner called on [*name not declassified*] who verified this figure. Brown, Christopher, and others thought it a very small number for a very large country.

Harold Brown moved the discussion to potential effectiveness of civil defense and related uncertainties. Would civil defense make a difference in the outcome of a nuclear exchange? What effect would it

have on society's survivability? Keeny responded by challenging the paper's³ estimates of survivors and condemned it for omitting attention to the long-term consequences. Soviet civil defense evacuation, he added, would give us added strategic warning. Harold Brown agreed about the warning, observing that we could generate high alert levels in 48 hours. Keeny suggested [4 lines not declassified].

Keeny challenged the paper's assertion that only a ten percent spontaneous U.S. evacuation would occur. Harold Brown observed that a large spontaneous evacuation without a reception plan would adversely affect longer-term survivability. Keeny insisted that the paper overstates Soviet opportunities to use civil defense and omits [3 lines not declassified].

Admiral Turner observed that U.S. suburban and rural areas are better prepared for a spontaneous reception than would be the case in the Soviet Union. Cutter agreed and emphasized the U.S. advantage in roads and family automobiles.

Keeny argued that evacuation in the context of this analysis certainly helps but it does not take into account the longer term effects. Huntington added that the Working Group had discussed the long-term effects but happily we do not have nuclear war experience to give us sufficient data to answer Keeny's question.

Brzezinski emphasized the effect that any U.S. civil defense has on the Soviet leaders. First, since the Soviets apparently believe in the efficacy of their own civil defense, it is bad for [2 lines not declassified]. Second, the crisis management role of civil defense on both sides is critical. A superpower confrontation in the coming decade is not to be discounted. In a situation where the Soviets implement a controlled civil defense evacuation and the U.S. responds with a chaotic spontaneous evacuation, the President's diplomatic bargaining position would be seriously undercut.

Harold Brown tried to defer this discussion of "perceptions" to later discussion of policy choices. Brzezinski rejected that suggestion, insisting that talk of civil defense effectiveness requires discussion of mutual perceptions of civil defense effectiveness.

Secretary Brown then proceeded around the table soliciting agency positions on the five program options, adding that he thought civil defense and continuity of government are separate in this case.

Christopher led off for State by arguing that we cannot compartmentalize the discussion. Suppose civil defense is part of the strategic balance and we frighten the public and allies by saying so. If we cannot

³ See the attachment to Document 72.

then get the Congressional support for the programs, we would be worse off than if we had done nothing.

Christopher added that he preferred to consult with Congress before making a program choice but that he leans towards Option 2b.⁴

Harold Brown said that Congress' view is unstructured. Congress probably would follow the Administration on any program choice between Options 2a and 3. Lower and higher level programs might get support but that is more dubious. Harold Brown rejected Christopher's request for Congressional consultations first, insisting that it had to be the other way around: we must choose a program and then go to the Congress.

Keeny, speaking for ACDA, favored program Option 2b, and expressed a fear of tying our civil defense to Soviet activities.

Cutter, speaking for OMB, chose program Option 2b with reservations about civil defense effectiveness.

Mitchell, speaking for the Federal Preparedness Agency, concluded that our real choices lie between 2a and 3, but that in view of Brzezinski's comments, perceptions are key in assessing civil defense effectiveness. Presently, what we know about perceptions indicates that we need a policy, program emphasis, and some movement.

Admiral Turner, speaking for CIA, responded to Brown's question, what is the effect of U.S. civil defense on Soviet perceptions? Turner said there are two schools of thought. One argues that the Soviets only care about our offensive programs. The other argues that they care about both offensive and defensive programs. An improved new U.S. program would, therefore, only have a mild effect on Soviet perceptions.

Lt. General Smith, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observed that we seem to believe that we must do more. The question is how much. The JCS favors Option 3.

Harold Brown then asked DCPA Director Bardyl Tirana whether we could achieve enhanced evacuation by diverting funds within the present civil defense budget from other elements of the program. Tirana answered that all but \$40 million of the present budget is required to buy into the state and local civil defense organizations. The remaining \$40 million is largely allocated for evacuation planning. It is politically impossible to divert the other money from state and local organizations because they would withdraw, leaving the Federal Government to build a replacement organization which would cost at least twice as much in the absence of local matched funds.

⁴ The five options are in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Civil Defense: Policy Review Committee: 9/77–8/13/78.

[2 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

Mitchell stated that he had been appalled at the neglected state of affairs when he became Director of FPA. We cannot defer the budget issue for long if we are serious about continuity of government. The "Washington arc" of hard sites goes back to the Eisenhower Administration. Little improvement has occurred since that time.

Brzezinski asked if we could postpone the decision for two weeks and use the time to get a sufficient understanding of the "continuity of [41 lines not declassified].

Huntington observed that perhaps Brown had in mind "assurance" rather than "insurance."

[7 lines not declassified]

Brzezinski rejoined that "equivalent survivability" makes it less likely that we would need to evacuate in a crisis because both sides would realize the other has an equivalent response.

Keeny insisted that evacuation would make no difference for a crisis, a point that Brown challenged.

Brzezinski went on to argue that "equivalent survivability" might not mean an equivalent civil defense program. [1 lines not declassified] In SALT III we must eliminate both civil defense and air defense on both sides.

Harold Brown, responding to Keeny, insisted that an option to evacuate for civil defense is worth \$100 million. Keeny replied that he fears an insurance policy will raise expectations which are illusory.

Tirana insisted that an explicit civil defense policy is very important for explaining anything we do to the public and Congress. If we have no public policy rationale as we increase the program, we encourage the public to believe that civil defense will be effective. Silence on a policy rationale, therefore, encourages the public to believe we have "equivalent survivability."

Harold Brown admitted that it is difficult to reject the "equivalent survivability" but he fears putting it down on paper. He does not worry about Soviet civil defense being effective. If he did, he would support a civil defense policy. There are genuine differences among us on this point, he added.

Christopher observed that the policy choices as stated in the paper are loaded. There are other ways to achieve "equivalent survivability."

Brown agreed and noted that "equivalent survivability" might be achieved on civil defense the way cruise missiles were substituted by the B-1.

Brzezinski said that "insurance" may be all right as a policy but its substance and definition should be that as stated in the paper for

“equivalent survivability.” We will need both the policy and the program for SALT III, where civil defense should play the same role that the ABM played in SALT I. If the Soviets will not cut back their civil defense, that is a sure sign of their seriousness about their war fighting doctrine and program efforts.

Brown rejected Brzezinski’s assertions on this point. Brzezinski once again emphasized the crisis control problem in which we could find ourselves between the two unhappy choices of war or surrender.

Brown then tried to express the spirit of the policy. It should be “equivalent effectiveness of civil defense when added to our strategic forces.” Tirana reasserted the need for a policy rationale for state and local leaders. Cutter insisted that the local leadership will not understand “equivalent survivability.” Keeny added that they can understand “insurance.”

Brown remarked that civil defense is part of the strategic balance. Keeny agreed that the option for evacuation may be useful but expressed fears that the costs are understated.

Brzezinski observed that if we initiate civil defense talks now, the Soviets probably would not respond, but with a U.S. program enhancement, they probably will respond in a year or two.

Brown, answering Keeny, insisted that the cost figures for Option 3 would provide some real evacuation capability.

Keeny insisted that the Soviets have never practiced evacuation. [name not declassified] supplied the intelligence information that in fact a major civil defense exercise was held in Moscow last April and that urban exercises for parts of cities are frequent. Keeny still insisted that Soviet civil defense is wholly ineffective.

Harold Brown said that we are in a position to recommend program Option 2c with a question about how much to add for “continuity of government” which should be left to be answered by a short study. On the policy question, he added, we want something like “insurance of the strategic balance.”

Brzezinski insisted that the rationale of “equivalent survivability” with some policy word like “insurance” is what we need.

General Smith observed that we need to reduce the asymmetries between Soviet and U.S. civil defense postures and, therefore, a policy must rationalize such a reduction.

Brzezinski added that “equivalent survivability” as it is defined in the paper is more clear about our purposes.

Gelb stated that civil defense is part of the overall strategic balance; equality of civil defense programs is not what we are after in a policy.

Brzezinski insisted that we will need a short follow-up meeting on continuity of government and a new policy statement.

Harold Brown expressed hope that it would be a very short meeting, if a meeting at all.

Harold Brown then noted some other things which are not on the agenda for this PRC but relate to the new civil defense organizational location in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):

1. The effect on civil defense and strategy of the organizational changes in the U.S. civil defense set-up.

2. The long-term effects of a nuclear strike, after two months, three months, six months, etc.

3. The feasibility and difficulties in sustaining a civil defense posture where the population has been relocated from urban centers.

After the meeting had officially ended, a number of remarks about procedures and positions were expressed.

Keeny said that the PRM does not adequately reflect ACDA's positions. It should not be considered a final document.

Christopher observed that the PRM does not include a full representation of agency views.

Huntington responded that the views of agencies are so diverse that every agency can make the same complaint as Christopher. There is no practical way in a single document to represent fully this diversity.

Christopher explained that his concern is more about the document falling into the hands of the *New York Times*.

Tirana observed that the best way to prevent that is to preempt it with an unclassified statement on a civil defense policy decision.

74. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 7, 1978

SUBJECT

FY 1980–1984 Defense Program

As you know, the Defense Department's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is somewhat different from that used in other Departments. In particular, we make much more extensive use of a programming phase (now nearing completion) during which we settle major issues before we enter the budgeting phase during which we settle details. The programming phase addresses not only the coming year, but the next five, and it is cast in "programmatic" terms (e.g., Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces, etc.) rather than budget category terms (e.g., Military Personnel Army, Other Procurement Navy, etc.).

Last March I issued my Consolidated Guidance to the Services as the basis for the preparation of their 5-year programs. You will recall that I sent you a 10-page summary of its key points, and we discussed it over a luncheon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed by an NSC meeting last May 10th.²

In response to that Consolidated Guidance, the Services have now submitted their recommended programs. I have reviewed them and will, during the second week in August, be discussing with them and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff modifications that I have in mind. Following that, and—insofar as we could—having settled the major issues of the Defense program, we will be ready to turn to the resolution of its details through the budgetary process. However, before taking that next step, I again need your guidance.

This year we have extended the principles of ZBB³ to our programming process, and have prepared not one, but three complete, alternative Defense programs at significantly different fiscal levels. While I do not think you want—or need—to concern yourself with all the differences between those alternative programs, I think that an appreciation

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 7–8/78. No classification marking. Carter drew a line from the heading to the top of the memorandum and wrote: "Harold—NSC format best—after I have paper for a day or so. J."

² Carter hosted a luncheon with the Joint Chiefs on May 10. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No minutes of the meeting were found. The NSC meeting that followed is Document 64. For Brown's 10-page summary of key points of the Consolidated Guidance, see the attachment to Document 63.

³ Zero-based budgeting.

of the major ones, not only with respect to cost but also the implications for effectiveness, is essential prior to your decision on what the Defense program should be. This whole process—everything we have been doing since last November—has been designed expressly to give you that appreciation, and it is now ready for decision.

With that in mind, I propose to send to you by August 15th a memorandum of between 5 and 10 pages. It will describe the highlights of what we could achieve at the basic program level, as well as the effect of a higher program level and what that would cost, as well as what we would have to sacrifice at the lower program level and how much that would save.

Each of the three program levels would be, in my view, internally balanced. At the same time, alternative levels for particular categories (strategic forces, naval forces, etc.) have been considered in arriving at the proper program for each of the three levels. Some of these program decisions have sufficient national importance and foreign policy impact to warrant your personal attention and guidance now. The memorandum would highlight the items I see falling into that category.

Following your receipt of that memorandum, I would like to meet with you during the latter half of that week, before you leave Washington. After a discussion of the issues raised in the memorandum, I would like to make my recommendations to you and get from you at least a tentative decision on the budget level for FY 1980 and the program through FY 1984. One possibility is an NSC meeting.⁴ Another is to use the breakfast of Friday, August 18th for this purpose.

I know you face difficult decisions this year. Among them are the need to respond to the severe effects of a rising inflation rate, to the growing costs of domestic programs, and to the massive buildup of Soviet military power. I cannot make decisions about such responses simple, but I do think you will find that the review of the outcome of our programming process that I am proposing will be informative and useful. Moreover, I believe it should precede the budget scrub; such program decisions are more properly associated with foreign policy issues.⁵

Harold Brown

⁴ Brzezinski underlined this sentence, drew an arrow to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote: "We propose to use the NSC meeting to introduce this review. Z.B."

⁵ Brzezinski sent the memorandum back to Brown under cover of an October 10 memorandum in which he wrote: "Attached is a copy of your August 7 memorandum to the President on FY 1980–1984 Defense Program. Please note the President's comment." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 7–8/78)

75. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 13, 1978

SUBJECT

The Defense Program—Request for Guidance

This is the memorandum promised you in my note of August 7.² Its purposes are to report to you on progress to date on the formulation of the FY 80–84 Defense five-year program and, more importantly, to obtain your guidance as we move to the next step in this process which so vitally affects the security of our country.

As was explained in my note, I directed the preparation this year of balanced five-year defense programs at three different fiscal levels, to permit comparison of how much change in military forces (and, as a result, in military risk) each involves—not only the effect during 1980–84, but implications for subsequent years as well.

The three fiscal levels used are termed the basic, enhanced and decremented. The basic level was developed last November in coordination with OMB, by starting with the \$126 billion you requested for defense for FY 79, plus real growth of slightly under 3%, plus a 6% allowance for inflation based on the estimates then available. The resulting level in FY 80 is \$137.6 billion in FY 80 dollars (although it does not adequately allow for the inflation rate now forecast, as is noted more fully hereafter).³

The enhanced level adds approximately 4%⁴ to the basic defense program for FY 1980, with slightly greater additions in each intervening year so that the enhanced level by FY 1984 is 6% greater than the basic.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 104, Military Posture: 7–12/78. Secret; Eyes Only. At the top of the memorandum Brzezinski wrote: “VU, FE. (The P. has seen.) ZB.” Brown sent the memorandum to Carter under an August 13 covering memorandum in which he wrote: “Attached is my memorandum on the Defense program and its implications, as background for the NSC meeting on Tuesday and for subsequent discussions. I have furnished copies only to Cy and Zbig, and have asked them to treat it as for their eyes only.” On Brown’s covering memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Sun. p.m. Since Harold wants no staffing, I have underlined those key passages that bear on the forthcoming NSC meeting. Z.B.” Next to Brzezinski’s comments, Carter wrote: “Emphasize US achievements. Map—US vs SU influence. ACDA Dir.” (Ibid.) For the record of the NSC meeting, see Document 76.

² See Document 74.

³ Carter wrote “?” in the left margin next to this paragraph.

⁴ The enhancement was obtained by adding 5% for FY 1980 to the Service programs, which do not affect such other fixed DoD accounts as retirement pay, and by raising it annually up to an increase of 9% for FY 1984. Because these enhancements affected only

The decremented level is calculated in a converse manner—it is 4% less than the basic in FY 1980, 6% less by FY 1984. These three program levels (covering a range of some \$95 billion in total program through FY 1984) permit us to consider a reasonably wide range of defense programs, and to have a better understanding of the implications of different levels of the Defense program.

The next step is one of particular importance. The three are program benchmarks to define what capabilities would be added at the higher levels, or sacrificed at the lower. Recognizing the other claims on our national resources (though no other claim can match in importance that of protecting our physical security), I need your guidance as to what the level of the Defense program for the next five years, and the budget for the next year, is to be. Your selection of a level now, followed by my staff's preparation of the balanced program corresponding to it, will lead to the final step in the process: preparation of the FY 80 budget for submission to the Congress next January.⁵

I have prepared this memorandum in three parts. The first summarizes briefly the present military context in which your decision will be taken, and the trends which have led to that military posture.

Part II, the main portion, summarizes the conclusions from eight months of intense effort by me and many others in the Department, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and the Military Departments. It describes the implications, mainly in hardware and force structure terms, of the choice of one or another level of five-year defense program—what really happens to our forces and defense capability, and in what particulars, if you decide to expand or contract the commitment to the country's defense.

Finally, in Part III I have appended my thoughts on the domestic and international considerations of a nature not entirely military which bear on the implementation and the effects of the defense decisions which you take.

part of the DoD budget, the divergence from the basic level DoD budget is only, as noted, 4%–6%. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ These programs of course represent only three specific points on a continuum of possibilities. Because of the large effort involved, I have not tried to build other properly balanced programs intermediate to these. By preserving these three as points of reference, we will be able to accommodate quickly to any intermediate level you might choose now, or adopt later. [Footnote is in the original.]

*I. BACKGROUND FOR DECISION**A. The Military Balance*

Our military capabilities relative to the Soviets' are still in the zone of "essential equivalence" that you directed in PD-18,⁶ but the general trend of the military comparison is quite unambiguously against us, and is widely recognized as such both here and abroad.⁷

This degradation is not due to any sudden surge on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been increasing its defense expenditures in real terms at a steady rate of 3% to 4% every year, compounded, for the past 20 years.

What we are seeing today is the cumulative payoff of those many years of steady effort on their part—an effort whose persistence is matched only by its breadth. In strategic offensive forces, the Soviets have deployed new ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers, with a large and continuing R&D program for the future. In strategic defensive forces, they have a serious civil defense effort,⁸ are deploying new SAMs and interceptors, and continue R&D in the ABM field. Their theater nuclear forces now include camouflaged mobile SS-20s, able to strike all the capitals of Europe, deployed in the Soviet countryside. In land forces, they have deployed large numbers of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and attack helicopters. Their tactical air forces used to be limited primarily to defense; but now they are being equipped with offensive aircraft more nearly like ours. The Soviet Navy, having moved well beyond coastal defense, now is taking tactical aircraft to sea, and developing modern ships and landing craft for amphibious assault. The pattern of growth seems to touch all areas of the Soviet armed forces, and though there may be doubt as to its purpose, there can be no doubt whatever as to its presence.⁹

The Soviets now spend substantially more on defense than we do—this year 20% to 40% more, depending on how the calculation is made. In terms of that portion of defense spending that represents investment in military weapons and R&D, the Soviets are outstripping us even further. Much more of our Defense budget than of theirs, of course, goes simply for pay and retirement. Their investments in military forces, as

⁶ "The United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other hand at least as favorable as that that now exists." [Footnote is in the original. For PD-18, see Document 31.]

⁷ Brzezinski underlined "general trend," "is quite unambiguously against us," and "is widely recognized as such both here and abroad," and drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the second half of this sentence.

⁸ Brzezinski underlined the words "serious civil defense effort" and wrote "?" in the right margin.

⁹ Carter drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this sentence.

measured by the hardware output, are about double ours. (See Figure 1, page 4.)¹⁰

Overall spending is a crude measure, representing a combination of present capabilities (current accounts) and the piling up of future ones (investment accounts). But its very crudity makes it the simplest and most visible measure of military power. And we see the cumulative effects in many specific additions to Soviet military capability, as noted above. At the same time, over the same twenty-year period, our defense spending in real terms, after rising because of costs of the Vietnam War, has steadily declined. (See Figure 2, page 5.)¹¹ It now is lower than it was when John Kennedy took office. Our Army has fewer personnel than it did *before* the Korean War. Our Navy has fewer ships than at any time since before World War II.

I do not wish to sound unduly pessimistic. I fully recognize that there are other factors—for example, the contributions of our allies and the fact that some Soviet forces are stationed on the PRC border—that tend to mitigate the trend toward imbalance. I am concerned, however, not just by the current balance but by the trends. They do, in my opinion, involve increasing military risk to the security of the United States. (See Figure 3, page 6.)¹²

¹⁰ Carter underlined the words “double ours” and wrote “Totals, incl. Allies?” in the margin. Figure 1 “Defense Investment Outlays,” is attached but not printed.

¹¹ Figure 2, “Defense Budget Trends,” is attached but not printed.

¹² Figure 3, “Defending Totals,” is attached but not printed. Parts II and III of the memorandum were not found.

76. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, August 15, 1978, 3:50–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Policy Implications of Interaction of Political Trends in Key Regions with Soviet Conventional and Strategic Buildup

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

State:
Secretary Cyrus Vance

Defense:
Secretary Harold Brown

ACDA:
Mr. Paul Warnke

JCS:
General David Jones

CIA:
Admiral Stansfield Turner

White House:
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. Hamilton Jordan

NSC:
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
(notetaker)

The meeting started with Brzezinski making the point that the purpose of the meeting is to examine the implications for U.S. policy of the interaction of political trends in key regions with the Soviet strategic and conventional buildup. He then suggested that the President call upon Stan Turner to initiate a discussion in regard to the three regions mentioned in the agenda given in the recent NIE.²

Turner: The Soviets are more assertive because of their power; because they feel that the U.S. is not as competitive. They are aware of the limitations of their power but they see detente as permitting effective competition. Moreover, their increasing war fighting capability gives them greater confidence. They are buoyed by their experience in Africa. Moreover, abroad the perception is one of change in the balance of power.

The President: Are the Soviets better off today than they were a few years ago? Are they better off now in Africa than they were three or four years ago?

Turner: The record in Africa is mixed, but one should note Ethiopia and Angola.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #11 Held 8/15/78, 8–11/78. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bartholomew. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the minutes.

² See Document 62.

The President: Let's consider where the Soviets are now stronger than they were, where their political influence is greater.

Turner: I think they are clearly in a stronger position in Africa, in India and Pakistan, and in Southeast Asia.

The President: Even considering what happened to them in Egypt?

Turner: Yes.

Vance: I don't agree. Look at what happened to them in Egypt, Somalia, Guinea and the Sudan. They tried to block the Namibia settlement but it went ahead. In India, Desai has replaced Gandhi and Desai is more to the center. It is not clear at all that their position around the world is better today than it has been.

Brown: Their position in Ethiopia is better. And certainly their role in Rhodesia compared to five or seven years ago is greater and more troublesome. On Namibia, the outcome remains to be seen. In North Africa, Qhadafi is a wild card and they have some influence with him. The Soviets are shipping substantial arms to Libya. The picture is mixed politically in the Pacific.

Brzezinski: We have to compare the present Soviet position and action with what it has been in the past. Under Stalin the Soviets concentrated on areas in immediate proximity to them (above all Europe) and we contained them. Then Khrushchev tried to use Sputnik and general Soviet momentum to launch a political, ideological appeal of global dimensions. This effort failed and in this Cy Vance is right. But today we face an ominous development in which the Soviets are compensating for the decline in their economic and ideological appeal with military pressure—massive arms, insertion of troops. It is a clear sign of their confidence in the military dimension of the balance that they moved to insert Cuban troops in Africa. This has major political implications.

The President: I sense that three or four years ago the Soviets saw Sub-Saharan Africa as an open field. Now, if the Soviets intrude, they face opposition from us, Black leaders elsewhere in Africa, and from the world. So they cannot see Africa as an open, unimpeded avenue. Also, in Europe they face the problem of Euro-Communism. And in Eastern Asia I think their influence has weakened.

Turner: But they are in a much stronger position in Vietnam and this is the dominating consideration in Southeast Asia. I think there is a standoff in Japan. But I think they are in a better position in India and Pakistan.

Vance: North Korea leans more towards China than in the past. The Japan-China PFT was a blow to them in the world generally.

The President: If I look at things from Brezhnev's perspective, I would feel that what causes us problems also causes him problems. He

doesn't want to see Angola or Cuba or Vietnam or China turn to the West; or have Mozambique turn to us for trade; or to see trade between us and Eastern Europe build up. If I were Brezhnev, I would hate to see these things happen. We have to take advantage of our opportunities and it is for this group to see that we do.

Brown: The Soviets are not a likable partner. When they get in, they seek to dominate. But if you compare their situation with five years ago, they are better off even if they do have the problems the President cited. Their influence with India, Pakistan and so forth, depends on their military power. They don't have much in the way of economic power. Though the Soviets do have real worries, they do have levers—above all the military. In all of the places we have talked about, they feel the Soviets are relatively more powerful, vis-a-vis the U.S., than they were five years ago. There is a certain ambivalence in response: for example, it has moved the Europeans to spend more. The Soviets are respected and feared, not loved, but they have options. So the Soviets may have certain apprehensions but do think they are much better off today than they were.

The President: We should enumerate the areas where we think we have a problem—political, trade, or military influence. We should approach each country or area as a separate question to be addressed. Congress is more aware of the need for peaceful competition with the Soviets than ever before. We should plan our political strategy on this basis and consult with Congress and get them aboard. For example, Mozambique and Angola are good cases for moving. What are others? We need to do this on a country-by-country basis: where we should move, what the problems are, the key Congressional elements to get on board, how to win public approval for our efforts. Our strength should help us. Brezhnev is vulnerable to competition. We have gotten the Allies to go with us. We should explore how we can do this with others.

I want to discuss our military presence abroad. I want to consider places where we can make it felt without direct military confrontation. I have no feel from Harold Brown or the JCS of the consequences of a military base in the Sinai. If at Camp David there is no agreement, there will be fear for the future and a U.S. base could be stabilizing. I don't know if we should do it, or how rapid the Soviet reaction would be. This is one place for a military presence and there may be others in the world. We should publicize our military presence elsewhere in the world.

Twelve months of our propaganda against the Cubans in Africa has led to worldwide pressure on them to get out. They are moving out of Ethiopia and it will be hard for them to stay in Angola.

Our reputation for weakness, vis-a-vis the Soviets, is not deserved. Many of us are guilty of this. For example, at defense budget time, we

tend to play up Soviet military capabilities and downplay our own. When we decided to have a public demonstration of our defense capabilities, the cruise missile test failed. We need a careful public relations effort to show that we are strong militarily as well as economically and politically. We recognize the Soviet buildup, but we are not vulnerable or weak. We have to put all of this into proper perspective and correct the weaknesses we have acknowledged. We have to do this in the defense budget for 1980 and decide what is best for us.

Jones: The JCS have had a lot of discussion of this. They see a dilemma. Things now are better than they are perceived but the trends for the future are worse than they are perceived. And the perception of imbalance today takes the focus away from the really serious problem of imbalance in the future. There is a deeper underlying concern about the military trends in the JCS than I have ever seen, and it is real and genuine. What we do today won't impact on the military balance until the future, but it will affect the perceptions of the future and the present.

Brown: There is too pessimistic a view of the military balance now and not a pessimistic enough view of the balance in 1982–83.

Brzezinski: We have to separate the global competition with the Soviets from the competitions in peripheral areas. We will do well enough in the peripheral areas. The Soviets will not sweep over Africa.

I am more concerned about Soviet power and perceptions in two areas—Western Europe and the Persian Gulf—which could affect the overall U.S./Soviet balance. In Europe we and the Europeans are doing more than ever before to assure a conventional balance. But internal politics and instabilities in Europe may mean that Europe's stronger NATO shield will be held with a trembling hand. There are also internal difficulties in Saudi Arabia and the situation is unstable in Iran and Yemen. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are concerned about the power balance between us and the Soviets. They see troublesome ambiguities in our conduct.

Vance: Some military trends are very disturbing. But we are better off politically than we give ourselves credit for. I agree with the President's presentation, but there could be serious political effects down the road from the military trends.

Warnke: The description on pages 10 and 11 of Soviet motives in arms control applies precisely to us as well.

Brown: Some events in Europe already can be attributed to the military trends and Soviet power. The 3 percent defense budget increase is one. But Norway backed off FRG participation in an exercise and, though there are domestic reasons, I think perceptions of Soviet power were involved. The Germans themselves may be starting to negotiate with the Soviets on different security premises—I am thinking of Bahr

and Wehner. It is hard to see how much all this has to do with military power, but it has something to do with it.

Turner: On the President's remarks, the Soviets would not be bothered if Angola turns somewhat to the West. They would still have 20,000 Cuban troops there. The UNITA still gives them reason to remain. As for more trade between the West and Eastern Europe, it is not a major factor in their economy and they are now turning back to the Soviets in any event. On Cuba, we can open relations, but Cuba will still be so dependent on the Soviets that the Soviets cannot be replaced. The Soviets would see all of these steps as retrograde but they would not tremble.

Vance: I think we should work with the Germans on Poland. The Germans just turned down a loan. Zbig and I have been discussing this.

The Vice President: I think we have made impressive progress in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, we have good relations where before we were barely able to talk to them. The return of the Crown to Hungary had a strong psychological effect.³ We have good relations with Romania.

The President: I think our relation with Nigeria is a notable achievement in our African policy.

I sense in Harold Brown's memo⁴ and in the NIE a feeling of despair and of abject inferiority. I don't feel this. If I look at the globe from Brezhnev's standpoint, I see tremendous problems everywhere, starting with uncertain allies. I don't feel the sense of Soviet superiority that is in these memos. We should start to be more hard-nosed about our defense expenditures. There are things we can do that would cause the Soviets concern. We should not tell Brezhnev that we are building a big nuclear carrier and a fleet of escorts, and not GLCMs or medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe. We should focus our defense spending on the most important weapons that show our strength. Our substance is sapped by non-weapons spending in the defense budget. We should also consider the proportion of the Soviet budget that goes to meet China, to control Eastern Europe, and to build a continental air defense that we don't have to depend on. We have done too much equivocating with Congress on defense.

Brown: Efficient management is important. But we cannot simply pick three or four important weapons. The total amount of money we spend determines our military capabilities. Soviet expenditures are efficient. We don't think much of Soviet air defenses, but they have a different doctrine and this expenditure contributes to their sense of security.

³ Documentation on the January 1978 return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary is in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XX, Eastern Europe.

⁴ See Document 75.

Brzezinski: Two points: 1) we have to make measured responses to the Soviets on the defense level; 2) politically, we are in one of those periods of friction with the Soviets which in the past have tended to produce new rules governing the relationship. The Soviets may learn from the costs they are now incurring, e.g., developments in the non-aligned movement and the Chinese move into Africa and now Europe. So we need to exercise considerable caution in how we handle the Soviets in this period of friction. We should insulate SALT and other arms control matters as much as we can. But we should be wary of initiatives that invite the Soviets to forget what has happened (the difficulties they have created) and make sure we make them reflect on the political costs of their actions. If we do this it may result, as it has in the past, in greater restraint in their future behavior. We must let them know that Third World turbulence will be with us for a long time and that their relations with us will be affected by how the Soviets behave. I think we are on the right course and we should keep on it.

The President: Other than increasing the defense budget, what else should we do to improve relations with the Soviets?

Vance: The key still is SALT. I think nothing will improve the relationship unless we have a SALT agreement.

Brzezinski: SALT may no longer be so decisive in the overall political and military relationship.

Brown: The relationship may get somewhat worse without SALT. But will it get better *with* SALT? I doubt it.

The Vice President: We have pursued human rights for more than a year. Is it a net plus or what? By pouring it on the Soviets on human rights, do we strengthen the people we don't want to come to power? U.S. opinion thinks we have overdone it with the Soviets on human rights.

Brzezinski: What actually have we done? We have been restrained in terms of government acts and have not talked much about human rights in the Soviet Union, after the gestures at the beginning of the Administration.

The Vice President: But are we strengthening the Soviet elements we don't like. Suslov must be arguing that Helsinki⁵ got them in a lot of trouble and encouraged centrifugal tendencies in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. Now the U.S. is exploiting these tendencies to weaken the Soviet Union. The Soviet reaction may be that we have to get tough, we need leaders who will stand up to the United States.

The President: Our human rights stance aggravated the Soviets. Some Allies think we did too much.

⁵ Reference is to the Helsinki Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975.

Page 25 of the NIE lists five goals of Soviet policy.⁶ I assume they are still applicable today.

Brzezinski: The goal of movement into the Third World has higher priority for the Soviet Union today.

The Vice President: The Soviets wish they had never signed Helsinki but they are stuck with it. It is now a major factor in relations between the Soviets and Eastern Europe as well as the West. We have to stand on our position on the Helsinki accords. But some of the things we have to say do strengthen the hard liners. It is a tricky road to walk. We have to stand behind our position.

Warnke: This is partly the price the Soviets had to pay to get the recognition of the European status quo at Helsinki.

Brzezinski: It is a mistake to punish the Soviets for their actions on human rights and not for their actions in the Third World. Unfortunately, this is the impression that was conveyed by the efforts surrounding Shcharanskiy, etc.⁷ The prevailing impression is that we are penalizing the Soviets for how they conducted their internal affairs rather than for their international behavior where we are on much stronger ground.

The President: I don't disagree. But both are part of the successful arousing of world public opinion against the Soviets, both speaking out on human rights and my statements on Africa. I feel that as a result the Soviets have lost esteem in the non-aligned movement and in the Western world. I remember when we used to be on the defensive on human rights. We were the target and the Soviets were the great protector of human rights. We were seen as aggressors because of Vietnam. Now the Soviets have the onus of being intruders, especially in Africa with the Cubans. We have done part of the job and have had a net gain on this.

I sense in this meeting a special concern with the rate of the Soviet military buildup and our response. But we stand well everywhere else.

We need an objective analysis of the proportion of the Soviet military budget which is not comparable to our own needs. After all, we don't have to maintain a million men on the Canadian border.

⁶ The five goals listed were: détente diplomacy toward the United States; détente diplomacy toward Western Europe; defense of the East European status quo; containment of China; and movement into the Third World.

⁷ Reference is to Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharanskiy, who was convicted of treason in a Soviet court on July 14, 1978, and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment and hard labor. For documentation on the Carter administration's objections to the treatment of Shcharanskiy and fellow dissidents such as Aleksandr Ginzburg, who was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" on July 13, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union.

Brown: Twenty-five percent of the Soviet budget goes for defense against China. But the forces they maintain in Eastern Europe are the forces they would use for attack on Western Europe.

The President: You have about got me convinced that we need to do more on defense. We also have to compete in other areas for minds and hearts in different countries—through trade, economic relations and the like. We should delineate the things we can do above and beyond the military, that would let us compete peacefully.

Brzezinski: We are developing with State a package of measures to undercut the Soviets and Cubans in Africa.

The President: What can we do to assure the Saudis and Iran? We need an NIE on the kinds of peaceful actions that can permit us to compete around the world. It ought to assess the various nations and regions, assess the use of our technology, and develop a propaganda effort designed to show that our strength is greater than now perceived. We should all make an effort to do this and to sell our position.

Brzezinski: This must entail a strategic concept: 1) continued strengthening of our relations with the European Allies; 2) stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran; 3) stronger relations with Japan, China, and Korea.

The President: This should be in the spirit of peaceful competition with the Soviets. We do have to make sure that there is no need for apology on the military side. Maybe we are deficient on this, or have been in the past. We should remedy the deficiencies.

Brown: Military power won't *win* for us. We have to rely on other things to build our influence. For example, things are looking better with Iraq—they are turning to us because we have things to offer.

The Vice President: We should involve the private sector more. American businessmen see more people around the world than government officials do. Our world economic position is shrinking. We ought to particularly enlarge and expand our position in Asia and help the private sector to do this.

Vance: We are already doing a great deal. Chuck Robinson will be leading an OPIC group to the Far East. John Moore will be going to Japan.

The President: We ought to use the 50 state governors, for example, ask them to organize trade missions to various countries. They would be delighted.

We should put together a program on what we could do in the peaceful competition, vis-a-vis various countries. We need to identify the specific countries.

Brzezinski: The countries should be identified strategically in relationship to our stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China.

The Vice President: We should do more to compete economically. The recent tax law means that U.S. multinational firms are hiring non-U.S. citizens because it is easier and cheaper. This is the kind of mistake we should work on.

The President: When Eanes came to the NATO Summit meeting,⁸ he was very concerned about Spain and, in answer to my question, said we could help by getting the key conservative Spanish military leaders to visit the U.S., and we did that. I think we should reach out our hands to military leaders and others and do more to bring people to the U.S.

Brown: Bringing military leaders here also reassures them about our capabilities because of what they see here.

Brzezinski: We will do a paper summarizing the conclusions of this meeting and the things that should be done.

The President: I want to ask Paul Warnke what he thinks the impact would be on the Soviets' desire for cooperation with us and detente if we were to commit GLCMs to Western Europe and establish a military presence in the Middle East.

Warnke: The Soviets would feel that they would have to match us with conventional GLCMs in Europe, but putting GLCMs in Europe would not torpedo SALT. It would just accelerate Soviet development of cruise missile capabilities. But would Western Europe feel better if *both* sides had cruise missiles, rather than neither having them? I think that there would be greater fear in Western Europe of surprise attack.

Brzezinski: Cruise missiles are not a surprise attack weapon.

Jones: Our inability to talk about command and control of cruise missiles with the Allies—targeting, range, and the like—is slowing our GLCM programs and this is what caused the slip from 1982. We need to open a dialogue with the Allies on these subjects. The dialogue itself would help to reassure the Allies.

The President: With reference to the trip I have asked Harold Brown to make to Europe, I have to do a personal letter to Callaghan, Schmidt and Giscard to find out what their thinking is and what they will do on: 1) ERW; 2) GLCMs in Europe; 3) medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe. I don't have answers from them on these items.

I have no doubt that if the Soviets had a chance to get a military base in the Middle East they would do it. But is it good for us to do it?

Warnke: To return to your first question, I think the main Soviet reaction to putting GLCMs in Europe would be a very heavy ERW-style campaign on the Germans. They would react in this manner rather than in SALT.

⁸ The 1978 NATO Summit took place in Washington, D.C., May 30–31.

They would see an American military base in the Sinai as separate from SALT. They don't believe in linkage. They would not like it but they would accept it. It would not interfere with arms control.

Vance: In my session with the SRFC, they went into the question of a military base in the Middle East at length. I said that the suggestion had been put to the U.S. but that we had made no decision. Glenn thought it would be very serious, that it would change the whole relationship with Israel and the Arabs and that it would increase the possibility of our being involved in a conflict. The question is very controversial.

Brown: Details on any base in the Middle East will matter in reactions to it. One is whether Israel and Egypt each asked for it. Another is the kind of base—for example, the JCS are examining a trilateral—U.S.-Israel-Egyptian—base for training purposes. In any event, the chances of our being embroiled in a conflict in the area would go up if we have a base there.

Vance: I think that if a base is critical to a security guarantee and the linchpin that will get us a peace agreement, then we should do it. But it should not just be thrown in at any point.

Jones: We are looking at a trilateral training base that would be open to all.

The President: Both Begin and Sadat raised the base with me. Sadat said that we should conclude a mutual security treaty with Israel. I need an answer on the base question for the Camp David meeting. The Israelis have always said they don't want U.S. troops. But I might face a request on the base nonetheless. I don't know whether we want the base option or not. Looking at our problem in reassuring Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, do we want a land presence in the Middle East or are our ships in the Eastern Mediterranean enough?

Brown: We have done a paper which we have given to Zbig and to Cy's people. There are marginal military advantages to an American military base in the Sinai. But it does mean that we are more likely to be involved in any conflict. If it is needed as a guarantee to secure a peace agreement, then it is sensible and there are military advantages in relation to the region. And a peace agreement in the Middle East cancels out the added risk that a base entails of getting involved in a conflict.

Brzezinski: A base helps secure a Middle East agreement. It also gives Saudi Arabia and Iran reassurance.

The President: Does the U.S. want a base in the Middle East if we can get a peace settlement without it? Do we want a base to reassure the Saudis and Iran?

Brown: We have to be asked to establish a base by Egypt and Israel. If we have choices in the matter, we should not establish a base if it is not necessary to get a peace settlement.

Jones: We would prefer a base in Saudi Arabia from the military standpoint and the critical importance of Saudi Arabia.

Brzezinski: A base in the Sinai does more for us throughout the region. A base in Saudi Arabia will be more susceptible to internal instability.

The Vice President: If we can get a peace settlement, we should be ready to pay for it with a base. The Sinai accords and the electronic systems set up are very important. Sadat would like an excuse not to invade Israel and to help resist his hotheads. There is nothing now in the way. An American base in the Sinai would be just a psychological, stabilizing presence.

Vance: A base would certainly help us with the problem of what to do with the air base in the Sinai and with the Israeli settlements problem as well.

The President: The base would be on Egyptian soil. If I thought there were any *opposition* from Egypt or Israel to a base, then I wouldn't do it. But I do think a base would contribute to stability in the area.

Turner: Saudi support for a base will be critical. The Soviets will try hard to split the Arabs on the issue and Saudi support will be needed to help hold firm against this.

The President: This meeting has been helpful to me. I would like to ask each of you to send Zbig further thoughts and comments on the issues we discussed and on the items we talked about doing.

77. **Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹**

Washington, August 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Defense Authorization Bill

I have given further thought to the question whether the defense authorization bill should be signed or vetoed. In terms of its effect on our defense posture, directly and through the reductions it forces in funds for procurement, readiness, sustainability, and research and development, the bill has a debilitating effect on our defense posture as compared with the budget that you submitted for Fiscal Year 1979.

In particular, addition of a nuclear carrier in the bill has two very serious effects. First, it caused the Appropriations Committees, in order to stay within the Congressionally approved budget limits for defense, to displace a number of more important and urgent needs mentioned above. Second, it continues the trend toward larger and more expensive ships—which inevitably means fewer ships—in the Navy; this is true both of the CVN itself and of the (nuclear) escorts for it that the Congress will presumably feel impelled to insert into future budgets. Thus, on substance, a veto is in order.

If we are to sustain the coherence of the defense program in support of the Administration's priorities and the defense needs of our country, the Congress must be encouraged to produce a better final outcome than now looms in its defense authorization and appropriation. A veto offers some chance of that, depending on how well we are able to articulate our objections. It does not offer a certainty, and there is a real possibility that the result will be worse. There is also the likelihood of inflaming our relations with the Congress; one must set against this the need to restrain the Congress from even more erosion of defense needs to meet their own more immediate political pressures. There is also the question of how confident we are that a veto can be sustained. Major adverse consequences to our ability to manage the defense program will follow if a veto is overridden.

A serious concern is that a veto could be seen as an Administration move toward a weaker defense posture. Our public statements, and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 7–8/78. Confidential; Personal. Additional talking points on the veto are in Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Department of Defense—Subject File, Box 37, Department of Defense—Defense Authorization Veto [1].

particularly your veto message, would be a key in countering such a misapprehension. I believe that we probably can show that a veto is not intended to weaken defense, by including in the veto message a number of points, including all of the following:

a. concentrating on the nuclear carrier, about whose wastefulness we have laid a substantial predicate over a period of six months;

b. making it clear that we urgently want to restore the more important items that were deleted in the Congressional authorization and appropriation process to make room for the CVN within the budget;

c. including in our proposed restoral Navy ships—some deleted by the Congress and some that we had anticipated funding in future years—to show that we can indeed get more ships if we avoid spending too much on a few ships.

d. making it clear that we want the Congress to appropriate funds in the full amount of \$126 billion, which was your budget proposal.

We would all, of course, work hard to persuade the Congress to return to the \$126 billion level through the bill which would replace one vetoed. But if the Congress did not, a supplemental request would be essential, and the intention of seeking one in the event the \$126 billion level is not reached in the basic bill would be a necessary part of a veto strategy. It is also important that this not be the only authorization or appropriation bill vetoed.

A clear Congressional, media and public understanding of our reasons for a veto would be absolutely essential. The public and the Congress would need to understand that you are firmly committed to a \$126 billion level for defense for FY 79. The nature of the veto message is an essential element in establishing such a position. I believe that with the message whose text is attached, a veto would be appropriate.²

Harold Brown

² Attached but not printed are undated talking points for Carter's veto of the defense procurement authorization bill for FY 1979 (H.R. 10929), which he announced during an August 17 press conference in the Old Executive Office Building. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pp. 1439–1447)

78. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, undated

AGENDA PAPER

The first PRC meeting on PRM/NSC-32, Civil Defense,² left two issues for further consideration. The purpose of this meeting is to decide them.

1. U.S. civil defense policy: a proposed policy statement is at Tab A.
2. Whether to improve the current continuity of government program: a statement of the choices is at Tab B and a paper setting forth the available program analysis on continuity of government is at Tab C.³

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF US CIVIL DEFENSE POLICY

Enhanced Survivability. The U.S. civil defense program will seek to enhance the survivability of the American people in the event that a major nuclear war occurs by providing some increase in numbers of surviving population and leadership, thereby improving the basis for eventual national recovery.

In addition, the U.S. civil defense program will contribute in part to the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic balance and reduce the possibility that the Soviets could coerce us in time of crisis. Perceptions of the overall balance should not be marked by major asymmetries in population of leadership fatalities.

"Enhanced survivability" as a policy does not require similar or equivalent programs. Survivability will depend on the nature of the society as well as the nature of the attack directed against it.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Civil Defense: Policy Review Committee: 8/14/78-9/78. Secret. Dodson distributed the paper to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Warnke, Jones, Turner, and Mitchell under cover of an August 16 memorandum.

² See Document 73.

³ Not found attached.

⁴ Secret.

Public Declaratory Policy. In support of an expanded U.S. civil defense program, the U.S. public policy should be:

The U.S. civil defense policy, *enhanced survivability*, requires modest improvements in our civil defense posture which will provide insurance in the event of the failure of deterrence while contributing to some degree to the maintenance of the overall strategic balance and crisis management.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

The FPA paper for the Policy Review Committee on civil defense provides several alternative approaches to enhancing the survival of continuity of government elements, but it does not make a comparative analysis on which to make a selection among the alternatives. It does, however, provide sufficient analysis to suggest that the current system needs significant improvements, probably including “mobility” in addition to, or in place of, fixed sites.

The choices for the Policy Review Committee, therefore, are:

- a. Retain the current continuity of government program, or
- b. Improve the present capability to make it more survivable but defer choice of alternatives for improvement pending further analysis.

⁵ Secret.

79. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 18, 1978, 2–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Civil Defense

PARTICIPANTS

State

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
Jerome Kahan, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)
David E. McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
Bardyl R. Tirana, Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

JCS

Lt. General William Y. Smith

CIA

Robert Bowie, Deputy to the Director for International Foreign Assessment Center
[*name not declassified*], Office of Strategic Research Analysis

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director
Al Lieberman, Chief, Office of Operational Analysis

OMB

Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

Federal Preparedness Agency

Joseph Mitchell, Director
Dalimil Kybal, Assistant Director for Research, Development and Program
Coordination

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC

William E. Odom

MINUTES OF MEETING

Harold Brown opened the meeting with the first of the two agenda points, a proposed civil defense policy statement. He introduced a new State version juxtaposed with the proposed Defense version for discussion.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 70, PRC 070, 8/18/78, Civil Defense. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions is *ibid*.

² The State and Defense versions were not found.

Keeny began the debate by declaring that there is no meaning in the sentence, "Perception of the overall balance should not be marked by major asymmetries."

Harold Brown defended this Defense language, arguing that it means we must either reduce the asymmetries or change the perceptions.

Brzezinski asked why the State version spoke of saving "population" but omitted reference to "leadership"?

Harold Brown suggested adding "government continuity," not "leadership" which has political overtones raising a question of which leaders will be saved.

Christopher objected to "coerce us in time of crisis." He prefers the term "crisis management" as a broader term. Harold Brown agreed, but Dr. Brzezinski did not. He suggested inserting "to stable crisis management" in the policy statement directly before the phrase "coerce us . . ."

Dr. Brzezinski then observed that the public declaratory policy statement should be changed by replacing the words "modest improvements" with "continuing improvements" because the word "modest" could invite public and Congressional criticism.

Harold Brown expressed the fear that this would be an open ended commitment.

Brzezinski replied that "continuing" or "gradual" are quite good words in the declaratory policy for avoiding an open ended interpretation. Dr. Brzezinski also proposed that "to some degree" be removed from the public declaratory policy statement. Upon Brown's objection to that change, Dr. Brzezinski offered "in part" in place of "to some degree."

Harold Brown then proposed wording along the lines of "Although civil defense has only a limited effect on the overall strategic balance and crisis stability, the program should also contribute in these regards.

General Smith objected to State's version, insisting that "survivability" would depend upon a number of factors as the last part of the DOD proposed statement indicates. "Among other factors" is omitted from the State version. General Smith wanted it included. Harold Brown agreed.

Brown then asked Keeny if ACDA would drop its alternative proposal?³

Keeny answered no. A real policy issue is being side stepped, he argued. Are we tying our policy to insurance, or are we, as is the case of the Defense and State version, tying civil defense to the strategic balance? This is not a small issue. The President should realize that it is

³ The ACDA alternative proposal was not found.

not. Furthermore, how will we explain to the public if we decide to tie it to the strategic balance?

Brown answered that the dollar figure for a program will make the tie and inform the public. The danger is to say that civil defense is important and then do nothing.

Keeny agreed. He added that the Soviets are pushing civil defense; we do not want to create pressure on this Administration by talking about civil defense. Keeny added that he did not object to the declaratory policy but only to the internal policy statement which ties civil defense to the strategic balance. The second paragraph is particularly troublesome. It can be construed to require a civil defense buildup.

Brown replied that ACDA's paragraph four, as an expression of this concern, is the thought in the DOD version.

McGiffert suggested omitting Defense's paragraph two and Keeny agreed. Keeny added that there is so little promise in the public declaratory statement that policies inspired by the internal statement would not be explainable.

Harold Brown asked Keeny if he would agree that in principle there could be differences in U.S. and Soviet casualty figures that would affect the strategic balance.

Keeny agreed that there are.

Brown then said that the statement is valid. Civil defense does contribute to the overall balance.

Brzezinski questioned whether we must reach a full agreement on the statement.

Brown said it would be a good idea to spare the President extra decisions.

General Smith said the Congress, the public, and others are concerned about civil defense being part of the balance and that we cannot side step the issue as Keeny suggests.

Tirana then explained that the public must know why we have a program and cited a recent TV program taping (60 Minutes) as an example. State and local officials cannot be encouraged to contribute without Federal guidance and policy rationale.

Keeny argued that this is why he is concerned. The declaratory policy statement offers little, but the internal policy rationale promises a lot.

Harold Brown said that we will send both policy alternatives to the President.

Keeny refused to accept the Defense modified version even if the words "in addition" were omitted. Keeny said that civil defense will become a major issue, and that the President will want to be aware that we are tying civil defense to the strategic balance.

Brown rebuttaled, “haven’t we already done so by talking to the Russians about including civil defense in SALT III?”

Keeny said yes, but for this change to be effective, there must be public debate. Tirana said it would cause less stir to accept the latest modified Defense statement than to create debate by submitting two statements for a Presidential choice.

Brown said he would include both. He also agreed with State to include a reference to “dual-use” in both the internal and declaratory statements.

Dr. Brzezinski said that is a good idea.

Jayne asked if *all* civil defense has “dual-use”?

General Smith said perhaps we could say “can have” “dual-use.”

Brown then turned to the continuity of government issue. Brown, Brzezinski, Mitchell, Christopher, and others agreed that the paper was inadequate for choosing a program to improve the present continuity of government posture. Brown agreed that the paper convinces him that the present fixed posture is not enough. He then explained the kinds of analysis that might help resolve a choice of how to enhance it.

Keeny, Mitchell, and others commented that indeed they agreed with Brown.

Brown then said we agree on the following things:

1. We need continuity of government.
2. The fixed site program is insufficient.
3. We need cost studies on how to improve the program.

Mitchell admitted that his paper was only an exploration.

Brown said that the paper convinced him it is not foolish to improve “continuity of government.”

Mitchell and Tirana then discussed how to get the study funds for an outside analysis.

Brzezinski insisted that we must decide what kind of study should be done, although Brown believed that was not for the PRC to decide. Dr. Brzezinski said we should have a working group look into what kind of analysis is needed and then commission it.

Tirana offered to fund a study in the 1978 time period with DCPA funds.

Christopher then raised a question about what program option had been chosen at the last PRC.⁴ Did it involve buying a one-year surge capability or a one to two-week surge capability?

Tirana and Smith believed that one to two weeks was the conclusion.

⁴ See Tab A, Document 73.

Keeny and Christopher thought otherwise.

Harold Brown acknowledged the ambiguity but insisted that it did not change our decision previously made. We will eventually move to the one to two-week posture, but the time was left open.

80. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Background for your SAC/NORAD Trip

Trip Purposes

Get a personal sense for the forces, equipment, and command procedures; *inspire* the officers and troops by your personal attention expressed in this visit—something not to underestimate and something you will do easily and with great impact.

Get a better sense for the relation between the realities of our forces structure and C³I on the one hand and a number of on-going policy issues on the other. Some examples are the targeting study, the secure reserve force study, adequacy of our intelligence capability, policy on theater nuclear forces, and arms control efforts, including SALT, ASAT, and verification.

The Larger Perspective for the Trip

Three general questions provide a larger conceptual framework for organizing what you want to learn. They flow from the doctrinal differences between “war fighting” and “deterrence.” They can be put this way:

—What is different about the kinds of forces and C³I that one buys for a “deterrence” posture as opposed to the forces one would buy for a “war fighting” posture?

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20–21/78 Brzezinski Trip 7–9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System.

—How would the forces and C³I for one posture interact in a conflict with the forces and C³I of the other posture?

—What changes and improvements in our own forces are implied by answers to the above questions?

These questions should inspire concern with:

—The length of a war.

—What one targets.

—Flexibility in targeting.

—The coordination (or absence of it) between strategic and other forces in the campaign.

—What the enemy will shoot at with his strategic forces.

—Survivability of C³I forces.

—Mobilization capabilities.

—Soviet views, forces, and plans.

Specific Issues and Areas of Concern

I. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

There are two kinds of problems in C³I. The first, most serious, is whether *the Soviets could attack our C³I in a way that would prevent us from retaliating*. Second, is our C³I adequate for “sustained war fighting?” Could we manage flexible planning for supporting theater campaigns? Do our intelligence assets provide timely enough information to support operational needs? And will they survive? More specific questions you might ask on these points are:

—Where are weak links in communications with the bombers? ICBM’s? SSBN’s?

—Can our communications equipment withstand the “electromagnetic impact” (EMP) they would receive from nuclear blasts?

—For how long could the Soviets repeat and sustain EMP over large parts of the U.S.?

[1 line not declassified]

—Should any actions be taken to enhance connectivity amongst our critical C³I modes? What?

[1 line not declassified]

—Do we have any backup/reserve satellites ready to launch to replace damaged ones during a campaign?

—Congressional oversight committees have concluded that our intelligence is adequate for peacetime only—if this is true, what should be done to improve the situation?

—How will SAC update its intelligence after the first strike? Successive strikes?

—Can the air command post do more than manage SIOP-type options? How will its intelligence and force connectivity be kept up to date in the weeks and months after a war begins?

—Where will surviving SAC bombers go after the initial strikes?

—If public electrical power is lost, can the ICBM force still launch? How long can it endure without public electrical power?

II. Planning and Targeting

As the PD-18 targeting study indicates, our major planning effort has been on the SIOP and its MAO and SAO variants. The SIOP is no small achievement, but its great complexity also introduces rigidities. As you recall from IVORY ITEMS, once there was a search for refinements to adjust a retaliatory response to various and different situations, the rigidity became apparent—e.g., recalling the bombers after a couple of hours. That is still virtually undoable without calling off every other part of the SIOP.

Another problem lies in the integration of our strategic forces with SACEUR's theater nuclear forces. The same problem also exists in Korea although it does not get the same attention. Here is the problem as I understand it. If SACEUR shoots his "general strike plan" (TNF) in conjunction with the SIOP, things are all right. If they are fired separately, great gaps occur. The most troublesome aspect of this seems to be the possibility of escalation in Europe which we want to hold at the theater level. There are differing views on the adequacy of our present planning of nuclear fires for that event.

LNO's and RNO's are the planning devices which are meant to move us away from the SIOP rigidity. The ones now planned are largely academic exercises because circumstances, military and political, will never be exactly as assumed in the planning phase. The direction to move with LNO's is toward more speed in planning them for particular situations as they arise. You should try to get a good sense for SAC's lack of flexibility and speed in such planning. SAC and the Air Force like to evade this issue because it shows so clearly how they are unprepared for anything but the big spastic retaliation.²

You will want to ask about "secure reserve force" (SRF) planning.³ This topic, like LNO's, brings up the question of how long a war will last and how to endure for the long campaign. SAC is very weak on this matter. The planners don't know what they would target with the SRF, and they are not sure how they will control them. SRF is also a bone of inter-service contention. The Navy likes to use SRF for justifying more

² Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this and the previous sentence.

³ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

SSBN's, and SAC knows that creating a survivable SRF from bombers and ICBM's is not promising. That is another reason SAC shows low interest.⁴

On targeting priorities, you have read the memos from Huntington and Utgoff,⁵ and you may want to discuss "economic recovery" versus "military forces" in targeting. This topic becomes scholastic very quickly. Once you move to duration of the war, planning flexibility, C³I, SRF, etc., the targeting priorities are implicitly reversed.⁶ The subject remains important, however, for the structure of the SIOP.

The following list of short questions may be useful in probing the briefers:

- How long does it take to plan an LNO from scratch?
- Who can plan LNO's? JCS? SAC?
- Could SAC support SACEUR in a theater nuclear campaign? Who would control planning? Where would it take place?
- How will targets be identified for LNO's?
- How will damage be assessed after LNO's have been fired?
- Are LNO's coordinated with actions by other forces? Ground offensives? If so, what is the planning link to the land force commander?
- Could we track, target, and hit a Soviet naval task force at sea with an LNO?⁷
- What constitutes our Secure Reserve Force? How do we know it is "secure?"
- What will we target with the SRF?⁸
- How will we assess SRF⁹ damage?
- Will the SRF be coordinated with theater forces (Europe) after a SIOP exchange?
- Could surviving SSBN's be reloaded with SLBM's? Where? Would it make sense to build and store extra SLBM's? Do we have any industrial mobilization for missile production in the event of a long nuclear war?
- Do we have LNO's for Soviet C³I?¹⁰

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this and the previous sentence.

⁵ Huntington's memorandum to Brzezinski is printed as Document 71. Utgoff's memorandum was not found.

⁶ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

⁷ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

⁸ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence and under-scored "with."

⁹ Brzezinski underlined the words "assess SRF."

¹⁰ Brzezinski circled this sentence.

—What does the increasing number of Soviet rail mobile command posts and airborne command posts mean for our targeting and planning?¹¹

—Does our target list have all the Soviet C³I bunkers in the USSR? In East Europe?

—Could we launch an LNO on only Soviet theater C³I in East Europe?

—Does SACEUR, in his RNO context, have the capability to destroy Warsaw Pact C³I.

—How far down the command line can SAC acquire and target command posts? Front? Army Group? Army? Division?

III. *Interaction of U.S. and Soviet Forces and C³I*

This topic pushes up the force structure implications of planning and programming for a “deterrence” doctrine versus planning and programming for a “war fighting” doctrine. I am attaching at Tab E a special paper done for me by a concerned denizen in the depths of CIA.¹² His thoughts are based on close examination of several years of Soviet military exercises. His most striking conclusion is the growing Soviet interest in nuclear conflicts limited in one fashion or another. Bob Rosenberg’s SAC/NORAD trip report (Tab D) summarizes Intelligence Community growing evidence of a Soviet sustained war fighting capability.¹³

Flexibility, use of nuclear forces in combination with other forces, and scenarios allowing for slower escalation are the hallmarks of Soviet exercise evolution.

Some questions in this area are:

—Where are the weak points in the Soviet approach?

—What changes are we making to take into account changing Soviet capabilities and exercise practices?¹⁴

—What should be done as opposed to what is being done?

—What are the implications of ASAT developments, both Soviets and U.S.?

—What is the consequence of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. What can be done about it? (Bob Rosenberg suggests that you discuss

¹¹ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

¹² Tab E was not found attached. Above this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: “Sustained limited nuclear war.” To the right of that comment, he wrote another illegible comment.

¹³ Tab D was not found attached.

¹⁴ Brzezinski drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to this sentence.

this with Bill Perry during the trip and initiate a “counters to damage assessment” effort.)¹⁵

IV. *IVORY ITEM and NORAD*

At NORAD you should ask General Hill about his problems with IVORY ITEM. In short, the issue is this. The JCS, in designating an IVORY ITEM scenario, assumes a sequence of enemy actions. When the President asks General Hill for refinements and clarifications of the enemy action, he may not have them in his JCS brief. If he makes them up, he risks throwing the entire scenario off base.

You might ask General Hill and General Ellis about trying some IVORY ITEM drills where a war begins in Europe or Korea with conventional forces and then escalates to the nuclear level. In other words, can we use the IVORY ITEM format to discover more clearly our ability to “control escalation” and to keep things at the theater level? An IVORY ITEM for an LNO scenario might also be interesting.¹⁶

V. *Arms Control, Force Postures, and Doctrine*

Senator Nunn has recently declared that our arms control negotiating requirements drive our military programs while the Soviet programs drive their negotiating requirements. During the trip, test this proposition. “Deterrence” ties our arms control approach to our force developments. Is deterrence an adequate paradigm for integrating arms control with programs? Or is it encouraging us to launch programs that do little to improve our military capabilities?

Some examples:

- MAPS for the ICBM force while ignoring C³I?
- Launch from under attack?
- Targeting policy “fixes” to compensate for Soviet civil defense?
- Targeting priority on “economic recovery” rather than flexibility to adapt to appropriate policy objectives during a war?

¹⁵ Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this paragraph, and an arrow in the right margin pointing to it.

¹⁶ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this and the previous sentence.

81. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Appraisal of Your SAC/NORAD Trip

The full impact of your personal appearance and touch with the officers and troops will not be fully apparent for some time, but it was undoubtedly great. I could see that, particularly in your interaction with the lower ranking officers and the enlisted personnel at Ellsworth AFB.² The SAC Wing Commander said that White House interest in strategic forces has never been so great as in this Administration. He felt it from the beginning and sees the persistency manifested in your visit.

The discussions on operational, planning, and doctrinal matters was most fascinating and hard-hitting for the briefing officers. The strongest impact was Sunday evening at Offutt.³ Perry and Jones were clearly nervous. General Ellis was having a great time dumping the tough questions on the JCS, but when you nailed him on the implications of C³I vulnerability, he was very unhappy with the trap into which he had put himself. He merely wanted to lobby you for a larger C³I budget, not to raise the fundamental issues about how Soviet growing capabilities are making SAC's posture less relevant to the President's crisis management and war fighting needs. When I tried to pick up on "war fighting" the next day, he evaded the question. So did Jones.

The other officers in that evening briefing were noticeably moved. Three of them told me the next day that the discussions were the most "interesting" they have ever heard on this topic. Coyle, Duncan's assistant, found them not only interesting but "troubling."

Several of the one and two star generals who briefed at SAC clearly had some idea of the direction you would probe. They could not tell me two months ago how long it took to plan an LNO from scratch. Nonetheless, your repeated underscoring of the non-SIOP scenario and the longer campaign gave them more than they could handle. The result,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20-21/78 Brzezinski Trip 7-9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System.

² Ellsworth Air Force Base, near Rapid City, South Dakota.

³ August 20. Offutt Air Force Base, near Omaha, Nebraska, was the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command.

in their mind, was a sense of our own military inadequacy for the era of strategic parity but also a sense that more of what SAC is doing may not help much.

One point to draw out in the question of C³I and the longer war is the “incentive structure” in the Pentagon for C³I budgeting. C³I funds are taken largely from the service budgets. The Air Force prefers new bombers and fighters if asked to choose between them and new C³I costs. So do the Navy and Army dislike surrendering their hardware to pay for the NCA’s C³I. Thus, it is difficult to find a sustained and powerful military interest in C³I. This is a key issue for Duncan who is chairman of the WWMCCS Council, the group which addresses the overall C³I budget and structure of the World Wide Military Command and Control System.

At NORAD, things were not as sharply focused as elsewhere, but General Hill’s briefers were pleasantly appalled to have the opportunity to answer many of your questions. Drawing out the Soviet SSBN threat to our C³I and the inherent asymmetry in the geography were two points they obviously had not expected the occasion to make. A number of other questions you asked gave them a chance to raise buried issues with Bill Perry. The solar interference with DSP coverage, for example, and the escalating space activity which NORAD is asked to monitor while much of its capability is eroding are two matters of considerable importance, not only for tactical warning but also for ASAT concerns and arms control verification.

Although General Jones’ presence was useful in many respects in your probing and questioning, it also dampened things for you slightly. At Ellsworth AFB and at NORAD the local command structure was obviously as much worried about pleasing and responding to Jones as about dealing with you. They will have to face Jones again and again, but not you; thus they had to split their attention. Jones intimidated General Hill by telling him that his small welcoming ceremony for you—involving a dozen troops—showed that Hill has too many unemployed personnel; otherwise he would not be able to afford the ceremony! Hill asked me several times thereafter if you were offended by the ceremony. I told him that you probably thought of it not as a personal thing but as a useful institutional symbolism that enhances the sense of purpose and coherence in his organization. I also learned that Jones did not desire to make the trip. “Someone” invited him twice before he “got the message.”

I cannot judge what Bill Perry took away, but your doctrinal and operational questions were not lost on him, and they clearly disturbed him at SAC. I was surprised that he did not challenge you more directly.

In summary, you have clearly opened the doctrinal debate within the SAC and NORAD circles on “deterrence” and “war fighting”, and

I suspect that it will reverberate back to the JCS in a short time. The military reaction is going to be mixed. They like your rhetoric, and they are easily compelled by your logic. As the budgetary and institutional implications become clearer to them—as they immediately were to Jones—they will have second thoughts, but thoughts difficult for them to voice candidly.

82. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Follow-up Actions on Your SAC/NORAD Trip

Your trip raised a large number of points, but follow-up action is relevant for only a few of them. It is useful to list the major points and then indicate the ways to follow up.

Key Points Emerging During Your SAC Briefings

1. US vulnerability to Soviet C³I attack, [2 lines not declassified].
2. SIOP rigidities and the limited work on flexible planning.
3. The problem of political guidance for LNO planning.
4. [1 line not declassified]
5. The growing importance of the SSBN fleet for US vulnerability.
6. The lack of a Minute Man reload capability.
7. The lack of redundancy in our SAC targeting data base. Once the NMCC, ANMCC, and SAC are destroyed, the airborne command system, including the NEACP, do not have the staff capability to handle flexible LNO and other targeting.
8. Our ability to assess damage after the SIOP or LNOs is problematical.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20–21/78 Brzezinski Trip: 7–9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Brzezinski wrote next to the date: "Good memo! please review with VU and others, so that it can be staffed out + followed-up. ZB."

Key Points Made at NORAD

1. The DSP system has blindspots at times and barely covers the threat areas. SSBNs could easily shoot through it undetected until the new PAVE PAWS coastal radar is active (1979 on the West Coast, but held up by an environmental impact court proceeding on the East Coast).

2. DSP ground stations are few and vulnerable.

3. Ground and satellite communications with the BMEWS system is degrading due to budgetary decisions to give up costly landlines.

4. There is virtually no BMEWS or other capability for characterizing a Soviet IRBM attack on Western Europe.

5. Monitoring ASAT activities and other space activities exceeds NORAD's capability, and the forecast is for the gap to grow in the future. Do the Europeans know this?

Follow-up Actions

This is a tentative list of things to do and approaches to take. The possibilities, of course, are rather staggering because you opened more issues than Defense could possibly resolve in a decade.

1. *How to deal with the rigidity in our SIOP and the lax of flexibility.*

This is the issue of most direct concern and responsibility for you as chairman of the Special Coordinating Committee (Crisis Management). You have already mentioned the very schemes I would recommend.

First, you mentioned to General Jones some IVORY ITEM exercises to explore scenarios other than the SIOP. Four or five limited nuclear conflict scenarios, particularly scenarios taken from Soviet exercises, can teach the President, you, Brown, and the Joint Chiefs a great deal about our present predicament. Creating that awareness is the first and most important step now.

Second, you could establish an SCC for LNOs, one to be an NSC when you can get the President involved. Once that process is started, you will generate the kinds of guidance needed for more flexibility in LNO planning. You are also going to uncover the lack of integration of LNOs with Army and Navy commands and plans, particularly in the theaters of Europe and Northeast Asia.

This SCC for LNOs could in fact grow into what has been sought by many people for several years. NSDM-242 called for some small political-military war staff for the President;² it never took hold because

²NSDM 242 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 31.

Kissinger's war doctrine did not require it. The general idea appears again in the DOD targeting study.

It seeks a "mechanism" that connects the military planners with the political leadership for appropriate guidance. You and the President began generating such a small group with the IVORY ITEM. I have encouraged Defense to accept that informal group as the "mechanism" they want in this targeting study. Their reactions are mixed, but Leon Sloss is willing to consider it as second best to a formal SCC for this purpose.

As you drew out the LNO issue at SAC with General Ellis and suggested that we might review the LNOs with the President, I was reminded of a short passage from Clausewitz: "If war is to be fully consonant with political objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet so that the cabinet may share in the major aspects of his activities." An SCC on LNOs, etc., puts the National Security Council in a position to share in the major activities of military planning with strategic and other forces.

2. *The C³I Problem.*

The best approach here is to discuss it first with Charles Duncan. He is beginning to take interest in the National Communications System and the WWMCCS as the DOD's major figure in that arena. Two topics for such a discussion are:

—The problem revealed in the SAC study of our vulnerability to a C³I attack and the kinds of things that make sense as program responses. (There is a DOD program issue paper on this C³I.)

—The institutional incentive structure for C³I budgeting: nobody wants to pay but everyone admits the need for someone to pay for WWMCCS.

3. *The SACEUR and NATO Planning Problem for TNF.*

I am not abreast of the way PRM-38³ is moving on this matter, but TNF policy is where the most immediate opportunity for follow-up lies. Uninformed of the PRM-38 rationale, I would guess that Gray Area Systems arms control perspectives are driving our weapons program options. European "psychological" or political needs (to avoid the "de-coupling" impression) probably rival the arms control concerns

³ Reference is to the interagency preparation of the response to Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-38, "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control," which Carter approved on June 22, 1978. Documentation on PRM-38 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983.

for driving weapons choices. Left out entirely is the perspective of planning for a theater nuclear campaign within and as part of the US strategic campaign planning.

4. *The "I" Concerns in C³I at NORAD.*

Rosenberg can probably be more helpful on this point, but the satellite reconnaissance budget is obviously a relevant place to follow up NORAD's worry about gaps in coverage of missile launches.

SALT and ASAT negotiations are also affected by the projected degradation of our capability to monitor space activities.

Telecommunications policy is an area for action to prevent degradation of NORAD ground communications, but after a chat with Bill Perry, I have reached the view that the AT&T monopoly—which allowed the DOD to set high standards for connectivity, hardness, and system interoperability—will erode and the National Communications System (including NORAD) will have to adapt. It is not clear to me what precise actions to take at present on this matter.

This is an initial hasty list. Several of the points need better staffing before you decide on precise follow-up actions.

83. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

JCSM-284-78

Washington, August 23, 1978

SUBJECT

Defense Programs and the Military Balance (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the pending decisions on the FY 1980 Defense Budget will exert a pivotal influence on the national security options available through the 1980's and beyond. Collectively, therefore, we wish to expand on observations made individually to you during the recent Program Review process and to draw

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 9/78. Secret. Thor Hanson sent the memorandum to Aaron under cover of a September 8 handwritten note that reads, "Dave, This is the memo Dr. Brown mentioned to you. He has passed a copy of it directly to the President." (Ibid.) Brown gave the memorandum to Carter at Camp David on September 8. (See Document 87.)

upon the memorandum the Chairman forwarded to you on 12 August 1978.²

2. (S) We believe that US (and Allied) and Soviet (and Allied) military postures are generally in balance today. However, we also believe that a contemporary snapshot of the current balance is misleading unless placed in the wider perspective of long-term trends. Leaving aside arguments about specific growth rates, percentages of GNP, or intentions and recognizing the Soviets' "China Problem" as well as their many shortcomings and reverses in political and economic spheres, there is no escaping the fact that the Soviets have been able to pull abreast of us militarily through a systematic and protracted investment in both numbers and quality of weaponry. In relative terms, there can be little doubt that the strategic balance has shifted, that the margin of US military capability relative to that of the USSR is narrower today than it has ever been, and that these adverse trends are continuing.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff see the present consequences and implications of these trends as follows:

Strategic Nuclear Forces: In the space of a few years, the United States has moved from a position of clear-cut superiority to our current position of essential equivalence. However, while the present balance might appear superficially static, the trends are divergent. The Soviets are modernizing virtually every component of their strategic nuclear force structure behind the momentum of new systems which are in the field and in production. In contrast, a decade or more of slips, reductions, and cancellations has retarded US modernization appreciably and our ability to accelerate production enough in the short term to keep pace in the event of an unrestrained competition is questionable.

Moreover, we agree with the conclusion of NIE 11-4-78 ("Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena") that the Soviets may expect to achieve a margin of superiority in the strategic field in the early 1980's.³ Statistically, the margin may not be great, but any significant overall edge would have a profound influence, not only on the perceptions and apparent options open to decisionmakers in Washington and Moscow, but also on the policies and alignments of other nations.

Our situation can be likened to skating on thin ice with the ice getting thinner. Any sudden and dramatic Soviet achievement could cause a precipitous change in world perceptions, just as Sputnik electrified

²Jones presented his views in an August 12 memorandum to Brown. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 87, Defense Budget: 1-8/78)

³See Document 62.

the world in October 1957 with the impression that the Soviets were far ahead of the United States in space technology. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, it took a "catch-up" program costing many billions of dollars and years of concentrated effort to correct that impression; in the more perilous area of strategic weaponry in the 1980's, the consequences could be much more serious.

We believe it is also important to bear in mind that Soviet doctrine does not mirror the widely held view in the United States that nuclear war is unthinkable. Soviet doctrine treats nuclear conflict as undesirable, but also as both possible and winnable. We do not believe this doctrine can be dismissed as declaratory posturing, for they suit the action to the word. Across the whole range of strategic capability—force structure, command and control, hardening, dispersal, civil defense, etc.—we see evidence of a nation which takes seriously the possibility of nuclear conflict.

Tactical Nuclear Forces: The formal clear-cut US lead in tactical nuclear capability has been overtaken by the Soviets. The implications of this vanished edge are particularly serious in a NATO context.

The previously cited NIE 11–4–78 makes a persuasive case for the Soviet expectations of a better-than-even chance of gaining a quick conventional victory in Europe. Many of our European allies share this view and consider a credible threat of escalation as an indispensable element of the NATO deterrent. Our NATO Allies have long viewed tactical nuclear weapons as both an essential leg of the "NATO Triad" (general purpose, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces) and a key element in assuring the credibility of the escalation option within NATO's MC 14/3 flexible response strategy. However, given the state of essential equivalence in US-USSR strategic nuclear forces and clear Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in conventional forces, the absence of an Allied edge in tactical nuclear capability is an added source of deep concern especially to defense planners in NATO capitals.

General Purpose Forces: The United States and its allies have never attempted to match the Soviet predilection for mass and numbers in conventional warfare. Rather, we have tended to rely upon the force multiplier effect of technologically superior forces to offset more numerous but relatively unsophisticated forces of potential opponents.

In recent years, however, Soviet quantitative advantages have persisted or widened while many of the key US qualitative advantages have been systematically overtaken. This qualitative erosion is a consequence of an extensive Soviet R&D effort and a reequipment program that has outpaced our own by a wide margin.

Soviet progress has been evident across the board. They are modernizing their ground forces with improved armor (new main battle tank), firepower (artillery with superior range and rate of fire),

battlefield mobility (new armored personnel carrier) and air defense weapons, all of which match or exceed the sophistication of similar US weapons. The Soviet Navy has grown from essentially a coastal protection fleet to a highly effective blue water surface and subsurface force, supported by a growing force of modern, land- and sea-based naval aircraft and an increasing amphibious capability. Similarly, the character of Soviet air forces has changed from primarily an air defense force with limited offensive capability into a long range, high performance, high payload, offensively oriented air arm.

These Soviet advances are particularly worrisome in a NATO context, in that the steadily growing Soviet edge in conventional and chemical warfare capability has for years been concentrated against Western European defenses. NATO deployments are thin and uneven, our allies are short of munitions, interoperability problems persist, sea lines of communication are critical, and, even with increased POMCUS, US augmentation is slowed by the limitations in our strategic airlift and sealift capability.

The picture is not altogether negative. The Long Term Defense Program is a step in the right direction and we believe it is critical to maintain this encouraging momentum through continued Alliance-wide modernization of conventional forces.⁴ However, we also believe that these measures must be recognized as but a beginning in redressing a regional imbalance which has been shifting for more than a decade and that the likely global nature of a NATO conflict must be borne in mind when assessing our progress.

Power Projection: This is one key military area in which the United States retains a substantial lead. We believe it essential to maintain this lead in view of the many political, economic, and military interests abroad which, if threatened, would have to be defended or reinforced with CONUS-based forces.

Much of our lead is based on global interests and an alliance system which motivated our developing both the technology and expertise required for power projection. We have long maintained a balanced mix of mobile ground forces, naval and airlift forces, and flexible amphibious and tactical air capability for rapid reaction to any level of threat worldwide.

At present, our superior ability to bring such forces to bear in a distant crisis area provides significant deterrent leverage, and we see compelling evidence that the implications of this imbalance have not

⁴ Reference is to the conclusions reached at the May 1978 Washington meeting of NATO heads of state to preserve NATO as an effective deterrent to the Warsaw Pact. A key outcome of the meeting was the agreement that NATO members annually increase their defense budgets by at least 3 percent in real terms.

been lost on the Soviets. They are embarked on a determined campaign both to increase their own projection capability and to deter or neutralize ours. Their increased emphasis on a quasi-military role for the Soviet merchant and civil air fleets, the growth of long-range offensive surface and submarine forces, growing amphibious capability, progress in wide-body aircraft technology, and pressures to obtain access to ports and airfields in Third World countries are some of the key signs that the Soviets appreciate the utility of power projection and intend to narrow our lead.

Additionally, the change in character of Soviet conventional forces, combined with Western dependence on imported oil, has expanded the area of potentially critical US/Soviet confrontation into a region—the Persian Gulf—which possesses little in-place deterrent.

Therefore, we believe it is essential to continue to modernize all aspects of US offensive and defensive power projection capability.

Breakout Potential: US industries are clearly more efficient, productive, diverse and technologically sophisticated than their Soviet counterparts. On the other hand, the Soviet near term capacity to produce military hardware exceeds ours by a substantial margin. With a determined effort, there is no doubt that the United States could eventually overtake and surpass the Soviet Union if forced into an accelerated arms buildup. However, given their “running start” and the time it would take us to reorient, retool, and expand our military production base, the overtake point is open to some question. The decisive issue could be whether the nature of the race were a 100-yard dash or a marathon. We believe this asymmetry in production base wields significant influence in the calculus of the strategic balance.

4. (S) Placing the above sobering military judgments into the broader context of the total power balance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude:

- The Soviet system has neither the political appeal nor the economic vitality of the United States; the USSR derives the majority of its influence in the world from the actual or potential use and deployment of its military power.

- The Soviets have experienced political setbacks and reverses in their efforts to exert influence abroad where the application of military pressure (direct or proxy) was either inappropriate or foreclosed.

- Although the Soviets traditionally have been very cautious in the direct use of their own military forces outside their immediate sphere of control, their present position of strategic nuclear equality, with accelerating momentum toward a margin of overall military superiority, could create further incentives for greater risks. We believe that the greater the Soviet perception of freedom of action in the military realm, the greater the danger that they might attempt to exert the leverage of military

power (threatened or used) in extending their economic, diplomatic, or ideological influence, miscalculate our will or ability to resist pressures, and precipitate a conflict which neither side wants or intends.

- In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the central security challenge of the 1980's—and the fundamental issue which the FY 1980 Budget must confront directly—will be to deny the Soviets any such real or perceived incentive to pursue options based on a preponderance of military strength.

5. (S) In our view, the first step should be an explicit and visible commitment that, until and unless Soviet military expansion becomes restrained, the United States will maintain at least the present balance through sustained and substantial growth in our own defense programs. We should also do everything possible to persuade our allies to follow suit. In the context of the 5-year budget levels as specified in the Consolidated Guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard the decremented level as a “reduce and withdraw” budget, the basic level as a “perpetuate the current trends” budget, and the enhanced level as a “retain the balance” budget.⁵ Recognizing that, in a constrained resource environment, the judgment on the size and allocation of limited defense dollars becomes fundamentally a risk assessment, we believe the enhanced level of funding is well justified by both the objective and perceptual considerations discussed above.

6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further believe that increased US defense spending should be only one element in a more confident and assertive national strategy. Without being arrogant or provocative in the use of our national power, we believe that the United States has the material and moral resources to arrest and reverse the dangerous trends discussed earlier, to force the strategic competition with the Soviet Union away from the military sphere and toward areas where the risks of violence are less and the incentives for negotiated force reductions are greater, and to support our national policy of eventual reduction of tensions. We will continue to study new alternatives for contributing to the military component of such a strategy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David C. Jones

⁵ For Brown's summary of the Consolidated Guidance, see Document 54.

84. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-43¹

Washington, August 24, 1978

TO:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO:

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

United States Global Military Presence (U)

Pursuant to the August 15 meeting of the National Security Council,² the President has directed preparation of a Presidential Review Memorandum examining the U.S. military presence abroad from the standpoint of maintaining and enhancing our political and military position vis-a-vis the Soviets and of providing reassurance and confidence to key countries of concern to us. The PRM should develop options for U.S. military presences in various areas.

The PRM should be prepared by an interagency working group chaired by the NSC staff for consideration by the SCC. It should be submitted for SCC consideration and recommendations to the President by October 2, 1978.

Dissemination of this directive and participation in the PRM should be restricted as much as possible.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 1, Working Copies of PRM/NSC 1 through 47. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 76.

85. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 30, 1978

SUBJECT

Report on My SAC/NORAD Trip

On August 20–21 I took advantage of your absence to familiarize myself with NEACP, to be briefed on the C³I² problem at SAC HQ, to fly a low-level attack mission in a B–52, to inspect a Minuteman silo, to review warning and assessment procedures at NORAD, to inspect tactical fighter training at Nevada, and to visit a site on which I will report orally.

Some key impressions (and you might wish to provide some guidance by marginal notes):

1. The military enormously appreciate the direct interest you have shown in C³I issues. This was mentioned everywhere. In this connection, I believe that we ought to run an IVORY ITEM on an LNO. We have not done this and that issue could become more critical in the years ahead.

2. I was struck by the extent of U.S. C³ vulnerability. More work on this is needed, and I will be pressing Harold Brown and my own staff to develop this matter further. I believe that our C³I vulnerability is serious. [*4 lines not declassified*] This issue could become a more serious problem for crisis stability than the question of [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

3. I believe that our strategic forces are well organized and designed for a single large retaliatory attack, but less so for any lesser variant, or for a war lasting weeks. We should not base all of our planning on the assumption that a nuclear war must either escalate or terminate quickly.

4. Our strategic doctrines are based on the concepts of the sixties, when we had strategic superiority and at least conventional parity. We need a fundamental doctrinal review. I am setting up an office in the NSC on Strategic Planning (under Fritz Ermarth, who is currently serving as the Director of the Strategic Systems Program at Rand) to work on this issue as well as on a comprehensive and integrated strategy for SALT 3 and the grey areas.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 52, SAC and NORAD 8/20–21/78 Brzezinski Trip: 7–9/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. [Footnote is in the original.]

5. Not enough attention has been paid in SALT to the fact that the Soviets can reload and fire from their SS–18, 19, and 17 silos within approximately 24 hours or less. The implications of this need to be examined more fully, especially in view of the lack of a Minuteman silo reload capability. I will have our staff take a look at this.

6. We have very limited warning capability in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on Europe and/or China. The Europeans and/or Chinese have even less. This issue could become a political problem in U.S.-European relations.

7. Our infrared satellite warning system (DSP) has occasional blind spots as well as growing requirements which it cannot meet without added capabilities, especially additional satellites. My staff will be developing the needed review.

8. We need more political input into the development of LNOs. Until now they have been developed purely by the military. I will be taking corrective actions.

9. Dave Jones accompanied me. He is immensely worried about the CTB and says the Chiefs will oppose it. He raised the CTB issue with me several times in the course of the trip.

86. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, September 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Weapons Systems, Military Capabilities, and Perceptions

You will recall the meeting of the NSC on August 15, on the subject of U.S.-Soviet competition with special reference to the military balance.² The issue of the relationship of U.S. weapons systems programs to public and governmental perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet balance has been raised at that meeting and since.

I have been giving further thought to this matter, and have reached a number of preliminary conclusions. These are listed below and are

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 76.

followed by a list of specific systems. I believe we need to proceed with a substantial selection of these in order to respond both to military needs and to political perceptions.

1. Though each of the major (and some of the minor) programmatic cancellations and deferrals effected by this Administration was made for sound programmatic reasons, cumulatively they have combined with the relative paucity of new starts to convey the impression, both to our allies and to some of our own public, of unreciprocated unilateral restraint—our detractors would say, unilateral disarmament. We do not know how the Soviets view these matters, but we should also be concerned about their perception.

2. We need to begin some systems that can be identified as initiatives of this Administration. Differing degrees of program commitment—full-scale development, production, deployment—are appropriate for consideration, depending on the particular case. But nothing less than full-scale deployment will count in the actual military balance, and at least some of these systems will have to be deployed if we are to change perceptions.

3. Military utility, relative effectiveness, and cost should be the principal criteria for going ahead with such new systems. But anticipated political effects, particularly effects on our allies or on the Soviets, can weigh heavily in such decisions. These effects include such considerations as the creation of parity in a geographical area or at a particular level of escalation; the promotion of arms control agreements; or the conveying of a sense of U.S. technological superiority.

4. In general, strategic systems will have the greatest effect on perceptions, though there are exceptions—ERW, for example.

Here are some examples of systems whose implementation would affect perceptions as well as military capabilities. Because they are not equivalent in nature, I do not present them as alternatives. However, I believe we will have to move forward with a substantial number of them to have a significant effect.

I emphasize that funds for the next steps have been programmed for very few of these systems. Thus any encouragement engendered by the thought that these systems exemplify the lead we *could* have over the Soviets in technology should be severely tempered. What this memorandum contains are ideas, potential development programs, and possible prospective deployments. These by no means offset the Soviet forces in being, or the Soviet systems in serial production.

Moreover, the systems described below are not a substitute for an increase in the size of the defense program. They are the part of what would constitute an increased program, specific reasons for increased expenditures. In no way could they substitute for the rest of our forces

and defense costs; they are examples of the additions that need to be made in order to offset the military and perceptual advantages that the Soviets have been accumulating. They are opportunities: advantageous if taken (or, rather, bought); useless if forgone.

1. M–X. Next decision is full-scale development, separately or in a joint program with Trident C–5 missile. Without it, we will not have even by the late 1980’s a quick-response hard-target capability comparable to that the Soviets will possess early in the 1980’s. A related question is survivability, both short-term and enduring.³

2. Alternate launch point land-based system. Some mobile system of this kind (there are two or three alternatives) can assure a survivable land-based ICBM, not dependent on warning, provided a solution can be found to the outstanding technical and cost problems. Other alternatives for increasing survivability will have comparable costs, but different balances of military value and political difficulties.⁴

3. B–X. A new bomber, of range and payload comparable with that of Backfire, but more effective, because of recent very significant technological advances, of which you are aware. This bomber would be greatly superior to the Backfire (and the B–1) in ability to penetrate air defenses because of a combination of low detectability features, improved countermeasures and improved defensive systems. It would be particularly effective in combination with a cruise missile attack because the “fixes” to the Soviet air defense required for the cruise missiles would be at cross-purposes with those required for the bomber (and vice versa). As you are aware, we could start full-scale development of such a bomber as early as 1979 and achieve IOC by 1984. Juxtaposition with B–1 could pose some political problems, but also has some potential for political justification—as you know, we had it in mind when the B–1 was cancelled.⁵

4. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

5. GLCM. One way to offset Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces. At the protocol deployment limit of 600 km, GLCMs (and SLCMs) cannot reach the Soviet Union from the FRG, though Soviet 600-km GLCMs from East Europe (or SLCMs) can reach all of FRG. But at the 2500-km test range limit, GLCMs can reach much of European U.S.S.R. from the FRG and the U.K. (as can SLCMs of that range from the oceans adjacent to Europe). These systems are in full-scale development—the next issue is deployment. To deploy in the early 1980’s will require acceleration of the process of making basing arrangements, planning targeting, etc.⁶

³ Carter wrote “ok?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁴ Carter wrote “?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁵ Carter wrote “no” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁶ Carter wrote “ok?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

6. Pershing II (XR-extended range). Range to 1500 km. Not limited by SALT, but NATO option III offered to the Soviets in MBFR reduces numbers of Pershings by 36 and limits the U.S. to 72 launchers for SSMs of range greater than 500 km. Would be a new development; much larger and less mobile than GLCM.⁷

7. Tactical cruise missiles of radius in the 1000-km category, with terminal guidance (10-foot accuracy or better), carrying conventional warheads, and reusable—to reduce costs greatly. Needs a bit more thought about targets (I am pushing the concept hard) but could soon be ready for full-scale development.⁸

8. Cannon-launched Guided Projectiles (Cooperhead). Introduction of laser guidance to artillery shells will allow us to employ the thousands of artillery tubes already deployed as precision guided weapons capable of making a direct hit on a moving tank at ranges in excess of 10 kilometers. We will begin production of laser-guided shells in 1979, reaching IOC in 1980.⁹

9. Assault Breaker. This program is a new initiative intended to break up an assault of massed armor without using nuclear warheads. It applies the MIRV concept to tactical forces: a tactical missile is launched at a column of tanks; as it approaches the column, its warhead separates into 20 or 30 bomblets, each of which has a heat seeker which guides that bomblet to an individual tank. Development has just started, but we have the program on an accelerated pace to achieve a field demonstration in 1981 and to begin production in 1983.¹⁰

10. Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). This will be our first “fire and forget” missile. It will allow USAF and naval air to achieve air superiority even if outnumbered. This missile will outrange missiles on Soviet aircraft and allow our F-15s and F-16s to engage two or three aircraft at a time since the radar guidance system in AMRAAM becomes autonomous shortly after launch (current air-to-air systems are either short-range or require the aircraft’s radar to track the target during the entire flight of the missile). We have just begun an accelerated development of this missile and expect to begin production in 1984.¹¹

11. SURTASS. The Surface Towed Array Surveillance System is a new submarine detection and tracking sensor that is the result of a major breakthrough in acoustic array technology. This 8000-ft-long line array will be towed behind surface ships accompanying carrier task

⁷ Carter wrote “?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁸ Carter wrote “MIRV’s?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁹ Carter wrote “ok?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

¹⁰ Carter wrote “ok?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

¹¹ Carter wrote “ok?” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

forces, or can be used in conjunction with the present SOSUS bottom-mounted arrays to extend the coverage and accuracy of the SOSUS system. Whereas previous ship sonars or arrays were limited to detection ranges of the order of 10 to 100 miles, SURTASS will have a range of 200 to 1000 miles, depending on propagation factors. SURTASS can be used also to provide a submarine surveillance or ASW capability in remote regions where we do not have bottom-mounted arrays, e.g., the Indian Ocean. The system will become operational in 1981 on the TAGOS ships.¹²

As the programming and budget process proceeds, I shall be considering systems and ideas that we will want to implement. Technology offers us one possible way to offset some of the advantages the Soviets hold in so many aspects of the military balance; but unless we move from the idea stage to tangible increases in capability, the ideas will not mean very much.

A number of these initiatives can take major steps toward incorporation into our military capabilities in the FY 80 program. Others will do so later. I and others in DoD will be considering with Cy and Zbig now to make maximum use of these actions internationally, and with the Vice President in terms of domestic perceptions. At some key internal decision points you will wish to make your own inputs on the interaction of perceptions and programs. You may wish to make the key announcements yourself.¹³

Harold Brown

¹² Carter wrote "ok?" in the right margin next to this paragraph.

¹³ Brzezinski returned the memorandum to Brown under cover of an October 14 memorandum in which he wrote: "I return for your records your memorandum to the President of September 11, with his marginal notes." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 10/78) Brzezinski also sent a copy of Brown's memorandum to Carter, with Carter's handwritten notes, to Ermarth and Utgoff under cover of an October 14 memorandum. (Ibid.)

87. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, September 15, 1978

SUBJECT

FY 1980 Defense Program

Since you appointed me Secretary of Defense, my own greatest concern has been assuring the adequacy of our defense against the growing threat from the Soviet Union. Though the U.S. has many other grave foreign policy problems, I believe that this one must take precedence in my thinking, because on the adequacy of that defense depends the protection of our country's physical existence and its vital interests in the world, and the deterrence of a nuclear war whose occurrence would end the world as we know it.

—On August 13 I sent you a memorandum outlining the defense program for FY 1980–84 as projected at three different fiscal levels.² To maintain a coherent process in the FY 1980 budget preparation, it is necessary for you now to select a program level for the FY 80–84 period, with associated fiscal level. This will provide a basis for me to have prepared, for submission to you, the proposed budget request for FY 1980.

—On September 8 at Camp David I gave you a paper by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.³ That paper is, in my view, an accurate statement (though incomplete, as any statement inevitably is) of the current military balance and the trends. I subscribe to what it says in that regard. The present military trend is highly unfavorable to us. I believe we cannot permit that trend to continue, if we are to meet our responsibility to the nation's security. It is in our power to stop the balance from becoming clearly adverse. To do so requires a greater defense effort.

I believe that this is one of the most important single decisions as to which I shall make a recommendation to you, and that your decision will directly affect the safety of the people of this country.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 9/78. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. In a September 22 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Brown that Carter had seen the memorandum (*Ibid.*)

² See Document 75.

³ See Document 83.

I.

The Soviet military buildup is the greatest direct threat to the United States. It continues to compound at 4% every year, year in and year out. That has gone on for almost twenty years; over that same period our own defense effort has not increased in real terms, and has halved as a percentage of GNP or of the federal budget.

Military capability, of course, is forces, equipment, and trained personnel, not money. But money largely determines those other factors. Funding is a crude—but reasonably good-overall measure of military capability. It is an even better measure of trends.

Depending on our predilections and our detailed judgments we may differ as to which side—the U.S.S.R. and its allies or the United States and its—is ahead militarily today. But the balance is close, and six or eight years ago it was not—we were clearly ahead. If the trend is not reversed, the balance will not be close six or eight years from now—the Soviets will be clearly ahead.

The trend lines are crossing or already have crossed. For the first time since World War II, the balance of military power is in process of shifting. It is true that the Soviets have some problems that we do not, such as the PRC—just as we have problems that are unique to us. Those problems of theirs are not enough to offset the advantage they are gaining. Unless we move, in a steady, real-growth way, as you pledged to the NATO allies and directed in PD-18, the gap will widen more and more. And the results, in my view, will not be long in coming.

II.

I am as aware as anyone—indeed, I have often reminded others—that spending for military purposes is not the sole determinant of national security. If it were, we already would be in a situation much more dangerous than the troubling one we now face.

I also am aware that there are many claims on the federal budget, a budget which must be controlled in order to help fight inflation. But no claim compares in urgency to the claim which makes all else possible—the physical security of our country and the deterrence of war.

Persistent inflation has had the effect of robbing our defense, just as it has robbed our people. For in the past three years the estimates of anticipated inflation allowed for in the Defense budget have not equaled the actual inflation after the results are counted each year. The same thing will happen again next year if inflation estimates are not realistic—an apparent increase in real defense program disappearing in added costs of trying to maintain even the current level.

The following table shows how inflation has been underestimated in the preparation of the Defense budget:

<u>Year</u>	<u>OMB Inflation Estimate at Time of Budget Submission</u>	<u>Actual Inflation</u>
CY 77	5.6%	5.9%
CY 78	6.1%	7.2% ⁴
CY 79	6.2% ⁵	7.5%/8.0% ⁶
CY 80	5.7% ⁷	

In planning the Defense budget, the adequacy of the dollar figure finally adopted is sensitive to the assumption about inflation. For instance, if the inflation estimate is understated by 1½ percentage points, half of a planned 3% real growth simply disappears. I am convinced that the OMB inflation figures for FY 1979 and again for FY 1980 are seriously underestimated.

Underestimation of inflation during the past few years has been an important contributor to a persistent slighting of our defense needs. The following table, and Figure 1 (next under), tell the story:

U.S. Defense Budget (TOA)
(Figures in billions, constant 1977 \$)

FY 73	
FY 74	
FY 75	\$ 98.6
FY 76	103.0
FY 77	108.3
FY 78	108.4 ⁸
FY 79 (request)	109.3 ⁹

⁴ Based on actual data, first six months. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁵ OMB estimate in FY 79 budget submission. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁶ C. Schultze's estimate/R. Strauss' estimate. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁷ OMB estimate in FY 79 budget submission. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁸ Assumes 8.0% actual inflation. If 7.5% inflation is assumed, figure is 108.7. [Footnote is in the original.]

⁹ Assumes 8.0% inflation. If 7.5% inflation is assumed, figure is 109.8. [Footnote is in the original.]




FIGURE 1

The trend is even more disturbing when compared with that of Soviet defense spending, as is shown in Figure 2. As you can see, at a time when the Soviets have been increasing their military expenditures at a steady rate of 4% per year (and their military hardware and R&D expenditures even more), our defense expenditures after a period of decline have risen slightly in the two Ford budgets, and then leveled off in FY 78 and FY 79, if realistic inflation figures for those years are




FIGURE 2

used. In my view, that movement, which may even result in a decline in FY 79, must not continue.¹⁰

¹⁰ Some savings in the defense budget from increased "efficiency" are theoretically possible. I have accomplished some, and I am making every effort to realize others. Most take time to achieve, and most of the really glaring inefficiencies (*e.g.*, unneeded bases, anti-competitive contracting rules, excessively high civil service pay) exist because they have political support in the Congress which has been reflected in law. Some of those inefficiencies have the support of other offices in your Administration—though they have not had yours. I do not believe that I—or any other Secretary of Defense—can achieve efficiency gains which can offset in any substantial degree inadequacies of budget level. [Footnote is in the original.]

III.

I have wanted to discuss this situation with you personally before making a recommendation to you on the Defense budget level for FY 1980. I plan to make such a recommendation in the next few days.

As Secretary of Defense, I of course feel a particular responsibility for the adequacy of our military capability. But you should know me well enough to know that I am not by nature an alarmist, and that in matters of this kind I consider my position carefully. I believe I owe it to you to make you aware of my very deep concern.

Harold Brown

88. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, September 18, 1978

SUBJECT

ICBM Vulnerability

Since late last year the Defense Science Board has been studying the ICBM vulnerability problem. The Chairman, Dr. Eugene Fubini, has just submitted the Board's report. It is well done and highly relevant to some key decisions we must soon make.

Enclosed (Tab A) for your information is an executive summary of that report. If, after reading this, you want additional background, I can send you a more detailed (18-page) summary. I should note that the group's conclusions on NCA survivability are, in my view, flawed by their lack of knowledge of our plans relative to that issue.

While the Defense Science Board was conducting this study, similar and related issues were being examined by three other panels: An OSTP panel formed by Frank Press; a panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; and a university-oriented panel of the Department of Defense known as JASON.² Bill Perry, Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, met with representatives from these four panels ten days

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 89, Doctrine/C³I: 1978. Top Secret.

² For the OSTP report, see Document 43. JASON ("July August September October November") refers to an independent advisory panel of scientists that consulted for the Department of Defense.

ago to determine whether the scientific community that had studied this problem was converging on a common opinion.

There was, I believe, strong agreement on the nature of the threat, our need to respond vigorously, and the desirability of starting a new missile program in the near future. Participants also agreed on most of the technical issues regarding how to rebase ICBMs for survivability, but disagreed on the best basing mode—partly because there is incomplete information on some of the proposals, and partly because of differing subjective judgments. A summary of the results of that meeting is enclosed at Tab B. You might also wish to discuss this with Frank Press, who has been following all of these studies and, of course, sponsored one of them.

This material is useful background for the Mid-Term Review of the Defense Program, planned for Wednesday, September 20.

Harold Brown

Tab A

Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by the Defense Science Board³

Washington, August 11, 1978

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper summarizes the major findings and recommendations of the DSB Strategic Nuclear Balance panel.

Current Policy and Planning

A review of official U.S. policy and guidance documents indicates that current definitions of strategic policy objectives are inconsistent, vague and incomplete.

Technical-Operational

[3 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified]

- ICBM survival will be increasingly doubtful starting in the early to mid-1980's because of the major increase in RVs as the Soviets MIRV their ICBM force and because of the increased accuracy being introduced in the SS-18 and SS-19.

- In view of the Soviet SLBM threat, bomber base escape is questionable, especially from coastal bases. Considerable improvement in

³Top Secret. The summary cover sheet, which bears the title "The Strategic Nuclear Balance," is attached but not printed.

survivability would be gained as a result of being able to move the bombers rapidly to the [less than 1 line not declassified] defined in the strategic bomber study.

- [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

In sum, the essential and immediate need to support a broader “deterrence” requires increased attention to the war-fighting capability of both our strategic forces and the C³I systems which support them. The DSB recommends that first priority must be given to fixing and improving existing systems; in particular, improving the survivability of our C³I systems, and correcting without further delay the increasing vulnerability of the major elements of our strategic forces.

Acquisition Policy

Establish priorities in the areas of acquisition that emphasize improvement in survivability and endurance of existing weapons or devices, even if this requires postponement of new starts of major national importance. In particular:

C³I: Fix the C³I system so that it works in peacetime and under attack.

ICBM: Rebase ICBMs in a survivable configuration such as a Multiple Aim Point System.

Bombers: Improve the survivability of the bomber force by providing interior dispersal bases for redeployment of alert B–52s (and any future strategic aircraft).

SSBNs: Maintain the capability of SLBMs at sea by extending the life of POSEIDON SSBNs to approximately 30 years, and back-fitting C4 missiles on most of them.

Resource Implications:

- We are now at a historic turning point.
- On the one side, we are committed to improving general purpose forces at 3 percent per year.
- On the other side, we must fix the deficiencies in U.S. strategic forces or be prepared to give strategic superiority to the Soviet Union.
- The presently projected Defense budget is probably not large enough to do both.

Tab B**Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴**

Washington, undated

*Seminar on ICBM Vulnerability & Responses**1. Purpose*

(S) [2 lines not declassified] The impact of this threat and potential US responses have been studied this year under the sponsorship of a number of organizations: Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB), Defense Science Board (DSB), JASON and OSTP. This seminar provided a forum for interchange and discussion among representatives of these groups in an attempt to: 1) examine the convergence of the technical community on the basic facts and issues, 2) better focus and understand the issues, and 3) separate the issues from the underlying technical facts. The discussion was organized in four topic areas: 1) the threat, 2) the importance of a US response to the threat, 3) the most effective basing approach in response, and 4) the most effective missile for that basing. There was also a discussion recognizing the growing importance of Command, Control and Communications to the SLBM and airbreathing legs of the TRIAD in the face of the threat to the ICBM.

2. The Threat

(S) [9 lines not declassified] Two groups (JASON and DSB) did not examine the threat as a part of their review, but took it as a given. The remaining groups (AFSAB, OSTP) had reviewed the threat analysis. Representatives from the various groups had examined the threat in greater depth within the past two years, and found no basis for disagreement. A more confident assessment of Soviet accuracy (by the Soviets as well as the US), as demonstrated in ongoing development tests, will probably require about six more months of testing. All groups felt it would be useful to conduct an independent threat assessment at that time, but that there was no need to defer programmatic decisions pending results of more detailed assessment.

3. Response to the Threat

(C) All four panels felt it was important to respond decisively and vigorously to the threat. Some felt the need to respond by 1983 in reaction to domestic perceptions if not military need. Others felt that a gap in an operationally deployed response could be tolerated from

⁴ Secret.

1983–1986 so long as there was evidence of a vigorous program which would be effective in the long term. The gap from 83–86 might be tolerated by beefing up our other TRIAD legs temporarily during this period (e.g., increased bomber alert), recognizing that we could rely on the effectiveness of these TRIAD legs until 1986, but that our confidence beyond then might begin to degrade.

4. Basing Approach

(S) If a Multiple Aimpoint (MAP) approach is selected, all panels agree that vertical shelters are the best technical implementation. All panels agree on the following desirable features of MAP: 1) it provides a technically sound approach to survivability; 2) it offers endurance; 3) it is straight forward to construct; and 4) we can confidently predict its nuclear hardness. All groups recognize the breakout problem associated with a Soviet MAP deployment, but there is disagreement on the degree to which a Soviet MAP deployment exacerbates the present breakout problem. All panels feel that mutual verification of MAP systems will be a difficult problem, but recognize that it can be resolved with hard work. With respect to MAP, there is disagreement on the expected difficulty in negotiations, the time when negotiations would be completed, and the impact on delaying SALT II.

(S) There is disagreement on the relative effectiveness of alternative approaches to MAP. The OSTP panel feels that a strip alert air-mobile system with dispersed inland basing (e.g., wide bodied jet, initially with MINUTEMAN III missiles) is the most attractive alternative, and it would be reasonable to begin deployment of such a system by 1983. A more effective air-mobile system (e.g., hardened aircraft with a new missile) would be competitive with a long term MAP deployment in 1986, in the opinion of the OSTP panel. This approach would avoid the potential environmental and SALT problems which this panel associates with MAP. Other panels objected to the strip alert air-mobile approach because of its dependence upon tactical warning, sharing many of the survivability problems of the present air-breathing force. They also felt that a 1983 Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was unrealistic and noted that, with a 1977 start, we were projecting a 1982 IOC for ALCM, with B–52 modifications as the pacing item. There was also disagreement on beginning with an unhardened aircraft as opposed to developing a system with long term effectiveness from the start.

(S) All panels agreed on the merits of two potentially far term (beyond 1990) solutions. One potential solution is a Ballistic Missile Defense system to provide preferential defense for those MAP shelters containing a missile. Such a system would be low altitude and probably non-nuclear. A limited point defense system could be consistent with the ABM treaty or, some felt, an expanded system (1000 interceptors) could probably be negotiated in SALT III (if non-nuclear). The second

potential approach is a shallow water (Great Lakes, continental shelf) submersible system deployed in large numbers. These systems would be small, with very small crews, and would create ASW problems drastically different than those associated with the TRIDENT in deep waters. All groups recommended accelerated R&D for both concepts.

5. *Missile*

(C) All groups agreed on the need and importance of developing and deploying a new missile, survivably based. However, there was disagreement on the relative priority of initiating a new missile development as opposed to proceeding first with a survivable basing approach. Some panels believed that the TRIDENT II SLBM (D-5) was needed for TRIDENT and therefore recommended starting now with the development of a common missile. Others felt that a D-5 was not needed in the medium term, and recommended proceeding now to obtain the flexibility offered by a large MX.

89. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹**

Washington, September 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Memo from McGeorge Bundy concerning "The Next Strategic Nuclear Weapons System"

McGeorge Bundy sent me a provocative memo concerning the above subject. I recommend that you read it (Tab A).

Bundy's main points are that:

—It is gradually becoming clear that there is no good replacement for the Minuteman force which would be land-based and thus operated by the Air Force; and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 124, Weapons Systems: 4-9/78. Secret. Sent for information. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "Zbig—Is he talking about subs in the Great Lakes? J." In a September 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Utgoff asserted that "Bundy's submarine proposals are in my opinion technically sound." Gates wrote on Utgoff's memorandum: "Bundy's memo is really excellent. RG." (Ibid)

—Only the President can overcome bureaucratic forces that are working against adopting a solution that would not be land-based.

While Bundy may be right, I think we are going to have to publicly establish a very strong case for whatever course of action we decide on. That case should involve not only an examination of the small submersible concept that Bundy mentions, but also a re-examination of some Air Force concepts such as air mobile ICBMs which were discarded back when the deficiencies of the trench and MAP schemes were less well understood.

Further, given the rapidly building concerns about the Minuteman vulnerability problem, the impact such concerns are having on SALT, and the corresponding interest in getting started on a solution, we may have to buy the time required to complete our search for an acceptable solution. This may involve starting a common missile, or accelerating the cruise missile carrier, or some other program.

The Minuteman vulnerability is probably the biggest defense issue you will face this year; it will be the main focus of your upcoming mid-term review of the Defense budget.

Tab A

Memorandum From McGeorge Bundy to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)²

August 21, 1978

SUBJECT

The Next Strategic Nuclear Weapons System

In the last month or two, partly as a member of the President's General Advisory Committee and partly as a foundation executive attending the annual summer seminar run by experts from the arms control centers that the Ford Foundation helps to pay for, I have had some exposure to the bothersome question of Minuteman vulnerability, and what to do about it. I have reached the conclusion that if I had your job again I would want to be sure that the President is fully caught up on some of the troubles that seem to be brewing. It looks to me as if both our basic deterrent posture and SALT are headed for a lot of trouble unless there can be a better solution than is currently favored by any uniformed service. To put it another way, I believe that we are headed for a dilemma which can be resolved only by the President as

²No classification marking.

Commander-in-Chief and that an early resolution, difficult as it may be, is much more likely to be successful than a delayed effort to patch things up.

The problem of Minuteman vulnerability is unpleasantly real. That is not the preferred conclusion of many of my friends in the arms control community, but the evidence from the Defense Department seems to me persuasive. The combination of throw-weight, MIRVs, and increasing accuracy on the Soviet side is producing a real vulnerability. The Nitze scenarios are highly implausible,³ but the increasing exposure of the Minuteman system is simply not what was aimed at when it was built. It is not about to become worthless, but in less than five years it will no longer be the secure second-strike system it was designed to be. Nothing has happened since 1960 to change the belief that such a secure second-strike capability is a highly desirable element in each of our strategic systems taken alone, on the obvious ground that survivable weapons are much better than those which are open to effective preemption.

Minuteman belongs to the Air Force, and its habitat is the continental United States. It follows that by natural bureaucratic inertia the effort to replace it has focused on land-based missile systems of one sort or another. The bad news is that none of these systems is attractive on basic technical and economic grounds, leaving aside the politics of large-scale ground-based deployments. The currently favored MAP system has the additional disadvantage of severely complicating SALT. Ironically, it is a system that no one would have designed if it were not for the counting rules of SALT. MAP is a bad plan, and a Soviet MAP would be a nightmare even for moderates, because of the problem of verification. The more this system is studied, the worse its consequences seem to be, and the nuttier the requirements associated with the shell game which is its theoretical *raison d'être*. MAP is the only weapons system I have heard of that makes the old MLF look smart.

Harold Brown and Frank Press are certainly two of the ten best men in the country, on the problems that lie at the intersection between weapons systems and science. Both of them know how hard this particular issue is, and both have had important studies underway for a long time. Until this summer, no one had any attractive ideas about alternatives to the mobile land-based missile. Now the Jason Summer Study Group, with such stars as Gell-Mann, Garwin, and Drell among its members, has found at least one interesting alternative—a relatively simple in-shore system of conventionally powered submersibles. The in-shore element is critical, (1) to the kind of command and control that is an attractive feature of Minuteman, (2) to the cost-effectiveness

³ See Document 1.

of the system, and (3) to its distinctiveness, as a system sufficiently different from Poseidon and Trident to require very different Soviet countermeasures.

Those to whom I have talked, and I admit that they are only a small sample, believe that this in-shore submersible system is much the most attractive in sight technologically, economically and militarily, if we think simply in terms of what a new secure second-strike strategic system should be like. Unfortunately, it is bureaucratically unattractive both because it offers no role for the Air Force and because it relies on exactly the kinds of vessels and capabilities that the Navy resists. As recent events have shown us again, the Admirals like large ocean-going ships, preferably with nuclear power, and they think in terms of insuring the survivability of each of these monstrous units, rather than in terms of the deterrent effect of a large set of small vessels that survives by numbers, not by individual "invulnerability."

If anyone can bend the uniformed bureaucracy to technical and strategic reality it is the President, and if any President has the intellectual and moral equipment for the task it is this President. There is a world of difference between what a President can command and what the ablest Secretary of Defense can manage.

Obviously, the technical and economic premises on which this memorandum is based need to be tested. Judgments of this importance cannot be rested on conversations in Colorado or on the hunches of even the most gifted of civilian scientists. But it is equally obvious that the service bureaucracies are not organized with a view to providing the best possible solutions to problems of this sort; they are organized for the survival of their own preferred symbols of status. The secure and closely controlled second-strike weapon is nobody's favorite, except when it happens to be a manned bomber or an ocean-going nuclear powered submarine. Minuteman itself is serving well for twenty years, but it was not designed by military men, and their bumbling efforts to replace it show that left to themselves they will not get the job done.

90. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Mid-Term Review of Defense Programs

You are scheduled to meet Friday, September 29th, with me, Harold Brown, Jim McIntyre and a few others for a mid-term review of those particular programs in the FY 80 Defense budget that seem likely to have the greatest implications for our overall national security policy.

In arranging this meeting, we planned for Harold to take the lead in framing the issues for discussion. The agenda Harold has proposed (Tab A) is too broad to allow discussion in-depth of any of the issues if we try to discuss them all. Harold will therefore focus on the strategic issues and in particular Minuteman (MM) vulnerability which is by far the most important issue you will face this year.

You should begin the meeting by calling on Harold Brown to outline the strategic forces issues as he sees them. He will then call on Under Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to present more detailed remarks and a "straw man" strategic force structure through the 1980's, along with development and procurement plans. This presentation and the ensuing discussion will probably consume most of the time of the meeting. Harold will then want to raise some issues on General Purpose Forces which Assistant Secretary of Defense Murray will present in more detail. Finally, if there is time, Harold may call on Dr. Perry to address the question of research and development strategy.

At the end of the general meeting, Harold would like to take 15 minutes to discuss the separate highly classified paper for which not all participants are cleared. When you so indicate, Harold will arrange for those not cleared to leave, or you may want to adjourn to the Oval Office with a much smaller group for that part of the discussion.

As background for the meeting Harold has sent you three short papers (Tabs B-D). In addition, Frank Press has prepared an analysis of the MM vulnerability issue and what we should do about it which is included at Tab E with a forwarding memo and an Executive Summary. The remainder of this memo summarizes and comments on Harold's

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Department of Defense—Subject File, Box 39, Department of Defense—General—I [1]. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy of the memorandum. Tabs A-E are attached but not printed.

papers and provides some questions you can use to channel the discussion in some interesting and useful directions.

Strategic Forces Issues

Harold Brown's first paper (Tab B) describes a strategic forces modernization plan that addresses three main factors:

- 1) obsolescence in the bomber and ICBM legs of the Triad;
- 2) vulnerabilities in the ICBM force and the bomber force created by Soviet ICBM improvements, their construction of an SLBM force that could pose a significant prelaunch threat to our bomber force, and improvements in Soviet air defense; and
- 3) the need to increase our force capabilities to maintain essential equivalence with the Soviets.

For the long term, Harold presents a "representative strategic force modernization program" aimed at increasing our capabilities through improvements in the forces that most need modernizing. The suggested program raises our steady-state total strategic spending to \$9B per year (compared to \$5.4B in 1979) and includes the following:

—Development starting in FY 79 of a new "mostly common" missile that closely approximates the M-X missile but provides major components that can be used to upgrade the Navy's new C4 missile to closely approximate the D5 (Trident II) missile at less than one-fourth the R&D cost of the D5.

—Development in FY 79 of the MAP basing scheme, and either an air mobile or ground mobile basing scheme, or both, with the best system to begin full-scale development by FY 80.

—Development of a cruise missile carrier (CMC) aircraft beginning in 1981 not as a force enhancement program, but as an eventual replacement for our first CMC, the B-52G.

—Production of 3,000 first-generation cruise missiles beginning in 1980 (with an IOC of 1982) plus development of a second-generation cruise missile with reduced detectability.

—Upgrading the B-52H fleet (including new avionics and ECM) to maintain it as a penetrating bomber force until the end of the century.

—40 new austere inland bases to allow wider dispersal of the bomber and cruise missile carriers.

Harold also notes that the vulnerability of our strategic C³ systems is as profound a concern as the vulnerability of the forces themselves; that our strategic C³ [3 lines not declassified] in a major study by mid-79. The paper also comments that a new penetrating bomber is "indicated by the late 80s" and that we will want to explore smaller submarines than Trident as a possible follow-on.

Comments

Harold's analysis is based on the judgment that we want to retain a full Triad and will not go to a posture (e.g., Dyad) that depends

primarily on SLBMs and bomber/CMs. However, Harold points out that even if his long-term plan is adopted, we will nonetheless face a period from the late 70s to the mid-80s during which our land-based ICBM force will be very vulnerable. Thus, until 1985 when our ICBM force will theoretically get well with some form of mobile basing, we will be very dependent on the other two legs of the Triad.

Whether or not to permit this vulnerable period is an extremely important judgment. Domestically, it will be used against SALT; internationally, it may undermine our Allies' confidence and be exploited by the Soviets. Harold is also concerned by the argument that if we can live with it for three or more years, why not indefinitely?—which will undercut support for the measures he proposes to rectify the situation in the long term.

Thus, the greatest weakness in Harold's program is the absence of an interim program to deal with the vulnerability gap in the early 80s. You should press him on this point and ask that specific options be developed for consideration in the final budget meetings at the end of the year.

It is also clear that Harold still believes that the MAP basing scheme is the best long-term solution to the MM vulnerability problem in spite of the fact that others outside DOD (including Frank Press' panel and the Jason group) have serious reservations about the practicality of MAP, to say nothing of the problems it may create for SALT. You should therefore urge Harold to take a serious look at other schemes on a priority basis.

In light of the above, you might ask Harold the following specific questions:

—How can we bridge the gap from 1980 until we have modernized the Minuteman force? Would the adoption [1 line not declassified] Would the required changes in our C³I/warning systems be useful even after we had completed the modernization of the force? Could these changes be made in 1–2 years?

—Given the limits on our resources, wouldn't it be better to substitute a short study of the MAP scheme and its more promising alternatives for the year-long parallel development program proposed, and develop only the scheme that the study shows to be best?

—Does it make sense to begin full-scale development of the relatively large "mostly common" missile when the smaller common missile might be more compatible with the basing scheme we end up choosing?

—Why aren't we considering a more vigorous CMC development program as a means for maintaining essential equivalence?

—Is it necessary to wait until mid-79 to take additional actions to improve our C³I systems? Aren't there actions beyond those you are currently taking, that we already know we'll want to take?

The most important thing Harold wants from this meeting is a policy statement from you that we are going to solve the MM vulnerability problem. Such a decision would be of great help in our efforts to widen support for SALT. Harold would like to announce this decision next week, and I would like to follow up on it in a policy speech I am scheduled to deliver the following week in Chicago.

Harold would also like you to indicate whether or not you support specific elements of his long-term plan. I believe that any such decisions would be premature and should be made in the budget review meetings that will be held between now and January.

General Purpose Forces (GPF)

Harold's GPF paper (Tab C) contains no surprises. It continues the NATO-emphasis improvements in reinforcement (POMCUS) and in strengthening the Army through a vigorous modernization and expansion program.

The most important issue is likely to be the scope of the Army modernization program, particularly in light of the current DOD study of Army force structure that you directed in the Spring budget review.

This study is examining an alternative defense doctrine based on a belt of fixed infantry-manned emplacements, equipped with anti-armor capability and backed up by mobile armored reserves. In the meantime, however, DOD proposes to modernize and expand the Army along the lines of the current "active defense" doctrine which raises the question: should the Army's plans be held back to await the results of the study?

Although the study may reveal some interesting new concepts, I do not recommend holding back on modernization now. For a number of reasons, we are likely to have the existing doctrine and force structure for some time to come, and failing to modernize as needed would harm near-term capabilities. On the other hand, this is an important issue and an opportunity to re-examine the premises behind our doctrine. DOD should not treat it lightly, as many there would like. To reinforce its importance, I suggest that you ask Harold how the study is coming and what effect it might have on future Army programs.

Shipbuilding is also an important issue, particularly since the budget veto. The veto message said that the Navy has been moving toward larger, more costly ships, but fewer of them. However, the upcoming budget reduces the shipbuilding rate a little further and may make us vulnerable to criticism that although we may be giving more relative emphasis to smaller ships, we are still moving toward lower numbers.

You might ask Harold the following questions:

—What explanations should we present to the Congress and the public for the continuing declines in both the size of the Navy and in our shipbuilding rates?

—Are the smaller ship types that we are building the types we should be building? If we haven't yet identified the appropriate types of ships to solve the Navy's force level problem, what efforts do we have underway to do so?

Defense R&D

Harold's last paper argues that steadily increasing Soviet R&D efforts in combination with US R&D efforts that have suffered a long-term decline due to inflation have led to a situation where the Soviets are seriously challenging our technology lead in many areas.

The paper also presents DOD's overall strategy for dealing with this situation which is basically—increased funding applied more selectively when projects start to get expensive.

I support this general approach, but would like to see it reflected in a specific collection of new R&D starts that we can use to demonstrate that we are making a concerted effort to draw on our technological strengths to solve our most pressing defense problems. You might express this same interest to Harold and ask him for a rundown of the new technological initiatives that he intends to include in the FY 80 budget.²

²On September 29, Carter met with U.S. officials to discuss the 1979 defense budget in the Cabinet Room at the White House from 3:38 p.m. until 5:39 p.m. From 5:39 to 5:59 p.m. he met with Brown, Duncan, Jones, Brzezinski, Aaron, Perry, McIntyre, and Press in the Oval Office to continue the discussion of the same issue. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary). No minutes of either meeting were found.

91. Presidential Directive/NSC-41¹

Washington, September 29, 1978

TO:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO:

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, General Services Administration

SUBJECT

U.S. Civil Defense Policy (U)

I have reviewed the recommendations of the Policy Review Committee meeting on PRM-32. Based on them, I direct that the U.S. Civil Defense program seek to:

—Enhance deterrence and stability in conjunction with our strategic offensive and other strategic defensive forces. Civil defense, as an element of the strategic balance, should assist in maintaining perceptions of that balance favorable to the U.S.

—Reduce the possibility that the U.S. could be coerced in time of crisis.

—Provide some increase in the number of surviving population and for greater continuity of government, should deterrence and escalation control fail, in order to provide an improved basis for dealing with the crisis and carrying out eventual national recovery.

This policy does not suggest any change in continuing U.S. reliance on strategic offensive nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Civil Defense: Policy Review Committee: 8/14/78–9/78. Secret. Based on the conclusions reached by the PRC on PRM-32 (see Document 73), Brzezinski submitted two versions of PD-41 to Carter under a September 19 covering memorandum. One version referred to a consensus among State, Defense, CJS, and OMB that “makes no special claims for civil defense but explicitly ties it to crisis stability and the strategic balance,” a connection that had been made “clear to the Soviets in SALT.” Brzezinski advised Carter to sign the consensus version. ACDA submitted the other version as a dissent. Referring to the consensus PD favored by Brzezinski, Carter wrote in the upper right corner of Brzezinski’s memorandum: “Zbig—It says *nothing*. J.” The President also noted in the bottom right corner: “Incorporate specifics of ACDA proposal at least.” At the bottom left, Brzezinski wrote to Odom: “WO revise, adding #’s marked by me. We will resubmit. ZB.” The PD printed here reflects those amendments. (Ibid.) In an October 12 memorandum to Mondale, Vance, and Brown, as well as Jones, Turner, and GSA Administrator Jay Solomon, Dodson noted that the ACDA Director had been “inadvertently omitted from the address list of PD/NSC-41,” and asked that recipients change their records “as necessary.”

maintaining deterrence. U.S. civil defense programs will take advantage of the mobility of the population stemming from wide ownership of private automobiles, the extensive highway systems, and the large number of non-urban potential housing facilities to achieve crisis relocation of the urban population. Civil defense programs should also help deal with natural disasters and other national emergencies.

Jimmy Carter

92. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan)¹

Washington, September 30, 1978

SUBJECT

C³I

Some of the major conclusions I drew from my August trip to SAC and NORAD concern the adequacy of our C³I for the changing U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.² I want to express my thoughts to you on this matter because of your role as Chairman of the WWMCCS Council. The following three points reflect my concerns:

—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

—Concern was expressed at NORAD about the erosion of Defense's ability to manage the National Communications System as it impinges on private telecommunications developments and policies. This appears to result from both budgetary trends and pending legislation.

I would like to have your views on how we should deal with these problems. I realize they are enormous in scope and budgetary implications, but I believe we must address them if we are to be prepared to maintain crisis stability in the years ahead. I am particularly concerned that we do not spend large sums rectifying the first problem—connectivity for SIOP execution—by means that fail to address the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I): 7-11/78. Top Secret.

² See Documents 80-82.

second problem—C³I survivability for conducting a campaign that might last weeks and perhaps longer.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

93. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, October 1978

PD/NSC-18
SECURE RESERVE FORCE
TARGET ACQUISITION STUDY
FINAL REPORT

[Omitted here is a cover sheet, a table of contents, a list of tables, and a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations.]

*SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (U)*

I. Introduction

(TS) National Security Decision Memorandum Number 242, with its call for the discriminate and controlled use of nuclear weapons, first advanced the concept of a secure reserve force—a survivable, strategic force held in reserve for “protection and coercion during and after nuclear conflict.”² In addition, PD/NSC-18 directed that “U.S. target plans should provide for the maintenance of a secure reserve force to be withheld for possible use subsequent to a major nuclear exchange.”³

(TS) The “strategic reserve” forces presently consist of: (1) the Secure Reserve Force, (2) withheld forces, (3) residual forces, and (4) recovered and reconstituted forces. This study deals only with the Secure Reserve Force (SRF).

(TS) Specific planning guidance for the employment of reserved forces, including the Secure Reserve Force, is not contained in NUWEP (with the exception of the injunction that such forces must not be

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 3, Defense (Items in the System: 9–12/78). Top Secret; Codeword.

² See footnote 2, Document 82.

³ See Document 31.

essential to meeting SIOP objectives), or any other national-level policy document.

(TS) In the absence of specific guidance on how to translate the idea of Secure Reserve Forces into actual nuclear attack plans, preplanned packages have been developed for the current SRF. These preplanned packages include a combination of the unique (Eastern European economic) and the strategic after-thought (e.g., low priority USSR economic SIOP "seconds") with no definition as to when, where and under what conditions the forces would actually be used, except that it would be after a major nuclear exchange. The SRF weapons are available for use in *ad hoc* employment options—they are *not committed* to any specific preplanned target package or employment strategy.

(S) Lack of attention at the policy level to Secure Reserve Force employment concepts is in part rooted in the persistence of the view that if deterrence fails a nuclear war will not only be massive but brief. In such a scenario there would be a role for a reserve force; but only for a force that is modest in size, and intended for use only in protection of the U.S. against coercion by a recovering Soviet Union, or from intimidation by a third party.

(S) What has not been satisfactorily addressed is the role that a Secure Reserve Force would or should play if a nuclear war were prolonged, and involved a series of exchanges.

(C) The task assigned the SRF Study Group was to assess the capabilities of the SRF in its present composition, particularly the capabilities for target acquisition, under two different employment strategies; preplanned targeting and *ad hoc* targeting for the SRF as it is currently composed (B-52s, POSEIDON/POLARIS and MINUTEMAN III). The study assessed the four basic requirements central to the use and control of the SRF against a range of time, C³I, and reconnaissance variables and constraints: (1) survival of the SRF; (2) survival of the decision-maker; (3) information requirements for the employment of the Secure Reserve Force and the availability of that information (survivability of intelligence and communications assets); and (4) the ability of the NCA to command and control and retarget/reprogram U.S. military forces and to communicate with allies, enemies, and neutrals.

(U) Two scenarios were developed for use in the study. In both scenarios, it was assumed that there was a major nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. The first scenario assumes that the Soviets initiate an attack on the United States and its allies with U.S. forces in a day-to-day alert posture. The second scenario assumes that the Soviet Union initiates an attack against the United States and its allies with U.S. forces in a generated posture.

II. Findings

(TS) *On the Survivability of the SRF*

In the absence of specific guidance as to what number and kinds of weapons we want to survive, for how long and for what purpose, it is not obvious what an analysis of SRF survivability should concentrate on. What can be said, however, is that:

—The TRIAD approach, with its programmatic hedges, has been applied to the composition of the SRF. [2 lines not declassified]

—At least a portion of the SRF TRIAD is expected to survive and remain available [*less than 1 line not declassified*] after an initial nuclear exchange.

—The endurance of the SRF is the product of two factors: its ability to survive the initial enemy attack (“initial SRF survivability”) and its ability to surmount problems in post-attack system support and maintenance (“long-term SRF endurance”).

—Estimates of initial SRF survivability were based upon individual system survivability and SNDV alert status. These estimates indicate that a militarily-useful portion of the SRF can survive a massive Soviet attack, under both the “surprise attack” and “attack with warning” scenarios. The initial force drawdown was found to be primarily the result of (1) the fact that, whatever standard is applied, Minuteman survivability is decreasing rapidly, (2) the loss of non-alert bombers, and (3) the loss of a non-alert SSBN in the surprise attack scenario.

—Long-term SRF endurance is estimated to be sufficient to provide militarily-useful SRF capabilities [*less than 1 line not declassified*] following the initial attack. [4 lines not declassified]

—In addition, the temporary non-availability of some weapons is expected, due to SSBN replenishment cycles and bomber recovery operations.

These survivability/endurability estimates were based upon the damage expected to result from a single massive Soviet attack. Additional Soviet or third country attacks could reduce SRF survival/endurance. The assumption of a single-wave attack makes the force endurance problem more manageable but does not understate the problem.

(TS) *On NCA Survivability*

—Current policy looks to emergency plans developed by the Federal Preparedness Agency [2 lines not declassified] There are 14 statutory successors to the President and 32 statutory successors to the Secretary of Defense.

—The adequacy of some of the current evacuation plans appear questionable. Furthermore, we cannot definitely conclude that they

will work properly, since these plans are not realistically exercised [2 lines not declassified]

—We also find that only the President, Vice President, and Secretary of Defense are briefed on nuclear weapons control and release procedures. Other successors are not familiar with SIOP or SRF procedures or options; however, military advisors will be available to assist an NCA successor.

(TS) *On Information Availability*

—The information “needs” of a national decision maker could range across the following competence or ability levels for decision-making and force management:

—Level I—“Blind.” Has minimum knowledge of status of U.S. forces, inferred from launch orders given and known weapons systems characteristics. Capable of launching preplanned SRF options.

—Level II—“Informed.” Has access to a reasonable amount of information about U.S. status but does not have comparable information on enemies or neutrals. This allows the NCA to reprogram forces against preplanned options to make up for force drawdowns.

—Level III—“Intelligent.” Has access to status of enemy, neutral and U.S. forces, and an assessment of the results of the SIOP laydown. Can do effective force reprogramming and retargeting against the preplanned options (including all withholds)—that is, a limited *ad hoc* employment capability, for response to enemy attempts at coercion or “peripheral pillage.”

—Level IV—“Ideal.” Knows the status of enemy, friendly and neutral forces; the extent of damage to the enemy (both economic and military); the rate and status of U.S. and enemy recovery efforts; international political situation; extent of damage to the U.S.; and has sufficient information and control of assets that he can sustain near-real-time battle management, including reprogramming, retargeting, and reconstitution.

—NSDM 242 requires that the SRF be available for use for protection and coercion during and after a major nuclear exchange. This implies a need for both SRF flexibility and responsiveness to rapidly changing real-world situations, and also an “Intelligent” decision-maker. Hence, the study used Level III information requirements and command abilities as the standard against which needs and abilities were assessed.

—*Information Availability—U.S. Status*

—Assuming that they survive, the ABNCPs will be able to monitor and update the status of most of the surviving military communications/intelligence/reconnaissance assets, as well as monitoring the

status of the SRF and of other surviving forces with “high” likelihood, except [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

—The primary U.S. status information deficiency is the limited information expected to be available on nuclear operations (launches, NUDETS), [*3 lines not declassified*]

—*Information Availability—Enemy Status*

—The ability to locate enemy residual strategic forces, elements of the command structure, strategic and intelligence/reconnaissance assets, or tactical forces will be severely limited by loss of intelligence assets due to enemy action or (in some cases) collateral damage.

—The most significant enemy information deficiency will be the inability to determine the mission and alert status of residual enemy forces.

—Determination of the extent of economic damage in enemy territories will be difficult without imagery data. SIGINT also is expected to be inadequate; hence, a “low” assessment of the availability of enemy status information, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

(TS) *On the ability of the NCA to Command and Control, Communicate, and Retarget U.S. Military Forces*

—The principal RF communications sites, satellite terminals and common-user facilities are expected to be destroyed in a major nuclear exchange.

—[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

—[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

—[*4 lines not declassified*] and the forces and information sources that survive.

III. *Conclusions*

(TS) The primary conclusions drawn from the assessments made by this study are:

(1) We cannot offer a confident judgment on the survivability of the NCA. We did not have full access to evacuation/reconstitution plans and successful evacuation is highly situation-dependent (ranging from a surprise attack during a Presidential inaugural or State of the Union address, to attack after a prolonged crisis). [*2 lines not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified*]

(2) At least a portion of each leg of the SRF TRIAD is expected to survive and remain available [*less than 1 line not declassified*] The rapidly decreasing survivability of the Minuteman [*2 lines not declassified*] The hard target capability and control responsiveness of the Minuteman argues, however, for retaining even a small MM element in the SRF.

At the same time, it is not clear that sufficient SRF forces will be available to support a wide range of possible preplanned and *ad hoc* options. [2 lines not declassified] That is, existing national guidance on SRF employment is not specific enough to permit detailed assessment of the adequacy of the number of weapons assigned to the SRF.

Even considering only the current preplanned SRF packages, it is important that the decision maker note that execution of any one package would have an effect on the weapons available for remaining packages. [2 lines not declassified]

(3) Assuming the survivability of and endurability of airborne command centers, we now have the capacity (i.e., adequate communications) in the post-SIOP period to execute the SRF forces. This capacity is neither scenario-dependent, nor [less than 1 line not declassified] time-dependent, [less than 1 line not declassified]

(4) [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

—[3 lines not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—[less than 1 line not declassified]

The principal reasons for this “low” capability are:

—Lack of enemy status and activities information:

—Due to loss of fixed ground facilities and non-alert reconnaissance aircraft or aircraft support.

—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

—Limited capabilities of surviving centers:

—To process, integrate, and assess information.

—To support decision-making.

—Primarily due to loss of fixed facilities, data bases and personnel.

—Aircraft endurance and potential EMP problems exacerbate the situation.

—[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

—Due to loss of fixed ground facilities and enemy jamming.

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—Limited pre-war planning and preparation:

—Incomplete prepositioning of data bases, equipment and supplies.

—Limited procedures, tasking, and training.

[1 paragraph (14 lines) not declassified]

IV. *Possible Improvements*

(TS) We did not explore all possible remedies to the present deficiencies. What follows are suggestions which are not fully staffed as to priorities, costs, or even technical and practical possibilities. It should be noted, however, that these suggested improvements range from virtually cost-free procedural changes to major (and possibly costly) improvements in or additions to SRF capability. That is, if we wish to improve our ability to employ the SRF in a protracted nuclear war, we are *not* faced with the choice of benign indifference or massive expenditures—there is a rather extensive “middle ground.”

A. *On Force Improvements*

Problem: [1 line not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[9 lines not declassified]

B. *On Communications Improvements*

Primary Shortfall: Limited Communications to [less than 1 line not declassified]

Problem: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[16 lines not declassified]

Problem: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[6 lines not declassified]

C. *On Sensor and Information Source Improvements*

Primary Shortfall: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Problem: [2 lines not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[10 lines not declassified]

Problem: Vulnerability of [less than 1 line not declassified] Ground Support and Control Interfaces to direct attack.

Suggested Improvements

[16 lines not declassified]

Problem: [1 line not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[5 lines not declassified]

Problem: [2 lines not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[2 lines not declassified]

D. *On Center Improvements*

Primary Shortfall: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Problem: [1 line not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[15 lines not declassified]

E. Other Improvements

Problem: [less than 1 line not declassified]

Suggested Improvements:

[7 lines not declassified]

V. Recommendations for Follow-On Study

A. Alternative strategic reserve force employment strategies and SRF force compositions should be explored at the earliest possible date. Particular attention should be given to the following:

1. Employment strategies

a. Identify specific targeting objectives and packages (i.e., high priority targets such as national leadership installations, national military headquarters, and attack assessment installations) that can be pre-planned, assuming the perceptions and problems of a "blind" NCA, but which are deliberately withheld from the initial attack, to be attacked by a "second strike" force.

b. Identify broad targeting objectives which can form a framework for *ad hoc* attacks, assuming an "informed" NCA with access to various levels of information.

2. Force composition

a. Examine the survivability and endurance of the SRF triad, including the issue of hedging against uncertainty (e.g., an SRF composed of bombers and SSBNs, SSBNs alone, MX/MAP alone, MX and SSBNs, etc.).

b. Identify the pros and cons of a force structure much larger than the current SRF (i.e., [less than 1 line not declassified] of the present SIOP figures).

B. The possible improvements suggested by the SRF study should be subjected to a cost-effectiveness analysis. Particular attention should be given to the following:

1. Development of an investment strategy which addresses the issue of allocating funds for modifications to the C³I infrastructure
[2 lines not declassified]

94. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 6, 1978

SUBJECT

War Mobilization Exercise; NIFTY NUGGET

I want to call your attention to a crisis management contingency exercise which begins full play next week and which should prove instructive about our capabilities to mobilize for general war.

NIFTY NUGGET is the largest mobilization exercise held since World War II. It includes all military services and 27 civilian agencies, boards, and commissions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and most of the principals of the agencies are participating in key decisions at some time during the four-month scenario which is largely compressed in the period October 10–30.

The level of activity varies from simple staff reviews of mobilization plans to extensive measures in the case of the services and some departments. The Army is calling a small number of personnel to active duty from every reserve unit planned for deployment in the first thirty days. The Air Force and Navy are contacting all reserves by mail or telephone to ascertain their location and availability. The Selective Service System has been preparing for the exercise since June because 110 days are required for it. As an example of civil agency play, HEW will be tasked to receive American civilians and dependents in a simulated evacuation from Europe.

A number of decisions by you are assumed in the early period of play. The scenario has you directing industrial preparedness measures, activating the Selective Service System, and asking Congress to approve military induction before the outbreak of hostilities. Later, a number of NSC/SCC decisions are required for allocating military resources among theaters of operations.

The purpose of the exercise is to determine the adequacy of existing plans, systems, and procedures. Interrelationships among OSD, JCS, unified and specified commands, the military services, and civil agencies will be evaluated. NIFTY NUGGET will be conducted with real world data collected prior to the exercise and played against requirements in current war plans to determine limitations and shortfalls in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 113, Mobilization Scenarios: 7/76–10/78. Confidential. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote beneath Carter's initials: "*return to Stebbins.*"

manpower and logistics for supporting operations. NIFTY NUGGET was partly inspired by the 2,000 deficiencies discovered two years ago in an Army exercise, MOBEX-76, and the 187 major issues still not settled in repairing the deficiencies.

Although the exercise play is classified, the general nature and extent of NIFTY NUGGET has been announced to the press.

95. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978

The assessment update of PRM-10 is now complete and available for whatever use you choose to make of it. Fritz Ermarth has reviewed it and has several ideas which he is working out. In the interim, however, I believe it would be most useful if you read the Overview (attached at Tab A) which was prepared largely by Sam Huntington with some assistance by Putnam and me. It will give you a good sense for what is in the much larger supporting papers. It is a rather concise statement of "how we have been doing vis-a-vis the Soviets" over the past two years. It provides a significant amount of graphic information to facilitate interpretation. Finally, in the section on implications, it specifies what needs to be done on the East-West front. I personally think that the Overview and selected papers from assessment would make excellent pre-summit reading for the President.

Fritz has some objections to the present form of the Overview. The charts do not enamour him. He believes that it treats the "objective" and "subjective" factors in the East-West relationship on an equal basis, giving insufficient emphasis to the objective factors. Sam believes that some of the upbeat aspects of the diplomatic balance must be kept in the forefront in order to get the President to take the objective factors more seriously. Fritz proposes to resolve this difference of opinion by

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 14, PD-18 [4]. Top Secret. Outside the System. At the bottom of the page, an unknown hand wrote: "DA has seen."

preparing an “overview” of the Overview, much shorter, which lends the emphasis he prefers.

When you have read the Overview, it would be most helpful if Fritz and I could speak with you about how to proceed.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

COMPREHENSIVE NET ASSESSMENT 1978

Overview

I. Introduction

The principal purposes of Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA 78) are to assess:

1. The changes that have occurred since January 1977 in:
 - (a) the military, political, economic, diplomatic, and technological capabilities of the U.S. and the USSR;
 - (b) the projections of future trends in those capabilities; and
 - (c) our perceptions of those capabilities and trends;
2. The causes of these changes;
3. The implications of these changes for U.S. strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The starting point for CNA 78 is the PRM–10 Comprehensive Net Assessment completed in June 1977, with most of its data referring to the winter of 1976–77.³ Unlike the PRM–10 net assessment, however, CNA 78 is not the result of an elaborate interagency process, but is instead a product of the NSC staff, drawing upon the information and expertise available from other agencies of government. This procedure was adopted, first, because PRM–10 already provided a solid foundation for subsequent analysis, and, second, because of the need for both frankness and confidentiality in an assessment by this Administration of changes that have occurred since it came into office. CNA 78 is, thus, in considerable measure an exercise in self-assessment. Basic reports were drafted on the following eight topics.

² Top Secret.

³ The PRM–10 Comprehensive Net Assessment for 1977 is printed as Document 4.

1. The strategic balance
2. The NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance
3. Power projection
4. The diplomatic balance
5. The political-ideological balance
6. The economic and technological balance
7. Europe
8. East Asia

This overview report summarizes the conclusions of these basic reports and attempts to spell out some of the implications of those conclusions for U.S. strategy.

II. *Capabilities and Trends*

No radical changes in the overall global balance of power have occurred during the past 18 months, and the broad conclusions of the PRM-10 net assessment remain valid today:

1. A rough asymmetrical equivalence in military capabilities exists between the U.S. and the USSR.
2. The U.S. holds significant advantages in economic, technology, diplomatic access and support, and political appeal;
3. The Soviet-American relationship is a mixed one, involving elements of both cooperation and competition.

In none of the central elements of the global balance of power did either superpower lose to the other an advantage in *capabilities* between January 1977 (Table 1) and July 1978 (Table 2). In a majority of categories, however, *trends* in the balance either changed direction or were intensified between these two dates (Tables 1, 2, 3). The pro-Soviet trend in the strategic balance which existed in January 1977 has now intensified so as possibly to call into question the future of essential equivalence. With this notable exception, all the other trend changes were in a pro-U.S. direction. As a result, *the trends in almost all non-military components of national power (except technology and covert action) now favor the U.S. The trends in the military components of national power, on the other hand, all favor the Soviet Union, except for a mixed trend in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance.*

The last eighteen months have thus seen a heightening of the incongruence in capabilities noted in PRM-10. With the notable exception of technology, the U.S. is pulling further ahead in the principal non-military areas where it already had the advantage. In the military areas, the capabilities are more even, and the trends more generally favor the Soviet Union. This pattern of incongruent trends gives renewed urgency to three key questions:

1. How can the U.S. more effectively capitalize on its non-military advantages in dealing with the Soviet Union?

2. How can the U.S. slow down and reverse the trends in military capabilities favoring the Soviet Union (as it has, in some measure, already done with respect to the European military balance)?

3. How are the Soviets most likely to attempt to use their growing military strength for political and diplomatic purposes and how can the U.S. best deter or counter such use?

Six of the specific trend changes between January 1977 and July 1978 appear to be particularly noteworthy.

A. Intensified deterioration in strategic balance trends. The trend in strategic forces has favored the Soviet Union since the mid-1960s. Since January 1977, however, this trend has become significantly more pronounced. The 1976 projections in the key indicators of the strategic balance generally showed adverse trends for the U.S. into the early 1980s and then, on most key indicators, a reversal in favor of the U.S. by 1985 (Chart 1). Current projections generally show a steady decline on almost all key indicators into the 1990s (Chart 2). These projections assume a SALT treaty along the lines agreed to as of May 1978, current U.S. programs for the ALCM and Trident II, and no new Soviet programs. In terms of equivalent countermilitary potential (the central indicator for counter force capability), the basic trend, if M-X is not built, will be unfavorable until 1987, when it will level off at a very substantial Soviet advantage. If M-X is built, the adverse trend will level off in the mid-1980s, and a favorable balance will emerge in the early 1990s (Chart 3). In either event, unless other corrective actions are taken, the Minuteman force will be highly vulnerable to Soviet attack during the early 1980s. With respect to equivalent megatonnage (the central indicator for countervalue capability), if M-X is not built, the adverse trend will continue into the 1990s; if M-X is built, the decline will level off in the mid-1980s at a 2:1 Soviet advantage (Chart 4).

In terms of dynamic indicators, current projections show that after a nuclear exchange in the 1980s (Soviet counterforce first-strike; U.S. counterforce second-strike), the U.S. would be very inferior in equivalent megatonnage, in a somewhat disadvantageous position regarding throw-weight, and slightly behind in warheads.

The vulnerability of U.S. C³ compared to that of the Soviets remains and PRM-32 analysis has shown that full implementation of current Soviet and U.S. civil defense programs would leave 10–20 percent of the Soviet population and 35–65 percent of the U.S. population dead in an all-out nuclear exchange.⁴

⁴ For PRM-32, see Document 37.

B. *Improvement in European military balance trends.* The PRM-10 assessment noted a sustained trend in the European military balance favoring the Warsaw Pact. It indicated that while the Warsaw Pact forces were generally superior quantitatively and were making significant qualitative improvements, nonetheless neither side could be sure that it could achieve its objectives in a war. In the past 18 months, the efforts by the U.S. to strengthen its early combat capability in Europe plus other collective measures to strengthen the NATO forces have slowed and perhaps halted the pro-Pact trend, though in absolute terms the West still remains at a disadvantage. Full implementation of the Long-Term Defense Program will reverse the pro-Pact trend and create a military balance in Europe more favorable to the Allies. At present, however, NATO disadvantages in chemical warfare, C³, and radio-electronic combat remain, with little effort being made to correct them.

C. *More active anti-Soviet, pro-West role of the PRC.* In 1976-77 it was appropriate to speak of a triangular relationship among the PRC, the USSR, and the U.S. During the past year, however, the PRC has turned outward and assumed a more active role in countering Soviet influence in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. It has also decided to promote its economic and military strength through the import from the West of technology, equipment, and weapons. In pursuit of these goals, it has moderated its position on normalization.

As a result of these developments, the relations between the USSR and the PRC have deteriorated, and the relations of the PRC with the U.S., as well as with the European countries and Japan, have improved. Given the additional strains which have developed in U.S.-USSR relations in the past year, the triangle is now clearly no longer equilateral.

D. *Reversal of unfavorable trends in diplomatic relations and political appeal.* Between 1960 and 1977, changes in U.S. relations with other countries were more likely to be in an unfavorable than a favorable direction. This was particularly notable during the Nixon and Ford Administrations; between 1970 and 1977, for instance, the U.S. suffered 51 diplomatic "losses" and scored 36 diplomatic "gains." During these same years, the opposite was true for the Soviet Union. Between 1970 and 1977, Soviet gains (50) exceeded losses (27) by a margin of almost two to one. While the past 18 months are too brief to arrive at any conclusive judgment about the longer term, they have, nonetheless, seen a significant shift in past trends. Changes in U.S. diplomatic relations were positive with 30 countries, negative with 21. Changes in Soviet diplomatic relations, on the other hand, were positive with only 11 countries and negative with 25. Improvements in U.S. diplomatic relations were particularly notable with Third World countries (especially India, and in Africa and Latin America) and in Eastern Europe. The deterioration in Soviet diplomatic relations was most marked in Africa,

the Middle East, and Latin America. As a result, the overall U.S. lead in the diplomatic balance has improved (Table 4).

PRM-10 pointed out that while the U.S. was the most powerful country in the world and the USSR was second, of the next five strongest countries, four were allies of the U.S. and one (the PRC) was the enemy of the Soviet Union. The significance of U.S. allies in the global balance is underlined in Table 5. Although in three of these four power resources, the USSR is ahead of the U.S., in all four the U.S. together with its allies and friends (not including the PRC) is ahead of the USSR and its associates, often by a substantial margin.

The PRM-10 assessment suggested that the initiative in terms of political and ideological appeal might be shifting to the U.S. Newly analyzed evidence on trends in world opinion supports this hypothesis. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the favorable gap between Soviet and U.S. standing narrowed dramatically, with U.S. popularity being eroded by Vietnam, racial strife, and Watergate, while the unpopularity of the Soviet Union was eroded by detente. Since 1976, however, scattered evidence suggests that these trends have been reversed. American popularity is clearly on the rise, though it still remains well below the highs of the early 1960s. Soviet standing in world opinion, in contrast, has plummeted to depths unequalled since the late 1950s. These preliminary findings will be tested and hopefully confirmed by more comprehensive ICA polling in November 1978.

E. *Intensified contrasting trends in economic and technology.* The trend in overall economic resources and productivity is now more clearly favorable to the U.S. than it was 18 months ago. The trend in technology remains strongly favorable to the Soviet Union, although the U.S. still retains a substantial overall advantage. During the past year, the U.S. has attempted to increase its potential gains from U.S.-Soviet economic interaction.

It now appears that during 1976–79, for the first four-year period since World War II, the real U.S. economic growth rate (4.6%) will exceed both the Soviet economic growth rate (3.5–4.0%) and the average growth rate of the other OECD states (3.5%). Soviet industry grew at its lowest rate since World War II in 1976 and its second lowest rate in 1977. The problems of coordinating U.S. economic policies with our allies have, however, become more apparent than they were two years ago, and overall international economic prospects seem gloomier than they did then. Nonetheless, at present, the energy picture for the U.S. is less threatening than it was previously, due to slower world economic recovery, increased conservation, and the short-term effects of North Sea and North Slope supplies. During 1977, on the other hand, Soviet oil production grew by its lowest rate in 30 years, and this past year the Soviets launched various measures to attempt quickly to increase

production in their West Siberian fields. These measures also increase the likelihood of a longer-term fall-off in production, and an absolute decline in overall Soviet oil production seems very likely in the early 1980s.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, total U.S. R&D expenditures declined steadily while Soviet expenditures steadily increased. During the past two years R&D expenditures have stabilized at about 3.0% of GNP for the Soviet Union and 2.3% for the U.S. In terms of military R&D, real Soviet spending during the past decade has increased at an annual rate of 6.6%, while real U.S. spending has declined at a rate of -2.2%. For 1977, both overall Soviet military investment expenditures and Soviet RDT&E expenditures were about 75% greater than U.S. expenditures. In terms of technological output, it is clear that the U.S. is still superior to the Soviet Union in many areas, particularly as a result of its superior ability to translate basic scientific knowledge into sophisticated and usable end-products. The question thus remains whether the superior resources which the Soviets are devoting to research and development, both generally and in the military area, will, at some point, enable them to equal the U.S. in qualitative output.

PRM-10 indicated that the Soviets benefitted substantially from their economic interaction with the U.S. and the West. PD-18 directed that the U.S. should capitalize on its economic and technological advantages to counter the spread of adverse Soviet influence and to induce the Soviets to be more cooperative in achieving solutions to global problems. During the past year, further studies have underlined Soviet dependence on the U.S. for energy-related equipment (including submersible pumps, high-quality drill bits, blow-out preventers, gas-lift equipment; advanced computers; large-scale credits; and, less certainly, grain (particularly feed-grain). During the past six months, the U.S. has begun to attempt to exploit these advantages by reforming administrative procedures on technology transfers and by placing oil equipment and technology on the Commodity Control List.

F. *Specific Soviet gains and increased polarization in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Africa.* The PRM-10 net assessment concluded that the Middle East-Persian Gulf area was the most important region of the Third World for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. PD-18 linked this region with Western Europe and East Asia as an area of critical interest to the United States. In addition, the net assessment argued that "From their viewpoint the Soviets would be hard-pressed to find a better spot than Iran for a crisis-confrontation with the U.S." During the past 18 months, the Soviets have gained two new and important bridgeheads in this area, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, while losing a less important one in Somalia. These new gains bracket the major sources of oil for the U.S. and its allies.

More generally, Cuban military personnel in Africa approximately doubled during this period. Overall Soviet arms flows to Third World countries in 1977 were one-third more than in 1976. Soviet support for the Ethiopians and the transport to Ethiopia of both equipment and Cuban troops demonstrated the effectiveness of Soviet power projection capabilities in a benign environment and the ability of the Soviets to secure the necessary overflight rights in the Middle East. The Soviets and Cubans also increased their involvement in the black nationalist struggles in southern Africa. Soviet-Cuban actions in the Horn, the invasion of Shaba, and the coup in Afghanistan, all generated responses on the part of both affected local countries and of concerned outside powers. They contributed to a decline in Soviet diplomatic relations with many African countries (particularly Francophone ones), stimulated criticism of Soviet intervention at the OAU, and encouraged opposition to Cuba by key states in the Non-Aligned Movement.

III. General Cause of These Changes

In Afghanistan and in Africa, the Soviets and Cubans promptly took advantage of opportunities to expand their presence and influence. Virtually all the other major changes in the global balances in 1977 and 1978 did not, however, derive from Soviet initiatives. Overall Soviet policy, particularly with respect to its military programs, was characterized by substantial continuity. In general, both positive and negative changes in the global balance during the last 18 months have been due less to what the Soviets have done than to what we and others have done.

The intensification of the adverse trends in the strategic balance was, in part, a result of changed perceptions stemming from new intelligence on the accuracy of Soviet missiles. In much larger degree, however, it was the result of U.S. decisions to cancel the B-1 bomber, to delay full-scale development of the M-X, and to push development of the cruise missiles. The improvement in the trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance in Europe was the result of the U.S. pushing, at the London Summit in 1977 and subsequently, for a three percent increase in real defense spending among the NATO countries, taking some immediate short-term measures to increase early combat capability, and securing approval of the Long-Term Defense Program at the Washington Summit in 1978. The improvements in U.S. diplomatic relations, particularly with Third World countries and Eastern Europe, were the result of the changed priorities, new initiatives, and "new broom" effect of the Carter Administration (paid for, in part, by some deterioration in U.S. relations with more conservative military regimes). The deterioration in Soviet diplomatic relations, on the other hand, reflected in large part the reaction of African states to Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn. The upswing in U.S. popularity

among foreign publics, as well as the drastic decline in Soviet popularity, were principally the result of the Administration's new explicit emphasis on human rights. Similarly, the improvement in the trend in the economic interaction balance reflected the Administration's new willingness, stemming from PD-18, to attempt to capitalize on U.S. economic advantages. The significant change in the role of the PRC was primarily the result of the decisions of Hua-Teng leadership to which the U.S. and other Western powers responded favorably.

Overall, the U.S. thus played a central role in effecting changes in the global balance during the last 18 months. The predominance of U.S. initiatives in its competition with the Soviets parallels the predominance of U.S. initiatives in the conduct of ongoing arms control negotiations (SALT II) and in proposing new arms control negotiations (CAT, ASAT). Contrary to some views, the tides of history clearly do not condemn the U.S. to simply a defensive and responsive role. This pattern of the past 18 months, however, may reflect in large part the fact that the Carter Administration was new to office while the Brezhnev regime was well along in its second decade. Five or six years from now, the roles could be reversed, with a new Soviet leadership attempting to seize the initiative and a second Carter Administration remaining committed to its earlier policies.

IV. Implications for U.S. Strategy

PD/NSC-18 set forth three broad purposes of national strategy:

1. to maintain an overall military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at least as favorable as that which currently existed, the achievement of this goal, in the light of the continuing Soviet build-up, requiring three percent annual increases in real defense spending;

2. to take advantage of U.S. non-military advantages to encourage Soviet cooperation in securing balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, resolving regional conflicts, expanding contacts between societies, and promoting cooperative solutions to global problems; and

3. to use U.S. non-military advantages and, if necessary, U.S. military forces to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence adverse to the U.S. in critical areas of the world.

The favorable changes which have occurred in the trends in the global balance in the last 18 months testify to the general validity of this strategy. Certain elements in that strategy have, however, received greater emphasis than others. The developments of the last 18 months also highlight problems and opportunities in some specific areas which could suggest the desirability of certain changes in emphasis within the overall framework of the PD-18 strategy.

A. Military Strategy. In the military area, the PRM-10 assessment indicated that while there was an overall asymmetrical equivalence in

military capabilities, the trends were adverse to the U.S. in three critical areas: the strategic balance, the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, and power projection. Developments in the past year in these balances reflect the different emphases which the Administration has given them in implementing PD-18 strategy.

During the past year, the Administration has given top priority to the needs of NATO and, as a result, it is now possible to project a mixed trend in the European military balance. Continued improvement in this balance depends upon the full and expeditious implementation of the Long-Term Defense Program by the Allies. This, in turn, depends upon the willingness of governments and parliaments to increase real defense spending at roughly 3 percent per year into the mid-1980s. In this connection, it must be noted that while the Administration proposed a roughly three percent increase in military expenditures for FY 1979, it also proposed roughly a two percent increase in new obligational authority. If the three percent spending commitment is to be maintained in the coming years, increases in obligational authority will also have to approach that level. Failure of the U.S. to maintain this level would probably produce a comparable falling off in European efforts and could seriously undermine the Long-Term Defense Program.

Despite the emphasis in PD-18 on the need to enhance U.S. strategic mobility and to develop a quick reaction force, the unfavorable trend in power projection continues. To halt that trend will require, among other things, rapid and coordinated implementation of the PD-18 directive in this area.

PD-18 committed the U.S. to the maintenance of essential equivalence in strategic forces with the Soviet Union. During the past year, however, the unfavorable trend in the strategic balance has intensified. The slowdown and/or reversal of this trend depends upon:

1. prompt actions to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. C³ and Minuteman missiles during the early 1980s;
2. early affirmative decisions to develop the M-X, M-X (MCM), Trident II, or comparable weapons systems; and
3. revision of U.S. nuclear war doctrines to emphasize the importance of C³, limited nuclear options, and sustained nuclear engagements.

In the absence of these actions, U.S. strategic forces are likely to become, in appearance and in fact, inferior to those of the Soviet Union, and essential equivalence in nuclear forces will no longer be maintained.

B. *The Role of the PRC.* The new role of the PRC has benefits for the U.S. but also could close off certain U.S. options. So long as the U.S. maintained a roughly comparable posture with respect to both the PRC and the USSR, it was in a position in which it could (and did)

use actual or prospective improvements in relations with one communist power to induce greater cooperation from the other. As the PRC becomes more aligned with the West, however, the U.S. ability to do this declines, and the Soviet Union, instead of attempting to forestall Sino-American cooperation, reacts negatively to it (as it has done in its global propaganda during the past six months). There is, thus, a trade-off for the U.S. between the gains to be secured by using the PRC to counter Soviet expansion, and those to be secured by using it to induce Soviet cooperation. At present, the balance is shifting from the latter to the former. How far and at what rate it is in the interest of the U.S. for that shift to continue is a central issue for U.S. strategy in relation to the major communist powers.

C. Diplomatic Support and Political Appeal. The improvements in the diplomatic balance and in the attitudes of foreign publics towards the U.S. stem largely from the new policies, new promises, and new style of the Carter Administration. Unlike Soviet gains which, as in Ethiopia and Afghanistan, tend to be concrete and difficult to reverse, these U.S. gains with respect to the attitudes of foreign governments and publics are less deep-rooted and could be much more ephemeral. In some respects, indeed, they result simply from the fact that the Administration is *new*. Thus, the increased attention which the Administration paid to some countries was a significant factor in the improved relations with those countries. Unless the attention is escalated, however, which is likely to be impossible, the impact of that increased attention will fade over time. Similarly, the Administration's emphasis on human rights has had an apparently major positive impact on foreign public opinion. Again, that impact seems likely to diminish over time as human rights becomes a familiar element in U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, in order to maintain the favorable trends of the past 18 months, it would seem desirable to explore ways in which improved U.S. relations with key countries could be secured by more institutionalized ties based on common interests.

D. Economics and Technology. The trends in these areas have three major implications for U.S. policy.

First, the U.S. can move much more decisively than it has to take advantage of the Soviet Union's current and prospective economic weaknesses. In particular, U.S. technology is of central importance to the Soviets in postponing the decline in their oil production and U.S. technology and credits could play a major role in developing Soviet natural gas and oil reserves. This situation is now ripe for exploitation by the U.S. One possibility would be for the U.S. to express its willingness to cooperate with the Soviets in developing their energy (particularly natural gas) resources on a massive scale, through such means as the \$6 billion Yakutsk natural gas project, provided the Soviets

correspondingly increased their economic dependence on the West in other ways and provided they adopted more accommodating policies in the Middle East and Africa.

Second, increased cooperation on East-West economic relations among the principal OECD countries would enhance each country's benefits from trade with the Soviet Union. East-West economic relations would be an appropriate item for the U.S. to place on the agenda of the next economic summit.

Third, the Soviet advantage in R&D expenditures suggests the desirability of intensified U.S. efforts to increase its R&D investment so as to reduce the likelihood of losing to the Soviets its crucially important leadership role in this area.

E. *Soviet Gains in Ethiopia and Afghanistan*. The coup in Afghanistan and the Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia open up the possibility of new Soviet threats not only to Iran, but also to the smaller Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen. As the riots in Iran this past summer indicate, all these states are likely subjects for political instability, which could offer the Soviets various opportunities to expand their influence. A comprehensive U.S. strategy to reduce the likelihood of this happening could include:

1. continued efforts to maintain as much access as possible to current regimes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan (as well as Iraq and South Yemen);

2. clarification of U.S. interest in the stability of the area and of the seriousness with which we would view any Soviet efforts to expand their influence in pro-Western countries;

3. arms transfers, technological assistance, and political support designed to strengthen current pro-Western regimes in the area;

4. rapid implementation of the PD-18 provisions concerning a quick reaction force;

5. reconstitution of CIA covert action capabilities in the area.

Attachment 1

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁵

Washington, undated

Table 1
U.S.-USSR Global Balance
January 1977

TRENDS	PRO U.S.	CAPABILITIES	
		<u>U.S. Advantages</u>	<u>Rough Equivalence</u>
		Economic Resources and Productivity	
		Political Institutions/Leadership	
		East Asia	
		Political-Ideological Action	Intelligence
		Technology	Overall Military
		Diplomatic Balance	Capabilities
		Power Projection	Strategic Balance
		West Europe	
		Third World	
	MIXED		East Europe
			Covert Action
	PRO USSR		NATO-Warsaw Pact
			Military Balance
			Economic Interaction

⁵Top Secret.

Attachment 2

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Table 2			
U.S.-USSR Global Balance			
July 1978			
	<u>U.S. Advantages</u>	<u>CAPABILITIES</u>	
PRO U.S.	<u>Economic Resources and Productivity</u>	<u>Rough Equivalence</u>	<u>USSR Advantage</u>
	<u>East Asia</u>		East Europe *
	Political-Ideological Action *		
	Diplomatic Balance *		
	West Europe *		
TRENDS	Third World *		
	MIXED		NATO-Warsaw Pact
			Military Balance *
PRO USSR	Technology	Overall Military	Economic Interaction
	Power Projection	Capabilities	Covert Action
			<i>Strategic Balance</i>

Note: Intelligence capabilities and political institutions/leadership were not assessed in July 1978.

* Asterisk indicates change in trend direction.

Underscore indicates trend intensification.

⁶Top Secret.

Attachment 3

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

Table 3

Changes in Trends in Global Balance

January 1977–July 1978

- A. From pro-USSR to pro-U.S.
 - Diplomatic balance
 - West Europe
 - Third World
- B. From pro-USSR to mixed
 - NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance
 - Economic interaction
- C. From mixed to pro-U.S.
 - Political-ideological action
 - East Europe
- D. Intensified pro-U.S.
 - Economic resources and productivity
 - East Asia
- E. Intensified pro-USSR
 - Strategic balance
- F. Unchanged pro-USSR
 - Overall military capabilities
 - Power projection
 - Technology
 - Covert action

⁷Top Secret.

Attachment 4

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

Washington, undated

Table 4
Diplomatic Relations of US and USSR
With Other Countries

	<u>US</u>		<u>USSR</u>	
	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1978</u>
NEGATIVE (Hostile or antagonistic)	21	18	39	46
MIXED (Cool, neutral or sympathetic)	74	74	75	73
POSITIVE (Friendly or allied)	44	47	25	20

Attachment 5

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁹

Washington, undated

Table 5
Shares of Global Power Resources
1978

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.S. Allies & Friends</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>USSR Allies & Friends</u>	<u>Total</u>
Population	5.0%	22.5%	27.5%	6.0%	5.9%	11.9%
Gross						
Economic						
Product	24.5	40.9	65.4	14.6	5.3	19.9
Military						
Manpower	8.0	26.2	34.2	17.0	9.9	26.9
Military						
Expenditures	23.0	25.4	48.4	32.0	5.0	37.0

⁸ Top Secret.
⁹ Top Secret.

Attachment 6


Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹⁰

Washington, undated

CHART 1

LONG TERM US/USSR STRATEGIC
FORCES RATIO-1976 DATA

STATIC INVENTORY (TRADITIONAL MEASURES)

¹⁰ Secret.


Attachment 7

Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹¹

Washington, undated

CHART 2

LONG TERM US/USSR STRATEGIC FORCES RATIO
STATIC INVENTORY (TRADITIONAL MEASURES)




¹¹ Secret.

Attachment 8

Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹²

Washington, undated

CHART 3

ADVANTAGE RATIO FOR POSSIBLE
FORCE CONFIGURATIONSECMP-C.G. DATA
EXCLUDES BACKFIRE¹² Secret.

Attachment 9


Chart Prepared in the National Security Council¹³

Washington, undated

CHART 4

ADVANTAGE RATIO FOR POSSIBLE
FORCE CONFIGURATIONS

EMT-C.G.DATA
EXCLUDES BACKFIRE



¹³ Secret.

96. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹**

Washington, October 18, 1978

SUBJECT

ICBM C³I

The mid-term review discussion² made clear that we need a thorough high-level look at the issue of Minuteman/C³I. We need to understand fully what our present capability is and what measures are most needed if enhanced capability is deemed desirable. A study should be prepared for the SCC which examines:

- Soviet capabilities
- present and feasible upgraded US warning, and C³I assets
- present and possible alternative US policies, including the political, doctrinal and allied implications

Because of its sensitive nature, this study should be limited to the minimum number of people required to successfully do it. Please designate a representative who should contact Fritz W. Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff as soon as possible for a discussion of terms of reference and study procedures.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 90.

97. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, October 23, 1978

SUBJECT

The Triad and Its Alternatives

At our meeting on September 29th, you asked why—since Minuteman is becoming vulnerable, and since MAP involves thorny questions of its own—we should not simply abandon the ICBM leg of the triad, and strengthen the remaining two legs as necessary.² You were also interested in other possible basing systems. This memorandum is to give you my thoughts on those issues.

In simplest terms, we could indeed abandon the ICBM leg and move to a dyad of SLBMs and bombers. Or we might retain a triad—or something like a triad—by replacing silo- or MAP-based ICBMs with one of the newer concepts (air-mobile ICBMs, land-mobile ICBMs, air-launched ICBMs, or perhaps even SLBMs carried in coastal submersibles). With any of those alternatives, we could probably maintain an overall balance with the Soviet Union in terms of static indicators and in terms of dynamic exchange calculations. In addition, though it's too early to estimate costs for the novel basing schemes, we can say that at least the SLBM/Bomber dyad need not be more expensive than an SLBM/Bomber/MX–MAP triad of generally equivalent capability as measured by most (though probably not all) criteria. But on the other hand, with the dyad alternative, and to a lesser extent with the triads involving the alternatives to MAP, we would give up features of both perceptual and military value that we have enjoyed in the past, and—if one puts aside some of the political and possible verification questions about MAP—would continue to enjoy with the MX in a MAP deployment.

The effect of the US giving up, under successful Soviet pressure, a military capability of considerable value which the Soviet Union retains would, in my view, have disastrous consequences both internationally and domestically.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 11/78–4/79. Top Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. Brown's handwritten covering memorandum to Carter, October 23, reads: "This is the first of a series of memos on issues that have arisen in past discussions on the Defense program. They are deliberately structured as information rather than decision papers, because I will want to make specific recommendations separately at a later time. Though they may seem lengthy, they are worth reading in full."

² See footnote 2, Document 90.

Though precisely what we would give up in terms of military value depends on the particular alternative, there are two types of losses: the first is the loss of specific characteristics (which determine what kinds of things we will or will not be able to do); the second is a loss in simple diversity (which determines our confidence in being able to do it, come what may, in the face of new and unexpected Soviet developments, or of unforeseen occurrences in a combat environment).

A less drastic alternative would be to retain Minuteman in silos until its reliability is unacceptably degraded by age, perhaps then replacing it with a new missile, and to plan to launch it before Soviet R/Vs destroy it. This presumes reliable attack assessment, and a decision sequence that works. The Soviets might not be sure that sequence would not work; I, for one, would be far from sure that it would. My major concern can be put this way: such a course would be a major step on the road to giving computers the power of decision on going to war.

LOSS OF CHARACTERISTICS

As for specific characteristics, some we value are:

- *Independence from tactical warning.* This means being able to ride out a Soviet strike. It's desirable because we avoid the need for a "hair trigger" response to possibly ambiguous warning with all the complexities that could entail, avoid as well the risk of the hair trigger not working because the postulated decision process doesn't function, and also because a Soviet attack on our warning systems cannot jeopardize forces that do not depend on warning in the first place.

MAP deployments of ICBMs—if their size is in the proper ratio to the size of the Soviet attack—would have this valuable characteristic. SLBMs have it already. Bombers do not—they can be wiped out *if* caught on the ground, or near their bases. (For simplicity, I'll save the discussion of novel basing systems for later in this memo.)

- *Endurance.* This means being able to maintain some capability after an initial exchange—perhaps for days, or weeks, or even a few months. It is desirable not only to prevent further coercion, but as a counter to Soviet sheltering of political leadership (they've got to come up sooner or later), and against third countries who might suddenly find themselves in positions of great relative strength.

Again, ICBMs in a MAP deployment would have this characteristic. The SLBMs *per se* do too, but their problem in this respect lies in the dubious endurance of the systems to communicate with them. Bombers, because their bases are vulnerable, have little endurance, unless they have so many potential recycling bases as to prevent the Soviets from targeting all the bases.

- *Quick Response Hard Target Capability.* "Quick" refers not only to short flight times [1 line not declassified], but also to your ability to

get in touch with the force quickly, and how quickly it can respond. “Hard target” primarily implies accuracy (though warhead yields are not irrelevant). There are two classes of hard target: one is the roughly 1100 Soviet silos we would expect under SALT II; [3 lines not declassified] (There are also [less than 1 line not declassified] hard communications points; we do not have enough accurate weapons to target these now.)

Thus far, ICBMs have had unique advantages in this respect—quick and reliable communications, a quick-firing capability, short flight times, and high accuracy. SLBMs are currently weak here—slow communication, mediocre accuracy, and limited warhead yield. [5 lines not declassified] Bombers have no quick response hard target capability. [2 lines not declassified]

- *Good C³*. “Good” here refers to communications links that can transmit adequate amounts of data as rapidly as needed, and are not vulnerable to enemy attack. Simple execution [1 line not declassified] requires one level of C³ sophistication; a “warfighting” capability (see next below) can require considerably more.

ICBMs have great advantages in C³. Though no C³ system can be invulnerable, [11 lines not declassified] The survivability of these aircraft—because of the vulnerability of their bases—is also limited in duration, thus limiting the endurance of this part of the C³ system. [2 lines not declassified]

- *Warfighting Capability*. Sometimes called “flexibility” or “responsiveness”, this refers to the ability to do more than execute a massive pre-planned strike—to be able to use limited amounts of strategic force against particular numbers and types of targets during a nuclear war on the basis of what had occurred before. This includes retargeting, assessment of surviving US and Soviet forces, and connection to a surviving NCA. We have considerably more of that kind of capability today than we had in past; further developments in this direction are possible, at a price. Generally desirable characteristics to this end are the ability to retarget forces and execute missions promptly and with high probability of success, to limit collateral damage, and to restrict the size of each mission to the minimum deemed necessary.

I should note that I doubt that this kind of a strategic war is among the likely possibilities, or that it could be fought without rapid escalation to an unlimited spasm. But there are many indications that the Soviets are structuring the forces to fight such a war. Their plans and exercises point the same way. If they think they have such a capability, and both we and the Soviets know that the US does not, adverse military consequences are possible, and adverse political consequences probable.

ICBMs are the best of our forces for such missions. We can retarget them quickly and launch as few as one if necessary. We are now at the

point of adapting some of our Minutemen for retargeting [1 line not declassified] They have a high penetration probability, and their accuracy limits collateral damage. SLBMs are much less well adapted to warfighting: communications tend to be slower, and launch of a single missile tends to expose the position of the SSBN. Penetrating bombers are not well-adapted to such missions: flight time is long, and—since such raids are likely to be small—penetration is problematical, particularly if attacks on Soviet defenses were to be restricted in an effort to limit collateral damage. On the other hand, aside from their long flight time, ALCMs carried on bombers offer good penetration probability, accurate delivery, and the likelihood of low collateral damage.

In summary, by giving up silo- or MAP-based ICBMs, we would lose the part of the Triad that provides our best warfighting capability and has our most reliable C³. [1 line not declassified] the best prospects for endurance of both the system and our ability to communicate with it, and a system that does not rely on either strategic or tactical warning. Some of these capabilities can be preserved with some of the alternative mobile ICBMs.

LOSS OF DIVERSITY

The other kind of loss entailed in moving to a dyad has to do with diversity, which relates to our confidence in our strategic forces in spite of an uncertain future. Diversity benefits us in three ways:

- It protects us against things the Soviets might do—“solve” the ASW problem, deploy a very effective air defense, face us with an ABM breakout, etc.
- It protects us against failures on our own part—physical failures of equipment (such as in our SLBMs in the early '70s), unsuspected vulnerabilities (such as the EMP problem we discovered in the late '60s), shortcomings in our war planning (such as the fratricide problem we recognized in the mid-'60s), etc.
- It tends to complicate enemy planning—for example, Soviet attacks timed to catch our bombers will warn our ICBMs, and vice versa.

Eliminating the ICBM leg would eliminate *one* of our hedges against marked Soviet progress in ASW (which could jeopardize the SLBM leg), but not the other—our bomber force. It could also eliminate *one* of our hedges against Soviet development of a successful tactic against our bomber bases—possibly a barrage attack—or a much stronger Soviet air defense (either of which could jeopardize the bomber leg), but not the other—our SLBM force. Thus, failures of a single leg of a dyad of SLBMs and bombers would be extremely serious but need not be catastrophic. Failure of both—unlike failure of two parts of the triad—would be a total disaster.

COSTS

Before turning to the possibilities of novel basing systems, I would like to elaborate on my statement above that dyad and triad costs need not differ appreciably. By way of illustrating that, below are outlined three forces, all roughly comparable in capability (aside from the inherent differences in characteristics noted above) to each other and to the Soviet forces expected under SALT II. One is a triad, with 400 MXs in a MAP deployment; the other two are dyads, one heavy in the airbreathing half (100 cruise missile carriers with 60 ALCMs each), the other heavy in the SLBM half (768 D-5 Trident II missiles in 32 SSBNs).

[table not declassified]

These differences in costs are well within the accuracy of estimation.

One would normally assume that the failure of a single leg would affect a dyad more than a triad. However, it's not that simple if costs are held constant—if the three legs of a triad are smaller than the two legs of a dyad. For example, if the most expensive and least effective leg of a triad were eliminated, and its funding applied instead to the more efficient two legs that remain, conceivably each could be made strong enough to match any two legs of the old triad.

How that works out depends on the relative costs and effectiveness of the three legs that happen to be involved. In the example above, if the ICBMs fail, either dyad (both of which omit the ICBM leg) is of course superior to the triad; if the bombers fail, the triad is better than the first dyad but worse than the second; if the SLBMs fail, the triad is worse than the first dyad but better than the second.

Thus, dyads and triads of roughly equivalent capability—insofar as it is possible to make them equal—need not differ appreciably in cost, and may not differ appreciably in hedging against failure of any *single* leg—it depends on which leg fails.

NOVEL SYSTEMS³

As for novel basing alternatives to the MAP system, I should caution first that none has been thoroughly studied (at least not recently), and experience teaches us that many concepts that initially seem to be ingenious ways of solving existing problems later turn out, after a closer look, to be flawed with new problems of their own. Furthermore, it is most important to understand that *none* of these novel proposals is really a substitute for the ICBM force; though they surely could add to our strategic nuclear force, none could preserve all the valuable characteristics of the ICBM force—excellent warfighting capability *and*

³ Carter wrote: "MAP is very 'novel'" in the right margin next to this heading.

reliable C³, and endurance, and complete independence from tactical warning.

- *Air-Launched Ballistic Missile (ALBM)*: With this system, large aircraft would carry ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. (In a feasibility test of such a system, we dropped and fired a modified Minuteman from a cargo aircraft some years ago, but no guidance system was operative, nor was capable of doing so).

This concept, however, is much more closely related to the ALCM-carrying bomber than to an ICBM. It suffers from the bomber's dependence on tactical warning and lack of endurance. As an alternative to the ALCM, it promises only better penetration (though we do not expect penetration to be a severe problem for the ALCM) and quicker reaction. On the other hand, its accuracy and the number of warheads carried per aircraft would be much inferior to the ALCM's. And, of course, instead of hedging against a Soviet ABM breakout (as the ALCM does), it would hedge against a breakthrough in Soviet air defenses.

- *Air-Mobile ICBM*: With this system, ICBMs would be transported from airbases to dispersed launching sites, where they would be unloaded, erected, and fired. Through use of short take-off and landing aircraft, the potential number of launching sites is very large. The dispersion process could begin on strategic warning, though some continuing movement of ICBMs between sites would be necessary to defeat Soviet reconnaissance and targeting.

This system, though similar in many respects to ICBMs as we normally think of them, would not be completely independent of warning, and it could be difficult to provide communications as secure and reliable as the ICBM's. The proper aircraft does not now exist.

- *Land-Mobile ICBM*: With this system, ICBMs would be carried in land vehicles, either in more-or-less continuous motion to prevent pre-targeting, or in a "dash on warning" mode (in which vehicles normally kept at central bases would disperse on tactical warning, possibly to shelters randomly chosen from among a large number prepared in advance). There was much interest in the '60s in mobile versions of the Minuteman, but the concept was abandoned in light of the problems of C³, security, and—most of all—the prospect of public reaction to the idea of so many nuclear warheads continuously circulating on the roads or rails of the country. However, the land required and the speed of the vehicles is subject to tradeoffs with the hardness of the vehicle, or of its MAP-like shelter.

In comparison with ICBMs in silos or MAP, this system would suffer in terms of reliance on tactical warning, or in terms of C³ for versions relying purely on mobility rather than random shelters.

- *Coastal Submersibles*: This concept postulates very small (350-ton), inexpensive submarines, each armed with a pair of encapsulated MX missiles, and manned by a crew of 12. They would operate on the coastal shelf, with communications via a redundant grid of fiber-optics cables on the ocean floor. The submarine would be connected to plug-in terminals in the grid through an umbilical.

If feasible, this system would probably be further off in the future than any of the other novel basing schemes. Its potential advantage would be lower cost; the likely disadvantage, even if feasible, is vulnerability. Aside from its vulnerability to Soviet trawlers—tearing up

the cables, attacking the submarines, or even making boost-phase intercepts of the missiles—I am particularly concerned about vulnerability to the so-called Van Dorn Effect, a subject of considerable interest when the Navy first considered such coastal submarines.

The Van Dorn Effect postulates that as the wave front from the detonation of a large-yield weapon in deep water to seaward approaches the rise to the continental shelf, its energy becomes crowded into a much smaller volume, and the result is violent motion throughout the mass, with waves at the surface hundreds of feet high. Theory predicts that a single weapon could generate a destructive wave front over a hundred miles in width. Though there is clearly no way of running any kind of full-scale test, vastly scaled down tests using sizeable amounts of chemical explosives in a lake gave results that agreed well with the theory. Should the coastal submersible be vulnerable to this effect, the entire force—and much of our coastline as well—could be wiped out with perhaps a dozen, large-yield Soviet weapons.

SUMMARY

We could abandon the ICBM leg and move to a dyad. By strengthening the airbreathing and SLBM components, we could build back our number of warheads, megatonnage, etc. But we would also be sacrificing some important characteristics that we would enjoy with the ICBM force, and we would be less well hedged against unsuspected developments on the part of the Soviets and unsuspected failures on our own part. And for a US force size comparable with that the Soviets are sure to have during the mid-80s, moving from a triad to a dyad would not save a significant fraction of our strategic force costs.

We could also consider—and we are doing so—novel basing alternatives other than MAP. None of these has been studied thoroughly enough for me to recommend a deployment decision as among them. The addition of such alternatives to a dyad will result in a force that may approach the full goals of a triad, though none would fully match the characteristics of a triad that included MX in MAP basing. The alternatives could avoid some of the verification and political concerns connected with MAP, but could have other political problems of their own.⁴

Harold Brown

⁴ In November 1 memorandum to Brown entitled "The Triad and Its Alternatives" Brzezinski wrote: "Attached is a copy of your memorandum of October 23 on the above subject. Please note the President's comments." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 11/78–4/79)

98. **Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Crisis Management: Priorities, Emerging Issues and Initiatives

You asked for a short review of the above three categories in my area, Crisis Management.

Basic priorities which have been met in the first two years.

1. Crisis management procedures at the strategic level. This is the area in which we have made the most progress. (An unanticipated and distressing consequence may be that we have oversold the capabilities for LUA.)

2. On the civil front, the FEMA re-organization is a major stride. The follow-through, however, is crucial and presently not ensured.²

3. PD-41 Civil Defense is a major achievement.³

4. We have generated a much changed impression and understanding of Soviet approaches to strategic force management.

5. We have created an interagency counter-terrorism incident management system which has met demands effectively thus far, and we have created new special counter-terror units in the Army.

Emerging Issues.

1. [6 lines not declassified]

2. [2 lines not declassified]

3. Mobilization inadequacies, thrown up by exercise play NIFTY NUGGET, will be an issue impacting on the organization of FEMA.⁴ Presently there is little understanding or desire in OMB to make FEMA fill the mobilization planning gap, but we will miss an extraordinary opportunity if we do not force the matter as FEMA develops.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 59, Administration's Policy: NSC: 1978. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² See footnote 4, Document 72.

³ See Document 91.

⁴ See Document 94.

4. Nuclear weapons security and terrorism could become a big issue. The scene in Europe is not comforting, perhaps not in the U.S. either.

5. The technology transfer and trade issue as it relates to oil, and the USSR is an on-going issue.

New Initiatives

1. *Continuity of Government.* We must launch a major review of “continuity of government.” The PRC on civil defense agreed that this should be done, and the civil defense directive, PD-41, requires the capability which at present is non-existent.⁵ This is not the easy issue it may appear to be. It relates to the C³I studies, LUA, stockpiles, mobilization, military manpower policy, and FEMA re-organization. Trying to work out the terms of reference for analysis boggles the mind. (TS)

2. *Military doctrine.* I have spelled out the categories for pursuing this one. They are: (a) the conceptual revolution; (b) implementation in C³I by small steps; (c) flexibility in planning for military operations; (d) force structure changes by small steps. You may be inclined to emphasize the conceptual revolution first. I am inclined to leave it until last, moving in the program and operations areas first. Such a sweeping doctrinal change is impossible to explain to most audiences and unacceptable to most who understand. (TS)

3. *Mobilization.* This one could be made an issue if you like or simply ignored for later. NIFTY NUGGET is generating a wealth of data which could be used to make it an initiative. Much can be done in this area at very little cost in defense budget outlays. Legislation and organizational changes would not be costly. (S)

4. *A real shocker.* The quickest way to drive the defense budget down and to increase our military power is to reinstitute the draft, reducing private’s pay by 10 percent in the process. The savings would probably dwarf the “increment” Harold Brown seeks. (S)

⁵The PRC met to consider PRM-32 on civil defense on August 3. See Document 73.

99. **Memorandum From Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)**¹

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Observations on the Continued Need for a Triad of Strategic Forces

During the recent Mid-Term Review of Defense Programs, the President questioned Harold's assumption that we must maintain our Triad of strategic forces. This memo reviews the arguments for maintaining a full Triad.

The first thing to note in addressing the overall issue is that, given the continued viability we project for the bomber and ICBM forces, and the modernization efforts already underway, the question is not the general one of whether we want a Triad. It is instead the more specific one of whether the *modernization of the ICBM force to maintain a Triad* (1) adds wholly unique and necessary capabilities to the Dyad of bombers and SLBMs we are already modernizing, or (2) hedges in some unique way against the possibility of a catastrophic loss of one leg of our strategic forces posture, or (3) provides capabilities present in the underlying Dyad, but at less cost.

Unique and Necessary Contributions of the ICBM Force

It is commonly argued that the unique combination of good C³, high readiness and short flight times make the ICBM force uniquely capable of rapid destruction of hard targets. There are several problems with this claim, however.

First, the requirement for rapid destruction of targets may not be very great. The ICBM modernization study now being completed by OSD argues that there are [*less than 1 line not declassified*] targets (including [*less than 1 line not declassified*] hard targets) other than missile silos and launch control centers that change value so rapidly that striking them with missiles might do significantly more damage than striking them later with bombers or cruise missiles.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 89, Doctrine/C³I: 1978. Top Secret. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "VU this is a *good* + and provocative memo. Set up a discussion of it among our people—and at some point we ought to draw in the DOD. In the meantime develop the [*illegible*] memos mentioned on pp 6-7. ZB."

However, the need to kill these targets is realistic only in scenarios in which the crisis deepens from modest levels (where actions to reduce the values of potential targets don't seem necessary to the Soviets) to the missile shooting level in a matter of less than a day or two, and such scenarios don't seem likely.

With respect to the missile silos and launch control centers, while we might like to be able to destroy such targets before they launch their missiles, it doesn't seem likely that we would be able to. Soviet missile readiness levels, warning systems, doctrine, and exercises indicate that they are capable of and apparently plan on launching their missiles under attack. We might want to attack such targets anyway—to destroy missiles that failed to launch, or to prevent reload of the silos . . . However, if this is our purpose, a half a day or so delay in hitting these targets probably wouldn't make much difference.

To the extent that there is a real requirement to be able to destroy the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] time-sensitive targets, SLBMs can be made capable of the task. Bill Perry noted in the Defense Review meeting that while it would be a tough technical problem, SLBMs can be made to achieve ICBM accuracies by the late 80's. Further, contrary to popular opinion, submarine C³ is good enough to rapidly generate large nuclear strikes. Against worst case jamming, TACAMO aircraft operating off our coasts can complete transmission of an emergency action message (EAM) within 45 seconds with virtually perfect confidence that it will be received by any submarine at normal operating depth that is within 800 nautical miles. This implies that two TACAMO aircraft can guarantee coverage of about 4 million square miles of ocean—enough operating area for at least five SSBNs carrying a total of more than 600 warheads. These aircraft can also guarantee delivery of an EAM over an additional 10 million square nautical miles within 15 minutes—which would allow launch of more than 1500 additional warheads.

One might argue that other elements of the SSBN C³ networks may fail to get the message to the TACAMO aircraft, but in this regard, the SLBM C³ network seems no worse off than the C³ network supporting the ICBM force. Given the vulnerability of ground based communications stations and transmission lines, the ICBM force seems likely to be controllable only from our airborne command posts, and getting the word to TACAMO isn't much tougher in principle than talking to our other airborne command posts.

The Increment of Hedging Provided by a Modernized ICBM Force

One of the strongest arguments made in favor of modernizing the ICBM force is that it substantially improves the degree to which our overall strategic posture is hedged against catastrophic failures in

any one force component. This argument is based on two ideas—first, that failure of any one force component in a strategic force divided into three essentially equal components leaves you with $\frac{2}{3}$ of your original force, whereas with a strategic force divided into 2 essentially equal components you would only have $\frac{1}{2}$ your original force left. Second, since there is no reasonable way to establish the relative probabilities of unforeseen catastrophic failures in each strategic force component, we should adopt a conservative approach and construct our strategic force so as to make the loss of our most capable force component at least marginally acceptable. While these ideas are not unreasonable, a deeper look yields some interesting insights.

To begin our analysis, we might first examine the significance of the 17% difference between having $\frac{2}{3}$ rather than $\frac{1}{2}$ the total strategic force remain effective, given a catastrophic failure? At Tab A I have constructed illustrative 1990 strategic force postures for a full Triad, and a slightly augmented Dyad in which our ICBM forces are not modernized. For these national forces, you have [*less than 1 line not declassified*] remaining after the strongest leg of the Triad fails, versus [*less than 1 line not declassified*] after the stronger leg of the Dyad fails. The significance of such a difference is clearly a judgment call. While moving to sharply lower strategic force levels than say [*less than 1 line not declassified*] will make a 15–20% difference more significant, I don't see this difference much of a motivation for modernizing the ICBM force in the foreseeable future.

We should also ask how likely the total failure of one leg really is? The only failure that our strategic forces have had that approaches the level one might call catastrophic occurred in the late 1960's. [*4 lines not declassified*] While this was a very serious problem and took a number of years to fix, even if we had discovered it in the course of a nuclear exchange, there is good reason to believe that we could have strung out our missile launches and realized at least $\frac{1}{3}$ of the original expected effectiveness in each missile leg (I grant you the failure was in 2 legs, but I'll get to that point below).

However, if we assume that hedging against a $\frac{2}{3}$ loss of effectiveness in any one leg of our posture is sufficient, a Dyad of forces should be acceptable. The reasoning behind this is that there seems to be a reasonable consensus that a Triad of forces provides *sufficient* hedging against a complete catastrophic failure of any one leg. However, a Dyad hedges as well against $\frac{2}{3}$ type losses as a Triad does against complete losses ($\frac{1}{2}$ your force plus $\frac{1}{3}$ of the other $\frac{1}{2}$ is equal to $\frac{2}{3}$).

Another question we might ask is—exactly how does modernizing the ICBM force to maintain a *second missile force* allow any greater degree of hedging than is possible by increasing the sizes of each leg of the underlying Dyad? Given the [*10 lines not declassified*]

Basing mode failures can be divided into two categories, failures by natural causes, and failures due to an unforeseen ASW vulnerability that gets exploited by our opponents. As far as natural causes are concerned, our oldest SSBNs have been operating for nearly 20 years and the complete gamut of required submarine evolutions through launch of the missile has been run through hundreds of times. Given this testing, and the fact that the Trident SSBN is already on the way and will have been in operation for many years by the time the current SSBNs will be retired in large numbers, the risk of a catastrophic failure of our SSBN force by natural causes seems extremely small.

The *relatively* significant possibility is that of a catastrophic ASW breakthrough—and even this doesn't seem very large. Thus, the ICBM force's significant marginal contribution to hedging against catastrophic failures—is in its ability to hedge against the loss due to a catastrophic ASW breakthrough, of whatever capabilities are provided uniquely by missiles.

Note, however, that the bomber forces can do anything except destroy their targets in less than [*less than 1 line not declassified*]²—which takes us back to the issue raised on page 2—given the likelihood that any homeland-to-homeland nuclear exchange would take place only after a deep crisis lasting a period of days or weeks—how important is it to hedge against the loss of our ability to deliver nuclear weapons on target within less than [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of the decision to do so? Wouldn't the value of the Soviets' time-sensitive targets have been reduced to a minimum long before an exchange of nuclear weapons begins?

Can Modernizing the ICBM Force Give US Capabilities Provided by the Two Legs of the Triad but at Less Cost?

In my opinion, the arguments we have been through so far seem to make less than a compelling case for modernizing the ICBM force to retain a full Triad. Thus, if we want to make a reasonably strong objective case for modernizing the force, we need a positive answer to this last question.

The most up-to-date source we have for judging the relative costs of modernizing our strategic forces is the PD-18 follow-on study on modernizing the ICBM force.² That study estimates the costs of deploying and operating additional strategic forces through the year 2000 at \$5–7 million per arriving warhead for an ICBM system, \$8–11 million per arriving air launched cruise missiles, and \$15–17 million per arriving Trident warhead. While these figures indicate that arriving ICBM RVs would be somewhat cheaper than arriving ALCM and Trident

²See Document 93.

weapons, they assume that we deploy the MAP system that DOD currently favors and that the Soviets do not fractionate their missile payloads to the maximum allowed by SALT in order to maximize their ability to attack the MAP system.

The costs of the alternative ICBM modernization schemes such as air mobile ICBMs, and the offshore submersible idea would probably be significantly higher than the MAP system, which could make ALCMs the least expensive option though we should realize its costs are quite uncertain, too. An ICBM system deployed on trucks that would disperse and hide whenever the Soviets order their forces to high readiness might cost significantly less than the MAP system, but DOD has not yet examined this system in any detail.

Summary and Conclusions

Aside from the institutional considerations, in order to believe that modernization of the ICBM force to maintain a Triad is necessary on other than perceptual grounds, it would seem necessary to subscribe to some combination of the following statements:

—There is a significant probability that given a failure in one leg of our strategic force, this failure will reduce the effectiveness of the affected force by more than 67% *and* that the advantage (maximum 15–20%) in total force effectiveness of a Triad relative to a Dyad under such circumstances will make a significant difference.

—There is a significant probability that we might find ourselves in a situation where the Soviets had achieved an ASW breakthrough negating the effectiveness of the SSBN force *and* a crisis had reached the shooting level so fast that the Soviets did not have enough time to reduce their time-sensitive targets down near their minimum values.

—There is sufficient value and a high enough chance of neutralizing Soviet ICBMs before they can be launched to justify hedging against an ASW breakthrough that made the SSBN force unable to perform this task.

—Modernizing the ICBM force allows us to buy at less cost capabilities that could be provided by further modernizing the other strategic forces.

While the first three statements have some validity, I believe that *unless* DOD can identify an ICBM modernization scheme that we can confidently expect to be more cost-effective in providing arriving weapons than CMC/ALCM or *unless* the political and institutional costs are too great, we should start moving toward a Dyad of SLBMs and strategic aircraft.

The above arguments also suggest the following:

—The importance of ICBM modernization schemes that could provide arriving warheads at the lowest possible cost (such as the

truck-mobile scheme mentioned by Harold Brown) should receive more emphasis.

—A careful study should be made to determine whether DOD's concerns about the security problems associated with moving strategic systems onto private land are reasonable—particularly if such movements occur only in deep crisis situations.

—As part of the assessment of the feasibility of ICBM systems that are normally visible and countable but disperse in times of crisis, the intelligence community should be asked to assess the level of confidence we can have that we would detect Soviet moves to the levels of military readiness at which they would be willing to execute a counterforce attack. This assessment should identify the numbers and types of strategic forces and other important Soviet assets that might have to remain vulnerable to a US retaliatory strike in order to achieve strategic surprise.

—DOD should be asked to bring its now overdue targeting study to a rapid close so that we can more fully appreciate how the issues it raises bear on the question of whether to modernize the ICBM force.

—DOD should be asked for descriptions of the various classes of time-sensitive targets, the numbers of targets in each class, the time required to reduce them to their minimum values, and a comparison of their relative day-to-day and minimum values.

—The intelligence community should be asked to assess the likelihood that we could prevent the launch of significant numbers of Soviet ICBMs.

—Improvements in C³ systems that support the SLBM force (more TACAMO and improvements in the systems that can talk to it, such as E4B aircraft) should be supported in the upcoming FY 80 budget review.

—On a very close-hold basis, a set of talking points making the case for a Dyad should be worked out to see if such a move can be explained in convincing terms to the public.

Even if our continuing investigations show that moving to a Dyad is the right thing to do, such a move would have to be made relatively slowly, given the upcoming SALT ratification debates and the enormous amount of change implied by the strategic forces decisions that have already been made during this Administration.

Fritz Ermarth has discussed this memo with me and has no significant difficulties with what it says.³

³ Ermarth initialed above his name and wrote at the bottom of the page: "I'll try for some contribution of my own shortly. F.E."

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁴

Washington, undated

NOMINAL US STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE FOR 1990

Assumptions

1. SALT reductions to 1500 SNDVs + 1000 MIRVs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers "counting as 1."
2. Deployment of a new "FB-111H" type penetrating bomber.
3. SNDV limits filled out by retaining Minuteman II, refurbished to solve 2nd stage propellant aging problem.

<u>Notional Triad</u>	<u>SNDVs/RVs</u>	<u>RV Subtotals by "Leg"</u>
[<i>number not declassified</i>] Tridents [<i>less than 1 line not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	
[<i>number not declassified</i>] Poseidons [<i>less than 1 line not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]
[<i>number not declassified</i>] M-X (11 RVs)	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	
[<i>number not declassified</i>] Minuteman II	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]
[<i>number not declassified</i>] CMC (50 ALCMs)	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	
[<i>number not declassified</i>] "FB 111 H" ([<i>number not declassified</i>] weapons)	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]
	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	
Remainder after strongest leg fails: [<i>number not declassified</i>]		

⁴ No classification marking.

<u>Notional Dyad</u>	<u>SNDVs / RVs</u>	<u>RV Subtotals by “Leg”</u>
[<i>number not declassified</i>] Tridents	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	
[<i>number not declassified</i>] Poseidons	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]
[<i>number not declassified</i>] Minuteman II	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]
[<i>number not declassified</i>] CMC	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	
[<i>number not declassified</i>] “FB 111 H”	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	[<i>number not declassified</i>]
	[<i>number not declassified</i>]	

Remainder after strongest leg fails: [*number not declassified*]

Note that differences in remainders are less if—cruise missile carriers count as 2; M–X carriers fewer warheads; Trident missiles average more warheads; penetrators carry fewer weapons. [Footnote is in the original.]

100. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT

The Triad and Its Alternatives

Harold Brown has sent you an information memo responding to your questions in the recent Mid-Term Defense Review meeting about the need to maintain a full Triad of strategic forces.²

Harold argues that while various combinations of SLBMs, bombers and novel ICBM deployment schemes or M-X/MAP can give us roughly equal cost Dyads or Triads that will equally well maintain an overall balance with the Soviets in terms of the usual static measures and dynamic exchange calculations, by going to a posture without M-X/MAP, we will give up features of the ICBM force that have substantial perceptual and military value.

Harold specifically suggests that allowing the Soviets to pressure us into giving up the military advantages of an ICBM force while they retain them would have a "disastrous effect" on both international and domestic perceptions. The military capabilities we would sacrifice to at least some degree are: independence from tactical warning; endurance after an initial exchange; quick response hard-target kill capability; good C³; and warfighting capability—which is the ability to use limited amounts of strategic forces against particular numbers and types of targets selected on the basis of how a nuclear war unfolds.

Harold also comments on the value of diversity in strategic forces, particularly as a hedge against the unexpected, and presents a short discussion of problems he sees with four alternative missile deployment schemes (air-mobile, ground-mobile, air-launched, and offshore submersible).

Overall, the memo makes a forceful case for modernizing our strategic force posture with M-X/MAP. In so doing it raises a number of interesting and difficult issues that should be more fully illuminated. Specifically:

Harold is imposing requirements on our strategic force posture, [2 *lines not declassified*]³—which they don't now meet and which have never

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 89, Doctrine/C³I: 1978. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 97.

really been imposed on them before. While imposing these requirements may very well be justified, we should first examine the doctrinal issues that give rise to such needs and which have been addressed in the very nearly complete PD-18 follow-on targeting study. We should also examine the potential for improvements in the capabilities of other forces to meet these same requirements. For example, SLBM C³ can be probably improved enough to allow large-scale SLBM strikes against time-sensitive targets under worst case conditions.

The stated requirement for capabilities to destroy targets rapidly seems to drive much of the argument in favor of an ICBM force. Harold should be asked for descriptions of the various classes of time-sensitive targets including numbers of each type, their relative day-to-day and minimum values, and the time the Soviets would need to reduce them to their minimum values. Further, since the large majority of the time-urgent hard targets are Soviet silos, launch control centers, and their associated C³ systems, it would be useful to ask Harold and Stan Turner to assess the likelihood that even if we did have an extensive time-urgent hard target kill capability we could prevent launch of a significant fraction of the Soviets' ICBMs.

I wonder if we aren't being a little over-selective in choosing where to mimic the Soviets and where not to. In particular, why must we match their land-based ICBM capabilities, but not the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] strategy that their exercises suggest they might adopt *in times of crisis*? Soviet exercises and doctrine give us reason to believe that strategic warfare is very unlikely to grow out of situations in which you will not have had hours or even days to implement a crisis-only [*less than 1 line not declassified*] strategy and contemplate your response if and when tactical warning of an attack comes in. We should also consider the possibility that in order to deprive us of strategic warning, the Soviets would have to leave themselves significantly more vulnerable to a retaliatory response. It seems clear that we need a better understanding of Soviet thinking and capabilities for [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

The memo's summary of difficulties and deficiencies of the alternatives to M-X/MAP seems a little hasty. We can afford to look at these possibilities more carefully, particularly if we keep our options open by proceeding with a common missile that could be used in Trident or in any of the ICBM deployment schemes, including MAP.

The arguments given in favor of M-X/MAP assume the Soviets will not respond by fractionating their missile payloads significantly above current projections. Even within the limits of the current SALT proposals, they can fractionate enough to sharply raise MAP's costs and the land area it would require. How should we view this possibility?

Harold's memo does not explicitly mention an argument for the Triad frequently made, i.e., that ICBMs protect the bombers by making it very difficult for the Soviets to attack both. Does modernization of ICBMs provide any such benefit to bomber survivability or does retention of some Minuteman in silos provide this benefit?

The issue of hedging against both evolving and unforeseen Soviet threats raises an interesting question. Is the margin of advantage of a Triad over a Dyad in hedging against unforeseen threats that meaningful if the ICBM modernization schemes required to maintain a Triad must be maintained against evolutionary expansions of threats we can already see?

The argument that abandoning the ICBM field to the Soviets could have a disastrous effect on perceptions needs more development. Are we being run unilaterally out of an otherwise attractive force posture, or are we simply the first to recognize and respond to a problem of technological obsolescence that the Soviets will eventually have to face?

Finally, there are several larger issues that this discussion of Triads versus Dyads does not come to grips with. Specifically, as we enter the relatively dangerous early 80's, we should have a clear view of what we need in terms of specific strategic capabilities, that may be realized in a variety of different forms, and how the Soviets may try to respond to our modernization efforts. We should ask which force mix poses the greatest problem over the course of a protracted competition to the Soviet force planner concentrating on damage-limiting objectives:

- Augmented sea and air mobile forces with no ICBMs?
- Augmented sea and air mobile forces with some silo-based ICBMs?
- Augmented sea and air mobile forces with improved and rebased ICBMs?

A better understanding of these larger issues may strongly influence our answers to the current key question—are the strategic capabilities we add or retain by modernizing and rebasing ICBMs really unique and necessary?

101. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, October 28, 1978

SUBJECT

ICBM Vulnerability, MAPS, and Verification

As we discussed at our midterm review, the growing numbers and increasing accuracy of Soviet missiles will give them the capability to destroy [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of our Minuteman silos by 1982–1983.² In a paper sent to you last week,³ I discussed the unique value of the ICBM leg of our Triad and the risks of giving up our ICBM force—especially under this pressure from the Soviet Union.

I also noted at the midterm review that while we should improve our attack assessment system, we should not allow our ICBMs—at least not all of them—to be so vulnerable that it would be necessary to launch our force out from under an attack in order to save it. Our ICBM force has had the ability to ride out any conceivable attack on it. This is far preferable to a situation where, because the ICBM force cannot survive, we embark on a course whose outcome is that a computer decides whether we launch a nuclear attack.

The alternative to the sobering options of retreating to a dyad, or being forced into a launch-under-attack policy, is to provide survivable basing for our ICBMs. We still are studying the various alternatives, but already it is clear that there are no simple, quick or cheap solutions.

Leaving aside political and perceptual problems, as well as the very important problem of uncertainties in counting the number of Soviet launchers (or missiles) if they go to MAPS or some other mobile concept—the best solution, both from a technical and from a cost point of view, appears to be MAPS. This is not to say MAPS is an inherently attractive solution; the problems just referred to cannot be left aside. But all of the other basing systems we are considering either cost more or compromise away some important characteristic of the present ICBM force (e.g., no dependence on strategic warning), or both. In most cases they also, like MAPS, involve counting uncertainties if the Soviets

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 2, Defense (Items in the System): 9–12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. An undated paper prepared in the NSC entitled “Comments on Harold Brown’s 28 October Memo on ICBM Vulnerability, MAPS, and Verification” is *ibid*.

² Refers to the September 29 Mid-Term Defense Review meeting. See footnote 2, Document 90.

³ See Document 97.

build similar systems. You should not expect our studies of these alternative basing systems to reveal a better solution than MAPS. Rather, we are looking at whether there are acceptable systems which do not raise the same issues of SALT verification and intelligence requirements that MAPS does.

It is important to emphasize that the SALT verification problems posed by MAPS are only a special case of a general intelligence problem that would also exist if SALT limitations did not exist. That problem is the requirement that our intelligence be able to monitor the size of the Soviet RV force which a MAPS must face with sufficient certainty to give us confidence that we have enough shelters to absorb the threat and leave an adequate number of U.S. missiles surviving. Uncertainties in the size of the Soviet force can stem from a Soviet MAPS, Soviet cheating on SALT, or Soviet measures to conceal the size of their force in the absence of SALT limitations.

Recognizing that there will always be some uncertainty in our estimates of the size of the Soviet force, a MAPS system would be designed with a tolerance for considerable uncertainty as to the Soviet ICBM inventory. For example, in one MAPS design concept we would plan on 200 M-X missiles with 50% survivability. If the threat from Soviet missiles were doubled, survivability would be reduced to 15%, *i.e.*, only 30 M-X missiles—but still a force equivalent to 100 Minuteman IIIs. We also could hedge against threat increases by adding additional shelters; for example, if as in the previous example the threat doubled, a 10% cost increment for added shelters would keep survivability from dropping below 25%, or 50 M-X missiles.⁴

In my view, a crucial point in discussion of MAPS verification in the SALT context is this basic fact about the concept: The system would, for strictly military reasons, be designed to tolerate a substantial concealed increase in the size of the Soviet force. The size of that tolerable concealed increase would have to be large enough that we would be confident our intelligence could detect a force larger than that with very high confidence—whatever concealment measures the Soviets might employ, including copying the MAPS concept. Meeting this strictly military requirement would in itself meet the basic test of arms control verification: That test is not absolute certainty, but high confidence that cheating (here, concealment of illegal missiles in a MAPS) would be detected before it could affect our security or undermine the strategic balance. For SALT it is very desirable—and may be politically essential—to have *more* confidence in counting the Soviet force than we require to meet this military requirement. However, it is important to recognize that we are talking about adding to a level of

⁴ In the right margin next to this paragraph, Ermarth wrote: "No numbers."

confidence that is, by definition, already adequate for preserving our military security.

With this perspective, it is reasonable to examine critically the SALT issues raised by MAPS:

1. Is MAPS legal under a SALT II agreement? (SALT says that we may not use deliberate concealment to impede verification by national technical means, including satellite reconnaissance.)

2. Can we design MAPS to allow verification and still keep the Soviets from knowing which shelters to target?

3. Is the Soviet Union likely to deploy a MAPS?

4. If the Soviet Union deploys MAPS, can we verify?

5. If the Soviets deployed MAPS, could they use it to “break out” from a SALT treaty?

6. If the Soviets deployed MAPS, and in fact complied with SALT provisions, would SALT critics claim the Soviets were cheating (and were also able to tell which of our MAPS shelters contained our missiles), thereby undermining public confidence in the system’s survivability, and perhaps thus push us to respond by filling up all our shelters?

These, like most questions raised about SALT verification, are difficult and complex. Our studies of the past few months have provided some important answers. In this paper I will discuss these issues using MAPS with vertical shelters (silos) as a frame of reference, but most of the discussion is also applicable to hybrid trenches (MAPS with horizontal shelters under cover), which I believe is also a viable, but somewhat more expensive, option.

1. Is MAPS legal under SALT II?

Yes. The verification provisions of the draft treaty say that we may not take deliberate concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. Although MAPS obviously conceals the current *location* of launchers, we could and would as discussed below make special design provisions to permit verification of their *numbers*. Provided verification is possible through NTM, concealment of current location is not barred—otherwise it would be illegal to send SSBNs to sea, an act which certainly conceals their location.

2. Can we design MAPS to allow verification and still keep the Soviets from knowing which shelters to target?

Yes. In addition to the inherent verification opportunities afforded by our open society, we have ways of allowing the Soviets to verify our compliance with MAPS without endangering the security of the system. These have been studied by both SALT and military experts, and

there is good agreement that they can provide an adequate approach to this problem.⁵

The first verification method involves insuring that the Soviets can monitor the number produced. We could do this by designing MAPS so that all missile-launcher combinations go through an assembly process which can be observed by satellite reconnaissance before they enter the shelter area. Thus the Soviets can count the missiles and launchers going into the shelter area without knowing which particular shelters (silos) they are going to. (This is similar to the way we verify SLBMs today, in that we make our count in the assembly area but do not know where the missiles are after the submarines carrying them are deployed.) The length of time required to assemble and deploy a missile and launcher before it is put in a shelter is long relative to the intelligence cycle time. The Soviets may worry that we would cheat by deploying a covertly assembled missile and launcher into a MAPS shelter overnight under cover of darkness. While this would be a difficult and risky undertaking, it is conceivable for MAPS (as for a variety of other strategic systems).

To help reduce this residual uncertainty about whether illegally produced launchers had been deployed secretly, we could also make a practice, or formally offer, to open a few groups of shelters on demand to prove that there is only one missile and launcher per group. We would open all shelters in a designated group except the one that was full. This occasional checkup could be accomplished by satellite; if the Soviets prefer, some of these inspections could be done by ground observers since there is no security risk in showing them empty shelters. I believe that countermeasures can be used to maintain security but still permit adequate verification. For a covered MAPS (hybrid trench) the missile would be assembled and put into the trench while under observation. Then the trench would be sealed except for a small opening for maintenance purposes.

No set of measures such as these can be absolutely cheat-proof—but there is a residual uncertainty about verification of any weapons system. This kind of measure would eliminate any basis for a good-faith claim that the situation for MAPS was in any way more uncertain than for other, more familiar systems.

3. Is the Soviet Union likely to deploy a MAPS?

Probably not. First of all, MAPS as such is an expensive defensive system which as such gives them no additional striking power. Second, if the Soviets decide to improve the survivability of their ICBM

⁵ In the left margin next to this paragraph, Ermarth wrote: "oh?"

force, they already have developed (but not deployed) in the mobile SS-16 or derivative, a model for a “truck-mobile” system which should be more than adequate. However, we cannot be certain on this point. If they did decide to deploy MAPS, they certainly would have fewer problems than we relative to land availability and environmental restrictions, a factor which would ease several types of non-silo basing.⁶

4. If the Soviet Union deploys MAPS, can we verify?

The Soviet Union is bound by the same SALT provisions as are we. Therefore, if the Soviets deploy a MAPS they would have to make adequate provisions as to its verifiability through exposure of the process of production, assembly and deployment. Otherwise, they would be impeding verification by NTM (including satellite reconnaissance) by concealment.⁷ If they followed the example I have described for our MAPS, we could verify it with good confidence. [2 lines not declassified] The potential problem, of course, is that they might make provisions for verification that we would judge less than adequate. In that case, we would then have a major argument in the SALT consultative commission. This is a risk of the kind we face with other SALT verification questions, including a variety of alternative basing concepts, and have been dealing with in the SCC.

5. If the Soviets deployed MAPS, could they use it to “break out” from SALT?

The answer is yes, but only if they are able secretly to produce and hide more than a thousand ICBMs. A few hundred covert ICBMs would not change fundamentally the nature of the threat; in fact, our MAPS would be designed initially to accommodate a 2:1 increase in Soviet RVs over present levels (achieved either by cheating or by RV fractionation), and could be expanded with relatively small cost to accommodate a 3:1 increase. Therefore, in order to pose a serious threat to our MAPS, their covert production and storage operation must handle more than a thousand ICBMs and their forces in the field must be able to support twice as many launchers as the apparent, legal force. I believe we would detect such a massive operation. Just as important, given the nature of intelligence, they could not be confident we would not detect it. The Appendix⁸ describes our problems in counting their ICBM production. This is an extremely important requirement. It

⁶ In the left margin next to this paragraph, Ermarth wrote: “DoD said the same thing about MIRV.”

⁷ Ermarth drew a vertical line in the right margin next to the first three sentences of this paragraph and wrote above it: “inadequate.”

⁸ Attached but not printed is an undated one-page paper entitled “Monitoring of Soviet Strategic Forces.”

deserves more intelligence emphasis; our current capability is far from perfect, but it is also far from zero. This issue is not unique to MAPS. It is fundamental to our ability to assess strategic balance, with or without MAPS—in fact, with or without SALT. As explained above, that confidence is a necessary precondition of the military acceptability of a MAPS system—that we could detect a massive Soviet effort needed to prepare to overwhelm it with secret missiles. If the Soviets can covertly produce and store more than a thousand SS-16s, SS-17s or SS-18s, they can launch them from their storage areas. All these missiles are designed for “cold-launch,” and could be launched from a simple pad or a simple erector launcher, with no need for silos. A MAPS, to be sure, would provide in-place C³ and logistic support, but would do so at locations which are under our intelligence “microscope.” If the Soviets can solve the problem of covertly producing and shipping that many ICBMs and expanding the support base in deployment areas for 2–3 times as many launchers as the legal force (which I doubt), I believe they could solve the further problem of covertly producing and shipping the attending C³ and logistic support. Thus, to the extent this is a real risk, it is a risk with or without MAPS.

6. *If the Soviets deployed MAPS, and in fact complied with SALT provisions, would SALT critics claim they were cheating, and that our MAPS missile locations were not secure?*

The answer is probably yes—such claims likely would be made, no doubt by some of the very people now advocating MAPS. Would that destroy our confidence in the viability of the system and force us to respond by filling up our shelters and abrogating SALT? Not unless the credibility of our strategic strength had been badly eroded by other issues. Your Administration and two which preceded it have weathered similar charges about Soviet cheating on SALT I—and about alleged Soviet military superiority in various areas—and have not given in, nor have they ever lost public support as a consequence. We probably shall have to deal with similar charges that the Soviets are cheating on Backfire, cruise missiles, SS-16 production, RV freeze, and other Treaty limits.

To summarize, I believe that for strictly military reasons our intelligence must be able, even without SALT, to detect a Soviet buildup big enough to threaten MAPS' viability. Most of the additional verification questions raised about MAPS in the context of SALT can be answered by the special design provisions we would make on MAPS to provide for adequate verification while maintaining security. In addition to political problems and impressions, that still leaves two possible situations that cannot be put aside. One is the possibility that the Soviets might succeed in covertly producing and storing more than a thousand missiles, and then suddenly “breaking out” from SALT.

The other is the possibility that some in the United States will claim that the Soviets are doing so and demand that we abrogate SALT. Both of these are risks. The risk of covert production exists even if we do not have a SALT, but is aggravated by the convenience of silos for the sudden deployment presumed. The risk that SALT critics will claim that the Soviets are cheating and that we should abrogate is aggravated by MAPS but also exists without MAPS. These factors need to be judged in the light of the risks of Soviet misbehavior, or charges of Soviet misbehavior, on Backfire, cruise missiles, new types and other provisions.

Risks of this sort must be weighed against the perceived benefits both to SALT and to strategic stability. In the case of MAPS, the risks are real, and the benefit is the degree of confidence maintained in the survivability for our ICBM force. When we have fully explored the alternatives to MAPS to the same degree of detail, MAPS may well prove to be the best option in combined political-military-cost terms. Many of the alternatives present comparable verification/intelligence problems. For that reason I believe we cannot now prudently rule MAPS out, though I do not think we can now choose it to the exclusion of the alternatives.

Early in November I expect to have for your consideration a development and deployment plan for strategic forces over the next ten or more years, including options for future decision. In presenting such a program, I shall include considerations of the Triad and MAPS along with the fundamental issue of the strategic balance with the Soviet Union.

Harold Brown

102. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Strategic Force Modernization Plan

Harold Brown has sent you a memo (Tab A) laying out a tentative plan for modernizing our strategic forces posture. Overall, I think Harold's plan looks quite reasonable. It allows for a really serious look at an air-mobile basing mode for a new ICBM. It provides for improved ICBM survivability during the early '80s (by deploying Minuteman III on trucks). Finally, it seems to strike a realistic balance between the extremes of [6 lines not declassified]

The memo is reasonably short and informative; in reading it you might keep the following points in mind:

—Harold seems to have decided on the mostly common missile (a squeezed M-X) rather than the common missile (TRIDENT II). However, proceeding with full-scale development of the mostly common missile means making an investment that will be largely wasted if we do not identify a good land-based deployment scheme. In light of this, I intend to ask Harold for a short memo outlining his basis for this decision.

—Given the relatively high costs of an air-mobile scheme and the drawbacks we are already aware of in MAP, it might be prudent to give the truck-mobile system that Harold proposes for Minuteman the capability to subsequently carry a mostly common missile.²

—Harold notes that the \$22B cost estimate for the air-mobile concept may be too high. However, even a better estimate would probably be overstated, in that the *net impact* on the defense budget of building this system should subtract the amounts we would have to spend to develop a follow-on cruise missile carrier or an intra-theater cargo transport, since the aircraft Harold has in mind can also serve these other purposes.

—There are a number of underlying issues that seem likely to at least color our attitudes toward some of the more detailed decisions imbedded in this plan; for example, can we develop and deploy the C³I systems needed to support a mobile missile system, and would the indicators of impending Soviet strategic attack be good enough to justify a significant investment in a truck-mobile system carrying the mostly common missile, and how much time-urgent, hard-target kill

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 11-12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² Carter wrote "I agree" in the left margin next to this paragraph.

capability do we really need? In the coming weeks, I will address these issues for you, in appropriate detail.

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter³

Washington, November 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Strategic Force Modernization Plan

I. Introduction

At the mid-term review I described the requirements for upgrading our strategic forces and presented a tentative program for strategic force modernization.⁴ Subsequently I sent you a paper describing why I believe we need to maintain the vitality of our strategic TRIAD and why this requires the rebasing of our ICBM's to enhance their survivability.⁵ We have continued to study our strategic offensive forces in general and the alternative solutions to the difficult ICBM problem in particular. I have arrived tentatively at a course of action which seems to me to meet our needs. This paper describes the programs I believe appropriate for modernization of our ICBM force, SLBM force and bomber/cruise missile force. The resulting capability would give us reasonable assurance that our strategic forces would provide essential equivalence with those of the USSR through the 1980's. Though forecasting beyond that is more risky, I think that the recommended program would also allow our successors to assure essential equivalence into the 1990's by exercising the appropriate options as that time draws near. The plan is consistent with SALT II provisions as we now envisage them and would put us in a strong position to negotiate major arms reductions in SALT III. The plan can be adjusted as time unfolds to reflect reductions negotiated in SALT II.

II. ICBM Modernization

The ICBM modernization plan has three major components:

³ Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote "Zbig. C" in the upper right corner of the memorandum.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 90.

⁵ See Document 97.

(1) Begin full-scale development of a new ICBM this fiscal year (after a review in early December by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Committee), with an IOC (Initial Operating Capability) of 1986, and a goal of deploying up to *[less than 1 line not declassified]* The missile would be constrained *[less than 1 line not declassified]* also be used in the TRIDENT II missile.⁶

(2) Conduct a parallel development program for two alternative basing systems—MAPS and an air transportable system—with the objective of making a final choice in one year. If MAPS is selected, and IOC in 1986 could be achieved, with an FOC (Full Operational Capability) of 290 missiles by 1990. The air transportable system we envision requires a new aircraft having fast takeoff, high nuclear hardness, and short takeoff and landing characteristics. It would operate in a land-and-launch mode in conjunction with a few thousand pre-surveyed landing strips (perhaps sod).⁷ Each aircraft would carry one of the ICBM's described above. An IOC of 1987 and FOC of 200 aircraft by 1990 seems possible. Because this system would have a "dead time" while the aircraft were being dispersed on strategic or tactical warning, I believe it would be wise also to deploy about 100 of the new ICBM's in existing MINUTEMAN silos, to provide an immediate response capability of the sort that the Soviets will have (though theirs will be much larger). The silos already exist, the missiles would be the same, and the operating costs in a silo mode are very low. This would therefore be a relatively inexpensive diversification.

At the same time, detailed study efforts on other basing modes for ICBM's, including off-shore and (perhaps hardened) ground mobile versions, would be carried out to provide a backup or a possible follow-on basing system.

(3) Develop a "stop-gap" survivable basing mode for MINUTEMAN, since the program just described will not be operational until four or five years after the threat becomes serious. *[2 lines not declassified]* On strategic warning they each would be redeployed to one of several thousand pre-surveyed sidings along the existing highways in the states where MINUTEMAN is based.⁸ This system is relatively simple, quick (IOC of 1983), and—by the standards of strategic force—of moderate cost (about \$1.5 billion, including necessary improvements in our warning system). It would be effective only until the Soviet Union

⁶ Carter underlined "also be used in the Trident II."

⁷ Carter drew an arrow pointing to this and the preceding sentence and wrote in the adjacent right margin: "seems very costly & vulnerable vs ground carriers a la SS 16."

⁸ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this sentence and the two preceding sentences: "seems Better."

improves its overhead reconnaissance to achieve an intelligence cycle time short enough to allow targeting of dispersed transporters (which will probably not happen until at least the late 80's). It is, of course, hardly effective against a "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack since we could not move the missile very far in the few minutes warning we would get from an SLBM attack.⁹ On balance, though, it would be a strong move—both militarily and politically—if coupled with a solid program for dealing with the longer term solution to the problem. This move is particularly valuable if we decide on the air transportable ICBM basing mode with its later IOC.

III. *SLBM Modernization*

The SLBM modernization plan has four major components:

(1) Begin production of TRIDENT I missiles in 1979 and deploy them on 21 of the POSEIDON submarines (336 missiles deployed) by 1985. Replacing POSEIDON missiles with TRIDENT I will give us our most immediate and effective increase in striking power to offset in part the military and political effects of the Soviets' major increase in ICBM RV's.

(2) Begin the development of the TRIDENT II missile in 1979 by taking advantage of the commonality of two propulsion states with the ICBM described above. [2 lines not declassified] If we decide to pursue MAPS as the ICBM basing mode, then we need not rush to deploy the TRIDENT II; in this case we envision a 1990 IOC. However, if we decide to pursue the air transportable basing mode for ICBM's, and if ways of communicating with SSBN's in a post-nuclear attack environment improve sufficiently, then we may want to accelerate the TRIDENT II IOC in order to compensate in part for our reduced capability to attack time-urgent hard targets. In either case the TRIDENT II would be deployed on the new TRIDENT subs as they come off the production line and later backfitted in the earlier subs that had been fitted with TRIDENT I.

(3) Continue production of the TRIDENT submarine at a rate of 1½ per year. I believe that the major startup problems are behind us now and that maintaining this program through the 80's is the proper course of action.¹⁰ The latter conclusion is subject to a size-connected vulnerability to ASW that I think a theoretical possibility, though not a practical one, during the next 15 years.

⁹ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this and the preceding sentence: "Could move every night."

¹⁰ Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to the phrase "I believe that the major startup problems are behind us now" and wrote: "optimistic view?"

(4) Begin the design study for a new submarine, conceptually smaller and cheaper than the TRIDENT.¹¹ If this design proves to be successful, consider it for production beginning in the late 80's, phasing out production of the TRIDENT then. If not, continue production of the TRIDENT. In either case, we will plan to extend the life of the POSEIDON submarines to 25 or 30 years (into the 90's).

IV. Bomber/Cruise Missile Modernization

The modernization plan for the air-breathing leg of the TRIAD has three components:

(1) Continue development of the first-generation cruise missile, leading to an IOC in 1982 and deploying on B-52G's at the rate of 500 per year until 1988.

(2) Begin development of the second generation cruise missile. Whether (and when) to phase over production from the first generation to the second generation is covered in a separate appendix.

(3) Begin study of a new strategic bomber. Whether (and when) to begin development and production of this bomber is covered in a separate appendix.¹²

If we decide to pursue the air transportable ICBM basing approach, the aircraft we would develop would also be compatible with the role of cruise missile carrier and would eventually replace the B-52's in this role (in the 90's). No additional funding would then be required for this CMC program during the 80's. Without this new aircraft we might use an adaptation of a commercial aircraft for the cruise missile carrier role—as we have been discussing to date.¹³

V. Funding Requirements

FY 79 funding requirements for all of these programs are covered in the FY 79 enacted budget plus our supplemental request. FY 80 total funding requirements are mostly covered in our FY 80 APDM budget at the "basic" program level (139.5B\$), though the detailed distribution among programs would have to be revised. At the "decremented" (135.4B\$ FY 80) program level, the strategic program funding is approximately one-half billion dollars less than what is needed for FY 1980 and approximately 3-5B\$ less in FY 1981-4. Estimated funding requirements in the 80's are given in Appendix A for two optional plans depending upon the choice of ICBM rebasing. The costs for

¹¹ Carter underlined the word "cheaper" and wrote "ha!" in the right margin.

¹² Appendix D was not found attached. According to the list of attachments, it was to be provided separately; it was not found. Carter wrote "???" in the right margin next to this paragraph.

¹³ Carter underlined the phrase "adaptation of a commercial aircraft."

the air transportable system are probably overstated. Considerably cheaper airplanes and dispersal schemes are being considered for this application, but we are not yet certain that they will provide adequate base escape. Appendix B contains a portrayal of U.S. versus Soviet expenditures to strategic forces; Appendix C summarizes the principal variations on the basic plan.¹⁴

Harold Brown

¹⁴ Appendices A–1 “Summary Chart of Funding Requirements—MAP ICBM Basing;”, A–2 “Summary Chart of Funding Requirements—Air Transportable ICBM;” B, “U.S. versus SU Strategic Forces Expenditures;” and C, “Variations on the Basic Plan;” are attached but not printed.

**103. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Duncan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, November 17, 1978

SUBJECT

Enduring Communications, Command and Control and Intelligence (C³I)

Your recent memorandum requested my views as to how we should deal with the problem of providing a communications, command, control and intelligence (C³I) capability that will endure a protracted nuclear conflict.² I share your concerns and agree that further improvement to our C³I systems to support general war is needed—particularly to support other than a limited set of pre-planned retaliatory responses.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 14, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C³I): 7–11/78. Top Secret. Odom forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under cover of a November 17 memorandum in which Odom noted: “I see no need for a specific response to Duncan’s memo. You have accomplished your original purposes: Changing the focus in C³I to endurance (see the last paragraph of Duncan’s reply.); Giving the matter top priority attention.” (Ibid.)

² In his memorandum to Duncan, September 30, Brzezinski expressed concerns about the C³I issue following his visit to SAC/NORAD in August. (Ibid.) See Documents 80–82.

In this regard several studies of our [6 lines not declassified] which are both a follow-on to PD-18; a SAC study of strategic C³I which is just getting underway; and a recently completed Defense Science Board (DSB) Study which addressed enduring C³I.³ I am also convening a follow-on task force of the DSB to extend the DSB's preliminary analyses; and plan to have Navy examine the enduring communications to strategic submarines.

With regard to your question on the continuity of government, we share your concern that the military C³I system and the survivability and endurance of the C³I system serving the NCA are part of a cohesive whole. To this end my staff will continue to work closely with Colonel Odom and Fritz Ermarth of your staff to ensure that changes we propose in military C³I systems are consistent with the President's desires and the procedures and systems of the Office of the President.

I also share your concerns with respect to the National Communications System, over half of which consists of the Defense Communications System. The impact of the Communications Act of 1978 (HR 13015), in its present form, on the DoD's national security and emergency preparedness responsibilities is of particular concern.⁴ Our views which have been provided to OMB, point out DoD's opposition to the bill in its present form and detail the shortcomings of the bill. Policies being developed based on private sector interests, e.g., unregulated competition, and pending legislation resulting from testimony on HR 13015 could very well have an adverse impact on many aspects of DoD operations, including the ability to support enduring general war C³I.

I am encouraged by your recognition of the importance of C³I to our war-fighting and deterrent posture, and am confident that, with your assistance, we can make progress in this extremely important area.

C.W. Duncan

³ For the Executive Summary of the Defense Science Board Study, see the attachment to Document 88.

⁴ The Communications Act of 1978, as proposed, was a measure designed to amend the original Communications Act of 1934 to introduce private-sector competition into the telephone system.

**104. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, November 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Final Report on the PD–18 Study Entitled “Modernization of the ICBM Force”

Attached is the final report on the PD–18 follow-on study entitled “Modernization of the ICBM Force.” This study was made to provide background for addressing two of the issues raised in your memorandum of August 24, 1977²: hard-target capability and the future of the Triad.

I believe that our discussion with the President on September 29³ and the memoranda I sent him on October 23 on Triads and Dyads and on October 28 regarding ICBM vulnerability and MAP verification, provide my views on these issues to the extent they can be formulated at this stage.⁴ I believe it will probably take several months, at least, to reduce the uncertainty in some important factors such as SALT, MAP verification, and alternative ICBM basing systems. For the moment, I believe we will need to proceed along several paths until the preferred choice becomes clearer.

Harold Brown

Attachment

**Report Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation⁵**

Washington, November 1978

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 14, PD–18 Folder #2 [2]. Top Secret.

² See Document 31.

³ See footnote 2, Document 90.

⁴ Brown's memoranda, October 23 and October 28, are printed as Documents 97 and 101, respectively.

⁵ Top Secret.

I. Preface

In response to the NSC Directive of August 24, 1977, subject: "Follow-On Studies for PD/NSC-18," the Secretary of Defense initiated a DoD study to address the following related issues:

- modernization of the ICBM force,
- the future of the Triad concept, and
- U.S. requirements for hard-target kill capability.

This two-volume study attempts to illuminate these and related issues of policy by focusing on broad cost-effectiveness considerations and the factual basis underlying arguments about military requirements. With only a few exceptions, the study does not examine alternative designs for specific systems; nor does it explore the full range of conceivable strategic systems. Instead, we have focused primarily on the relative merits of illustrative forces with various deployments of MAP-based MX, Trident II, and Cruise Missile Carriers.

Volume II has been printed as a separate document; it contains: (1) the full text of the study's technical papers, (2) discussion of the analytical methodology used in the cost-effectiveness analysis, and (3) detailed information and results from that analysis, including background material on costs and special nuclear materials.⁶

This study was conducted by the Strategic Forces and Arms Limitation Division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation). Although the study team was assisted by a working group comprised of representatives from the Services, OJCS, DIA, and a number of OSD offices, this report is a PA&E product and has not been coordinated within DoD.

II. General Observations

This section describes a number of observations drawn from the study, but avoids conclusions on matters of policy. Section II.A summarizes observations of a general nature traceable to the technical papers contained in Volume II. Section II.B describes the observations from the study's cost-effectiveness analysis.

A. From the Technical Papers:

1. The ICBM force has played a dominant role in the targeting of our strategic forces against the Soviet Union, [1 line not declassified] our forces will still be well-hedged in their ability to destroy economic targets; however, we face a significant decrease in our counterforce capability until ALCMs are deployed in the mid-1980s. At that time,

⁶ Volume II of the report is in Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 14, PD-18 Folder #2 [1].

the issues will be: timeliness of response, ALCM penetration capability, and flexibility, e.g., in other than a spasm-type war.

2. Modernizing the ICBM force through MAP basing has some strong rationale: to enhance crisis stability and restore the more stable pre-MIRV situation in which an attacker could not expect to destroy as many missiles as he expended; to preserve the Triad concept of well-hedged forces against non-silo targets and the unique contributions of the ICBM force; and, to discourage the Soviets from seeking strategic superiority. There are also a number of concerns with the MAP concept. Among the most severe are MAP verification (not addressed in this study) and the sensitivity of the system and its cost to a responsive threat. A SALT agreement limiting Soviet MIRVed ICBM throw weight and RV fractionation could go a long way toward ensuring that a MAP system would be affordable. Without a fractionation limit, 10-year system costs could rise above \$40B. Without a SALT agreement, there would be no way to confidently bound the problem, i.e., the Soviets could continuously expand the threat and we would be forced to expand the MAP system for a given level of survivability.

3. [1 paragraph (12 lines) not declassified]

4. Deploying MX in existing Minuteman silos would be by far the least expensive way to modernize our ICBM force. Among the potential advantages of this option are: (1) it would be a clear response in kind to Soviet acts, and might encourage them to accept more arms control and [14 lines not declassified]

5. [1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

6. Survivability “requirements” for a MAP system should not be based on throw weight or EMT, especially when comparing the adequacy of different concepts such as MX in MAP vs. Minuteman in MAP vs. the common missile in MAP. Retaliatory effectiveness against the current [2 lines not declassified]

B. From the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis:

1. A minimum modernization force (i.e., a force with Trident SSBNs, the Trident I missile, and ALCMs on 169 B-52Gs, but without MX, Trident II or CMCs) would cost roughly \$100B in constant 1979 dollars (\$45B when discounted at 10%) through the year 2000. The cost of greater modernization would depend primarily on: (1) decisions regarding what constitutes essential equivalence, (2) our requirements for hard-target capability, (3) the risks we were willing to accept regarding breakthroughs in ASW, air defense and pre-launch destruction of bombers, and (4) the strategy we chose for influencing the Soviets on arms control.

2. All forces considered in this analysis, including the minimum modernization force, would provide more non-silo retaliatory

capability against the current National Target Base than today's forces. The minimum modernization force would also be as well-hedged against force-wide degradations and against catastrophic failure of any one component as today's forces. This greater non-silo retaliatory capability will be the result of planned improvements in the SLBM and bomber forces, including increased day-to-day alert rates.

3. The incremental cost for "fully" modernized forces that present a relatively strong essential equivalence picture, provide an extensive hard-target capability, and hedge against catastrophic failure in any force element would be \$30–45B (constant 1979 dollars); +\$15–22B in discounted (10%) dollars. Foregoing the *extensive* hard-target capability could save \$6–10B (constant 1979 dollars); +\$2–5B in discounted (10%) dollars.

4. There are no significant differences between Triads providing *quick-response vice non-quick-response* hard-target capability in terms of cost, essential equivalence measures, total hard-target capability, non-silo retaliatory effectiveness or hedging. This issue will have to be decided on the other important factors, primarily timeliness of response and whether or not we want to "threaten" the Soviet ICBM force or attempt to drive them to a mobile ICBM or more SLBMs.

5. Under the assumption (not assessed in this study) that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Dyads of Trident II and bombers (plus silo-based MM III for use in limited exchanges) could be given much the same capabilities as comparably priced Triads. In particular, balanced Dyads could hedge as well as Triads against force-wide degradations of effectiveness, and even against catastrophic failure of one leg. Therefore, conclusions about the relative advantages of Triads vs. Dyads depend on judgments about [*2 lines not declassified*]

6. [*1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified*]

7. Given a decision to deploy an extensive QRHTC, a force emphasizing the baseline MX in MAP basing would be significantly more cost effective than a force with both MX and Trident II, whether or not MX and Trident II were developed jointly in a common missile program. However, a Triad without Trident II would provide no hedging of the QRHTC.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

105. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, November 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (U)

I am forwarding to you our recently completed review of nuclear targeting policy that you requested in August 1977 as one of a number of follow-up actions in PD-18. The study outlines several broad policy alternatives and also makes a number of specific recommendations with respect to nuclear weapons employment policy. It suggests some major changes both in the thrust of current policy and in the procedures for planning SIOP and non-SIOP options. Some issues will require further study and several of the broader policy issues should be the basis for interagency discussion. In the meantime, I plan to initiate action within DoD on those matters noted below that are within the framework of current policy, and which I believe can be acted on now.

The basic theme of the study is that employment policy will make its maximum contribution to deterrence—our basic strategic objective—if our employment policies make a Soviet victory, as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it, independent of Soviet employment policy and of any particular scenario. These plans should include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets, while minimizing collateral damage. We should also have a capability to threaten escalation. To lend credibility to a US threat to escalate, we need employment options and supporting capabilities which the Soviets might perceive to be advantageous to us. Such options require greater flexibility and endurance than we now have in our nuclear posture.

As you will note, the study makes a number of specific recommendations to these ends. In particular, it proposes specific measures to improve our capabilities to target and attack Soviet forces, C³ and *[less than 1 line not declassified]* It also suggests that we develop both plans and capabilities that will permit us to withhold attacks on *[less than 1 line not declassified]* targets as a means of coercion if a nuclear war is prolonged; and in general, that we focus our plans and our capability on the possibility of an extended exchange, rather than (as now) principally on an essentially instantaneous all-out spasm exchange.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 35, Nuclear Targeting Policy Review: 11–12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive.

It also proposes measures to strengthen the strategic reserve forces. These measures are designed to enhance deterrence by posing to the Soviets the prospect that they would not only suffer severe damage in a nuclear war, but be unable to achieve their military objectives or gain any other advantage. The proposals also would provide a broader range of options should deterrence fail.

The study places considerable emphasis on enhancing the *flexibility* of the SIOP through the development of more discrete building blocks of like targets. By breaking down the present target base into smaller increments, the President would have a broader range of options should we ever have to consider SIOP-type attacks. A number of practical problems must be resolved, however, before deciding precisely how to implement the concept. The SIOP probably cannot be put together by taking an arbitrary linear combination of building blocks; the interactions need to be considered.

Endurance is another issue of considerable importance, not only in forces, but also in command, control, communications and intelligence. Very few of the objectives listed above in terms of an extended exchange, withholds, etc. can be achieved without endurance, both in forces and in C³I. We need to consider the kind of endurance we need and the rate at which we should proceed in acquiring a more enduring strategic posture. Inasmuch as some of these issues relate to acquisition policy, I have recently initiated studies designed to identify the problems and lead to specific development and procurement actions. In the meantime, we should take care to assure that adjustments in targeting policy are phased to match improvements in endurance.

We have also attempted to deal with the guidelines for targeting the Soviet nuclear threat—more effective targeting of Soviet military and war-sustaining capacity, and targeting to threaten [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

The study also addresses non-SIOP options (LNOs and RNOs) and suggests strengthening procedures to assure that both political and military considerations are brought to bear in the development of these options, and in any consideration of their use.

In all these cases—but especially endurance and flexibility—there are some initial steps that can be taken with the existing establishment, but to realize the concepts fully will require acquisition decisions. In other cases, some concepts appear promising, but require more analysis before we can decide on concrete actions. One example of an interesting idea where feasibility has not been determined is a “regionalizing” strategy, to threaten continued central control of the USSR by isolating its constituents from each other through a retaliatory nuclear strike.

I believe that the study (whose Executive Summary I hope you have time to read) makes it clear that, while we have made substantial

progress over the past year in defining issues and proposing specific solutions, much remains to be done to follow up on this report. Among those matters that we intend to move on promptly within DoD are the development of the following:

- More discrete building blocks which would provide increased flexibility in the SIOP.

- An improved intelligence data base, particularly for command and control targets and other military forces.

- A launch-under-attack option for our land-based ballistic missile force, which will become vulnerable in the early 1980s and remain so to a substantial degree for a number of years even though we take prompt steps to deploy it in a less vulnerable form.

- [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

- Possible alternative criteria for the targeting of Soviet [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

- Specific program proposals to enhance endurance of strategic C³I.

- More detailed guidelines for the Secure Reserve Force.

- Exercises that will test and provide the basis for refinement of non-SIOP options.

We also plan to develop a program of additional studies. These will explore such issues as how we might target Soviet general purpose forces more effectively, [*2 lines not declassified*]

In addition, there are some issues that are broader in scope and, therefore, should receive NSC consideration. Among the most important of these is identifying and electing a broad and coherent set of policy objectives that will give focus to our nuclear weapons employment plans and related acquisition policies. This report identifies four such broad policy options. It is my view that we should adopt, at a minimum, alternative b, described on page ix of the Executive Summary, and that we should consider moving some distance toward alternative c, insofar as budgetary constraints allow.

We also should review in the NSC the extent to which we should adjust our targeting policy with respect to Soviet industry which now focuses on “impeding recovery.” The study suggests modification in light of our evaluation of deterrence requirements and our limited understanding of the recovery process itself, as distinct from simply targeting industrial capacity.

Another important unresolved issue, also addressed in the separate ICBM Modernization Study,² relates to counterforce capabilities; the range of capabilities we require and the extent to which we should develop quick reaction hard target capabilities. The issue of future ICBM requirements and Hard Target Capability have also been the

²See Document 102.

subject of recent DoD studies. Neither this report nor any of the other studies provide a tidy answer to the issue of future ICBM requirements and Hard Target Capabilities. This is an issue that we will clearly have to come to grips with in the review of these studies and as our strategic modernization program takes shape.

Targeting population is still another issue that is appropriate for high level discussion. We have not in recent years targeted population *per se*, nor do we propose to do so now. Should the Soviets proceed further with plans to shelter and evacuate population, we must consider whether targeting some specific part of population should become an explicit objective and, if so, how much of our resources would we want to devote to that objective as compared with other targeting objectives. Meanwhile, the NSC should reaffirm current policy.

Another important policy issue that merits attention is the development of revised targeting plans for China. This study recommends that we alter our targeting plans for the PRC by handling China targeting through non-SIOP options and the Secure Reserve Force. I will proceed to implement such a policy if you wish to direct it now; such a decision seems appropriate.

A number of these issues should receive interagency consideration. To that end, I propose one or more meetings of the PRC and/or SCC, prior to an NSC meeting with you, to review this study as well as the related ones concerning ICBM Modernization and the Secure Reserve Force.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, November 1, 1978

[Omitted here are the cover page and table of contents.]

NUCLEAR TARGETING POLICY REVIEW

Summary of

Major Findings and Recommendations

A. Purpose

The purpose of this review was to evaluate nuclear employment policy—that is, the policy guidelines and procedures for the targeting

³Top Secret.

of nuclear weapons—and to identify alternatives to current policies. In conducting this evaluation, we focused particularly on the relationship between our stated policy (as set forth in PD-18 and NSDM-242) and the targeting plans designed to carry out that policy. We have also reviewed, where appropriate, the relationship between employment plans and the capabilities of forces and supporting command, control, communications and intelligence. The evaluation that follows uses as its framework the principal objectives of nuclear employment policy, namely: deterrence and essential equivalence; escalation control and war termination; and the four general war targeting objectives described below. We also have evaluated the Secure Reserve Force (SRF) concept, Launch Under Attack (LUA) targeting and targeting policy for China.

B. Major Findings

1. *Deterrence.* Our deterrence objectives are to deter nuclear attack on the United States; to deter attacks on U.S. forces abroad and on our allies; and to impede coercion by unfriendly nuclear powers of the US, its allies and other friendly nations. Nuclear weapons play a major role in meeting these deterrence objectives, but they are not expected to do this task alone.

While we are not sure what deters the Soviets, there is fairly broad consensus in the US intelligence community and among a number of Soviet experts that the Soviets seriously plan to face the problems of fighting and surviving a nuclear war should it occur, and of winning, in the sense of having military forces capable of dominating the post-war world. Their emphasis on planning for nuclear war and on damage limiting measures, including civil defense and civil emergency preparedness testifies to this overall thrust in Soviet policy. This does not mean that the Soviet leadership is unaware of (or indifferent to) the destructive consequences of a nuclear conflict. Indeed, there are many statements by Soviet leaders which attest to their desire to avoid nuclear war and to their recognition of its potential destruction. However, the Soviets appear to have prepared themselves militarily and psychologically for the possibility that a nuclear war could occur and within the limits of their resources, they have prepared plans and developed capabilities which would permit them to do as well as possible in surviving a nuclear conflict and in defeating the military forces of their adversaries. It is clear that they are continuing substantial efforts to improve their own strategic posture. The effect is to pose new obstacles to achievement of our strategic objectives. We do not argue that the US concentration on deterrence is wrong, or that the Soviet idea that nuclear wars are winnable is right, but rather that carrying out a policy of deterrence cannot ignore these Soviet attitudes.

Our deterrent appears adequate in normal circumstances to prevent the Soviets either from attacking us or our allies deliberately or from pursuing a recklessly aggressive policy carrying with it a high risk of war. But it is in a severe crisis that our ability to impede coercion and extend deterrence to other nations would be most severely tested. Should such a crisis occur, we would want to avoid war (or terminate a war at the lowest possible level of violence) while simultaneously preventing the Soviets from coercing us or our Allies. In such a case, deterrence requires that the Soviets must never be confident that escalation would be to their advantage; also they must never be certain that the U.S. is unwilling or unable to respond effectively to any attack.

Deterrence will be influenced primarily by Soviet perceptions of our capabilities and will, rather than our plans. However, to the extent that our plans are known to the Soviets, these plans say something about our capabilities and will. Employment policy also has an impact both on the Soviet perception of the risks and advantages if they escalate, and on our confidence which in turn affects the Soviet perception of the likelihood that we may escalate.

Since the Soviets appear to have a concept of military victory, even in nuclear war, we should seek employment policies that would make a Soviet victory as seen through Soviet eyes, as improbable as we can make it in any contingency. Thus, we should develop plans and capabilities that minimize Soviet hopes of military success. These should include targeting options against Soviet military forces, command and control, and military support that would maximize the threats to the objective targets while minimizing collateral damage. We should also have a capability to threaten escalation ourselves. This threat to escalate if and as necessary is at the heart of NATO's flexible response strategy. It is likely to be especially effective if it threatens Soviet ability to maintain effective military forces in the field.

It is sufficient for purposes of deterrence if the Soviets perceive that there be a reasonable likelihood that we could (and would) escalate or respond successfully; it is not necessary that we have *highest confidence* that escalation control will work, or, still less that we can win the war. However, to lend credibility to a U.S. threat to escalate, we need employment options and supporting capabilities which the Soviets might perceive to be advantageous to us. Such options require greater flexibility and endurance than we now have in our nuclear posture.

2. *Escalation Control.* There are and will inevitably always be great uncertainties about our ability to control escalation and terminate conflict on terms acceptable to us and our allies. Nevertheless, we conclude that it remains in the U.S. interest to have plans and capabilities that could limit damage by controlling escalation and terminating a conflict before it can extend to all-out nuclear war. Thus, we reaffirm the

desirability of a policy of escalation control based on a range of SIOP and non-SIOP options. We find, however, that there are serious deficiencies in current plans and capabilities to carry out a strategy of escalation control. There has been inadequate political input into the planning of nuclear options, particularly non-SIOP options. There are deficiencies in the integration of limited nuclear options with non-nuclear plans, and an absence of political, economic and psychological plans to complement non-SIOP options. Further, the plans for limited use of nuclear weapons have not been sufficiently exercised with the participation of high level political and military leaders. The vulnerability of forces and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C³I) also limits the effectiveness of an escalation control strategy. As a result, the US Government may not be adequately prepared to deal with a crisis which could involve nuclear weapons, should it occur. Dealing with a nuclear crisis in the multilateral framework of NATO would be even more difficult.

3. *General War Plans.* Our general war plans are designed to meet the following principal objectives, the last three of which are to be accomplished "to the extent practicable:" (1) impede recovery of the Soviet Union both in the short term and the long term; (2) destroy Soviet national political and military leadership and command and control; (3) destroy Soviet nuclear forces, and (4) destroy Soviet non-nuclear forces.

Although targeting to impede recovery receives highest priority [less than 1 line not declassified] it is not clear that threatening to impede recovery by destroying large amounts of Soviet population and industry is the most effective deterrent, particularly in situations less than general war. Nor is it clear that our current targeting would, in effect, subsequently impede recovery, in the long-term (as distinct from reducing Soviet GNP sharply, which it clearly would do). Furthermore, we have no confidence that our present targeting plans would prolong Soviet recovery more than our own if massive attacks were launched by both sides. While planning contemplates the possibility of withholding attacks on recovery targets if substantial US urban/industrial assets survive an initial attack (and this is appropriate in our view), the endurance and survivability of our forces and their supporting command, control, communications and intelligence are not sufficient to support such a strategy.

In all large scale attacks on Soviet recovery targets (and indeed on military forces) there would be substantial Soviet population losses (at least tens of millions). But, if Soviet civil defense plans are successfully implemented, these levels could be significantly reduced. If the Soviets or the US could effectively shelter and thereby protect a significant portion of their labor force, this should have an important bearing on

recovery, for the surviving skilled labor force will be an important element in achieving recovery.

[13 lines not declassified] Under present plans the attack on political leadership would involve substantial collateral damage to the general population assuming that the population is unsheltered and unevacuated.

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

The U.S. targets the Soviet nuclear threat to achieve two objectives: the first is limiting damage both to the U.S. and our allies; the second is to prevent the emergence of a post-war nuclear balance that would facilitate coercion by the Soviet Union. It also is apparent that the criterion for destruction of Soviet nuclear capabilities, i.e., "to the extent practicable with available allocated nuclear forces" is extremely general—hardly a precise guideline for target planners. Moreover, there are substantial uncertainties associated with this objective (as with others). [5 lines not declassified] One fact is clear, however. The proliferation and hardening of Soviet missile systems have substantially eroded our counterforce capabilities over the past decade. We have found no plausible changes to targeting policy or force structure in the course of this study that give any promise of restoring the relative capabilities we enjoyed in the early 1960's. This does not mean, of course, that we can or should do nothing to improve the present or prospective balance. Cruise missiles will put Soviet land based missile systems and other hard targets at risk again, but this will not give us a prompt capability; MX and TRIDENT II will, however.

With respect to the damage limiting objective, today there are two distinct views as indeed there have been for some time. One view holds that since we cannot expect to limit to low levels the damage resulting from a large scale nuclear attack, that it is no longer a meaningful objective and should be abandoned or at least given a low priority in employment policy. A central concern is that continuance of damage limiting as a major objective of U.S. policy could lead to increased arms competition without any resulting improvements in U.S. security and could divert forces from more promising objectives. The opposing view is that we must continue to do the best that we can to protect the U.S. from the consequences of a nuclear war if deterrence fails. Given the uncertainties of nuclear war, and the wide range of possible scenarios, there might well be situations where the capability to reduce damage by perhaps tens of millions of American lives would be far from futile. This view also stresses the potential effects on deterrence and crisis management in situations short of nuclear war if U.S. society were to become far more vulnerable than the Soviet Union.

With respect to the objective of preventing an unfavorable postwar nuclear force balance, the debate turns on what constitutes a balance and on the best means for achieving it. Recent changes in the strategic balance pose us with a dilemma—how much of our force should we use in an effort to erode the Soviet nuclear threat and how much do we hold in reserve to secure a post-war balance? A substantial portion of the forces available for SIOP [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is used for the counter-nuclear mission even though relatively low damage expectancies are anticipated. Allocating additional weapons with current capabilities would not be productive. Indeed a considerable number of the weapons now used are SLBMs which have low DEs [*less than 1 line not declassified*] against hard Soviet missile silos. Furthermore, as ICBMs, which have a better hard target capability, become more vulnerable to attack, withholding them for use in other missions may only result in their loss. Some argue that we should allocate only weapons with the best hard target capability to the nuclear threat and not allocate SLBM weapons with low DEs to hard targets. Others argue that the present scheme of cross-targeting is a hedge against failure of one leg of the TRIAD, and that given uncertainties as to what actually would kill a silo (or interfere with reload and force reconstitution), we should continue to allocate [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to each silo, (even if some have low DEs against the silo itself) at least as long as we have sufficient weapons.

Because a substantial portion of the Soviet nuclear threat is hard, a major issue is how much and what kind of capability is required for this targeting objective. This is an area in which programmed force changes—and acquisition decisions—and employment policy are closely linked. For example, the large ALCM force that will be available by the mid-80's will have the accuracy for a considerable counter-silo potential if ALCM penetrability is high. The US also faces basic decisions about the characteristics of future ICBM and SLBM forces in which the requirement for Quick Reaction Hard Target Capability (QRHTC) is a driving factor.

From the standpoint of targeting it seems clear that we ought to retain a substantial hard target capability. Such a capability is required not only to be able to attack Soviet ICBM silos effectively, but also for the growing number of hardened C³ facilities and some other hardened installations. Improved HTC would enable us to reallocate weapons with low DEs against hard targets to other missions. Whether a substantial portion of our HTC needs to have a rapid response capability cannot be determined on targeting considerations alone. The targeting requirements for rapid responses are very scenario dependent. For example, if Soviet forces are alert when the US launches a counter-force attack the probability of their preemption or launch under attack is high, and the difference in response time between a few hours and

a few minutes may be inconsequential. On the other hand, given the many uncertainties noted above, a quick hard target capability might well improve the outcome of a nuclear exchange from our standpoint or complicate Soviet calculations of the outcome and thereby help to strengthen deterrence.

We have also found that with current plans, attacks against Soviet non-nuclear military forces are likely to be ineffective in many scenarios. The current set of targets attacked in the other military targets category, includes only fixed installations. Our knowledge of Soviet war plans suggests that with plausible amounts of warning, both forces and stocks would be dispersed rapidly away from these fixed installations. Thus, much of this attack, unless the US achieves total surprise, is likely to go on empty or partially empty kasernes and other bases, and the Soviets would be left with substantial military power to coerce other nations, to seize valuable industrial resources in Western Europe and the Middle East and to assist them in post-war bargaining with the United States. On the other hand, there are clearly a number of fixed military installations that will remain valuable in supporting the Soviet war effort, regardless of warning. For example, secondary airfields, transportation centers, etc. Current planning does not give these targets high priority in relation to facilities that are likely to be evacuated with warning. We believe future planning should take this into account. For the longer run, priority should be given to capabilities to attack dispersed military forces. Trans-attack reconnaissance and responsive targeting are needed to do this.

With regard to the strategic reserve force we find that the force and its supporting command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) may need to survive for weeks or even months after an initial nuclear attack. These elements lack sufficient endurance today to meet such an objective. If the SRF is to meet its stated objectives, the principal criteria for composition and sizing should be its endurance and its relative capabilities in relationship to Soviet plans for secure reserve forces. Indeed, many of our requirements for more flexible and discrete targeting at lower levels also imply larger reserve forces. The force mix in the Secure Reserve Force also needs reexamination to assure that it has maximum endurance. C³I supporting the reserved forces also needs greater endurance. Furthermore, the current provisional target sets for the Secure Reserve Force (primarily low-priority economic targets) do not contribute significantly to the objective of post-war coercion.

In relation to NATO our deterrence and escalation control objectives require an effective NATO employment policy. Allied concerns about our ability to deter aggression against NATO have grown as Soviet capabilities have grown. More effective plans for targeting the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO with strategic weapons and closer coordination of US

and NATO planning could help to alleviate these concerns. However, to make such plans effective requires more responsive and survivable C³ and intelligence, and even closer integration of employment planning and crisis management between the U.S. and its allies at both the military and civilian levels. For the longer run, the availability to SACEUR of an option to target a full range of threats to Allied Command Europe (ACE) without invoking the SIOP would also strengthen deterrence and the confidence of our allies.

There is no plan at present for launch under attack of only the ICBM force. If the ICBMs were launched against their current SIOP targets there would be substantial collateral damage to Soviet population and this would likely invite retaliation against US urban/industrial assets. In any event, the set of targets for our ICBM force is not in itself planned to meet any specific objective. We ought to have an option to launch only our land-based ballistic missiles against a target set which would serve some defined objective while minimizing collateral damage, thereby reducing the prospect of retaliation against a broad US urban/industrial target set. The launch under attack doctrine should not be seen as a solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability. In many situations, LUA, would, in effect, rule out a real choice by the President. The President should not be forced to make a “use or lose” choice if there are other options available. Reliance on LUA increases the risk of an accidental war and thus would increase instability in a Soviet-US crisis. However, we do believe that targeting plans should include a LUA option for ICBM forces only that is less escalatory than current plans.

The current SIOP targeting policy for China is out of date. It was based on a period when China was seen as a threat comparable to the Soviet Union. We believe that our China targeting policy should be reformulated to bring it more into line with current political and military realities. China poses no strategic nuclear threat to the US today and will only have a minimal capability within the next several years at least. At present, US-Chinese relations are improving, and the PRC is clearly more menacing to our adversaries than to our allies. Political relations could change, but we would likely have a good deal of warning. In any case, while it is not clear what will deter China, it seems unlikely that a primarily agrarian society with a small industrial base will be deterred from regional aggression against its neighbors by the threat of massive attacks on industry. We not only do not understand the recovery process as it relates to China, but we are quite arbitrary in assigning value to those targets we select. The current requirement to program at least one weapon on an industrial facility in the top 125 urban areas in the PRC, drives, to a large extent, the high weapons requirements for China targeting even though over 50 percent of China’s industry is located in 25 cities.

C. Major Policy Alternatives

We have developed several alternative employment policies that we believe, on the basis of our study, to be representative of the choices facing national leaders with respect to future employment policy. The identification and assessment of major policy alternatives is a somewhat artificial exercise. If precedent is any guide, policy is more likely to be determined incrementally by a series of discrete decisions about what to procure and when, how to phrase a given policy statement, what to include in an arms control proposal, etc. Thus, there are, in actuality, a number of choices that could be made. Nevertheless, it can be useful to identify and assess broad policy as a framework for making more specific decisions. And such decisions should, if possible, be made with some set of overall objectives in mind.

There are several factors that are likely to dominate the choice of alternatives. Most important are assessments of Soviet views and objectives with respect to the role of nuclear weapons; and in light of these Soviet views and objectives, judgments as to what actions we should seek to deter with nuclear forces, and how best to do so. In this connection we also need to consider: (a) what flexibility in our nuclear posture (i.e., how broad a range of options) is desired and what is feasible and how much we should spend on it; (b) how much endurance do our forces require and how much is possible; (c) how much damage limiting capability is considered necessary and how much is possible; and (d) the costs of achieving these capabilities. One alternative, of course, is to continue current policy as described above. We offer below four broad alternatives to current policy.

All of the following options will meet the current objectives of nuclear policy to some degree. However, they differ in their relative emphasis on flexibility, endurance and counterforce; and as a result could have substantially different cost implications. However, each contains at a minimum, an assured destruction capability.

a. *One alternative is to strengthen current policy, particularly by improving the flexibility of plans and the endurance of forces and their related command, control and intelligence.* Under such a policy, an assured capability to destroy industrial targets of value to the Soviet Union would remain the backbone of deterrence, and would receive emphasis in declaratory policy. However, the goal of "impeding recovery" would be redefined to focus [2 lines not declassified] The forces and related C³I to accomplish this mission should be given additional endurance over time so that attacks on industrial targets can be withheld so long as substantial U.S. industrial value remains undamaged. Added emphasis would be given both in planning and declaratory policy to a more effective means of targeting Soviet conventional forces and command and control as a supplement to assured destruction of industry. Counterforce objectives

would deemphasize damage limiting and focus targeting on preventing the emergence of marked asymmetries in US and Soviet capabilities that could be exploited by the Soviet Union to coerce us or our allies following a nuclear attack; or which, if perceived as an advantage by the Soviets, could affect crisis bargaining short of nuclear war. This policy would also retain non-SIOP options, but strengthen the procedures to integrate non-SIOP nuclear options with other military and political measures. This policy would involve alteration of current targeting plans and declaratory policy in order to take into account what we know of Soviet views of nuclear strategy, in particular their sensitivities to losing control over their society, and the deterrent effect that we might achieve by planning to attempt to deny the Soviet Union a war winning capability. Some believe such changes to current policy represent the minimum necessary to strengthen deterrence in light of what we know of Soviet objectives and their growing military power. Others believe that changes to current policy are not necessary to strengthen deterrence and would be provocative and costly.

b. *A further departure from current policy would be to focus both employment and declaratory policy more heavily on denying the Soviets any confidence of achieving a favorable war outcome.* A high priority effort would have to be put on developing greater endurance and on improved targeting of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] New capabilities would be required to support such a targeting policy, particularly more survivable C³I. Countervalue targeting would (as in a.) focus on Soviet [*1 line not declassified*] However, these attacks would be designed to be withheld for [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as part of an expanded reserve force concept. Targeting population or targeting industry to impede long-term recovery would not be a specific SIOP objective, but an assured destruction capability (to be withheld so long as the Soviets spared U.S. cities and industries) should be maintained. Targeting of both Soviet nuclear and conventional forces would be designed principally to assure that they could not expect to achieve a favorable nuclear or military balance following a counterforce exchange. However, damage limiting to the extent feasible would also be retained as an objective of counterforce targeting. Non-SIOP option planning would be improved as in a. above. Declaratory policy would stress that the overall objective of our nuclear policy is to deny to the Soviet Union a favorable outcome from a nuclear war. Some argue that this policy could help to convince the Soviets that the US was seeking serious war-winning objectives (as some maintain the Soviets do) and thus, would be a far more effective strategy in extending deterrence and preventing coercion, and that it would give the U.S. more reasonable war objectives if deterrence fails. Others argue that by reducing emphasis on the prospect of massive retaliation and by implying that the U.S. was

more prepared to fight a nuclear war than we have been in the past, we would weaken deterrence and decrease stability. This policy could prove more costly than Option a., but whether it would be substantially more costly is not certain.

c. *Still a further departure from current policy would add a higher confidence capability to limit damage.* This would require not only greater capability against Soviet nuclear forces than in Option b. above, but also substantial improvements in defenses. Under this policy, we might return to the targeting objectives of the earlier SIOPs. For example, we might attempt to achieve something like [1 line not declassified] threatening the U.S. and our allies under all circumstances of war initiation. Obviously, the forces required for such a strategy would be substantial and would have to be acquired over a period of years. Thus, this could not be a short-term objective of U.S. policy. Some would argue that a damage limiting capability at least comparable to that of the Soviet Union is the *sine qua non* of essential equivalence and a necessary requirement to make a strategy of escalation control credible. Without the ability to deter escalation at the higher levels the U.S. could not count on controlling escalation at lower levels. Others argue that the achievement of such a damage limiting capability would be highly destabilizing and would hardly be feasible given the Soviet capability to respond to whatever measures the United States might take. It seems clear that this option would be more costly than current policy or either of the two prior options.

d. *Finally, the U.S. might choose to move to the other direction from current policy and rely more heavily on assured destruction defined in either terms of industry, population or cities.* This would avoid the need, perhaps quite costly, to improve current deficiencies in flexibility and endurance. Moving in this direction would imply a judgment that the post-war nuclear force balance is not a meaningful measure of "victory" and that the prospect of massive destruction is a credible deterrent for large scale attacks including those aimed at nuclear forces. A continued capability to execute a wide range of limited attacks would be possible with the forces provided by this approach, but, in general, the approach assumes that any nuclear exchange is likely to escalate very rapidly to all-out countervalue exchanges. Indeed, it depends on that prospect for its deterrent effect. The argument against this approach is that it would narrow the scope of deterrence. In particular, such a policy would have an adverse impact on extended deterrence and thus on alliance relationships, and might suggest opportunities in the future for the Soviets to utilize their nuclear forces for coercion of the US and our allies. It would provide the US with a very narrow range of options should deterrence fail.

D. Major Recommendations

1. *Greater flexibility should be built into the SIOP through the development of more discrete building blocks* which could break down the present target base into smaller increments and thereby give the President a broader range of options if he should ever have to consider SIOP type attacks. Each building block should have distinct targeting criteria which take into account not only the timing and damage requirements for attacking the objective target but also collateral damage to other target sets. Given the planning complexities, the development of building blocks requires an evolutionary approach with close interaction between policy levels and planners. Care must be taken to insure that a balance is struck between the quantity of useful options desired and the need to maintain a relatively simple and responsive execution process. (See Issue #1)⁴

2. *The requirement for endurance should be considered a high priority requirement in the future planning of US forces, command, control communications and intelligence assets.* Endurance—the ability of strategic nuclear forces not only to survive the initial attacks but to remain an effective military force for a prolonged period afterwards—is a key element in any strategy that pays attention to post-exchange balances and/or the possibility of a drawn-out series of exchanges. Specific recommendations for endurance measures involve acquisition policy, and thus are beyond the scope of this study. However, we can say that to carry out current employment policy effectively, much less the more demanding alternatives outlined above, the endurance of command, control, communications and intelligence assets need to be improved substantially so as to make it possible to support the concept of a Secure Reserve Force and withhold attacks (e.g., on Soviet non-military industry) so long as substantial US urban/industrial assets remain undamaged. It is important that modifications in employment policy and plans that rely on greater endurance proceed in phase with the improvements in our force posture and supporting C³I that are necessary for endurance. (See Issue #2)⁵

3. *We should target Soviet nuclear forces and develop our own forces so as to maintain roughly equal counterforce capabilities. In particular, counter-nuclear targeting should be designed primarily so as to assure that the Soviets are unable to shift the balance of nuclear power drastically by attacking our forces, and so that it is clearly perceived they cannot.* This objective cannot be achieved solely by attacking Soviet forces and thus is not solely a function of targeting policy. It also requires that we be able to hold in reserve forces comparable to reserved Soviet forces, so as

⁴ Issue #1 in the report is titled “Flexibility.”

⁵ Issue #2 in the report is titled “Endurance.”

to prevent post-war coercion and thus protect these forces and their related C³I. While we lack the ability to limit damage to the US society meaningfully in a large scale Soviet attack, we are reluctant wholly to eliminate this as an objective of US policy, particularly because to do so explicitly would appear to confirm a major asymmetry between US and Soviet policy and would ignore important uncertainties about the effectiveness of a damage limiting strategy. However, if we focus on avoiding asymmetries in nuclear power in developing targeting plans, we are also likely to do as well as we can expect to do in limiting damage.

We recommend the following specific guidance for targeting the Soviet nuclear threat to the US and our allies. First, we should, for reasons of alliance solidarity, continue to give equal priority to targeting threats to the US and to our NATO allies. Second, when forces are fully generated and there are sufficient weapons available to meet other targeting objectives adequately, including the maintenance of a Secure Reserve Force, we should continue to plan to place at least one weapon on each target that constitutes a nuclear threat to the US or our allies, using the most effective weapon for each type of target and taking into account the desirability of promptly using forces with less endurance. For the longer run we should have sufficient weapons with hard target capabilities to meet this objective without utilizing weapons with low PK. Third, in the retaliatory case, priority should be given (among nuclear threat targets) to [6 lines not declassified] It will be important in the longer run to improve the US capability to acquire information rapidly on the status of Soviet strategic forces following an attack. (See Issue #3)⁶

4. *New priorities should be established for targeting Soviet non-nuclear forces* taking into account the probability that Soviet forces will be dispersed upon warning. Any victory-denial approach should pay close attention to the ability of nuclear weapons to affect the post-exchange balance of military forces, broadly defined, not just nuclear forces. This will require a special effort to identify the [1 line not declassified] does not decrease greatly with warning, to include [1 line not declassified] The target value system would be adjusted to assure the destruction of these targets and to give [1 line not declassified] For the longer run, we should initiate a high priority special study on the feasibility of targeting [1 line not declassified] requirements for accomplishing this. Particular attention should be given to how strategic forces might be utilized more effectively in support of NATO. A target package should be developed to [1 line not declassified] (See Issue #4)⁷

⁶ Issue #3 in the report is titled "Targeting the Nuclear Threat."

⁷ Issue #4 in the report is titled "Targeting Soviet Theater Forces."

5. *Targeting of the Soviet* [5 lines not declassified] A high priority effort should be undertaken to identify and target [3 lines not declassified] We should continue to have an option to withhold attacks [4 lines not declassified] should receive further study on a high priority basis along with [less than 1 line not declassified] (See Issue #5)⁸

6. *Targeting of Soviet* [2 lines not declassified] This attack should be designed so as to minimize collateral damage to population [less than 1 line not declassified] consistent with achievement of the attack objective. It should be possible to carry out this attack [1 line not declassified]

Second, [4 lines not declassified] by the US during and after the war.

We recommend that the US continue current policy with respect to the targeting of population, in which population, as such, is not an objective target. At the same time, we recommend continuing to plan. [2 lines not declassified] Unless Soviet civil defense becomes far more effective than presently estimated, there will be substantial population at risk in any such large scale attack, as is the case now. We find no reason to believe that targeting population *per se*, would be a more effective deterrent or a more useful objective in general war than targeting the specific economic objectives suggested above along with the control apparatus and military power which the Soviets appear to consider of high value. Furthermore, targeting population would require substantial additional allocation of weapons if we assume that the Soviet civil defense is implemented and effective, and therefore would divert weapons from other objectives. However, estimates of population fatalities will continue to be an important criterion for any decision maker contemplating the use of nuclear weapons. Our data and methodology for making such estimates should continue to be improved. We should also keep under continuous examination the feasibility and the implications for other targeting objectives of adjusting our targeting so as to be able to attack some defined portion of Soviet population even if it is evacuated and/or sheltered. Whether we should have a specific target set for use in such a case remains an unresolved issue.

7. *We should continue to plan a Secure Reserve Force (SRF) as part of the strategic reserved forces.* Our long run objectives should be to assure that reserve forces in a prolonged nuclear war at any stage of that conflict would be superior or at least comparable in capability to the forces of the Soviet Union. A principal objective of the Strategic Reserve Force would be to deny the Soviet Union the possibility of changing the correlation of forces. We need to consider the role of theater-based forces in a secure reserve concept and the possibilities for augmenting forces during a crisis or after a limited attack. We need to develop capabilities that would permit flexible retargeting of the reserve force for we see

⁸ Issue #5 in the report is titled "Targeting Soviet Control Apparatus."

no way in which this force can be realistically pretargeted prior to a nuclear engagement.

For the short run, we recommend that the composition of the Secure Reserve Force be based heavily on the probability of survival and endurance in its components. Given this concept, the principal objective of the Secure Reserve Force should be to achieve enduring survivability. What it is targeted against is less important than its ability to survive and endure. However, during the period when we lack an enduring intelligence and retargeting capability, the Secure Reserve Force should continue to have tentative targets likely to have high continuing value even after an initial attack, e.g., bomber bases. This would permit, under worst circumstances, follow-up strikes to be executed "in the blind" against targets likely to have continuing value to the Soviet Union. (See Issue #7)⁹

8. *In addition to developing more discrete SIOP options, the process for the planning and use of non-SIOP options should be improved.* The only way to develop realistic political/military contingency plans is through a continuing interactive process between the planner and the policy/decision maker. It is in the nature of limited nuclear options that there will be a high political input into any consideration of the use of such options. And, if they are to achieve their stated objectives, the other associated military and political measures must be closely integrated with the use of limited and regional nuclear options. We, therefore, recommend that the current planning process be modified to include regular interaction between the JCS and OSD, including selective representatives from the State Department, the NSC staff and the Intelligence Community. Planning should include periodic exercises to test both the feasibility of implementing the plan and to expose policy/decision makers to the plans and give them an opportunity to evaluate them under as realistic conditions as possible. While DoD cannot organize the crisis management machinery of the US Government unilaterally, the SecDef should recommend to the President's National Security Advisor the development of a national crisis management mechanism based on the planning procedures described above. (See Issue #8)¹⁰

9. *Closer coordination of nuclear planning between US and NATO planning staffs should be undertaken.* In particular, USCINCEUR and CINCLANT should be encouraged to develop additional US employment options in support of SEPs. Closer integration of nuclear planning between US and NATO planning staffs is needed, particularly in the development of target plans which integrate theater and strategic

⁹ Issue #7 in the report is titled "The Strategic Reserve Force."

¹⁰ Issue #8 in the report is titled "Planning in Support of Escalation Control."

nuclear forces in striking the Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional military threat to NATO. Should further analysis suggest that more effective ways can be found to target the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat to NATO, these should be the basis for discussion with our allies under the aegis of the NPG. The opportunity should be seized to involve the allies in a more meaningful way in the development of alliance nuclear employment policy. Improvements in the vulnerable and outdated NATO C³ system clearly are needed, along with better means for rapid processing of intelligence. We need to take steps that assure that both NATO Selective Employment Plans (SEPs) and SACEUR's Nuclear Operations Plan (NOP) are consistent with our own; that if current LNOs or SAOs are employed there will be corresponding NATO plans that are complementary rather than conflicting. (See Issue #9)¹¹

10. *The JCS should develop a launch under attack package for ICBMs only* that will be directed at a range of military and defense production targets but will result in minimum collateral damage consistent with achievement of its targeting objective. This launch under attack package should be ready for use beginning in the 1981–82 period and should include a broad set of nuclear and non-nuclear targets and command and control. It should also include such targets as the Soviet ASAT launch facilities and Soviet ASW bases which might support attacks which could reduce US endurance. The attack should be designed so as to minimize collateral damage to population consistent with achievement of the attack objective. We do not see LUA as a solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability, but believe such an option should, nevertheless, be available to the NCA. (See Issue #10)¹²

11. *Employment policy for China should not require the extensive planning process which is devoted to the Soviet Union.* We should, of course, recognize that China does pose a threat to some US interests in the Far East and that the PRC might attempt to coerce US friends or gain assets of interest to us, particularly in the aftermath of a US-Soviet exchange. We would assume that if China's posture substantially changed, we would be sensitive to this and could accommodate modifications in our targeting policy accordingly. Implicit in this recommendation is the belief that U.S. and Allied conventional and U.S. theater nuclear forces (using non-SIOP options) are sufficient to deter the likely range of Chinese threats in peacetime and that the SRF, available for protection and coercion worldwide could be used to deter China in a trans- and post-attack environment. (See Issue #11)¹³

¹¹ Issue #9 in the report is titled "The Policy Interface with NATO."

¹² Issue #10 in the report is titled "Launch Under Attack."

¹³ Issue #11 in the report is titled "Employment Policy for China."

12. *The data base for targeting needs to be revised and expanded.* It is evident from past experience that the design and maintenance of a responsive target intelligence data base is very complex and any change in policy portends significant modifications in data. For these reasons, we recommend JCS evaluation of the impact that the targeting policies contained in this report will have on the ability to produce and maintain an adequate, comprehensive, responsive target intelligence data base. The JCS should provide a plan, with appropriate milestones and resource requirements, to provide a flexible data base.

13. *The development of nuclear employment policy is an ongoing process that requires continuing interaction between policy makers and planners.* Presently, there is no mechanism or arrangement that could assure that our employment policy is developed on this basis. The Secretary of Defense should create within OSD a mechanism to conduct the necessary follow-on work and assure its continuity.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

106. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 2, 1978

SUBJECT

The U.S. Defense Program

As background for our meeting Monday, *this memorandum provides (1) a brief overview of the kind of defense the United States will have at various funding levels, and (2) a discussion of four selected issues of unusual importance: the future of strategic forces; the naval shipbuilding program; improving the capabilities of our Army divisions in Europe to meet the Warsaw Pact threat; and improving further the efficiency in the Department of Defense.*²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 157, Budget, 1/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not printed are an undated chart prepared in the Department of Defense entitled “Department of Defense—YOA & Outlay Summaries” and undated papers prepared in the Department of Defense on several specific issues.

² Carter attended a meeting on defense appropriations on Monday, December 4, from 9 to 11 a.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary.) No minutes of the meeting were found.

I. Levels of Defense Effort

In preparing the FY 1980 Defense submission, alternative programs have been addressed at several levels, three of which I shall discuss here.

My three top priorities in developing the Defense program and budget have been: maintaining parity with the Soviet Union in strategic forces; increasing NATO's capability to withstand a "blitzkrieg" war with the Pact in Central Europe; and modernizing and increasing the readiness of forces. *The basic level program, which would meet your 3% real growth goal, would produce total obligational authority of \$138 billion for FY 1980 (124B\$ of expenditures) and requires 3% per year growth thereafter. It would provide for a first step toward making those goals. That program, however, would still result in further deterioration of our relative military position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union if they continue to increase their capability at the rate of the past decade.*

Since the pace of Soviet military growth shows no sign of abating, I believe we must be prepared to continue to fund growth at no less than that rate. Though the strategic balance is still generally satisfactory today, it is much less so than five years ago. The Soviets are rapidly overtaking us and we must react strongly to assure essential equivalence. Furthermore, the conventional force balance in Europe today is not satisfactory. To maintain our naval forces near their present size into the 1990s requires action now, and their readiness and survivability need improvement now. *In short, we should consider our 1980 defense budget as part of a longer-term program that will require increased effort, and consequently increased expenditures for defense, on our part as long as the Soviet Union continues on its current path.*

The military balance resulting from our following the basic level program, even with its 3% growth, would almost certainly be less favorable in 1984 than it is now. In the strategic balance, our lead in almost all measures will have disappeared by the mid-1980s. There could well be a widespread perception that the Soviet Union had achieved at least some sort of marginal superiority in the strategic area by that time. We are uncertain about what, if any, practical effect such an advantage might have on the outcome of a strategic war. But such evidence as there is strongly suggests that many of the Soviet leaders believe otherwise with regard to both military utility and political intimidation. And the area of strategic thermonuclear war is one in which, because there is no experience, perceptions and doctrine are critical.

As for the conventional balance in Europe with a basic level program, the Pact would have an advantage in terms of equivalent forces of almost 2:1 over most of the early days of a NATO/Warsaw Pact mobilization. Additional armor and mechanization, together with prepositioning of U.S. equipment, and improvements on the part of our allies,

may improve the situation slightly by the mid-1980s. We have also been making headway in improving rationalization, standardization and interoperability, with consequent gains in efficiency. We would remain ahead of the Soviets by most naval measures, especially in ASW.

I believe that *maintaining at least the current military balance with the Soviet Union is an essential component (although not the only component) of our national security.* The fiscal resources for the basic level program do not assure us of maintaining that balance, though with hard work and luck if our allies increase expenditures and efficiency of alliance efforts, we may be able to do so in conventional forces. There are many items that I have not been able to include in the basic program that are needed for confidence in maintaining the present balance. I have included most of these items in an enhanced level program, starting at a level of \$144.5 billion for the 1980 budget, with expenditures of over \$126 billion in FY 1980, and growing at 3.7% per year for the following four years. I believe a program at that level would give reasonable confidence assuming corresponding allied efforts of maintaining the existing balance (given the limits on the precision with which we can measure that balance). *I also, for the sake of completeness, include a description of a program at a level below the basic. That decremented level, which as noted hereafter would force elimination of critically needed programs, would in my opinion result in military imbalance to a degree which would constitute a severe risk.*

A. Basic Level

The basic level program would provide the following:

In Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces:

- 1054 ICBMs—550 MIRVd Minuteman IIIs, 450 single-RV Minuteman IIs, and 54 of the large single-RIV Titan IIs. *Initial deployment of M-X in 1986. Interim mobile system (MM III) in 1983.*
- 600–700 SLBMs through the late '80s (all MIRVd after 1983), dropping to 400–500 in the early '90s as Poseidon boats are retired. *Five new Trident SSBNs funded between 1980 and 1984.*
- 346 B–52s. *Initial deployment of ALCMs in 1982, all 150 B–52Gs with 3000 ALCMs by 1989. First deployment of wide-body cruise missile carrier in 1987.*
- Initial deployment in Europe of the ground-launched cruise missile in 1982, and of the long-range Pershing in 1984.

In General Purpose Forces:

- 19 active and 9 reserve Army and Marine divisions.
- *Conversion of 3 light Active Army divisions to armored/mechanized by 1984, altering total U.S. force from 12 of these and 16 light to 15 armored/mechanized and 13 light.*

- 9 new armored or mechanized battalions in the active Army by 1984.
- Prepositioned equipment in Europe for 3 more division equivalents (for a total of $5\frac{1}{3}$) by 1984, and a further 3 (for a total of $8\frac{1}{3}$) by 1986.
- Procurement of 90 XM–1 tanks per month (less than 40% of Soviet production) by 1983, and 50 IFV/CFVs per month (a quarter the Soviet rate) by 1980.
- 26 active and 12 reserve tactical air wings in the Air Force, 12 active (with 12 deployable carriers) and 2 reserve in the Navy, 3 active and 1 reserve in the Marine Corps, for a total of 56 wings.
- Funding during the 5-year period of 250 A–10s, 120 F–14s, 150 F–15s, 895 F–16s, and 453 F–18s, for a total of 1868 of these types (the Soviets produce tactical fighter and attack aircraft at the rate of 1200 per year).
- Funding during the 5-year period of 67 new ships, implying an eventual steady-state fleet size of about 350 ships, though the backlog of ships already funded will temporarily raise the current level of 470 to over 500 in the '80s.
- Buy 20 KC–10s, modify civilian wide-bodied aircraft, stretch and add refueling to the C–141 fleet, give the C–5 wing longer life, and increase C–5 and C–141 utilization rates.

B. Enhanced Level

Here are some examples of increases in capability above the basic level program that the enhanced level offers.

In Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces:

- Eight instead of five Trident submarines begun in 1980–1984.
- Full operational capability for the B–52/cruise missile force (about 150 bombers with 3000 missiles) by FY 1987 instead of FY 1989.
- Two more Pave Paws radars to complete coverage against Soviet SLBM attack [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
- Development of an MRBM similar to the SS–20 that the Soviets are deploying.

Among other things, these changes would increase U.S. strategic warheads by about 20 percent by 1990. This could be important, since the Soviets may be able to reduce our current 2:1 advantage in warheads to about 1.3:1 by 1985, and could eliminate even this—our last static advantage—by 1990.

In Land Forces:

- Increase production of the XM–1 tank from 90 to 120 per month, and of the Army's new armored personnel carrier from 50 to 105 per month. (Both these latter figures are still only about half the current corresponding Soviet rates.)

- The equivalent of four more 155mm battalions in Europe. (Since 1973, Pact artillery and rocket launchers in Eastern Europe have grown by 25 to 30 percent. This calls not only for more artillery on our part, but also for more armored personnel carriers to protect our troops.)

- Fifty percent more of our new Patriot SAMs in Europe by 1984 to counter growing Soviet offensive airpower (*e.g.*, an increase of up to 60 percent since 1974 in payload that could be delivered 2000 n.mi. inside NATO territory.)

In Tactical Air Forces:

- An 80 percent increase in the number of sorties we could fly in Europe in the first 30 days, equivalent to a 10 percent to 15 percent increase for NATO as a whole in the first week, and about 35 percent in the first month. This could be very important—the Pact now outnumbers NATO in air-to-air capable fighters by about 25 percent, a figure likely to grow to about 50 percent by the mid-1980s. These sorties take on extra importance in light of the reliance we place on airpower to react rapidly to intense and localized Soviet armored thrusts.

- Accelerate production of the A-10 attack aircraft by 13%, and buy 50% more electronic countermeasures aircraft, 25% more air-to-air missiles, and 40% more precision-guided weapons.

- R&D for a new all-weather standoff attack system for the A-6, for a new short-range air-to-air missile, and for a new turbofan engine for tactical aircraft.

In Naval Forces:

- Twenty-seven more new ships for a five-year total of 94—a rate sufficient to sustain a 500-ship fleet in the long run—instead of the basic level of 67 new ships, which is enough to sustain only a 350-ship fleet.

- New 8" guns for DD-963 destroyers, for amphibious fire support. (At present, the United States has nothing larger than a 5" gun in the fleet.)

- Twenty percent more new P-3C patrol aircraft, our most cost-effective antisubmarine system.

- Clipper Bow—an active radar satellite for ocean surveillance—ready in 1983 instead of 1988.

In Mobility Forces:

- Modernization of our tactical aircraft force. (The aging C-130s cannot carry the tanks and self-propelled artillery on which our ground forces increasingly depend.)

- Twenty percent to 30 percent faster deployment from Central Europe to the flanks of NATO or the Persian Gulf, and far more rapid

movement within countries having poorly developed ground transportation system (e.g., twice as fast in Iran).

- Provisions for higher utilization rates of our existing strategic airlift aircraft (C-5s and C-141s), and prepositioning of another division's equipment in Europe by FY 1981 instead of FY 1982.

In Logistic Support and Readiness:

- The enhanced level would permit a number of actions to improve logistic support and readiness. Their cumulative effect could be vital in terms of real combat capability.

In my view, the program at the enhanced level would give us reasonable confidence of maintaining the relative position we hold today.

C. Decremental Level

In developing these alternative programs, we also investigated a *decremental level, roughly 4% below the basic level program (e.g., roughly \$133 billion) and growing thereafter at a slower rate (e.g., about 2%) than the basic program. Some of the important changes in dropping to that level would be:*

In Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces:

- *Slip the initial deployment of M-X by a year, and that of Trident II, the ground-launched cruise missile, and the antisatellite program by two years each. Eliminate the interim mobile MM III.*

- *Cancel the wide-bodied cruise missile carrier, airborne launch control for 200 Minuteman IIIs, 2 F-15 squadrons for continental air defense, Pershing II, and all R&D for a new manned bomber.*

- *Cut the B-52G alert rate from [less than 1 line not declassified] (roughly [number not declassified] fewer aircraft with [number not declassified] weapons would escape a surprise Soviet attack.)*

In General Purpose Forces:

- *Close the M-60 tank production line before the XM-1 starts (leaving us no surge capability), and cut the eventual XM-1 rate by a third—to 60/month, or about a quarter the Soviet T-72 rate. Delay start of IFV/CFV production until FY 81.*

- *Eliminate 2 of the 9 new armored/mechanized battalions, 3000 NATO-deployed support spaces, 3000 more support spaces for non-NATO, contingencies, a third of our 155mm guns for early use in NATO, and all 16 of the new electronic warfare and intelligence battalions planned as part of the LTDP (the Soviets now use 15–20 times as many jammers as has the U.S. Army, and roughly 50 times as many intercept location systems).*

- *Cancel the Roland surface-to-air missile program (an international project), the advanced scout helicopter program, and ¼-ton, 2½-ton, and 5-ton truck procurement, and buy 83 fewer UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.*

- *In the Marine Corps, eliminate the XM-1 tank program, modernization of LVT-7 amphibious tractors, helicopter reliability improvements, and procurement of laser designators for precision guidance.*

- *In tactical air, eliminate one USAF wing, all three Navy carrier-based ELINT squadrons, all five USAF Special Operations squadrons, and half of the Marine Reserve A-4 squadrons.*

- *Cancel procurement of the GBU-15 electro-optical glide bomb, new Navy carrier-based cargo aircraft needed to replace obsolete C-1s, and cut the combined A-10 and F-16 production rate by 15%.*

- *End all V/STOL programs, including both the Navy's exploratory program and the Marines' AV-8B.*

- *End development of the EF-111A, the Air Force's only radar jamming aircraft.*

- *End several advanced radar and reconnaissance programs.*

- *In naval forces, retire 42 ships early (thus prolonging instead of reversing the decrease in size of the fleet), and cut ready Marine amphibious lift to less than a Division/Wing team (i.e., 85%). (A dozen years ago Soviet lift was 6% of ours; it is 18% today; it would be 40% of ours by 1986 at this level.)*

- *Fund 3 fewer ships, do not modernize the missiles on our nuclear cruisers, cut P-3 procurement from 12 to 10, and do not buy anti-ship Tomahawk.*

- *End 5 major naval R&D programs (Captor, advanced lightweight torpedo, replacement for the P-3, the ASMD missile, and SIRCS).*

- *In mobility forces, end the KC-10 program, modernize only 60% (vs. all) of the C-141 fleet, and cut our overall strategic airlift capability (e.g., by 17% for a deployment to Iran).*

- *In R&D, cut real growth rates from 10% to 7% in basic research, and from 5% to 3% in exploratory development, through FY 81, with no real growth in later years.*

- *In C³, eliminate CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR airborne command posts, cancel the digital data link for AWACS, and defer 6 AWACS from FY 81/2 to the end of the NATO buy, have only four E-4Bs rather than 6, cancel the over-the-horizon radar project, slip the IOC of Navstar GPS by 2 years, and the IOC of the Clipper Bow radar ocean surveillance satellite by 3 years.*

Though the roughly 4% reduction in funding from the basic to the decremented level may seem modest in comparison with the obvious

havoc it would wreak in the defense program, I believe that what I have described above is realistic, and that though alternative kinds of reductions in R&D, procurement, or forces could be taken, they would be equally destructive of our military capability.

The decremented level illustrates the sensitivity of the defense program to its funding. However, I do not consider it a serious alternative. In my judgment, it would clearly mark a degree of military retrenchment by the United States which, in the face of the Soviet buildup, would prevent us from countering the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

II. Impact on Allied Perceptions—and Performance

In launching the Carter initiatives to strengthen NATO's defense posture, we had two aims. One was to improve efficiency through rationalization. The other, and chief immediate aim, was to generate greater Allied contributions—without which U.S. defense budget increases alone would not do the job. But this required the United States, as the price of leadership, to commit itself as well to the same 3% real annual growth. So far this has worked. Nine countries—which together account for over 90% of Allied defense outlays—have pledged that they will achieve the 3% increase on average during 1979–83.

By the same token, if the United States again falls below 3% only eight months after the Washington Summit blessed the Long Term Defense Plan, it will inevitably invite—and in my judgment ensure—Allied cuts as well. We have no way of estimating the magnitude of such cuts: they will depend on each country's political and economic situation. A conservative estimate is that the reduction would on the average amount to a cumulative decrease over five years in defense effort among our allies of \$10–20 billion in 1977 dollars.

Nor can we specify the particular Allied programs that would be cut, except that most would necessarily be from readiness and defense investment, *i.e.*, modernization rather than force size or people costs. Thus the cuts would inevitably delay, if not undermine, implementation of key LTDP measures, adversely affecting the long-term goal of rationalization, standardization and interoperability.

The impact on Allied perceptions of U.S. determination, while even less quantifiable, is likely to be still more serious. Having just taken the initiative in NATO and demonstrated vigorous leadership, we would again be seen as all too quickly changing course. Though our anti-inflationary rationale would be understandable to—and quickly adopted by—European elites, our move would also be interpreted, given our necessary attention to strategic forces and SALT II, as a lower level of concern and commitment about the NATO/WP balance than over the superpower strategic balance—whatever the cost to Europe. A corresponding perception would arise among the Japanese. It is doubtful that we could rebuild this momentum; even if we could, years would be required.

The likely reactions by Moscow, Peking, and Tokyo, as well as those of states friendly to us in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, would be a perception that the trend in the balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union, already of concern, now could be depended upon certainly to worsen. They would further question U.S. resolve—with obvious consequences for our foreign policy and our position in the world.

III. Domestic Considerations

The international political implications of not following through on the 3% pledge thus are obvious and dramatic. The domestic political implications may not be as immediately visible, but they probably would be significant.

One reason for the success you have had in meeting criticism of the B-1 decision, the nuclear carrier veto, the Korean ground forces withdrawal, and other similar actions has been the ability to counter charges that these actions were evidence that this Administration is soft on defense. You and I have been able to counter these charges by stating consistently that you were committed to real growth in the defense budget after years of neglect. Critics were left to argue about the choices among individual programs, but not about the needed overall level of defense spending.

If you now decide not to approve 3% real growth for FY 1980, these critics—both in and out of Congress—would have their positions considerably strengthened. Particularly distressed would be those members of Congress (of both parties) who have supported our most controversial program decisions on the basis of the commitment to overall real growth.

One of the more immediate results of this would be to make it more difficult to obtain Congressional and public support for a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. It would give ammunition to the opponents on an issue whose very complexity forces many of the public to form an opinion on it simply according to their general confidence in the judgment and commitment reflected in our national security policy. I believe it would also seriously complicate the ability of the JCS—whose attitudes also are influenced by their perception of the quality of the commitment of defense, as evidence in tangible ways—to support such agreements. Though (with one or two possible exceptions) they would in my judgment not declare against a SALT agreement, the quality of the support they would give under Congressional questioning would be seriously eroded. And even one defection among the Chiefs would greatly aid opponents.

Every recent poll I have seen shows broad, and growing, public support for a real increase in the United States defense effort. There has been wide editorial support, lately even from commentators not usually friendly to defense. The election results earlier this month, although somewhat mixed, also I believe in general reflect this support. Your public statements have consistently recognized defense needs, avoiding adverse effects from

that trend. *Without an increase in defense spending at the 3% level, which has been committed to and urged on our allies, the issue of credibility will certainly be raised, as it has been already even by such a socially-sensitive paper as the Washington Post.*³

At the same time, there is no question that reducing the level of real growth in defense spending will help—although marginally—in meeting a reduced-deficit target (although as I have pointed out often, Defense has shrunk dramatically as a portion of the federal budget from what it was fifteen years ago, and cannot be held responsible for the current deficit problem). To some degree it might make it much easier for other departments and constituencies to accept program reductions, though I doubt that they would ever acquiesce; at the same time, probably many overlapping and conflicting claims would be made against any supposed “defense dividend.” As you know, a decision among ten such claimants would produce nine infuriated losers and one ingrate.

In summary, excluding national security needs, which I believe to be the central issue, and considering only the political questions, I believe that while cutting the defense figure would ease slightly a tough budget problem, it would be of only marginal help, and not enough to offset the many negative consequences of such an action. *In the overall political picture, I suspect that while a visible shift away from defense would give short-term satisfaction to some constituencies (although they would probably continue to complain that the shift was only a token), over the next few years the majority of the American public will weigh steadfastness on defense as a virtue and an extremely important one.*

IV. Conclusion

I have planned the defense program in light of the needs of the future—a future which our actions now are shaping—as well as in light of present contingencies. I have built it with my eye on the defense programs we need, not a particular budget figure—but not of course without paying attention to realistic constraints on resources. *The difficult task has not been to build a program to reach the range of a 3% annual real growth budget level. Rather, it has been to cut enough important programs in order to reduce it down to that level, yet retain an overall program which I can assure you will provide adequately for the security of the United States.*

The programs presented here are as they have been balanced by me, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and our staffs. Not every item is sacrosanct, and each is open to your questioning. But the programs have been

³ Reference is to Art Pine and Edward Walsh, “Carter Seen Wavering on Defense Rise,” *Washington Post*, November 29, 1978, p. A1.

assembled at each level into what I consider a coherent whole. There may be particular items included at any level which for reasons of policy you may decide not to include. In the event that you do, I would have to rebalance the overall program at that level to take account of such omission.

Harold Brown

107. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, December 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Net Assessment of C³

This memorandum responds to tasking I received from Bob Gates (Tab A).² See the last page for a point summary. (U)

Concern about the comparative status of US and Soviet C³ has been growing for some years. In 1976 Congressional committees sought a comprehensive net assessment on the subject from DOD, with annual updates. The Director of Net Assessment in OSD produced the first report in July 1977, a substantial study with voluminous appendices.³ A follow-on report, updated with new intelligence and revised on the basis of additional analysis, was produced in January 1978. A draft report to be issued early next year has been completed.⁴ This activity has proceeded in a context in which many other organizations have been developing or contributing to net assessments of US and Soviet C³. The level of effort, priority, and organizational prominence of the subject has been rising in the Intelligence Community for some years. It has been the subject of several, some continuing, projects by the Defense

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 2, Command, Control, and Communications. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Utgoff, Rosenberg, Odom, Thomson, and Molander.

² Not found.

³ See Documents 24–27.

⁴ See Document 95.

Science Board. Senior levels in the DOD are unusually concerned about and focused on C³I issues currently. (U)

To date, net assessments of US and Soviet C³ have achieved:

- Improved and more orderly data bases on the subject;
- Descriptive characterizations of the two sides' programs;
- Better understanding of the contrasting priority and place in overall military strategy assigned by the US and the USSR to C³ and C³I.
- Better understanding of the contrasting technology, management, and organizational approaches applied by the two sides. (C)

The analyses of OSD/NA have by and large agreed with the now widely held judgment that the Soviets have sought and achieved a more robust and enduring C³ infrastructure at all levels of military operations than we. But these analyses have usefully stood apart from the crowd in emphasizing possible sources of vulnerability in both the physical structure of Soviet C³ and the Soviet organizational style, i.e., high degrees of centralization.⁵ By the same token, OSD/NA has stressed potential US strengths that could be exploited, e.g., superior communications technology, a rich civilian communications system, decentralized styles of management and command. The work of this office has also stressed the importance of basic doctrine, training, and organizational patterns. It has stimulated the study of counter-C³ tactics by several operational commands. (S).

Thus, a good deal has been and continues to be done on C³I net assessments. OSD/NA is charged by Congress to produce an annual report. Further tasking by the NSC is not indicated. Further, the amorphous and large community that struggles with C³I as a problem of policy, resources, and programs is well charged up. It is most in need of a *conceptual framework* and *policy guidance* to shape its work. To some extent this can come from the Secretary of Defense. But, because much of the problem runs to the heart of defense policy and strategy, basic guidance must come from the President and the NSC. (C)

Strategy and C³I (U)

Clearly, military C³I capabilities we seek are a function of our strategy. Even minimalist "fixes" to assure that SIOP execution messages get out represent strategic judgment as to the kind of war we expect to face and how we expect to fight. Beyond this, enhanced capabilities to manage crises, battles, and large conflicts at all relevant levels of violence; improving the survivability, endurance, and reconstitutability of such capabilities; relating such military capabilities to civil defense

⁵ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this and the previous sentence.

and continuity-of-government programs—all this requires explicit and farreaching, although not necessarily radical, strategic choices to be made. (S)

The Administration has from the beginning been in a process of making those choices: PD-18, PD-37, PD-42, budget decisions, and your sustained interest in C³I issues have been part of this process.⁶ The next major step is SCC/NSC consideration of the DOD reports on nuclear targeting and the Secure Reserve Force, a step we are currently organizing. (S)

After several months of wrestling with the challenge of strategic planning from the NSC staff, I've come to the view that a) the politics, bureaucraties, and substance of strategic policy reform insist on an evolutionary approach, and b) the process currently in train appears very promising. Our challenge is to keep it on track and moving. (C)

Much hinges on implementation of policy guidance emanating from the NSC. The DOD studies reveal the extent to which current strategic failings result from inadequate follow-through on NSDM 242 and PD-18.⁷ To assure that follow-through we shall have to enhance the visibility of the policy, program, and budget process within DOD, exerting corrective influence where necessary. (S)

To help shape this evolutionary process, I propose to organize a small, relatively informal Strategic Planning Group, on the model of the East-West Planning Group. Some 6–8 people from NSC, State, and Defense would constitute the group.⁸ (U)

C³I Organization (U)

Making things come out right is more than a matter of the right guidance. Especially for large and continuing activities, they must be structured so that the actors have the right incentives. Bill Odom has pointed out in numerous memos how the Service-JCS-Command-OSD structure short changes C³, perhaps not in terms of money—much is spent, but in terms of purposefulness and cohesion (the Russian term *tselestremlyonst'* is very apt; it comes up often in their discussions of the C³). The "I" of C³I, meanwhile is not structured outside of DOD to look earnestly at military support roles where they compete for budget with peacetime requirements. (C)

The marriage of C³ and Intelligence in C³I is useful in bringing related things together. But it is still a shotgun marriage, dominated

⁶ PD-37 on National Space Policy, May 11, 1978, and PD-42 on Civil and Further National Space Policy, October 10, 1978, are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues.

⁷ For NSDM-242, see footnote 2, Document 29. PD-18 is printed as Document 31.

⁸ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the margin to the left of this paragraph and wrote: "good."

in practice by the *communications* technicians (as in WMCCS) and the *sensor* technicians (as in DSP and the Special Air Force). They should be but servitors of the “command” function (with “control” as its nether side). Command—how the forces are directed to fight—is a matter of strategy, doctrine, training, battle assessment and planning. It is a very cerebral and people-oriented function. (C)

Hans Mark relates the story that, at Trafalgar, Nelson sent up two signals: “Engage the enemy,” and “England expects every man to do his duty.” A very simple C³ scheme sufficed because he had strategized, planned, trained, and fought with his captains to the point where they knew how to conduct operations with little guidance, even in the face of the unexpected. We are vulnerable to getting lost in a technological swamp at the other extreme: sensors that can see everything, communications from the President to the foxhole. Strategy itself determines what we wish to see and what we wish to communicate to forces. If it fails to do that, the technicians will have no limiting criteria against which to build their systems or we will be left with pre-canned fire plans for World War III (SIOP and its lessor bretheran). (S)

As we move down the evolutionary path of doctrinal reform, we shall discover that defining requirements for communications, ADP, and sensor technology is as vital as defining force requirements. This task will have to be taken out of the hands of the C³I technicians and placed in the hands of these strategic planners now almost entirely pre-occupied with force structure. This may require organizational change in OSD, the JCS, and the Service staffs. More than any other single phenomenon, grappling with the strategic C³I problem will force us in the direction of a general staff.⁹ (C)

Furthermore, if we properly subordinate sensor, data processing, and communications technology to strategy, we shall find that the “people problem” of command (the commander and his battle staff) has reappeared on center stage, where it has always been in Soviet doctrine. Are the people, from the NCA down, who must make the command decisions that implement strategy and who must advise on those decisions trained, exercised, survivable? [8 lines not declassified] (S)

In considering the DOD targeting and SRF studies, we shall first of all, be concerned with redefining basic strategy for various levels of conflict, and, second, with the likely implications for force posture and programs. We must also, however, raise organizational questions. What does a more open-ended approach to operational planning require in the way of command structure and staff support in war? How should

⁹ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the margin to the left of the last three sentences of this paragraph.

those organs be made survivable? Trained and exercised? Does evolution in strategy require change in the peacetime structure of defense and national security decisionmaking? (S)

As a first step into this thicket I plan to examine the Steadman and Ignatius reports¹⁰ to determine how their findings jibe with the implications of the two studies on strategy, if at all. From this, issues ripe for near term decision could emerge; issues for further study certainly will. It will be appropriate to task DOD with specific study of organizational implications of doctrinal change and increased reliance on C³I *after* the targeting and SRF studies have been reviewed by the NSC. (C)

C³I and Military Assessment (U)

So far, there has been no comprehensive attempt to examine in any operational detail how US and Soviet strategic C³I resources would perform in a major nuclear conflict involving attacks on those resources. Most strategic exchange analyses over the years have deliberately ignored the implications of C³ targeting.¹¹ JCS's RISOP-SIOP exchanges have typically included such targeting, but have not in the judgment of many critics, translated that phenomenon into a realistic degradation of the respective sides' force performance. In short, the go-code still gets out and the forces still perform in this highly preplanned, massive exchange. (S)

Important new insights into the vulnerability of Soviet strategic C³I will result from further study of discrete targeting packages, as recommended by Harold Brown in his transmittal of the targeting study.¹² C³ targets will represent one or more of the packages. Ultimately operational net assessment of C³I in war cannot be separated from the totality of military and even political interactions in a given scenario. Our strategic interaction analysis is deficient across the board because it lacks attention to operational detail, uncertainty, scenario variations, the role of non-strategic and civil capabilities, and C³I. (S)

A number of people in OSD, the Services, and the JCS are concerned about this and are seeking ways to improve official analysis of strategic exchanges and balances. They are moved in part by the need to counter highly simplified quantitative analyses which, depending on the prejudices of the analyst, either minimize our deficiencies (as did a

¹⁰ Reference is to Richard C. Steadman, *The National Military Command Structure: Report of a Study Requested by the President and Conducted in the Department of Defense* (Washington, Government Printing Office, July 1978) and Paul R. Ignatius, *Department Headquarters Study: A Report to the Secretary of Defense*. (Washington, Government Printing Office, June 1978)

¹¹ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this portion of the paragraph and wrote: "we need this."

¹² See Document 105.

recent ACDA report) or exaggerate them (as is probably the case in the work of T.K. Jones). (C)

One approach to stimulating progress on this front might be to task Harold Brown with an assessment of strategic analysis in DOD and elsewhere in the light of the above critique. He is getting strong messages of this sort from within DOD, however, especially from Andy Marshall. I am personally known to be a critic of most official analysis.¹³ A formal initiative from the NSC would risk provoking an unconstructive, defensive reaction from much of the analytical community in Defense.¹⁴ For now I believe the best course is to maintain low-keyed¹⁵ pressure on the system. We should examine the next version of the DOD Consolidated Guidance and the results of some new efforts in the JCS for signs of progress. If they are dissatisfying, we can take more formal steps early next year. (U)

In Summary (U)

—Periodic net assessments of US and Soviet C³ are in progress.

—Policy guidance on strategic C³ should result from review of the targeting and SRF studies.

—As we move toward shifts in doctrine and upgrading of the role of C³I, organizing the C³I business better in peace and war will become an issue we may be obliged to task DOD to study.

—The quality of military exchange analysis needs improvement; but a low-keyed campaign of steady pressure is the best approach for now.

—I am going to organize a strategy planning group, on the model of the East-West Planning Group, to gain better visibility into the relevant DOD processes that must be shaped and to provide a standing but informal mechanism for airing problems.¹⁶ (C)

¹³ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this portion of the paragraph and wrote: "OK."

¹⁴ Brzezinski underlined the word "unconstructive" and wrote "I wonder?" above it.

¹⁵ Brzezinski underlined the phrase "low-keyed."

¹⁶ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this point and wrote a checkmark.

108. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 18, 1978

SUBJECT

Sorting out the ICBM Vulnerability Issue (U)

Background

Another year has gone by and we still aren't ready to resolve the issue of how to deal with the decreasing survivability of the Minute-man force. Harold has pursued MAP—but it hasn't worked out. Harold therefore proposes to carry out a 90-day final examination of MAP and the air-mobile concept, make a decision on both the missile and its basing mode at the end of that period, and go into full-scale development by means of funding in both the FY 80 budget and the FY 79 supplemental. OMB, on the other hand, proposes to keep both the missile and its basing mode in advanced development until the end of FY 79, make both choices then, and proceed with full-scale development in FY 80. (S)

Both proposals have serious problems—DOD's because it will seem like a rather hasty decision, given the newness of the air-mobile concept; OMB's because adequate support for SALT II ratification will require a more solid commitment to solving the ICBM vulnerability problem—before the vote gets taken. (S)

As I see it, you have four basic questions to resolve—

—Should you authorize full-scale development of a new missile before a basing mode has been chosen?²

—When should the basing question be resolved?³

—If the basing modes are to be examined further, which modes deserve attention?

—What should be done to bridge the early '80s gap when MM will be highly vulnerable but our long-term solution not yet deployed? (C)

Proceeding with a Missile

The virtue of making a separate missile decision now is that it would seem to demonstrate the kind of commitment to modernizing the ICBM force that is probably needed if we want to get the SALT II

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 11/78-4/79. Secret. Sent for action. The date is handwritten.

² Carter wrote "no" in the right margin next to this point.

³ Carter wrote "spring" in the right margin next to this point.

treaty ratified. There are some very powerful arguments why we shouldn't make a separate missile decision, however. (C)

First, while the Congress generally supports proceeding with the M-X, it has already made clear that it does not want to put the M-X into the MM silos, and some on the Hill will worry that starting a missile now is a step in that direction. Others will be concerned that by starting a missile now, you may gain enough support to get SALT ratified, but then would not carry through to full deployment in a new basing mode. Neither group would want to say no to the missile, however, and both could be strongly motivated to table SALT II until the basing issue gets resolved. (U)

Second, Harold told the Congress last year that it was unreasonable to proceed with a missile before settling the basing mode issue. This argument would surely be thrown back at us and it has some validity.⁴ If we proceed with MAP, we will want a considerably larger missile than if we proceed with the air-mobile system. While the funds wasted by carrying both designs along for a few months would probably be modest by DOD standards (a few million)—the fact that money is being wasted will be obvious and very easy to criticize in the current budget environment. (U)

Third, proceeding with a missile before you have chosen a basing scheme does not give the appearance of an orderly decision process no matter what the realities—and the value of an orderly process, particularly with as important a decision as this one, is very high. (U)

I therefore believe that you should make these decisions together, if the basing decision can be made fairly soon—but that is the next question. (U)

Timing for the Basing Decision

There are too many uncertainties about the alternatives to MAP to make an immediate decision. The Air Force did some very detailed studies of the air-mobile concept several years ago. However, the cost estimates and SALT impact analysis that were done are out-of-date, and DOD has been re-examining the concept for only a few months. (U)

At the other extreme, delaying the decision until the end of 1979 as proposed by OMB seems virtually impossible without jeopardizing the SALT II ratification vote, or significantly delaying it. (C)

Making both decisions in late March or early April, as Harold now proposes, seems like the only reasonable course of action. The Air Force believes that with a 60–90 day final examination it can reduce the uncertainties about the air-mobile system and MAP systems to the

⁴ Carter drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the previous sentence.

point where making a decision will be appropriate. While so short a period for a final examination may not appear to be the ultimate in orderly decision-making processes, we can make clear that the air-mobile idea has been studied in detail before—and that this relatively short period is enough for an update of these studies plus a careful comparison. (C)

Options to Be Given Further Study

At this point, two systems you are quite familiar with would be in the finals—MAP, and the air-mobile system. Further, some of the arguments given above suggest that introduction of wholly new ideas at this point simply isn't a good idea. If there is another horse to be entered in the race, the only reasonable candidate in my view would be an off-road mobile system, an idea that also received detailed study by the Air Force some years ago. (C)

This concept would involve deploying 150–200 large transporter/erector/launcher vehicles at perhaps fifteen military bases scattered across the Western part of the US. The vehicles would carry an M-X size missile and be capable of off-road operations without resupply for 60 days. Except for occasional exercises, they would remain at their bases. In a crisis they would disperse throughout the rural areas within 100–150 miles, hiding during the day and changing their positions each night. The total available dispersal area of perhaps 400,000 sq. miles is far too large for the Soviets to barrage. Attached is a table summarizing the main features of the MAP, air-mobile and off-road mobile systems. (S)

In my opinion, the pros and cons of asking DOD to include off-road mobile systems in their final evaluation are as follows: First, you will be under enormous pressure to go forward with one of the options considered in this evaluation. There are many uncertainties about the air-mobile system, particularly its cost. If the system gets disqualified on cost, we will be into MAP for better or worse. Second, if the off-road mobile system's drawbacks are ultimately acceptable, it might save us a lot of money. (C)

The verification problems posed by this system are uncertain, but probably easier to deal with than those posed by MAP. You should note that the verification [3 lines not declassified] (S)

The most significant of the drawbacks to the system are its need for occasional exercises in the public domain, and the fact that its survivability depends upon getting [7 lines not declassified] (S)

Bridging the Early '80s Gap

There are three possible alternatives for increasing our strategic forces' capabilities during the early '80s when Minuteman will be

vulnerable but we won't yet have deployed its ultimate replacement. The first two would involve initially installing Minuteman on the air-mobile aircraft if we decided to go forward with that option, or installing it on a modification of its current transporter to create a road-mobile system. (C)

The Air Force is very cool on both of these possibilities. They feel that the components of the air-mobile system other than the missile can be deployed only 1–2 years in advance of a new missile, and thus deploying Minuteman in the system isn't worth the cost and effort. (C)

In the case of the road-mobile option, they believe that the system could be available somewhat sooner, but that its military value would be small. Given these facts and the fact that almost none of its components would be usable in any of the long-term solutions that employ a new missile—including off-road mobile—they think it is a waste of money. These arguments seem pretty reasonable. (S)

[5 lines not declassified] This would provide more military capability than the proposed road-mobile MAP system, and the decision to do it need not be made right now. (S)

On balance, then, I believe that we should plan on raising alert rates, if necessary, to tide us through the early '80s.⁵ In the context of an ongoing program to modernize the ICBM force, the perceived strategic balance should be acceptable. (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you ask Harold to carry out an evaluation of alternative plans for modernizing our strategic forces to include the MAP and Air-Mobile concepts. His resulting analysis and recommendations should be forwarded for your approval by April 2nd.⁶ (C)

That you signal the strongest reasonable level of support for modernizing the ICBM force by providing sufficient funds in both the FY 79 supplemental and the FY 80 budget for beginning full-scale development of both a new missile and a new basing scheme.⁷ (C)

That Harold Brown and the Chiefs take the lead in explaining this situation to the Congress.

⁵ Carter placed a checkmark in the right margin next to this sentence.

⁶ Carter placed a checkmark in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁷ Carter wrote "?" in the right margin next to this sentence.

Attachment

Table Prepared in the National Security Council⁸

				Washington, undated
		<u>MAP</u>	<u>AIR MOBILE</u>	<u>OFF-ROAD MOBILE</u>
<i>Concept</i>	Rotate missiles among simplified silos when maintenance needed; approximately 20 silos per missile.	Carry 2 missiles each in C5A aircraft or 1 each in stretched AMST aircraft; strip alert at military bases—disperse to civil airfields in crisis.	Large transporters carrying 1 missile each; normally in garrison but scatter, across wide area on alert.	
<i>Interaction with Missile Decision</i>	No advantage to small missiles; larger missiles imply lower total costs to achieve objective of 800 surviving EMT.	Optimal missile smaller than M-X (TRIDENT II size missile could throw 8 RVs with air drop and northern launch areas).	Same as MAP.	
<i>Warning Requirement</i>	Completely independent of warning.	Needs tactical warning of incoming missile attack; significantly harder to attack if dispersed.		[5 lines not declassified]
<i>IOC</i>	'86	Early '86 with M-X partly common missile; late '86 with common missile.		

⁸ Secret.

	<u>MAP</u>	<u>AIR MOBILE</u>	<u>OFF-ROAD MOBILE</u>
<i>Systems Cost</i> (‘78 \$)	\$26–27B	\$28–30B; very uncertain—some offset if AMST aircraft serves other purposes.	\$18–20B (very rough guess).
<i>Public Impact</i>	25–35 sq. miles permanently removed from public use.	100–120 sq. miles may need to be permanently removed for new bases; little recurring public impact except for perceptions of dispersal exercises.	Negligible public land permanently removed; might compare with Pershing; wide dispersals will generate claims damage, and frighten public unless routine.
<i>Verification</i>	Open production/assembly process could support adequate verification by Soviets; reverse verification tougher—will Soviets accept constraints we say we need?	Seems adequately verifiable using currently accepted techniques.	Open production/assembly process could support adequate verification by Soviets; can be made easy to count in normal garrison posture.
<i>Survivability/Endurance</i>	Nominally designed for perhaps 50% survival; endurance can be made a matter of months.	Nominally assessed to have 70% survivability; significant endurance problems if support bases and tactical warning systems are attacked; spread/hide across very large number of airfields helps considerably; ability to counter Soviet surveillance may be important.	Vulnerable to surprise attack but most dispersed systems should survive; 80–90% normally ready for dispersal; endurance can be made a matter of months.

	<u>MAP</u>	<u>AIR MOBILE</u>	<u>OFF-ROAD MOBILE</u>
<i>Responsive Threat/Competitive Leverage</i>	Cost to expand system may not be significantly different from costs to expand threat; Soviets could drive our costs considerably higher within SALT.	Probably more expensive for Soviets to expand threat than for us to expand system; SALT limits may ultimately bind Soviets.	May be significantly cheaper to expand system than for Soviets to expand threat; plenty of land available if public will accept idea.
<i>Political Issues</i>	Environmental objections could delay system; would we trust the Soviets with this system? possible breakout problems; confidence in successful deception?	Environmental objections could delay system if new bases needed; excessive dependence on bombers could be argued.	Environmental objections—but may be less focused than for MAP, etc.; <i>wisdom of depending on strategic warning will be continuously questioned.</i>

109. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 18, 1978

SUBJECT

Civil Defense Program Funding (U)

In view of the confusion created by press reports of a \$2 billion civil defense program, I want to clarify several points to help you deal with the Defense budget decisions and to answer future press queries.² (U)

The policy decision. Two Policy Review Committee meetings were held on PRM-32, Civil Defense.³ One dealt only with a policy statement, not program choices. Upon reviewing and commenting on its results, you signed PD-41, which specified the rationale for our civil defense effort but not its funding level.⁴ (C)

The program options. At the other Policy Review Committee meeting, several program options were offered, ranging from "minimal" to "major." The table at Tab A displays this range.⁵ The Policy Review Committee expressed preferences for something between program 2b and 3. A "2c" choice was suggested by Harold Brown, which includes "civil defense" from option 3 but leaves out the "continuity of government" element pending further analysis. No annual program rate was discussed for moving toward the 5-year goal of a one-to-two week "surge" objective. (C)

In line with this five-year program scheme, Harold Brown has planned to ask for about \$40 million above the FY 1979 level of \$96.5 million. At no time have you committed yourself to a particular funding level. You will, of course, make a decision on annual funding in the regular budget cycle. (C)

For a look at the program elements and a suggested annual rate of moving to the five-year goal, see Tab B.⁶ The five-year total would be \$1.26 billion. If we add nothing to our present "minimal" funding

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 81, Civil Defense: 1977–78. Confidential. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

² See, for example, Richard Burt, "Carter Uncommitted on Money For Plan to Bolster Civil Defense," *New York Times*, December 2, 1978, p. 21.

³ For PRM-32, see Document 37. For the meetings, see Documents 73 and 79.

⁴ See Document 91.

⁵ Attached but not printed is an undated table listing alternative U.S. civil defense programs.

⁶ Attached but not printed is an undated table summarizing prime costs for FY 79–84.

level, the total would still be over \$500 million for five years. (\$96.5 million annually plus inflation.) By subtracting that amount from the \$1.26 billion figure (Tab B), it is clear that the real increase is about \$700 million spread over five years. This is a far cry from the \$2 billion annual increase suggested by press reports. (C)

How much civil defense to buy in FY 1980? Since 1975 we have been buying a skeletal staff capacity for about \$96.5 million. A few pilot areas have inchoate plans. Most cities have nothing. Defense proposed to upgrade our effort in various program categories as indicated under the FY 1980 column in Tab B, eventually achieving a nation-wide one-to-two-week relocation capability. The program can be stretched out, or it can be left at \$96.5 million. (C)

I encourage you to add no less than \$20 million for FY 1980 for two reasons: (C)

—The step up to roughly \$140 million is a small one, but it moves us from doing virtually nothing to doing something in an area which is part of the overall strategic balance. (C)

—If you feel you must cut back, some increase is politically important for giving substance to the civil defense policy as it is perceived, both domestically and by the Soviets. (C)

What is CRP? You have raised questions about the substance of crisis relocation planning. I am attaching (Tab C) a short description of the general concept.⁷ In judging the efficacy of such planning, it is important to remember that no plan will work smoothly. It can only reduce the level of chaos attendant to spontaneous evacuation. In the 1962 Cuban crisis, about 10 million people evacuated spontaneously. The future choice will be whether or not to facilitate it. The occasion could arise far short of war—from a nuclear power plant accident or a nuclear terrorist threat. (C)

Given some of the hostile press reaction, I thought you also might like to review the item at Tab D on public attitudes.⁸ The editorial opinions of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* do not, apparently, reflect the broader public attitude.⁹ (U)

⁷ Attached but not printed is a December 8 paper entitled "Developing Crisis Relocation Plans and Capabilities."

⁸ Attached but not printed is a December 6 paper entitled "Public Support for Moderate-Level U.S. Civil Defense Programs."

⁹ See "Mr. Carter's Fallout Biscuits," *New York Times*, November 14, 1978, p. A26; and "No to Civil Defense," *Washington Post*, December 15, 1978, p. A22.

110. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 30, 1978

SUBJECT

A Review of Continuity for Government Programs (U)

As you recall from the Policy Review Committee meeting on PRM-32,² Harold Brown put off making a program choice on “continuity of government” until better analysis is available. You asked for a quick analysis by the working group—in two weeks—to satisfy Harold. That did not prove possible for three reasons. First, the Working Group relied on FPA (for a quick answer there was no other choice) which had failed during a full year to produce acceptable analysis. Second, many aspects of the continuity of government program are close-hold and politically sensitive (particularly the NCA successor problem and plans for Congress which only two members know about), not matters for treatment in an ordinary interagency working group as we had for PRM-32. Third, both the Director of FPA and OMB staffers cogently argued that the continuity of government programs have been neglected for so long that they need a fundamental review. (They received major reviews in 1962 and 1970, but no corrective actions followed. NSSM-58, prepared in 1970, was never ever brought to an NSC meeting.³) Clearly, a more comprehensive effort is needed. (S)

Related developments also give urgency and focus to what needs to be done in FPA programs:

[2 paragraphs (8 lines) not declassified]

—The mobilization inadequacies revealed by the NIFTY NUGGET exercise this fall have stirred follow-up activities which impact heavily on FPA capabilities. (C)

—The FEMA reorganization is now law and to be completed by March 31, 1979. (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 21, PD/NSC-41 [1]. Top Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “Why should OMB co-sponsor it? ZB.”

² See footnote 3, Document 109.

³ National Security Study Memorandum 58, “Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness,” May 26, 1969, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 29.

—The growing Soviet “hard target” capability [*less than 1 line not declassified*] creates a Minute Man survivability problem. [*2 lines not declassified*] (S)

These developments are creating a more receptive attitude in Defense and OMB to the idea of a fundamental review of continuity of government. (S)

It should also be obvious to you that this issue is closely related to changing views on strategic doctrine. It is the crux of the C³I issue on the civil side. We could neglect continuity of government and emergency succession as long as we held a significant strategic lead. Today, without that lead, we need an effective leadership protection capability to enhance deterrence. (S)

The argument can be made that PD-41 provides sufficient policy guidance (i.e. directing “greater continuity of government”) for FPA to proceed on its own program review without further assistance from the NSC. The flaws in this argument are two. First, FPA is so deteriorated that it does not have adequate staff for making such a review. Second, FPA does not have adequate clout to make all the Federal agencies—for whose “continuity” FPA is planning—take a review seriously. FPA could not even force all agencies to review the PEADs (Presidential Emergency Action Documents), during the first year of this Administration. (TS)

What is needed, therefore, is a combination of staff reinforcement with expressed support from the NSC and OMB. With these, FPA can make progress. (C)

—*Staff support.* The “management” part of OMB and Defense can be tapped to augment the FPA staff. If necessary, some tasks can be contracted to outside consultants. (C)

—*NSC/OMB support.* The first thought, of course, is a PRM, but that is undesirable for two reasons. First, the non-sensitive FPA programs have been through the PRM-32 process with no real result. Second, sensitive programs like Presidential successor plans and maintenance of the NCA in face of a Soviet de-capitation attack on our C³I should not be treated in the PRM working group circles. (TS)

In several meetings with OMB (Szanton and Jayne) FPA (Joe Mitchell), and Hugh Carter, I discovered that the preferred approach is an NSC/OMB jointly mandated study, guided by a small NSC/OMB steering group. The study results, of course, could be reviewed by an SCC if that is later determined appropriate. (S)

The proposed memo at Tab A would authorize the study by FPA (FEMA as FPA passes to FEMA) under a White House steering group signed jointly by you and McIntyre.⁴ I have worked with OMB on the

⁴ Not found attached.

memo's structure and rationale. If you approve in principle, I shall proceed to get OMB support and return shortly with a final version of the tasking memo at Tab A. (S)

*RECOMMENDATION:*⁵

Proceed with the joint memorandum _____

Other _____

⁵ Brzezinski did not indicate a preference, and wrote: "I don't see why OMB should play a co-equal role."

111. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–3/8–78

Washington, January 16, 1979

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s

[Omitted here is a cover sheet, scope note, and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Key Recent Developments

1. In recent years, estimates in this series have called attention to the broad scope, vigor, and persistence of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs, the increased Soviet emphasis on technological improvement, and the continued Soviet concentration on counterforce and damage-limiting capabilities.

—Last year we forecast that during at least the coming few years the general picture would be one of continued Soviet advance on a broad front, while the US effort remained more limited. We called attention to the likelihood that prospective developments would convey a perception of Soviet momentum and of trends unfavorable to the United States and its allies.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Top Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and the National Security Agency, with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

—The evidence this year strengthens these judgments. It indicates that some near-term Soviet advances will be greater than we had foreseen.

2. During the year, the USSR has continued its steady modernization of both intercontinental and intermediate-range offensive forces and has made additional progress in research and development to create more capable offensive and defensive systems. The most important recent developments, and their effects on our estimates about the USSR's prospects and policies, are as follows:

—The Soviets are flight-testing modified ICBMs with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) that are considerably more accurate than currently deployed versions. Extensive and successful testing this year indicates that these modified systems probably will start to be deployed in 1979. We had expected such accuracy improvements, but not until the advent of new ICBMs several years later. We now estimate that the Soviet ICBM force will achieve the potential capability to destroy some four-fifths of the US Minuteman silos in 1980–81, three to four years earlier than projected in last year's estimate.

—In their testing programs for both ICBMs and SLBMs, the Soviets have continued to stress MIRVed systems, two of which carry more RVs (reentry vehicles) than the initially deployed versions. In deployment programs, the Soviets have evidently decided to install MIRVed missiles in virtually all of their MIRV-capable ICBM and SLBM launchers. Thus, the number of missile RVs in the USSR's intercontinental striking forces will probably increase considerably more rapidly in the next few years than we had expected. At the same time, the United States now anticipates some slippages in its own new programs. We now estimate that for a few years in the early-to-mid-1980s, the USSR is likely to match or slightly surpass the United States in total online intercontinental offensive weapons—that is, in online ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles and bomber weapons combined.

—In air defense research and development, the Soviets this year demonstrated low-altitude intercept capabilities in a new lookdown/shutdown fighter under test conditions. They made further progress in their R&D on an AWACS (airborne warning and control system) and a new low-altitude SAM system. These developments, along with the great importance the Soviets assign to the damage-limiting aspects of their strategic capabilities, lead us to believe that in the 1980s the Soviets will place increasing emphasis on improving their defenses, especially against bombers and cruise missiles at low altitudes.

—The Soviets have now achieved initial operational deployments of MIRVed mobile IRBMs as part of an extensive program to modernize their strategic capabilities against European NATO, China, and other areas on the Eurasian periphery. Soviet strategic forces for peripheral attack are already superior in striking power to those of the comparable Western and Chinese forces combined. The modernization of these Soviet forces will increase the existing disparity.

—[less than one line not declassified] the Soviets have continued to emphasize the launch of their strategic missiles upon receipt of tactical warning from early warning radars and other detection systems that

an enemy strike was en route. Along with continuing improvements in warning sensors, in force reaction times, and in the flexibility and survivability of forces and command and control systems, [*less than one line not declassified*] the USSR can now employ its strategic forces for preemptive, retaliatory, or launch-on-tactical-warning strikes, in addition to the much less likely option of surprise attack. While we do not fully understand the significance for Soviet strategy [*less than one line not declassified*] could reflect: concern that the USSR might not obtain advance warning of a US decision to strike; recognition that any decision to preempt would risk initiating a nuclear exchange by mistake; growing confidence that Soviet forces could respond in time or even suffer some losses and still be able to counterattack against a wide range of US targets; and hope that Soviet power now deters the United States sufficiently to lessen the chances that the United States would escalate from theater to intercontinental war. At a minimum, launch-on-warning capabilities and tactics increase the options available to the Soviet leadership under circumstances of crisis and conflict which could vary widely.

3. Other noteworthy developments of the past year show that Soviet strategic programs have neither narrowed in scope nor slackened in pace. These programs continue to reflect the Soviet conviction that enhancement of the USSR's strategic posture requires concentration on supporting capabilities, such as command and control, as well as on forces and weapons:

—In strategic offensive forces, research and development activity is in progress on improved weapons in all categories. Systems under development include several new or modified ICBMs, a new IRBM, a new large ballistic missile submarine and SLBM weapon system, what is probably a long-range ALCM (air-launched cruise missile), and possibly a new intercontinental bomber or cruise missile carrier or both.

—In ASW programs, there were initial sea trials this year of a new class of SSN (nuclear-powered attack submarine) which can dive deeper and may be somewhat quieter than its predecessors. There is evidence that the Soviet SSN force will expand in the future. The Soviets have continued their efforts to develop more effective ASW sensors, though they continue to lack broad ocean detection capabilities.

—In ABM defense, R&D in both systems and technology continues. The limited ABM capability at Moscow remains operational without change.

—In command, control, and communications, the Soviets have long stressed redundancy and extensive bunkering in an effort to ensure continuity of command and the availability of information in wartime. In addition, they are augmenting their fixed facilities with various kinds of mobile command posts for national and military authorities. The command and control system appears capable of supporting essential decisions and transmitting initial launch instructions to Soviet strategic forces even if directly attacked. It also appears to have good capabilities for sustained battle management, but these capabilities would be severely degraded if key national-level command bunkers and communications centers were destroyed.

—[3 lines not declassified] We estimate that present Soviet antisatellite systems are capable of being employed against US satellites at low and medium altitudes, although the latter capability has not yet been demonstrated. In the 1980s the Soviets could have systems able to destroy or degrade satellites at higher altitudes, including those in geosynchronous orbits.

Implications of Trends in Soviet Intercontinental Offensive Forces

4. Judging by developments under way or foreseeable in the near term, the early-to-mid-1980s will be a period in which Soviet intercontinental offensive capabilities are further improved relative to those of the West. Substantial increases in our estimates of Soviet countersilo capabilities and MIRV deployments over the next few years, combined with some slippages in US programs, lead us to believe that this period will arrive sooner and last longer than previously anticipated. Beginning around the mid-1980s, if Soviet programs proceed in accordance with our best estimates and US programs go forward without further slippages, US weapon systems becoming operational are likely to bring a new rise in US intercontinental offensive power along with continuing Soviet advances.

5. To assist in interpreting the implications of Soviet intercontinental offensive forces over the next 10 years, we compare them in the accompanying charts with projected US forces. The primary purpose of these comparisons is to display in graphic form some of the factors which may affect: the viability and stability of the US deterrent; the USSR's evaluation of its comparative intercontinental offensive capabilities and vulnerabilities; and perceptions of relative power in the United States, the USSR, and elsewhere.

—The future Soviet forces are intelligence projections, whereas the future US forces are based on Department of Defense projections. The projections assume adherence by both sides, through 1988, to the provisions of an agreement along the lines now being negotiated at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The projections of Soviet forces represent our best estimates of Soviet deployments and technological progress under a SALT II agreement.

—The forces compared consist of ICBM launchers and their missiles, SLBM launchers and their missiles, and heavy bombers carrying bombs, SRAMs (short-range attack missiles), or ALCMs. The comparison of delivery vehicles includes all SALT-accountable systems except for about 200 B-52 aircraft that are in storage and not operational. Systems off line for overhaul or conversion are included in the number of delivery vehicles but are excluded from the comparisons of numbers of weapons and equivalent megatons.

—The comparisons also exclude a number of options each side could exercise to alter the striking power or survivability of its intercontinental forces. Options not illustrated on the US side, for example, include the deployment of ICBMs in a mobile basing configuration

and the introduction of the M–X ICBM or a system with comparable capabilities.²

6. Chart 1 shows how Soviet and US intercontinental offensive forces compared in the past 10 years and are projected to compare in the coming 10 years, using four indexes of quantity and quality to illustrate the trends.³

—The graphs show that, over the past decade, the Soviets have moved from a position of inferiority in each of these indexes to a present position in which they lead in delivery vehicles and online equivalent megatons, but are still inferior in total numbers of online weapons and average accuracy of MIRVed ICBMs.

—With respect to the future, the upper left-hand graph shows that SALT II would require a reduction in Soviet delivery vehicles and bring about a more nearly equal situation in this index.

—The lower left-hand graph shows that the substantial Soviet lead in online equivalent megatons will increase as the USSR continues to deploy weapons with relatively large yields.

—The lower right-hand graph illustrates the effects of the anticipated Soviet deployment of MIRVed ICBMs with improved accuracies. (The accuracies of individual Soviet ICBM systems are shown in figure 2 of part B.)⁴ The current US defense program does not include further accuracy improvements for present types of ICBMs.

—The upper right-hand graph, comparing total online weapons in intercontinental forces, shows how Soviet MIRV deployments, which began about five years later than those of the United States, are substantially increasing total Soviet weapons for intercontinental attack. In this index, the United States remains about at its current level until Trident and especially ALCM programs are under way. This Estimate is the first in which we have forecast even temporary Soviet equality in this index at any time during the ensuing 10 years under a SALT II agreement.

—The upper right-hand graph also shows that, in the middle and late 1980s, both sides are likely to advance in total numbers of online weapons in intercontinental forces. In the mid-1980s and after, the US advance is likely to be somewhat faster than that of the USSR because of the programed large-scale US deployment of ALCMs.

7. Chart 2 combines numbers of online weapons and the yields, accuracies, and reliabilities of weapons and their delivery vehicles into simplified measures of the total theoretical destructive potential

² In the body of the Estimate, a variety of alternatives and options are included and the sensitivity of comparison to these and other variables is examined. Among other things, the Estimate examines the effects of adding Backfire and FB-111 aircraft, representative non-SALT projections for each side, more pessimistic assumptions about Soviet technological progress, the effects of new deployment modes for US ICBMs; and the deployment of a system such as M–X. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Part B is attached but not printed.

of intercontinental striking forces.⁵ For purposes of measurement and comparison, we assume in each case that every online weapon in the intercontinental forces of both sides is to be used for one or the other of two generic applications: lethal area potential assumes exclusive use of all weapons to destroy soft area targets; hard-target potential assumes exclusive use to destroy hard point targets. For a common base of comparison, the damage criterion for soft targets is set at a level sufficient to destroy a reinforced concrete building, while for hard targets it is set at a level sufficient to destroy a representative hard missile silo.

—It should be noted that the graphs in chart 2 display rough measures of prelaunch potential against notional targets of purely nominal hardness. They do not reflect real-world economic or military target sets, targeting plans, or operational attributes of weapon systems which would affect their utility in intercontinental warfare.

—The left-hand graph shows that the USSR's program to deploy MIRV warheads of relatively high yield will cause its lead in lethal area potential to increase. The absolute potentials of both sides are very large, however. Even at the stringent damage criterion chosen, the total US lethal area potential today is *[3 lines not declassified]*

—The right-hand graph shows that the USSR's program to deploy MIRVed ICBMs with improved accuracies and relatively high yield warheads will cause Soviet hard-target potential to match and slightly surpass that of the United States beginning in about 1980. At that time each side will have the theoretical potential to destroy *[less than one line not declassified]* hard targets. These theoretical potentials will more than double by 1988. During this period, there will be many more hardened targets in the USSR than in the United States: in the USSR, some 1,400 to 1,600 hard ICBM silos and launch control centers plus hundreds of bunkers of varying lesser hardnesses; in the United States, some 1,100 to 1,200 hard silos and launch control centers but only a small number of other hardened facilities. It should be noted that most of the Soviet capability is in ICBMs with flight times of about 30 minutes, whereas a large portion of the US capability is in weapons carried by bombers with flight times on the order of 10 hours.

8. Chart 3 illustrates the countersilo capabilities of Soviet ICBMs, which make up that portion of the Soviet force best suited to a first strike against fast-reaction opposing forces.⁶ This consideration would be of particular importance to the Soviets' assessments of the capabilities of their intercontinental offensive forces, because their military doctrine stresses countermilitary targeting to contribute to damage-limiting objectives. The chart also illustrates the vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos to a first strike by US ICBMs of programed types (that is, excluding M-X or a system with comparable hard-target capabilities).

⁵ Chart 2 is attached but not printed.

⁶ Chart 3 is attached but not printed.

The Soviets' heavy dependence on silo-based ICBMs would make them especially mindful of the survivability of these weapons.

—The top two graphs show the increasing vulnerability of US Minuteman silos caused by Soviet deployment of accurate MIRVed ICBMs. For these calculations, we use a severe damage criterion, which we assume is the conceptual equivalent of what a prudent Soviet planner would use in evaluating his own capability.

—The top right-hand graph shows that if the Soviets elect to employ and can successfully execute two-on-one targeting tactics to compound the probability of destroying US silos, the number of Minuteman silos which would be expected to escape severe damage from a Soviet strike would be about 200 in 1980–81. This number would decrease to fewer than 100 in the mid-1980s and afterward.

—The bottom two graphs, on the other hand, show that the ongoing Soviet silo-hardening program largely offsets the improvements the United States has made and plans to make in the hard-target potential of its current types of ICBMs. Some 500 to 700 Soviet silos would survive attacks by currently programmed types of US ICBMs during the period. The number of RVs in surviving Soviet silos, not shown on the chart, would in fact increase as the Soviets deploy more MIRVs.

—With respect to the graphs on Soviet silo survivability, it should be noted that our estimates of Soviet silo hardness are subject to considerable uncertainty. Further, we have no basis for estimating total system hardness, which is the criterion the Soviets would use. The continued testing of silo hardness, and a current program to modify even their newest silos and launch control centers, indicate that the Soviets are still seeking to improve their ICBM system survivability.

9. Charts 4 and 5 display trends in the destructive potential of intercontinental striking forces remaining after hypothetical counterforce attacks by the ICBMs of one side on the other.⁷ This is another simplified measure of some of the factors relevant to strategic capabilities, to perceptions about them, and to deterrence. (For a divergent view about the utility of this type of measure, see paragraph 13.) The calculations assume that the attacking side employs only ICBMs and strikes only at the retaliatory forces and bases of the other side. Clearly these are arbitrary limitations which neither side would likely follow in practice, although bombers and SLBMs are less useful than ICBMs for first-strike counterforce attacks against fast-reaction enemy forces. Using these assumptions, we make subtractions of two kinds from prelaunch potentials in order to show what we call residual forces.

—For the attacking side, residual forces are those ICBMs not used in the hypothetical counterforce attack plus all those SLBMs and bomber weapons that could be generated. Thus, for the attacker, the residuals are those forces available for other missions, either at the time of the first strike or later.

⁷ Charts 4 and 5 are attached but not printed.

—For the side attacked, residual forces are those available for retaliation—that is, ICBMs calculated to survive hypothetical countersilo strikes plus bombers on alert and SLBMs at sea. The calculations assume that ICBMs ride out the attack without being launched from under attack, and assume that alerted bombers and at-sea SLBMs are not vulnerable to first strikes.

—Alternative first-strike conditions are examined: surprise attacks, in which the forces of the attacking side are in a generated posture but those of the side attacked are on day-to-day alert; and preemptive attacks, in which the forces of both sides are in a generated posture. The former is a worst case assumption for the side attacked. The latter corresponds conceptually to the conditions the Soviets believe most likely. Soviet military doctrine anticipates that intercontinental warfare would likely arise out of a crisis or theater conflict, although it does not rule out the possibility of surprise attacks.

10. Charts 4 and 5 show that Soviet residual potentials will tend to grow throughout the next 10 years, whereas those of the United States will remain fairly constant until about the mid-1980s and then increase. Noteworthy specifics are:

—In lethal area potential, shown in chart 4, the Soviet residual would far exceed that of the United States throughout the 1980s if the USSR struck first. The two sides would be about equal if the US struck first with surprise until about the mid-1980s, after which the Soviet residuals would be the larger. The Soviet residual potential would exceed that of the United States if the United States struck first preemptively.

—In hard-target potential, shown in chart 5, fairly steady increases in Soviet residuals would improve the USSR's relative position considerably in the early 1980s, after which US advances would tend to parallel continued Soviet gains if the USSR struck first and would exceed the Soviet gains if the United States struck first. Except in the case of a Soviet surprise attack, US residual capabilities would be greater than those of the USSR in the middle and late 1980s.

—In absolute terms, however, the residual potentials of both sides are already substantial and will remain so. In all circumstances of attack, each side would have residual capabilities sufficient to inflict massive urban and industrial damage on the other. Even in the early 1980s, a Soviet surprise attack, though it would reduce the US potential by half, would leave the United States with residual lethal area potential greater than the total urban area of the USSR. Soviet residual lethal area potential would grow from more than half the total US urban area today to about [*less than one line not declassified*] It should be noted that this analysis uses a very stringent damage criterion—sufficient to destroy a reinforced concrete building.

—Finally, a comparison of the surprise and preemptive attack cases displayed in charts 4 and 5 shows—as would be expected—that both the relative and absolute residual potentials of the side attacked would be improved in the preemptive cases because in these cases we assume that its forces had been alerted prior to the attack. In residual hard-target potential, the improvement would be greater for the United States, largely because a greater proportion of its prelaunch potential

is in bombers and ALCM carriers which can achieve enhanced survivability by higher alert rates.

11. Chart 6 illustrates the marked and growing asymmetries in the composition of Soviet and US intercontinental offensive forces, using residual potentials after hypothetical surprise attacks as the example.⁸

—The left-hand graphs display the continuing heavy Soviet dependence on silo-based ICBMs. Soviet SLBM RVs, while increasing in numbers, add very little to residual lethal area and hard-target potentials because of their relatively low yields and poor accuracies. In this calculation, bombers make no contribution to Soviet residual potentials because the USSR keeps no bombers on alert—hence, we assume that none would survive a US surprise attack. Because virtually all of the USSR's residual potential would be in ICBMs having short flight times, strikes against the United States by Soviet residual forces could arrive promptly.

—The right-hand graphs illustrate that the US force mix is more balanced at present, but that silo-based ICBMs would be reduced to only a negligible fraction of residual potentials in the future. The projected increases in the US residual potentials in the middle and late 1980s are caused by US deployment of Trident SSBNs and especially ALCMs.

—Increasing US dependence on aerodynamic vehicles (bombs, SRAMs, and ALCMs) is illustrated by their growth as a proportion of US residual potentials. With respect to hard-target potential, for example, in the case of a Soviet surprise counterforce attack in 1988, more than four-fifths of the US residual potential would be in aerodynamic vehicles having relatively slow flight times and subject to attrition by Soviet air defenses.

12. The results displayed in this Estimate are not to be taken as indicators of the results which might occur in war. Clearly, just the technique of allocating all residual forces against either hard or soft targets of nominal hardness before comparing them fundamentally divorces these analyses from the world of reality. Instead, the technique is intended only to display the general characteristics and qualities of the forces in comparable terms, and to illustrate trends in the two forces over the period of the next decade. Specifically, the calculations seek to:

—Compare gross capabilities against hard or soft targets in comparable situations in order to display whether one force or the other has more of an accent toward hard or soft target capability.

—Compare the relative capabilities of the two forces to absorb a first strike, by displaying how much retaliatory potential would survive on the side attacked (a factor which a side contemplating a first strike would have to consider along with its own remaining potential).

—Display the relative reliance of each weapons mix upon one type of weapon or another.

⁸ Chart 6 is attached but not printed.

13. Last year, in NIE 11-3/8-77, a dissenting view was voiced with respect to the usefulness of such theoretical analyses. In part as a result of this difference of opinion, the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during this past year has conducted a simulation of a nuclear exchange between US and Soviet forces. This simulation differs from the work in this Estimate in two cardinal respects:

—It seeks to be more realistic with respect to what might happen in wartime. The simulation attempts to take into account many more elements, such as a full range of economic and military targets on each side, the targeting doctrine of each side, and the possible attrition of bombers and cruise missiles by air defense.

—It analyzes the results of a two-sided exchange in which the opposing forces seek to achieve specified levels of damage against a wide range of military and nonmilitary targets. The NIE looked only at the remaining and surviving forces after a first strike by only the ICBMs of one side against only the strategic nuclear forces of the other.

14. These different analytic approaches shed light on different aspects of the question of deterrence.

—The residual calculations in the NIE focus on the question of the capability of a side after its strategic forces had been attacked first. They shed light on the question of deterrence to the extent that the criterion is whether, after absorbing a first strike, a side would have enough destructive potential remaining to deter the other from attacking in the first place. Broadly speaking, this is the outlook of the doctrine of assured destruction as the principle of deterrence.

—The other form of analysis focuses on what the situation would be after a full-scale two-sided exchange. Broadly speaking, such analysis sheds light on ultimately war-fighting potential as the principle of deterrence.

15. The SAGA simulation has reached only preliminary conclusions thus far, and a number of the key assumptions are still being reviewed and tested for sensitivity. Thus, it is too early to draw opinions as to the nature of the balance of strategic forces from the SAGA effort. Next year, we hope, the results of both techniques will be available for comparison.

16. Over and above the question of whether the NIE and SAGA techniques lead to differing conclusions about the strategic balance, there remains a divergent view in the Intelligence Community about the propriety of the quasi-dynamic assessments of residual potentials contained in the NIE. The holders of this view believe that: (a) the analysis of relative US and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities in wartime circumstances is not a proper function of the US Intelligence community; and (b) such analysis is best done within the Department of Defense, with Intelligence as a full partner. The holders of this view also believe that only the form of analysis that considers comprehensive two-sided

exchanges can convey valid and useful impressions about relative US and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities.⁹

17. The Director of Central Intelligence believes that both forms of analysis have their merits for the purpose of informing national decisionmakers about trends in the relative capabilities of forces. In his view:

—It is highly desirable to proceed with the SAGA simulation of wartime capabilities.

—The Intelligence Community welcomes an opportunity to participate as a partner in such an endeavor.

—Ultimately, what is needed is a net assessment effort under the direction of the National Security Council, with participation by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the prospective Federal Emergency Management Agency, and perhaps others.

Implications of Trends in Soviet Air Defense and ASW Capabilities

18. *Air Defense.* In light of the trends we anticipate in intercontinental offensive forces, the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses against aerodynamic penetrators will become even more important to US deterrent and striking capabilities in the 1980s than it is today. At present, the massive Soviet air defense forces would have good capabilities against aircraft at medium and high altitudes. There are, however, major technical deficiencies in their ability to intercept penetrators at low altitudes, and these are compounded by the low level of proficiency the air defense establishment has demonstrated to date. The Soviets are now working to develop improved systems for low-altitude defense. In the early 1980s, they will probably begin to field lookdown/shootdown fighters, an improved low-altitude SAM system, and an AWACS capable of detecting and tracking low-altitude targets at least over water.

19. Chart 7 displays estimated trends in the Soviet potential to perform functions essential to low-altitude air defense over the next 10 years.¹⁰ It illustrates this potential for the region of the USSR west of the Urals, which contains much of the nation's population and economic and military assets, and in which the bulk of Soviet air defense forces are concentrated.

—As illustrated in the top left-hand graph, beginning in the early 1980s, the numbers of improved Soviet weapon systems will probably grow fairly rapidly if, as we anticipate, the USSR places considerable

⁹ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. For an elaboration, including views and commentary on preliminary results of the SAGA study, see part E, paragraphs 198–201. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Chart 7 is attached but not printed.

emphasis on defenses against aerodynamic penetrators at low altitudes. By 1988, our best estimate projects the deployment in the western USSR of about 900 lookdown/shootdown fighters of several different types for area defense, and nearly 300 sites with low-altitude SA-X-10 SAMs having point defense capabilities.

—The top right-hand graph shows that, as Soviet lookdown/shootdown fighters increase in numbers in the middle and late 1980s, the improving Soviet air defense warning and control systems would have the technical potential to direct them to the vicinity of low-altitude bombers in an area growing from about 15 percent to about 35 percent of the western USSR. In the middle and late 1980s, the potential to vector fighters against cruise missiles at very low altitudes would exist in about 20 percent of this area. Much of the potential coverage is concentrated in the northwestern and Baltic approaches to Moscow and other major centers, and we expect this concentration to continue.

—The bottom left-hand graph shows the potential area in which improved SAM systems will have the technical potential to direct their missiles against low-altitude targets. The graph shows that the area of the western USSR afforded SAM coverage against low-altitude bombers is projected to grow from very little at present to about 25 percent in 1988, and against cruise missiles at very low altitudes from none at present to roughly 15 percent. These areas are much smaller than the roughly 45 percent of the western USSR now afforded coverage against high-altitude aircraft by point-defense SA-2 and SA-3 SAMs, but could include a number of high-value economic and military assets. It should be noted that the total area of future SAM coverage could be less than shown here, depending on the degree to which the Soviets deploy SAMs with overlapping coverage.

—The bottom right-hand graph illustrates our estimate of the offshore defense capabilities the Soviets would acquire by deploying an AWACS to cover overwater approaches in order to detect US bombers and ALCM carriers and direct interceptors to their vicinity. By the late 1980s, the Soviets will probably have the potential to maintain continuous forward defense coverage some 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers from Soviet borders along all overwater approach routes to the western USSR, for periods of up to about three days during a crisis or following Soviet counterforce attacks against the United States. There would, however, be gaps in the potential coverage against cruise missiles once they were launched.

20. These graphs do not measure the probability that Soviet weapons would destroy penetrators, nor do they measure the overall effectiveness of the air defense system under operational conditions. We are unable to quantify the attrition which Soviet air defenses would be able to inflict on US low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles, in large part because of uncertainties about key technical characteristics of future systems. Further, the actual attrition achieved would be influenced by other factors not measured or shown on the graphs, such as the manner and depth of defense deployments and the number of strategically important installations included in defended areas. Nor have we been able to quantify important operational factors and interactions [2 lines

not declassified] Accordingly, there is a divergent view in the Intelligence Community which holds that graphs showing the gross area of theoretical coverage of air defense systems, particularly when standing alone, can be misleading as indicators of trends in Soviet air defense potential. Because such graphs cannot incorporate the more important deployment and operational considerations noted above, this view concludes that the graphs are not useful.¹¹

21. The estimates that follow represent our best judgments about the nominal capabilities of Soviet air defenses against the several elements of the programed US aerodynamic force, without taking operational factors into account.

—In general, we estimate that at least through the early 1980s, improved Soviet air defense systems will not be available in numbers large enough to markedly improve defense against bombers and cruise missiles at low altitudes.

—In the middle and late 1980s, Soviet air defenses will probably have reduced the USSR's vulnerability to US defense avoidance tactics. Undegraded, the defenses would have the nominal potential to inflict considerably higher attrition against an attack by US bombers of current types. We believe that these defenses, however, will probably have little or no effective capability against SRAMs carried by bombers.

—It is especially difficult to estimate the likely capabilities of Soviet air defenses against cruise missiles in the middle and late 1980s. We believe that in the mid-1980s the USSR could have a gradually increasing nominal capability to defend some key areas against currently programed US cruise missiles. Nevertheless, throughout the next decade, because of technical and numerical deficiencies, the USSR's nominal capability to defend against a large force of US cruise missiles will probably remain low.

—While we cannot quantify the effects of [2 lines *not declassified*] it is likely that these factors would weigh heavily against the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses. Thus we believe that the actual performance of the defenses against combined attacks involving large numbers of US bombers, SRAMs, and cruise missiles will remain low during the period of this Estimate.

22. *Antisubmarine Warfare.* Soviet forces with ASW capabilities are not now an effective counter to US SSBNs. The USSR is attempting, however, to overcome its deficiencies in ASW. Major R&D programs include the development of improved sensors for submarine detection. The number of nuclear-powered attack submarines having ASW capabilities which are relatively good by Soviet standards will probably increase from about 25 at present to 75 or more in the late 1980s, or as many as 100 if a number of Y-class SSBNs are converted to SSNs. There is tentative evidence suggesting a trend toward quieter SSNs.

¹¹ The holders of this view are the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]

New types of surface ships and long-range patrol aircraft with somewhat improved capabilities for ASW are likely. The critical problems confronting the USSR in ASW, however, are limitations in sensors and data processing.

—Foreseeable improvements will likely give the USSR better technical capabilities to detect, track, and attack SSBNs that are operating near the USSR, are in confined waters, or are transiting choke points such as straits.

—Judging by what we know of Soviet R&D programs and our understanding of ASW research in the United States, we believe the Soviets have little prospect over the next 10 years of developing systems capable of detecting and covertly tracking US submarines in broad ocean areas.

—With larger numbers of ASW-capable forces and improved ASW sensors, the Soviets would have somewhat better capabilities for overt tracking of US submarines as they leave port or transit through choke points. Considering the likely limitations in Soviet forces, the countermeasures available to US forces, and the general complexity of the problem, we do not believe that, during the next 10 years, the Soviets will be able to conduct sustained overt tracking of US SSBNs on patrol.

—In the 1980s, moreover, longer range SLBMs will triple the ocean area within which US SSBNs will be able to operate and remain within missile range of targets in the USSR.

—We therefore believe that, throughout the period of this Estimate, virtually all US SSBNs on patrol would be able to launch their missiles.

Major Factors Influencing Future Soviet Policy

23. As the Soviets now view their strategic position, they probably consider their strategic capabilities to be the equal of those of the United States and superior to those of their other adversaries. They almost certainly have increased confidence that these forces effectively buttress the USSR's superpower position, and that they contribute to the Soviet aim of shifting the total world correlation of forces in the USSR's favor. The Soviet leaders do not want nuclear war—they believe it would be a disaster. In our judgment, however, their ideology and their political and military objectives combine to motivate them to compete with the United States in the global arena and to try to isolate it from its allies. From their perspective, powerful strategic capabilities offer foreign policy advantages, and superior capabilities to fight and survive a nuclear war constitute the best deterrent as well as the best preparation for the contingency of nuclear war should it occur.

24. The Soviets are approaching the end of an ICBM/SLBM deployment cycle and the beginning of a new Five-Year Plan. In the relatively near term, they face mounting economic problems and leadership transition. They are aware that the United States and NATO are considering several important military program options which are as yet undecided. The Soviets want to conclude a SALT II agreement limiting some aspects of the arms competition, for reasons which we believe

include increasing their prestige as a superpower equal to the United States and reducing the prospects of increased US defense efforts.

25. Thus the Soviets could be reaching a major decision point, at which they might contemplate reductions in the growth of resources committed to strategic programs as part of an effort to reduce the defense burden they carry. Total military expenditures, which absorb an estimated 11 to 13 percent of the Soviet gross national product, will come under close scrutiny because the USSR's economic growth rate is expected to decline in the 1980s because of manpower, energy, and productivity problems.¹² Procurement and operation of strategic forces account for roughly one-fifth of total defense spending. Strategic programs also absorb a large but unknown portion of the additional one-fourth of total defense spending which is allocated to R&D.

26. As the Soviets evaluate possible ways of reducing the burden of defense programs, they would seek alternatives which offered significant returns to the economy without jeopardizing their military posture. Prospective SALT II limitations on strategic offensive forces would not by themselves significantly affect defense spending. The resources devoted to development, production, and deployment of these forces, moreover, tend to be highly specialized and not readily transferable to such critical civilian programs as energy. Reduction in strategic force manpower would be of marginal value because these forces are less manpower intensive than other elements of the armed forces. In addition, the Soviets already have committed large capital resources for strategic programs which will extend into the 1980s. The Soviets probably view some of these commitments as consolidating and reinforcing recent strategic gains, and some as offering the prospect of overcoming current deficiencies. In sum, we believe that even if overall military spending were to be curbed, strategic programs would suffer least.

27. A number of countervailing factors lead us to conclude that, despite economic difficulties, the Soviets will continue their long-term strategic force improvement programs. Chief among them are the following:

—In the Soviet view, even better strategic capabilities would enhance deterrence still further and foster strategic stability through Soviet advantage. The Soviets almost certainly make generous assumptions about potential US and NATO capabilities, and are also concerned about China and its prospective modernization. They can anticipate that in the mid-1980s and after, US programs now in the planning stages could erode the USSR's earlier gains.

¹² See NFAC Intelligence Assessment SR 78–10136, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects*, August 1978. [Footnote is in the original.]

—The Soviets almost certainly do not have full confidence in the countersilo capabilities they will possess in the early 1980s, in part because success would depend on execution of complex and inherently uncertain targeting tactics. We believe they will seek to develop and deploy new or modified ICBMs with accuracies sufficient to permit them to employ simplified targeting tactics to attack US ICBM silos, thereby increasing Soviet confidence in the probability of successful attack. We also believe they will concentrate heavily on attempts to overcome the USSR's weaknesses in low-altitude air defense and in ASW capabilities against SSBNs, and will continue R&D on improved ABM systems.

—Momentum is imparted to Soviet strategic programs by the USSR's large, permanent military R&D establishments, the military services, and the military industries. In R&D especially, the Soviets will strive to match or surpass the United States in selected advanced technologies having strategic application, and at a minimum to avoid falling behind technologically.

—The possibility, however remote, that intercontinental nuclear war might actually occur will continue to support Soviet efforts to improve the USSR's strategic posture. The Soviets still express concerns about the US capability to conduct a surprise intercontinental attack, even though they believe the likelihood of such an attack is low for the foreseeable future. They are evidently also doubtful about whether escalation to intercontinental warfare can be avoided once the nuclear threshold has been crossed in theater warfare. In evaluating their chances of surviving a nuclear war, the Soviets are likely to remain uncertain about the degree to which their active and passive measures would protect their economy and population, and about their ability to conduct sustained military operations.

—In general, in their planning for the future, the Soviets are likely to be seeking ways to increase the options available to the leadership in crisis or conflict, to control nuclear escalation in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact theater conflict, and to improve the endurance of the nation and its forces so that in the unlikely event of intercontinental war the USSR could emerge in a better position than that of its adversaries.

Other Considerations

28. *Effects of SALT II Limitations.* We have examined the effects of a prospective SALT II agreement on Soviet intercontinental offensive forces. As the preceding analysis shows, we expect Soviet strategic capabilities to improve steadily under SALT II limitations.

—In the forces we have projected under SALT II, Soviet delivery vehicles of types limited by the agreement are some 15 to 30 percent fewer than we would expect in the middle and late 1980s in the absence of such limitations. Total online weapons projected for Soviet intercontinental forces are several thousand fewer, but SALT limitations would not prevent the USSR from matching or surpassing the United States in this index, at least for a few years in the early 1980s.

—SALT II limitations would not reduce the threat to US ICBM silos and other intercontinental forces and bases. However, both prelaunch and residual Soviet lethal area and hard-target potentials are somewhat

less in our SALT II projection than we believe they would be if Soviet programs were unconstrained.

—SALT II limitations would not prevent the development and deployment of a broad spectrum of improved weapons, but it would foreclose some Soviet options—such as deploying follow-on systems as add-ons rather than replacements, building more than one wholly new ICBM, and taking full advantage of the USSR's large ICBM throw weight by pressing fractionation still further.

—One effect of SALT II would be to reduce some US uncertainties about the future size and composition of those Soviet forces which were limited, though many critical uncertainties are independent of SALT.

29. *Likely Soviet Hedges.* Some Soviet developmental activities probably represent hedges against possible future US threats, deterrents to US withdrawal from arms control agreements, and efforts to give the Soviet leaders options—including options to break out of arms control agreements themselves—which could be exercised if they came to judge that the situation warranted it. These include:

—An R&D program in antiballistic missiles could give the Soviets the option to deploy widespread ABM defenses, but probably not before the early 1980s or later. The ABM system now under development could probably be deployed at some 25 urban target areas some five years after a decision to begin such deployment, or in as little as a year if the Soviets stockpiled components and trained troops covertly for several years beforehand. [2 lines not declassified] We have no reason to believe, however, that the USSR would abrogate the ABM Treaty in circumstances approximating those of the present US-Soviet political and strategic relationship.

—A mobile ICBM program could give the Soviets the option to deploy ICBMs with better survivability should their fixed silos be threatened. A mobile ICBM system has been developed. Its production and deployment are evidently now in abeyance, but R&D on a modified or follow-on missile continues.

—A long-range air-launched cruise missile program may represent another hedge against potential vulnerability of Soviet ICBM silos or an attempt to demonstrate the USSR's capability to compete with the United States in systems of this type. We assume that the Soviets will deploy at least some such missiles under SALT II, on existing aircraft beginning in the early 1980s or on an aircraft specifically designed to carry them somewhat later. A small cruise missile similar in size and capability to the US Tomahawk could probably be ready for flight-testing in the mid-1980s.

30. *Soviet Civil Defense Program.* We have acquired no new evidence during the past year that alters any of our principal conclusions about the scope, objectives, pace, and effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program. Soviet civil defenses remain capable of protecting most leaders, a crisis work force, and some of the urban population in blast-resistant shelters. The critical decision for protecting most urban dwellers, however, is and will remain whether to order evacuation in a

crisis. With no evacuation, prompt casualties could be on the order of 100 million, whereas with about a week for urban evacuation and other preparations, prompt casualties could probably be reduced to the low tens of millions. The civil defense program is not capable of preventing the destruction of much of the USSR's industrial capacity and its most valued material accomplishments, and it is not proceeding in a way which seems likely to achieve a significant reduction in the vulnerability of the Soviet economy.

31. The Soviet leaders view their civil defense program as integral to the USSR's military strategy and strategic posture. They almost certainly believe their present civil defenses would improve their ability to conduct military operations and would enhance the USSR's chances of surviving a nuclear war. Given the many uncertainties attendant to a nuclear exchange, however, they cannot have confidence in the degree of protection that would actually be afforded. We do not believe that their present civil defenses would embolden Soviet leaders deliberately to expose the USSR to a higher risk of nuclear war. We have no firm basis for judging the degree to which civil defense preparations will affect Soviet perceptions of the future strategic balance.

32. There is a divergent view in the Intelligence Community which holds that the USSR's civil defenses, in conjunction with its other strategic capabilities, provide the Soviet leadership with a significant advantage in the event of a nuclear war. In this view, the Soviet civil defense program—through its potential for influencing political perceptions, providing leverage for coercion during a crisis, affecting nuclear exchange outcomes, and contributing to postwar recovery—impacts on the reality of the strategic balance and on perceptions of the balance in the USSR and elsewhere.¹³

33. [*less than one line not declassified*] The foregoing evaluations assume SALT II conditions and adherence to the ABM Treaty. They reflect our best estimates of likely Soviet programs. The results, however, are sensitive to a number of uncertainties about the size, structure, and capabilities of Soviet forces and their supporting elements. In addition, [*2 lines not declassified*]

—Soviet concealment programs are becoming more sophisticated, centrally directed, and better enforced. [*3 lines not declassified*]

—In the area of Soviet weapon characteristics, Soviet security measures in many cases prevent us from learning enough about the prospective capabilities of systems in R&D to determine the threat until after the systems have reached the flight-test stage or its equivalent. Uncertainty sometimes persists even after a system is deployed. [*3 lines not declassified*] These factors, along with the breadth of Soviet military

¹³ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]

R&D, lead to the danger of delay in determining the performance of improved Soviet strategic systems and imprecise or belated identification of advanced or novel systems. With respect to ASW R&D, [2 lines not declassified] we believe we can learn enough about Soviet progress to identify major new developments before they reach operational deployment.

—The military capabilities of US and Soviet strategic forces are highly dependent on their prospective performance under actual operational conditions. US intelligence, however, confronts serious gaps in information and analysis about Soviet force performance, and cannot by itself judge the net effects of interaction between the forces of the United States and the USSR in the event of crisis or conflict.

112. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency (Bray)¹

Washington, January 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Program Review (U)

The President has directed that you undertake a major review of your agency's programs and make recommendations to the Special Coordination Committee for appropriate improvements and changes. (C)

All Federal agencies involved in continuity of government programs are directed to cooperate fully in expediting this review. (U)

An ad hoc group, chaired by the NSC staff and including representatives from OMB, OSTP, the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Administration, and you will coordinate the review. The ad hoc group will approve the review's terms of reference and follow its progress. (U)

The review should include the following areas:

—*Protection of national leadership.* Recommend improvements in the procedures and methods for ensuring effective Presidential succession

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 21, PD/NSC-41 [1]. Confidential. Copies were sent to Vance; Brown; McIntyre; Jones; Turner; Press; Burdyl Tirana, Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency; Marvin Beam, Director of the White House Military Office; and Dinneen.

in a crisis as well as protection and re-constitution of the Congress and the Judiciary. (C)

—*Continuity of essential functions of the Federal Government.* Identify those functions of government which are essential in an emergency and recommend improvements which enhance their continuity through a crisis to eventual national recovery. (C)

—*Protection of state and local government.* Make recommendations for enhancing the continuity of state and local government and for activities appropriate for each level in supporting overall continuity and national recovery. (C)

—*Emergency telecommunications.* Review the adequacy of communication to support Presidential succession, protection of national leadership and essential functions of government and resource allocations for mobilization and recovery. (C)

—*Resource allocation, mobilization, and recovery.* Examine present plans for carrying out these activities. Make recommendations for changes in policy, process, and organization to enhance the conduct of these activities. (C)

The results of the continuity of government program review should be submitted to the SCC for consideration and recommendation to the President by September 30, 1979. The ad hoc group will determine an appropriate time for submitting the results of the resource and mobilization parts of the review. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

113. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, January 27, 1979

SUBJECT

M-X Survivable Basing (U)

Given the broad range of political, military and arms control implications that the M-X basing mode decision will have, the President will be interested in having an NSC meeting in early April to review

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weapons Systems: 1-4/79. Secret.

your recommendation as well as the analysis upon which it is based. I thought it would be useful, therefore, to describe the sorts of information that we would like you to forward as a basis for this meeting. (S)

I believe the President would like to see a side-by-side comparison of four options: the air-mobile option that you have recently asked the Air Force to develop; the MPS option they are also working on; the off-road mobile option we have discussed on previous occasions; and finally, on the possibility that none of the above options seems acceptable, an option that combines whatever improvements can be made to the silo-based ICBM force and significant new efforts to improve the bomber and SLBM forces. (S)

The side-by-side comparison we have in mind should evaluate the various options according to all the standard criteria—costs, technical risk, IOC, survivability, etc. It should take particular care to answer the following specific questions:

—How do the basing schemes differ in their abilities to support the flexibility, endurance, and targeting capabilities required to defeat possible Soviet objectives in a nuclear war? How do they differ in their ability to serve as a basis for rapid expansion of our strategic forces, should such a need arise?

—Within the likely constraints of SALT, what are the most effective Soviet options for reducing the survivability of each new basing scheme? In the face of such Soviet responses, what would be our most effective options for maintaining the overall survivability of our strategic forces? What are the economic and other costs of such responses and counter-responses? (S)

—Assuming that our adoption of each basing scheme leads the Soviets either to deploy a similar scheme or to deploy the scheme that is most cost-effective for them, in what ways would the existence of this new Soviet system make it easier for the Soviets to break out from SALT and upset the strategic balance? (S)

—In what ways might the adoption of each basing scheme lead to difficulties for each side in determining the strategic forces capabilities of the other side, or in verifying arms control provisions of the kind embodied in SALT II or possible future agreements?² (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

² Below this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: "We will need this by March 15."

114. Report Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics¹

Washington, January 30, 1979

[Omitted here is the title page, the forward, and the table of contents.]

SECTION I—INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

A. (C) *Background*

In November 1975, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) began a study that resulted in a report in April 1976 to Congress on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO.² The study effort continued into a broader review of mobilization and deployment planning. Concern about this area was greatly reinforced by an Army exercise, MOBEX-76. In response, besides undertaking some immediate actions, the Secretary of Defense called for extensive testing of the full mobilization process.

In this context, exercise NIFTY NUGGET-78 was designed and scheduled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was to: (1) determine the adequacy of plans, systems and procedures for full mobilization, (2) examine limitations and shortfalls in manpower and logistics through the period of initial deployments, (3) fully exercise the mobilization and deployment responsibilities (without actual call-up or movement of units) of the Military Departments, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the transportation operating agencies (Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and the Military Traffic Management Command), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and participating Federal departments and agencies, and (4) assess the effectiveness of deployment planning.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to fully exercise the support provided through the civilian Federal agencies and the coordination needed to gain that support, encouraged and helped in the design of a companion civil sector exercise REX-78. REX and NIFTY NUGGET were held simultaneously, 10–30 October 1978, with some organizations extending their play into November.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 112, Mobilization Planning Study: 1/79–8/80. Confidential. According to the title page, the report, entitled "A Review of Military Mobilization Plans," was prepared for the House Committee on Armed Services. For more on NIFTY NUGGET, see Document 94.

² Reference is to Robert J. Murray and Herbert C. Puscheck, *A Report to Congress on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO*. (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1976)

As planning for NIFTY NUGGET progressed, its potential value in identifying serious deficiencies and energizing remedial work became apparent. Three things were done to make the exercise of more value:

—A complementary exercise, PETITE NUGGET, was designed and held prior to NIFTY NUGGET to examine the premobilization assumptions of the latter exercise. Less an exercise than a discussion, PETITE NUGGET was nevertheless situation oriented and it forced the players to make what in reality would be very difficult decisions. PETITE NUGGET shed light on our lack of preparation for such decision making.

—A decision was made to involve senior level civilian personnel in NIFTY NUGGET. Heretofore, Joint Staff exercises had used exercise control groups or a few, action level OSD staff members to represent the Secretary of Defense and his staff. As a result, crucial decisions that must be made by civilian authorities were assumed away. For NIFTY NUGGET the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Stanley R. Resor, acted as the Secretary, and Richard Danzig, DASD for Program Development (MRA&L), acted as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Many Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense participated. The Military Departments established a similar policy. This level of participation was unprecedented, and led to an extremely rich harvest of insights.

—An evaluation of DoD performance and OSD management preparedness was commissioned. Although each Military Department and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had designed its own evaluation, it was believed that much would be gained by specific focus on policy, planning and procedures at the OSD level. A former Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA), William K. Brehm, assisted by two recently retired general officers and a small staff, undertook this difficult task. Now almost complete, that evaluation is reflected in this report.

B. (C) *An Assessment of Capability*

The two exercises, PETITE and NIFTY NUGGET, tested thousands of functions and relationships under extreme conditions. Many passed with flying colors. However, the exercises also underscored important respects in which the DoD can and ought to improve its capacity to mobilize and move forces rapidly to reinforce our NATO Allies. The exercises bred a conviction that more attention should be given *now* to management of the systems that would mobilize, augment and deploy national resources.

Planning for mobilization needs to be improved. The current plan is an assembly of old and unconnected Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations and procedures. Each covers a single aspect of the process but not all aspects are addressed. With little warning, mobilization execution would have to be decentralized; but plans need to be improved if the process is to proceed without major blockages. More must also be done to plan for a graduated build-up. We can profit

from further study of how to augment the deterrent value of our forces during periods of rising tension.

Mobilization and deploying resources do not meet the demand under the most stringent conditions. Under a NIFTY NUGGET scenario the Army cannot meet its demand for trained manpower without reallocating personnel from later deploying units to those deploying early. At present, under this scenario, more Defense strategic lift assets are needed, and our existing prepositioned stockpiles of equipment and ammunition are in many cases significantly short.

Deployment transportation planning needs to be better integrated, made more detailed, and made more flexible.

War planning was found wanting to a lesser degree. Yet, the exercises revealed that the simultaneous execution of war plans in different geographic areas could not be effective because each used common forces and strategic lift assets.

Federal civil agencies were often unaware of and/or unprepared to support defense needs. Substantial work needs to be done in this respect.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

115. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11-10-79

Washington, February 1, 1979

Soviet Military Capabilities To Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas

[Omitted here is a cover sheet, preface, and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Objectives

1. Soviet leaders continue to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet political, military, and economic influence through an assertive and opportunistic policy. They see political

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Top Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense, and the National Security Agency, with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

conflict involving the use of military force or conducted in its shadow as the main propellant of fundamental changes in the Third World. They believe that military power will remain the cornerstone of Soviet policy. Their primary objectives in aligning themselves selectively with states and insurgent movements in Third World conflicts are to assert the USSR's legitimacy as ideological vanguard of world "national liberation" movements, to secure a major role in Third World affairs, to affect the outcome of regional conflicts in favor of Soviet interests, and to neutralize Western and Chinese political and military influence. The Soviet leadership has no illusions, however, about the difficulties of attaining these objectives.

2. While broad political objectives are paramount, the Soviets pursue specific military objectives as well. These include acquisition of overflight clearances and access to facilities abroad for supporting military operations of Soviet as well as friendly forces, especially emergency air and sea lifts of military equipment and supplies to Third World states and insurgent forces. Overseas facilities also can ease the logistic problems of operating naval forces at great distances from Soviet waters. The Soviets deploy military forces in distant areas to show the flag, to maintain a military presence that can be augmented relatively quickly in time of crisis, and to monitor and, if necessary, counter the operations of Western naval forces.

3. Objectives of a lower order in Soviet policy in the Third World are to promote trade, to secure access to certain raw materials and foods, and to be capable of restricting Western access to these materials. Moscow's efforts to foster both military and economic dependence in individual Third World countries go hand in hand, as the major recipients of Soviet arms in 1978 also account for almost half of the USSR's nonmilitary trade with the Third World. Soviet economic aid has not always resulted in a commensurate level of influence, nor do the Soviets expect economic interests alone to buy much influence.

Policy Appraisal

4. The Soviets have undoubtedly gained from the expansion of their military activity in the Third World. Soviet policymakers are probably persuaded that they have generally been on the right track, and their most recent ventures in Angola and Ethiopia have surely reinforced that conviction. Soviet political influence has grown in some countries at the expense of the West and China. Events in Angola and Ethiopia have enhanced the USSR's image as a great power capable of projecting military force far from its shores. Military assistance to Africa and the Middle East has demonstrated the value of Soviet support, especially under emergency conditions. Moscow also has benefited from the international perception that the military balance has changed, to

the detriment of the West, and from the seeming US reluctance to use military force to counter the expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence in the Third World.

5. Soviet military involvement in Third World conflicts has evolved from military assistance programs, to occasional use of Soviet forces in defensive roles, to the extensive use of Cuban combat forces. The Cuban intervention in Angola and especially Ethiopia has probably strengthened Soviet confidence in the feasibility and effectiveness of this strategy, enhanced its appeal among political and military leaders in both Moscow and Havana, and encouraged them to press this strategy. Soviet and Cuban leaders probably will believe that, as long as such actions do not portray them as invaders and do not threaten the West's allies or its sources of vital raw materials, the risk of Western military involvement and escalation to a wider conflict will be slight.

6. The interdependent relationship between the USSR and Cuba is complex, and both sides would probably find it difficult to determine at this stage who has gained more from their joint military ventures. The Cubans have worked closely with the Soviets, and Cuban involvement in the Third World has served Soviet policy. The foremost advantage in using Cubans or other friendly forces is the reduction in visibility of Soviet involvement in Third World conflicts. It also allows Moscow to exert influence in circumstances where Soviet forces would be unwelcome.

7. Calculation of the risks in applying military force remains a central feature of Soviet policy. The Angolan and Ethiopian ventures, though dramatic in scale and noteworthy in their use of Cuban forces, did not entail major risks for the Kremlin, but reflected Moscow's assessment of African reactions, of political restraints on the United States, and the availability of Cuban forces. Though the initial role of the Soviets in Cuban military operations in Angola is not known, we assume that the strategy and tactics employed were coordinated with them. In Ethiopia, Moscow's role was clearly more dominant from the outset.

8. In the few instances where the Soviets have introduced their own military forces into conflicts in the Third World, they did so to assist friendly countries and to inhibit possible Western military initiatives. In these cases, however, they have exercised a policy which strictly limits the role of Soviet forces while at the same time accepting measured risks of escalation.

—Their pilots and air defense units have engaged in combat, but to date have not operated outside friendly territory.

—Soviet naval forces have established or augmented a presence in the regions of conflict but have not engaged in combat.

—Airborne units have been placed on alert in a manner possibly designed to bring pressure on the belligerents as well as the United States.

These activities illustrate Soviet appreciation for the utility of a show of force and of implicit and explicit threats as a means of achieving policy goals.

Instrumentalities

9. Arms transfers are by far the most widely employed of the military means available to the Soviets for projecting influence in the Third World. The Soviets have more than tripled the current dollar amount of agreements and deliveries of military assistance to Third World countries over the last five years. Where the bulk of a recipient's military forces become equipped with Soviet weapons, dependence on the USSR for advisers, spare parts, and newer equipment grows and in time becomes a potential means of influencing the recipient's policies. In practice, Moscow's efforts to exploit such dependence for this purpose have had both successes and failures.

10. Third World nations continue to be lured by Soviet offers of modern military equipment not usually available from other suppliers, by long-term credits at low interest rates, often by lower prices, by payment (until recently) in local rather than hard currency, and by quick delivery. Moscow is laying greater stress on the commercial considerations of its arms sales to earn hard currency. Given these factors, the market for Soviet arms remains fertile, and the trend in sales is upward.

11. Through military training, advisory, and assistance programs the Soviets attempt to create a base of enduring influence by fostering extensive ties with Third World military personnel. Since 1955, some 42,000 have been trained in the USSR. About 9,500 Soviet military advisers and technicians are currently stationed in Third World countries. In recent years, suspicions of some Third World leaders about the motives behind Soviet military assistance programs have grown and led to increasing reluctance by some to allow large numbers of Soviets into their countries. Nevertheless, the number of Soviet military advisers abroad has steadily increased.

12. Emergency resupply of high-priority military items by air and sea is the most widely publicized form of Soviet combat support to Third World states. In this regard, the USSR's ability to provide large quantities of arms in a relatively short time is a major advantage. This service carries little risk for the USSR because few Soviet personnel are involved, they are not combatants, the deliveries are generally made to areas remote from the fighting, and other countries are reluctant to oppose such operations militarily. In addition, such resupply operations do not necessarily commit the Soviets to deeper involvement.

13. A step higher on the ladder of involvement and risk is the assignment of Soviet advisory personnel to Third World combat units. Since 1967, when Soviet pilots flew combat missions against rebels in North Yemen, Soviet personnel have seen actual combat in at least three Third World countries—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—and have played a direct combat advisory role in two others—Angola and Ethiopia.

14. The USSR supports a number of insurgent movements in the Third World, but the type and extent of this assistance vary. It is usually channeled through third parties because insurgents normally do not operate where Moscow can provide direct aid and because the Soviets may want to play down or conceal their role. By leaving the degree of their support ambiguous, the Soviets gain freedom for political maneuvering.

15. East European states have provided a wide variety of military equipment and experts to Third World nations and insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with the USSR. While in most cases this support has furthered Soviet objectives, the East Europeans have had their own political and economic motives. The East European governments have not committed combat troops in the Third World and would be reluctant to do so.

16. Naval surface ships and submarines are the principal Soviet military forces deployed in distance areas and are supplemented by periodic deployments of naval aircraft. Although Soviet concerns over potential strategic threats from Western carrier-launched airstrikes and submarine-launched ballistic missiles remain prominent in Soviet distant operations, the Navy continues to perform important missions related to the projection of power and influence in the Third World, primarily by maintaining forces in regions of Soviet interest which can be augmented relatively quickly in times of crisis.

17. We have no evidence of Soviet contingency plans to exert political or economic pressure on the United States or its allies through interdiction of sea lines of communication in the absence of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. The Soviets probably believe that such an operation would lead to war with NATO.

18. In the principal areas of their normal deployments in distant areas, Soviet diesel submarines and naval ships have access to a number of ports for crew rest, replenishment, maintenance, and in some cases major overhaul. Moscow is seeking additional access, but the only good prospects in the near term are in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. Staging facilities for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft are currently limited to Cuba and Angola, but Ethiopia and South Yemen probably will grant access for this purpose. Hanoi is unlikely to grant the Soviets any formal base rights in either Vietnam or Kampuchea but there are circumstances in which it might permit Soviet access to air or naval

facilities. The recent Chinese incursion into Vietnam may induce Hanoi to permit a Soviet military presence at least as long as the threat exists.

Intervention Capabilities

19. The Soviets have significant forces capable of intervention in distant areas and have introduced forces into combat situations in distant areas in the past. We believe that Soviet leaders in the future would be willing under certain circumstances to use forces for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet conventional forces—ground, air, and naval—are potential resources for use in situations that call for intervention. The deployment of a large segment of Soviet forces in distant areas is constrained not only by the practical difficulties of moving large forces over long distances but by the requirement, as Moscow sees it, to retain the bulk of these forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe in readiness for their primary mission of waging war with NATO or China. On the other hand, these factors would not restrict the deployment of smaller units.

20. Where Cuban or other friendly forces are not available for use in the Third World or are deemed unsuitable, Moscow would have the option of using its own ground forces. Although Soviet air, naval, and air defense forces have been involved in conflicts in the Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, Soviet ground combat forces have not. Growing Soviet self-confidence in projecting power and in the USSR's role as a global power will diminish whatever Soviet reluctance may have existed in the past to employ ground forces outside the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, there are limited situations in which allied forces would not be preferable from a Soviet point of view; Afghanistan is one where the provision of limited Soviet ground forces in a hurry might well be undertaken. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership would probably view the use of ground combat units, even in modest numbers, as a significant escalation of Soviet involvement. The major constraints would be concern over the likelihood of Western or regional counteraction and the impact on Third World perceptions of Soviet policy. We believe, therefore, that Moscow would employ ground combat units only where, and to the degree, it considered such action essential to preserve vital Soviet interests in the region.

21. Over the next 10 years the Soviets will continue to make modest improvements in amphibious lift, logistic support ships, naval tactical air support, gunfire support, and airlift. Such improvements, when added to current naval, airborne, naval infantry, and command and control resources, will result in an increased ability to deploy forces in distant areas and to come to the assistance of any ally. For example, the Soviets might introduce an airborne or naval infantry unit at the invitation of a government, particularly if Moscow believed there was little danger of Western reaction and that the intensity of combat would be

low or the presence of an armed Soviet contingent would be sufficient to accomplish Moscow's objectives. Indeed, a single Soviet airborne division is larger than the armies of many Third World states.

22. We believe, however, that the Soviets are unlikely to invade a Third World country. They have never mounted an airborne assault or amphibious assault operation in a distant area. Nevertheless, Soviet forces have long been capable of undertaking such an operation against the light opposition which could be expected in most areas, and the above-projected improvements will expand this capability. But, over the next decade the Soviets will still not have built the forces capable of transporting, landing, and sustaining a large joint assault operation against substantial opposition in the Third World.

Outlook

23. *Policy.* Although a change in the makeup of the top Soviet leadership is highly probable in the next five years and virtually certain in the next 10, we do not believe that Soviet policies or long-term objectives toward the Third World will change substantially for this reason alone. We do not foresee the present or any likely future Soviet leadership altering these objectives to secure short-term economic or political benefits from the West. Although future Soviet leaders will attach varying degrees of importance to detente relations with the United States and other Western powers, we believe it unlikely that Soviet leaders will be any more dissuaded from pursuing opportunities in the Third World in the future than in the recent past by concern over adverse effects on detente. Indeed, Soviet leaders will probably continue to calculate that major issues like the strategic arms limitation talks will be largely unaffected and that costs in less critical areas of US-Soviet relations will be bearable.

24. *Regional Prospects.* We believe the Soviets will persist in a steady course of creating and exploiting opportunities in distant areas, utilizing wherever possible their comparative advantages in military instruments of influence. They will continue to regard military means—principally arms sales, military assistance, and support of insurgent movements—as the most feasible way of bringing about the changes they seek in the political structure of the Third World.

25. In Latin America, opportunities for expanding Soviet influence through military means are less favorable than in other regions of the Third World, with the exception of the continuing Soviet role in Cuba. Although Moscow has designated Latin America as an arena for Soviet-US competition and has made some economic and diplomatic inroads, prospects are still limited. There will undoubtedly be incidents of unrest and turmoil that should lend themselves to exploitation, but Soviet efforts will be hampered by prevalent anti-Communist

sentiments in Latin America and by the USSR's inability to provide the kinds of nonmilitary assistance Latin Americans need. Most Latin American governments are wary of Soviet overtures and concerned as much about Soviet expansionism as about US regional influence.

26. In Cuba, there are signs that the Soviets are continuing to strengthen their influence on the island as well as to upgrade Cuba's military capabilities. There are differing views, however, on the extent to which the Soviet military presence on the island will grow:

—According to one view² both the Soviets and the Cubans are aware of US sensitivities concerning the permanent basing of nontechnical or nonadvisory Soviet military personnel in Cuba and, for this reason, Moscow would be unlikely to station any combat or reconnaissance unit there permanently because it would exacerbate US relations with both the USSR and Cuba and further endanger Cuba's position in the nonaligned movement.

—Another view³ can be summarized as follows: The Soviets continue to view Cuba as a means to expand Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere and to test US reactions to increased Soviet military use of Cuba. Although the Soviets retreated from their attempt to place offensive weapons on the island in 1962 and to use Cienfuegos harbor to support nuclear-powered submarines in 1970, they continue to use Cuba in a variety of ways to support their objectives. The Soviets will probably expand their military use of Cuba. The most likely way would be to extend the frequency or length of their current naval ship or naval air reconnaissance deployments until their presence there becomes permanent; this would not require additional support facilities. The last naval deployment in 1978 lasted more than 90 days, the longest period overall involving a Soviet Navy task group in Caribbean waters since 1973. The Soviets are carrying out other military activities in Cuba [*1 line not declassified*] and there are indications that small elements of Soviet ground forces are on the island, although the nature of their activity is uncertain. (Possible explanations range from demonstrations or testing of Soviet equipment and tactics or training of local advisory and security personnel, to specialized training of Soviet tactical units.) Moscow is also significantly upgrading Cuba's military capabilities by supplying its forces with equipment and by providing military advisers and instructors to train Cuban forces. And, for the first time, the Soviets have given Cuba an F-class submarine and MIG-23 Flogger air defense and ground attack aircraft, the latter with a range sufficient to reach the southeastern United States and the Panama Canal. Soviet pilots, already in Cuba, occasionally fly these aircraft, probably to maintain proficiency; this flight activity could be expanded in the future to include other roles.

² The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Director, National Security Agency. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]

27. In South Asia, the Soviet outlook is somewhat brighter than in Latin America. The Soviets are expanding their role in Afghanistan and are maintaining close relations with India. India's current government, however, is not as well disposed toward the Soviets as its predecessor and has begun seeking to make Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned by improving relations with both China and the West and by reducing its dependence on the USSR for arms aid.

28. In Southeast Asia, Soviet support to Vietnam—and the Friendship Treaty of November 1978—gave Hanoi significant external backing for its invasion of Kampuchea in early 1979. Nonetheless, Hanoi remains fiercely independent, and Soviet influence in the region will remain largely dependent on Hanoi's sufferance.

29. In the Middle East, opportunities to expand Soviet influence will depend, at least in the near term, mainly on the outcome of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and the evolution of events in Iran. Over the long term, underlying antagonisms toward, and deepening suspicions of, Moscow's motives will qualify Soviet prospects. Soviet opportunities could greatly improve, however, if peace negotiations in the Middle East fail, raising the likelihood of renewed hostilities. As a result of the instability in Iran, the Soviets undoubtedly anticipate significant changes there and in the conservative regimes of the Persian Gulf area that will lead to opportunities for new Soviet ties with the oil-producing states and to further reduction of Western influence.

30. The best opportunities for the USSR will lie in Africa, where political instability is commonplace and where conditions that promote subversion and insurgencies will remain rife.

31. *Preservation of Influence.* This will remain the overriding problem in Soviet efforts to project power and influence in the Third World through military means. Even where Soviet influence is strongest, it is vulnerable to unpredictable changes in the local political leadership or in its attitudes. Nationalist-minded states will continue to resent the arrogant behavior and thinly veiled prejudice often displayed by Soviet representatives. Many Third World leaders will remain suspicious of Soviet motives and probably would be reluctant clients of the USSR. Those who do accept Soviet assistance can be expected to react against instances of exploitative military agreements, poor-quality assistance and training, and interference in internal affairs.

32. To preserve Soviet influence in a country where, for example, dependence on Soviet military support has diminished or expulsion of Soviet personnel is threatened, Moscow has essentially three alternatives beyond the continuation of present policies:

—Use friendly outside forces more extensively to carry out Moscow's policies.

—Seek to acquire through Soviet advisers sufficient control of the military and internal security forces to prevent the leaders of the client state from taking actions inimical to Soviet interests.

—Garrison Soviet troops in the client state, at its invitation, ostensibly to protect the state against some external threat but in reality to preserve in power a government that is friendly and beholden to Moscow and that will enforce policies in line with Soviet interests.

33. The last alternative would have unforeseeable ramifications for Soviet foreign relations, but it is nonetheless an option that conceivably could attract serious consideration by Soviet decisionmakers. The deployment of Soviet forces for this purpose, however, would be a drastic departure from the policy Moscow has followed in the Third World.

34. Despite Soviet difficulties in preserving political influence in most Third World countries, Moscow will have ample opportunities to play a major role. Soviet policy in the Third World feeds on political turbulence, military conflict, and civil strife. During the next 10 years these disruptions are likely to recur, especially in Africa and the Middle East, and the major role the Soviets have effectively played—a source of arms and military assistance and a protector of clients—will remain relevant to the needs of many countries.

[Omitted here is the body of the NIE and six annexes.]

**116. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom)
to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, March 27, 1979

SUBJECT

The Targeting Study: Desired Outcomes

I want to make a few points for you to keep in mind at the SCC on the Targeting Study. There is a real danger that the mix of antithetical theologies will paralyze our efforts to move our defense establishment from a "1914" posture (i.e., one big war plan which cannot support any conceivable war aims, an irreversible war plan, no plans for economic

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 202, Targeting: Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1-6/79. Top Secret.

and other civil mobilization, and a misplaced belief that the war will be short) to a posture that allows our military power to be more politically useful. The following outcomes, achieved not at this SCC but at least by the end of the series of SCC which Victor has scheduled, would accomplish a major favorable change. (S)

I. *A general targeting policy of "flexibility"*. This does not mean breaking the SIOP up into small pieces. It means a targeting capability in addition to the SIOP. It means the capability to identify and locate a target after the conflict starts, to fire a nuclear strike which destroys the target with as little undersired collateral damage as possible, and to make a post-strike assessment which accurately reports the damaged achieved. It also means the capability to coordinate strategic nuclear fires with other military operations by land, naval, and air forces. (TS)

II. *Divest ourselves of the illusion that time urgent "hard target kill" (HTK) capability in large amounts is "destabilizing."* There are many targets other than ICBMs for HTK. For example, destroying enemy C³I, attacking conventional forces of the second echelon and strategic reserve, neutralizing attacks on flanks or outside a theater of war. For any targeting problem where limiting collateral damage is desirable, HTK becomes attractive. We need all the HTK we can get. (S)

III. *Task Defense and the JCS to develop a counter-C³I doctrine.* This aspect of our targeting is highly underdeveloped. It will take several years of work. (S)

IV. *Create a mechanism for more and continuous interaction between the political leadership and military planners.* You will receive a lot of pressure to create special working groups, putting State and others in the military planning loop. Brown and the JCS will balk. State is not the "political leadership." The Secretary of State was not elected and has no statutory authority to give "political guidance." Political guidance means Presidential guidance. We already have a highly effective system for IVORY ITEM exercises. The answer to the "mechanism" problem is to develop it as an excursion within the IVORY ITEM group. David asked me last fall to work up some LNO scenarios for this purpose. I have been in touch with the J-3, the shop that develops such exercises, and they have been working on scenarios for several months. Let's keep things in the IVORY ITEM context. Harold Brown will support you on this.

V. *The C³I problem must be faced not only in Defense but also in FEMA.* This outcome is beyond the targeting study, but it is crucial for the "flexible" approach to targeting. Keep it in mind as a separate problem for SCCs but integral to targeting capabilities. (S)

Some Caveats. We cannot achieve all these outcomes in one SCC meeting, or even four or five, but we can avoid decisions that block their eventual achievement. Let me cite an example of counter-productive decisions. (S)

The first of the nine principles of war is the OBJECTIVE: DESTROY THE ENEMY ARMY OR ITS ABILITY TO FIGHT. When Napoleon took Moscow and ceased chasing the Russian Army, he violated that principle. He lost. When we target 70 percent of economic recovery capability, we have little idea of the impact on Soviet forces. It can't be large. Most of our SIOP criteria are analogous to Napoleon's objective: Moscow. When you speak of targeting Russians, this does not necessarily kill Soviet military forces. In general, population per se is a wasteful target. Breaking the SIOP into small pieces may also fail to kill Soviet forces, especially theater forces. An SCC outcome that merely replaces old SIOP criteria (e.g., 70 percent of economic recovery) with new SIOP criteria (e.g. 60 percent of all Great Russians and 50 percent of Ukrainians) is a paralyzing, non-change decision. An *effective decision* will call for flexibility in targeting in support of other military operations, which are tailored to particular war aims as they are developed for a particular future situation. It will move us away from the dangerous "1914" syndrome.

117. Note From President Carter to Secretary of Defense Brown and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 3, 1979

To Harold, Zbig

a) What is status of the assessment of truck mounted mobile launchers for ICBM? Who is doing this analysis?

b) What is status of negotiation with SU re prior notice of ICBM test launches? What type of tests is included?

J.C.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 3–4/79. Secret. Brzezinski forwarded the handwritten note to Brown under an April 3 covering memorandum, in which he noted that his staff and Brown's staff should "coordinate a prompt reply to the President's questions." (Ibid.)

118. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 4, 1979, 1:45–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Strategic Forces Employment Policy (U)

PARTICIPANTS

State
Cyrus Vance
Secretary

Defense
Harold Brown
Secretary

ACDA
Spurgeon Keeney
Deputy Director

JCS
General David Jones
Chairman

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director

NSC
Victor Utgoff

Detailed Minutes

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by suggesting that we discuss how to proceed. He said that the ultimate goal of the process would probably be an NSC meeting with the President, and perhaps a new PD on Strategic Targeting Policy, or at least an update—some parts of the current PD need an update.² (S)

Dr. Brzezinski also noted that there are a large number of important political questions raised by this study;³ in particular, what we say about employment policy to our Allies and to our public. He recommended Harold state the purpose of the study, summarize its main results and discuss what it is and what it isn't. (S)

Secretary Brown noted that what we say about deterrence and war fighting are particularly important. He then began his introduction of the study. He noted that in his mind the principal purpose of being prepared to handle various war fighting scenarios is the effect such capabilities have on deterrence. He noted, however, that the report does not propose that we move from deterrence to a war fighting

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 201, Targeting: SCC 4/4/79 Meeting: 4/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brackets are in the original. The Summary of Conclusions is *ibid*.

² Reference is to PD-18; see Document 31.

³ Reference is to the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review; see Document 105.

capability. He noted that some Soviet writers and strategists seem to recognize a difference in potential nuclear war outcomes. He said that we must take such things into account when we consider how to deter the Soviets. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that what we deter them from doing is a central issue. (U)

Secretary Brown responded by noting that one of the things we are trying to deter them from is attempting political intimidation of the US or its Allies. (C)

Secretary Brown continued his summary by noting that the study does not say that the Soviets are right in believing that nuclear war can be won in any meaningful sense, and it doesn't say that we should shift from targeting the Soviet urban industrial base to targeting Soviet military forces. He noted that most of our SIOP weapons have always been targeted on Soviet military forces. (TS)

Secretary Vance questioned Harold's statement that the study was not proposing to shift from economic to military targets. (S)

Secretary Brown and General Jones noted that the changes proposed by the study probably won't change the target list much at all. (S)

Mr Keeny disputed this by saying that shifting our emphasis from urban industrial to military targets is a central theme in the study. He argued that the study notes that we don't understand how to prolong Soviet recovery from a nuclear attack, and thus that we should place more emphasis on military targets. (TS)

[Spurgeon is wrong on this point—he is mixed up on two issues: The study says that we don't understand how to prolong Soviet recovery and thus should drop prolonging recovery as an objective of our targeting and shift our industrial targeting back toward two broad sets of targets—war supporting industry, and, as the ultimate deterrent, the broad urban industrial base that would support the post-war power of the Soviet Union. Within military targeting, the study proposes a more flexible building block approach to the SIOP, plus the development of a capability to target Soviet conventional forces even after they have begun moving away from their peacetime locations. While implementation of the study's recommendations may lead to some shifts in the fraction of our weapons going to military as opposed to non-military targets, it does not appear that this shift will be significant.] (TS)

Secretary Brown responded by saying that Mr. Keeny was making too big an issue of how the study's recommendations might change the percentage of our weapons allocated to military as opposed to non-military targets. Secretary Brown noted that the study recommends placing more emphasis on being able to hit moving targets, C³ and leadership. He noted that while the ability to do these things was

important, he still thought that if a nuclear war ever got started, it was very likely to quickly become an all out war. (TS)

Secretary Vance asked how many weapons might be shifted from urban industrial to military targets if the study's recommendations were adopted. (S)

Secretary Brown answered that only a small percentage change would occur because we have always emphasized targeting military forces in the SIOP. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski asked Secretary Brown to elaborate on Mr. Keeny's point. He noted the proposal to change how we target industry and asked what war supporting industry really is. (S)

Secretary Brown attempted to go back to his original line of argument by noting that if in the course of a war between the US and the Soviet Union, we did not destroy Soviet general purpose forces, they might use these forces to capture the European industrial base and use it to aid in their own recovery. He said that this sort of possibility motivates his interest in being able to destroy moving Soviet general purpose forces. He argued that being able to destroy such forces can serve as additional deterrent to nuclear war, but questioned how we could convey the deterrent message to the Soviets. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski answered by noting that if we display sufficient flexibility to do this sort of thing, the Soviets will get the message. (S)

Mr. Keeny then argued that the study says that the Soviets may be more deterred from starting a nuclear war if we shift our targeting more toward military forces. (S)

Secretary Brown responded by saying that the study does not say that. It proposes to improve our capabilities to target military forces, and that such improvements would be an additional deterrent to the Soviets. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski then rescued the discussion by asking Harold to return to his summary of the study. (U)

Secretary Brown continued by saying that the study does not suggest that we abandon economic or city targeting. He noted that the ultimate deterrent will continue to be the comprehensive targeting of the urban industrial base. Finally, he argued that the main point is that the study is not urging a big change in targeting policy. (S)

Secretary Brown then began to summarize some of the additional follow-on efforts being made within DOD. He cited a list of studies on criteria for targeting various categories of targets such as nuclear threat targets, other military targets, C³I, Soviet leadership, etc. He mentioned work underway to improve the flexibility of the SIOP by structuring building block options that could be combined to suit evolving circumstances in a nuclear war. He mentioned several efforts

to restructure some of the selected attack options that were defined several years ago. (S)

He noted that DOD is now developing a launch under attack option. He said that 71 percent of the Minuteman force is now targeted against low collateral damage military targets in the SIOP, but that we currently have no way to withhold the remaining 29 percent. (S)

He said that DOD is looking at limited nuclear option attacks to damage and disrupt Soviet forces on the Chinese frontier. He noted that DOD is also developing plans to substitute regional nuclear options for SIOP attacks on China. (TS)

He commented on efforts being made to improve the targeting data base. He cited efforts being made to improve the crisis management process, in particular by structuring exercises that would include senior officials in planning non-SIOP options. He noted that several efforts are underway to improve our C³ capabilities. He said that first priority must go to achieving improved survivability for our C³ in the initial stages of a war and, after we have achieved this, we should pursue measures to improve long-term endurance of both C³ and forces. He noted that both the Air Force and the Navy are carrying out studies on connectivity of their C³ networks. Finally, he noted that DOD is constructing some additional nuclear options against Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe. He raised the question of how we might go about telling our NATO Allies about these efforts. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski commented that this was a long list of efforts and that it, along with the other issues in the study, constituted a very long list of items for the group to discuss. He suggested that we should structure the discussion by framing the major issues as follows: (1) what are the requirements of stable deterrence at different levels? (2) what are the requirements of stable crisis bargaining? and (3) what are the requirements of effective war management? He noted that we must move beyond planning for nuclear force employment as if all the forces would be employed in a single spasmodic attack. (TS)

Secretary Brown agreed with this last point, but said that it is important to have our planning for all out nuclear war well in hand because an all out spasm war is the most likely possibility, given the unlikely possibility of nuclear war in the first place. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski responded by noting that the very likelihood of all out nuclear war is increased if all out spasm war is the only kind of nuclear war we can fight. He then asked Secretary Vance if the three questions he had posed constituted a reasonable framework for further discussion. (S)

Secretary Vance responded by noting that the first question was fine, but asked what was meant by the second. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski responded by noting that our requirements for C³I and civil defense could only be understood if we discussed the roles they would play in crisis bargaining scenarios. (S)

Secretary Brown agreed that while we should relate targeting to these issues, the targeting study is not cast in these terms. He noted that the question at hand was what should be the thrust of our targeting policy. (C)

Mr. Keeny then said that many things in the study are very difficult to discuss because the study presents little information on what we would have to buy if we accept its recommendations. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that the first question is what to do with what we have. (U)

Mr. Keeny rebutted by saying that our employment policy has implications for our acquisition policy. (U)

Secretary Brown noted that we have traditionally separated employment from acquisition by discussing employment in terms of what should be done with the available forces. Acquisition was then discussed separately in terms of the degree to which the agreed employment objectives were met. (C)

Mr. Keeny then commented that we must understand the declaratory policy issue before we proceed with the study's recommendations. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski responded by stating what we should first decide what we need, and then establish how we should package or explain it. (C)

Mr. Aaron proposed a middle course, specifically that we talk about targeting issues, but then test our resulting ideas against *Dr. Brzezinski's* questions. (C)

He went on to make the point that stability at one level can be the enemy of deterrence at another level. For example, overall strategic superiority may create a very stable situation with respect to deterring Soviet military initiatives, but be very destabilizing in the degree to which it encourage Soviet efforts to improve and expand their forces. (S)

He also noted his concern about the impact of our discussion of these issues on our own and our Allies' confidence. He suggested that many who discuss these issues give us less than proper credit for our real capabilities. (U)

Secretary Vance noted that he shares this concern. (U)

Secretary Brown commented that *Mr. Aaron's* last point had more to do with the adequacy to our strategic posture than the targeting issues. (U)

Mr. Aaron then made the point that we must focus on how certain types of preparations to fight nuclear war might actually undermine deterrence. (C)

General Jones said that he sees the basic thrust of of the study as a push for much more flexibility and in the future for more endurance, not only for our forces but for our C³I systems. He noted that there were a number of narrower issues that we can and should get on with. He cited the issue of how we should target China as an example. He said that we can make some useful decisions without solving all the broad problems. (TS)

Admiral Turner said he thinks of the study in terms of three questions: how does our targeting policy affect (1) Soviet diplomacy; (2) Soviet deterrence; and (3) Soviet war fighting? (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he agreed with Mr. Aaron's suggestion that we should focus on some of the more important issues and then test them against the larger framework he had proposed. As a first issue, he proposed discussion of whether or not China should be removed from the SIOP. As a second issue, he proposed a discussion of the problems involved in targeting population/leadership/C³ and the idea of targeting to achieve regionalization of the Soviet Union. (TS)

General Jones suggested that the population targeting issue be dropped because population targeting is illegal under international agreements to which the US is a party. (S)

There were several comments to the effect that retaliation for attacks that killed civilian population was not illegal. Secretary Brown noted that while our current efforts to minimize collateral damage to population bias our targeting away from residential areas, strikes against industry may cause many fatalities. (S)

Secretary Brown then noted there is a real issue here—do we want to be able to hit an evacuated Soviet population? (TS)

Admiral Turner asked what the group believes really deters the Soviets most. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that it is the threat to the Soviet population, and Secretary Vance agreed. (S)

Secretary Brown expressed some skepticism, and also noted that the population fatality calculations that are done currently reflect only fatalities due to prompt nuclear effects, and thus might be quite low. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski reiterated his belief that Soviet leadership is concerned about the survival of its population, and noted that it is appropriate to discuss the population issue in terms of the importance of assuring that there are no significant asymmetries in the population losses that might be suffered by the two sides. (TS)

As a third issue, Dr. Brzezinski proposed discussion of economic targeting, and in particular, whether we should continue to have as an objective the prolongation of Soviet recovery, or should instead target the Soviet economy in terms of war sustaining industry and the broad urban industrial base upon which Soviet post-war power would depend. (TS)

Secretary Brown noted that this may not be an important issue because whichever policy we choose for economic targeting will probably lead to pretty much the same targets. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then asked how we should deal with the issue of hard-target kill—specifically the ability to destroy Soviet silos, sheltered leadership and targets of this type. (TS)

Secretary Brown noted that this is primarily an acquisition issue. (U)

Mr. Aaron responded by saying that it is important to discuss it, nonetheless, because many people think of targeting in terms of this issue. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that a major reason to want hard-target kill capabilities is to eliminate Soviet capabilities to reload and reuse their missile silos. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then stated that the fourth issue would be a discussion of the need for prompt hard-target kill capability. (S)

Secretary Vance then suggested that the SCC discuss how our targeting policy impacts on European interests. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski argued that this issue should be taken up later. (U)

General Jones said that some new SAOs are being constructed for targeting conventional forces in Eastern Europe, and that these targeting plans might be well received by our NATO Allies. (TS)

Mr. Aaron said this is probably not true of all of our European Allies and the issue of whether, when and how to discuss these new SAOs with our Allies should be thought through carefully. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski then suggested that the fifth and sixth issues for discussion should be the launch-under-attack question, and the impact of our targeting plans upon our Allies. (TS)

Mr. Aaron suggested that after the issues Dr. Brzezinski had suggested had been dealt with, the SCC should discuss our declaratory and acquisition policies. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then suggested Harold Brown should be prepared to open the discussion in the next meeting on the first two or three issues, and that background papers drawing on the study should be prepared on all the issues. (U)

Secretary Vance noted that these papers would be very sensitive and suggested that they be distributed to the principals through the ALPHA channel. (S)

General Jones then commented that the discussion had missed two important points, specifically, that we should pursue greater flexibility and endurance in our strategic targeting and our force posture. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded by saying that he had assumed this was understood by all. (U)

Mr. Aaron noted that it is the purposes of flexibility that must be discussed by the SCC. (C)

Secretary Brown reacted by saying that in his view flexibility was not the central theme for discussion—that achievement of greater flexibility in the SIOP was simply something he believed the President would expect DOD to be pursuing. (S)

[Two issues are being raised up here—flexibility achieved within the SIOP by means of the building block approach which is well within Harold's charter to do. However, the other type of flexibility, the kind required to attack Soviet forces on the move, does raise issues that should be discussed within the NSC process.] (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski commented that it may require more than one additional meeting to discuss all these issues and that in future meetings, the principals could each bring one additional person. (U)

Secretary Brown also proposed that the group receive briefings he had recently gotten on four subjects: the SIOP, the RISOP, C³ connectivity, and the MX. He said that these briefings could be heard in a total of approximately two hours. At this point, *Dr. Brzezinski* adjourned the meeting. (C)

119. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (Murray) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, April 9, 1979

SUBJECT

PRC on the Consolidated Guidance

In a note to Charles on March 20th, you asked that I chair a working group in preparation for a PRC on the CG.² The group—consisting of Les Gelb, Randy Jayne, Dan Murphy, Walt Slocombe, Bill Smith, and Vic Utgoff—met for the first time on March 30th to hear suggestions for the PRC meeting agenda. Those suggestions are summarized in this memo. To the extent that you approve them, the working group will turn next to the preparation of suitable back-up material for the principals.

Fortunately, all members of the working group agree on the principal issue for discussion at the PRC meeting: the adequacy to the needs of national security of the forces and capabilities assumed in the CG.³

That is an issue that the CG was never really intended to address. Though adequacy is in no small way dependent on funding, the CG does not determine the fiscal guidance—it merely reports it. And since the CG is intended primarily to guide the preparation of the Service POMs, we labor to assure that its forces and capabilities are at least *consistent* with that (exogenously determined) fiscal guidance. But whether that funding—and the forces and capabilities that flow from it—is *adequate* to the needs of national security is quite another matter, and one the working group agrees is the biggest loose end of all concerning the CG.

Though no great surprise, the most consistent charge from the Services and Chiefs in their comments on the CG was one of inadequacy to the needs of national security. Our response to the effect that the CG was never intended to define “how much is enough”, though correct,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 75. PRC 106, 5/15/79, DOD Consolidated Guidance. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Duncan. A stamped notation on the first page indicates that Brown saw the memorandum. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Brown wrote: “4/10, RM II, Good, see my notes. HB.”

² Reference is to Charles Stebbins of the NSC. Brown’s March 20 note was not found.

³ In the right margin next to this sentence, Brown wrote: “and is the Financial Guidance enough to fund it.”

begs the question. While the PRC alone cannot resolve the issue, it's hard for us to imagine anything of higher priority for the agenda. In fact, discussions of lesser issues in the CG could well be idle so long as that basic issue remains unresolved.

A suggested agenda based around that central issue (and fleshed out below):

1. The Needs of National Security
 - A. The Basic PD-18 Criterion
 - B. Strategic Forces
 - C. NATO
 - D. Non-NATO
2. Affordability of Current Programs
 - A. Navy
 - B. Air Force
 - C. Army
3. Alternatives

As for 1A, PD-18 states that “the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now (August 24, 1977) exists.”⁴ The PRC might want to address our performance in that regard during the intervening year and a half, and we can supply some background material to illuminate the issue. But it might also want to reconsider the policy itself, since it states only that the balance shall get no worse, but does not explicitly address the balance itself, or the possible need for a worldwide perception of a positive (rather than merely non-negative) first derivative of the balance function over time.⁵

As for 1B, we can furnish the principals with a great variety of both static and dynamic indicators of the strategic balance, both now and in the future, and with all sorts of alternative assumptions as to both US and Soviet programs. While all that is essential background material, the larger issue has to do less with our own mathematical calculations of that balance than with how others perceive it. Essential equivalence—which PD-18 adopts as a central policy—is largely, if not entirely, perceptual.⁶ The group believes that an evaluation of that perception and its likely trend for the future is a most important issue

⁴ The full text of PD-18 is printed as Document 31.

⁵ In the right margin next to this sentence, Brown drew a vertical line and wrote: “I agree—this is the most important issue—even if PRC can’t resolve it.”

⁶ In the right margin, Brown drew an arrow pointing to this sentence and wrote “largely, *but* not entirely.”

for the PRC. Subsidiary issues such as MX basing, targeting policy, etc., no matter how important in their own right, should not displace an evaluation of the adequacy of our programs to carry out the policy of essential equivalence.

As for IC, our announced policy is to have “the capability, in conjunction with (our) allies, to stop a Warsaw Pact attack with minimum loss of territory and ultimately to restore prewar boundaries.” The analyses in the CG give little if any reason for confidence in our ability to carry out that policy. However, at least as important an issue is whether the force balances we calculate are adequate to deter a Pact attack, quite apart from any consideration of restoring prewar boundaries. The judgement of the PRC on that issue would be important.⁷

A possible additional issue for consideration in connection with NATO is the allocation of forces to the flanks as distinct from the Central Front. We could lay out the opposing forces as an aid in making a judgement of this issue (which is of great importance to the Navy). However, we must guard against loading down the principals with so many subsidiary issues that they never arrive at the all-important central judgement as to adequacy in the aggregate. Much depends, of course, on how much time you believe will be available.⁸

1D on the agenda is a particularly difficult issue—whether our forces are adequate to handle non-NATO contingencies. We have reasonable confidence in our estimates of the military balance for Korea, but not for areas such as the Persian Gulf, where our analyses still have a ways to go, and where our understanding of the issues is nowhere near as developed as it is in our more traditional areas of interest. Yet, the issue cannot be ignored, and I would suggest that we do the best we can. One special point worthy of consideration by the PRC is the CG’s assumption—based on our estimated capability—that we will not have to cope with a mobilization or war in Europe sooner than 45 days after we start a deployment to the Persian Gulf.⁹ We can calculate the cost of being able to cope with greater degrees of simultaneity, but adequacy is a matter for PRC consideration.

Part 2 of the agenda deals with the general subject of affordability—whether the current programs will “fit” within the likely fiscal

⁷ Brown drew a vertical line and put a check mark in the right margin next to this and the preceding sentence.

⁸ Brown wrote “This is one issue we ought to include” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁹ Brown drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this sentence and wrote: “worth asking for judgments.”

guidance.¹⁰ As you know, the CG addressed that issue directly in the case of tactical air and the case of amphibious assault forces. Since that time, we have seen some preliminary work by the OpNav staff on the affordability of the Navy as a whole, the results of which imply perhaps an even more serious problem than we understood. (Tom Hayward tells me he will be glad to make this analysis available to us, and enthusiastically endorses the idea of having it on the PRC agenda.) PA&E has continued to work on the affordability of USAF tactical air, and should be able to have something worthwhile by way of background material before the PRC. I am less confident in the case of the Army, but it does seem to me that the general problem of affordability—even with a real 3% annual growth—is liable to be serious, and that we may be faced with a declining force structure. *If* the analyses now being worked out substantiate that concern, there is no question in my mind but that the PRC principals should be made aware of it, and that it should be discussed in the context of adequacy.¹¹

The final part of the agenda would deal with alternatives, which seem to be:

- If necessary, alter the fiscal guidance to match the policies and objectives, or
- If necessary, alter the policies and objectives to match the fiscal guidance, or
- Try to influence our Allies' actions (which would include the issue of our shared commitment to an annual 3% real growth in defense expenditures), or
- Some combination of the above, or
- Decide that the current situation is satisfactory, and do nothing.

While the group agrees that some rough indication of the quantitative aspects of these alternatives is important, there should be no attempt to turn this PRC meeting into a budget-setting exercise.¹² Rather, the emphasis should be on reaching a judgement as to the general adequacy of the forces and capabilities implied by the CG and,

¹⁰ In the right margin next to this sentence, Brown wrote: "Should perhaps put another way: 1) are present pgms sufficient 2) can we afford present pgms within fiscal guidance."

¹¹ In the right margin, Brown drew an arrow pointing to the end of this paragraph and wrote: "I'd like to approach this differently: 1) what can we buy within present FG? 2) how well does that meet needs of national security, 3) with added funding increments, what added forces can be procured/maintained, 4) how do these add to security."

¹² Brown underlined the words "there should be no attempt to turn this PRC meeting into a budget-setting exercise," drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this sentence, and wrote "very important."

should they appear inadequate, a further judgment as to which alternatives should be pursued in more detail.

If you will give us your reaction to these suggestions, or others of your own, we'll get busy on the back-up material. (Vic Utgoff tells me that Zbig would like a cut at this suggested agenda.)¹³

Russell Murray, 2nd

Assistant Secretary of Defense

Program Analysts and Evaluation

¹³ Brown drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this paragraph and wrote "OK—invite Vic to show it to Zbig with my comments." In an April 11 memorandum from Utgoff to Brzezinski, Utgoff endorsed Murray's agenda, noting that it was "reasonable provided the Working Group can develop good background information, and provided we can control it well enough to make it a respectable examination of the issues rather than simply an attempt to high pressure the White House into a larger DOD budget." Bartholomew underlined the words "an attempt to high pressure the White House into a larger DOD budget," wrote "*" next to this phrase, and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "ZB: Murray's memo is very good, but Harold's comments on it are even better. His notes on page 3 on how the discussion of force and fiscal adequacy should be structured are right on—and the best way to head off the pressure Vic notes (* above) and to avoid putting the President in (too much of) a box. (Even though I think we *should* be spending more.) Reg." Brzezinski indicated his approval of the agenda set out in Murray's memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 117, Security Analysis Chron: #24–36, 4/79)

120. Memorandum From Charles Stebbins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 10, 1979

SUBJECT

The President as Commander-in-Chief (U)

I have listed some substantive and cosmetic actions at the Tab that the President could take to enhance the public's perception of him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and to reverse what I sense to be a growing alienation of the military community from him. (C/S)

Certainly, the President's decisions on Vietnam amnesty, B-1, Defense veto, military pay cap, etc., have been controversial, and he faces some similarly difficult decisions in the near future (SALT, CTB, M-X, the military retirement system, etc.); but I do not believe that the inevitable consequences of such decisions need be a lessened leadership image and an alienated military community. (C/S)

Rather, I believe that the perception of the President as Commander-in-Chief can be improved perhaps substantially by our making his already considerable contacts and involvements with the military more visible to the public, and by increasing their number and scope. (C/S)

I also believe that the President can reverse the alienation process by being sensitive to the special psychological needs of the military community in making its members feel that as their Commander, the President regards them with "special" affection and not just as another category of "federal government employees." Very simply, these people—who endure the hardships of life in missile silos, submarines and remote locations away from families—believe they are indeed "special" and that their peacetime sacrifices deserve public recognition and appreciation no less than their wartime sacrifices. I feel that some additional and carefully considered bows in this direction by the President could produce dramatic results. (C/S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 59, Administration's Policy: General: 1-7/79. Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote "good, ZB" in the upper right corner of the memorandum.

Tab A
Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

- Deliver a major, nationwide address on the importance of the Armed Forces and of their special relationship with the President. Put Vietnam behind us by eliminating the “second-class citizen” stigma that has been attached to the military since that conflict. Recognize the wartime and peacetime sacrifices of the military community, with a special bow to the families of the KIAs/MIAs (who are still regarded with considerable reverence in the military community). Recognize also the special demands placed on the Services as a result of our more complex two-tracked approach to national security—arms plus arms control. (Suggest: Memorial Day, Armed Forces Day, Veterans Day, or Vietnam Veterans Week.)

- Continue the above theme in every subsequent major address (where feasible), including State of the Union message.

- Deliver a major, nationwide address on SALT TWO, explaining: the hard choices that were made and why they were the right ones; that we are committed to essential equivalence; and that JCS advice played a prominent role in making these choices. Announce the M-X decision or expand on it. (Suggest: the AF Academy Commencement Ceremony.)

- Announce “quality of life” decisions (e.g., the military retirement policy, Ethics law, pay caps, selective service decisions, etc.) at the opening of press conferences or in other fora with nationwide audiences. If the decision will be unpopular in the military community, announce it as the Commander-in-Chief expecting his subordinates to rally to the decision.

- When traveling, attempt to visit an important military installation enroute or near the destination, with appropriate pomp and publicity. Where possible, inspect facilities and talk to enlisted personnel. Attend important missile, aircraft or ship launchings (or significant tests).

- After the fact, publicize any direct Presidential involvement in military exercises or crises (e.g. Yemen), to demonstrate a readiness and determination to take actions as Commander-in-Chief when necessary.

² Confidential; Sensitive.

- Meet with the JCS perhaps once a year away from the White House to discuss their view of the state of the world. Invite the JCS to important state dinners, and dine with the JCS, the CINCs and their wives once each year. Meet the JCS and their Operations Deputies in the Pentagon nerve center (the “Tank”) perhaps once a year, focusing on readiness and leadership instead of programs and management—which absorb the bulk of the JCS/Presidential discussions. Announce and publicize each meeting with the JCS—wherever held and on whatever subject.

- Host a Q and A session with the senior *enlisted* members of the Services (each Service has one member so designated) to hear the views of the people at the bottom of the pyramid.

- Improve liaison between the President and the Services/JCS in administrative, morale and welfare matters, by appointing a senior military office to serve as Deputy Military Assistant to the President. (in Marty Beaman’s office).

- Attend Service Academy football games and one of their commencement exercises each year.

- Establish a Presidential-level program to reward military achievement or excellence, akin to the Medal of Freedom program.

121. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Ground Mobile M-X (U)

Harold has responded (Tab A) to your questions of last week regarding the study of ground mobile basing systems for an M-X missile.² In reading the memo you might note the following points:

First, the road mobile system that the study team seems to favor carries an “M-X” missile that is about the size of the Minuteman III missile. While its more energetic fuel allows it to throw more RVs over

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 3-4/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

² See Document 117.

a longer range than Minuteman III, it has about half the throw weight of the larger M-X variants that the Air Force wants. (S)

Second, the memo gives no indication that DOD is giving the issue of strategic surprise more than superficial treatment. For example, in order to deny us strategic warning the Soviets might have to leave themselves so much more vulnerable to our retaliatory strike as to more than offset the extra counterforce effectiveness they might gain. I will ask Harold to look into this issue carefully. (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter³

Washington, April 7, 1979

SUBJECT

Ground Missile M-X (U)

(U) You asked for a status report on Ground Mobile M-X. We have had a team restudying this problem the past few months in parallel with our study of Air Mobile M-X. Both studies were under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. The Ground Mobile team consisted of senior personnel from the Air Force Office of System Analysis and two contractors (Boeing and Martin). All of them have had extensive experience in missiles and their basing systems (the Air Force team leader was the same officer who led our design team on GLCM basing). Their study is essentially finished and will be ready for review, along with the Air Mobile report, in a week or two.

(U) The study has considered two different types of ground mobile systems—road mobile and off-road mobile. Preliminary findings on each of these follow:

Road Mobile:

(S) The missile would be carried on a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) which would weigh (including the missile) about 200,000 pounds (limited by the load-carrying capability of the interstate system). [3 lines not declassified]

³Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

(S) The system would be based in the southern part of the U.S. where weather problems would be minimal. Each of the bases would have security appropriate for the protection of nuclear weapons on day-to-day alert. The TELs would be kept in the open at known locations to facilitate verification. On the receipt of strategic warning, the TELs would go out on public roads at maximum speed until they were so widely dispersed that they could not be successfully barraged.

(S) The baseline system would have 250 TELs and missiles and 1250 warheads. We estimate the acquisition cost at about \$16B (in FY 78 dollars) which is about \$5B less than MPS. Annual O&S costs would be about \$0.5B, about \$0.1B more than MPS.

For a postulated attack of 70% of the Soviet ICBM RVs (the same threat we used for MPS and Air Mobile calculation),

- a) None of the systems survive a surprise attack, even with a full 30 minutes of tactical warning;
- b) With 1 hour of "strategic" warning, none survive;
- c) 50% of the systems survive an attack for which we have 4 hours of strategic warning;
- d) 80% of the systems (1000 RVs) survive an attack for which we have 6 hours of strategic warning.

(S) To achieve a degree of survivability against a surprise attack it is necessary to maintain some percentage of the systems dispersed on the highways. The difficulty with peacetime dispersal is the public interface problems created by moving nuclear missiles about on public highways and the possibility of an accident. We will continue to examine the legal and environmental aspects of such a peacetime dispersal.

Off-Road Mobile:

(S) In the off-road mobile concept, the missile achieves its survivability by being moved about on its TEL at frequent intervals. To avoid public interface problems, its movement during peacetime is limited to Defense Department bases in the southwest (Yuma Bomber Range, Nellis Air Base, e.g.). Because of the possibility of barraging this limited area, the TEL would have to be very hard [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and therefore very heavy (on the order of 1,000,000 pounds), and expensive. If confined to DOD land, such a system would be able to provide the equivalent of 1,000 to 2,000 independent aim-points for Soviet 1 MT warheads.

(U) Further consideration and detail will be included in my presentation of ICBM rebasing options to you following a PRC on the subject later this month.

Harold Brown

122. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, April 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Strategic Warning (U)

Both the truck and the air mobile basing schemes you are now studying are dependent to some degree on strategic warning. Thus, it seems important that our debate on the basing mode be supported by a better understanding of the strategic warning issue. (S)

In thinking about this issue, the following questions seem relevant:

—Can improvements of our strategic warning capabilities significantly reduce our worries about surprise attack? Are there significant motivations to make such improvements independent of the basing mode chosen for the M-X? (S)

—In plausible nuclear attack scenarios, can the Soviets deny us strategic warning only by leaving extra vulnerabilities to our retaliatory attack that would more than offset the increased effectiveness of their initial attack? (S)

—In assessing the public interface issue—what has been our experience concerning public reaction to military convoys in the US, or in Europe—especially movements of nuclear missile systems such as Honest John, Pershing? (S)

—What can be done to minimize the political repercussions of dispersing the ground or air mobile systems? Can practical arrangements be made that will (1) give the authority to disperse to an official who can be insulated from the political repercussions of such decisions, and (2) guarantee him immediate access to all the potential strategic warning information? (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 5, Defense Department: 3-4/79. Secret.

123. Memorandum From Victor Utgoff, William Odom, and Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 24, 1979

SUBJECT

Targeting Study SCC

Tomorrow's SCC is largely an education for State and ACDA. It involves Defense briefings on SIOP, RISOP, and C³I vulnerabilities. You should seek the following objectives in the meeting:

—Greater awareness that we can no longer ride out an attack and then retaliate in a coordinated fashion. More explicitly, the land-based ICBM vulnerability problem has its analogy in NCA vulnerability. Both need a new basing mode.

—Greater awareness that the 1960s assured destruction doctrine has given us a "1914 war plan" posture in the 1970s and 1980s.

—Greater awareness of what the Soviets can do to us as a result of our present capabilities to only fight a spasm war.

These three objectives illustrate the importance of your three conceptual questions in the last SCC: (1) what does it take to deter today? (2) to maintain crisis bargaining stability? (3) to manage the battle if deterrence fails?

The following additional comments will prepare you for the separate briefings.

The SIOP Briefing

This is standard information, nothing you have not seen before. A critical point is hidden in the category "political leadership." The SIOP purports to provide a selective attack on the leadership which might be understood as a counter-C³I attack. In fact, it is based on target data that omits hundreds of leadership bunkers and C³I facilities because we have not located them.

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 202, Targeting: Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1–6/79. Top Secret; Outside the System. Sent for action.

The RISOP

This is fairly standard information which you saw at SAC last summer.² The key point for you is what it shows about our C³I vulnerability.

JCS Connectivity Study

This is the study that General Ellis has hounded Odom and Hugh Carter about. The recommendations should be viewed as SAC's wish list. Some are ridiculous, e.g. putting the helicopter near the White House (South Lawn or on top of the OEOb were the SAC suggestions!!). SAC wants to believe that the President can escape under any Soviet attack. It is not possible in the SLBM scenario, but SAC will not admit that. Instead, they claim the White House (i.e. Hugh Carter) is preventing a solution. Some of the suggestions have already been implemented. Listen to them and do not respond.

The Navy Connectivity Study

This briefing shows a number of SSBN connectivity problems not fully spelled out to you before. Listen for the information, but treat the conclusions and recommendations as a major problem area to be kept in mind as further SCC deliberations occur. You may want to underscore the obsession in this briefing and the JCS (SAC) study with a spasm response. *Enduring* C³I is only briefly dealt with in the end of the Navy study when concern over transattack and post-attack C³I management arises. In a word, the studies do not give us effective recommendations on how to ride out an attack and respond intelligently later on. Nor do they deal with "battle management" of escalation control in a nuclear campaign.

² See Documents 80–82.

124. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 25, 1979, 3–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Strategic Forces Employment Policy

PARTICIPANTS*State*

Cyrus Vance

Leslie Gelb

Director for Politico-Military
Affairs*OSD*

Charles Duncan

Deputy Secretary

Admiral Daniel Murphy

Deputy Under Secretary for
Policy*ACDA*

George Seignious

Spurgeon Keeney

Deputy Director

JCS

General David Jones

Lt General William Smith

Assistant to the Chairman

General Richard Ellis

Commander in Chief, SAC

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Howard Stoertz

NIO for Strategic Policy

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC

Victor Utgoff

Fritz Ermarth

Summary of Conclusions

An SCC meeting was held for the purpose of hearing some briefings by the JCS that DOD sees as important background for the SCC's continuing discussion of strategic forces employment policy. (S)

The first brief described the latest major revision of the SIOP. It described the targeting guidance under which the SIOP is prepared, the numbers and types of targets that are included in the national target base and are thus candidates for attack, the numbers of weapons applied to the targets under each attack option, and the consequences of execution under different conditions. (TS)

The most important points made in this brief were that (1) under the best of conditions we can destroy [*percentage not declassified*] of the Soviet nuclear threat targets, (2) in their most vulnerable posture, the Soviets would lose [*percentage not declassified*] of their population, and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 202, Targeting: Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1–6/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. No minutes of the meeting were found.

(3) Soviet civil defense can hold these fatalities under the worst of our currently planned attacks to about [*percentage not declassified*]. (TS)

The second brief described the results of the latest RISOP analysis in which Studies, Analysis and Gaming Agency analysts apply Soviet strategic forces in hypothetical strikes against the US. The objectives assumed for the Soviet Union are to defeat "enemy nuclear capabilities," eliminate the US as a major global power, facilitate Soviet recovery and reconstruction, improve the (postwar) correlation of forces, and be prepared to fight the PRC. (TS)

The first "Soviet" attack option considered involved a preemptive attack with both sides on fully generated alert and with counterforce being the dominant objective. The attack employs over [*number not declassified*] warheads and holds over [*number not declassified*] warheads in reserve. It places a high priority on destroying the US C³ system in order to disrupt our retaliatory attack. It results in severe damage to [*percentage not declassified*] the US missile silos, destruction of [*percentage not declassified*] of the manufacturing value added of the assumed US industrial target base, and fatality levels of approximately [*percentage not declassified*] for the US and [*percentage not declassified*] for our European Allies. (TS)

The second "Soviet" attack option considered was a bolt-from-the-blue attack again emphasizing destruction of "enemy" nuclear forces. The Soviets attack [*number not declassified*] hours into a major Soviet exercise. Some [*number not declassified*] fewer weapons are available as a consequence of not being on a full alert. However, the damage expectancies achieved in the attack are nearly as high as in the first option. (TS)

In closing, the briefer emphasized two points—first, while their attack plans could not guarantee the destruction of the alert bomber force or the C³ network connecting the NCA to the SLBM force, it might achieve very significant results against these systems if the US response to attack warning was at all delayed or confused. Second, US casualties would be significantly higher than for the Soviets, particularly if the Soviets have had time to evacuate their cities. (TS)

The third brief presented the results of a recent JCS examination of the Soviets ability to destroy the connectivity of the C³ system running from our tactical warning and attack assessment systems to the NCA and on out to our strategic forces. (TS)

The study was based on the Soviet nuclear attack constructed by the RISOP analysts. The study showed that within [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of the start of the attack, the Soviets could expect that *all* of the major nodes (White House, Crown helo, NMCCS, etc.) of the current C³ system except for SAC's Airborne National Command Post and the Post Attack Command and Control System would be gone. (TS)

The study also looked at a number of possible changes to the C³ system including deployment of mobile ground stations, improving the Crown helo and moving it closer to the White House, and rebasing NEACP further from the coast. [2 lines not declassified] (TS)

The final brief concentrated on the connectivity of the airborne national command post aircraft to the SSBN force. It showed that successful receipt and transmission of an EAM through this portion of the C³ network is very uncertain. The brief also showed that a number of fairly straightforward and inexpensive improvements can be made that will significantly improve this situation. (TS)

There was some discussion of the briefs but no specific conclusions were drawn. The discussion included the following points:

General Jones pointed out the disparity in fatalities and silo destruction capabilities estimated for the US and the Soviet Union in the first two briefs. He also pointed out the large number of strategic reserves the Soviets have left over after they have fulfilled what we think might be their reasonable strategic attack objectives. He expressed concern that the importance of moving the NEACP aircraft inland from Andrews and making the suggested improvements for the Crown helicopter would not be fully appreciated. Finally, he noted that while the SALT II limits bound the Soviet threat, the difficulties illustrated in these briefs would still exist at force levels well below the SALT II limits. (TS)

Secretary Duncan noted that General Jones' last point illustrates the importance of achieving deep reductions in SALT III. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski illustrated the value of the three question framework he presented in the last meeting by commenting that (1) the briefs make the weaknesses in our ability to manage a nuclear war quite clear, (2) Soviet knowledge of this fact would weaken our position to bargain over our respective interests in a nuclear crisis, and (3) this in turn would lead to a weakening of deterrence. (TS)

Secretary Vance asked a number of questions about the assumptions underlying the analysis presented in the four briefs. He questioned the expected destruction of the Crown helo in particular, and the implication that the current system would only allow about [1 line not declassified] (TS)

George Seignious asked how the corresponding situation might look from the Soviets' point of view. He was told that while this question had not been analyzed in any detail, Soviet geographical advantages and the attention they have paid to making their C³ hard and redundant should lead to a better result for them. (TS)

125. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 26, 1979, 4–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Strategic Forces Employment Policy

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher
Deputy Secretary
David Gompert
Deputy Director for Politico-
Military Affairs

JCS

General David Jones
Lt General William Smith
Assistant to the Chairman

ACDA

George Seignious
Spurgen Keeny
Deputy Director

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

OSD

Harold Brown
Admiral Daniel Murphy
Deputy Under Secretary for
Policy
Walter Slocombe
Secretary for International
Security Affairs

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Howard Stoertz
NIO for Strategic Policy

NSC

Victor Utgoff
Fritz Ermarth

Detailed Minutes

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with a reminder on where we are headed. He cited the five topics to be discussed today, and said that Harold Brown will summarize the backup papers² that have been prepared in order to start the discussion of each topic. He noted that we will have another SCC meeting to discuss the remaining topics and will then have an NSC meeting with the President to discuss the SCC's recommendations with respect to strategic forces employment policy. He noted that the end objective of the entire process would be a new PD.

He then recalled the three questions he had posed in the first SCC meeting on this overall issue—what are the requirements of (1) effective nuclear war management for defined political purposes, (2) crisis

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 117, Security Analysis Chron #24–36, 4/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski forwarded the Summary of Conclusions of this meeting, along with the Summary of Conclusions of the April 25 meeting (see Document 124) under cover of a May 1 memorandum to Carter, who wrote: "Insist on DOD & others maintaining secrecy—J." (Ibid.)

² Not found.

bargaining stability, and (3) stable deterrence at different levels.³ He suggested that to avoid getting bogged down, we should discuss the various issues in these terms. He noted that the message he got from the previous day's briefs was that there are many weaknesses in our C³ system that imply a very poor capability to manage a nuclear war today. He noted that these weaknesses imply a weak bargaining position for us in a crisis, and this in turn implies a weakening of deterrence. Thus, the three questions are related.

Admiral Turner questioned whether the connection between war management, crisis stability and deterrence stability was one that existed in reality or we created ourselves.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that while one could think of this problem in many ways, the connection between war management, bargaining in a crisis and deterrence exists, and the Soviets must realize that. He also said that moreover they may have an incentive in a crisis to exploit this connection.

Mr. Aaron observed that a bounding case was presented by the ability of one side to completely defeat or destroy the forces of the other. In this situation we would be unable to bargain successfully in a crisis and the Soviets would not be deterred. At this sort of extreme the connection must exist. Short of this extremes, we must weigh the tradeoffs involved in improving war management capabilities and how such improvements will affect crisis management and deterrent stability.

Secretary Brown observed that weighing the role of war management capabilities is a matter of judgment and that he personally places little stock in many controlled war scenarios. He did feel, however, that large asymmetries in enduring war management capability could affect crisis bargaining and conflict outcomes. In any case, the side that perceived itself inferior in this respect would be extremely nervous in a crisis.

Dr. Brzezinski commented that in democratic societies such nervousness would spill out into the public with obvious political effects.

The discussion then turned to the first agenda item: China in the SIOP.

Secretary Brown summarized the DOD point paper noting that at present there are [4 lines not declassified] *Secretary Brown* judged that the current US/Soviet strategic balance argued that SIOP weapons now allocated to China would be better used against Soviet targets, but he asked whether the military gain from such a shift, should it become public, would be worth the possible political problems created.

Dr. Brzezinski asked about the security of such information.

³ See Document 118.

General Seignious asked whether such information had ever leaked, and who knew now whether or not China was in the SIOP.

Dr. Brzezinski questioned whether this was a change of great magnitude and asked what it would take to accomplish it.

Secretary Brown commented that taking China out of the SIOP could be accomplished quite simply in the preparation of the next SIOP revision. Approximately a hundred people would have significant knowledge of the change effected, but many more could be aware that a change had taken place.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if we must say that China had been taken out of the SIOP.

Secretary Brown answered we could ask for an RNO against China and simply retarget the current SIOP weapons used against China. He noted that this would be useful, but that if it came out it would still raise political problems. For example, as in the matter of arms transfers, would not removal of China from the SIOP *per se* imply some change in our "even handedness" toward Moscow and Peking?

Dr. Brzezinski favored making the move and proposed a further question—should Cuba be in the SIOP?

General Jones pointed out that at present [2 lines not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski responded by noting that Cuba's absence from the "black book" would require someone to remind the National Command Authority that military targets in Cuba might have to be attacked; for example, general purpose forces with possible strategic implications.

Secretary Brown said we could put a Cuban option in the black book simply by inserting a page.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether China and Cuba could be treated in a like manner, [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Jones observed that China is in any case covered by [less than 1 line not declassified] attack options [less than 1 line not declassified]

Secretary Brown proposed to structure a decision paper for the President in which the option for attacking China would be changed [1 line not declassified] and the current SIOP weapons targeted against China would be retargeted against the Soviet Union.

Deputy Secretary Christopher questioned the assumption made in the background paper that removing China from the SIOP, if it became public, would not have a lasting effect on US/Soviet relations.

Secretary Brown noted his agreement with Christopher and that he had not repeated this statement in his summary of the paper. He observed further that if the Soviets became upset over major US exercises, one should expect them to be disturbed over a change of China's status in our strategic targeting.

Dr. Brzezinski thought it absurd that Soviet peacetime sensitivities should be allowed to influence our deliberations on war plans toward the Soviet Union in this way. He believed that we, like the Soviets, should shape war plans for maximum military effect.

Secretary Brown then noted that treating China and Cuba in an equivalent manner undermines any arguments that this change in targeting plans implies that we are forming some sort of alliance with China.

Secretary Brown noted that we could simply take [2 lines not declassified]

Mr. Aaron asked whether the systems thus directed against China would be as capable and survivable as those currently used.

Secretary Brown responded that the change would in the main mean retargeting some bomber weapons.

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked how China's current status in the SIOP had come about, noting that China had only recently begun to acquire ICBMs; why should we reduce China's status in the SIOP now, and why had we put China in the SIOP in the first place?

Secretary Brown replied while China had been weaker in the past, US/China relations had also been more hostile.

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked the group to imagine the public reaction should some reduction of strategic targeting against China be revealed.

Dr. Brzezinski commented that the strategic balance between the US and USSR was shifting unfavorably and we should alter our war plans to make the best of the situation. Should this leak and upset the Soviets, too bad.

Secretary Brown observed that the question was not whether to make a sensible move in targeting plans, but how to explain the change if it had to be explained.

Dr. Brzezinski thought we should design the best plans and then worry about how to explain them if need be.

Secretary Brown repeated that it looked like the best approach would be to put most of the [less than 1 line not declassified] SIOP weapons now targeted on China against Soviet targets while covering China targets [less than 1 line not declassified]

General Smith asserted it would still be appropriate to [1 line not declassified]

Dr. Brzezinski called for a decision paper to lay out a plan and its possible political implications for the President.

The discussion then turned to the second agenda item: asymmetries in population fatalities and leadership targeting.

Secretary Brown summarized the DOD point paper on population targeting by noting the great uncertainties that would exist in the event the population were dispersed, and how those uncertainties about the real location of the Soviet population could cause gross misallocations of weapons. He noted that DOD had studies underway to reduce uncertainties as to population location specifically, on how and at what times it might be targetable, but these studies are not yet complete.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how the logic of targeting Soviet population would be affected by the presence or the absence of US population dispersal.

Admiral Murphy noted that DOD studies were not looking at US population dispersal.

Secretary Brown commented that question here was how to target Soviet population in the presence of uncertainty as to where it would be located.

Dr. Brzezinski said that our approach to targeting Soviet population should be influenced by any asymmetries in the vulnerability of the respective populations.

Secretary Brown noted that the not yet existing FEMA was now custodian of the US side of the problem, but that DOD would have to do the evaluation looking at both sides.

Mr. Slocombe promised to report back with a schedule and an outline for a study of relative population vulnerabilities and their relation to targeting.

Spurgeon Keeny reminded the group that much data was available from earlier Civil Defense studies.

Mr. Slocombe pointed out that those studies contain artificial assumptions about the actual locations of Soviet evacuated population.

Secretary Brown called attention to a recent Soviet Civil Defense CPX that revealed some information on CD planning for Petropavlovsk. He noted that some 16% of the population covered by that paper exercise had been expected to become casualties.

Dr. Brzezinski reaffirmed the need for an outline and a target date for a study of this issue.

Secretary Brown then introduced the discussion of targeting leadership: Our basic problem is we don't know how the Soviet leadership would function and where in fact it would be in a war. We now target their peacetime locations and known bunkers, but they have many bunkers (all of which we can't be sure we know about) and elaborate hardened communications. This is one reason, he said, why accurate missile warheads are useful. He observed that the US leadership structure appeared much more vulnerable in this respect and our problem here was mainly to fix our vulnerabilities.

Admiral Turner questioned whether the Soviet leadership was really a lot less vulnerable than the US.

Secretary Brown judged that the US leadership was substantially more vulnerable; it would not have the kind of hardened C³ the Soviets have. He also noted that we rely much more heavily on airborne assets.

Mr. Stoertz observed that we are continually discovering new aspects of Soviet leadership protection, and noted that the Soviets are giving increased attention to mobile, especially airborne, facilities.

David Aaron asked if we are primarily discovering new facilities or rather newly discovering facilities that had existed for some time. *Stoertz* answered—mostly the latter.

General Jones commented that from a war management point of view, a key issue for US targeting against Soviet leadership was how the Soviets arranged for the devolution of top authority down the chain of command.

Admiral Turner repeated his judgment that leadership and C³ would probably prove highly fragile in both countries.

Secretary Brown agreed and observed that we needed more study to determine how to fix our vulnerabilities and exploit those of the Soviet Union.

Director Seignious commented that attack timing was crucial; Soviet SLBMs could reach US leadership targets very quickly.

Secretary Brown noted that US ICBMs could reach Soviet targets in [less than 1 line not declassified]

Director Seignious repeated that the difference between SLBM flight times to US leadership targets and ICBM flight times to Soviet leadership targets could be extremely important.

Secretary Brown commented that it was most important to reduce our vulnerabilities in this respect and to develop counter-C³-leadership targeting options against the Soviet Union.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what Presidential decisions were involved here: a separate leadership targeting package? Budgets for C³ improvements?

Mr. Aaron asked what are the implications of targeting Soviet leadership and C³ assets. Would it be wise to destroy Soviet ability to withhold and control strategic forces from the center?

Secretary Brown responded that this depended on how one viewed various conflict scenarios which he thought intrinsically implausible, for example, would an initial Soviet attack leave a large Soviet reserve force? A US counter-C³ strike could reduce Soviet ability to use that reserve efficiently.

Mr. Aaron commented that the value of such strikes depends on whether you believe strikes by withheld Soviet forces would simply become automatic if the Soviets' top leadership disappeared.

Mr. Slocombe commented that one could make distinctions between military C³ and national political leadership.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that a crisis or conflict bargaining advantage could go to the side whose leadership and C³ system could endure over time. This might give the Soviets incentives to protract a conflict scenario.

Mr. Aaron observed that our vulnerabilities sprang from failures to pay sufficient attention to this problem in the past, but asked whether we would not be in rather good shape if we succeeded in getting our leadership and C³ assets airborne.

Secretary Brown responded that a protracted conflict with strategic strikes over time would tax the endurance of our airborne assets.

Dr. Brzezinski expressed doubt as to whether an airborne US leadership could maintain political control during a war.

General Jones noted that current plans contain leadership targeting options which can be used or withheld. The question is whether the intended targets will actually contain the Soviets leaders when the weapons arrive.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the current options for targeting leadership and C³ are adequate.

General Jones said that the options need improvements but that the kinds of improvements needed aren't really political issues.

Secretary Brown observed that our ability to successfully attack Soviet leadership and related C³ appears to require very early strikes in a conflict.

General Jones noted that many strategic war games and exchange analyses were very misleading because they did not take into account the affects on each side of strikes on its C³. This is particularly important in assessing retaliatory capabilities.

Secretary Brown noted that DOD is moving forward on these issues.

Regionalization was then discussed.

Secretary Brown observed that we had acquired only the poorest insight into the political aspects of this issue. We simply would not know what effects various approaches to targeting would have on the unity of the Soviet State. Would they fly apart or rally round the flag? If we spared certain regions in the hopes they would split off from central Soviet authority and they failed to do so, would we not in effect spare Soviet resources for continuing and recovering from the conflict? Would disclosure of a "regionalization strategy" cause the Soviets to tighten peacetime control in the provinces? Secretary Brown summed up by noting that the matter remained somewhat academic until we get a better handle on how such a strategy could be implemented.

Dr. Brzezinski commented that we should forget the political effects for the time being and first look at how in practice one could implement a targeting strategy that inflicts higher levels of damage on the great Russians, and creates fears that the Soviet Union would dissolve.

Mr. Aaron recommended that a special look should be taken at strikes by theater forces against Eastern Europe in the light of the potential of those countries to break away from Soviet authority. He also noted that we should examine counter declaratory strategy too.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that strategic war is still political and that we had to exploit any possible advantages since our margins of strategic strength had narrowed. More discriminating targeting may be of considerable value.

Secretary Brown observed that however one approached “regionalization,” it seemed to imply the capabilities for very discriminating use of our weapons.

Targeting industry was then discussed.

Secretary Brown began by noting that he believes that there would be little practical distinction between targeting economic recovery resources and a general urban industrial target set.

Mr. Slocombe said that war supporting industry should be a war option and would be narrower than the current package for attacking Soviet industry. He went on to explain that out of some [*less than one line not declassified*] economic facilities, DOD had attempted to identify [*less than one line not declassified*] key installations that would be directly supportive of a general war effort, [*4 lines not declassified*]

Secretary Brown observed that such a war supporting industry attack would cause far fewer fatalities than a general urban industrial attack. Fatalities could be reduced further by evacuation on the Soviet side and by careful targeting by the US.

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked if population would be targeted.

Secretary Brown answered that targeting population would not be the objective. *Secretary Brown* went on to say that war supporting industry could be distinguished from general economic targets, the latter would be included in the general urban industrial target set.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that one could attack war supporting industry along with strategic and general purpose force targets.

General Smith asked how war supporting industry would be defined.

Secretary Brown replied that our target data base has such a category.

Dr. Brzezinski commented that attacks on war supporting industry might make sense in a limited but sustained conflict not involving general strikes against each other’s economic targets.

Secretary Brown observed that we were then talking about two distinguishable target sets: (a) war-supporting industry, a relatively small set which could be attacked with or without special efforts to reduce collateral fatalities, and (b) an urban industrial or general economic target set, very large and practically indistinguishable from what is targeted under the criterion of suppressing economic recovery, which could be withheld to counter coercion and perhaps terminate the conflict.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that while the utility of discretely targeting war supporting industry might not easily be measured, it was likely to be positive.

Mr. Aaron thought it would nevertheless be useful to attempt to measure the potential effects of such a targeting package including the expected levels of collateral fatalities and the potential effect on the Soviets capability to wage war.

Secretary Brown noted that collateral fatalities from targeting war supporting industry could be quite low.

Mr. Slocombe observed that such targeting might involve 10–15 million fatalities if no care were taken to avoid them.

Warren Christopher asked if we are simply discussing possibilities or proposing to recommend some specific action.

Secretary Brown proposed that a war supporting industry package for inclusion the SIOP be prepared for Presidential decision.

Dr. Brzezinski said that this should be developed along with measures of the utility of such a targeting option.

Secretary Brown observed that the utility of targeting war supporting industry would be scenario dependent, for example, whether Soviet general purpose forces were engaged and could be degraded by the loss to those industries.

Mr. Slocombe then noted that, setting aside war supporting industry, the practical difference between targeting against recovery and general urban industrial targets could not be usefully measured.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that the distinction was not too useful for deterrence.

Mr. Keeny concluded on this agenda topic with the observation that the threat to urban industrial targets overall was most important for deterrence.

The discussion then turned to the topic of hard-target capability.

Secretary Brown observed that over the years US planners had worried a great deal about the potentially adverse implications for arms control and stability of US threats to Soviet silo-based forces. The Soviets on the other hand showed no signs of reciprocating this concern at all. He noted that in our own programs the accuracy improvements

that enhanced our capability to attack hard targets came fairly naturally and at low cost with improving technology. Our ICBMs had improved steadily in accuracy, SLBMs were coming along behind them. The basic questions remain: what advantages would we derive from improved hard-target capabilities? And how destabilizing might they be?

Secretary Brown observed that, should the Soviets not believe their silos to be threatened, they derive a large cost saving because they can retain their present capability in silos for about a third of what it would cost them to buy and operate an equivalent capability in a mobile mode. On the other hand, they probably already believe that Mark 12A, and Trident will constitute effective hard target threats to which they will have to react somehow. It would appear that we are debating with ourselves about the stability issue aspects and hard target capabilities.

Secretary Brown commented that the President's latest speech containing remarks about the large fraction of Soviet capability in potentially vulnerable silos may have misconstrued the issue. With $\frac{3}{4}$'s of their capability in silos, should they double that capability, they would have $\frac{7}{8}$'s of their vastly increased total capability in potentially vulnerable silos, but the invulnerable portion of their forces would remain the same in absolute size. He wondered which side would worry most about such a situation and speculated that we would.

Deputy Secretary Christopher commented that stability remained the central issue.

Secretary Brown put the question as to whether two hair trigger capabilities were more dangerous than one, if our increasing vulnerabilities made us more likely to preempt, and stated that he didn't think so.

Director Seignious noted that the Congress showed a lot of concern about the dangers of US hard target capability.

Secretary Brown commented that the vulnerability of our ICBM force could in a crisis increase our incentives to go first [2 lines not declassified] or effecting concentrated attack on Soviet SS-18s.

Mr. Slocombe added that targeting all our Mark 12A warheads on the SS-18 force would be quite effective and a strong incentive for our preempting.

Mr. Aaron asked Stan Turner whether the Soviets showed any sign of sensitivity to our debates about stability.

Director Turner replied that the Soviets seemed quite unconcerned about stability in a two-sided sense. They appear to believe in war-fighting for meaningful military objectives, were concerned about the size of their residual force after an exchange, and seemed unconcerned that such a pursuit of an improved sense of security for themselves produces insecurity for their opponent.

Director Seignious asked whether any Soviets perceive any meaningful advantage to be gained from any form of nuclear conflict.

Secretary Brown replied that some Soviet military believe war should be fought to win and try to plan accordingly.

Mr. Stoertz observed that in Soviet eyes, this does not mean that they would commit willful aggression, but rather that beleaguered capitalist states would precipitate a war in which they might want to preempt.

Secretary Brown voiced the opinion that concern about destabilizing implications of US hard target capability was probably misplaced, but that this was nonetheless a matter of concern on the Hill. Some people in Congress suggest that we should make M-X inaccurate to preserve crisis stability and to leave the Soviet Union more confident of the survivability of their strategic forces. He voiced the fear, however, that such Soviet confidence coexisting with a Soviet ability to threaten US forces could lead to adventuresome Soviet actions. And we, being on the low end of this asymmetry, might be either deterred from responding to Soviet challenges or compelled to preempt with our vulnerable strategic forces.

Mr. Aaron commented that this situation was a recipe for miscalculations.

Secretary Brown commented that if we had effective hard target capabilities, it would be appropriate to target them against silos.

Mr. Aaron asked whether we couldn't get hard target capabilities in SLBMs, preferably because they are invulnerable.

Secretary Brown responded that while SLBMs can in time become accurate enough to kill silos, C³ problems may not allow them to be launched quickly enough.

Mr. Utgoff noted that good communications to SSBN's close to the U.S. were possible and that this is one of the reasons that a long range SLBM was important.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how was this an issue for the President, what must he decide?

Secretary Brown responded that we are going to have some improvement in hard target capabilities if we modernize our forces. ICBMs are going to be more accurate, and SLBMs will follow close behind. The key issue is that we need less vulnerable quick response hard target capabilities.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if one could say that we need an improved hard target kill capability because the Soviets have closed the gap in overall strategic forces capabilities?

Mr. Aaron asked whether we could achieve the needed hard target capabilities with cruise missiles.

Secretary Brown expressed doubts on the basis that the Soviets could possibly reload their silos faster than cruise missiles could arrive. He argued that the Soviets might be able to reload their silos in as little as 12 hours.

Mr. Stoertz disputed this point by observing that it would take a couple of days for the Soviets to reload silos *during a conflict*.

Mr. Aaron disagreed with Harold's opinion that the stability aspects of US hard target capability had become moot. He observed that the respective vulnerabilities of the two sides' forces would be a much more important variable in determining whether a crisis led to war than the other aspects of employment policy so far debated. He called for a much better paper that treated the stability issues, the need for quick as opposed to slow hard target capability and the merits of SLBMs vs ICBMs as potential hard target weapons.

Dr. Brzezinski asked that the next SCC on targeting return to the question of hard target capability and that in the meantime a careful paper be written on this issue. This paper should be organized in terms of the 3 questions he had originally posed and should consider the impact of the changing strategic balance. The next SCC would also take up the remaining agenda items as well as the questions of targeting moving general purpose forces and the size and role of the secure reserve force.

Deputy Secretary Christopher endorsed David Aaron's observations on the importance of the hard target issue and recommended that DOD's paper be done on an interagency basis.

Director Seignious questioned whether the President should be obliged to deal personally with the hard target stability issue at all before SALT II is ratified.

Secretary Brown commented that the President must make a decision on M-X and therefore its implications for hard target capability cannot be avoided.

Director Seignious repeated the fact that Presidential decisions on this specific issue of hard target capability prior to SALT II ratification would be dangerous.

Mr. Aaron repeated his call for a thorough examination of the strategic risks and advantages of improved hard target capability.

Dr. Brzezinski called for DOD to lead in the preparation of the appropriate paper and to have an interagency group review the paper to insure that all the important points of view are considered. At this point, the meeting was adjourned.

126. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 26, 1979

SUBJECT

The President's M-X Basing Decision (U)

My present understanding is that the DOD will offer the President two options which it regards as acceptable: MPS and "Enhanced DIAD". The latter may be called "Variant TRIAD" or some such, but it amounts to the same thing: foregoing any rebased ICBM and putting the strategic force modernization effort into the sea-based and air-breathing force elements. (TS)

The DOD will recommend rejecting several alternatives as unacceptable: All air-mobile combinations will be rejected because the 200 missile force is vastly too expensive, while smaller forces sized to a reasonable budget have much too little capability for the still very large outlay required. The truck/land mobile option boils down, evidently, to the road mobile version. I'm not sure how the argument will be made, but would expect it to be rejected because a) it depends on strategic warning when the threat of strategic surprise is too high for comfort, and b) the missile must be small (i.e., 4-5 RVs) to fit on a road-mobile truck. Off-road mobile truck, which could physically be designed to carry a larger missile (10 RVs), is probably out because it is just too big and destructive to operate off government land, even in crisis. (TS)

As I say, these are informed expectations, not firm advanced notice of what is coming. Harold Brown and Bill Perry will probably put their own spin on the recommendations and the analysis of each option. Moreover, the plan calls for them to make their recommendations only after the PRC has reacted to the full set of options. Hence, some cheap version of the air mobile option, e.g., 50-70 missiles in aircraft, 100-150 in silos, might be presented as "barely acceptable" under pressure and over the bitter opposition of the professionals. (TS)

Thinking through the politics of this decision is important not only because the President wants to come through it politically and wants it to help SALT, but the credibility of the decision is itself important to the national security, allied confidence, Soviet respect, etc. (TS)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 6, MX Missiles: 4/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information.

Whatever his leaning, the President ought to give the most serious consideration to involving the Congressional leadership through consultation prior to the decision. (I know of no such effort so far by the White House.) Of course, Congress has been kept abreast of the proceedings inside DOD through OSD and Air Force channels. My impression is that this has softened opposition to MPS a great deal and perhaps even created some pressure for it, but these reports come from biased Air Force sources. In any case, the President has a right to a clear view of Congressional sentiment before he makes his decision. He would profit from such consultations. They could take off some of the political heat and make the final choice go down more easily, especially in relation to SALT ratification, by sharing the responsibility a bit. (TS)

I see four possible scenarios: one good, one marginal, and two disasters. They are influenced by my own judgment as to what is required for strategic security, and by my sense of the political setting.

1. *Good Scenario: MPS*

The President decides for the MPS option. He declares that we definitely need a new ICBM for essential equivalence, survivability, endurance, and flexibility. He notes that this is the most cost effective of the serious alternatives and probably half as costly as the equivalent air mobile option. He reports that his doubts about the verification problem have been largely laid to rest: We can make our MPS verifiable. With the same cooperation, a like Soviet system would also be verifiable.² Moreover, mobile alternatives the Soviets are likely to prefer and which cannot be simply denied the Soviets, i.e., truck, are likely to be even harder to verify. Only were we able to ban all kinds of land-mobile deployment modes—which is unrealistic—can we avoid the kinds of verification challenges requiring cooperation as in MPS. (TS)

Should the Soviets not be cooperative on verification modalities for MPS, or whatever mobile ICBM mode they choose, or should they otherwise give us serious concern about a breakout threat of more RVs to swamp our MPS target array in the later 1980s, then we would have to consider enlarging the number of shelter/aim points and building an ABM defense overlay (which could be very efficient because it could preferentially defend only full holes while the Soviets would have to attack all of them as though they were full and defended). (TS)

MPS basing would leave us the path of reducing land-based ICBMs in the future, first those in silos, and then those in mobile deployments. A major virtue of the MPS systems is that the number of missiles in it can be reduced without allowing the enemy to “gang up” on and

² Brzezinski underlined the word “cooperation” and drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

thereby reduce the survivability of the remainder. The air and truck alternatives do not have this feature. (TS)

This scenario would draw fire from the Left, which doesn't care about the basing much but wants to kill M-X (and will probably try to kill Trident 2, at least as a hard target weapon, if M-X is cancelled). The Right, of course wants to see M-X go forward and, even more perhaps, to victimize the President if it doesn't; it cares less about the basing mode. As things stand now, this scenario would be a measurable, but not overwhelming, net plus for SALT ratification. The anti-SALT votes will not be changed; but their persuasiveness with the moderates will be lessened. The President will look like a man who can stand tall on defense, even over his own earlier feelings. There is no question that this perception would be good for SALT. He would have to comfort himself in a way that avoided the appearance of being pushed by the Pentagon into supporting M-X because of SALT. This would make him look vacillating to all and especially untrustworthy to pro-defense sentiment. (TS)

2. Marginal Scenario: Augmented DYAD.

In this scenario, the President would say he was, in essence, choosing to rebase ICBMs in what all agree to be the single most survivable basing mode, in SSBNs. Trident 2 would be our new ICBM and would be accelerated to, say, 1986.³ We would also speed up development of a) a cruise missile carrier,⁴ b) a follow-on ALCM, and c) a possible advanced penetrator aircraft for the very late 1980s.⁵ We would also stress improvements to C³I, basing, and transwar support to assure that the SSBN and air-breathing legs would be surviving, enduring, flexible, and inherently diversified. We would also keep most of the Minutemen in their silos for synergistic protection of aircraft, limited operations, and possible launch-on-warning. (TS)

The trouble with this scenario is that the headline would be "Carter Cancels M-X". Many critics would contend that a combination of Soviet missile programs, Soviet hard bargaining at SALT, and disdain for US strategic power in the Administration had basically run the US out of the ICBM business while the Soviets remained comfortably in their silos.⁶ (TS)

³ Brzezinski underlined the words "to, say, 1986" and wrote "(1) Trident II—accelerated—[illegible]" at the bottom of the page.

⁴ Brzezinski underlined the words "a) a cruise" and wrote "(2) ALCM carrier" at the bottom of the page.

⁵ Brzezinski underlined the word "late" and wrote "(3) [illegible]" at the bottom of the page.

⁶ Brzezinski drew a vertical line and wrote "some mix?" in the left margin next to this paragraph.

Therefore, in addition to explaining what he would do to make the DYAD assuredly survivable, the President would have to explain what he was also doing to make the Soviets strategically uncomfortable in their silos. He would have to stress that the Trident 2 would definitely be a hard-target killer with his full support, both to meet warfighting objectives and to force the Soviets to worry about stability and ICBM reductions. In short, the President would have to stress not only that he is paying the “survivability tax” that the Soviets had imposed on us, but he is going to impose that tax on the Soviets in return. He might also hint that because of increased US reliance on SSBNs we would increase our submerged ASW capability and thereby give ourselves options to imperil Soviet SSBNs in some situations. (TS)

To borrow from boxing, this scenario involves fast footwork (evading the Soviet counter-silo threat) and counter-punching (purposely making Soviet silos vulnerable—you could also do that with MPS but it would not have to be emphasized politically). The major flaw in it is that the President would readily sign up for the fast footwork, but not believe in the necessity for counterpunching. And even if he said the right things, as the author of the statement that one SSBN can destroy all Soviet large and medium cities, he would not be believed. Politically, you have to start from a very credible stance on strategic issues to make this scenario viable. (TS)

I, for one, do believe that the DYAD scenario can be made to work politically and strategically, at home, with allies, and with the Soviets.⁷ But it requires a determination to follow through on the counter-punching elements (hard target kill and ASW), a tough campaign for future reductions in ICBMs, and a competitive thrust to our strategic behavior that I do not believe this Administration is up to. Therefore, I strongly recommend that this scenario not be adopted.⁸ It would draw tremendous fire from the Right and still face opposition to needed improvements from the Left. But I describe it to lay out the minimum essential conditions for making it work plausibly.

3. *Disaster: DYAD without “Counterpunching”*

The President is likely to face a political disaster, for SALT and his reelection prospects, if he opts for the DYAD and tries to sell it in terms of cost effectiveness, ease of verification, and avoidance of the strategic challenge to the Soviets represented by M–X in MPS. If he fails to stress and follow through on the counterpunching themes of the DYAD option, it will look like strategic appeasement. (TS)

⁷ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

⁸ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

4. Disaster: Air-mobile or Hybrids Thereof

The President may choose the air mobile concept over Harold's objections or after persuading Harold to agree that it is a very poor third, but acceptable, choice. Much of the defense technical establishment, including the Air Force, is very likely to be hard against him. The budgeteers will shudder at the cost implications. And everyone will really doubt whether the President intends to follow through. This will look like an interim effort to make it seem like M-X is going forward, while avoiding selection of MPS. Some in the defense community might be willing to go along because they would believe that a new Administration would review the issue. In the meantime, we would at least keep moving on M-X. But these sentiments would clearly be the opposite of the strategic consensus that we need. (TS)

An equally bad variant on this disaster would occur if the President selected truck mobile. Over the long term, trucks are a sensible option to continue to explore, perhaps as a later 1980s adjunct to DYAD or MPS. But they are anything but an answer to the Minuteman survivability problem now, politically or strategically.⁹ (TS)

Therefore, the real options are MPS or DYAD, the latter accompanied by a very tough strategic line that will be extremely difficult to adopt or make convincing. (TS)

You should understand that the above judgments are informed by a fairly conventional appreciation of the technical and strategic arguments as DOD seems likely to present them, on one hand, and a very subjective view of what the political situation warrants, on the other. We know that the Congress wants urgently and SALT requires urgently a firm decision on ICBM basing. But I worry that our understanding of Congressional sentiment on a) how vital M-X *per se* is, and b) on the basing choices is not sufficiently firm to plot one of the two workable scenarios in political terms. (TS)

Suggesting now that the President is leaning against M-X and for DYAD (which he implied in his New York speech)¹⁰ has grave risks. The press is already onto this. What we should do is get a better sense of Congressional views on the basing options now, knowing that they won't become firm until the President has begun consultations and made a decision.¹¹ (TS)

⁹ Brzezinski underlined the word "now," drew a vertical line and wrote "Why? The others are later" in the left margin next to this sentence.

¹⁰ Reference is to Carter's April 25 remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, pp. 693-699)

¹¹ Ermarth wrote a postscript at the bottom of the page: "Zbig, These are my own thoughts. Once DOD comes over with its 30 April report, I'm happy to work this problem jointly with Vic et al. F."

127. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 30, 1979

SUBJECT

CNA-78 (U)

A. (TS) The Comprehensive Net Assessment, 1978, is a much needed review of the elements of our competition with the Soviet Union.² However, I believe that in many ways it paints too optimistic a picture of our current position. In particular, your assessment of world attitudes, although correct as of today, does not consider adequately the relation among the dislike, the respect, and the fear with which the USSR is regarded. Is it better to be feared or loved (or rather, not disliked)? "The Prince" gave one answer. Another comparison that is inadequately addressed, I think, is the respective vulnerability of the US and the USSR to economic and political forces over which we may have little control. In a number of areas we, perhaps more than the Soviet Union, face serious risks that could significantly alter the current balance. I would like to note some of these for your consideration. Further, in keeping with the format of your assessment, I would like to comment on the military balance, where I would again take some exception to the picture you present; in some cases it seems too optimistic, in others perhaps too pessimistic.

(S) The most important changes in the non-military aspects, of our world position vis-a-vis the USSR, have been (not necessarily in order of importance):

1. The President's stress on human rights, which has been instrumental in improving our image throughout the world.

2. Our increasing energy vulnerability, coupled with the recent upheavals in Iran and Soviet penetration of Afghanistan and the Red Sea area.

3. The achievement of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, reaffirming the US role as the only major power who can talk effectively to most if not all of the significant Middle East players.

4. The widening PRC door to the West, including the Sino-Japanese treaty, and a major (though tactical and perhaps temporary) PRC attempt to play "the American card."

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel: Miscellaneous: 5/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent via Alpha Channel. A copy was sent to Vance.

² See Document 95.

5. Continuing US-Soviet competition in Africa, with the Soviets setting the pace, increasing their influence and also African apprehensions about them.

6. Continued and perhaps increasing strains in the Warsaw Pact alliance.

7. FRG reexamination of its policies toward Eastern Europe and the USSR, prompted both by internal politics and perhaps a perceived change in the balance of external factors.

8. Continued turmoil in Southeast Asia and increased Soviet influence there.

9. Aborted US efforts to establish normal relations with Cuba, and the increasing violent opposition to repressive regimes in Central and South America.

10. The growth of Euro-communism and terrorism, with increased general political instability from Portugal to Turkey.

B. (S) Although the President's personal involvement and moral leadership have given the US again an image of decency and fairness in world affairs, we cannot count on friendships alone to preserve US interests. In areas where changes have occurred, even to our benefit, there remain serious risks. My review of the above list suggests to me we live in a less benign world than we did two years ago, and that we face increased chances for major political and economic setbacks. The question is how nations now friendly to us will behave if faced with internal upheaval or external threats backed by Soviet power. As but one example, we have more friends in Africa today than two years ago, but the Soviets and their Cuban allies are more of a military force in that area because of their successful operations in Ethiopia and their demonstrated willingness to intervene militarily in their interest. Thus, I do not believe that any estimate of the numbers of our friends in the world, as provided in your assessment, is a reliable measure of our influence—especially as in that table Botswana, Belgium and Brazil are counted equally.

1. (TS) Of central concern is our continuing vulnerability to interruption (political or military) of oil from the Persian Gulf. In spite of the Administration's intensive efforts to produce a coherent energy program with Congress, we cannot foresee independence from Gulf oil for more than a decade—perhaps much longer than that. Our Allies will remain dependent through the turn of the century. Should that oil flow be cut off, the western alliance would have few alternatives but to try to reopen the Gulf by military force or to accommodate politically in whatever way was demanded to restore the flow. The prospects of successful use of military force to this end are at best uncertain. Continued loss of Gulf oil would not only destroy western economies, it would threaten fragmentation of the alliance itself. I believe that this situation poses a most grave risk to us, one which has increased dramatically in the past two years, and with no counterpart that the Soviets face.

(S) There is the additional economic threat posed by even the current oil situation. Our and our allies' economies are vulnerable to major oil price increases—say of a factor of two or more in real dollars. In the long run such a price rise would create alternative energy sources; in the short run it would be disastrous. We now pay \$45 billion to foreign nations to import oil—roughly one third our Defense budget. That number will surely increase this year with adverse effects on our balance of payments and further stimulation of inflation. So long as these trends continue, our own economic health lies in the hands of others. The Soviet Union's energy problems are not of this magnitude, nor so susceptible of manipulation by others.

2. (S) Oil is not our only strategic import. We must likewise import cobalt, chrome, and a variety of other materials which may be subject to cut-off or arbitrarily increased prices. We will be increasingly dependent on world trade in the coming years. Again, though the Soviet empire is not at times self-sufficient in agricultural commodities, it remains so in raw materials. And it can accommodate, albeit painfully, to agricultural deficit by shifting its ratio of consumption of meat to cereal.

3. (C) I am convinced that, as your assessment notes, we will continue to maintain and expand our world trade and political leadership in international affairs. The appeal of western concern for the individual citizen and his economic welfare remains in stark contrast to Soviet oppression. Yet it is this very contrast that, in my view, continues to pose problems for the Soviets—problems they may choose to solve internationally by subversion or force, their own or surrogates'. Thus, it is in part *because* of our political and economic appeal, and their lack of it, that we may face increased risk of the use of military force from the Soviets.

4. (C) In a different way, our international economic competition with the USSR is affected strongly by the Soviet concentration on *military* research and development. The opportunity cost of this concentration is a deprived non-defense industry which cannot compete in the worldwide commercial market. Soviet technology might instead be used to improve production of commercial aircraft, autos, trucks and oil, and to develop a petro-chemical industry—but it is not. We and our Allies, in contrast, exploit our technology in non-defense industries to develop and sustain a clear competitive advantage vis-a-vis the Soviets in world markets. In the past two years, we have maintained this advantage, with concomitant international, economic and political benefits. For example, China's interest in normalized relations with us has been driven in part by US technical superiority. This coupling of our commercial leadership with a free, political tradition is, in my view, our strongest international asset. Thus, I would be loath to trade to the Soviets our technical lead in any area for short-term or unsure political

accommodations. In this regard I differ with some of the suggestions in your assessment.

C. (TS) On the general military balance, I believe your assessment may be in some places too stark (on strategic forces) and in others too optimistic (general purpose forces).

1. I concur that after certain worst-case Soviet attacks on our strategic forces, and our retaliation on theirs, we would have about 10 percent less deliverable warheads than the Soviets would (1982 estimate), and far less megatonnage. On the other hand, I believe such estimates must be viewed in light of the assumptions involved, recognizing that a scenario approach is only one consideration:

a. Such a "military" attack on the US would involve the detonation of 2000 or more megaton-sized warheads on US soil. The resulting fatalities, direct and from fallout, would probably exceed in a few days time the losses in Europe in World War II. I think it unlikely that we would try to "ride out" such an attack, or respond as calculated. Still less could the Soviets count on our doing so.

b. Even if we chose to wait, we would have about 3000 remaining deliverable strategic nuclear warheads, after we struck at residual Soviet strategic forces. Thus, it is not clear what the Soviets could gain by the initial attack.

c. For safety we make calculations assuming fully generated Soviet forces with US forces on day-to-day alert. If either a preceding period of tension is assumed or some strategic warning, enough US forces are generated to alter the residual warhead balance in our favor.

d. We could alter the bomber alert rate in the 1980's, albeit at some cost, to rectify perceived imbalance, and can in other ways, if we choose, add modest numbers of warheads by 1985.

e. By the mid-to-late 1980's with the advent of TRIDENT and M-X, the calculations will become more favorable for us.

(TS) I do not wish to imply I am content with our strategic position. Indeed, the trends are quite bad over the next five years. Deficiencies in our C³ survivability and endurance are particularly troubling. And we cannot be other than greatly concerned about Soviet advantages in many measures of strategic force capability—and in TNF and conventional forces as well—in the early-to-mid 1980's. A confident, aggressive Soviet leadership is likely to have a relaxed attitude toward precipitating crises, and in them. The potential for miscalculation and catastrophe will be substantial. I therefore think we need to increase our strategic force programs above what is now approved. Without that, I foresee grave difficulties. But I do not feel that the nation is now in peril because of the strategic balance or that we are now so perceived by our friends and Allies.

2. (S) Conversely, I am concerned about your estimate that we have begun to achieve a better balance in NATO. I certainly agree that the LTDP is a great step forward, but it is as yet only promise. The actions

of both Congress and inflation on our FY 1980 budget are yet to be seen. We have not yet achieved any major changes in our actual capabilities in Europe. The Pact strength grows on the basis of its previously established momentum. Soviet theater nuclear forces are being modernized to the alarm of our Allies. In addition to strengthening our forces and our lift, we must improve our C³, electronic warfare, and intelligence. All of this will take time and money, which we have decided to provide but whose results do not yet show. The US will need to exercise vigorous leadership in NATO on the LTDP, and especially on theater nuclear forces.

(S) Currently, the Soviet Union fields forces that would cost us 40 percent more than we are now spending annually, and is increasing its expenditures by not less than three percent per year. In total, NATO and the Warsaw Pact today spend about the same amounts on defense. Unless we can match Pact expansion in the long term, we will slide behind rapidly in military capabilities across the board. In five years, certainly before ten years time, the military balance will in that case have shifted adversely. But well before it does, it will cast before it a political shadow. In any era of strategic nuclear parity (which is the most favorable situation we are likely to have at any time in the 1980's), Soviet conventional capabilities will be more able to threaten our global (what used to be called "strategic") interests.

(S) Because of their larger military forces, and because many of the areas for potential military action are near Soviet borders, the Soviets hold some advantage over us in mounting limited intervention operations. Key areas of concern include the Mid-East, Persian Gulf, and Korea. We are pressing development of quick reaction plans and capabilities, but remain limited by our strategic lift.

3. (S) I must stress that planned funding will not by itself allow us to maintain the precarious military balance that now exists, if the Soviets continue their trends of the past fifteen years. Our FY 1980 obligational authority, the best measure of our long term funding, increased only 1.7 percent in real dollars over 1979 based on 6.5 percent inflation. Our actual FY 1980 obligational authority may show little or no real increases over FY 1979. Furthermore, if current inflation rates persist, the preliminary budget targets for FY 1981 would allow for no real growth. It is unlikely that we will be able to sustain even current force levels should this no-growth policy continue. At the same time, opportunities exist (and will have to be exploited in any event) for greater Allied contributions to military efforts, better cooperation with them to produce greater effectiveness, and several areas of opportunity for exploitation of technological breakthroughs. If we can exploit these various potential advantages while avoiding political dissolution in our alliances and the perhaps even greater risk of an attitude, associated with some in the

new generation, that sees little to choose between democratic and dictatorial values, we may be able to avoid a military-political crisis that would require a return to a defense share of GNP corresponding to that of the 1950's and 1960's (or even the early 1940's). It is less likely that we will be able to hold to the present share. I will present a more detailed analysis of some of these issues in the forthcoming PRC meeting on Defense Consolidated Guidance.

4. (S) In the past two years, the Soviets have continued to stress technology to improve significantly their military capabilities. Military R&D in the Soviet Union is of high priority; the current level of effort as measured in dollars approaches twice that of the US. They are moving forward with an intensive and comprehensive program of development—and deployment—of systems: strategic and tactical; ground, air and naval; nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. We are just now seeing the results of this emphasis in systems being deployed or in advanced testing:

a. Their new ICBM guidance systems (SS-18 and SS-19) will have approximately the accuracy of Minuteman III.

b. Their new SLBM (SS-N-18) has a MIRV system (7 RVs) comparable to TRIDENT I.

c. Their new fighter aircraft are being tested with a look-down shoot-down radar/missile system capable of engaging four low-altitude aircraft simultaneously, similar to the AMRAAM system under development by the US.

All of these are areas where we have enjoyed in the past a significant military advantage because of our substantial technological lead.

(S) Additionally the Soviets are pushing very hard on military technology not yet ready for systems applications. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this is their high energy laser program, where their R&D effort is equivalent to about \$1 billion a year, compared to about \$200 million a year in the US (and that is our largest single technology program). They appear to be moving to prototype weapons, whereas we are still in the exploratory development phase.

(S) As a result of this emphasis on military R&D, the Soviets are closing the quality gap in military systems. The momentum established poses a real problem for the future military balance—affecting the strategic balance in the early 80's and the tactical balance in the late 80's. In addition, there will be an increasing risk during the 80's of a real technological surprise—a Sputnik-like event in the military field leading to both substantive military and perceptual political problems.

(S) On the other hand, the Soviet military R&D program is inefficient. There is unnecessary duplication (e.g., 4-5 parallel new ICBM programs). There appears to be no good way of stopping programs—even low payoff programs such as air defense—once started in earnest.

They spend large amounts of effort on programs that have no obvious payoff (e.g., titanium-hull submarines, large surface effect vehicles, a variety of peculiar aircraft). In addition, the Soviets obtain no real technological support from their Allies. We have Allies with a major technological base, and are developing ways to better share our military R&D burdens.

(C) With continuing Soviet inefficiencies in R&D, with continued emphasis on R&D in our defense program, and with improved cooperation with our Allies, we can successfully compete with the Soviets in military technology, despite their larger spending. However, no longer will we have the large per-vehicle superiority we now enjoy to make up for numerical deficiencies.

5. (TS) In sum, unless we take additional measures soon, I see the military balance shifting in the favor of the Soviet Union. In this regard, I see that trend at a time when the economic and political risks we face in the world are mounting. As the Soviets' capacity to project military power mounts, so apparently does their willingness to use military forces to intervene on a global scale. Thus, I feel we are entering an era where direct military confrontations between the US and the Soviet Union will become more rather than less likely. Should that be true, it is my firm belief that we must be prepared to meet the Soviets wherever we must rapidly and with whatever military capabilities are necessary. The first task of US forces must be to deter military action; they can only do so when it is clear that they are capable of success in any ensuing conflict. Today our military forces are marginal for such deterrence. Tomorrow they may be inadequate.

(TS) In light of these problems, I believe a major review of US policies and forces and budgets should be undertaken by the National Security Council, based on a further assessment of the risks we now face, and the details we will present to the PRC on our programs. I concur that PD-18 remains a valid framework for national strategy,³ but I believe the problems we now face demand more than the "certain changes in emphasis" that your assessment recommends.⁴

Harold Brown

³ See Document 31.

⁴ At the bottom of the page, Brown handwrote a postscript: "Zbig—I believe there should be an NSC meeting on this subject. HB."

**128. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, May 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978 (CNA-78)

We believe CNA-78² is a useful effort to review overall East-West trends and changes since the earlier PRM-10 exercise. The paper correctly confirms most of the broad lines of existing Administration policy in PD-18.³ It also identifies several important issues which deserve and are receiving continuing attention, including:

—US clear-cut non-military advantages and the need to exploit them fully in the on-going competition with Moscow;

—destabilizing Soviet military programs and the need to counter them through military modernization and arms control;

—the changing situation in the Persian Gulf (and oil prices) and the need for an effective US strategy; and

—the US-USSR-PRC relationship and the need to consider how relations with China aid and damage our relations with Moscow.

We have some problems with the CNA *methodology*, which appears to be based on zero-sum assumptions. Scorecards of US/Soviet “gains” and “losses” are inherently difficult to evaluate and the CNA criteria seem unclear and incomplete; the study discerns two US defeats but it is not apparent what they (or the gains) were. Moreover, “popularity” is a questionable indicator of power. The focus on political and military trends is potentially misleading without the perspective of existing absolute balances.

We believe that the treatment of the substantive issues is far too broad to allow any policy decisions to be made. Instead, we should continue to use the SCC and PRC for high-level decision-making, as we now are doing (for example) with MX, strategic targeting and numerous regional issues.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Alpha Channel: Miscellaneous: 5/79. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 95.

³ See Document 31.

We have some specific concerns about the military, political-diplomatic and economic areas of the US/Soviet balance as assessed by CNA–78.

Military Balance—CNA appraisals of strategic and power projection force trends are too somber, the positive NATO trends may be somewhat overstated and theater nuclear forces are discussed only elliptically.

—*Strategic Forces*. We agree that the Minuteman survivability problem will be with us earlier than anticipated but the paper conveys undue alarm.

- This year's CG shows a substantial increase in US capability, whether or not we deploy MX, and a US advantage over the Soviets after 1986. If MX is not deployed, we will almost certainly advance the Trident II and CMC IOCs and accelerate production of missiles, submarines, CMCs and cruise missiles.

- The report does not address the survivability of each side's forces. For example, only 20% of our warheads, but 70% of theirs, are in ICBMs. Both sides' ICBMs can become vulnerable, placing the Soviets in a worse situation.

- The statement that adverse strategic trends result from US program trends is not sound. In fact, we are in the midst of a major strategic forces modernization drive—with ALCM, Trident SSBNs, Trident I missiles and MK-12A all coming on line soon.

- The CNA recommendation for greater emphasis on limited nuclear options (LNO) is a highly contentious one which would require detailed interagency study.

- The paper does not consider the capability of US forces to meet their basic deterrent tasks.

—*European balance*. As far as we can tell, the CNA judgments are not based on any rigorous analysis of changes in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces (e.g. ratio of Armored Division Equivalents or of tactical aircraft). We agree that NATO has begun to improve the military situation but the CNA may be too optimistic given Western economic constraints. This year's CG shows that no significant change in the balance can yet be measured and that we need to pursue the LTDP and maintain our European emphasis through the 1980s to have an important impact on the balance.

—*Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF)*. CNA-78 expresses concern over the evident political problems but does not analyze the complex military issues involved and exaggerates the implications for Germany. It also fails to note encouraging allied progress toward a dual modernization/arms control strategy and the real possibility that these two policy instruments may be able to resolve our TNF problem.

—*Power Projection*. The paper offers no evidence to support the judgment that the trend has favored the Soviets during the last two

years. The Soviets have demonstrated their capacity to supply troubled allies or friends but not to carry out these actions if opposed nor to wage distant wars themselves. This remains an area of large overall US advantage.

In sum, the document appears to downplay an emphasis on NATO vis-a-vis strategic and power projection forces. We do not find the arguments persuasive and strongly favor continuation of DOD's current European emphases as stated in PD-18.

Political/Diplomatic Balance

—Great power triangular relations are treated primarily in terms of the costs and benefits of using our relations with Beijing either to induce Soviet cooperation or to constrain Soviet expansion. We agree that these two elements are important factors to be considered in our relations with the Soviet Union and China but the discussion oversimplifies the range and significance of our relationships with both countries. There are prospective interests and activities we may wish to consider vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which may have a minimal impact on China, and a comparable set of relationships with China that may neither work to constrain the Soviets nor induce their cooperation. Our overall objective should be to strengthen and improve our relations with both China and the Soviet Union in ways which enhance global US security and influence.

—We believe more weight should be accorded to Europe and Japan in the political/diplomatic balance. The strength of the industrial democracies is a fundamental factor in our international position. This is in contrast to the significant problems faced by the USSR in a potentially unstable Eastern Europe.

—The paper's speculation concerning a Soviet "German card" is highly misleading and could lead to policy judgments and conclusions which would be potentially destructive of US/FRG relations.

—US/Soviet competition in the Third World significantly complicates our bilateral and overall East-West relations. As the CNA acknowledges, however, it is far from clear that the turbulence in the Third World translates into durable Soviet gains. Perhaps because of the time at which the CNA was written, it does not take account of (a) the Egyptian-Israeli treaty;⁴ (b) the Baghdad Summit and shift of

⁴ Reference is to the Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, which was signed by President Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on the North Lawn of the White House on the afternoon of March 26, 1979. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, Document 239.

conservative Arab governments;⁵ (c) the current anti-Soviet unrest in Afghanistan;⁶ or (d) the shift in US policy from arms control to increased military presence in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area.⁷ These recent events underscore the difficulty of drawing balances in a time of significant and rapid political flux and the dubiousness of weighting all countries the same.

—While we have an overall advantage in international political and diplomatic standing compared with Moscow, the picture is far more complex than that depicted in CNA–78. There was no pro-Soviet trend in 1977 as the CNA states. On the other hand, we have clearly had our share of problems and reversals in the last two years. In fact, some of the policies which have improved our overall standing have at least temporarily worsened our relations with some important governments. The balance between our global policies and some of our bilateral objectives has on occasion been hard to maintain. It is difficult to mesh these factors with the trends described in CNA–78 other than to emphasize the complexity of the issues and the difficulties of defining the world in terms of US-Soviet relations.

The CNA recommendations on specific countries and on covert action are addressed more appropriately when we deal with specific issues relating to US security presence in the Middle East and to our relationships with Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

Economic/Technological Balance. CNA–78 states that the “trend in technology remains strongly favorable to the Soviet Union” since Soviet R&D expenditures as a percentage of GNP are higher than the US. *In real terms*, however, the US has a major technological advantage over the USSR which the Russians are most unlikely to overcome. This technological advantage is still greater when comparing East and West as a whole. Indeed, given the West’s technological base, the East may well feel further behind the West, regardless of their relatively greater R&D investment.

The paper also contends that the US should exploit its economic and technological advantage as a lever to affect Soviet behavior. Such

⁵ Reference is to either the November 1978 Arab League summit meeting in Baghdad or the Conference of Foreign Ministers from 18 Arab states and the PLO that convened in Baghdad March 27–31, 1979, which resulted in the temporary suspension of Egypt’s membership in that organization. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*. vol. IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition, Document 242.

⁶ Reference is to armed insurgencies opposing the Soviet-supported regime of Nur Muhammad Taraki. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 39.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 99–129.

leverage has proven difficult to apply (e.g. Jackson-Vanik Amendment;⁸ oil drilling equipment). Support for “national liberation struggles” remains a basic tenet of Soviet foreign policy, which Moscow is unlikely to alter in order to obtain Western economic favors. Moreover, US economic leverage is weakened by domestic political pressures from US producers (especially farmers) and the clear unwillingness of our OECD partners to adopt a common stance on this issue with Moscow.

Peter Tarnoff

Executive Secretary

⁸ Reference is to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act (P.L. 93-618; 88 Stat. 1978), which President Ford signed into law on January 3, 1975. The amendment denied most-favored-nation trade status to nations with non-market economies that restricted emigration.

129. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, May 1, 1979

SUBJECT

CNA-78 (U)

Your comments of April 30 are highly pertinent and helpful.² As you know, I share many of your concerns. Indeed, I feel strongly that we need to take some decisions now if the negative trends, which could so adversely affect our position in the early eighties, are to be averted.

I am glad that you approve the notion of an NSC meeting on the subject, and I will proceed to schedule one.

To give it focus, and to make the discussion of Presidential import, I intend to structure the agenda around the following three fundamental questions:

1. What are the requirements of stable deterrence, now and up to the mid-eighties?
2. What are the requirements of stable crisis bargaining, now and up to the mid-eighties?
3. What are the requirements of effective war management with defined political purposes, now and up to the mid-eighties?

I will ask my staff to coordinate with your staff and that of State in the development of some appropriate issue papers, covering the three questions indicated above.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 15, Comprehensive Net Assessment (CNA)-78: 4-6/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to Vance.

² See Document 127.

130. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 4, 1979, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

M–X Basing

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher
Deputy Secretary
David Gompert
Deputy Director for Politico-
Military Affairs

JCS

General David Jones
Lt General William Smith
Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Howard Stoertz
NIO for Strategic Policy

OMB

Dr. John White
Deputy Director
Randy Jayne
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

OSD

Harold Brown
Charles Duncan
Deputy Secretary
Dr. William Perry
Under Secretary, Research and
Engineering
Walter Slocombe
Principal Dep Asst Secretary of
Defense (ISA)

ACDA

George Seignious
Spurgeon Keeny
Deputy Director
Dr. Barry Blechman
Assistant Director, Weapons Eval-
uation and Control Bureau

OSTP

Dr. Frank Press
John Marcum
Staff Member

NSC

Dr. Victor Utgoff

Summary of Conclusions

Secretary Brown opened the meeting with a brief summary of some of the issues underlying the basing question. *Bill Perry* then described the context within which the question must be resolved, by reviewing the latest intelligence estimates on Soviet strategic modernization programs, their impact on Minuteman survivability, and finally, the strategic modernization programs we currently have underway. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 3, Defense (Items in the System): 1–6/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

Dr. Perry then presented five possible modernization programs for our ICBM force: (1) a baseline option with minimal modernization; (2) an option adding MPS/M-X to the baseline for \$32B in procurement and operating costs thru FY 2000; (3) an option adding small missiles on trucks to the baseline for \$26B; (4) an option adding 100 M-X in STOL aircraft plus 100 M-X in silos for \$35B, and finally (5) an option putting Trident II missiles in submarines and 400 silos, and increasing the baseline cruise missile carrier purchase by 100 at a total cost of \$37B. *Dr. Perry* then showed that Option 5 is the most cost effective in terms of surviving EMT or RVs per dollar, Option 2 comes in second, Option 4 comes in third, and Option 3 is tied with Option 1 for last place because its trucks can be destroyed on their bases in a day-to-day alert situation. In discussing the options, the following points were made. (S)

Option 2 is the JCS strong and unanimous choice, though they suggest adding a Trident II deployment program to it once MPS/M-X has been developed. They argue that MPS can be expanded to deal with increased threats, or defended by BMD, and can be verified with the sort of cooperative measures that will be required if deep cuts are to be achieved in SALT III. The JCS noted that the fractionation limits it contains are the most valuable element of SALT II and that with unlimited throw weight fractionation, MPS would have problems. (S)

OSD noted that Option 2 has a big SALT plus in that by making the percentage survival of our missiles independent of the number we own, it could make reductions easier; that the governors and legislatures of the two states where it would be deployed support it—though outside opposition might build a case on environmental concerns anyway; that losing its security would make MPS a disaster; that MPS has good endurance though perhaps not against bombers; and that while the breakout problem is not unique to MPS, this system draws attention to the problem. (S)

State questioned whether MPS could survive in the absence of SALT and was told we could expand MPS more cheaply than the Soviets could raise their RV numbers. *OSTP* argued that a race where the Soviets build RVs and we build holes would be ludicrous, and that the panel they have looking at the basing issue is concerned about the possibility of catastrophic breakdowns in deception. *ACDA* asked whether the large number of aim points presented by MPS would reduce Soviet incentives to agree to fractionation limits in SALT III. *CIA* suggested that a variant of MPS using the Trident II missile should be examined—this change would allow us to go to a different mobile option if necessary. Further, proceeding with Trident II would allow us to move our hard-target capability to sea. (S)

Mr. Aaron commented that we should test the MPS system against larger threats than those possible under SALT II since it will expire

before the first MPS system is deployed; that while cooperative measures will be an improvement, MPS makes it essential that we get such measures, and thus we may end up using our bargaining leverage to achieve rules on paper rather than real reductions; that a security breakdown could occur for MPS without our knowing it, and that cooperative measures could increase such concerns. *OSD* responded that *SSBN* locations might also become known without our realizing it, and that the cooperative measures developed for MPS could concentrate on the missile production process rather than sampling existing missile locations. (S)

Option 3 got little attention beyond the original comment that it could be destroyed on its bases if attacked while in a day-to-day alert posture. *Mr. Aaron* noted that such a system might appeal to the Soviet mentality. *OSD* commented that it would probably work to our overall net advantage if the Soviets were to adopt a mobile system—the cost to deploy and operate such systems is 2–3 times as great per EMT or RV deployed as a silo-based system, and the reduced payload the Soviets might have to adopt would probably offset the uncertainties involved in determining the capabilities of such a system. The *JCS* noted that, without cooperative measures, a truck mobile system would pose larger verification problems than MPS. (S)

Option 4 got even less attention—*OSTP* asked what might happen if it made use of a common missile and was told that some savings might result. (S)

The *JCS* argued that while Option 5 puts the Soviets at risk, which they must be if we are, it is simply a postponement of the *ICBM* vulnerability problem. They also argued that adoption of Option 5 would have a bad effect on *SALT II* ratification because it will raise some very contentious issues, such as the advisability of putting new missiles in silos, an idea that is strongly opposed on the Hill. Finally, they noted that the background material presented for Option 5 underestimates the severity of the problems associated with it. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there is considerable political value in deploying the largest missile allowed under *SALT II* and suggested that a variant of Option 5 that deploys *M-X* in silos be examined. *Mr. Aaron* noted that while Option 5 may not solve the *ICBM* vulnerability problem, it could eliminate the asymmetry in strike options that is developing, and that while the silo deployment portion of Option 5 might decrease crisis stability to some extent, neither side could expect more than limited success if it attempted a disarming first strike. (S)

OSD commented that the missile proposed under Option 5 for silo deployment can be called an *M-X* if necessary, and that the *Trident II* design they had in mind would have as much hard-target capability as the *SS-19*. They further noted that the silo deployment portion of

Option 5 would result in some reduced crisis stability, and that, for another \$5–10B a mobile deployment option could be included under Option 5. *State* commented that the material presented suggested that Option 5 might be best, and finally, *OSTP* asked that an examination be made of the possibility of adding a mobile deployment to Option 5. (S)

Several additional points were made concerning SALT and the stability of the strategic balance. Specifically, (1) *Mr. Aaron* asked if the improvements in hard-target capabilities proposed in the various options would reduce Soviet incentives to agree to reasonable limits in SALT III. He also noted that one of the problems with MPS is that the shelters are not distinguishable from launchers, and asked if a variant of MPS that gets around this problem could be found; (2) *CIA* noted that while the backup papers² for the meeting were very good, they did not make clear which options lead to more stable strategic balances; (3) *JCS* commented that going ahead with MPS would put the Soviets under the greatest pressure, and that we could adjust the relative emphasis that we give to this strategic system to suit the situation. (S)

Finally, *Mr. Aaron* suggested that for the next meeting a paper be prepared that takes a more careful look at the question of cooperative measures, and compares the various risks inherent in proceeding with versions of Options 2 and 5. (S)

²Not found.

131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 8, 1979

SUBJECT

PRC on M-X Basing (U)

A PRC meeting was held last Friday² to review the M-X basing decision. The meeting opened with a summary of the underlying issues, a brief review of the main features of both sides' ongoing strategic modernization programs, and the presentation of the five ICBM modernization options that DOD has been studying: (1) a baseline option with minimal modernization; (2) an option adding MPS/M-X to the baseline for an additional \$32B thru FY 2000; (3) an option adding missiles on trucks for \$26B; (4) an option adding 100 M-X in STOL aircraft and 100 M-X in silos for \$35B; and finally, (5) an option putting Trident II missiles in silos and submarines, and increasing the baseline cruise missile carrier purchase by 100 at a total cost of \$37B. (S)

After a short examination of the relative cost effectiveness of each option (i.e., life cycle costs/surviving RV in a "bolt from the blue" attack) that showed Option 5 to be best, 2 second, 4 third and Option 3 tied with 1 because truck mobiles cannot survive without strategic warning, the discussion turned to a comparison of the qualitative characteristics of each option. The following points were made:

Option 2 is the JCS strong and unanimous choice: it solves the U.S. alert ICBM vulnerability problem but puts Soviet ICBMs at risk—thus providing leverage for SALT III reductions. They argue that MPS can be expanded, or protected by ABM, if greater threats develop. (The ABM Treaty would have to be modified or terminated.) The JCS argue it can be verified using cooperative measures (e.g., on site inspection) which the Chiefs argue will be needed to achieve deep cuts in SALT III (S)

Others pointed out (1) that MPS could make future SALT reductions easier by making the percentage survivability of this ICBM force independent of the number of missiles it deploys, (2) that loss of security, particularly if we were not aware of it, would make MPS a disaster, (3) that the "breakout" problem of a Soviet MPS is not unique to MPS, (4) that MPS should be examined against threats greater than those allowed under SALT II because it won't start deployment until 1986,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 3/79–5/23/79. Secret. Sent for information. Aaron initialed for Brzezinski. Carter wrote in the upper right corner: "Susan, SALT file. J."

² May 4. See Document 130.

(5) that the large number of valuable MPS aim points and the powerful first strike capability of M–X against Soviet ICBMs might reduce Soviet incentives to extend the fractionation limits of SALT II beyond 1985 and into SALT III, (6) and finally, that getting cooperative measures in SALT III needed to verify a Soviet MPS may consume U.S. bargaining leverage that might otherwise be directed toward reductions. (S)

There was little discussion of Options 3 and 4 beyond the JCS comment that without cooperative measures, Soviet truck mobiles would be more difficult to verify than MPS. Harold Brown thought that on balance U.S. security improved by a Soviet shift to truck mobile ICBMs since their lesser capability would offset verification uncertainties. (S)

The JCS argued that while Option 5, with its improved hard-target capability, would put the Soviets at equal risk, and provide a large number of surviving weapons, it did not solve the ICBM vulnerability problem. They further argued that Option 5 would have an adverse effect on SALT II ratification because it would raise some very contentious issues such as the advisability of putting more capable missiles in silos, which is strongly opposed on the Hill. Others noted that (1) given the political value of deploying the largest missile possible under SALT II, we should look at a variant of Option 5 putting M–X in silos, (2) that while putting more capable missiles in silos might decrease crisis stability, neither side could have more than limited success in any attempt at a disarming first strike, and (3) that variants of Option 5 substituting mobiles for silo deployments should be examined. Finally, several principals noted that if a common missile were used for both Navy and Air Force deployments, we could change deployment modes later if necessary. (S)

In the next PRC meeting, which will take place next week, we intend to (1) examine variations of Options 2 and 5—one variation of 5 will include truck mobiles, (2) compare the various types of risks inherent in proceeding with these options including the likely Soviet reaction and the impact on SALT bargaining, and (3) look more deeply at the question of cooperative measures. (S)

132. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, May 10, 1979

SUBJECT

M-X Basing PRC (U)

There is a new contender in the field: Open trench/rail mobile! Awaiting the full PRC, those gathered in the Sit Room on 9 May² heard Bill Perry preview what he had planned to present. He covered the following:

1. Open Trench/Rail Mobile M-X Basing

The rail mobile variant of Option 5 (DYAD with 300 D-5s in silos and 100 on trains) has evolved into a distinct basing option for the M-X. The concept is very like the hybrid trench, except that the trench and appropriately spaced hardened shelters along the trench can be opened to overhead inspection. Ease of verification results. Ability to move missiles rapidly on the rails in the trench, even on tactical warning, makes long-lasting denial of location information less critical than in MPS. If necessary simulators could be used to defeat close-in sensors. (S)

In principle, this concept could be as survivable as MPS. Verifiability on the US side is more easily achieved than in MPS, and is probably easier on the Soviet side. On the other hand, impact on public use of land and on the environment is probably more severe than with MPS. This was one of the several factors that removed the open trench from consideration over a year ago. (S)

In the discussion it was pointed out that costs and environmental impact might be reduced by laying the track between shelters at ground level, but security and location secrecy might be made more difficult. It was noted that our selection of this concept would not constrain the Soviets to it (this applies to any concept). Open trench might be less susceptible to Soviet breakout within the basing system than MPS would be. But it might, like MPS, give the Soviets an incentive to proliferate RVs covertly, which they could deploy outside any multiple shelter system. Clearly, if limiting force size is important for arms control and stability, we need controls on system production in SALT. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 182, [MX]: 5/78-4/80. Secret. Sent for information.

² No minutes of this meeting were found.

Davy Jones observed that, in the JCS view, open trench was next best to MPS and clearly preferred over putting improved missiles into silos. (S)

2. Incremental Costs

The open trench concept would, as Perry described it, be very roughly \$3B more expensive than the baseline MPS concept. If the D-5 (fully common missile) were deployed in place of the M-X, in either MPS or the new trench concept, it would cost yet an additional \$1B because a larger number of D-5 missiles would have to be deployed to achieve the same level of surviving RVs as afforded by the M-X. On the other hand, later procurement of the D-5 for Trident deployment would be much cheaper. (S)

3. The Case for Trident II.

Perry also argued that, whatever is done about ICBM development and basing, it makes sense to develop and deploy the Trident II missile. Apart from the greater operating area and resultant increases in SSBN security afforded by the Trident II's range, its larger payload would allow us to maintain the current SLBM RV levels with 6 fewer Trident subs—resulting in more than enough savings to pay for the larger missile. (S)

The Navy is clearly not enthusiastic about Trident II—but some elements of OSD clearly are. Queried on prospects for SLBMs becoming accurate enough to be silo killers, Perry said he thought SLBM [*less than 1 line not declassified*] could possibly be attained in 10 years. This might or might not be sufficient to make the MK-12A a silo-killer; uncertainties about Soviet silo hardness deny confidence that this CEP is sufficient. Perry was confident however that the D-5 missile can be made accurate enough to be a good hard target killer when deployed on land. (S)

The attractions of the open trench concept are considerable. It should be examined more carefully, particularly with respect to environmental impact, before Harold makes his final recommendation. (S)

133. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 10, 1979, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

M–X Basing

PARTICIPANTS

State

Cyrus Vance

David Newson

Under Secretary for Political
Affairs

David Gompert

Deputy Director for Politico-
Military Affairs

JCS

General David Jones

Lt General William Smith
Assistant to the Chairman

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Dr. Robert Bowie

Director, National Foreign
Assessment Center

Howard Stoertz

NIO for Strategic Programs

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Hamilton Jordan

NSC

Dr. Victor Utgoff

Fritz Ermarth

OSD

Harold Brown

Charles Duncan

Deputy Secretary

Dr. William Perry

Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering

Walter Slocombe

Principal Dep Asst Secretary of
Defense (ISA)

ACDA

George Seignious

Spurgeon Keeny

Deputy Director

OSTP

Dr. Frank Press

John Marcum

OMB

Dr. John White

Deputy Director

Randy Jayne

Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs

Detailed Minutes

Harold Brown opened the meeting proposing to go through the material previewed the day before on 1) variations to Option 5, and 2) the question of missile size.² The first topic lead to a discussion of new basing concepts.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Russell, Box 117, Security Analysis Chron: #1–25, 5/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Brackets, except those indicating material not declassified, are in the original. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is *ibid*.

² See footnote 2, Document 132.

Bill Perry began addressing the questions that had been posed about the option variations, especially cost. To do Option 5 in silos with a 100 mobile missile component as well as 300 improved missiles would average \$15B across the mobile modes—leading to a rough total force cost of \$90B, compared to the \$50B minimum modernization baseline force.

Dr. Perry then briefly showed some calculations on the effectiveness of different RV loadings vs. nominal soft and hard target sets. He showed that [6 lines not declassified]

Howard Stoertz commented that some work DNA is now doing suggests that Soviet silos may be harder than DOD is assuming. *Harold Brown* responded that the CEPs being discussed would put the silos inside the nuclear fireballs.

Dr. Perry then turned to an argument in favor of development of the Trident II SLBM. He said it would be a good idea whatever we did about ICBMs because its higher RV loading would permit a reduced number of boats and consequently reduced procurement and operating costs of \$13B. This is because the Trident boat is already configured to receive larger D-5 missiles and at least 12 Tridents will be under contract before construction of a new class SSBN could begin.

Harold Brown observed that the Trident II issue is really a question of when you do it. *Dr. Perry* noted that depending on the D-5 missile decision we would plan a force of 12, 15, or 18 Trident boats and then develop a new and smaller follow-on submarine.

Dr. Perry then turned to describing the open trench basing concept involving 5000 miles of trench [1 line not declassified]

[2 lines not declassified] no one really knows how hard they are.

Cy Vance asked how long it took to move between shelters. *Dr. Perry* answered that it would take about 3 minutes to get to the first neighboring shelter and about 2 minutes for each succeeding shelter down the line. Thus, in 30 minutes of ICBM flight time, location uncertainties of about 30 shelters could be obtained. The missile would launch from outside the shelter. Roofs over the trench and shelters would enhance denial of location information but could be opened for verification. The concept could be operated either with roofs opened most of the time and closed for movement or with roofs closed most of the time and open for inspection.

Currently, the main security issue being raised about this system *Perry* said was the possibility of missile location reparting by implanted close-in sensors. One way to look at the system is as a grid of shelters separated by a mile in all directions and connected by trenches along one dimension. Tactical warning could allow the missile to move once to a new shelter before elements of the track were destroyed. The

attacker might seek to pin down the missile force in its initial location by blocking tracks and then seek to find and strike the real missiles. However, this scenario is not very plausible, because given the warning and destruction of the precursor SLBM attack the US would probably be assumed ready to use its force before losing it.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the heavy missile was being used in this concept? *Perry* noted that this basing concept does not prescribe any particular missile size. As noted before, however, it would cost \$1B more up front to go with the smaller missile because more of them would be required.

John White asked whether this concept might not cost a lot more than MPS because of the excavation, track laying, etc.

Bill Perry answered that his analysis was rough but suggested a range of \$2–5B in extra costs, with his best guess being \$3B. *Harold Brown* noted that DOD's feeling for cost was based on a lot of study and field experiments on the underground trench. The AF, it was noted, had done extensive work on trench design that was directly applicable to this concept.

Spurgeon Keeny asked why the rail connections had to be trenches. Could they not be on the surface? He was told that this would be possible though it might raise additional security concerns.

Frank Press commented that this idea looks much better than MPS on verification, worse on security, worse on environment, and better on survivability. He observed that environmental impact would be severe because of large land areas excluded from public access.

Harold Brown noted that this would depend on where the system was located. It could be located in military reservations such as bombing ranges from which the public was excluded anyway. *Dr. Perry* noted that DOD had about 38,000 square miles of suitable land, the AF about 14,000. *Randy Jayne* asked whether high water tables—in some locations—had been taken into account. *Dr. Perry* said the AF had studied such matters extensively with respect to MPS and trenches. *Gen Jones* noted that laying the track above ground would reduce environmental impact if that proved to be the major problem. *Harold Brown* said that continuous fences along the trench would be required to keep the public away from nuclear devices.

Frank Press continued his comments observing that while a launcher on its side might be easier to verify than a vertical launcher, Soviet deployment of this concept would worry us. We would be concerned about extra missiles lurking in or stored for introduction into the system. *Harold Brown* asked whether this basing concept created a problem in this respect or merely called attention to the threat of extra Soviet missiles, a threat that already exists?

Frank Press continued by noting that like MPS, the open trench concept gives the Soviets an incentive to fractionate. If they did so, they could confront us once again with a vulnerable system. *Harold Brown* asked why this should be? We could build more trenches to affect their RVs. The question was what kind of a race we were interested in. He noted that no matter what we do, the Soviets could build more RVs anyway.

David Aaron observed that the Soviets could but don't have to *seek* to make our basic concept vulnerable through fractionation. He questioned their incentive to try to overcome this system where they will see that their efforts can be readily thwarted.

Harold Brown asked whether *Frank Press'* objection did not imply that all shelters should have missiles in them instead of only 1 in 20 being full. *Frank Press* said his point was merely that the survivability of the open trench like MPS was sensitive to a variable fully in the enemy's hands, mainly RV levels. *Harold Brown* responded that we could have more aimpoints, more missiles, and more RVs if Soviet RV levels went up.

Gen Jones noted that Option 5 results in our producing some 18,000 weapons. He wondered if this would cause the Soviets to go for more survivability or instead simply force further growth in their RV levels.

Harold Brown noted that the multiple aimpoint systems of any kind separate survivability from force size.

Stan Turner commented that MAP systems encouraged fractionation on the Soviet side. Option 5 would drive the Soviets to mobility which [*whereas?*] Option 2 would drive them to fractionation. *Harold Brown* responded by noted that fractionation (or EMT increases) can be applied against submarines and aircraft as well as multiple shelters. Our primary concern should be a survivable force—preventing fractionation (or EMT increases) is a subordinate aim.

David Aaron said if the Soviets want to try to imperil our forces they can. If we go with an option along the lines of 2 we can roll effectively, with Option 5 we cannot.

Stan Turner said Option 2 means a spiraling arms race in weapons, whereas Option 5 means a race in mobility. [Adm. Turner is arguing that Option 2 would cause the Soviets to proliferate RV's in an attempt to maintain the threat to our ICBM's. Option 5 would present so large a threat to fixed Soviet silos that they would be forced to go mobile] *Harold Brown* noted that, assuming Soviet dedication to counter-military capabilities, Option 5 could lead to heightened competition in ASW/ barrage technology. *Stan Turner* argued, but said that Soviet prospects in ASW are much less certain than Soviet ability to fractionate multiple aimpoints. *Harold Brown* said that the Soviets cannot necessarily

fractionate enough to defeat MPS or open trench. The Soviets already have many more RVs than we think they need for target coverage. The multiple shelter concept proceeds on the assumption that aimpoints can be proliferated more easily than RVs. *Stan Turner* noted that the Soviets have shown a willingness to spend great amounts in trying to reduce the effectiveness of our forces. *Harold Brown* said that if you concede to the Soviets the ability and willingness to beat all survivability approaches, life becomes very hard for us. They can work very hard on ASW. *Frank Press* opened that the Soviets could not achieve much in ASW in the 1980's or even in 1990's. *Harold Brown* said he was concerned about the 1990's but less so about the 1980's. *John White* asked if MPS and open trench reacted differently to fractionation. *Harold Brown* said no. *Dr. Perry* noted that the Soviets could increase fractionation levels by a factor of 4 by putting [less than one line not declassified] But then they would need much better CEPs and we could put our shelters closer together.

David Aaron noted 3 Soviet reasons to fractionation—1) they may want to keep us vulnerable, 2) match our RV numbers, or 3) increase their absolute numbers of RV's surviving a counterforce nuclear exchange.

Harold Brown observed that increasing the numbers of RV's on silo based missiles is not a cost effective way to add surviving RV's given very severe threats to the silos.

Cy Vance asked what constraints or cooperative measure we would want in order to verify a Soviet "open trench" system. *Harold Brown* said we would want them to open the system for observation some of the time.

Frank Press noted that we might be worried about hidden missiles deployed in such a system. We face the threat of secret silos and hidden missiles now. Further, for the Soviet offroad mobile is an attractive option because of their large land areas—and this system poses even larger problems of verification. *Stan Turner* said we would want three things to verify open trench on the Soviet side—a choke point where missiles were to be introduced into the deployment area, quick inspection, and production controls. *Harold Brown* said all connected trenches would have to be inspectable at once.

Dr. Brzezinski asked what kind of production controls would be desired? *Stan Turner* observed that something like the MPS special assembly facilities near the point of system introduction might do.

Harold Brown asked how do we control a system like the SS-20, or the evolution of the SS-20 into a SS-16? [less than one line not declassified] *Harold Brown* said this trench system is easier to verify than those Soviet systems. *David Aaron* said we don't now impose controls on missile numbers. Building secret silos would seem easier

than covertly introducing illegal missiles into a trench system. *Harold Brown* said its fairly easy to imagine the construction of some extra missile silos.

Stan Turner said with multiple aimpoint systems, you have an invitation for excess missiles. *Harold Brown* replied that the breakout problem exists now.

Frank Press said security against close-in sensors would be a real problem for the open trench. *Harold Brown* asked how could a sensor transmit without betraying itself. *Frank Press* said Vietnam gave us a lot of experience with such sensors. The open trench system would require decoys. *Harold Brown* said why decoys be needed if the missile could move every 15 minutes. *Frank Press* asked if that was the plan. *Harold Brown* said it was if necessary. *Frank Press* said secret sensors could betray determined location just before an attack. *Harold Brown* said that would give us warning. *Frank Press* asked how we would know the sensors had transmitted? *Davey Jones* said simulators to beat sensors would figure in this concept. The simulators would be distinguishable to NTM's.

Harold Brown said the systems could operate like Metro. Something would always be moving somewhere. A given missile could move 15 minutes, stop 15 minutes, or any combination. The enemy's intelligence cycle time could not be fast enough to beat such a system.

Frank Press said the tracks are soft. SLBMs could pin down the missile, and sensors could then see an ICBM attack to destroy our missiles. *Harold Brown* doubted the practicality of such a scenario. *Frank Press* said the scenario was no less delirious than many in the strategic business. *Harold Brown* noted that a [*less than one line not declassified*] roof would protect the trench from ejecta. *Harold Brown* said that open trench concept had not been studied nearly as fully as had MPS, but that he had heard no new arguments against it. He asked if *Frank Press'* critique in effect said MPS was better than open trench. *Frank Press* said perhaps yes for survivability, but no for verification.

Hamilton Jordan asked whether trench length could be reduced to reduce environmental impact. *Harold Brown* said about 5,000 miles of trench would be needed, but that it could be cut up almost any way you want. *Hamilton Jordan* said, "that is a lot of trench." *Harold Brown* said military bases could accommodate it. *Frank Press* asked whether public access would in fact be disrupted except for places where public access is not now permitted such as bombing ranges. *Hamilton Jordan* asked: isn't total mileage the key variable in public impact. *Harold Brown* said environmental impact can be reduced by laying track above ground.

Gen Jones commented broadly on the basing issue and then spoke to the question of missile size: He said the Chiefs definitely want a survivable ICBM, the AF prefers MPS but would "be cooperative" with

something like the open trench if MPS is rejected. He noted that verification difficulties would be very serious in SALT III no matter what our basic concept because of system mobility.

Personally *Gen Jones* said he leans toward the trench. Regarding missile commonality and size, he said we must understand that building a 110,000 lb. missile will mean designing it for the Trident. It will be called the D-5, or Trident II; M-X will be regarded as cancelled. We may attain a \$3-4B saving from commonality, but the Chiefs regard this cost saving as very dubious. The Chiefs believe that the common missile will be another TFX. It will involve a delay of 6 months to a year, when we've already delayed too much. It will yield a missile with less capability than permitted by SALT. Thus, we shall have a perception problem involving cancellation of M-X and delay of a new missile. Ergo, the fully common missile is not a good idea. The Chiefs believe that if commonality seems as important, a 150,000 lb. partly common missile is the way to go—two stages in common, a third stage to achieve an M-X capable of carrying 10 MK-12As, and a best effort on common components. The Chiefs would also propose going forward with a Trident II, but later than envisioned in Option 5.

Dr. Brzezinski asked how many RVs the 150,000 lb. missile would carry in the absence of a fractionation level. *Harold Brown* said as many as 20 MK-4s could be carried, but with that many RV releases there was a problem of reliability and accuracy. *Gen Jones* said a 190,000 lb. M-X would use all our head room under SALT and match the SS-19 in throw weight—a 150,000 lb. missile would have only 700 lbs. less throw weight capability. The SS-19 has 7900 lbs—a 150,000 lb. missile would have 7200 lbs.

Stan Turner asked whether the 150,000 lb. missile could be mated with an aircraft. *Harold Brown* said yes. *Stan Turner* asked about putting it on a truck. *Harold Brown* answered only two stages would be used in effect. The truck would be deploying the D-5.

George Seignious said that if one looked in the long term to negotiations beyond 1985, it appeared there could be a race between RVs and aimpoints, and arms control might end up trying to limit both weapons and aimpoints. *Stan Turner* said the Soviets pursued forces that gave them warfighting and reserve strategic capabilities.

Harold Brown said we could afford to, and some time ago did concede to the Soviets over all strategic equality, but we could not accommodate their quest for warfighting advantages. If they wanted to strive for those advantages, we would simply have to move to deny them.

David Aaron said if we can effectively restore force survivability in the face of Soviet threats, then we may have a chance to negotiate the forces downward. But we will never get them to agree to limitations if we allow them to make their counter force achievements stick.

Harold Brown said we don't want to be in the situation we have faced during SALT II when we wanted the Soviets to reduce their missile threat to Minuteman, but had no leverage to achieve that goal.

134. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 14, 1979, 9–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Consolidated Guidance

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher,
Deputy Secretary

JCS

General Bernard Rogers,
Acting Chairman, JCS

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

OSD

Harold Brown
Charles Duncan,
Deputy Secretary

Russell Murray,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Program Analysis and Evaluation

OMB

John White,
Deputy Director

NSC

Victor Utgoff

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

DOD presented material² showing that even if we were to buy the forces currently programmed, we would not be able to meet the strategy given in PD-18:—1) maintain an overall balance at least as favorable as that existing in August 1977; 2) maintain essential equivalence; and 3) minimize NATO territory lost to any Warsaw Pact attack and restore prewar boundaries.³ DOD also showed that due to higher than anticipated inflation and widespread underpricing, purchasing the forces programmed for the next five years would cost \$40+B more than

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 75, PRC 106, 5/15/79, DoD Consolidated Guidance. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found. An undated memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter summarizing the meeting is *ibid*.

² Not further identified.

³ See Document 31.

would be available with real increases of 3 percent. In discussing this material, the following points were made:

—The strategic forces balance is worse now than in 1977, and will continue to get worse. Programs currently under discussion can begin to improve the situation by the mid-'80s, however. No matter what program decisions we make to modernize our strategic forces, in the early '80s we are likely to be perceived as having less than essential equivalence with the Soviets. We must find ways to improve such perceptions in order to ensure that we don't face a "Cuba-in-reverse"—from which we might not recover. Improvements in C³I systems should be emphasized.

—JCS said that Army computer studies show that NATO would not be able to stop an all-out WP attack (problems are particularly severe in the NORTHAG area), much less restore prewar boundaries. It was also noted that while NATO improvements being made by our collective efforts to increase defense spending by 3 percent are achieving modest results, much larger increases are needed if we want to be able to fulfil our NATO strategy anytime soon. Dr. Brzezinski said that while declaring this strategy before we have the capability to carry it out may seem unrealistic, the strategy is essential to maintaining Alliance cohesion.

—State does not see any particular signs that our current defense posture is inhibiting Allied support of the US. Our Allies are jittery about the Soviet buildup, but less than they would be in the absence of the improvements being made in NATO's defense posture. Further, the Allies probably can't do more than the 3 percent they have already promised.

—The Middle East/Persian Gulf situation presents difficult problems. The Soviets may doubt our ability to project significant military power into the area—and we clearly couldn't if crises in NATO and the ME/PG area were to begin simultaneously. Having a permanent presence in the ME/PG area may deter situations requiring considerably larger forces. Given other countries' stakes in continued access to the region's oil, we should not be expected to provide the forces required to stabilize the region by ourselves, however.

—The Korean balance looks adverse from a military viewpoint, but in the larger context of developing political relationships in the Far East, this balance is not so bad as it might seem. (S)

There were several comments suggesting that some Western advantages may not be fairly reflected by the armored division equivalents measure used to assess the balance of forces in various areas. CIA commented that the Soviets probably don't believe the military balance favors them as much as we think it does. (S)

In discussing the possibility of significant funding increases, there seemed to be general agreement that the 5 percent real increase rate that would be needed to meet the requirements of PD-18 by 1990 was not politically feasible. In support of this point, OMB noted that the recession we may face in 1981 may result in a \$13–\$15B deficit that year. OMB noted that in 1981, the federal tax burden will reach levels in excess of 20 percent of the GNP—which is unprecedented in peacetime. This burden will lead to increased political pressures for a tax reduction. OMB also noted that we are going to have to increase the estimated inflation rates for the next few years that DOD is using in planning its budget. Finally, considerable support was voiced for meeting the 3 percent real increase in 1981. (S)

It was also noted that while there is a general consensus that military spending should grow—such support had its limits. The Congress has cut out a number of defense programs the Administration has proposed, and most domestic programs have not been allowed to grow in real terms in the last several years. Thus, the political costs of getting additional defense funds may be high. DOD noted that this suggests that we should pay more attention to the fact that some defense programs can win Congressional support more easily than others. (S)

In view of the continuing problems in maintaining an adequate overall military balance, and the likely constraints on increased DOD funding, a suggestion was made that we take a particularly hard look at issues such as the balance between combat and combat support, the land-based vs. sea-based tactical airpower trade-off, the need to maintain significant amounts of shipping dedicated to support of opposed amphibious landings, the feasibility of increasing Allied ammunition stocks, and the potential utility of some MAP programs in important areas such as the Persian Gulf. (S)

Finally, it was generally agreed that some parts of our military strategy are more important than others, and that priorities need to be established. An NSC meeting will be held in the near future to discuss the material DOD presented in this meeting, some closely related material in the comprehensive Net Assessment, and the M–X basing decision. On the basis of the President’s reactions to that meeting, and a future NSC meeting to discuss strategic targeting and C³I issues, PD-18 may be updated to establish more clearly the relative priorities of the various elements of our overall military strategy. (S)

135. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 15, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategic Policy

During the coming months, several basic strategic issues will come to you for decision. To prepare the best possible perspective and options for your consideration, this month we will have had three PRC meetings on M-X basing and a PRC to review the Consolidated Guidance.² By the first week in June, I believe we will be ready for an NSC meeting to look at these problems and other imminent strategic decisions in a comprehensive manner. The subject of the proposed meeting will be "U.S. Strategic Arms Policy and U.S.-Soviet Relations."

I would propose to begin such a meeting with an overview, briefly summarizing CNA-78 and the Consolidated Guidance and reviewing the different perspectives of State and Defense. I would propose that next we focus (in the context of the three basic strategic problems we face: deterrence, crisis bargaining and war management) on the five areas in which your decisions are required: M-X basing, TNF, C³I, targetting and a new strategic document. I would propose to concentrate particularly on M-X basing and TNF because it will be important to have your preliminary decisions on these two issues prior to your meeting with Schmidt and the U.S.-USSR Summit.

While we can arrange a follow-up session on C³I, targetting and a new strategic document, we need to consider the latter very carefully because both the subject and the timing of its completion will be politically sensitive. Any attempt to create a new strategic document updating PD-18 and to provide the direction to American strategic policy that NSC-68³ did in the early 1950's will have to be considered very carefully and cautiously.⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: 5-7/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten "C" at the upper right corner of the memorandum indicates that Carter saw it.

² For the May 4, May 10, and May 25 PRC meetings on M-X basing, see Documents 130, 133, and 138. For the May 14 PRC meeting on the Consolidated Guidance, see Document 134.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, p. 234.

⁴ Carter wrote below this paragraph: "I'll do this after you, Harold and Cy arrange for confidentiality."

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a two-hour NSC meeting on June 4 or 5 (possibly using the Cabinet time) for a discussion of U.S. strategic arms policy and U.S.-Soviet relations, with the specific purpose of your providing at the end a preliminary decision on M-X basing and TNF in anticipation of the Schmidt visit and the U.S.-Soviet Summit, deferring the other items to a later follow-on meeting.⁵

⁵ Carter wrote "ok" below this paragraph.

136. Memorandum From Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, May 23, 1979

SUBJECT

3rd PRC on MX basing

Background

The 3rd PRC on MX basing is scheduled for Thursday, May 24th from 3:30–5:00. The nominal purpose of this meeting is to narrow the options down to a very small number for presentation to the President in an NSC meeting on June 6. DOD's proposed agenda for this PRC is at Tab A.² (S)

The Basing Decision

At this point there appear to be 3 live basing options

—a modification of the trench concept Bill Perry presented in the last PRC meeting. The primary difference between the current concept and the one you heard about last time is that due to cost, excessive land use and security concerns the trench is now covered with removable concrete slabs which are covered with earth. Nonetheless, any trench can be scraped off and opened up for verification in about a day. Cost

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Council Meetings, 1977–1980, Box 100, NSC Meetings, [6–12/1979]. Secret. Sent for information.

² Attached but not printed is the proposed agenda from the Department of Defense.

estimates vary for this system—OSD is saying roughly \$6B more than MPS, the Air Force is saying \$10–12B.

—MPS with vertical shelters, or for \$1–2B more, with sliding roof horizontal shelters that should ease verification concerns.

—a variation of the original Option 5 that deploys Trident II in submarines, deploys a missile with some degree of commonality in STOL aircraft and silos, and accelerates the cruise missile carrier program. This option costs somewhat more than MPS but offsets much of the high cost of the airmobile deployment with the reduction in the numbers of Trident subs, that can be justified by building a large SLBM. (S)

Agency Positions and Arguments on Basing

OSD champions the first option. They appear to believe that MPS even with horizontal shelters is a non starter with the White House, and they have decided that the dash-on-warning feature of the trench option is the only way to beat the nagging doubts about whether the Soviets will be able to discover the locations of missiles deployed in an MPS system, perhaps without our knowledge. JCS prefers MPS but is willing to go along with the trench concept. (S)

The Air Force still prefers MPS and argues that building MPS with horizontal shelters should give it verification properties as good or better than those of the trench. The Air Force is also concerned that the uncertainties of the trench scheme may lead to further delays in fielding a survivable ICBM. Finally, they argue that the costs of building the trench system are \$4–6B more than the OSD estimates. (S)

OMB feels that the President must make a decision on the basing mode very soon and that the trench concept is too uncertain to be choosable. They further argue that the Option 5 variant is not politically feasible in that it would not satisfy the Air Force, and choosing it would hurt SALT II ratification. OMB thus leans toward MPS. (C)

Partly on the basis of its panel's report, OSTP feels that the trench concept has too many uncertainties to be chosen right now. They argue that we haven't yet taken a serious look at the security and verification issues, and there is no way to evaluate shelter hardness and thus TEL speed and land requirements until DOD settles on a shelter design. They also say that the system has much poorer location security than MPS and could thus be vulnerable to a 2 phased attack in which SLBM's are used to deprive the system of its mobility and then ICBM's are used to destroy the missiles which would be located by covertly planted sensors. Given the problems it sees with the other options, OSTP suggests that the President announce a decision to proceed with the mostly common missile (which would keep all basing options reasonably open) and commit the trench to perhaps another month of study. (S)

Assessment of the Basing Arguments

OSTP and OMB have a point in arguing that there are some uncertainties regarding the trench system, but I think they are carrying their point too far in saying the system is not choosable now. As a result of their original interest in the trench concept the Air Force has a large body of study and test information to draw on in completing a design with the desired features, and I believe that reasonable answers will drop into place if the trench idea is pursued. (C)

On the other hand, with a somewhat faster shuffling of missile positions to minimize concerns about the possibility of a breakdown in security, and with horizontal shelters to ease SALT related concerns, MPS looks like a reasonable choice too. The key question would seem to be—Are we so concerned about the possibility that the Soviets can determine which shelters our missiles are in as to justify the very rapid inter-shelter mobility provided by the trench system? (C)

As far as Option 5 goes—I agree with OMB's agreements that it is not politically feasible. In addition, some other arguments given against Option 5 seem very persuasive: 1) it does not restore the survivability of the ICBM leg of the Triad and may thus encourage the Soviets to think we will let their efforts to undermine our strategic forces succeed and, 2) it sharply increases our RV levels, which may increase Soviet interest in mobile systems, but may also cause them to resist fractionation limits in the future and simply proliferate RV's themselves. (S)

The Missile Decision

OSD is now arguing that if the trench concept is chosen we should also proceed with the largest missile possible. This is because smaller missiles must be bought in larger numbers to reach any given level of surviving capability and each additional missile requires additional trench and a transporter, both of which are relatively expensive. (S)

OSD argues that if Option 5/air mobile is chosen we should proceed with a common missile. The largest missile won't fit in the airplane they would use, and the mostly common missile will not offer enough improvement over the common missile to justify the extra cost and the management problems it would create. (S)

I believe these are reasonable arguments and that the mostly common missile is not a good idea for any deployment mode. In the deployment modes where it makes sense, trench and MPS, the larger missile offers perceptual, political, schedule, and management advantages that far outweigh the marginal cost saving that might be achieved with the mostly common missile. (S)

The Bottom Line

I think the President's best course would be to go ahead with the MX decision in early June as now planned. I agree that there are still some significant uncertainties in the trench concept. I also believe that in the two weeks remaining until the NSC meeting to review the issue with the President the Air Force and OSD will be able to refine the trench and horizontal MPS options sufficiently to give the President 2 reasonably acceptable options to choose from. (S)

Finally, while Option 5 looks like an overall loser, I recommend that it not be dropped from the list of options to be presented to the President. Keeping Option 5 in the running and perhaps tuning it a little and saying something nice about it may have a beneficial effect on the final stages of DOD's studies of the trench and MPS variant concepts. (S)

**137. Memorandum From Denis Clift, John Matheny, and
Ralph Crosby of the Vice President's Staff to Vice
President Mondale¹**

Washington, May 24, 1979

SUBJECT

PRC on MX Basing, Friday, May 25, 1979, 2:00 p.m., Situation Room

The third PRC (principals only) on MX Basing will be held on May 25. We recommend that you attend. The candidates for MX basing have now been narrowed to three from the original list of five:

—*ICBMS in Trenches*. This concept was first introduced at the last PRC and consists of a series of 25-mile long trenches with several rail cars carrying missiles running back and forth within each trench. The trenches are covered with removable concrete slabs. This option would run anywhere from \$6 to \$10 billion more than MPS and appears to have no advantages (if MPS uses horizontal shelters) other than being able to shift missiles more quickly during crisis buildup to enhance security. OSD currently favors this option because they believe it has a better chance of Presidential approval than MPS.

—*MPS: The Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) System* (the preferred option, in fact, of OSD and JCS)—this time with an added feature

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Council Meetings, 1977–1980, Box 100, NSC Meetings, [6–12/1979]. Secret.

of horizontal vice vertical shelters to ease verification concerns (this is the only one of the original options which has basically remained intact).

—*Common M-X/Trident II in SILOs, at Sea and Aboard Aircraft*—a partly common missile for use in Trident submarines (more capable missile, therefore less submarines), in STOL aircraft and in fixed SILOs. This option also accelerates the cruise missile carrier program. This is a hybrid (costing more than the other two options) which features the largest increase in warheads per dollars spent (an analyst's dream), but which also dodges the question of a new large ICBM ("partly common" is smaller than the original M-X) and abandons our land based missiles to their present highly vulnerable deployment mode. (As noted in the NSC memorandum, this is really not a politically feasible option—it does not restore survivability of the ICBM.)

What is not explicit in the PRC preparatory material is that the President has made it clear on a number of occasions that he has a great problem with MPS, although the Defense community (together with OMB and the NSC) are almost universally for it.

The President is concerned over what he perceives to be more difficult verification problems than are thought to be the case by his advisors; he believes that the Soviet response might be to produce more reentry vehicles to defeat MPS or even try to "breakout" by duplicating MPS in an unverifiable manner, thus escalating the arms "race."

Ironically, the MPS system, if deployed, may have precisely the opposite effect. By decoupling the force size from survivability, we are forcing the Soviets to "come clean" as to their intentions. By the end of the current SALT treaty, they will have matched us in total number of reentry vehicles—this can be done within SALT constraints if they MIRV their SLBMs with smaller RVs—the final political plateau to perceived Soviet equality. Should the Soviets seek to further fractionate their ICBM RVs to try to defeat MPS (a violation of SALT II), they are clearly moving in a counterforce direction and there can be no argument as to their intent. Even if this were the case, however, we can build holes in the ground as fast and as cheaply as they can build new RVs, and the absurdity of that exercise may drive both sides to finally reduce forces.

This third PRC is preparatory to an NSC meeting on June 6² at which time the President is expected to reach a decision. *Your entrance at this point in time into the deliberation process would serve to make you fully aware of the pros and cons for each MX basing option. We recommend that you attend.*

As you know, while no one in authority is saying so publicly, a positive decision by the President on MX is seen as vital by the Joint Chiefs.

² The NSC meeting was held on June 4. See Document 141.

This decision, in turn, cannot help but influence the final position of the Chiefs on SALT II.

138. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 25, 1979, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

M–X Basing

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher
Deputy Secretary

JCS

General David Jones

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

OSTP

Frank Press

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

OSD

Harold Brown
Charles Duncan
Deputy Secretary

William Perry

Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering

ACDA

George Seignious

OMB

John White
Deputy Director

NSC

Victor Utgoff

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The bulk of this meeting was used to review the trench basing concept, which is converging on a design similar to the one originally examined over a year ago but with two important differences. First, the trench is covered, but its sectioned top can be completely removed to allow verification. Second, the transporter has larger engines to give it higher speed. This would allow it to completely randomize its position within the flight time of a Soviet ICBM, if we suspect that the security guarding our transporter locations has been broken. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Council Meetings, 1977–1980, Box 100, NSC Meetings, [6–12/1979]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of the meeting were not found.

In discussing the environmental impact of such a system, it was pointed out that the governors of the states where the system might be deployed—Utah and Nevada—had objected to the kind of area security that an open trench system would require. With a covered trench, we could go to point security, and the public could be allowed to use much of the deployment area, though the area would be kept under surveillance using national park-type security, and would be periodically swept for covertly implanted sensors. Mr. Jordan commented that while the environmentalists would like an underground system better than one on the surface, both environmentalists and politicians would be shocked at the extent of the system, and it should be concentrated in as small an area as possible. Secretary Brown commented that the construction should be confined, at least initially, to DOD land so the public could see how little impact a completed system would have. (S)

In discussing the survivability of this trench system, Dr. Perry pointed out that this basing mode is unique in having two methods of achieving survivability—deceptive location and a dash-on-warning capability. He further noted that while the system was designed to initially include 8,000 hardened shelters, another 8,000 could be built between the original shelters for about \$1B in additional costs. This would defeat greater than expected Soviet efforts to fractionate their missile throw-weight, and any amount of further fractionation could be similarly defeated. Mr. Seignious commented that this capability to cope with increased fractionation should provide minimum incentives for Soviet fractionation and thus help to preserve one of SALT II's most valuable achievements—fractionation limits. (S)

Stan Turner questioned whether the Soviets would let us achieve the high level of survivability anticipated for this system, when they would be starting so far ahead in the warhead versus shelter race we would be running. [3 lines not declassified] Secretary Brown argued that many of the RVs in this estimate are below the 1 MT size used as a design threat for the trench system, and many are [2 lines not declassified] He also argued that we can pour concrete faster than the Soviets can build missiles, and that if the Soviets abrogate the SALT limits in an attempt to maintain a high level of threat to the system, we could conceivably defend it with an ABM system. Mr. Aaron suggested that an analysis be carried out of the relative efforts required to expand and to offset the threat to the trench concept. (S)

Finally, Dr. Press asked how the system would cope with a scenario in which the Soviets use SLBMs to deprive the transporters of their mobility, and then use ICBMs to attack shelters that have been identified as containing missile transporters by covertly implanted sensors. Secretary Brown commented that this scenario seems unrealistic, particularly given the fact that the Soviet SLBM attack would provide

considerable warning of their intentions, and could be the basis for launching our missiles upon warning of the follow-up ICBM attack. He also noted that the systems dash capability responded to the concerns about catastrophic security breakdown that had been expressed by the PRC in the previous meeting on this issue. He suggested that while we could leave it out and thus save about \$1B in the cost of the trench system, he would not want to see the system cancelled later for lack of such a capability. (S)

With respect to verification of the system, Bill Perry said that within several hours any trench can be opened up enough to allow the Soviets to see that it contains only a single missile transporter; uncovering the trench completely might take a day. The trench could be left open several days, and as many as 10 to 20 percent of the trenches could be open at one time—opening could be done on a regular schedule or in response to Soviet requests. The key to this verification scheme is arranging the deployment area so that missiles and transporters cannot be brought in and taken out between surveillance opportunities. In response to questions by Warren Christopher, Secretary Brown noted that we would need to ask the Soviets to open any mirror-image system perhaps once per year, and that given a reasonable Soviet design, we could deal with the amount of cloud cover encountered over the Soviet Union. (S)

George Seignious asked what we would do if the Soviets responded to our deployment with a different system. Secretary Brown commented that no US system solves this problem—the real issue is: does our action say that the Soviets can deploy something that is not verifiable? (S)

At several points in the meeting Dr. Brzezinski asked questions about the possibility of designing the system to run on the surface using a large road vehicle. This would allow it to move out of its shelter complex if sufficient warning were available and achieve even higher levels of survivability. Secretary Brown responded that without strategic warning, the system would be far tougher to kill inside its shelter complex than on the surface trying to disperse. He also argued that use of the M-X or mostly-common missile implies a transporter with a gross weight of roughly a million lbs. This would require special roads within the deployment area which would have significantly greater environmental impact than the covered trench. Finally, he noted that while the system might have greater survivability in some scenarios, its ability to move outside the designated deployment area would raise verification concerns. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted our apparent willingness to spend billions to protect this force from bolt-from-the-blue attacks, and questioned whether we wouldn't regret being confined to our trenches if the Soviets

were to respond to our mobile systems by deploying something like the SS-16. George Seignious said that getting a survivable system ourselves is more of a concern than what the Soviets do. Secretary Brown commented that we will always want to verify limits on Soviet proposals and should thus pay attention to the example we set in verification. Finally, General Jones argued that the Soviets will be able to cover very large areas with overpressure that would be lethal to a surface-mobile system, and that dispersing it in a crisis might be destabilizing in that it could send a bad signal. (S)

There are [*was?*] some discussion of Option 5A,² which deploys a common missile in silos, the Trident sub, and a small number of aircraft, and uses this same aircraft in an accelerated cruise missile carrier program. Stan Turner noted that this option would provide significantly more surviving capability than any of the others. Dr. Brzezinski commented that he had not made up his mind on Option 5A and wanted to see it brought forward. Secretary Brown noted that this option would be more frightening to the Soviets due to the rapid rate at which it would improve our SSBN and strategic aircraft forces. Frank Press noted Option 5A's greater effectiveness, and the fact that it did contain the air mobile deployment option. He then added that the trench scheme being discussed is only two weeks old—and is a relatively uncertain concept that is still changing. General Jones answered that the air-mobile concept is more uncertain than the trench concept, and Secretary Brown showed a short film on trench construction and testing to illustrate the point that the current trench concept is building upon a body of knowledge that has been evolving for some time. Secretary Brown concluded the discussion of basing modes by suggesting that the MPS, covered trench and Option 5A alternatives be presented to the President for decision. (S)

In discussing the issue of missile size, Dr. Brzezinski commented that if we are not going to proceed with a ground-mobile system that might need a smaller missile, he favors building the largest missile possible under SALT II—the 190,000 lb. M-X. He argued that this missile is better defined than the various common missiles, and could be put in full-scale development almost immediately, where the others would involve significant delays. Dr. Brzezinski noted that such delays might be seen as an attempt to make it easier to cancel the deployment of the new land-based missile once SALT II ratification is behind us. George Seignious added that there appears to be strong support by the Congress for proceeding with the largest possible missile. (S)

Frank Press argued that we will have no flexibility to deploy the new missile in other basing modes if we proceed with the large M-X.

² The options paper was not found.

Secretary Brown responded that a surface-mobile system might still be possible, or deployment in the sort of small submersibles that Frank Press' panel had suggested. (S)

General Jones argued in favor of the large M-X, noting that the smaller missiles were less capable, and that development of a common missile could lead to common failure modes and would be a management disaster according to several experts who had managed larger missile programs before. Secretary Brown argued that these management concerns were in his view overblown, and Bill Perry showed a chart³ indicating that the capabilities of the common missile do not compare that unfavorably with those of the large M-X if its accuracy goals can be met. Secretary Christopher noted that given the tension between survivability and verification, and Congressional attitudes, he thought the trench concept with the full-sized M-X missile would be the best answer. Finally, Secretary Brown noted that interest in Option 5A implies interest in proceeding with the fully common missile. (S)

³ The chart was not found.

139. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Science and Technology (Press) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 1, 1979

SUBJECT

M-X Missile and Basing Option

As you recall you directed me to convene a panel to review various alternatives for the M-X missile size and basing mode. Although much of their effort focused on multiple protective shelter (MPS) and airmobile ICBM systems, they also briefly considered the recently proposed trench and included some general comments on this system in an addendum to their report (Tab A).² Following is a brief summary of the panel's conclusions:

—Although technically feasible and more effective than other alternatives in preserving the current attributes of our Minuteman

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 86, Defense: 1979. Secret.

² Attached but not printed is the May 1979 M-X Panel Report.

force, MPS still has serious shortcomings including verification, break-out and security problems.

—The trench system could in principle resolve the MPS verification problems but seems to involve an inherent conflict between verification and security. The environmental and security problems could be minimized if the trench were closed most of the time, as DOD is proposing, but this would lead to verification concerns about possible clandestine activities, such as digging side tunnels to store excess missiles.

—The Panel saw considerable merit in a system which would involve placing some new missiles in current Minuteman silos and some in airplanes. They felt that such a system would have some important advantages due to synergistic cross-force effects. For example, a simultaneous Soviet launch of ICBMs against our silos and SLBMs against our airbased missiles would permit the silo based force to be launched on confirmation of actual nuclear detonation instead of on warning as at present.

Based on the panel's findings and my own review of this issue, I believe that a mixed silo and air basing approach which includes a new aircraft that would also be used for cruise missile carriage and the TRIDENT II SLBM is the best approach from the standpoint of military and cost effectiveness. The DOD analysis indicates that for comparable expenditures this system would have significantly more warheads and surviving EMT than either the MPS or trench. For political reasons, however, I think that it would be important to use a "mostly common" missile in the silo and airbased forces rather than TRIDENT II. This missile could carry 10 MK-12A RVs, the maximum we are allowed under SALT, and its increased firepower would further enhance the military effectiveness of this option. Since it would have a third stage and guidance system that would not be compatible with SLBM use, it would help offset the Chiefs' concern that if TRIDENT II is picked, the silo and airbased ICBMs would be dropped entirely at a later point. The mostly common missile could cost an additional 2–3 billion dollars, but this could be offset if necessary by reductions in missile or aircraft procurement.

I believe that this option would also be the most compatible with your arms control objectives. All of its components would be readily verifiable and in view of its tremendous military effectiveness and the fact that many procurement decisions would not actually be made for several years, this option would give us significantly greater negotiating leverage with the Soviets.

In spite of its inherent advantages, however, there may be overriding political objections to this approach. It is not as effective as the MPS or trench in preserving Minuteman's attributes, and the mostly common missile would not be as large as the 190,000 lb one we are permitted to build under SALT. (It would weigh 170,000 lbs for silo launch and 150,000 lbs for air launch.) For these reasons it is unlikely

this option would be supported by the Chiefs. It could be criticized as an abandonment of the triad and could considerably complicate prospects for SALT ratification. Consequently, you may want to proceed instead with some variant of the trench system.

The current approach of having a heavy concrete and ground covering over the entire trench which would only be removed once a year and even then with considerable difficulty would involve verification problems approaching those involved with the MPS. The Soviets have objected repeatedly to our use of temporary shelters over Minuteman silos and could be expected to object even more strenuously to a system that was covered most of the time. It is possible that a different concept, such as placing the tracks and shelters completely on the surface with no covering between shelters, could overcome this verification problem and possibly be acceptable from an environmental and security standpoint. Given the present uncertainties in the trench, however, I recommend that you offer only tentative endorsement of this option pending a fullscale definition study this summer.

There would be considerable objection to yet another delay on the basing mode but this timetable would permit you to reach a final decision by October 1, the M-X reporting date set by the Senate in its review of the FY 80 budget, and prior to the vote on SALT ratification. To minimize objections, however, it would be essential for you to decide now on the size of the M-X missile and to authorize its full-scale development. I recommend you select the mostly common rather than 190,000 lb missile to preserve the flexibility for aircraft basing in the event that the trench problems can not be overcome and to permit eventual use of the first two stages for the TRIDENT II SLBM.

140. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 3, 1979

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on Strategic Issues and US-Soviet Relations (C)

You will chair a meeting of the National Security Council on June 4 to discuss selected strategic issues and the general balance of power in US-Soviet relations. It will have a four-fold importance:

—On the eve of the Vienna Summit,² you will review the trends in the East-West strategic balance. For example, there is no doubt that JCS support for SALT ratification will be enhanced if problems with this balance are addressed at an NSC meeting and some specific actions taken to mitigate them.

—The following day you will review the Defense budget with OMB. It is important that strategic perspectives guide the budget decisions, not vice-versa.

—You will meet with Chancellor Schmidt two days later³ at which time you will want to indicate your position on TNF, which will also be reviewed at this NSC meeting.

—DOD will formally present its analysis of the M-X alternatives. (TS)

NSC Meeting: Issues and Conduct

With the above points in mind, the NSC meeting agenda will be as follows:

1. I will provide a brief review of CNA-78 and the PRC on the DOD Consolidated Guidance with conclusions that bear on the strategic trends. I shall also indicate several topics for a later NSC meeting, including C³I and strategic doctrine. Others will comment briefly.

2. We shall briefly review policy and planning on Theater Nuclear Force modernization, specifically: a) Chancellor Schmidt's visit; b) the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 56, NSC-019, 6/4/79, Strategic Arms Policy and Relations with USSR. Top Secret. Sent for action. The date is handwritten.

² Carter traveled to Vienna on June 14 and met with Brezhnev June 15–18. On the final day of the summit, the two leaders signed the Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 241.

³ Documentation on Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's June 6 visit to the White House is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

status of NATO consultations; c) development of force posture options within the USG. (An example is at Tab A.)⁴ You will receive a more complete memo on this subject in your briefing book for the Schmidt visit. You should instruct Harold to present you with specific deployment options by the end of June for our decision and then discussion with the allies in July.

3. The main business of this meeting is to discuss M-X alternatives and basing, which constitute the most important immediate decision required for long-term solutions to our strategic problems. Harold Brown will present the results of PRC deliberations, options on basing, options on the missile choice, and supporting analysis.

4. Time permitting, we shall have a brief discussion of the strategic problem we may face in the early 1980s when Minuteman will be highly vulnerable but offsetting new force deployments will not yet have been made. We want to elicit views as to whether we have a critical problem in the early 1980s and, if so, what short-term fixes might be in order. Several options have been surfaced, e.g., uploading more weapons on our Poseidon SLBMs, delaying deactivation of Polaris SSBNs, raising bomber alert rates, and accelerating B-52/ALCM conversions. We want to determine whether a more systematic look at these and other possibilities is in order. You should also ask Harold to present you with specific proposals by the end of June.

Throughout the meeting you should keep in mind three questions⁵ as criteria for decisions and guidance you may give on strategic matters:

a. In view of the continuing Soviet buildup and capability, what will be required to maintain stable deterrence in the 1980s and beyond?

b. In the event of a strategic crisis with the USSR, what will be required for a stable bargaining posture?

c. Finally, if deterrence fails in a crisis, what will it take to make our military power support politically selected war aims instead of letting our military posture draw us into a meaningless spasm war?⁶ (TS)

Analysis of M-X Choices

As I see it, you have two broad options to choose between—you can deploy a survivable land-based ICBM system (Harold's option A) using one of the mobile/shelter systems that have been proposed, or you can place more emphasis on strategic aircraft and SLBMs and maintain an ICBM that is not independently survivable (Harold's option B).

⁴ Not found attached.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined "three questions."

⁶ An unknown hand drew a bracket in the left margin next to points a-c and wrote: "key issues."

The main arguments in favor of option A are that land-based missiles provide the easiest way to achieve a quick response force with rapid reliable C³ and the capability to destroy all types of targets—in fact the land-based options being considered under option A have significantly lower life-cycle costs than SLBM or strategic aircraft forces of equivalent size.

The main argument for option B is that it does not require us to solve the collection of technical, environmental, and verification problems associated with option A. On the other hand, no matter what we say, abandoning the idea of a survivable ICBM force will be seen as a defeat for the U.S. It would also permit the Soviets to concentrate their efforts on jeopardizing our other forces.

If you choose option A, you must then decide on which approach to take in achieving ICBM survivability. DOD is strongly opposed to the air-mobile system because of its high cost and low endurance, and dead-set against truck mobiles because of their dependence on strategic warning and/or their high public impact when dispersed. Thus, the basing mode choice appears to be between MPS and the track-mobile systems. (See Tab B.)

The main technical distinction between these systems is the speed with which the missiles would move from shelter to shelter. This distinction leads to major differences in the systems' verifiability, environmental impact, and their acceptability. The MPS system shuffles its missiles relatively slowly, which implies a critical dependence on maintaining the security of missile locations, and the required security measures complicate verification. The track mobile system uses high speed transporters that allow complete randomization of missile locations within the flight time of a Soviet ICBM. This feature costs perhaps \$2 billion more than the corresponding MPS system if the tracks are on the surface, but makes missile location security less important and leads to a system that is considerably easier to verify. A track system in an openable trench would be less verifiable than one on the surface and somewhat more expensive—whether it would have more or less environmental impact is not clear. (S)

The choice of which missile to deploy must also be made unless you choose option B, which makes sense only with the common missile. As I see it, we are eventually going to want to build the Trident II missile independent of what we do for the land based force. This is because once a dozen or so Trident submarines have been built, it will become more cost effective to go back and fill those submarines with the largest possible SLBM than to build toward an equivalent capability using only the Trident I. Thus, the issue is do we want a significantly different land based missile? (S)

In our PRC meetings, OSD compared the capabilities of the Trident II and the 192,000 lb MX missile the Air Force prefers. These comparisons show that if the Trident II can meet its accuracy goals, it would be nearly as capable as the large MX and thus not many more would be required to achieve the assumed design goals of the land based force. Thus a savings of perhaps \$4 billion might ultimately be achieved by using the Trident II in the land based deployment—though more money would be required up front to design a missile that is able to operate in both basing modes. (S)

There are major problems involved in choosing the common missile approach however:

- many in Congress and elsewhere want “largest” missile allowed under SALT II;

- Trident II is not well enough defined to begin now. The 6–12 month delay needed to define it will exacerbate concerns about Soviet strategic momentum;

- designing a missile for land and sea use will pose a significant management challenge—some see possibility of another TFX;

- a common missile implies some increase in the probability of a simultaneous failure in both land and sea based missile forces;

- suspicions will be generated that we will cancel the land based deployment once SALT II ratification is behind us. Such suspicions will result in lower SALT support that would have been generated by the choice of the largest missile;

- the Air Force is strongly opposed for above reasons and more;

- the Navy is opposed because funding for Trident II will divert resources from other programs they strongly prefer (S)

Taking everything into account, I don’t believe it would be prudent to choose the common missile for the land based deployment. I believe the partly common missile is even a poorer idea because it poses pretty much the same difficulties as the common missile, but promises significantly smaller ultimate saving even if everything works out. (S)

M-X Decisions

You should try to make as many of the above decisions as you can. At a minimum, you should make the broad choice between options A and B. If you choose B, it is extremely important that you announce it before the Summit in order to avoid any impression that it is the result of a deal with the Soviets. (TS)

Assuming you choose A, you should also try to choose between MPS and the track-mobile systems and, unless you choose MPS now, you should ask Harold to refine the track-mobile concept by the end of June. (S)

Again, assuming you choose A, I recommend that you decide in favor of the large M–X missile and announce it now, particularly if you are not ready to choose between MPS and the track-mobile concept. (S)

Agenda and Recommended Decisions

1. CNA–78/CG review—ZB; comments by others.
 2. TNF—Brown instructed to provide concrete deployment plans by the end of June.
 3. Early '80s imbalance—Brown asked to present by the end of June options for short-term fixes.
 4. M–X issue—resolve as completely as possible prior to Summit—if B is your choice, *must be announced before Summit*.
-

141. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, June 4, 1979, 3–4:20 p.m.

Minutes from NSC Meeting on Strategic Issues and
US-Soviet Relations (C)

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by stating that its purpose was to review the trends in the US-Soviet balance as indicated in CNA–78 and the recent PRC on the Consolidated Guidance,² and to reach some decisions concerning tactical nuclear forces and the M–X. He noted that other meetings would be needed later on to discuss some related issues such as strategic targeting, C³I, and our strategic doctrine. He then stated the following seven key conclusions that he had drawn from CNA–78 and the Consolidated Guidance meeting:

1. The US continues to enjoy considerable advantages in all non-military aspects of the US-Soviet competition. (TS)
2. Only with our Allies do we have an advantage over the Soviets in the crude dimensions of military power. Thus we cannot afford to jeopardize Alliance cohesion and confidence which are crucially dependent on US power and resolve. (TS)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #19 Held 6/4/79, 5–7/79. Top Secret. According to the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting, in attendance at the meeting, which took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House, were Carter, Mondale, Vance, Jones, McIntyre, Press, Utgoff, Brown, Duncan, Turner, Seignious, Brzezinski, Aaron, Jordan, and Powell. (Ibid.)

² For the May 14 PRC meeting on the Consolidated Guidance, see Document 134.

3. With respect to trends of the regional military balance, in the Far East favorable political trends may offset an unfavorable military balance; instabilities in the Persian Gulf/Mideast region create an adverse balance with an uncertain future; and in NATO the balance is slowly improving. (TS)

4. The strategic nuclear balance is deteriorating faster than we expected two years ago and will continue to do so to the early '80s. The Soviets have been outspending us in defense since the late 1960s and military investment is important because it accumulates. (TS)

5. In the early 1980s we will face "a strategic dip." We will not meet the criteria established in PD-18 that we maintain essential equivalence and a balance no worse than that existing in '77.³ (TS)

6. The strategic gap of the early '80s could produce damaging political perceptions and encourage assertive Soviet behavior. (TS)

7. If these trends are not corrected, the US will be able at best to wage a spasmodic apocalyptic war rather than one controlled for political purposes. Because of this situation, the US will be less able to bargain stably in a protracted crisis situation and therefore the US may be less able in the '80s to deter the Soviet Union from assertive behavior. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski also noted that it would really be an irony if our strategic position in the 1980s forces us to again rely on massive retaliation just as we did in the '50s when we possessed a massive strategic superiority. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski said that he recognized that there were some divergent views with respect to these conclusions and suggested that the other principals comment. (TS)

Secretary Vance said that he agreed with all Zbig's conclusions, with two exceptions. First, he felt that characterizing the situation outside NATO as adverse was too pessimistic, that it would be more appropriate to characterize it as uncertain. More important, however, he felt that we will have a situation of rough strategic equivalence in the early '80s and that we should not take the position ourselves that we are inferior—this is a very dangerous way to characterize our situation, and we may hurt ourselves in doing it. (TS)

Secretary Brown began by saying that while he felt the comprehensive net assessment was in some cases too pessimistic—the strategic forces balance being one example of this—he thought the assessment was too optimistic overall. In supporting this view, Secretary Brown made the following points:

—While relative dislike of the Soviets felt by other nations is a modest advantage to us, making too much of this point draws attention away from the fact that the Soviets can play on other nations' fears of them to achieve their objectives.

—We would be hurt more than the Soviets by adverse events in the Third World.

³ See Document 31.

—While the gross resources available to, and the military efforts being made by the US and its allies were larger than those of the Soviet Union and its allies, they can't really be added together since our objectives are not always the same. Further, our column includes the resources and efforts of countries like the People's Republic of China and Iran.

—The military investment imbalance in favor of the Soviets may be far more significant for the future than we realize. By 1985 the Soviets will have greater strength than the US in almost every military category, no matter what we do. We are going to have to be prepared to live with this. (TS)

Secretary Brown also noted that there are some bright spots working for us, particularly in the area of technology, and he mentioned the space shuttle in particular. However, given the Soviets' large efforts in the technology area, they might produce something revolutionary in the way of military capabilities. (TS)

Finally, Secretary Brown commented that we must be careful that we don't let spending for strategic forces improvements absorb too much of the resources that we devote to defense. (TS)

George Seignious commented that perceptions of Soviet superiority will have to be handled carefully in order to make sure that they do not have major adverse effects on our arms control efforts. (TS)

The President then said that much of this perception of Soviet superiority is created by this group. He noted that he had just convened a group of experts to discuss the problem of public perceptions and attitudes, and their discussion had convinced him that maintaining a balanced view of our actual situation is a serious problem. He noted how the newspapers tend to distort the testimony given about military matters by high-level DOD officials. He commented that the eleven members of the House of Representatives he had recently met with at Camp David had expressed concerns about the problem of perceptions. He commented that it seemed strange that we would hear so much about emerging military problems, given the fact that we have been increasing DOD funding. He remarked that we should do what we can to let people know that we have a strong, powerful, permanent government and that we are not crawling abjectly before the Soviets. He pointed out that we have military advantages over them such as the fact that the Soviets have multiple enemies, where we do not. (TS)

Stan Turner commented that he generally agrees with Harold Brown's assessment of Zbig's conclusions about the overall balance. *[4 lines not declassified]*

General Jones remarked that the Chiefs have muted their concerns about the evolving military balance and cited as an example of their care to contain their concerns that it took three months for their memo

to the President about SALT to leak to Evans & Novak.⁴ Jones noted that it poses a real dilemma to the Chiefs to be so muted when they have such concerns about where we are going, and he commented that he has never seen his fellow Chiefs or the Allies more concerned than they are now. He remarked that the NIEs sound more pessimistic now and that past NIEs have proven optimistic in their projections of the future. He said that he expected that the Soviets may be very assertive during the early '80s and that thus this period will be far less stable. He noted that we are far more vulnerable today than we used to be, particularly given our dependence upon imported oil. He also remarked that in his view the Soviets probably could achieve a conventional victory in NATO though they cannot feel confident of it. Finally, General Jones said that his colleagues told him that they don't believe that it will be possible for Jones to express their concerns strongly enough. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the meeting was already behind schedule and suggested that the discussion of tactical nuclear forces be skipped except for a request to Secretary Brown to develop specific deployment plans for tactical nuclear forces for discussion in another meeting. Dr. Brzezinski also suggested that the President show Chancellor Schmidt during his upcoming visit⁵ the illustrative plan for long-range tactical nuclear forces that was forwarded to him during the weekend, and thus attempt to smoke out his attitudes about having Pershing II only in Germany and only GLCM elsewhere. Finally, Dr. Brzezinski noted that we should consider possible short-term fixes to the strategic imbalance problem that is going to appear during the early '80s, and he listed several possibilities including uploading more weapons on our Poseidon SLBMs and accelerating B-52/ALCM conversions. Secretary Brown responded by noting that he also has other options for alleviating the early '80s imbalance, such as deploying SLCMs. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we meet in July to discuss these problems. (TS)

The President then said that he had decided to notify the Allies that we are ready to take a leadership role on tactical nuclear forces. He said that we have told our Allies that we will try to accommodate their political needs and will try to get them to support each other. These points will be made to Chancellor Schmidt in the upcoming visit. (TS)

⁴ Reference is to Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Chiefs Knock SALT," *Washington Post*, June 4, 1979, p. A27. In the article, Evans and Novak referred to a March 12 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Brown requesting that he send it to President Carter. The memorandum, dated March 16, is in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972-1980, Documnet 236. According to a June 12 memorandum from Ermarth to Brzezinski, "Harold apparently decided not to send the JCS memo. His office told me 'not to worry; Harold is taking care of this by himself.'" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 54, SALT: 3/79)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 140.

The President also said that he recognizes the MINUTEMAN vulnerability problem and the nation's longstanding commitment to the concept of Triad. He noted, however, that his decision was made more difficult by the fact that he had been presented with options that were stated only in counter-force terms. He remarked that we should also pay more attention to the capabilities of ALCMs and bombers. He also said that he sensed that many in the group did not sufficiently share his concerns about the effects this decision might have on SALT, and that his own attitude was not a question of timidity. He said that he needed the assistance of the assembled group, and he remarked at the progress that had been made in getting the Congress to accept the idea of proceeding with an M-X missile, which was quite a reversal of their previous attitudes. He also remarked, however, that there are limits on the amount of money available for military expenditures, and that large increases in military spending must be recognized for the threat they could pose to our economy. (TS)

The President suggested that the group should make a greater effort to put themselves in his shoes—that he was not interested in destroying SALT and then having to embark on a massive arms race. He suggested that the group had not explored nearly enough means for solving our strategic forces problems and that getting on with a solution was not a question of lack of will to solve the problem or dollars. He remarked that the effects on SALT III of this decision are very important. The President suggested that a longer meeting would be required to discuss the M-X issue and that an evening meeting be scheduled. Finally the President asked Secretary Brown if he needed more guidance concerning theater nuclear forces. (TS)

Secretary Brown remarked that he thought that he had enough information on TNF to proceed. He then stated that he thought that the President should make as much of the decision on M-X as possible before the Summit. He noted that there are two general options. The first is Option A; this option preserves the Triad and presents opportunities for scaling-back production of new strategic forces later on. Thus it would be compatible with reductions achieved in SALT III. Option B, on the other hand, is more of a force increase and is thus somewhat less compatible with our ultimate goal of reduced strategic forces. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that if the President is interested in choosing Option B, he should do so before the Summit. It was important that such a decision not be seen as the result of his discussions with the Soviets. Dr. Brzezinski also argued that the missile decision can be made before the Summit. (TS)

The President responded that the missile decision is easy; it's just a question of money. The basing decision, however, is a much tougher question, and until late last night he had not even heard of the covered

trench. He noted that he had an exchange of correspondence with President Brezhnev discussing the question of verification of mobile systems, and that he had assured the President that the US would not deploy a system that was not verifiable.⁶ The President commented that he could not see how a 20-mile trench that could be opened once per year after 10,000 tons of dirt had been scraped off, could lead to a verifiable system. In his view, a decision in favor of such a system would mean the end of SALT, though perhaps he did not understand everything. Secretary Brown responded that the President didn't understand the concept. The President continued by noting the problems we had had with canvas covers over the MINUTEMAN silos, and the problems created as a result of darkness and cloud cover, and the possibility of openings for extra missiles along the sides of the trenches. Secretary Vance remarked that he could not recommend the non-open trench, and then said that the open trench is what he had thought the group was talking about, a concept that he could recommend enthusiastically. (TS)

Secretary Brown said that there is an open trench variant that could be put completely on DOD land. The concept would be to build the system and cover it later if expansion of the Soviet threat required it. The President responded that this sounds like a better idea. Secretary Brown then continued by noting that the covered trench is not as difficult to verify as you might think. The trench would be open to view for a long time during its construction process, which would presumably rule out the possibility of hidden chambers for extra missiles. The launchers that would be used are million-pound vehicles that would only be assembled at the deployment site and the trench would be openable in as little as two hours in that enough of the section can be removed to guarantee that no more than one missile is inside it. He then remarked, however, that given the President's and Secretary Vance's perceptions, it looked like we would have to stay with an open trench although it would not be as good. The open trench would require large amounts of land to be fenced off and might have more impact on the environment, and it might not be as good militarily either. (TS)

Secretary Vance then remarked that the Soviets might want to do the same thing. Secretary Brown responded that this question had been discussed before and that the real issue was whether we were deploying an unverifiable system. (TS)

Frank Press commented that going to the open trench concept will lead to closing off 3–4000 sq. mi. of area that is currently open to public use. Secretary Brown responded that only the area immediately around each trench would have to be fenced off. (TS)

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 189.

The President then remarked that the capability to cover the trench is okay in his view, but that he would not want to try to explain the covered trench concept in Vienna. He then remarked that if we proceed with the largest M–X missile allowed under SALT and the cruise missile improvements as well, we will be in a good position to expand our forces if SALT breaks down. He also noted that at this point he really didn't know how many TRIDENTs we might ultimately need, or if the TRIDENT II missile would be needed. Finally the President remarked that the \$75–80B figures that Harold Brown is citing in the memo he forwarded are going to come as a big shock to the public and Congress since so far we have only been talking about numbers like \$25B. (TS)

Secretary Brown responded that the figures we are giving are the acquisition costs for a number of systems that will be purchased over a number of years. He suggested that perhaps it would be better to think about strategic costs in year-by-year terms and wondered if we wouldn't have a different attitude towards our domestic programs if their costs were presented in terms of sums for a large number of years. He then presented figures comparing the costs of the systems being proposed today to those of the corresponding submarine and land-based missile systems we built in the '60s. These comparisons showed that those original systems would be quite expensive in '80 dollars and that the strategic modernization effort we made in the late '50s and early '60s was really massive. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we clearly cannot solve the whole problem today but perhaps some parts of the overall question can be resolved. The President responded that he would hate to see us give up land-based systems and that he agreed with the concerns that have been expressed in the memos that had been sent him that this would be a serious political blow. He stated that it would be worth a great deal of effort on our part to avoid such a setback. He also stated that over the years a mystique had built up about the M–X and that not going forward with it would also be a political blow. The question of exactly what kind of a force mix we might want is another issue and a very complex one that he is not ready to decide. The basing issue in particular is complex, and though he liked the open trench idea, he must analyze this concept further. He remarked that the environmental questions are going to be very tough and he cited a problem that had been related to him during the weekend with the opening of a single copper mine in Utah. He said that this mine had been blocked by the environmentalists by the expedient of having a series of people file suits against it over a long period of time. He said that he thought that the statements that had been made that the governor of Utah was for the M–X deployment were a little glib and that one could conclude that the problem was much bigger, if you consider the problems we have had in places like Michigan. The

President stated that he was prepared to make preliminary decisions to maintain the Triad and proceed with the large M-X. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if the President was saying that he was deciding against Option B though not among the various ways of realizing Option A, and that he was also deciding that there would be no common missile, at least as tentative decisions. The President said Yes, but that the question of the 190,000 lb missile versus the 170,000 lb missile isn't completely closed. (TS)

Jim McIntyre then stated that he saw some technology and cost questions associated with the trench concepts. Secretary Brown responded that we know a great deal about the trench already and have developed some of the machinery required to build it, and have even built several segments. Jim McIntyre continued that he was uncomfortable about some of the costs being cited for the mix of systems being considered. He also saw the schedules that were cited as uncertain, and was also concerned that there might be serious environmental problems. (TS)

The President suggested that the entire basing issue would have to be discussed further and asked Zbig to schedule an evening meeting for this purpose. The President then remarked that we needed a fallback on the basing question if we are to hedge against the possibility that we run into insurmountable difficulties. However, for the moment, the decision to proceed with the M-X should be enough to keep us busy. He then remarked that we have serious problems in getting Congressional support for our defense spending and that the scare language that might be needed to gain another \$5B in defense spending might work to reduce our confidence in ourselves by the equivalent of \$20B in defense spending. (TS)

Secretary Brown commented that one fallback position would be to put M-X in silos. He thought however that moving MINUTEMAN around would be a real problem. The President responded that if you had 50-100 MINUTEMEN on trucks that would be something—but that he was not trying to dodge the issue with suggestions like this. (TS)

Dr. Brzezinski, referring back to the question of perceptions, said that we must of course say that we are strong, but on the other hand, we can't close our eyes to the possibilities six years from now. (TS)

The President responded that we have done all right in our approach to the Congress for defense funding. The Congress used to cut the defense budget by \$5B automatically but in recent years the reasonably unified position that we have presented to the Hill had done all right. He said that he would hope that we can sell our solution to the MINUTEMAN vulnerability problem to the Hill without using scare tactics. The President remarked again that while the trends are against

us, we are strong, and that we must solve the problem posed by perceptions that we are not. (TS)

Secretary Vance suggested that we attack the SALT critics head-on and as part of combatting these misperceptions. Jody Powell remarked that he thought the problem is an overall unease with our situation and that we need an honest and frank assessment of our problems. He said that if we don't play it straight, "we will get our heads beat in." Secretary Brown said that there are some very respectable people who believe that we may actually have too much military strength. (TS)

Finally the President closed the meeting with a request that the charts Dr. Brzezinski had used in his presentation be returned. He said that he hoped that they would not show up in Evans and Novak. (TS)

142. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, June 5, 1979, 6–8:24 p.m.

SUBJECT

US Strategic Arms Policy and US Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President

State
Cyrus Vance
JCS
General David Jones

OMB
James McIntyre

OSTP
Frank Press

NSC
Victor Utgoff

OSD
Harold Brown
Charles Duncan
Deputy Secretary
William Perry
Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering
DCI
Admiral Stansfield Turner
ACDA
George Seignious

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #19 Held 6/4/79, 5–7/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The date on the original, June 4, from 3 until 4:20 p.m., is incorrect. A handwritten note on the first page of the minutes reads: "Note: These notes are from evening portion of June 4–5 meeting (3:00–4:20 was only 1st portion." The meeting actually took place June 5 from 6 p.m. until 8:24 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

Hamilton Jordan
Jody Powell

DETAILED MINUTES FROM THE NSC MEETING

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by noting that there were four items on the agenda: first, the choice of the missile, second, the question of basing mode (four concepts would be discussed), third, the question of verification, and finally, the conclusions and recommendations of the principals, including public relations aspects. (C)

Secretary Brown opened the question of missile size by describing the 190,000 lb. missile and stating that it was deployable in all of the ground deployment modes, though not in aircraft or in the Trident submarine. He stated that this missile was designed to carry 10 Mark-12A warheads, though, if necessary, it could probably be uploaded to as many as 12. He also argued that this missile was already designed whereas other possibilities such as the partly common missile or common missile would involve at least a one year delay. He noted, however, that the 190,000 lb. missile involved no common elements that would be usable in the Trident missile. Finally, he stated that the capability of this missile would be comparable to that of the SS-18. He then discussed the 110,000 lb. common missile, stating that this missile could carry 6 or 7 Mark-12As, or a mix of 4 Mark-12As plus 6 smaller Mark-4 RVs. He said that the effectiveness of the smaller RVs would be more sensitive to the accuracy achieved by the missile. (S)

The President asked if the common missile would be as accurate as the larger MX missile. *Secretary Brown* responded that this would depend upon whether we were thinking about the sea-based or the land-based deployment. At sea, the missile would certainly be less accurate, and in this case it would be hard to make the argument that its capabilities would be comparable to those of the SS-18. (C)

Secretary Vance asked what RV sizes were being considered. [1 line not declassified] (S)

Secretary Brown said that DOD had also looked at the 160,000 lb. partly common missile, and that he had come to the conclusion that this was probably the worst of both worlds. In particular, it would pose quite a management challenge to design a single missile for operation in both the Air Force and the Navy environments. (C)

Secretary Brown and *General Jones* responding to a question from the President, noted the differences in the two environments, and cited the fact that the Air Force employs missile designs that use a liquid fueled post-boost vehicle, while the Navy is not willing to use liquid fueled rockets aboard submarines for safety reasons. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that savings could probably be obtained, but they would be delayed until we actually decided to go forward with

deployment of the Trident II missile. He said that he had actually been through a program to design a major piece of hardware for use by both the Air Force and the Navy, and that while such joint use programs were feasible, they were a great strain. (U)

General Jones noted that he would prefer a survivable MX missile to an SS-18 based in a silo. *Secretary Brown* replied that Jones had combined several questions here, and asked him how he would feel about the two missiles if they were both based in silos. *General Jones* responded that this would be a wash in his view—his point was that deployment of the large MX missile would defuse concerns about the Soviets' large missile advantage. (C)

George Seignious commented that he thought it was extremely important that we take full advantage of the single ICBM exception that was allowed under SALT II, by deploying the largest missile permitted. (C)

Secretary Brown argued that many in the Congress want the largest allowable missile, and that he also prefers the 192,000 lb. MX, although he was not convinced of this several months ago. (C)

The President asked if there were any contrary opinions. (U)

Frank Press responded that he supports Secretary Brown's preference for the larger missile, but he went on to note that we would have greater flexibility in going to alternative deployment modes if we deployed a somewhat smaller missile. (C)

Stan Turner then raised a concern he had about the possibility that the Soviets might want to keep our land-based missile force vulnerable and thus might try to stay ahead of our effort to deploy more aimpoints than they could attack. [3 lines not declassified] He noted that while we might be able to achieve our aims if the Soviets remain within the limits of SALT, if their desire to keep us vulnerable were strong enough, this might make them unwilling to agree to any future SALT limits. (S)

The President asked Admiral Turner what sort of a solution he would suggest to such a problem. *Admiral Turner* responded that we should go to a more flexible missile, and place more emphasis on our SLBM and bomber forces. (C)

Secretary Vance asked *Admiral Turner* if he would still want to go to a smaller missile if our SLBM force and our bomber force were already much stronger. *Admiral Turner* responded that he would still like to see more flexibility. *Frank Press* added that flexibility is particularly important if we run into obstacles in our pursuit of a survivable land basing system. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that the large missile would be deployable in the small submergibles that had been suggested by Frank Press' panel. He further noted that while the large MX missile would not go in the

Trident submarine, we might end up building only ten of these submarines and thus these boats might be only a minor part of our SLBM force. He remarked that he was reluctant for that matter to depend too much on SLBMs. He also noted that if we did not pursue a survivable land-based missile system, this almost implies an invitation to the Soviets to concentrate on reducing the survivability of the other two strategic force components. He noted the diversity of problems that the Soviets would face in trying to find counters to some sort of a multiple aimpoint scheme as well as to our SLBM force. Finally, he remarked that given the large R&D efforts the Soviets were making, there was always the possibility of a technological breakthrough against one of our strategic force components. (S)

Stan Turner remarked that yesterday the President had criticized the principals for not presenting more information on the SALT impacts of the schemes they were discussing.² He noted that, in his view, staying in the land-based missile business may work to the disadvantage of our long term SALT interests. He remarked that if we got out of the land-based missile business, and then deployed the Trident II missile, which would be good enough to put Soviet land-based ICBMs at risk, this might push the Soviets toward adopting mobile survivable systems as well, and thus we would have created a very good situation in which neither side's forces would be vulnerable. (S)

The President asked how many missiles the Soviets had deployed in silos. [1 line not declassified] (S)

Secretary Brown disputed Admiral Turner's arguments by arguing that if the Soviets can concentrate on anti-submarine warfare, they might actually succeed in threatening the survivability of our SSBNs. He argued that maintaining a variety of survivable basing modes may pose such a challenge to Soviet interests in gaining counterforce capabilities as to encourage their acceptance of arms control. He also noted that by pursuing survivable basing modes for all our systems, we would be in a posture in which it would be easier for us to accept arms control reductions. He noted that with a fully survivable Triad we could probably reduce our forces by a factor of two or more. (S)

The President remarked that the main point of all these arguments seems to be that there is no flexibility if we proceed with 190,000 lb. missile. (C)

David Aaron asked if [less than one line not declassified] the Soviets can really outrace us [less than one line not declassified] *Secretary Brown* responded that calculations the Defense Department had done indicated that fractionation would be a losing proposition for the Soviets. He remarked that under current plans, a large margin of extra shelters

² See Document 141.

would be built into the initial basing deployments. He also commented that even if the Soviets did choose to attack our forces, they would have to accept a very adverse exchange ratio in the process of destroying our forces. He went on to remark that if the Soviets choose to build more missiles in order to increase their capability to attack our land-based deployment, we would have to build more trenches or shelter arrays, but that calculations done within DOD suggest that the cost to the Soviets to jeopardize our basing deployment with more missiles would be approximately twice as large as the cost to us to maintain our survivability. (S)

Admiral Turner disagreed with *Secretary Brown's* calculations, [2 lines not declassified] He also remarked that the Soviets may be willing to spend more money trying to overcome our efforts than we will be willing to match, even at an economic exchange ratio of 2 to 1. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that we will be better off politically if we build a survivable land based missile force, because it will be easier to increase our forces—moving to a dyad implies an inherently poor SALT bargaining position. (C)

The President suggested that we look at potential Soviet reactions to the various options. He said that his sense is that choice of the dyad will be interpreted as a yielding to them, a sign of weakness. In addition, if the Soviets aren't interested in further SALT treaties, he would feel better with the MX ready for deployment, even if we had to put it in a basing mode that was not verifiable. He remarked that backing away from the Triad would be an error. He went on to say that he felt our objectives should be to arrange for a situation in which the easiest path for the Soviets would lead to a treaty and a strategic posture that would allow verification and be stable. He said that his guess is that the Soviets would respond best to a strong move on his part. He remarked that in his contacts with the Soviets, he had come to believe that they suffer from a sense of inferiority and that strategic equivalence with us may make them somewhat easier to deal with. Finally, he noted that they would be ahead in conventional forces for a long time. (TS)

General Jones remarked that one aspect of arms control that had struck him as having something of an Alice in Wonderland aspect was the fact that during the many years of negotiations we had been engaged in, the number of strategic weapons deployed had continually and rapidly risen. He remarked that in the past we had not wanted warhead limits perhaps because that was our only advantage, but that given the situation that was emerging now, such limits may be far more acceptable. He said that he would like to see warhead limits in SALT III, and that such limits would be far easier to accept with a fully survivable Triad than with the augmented Dyad. [2 lines not declassified] He also remarked that the augmented dyad would lead to increased pressure

on our ALCM carrier—first, because we will be depending more upon that force, and second because the Soviets will be able to better concentrate their efforts against it. He said that we would probably need a hardened cruise missile carrier that will have many of the characteristics of the B-1, but that our need for this aircraft will be somewhat less under the Triad options than under the dyad. He also remarked that he wouldn't recommend the airmobile approach because of the C³I problems it would pose, and the reduced accuracy that would result with an airborne missile system. Finally, he remarked that he did not like the fact that the dyad option would require us to use a smaller missile. (TS)

Secretary Brown noted that the survivable Triad options did not require us to make a decision on ultimate force size until 1985. *Secretary Vance* asked why, and *Secretary Brown* responded by noting that IOCs of the systems we would be pursuing under this option came slightly after 1985. He went on to note that with this option, the survivability of our land-based missile force could be made independent of the number of missiles deployed in it. (C)

The President asked if it was true that we were deploying three additional RVs every day. He was told that we were deploying more like one a day (this was later corrected to approximately one a week). The President noted that some of the anti-war literature he had seen had made the statement about three. It was also noted that the Soviets are currently deploying approximately 5 RVs each day. (S)

Secretary Vance asked if warhead proliferation wasn't mostly a matter of ALCM deployments. *Secretary Brown* reviewed some of the numbers involved, and drew the conclusion that the options that were being discussed involved deployments of comparable numbers of ALCM and missile warheads. (C)

The President asked what the maximum allowable range of the ALCM was, and was told that it was intercontinental. He remarked that this suggested that additional cruise missile deployments might provide a good response to a Soviet breakout, but he wondered where we would find targets for all of the additional warheads. (S)

Frank Press remarked that if we can find a way to build a survivable Triad that is secure, verifiable, and feasible, it would be the best idea. *The President* remarked that the question was whether or not there existed a land-based deployment scheme with these three characteristics. He added that it is obvious that the point of the small missile is that it really keeps the dyad option open. (C)

Secretary Brown noted that we should look at ways to get the 190,000 lb. missile to sea. *Bill Perry* commented that we have put \$40M for Trident II into the '81 budget. *Secretary Brown* remarked that perhaps the best policy would be to push both Trident II and the large MX for a year. (C)

Frank Press suggested that we pursue the idea of putting Minuteman on trucks as an interim measure, while pushing forward with the large MX missile and looking at alternative ways to deploy it. *Secretary Brown* commented that he has examined the truck idea in some detail and it doesn't look practical to him. *Bill Perry* added that 200 Minuteman IIIs can be deployed on trucks within three years for approximately \$3B. *Secretary Brown* responded that such a deployment would be easily destroyed by the Soviets if we didn't get sufficient strategic warning. *Bill Perry* remarked that Minuteman III deployed on trucks would have considerably higher survivability than they would have in silos, if ten hours of strategic warning were available. (C)

David Aaron said that it was important to note the long period of ICBM vulnerability that we were going to face. He said that the Congress will say that if we can live with this period of vulnerability for awhile, why can't we live with it forever. He suggested that we should look at the Minuteman on trucks idea in light of this question—in other words, it may be a suitable, short term fix to our problems. *Secretary Brown* said that he thought other alternatives should be looked at for dealing with the period of vulnerability, and that he had some better alternatives. (S)

The President asked how long will it be until we had deployed the first ALCMs on B-52s. *Bill Perry* answered that the first deployment will take place in 1981, but that we will not have a complete squadron of B-52s with ALCMs until 1982. *Dr. Brzezinski* remarked that pushing the B-52/ALCM program somewhat harder might represent a good interim fix to the early '80s problem. (S)

David Aaron remarked that simply assuming the Soviets will make every effort to stay ahead of us may not be reasonable in the light of history. He noted that they were ahead in the ABM area, but that once we demonstrated our willingness to compete, a process began which resulted in the ABM treaty. (C)

Secretary Brown remarked that this outcome probably resulted from Soviet fears that we would deploy a better system. He went on to note that the only thing the Soviets would probably feel comfortable with is the complete vulnerability of all our strategic forces, a situation we should certainly not cooperate in arranging. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the Soviets would be most worried if we proceeded with the dyad option, because this option would involve the largest expansion of our forces, and would pose the greatest threat to them. (C)

Jim McIntyre said that he wanted to go on record that OMB supported the 190,000 lb. MX missile, despite its larger cost, because of the political and technical problems that would be involved in proceeding with the smaller missile. (C)

The President asked if anyone knew how much money might be saved with smaller missile. (jocularly) *Bill Perry* responded that \$2–3B might be saved, if one assumed that the alternative would be to proceed with both missiles. (C)

Secretary Vance commented that in his view the 192,000 lb. missile was politically the best choice and would provide the best bargaining position with the Soviets. He disagreed with Stan Turner's arguments that the Soviets might try to stay ahead of our efforts to achieve a survivable land-based deployment. (S)

The President said that Stan is apparently saying that proceeding with the Triad option would lead to a larger Soviet threat—*Stan* responded that that was not quite his point. (C)

The President said the problem he saw with Stan's calculations was that they placed too much emphasis on our current vulnerability. The President argued that it would be better to show the Soviets that we are resolved not to accept their attempts to make us vulnerable, and that if we do so, they will respond better than Stan is suggesting. (S)

Secretary Vance again stated that he likes our position better if we proceed with the survivable triad option. (C)

David Aaron remarked that the Soviets might simply want to match our numbers of warheads in which case proceeding with the dyad option will pose the larger problem for our arms control interests. (C)

George Seignious noted that going to the large numbers of warheads provided by the dyad option creates a situation that would place maximum stress on our verification capabilities. This is because the Soviets will be more motivated to proceed with mobile systems, and they may elect to proceed with SS-16 type systems which are particularly difficult to verify. (TS)

The President then noted that he's not prepared to decide this issue now. He must first understand better the possibilities for achieving a survivable land-based deployment mode. (U)

Bill Perry began the discussion of ground-based deployment modes by describing the track mobile system in the covered trench. He said that he believes that this is the best system because it has two modes of survival, its position is normally hidden, and it can randomize its position in a very short period of time if desired. He said that this system was designed to deploy missiles on large trailer erector launcher systems that would be the size of railroad locomotives, and would be capable of moving at maximum speeds of approximately 30 knots. He said that the system was designed to enhance two features: verifiability and survivability. (C)

Dr. Perry went on to describe two classes of mobile deployment modes. The first, which he called "full-mobile systems", included the

road mobile, the air mobile, and the submarine mobile deployment modes. He said that these systems are soft and that they achieve their survivability by hiding in very large deployment areas. The other class of mobile systems which he referred to as “confined-mobile systems” included multiple silos, the track mobile system, and the horizontal MPS system. He pointed out that these systems are deployed in a very limited area, and are therefore required to be very hard. He went on to compare the verification difficulties encountered with each of these systems. He said that the confined-mobile systems were an advantage for verification in that one knew where to look for them, though seeing the missiles in these systems required opening them up for verification. He then remarked that the full-mobile systems can pose trickier verification questions—and that submarine launchers are verifiable only because they are so large that they can be easily seen during construction and when in port. (C)

The President then asked if B-52s are required to be visible under the SALT II agreement. He was told that there are no such constraints, and that these systems are often under cover—they are monitored as they were built and deployed, and through the use of COMINT. *The President* noted that this was an interesting point, and then asked what the problem was with the covers that had been placed over the Minuteman silos. *Secretary Brown* answered that the basis of the Soviet objection was that these covers might be hiding a change in the size of the silo. (TS)

Dr. Perry continued his explanation of verification problems by noting that the problem with the vertical MPS system is that the launcher is very small and difficult to see into, thus raising suspicions that there might be a missile in every silo. He contrasted this system with the track mobile system by pointing out that track mobile would use a very large locomotive type launcher that is easy to count. (S)

Frank Press remarked that we could still hide extra missiles in the trench. *Bill Perry* responded that the current SALT limits are not based on limiting missiles, but rather on limiting launchers, and that the trailer erector launchers used in the trench system are too large to allow extra ones to be hidden. *Frank Press* responded that a single TEL could nonetheless launch extra missiles. *Bill Perry* agreed but said that the same thing was true for silos. (C)

The President then asked about the MPS system using horizontal shelters. He asked if we could deploy 200 missiles in such a system, on the surface, and completely within DOD land. *Secretary Brown* responded yes. *The President* said that he hadn’t heard of this system before, and went on to note that, provided we had hard points within which to hide the missiles, it would seem that the need to have a trench

would be smaller, which should lead to smaller environmental problems. (C)

David Aaron pointed out that there are two basic possibilities for systems that rotate missiles among a large number of shelters—we can proceed with systems that use very fast transporters, allowing very rapid rotation between shelters, or go with systems that use slow transporters in which case there might be a requirement for decoys to help hide the movements of our missiles. (U)

The President commented that while he now sees the problems with covered trenches as somewhat smaller than he had before, nonetheless it looks like a surface system would be more acceptable for environmental reasons. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that for safety reasons it might still be necessary to fence off the roads or rails connecting the shelters. It was noted that while railroad tracks aren't generally fenced off today, we might have a tough time introducing a railroad system into the country now, given current concerns about environmental impact. (U)

General Jones noted that the track mobile concept being considered does not involve putting the entire system on military bases. *The President* asked why not—to which *Jones* responded that there aren't that many large military bases, and the cost for such a system would be very much larger if it had to be broken into numerous small deployments. *The President* asked why it was necessary to have 20 miles of track for each missile. He was told that approximately 40 shelters would be needed for each missile, and that they could not be spaced closer together than approximately a half a mile, given yields of current Soviet warheads. The idea is to ensure that a single warhead will not destroy on the average more than one shelter. (C)

Frank Press noted that there was not enough area on military bases to allow for deployment of the 3–4,000 square mile system envisioned. *Secretary Brown* responded that the suitable bases could provide approximately one-third of the total area required. He also noted that it would not be a good idea to go to a substantially smaller deployment because the purpose was to reach deployment levels that would discourage the sort of scenario that Admiral Turner had described. (C)

Bill Perry noted that if we made the planned deployment, we could create a situation in which the Soviets would have to use up all of their ICBMs in order to destroy our ICBMs—this would leave our bomber and SLBM forces facing the corresponding forces on their side, a situation that they certainly wouldn't like. Thus, they would be deterred from making such an attack in the first place. (S)

In response to Secretary Brown's request for a discussion of the open trench, *Bill Perry* said that they were looking at the possibility of putting an open trench system in Nevada and Utah. *The President*

interjected that he thought that pursuing such a system was a pipe dream and that the environmentalists would simply never let it happen. *Bill Perry* responded that the governors of these states had been asked about the acceptability of an MPS system with 4–5,000 shelters and point security. Such a system would involve fencing off 4–5,000 small areas of about four acres apiece, and the governors had said it would be acceptable. *Perry* noted that the covered trench system he had in mind would result in the same sort of situation. A fairly large number of small areas fenced off, but the bulk of the deployment area open for public use. (C)

The President said that you are coming close to convincing me. He then asked: if the Soviets were to do the same thing, what would we want them to do for us to allow for adequate verification. (U)

Dr. Perry said that he would ask for two things: first, he would want them to use a large enough transporter system so that there was little possibility that it could roam freely outside the nominal deployment area; second, he would want the Soviets to open their trench system every several months to allow for verification. (At this point there were a number of joking comments about the possibility of allowing the Soviets to walk through a U.S. trench system or having a JCS representative walk through Soviet trenches.) *Bill Perry* continued there were three possibilities for connecting our shelters. We could leave the connectors completely open, we could close them with some sort of heavy structure, or we might use some sort of effectively transparent covers. Of the three, *Dr. Perry* felt that only the open trench was a non-starter because it would restrict so much land from public use. He said that he had very high confidence that we could get the covered trench accepted by the people of the states where we would hope to deploy it, certainly by their governors. (C)

The President asked if it wouldn't be possible to use an arrangement of shelters and connectors like spokes, radiating from a hub. He wondered if such an arrangement might reduce land requirements. He was told that the constraints of the rough topography in Nevada and Utah implied that the spoke arrangement would require more land rather than less. (C)

Frank Press asked Stan Turner for his view on the verifiability of the trench concept. *Admiral Turner* responded that the concept had evolved fairly rapidly, and that he had not yet had time to carry out a thorough study of its verifiability. He said that he expected that it would be more verifiable than the vertical MPS system. He went on to note, however, that our arms control efforts will eventually require cooperative measures and on-site inspection. He suggested that the verification requirements of the systems being considered now might actually be a good

thing, in that they might motivate us to seek improved verification arrangements in the near term rather than putting it off. (S)

Dr. Perry noted that the trench system might lend itself to verification through the use of various types of black boxes which could provide electronic verification information to the other side. (S)

Secretary Vance remarked that even aside from the verification problems, anything but an open trench or one covered with transparent plastic would generate complaints from the Soviets. *David Aaron* expressed skepticism about proceeding with any system if it required on-site inspection, cooperative measures or other special procedures that might have to be negotiated. (S)

John White remarked that it's important to understand the need for the dash requirement—he was told that it simply reduces the need for location security. (U)

Frank Press noted that a system of this type, with interconnecting roads or rails on the surface, might be particularly susceptible to attacks designed to reduce the system's mobility. The movements of the transporters might be observed, and their positions reported back after their mobility had been lost. (S)

Secretary Brown said that most of these questions are probably resolvable in several weeks, but he asked whether we don't already know enough to be able to choose to go ahead with some sort of ground system. If we can choose, then we can get started on a missile. (C)

Jim McIntyre remarked that there are a great number of uncertainties to be resolved. (C)

The President remarked that he has no doubts that we should proceed with a large MX missile, but that we must look more to the question of which land-based system to deploy. He noted that we will face a massive outcry which could delay its deployment, at least outside DOD land. (C)

The Vice President then began a discussion of some of the political problems involved with this decision. He said that we may wish to look at the possibility of legislation similar to that used to overcome environmental opposition to the Alaska Pipeline. He also noted that we are going to be in a touchy position on the Hill. If we make a very specific choice on the MX, we may lose some pro-SALT II votes. If on the other hand we make no choice at all, we will raise concerns that we are not maintaining an adequate strategic balance which will also reduce support for SALT. He suggested that the best policy may be to identify with the 190,000 lb. MX missile, yet stay in a reasonably flexible position with respect to basing mode. He noted that Senator Jackson would take anyone's help in beating SALT, and that he might be very ready to suggest an MX deployment for every state. (C)

Secretary Vance said that he agreed with much of the Vice President's argument, but he felt that we should definitely eliminate the MPS system. *The President* said that the appropriate thing to do would be to say that we are going to proceed with a verifiable land-based system, and that this approach would enhance stability and eliminate the Soviet counterforce advantage, and that it would also enhance the possibility of deep cuts later on. (C)

Secretary Vance asked how this would solve the MPS problem. The President noted he'd been against MPS on verification grounds all along, and that MPS was simply not verifiable. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the President's posture should have three elements: (1) that we were going to proceed with a verifiable land-based deployment mode, (2) that we were going to proceed with the largest missile allowed under the SALT II agreement, and (3) that we would resolve the question of exactly which basing mode we would use within several weeks. He suggested that it might be useful not to preclude MPS before the Summit—it might be possible to trade MPS for some sort of a concession from the Soviets. He noted that MPS can be eliminated as something desirable for us on a number of grounds. He went on to suggest that the President surface this posture with Senator Nunn, and that the *Vice President* talk to those on the other end of the political spectrum about this posture being necessary for SALT III. (C)

Secretary Vance said that he really disagreed with the idea that you can simply gut it through on the MPS issue. He said he wasn't sweating the possibility of leaving this system in play for another seven days, but that going much longer would be a mistake. *Secretary Brown* commented that if we hold off until after the Summit to eliminate the vertical MPS system, we risk accusations that we gave the system away. (S)

Frank Press said that we would not know that much more in several weeks, and wondered if we wouldn't be better off by proceeding with the idea of Minuteman III on trucks which would buy us enough time for a more careful study of the basing mode question. *Secretary Brown* responded that this would be seen as simply waffling the issue. (C)

The President said that unless unforeseen circumstances arise, he proposes to go ahead with the full size MX. He said, however, that he wanted to reveal his decision in his own way, and that he would like for the people in the room to concentrate on how to present the decision to the Soviets, and to the public. He said that he would like them to evolve the best possible approach to briefing the Senate, and that he wanted to brief all kinds of Senators—that he was not interested in separating them into different groups. Thus he must understand the arguments that would appeal to both sides. He gave several straightforward examples of the sorts of arguments that might be used, and noted that we would have to decide what to tell the Soviets if anything,

and that it would be very important to make a strong presentation of this decision. Finally, he remarked that he feels at ease with the decision to go ahead with a full size MX in the land-based mode. In response to Dr. Brzezinski's suggestions, the President instructed everyone not to brief anyone outside this room on this decision. However, the President went on to say he wants the republic to know of this decision before the Summit. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that it was important to announce this decision soon, and suggested that it should be done before the end of the week. There were several comments to the effect that the decision should be announced before there was much chance of its leaking to the press. *Dr. Brzezinski* continued that the announcement should not be too close to the Summit, where it may seem heavy handed. (There were a number of jocular remarks about the possibility of combining the announcement with announcements on Rhodesia and health care, and perhaps having the MX decision announced by Secretary Califano.) *Dr. Brzezinski* asked those assembled to send in their contributions on how to present the decision. He told the President he would try to have a package assembled by the next evening. (C)

The President said that we should list all the points bearing on the decision and base all our arguments on hard facts. He also said that he would need a specific plan on how to approach the Senate. *The President* also asked if any of the principals would have to seek help in making the preparations he had requested—help from people or subordinates not currently in the room—the principals all said no. (U)

Secretary Brown asked how we were going to approach resolution of the basing issue. *The President* responded that it would have to be resolved before the SALT vote. *Secretary Brown* answered: perhaps even earlier, perhaps before the debate. *The President* commented that it will help to know the reactions of some of the more influential Senators, such as Nunn, Culver, and Glenn. (C)

General Jones noted that while he needn't tell any one about this decision, he would like to be able to tell his colleagues before any Senators became aware of the decision, and he was told that this would be possible. (U)

Jody Powell asked if the President's decision should be considered tentative, pending receipt of the material that he had requested. *The President* agreed and the meeting was adjourned. (U)

143. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Defense Investment (U)

The attached chart, one you used at the 4 June NSC meeting, makes a point we shall have to take increasingly into account in defense planning and budgeting: Soviet defense investment has exceeded ours for a decade, has exceeded ours by about 75 percent for the past several years, and is projected to continue to do so well into the 1980s.² (S)

This is the conclusion of work done in Andy Marshall's net assessment office in OSD. I've had a chance to review informally a draft of his full report, and want to pass on some additional highlights. Andy has sent copies to Harold Brown and other senior DOD people. After responding to some of their comments, he will distribute a finished version. Almost all of the analysis, incidentally, is unclassified. It derives from comparing published US and NATO defense data with unclassified CIA analysis of Soviet and Warsaw Pact defense outlays. (U)

The key message is in the chart itself. While Soviets outspend the US on defense by 25–40 percent, depending on how you measure, they out-*invest* us by even larger amounts. Defense investment is defined as spending on military R&D, procurement of hardware, and military construction. Unlike spending for current operations and maintenance (except for training), defense investment is aimed at future strength. It tends to be cumulative (although there is also the opposite tendency for investments to “decay” through obsolescence and wear-out of equipment and facilities). In other words, even if we somehow matched Soviet defense investment next year, we could not suddenly match the results of Soviet investment in earlier years. (U)

This is, of course, a highly generalized indicator of relative defense activity. Captured within it are such specific developments as those Soviet strategic force improvements that have made MINUTEMAN vulnerable. Andy's study reaches the judgment that unless the USSR sharply alters very long-standing defense spending patterns,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 3, Defense (Items in the System): 7/79–6/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bremont, Odom, and Utgoff.

² Not found attached. For the June 4 NSC meeting, see Document 141.

continuation of established US defense spending policies, including budget increases currently projected, will lead the US into a clearly inferior position in the 1980s. The trends and magnitudes depicted in this analysis have to be radically in error for any other conclusion to be reached. It follows naturally, to quote from the draft, "We will have to spend a lot more on defense if we are to remain a major power relative to the Soviets." (U)

The Marshall study considers various arguments advanced to soften or discount so stark a judgment. For example:

—Methodological uncertainties in measurements of this sort may lead to an overly gloomy view. This may be so. Or the true picture could be even worse. CIA data probably understate Soviet defense investment somewhat because they do not measure all real investment in defense, e.g., construction for R&D facilities. At the same time, US projections of actual US defense investment in the 1980s may be optimistic. In any case, the gross picture of relative investment is not likely to be wrong.

—The role of our allies compensates somewhat. This is true. But taking allies on both sides into account shows the Warsaw Pact out-investing NATO by 15–20 percent. Moreover, as Victor noted in our pre-NSC discussions, NATO defense efforts are a "dependent variable"; they depend on US strength and leadership. If the Allies see the overall trends against the West, they will not take up the slack, but seek refuge in Soviet good will, knowing that they cannot compensate for Soviet power.

—Do we have compensating technological advantages? Yes, but they are dwindling. Our general level of military–technological innovation appears to be subsiding, and we put less of our available technological potential into deployed systems than the Soviets do.

—The Soviets continue to fear our demonstrated capacity to mobilize our industrial base for defense when we get excited. But they probably also notice that this US capability has declined in recent years for various reasons: (1) Due to our shrinking overall defense effort, the defense industrial base for mobilization has shrunk, e.g., many sub-contractors have left the business. (2) Modern weapons systems are more complex and, therefore, expanding their production takes more time than past experience would suggest. (3) We pay less attention to national mobilization as an aspect of defense policy than does the USSR.

—In the 1980s, Soviet internal difficulties may persuade Soviet leaders to reduce defense effort. This is possible but not likely, and, according to CIA, not dictated by economic necessity. Soviet priorities are well entrenched. The opportunities and threats of the 1980s are likely to impress upon Soviet leaders the wisdom of past emphasis on defense. Defense is a "success industry" in the USSR from a political viewpoint. And, as Bialer keeps reminding us, today's USSR is striking, not for the severity of its internal problems, which it has always had, but for its socio-political stability and its ability to manage despite these problems. (U)

It might be argued that investment is a measure of "inputs" to defense, but not necessarily a measure of useful military outputs. The investment imbalance may be thought to reveal Soviet inefficiency;

they have to spend more because they get less out of it. In fact, the Soviets are probably a lot less efficient in the defense sector than we used to think. But this measure does not reveal it. Rather, this measure is largely the result of military *outputs*. Soviet defense costs are estimated by CIA on the basis of observed physical activity, e.g., missiles, ships, bunkers, etc. Occasional clandestine reports of real Soviet defense budget figures confirm that our totals are about right. (S)

A more significant deficiency of Andy's analysis might be called "the problem of relative starting points." If the Soviets were far enough behind the US in real military strength when, around 1968, they began to invest more than we in defense, then all their effort may amount to no more than closing large gaps. This merely reminds us that we cannot divorce gross investment and spending trends from real force balances, trends in those balances, and missions. To a large extent the Soviets have been closing gaps. They have also been investing in areas where we choose not to compete and may, in fact, be forcing them to waste investment, e.g., in air defense. And they must invest against the China threat. (U)

Yet it is hard to accept that a Soviet investment effort larger than ours for more than a decade will yield no more than gross military equality, given the starting point. In the late 1960s, the Soviets had functional strategic parity with the US by their own testimony. They enjoyed preponderance in theater forces in Europe. And they had largely completed the quantitative expansion of their forces opposite China, a power balance in which the US also has an interest. They suffered deficiencies in all these areas. Naval forces were a major area in which they lagged. Here differences between US and Soviet naval missions and doctrine are important. In terms of missions, the US needs naval superiority; the USSR does not. (U)

We should keep in mind that Soviet spending levels in the 1970s result from steady growth since the late 1950s, not any change of Soviet policy. It is we who changed our behavior, reducing real defense outlays since the late 1960s after a period of growth. One cannot easily escape the conclusion that, sooner or later, a superior effort by a competent performer will yield a superior position. (U)

If this overall message is approximately correct, it has far-reaching implications:

1. The increases in defense spending we now talk about are likely to be insufficient. In no case can we turn things around quickly. Substantial increases in defense spending as a percentage of GNP over a sustained period may be necessary to alter the prognosis in five years or so.

2. Increasing the efficiency with which we select and buy defense assets is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for redressing the balance. There must be more resources. But at the same time we probably

do require radical reform of defense decisionmaking to achieve a new level of innovative capacity and to squelch time-honored forms of resource misallocation. Trying to find the “most cost-effective options” among many dozens of discrete choices tossed up by the established system will only exhaust the leadership and defeat it in detail. At best we may sub-optimize at the wrong level of performance. (S)

It would be useful for you to mention the defense investment study to Harold at one of your regular meetings. You should solicit his reaction to its basic messages, and urge him to send it over to us for comment. If it withstands critical examination, it could be then made “background reading” for the DOD budget review and possibly incorporated into another NSC meeting, as was CNA 78 in the last one.³ (C)

³ The NSC discussed the 1978 Comprehensive Net Assessment on June 5. See Document 142.

144. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 19, 1979

SUBJECT

DOD's Military Investment Balance Paper (S)

On 5 July, Harold Brown sent to the President a paper on the US-Soviet defense investment balance prepared by OSD's Net Assessment Office.² We have reviewed that paper carefully and spoken at length with the authoring office and CIA analysts who supplied critical input data. For reasons developed below we believe the paper should be replaced by a short memo from Harold Brown to the President. (S)

The overall message of the OSD paper is valid. The USSR has been investing more in military strength than the US for at least a decade. Its military investment effort—that is, spending on military RDT&E, procurement, and construction—now exceeds ours by around 75%, measured in dollars. Moreover, there is no evidence that the steady

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 3, Defense (Items in the System): 7/79-6/80. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not found.

growth of Soviet military investment will be reversed or slowed before the mid-1980s, if then. Unlike much defense spending on current operations and maintenance, investment accumulates over time and pays its returns in the future. (S)

The study concludes that the US will have to increase its defense investment spending markedly if we are to remain a competitive military power. This message implies a gloomier future for relative US power than the prevailing public view, and a much gloomier view than the President now holds. It calls for a major shift of federal spending priorities toward defense at a time when, notwithstanding its commitment to growth in defense spending, the Administration faces sharply competing spending-related priorities, namely with respect to energy and inflation. (S)

However, as a contribution to understanding our defense predicament—which is how Harold describes the paper in his cover memo—the paper has substantive deficiencies. In particular, it under-rates the US on a number of counts:

—It does not distinguish how much of past Soviet investment only permitted catching up with the US as opposed to surpassing us. Nor does it address the advantage to the USSR of being able to follow technological paths pioneered by the US, advantages given up as technology gaps are closed.

—It doesn't appear to give adequate weight to US technological developments now in train that serve to devalue Soviet investments, e.g., cruise missiles vs. their air defenses.

—It doesn't attempt to account for the fact that some Soviet military investment is directed against China, not NATO. While such resources can be redirected and we have an interest in the Sino-Soviet balance, some discounting of such Soviet efforts would seem reasonable. (S)

Were these and other substantive problems addressed, the main message of the paper probably would not change. But it would be more persuasive and the policy problem it poses more manageable. (S)

The paper suffers from being much too long. Harold suggests that the President read some 35 pages to get the essence of it; and OSD supplied an "executive summary" not much shorter. We think the study can be effectively summarized in no more than 3–5 pages.³ (S)

In addition, the paper contains no policy recommendations other than the general admonition to spend more. We believe the Secretary of Defense should accompany the bad news with a clear statement of his opinion about the message and its policy implications. (S)

The NSC should not block the communication of the message to the President. At the same time we should not forward difficult analytic

³ For Brown's summary, see the attachment to Document 145.

material when Harold Brown has not been sufficiently explicit about its implications. (S)

We recommend that you ask Harold for a short (3–5 pages) memo to the President that does the following:

- Presents a crisp summary of the paper's findings;
- Mentions the appropriate caveats;
- States Harold's view of the findings and the implications he sees for US defense spending. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to Harold Brown at Tab A. (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown⁴

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

DOD's Study of the US–USSR Military Investment Balance (S)

I have reviewed the subject paper you sent to the President on 5 July. Although it's an impressive piece of work and it presents an important message, the paper may characterize the defense investment imbalance too unfavorably and even the executive summary is much too long to ask the President to read. (S)

Because the message of this study is very important and disturbing, I urge you to prepare a short 3–5 page memo for the President that:

- crisply summarizes the study;
- states the appropriate caveats (our staffs have discussed the more important ones); and
- states your own view of the implications for our defense spending and policies. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski⁵

⁴ Secret.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

145. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 1, 1979

It has become evident that we have won the debate on SALT II in the Senate hearings and with the media (and probably the public). But we have not yet won the Senate vote. There will be difficult bargaining, in the process of achieving a two-thirds vote of approval in the Senate, over the issue of defense programs and budgets. Sam Nunn speaks for a group without whose votes we probably can't get Senate approval of SALT. He clearly believes that the present five-year defense program is inadequate, and that the financial plan won't fund even the present five-year program. He will demand a commitment, whose exact nature he can't yet specify, to an annual growth in the defense budget of at least three percent (perhaps more) after actual inflation. At the same time, others such as George McGovern could well be brought to vote against SALT II by such a commitment. And whether the Congress would actually be willing to put money where some of its members' mouths are is questionable. John Stennis wants to support SALT II and is for a stronger defense program, but is more influenced than Nunn by fiscal conservatism; his views may provide a good vehicle for compromise.

My present thought is that one way to meet the Nunn position may be to revise the fiscal guidance for the Five Year Defense Plan (1981–5) to assure a genuine after-inflation annual budget growth rate of three percent. The Congress has those figures, and it is on the basis of the claimed growth rate and assumed inflation rates contained in it, along with the past effects of underestimated inflation rates, that Nunn has taken his position. Another (and they are not mutually exclusive) way would be to submit a FY 1980 supplemental. This could cover the amount of Congressional cuts (which I anticipate could well be 1B\$ or more—the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will recommend a 2B\$ cut) and/or the unprogrammed increases in fuel costs (which will amount to 0.9B\$ for FY 1980).

In this situation, I believe it would be useful for you to consider the findings of a DOD examination of the military balance, specifically the military investment balance.² I described these findings at the June 4 NSC meeting which updated the Comprehensive Net Assessment

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 60, Miscellaneous: 6–10/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Alpha Channel.

² See Document 144. The July 5 memorandum from Brown to Carter and the full report of the Military Investment Balance were not found.

made in PRM-10 and reflected in PD-18.³ I have had the principal conclusions of that DOD study boiled down to a few pages; they are attached.

My judgment is that those conclusions are essentially correct. In some ways they may be too pessimistic. In particular, I think that if we exert the efforts necessary to put some of our advanced technological concepts into operational hardware, we can make the trend of the balance somewhat less adverse—but I also believe the Soviets are likely in the next five years to confront us with some technological surprises of their own. In any event, I believe the highly probable dangers of the prospective military balance fully justify an annual growth in the defense program, after inflation, of at least three percent annually through 1985. Moreover, I believe that the Congress as a whole would support that growth if such a program is put forward vigorously by the Administration. I recognize the major problem posed by House Republicans voting in the Budget Resolution process to increase defense, and then voting against the Resolution. But I do not believe that a defense budget set at the level of the median view of the Democratic Party will satisfy either the defense needs of the country or the demands of the electorate. Your leadership can, in my view, produce Congressional support for the necessary program. We should be reticent in responding with compromise to what Sam Nunn (and Kissinger) are saying about the defense program.⁴ That should be saved for the end game. But I believe that program and process can be elaborated during the next month or two, and that they will need to be reflected in some joint Presidential-Congressional statements and actions before Congress adjourns this year, if SALT II is to be ratified.

Harold Brown

³ See Document 141.

⁴ Carter drew two vertical lines in the right margin next to this sentence.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁵

Washington, undated

THE MILITARY INVESTMENT BALANCE

We have recently assessed the US-USSR Military Investment Balance. Some military expenditures contribute only to current capability, others—in varying degrees—to future as well as present military capability, and ought to be considered as investments. The assessment concentrated on future-oriented activities such as RDT&E, procurement of long-lived weapon systems, and the construction of military facilities. It examined those current investment flows, and the accumulated stock of past investments, which contribute to future military capability. The assessment, thus, is an indicator of the future military balance.

The main message of this balance is that continuing current trends in and differences between US and Soviet military efforts for 5–10 years will place the US in a clearly inferior military position. Focusing on investment makes this clearer, providing a picture less favorable to the US than does comparing overall efforts.

The assessment is based on CIA-produced dollar estimates of Soviet military programs. Those show that:

- Soviet military efforts measured in dollars have exceeded ours by a steadily widening margin since 1969 and are now almost 45% greater.

- The Soviets have out-invested us for 10 years and, for the last few years, their investment effort has been about 75% larger than ours.

- Projecting current Soviet trends and US plans into the future shows only a slow reduction in the gap in the rate of investment, and even that reduction is uncertain.

The Soviet advantage is growing even more rapidly than is revealed by the respective rates of current investment flow, since:

- Soviet investment stock value is now about 25% more than ours.

- That differential is expected to increase to 40–60% by the mid 80's, depending on assumptions about the depreciation profile.

- The stream of Soviet investment dividends can be expected to exceed those of the US for many years.

The analysis also examined several possible, but not very convincing, arguments as to why these investment trends need not be cause for concern.

⁵ Top Secret; Eyes Only.

—Adding allies' defense efforts to both sides changes the comparison, but much less in the investment area than when total defense efforts are compared. In either case we think there is more unproductive duplication among NATO than among Warsaw Pact programs, which are centrally directed.

—US technological leads are being eroded by massive, broad-based continuing Soviet R&D programs, increasingly in high-risk, high-cost, potentially high-payoff areas. However, as I have indicated earlier, we ourselves have two or three efforts underway that I consider of major potential effect.

—The fundamentally stronger underlying US economy is offset somewhat by Soviet design and manufacturing processes which facilitate military surge production. Further, the relevance of industrial mobilization is questionable in many cases.

Trying to assess the balance from the Soviet perspective suggests they probably measure their efforts against those of the US, the NATO Allies, and at least Japan and China. Therefore they may:

—Believe they face total defense efforts greater than their own.

—And see reasons to sustain or even increase the rate of growth in their defense efforts in the recent reversal of the downward trend in the US defense efforts, the NATO commitment to real defense growth and the US-PRC rapprochement.

The assessment also notes our uncertainty about how Soviet defense efforts will be constrained by demographic, energy and economic problems. This is a possible future bright spot for the US and is a critical area for further study.

However, Soviet gains in the military balance are likely to be even greater in the future because:

—Soviet investment flows have continued to grow while ours, in general, are lower than in the 50's and 60's.

—The fruits of the Soviet differential in military investments have yet to be realized due to the long lead times between large investments in R&D and visible, deployed weapons.

Finally, the assessment addresses the consequences if current trends persist. The following three scenarios outline some possibilities:

—Continuation of current US and Soviet military trends into the mid-eighties, followed by slackening in the Soviet military buildup because of economic, demographic and other problems.

—Continuation of current trends throughout the 80's to a situation of clear US military inferiority with respect to the Soviets. This is unlikely to be a stable situation, however.

—A major confrontation a few years hence triggered by the Soviets aggressively pushing their advantage somewhere. Depending on the nature and severity of the crisis and the political reaction in the US to the crisis or to consequent US losses, a major increase in US defense expenditures and a more competitive US-Soviet relationship may

result. (In the past four decades, 40–200% increases have occurred three times—each following a crisis involving combat.)

The assessment concludes that the consequences of any of these scenarios are enormous. They will likely impact directly on our ability to defend our interests and our allies. Also, since the US has been the core around which western alliances have formed, allied perceptions of US inferiority are likely to lead to severe stresses⁶—at the very least—in these alliances. They could break, others could be formed, and there could be hedging and increased compliance with Soviet desires on the part of former allies. The US has had such a central role in organizing the western world that repercussions would likely be felt throughout the world.

I found this assessment, focused on expenditures and investment, to be particularly useful. The adverse overall trends indicated are generally confirmed by the changes we see in more detailed assessments of various military balances:

—We see deterioration in the strategic nuclear balance by all the common indicators, static and dynamic which will very probably continue until we deploy the ALCM and, later, the MX.

—NATO's ASW forces have probably improved relative to the Soviet submarine force, and the Central Region ground force balance has been roughly static, but the balance has deteriorated in theater nuclear forces, tactical air forces, and forces on the flanks (particularly the Southern Flank).

—(The perceived balances in the Persian Gulf and Korea have also deteriorated, but these have resulted from revolution in one case and new intelligence in the other rather than from differences in US and Soviet military investments.)

In the context of policy, all this implies that we have not and will not maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that existing in early 1977, the central requirement laid down in PD-18.

We have yet to achieve a 3% annual real growth in defense spending. The FY75–79 average is less than 0.3%. No year reached even 2%. If we continue that trend because of insufficient provision for inflation, competing demands for national resources, or any other cause, the military balance will become perilous over the next five years.

⁶Carter underlined the phrase “allied perceptions of US inferiority are likely to lead to severe stresses” and wrote in the right margin next to it: “U.S. officials’ wringing of hands doesn’t help.”

On the other hand if we and our NATO allies achieve a 3% real growth rate, the military balance likely will roughly stabilize after a few years. Even then it would still not meet the PD-18 criteria.

—We would have essential equivalence in strategic nuclear forces, but the general purpose forces situation would be far less satisfactory, in (small) part because of the diversion of resources to the higher priority strategic force investments.

—The conventional force balance would give us only a questionable ability to stop a Warsaw Pact attack and practically no confidence in our ability to restore prewar boundaries.

—Our ability to cope with some plausible crises involving local and Soviet forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf or Korea would still be severely limited, depending both on generous warning times and on freedom from crises elsewhere, particularly in Europe.

To redress the balance and meet the criteria of PD-18 by 1990 will require an average annual real growth in the US defense program well in excess of the 3% we have discussed; it would also require increased allied efforts.

**146. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Charles Stebbins
of the National Security Council Staff to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, August 6, 1979

SUBJECT

PRC on M-X Basing Mode (U)

Tomorrow Harold Brown will recommend to the PRC that the M-X be deployed in a mode involving multiple horizontal shelters among which the launcher could be moved surreptitiously or, *in extremis*, dash on warning. The basing concept is adequately described at Tab A.² (S)

All in all, we believe the DOD has come up with a satisfactory basing mode against the difficult criteria of survivability, verifiability, environmental impact, and cost. State, ACDA, and OMB are expected

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 125, Weapons Systems: 8-12/79. Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen."

² Attached but not printed is a July 23 paper prepared in the Department of Defense, entitled "The Horizontal Dash MX System."

to endorse the DOD recommendation. Admiral Turner may raise two points of criticism (noted below). We recommend that you express support of this basing mode and believe the PRC can promptly make this recommendation to the President. (S)

This memo highlights certain issues and data you may find useful in the meeting. (U)

Survivability

The DCI may argue that the proposed baseline deployment of 4600 shelters could be swamped by large numbers of Soviet ICBM RVs in the late 1980s. Tab B displays his tabulation of possible Soviet RV threats as extracted from the latest NIE.³ These threat levels are physically possible. But that possibility does not obviate the viability of the multiple-aim-point basing approach.

—Under SALT II limits, assuming they are extended into the late 1980s, the attacker would fall short of weapon numbers required to kill M–X and Minuteman, or have just about enough. In any case, he would have virtually to exhaust his ICBM force in order to swamp our baseline deployment.⁴

—With or without SALT, if we see a proliferating RV threat, we can expand the number of aim points at from \$1.7M to \$2.2M each. Additional deployed RVs probably cost the Soviets on the order of \$3–5M each if the missile force is expanded. Buying more RVs through fractionation would cost them on the order of \$1–2M per RV.

—Should SALT II limits break down, SALT III fail, and we see the Soviets trying to swamp our expanding set of aim points, this would signify a kind of competition in which current constraints would surely be relaxed. We would be much more willing to consider:

- Hard-point preferential ABM defenses for M–X.
- Launch-under-attack options that could be more effective in the late 1980s against a 5000+ RV raid into a small area than such options are today as a response to Minuteman vulnerability.
- M–X mobility outside confined areas.

The point is that there are no perfect, good-forever answers to this or any other strategic problem. Insisting on them tends to mean opting out of the competition. (S)

Verifiability

DOD, State, ACDA and CIA staff believe the DOD basing concept would be verifiable if deployed by the US or the Soviets. Admiral

³ Not found attached.

⁴ A marginal note at the bottom of the page reads: “sheltered reinforced truck-mobile system.” The word “reinforced” was struck through.

Turner reportedly has residual concerns about verifying a Soviet version. He fears they might try to slip a small highly mobile missile into the system as an evasion or breakout approach. This is possible, but would have to be in large numbers to matter. Moreover, this is a risk no matter what we do with M-X. Only a complete and tightly policed ban on all mobile missiles of strategic size could eliminate this problem . . . and that might not be enough. (S)

People in the Area and Security

You raised a question this morning about "campers along the dash road." Under normal peacetime conditions, the missile TEL would move but once every six months or so. This would leave plenty of time to clear intruders from any specific confinement where a missile is being moved. Even a "rapid shuffle" (complete relocation over some 12 hours) would allow enough time to clear roads. In a crisis, deployment areas could easily be cleared. Only in the case of a large-scale dash on tactical warning might there be some chance of running a camper off the road. Incidentally, the average camper, jeep, etc., could outrun the M-X TEL at its maximum 20-30 mph speed. Each unit would have 5-8 people with it for operation, security and other functions. (S)

Costs for SALT

There is some concern that we are buying a horizontal basing mode (\$26.9B acquisition costs) that is more expansive than vertical MPS (\$21.1B) largely for SALT verification reasons. Some may be unwilling to pay \$6B to solve a verification problem the Soviets don't really have. In actuality, the extra \$6B buys a mixture of increased verifiability and increased survivability through rapid shuffle and dash capability. At most, \$1-2B less would be spent if we wanted horizontal shelters but didn't care about verification. Registering the principle that systems can and should be designed for verifiability is worth it if the Soviets follow suit. (S)

Acceleration Option

At Tab C⁵ is a US AF point paper that argues we could possibly have IOC as early as early 1985 and also save \$1.2B in total system costs. The burden would be some \$6B in added FY 81-84 funding. This option should be discussed at the PRC, further examined, but not immediately decided. It has political and strategic attractions. But it would further warp the budget in favor of strategic spending when, with M-X now moving, general purpose programs may be more deserving. This should be resolved in the context of new defense budget levels. (S)

⁵ Not found attached.

Presidential Decision

You may wish to discuss the possibility of having the President announce the basing mode decision at the beginning of a press conference in order to identify himself with strong defense and strategic equivalence. The President's tone should be one of fiscal sacrifice in order to relieve Soviet-induced pressures on our land-based ICBM force. A PRC recommendation to the President that he make the announcement personally would be persuasive. (S)

147. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 7, 1979, 11 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

M–X Basing (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Vance
R. Bartholomew, Dir., Bureau of
Politico-Military Aff.

OSD

Secretary Brown (Chairman)
W. Perry, Dir. Defense Research &
Engineering
G. Schneider, Dep. Dir., SALT Task
Force

JCS

General Jones
LTG J. Pustay, Asst. to Chairman, JCS

DCI

Adm. Stansfield Turner
R. Bowie, Dir., National Foreign
Intelligence
H. Stoertz, NIO for Strategic Programs

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny
Barry Blechman, Asst. Dir.

OMB

John White, Dep. Dir.

OSTP

Ben Huberman

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Landon Butler

NSC

Fritz Ermarth

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 77, PRC 121, 8/7/79, MX Basing Mode. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is *ibid*.

MINUTES OF MEETING

Brown: You've been briefed on the basing option involving horizontal shelters with a dash capability.² We want to review the considerations involved in deciding whether this is acceptable, namely, survivability, verifiability, and public acceptance. Soviet reaction is a factor in the case of survivability and verifiability. Then we want to consider how to move to a decision, possibly to an NSC meeting where we make a final recommendation to the President. Bill Perry will address the survivability issue.

Perry: I'll present three illustrative threats and options for our responding, with the help of these charts (draw-down curves).³ In the first case the Soviets fill out their ICBM force under SALT II limits to a level of 6300 RVs by 1982-83. Clearly our MINUTEMEN are eliminated in a Soviet attack. The attacker can then devote the rest of his ICBM RVs to attacking our base-line M-X shelter system of 4600 aim points. He basically exhausts his ICBM force, leaving us with zero or very few survivors. The force balance is then constituted of SLBM and bomber weapons.

Turner: He can get this capability by 1982-83, whereas we don't get those 4600 aim points until much later.

Perry: In the next case, the Soviets go to 10 RVs on most of the 820 ICBMs, extensively deploying their new ICBM for this purpose. They get a force of some 8600 ICBM RVs by 1987-88.

Turner: They could do it by 1986 under the High SALT Force of the NIE.

Perry: If we see this threat coming, our response is both to expand the number of shelters and to expand the number of deployed missiles such that, at a minimum, we could enforce the exhaustion of his ICBM force and retain a few survivors because of his unreliable missiles. The main thing is that we must see this threat coming about 1983, and we probably would see it for him to have such a capability by 1987-88. This threat level will also drive M-X procurement costs in the expensive years, 1984-86.

Keeny: [1 line not declassified]

Turner: [2 lines not declassified]

Perry: Basically, such inputs don't matter. If they put an RV on a shelter, they can destroy it. The outcome is defined by the numbers of weapons and shelters plus missiles in shelters. In the third case, the Soviets go for very high fractionation levels and force expansion after 1985, essentially doubling the number of RVs we now expect on their

² See footnote 2, Document 146.

³ Not found attached.

SS-17s, 18s, and 19s. They'd have to start testing overtly by 1986 and could have a 12,000 weapon ICBM force by, say, 1989. In this case we'd halve the separation distance between shelters to 3500 feet from 7000 feet, doubling the number of shelters right off, and further expand the number of shelters as necessary. This would again enforce the exhaustion of his force. In the first case, our costs would be the base-line costs of \$30B. The second runs us up to \$38B; the third to \$41B. In the third case, we'd have to make a decision around 1983–84 to respond.

Brzezinski: Can we see the threat that soon?

Brown: We can respond when we see the tests he has to conduct to give himself these high fractionation levels.

Perry: We can build shelters and expand the system as fast as he can expand RV numbers.

Brown: We'd build the necessary roads and mark out shelter sites from the beginning. This could "bluff" him out of going the high fractionation route.

Brzezinski: Or it might provoke him to take that route, or give him an excuse. Whether they actually believe it or not, they could adopt the public rationale that they expect all our shelters to be full and hence have a right to cover them with weapons.

Brown: Of course, if the Soviets feel threatened by empty shelters, that would be an ominous development indeed. If they're that paranoid, how can we reassure them by self-restraint? We could go to shelter numbers capable of exhausting 20,000 RVs, but this becomes an unreal world. In my view it becomes unreal for the attacker before it becomes unreal for the shelter builder.

Perry: The Soviets face some limits on the amount of nuclear material they have for these high weapon levels. They also face an exchange ratio of 3 weapons expended to kill one of ours. At the force levels posited here, moreover, [3 lines not declassified] but by running this kind of race they can assure that we could destroy their whole ICBM force in a first strike. It is this logic that may persuade them to go mobile. Remember, moreover, that these are limiting cases. In the real world, they would probably never put all their ICBM weapons against our ICBM targets. Hence, at the shelter numbers indicated, we would come away with respectable numbers of M-X survivors.

Brown: The point is that the multiple shelter approach to M-X basing can adequately respond to threat growth. There are many uncertainties around, but they weigh most heavily against the attacker.

Perry: In the third case, we'd aim for about 400 M-X by 1990.

White: Do you see any cases to which we cannot adequately respond by expanding the shelter numbers?

Brown: No, not realistic threats. But if you want to worry about threat levels I consider unrealistic, we have other options.

Turner: We see it a bit differently. Because the yields we use for these calculations are somewhat higher, when the Soviets fractionate, we see that they might put weapons between shelters and get more than one-for-one.

Brown: In this kind of game, it is inconceivable to me that Soviet target planners would not insist on placing a weapon on each shelter. No US planner would proceed otherwise.

Turner: I think it's quite possible they would try for multiple shelter kills. The point is, can we safely rule that out?

Brown: If we go to 3500 foot spacing, I feel very confident that he'd have to put a weapon on each shelter to be in the game.

Jones: This is sort of academic, since we'll use the best data on yields and numbers available at the time we start construction.

Turner: I'm challenging the assumptions here. My calculations show that, if the Soviets pursue a moderate effort under SALT, they will be some 600 ICBM weapons short of an ability to target our ICBMs. If their effort is on the high side, then they could have some 1800 ICBM weapons more than necessary to cover MINUTEMAN and M-X. But with SLCM and bomber weapons counted, we'd still have a 2-to-1 advantage in residuals. But these outcomes are highly dependent on SALT II limits affecting RV numbers. Without those limits, he can cover our baseline shelter set of 4600 easily and enforce a 1.5-to-1 residual weapon advantage. A high effort without SALT could give him in excess of 10,000 ICBM weapons. We'll have to pay a high premium to assure extension of the SALT II RV limits beyond 1985. By 1983-85, he could put a lot of pressure on us by starting to test the technology for, say, 30 RVs on an SS-18. He could limit the number of simulated RV releases to 10, but design a new bus capable of handling 30 new RVs.

Vance: He'd then be in violation of SALT II.

Brown: We'd certainly consider that a violation. This is a major matter, but not new.

Keeny: If he didn't try to draw us down all the way, then he'd have a residual force under Perry's calculations and a more favorable exchange ratio.

Brown: You're now talking about a limited attack of 5,000-10,000 RVs. I don't believe in that.

Perry: The right answer is that he's better off not starting. If he leaves any of our M-X surviving, they are much more effective against his force because he is in single silos.

Turner: Let's try to get these calculations in line with the NIE before we present them to the President.

Brown: The President should understand the picture of possible threats and our response options. We should not pretend we can depict future threats with certainty.

Turner: But we have agreed threat estimates within the government.

Perry: We can adjust my calculations for the official NIE numbers. The results will be the same: we can, at a minimum, present a shelter array that would exhaust the Soviet ICBM arsenal.

Turner: That's true if you keep running up the number of shelters.

Brown: Of course. I can run up the shelter numbers as easily or more easily than he can run up the weapon numbers. (Nautical anecdote about anchors and hurricanes followed.)

Perry: The great benefit of SALT II is that it assuredly delays the development of the worst kinds of threats to this system. We need SALT II to prevent them from exploiting their throw-weight and getting the jump on M-X deployment.

Turner: We ought to look at the threat of early Soviet abrogation of SALT II in order rapidly and early to expand their RV threat to M-X.

Perry: Going into M-X without SALT II would be a real problem. There is a physical limit on suitable land. At 7000 foot spacing, we could build 10,000 shelters; at 3500 foot spacing, 20,000.

Brown: This is a ridiculous extreme.

Brzezinski: But there is another angle to Stan's point. The Soviets have an incentive to abrogate SALT II on account of M-X. If they showed us a credible threat or preparation to do so, would we want to go ahead with M-X? We should examine this gambit as a Soviet means of deterring us from proceeding with M-X.

Brown: This is a good question. Facing that kind of threat, we would be credibly interested in options beyond expanding the number of shelters, e.g., providing for ABM defense of M-X. To deter the Soviets from trying the abrogation threat, we have to have a credible ABM program. We also have to convey willingness to abrogate the ABM agreement or be willing to regard Soviet abrogation of SALT II as tantamount to total abrogation of SALT.

Perry: We could also sharply accelerate other programs, e.g., increase our buy of ALCM. In terms of numbers of weapons added to the force over time, we could match a Soviet ICBM escalation with an escalation in the procurement of ALCMs. This in addition, possibly, to the ABM defense would be an adequate response to and deterrent of the Soviet SALT II abrogation threat.

White: This would be in addition to, not a substitute for, expansion of M-X shelter numbers?

Brown: Yes.

Turner: My concern is, given these kinds of threats and necessary responses, is M-X in multiple shelters the right way to contend with possibilities readily open to the Soviets because of their high throw-weight?

Brzezinski: This is a real question because the Soviets are likely to have a strong incentive to cover the whole strategic target set as well as they can.

Brown: But there are lots of strategic targets they have an incentive to cover. Our aim is to give them a problem that is too tough and expensive for the payoff.

Keeny: We should not lock ourselves into a specific base-line number of shelters like 4600 because this can too easily be demonstrated by the amateur critic to be inadequate. In any case, these calculations show that M-X is not survivable against the threats postulated. M-X exhausts the threat but does not survive. You're left with SLBMs and bombers against each other, which is where you'd be without buying M-X.

Brown: What do you think the Soviets would do with their 5,000-10,000 ICBM weapons? Without a large hard-target array to shoot [1 line not declassified] Part of the problem is whether the Soviets have a survivable ICBM capability while we do not. Kissinger has made the point of how intolerable this would be. M-X challenges the survivability of Soviet ICBMs. As to the apparent failure of M-X to survive in these calculations Bill presented, remember they are limiting cases in which the entire Soviet ICBM arsenal is thrown at M-X and MINUTEMAN. They would never throw [number not declassified] percent of their force at [number not declassified] percent of ours. They have many targets to cover and residual force needs.

Keeny: But these kinds of calculations make it look like the rationale for M-X is to exhaust the enemy, not to survive. This is in part a political problem.

Perry: If we actually deploy according to the defense conservative logic we display in these calculations, we would in fact have much higher survivability. And when the Soviets look at the problem in an offense conservative manner, then they will be deferred from attacking and probably dissuaded from attempting to overcome the shelter array with weapon numbers.

Vance: These massive and pure attacks are highly unlikely. In a real attack, M-X would be more survivable than displayed on the charts.

Brzezinski: At a minimum, we can enforce a situation in which he must disarm himself to attack M–X. In reality, we can do better than the minimum.

Jones: Today, if you want to believe in highly artificial attack threats, he can take out 100 percent of our bombers with 100 percent of his ICBMs in an area overpressure attack.

Perry: The more realistic depiction of the threat is the one used by the Air Force to configure the base-line. If he puts [*number not declassified*] percent of his hard-target-capable weapons against [*less than one line not declassified*] percent of the M–X missiles will survive.

Brown: Let's move on to verification. We have an overhead photo here⁴ which [*2 lines not declassified*] There are, of course, other means to verify than photography. Stan, do you want to comment?

Turner: There are two problems: The Soviets verifying us, and we verifying the Soviets. [*13 lines not declassified*] Our confidence in verifying a Soviet version is bound to be less than theirs because we face a closed society and shall have less confidence in cooperative measures.

Brown: But we have better resolution and real time imagery.

Turner: By the late 1980s these advantages may not be so great. [*9 lines not declassified*]

Brown: How many SS–16s might they hide this way, in your view?

Turner: [*3 lines not declassified*]

Brown: Why not hide them elsewhere, away from multiple aim point confinements? They'll have more chance of getting away with it where we are not looking hard.

Turner: [*5 lines not declassified*]

Brown: Wouldn't they do better to deploy SS–16 type missiles in SS–20 deployment areas?

Turner: [*1 line not declassified*]

Brown: But we shall be looking closely at both possibilities for cheating, and using all types of intelligence.

Vance: [*1 line not declassified*]

Turner: [*1 line not declassified*]

Jones: Adjacent confinements could be opened simultaneously to assure no escape of an illegal missile from one to another.

Perry: In our scheme, we would be able to open a whole valley of several adjacent confinements to protect against this problem.

Brzezinski: In my view, it's hard to see them building the multiple shelter system unless they are planning to cheat.

⁴Not found attached.

Turner: [2 lines not declassified]

Brown: They can go straight mobile deployment.

Turner: [2 lines not declassified]

Brzezinski: On the contrary, they'll claim M-X is unverifiable and use that to justify building their preferred mobile deployment scheme as they wish without reference to our verification concerns.

Brown: I am convinced we have a good case on verification.

Brzezinski: That may be, but we cannot enforce it. Their incentive to cheat is high.

Keeny: DOD has clearly made heroic efforts to make our scheme verifiable. Our topography in the West helps, especially the separated valleys. What about Soviet topography? How do we stand with the size of the port holes required? How about the problem of using an image to fake the bottom of the shelter?

Stoertz: Stereo and other image enhancements help.

Brown: Faking images is a problem in other areas too, e.g., making SSBNs look like SSNs.

Jones: Different sensors will be used, e.g., radar, to ease this problem.

Perry: The observation ports have to be big enough to allow stereo imagery of the floor, to measure real depth.

Vance: I take it, Stan, you're satisfied we can verify [1 line not declassified]

Turner: [3 lines not declassified]

Vance: [less than one line not declassified]

Turner: [less than one line not declassified]

Stoertz: But it would not be definitive.

Brown: We need your position on this sooner. We are under pressure to move quickly to a basing recommendation. The verification problem you raise will never be resolved definitely.

Brzezinski: We need a recommendation to the President by the end of the month when he returns. And we can hold an NSC on it in the first week of September.⁵

Brown: We have the following agenda of issues, then: Stan, you will complete your study [less than one line not declassified] by the end of the month. DOD will reconcile Bill's draw-down curves with official NIE data. And we shall look at the threat of Soviet abrogation of the SALT

⁵ On August 17, President Carter and Mrs. Carter flew to Minneapolis to embark on a steamboat cruise down the Mississippi River, arriving in St. Louis on August 24. From St. Louis they flew aboard Air Force One to Camp David, where they stayed until August 30, when they departed for Plains, Georgia. They returned to the White House the evening of September 3. (Carter Library, Presidential Material, President's Daily Diary)

II limits prior to 1985, plus our responses other than expanding shelter numbers.

Keeny: We still have to examine the likelihood that the location uncertainty will collapse.

Brown: This is less critical because we can reshuffle or dash.

Keeny: But surely maintaining location uncertainty is still critical. We might not know that we should move or dash.

Brown: Our move/dash capability denies him any basis for confidence that he could ever use his ability to locate the missiles were he ever to acquire such an ability.

Brzezinski: Would we dash in all cases of tactical warning of an incoming attack?

Brown: We could require dash on tactical warning if the number of incoming weapons indicated that the attacker thought he had broken the location uncertainty. We've provided for including mass simulators, but I believe we need only deploy them if we see convincing evidence that he can threaten to break location uncertainty.

Turner: Maintaining location uncertainty is a genuine concern. Sensor technology is improving, cooperative measures to assure verifiability will tend to compromise location uncertainty. The Soviets will certainly work on the problem. Would you build the system this way if there was a reasonable probability they could break the location deception?

Brown: This is a matter of juggling doubts and uncertainties on both sides. Our side will have doubts about survivability. Their side will have doubts about their capacity to attack the system. On balance these doubts will come out favoring not going to war, i.e., favoring deterrence. That is why we selected this approach.

Brzezinski: What is the speed of dashing?

Perry: If dashing were fully adequate for survivability, we wouldn't have to hide. The combination of hiding and dashing is adequate.

Brown: Let's conclude. Have we had enough discussion to make a recommendation to the President right after Labor Day? What issues remain?

White: We have to examine costs further: cost uncertainties, the impact of IOC on cost profiles, and the impact of M-X spending profiles on other DOD spending priorities.

Brown: We're hurting when the annual outlay for M-X hits \$2B.

Jayne: The year of FOC is crucial.

Brown: 1983–85 will be the expensive years.

Vance: Our decision schedule turns on Stan's date for completing his work, doesn't it?

Turner: My concerns may not be all that critical; they involve relatively unlikely possibilities on which we must have good analysis as we move ahead.

Vance: We have to answer your questions.

Turner: We'll do our best.

Brown: Other issues? Public acceptance?

Vance: The public acceptance issue of greatest importance right now is the requirement that we speak with one voice. It should be DOD's voice.

Brown: We'll look further at the location uncertainty question.

Huberman: We understand you will also be conducting a positive security program for maintaining location uncertainty, analogous to the program for submarine security.

Keeny: In addition to location uncertainty, what about the threat of SLBM attack?

Perry: If SSBNs come in close, we shall go into a mode of constant motion or readiness for motion with the ability to get to a new shelter in time to thwart an SLBM attack. If we get indicators of enemy SSBNs coming in close, we can defeat the SLBM and the ICBM threat.

Ermarth: We may have a political problem between now and early September, according to the schedule laid out. The attentive public expected a firm decision out of the 14 August PRC; this is that PRC. How do we represent the results of this meeting? It will not do to say we are continuing to study the problem.

Brown: We'll say what I've been saying in testimony: A consensus has emerged on a satisfactory basing mode, and a recommendation will be made to the President in a matter of weeks. Of course, we have been saying "a matter of weeks" for a matter of weeks.

148. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

The Defense Budget (U)

I want to share my personal views with you on what course we should advise the President to take over the next few months as he responds to Congressional and inflationary pressures on the defense budget. (S)

With respect to the possibility of overall dollar adjustments, I suggest that we determine what kind of long-term budget strategy—defined in terms of specific programs—would best counter the adverse trends indicated by your recent paper on the military investment balance,² and that we attempt to conform any near-term (beginning FY 81) dollar adjustments to the long-term strategy. This should be done soon if we're to have any impact on the effort initiated by Jim McIntyre's August 3, 1979 memo to the President on "SALT and the Defense Budget."³ (S)

With respect to what is bought with whatever overall dollar adjustments the President makes, it seems of vital importance that the additional monies be applied against our remaining highest priority strategic and tactical needs. My own view of which needs are the most important from among those identified in PD/NSC-18 and your subsequent Consolidated Guidance documents, is as follows:

— <i>Strategic:</i>	Highest—improve C ³ I; short-term fixes.
	Next highest—accelerate modernization (M-X IOC, cruise missile carrier development, ALCM IOC)
— <i>TNF</i>	Highest—improve C ³ I
	Next highest—accelerate theater nuclear forces modernization (including MRBM development)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 8-9/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² See Document 145.

³ Not found.

—Non-NATO GPF	Highest—man, support and exercise the quick reaction contingency force; expand mobility (lift) capability.
—NATO GPF	Highest—accelerate ground force modernization (XM-1, 1FV). (TS)

I believe that applying monies against the above list of needs would be both militarily and politically defensible in that: (1) I am confident the list will prove to be consistent with the long-term budget strategy I mentioned earlier; and (2) since the list has been evolving since the earliest days of the Administration, it cannot be labeled as merely a reaction to the SALT TWO ratification debate. (TS)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

149. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, August 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Telecommunications and C³I Policy Issues (U)

A number of C³I issues (which require action by the National Security Council) have been raised by telecommunications legislation and the National Communications System Annual Report.² They can, I believe, be brought together in two groups. (U)

The *first* concerns legislation for de-regulating the telecommunications industry. Executive Order 12046 placed responsibility for national security telecommunications policy with the National Security Council, and in carrying that policy responsibility, my staff has tried to resolve a number of differences on pending legislation between the Department of Commerce and national security agencies represented through the National Communications System. The interagency paper at Tab I reflects NCS efforts at stating a national security position on

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 83, Communications: 7-12/79. Secret.

² The 1978 National Communications System (NCS) Report is *ibid*.

telecommunications legislation.³ Commerce found it unacceptable, but a dialogue continues on legislative issues. (U)

Three points emerge rather clearly from an examination of the debate between the NCS agencies and Commerce.

—In the past, there has been a reliance on AT&T for the provision of adequately survivable and restorable communications networks. It is doubtful, in light of present vulnerabilities in the system, that such reliance is justified. (U)

—De-regulation, if it leads to a competitive telecommunications industry, is not necessarily detrimental to our national security interests as long as legislative authority is reserved to the Federal Communications Commission enabling it to set standards that ensure adequately survivable and restorable networks. (U)

—The lack of defined national security requirements addressing survivability and restorability hamper our efforts to obtain legislative authority to deal with these national security needs. (U)

Concerning this last point, your Annual Report on the National Communications System calls for the establishment of a national policy for C³I addressing survivability and restoration. Indeed, we need such a policy if it will provide the basis for legislation and for holding telecommunications common carriers to appropriate standards. My concept of such a policy is a statement of national security telecommunication objectives which serve as the basis for your staff and other agencies' staffs determining C³I requirements and working out the technical standards essential for telecommunication carriers to meet them and for the FCC to rule effectively in support of them. (U)

I propose the following set of objectives as national security telecommunications policy: (C)

1. Provide communications between the NCA and our strategic forces to support a flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack. (C)

2. Provide communications to support the operational control of the armed forces at all levels of conflict, including an extended nuclear war. (C)

3. Provide for continuity of government in a nuclear war and during natural disasters. (C)

4. Support recovery of political, economic, and social structure of the nation during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster. (C)

5. Provide for adequate transmission of intelligence to support all of the foregoing objectives. (C)

I welcome your reaction to these objectives. I would like to present them to a meeting of the SCC in September before recommending them to the President. (U)

³ Not found attached.

The *second* group of issues concerns NCA survivability beyond the endurance of the NEACP, that is, about 72 hours. I have directed a review of the Federal Preparedness Agency (now FEMA) programs, which include this longer-term survival for Presidential successors and the civil side of emergency government. Progress reports from that study indicate that our present system of alternate hardened sites for the Executive Branch are not adequate to withstand a Soviet attack. The vulnerability of our "continuity of government" system as well as our "NCA survivability system" is growing no less rapidly than the vulnerability of some of our weapons systems, i.e., land-based ICBMs. I request, therefore, that you give special assistance to John Macy, the Director of FEMA, in working out a new concept of basing the NCA for both of the leadership responsibilities in an emergency: commanding the armed forces and governing the country. (S)

I am also particularly concerned that military contingency planning for *less* than all-out nuclear war be fully integrated with the basing and protection of our civil leadership in emergencies. (C)

Crisis stability in the future could depend on managing a conventional conflict from a leadership posture which could survive a surprise nuclear attack. Furthermore, a number of vulnerabilities revealed by the recent JCS connectivity studies can be dealt with effectively only through a significantly different approach to leadership protection. (S)

It is desirable to make a decision on a more survivable system of leadership protection early this fall. I would like to expedite that part of the FEMA study and take the results to the President by October 19. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

150. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 24, 1979

(C) I have made my final review of the MX program preparatory to your decision. Upon your concurrence, I will initiate full scale engineering development of the basing system. Development of the large missile (190,000 pounds and carrying 10 RVs) has already begun, as we agreed in June.² The baseline MX program envisions deploying 200 of these missiles, each mounted on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). Each TEL would have a deployment area consisting of 23 horizontal shelters interconnected with a loop-road. We would conceal which of the 23 shelters contained the TEL, but would periodically (or on demand) open the shelters for inspection by satellites. As an additional security feature we would be able to redeploy the missiles from one shelter to any other in a time less than that of ICBM flight.

(C) The basing concept is described in more detail in the attached paper, which also covers costs, survivability (including resilience to escalated threats), verification and environmental impact.³ The material presented is essentially that discussed at the PRC meeting of 7 August 1979, with additional clarification on matters pointed out by the participants at the meeting and in subsequent conversations with them.⁴ The paper has been reviewed in draft by other agencies at the staff level. I'm sending Zbig copies to distribute to Cy Vance, Stan Turner, Frank Press, Jim McIntyre, and George Seignious.

(C) The system is estimated to cost about \$33 billion in FY 80 dollars, including development, production, and installation; operating costs will be \$440 million per year. That is a substantial expense, but comparable with other major strategic programs. Corresponding costs for the Minuteman program (in FY80\$) are \$40 billion, with operating costs running \$340 million per year. By comparison, the TRIDENT program will cost \$39 billion (FY80\$) if we build enough TRIDENT submarines (25) to maintain a force of 600 SLBMs (slightly fewer than now deployed).⁵ Operating costs for the SLBM program run more than \$1 billion per year and for the B-52 program about \$1.6 billion per year

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 7, MX Missiles: 8/79. Top Secret; Codeword. Sent via Alpha Channel.

² See Document 142.

³ Not found attached.

⁴ See Document 147.

⁵ Carter wrote in the right margin next to this and the previous sentence: "looks like SLBM's are cheaper."

(including tanker costs). Alternative MX concepts with adequate survivability would be even more costly (Air Mobile MX and Trench MX for example), except for the vertical shelter MPS system. That would cost about \$27 billion (FY80\$) but would not be as satisfactory a solution either from a verification or a survivability point of view.

(C) The costs have been carefully prepared, but with any complex system projected 10 years into the future, there is bound to be uncertainty. Historically, major DoD projects have averaged 15% higher than their originally estimated costs. I have taken that as a challenge to prepare careful and conservative estimates in the first place and to maintain tight management control during the execution phase. The most critical phase in terms of cost control is the first year or two, when requirements tend to balloon ("gold-plating") and when the contract structure is established. There is already pressure to "improve" the system in various ways (installing radar intrusion sensors at each shelter instead of each complex, e.g.) which I intend to resist. There are some features which probably will ultimately be added to the system (mass simulators, e.g.), but which I intend to defer until their need is clear. Finally, there is the possibility that the Soviets will increase their ICBM threat more than we have estimated, especially in the absence of SALT or termination of SALT. In that case we would expand the MX system in response and that would, of course, increase the cost. Expanding to 300 missiles and 6900 shelters, for example, would cost an additional \$8 billion.

(C) It may also be possible to reduce costs by actions we take in the engineering development phase. The shelter spacing is set conservatively at 7,000 feet. We will explore the possibility of reducing this to 6,000 feet with concomitant reduction in road costs. We will also investigate the development of automated mass production techniques to reduce the cost of the shelters. Finally, there is another side to the threat uncertainty. We may be able to negotiate significant reductions in the Soviet ICBM threat in SALT III, which would allow us to deploy fewer MX missiles than planned, with a corresponding cost reduction.

(S) A key technical-military issue with this system is whether it poses a sufficiently difficult task to the formidable Soviet counterforce capability projected for the 1990's and beyond so that our ICBM forces can then be considered survivable. The system will not achieve its full operational capability for 10 years. During that period we must depend primarily on our SLBM and bomber/cruise missile forces for high confidence deterrence because of the possibility of a crippling surprise attack on our Minuteman force. While the bombers and cruise missile carriers can also be attacked at their bases by Soviet SLBMs, I believe that our at-sea SLBM force will be invulnerable to attack during this 10-year period. However, we cannot count on such SLBM invulnerability

indefinitely, especially if we give the Soviets a chance to concentrate on it. From that, in major part, flows the importance of restoring the ICBM survivability by the end of the 1980's. Other factors include the C³ and accuracy associated with the ICBM force.⁶

(S) The MX achieves survivability by (a) forcing the Soviets to target shelters instead of missiles, and (b) building more shelters than they can realistically attack effectively. We achieve the first objective by concealing which one of the 23 shelters contains the missile. I believe the elaborate measures we have devised will allow the Soviets to know that only *one* shelter has a missile but will not allow them to know *which* one. If this belief proves unfounded, that is even if the Soviets were to locate the missiles and launch an attack, we could move the missile to a different shelter, before the ICBM reached its target. This rapid dispersal capability is intended primarily to complicate the task of the Soviet war planner (thereby deterring him from attacking) and to give the President an insurance policy against loss of security, or assertions of such loss. As a result of these measures, we can have high confidence that any attacker wanting to destroy the MX missile force would have to target all of the shelters. [10 lines not declassified] In short, the Soviets would be in a worse position after the attack than before, even without considering a US retaliatory strike against residual Soviet forces.

(S) Larger Soviet ICBM forces are possible to envisage. These would require a correspondingly larger MX "force" (more shelters, and perhaps more deployment areas, depending on the nature of the threat) to achieve comparable levels of survivability. In the attached paper we describe, in addition to [21 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

(S) Another crucial issue is verifiability of the system. I believe we have designed a system which deals effectively with that issue, both in fact and in perception. This system should be easier to verify than other mobile systems—SLBMs, bombers, and road mobile systems like the SS-20 that are not confined to a designated deployment area. CIA and [less than 1 line not declassified] analysts have done an outstanding job of assessing verifiability (and as a result have influenced some of our design features). They conclude that the system can be verified either as a US deployment or as a Soviet deployment. The verification issue is treated in detail in the attached paper. Also, Stan has prepared a separate memo on this subject which you will want to review.⁷

⁶ Carter wrote in the margin to the right of this and the previous sentence: "ex schizophrenia."

⁷See Document 151.

(U) Environmental impact and public reaction have been handled very well by the Air Force. There is good public support in the probable development areas—Nevada and Utah. The Governors of both states have written to you expressing their interest. The attached report contains a section on this matter. We plan a vigorous effort to make MX energy-independent via solar techniques. Though very much a side-issue in military terms, such an effort could be of significant national value in maturing that technology so that costs reduce to acceptable levels for other applications.

(C) I believe that we should move out promptly with a decision to start full scale development.⁸ We now have the funding (the FY 79 Supplemental Appropriation) and we can demonstrate to Congress and the public a forceful step to strengthen our strategic forces. By announcing a decision before 5 September, we can take the initiative rather than appear to be responding reluctantly to the criticisms of delay that will be made when Congress reconvenes.⁹ Before you make a public statement, you or I should personally call Governor List of Nevada and Governor Matheson of Utah, as well as Senator Robert Byrd and Speaker O'Neill, to give them advance notice.

Harold Brown

⁸ Carter underlined "move out promptly" in this sentence.

⁹ Carter underlined "before 5 September" in this sentence.

151. Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 24, 1979

SUBJECT

Comments on Proposed MX Basing Mode From an Intelligence Point of View

1. Attached are two sets of comments on the proposed MX basing concept.² One covers considerations of verification which are relevant to this system and responds to your memorandum of 13 August;³ the other addresses possible Soviet responses to the deployment of an MX system. Both are summarized below.

2. *Monitoring:*

a. Objectively the Soviets should be able to monitor with high confidence the MX system as currently proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

b. The Soviets will probably not actually feel quite that confident.

c. The Soviets will very likely continue to protest that this basing mode is not verifiable.

d. Should the Soviets deploy an identical system, we believe that we could monitor the number of MX type missiles deployed in it with high confidence; there are, however, possibilities for cheating [*1 line not declassified*] The Soviets are not likely to view this cheating possibility as an attractive option.

e. A Soviet multiple protective shelter system would likely differ in some respects from the US proposal, and our monitoring confidence would depend heavily on the characteristics of that system.

3. Soviet response: [*4 lines not declassified*] The proposed baseline MX basing system would have 4,600 shelters, or aim points by 1989. The following tabulation shows how many RVs the Soviets could have in excess of the number required to attack all Minuteman silos, the baseline MX system, and command and control facilities in the US. This is not intended to imply that the US should or would need to build this many shelters, but it does serve to illustrate the scope of the problem the Soviets might create.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 7, MX Missiles: 8/79. Top Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Copies were sent to Vance, Brown, and Keeney.

² Attached but not printed are two comments on MX basing.

³ Not found.

<i>Case</i>	<i>Excess Soviet RVs Following Attack on Minuteman, Command and Control, and Baseline MX</i>
1. Moderate Soviet effort within SALT II	-310
2. High Soviet effort within SALT II	2,140
3. Moderate Soviet effort if SALT II fails	3,130
4. <i>Accelerated</i> Soviet effort in 1986 if SALT II RV limits expire	2,750
5. <i>Accelerated</i> Soviet effort after abrogating SALT II in 1982	4,620
6. High Soviet effort if SALT II fails	8,490

While it is difficult to predict which option the Soviets may elect, it is clear that they do have options which at the least would apply pressure on us to seek continuation of the limits on RVs (Cases 1 and 2).

4. Detailed back-up analysis is being performed and will be made available as soon as possible. This report is forwarded preliminary to that to meet the deadline requested in your reference memo.

Stansfield Turner

152. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 28, 1979

SUBJECT

MX Basing (U)

Harold Brown has sent you the memo at Tab A recommending full scale development of the horizontal shelter/ground mobile MX basing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 8-9/79. Secret.

scheme I briefed you on several weeks ago.² I also asked Stan Turner to provide his comments on the verifiability of the system—the result is at Tab B.³ While there is general agreement that we should proceed with this system, as you will see, Stan Turner continues to be concerned that the Soviets might try to defeat the MX system by sharply increasing their strategic forces. (S)

This material will be the basis for the NSC meeting that I propose you hold early next week. I believe that the basing decision must be made at that meeting or very shortly thereafter—an inconclusive meeting is likely to hurt our efforts to get the SALT II agreement ratified. In this meeting we must also agree on a unified position for answering critics of MX counterforce capability. (S)

I recommend that you read Harold's 5 page cover memo (Tab A)—it summarizes the important points in his longer attachment. You should also read Stan Turner's 3 page cover memo (Tab B). In reading this material you should keep the following points in mind:

—While DOD has done an excellent job of minimizing the concerns of the citizens of Utah and Nevada, opponents of the system are certain to try to block the system on environmental grounds. To defuse the considerable concerns already surfacing that you might simply allow this to happen, Lloyd Cutler and I believe that when you announce the MX decision, you should also state your intention to seek legislation to prevent environmental blocking of the system. Such a statement will underline your resolve to proceed. (C)

—Harold Brown believes that, beyond the perceptions issue, the primary advantage of matching the Soviets countersilo capability is to motivate them to go to smaller, mobile survivable ICBM's. I believe that the primary advantage of survivable countersilo capability is to remove any potential Soviet advantages in a counterforce exchange. Such advantages might make the Soviets more willing to press their interests in any deep crisis, and thus increase the threat of nuclear war. (C)

—Stan Turner's continuing concerns with the possibility that the Soviets might try to expand their forces to provide extra RV's for targeting the MX system seem overblown. They obviously *can* expand their forces but I doubt that they will because (1) we can expand our MX force at lower cost, (2) if we do, their efforts will have gained them nothing, and in fact, (3) if they race us by deploying new silo based forces and we respond by expanding MX, the potential US advantage in any counterforce exchange becomes increasingly more significant. In the NSC meeting you may wish to briefly discuss this issue again—a consensus of your advisers on this issue would be useful. (C)

Finally, as part of our preparations for the upcoming decision, Hamilton Jordan's office is working with my staff and DOD to develop

² Attached but not printed is Brown's memorandum; see Document 150.

³ Attached but not printed is Turner's memorandum; see Document 151.

a plan of action for announcing the decision. We believe—and Lloyd Cutler agrees—that you should make a short announcement yourself, and Harold and others should provide more detailed backup. We are therefore preparing a draft statement as well as other backup material. We will also provide a list of people you should call in advance of any public announcement. (C)

153. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 4, 1979

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on MX Basing (C)

The purpose of this NSC meeting is to review and decide upon the MX basing mode Secretary Brown described and recommended in the memo he sent you last week.² If at all possible the meeting should result in your final decision on a basing mode—an inconclusive meeting would probably have an adverse affect upon SALT. (S)

I suggest you consider the basing issue in terms of two separate questions—should we proceed with the recommended basing mode? and how should any decision to proceed be implemented? To begin discussion of the first question Secretary Brown is prepared to give a quick summary of the major features of his recommendations—the summary will assume that all present have read the backup memo. The issues of potential disagreement are:

Cost: Jim McIntyre (and some parts of OSD) believes the initial systems acquisition is likely to be significantly higher than the \$33B or so estimated by Secretary Brown. They may be right, but in my view Secretary Brown's arguments as to how costs can be held down sound reasonable too, and even if the costs were another \$5B–10B higher, the arguments in favor of this kind of system rather than any of the alternatives, particularly a dyad, are compelling. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–021, 9/5/79, MX Basing. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum and wrote "Swamp—[illegible]."

² See Document 150.

Survivability: Stan Turner believes that the Soviets may try to increase numbers of ICBM warheads numbers enough to make targeting all MX shelters feasible. This doesn't seem reasonable. While increasing numbers of silo based missile warheads might be possible at costs comparable to those required to make corresponding increases in the size of the MX system, the Soviets will see that their efforts can readily be offset, and that such a race would increase their vulnerability to a U.S. first strike. If on the other hand the Soviets consider expanding the threat to MX in the form of mobile missiles, they have some significant technical problems to solve, and would be at a significant economic disadvantage in such a race given the extra costs of mobile systems. (S)

Verifiability: Stan Turner also believes that we do not yet know what design measures are needed to allow satellites to verify that extra missiles are not hidden in the shelters (memo at Tab A).³ His staff believes that appropriate measures can be found—perhaps [*1 line not declassified*] You should question Stan to get as tight a statement of his concerns as possible, and then simply instruct Harold to ensure that the shelter design does allow satellite inspection.⁴ Waiting another several weeks or months in order to sort out the detailed design requirements of inspectable shelters isn't reasonable. (S)

If at this point you can make a decision to accept Harold's recommendation, or if you anticipate accepting it soon, we should discuss how to implement it. (U)

The first question on implementation is how we should continue to explain the counterforce capabilities of the MX. We need to agree on what the valid arguments are, and that no other arguments will be given without further NSC discussion.⁵ This is necessary in order to minimize the chance that anyone will undermine the arguments that have been made so far, or alternatively that the MX decision will be taken to imply things it does not necessarily mean such as—we are taking a first step toward a damage limiting capability. (S)

In my view there are two valid arguments we should use:

—We don't want the Soviets to see a potential advantage in any nuclear exchange limited to strikes against each others forces (I used this argument in answering Senator Hatfield's criticisms)

—MX counterforce capabilities should push the Soviets toward the same kinds of relatively expensive mobile systems we are moving toward. This would prevent them from maintaining their strategic posture at significantly less cost than we maintain ours, and may ultimately

³ See Document 151.

⁴ Carter drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the preceding sentence.

⁵ Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to this sentence.

mean greater strategic stability. (Harold has used this argument in his memo to you) (U)

You may wish to discuss the arguments in this meeting, or simply say that the counterforce arguments in Harold's meeting and the interagency Q's and A's (my argument is the only one used there) are the only ones to be used until the counterforce issue has been further addressed in another NSC meeting. (C)

You must also decide whether or not to ask for legislation to guard against attempts to block the MX on environmental grounds.⁶ Lloyd Cutler and I favor your announcing your intent to do this when the basing mode decision is announced. Such an action will underline your determination to proceed, and will undercut suspicions that you intend to let the system be blocked one way or another. (C)

Finally, there are the questions of who you should call in advance of the public announcement, and whether you should make a public announcement yourself. Background material on these questions has been developed and forwarded to you by Hamilton Jordan's office. You might ask the principals at the NSC meeting for their views on whether you should make an announcement, for any inputs they might have on who should be contacted in advance—and any special points they think should be made in such contacts.⁷ I believe you should make a short announcement of the decision yourself, just as you did with the B-1. (C)

⁶ Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to this sentence.

⁷ Carter drew an arrow in the right margin pointing to this sentence.

154. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 4, 1979

SUBJECT

MX Costs

In connection with your upcoming decision on MX, I want to inform you of our latest efforts to understand the cost implications of the program now recommended by Harold Brown. Harold estimates that this system will cost \$33 billion to acquire (constant 1980 dollars), about \$8 billion more than the vertical multiple protective silo system originally proposed by the Air Force. The currently proposed system is more costly because of features that provide increased security against attack (rapid shuffle, dash) and increased verifiability (openable horizontal shelters).

OMB staff has been working closely with DOD and the Air Force for some weeks, including a cost analysis session with the project office in California. In our judgment the DOD \$33 billion estimate is probably understated by about \$8 billion for the following reasons:

—Based on historical data, we believe the baseline system cost is overly optimistic, and should be increased by about \$5 billion. Our judgment here derives in great part from the massive road and shelter construction involved. Given the unprecedented magnitude of this major construction, these added costs are likely to happen even if the program is tightly managed. The cost growth could be much worse otherwise.

—Modifications to the baseline system that are now under active consideration would add another \$3–4 billion. These modifications include deployment of mass simulators to preserve location uncertainty, development of a larger reentry vehicle to fully exploit the throw-weight capacity of the MX missile, command and control improvements, and improved road surfacing needed for rapid dash. In my opinion, some if not all of the modifications will be recommended to you eventually.

Over and above our OMB estimate of \$41 billion for the presently configured system, it is also likely that a larger system will be needed to counter an expanded threat. If the Soviets build to the MIRV limit allowed by SALT II, the currently planned MX system would become very vulnerable (almost all the MX missiles could be destroyed). To

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 8–9/79. Secret.

expand this system to meet the threat would require another \$7–8 billion, primarily for constructing additional shelters and the connecting roads.

Harold Brown estimates that Soviet costs to increase the threat to MX would be approximately 25% higher than ours to respond, but this is very little cost leverage. My staff estimates that it may well be *cheaper* for the Soviets to build an additional 10 RV missile than for us to build the additional shelters needed to maintain planned survivability. If the Soviets exceed SALT II limits, we may have to expand the system even more.

Most optimistically, MX will cost \$33–41 billion over the next decade. The proposed horizontal shelter system with its improved security and verifiability features is about as expensive as trench basing, although environmentally more acceptable. Funding for the system is planned to exceed \$2 billion in FY 1982 and to be in the \$6–9 billion range (constant 1980 dollars) annually in the 1983–86 period. Even at funding levels that allow 3% real growth in defense spending, MX alone will take about half of the total real increase through 1984. This means that unless defense totals are increased beyond current plans, important conventional force modernization (particularly shipbuilding) and readiness improvements will be curtailed. Another choice is to slip the MX program schedule. This is likely to occur anyway, since the currently planned 1986 deployment rate is very optimistic. Such a slip could lessen 1983–85 funding requirements but would probably further add to total system costs.

Recommendation. While the additional security and verification features of the proposed system may be necessary, defense should pursue R&D on a less costly alternative. In particular, we should let further study determine whether dash and rapid shuffle features are really necessary or whether a system with simple transporters and smaller shelters would be acceptable. Even if these additional features are deemed necessary, DOD should design the system so that the basic capabilities could be built first, with dash and other features added later (beyond 1986) if appropriate. Given the difficult overall defense budget choices mentioned above, this “building block” approach provides maximum flexibility in the early 80’s for you to allocate adequate funds to our most pressing DOD requirements.

155. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 5, 1979, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

M–X Basing

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State

Warren Christopher

Defense

Harold Brown

JCS

General David Jones

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

OMB

James McIntyre

ADCA

George Seignious

OSTP

Frank Press

White House

Hamilton Jordan

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

NSC

Victor Utgoff

Detailed Minutes

The *President* opened the meeting by stating that the agenda would consist of two topics—M–X basing, and a short discussion of the question of Soviet troops in Cuba. *Dr. Brzezinski* added that another NSC meeting would be held soon on the related subjects of C³I, targeting, and theater nuclear forces. *Dr. Brzezinski* then asked *Harold Brown* to explain his recommendations on M–X basing. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–021, 9/5/79, MX Basing. Secret. Brackets, except those indicating text not declassified and omitted material, are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. The meeting ended at 3:35 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

After the President's comment that he had read all the background memoranda he had received on M-X, *Harold Brown* summarized the main features of his preferred basing system, referring to a model of it on the table. Harold's main points were:

- the basing system would maintain uncertainty about the location of the missiles by rotating them among shelters every several months;

- given this uncertainty, the Soviets would have to attack all the M-X shelters;

- the number of shelters had been chosen to make attack of the M-X system by the projected Soviet threat very disadvantageous, if not impossible;

- there were a number of alternatives for responding to expansion of the Soviet threat;

- that he believes we can stay ahead of the threat, though this will be more difficult without the limitations on the Soviet threat contained in the SALT II Treaty;

- that the Soviets would find competing with us (to make M-X vulnerable against our efforts to keep it survivable) an unattractive proposition, particularly because the only way they could expand their threat at a cost comparable to the offsetting efforts we could make, would be through further investment in *vulnerable* silo based forces, and finally;

- that the disadvantages the Soviets would see in such a competition would deter it. (C)

Finally, Harold noted that Stan Turner has a different view as to how the Soviets might view this competition. (C)

The *President* noted that Jim McIntyre had told him that the overall cost estimated by DOD for M-X is 20% too low.² The President also questioned the need for the proposed dash capability, and for shelters hardened to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] He asked whether we could maintain options for these features but not commit ourselves to them at the outset. (C)

Jim McIntyre added that he was skeptical about the feasibility of quick movement of so large a vehicle as the M-X transporter, and particularly, of stopping it quickly once it got moving. Jim said he was prepared to discuss the cost question, but suggested that Harold open that discussion. (C)

Harold Brown said that \$33 billion is his estimate—which is slightly above the \$30 billion cost estimated by the Air Force. Both these costs

² See Document 154.

are in 1980 dollars. Harold noted that while these amounts are large, they should be compared to the roughly \$40 billion it would cost to replicate the POSEIDON or MINUTEMAN forces today. Harold admitted that, historically, costs for major systems have risen as the programs have progressed from their initial stages to deployment.

Generally, however, most of these cost increases are associated with add-ons that become attractive as the system development progresses. (U)

In response to McIntyre's comments on the feasibility of building so large and agile a transporter, Harold noted that its horsepower was only twice that of the M-X tank, and stated his conviction that construction of this vehicle is feasible. He stated that he was very much against leaving out the dash capability—that it would deter Soviet efforts to develop means for discovering which shelters contain missiles. (U)

The *President* asked if we would want to move the M-X missiles upon detection of a Soviet attack. *Dr. Brzezinski* answered that this would depend on how you want to respond. *Secretary Brown* added that suspiciously small attacks might suggest that the missiles should be moved (a point that *Stan Turner* supported). (U)

The *Vice President* noted that without the dash capability, you would not be able to shift missile locations if you wanted to, upon warning of a Soviet attack. He noted that the ability to quickly shift positions of the missiles is one of the best arguments on the Hill for adopting this particular basing scheme. (U)

The *President* asked if there is a comparable ground vehicle in existence. *Harold Brown* answered the proposed vehicle is similar to a locomotive. The *President* responded that Harold Brown's response suggests that he doesn't know the answer. *Harold* responded that he did indeed know that comparable tracked vehicles exist. The *President* added that strip mining equipment is somewhat comparable. (U)

Jim McIntyre noted that OMB had presented the President with an alternative basing plan that he thought would be a safer choice for the President. He noted that we will need good answers now for the questions raised about Harold's proposal, or we will be in trouble later on the Hill. *Harold Brown* asked what particular questions McIntyre was referring to. (U)

Jim McIntyre said that he was skeptical about whether a million pound vehicle could run on gravel. He added that Harold's figure of \$2.1 billion for 10,000 miles of gravel road seemed optimistic, and that these roads would cost more to maintain than Harold had assumed. Finally Jim said that his staff believes that some shelters had not counted in Harold's costing. (U)

Harold Brown argued that Jim's cost figures reflect add-ons that DOD did not see as necessary, and that OMB was costing the system for a larger number of shelters than DOD believes is necessary in view of the projected threat. *Jim McIntyre* countered that even the basic system that DOD was talking about was priced \$5 billion too low. *Harold* asked whether this was a "not to exceed" figure—*Jim* responded that it was a best estimate. (U)

The *President* asked Jim McIntyre if OMB had developed independent estimates of shelters and road costs. *Jim McIntyre* responded that they had not, and that their cost estimates were based on comparing various components of M-X to similar but not identical things. The *President* then said that even if we assume Jim McIntyre's figures of \$41 billion is correct, what can we do about it? *Jim McIntyre* stated that \$5 billion should be added to DOD's figures in order to achieve a realistic figure for the Hill—\$3 billion of this figure is required for mass simulators, and the rest to achieve the postulated dash capability. *Harold Brown* asked what advantage there was to stating such an estimate? (U)

The *President* commented to Jim McIntyre that he presumed the Defense Department had made a detailed cost estimate and what he is hearing now is that OMB has not done this. *Jim McIntyre* responded that DOD cost group is the source for his estimates. (U)

Harold Brown said that there may be some honest differences in judgment, but that he does not believe that the DOD figure is low. He argued that the costing has been more honest and careful than say that done for Trident, and in addition these costs are based on some testing. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski noted that there is no real alternative to M-X even at \$38 billion. The *President* agreed, and stated that the question is: "do we hurt our credibility by being either lower or higher than our best estimate"? *Dr. Brzezinski* suggested that we should take a further look at this question. (U)

Harold Brown remarked that we are going to simply have to admit to some uncertainty in our estimates of the cost of the system. The *President* said that perhaps we should simply say that the DOD estimate is \$33 billion, and some say the cost may end up being somewhat more. *General Jones* remarked that the incentives of the involved bureaucracies suggest that we should start with the lowest reasonable number. He pointed out the problems inherent in discussions of costs in constant dollars, and suggested that we don't overemphasize the confidence we have in the cost estimates. (U)

The *President* remarked that if a low figure is used, DOD may assume that more money will be available for other types of forces,

which will lead to problems. He suggested that the appropriate course of action would be to go with the best estimate, but recognize the degree of uncertainty we have about it. *Jim McIntyre* proposed that OMB and DOD take another look at the systems costs. He noted that he was not interested in signing up for another program with significantly higher costs than originally estimated, such as we had done with the program of action associated with the Panama Canal Treaty. (U)

The *President* then said, setting aside the question of its exact cost, this basing mode looks better than those proposed previously. He suggested that the discussion turn to the question of basing mode compatibility with SALT, particularly with respect to verifiability, and system expandability if SALT breaks down. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that Stan Turner and George Seignious comment on the question of verification. *Admiral Turner* responded by summarizing the main points on verification that he had made in the background paper he had submitted for the meeting. In making these points, Admiral Turner argued that 1) given the appropriate verification provisions, limits on the numbers of M-X type missiles in the system would be adequately verifiable by the Soviets, or by us, if they were to build the same system, [3 lines not declassified] (S)

The *President* said that we need to understand how much notice DOD would want for opening the shelter systems for verification. He said that he wanted to avoid being at odds with DOD in future negotiations with Brezhnev. (U)

Harold Brown said that the verification plugs could be pulled in a day, and that this length of time should be acceptable, if the system clearly has no cross country capability. He noted that there was the question of how many shelters should be opened simultaneously. He thought that the appropriate thing to do would be to open all the shelters in any given cluster. (U)

The *President* then asked if the sort of thing DOD had in mind was perhaps a capability to open 10% of all the M-X shelters with 24 hours notice, and keep them open for say 48 hours? *Harold Brown* responded that opening a total of 5% at any given time was more what he had in mind. *General Jones* said that he thought it was important that we be able to simultaneously open all the shelters in any valley. The *President* asked if he could count on a capability to open 10% within 24 hours for a period of 48 hours. Both *General Jones* and *Harold Brown* agreed to give the system this capability. (C)

Admiral Turner said that the length of time we would want the shelters open in a similar Soviet basing scheme would depend on cloud cover conditions. [2 lines not declassified] The *President* said that whatever we would demand from the Soviets in the way of verification provisions in this kind of system we must make sure to provide to

them. *George Seignious* said that cooperative verification arrangements are clearly needed for this system, and we will have to tell the Soviets what we will be doing to insure verification. *Admiral Turner* added that we would have to carefully time our challenges against any similar Soviet missile basing system if we expect to meet our exact verification requirements, and we will have to watch for phony excuses for not meeting our challenges. (C)

The *President* said: "I may have a different concept of how this is done, but I thought the idea was to open all the shelters in a given area within say 24 hours notice for a period of perhaps 48 hours. If we are prepared to do this kind of thing, then we can demand the same of them." He then asked DOD, "can you open all the shelters in a valley in such a simultaneous manner?" *Harold Brown* answered that this should clearly be possible with enough cranes. *Admiral Turner* said that CIA estimated that the proposed system would allow opening all the shelters in a valley within a day. *David Aaron* noted that Stan appeared to be arguing for a quick challenge to avoid the possibility of slipping missiles out of the cluster of shelters to be examined and into others. (C)

Frank Press asked why Soviets would see an advantage in placing extra small missiles within this kind of basing system if they were to build one? *Admiral Turner* responded that missiles need supporting infrastructure which could be found there. The *President* then asked *Admiral Turner* the key question: "Do you want to change anything in DOD's design?" *Admiral Turner* responded no—he just wants to arrange proper challenge procedures. *Dr. Brzezinski* then asked why the Soviets would spend the equivalent of \$40 billion to build a system of this kind, which so obviously takes great care to minimize the potential for cheating, if their purpose were to cheat? (C).

The *President* then turned to the question of the ability of the system to expand to counter larger Soviet threats. He noted that if we made no effort to build a survivable replacement for Minuteman, we would be worse off than if we ended up in a race to keep M-X survivable against an expanded Soviet threat. He noted that the question would seem to be: Is there an alternative basing scheme that is better from the point of view of our ability to stay ahead of expanded Soviet threats? (U)

George Seignious noted the danger inherent in thinking of this basing system as "sponge" for Soviet warheads. He also said that we should not exaggerate the survivability of the system. Finally, he argued that a Trident II missile should be pursued as a hedge against the possibility that the M-X program would not work out as currently conceived. (C)

The *President* said "I think the Soviets have thought they could win the strategic arms race. In my view, M-X, plus other improvements we are making will convince them otherwise—will make them

more willing to negotiate. Without M–X, the Soviets will whip [us]—something the US has been slow to realize”. (U)

Harold Brown said we are not just building up a force of 2,000 warheads, what we are doing is decoupling the numbers of warheads on our side from their survivability. The key to understanding the potential for a race between Soviet efforts to expand their capability to target M–X and our efforts to maintain M–X survivability is that, unless the Soviets go mobile, they will have to worry about survivability themselves. For that matter, if they push too hard, we can conceivably put M–X’s in silos ourselves. (C)

George Seignious noted that the prospect of this system will change the context of the SALT negotiations in 1982. We will be moving toward a system that will be able to destroy the Soviet’s missile silos. (C)

Harold Brown noted that if the Soviets build 20,000 RVs, that implies no SALT, and that we should consider ballistic missile defense systems for M–X. We should also realize that we will have the option of expanding our ongoing cruise missile programs. (C)

George Seignious said that, in view of the uncertainty of the situation we are looking at, we should not lock ourselves too tightly into the idea of exactly 4600 M–X shelters, it might be more, and it might be less. (Presumably in response to Seignious’ remark about the possibility of fewer than 4600 shelters), the *President* said that it would be a mistake to view M–X as a bargaining chip). (C)

The *President* then remarked that he was prepared to go ahead with the system. *Dr. Brzezinski* then asked how the President’s decision ought to be announced? (C)

The *President* asked if, setting aside the cost uncertainty, and assuming that suitable arrangements for cooperative verification can be negotiated, and that we are satisfied concerning the possibility of a dramatic expansion of the Soviet threat, whether anyone saw any other issues that seemed to suggest a need for a different basing alternative? (U)

Admiral Turner responded that the Soviets may make us pay heavily for the continuation of the implicit limits on numbers of RVs that is embodied in SALT II. He went on to say that a strong US commitment to this system could thus be particularly expensive. The *President* asked if the costs to each side of competing (in terms of an expanded threat and the adjustments to M–X required to meet this expansion) are comparable? *Stan Turner* responded yes. (C)

The *Vice President* asked if *Harold Brown* hadn’t said that the Soviets would pay more than us to run such a race? *Harold Brown* responded that the real drawback with the Soviets in running their cheapest race

would be that they would be investing further in vulnerable silo-based missiles. (U)

Admiral Turner noted that with this step we are entering the world of mobile ICBM's, [less than 1 line not declassified] The *President* countered that it was his understanding that the system being proposed would be verifiable given provisions costing a tiny fraction of the overall cost of the system. *Harold Brown* added that the verification provisions embodied in the system add no more than \$3 to \$4 billion to the overall system cost. He then noted that while *Admiral Turner's* point was a good one, he derived a different conclusion. Specifically, the inevitable vulnerability of fixed silo based systems implies a need to go mobile. But if mobile strategic missiles are going to be introduced, we should set the standard for verification of such systems. The *President* noted that we have committed ourselves to making mobiles verifiable. He noted his letter to Brezhnev on this subject, and Brezhnev's reply.³ (S)

The *President* then said he accepts this basing mode but requires that any declaration concerning its costs, verifiability, or ability to cope with expanded Soviet threats must be reviewed by the involved agencies and approved by him personally. He said that they must all agree on a single position on each of these issues, and that *Harold* should take the lead in developing each position. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we need background material for explaining this decision, including appropriate Q&As, by Friday. The *President* noted that we probably can't explore the cost question by Friday,⁴ but should develop tentative positions on the issues as rapidly as possible. *Dr. Brzezinski* noted that, in view of the closeness of the Summit with Brezhnev, we really need to have this material in hand by COB Thursday, September 6. *Admiral Turner* remarked that the group really didn't have major differences bearing on the appropriateness of proceeding with this basing system. *Dr. Brzezinski* said that we will have an announcement worked out by Friday. The *President* stated that he would make the announcement, and suggested that it be done at the Pentagon. (C)

³ Reference is to Carter's March 4, 1977, letter to Brezhnev in which Carter called for "the rapid conclusion of a formal agreement between us on those issues on which both of us seem predisposed to agree," and included among those issues: "c) provisions for mutually satisfactory verification" and "j) elimination of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles." (*Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 13) In his March 15 response, Brezhnev stated: "The issue of mobile launchers for ballistic missiles of intercontinental range naturally should find its solution in the agreement in question. Earlier we proposed to agree that over the period that agreement remains in force the sides should refrain from deploying land-based mobile ICBM launchers." (*Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 14)

⁴ September 7.

Jim McIntyre asked if the need for mass simulators would be resolved by Dr. Brzezinski and the others. The *President* responded that this system need not include mass simulators initially. (U)

General Jones noted the skepticism on the Hill, to the effect that the President is going ahead for M-X strictly to develop adequate support for SALT. He noted that we should probably ask for legislation to get around unreasonable opposition to the system based on uncertainties or exaggerations of its possible environmental impact. He also remarked that asking for multi-year funding for M-X would improve perceptions of the President's seriousness in seeing this system through. (C)

General Jones also noted that he had been called by Senator Nunn concerning remarks Nunn said were coming from the White House, to the effect that DOD could not effectively spend additional funds over and above the 3% increase the President was already committed to. General Jones remarked that comments of this kind from the White House hurt preceptions of the President's support for an improved defense. (U)

The *President* responded that to his knowledge the White House was not making statements of the kind Nunn reports, and that he personally had no doubt that DOD could spend more money usefully. (U)

Jim McIntyre remarked that General Jones had raised some good points. He added that we must guard against supporting the notion that is being voiced in some quarters that M-X will never be built. The *President* responded that you can quote me concerning my determination to see this through. *Harold Brown* added that as we proceed with this system, we must make certain that people understand that our intention is not to violate the laws protecting the environment. (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to national security policy.]

156. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Strategic Aircraft Programs (U)

With the M-X decision process completed, the next big strategic force posture issue is the future of the air-breathing leg of the Triad. It ranks along with strategic C³I in importance and dependence on basic decisions about doctrine. By contrast the future of the SSBN force is not so pressing. In the early 1980s we shall have to decide on Trident II and the possible need for a smaller SSBN. But we should not enter the 1980s without a firm planning concept for strategic aircraft. (C)

The questions being asked now include the following:

—We shall definitely need a follow-on to the B-52 as a cruise missile carrier. But when and what design?

—Do we need a new manned penetrator? When? What design?

—What are the tanker implications?

—Should we design advanced strategic aircraft to accomplish other missions, like conventional bombing, sea-control, and bomber defense? (C)

The timing of fiscal constraints and technological opportunities is of concern. By 1984, M-X will be eating up a large piece of the strategic budget and there is some incentive to load a new strategic aircraft program into earlier years. This argument has been used on behalf of the FB-111 B/C and derivations of the B-1 design. On the other hand, living a bit longer on the B-52's may permit us to exploit newer technology for the strategic aircraft fleet of the 1990s, especially interesting because the penetration problem is expected to get very severe. (C)

It is clear, whatever the course and timing chosen, we'll want high-performance airframes. Base-escape requirements and the possibility of very long-legged Soviet air defenses² probably rule out the application of a wide-body commercial design as the cruise missile carrier for the late 1980s and 1990s. The Air Force can be expected to push for the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B-1: 7/77-9/79. Confidential. Outside the System. Sent for information.

² Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with "It is clear" and ends with "long-legged Soviet air defenses."

inclusion of an effective penetrator. And it seems likely that tanker support aircraft (if needed) will have to be comparable to bombers/CMCs in base escape characteristics. (C)

As reported to you by Charlie Stebbins, the Air Staff is attempting a short study of all this intended to go to SecDef later this month. The rush results from CINCSAC pressing hard for the FB–111B that the Air Force is not keen about. (C)

This seems likely to be a major programmatic issue over the next year to which we must pay close attention for fiscal and political reasons. Even more important, like C³I, strategic aircraft are likely to be closely linked to doctrinal questions. Although we are not in a position simply to pronounce a strategic doctrine for the 1980s and 1990s (doctrine doesn't get made that way anyhow), we can and should assure that the future of strategic aircraft is discussed in terms of future doctrinal perspectives. For example, what are the new implications of your three questions on stable deterrence, crisis bargaining and warfighting? How should our growing concern about endurance and reconstitution shape strategic aircraft design? Do capabilities for limited options present special requirements? What SALT III, etc., environment should we plan for? (C)

The Air Force, SAC, and other strategic aircraft advocates have long sensed the value of new doctrine in promoting their interests. The “flexibility” of manned aircraft is always featured in the relevant brochures. But when they get down to cases, these people generally think of strategic aircraft as dump trucks to carry megatonnage into the USSR in a short, intense war having no aftermath of interest. Designers and force planners do not develop doctrine; they use it (or evade it) to rationalize “their thing.” (C)

We are in close touch with the Air Staff people currently working this problem, and with their OSD audiences. We can therefore track and influence the results. (C)

But we should take further steps:

—At an early BBV lunch you should raise the nexus of aircraft and doctrine.³

—We should follow the planned NSC meeting on C³I, “quick fixes”, and counterforces with a follow-on that addresses the content of “countervailing strategy” (Harold Brown’s felicitous name for the strategic doctrines you are pushing) and its implications for strategic aircraft.⁴

³ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this point and wrote: “and ask what?”

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to the portion of this point that begins with “addresses the content” and ends with “implications for strategic aircraft,” drew a line from this section to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote: “this is interesting. What would it involve?”

—We should then define the broad criteria that define future strategic aircraft posture. (C)

Unless General Ellis gains ground for his FB-111 B/C (some report that he is doing so), these ought not be big issues in the FY 81 budget. They should be quite significant for FY 82. (C)

157. Editorial Note

On September 7, 1979, President Jimmy Carter, joined by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, spoke to reporters in the Old Executive Office Building to announce details of his decision to develop a new, mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, the MX, as part of his administration's plan to strengthen the U.S. strategic Triad of sea-, air-, and land-based nuclear weapons. At 95 tons with 10 independently targetable warheads each, the MX was the largest ICBM system to date and was comparable to the Soviet SS-18 ICBM system (its largest in 1980). (*Public Papers: Carter*, 1979, Book II, pages 1599–1601)

In his remarks, Carter outlined the five criteria for the MX basing system: "First, it must contribute to the ability of the strategic forces to survive an attack. Second, it must be verifiable so as to set a standard which can serve as a precedent for the verifiability of mobile ICBM systems on both sides. Third, it must minimize the adverse impact on our own environment. Fourth, its deployment must be at a reasonable cost to the American taxpayer. And fifth, it must be consistent with existing SALT agreements and with our SALT III goal of negotiating for significant mutual reductions in strategic forces." Carter then announced the development of a system of 200 MX missiles, transportable among 23 shelters via specially constructed roadways in Western states of the United States at a projected cost of \$33 billion. Carter concluded by stating that MX was "not a bargaining chip," but rather a necessary addition to ensure national security Carter concluded: "As long as the threat of war persists, we will do what we must to deter that threat to our Nation's security. If SALT II is ratified and SALT III is successful, then the time may come when no President will have to make this kind of decision again, and the MX system will be the last weapon system of such enormous destructive power that we will ever have to build. I fervently pray for that time, but until it comes we will build what we must, even as we continue to work for mutual restraint in strategic armaments." (Ibid.)

158. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 10, 1979

SUBJECT

The Defense Budget

The two of us, together with Cy, Zbig and Lloyd Cutler, believe it important for you to resolve the Administration's position on the defense budget issue immediately, before the Second Budget Resolution reaches the floor.

Even before the Cuba situation,² many of those whose support is essential to Senate approval had joined the growing chorus calling on you to affirm your intention to propose and support real growth in defense spending. Recent events have now underscored that position. They have also emboldened SALT critics to believe that they can defeat SALT II ratification by claiming defense spending and the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba as demonstrations of an unacceptable lack of will and willingness on the part of the Administration in defense matters.

Sam Nunn has proposed as much as a 5% real annual increase,³ though his conversations with us suggest that he has some flexibility on the numbers, especially for 1980. Others have aligned themselves with 5% or even more. We believe that you can—and at least for now, should—hold the line at the amount to which your Administration and our NATO Allies have publicly committed in the past. Your civilian advisers feel comfortable in arguing that a real 3% growth will probably do what is needed, and we think that, depending on how this is interpreted in the out years, there is a good chance that the JCS can be

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 8–9/79. No classification marking. Jayne initialed the memorandum on McIntyre's behalf.

² On August 31, the Department of State issued a statement indicating that the United States had "recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit. This is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island." (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, p. 63) Vance discussed the troops in a press conference held September 5, as well as before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later that day; Carter addressed the issue in September 7 remarks before reporters in the White House Briefing Room. (Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops in Cuba Could Imperil Ties," *New York Times*, September 6, 1979, p. A1; *Public Papers: Carter*, 1979, Book II, pp. 1602–1603)

³ In July, Nunn suggested that his vote on SALT II was contingent on the Carter administration's willingness to undertake "'effective' military competition with the Soviet Union" through "increasing defense spending by 4 to 5 percent in constant dollars." (Charles Mohr, "Arms-Pact Debate: A New Script Has Both Sides Winning," *New York Times*, July 30, 1979, p. A3)

brought along. Moreover, since this would be in effect a reaffirmation of an existing Administration position, it should help us counter cries for equivalent increases in domestic programs.

For these reasons we recommend that you base your statement⁴ on such a reaffirmation and that you make clear that your determination applies to both present and future budgets (with, inevitably, less certainty—up or down—in future than at present). You need and should go no further than that now. The Secretary of Defense will amplify our defense program plans in a separate letter.⁵

One further point: All of us believe that the best form for your communication is a letter from you to the leadership of Congress, to precede the budget resolution debate. Certainly this, accompanied by a public statement, will give the greatest impact and may be helpful should circumstances later require you to point out in subsequent weeks and months that you have made a firm commitment—indeed one far firmer than any the Congress as a whole has made to date. Whether or not Congress accepts your proposals, it is important for SALT II that everyone understand your own position on the issue.

Because your schedule is so crowded, and because the Second Budget Resolution will reach the Senate floor no later than Wednesday,⁶ we believe you should send the attached letter to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House on Tuesday.⁷ But as soon as possible thereafter, which we understand to be Thursday, we urge that you meet with the appropriate Congressional leadership to get their views and reemphasize yours.⁸

⁴ For Carter's September 11 message to Congress on the FY 1980 and FY 1981 defense budgets, see *Public Papers: Carter*, 1979, Book II, pp. 1628–1630.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ September 12.

⁷ September 11. Attached but not printed is an unsigned and undated draft letter to be sent to Mondale (as President of the Senate) and to O'Neill.

⁸ Carter discussed SALT II and the defense budget with select Senators on Thursday, September 13, in the Cabinet Room at the White House from 7:47 a.m. until 8:40 a.m. He also met privately with Nunn in the Oval Office from 5:03 p.m. until 6:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of either meeting was found. According to a report in the *New York Times*, "Carter told the senators he would ask for a 3 percent increase in defense spending in fiscal 1981." (Charles Mohr, "Carter Expected to Refuse Senators on Arms Request," *New York Times*, September 15, 1979, p. 3)

159. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Telecommunications and C³I Policy Issues (U)

Last month, you requested my reaction to five proposed objectives which could serve as the basis for a national security telecommunications policy.² I endorse your concept and support the objectives you proposed. However, these objectives alone may not provide adequate guidance for governmental, legislative and industry actions to enhance telecommunications capabilities. Therefore, I have prepared the attached alternative statement of national security telecommunications policy which, I believe, might be more useful for this effort. The statement is unclassified, so as to allow broad discussion and dissemination. I believe a policy statement along these lines, endorsed by the President, could have a significant impact on the Congress, Executive Branch planning efforts, the Federal Communications Commission and the telecommunications industry as a whole.

I also agree that a meeting of the Special Coordination Committee to discuss a national security telecommunications policy and related C³I issues would be most desirable.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense³

Washington, undated

NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

It is essential to the national security of the United States to have a telecommunications capability to meet the needs of the Nation during and after any national emergency, including nuclear war. This capability

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 83, Communications: 7–12/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 149.

³ No classification marking.

is required in order to gather worldwide intelligence, conduct vital diplomatic functions, execute command and control of the military forces, provide for continuity of essential governmental functions, and reconstitute the political, economic and social structure of the Nation. It is National policy that the telecommunications resources of the country shall have inbeing attributes to ensure the flexibility, adequate residual capacity and restorability to fulfill these needs.

In support of national security policy and strategy, the Nation's telecommunications must provide:

- Connectivity between the National Command Authority and the Strategic forces to support a flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack.

- Support for the vital functions of worldwide intelligence gathering and diplomatic affairs.

- Responsive support for operational control of the armed forces, even during an extended nuclear war.

- Support of mobilization in all circumstances including nuclear war.

- Continuity of government and all essential government functions and services before, during, and after a nuclear war or natural disaster, to include those functions essential to life support, weapons construction, and the survival or reconstruction of the industrial complex.

- Recover of the political, economic, and social structure of the Nation during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster.

The following objectives are established:

- Telecommunications requirements for national security, continuity of government, and government functions vital to the national survival should have priority in the restoration of services and facilities in national emergencies.

- Interstate common carrier networks (including specialized common carriers and domestic satellite carriers) shall be interconnected and capable of interoperation in emergencies at selected, proximate, breakout points outside of likely target areas.

- Outside of likely target areas, the backbone facilities of interstate common carriers should be situated to avoid collateral damage from nuclear attack. The Government will make available the necessary information to allow such siting.

- The Government shall plan for emergency use of industry private line communications that have significant capabilities.

- All functionally similar government telecommunications networks shall be capable of interchange of traffic in emergencies.

—A national telecommunications control system is required to manage the restoration and reconstitution of the national telecommunications system following an emergency.

—All private line and public communications which carry information vital to the national security or which is otherwise important to the national interest shall be protected from exploitation by hostile powers.

—The Government will place substantial reliance upon the private sector for advice and assistance in achieving national security and preparedness goals.

—Common carrier communications should be used to the maximum extent feasible. Government owned and operated facilities will be used where necessary to ensure availability of vital communications under all conditions in support of functions vital to national security.

160. Letter From the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Macy) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 22, 1979

Dear Dr. Brzezinski:

In your memorandum of January 26, 1979, to the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, you requested that he undertake, at the direction of the President, a major review of the Continuity of Government Program.² This review has been conducted under the guidance of the ad hoc group established in your memorandum and in accordance with the Terms of Reference specified in Colonel Odom's memorandum of April 24, 1979, to the Ad Hoc Group.³ (C)

The initial draft of the review was completed on September 29, 1979,⁴ and copies were distributed to the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the members of the ad hoc group for comment. The draft review recommended that the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 16, COG: 7/79–3/80. Secret. Copies were sent to the Ad Hoc Group members, Vance, Harold Brown, Turner, McIntyre, Press, Beaman, Dinneen, and David Jones.

² See Document 112.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

President approve fundamental changes and improvements to the current program which would:

- Be tailored to the strategic environment of the 1980's and contribute to the deterrent and defense posture of the United States. (C)
- Assure, with a high degree of confidence, the survivability of the Presidency and the preservation of a capability to perform the President's roles as Chief of State, Commander in Chief, and Chief Executive during any national emergency. (S)
- Focus on the need for civil/military development of plans, telecommunications, and other support capabilities to respond to and deal with such emergencies and to recover from their effects. (C)
- Abandon the current concept of departmental and agency functions to be conducted from fixed, known locations in the National Arc during the transattack and immediate postattack phase, in favor of: (a) more extensive direct support to the Presidency during that phase and (b) greater delegations of responsibility to Federal regional and State organizations for carrying out essential survival and recovery phase functions. (C)
- Charge Federal departments and agencies to expand executive branch regional level capabilities to provide for dispersed executive branch survival and recovery, and to assist and coordinate State and local development of "all hazard" civil emergency preparedness plans. (S)

Comments received from the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency were, in general, very supportive of these recommendations and other findings of the review but urged further study and analysis of alternative measures to correct deficiencies. (C)

Assuming your concurrence with the basic redirection of the program outlined above, I propose to proceed, within my own authority and in consultation with Colonel Odom of your staff, with its implementation to include, as recommended by the Secretaries of State and Defense, studies of alternative means of carrying out certain aspects of the program. In this latter context, I welcomed your memorandum of August 10, 1979,⁵ to the Secretary of Defense and have joined with him in addressing the concerns expressed in that memorandum. (C)

Sincerely yours,

John W. Macy, Jr.

⁵ See Document 149.

161. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 7, 1979

SUBJECT

Telecommunications Policy

I am submitting for your signature a directive on telecommunications policy. It is greatly needed for two reasons:

First, you have sent a message to the Hill supporting deregulation of the telecommunications industry. If deregulation is written into law, the requirements for the Defense and other agencies in the National Communications System (NCS) to prescribe national security criteria to common carriers will increase significantly. They will also need the authority in new legislation to develop and ensure national security and emergency preparedness capabilities. The directive proposed by the NCS and Harold Brown provides a combination of long-term objectives and specific operating principles for dealing with common carriers to achieve the C³I capabilities we need.

Second, the National Communications System (the Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent), which integrates all national security communications systems, has relied almost exclusively on AT&T for voluntary hardening interoperability, and creating a sufficiently dense network to make it impossible for the Soviets to prevent "connectivity" for SIOP purposes. A recent SAC connectivity study and some Defense studies² have thrown doubt on the survivability of the AT&T system under stress today. By deregulating and forcing Defense to give more guidance to industry, we shall be taking Defense from under AT&T's protective wing and making its analysts determine more precisely what capability we have and what we may need to add or relinquish.

The absence of national objectives and guidance has allowed the C³I concerns to become fragmented and unfocused. The directive at Tab A³ will not cause major improvements at once, but it will place responsibility more precisely and provide directions which are necessary for improvements.

Harold Brown, as Executive Agent of the NCS (his memo is at Tab B),⁴ supports this directive. Its substance has been staffed through

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 50, Telecommunications: 11–12/79. Secret. Sent for action.

² Not further identified.

³ Not found attached. The directive is printed as Document 165.

⁴ Not found attached.

the NCS with Defense, State, Interior, Commerce, Energy, GSA, FAA, NASA, CIA, and FEMA. All agencies concurred.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the Presidential Directive at Tab A.

162. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 8, 1979, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

FY 81 Defense Budget

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President's Office
Capt Ralph Crosby

OSD
Secretary Harold Brown
W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
Deputy Secretary
Ambassador Robert Komer
Under Secretary of Policy
Mr. Russell Murray
Assistant Secretary, Program
Analysis and Evaluation
OMB
Mr. James McIntyre
Dr. John White
Deputy
Mr. Randy Jayne
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs

White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. David Aaron

JCS
General David Jones
Lt General John Pustay
Assistant to the Chairman

DCI
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Mr. John Koehler
Deputy to the DCI for Resource
Management

OSTP
Mr. Ben Huberman

ACDA
Mr. George Seignious
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
Deputy

NSC
Maj Gen Jasper Welch
Dr. Victor Utgoff

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 129 FY81 Defense Budget [1]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is *ibid*. Brzezinski forwarded the detailed minutes and the Summary of Conclusions to Carter under cover of a November 13 memorandum. Carter wrote on the first page of Brzezinski's covering memorandum: "Noted only, J." (*Ibid*.)

DETAILED MINUTES

Harold Brown presented a summary of how the defense budget increases in the proposed 5 Year Defense Program (relative to the FY 80 real spending level) are allocated among major mission areas. The \$116B cumulative increase over these five years that results from the “basic” budget real rate of increase of between 4 and 4½ percent, would provide \$34B additional dollars for Naval forces, \$30B for improvements to NATO, \$29B for strategic forces, \$16.3B for the rapid deployment force and \$6.2B for intelligence. (S)

In response to questions by *Dr. Brzezinski*, *Secretary Brown* noted that his assessments of the effects of these defense increases assume that our NATO Allies will match our defense spending rates of increase or decrease. He also noted that he has not attempted to accelerate the MX program in this proposed defense plan. (S)

Gen. Jones remarked that there are few new programs in this budget, outside the RDF, but that he was not looking for new starts, preferring to place emphasis on improvements in readiness. *Jim McIntyre* supported this emphasis and remarked on how infrequently programs are stopped once started. Several remarks were made to the effect that Congress tends to reduce defense budgets by making cuts in readiness funding rather than in acquisition, and that the effect of arbitrary cuts in defense spending can often only be accommodated with cuts in readiness related purchases. (U)

In response to questions by *Secretary Brown*, all agreed that the allocations of increased dollars among the various mission areas seems correct, particularly given the fact that some funding counted under naval forces and NATO yields capabilities that are applicable to the RDF. (C)

In discussing proposed improvements to the RDF, *Secretary Brown* pointed out that at the basic budget level he proposes to begin purchase of commercial ships that would be loaded with Marine equipment and forward deployed to increase the speed of response of the RDF. He also noted that in the basic level, the RDF would get 20 additional KC–10 cargo tanker aircraft and initial development of a large new intertheater transport aircraft (“CX”) would be begun. *Russ Murray* noted that enough of the new RDF ships would be available to support a brigade by 1983, with further additions coming shortly thereafter. He also noted that the RDF needs aircraft carriers and asked what we might do to free a few of them from their current commitments. (S)

David Aaron remarked on the importance of the various RDF programs that DOD proposed to buy at the enhanced level and even at the basic budget levels and said that these programs would be needed even if the budget were to come in at or somewhat below the basic level. He noted that programs such as reengining the KC–135 cargo tanker

aircraft could improve our RDF capability in the short term, whereas efforts such as development of the CX transport would have an effect only much later. *Gen. Jones* supported the notion that reengining the KC-135 would help our RDF capabilities. *Secretary Brown* said that Aaron's point concerning short term versus longer term improvements in the RDF is a legitimate concern, but also noted that the new intertheater transport he proposed to develop would increase our capability to carry outsized cargo. (C)

Reggie Bartholomew noted that the effectiveness of the RDF can be enhanced through arrangements with other governments for overflight and basing rights. He suggested a study of the objectives of the RDF in order to understand where we should be making diplomatic efforts to gain such rights. He noted that an understanding of our RDF objectives would be important as we entered into negotiations next year with Spain and Portugal over basing rights. (TS)

Harold Brown responded by saying that studies of such issues were already going on in DOD, and that the President would be receiving a memorandum today on some of the questions involved.² He agreed, however, that State should be involved in these studies. (U)

David Aaron noted the dangers that would be involved if we let the notion get out that defense programs trade off against base and overflight agreements. Finally, *Stan Turner* remarked that the RDF would probably be the most significant feature determining how the budget is perceived in other countries. He noted that the Allies will probably like the RDF, provided they don't see it as challenging NATO improvements—the Soviets clearly won't like it. (S)

Harold Brown opened the discussion on shipbuilding by noting that the central issue is numbers, and more specifically, should we reduce the number of AEGIS ships that provide air defense capabilities that the Navy says are its greatest need in favor of more frigates, which can be bought in greater numbers and may provide more presence? (S)

Reggie Bartholomew noted the fact that the decreasing size of the Navy will create pressures for reducing the numbers of ships that are committed to NATO. He also noted that many people in the world are impressed by fleet size—a measure of naval capability that even influences our own debates. (S)

David Aaron remarked that he was in favor of improving perceptions of our military strength, but that he was not willing to trade off real military capabilities to meet the most worrisome threat to the Navy, just to get ship numbers up. He noted that there are other ways

² See Document 163.

to increase the presence value of our Navy, such as increasing steaming hours and numbers of exercises. (S)

Secretary Brown noted that the effect of increased POMCUS in Europe is to reduce the demand for convoys, and thus to reduce the requirement for ASW capabilities. He also remarked that if more ASW capability were required, he thought additional buys of P-3 aircraft might be a better idea than additional frigates.

Stan Turner said that, provided we had enough AEGIS ships to escort our carriers, he was in favor of purchases of additional frigates. He remarked that the air defense problem will not be solved by AEGIS alone, but by a combination of measures—land based air defense, greater ship numbers to increase the number of targets that the Soviets would have to attack, etc. *Secretary Brown* noted *Stan Turner's* caveat that our carriers should be protected by AEGIS, and remarked that emphasizing numbers of ships at the expense of buying AEGIS ships, reflects a great underestimate of the Backfire threat. He noted *Admiral Train's* remark that whether a submarine or an aircraft shoots at you, the threat comes through the air and you need something to stop it. *Stan Turner* noted that many submarines are not armed with cruise missiles. (S)

Stan Turner went on to note that the building rates assumed for the 500 ship Navy *Harold* had presented were not realistic. In practice ship life times were considerably shorter than the 30 years *Harold* has assumed. *Gen. Jones* said that in terms of warfighting capabilities, 1 AEGIS ship was a much better idea than 3 frigates. He noted that we are fairly rich in frigates already, and that the Navy's proposed mix of ship types looked about right to him. (S)

Randy Jayne remarked that frigates provide some useful military capabilities. He also remarked on the complexity of the AEGIS air defense system, suggesting a slower initial rate of construction would be prudent. *Harold Brown* responded by saying that the AEGIS system had been very thoroughly tested, and that any implied comparison with the Tartar, Terrier, and Talos air defense systems was inappropriate. Finally, *Russ Murray* noted that the budget includes a proposal to begin the design of a newer, cheaper, smaller frigate, suggesting that this ship might be bought to get ship numbers up. (C)

Harold Brown opened discussion of the question of whether we should proceed with construction of a pilot binary chemical weapons plant in 1981 by noting that there are two issues: what are the political implications of such an action, and what are the military needs for an improved CW capability particularly as a deterrent to Soviet use of chemical weapons? (C)

David Aaron noted that proceeding with construction of a CW plant will create political problems in Europe. He noted the upcoming FRG elections, and said that while he was not questioning the need for this plant on its merits, we don't need to open up another political debate right now. He also noted the possibility that such a debate could create problems on the Hill, particularly given the possibility that the TNF and CW modernization issues might get aggregated. *Reggie Bartholomew* said that it was important to get past the long range theater forces modernization issue before opening up the CW question, and that it might be appropriate to consider the binary CW plant early next year, perhaps with a supplemental appropriation. (TS)

Harold Brown noted the importance of having a CW capability that would deter Soviet use of CW, and the enormous disadvantage that results if the Soviets can force us to try to fight in CW protective gear, while our lack of an offensive CW capability lets the Soviets fight without being similarly encumbered. He asked however, how we could answer the strong political questions that had been raised about the wisdom of going forward with the CW plant now? (S)

George Seignious remarked that the idea of building a new CW production plant had been around as long as he could remember and that he had never heard a really good case for it. He said that if the deterrent argument is a good one, we should build a good case for the plant that develops that argument. He also noted that we should have a better understanding of the potential effect of starting with a new plant on the CW negotiations. He suggested that we carry out a study of these two questions and go forward only after a strong case had been developed. All agreed. (S)

Secretary Brown opened discussion of the last question: Is development of a ballistic missile defense system for MX justified as a hedge against loss of the SALT fractionation limits? (S)

Randy Jayne remarked that the Army appeared to be planning a major \$1B deployment program for this purpose. *Reggie Bartholomew* noted that critics of the MX might take the program as an indication that the MX system "needed a crutch." (S)

Jasper Welch noted that the Congress has had this idea explained to it before, in the course of consultations on the MX. *Harold Brown* said that it had been presented as an alternative to building additional shelters. He also noted that if this system is ever really needed, it will only be one among many things that we will have to do to improve our strategic posture. (S)

Reggie Bartholomew said that the proposal might play in a reasonable way, but that was not certain, and in light of the risk, is it really

necessary to begin this year? *Harold Brown* responded yes, if we want an option for this system to be available as the MX comes on line. (S)

There was a short discussion of the consistency of this system with the ABM treaty. It was noted that development of components such as missile launchers and radars was permitted provided that they were not mobile. It was also noted that the Soviets are making an effort to develop small ABM components, that though fixed, had the potential of being made mobile.

George Seignious suggested that we should redirect our ABM research in this direction, but that we should not advertise it. We can clarify the potential value of such efforts, perhaps two years from now, if that became necessary. All appeared to agree with this proposal. (TS)

Harold Brown then asked all but *Jim McIntyre* to express their opinions on the appropriate level of the budget from a foreign policy point of view. All responses were in the range from “a strong increase in excess of 3% is needed” to a program “at the basic level or perhaps a bit more” (4.5–5% real increase). (S)

There were a few remarks on the importance of making the increase in straightforward and easily understood terms. *Jim McIntyre* responded that the calculations of the sizes of the increases we have made in the past have been straightforward. *Stan Turner* noted that some parts of the public have seen past claims about the sizes of our budget increases as less than straightforward. (C)

Finally, *David Aaron* remarked that increases stated in terms of total obligation authority may play better in the public perception. He also remarked that it was important that the defense program we settled on be politically sustainable for years to come—that it not be something designed to respond solely to the current debate which will collapse after SALT II is behind us. (C)

163. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, November 8, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S. and USSR Capabilities to Project Power

(S) A recent net assessment addressed US and Soviet abilities to project military power and examined related means such as friendship treaties, aid, advisors and proxies which have been used to achieve strategic objectives beyond national borders. The utility of this comparative study to me was primarily in three areas: defining the growth in Soviet intervention capabilities, showing that US capabilities need broad reexamination, and suggesting some specific approaches that might be fruitful.

(S) Early in this Administration we recognized a competitive Soviet strategy of jockeying for position while avoiding undue risks, especially of directly confronting the US. We identified several features of Soviet style including:

- Choosing areas where the US is inhibited from responding.
- Seeking invitations by a government or faction.
- Providing equipment rapidly to clients.
- Using proxies.
- Cementing relationships by continuing arms aid, building military facilities and concluding treaties of friendship.

(S) The net assessment highlighted another development which has been overshadowed so far by more obvious Soviet activities. We are seeing a big shift in Soviet thinking about, and capabilities to project, military power into areas distant from the USSR. For example,

- Training manuals have appeared containing material on previous Russian or Soviet use of military forces beyond Soviet borders.
- Capabilities have been developed that allow them to project and support forces at a distance—e.g., a new class of amphibious assault ships, several classes of cruisers, V/STOL carriers, large underway replenishment ships, etc.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 4, Middle East/Persian Gulf: 9/79–1/80. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. In a November 30 memorandum entitled "U.S. and USSR Capabilities to Project Power," Brzezinski wrote Brown: "Attached is a copy of your memorandum to the President of November 8 on the above subject, together with the President's comments and notations." (Ibid.)

² Carter drew a checkmark in the right margin next to this paragraph.

—Command, Control & Communications (C³) capabilities to manage distant operations have been improved by incorporating sophisticated long-haul systems in naval ships and by establishing C³ facilities in places such as South Yemen, Vietnam, and Angola.³

—An overseas base structure has been established although Soviet access to certain overseas facilities may be tenuous and even reversible.

These trends strongly indicate real trouble ahead for us, especially when they are coupled with the other features of Soviet strategy in the third world with which we have become familiar.

(S) In light of this I believe that, in addition to our programs for improving our rapid deployment forces, we must look to some broader approaches. These include designing a counter-strategy and ensuring continued management attention to this problem within DOD. Obviously, developing a strategy that effectively counters Soviet power projection cannot be done by DOD alone. Indeed, competing with the Soviets in a way that raises the costs that they perceive (in terms of risk, resources expended, and the effect on their image) will require a wide range of political, military and economic activities and policies. For example, the effectiveness of our MAP and IMET programs and our covert action capability (or absence thereof) will have a large effect on whether, or at least at which point in the conflict spectrum, DOD would have to be able to intervene in the future.

(S) Finally, examining US and Soviet capabilities to project power suggest two problem areas for US military forces that require correction.

—With respect to rapid deployment forces, being able to deploy a battalion on day 1 may be more important than being able to deploy a larger force on day 10. This may be crucial to preempting a coup or threat to our friends, or to deterring the Soviets from intervening by making the risks of escalation clear. Accordingly, I have directed the JCS to consider how to improve our ability to get small, effective forces into a crisis area early. In particular, I have asked the CJCS and CMC to consider whether the Marines should have a larger role in such planning.⁴

—A major factor that will influence our ability in the long term to react quickly as I have just described is specialized weaponry. We are looking at options for arming light, highly mobile US forces of the type that may be needed for rapid insertion into crisis areas. New designs would take a long time to reach inventory. In some cases, existing non-military (or non-US military) equipment may be best. After the

³ Carter underlined “Yemen, Vietnam, and Angola,” and wrote beneath this paragraph: “Afghanistan?”

⁴ Carter wrote “ok” in the right margin next to this paragraph.

technical possibilities have been defined, we can then judge whether practical programs for reequipping some of our forces can be devised.⁵

Harold Brown

⁵ Carter drew a checkmark in the right margin next to this paragraph.

164. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 15, 1979

SUBJECT

FY 81 Defense Budget Review

Attached is Harold Brown's memorandum to you on the OMB Defense budget book.² In addition, I wanted to give you my own views on the program that I believe is required to meet our strategic military and political requirements. I strongly believe that whatever "percentage" increase results should be derived from our programs and not vice versa.

The Program

A zero based budget is a major accomplishment of your Administration, but it is important to recognize that it is biased against innovation and new investment. This is because overhead, O&M and continuing activities are always protected in a minimum program.

This year, Harold is trying to protect crucial new nuclear programs such as LRTNF and, in particular, MX by placing them well within the minimum program. As a consequence, procurement for general purpose forces has been pushed to the margin where you must decide among a welter of programs and activities whose military importance may not be immediately self-evident.

OMB's answer is to push for less capable systems (e.g., FFG in place of AEGIS ships) and cut back procurement programs directly

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: FY 1981 Presidential Review, 11/79. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² Not found.

related to our allies' support for the NATO emphasis of our general purpose forces—war reserve stocks and items we would buy in the two-way street program.

To help you through this thicket, these are the programs I consider it essential to include and the reasons therefor:

(1) Basic nuclear modernization—MX, LRTNF, strategic cruise missiles, TRIDENT.

(2) Adequate naval power. In particular, we should go forward with two AEGIS ships to guard against the greatest threat to our navy—the Backfire bomber. To drop one AEGIS and substitute three additional FFG's (whose main mission is ASW where we are in good shape) makes no military sense, and carries the "perceptions" argument too far.

(3) Continued procurement of major military items—particularly fighters—close to the FY 80 projected level. You should be aware that apart from a few modest increases, Harold's "Basic" FY 81 program will generally slow the rate of procurement below what we asked for in the FY 80 budget.

(4) War reserve stocks. There must be an adequate program to reduce what is the major vulnerability and weakness in our NATO posture recently underscored by NIFTY NUGGET. Real capability to fight requires a better balance between our weapons systems and the ordnance and spare parts they consume.

(5) AV8B (U.K. HARRIER) and ROLAND (French air defense system). Substantial procurement is essential for survival of the NATO two-way street, one of your key contributions to a more rational allied defense effort.

(6) Rapid Deployment Force programs. In particular, we need to go forward with pre-positioned Marine Corps stocks on ships, more KC-10 tankers and begin R&D on new CX long-range, large-size cargo aircraft.

(7) Procurement of the EF-111 to cope with the extremely intensive Soviet air defenses in East Germany which protect their blitzkrieg capability.

The Alternatives

I have directed my staff to look hard at alternatives.

—We could cut back military construction, but most of it is directly related to needed force modernization.

—We could hold down readiness; however, this has been one of your highest priorities.

—We could postpone new starts in ships, guns and aircraft and reduce production rates in ongoing programs. But it is essential to acquire adequately capable systems. Whether in NATO, at sea or in

the Third World, we now confront either Soviet forces equipped with the most modern weapons or other nations so equipped by the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, Soviet clients are now receiving their most advanced equipment—T-72 tanks and MIG-25 aircraft. As our analysis of our options in the Persian Gulf make clear, without continued modernization we will have difficulty meeting these threats let alone the test of the central front in Europe. (For example, there are questions whether some of our most modern equipment, such as TOW, can even penetrate the armor of the T-72.)

The Budget Level

Both Harold and Jim have kept their personal positions close to their vests and rightly so. But it is our clear impression that the OMB staff is pushing for Band 1 which, in our judgment, would kill SALT outright; and DOD is pushing for Band 4 or 5 which is clearly excessive. The program I recommend involves an expenditure in the area of Band 3; that is, \$156.4 billion TOA, \$143.6 billion outlays (current dollars). This would provide total growth of 5.8 percent in TOA and 4.1 percent in outlays. This presumes Jim McIntyre is correct that he can squeeze \$3 billion out of a vigorous budget scrub.

In my judgment, any less will not make clear our determination to reverse recent military trends and over the next decade eliminate the most important deficiencies and imbalances. As Harold points out, this is where OMB's analysis is most deficient. It is these trends that have fueled the political pressure for a more vigorous program to modernize our military posture. If we go for less, I do not believe we will have the broad consensus to support both SALT and an adequate yet prudent defense program—a consensus that has eluded us since the war in Vietnam and which you have an opportunity to forge, not only for FY 81 but for the difficult decade ahead.

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter³

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

FY81 Presidential Review, Department of Defense

I am concerned that the OMB paper, subject as above, does not by itself provide an adequate basis for your consideration of the FY81 DoD budget and FY81–85 program. In particular, the first two sections (“Overview” and “Issue #1: Level of the Defense Budget”) represent a perception so different from my own, and bear upon matters of such fundamental importance to the security of the nation, that I believe you are entitled to these additional views as a matter of fairness to you in the decision-making process.

It is of course true that the level of the Defense budget always has been, and always will be, decided in the light of other demands that compete for our national resources. But, it is just as true that the choice—unlike much of the rest of the federal budget—must also reflect demands over which we have little control because they are imposed on us by the Soviet Union and its allies. In my opinion, the treatment in the OMB paper of this latter factor—the Soviet threat, the balance, and the trends in that balance—is inadequate and misleading.

The situation we face today is the result of 15 years or more of failing to match a steady, resolute, and comprehensive growth in the Soviet Defense program. During each of those years, when the budget was being formulated, similar arguments to those contained in this week’s OMB analysis could be and were made. They were made successfully, and the present situation is in part the result. While we were spending hundreds of billions of dollars in Vietnam at the expense of building our forces for the future, the Soviet Union was building the unprecedented force we face today. While we have stopped the decline in Defense spending and—much to your credit—have even turned it around to real growth, it is important to understand that the results of a 15 year trend cannot be repaired in one, or even five years. In my view, the OMB paper does not address that key point satisfactorily; the

³Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

problem did not start last year or the year before, nor will it be cured in the next five. We must broaden the horizon from such a narrow concentration on this budget year.

The situation in Europe, in my opinion, is far from satisfactory. The OMB paper, on the other hand, states that the military balance will show continued improvement even at the Minimum budget level. That is correct but—because it deals only with trends in the balance, rather than the balance itself—is seriously misleading. The *trend* in the balance—now badly adverse—will improve; the balance itself will remain adverse and by many measures will not improve. In the material we prepared for the PRC last week on the Defense budget⁴—which I take to be the source of the OMB's statement—there was only *one* indicator in which NATO showed a superiority in 1985, given the Minimum level program. That was in the maximum number of air-to-ground capable aircraft, where we showed a superiority of 1.3:1. However, under the same conditions, we would also be outnumbered in air-to-air capable aircraft by 2.3:1, raising a serious question as to the survivability of our superior number of air-to-ground aircraft, and the significance of that sole area of superiority in Europe.

In *all* the other measures we calculated, the Warsaw Pact would have an advantage over NATO: a slight advantage in total number of tactical aircraft, a 10% faster rate of tactical aircraft modernization, a 70% advantage on the ground on the Southern Flank, a 100% advantage on the Central Front, a 180% advantage on the Northern Flank, and a 3:1 or 4:1 advantage in sustainability. Those balances are what we will face in 1985, in spite of the “improvements” that the OMB has highlighted. In my opinion, they are seriously unfavorable.

I also caution you not to be misled by OMB's table showing that “our projections of Soviet forces' readiness against NATO has declined sharply as more and better intelligence has become available.” What you see there is not a marked reduction that has occurred in the readiness of Soviet forces, but a marked increase that did not occur. Actually, part of that is because *we* have changed our counting rules. The OMB comparison also fails to note that in 1970 we predicted that the effectiveness (i.e., measured in Armored Division Equivalents) of a Soviet division would increase by about 15%; now that 1979 is here, we find that it has increased by twice that much. But all of that is quite beside the point. No matter who predicted what how long ago, today NATO is at a disadvantage on the ground in Central Europe at M+10 by a factor

⁴See Document 162.

of 2.2:1, which in my opinion is cause, not for complacency, but for deep concern.

Another example that I consider seriously misleading—even if literally correct—is the statement that our projections show continued improvements in the ratio of ROK/US ground forces versus North Korea in the next decade even at the minimum level. At the minimum level, that balance will by 1985 still be 1.74:1 in favor of the North Koreans. In 1977 (when in PD-18 you directed a policy of no further degradation in that or other such balances), we had thought the ratio was 1:1, or slightly better. But now, at the current rate, the balance will still be 1.46:1 against us and the ROKs as late as 1990. The fact that the balance is improving should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is currently unsatisfactory and likely to remain so for some time to come.

And in one final geographical assessment, I consider the treatment of the Persian Gulf area totally inadequate. The PRC material, which the OMB has, points out that if we had to counter the Iraqis alone—quite apart from any Soviet or Cuban forces—today, we would be at more than a 2:1 disadvantage on the ground (measured in Armored Division Equivalents) for at least 3 weeks, even if we could devote our whole current mobility force to the deployment. If there were also to be a simultaneous NATO crisis (perhaps orchestrated by the Soviets), the 3 weeks would grow to 5. Our capability for intervention with more than a token force in that area of the world today, therefore, depends on 1) weeks of advance warning, 2) immediate action on that warning, and 3) *no* simultaneous crisis elsewhere—far from an impressive capability and, in my opinion, quite unsatisfactory. The OMB paper gives no inkling of that, but I think it must enter your deliberations.

Beyond the question of specific military balances, there is the far larger issue of US leadership. The OMB paper cites a decision by the FRG to limit its real growth in defense spending to 1½–2% (we feel that a higher figure is likely for 1980 before that year ends), points out that the Japanese have been reluctant to increase the allocation of their resources to defense, and notes that the US allocates more to defense on a per capita basis and as a percent of GNP than Japan, Germany, the UK, or France. Though perhaps not intended, one possible inference—the most likely one, I think—to be drawn from all that is that if our allies are devoting less to the common defense than we are, we should cut back.

We must press (and we will) for greater efforts on the part of our allies. But I urge you not to abandon our position as leader of the free world's military alliance. If we elect to cut the burden we bear to no more than that borne by any of our allies, we will have become a

follower rather than the leader. We will have said that our alliance is like a convoy in which the speed of all is set by the speed of the slowest member. We must continue to lead and continue to spend what is truly required if we are to maximize the incentive for our allies to hold up their end. If we fall back, there is, in my opinion, no chance that they will carry on without us.

We must not look at this issue as making sure that no slacker takes advantage of the United States. Rather, we must continue to recognize that the common defense is not only in our own interest—even if we should have to bear an extra measure of the load—but is actually a matter of the survival of our world. I urge that you not let recitations of our allies' performance distract you from the real issue. We *will* work on our allies, and have been far more successful during the past thirty months in pushing them to greater efforts than ever before. But we must maintain our leadership to be able to do so, or for there to remain any point in our even trying.

I mentioned that we held a PRC meeting last week on the Defense budget and program. With the exception of Jim McIntyre, whom I did not press because I recognize that doing his job requires him to take a different perspective, *every* participant at that meeting agreed that a growth in defense significantly higher than the earlier projected 3 percent per annum is needed. I think that view has also become a consensus of the country at large. It clearly is shared by some key members of the Congress and other persons of influence. Yet the position recommended by the OMB staff in this paper is wholly at odds with such a view. I recognize that the OMB has its own responsibilities to you, and that they must play the Devil's advocate. But the contrast between their position and the vast majority of other responsible voices, my own included, is very great. Moreover, I remain concerned that we will be correctly seen as justifying inadequate defense program growth by using questionable arithmetic.

I feel quite sure, were you to adopt anything like the OMB staff's recommended analysis, budget level or program, that all chance for the ratification of SALT II would vanish. The consequences, political, military, and international, would be many and damaging. As one of them, I have no doubt that in the aftermath our requirements for strategic forces would rise. We would then face the choice between paying for them by cutting back on our general purpose forces, or increasing the defense budget, or some combination thereof. Given the unsatisfactory nature of our general purpose force balances as outlined above, the former would, in my opinion, be unacceptably risky. The latter would face you with a far greater economic problem than the one before you now.

But the need for a larger defense program—considerably greater than suggested by the OMB staff—is not merely or even principally a question of the ratification of SALT II. The need in terms of our national security is, in my judgment, absolute—and absolutely critical—in and of itself. The ratification of SALT II will only prevent an even greater, and perhaps insurmountable problem.

Let me summarize by noting that the trends in the military balance between the free and the communist worlds have been deteriorating for well over a decade. Over the past five years or so, the analysis has developed a familiar ring: the balance is still all right, but the trend is unfavorable, and we'll be in trouble soon if we don't do something about it. I've said it often enough myself, and meant it. But then when we get down to deciding on a particular defense budget for a particular year—when we come to the hard choices and the actual bottom line—we have cut some things out on grounds that delaying for a year won't hurt, and others because their immediate worth is not analytically demonstrable, and we have cut funding in the hopes that offsetting efficiencies will somehow be found later. In that process of putting off the day of reckoning, the point when the balance will finally be no longer tolerable has been moving closer and closer.

That procedure has gone as far as—and possibly further than—is prudent. It must stop now. We cannot risk even one more year of temporizing. We must face the serious military imbalances that have grown so large, and resolve to remedy them starting now. The United States has come to a cross-roads, and the world is watching.

Harold Brown

165. Presidential Directive/NSC-53¹

Washington, November 15, 1979

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Office of Management & Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs & Policy
The Director, Office of Science & Technology Policy
The Administrator, General Services Administration
The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

SUBJECT

National Security Telecommunications Policy

I have reviewed the report of the National Communications System on the need for a national security telecommunications policy.² It is essential to the security of the United States to have telecommunications facilities adequate to satisfy the needs of the nation during and after any national emergency. This is required in order to gather intelligence, conduct diplomacy, command and control military forces, provide continuity of essential functions of government, and to reconstitute the political, economic, and social structure of the nation. Moreover, a survivable communications system is a necessary component of our deterrent posture for defense. In support of national security policy, the nation's telecommunications must provide for:

—Connectivity between the National Command Authority and strategic and other appropriate forces to support flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack.

—Responsive support for operational control of the armed forces, even during a protracted nuclear conflict.

—Support of military mobilization in all circumstances.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 1, PD/NSC 33-63 [1]. Unclassified.

² See footnote 2, Document 149.

—Support for the vital functions of worldwide intelligence collection and diplomatic affairs.

—Continuity of government during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster.

—Recovery of the nation during and after a nuclear war or natural disaster.

In order to achieve adequate capabilities for these objectives, the following principles are established as national security telecommunications policy:

—National security and continuity of government telecommunications requirements have priority in restoration of services and facilities in national emergencies.

—To the maximum extent feasible, interstate common carrier networks, including specialized common carriers and domestic satellite carriers, should be interconnected and capable of interoperation in emergencies at breakout points outside of likely target areas.

—The National Communications System will make available information necessary to allow interstate common carriers to locate backbone facilities, where possible, outside of likely target areas.

—Functionally similar government telecommunications networks shall be capable of interchange of traffic in emergencies.

—The Federal Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the National Communications System, shall plan for emergency use of industry private line communications that have significant capabilities (e.g., pipeline, railroad, and airline).

—There must be a capability to manage the restoration and reconstitution of the national telecommunications system following an emergency.

—The National Communications System will consult with the Federal Communications Commission on implementing these principles and will place substantial reliance upon the private sector for advice and assistance in achieving national security and preparedness goals.

The National Communications System will amend and revise these principles as security needs dictate and submit them to the Special Coordination Committee for approval, as required by E.O. 12046.

Nothing in this directive amends or contravenes Presidential Directive/NSC-24.³

Jimmy Carter

³ See Document 40.

166. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 16, 1979

SUBJECT

Brezhnev Message on the NORAD Alert

I am attaching TASS comments on the missile threat assessment call.² (U)

I believe you will recognize the line as straight from Brezhnev's message to the President.³ As I suspected from the tone, it was not a serious communication but an opening shot in a propaganda campaign designed to take advantage of the President and what the Soviets believe they know of his attitude toward nuclear weapons. That is why my proposed reply to Brezhnev was sharp. I still believe it would be wise to send that version. Otherwise we are going to be in second place throughout this exchange, and we may see the Soviets succeed in working up public support in the U.S. and Europe for a major investigation. Soviet operatives in the U.S. and Europe will undoubtedly try to get the "no nukes" groups into the streets on this issue. (S)

Marshall Shulman did not like the idea of a reply at all. He would not give me a comment on the Gates' version.⁴ There is no reason, he argued, to overload the circuits with another protest now.⁵ (S)

Defense, Komer and his staff, thought the Gates' version was much too soft. They were trying to toughen it. (S)

I provide this background so that you may, if you wish, get Brown to support you on a response that will preempt this Soviet campaign which could possibly affect adversely the LRTNF decisions next month. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 15, Crisis Management: 11/78-5/80. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: "ZB has seen."

² Attached but not printed is an FBIS report entitled "TASS Comments on Recent Malfunaction at NORAD Headquarters," dated November 15.

³ On November 14, Dobrynin called on Vance to deliver a message from Brezhnev to Carter: "Reports have been received that recently, due to some erroneous actions, the US technical systems gave a signal of a nuclear missile attack on the United States which resulted in putting appropriate means on alert," and that "according to reports the incident was reported neither to you nor to the Secretary of Defense, nor to any responsible officials." For the full message, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 233.

⁴ Not Found.

⁵ Brzezinski wrote in the margin: "he is right!!"

167. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, November 20, 1979

SUBJECT

NORAD False Alarm (C)

(TS) On 9 November 1979, a spurious missile attack warning was inadvertently introduced into the computer system at the NORAD Combat Operations Center (NCOC) in Cheyenne Mountain. As happened in this case, the system design properly and automatically transmits such warnings to appropriate national and regional command centers in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Understandable concern over this event by those unfamiliar with the technical and procedural safeguards in our strategic warning system has raised questions both here and abroad concerning the potential for precipitous action in a real or simulated crisis. The following report summarizes the genesis of the false alarm, the actions taken as a result, and my conclusions regarding the reliability of the warning system.

(TS) The immediate cause of the incident was the inadvertent introduction of a test attack scenario into the automated NCOC missile warning system display. To the NCOC operations staff, the attack indications were not immediately identifiable as spurious when the display appeared, and they properly initiated alerting and verification procedures appropriate to indications of a mass missile raid. Concurrently, a Threat Assessment Conference (TAC) was called by the Deputy Director for Operations in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to evaluate the threat. The TAC is an emergency conference one level below the Missile Attack Conference; the latter includes the National Command Authorities. As a result of this conference and the many quickly identifiable anomalies, the threat was clearly, correctly, and conclusively evaluated as spurious in less than six minutes of the first alarm. Because of this evaluation and the earlier recognition of the many anomalies before the official assessment of the threat as spurious, a Missile Attack Conference was deemed unnecessary.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Top Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "Harold, This was a *serious* mistake and should have been reported to me *immediately*. J." Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under cover of a November 21 memorandum, which Carter initialed. (Ibid.) Odom sent both Brown's memorandum to Carter and the covering memorandum to Brzezinski for his signature under cover of a November 21 memorandum. Aaron wrote on Odom's memorandum to Brzezinski: "ZB, This is an unbelievable fuzzy-ball. It is not possible to figure out what happened. I think Harold should be told to give us an explicit statement of what happened." (Ibid.)

(TS) Within less than sixty seconds of initial alert, system redundancy and direct paths of critical warning information from sensors to users had enabled responsible officials at SAC Headquarters and the NMCC to detect anomalies in warning indications which could not have been present had an actual mass attack been underway. Inconsistencies also began to emerge at NORAD Headquarters in about one minute. For example, Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and transmission systems were operating normally but were producing no displays to corroborate the missile launches depicted on the NORAD warning display. Similarly, our radar sensors were operating normally, but detected no SLBM activity even though the NORAD display depicted over 200 SLBMs en route. Assessment of these and other anomalies raised serious questions regarding the validity of the NORAD-generated display and avoided any precipitous reaction involving nuclear forces. (No nuclear armed aircraft were activated and no increased alert measures were ordered for any US nuclear forces.)

(TS) However, this incident deserves close attention, causes me real concern, and requires corrective actions.² There are two issues. The first involves the technical and procedural causes of the false alarm, the scrambling of the air defense aircraft, and the launch of NEACP. As to the cause, the possibility of recurrence of such an incident has been eliminated by prohibiting connection of the test computer to the main system in the future without advance coordination and warning to all concerned. Action is also underway to review, clarify, and refine procedures governing launch of air defense and command and control aircraft. In short, mistakes were made and imperfections brought to light which have been and are being corrected.

(TS) But there is a higher order of concern. It involves the broader issue of the reliability, responsiveness, and human control over both our strategic warning system and our nuclear forces. In these terms, the events of 9 November appear to me to provide, overall, considerable reassurance on all counts. Despite a freak incident which severely stressed our warning and assessment procedures, the systems worked as designed, the redundancy of warning paths provided the basis for correct decisions and eliminated the risk of precipitous action. Most important, the people involved at every level acted responsibly and with good judgment, based on the information available to them. Under the demanding situation of conflicting information, a narrow decision-time window, and the natural stress accompanying such circumstances, I believe that the following were amply and creditably demonstrated: a high degree of responsiveness; safeguards against precipitate action;

² Carter drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this paragraph.

and a system design that places human judgment in a position to override computer mistakes.

(TS) My overall assessment of the lessons learned is that the mechanical, procedural, and human elements of our strategic warning and control system are fundamentally sound and should be supported as such in response to questions or assertions to the contrary. The key point is that the system corrects errors before they cascade in a dangerous way. However, I do not want to minimize the fact that we had several errors in the system and we still have considerable work to do to improve strategic command and control and connectivity across the board. For example, there are still some bugs to be worked out in NORAD's Command and Control Computer System (427M). These and other problems will receive our priority attention in the days ahead.

(U) In case this incident raises further questions in the Congress, the media, or among allies, I believe that the following points should be stressed:

1. At no time were the strategic nuclear forces activated—the incident was completely contained within the command and control community;

2. The malfunction was very quickly identified and acted upon;

3. The overall way in which the system worked after the initial malfunction is reassuring with respect to the redundancy of indicators, responsible human judgment and adequacy of safeguards in a very short decision time frame.³

Harold Brown

³ Brzezinski returned the memorandum to Brown under cover of a November 23 memorandum that reads: "Attached is a copy of your memorandum to the President of November 20 concerning the NORAD false alarm. Please note the President's comment on the first page." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80)

168. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Jasper Welch of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 23, 1979

SUBJECT

US and Soviet Defense Expenditures—Growth Rates and Cumulative Results

We have continued to examine the consequences of various US and Soviet total defense growth rates in terms of cumulative defense expenditures for the two sides in the decade 1980–1990. The following are some salient points, all referenced to constant dollars.

Background Data

—Currently, the USSR is spending about 50% more on defense than the US, according to CIA dollar costing.

—During the decade 1968–78, the Soviets spent cumulatively about 10% more than we on defense; or about 30% more than we if US Southeast Asia expenditures are extracted as “wasted.”

—On the basis of physical indicators, the CIA projects that the Soviet defense effort will continue to grow at past rates of about 3% *per annum*, at least until the mid-1980s. A steady Soviet defense growth rate of 3% throughout the decade 1980–1990 is reasonable.

Implications

—If Soviet defense grows at 3% through the 1980s, a US defense growth rate of 3% will perpetuate the present 50% advantage of the Soviet side in annual effort. At these growth rates, the Soviets will spend cumulatively over the decade 50% more than the US, as compared to the past decade in which they spent 10–30% more than the US.

—If the Soviet effort grows at 3% *per annum*, a US growth rate of about 5.5% would be required to “duplicate” the experience of the last decade, i.e., a 30% Soviet advantage in cumulative outlays, not counting US Southeast Asia expenditures. Of course, the absolute magnitude of this disparity will be larger at the higher spending levels of the 1980s. A US growth rate of 6% would narrow the cumulative gap to a 25% Soviet advantage.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: FY 1981 Presidential Review, 11/79. Confidential; Outside the System. Sent for information.

—To *equal* the cumulative expenditures the Soviets would achieve at a steady 3% growth rate through the 1980s, the US total defense effort would have to grow at 9.5–10.0% per year. Even if total Soviet spending remained constant (zero growth rate) for a decade, it would still require an average annual US growth rate of 6.5% to match the cumulative Soviet effort because of the gross disparity of the two sides at the starting point (1.5:1).

Conclusions

—The outlook for the return on various defense growth rates to the two sides in terms of cumulative expenditures is dominated by their vastly different starting positions.

—Even if a 25–30% disparity in total effort is deemed tolerable during the 1980s (because of Allied contributions, technological advantages, etc.), US growth rates of 5–6% *per annum* appear to be rock-bottom for a competitive US effort when there is no evidence that the growth of the Soviet effort must taper off.

—A US commitment to growth rates of no more than 3–4% either means that a roughly 50% Soviet advantage in cumulative effort is tolerable (because of vastly increased NATO contributions) or it means we are convinced that Soviet defense spending must decline significantly in the next decade.

The purpose of this memo is to assure that you have a good summary of the relationship between defense growth rates and cumulative results. While a very significant perspective on the defense growth rates we must aim for, it is not to be seen in isolation from other factors, e.g., Allied efforts, China, technology, and non-military counters to Soviet military power.

169. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 6, 1979

SUBJECT

Readiness, Mobilization and NIFTY NUGGET

At our meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the FY 1981 budget,² we discussed readiness, mobilization and Exercise NIFTY NUGGET. I am not sure that we were precise enough in distinguishing between the readiness of our forces and our ability to mobilize. This memorandum summarizes what we learned about the nation's mobilization capability in NIFTY NUGGET. That exercise did not improve our insights into readiness of our units, nor was it designed to do so.

Readiness is a term the Department of Defense uses to describe a military unit's ability to carry out its mission in military operations. The readiness of each military unit is estimated by comparing the number of people assigned to a unit, the extent of their training, and the amount of their equipment with the people, training and equipment required for that unit in wartime. The term readiness is sometimes used more broadly to include as well our ability to deploy units and to sustain them once in combat. In this latter usage readiness overlaps somewhat with mobilization but, in general, the mobilization process complements readiness.

In mobilization we would make it possible for active and reserve units to be deployed rapidly to an area of conflict, and to be sustained with trained replacements, ammunition, equipment and other supplies. During mobilization, the private sector must augment Defense resources. Commercial airlines, the shipping and trucking industries, and current Defense suppliers would be the first to be called upon. If the emergency continues, the entire nation would become involved in the mobilization effort.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 113, Mobilization Scenarios, 8/79-4/80. No classification marking. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "cc Harold—(a) I should have been more thoroughly informed earlier (b) when would it be feasible to have another similar exercise? J." Brzezinski returned the memorandum to Brown under cover of a December 10 memorandum in which he noted: "The President notes that he should have been more thoroughly informed earlier and asks when it would be feasible to have another similar exercise." (Ibid.)

² Carter met with Brown, Brzezinski, Claytor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Camp David the morning of November 24. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion was found.

The mobilization process cannot be fully tested because it involves the private sector. In Exercise NIFTY NUGGET, conducted in October 1978, we made the first attempt since World War II to test, in a combined mobilization exercise, military and civilian agency plans and procedures. Although many mobilization activities went well, there were serious shortcomings.

Recognizing the need to correct the shortcomings identified in NIFTY NUGGET, we established a DoD Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group chaired by my Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The charge to this Steering Group is to provide high-level direction and coordination throughout Defense as well as foster military-civilian cooperation.

The areas of general weakness discovered in NIFTY NUGGET and follow-up activities are:

—*Mobilization Planning*

—Our planning relied on an assembly of old, unconnected, and inconsistent emergency orders, policies, regulations and procedures. For example, you have statutory authority to recall Regular Army and Air Force retirees, while all other retirees cannot be recalled until after a declaration of national emergency. In addition, the existing plans were too general for decentralized execution to proceed without major blockages.

—We are now preparing a Defense Mobilization Plan that assigns responsibilities, identifies tasks and provides guidance for my staff, the Military Departments, and Defense Agencies. That planning activity will help coordinate and decentralize the mobilization process.

—*Deployment Planning*

—The exercise identified shortcomings in our planning to transport military units and equipment overseas. For example, we found that many Army units required more cargo airlift than plans had allocated to them. We also found that airlift was underutilized because we did not have a good mechanism for adjusting schedules.

—To improve deployment planning we created within existing manpower a Joint Deployment Agency that reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency is revising deployment planning so that it is more flexible. It is also more accurately calculating air and sealift requirements for unit movement.

—*Interagency Coordination*

—NIFTY NUGGET showed that we need better coordination between Defense and other Federal agencies. One example was the difficulty experienced in the reception and relocation of the large number of noncombatants assumed to be evacuated from the war zone. Both Defense and the civil agencies had made incorrect planning

assumptions about the others' responsibilities and capabilities. As a result evacuees would not have received adequate care nor would they have been screened by customs or immigration officials.

—In May, you directed a comprehensive review of mobilization planning. An interagency group under the National Security Council was formed. This group has representatives from seventeen Federal Departments and Agencies. The efforts of the interagency group are beginning to pay off in the identification and resolution of mobilization jurisdictional issues. This group will develop mobilization planning guidance for all agencies and the means for periodic assessment of capabilities. In addition, the formation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in mid-1979 has already had a positive effect on mobilization planning and coordination at the interagency level.

—*Resources*

—We also learned that our operation plans need to be adjusted to take into account current resource limitations. For example, our plans were developed on the basis that we would have ample stocks of ammunition and equipment in Europe and that trained manpower would be available to fill all units to wartime strength and replace casualties. Moreover, as NIFTY NUGGET unfolded, the demand for transport aircraft in the several theaters far exceeded those available. Some of these resource limitations will be cured in the next several years, but operation plans should be based on current resource levels and changed when resource levels are improved.

—We have already informed our Unified Commanders that fewer cargo aircraft are likely to be available. We are developing revised guidance for military operations planning that would specify resource limitations for major contingencies.

NIFTY NUGGET heightened concerns about critical resource shortfalls. These deficiencies come to my attention and yours during our annual program and budget reviews. During the NIFTY NUGGET exercise these same shortfalls were portrayed for our senior military and civilian Defense officials for the first time in a simulated crisis. Because our Five Year Defense Program is designed to provide the means to respond to a crisis not unlike that simulated in NIFTY NUGGET, the exercise has strengthened our desire to achieve the improvements contained in that five year program.

In sum, readiness and mobilization are separate but complementary elements of military preparedness. We are taking actions necessary to maintain the readiness levels of our active forces, to improve readiness in our reserve forces, and to continue improving and testing our mobilization plans and procedures.

Harold Brown

170. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Taking Stock of the Defense Program

As we approach the final quarter of the Administration's first term, I would like to take stock of the major developments in the Department of Defense during the past three years. Though we face severe challenges in the form of military capabilities of potential adversaries, there have been tremendous accomplishments, of which we, our military leadership, and the Nation can be proud. I have summarized some of the most significant of these below.

I

Four general developments, which will be remembered long after the individual decisions are forgotten, stand out from a review of this period in the Department's history.

First, and by far the most important, we have without question entered a new era in the establishment of a strong national defense. This is not an expression of judgment; it is a finding of fact. The defense programs of this Administration have reversed the adverse trends and the neglect characteristic of the prior decade. We have made U.S. strategic and conventional forces more modern, more ready, and more capable.

Second, forceful U.S. leadership has been instrumental in revitalizing NATO's defense efforts. Not only have we invested heavily in upgrading our own NATO contribution, but we have brought our Allies along in making similar efforts.

The third overriding theme that emerges from a review of the past three years is that this Administration has been scrupulous in recognizing cost as an important consideration in all defense decisions, large and small. We are not buying inferior products, but we are insisting that precious tax resources only be spent for cost-effective programs.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 12/79. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under cover of a December 18 memorandum in which he wrote: "The memorandum is unclassified and provides a very useful recapitulation of an impressive record, which you initiated with your PD-18 of August 1977, and which we have strongly backed from here." (Ibid.)

Fourth, the last three years have been characterized by a willingness on the part of your Administration to take on the responsibility of actually managing the Department of Defense—a willingness to suggest innovative solutions to old problems and to make tough decisions about defense priorities. The result has been not only stronger defense programs, but also a renewed sense of purpose and confidence within the Department.

II

A Program for Strategic Security

When this Administration took office, our Nation's ability to maintain the unambiguous strength of its strategic deterrent was being eroded by two alarming trends: the first was the massive buildup of Soviet strategic forces over the past fifteen years, and the second was the progressive obsolescence of our own strategic forces, most of which had been deployed in the 1960s.

Ratification of the SALT II Treaty will represent a major step forward in restraining the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces. Because SALT II reduces superpower competition in its most dangerous manifestation, this Treaty is the single most important bilateral accord of the decade.

To guarantee our strategic deterrent further, this Administration is implementing a comprehensive program to modernize all three legs of our strategic triad. Three years ago, we took a hard look at our major strategic programs, and found serious problems: the B-1 bomber was vulnerable to the new Soviet air defense systems already under test; the TRIDENT submarine program was bogged down in schedule and contract litigation problems; and the proposed design for basing the M-X missile system in closed trenches was found to be too vulnerable to single nuclear explosions. We have taken decisive action to correct these problems.

Our first major action was to substitute the air-launched cruise missile for the B-1. Not only is the cruise missile less expensive, but because of its small size and large numbers, it renders the Soviets' new air defense system obsolete even before that system is deployed. We put the cruise missile under accelerated development, are now well into the competitive flight test program, and will begin serial production in 1980.

Our second major action was to institute management control of the TRIDENT program. We settled the contract dispute, and the program is now back on track. The first submarine was launched this year, and six more are under construction. The TRIDENT I missile is on schedule and is now being backfitted on POSEIDON submarines.

Our third major action was the design of a basing mode for the M-X that would survive a surprise attack by Soviet ICBMs, be adequately verifiable under SALT II, and have a minimal impact on the environment. After intensive study of alternatives, a mobile M-X based in a complex of horizontal shelters was selected. The M-X missile is designed to have military capability equal to that of the Soviets' SS-18, even though it is half the size. Full scale development of the missile and basing system began this year.

In the aggregate, these programs will double the spending on strategic systems compared to the early '70s, but will still be far less than we spent in the early '60s. In fact, improved technology will allow us to build the new missiles at less cost (in constant dollars) than the systems they are replacing.

These strategic programs have also contributed to the development of two new weapons to strengthen our theater nuclear forces. The ground-launched cruise missile is a derivative of one of the competing air-launched cruise missile designs. It will be deployed one year later than the ALCM. The PERSHING II missile uses the same solid fuel technology developed for the TRIDENT I missile, which allows each of them to have greater range than their predecessors. The PERSHING uses advanced technology terminal guidance systems, which improves accuracy ten-fold over previous systems.

Our new systems will enable U.S. strategic forces to maintain their equivalence in the face of the mounting Soviet challenge. Even more important, all of these systems have been designed to have high inherent survivability, thus discouraging any hopes the Soviets might have for a successful disarming surprise attack. In addition, the high survivability of these new systems will make it possible for us to reduce significantly the total number of nuclear weapons in our force, while preserving national security interests, if the Soviet Union can be persuaded to make similar reductions in SALT III.

III

Leading the NATO Alliance

From its very outset, this Administration launched several major initiatives to strengthen NATO's deterrent and defense capabilities, which had languished during and after the Vietnam conflict. At the May 1977 NATO Summit in London, you called for a stepped-up long term effort, implementation of selected short term readiness measures, and greater armaments collaboration.

Within a year, NATO heads of government personally endorsed at a May 1978 Washington Summit a bold Long Term Defense Program backed up by pledges of 3% real annual growth in defense spending.

This far-reaching step reflected common Allied recognition that only through greater cooperation and mutual burdensharing could NATO meet the security challenges of the 1980s.

Our efforts are also breathing new life into collaborative design and production of new weapons such as the F-16, ROLAND, 120 mm tank gun, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System. The December 1978 agreement on joint funding and operation of a \$2 billion NATO airborne early warning fleet is especially noteworthy. The U.S. has also proposed an innovative concept of jointly developing "families" of new systems, where Europe would take the lead in some and North America in others.

Under U.S. leadership, the Alliance is spurring the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear forces, through a proposed force of longer range theater ballistic and cruise missiles. Adoption of this program by NATO will close an emerging and serious gap in the Alliance's spectrum of deterrence.

In addition, the U.S. is greatly accelerating its ability to reinforce Western Europe with massive ground and air forces in a crisis. We are prepositioning additional U.S. equipment, but counting on our European allies to provide adequate facilities and host nation logistic support, as well as the bulk of the ground and air forces that would engage in a conflict in Europe. This "transatlantic bargain" will markedly enhance NATO's military posture.

IV

Confidence in Our Conventional Forces

Your Administration has taken vigorous measures to modernize our conventional forces, which experienced a severe decline in capabilities during the prior decade. We have laid particular stress upon achieving a higher state of readiness, largely through overcoming maintenance backlogs and increasing initial supply stocks.

Rapid Deployment Forces. We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our treaty commitments, or in response to requests from friends and allies. These rapid deployment forces can range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. We are giving priority at present to the Middle East and Persian Gulf contingencies, but our forces stand ready for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance, like the Caribbean.

We are taking two specific initiatives to help us respond in a crisis outside of Europe. The first is the development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft with intercontinental range; the second

is the design and procurement of a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades. These aircraft and ships will permit us to move combat forces over vast distances quickly enough to deter conflict or, failing that, to turn the tide of battle in our favor.

Ground Forces. We have substantially increased our ability to reinforce NATO. Primarily by prepositioning equipment, we will be able by 1984 to double our ground forces in Europe, and triple our air forces, in less than two weeks. Our ground forces now include more tank and infantry battalions, and more artillery tubes—an augmentation that will continue through the next several years.

We have enhanced readiness and combat endurance by improving the Reserve Components. Some reserve personnel are now equipped with new equipment and all reservists are assigned to units structured to complement and provide needed depth to our active forces.

The opening of a new National Training Center by the Army, and the introduction of new equipment—XM-1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and better artillery and air defense weapons—have, together with the contributions of our allies, strengthened our ability to meet any threat.

Naval Forces. We are emphasizing U.S. naval forces that are able to maintain the sea lanes to Europe, protect other essential sea lines of communications, project force ashore, and support allied forces on the flanks of Europe, in the Western Pacific, and elsewhere—in the face of Soviet challenge. To accomplish these missions we have procured modern, guided-missile equipped surface ships, such as the DDG-47 class; we have begun deployment of ship-, air- and submarine-launched HARPOON cruise missiles; and we have continued improvement of our anti-submarine warfare capability with actions such as procurement of new towed array sonar ships and development of a new class of attack submarines. Equally important to our strength at sea have been our success in reducing the chronic backlog of ship overhauls, and our resolution of \$2.7 billion in long-standing shipbuilding claim disputes, some dating as far back as the 1960s.

Air Forces. Our program for the FY 80–84 period will field an active Air Force of 26 fighter and attack wings and will modernize—and in some cases enlarge—the active and reserve components of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical aviation. This constitutes the first full-scale modernization of U.S. tactical air forces since the 1960s.

Over the next few years we will procure about 1700 fighter, attack, electronic warfare, surveillance and support aircraft. This will include the first KC-10s, which will be delivered in 1981, and allow very long range deployments of tactical air forces.

We have maximized the cost/effectiveness of our aircraft procurement programs by using a mix of high and low cost aircraft—each possessing good mission performance characteristics. Procurement of lower cost alternatives such as the A-10 and F-16 allows our force modernization to proceed, while purchase of F-15s, F-14s, dual purpose F/A-18s, and E-3As improves our capability to maintain air superiority.

V

Managing the Department and its Resources

Departmental Reorganization and Resource Management. Upon assuming office, I concluded there were significant obstructions to efficient management of the Department: headquarters were too large, lines of authority were confused, and there was a clear need to integrate better some activities. To correct these problems, we initiated a number of structural changes, which have:

- Eliminated, since January 1977, five Assistant Secretary and approximately 31,000 other civilian positions, reduced the size of Departmental headquarters staffs by approximately 20%, and closed or substantially reduced operations at a number of installations. Estimated annual savings from these actions alone are over \$375 million.

- Strengthened policy and planning functions (through, for example, the creation of an Under Secretary for Policy) to insure that individual, detailed decisions on force structure and weapons will support our overall national security objectives.

- Consolidated support-related activities (under a single Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) to provide integrated direction of DoD manpower and material resources.

- Strengthened the programming and budgeting process (through, among other innovations, the establishment of the Defense Resources Board) to provide a more integrated approach to resource allocation decisions and to streamline the budget decision process.

Weapons Acquisition Management. Procedures have been revised to insure consideration of logistic and manpower planning requirements at the same time that performance objectives are addressed. As a result, some high-rate production decisions have been deferred until support questions have been resolved—resulting in substantial cost savings. We have also required a more precise understanding of manpower and skill-level requirements related to the introduction of new systems—resulting in additional economies. This increased attention to support problems *before* a system is fully operational is helping avoid readiness and manning problems like those experienced during the 1960s.

In related actions, to assure the highest return for each dollar spent, we are also pursuing such actions as: increased contracting out, wage board pay reform, improved depot-level maintenance efficiency, realignment of the material distribution system, and increased procurement of commercial products (where these are less expensive than, and as suitable as, those built to military specification).

Combatting Fraud and Waste. The Department's steering group on combatting fraud, waste, and mismanagement has programs under active review to avoid computer fraud, provide audit and inspection safeguards, and investigate allegations of fraud. Project teams are addressing other areas that need improvement, such as property accountability, and auditor and investigator training.

Energy Conservation. The Department of Defense has aggressively pursued energy conservation through a restructured energy management program. Since the base year of 1975, energy use has been reduced almost nine percent; in FY 78 alone, DoD's energy consumption was 2.2 percent less than the year before. To maintain combat readiness, we are making greater use of simulators and increasing the fuel efficiency of our weapons systems. To provide for future needs, we are arranging to procure more than 500,000 barrels of shale oil for testing in military equipment, and carefully examining in cooperation with DoE the use and supply of synthetic fuels.

Personnel Resources. A major accomplishment of the Department of Defense since 1977 has been the increased use of women in the uniformed services, both in terms of numbers of women serving and in the expanded occupational fields and career opportunities open to women. In FY 76 women constituted 5% of total military strength. Women today are 7% of our uniformed workforce and, as a direct result of our policy initiatives, will be 11% of our military population in FY 83. Parallel successes have been achieved in the civilian workforce.

As one example of our commitment to assuring equal opportunity, we have revitalized the Department's equal opportunity management training program for race relations instructors. We are now providing the kind of equal opportunity specialists that our civilian managers and military commanders need to pursue dynamic, successful programs.

VI

Planning for the Future

It is clear that 1980 will be a watershed year for U.S. national security programs. Stimulated by the national debate on SALT II and by events abroad, Americans are recognizing that we must pay greater attention to our military capabilities if we are to play a constructive and stabilizing role in the international arena. The FY 1981 defense budget and the five year program for FY 81–85 have been carefully developed

to accomplish this. Generally, the program has been designed to assure four major objectives:

—That our strategic nuclear forces will be essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union.

—That the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to deter the outbreak of war—conventional or nuclear—in Europe.

—That our ability to come quickly to the aid of friends and allies around the globe will be clear.

—That our Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the seas.

Since taking office, this Administration has deliberately and steadily achieved increases in defense resources. But three years is not sufficient time to arrest and reverse the cumulative result of fifteen years of intense Soviet investment in military capability, during a period that American investment declined. The budget and five year defense program we will submit to the Congress next January will provide for a real and substantial growth in defense capabilities over a sustained period. It will deal directly and effectively with a problem that the Nation has put off for over a decade.

VII

I have summarized above some of the most significant initiatives we have undertaken in the Department of Defense during your first term. The list by no means includes all of the important developments, but is intended to identify the general areas where we have focused our attention and the successes we have achieved thus far.

The Department of Defense has shown measured and impressive progress during the past three years. Our management reforms have resulted in a more efficient organization that is more responsive to our Nation's defense needs. We have begun a thorough modernization of our strategic and conventional programs, which has already led to a demonstrable increase in the military strength of the U.S.

I look forward to building on this solid foundation.

Harold Brown

171. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 21, 1979

SUBJECT

NORAD Computer System Failure

I have attached at Tab A a MFR from the JCS which explains what happened during the NORAD 18-minute failure on December 19th.

The warning system worked during the 18 minutes, DSP East and West. The information went directly to SAC and the NMCC. The major loss was speed in processing the information, a delay of approximately two minutes.

Tab A

Memorandum for the Record²

Washington, December 20, 1979

SUBJECT

NORAD Computer System Failure (U)

1. (S) On 19 December 1979, at 1526 EST the NORAD computer system experienced an eighteen minute failure which required NORAD to manually process missile warning information.

2. (S) There are two primary computers which process missile warning communications in and out of NORAD. They are backed up by a third, older computer, called the Digital Information Processor (DIP). At the time of the failure, one primary computer was online and in use; one was undergoing program testing and was not committed to automatic take over. The DIP was undergoing corrective maintenance and was not operational. Under those conditions, when the primary computer failed (cause unknown) it was necessary for NORAD

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 15, Crisis Management: 11/78–5/80. Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for information.

² Secret. Prepared by Brigadier General George Stotser, NMCC Deputy Director for Operations.

to bring up the other computer manually. This action required eighteen minutes.

3. (S) SAC, the NMCC and the ANMCC all receive information directly from DSP ground processing stations. This information is processed in computers at those three locations as soon as it is available. Washington principals, during the NORAD system outage, would have received missile warning information from DSP-E and DSP-W without delay. All FSS-7 SLBM radar information and NORAD assessments would have been delayed by the manual processing time (voice tell) of approximately two minutes.

George R. Stotser
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

**172. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Claytor)
to President Carter¹**

Washington, January 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Civil Defense Program Funding (U)

(U) In accordance with your instructions that my Department and the National Security Council exercise oversight responsibility for Civil Defense programs and policies, my staff took part in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's formulation of the FY81 Civil Defense program. Our aim throughout was to insure that the program meets the letter and intent of your Civil Defense policy (PD-41).²

(C) We have examined the details of FEMA's proposed FY81 program and concur with FEMA Director John Macy's assessment that it represents a start on the first year of a seven year effort and, as such, is minimally consistent with your policy as defined in PD-41. Defense had budgeted for a start in FY80, but Congressional reductions have precluded that course. We would have preferred a larger level of effort in FY81, but recognize the constraints of fiscal reality.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Welch, Box 210, Civil Defense. Secret.

² See Document 91.

(S) Nevertheless, we must point out that this is the second consecutive year in which a civil defense budget ceiling has been imposed which calls into question realistic achievement of a credible capability for crisis relocation of our civil population.

(S) The PRM-32 study³—upon which PD-41 is based—concluded that such a credible capability for crisis relocation was needed, and that when achieved, it would enhance deterrence and stability, contribute to favorable perceptions of the Soviet-American strategic balance, and reduce our susceptibility to Soviet coercion in time of crisis. In 1978, we developed a specific program to realize such a capability. This program, known as *D-Prime*, called for a crisis relocation capability to enhance population survival, in-place fallout protection, and emergency operating centers in host areas. During the examination of a range of costs to implement each of the candidate programs, we estimated that such a capability could be achieved over a five to seven year period with an average annual funding of \$230 million, an initial outlay of \$136 million and progressively greater levels of funding in the outyears.

(S) We still believe that it is necessary to acquire a nationwide crisis relocation capability at the earliest practical date, and that program *D-prime* is the surest and most cost-effective way to meet the requirements of your policy. This is the program that FEMA will begin to implement in FY81. If, however, annual funding for FY82 and beyond continues to be held to the previous year's level, a credible capability for crisis relocation on the scale necessary to achieve the objectives of PD-41 may never be attained. This issue should be resolved before the FY81 budget hearings.

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

³ See the attachment to Document 72.

173. Memorandum From Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 8, 1980

SUBJECT

M-X Basing Vulnerability

In response to your question as to which is less vulnerable—the racetrack or multiple holes—I think the sheltered road mobile basing *system* is less vulnerable overall, because it can be made as resistant to nuclear attacks as the multiple holes system, but is far less vulnerable to loss of missile location security.

Making the horizontal shelters of the road mobile system as resistant to nuclear attack as the vertical holes does cost more for several reasons.

First, the portions of any shelter that are exposed to the overpressures produced by a nuclear blast must be particularly strong, and much more area is exposed to blast overpressure by the horizontal shelter.

Second, the suspension system used to isolate the missile from the ground motion associated with the blast is more complex for the horizontal shelter, and more “rattle space” is required—resulting in a bigger shelter.

The purpose of hardening the MX shelters is to make sure the Soviets would not find it advantageous to go to warhead placements and yields that would allow them to kill more than one shelter with a single weapon. Given this purpose, we have the choice of building somewhat softer shelters if we space them farther apart. In fact, at this point it appears that minimizing the cost of achieving an equally survivable MX basing system using horizontal shelters will mean going to somewhat softer but more widely spaced shelters than we would have used had we elected to go with the multiple hole system.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 10/79–3/80. Unclassified. Sent for information. Sent through Welch. A stamped notation indicates Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is a January 28 Evening Report from the NSC Defense Policy Coordination Cluster to Brzezinski. Next to the section on the M-X missile, Brzezinski wrote: “Which is less vulnerable: the ‘race track’ or the multiple holes?”

174. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Defense Production Priorities (U)

Deputy Secretary Claytor has requested (Tab B) that you designate the XM-1 tank and the MX and PERSHING II missiles as "Programs of Highest National Priority" to ensure that they are given priority over other DOD and all commercial programs in the competition for components, materials and other resources.² (U)

I support Claytor's request:

—Essentially all DOD programs already enjoy priority over all commercial programs by virtue of the Defense Production Act of 1950; the action Claytor recommends simply realigns priorities among the various defense programs. (U)

—DOD, DOE, Commerce and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have surveyed each of the affected prime and sub-contractors and suppliers and found that the action will not adversely affect any member of the production community, and that it will, indeed, help prevent production slippages. (U)

—DOD, DOE, Commerce and FEMA also assure me that the action will have no adverse impact on the economy. (U)

—And I feel that the signals you would send to the Congress, the public and our NATO allies by the action would have a positive political impact. (C)

There are currently ten other DOD programs on the "Highest National Priority" list: three sensitive programs concerning space reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare and airframe design; the Cruise Missile; TRIDENT; the Fleet Ballistic Missile program; two anti-ballistic missile programs; MINUTEMAN III; and the M-60 tank.³ DOD is reviewing the list (especially the last five programs, above) and will

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 2/80. Secret. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum Carter wrote: "Zbig. J." Stebbins and Welch sent the memorandum to Brzezinski for his signature under cover of a February 15 memorandum in which they noted: "The package was delayed while we sought interagency advice on the DOD request, since it had the potential to affect the programs of other agencies." (Ibid.)

² Carter underlined "XM-1 tank," "MX," and "Pershing II missiles" in this sentence.

³ Carter underlined "space reconnaissance," "anti-submarine warfare," "Cruise Missile," and "TRIDENT" in this sentence.

come to you later this year with recommended adjustments as appropriate. (S)

Lastly, your reply to Claytor's request provides an opportunity for you to lend emphasis to the development of our rapid deployment capabilities. I suggest that you task DOD to consider ways to minimize delays in production of the new CX cargo aircraft—to include assignment of the "Highest Priority" and, perhaps, streamlined management procedures. Since no aircraft production program has yet been assigned the "Highest Priority," DOD, Commerce and FEMA will have to do some thinking to find ways to smooth the production process.⁴ (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab A that grants Claytor's request and directs consideration of ways to minimize CX production delays.⁵ (U)

Tab B

Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Claytor) to President Carter⁶

Washington, January 10, 1980

SUBJECT

Request for Presidential Approval of the XM-1 Tank, PERSHING II and M-X Missile Systems as Programs of Highest National Priority

(U) Highest priority for industrial resources is essential to meet development/procurement and deployment schedules for the above systems.

(U) Your approval will allow assignment of a Brick-Bat (DX) industrial priority rating to our contracts with industry. This priority will assure the three weapon systems will receive materials, components and other resources first in the event of conflict with other Defense or commercial contracts.

⁴ Carter drew a question mark in the right margin next to this paragraph.

⁵ Tab A was not attached. Carter approved the recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Retype memo, J." In a February 19 memorandum to Brown, Carter wrote: "I approve your request to assign the highest national priority to the XM-1 tank and MX and PERSHING II missile programs. Additionally, I would like you to consider ways to minimize delays in production of the XC cargo aircraft. Please provide me your recommendations as soon as possible." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 2/80)

⁶ Secret. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

(C) Industrial experience has shown lengthy leadtimes for many materials and components utilized on these systems. Failure to apply this highest priority rating to these programs could make it necessary to resolve individual resource bottlenecks and conflicts on a case-by-case basis, possibly causing costly delays. Further, elevation of their priority would serve as a signal of U.S. intent and resolve with respect to the defense of our NATO allies. Additional pertinent information is set forth in Enclosure 1.⁷

(U) I recommend your approval of the three systems as programs of Highest National Priority. Enclosure 2⁸ contains the text of a suggested reply.

W. Graham Claytor, Jr.

⁷ Attached but not printed are additional details about the manufacture of the XM tank as well as the MX and PERSHING II missiles.

⁸ Attached but not printed is a draft reply.

175. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile (U) (Annual Update)

DOD and DOE have submitted their recommended FY 1980–82 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (Tab B)² for your approval. The Plan consists of suggested ceiling levels for each of the sixty-one types of nuclear warheads held in the stockpile, and, for information only, projected levels for each of the warheads for the extended period FY 1983–87. (C)

For the period FY 1980–82, there are no changes of any consequence from last year's projections:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 23, PD/NSC–56. Top Secret; Formerly Restricted Data. Sent for action. The date is handwritten.

² Not found attached.

—The continuing success of the TRIDENT warhead production line, coupled with DOD's decision to keep a seventeenth POSEIDON boat on-line during the 1980s, will permit earlier retirement of POLARIS warheads than was anticipated last year. (S/RD)

—Production, technical or fiscal problems have caused some delays in modernizing the MINUTEMAN III warheads, as well as certain strategic and tactical bombs, tactical missile warheads, and artillery shells, but the delays do not appear excessive and the "get well" schedules seem adequate. (S/RD)

—[3 lines not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

For the extended period FY 1983–87, however, there are some fairly substantial changes over last year's projection. [4 lines not declassified]

—DOD and DOE display a sizeable number of older strategic and tactical bombs in the Stockpile after their modernized replacements appear. (C)

—New, approved warheads begin to appear in the inventory, including MX, ALCM, GLCM, and PERSHING II. (S/RD)

—New systems that have not been approved also appear, including SLCM, HARPOON, the new 155mm artillery projectile, and the Navy's Standard Missile II. (S/RD)

Ordinarily, we would pay scant attention to the out-year projections for FY 1983–87 since: (1) they are provided for information only; and (2) they are unconstrained, and, therefore, probably inflated. However, this year for the first time the out-year projections have had near-term impacts: DOE sought FY 1981 funding to begin reactivating the N-reactor/PUREX plutonium production facility because they felt they would not have enough special nuclear materials (SNM) to build all the weapons in the out-year projections. OMB turned down DOE's initial funding request, and, although DOD lent its support to the request, DOE did not appeal the OMB decision. However, since the issue was raised, it will undoubtedly be a subject of debate during the forthcoming authorization hearings. (The agreed interagency position on this matter is that we have sufficient SNM for the next five years, that projections beyond five years are difficult to make, but the Administration has long-term SNM requirements under review and will act if and when necessary.) (S/RD)

The lack of coordination between DOD and DOE on the SNM issue and the fact that the White House was not drawn into the matter until after the FY 1981 Budget was finalized, are the latest manifestations of the rather serious communications problem that exists between DOD and DOE on nuclear-related programs. We have held informal discussions with DOD, DOE, JCS, OSTP and OMB in an effort to find ways to

get decision makers to focus on problems like SNM availability rationally and sufficiently early to impact the budget process. Two remedial steps have been taken: (1) DOD and DOE have begun an extensive joint examination of the warhead acquisition process and of warhead requirements through FY 2000; and (2) DOD and DOE have agreed informally to submit next year's Stockpile Memorandum to you for approval by September 1, 1980. NSC and OMB will closely monitor the former and ensure compliance with the latter. We are pursuing further remedial steps, with OMB's collaboration, to ensure better procedures in formulating the FY 1982 budget. (S/RD)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my signing the Presidential Directive at Tab A³ that: (1) approves the proposed FY 1980–82 Stockpile Plan subject to future policy and programming decisions; (2) notes but does not approve⁴ the FY 1983–87 Stockpile Projection; (3) authorizes continuation of standard production, retirement, custodial and, transfer procedures for nuclear weapons and parts; and (4) directs DOD and DOE to submit the FY 1981–83 Stockpile Plan for your approval not later than September 1, 1980. OMB and OSTP concur.⁵ (S/RD)

³ Not found attached. See Document 176.

⁴ Carter underlined "does not approve," drew a line to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote "J."

⁵ Carter approved the recommendation.

176. Presidential Directive/NSC-56¹

Washington, February 27, 1980

SUBJECT

FY 1980–1982 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile (U)

The proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for FY 1980–1982 is approved subject to future policy and program/budget decisions. The stockpile levels represent authorized ceilings, not to be exceeded except as provided below or otherwise approved by me. (U)

For the period FY 1980–82, the following are authorized:

—The production and retirement of those quantities of nuclear warheads and nuclear warhead parts necessary to achieve and maintain the approved stockpile, as well as the production of additional parts of nuclear weapons necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the Agreement for Cooperation. (S/FRD)

—DOE, in coordination with DOD, to initiate production of such long lead time nuclear warhead parts as may be necessary to prepare for FY 1983–84 production of warheads required to support approved DOD forces. (This does not apply to production of parts for the W80–0, W81 or W82 warheads.) (S/FRD)

—DOE to produce and transfer to DOD parts of nuclear weapons, not containing special nuclear materials, as may be agreed by DOE and DOE. These parts may be used in nuclear weapons, training programs, research and development, and production. (U)

—DOE, in coordination with DOD, to make such changes in the production and/or retirement of nuclear warheads during FY 1980–82 as may be necessary to reflect changes in DOE materiel availabilities, production/retirement capabilities, or quality assurance requirements; or as necessary to reflect changes as may be required by DOD because of adjustments in military requirements or delivery assets, provided the changes do not exceed plus or minus 10 percent in each year in strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical, or fleet warhead totals. (Any such changes which indicate a significant shift in defense requirements or DOE production capabilities will be submitted to me for approval.) (S/FRD)

—DOD to designate as retired and, in coordination with DOE, to retain custody of nuclear warheads for a period of up to 18 months from the designation date, if necessary to reduce DOE requirements for

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 2, PD/NSC 33–63 [2]. Secret; Restricted Data.

weapons storage during periods of high production workloads at DOE assembly facilities. (C)

The FY 1983–1987 Stockpile Projection which was submitted with the FY 1980–1982 Stockpile Plan has been noted;² it should be updated to reflect policy and programming decisions and used as the point of departure for the development of future Stockpile Plans. (U)

The recommended FY 1981–1983 Stockpile Plan and the FY 1984–1988 Stockpile Projection should be submitted to me for approval not later than September 1, 1980 to ensure its availability in the FY 1982 budget deliberations. (U)

This directive supersedes PD/NSC–44, dated January 5, 1979.³ (C)

Jimmy Carter

² Carter underlined the phrase “has been noted” and wrote in the right margin next to it: “noted only.”

³ PD/NSC–44 is in Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 1, PD/NSC 33–63 [1].

177. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Mobilization Planning (U)

I have indicated to you several times over the past year that US mobilization planning has been in a state of considerable disarray for many years, due primarily to a lack of authoritative planning guidance and to poor interagency communication. (S)

Last summer, I commissioned an interagency mobilization planning study under NSC sponsorship and assigned it three ambitious objectives: (1) develop draft Presidential guidance that will ensure consistency and coordination in all US civil and military mobilization planning; (2) establish a process for assessing our mobilization potential

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 104, Military Posture 1–3/80. Secret. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum Carter wrote: “Zbig. C.”

and for rectifying any deficiencies in it; and (3) achieve mobilization planning commonality with our allies. (C)

The first objective and part of the second have now been completed:

—The interagency mobilization planning structure that lay dormant for thirty-five years has now been substantially revitalized. (In the process, several very sticky, long-standing interagency jurisdictional disputes that, for example, plagued the DOD/FEMA NIFTY NUGGET large-scale mobilization exercise last year, were settled.) (S)

—Fifty-six major Presidentially-directed emergency actions that will determine the extent of US mobilization in a crisis have been identified (e.g., evacuate citizens abroad, surge defense production, assume control of civil telecommunications, etc.), as have the agencies responsible for planning the execution of each of the 56 actions and the Presidential authorities required to actually carry them out (e.g., Presidential Proclamation, declaration of National Emergency, etc.). (C)

—Additionally, 29 major peacetime preparedness activities that contribute directly to our ability to take the 56 major emergency actions have been identified (e.g., prepare military contingency plans, pre-identify wartime civilian and military personnel requirements, stockpile critical materials, etc.), along with the agencies responsible for the activities. (C)

—And five politically bland but broad, representative crisis scenarios have been developed to serve as the basis for the creation of plans by the responsible agencies for the 56 emergency and 29 preparedness actions. (C)

We are now ready to begin the next phase of the NSC Study effort: the actual development of plans for the emergency and preparedness actions, plus a comprehensive assessment of our mobilization potential. For at least two reasons, I feel it is important that you endorse the interagency effort at this time: (1) the mobilization community has been essentially ignored for three decades and badly needs a shot-in-the-arm to boost its morale and productivity; and (2) the planning resources that the departments and agencies will have to commit to the next phase of the effort are quite substantial. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my signing the Presidential Directive at Tab A, which would:

—Recognize the fundamental importance of mobilization planning and your support for it;

—Endorse the NSC Mobilization Study effort to date and direct that it be used as the principal basis for future US mobilization planning, subject to whatever changes are necessary to ensure its continued relevance;

—Direct FEMA to oversee the drafting of plans for the 56 emergency and 29 preparedness actions against the five scenarios, but with enough flexibility built into the plans to permit their use over a wider range of scenarios where possible. (The plans would be based on funds, personnel and other physical resources expected to be available in FY 1980);

—Direct NSC to oversee the assessment of the US mobilization potential. This will involve: (1) conducting a net assessment of US/Soviet and, eventually, NATO/Warsaw Pact mobilization capabilities; and (2) assessing the “goodness” of FEMA’s planning effort, including tailoring future DOD and FEMA mobilization exercises (e.g., NIFTY NUGGET II) to test various aspects of FEMA’s plans. (S)

State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, HEW, HUD, Transportation, Energy, OMB, JCS, CIA, OSTP, GSA, Post Office, FCC, Selective Service and FEMA concur. This is a significant initiative: your Administration will be the first since World War II to conduct a comprehensive mobilization planning effort at the highest level of government.² (U)

Tab A

Presidential Directive/NSC–57³

Washington, March 3, 1980

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Interior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare
The Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy

The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy
The Administrator of General Services
The Postmaster General
The Chairman, Federal Communica-
tions Commission
The Director, Selective Service System
The Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency

²Carter approved the recommendation and initialed the bottom of the memorandum.

³Confidential. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the directive: “ok, JC.”

SUBJECT

Mobilization Planning (U)

I. *Policy.* It is of fundamental importance to the national security that the United States maintain the capability to mobilize its national resources in a timely and efficient manner in order to respond effectively to crises that might arise. (U)

Such maintenance requires consistency and coordination within the United States government in all civil and military mobilization planning activities. Accordingly, the President directs: (1) that the broadly-defined crisis scenarios, emergency actions and preparedness activities developed in the NSC Mobilization Study are to serve as the principal basis for future US civil and military mobilization planning;⁴ and (2) that all such future planning is to be fully coordinated among all interested Federal agencies. (U)

II. *Implementation.* The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will ensure that all existing and pending Executive Orders pertaining to mobilization are made consistent with this directive. (U)

Implementation plans for each emergency action identified in the NSC Mobilization Study will be developed by the designated responsible and coordinating agencies based on the funds, personnel and other physical resources expected to be available in FY 1980. The implementation plans should be based on the NSC Mobilization Study crisis scenarios, but should also be sufficiently flexible to facilitate their use over a wider range of scenarios where possible. The Director of FEMA will arbitrate among the responsible and coordinating agencies wherever necessary to eliminate overlap among individual implementation plans, to conserve resources, and to resolve any jurisdictional conflicts. The implementation plans pertaining to Continuity of Government, the Selective Service System, and US Telecommunications Facilities are to reflect the policies and guidance resulting from the ongoing Presidentially-directed studies in these areas. (C)

The Director of FEMA will combine the completed individual implementation plans into a Federal Master Mobilization Plan and ensure that necessary standby legislation is drafted and execution procedures are promulgated to facilitate use of the plan during crises. The initial Master Plan should be provided to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for NSC review by June 1, 1980. (U)

The following tasks are to be added to the NSC Mobilization Study charter:

⁴ Not found.

—with the Intelligence Community, provide the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by April 1, 1980 terms of reference for a comprehensive comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact mobilization capabilities and historical levels of effort. (C)

—provide the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by June 1, 1980 a detailed plan for assessing the adequacy of the newly developed Federal Master Mobilization Plan. To assist in the assessment and to help refine the Master Plan, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of FEMA are to ensure that, to the maximum extent practical, mobilization-type exercises over the next few years (e.g., NIFTY NUGGET/REX) are designed, conducted, and evaluated in a manner that supports the NSC Study. (C)

—adjust the crisis scenarios, emergency actions, and preparedness activities as necessary during development of the Master Plan to ensure their continued relevance and appropriateness; and seek ways to improve the mobilization planning and implementation processes. (U)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

**178. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, March 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Contingency Plans for Increased Strategic Capability (U)

(S) Last year's NIE raised the prospect that the Soviets could pull ahead of us in warheads in the early 1980's.² That conclusion was partly because of inconsistent rules for counting U.S. and Soviet SSBNs on sea trials. Furthermore, in the event Soviet deployments of highly fractionated SLBMs and ICBMs have progressed more slowly than the NIE predicted, [1 line not declassified] It now appears unlikely that we will lose our lead in warheads in the early 1980's. Nonetheless, I share your belief that we must be prepared to take further actions. If SALT II collapses, our planned forces may be inadequate, particularly in the mid-1980's before MX can be deployed in numbers.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 89, Doctrine/C³I: 1979–1980. Secret; Restricted Data.

² See Document 111.

(S) My staff has examined a number of options, as illustrated by the attached table. The shortest and cheapest path to a real increase in our strategic and theater nuclear capabilities would be to accelerate deployment of cruise missiles—ALCM, GLCM, and perhaps SLCM. [2 lines not declassified] We have also examined the option of converting POLARIS submarines to SLCM launchers with 80 or more per boat. It is not necessary to choose among ALCM, GLCM, or SLCM now, however, in part because these missiles share so many components. My staff is examining actions we can take to cut the lead time for increasing production; I will let you know our plans in the near future.

(SRD) One other problem that could limit our response to a breakdown in SALT is the supply of special nuclear material. According to the “Moderate No-SALT” estimate in Draft NIE 11-3/8-79 the Soviets could deploy an additional 8000 warheads by 1989.³ [6 lines not declassified] Therefore, if we want to prepare for this contingency, we should soon increase production of special nuclear material.

Harold Brown

³ For the final version, see the attachment to Document 184.

Attachment

Table Prepared in the Department of Defense⁴

Washington, undated

Table 1. *Summary of Quick Fix Options*

<u>Option</u>	WHDS			Cost (FY 81 \$M)		<u>Comments</u>
	<u>IOC</u>	<u>FOC</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>Acquisition</u>	<u>Annual O&S</u>	
100 MN III missiles in silos	80	81	200 ⁵	167	-	Little increase in survivable capability.
Full bomber weapon load-out	80	81	140	-	100	Poses operational problems
All MN III to MK-12A	82	84	-	261	-	Little increase in survivable capability
200 mobile MM III	83	85	300 ⁷	3000	135	Needs strategic warning to survive

⁴ Secret.⁵ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]⁶ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]⁷ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]⁸ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]

<u>Option</u>	<u>WHDS</u>			<u>Cost (FY 81 \$M)</u>		<u>Comments</u>
	<u>IOC</u>	<u>FOC</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>FOC</u>	<u>Annual Acquisition O&S</u>	
Trident I on Polaris	83	85	256 ⁹	1280 ¹⁰	6000 185	Lifespan of Polaris is uncertain
SLCM on Polaris	83	85	400	800	2500 185	No firm option exists
Increase ALCM production (B-52 G&H)	83	90	590 ¹¹	720 ¹²	4000 100	
FB-111 B/C (140 UE)	84	86	550	1160	7200 500	SAC's recommendation
CMCA (B-1 variant 100 UE)	85	88	-	3000 ¹³	11000 400	Requires a second ALCM production line
B-1 (210 UE)	85	90	-	3360	26700 1000	Subsonic variant possible for ¾ the cost
FB-111H (210 UE)	85	91	-	2100	13400 1000	

⁹ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹⁰ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹¹ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹² Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]

¹³ Adherence to SALT I or SALT II would require retirement of other systems, resulting in smaller increases in warheads. [Footnote is in the original.]

179. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 15, 1980

SUBJECT

Threat Assessment Conference Call on Missile Warning

The NMCC convened a "Threat Assessment Conference Call" last night at 2132 hours. Launches from the Kurile Island site were detected, not unusual, but the "fan" of one of the missile tracks included Alaska, Canada, and the tip of Oregon. At that point, NORAD and the NMCC convened the Threat Assessment Conference. It was terminated five minutes later when the impact of both missiles were determined to be in Kamchatka. (S)

The procedures worked well within the White House. I was in the call by one minute after it was convened. The duty officers at NORAD and the NMCC sorted out the "anomalies" in the computer displays quickly. They might have avoided the Threat Assessment Conference, but I heard enough on the line to realize that convening it was prudent. (S)

Other procedures went as well. SAC readiness changed at 2130 hours. The NEACP began rolling at 2132 hours. (S)

Daily Report Item

The National Military Command Center convened a Missile Threat Assessment Conference Call at 2132 hours on March 14. Soviet launches from the Kurile Island site were detected, not unusual, but the "fan" of one of the two missile tracks included Alaska, Canada, and the tip of Oregon. At that point, NORAD and NMCC decided that a threat assessment was appropriate. The conference terminated five minutes later when the impact of both missiles were determined to be in Kamchatka. (S)

The procedures within the White House worked well. The duty officers at NORAD and the NMCC sorted out the anomalies in the missile attack displays quickly. Other procedures also proceeded smoothly. SAC readiness changed at 2130 hours. The NEACP began to roll at 2132 hours. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 15, Crisis Management: 11/78–5/80. Secret; Outside the System. A stamped notation indicates Brzezinski saw the memorandum.

180. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Perry) to Secretary of Defense Brown and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Claytor)¹

Washington, March 31, 1980

SUBJECT

M-X Status Report—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

1. *M-X Steering Committee (U)*

(S) The M-X system is facing formidable opposition from a variety of sources and for a variety of reasons—some real, some imagined, and some politically inspired. We have established a Steering Committee to correct the real problems, dispel the imaginary problems, and cope with the politically-inspired problems. The committee, which I chair, consists of Gen Bob Mathis, Toni Chayes, Robin Pirie, Tom Ross and Jack Stempler. We had our first meeting last Monday² and will meet about once a week to plan strategy and coordinate tactics on actions bearing on substantive program issues and public/congressional relation issues.

2. *Program Issues (U)*

(S) The focus of the engineering effort is to effect a design simplification so that we can reduce cost. We have dropped the dedicated railroad track which connects the valleys in favor of a dedicated road, which is significantly cheaper. We are exploring a variation of the horizontal-dash (racetrack) system in which the transporter is detachable from the erector launcher and only the latter goes into the horizontal shelter. This design is several billion dollars cheaper, but permits only road-to-shelter dash instead of shelter-to-shelter dash. We are working on an operational plan for this design which maintains the high confidence in survivability we had in the baseline (horizontal-dash) system.

(S) We continue work on the Environmental Impact Statement, focusing on the “narrowing” issue. We are eliminating a number of regions for operational or geotechnical reasons but are *not* eliminating regions for reasons of increased basing costs. As a result, we will probably end up with two acceptable regions—the Nevada/Utah basin, and the Northern Texas/New Mexico plateau. That means we have

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 4/1–11/80. Secret. Smith sent the memorandum to Brzezinski and Vance via Alpha Channel under cover of an April 3 memorandum, on which Brzezinski wrote: “JW/your reaction? ZB.”

²March 24. No minutes of the meeting were found.

three alternatives—Nevada/Utah, Texas/New Mexico, or split basing, with the first one preferable, the second one more expensive (and with greater public impact); and the third most expensive (by \$2 to \$5 billion). While these results will clearly indicate the desirability of sticking with Nevada/Utah basing, I don't believe the EIS study should reach that conclusion; rather, that decision gets bucked to SECDEF and—if we were to decide to propose the split basing at the extra cost—to the President for approval and Congress for appropriation.

3. *Congressional/Public Interface* (U)

a. House (U)

(S) The FY 81 M–X request will be supported by the HASC without crippling amendments. HAC is still an unknown, but could be a problem. Gunn McKay is taking a real position of leadership here. He held a constructive hearing last week which cleared up a lot of misinformation on M–X basing. I will be meeting with him tomorrow morning (at his request) to plan a strategy for getting the bill through the house and for interfacing with State Officials. I will seek his advice on how to handle the split basing issue (clearly Nevada and Utah would prefer this, but the Congress probably would not accept the additional cost).

b. Senate (U)

(S) SASC will probably support the FY 81 request, but may be looking for restrictive language. I see Sen Nunn as the focal point on the Democratic side and will meet with him to discuss strategy. Sen Warner has offered to take the leadership in bringing around the Republicans, whose opposition is partially state oriented (Sen Garn) and partially politically inspired. Sen Warner will argue that a bipartisan approach is indicated for this important national security program, and that Republican opposition to M–X “because its the wrong design” is transparent and could backfire on them. He is planning an additional M–X hearing this Wednesday³ at which he will invite some dissident Senators, not on the committee, to give them a chance to get onboard. Additionally, I plan to meet one-on-one with Sen Garn to see if I can determine how much of his objection is a real concern with the system (which we can deal with) and how much is Utah politics.

c. State Leadership (U)

(S) I met with Gov Matheson and Gov List last week⁴ and gave them a chance to express their concerns. I explained in detail why other basing options (air mobile, SUM, etc.) are unattractive. We talked about the split basing option; I assured them that the Air Force EIS study would not foreclose the split option, but that the extra cost would be a

³ April 2.

⁴ No minutes of this meeting were found.

significant negative factor in considerations of OSD, the President, and the Congress. I will be visiting them on a monthly basis from now on, and will invite them to join me in some M-X site visits. Gov Matheson is sponsoring a two hour TV debate that will be nationally broadcast (PBS) on 24 April. I proposed that Dave Aaron, Toni Chayes and I represent the Administration's position (Policy, Public Interface, and Military/Technical). Bill Moyer will be the moderator and will select three "Doves" and three "Hawks" to round out the debate. Sounds interesting.

d. Public Information (U)

(S) We also are coordinating through the Steering Committee a series of public speeches with local groups in Nevada and Utah. I'll have a schedule for your review soon. Also, Tom Ross is preparing a schedule for one-on-one interviews with influential journalists.

4. *Tactics* (U)

(S) I believe that we should take the initiative with our design changes. We should be able to settle on them when the Defense Science Board review is completed (in a few weeks). At that time, we should brief the committees and be sure that the FY 81 language is consistent with this design. Ichord and McKay in the House, and Nunn and Warner, in the Senate, will probably take the lead in reviewing and validating that these actions are desirable and responsive to the Stevens Amendment.

(S) I don't have a plan yet on dealing with the split basing problem. I feel that the initiative on that should come from the Congress through language in the 81 bill. I will discuss this further with McKay and Nunn. If we were to ultimately go with split basing, there would be some "credit" which probably should go to Gunn McKay and shared somewhat by the governors. If split basing were ultimately to be rejected on cost, it is better not to raise expectations and to put this in the clear perspective of something to which we are giving a fair hearing but about which we are not optimistic.

William J. Perry

181. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, March 29, 1980

SUBJECT

The U.S.-Soviet Military Balance

I have reviewed my recent public characterizations of the U.S.–Soviet military balance, as well as my testimony before Congressional committees and responses to questions from Members on this subject. In the course of this review I have also examined media reporting to see how accurately my assessments have been quoted and in what context; I recognize that we have to take some responsibility for what we are perceived as saying, as well as full responsibility for what we actually say.

The products of this review are attached. On reflection, I think my characterization has been accurate—neither alarmist nor inappropriately comforting.

The basic elements of my explanation of the balance are:

- In 1960–63, the U.S. spent 30% more on defense than did the Soviet Union; in 1980 we will spend 30% less. The turnaround is the result of a doubling of Soviet defense spending, while U.S. defense spending remained level.
- The Soviet Union has, for over two decades, spent vast sums of money in a determined effort first to equal, and then to surpass, the United States in military strength. That they have not yet succeeded in surpassing us is not a reflection on their determination or, indeed, on their achievements. It is partly because we were well ahead when they began their build-up, partly because our allies and their adversaries must also be weighed in the balance, and also because we remain ahead in a number of important technological areas.
- In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of substantial numerical inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today. Their forces have improved in quality as well as numbers. The Soviets have a potential for strategic advantage if we fail to respond with

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 106, Secretary Brown Eyes Only, Jan–June 1980. Confidential; Eyes Only. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “I have read this carefully. It is a good analysis—and your presentations seem balanced. It is difficult to include NATO v. W. Pact, PRC border, air defense etc in every statement. My concerns are not fully alleviated because in general, the impression is that we & our allies are inferior—now—seriously we still need to work on this problem—with \$ and with words—Thanks, J.C.” A stamped notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates Brown saw Carter’s note.

adequate programs of our own. But we are responding, by modernizing each leg of our Triad, to prevent that from happening.

- In Central Europe, NATO will be much more nearly in balance with the Warsaw Pact within the next few years, provided that the Allies proceed with the modernization of their forces and other increased defense efforts, and provided that our programs for rapid deployment of reinforcements are brought to fruition. Even with these improvements, however, we will not have as high a level of confidence as I would like of containing a large attack against NATO launched by the Pact with little preparation and warning.

- The disparity between U.S. annual defense expenditures and the dollar cost estimates of annual Soviet expenditures has continued for so long and grown so great that it has begun to bring the credibility of our defense posture into question. A prolongation of the past 15 year trend for another 10 or even 5 years would clearly consign us to inferiority.

- To prevent us from falling behind, or from appearing to, our efforts devoted to defense must increase in real terms. If we do not respond now to the sustained expansion of Soviet military power by increasing our own, we will condemn the United States to an inferior military position. We need a steady, sustained, and significant increase in effort. This Administration has set that in train.

- What needs to be done is to set a pattern of growth and then sustain it over a period of years—rather than have a large growth in one year and then assume that the problem has been solved. The program that the Administration has proposed will arrest and then turn around the relative disparity in momentum between the Soviet and U.S. programs. This will require not only the projected growth in our defense efforts, but greater efforts by our allies, more effective coordination of U.S. and allied defense programs, higher efficiency in our own defense program, and correct choices on our own part to take advantage of our technological lead.

- The Administration has responded to the adverse trends in the military balance and to increased dangers to U.S. interests through steady increases in defense budgets, culminating in substantial growth in the FY 81 defense budget. The FY 81–85 Five Year Defense Program projects continued real growth in defense spending through FY 1985.

- In the first year of this Administration, we placed the major weight of our efforts behind improving NATO's early conventional combat capability, primarily through the LTDP and the three percent real growth commitment. We next turned to the problem of modernizing our strategic TRIAD. Most recently, we have taken steps to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe. Thus, programs in each of these areas are underway and have momentum. We can now concentrate special attention and resources on improving our capabilities to

deal with threats and crises around the world and, in particular, we are acting to expand the improvement (begun two years ago) in our ability to get men and equipment quickly to potential areas of conflict and to retain our preeminence at sea in an era of new technologies.

These comments represent the situation as I judge it. Most others with comparable experience take a more pessimistic view. I believe that much of the difference comes from their failure to distinguish between the present balance and the balance to be expected if past trends continue, that is if the Soviets continue their build-up and we do not implement the defense programs that this Administration has adopted and those we have urged on our Allies. For that reason, I have tried to make the distinction in my own statements between the present balance, about which we can do little, and the future balance, which we will affect by our decisions. I also think that getting the American people to understand this distinction is the most responsible and practical strategy for sustaining confidence in American strength while assuring an adequate military balance in the future through the necessary growth in our capabilities.

In general, I am satisfied that the media have reported my assessment accurately. I've said pretty much the same things on scores of occasions—and you have heard me say them a number of times at Congressional briefings at the White House. If after your review of the attached quotations, you believe that my assessment of the balance (present and future) raises problems, please let me know.² Otherwise, I will continue to sing from essentially the same sheet music.

Harold Brown

² Attached but not printed is a collection of public statements and press coverage.

182. Memorandum From Jasper Welch of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 7, 1980

SUBJECT

M-X Status Report by Bill Perry

You asked for my reactions to Bill Perry's memo to Harold Brown which was recently transmitted to you via ALPHA channel.² (U)

Bill provided a nice summary of where things stand, all of which was familiar to me. If you have not scanned the memo, the following points were made: (U)

—Bill is chairman of an M-X steering committee to get on top of current opposition. (U)

—Design simplifications to reduce cost proceed. The dedicated railroad track has been dropped. They are exploring a variation of the horizontal dash in which the transporter is detachable from the erector launcher and only the latter goes into the horizontal shelter. It is several billion dollars cheaper but constrains some of the dash options. Perry is waiting for completion of the Defense Science Board review (in a few weeks) before reaching his recommendation. (The fact of this variation has been reported in *Aviation Week*.) (S)

—The environmental impact statement will eliminate certain regions for operational or geotechnical reasons, but not for cost. That means they will have three alternatives: Nevada/Utah, Texas/New Mexico, or split basing, with the first one preferable, the second one more expensive (and with greater public impact), and the third most expensive (by \$2-5 billion). Perry expects that the Congress may well be the forum for this decision. (S)

—Perry expects support for the FY-81 M-X request from both Armed Services Committees perhaps with some restrictive language on location on the Senate side. He is unsure with regard to the Appropriations Committees. (S)

—Perry reports an active series of consultations by him with Congressman McKay, and Senators Garn and Warner. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Welch, Box 219, MX: 2-4/80. Secret. Sent for information.

² See Document 180 and footnote 1 thereto.

—Perry has also met with Governor Matheson and Governor List. Perry plans to be on the PBS TV debate on 24 April. (S)

—The Steering Committee is coordinating a series of public speeches with local groups in Nevada and Utah. Tom Ross is scheduling one-on-one interviews with influential journalists. (S)

On the whole Bill is doing right things, but much more is required. I will be working with Bill under the guidance developed at the recent VBB. I will keep you informed of progress and problems. (U)

183. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, April 30, 1980

SUBJECT

FB-111B/C Proposal (U)

(S) General Ellis, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, has proposed that we modify 150 F-111As and FB-111s into a new, longer range strategic bomber called the FB-111B/C. He argues that this would strengthen our strategic forces during the “vulnerability window” i.e., during the period after Minuteman becomes vulnerable (1982) and before M-X becomes operational (1986). Key to this proposal is the belief that the FB-111B/Cs is relatively cheap, could be available quickly, and would be an effective penetrator of Soviet Air Defense.

(S) Unfortunately, none of these beliefs is correct. The Air Force Systems Command has made a careful analysis of General Dynamics’ proposal and concluded that the program to modify 150 aircraft would cost \$8B (FY 80\$), reach an IOC in 1985 and an FOC in 1987. Even more importantly, the FB-111B/C does *not* solve the B-52’s penetration problem. The B-52 actually will continue to be a capable penetrating bomber until the SU deploys in quantity an effective low altitude

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 20, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)—[4/80–6/80]. Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “CC: Harold—Gen Ellis should quit lobbying for this unacceptable proposal or resign if not able to work it out with you—JC.” In a May 1 memorandum, Brzezinski wrote Brown: “Attached is a copy of your memorandum to the President on the FB-111. We might have been able to support you on this issue had the paper come through normal staffing channels.” (Ibid.)

defense consisting of several hundred SA-10s and a new "lookdown shoot-down" interceptor (a modified MIG-25 with AA-X-9 missile). These Soviet systems will begin deployment in the early 80's, will erode the B-52s penetrating capability by the mid-80's and make it untenable by the late 80s. The solution to this problem is the cruise missile which becomes operational in 1982, and reaches a deployment of 1800 missiles by the mid-80s. The cruise missile by virtue of its low detectability and large numbers *will* be able to penetrate the new Soviet air defense system. On the other hand, the FB-111B/C, which is well behind the cruise missile's schedule, is almost as vulnerable as the B-52s to the new air defense system. Its radar cross-section, only slightly lower than the B-52s, is 100 times as great as the cruise missile.

(S) The FB-111B/C cannot fly supersonic during low altitude penetration, when its speed is only Mach .8 to Mach .85. While this is faster than the B-52 (which penetrates to about Mach .6), it is *not* fast enough to degrade the effectiveness of the new Soviet air defense systems. Because of these limitations the only chance of either the FB-111B/C or the B-52 successfully penetrating these new defenses is for them to have an effective ECM system. Neither the B-52 or FB-111B/C has a modern ECM system in which we could have much confidence. An improved system (designed for the B-1) could be installed on the B-52s for several billion dollars. A similar additional expense would be needed for the FB-111B/C, but because of space limitation, it is doubtful if the full ECM capability could be installed on that plane. At best, a new ECM set would give us only a fair confidence of penetrating the new Soviet air defense system because of that system's extreme use of monopulse radars which are highly ECM resistant—this was a principal reason for deciding not to produce the B-1 aircraft.

(S) There are other, less important, problems with the FB-111B/C. It is short-legged, requiring two tankers to give it full target coverage. If we dedicate these aircraft for the strategic forces, we deflect them from the valuable function they perform for our conventional forces. In fact, during the several years of airframe modification (during the peak of the so-called "window of vulnerability") they will not be available for either tactical or strategic forces.

(S) We already have underway significant programs to strengthen our strategic forces before M-X is deployed. We will be deploying about 300 TRIDENT I missiles and 1800 cruise missiles during that period. If it is necessary to augment further our strategic forces prior to M-X deployment, we have two alternatives available to us much more attractive than the FB-111B/C proposal. First, we could increase the production and deployment rate of our cruise missiles (60 per month instead of 40 per month) giving us 1000 more cruise missiles deployed by 1986, at a cost of about \$2B. Second, we could deploy sea launched

cruise missiles on the retired POLARIS submarines, giving us initial deployment by mid-1983 and 600 cruise missiles deployed at sea by 1985 at a cost of about \$2B. Either of these forces has greater military effectiveness than the FB–111B/C program at substantial less cost.²

Harold Brown

² At the bottom of the memorandum Brown wrote: “P.S. You are also aware of another factor that I mentioned to you on the phone. So is Jim Wright. But Bob Carr is not. HB.” No other record of Brown’s telephone conversation with Carter was found.

184. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Strategic Balance in the 1980s

Stan Turner has issued the latest NIE on Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Harold Brown has at the same time circulated recent Defense studies of the strategic balance. You should read as much of the NIE Summary Volume I as possible (Tab D). I am summarizing very briefly for you here the essence of what is said about static and dynamic trends and what can be inferred about Soviet programmatic intentions. (TS)

The Static Trends

The chart at Tab A simply compares numbers of U.S. and Soviet RVs and bomber weapons on the left and the megatonnage on the right [7 lines not declassified] (TS/U)

The Dynamic Trends

Another view of comparative capabilities is gained by assuming that one side strikes the other first. The chart at Tab B shows the NIE results of such a comparison of U.S. and Soviet SALT-limited forces. [7 lines not declassified]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 3, Defense (Items in the System): 7/79–6/80. Top Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified]. Sent for information. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig—we need clearer charts showing comparisons to a) with/without SALT b) with/wo MX. For use w/ Congress—J.” Tabs A–C were not found attached.

Harold Brown has sent us a JCS analysis that is somewhat more elaborate in its attempt to be militarily realistic (Tab C).

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

Omitted Factors

Neither static nor dynamic analyses provide a confident basis for predicting the outcome of a conflict. At best they are artificial comparisons which yield limited information about the possibilities for war outcomes. Taken alone, they could be very misleading. This caveat has much greater significance when forces on both sides are near parity than when one side has vast static advantages. As noted at the bottom of the chart at Tab B, all the military intelligence chiefs dissent from this analysis. They do so because they believe that such abstract comparisons understate U.S. weakness in C³I, civil defense, and other factors critical to conflict dynamics. Although their argument is cogent, static and dynamic comparisons have become a net assessment practice, not only in the U.S. Government but also by private defense analysts like Paul Nitze. Thus, they have become part of the basis for public perceptions and public debate. (TS/U)

Soviet Programmatic Intentions

The NIE judges that the Soviet purpose in this comprehensive buildup in strategic forces is to provide "a more favorable backdrop than before to the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and to the projection of Soviet power abroad." The evidence from Soviet programs leads Stan to believe that the Soviets are striving to acquire capabilities to:

- launch crippling counter force strikes;
- survive large-scale nuclear attack;
- be employed flexibly against a wide range of targets;
- limit damage substantially to the USSR. (TS/U)

He sees growing *counterforces capable weapons* (improving accuracy), improving *survivability*, added capability for *flexible employment* (C³I, hardness, mobility, exercises), and strategic defense which contributes to *limiting damage* (civil defense, ABM research, ASW, and ASAT activities). (TS/U)

Conclusion

1. The military intelligence chiefs' dissenting viewpoint seems concerned more with who has the authority to make "net assessments" than with the actual intelligence estimate of Soviet forces. They hold that only DOD can render judgments on U.S. capabilities. (TS)

2. Both the balance and the trends reported in the NIE make it clear that we have serious problems in the early and mid-1980s. (TS/U)

3. Soviet apparent views on the political utility of strategic forces are disturbing and not compatible with several assumptions we have tried to get Soviet leaders to accept. (S)

4. SALT limits help considerably, but they cannot remove the Soviet growing edge in several comparative indicators. (S)

5. Both the NIE and Harold Brown's analysis are consistent with the adverse trends initially projected in PRM-10, Comprehensive Net Assessment² and updated in Comprehensive Net Assessment-1978 which you reviewed about a year ago.³ (TS)

Tab D

National Intelligence Estimate⁴

NIE 11-3/8-79

Washington, March 17, 1980

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the 1980s

Volume I—Summary

SUMMARY⁵

1. During the next few years, Soviet strategic capabilities will continue to grow relative to those of the United States and NATO. The Soviets have pursued steady, persistent strategic programs for many years, while new Western programs remain largely in planning and development phases. We believe that important aims underlying these

² See Documents 3 and 11.

³ See Document 95.

⁴ Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Figures 1-6 were not printed.

⁵ *The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, disassociate themselves from this volume and its characterization as a Summary of the Estimate. In general, they believe the Summary is not representative of the intelligence analyses developed in the Estimate. In their judgment, it concentrates on quantitative information at the expense of intelligence concerning Soviet doctrine, policy, capabilities, future programs, and possible initiatives. In their view, the extensive use of comparative force analysis in the Estimate drives and distorts the Estimate's judgments, especially in this Summary volume.*

The holders of this view also consider the judgments outlined in the Summary as unduly shaped by US perceptions and strategic thinking and not properly reflective of Soviet strategic objectives. The Summary should emphasize that the Soviets are pursuing strategic nuclear capabilities for motives quite different from those of the United States. Because of this misplaced emphasis, the Summary fails to explain satisfactorily the comprehensive nature of Soviet strategic planning involving both offensive and defensive systems. The very great political and conventional military consequences of the asymmetries in strategic forces and doctrine are not adequately addressed. [Footnote is in the original.]

Soviet programs are to strengthen the USSR's deterrent, to support its foreign policy, and to foster strategic stability through Soviet advantage. In these efforts, however, the Soviets would face less favorable strategic trends over the longer term if additional and more formidable weapons now in prospect are deployed by the United States and NATO in the middle and late 1980s.

2. Throughout the 1980s, with or without SALT limitations, the retaliatory capabilities of US and Soviet forces surviving even a surprise attack would be very large. In the early 1980s, when Soviet forces would have greater capabilities than today to reduce US surviving weapons in a surprise attack, the Soviets would still have to expect the United States to retain the potential to destroy a large percentage of the USSR's economic and military assets. Similarly, despite the improvements planned for US forces in the late 1980s, the Soviets could expect to retain the potential for massive retaliation against US economic and military facilities, even under circumstances of a US surprise attack. This Soviet potential, however, would be less than in the early and middle 1980s, and such a prospective decline is cause for Soviet concern.

3. In seeking to meet the challenges posed by prospective US and NATO force improvements, we believe that the Soviets would hope to avoid substantial further increases in the costs of their strategic programs. We believe that principal Soviet aims will be to slow or halt the Western programs through a combination of threats, inducements, and arms negotiations and, at the same time, to continue to develop force deployment options that could counter these programs. The Soviets would have more latitude to develop and deploy such counters if they were not bound by the limits of SALT II or if those limits were to lapse in 1985. If Western strategic programs proceed as planned and SALT II limits are not changed, the Soviets could find it increasingly difficult to reconcile their strategic force objectives with their desire to continue the SALT process.

4. We do not expect immediate, irreversible responses by the USSR to US deferral of the SALT Treaty. We believe the Soviets will wish, at least initially, to avoid visible changes in strategic programs that could seriously jeopardize the chances of eventual US ratification. They could, however, take measures designed to pressure the United States, with the idea of reversing them later if the Treaty were eventually ratified. A US rejection of the Treaty, particularly in light of prospective US and NATO force improvements, would probably result in a combination of actions by the Soviets that would increase their forces and capabilities beyond those they could have under the SALT II agreement.

A. Soviet Strategic Planning for the 1980s

5. The Soviet leaders view their strategic requirements in the context of persistent long-term struggle between social systems, continuing rivalry with the United States for global power and influence, and concern for the policies and forces of countries on the Eurasian periphery, especially NATO and China. Within this framework, the Soviets seek strong and growing strategic capabilities to provide:

- A powerful deterrent against nuclear attack by any adversary.
- Along with other military forces, the prospect of greater freedom of action in the world arena while minimizing the risk of nuclear war.
- An improvement in the chances that, if nuclear war should occur, the USSR could survive and emerge in a better position than its adversaries.

6. The Soviets have made substantial progress toward these goals over the past 15 years. Their strategic forces are generally acknowledged to be equal to those of the United States, and are superior to those of all their other adversaries combined. Despite Soviet progress, however, powerful US retaliatory capabilities would survive even successful Soviet initial strikes, and active and passive Soviet defenses could not prevent the devastation of the USSR. From their statements and writings, it is clear that the Soviet leaders perceive the present US-Soviet strategic relationship as one in which each side could inflict massive damage on the other side under any circumstances. The Soviets would prefer a relationship in which deterrence and strategic stability were assured by Soviet possession of superior capabilities to fight and survive a nuclear war with the United States.

7. The Soviets probably view their improved strategic position as providing a more favorable backdrop than before to the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and to the projection of Soviet power abroad. They probably do not see the present situation of approximate strategic nuclear parity as providing them with the latitude to safely confront the United States directly in areas where they perceive US vital interests to be involved. However, in areas that they believe the United States regards as less central to its interests, particularly in regions where the USSR enjoys a preponderance of conventional forces and the advantage of proximity, such as Afghanistan, the current strategic relationship probably enhances Soviet confidence that the risk of a US local or escalatory military response would be negligible.

8. There is an alternative view which holds that the increasing aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy will expand as the Soviet Union's advantages in strategic nuclear forces become more pronounced. The Soviets may now perceive that they have nuclear superiority. As they see this superiority increase during the next three to five years, they will probably attempt to secure maximum political advantages from

their military arsenal in anticipation of US force modernization programs. Moreover, the holders of this view sense that the Soviet leadership remains uncertain about the bounding of US national interests and American resolve to meet challenges to these interests. If such uncertainties continue, there is the distinct danger that the USSR may grossly miscalculate US reactions during a regional crisis and thus set the stage for a serious military confrontation between the superpowers.⁶

9. This year the Soviets find themselves at what they may well regard as a critical juncture in their planning for future strategic forces. They are nearing the end of large ICBM and SLBM deployment programs and the beginning of a new five-year economic plan. They confront growing internal economic problems, which could be complicated by a transition in leadership some time soon. External problems include deteriorating relations with the United States and China, uncertainty about US ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and a growing Western determination to counter improvements in Soviet military forces. Further, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the international condemnation that it incurred probably indicate that, in their present planning, the Soviets are not counting on much benefit from detente.

10. The Soviets must now plan for the middle and late 1980s, a period that they almost certainly perceive as posing major challenges. US Trident submarines and air-launched cruise missiles will make it even harder for them to overcome their insufficiencies in antisubmarine warfare and in air defense. Planned new NATO long-range theater nuclear forces could reduce the large Soviet advantage in forces for peripheral attack; long-range cruise missiles in the European theater would be of particular concern to the Soviets. Finally, the Soviets would see deployment of an MX/MPS system as giving the United States the potential in the late 1980s to destroy the bulk of their ICBM silos and as restoring a measure of survivability for the US ICBM force. The Soviets interpret these Western programs as attempts to regain a strategic advantage rather than as countervailing responses to Soviet initiatives.

11. SALT considerations will figure heavily in Soviet decisions about how to deal with these challenges. As would be expected, the Soviets negotiated the SALT II Treaty so as to protect program options they considered crucial to their strategic needs during the period of the Treaty. The Soviets do not appear to have strategic requirements so pressing as to cause them to make major visible alterations in their strategic programs in the coming months, while US ratification of the Treaty is deferred. They have indicated their willingness, if the Treaty

⁶ *The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps. [Footnote is in the original.]*

is ratified, to proceed promptly to negotiate further reductions and limitations, but their aims would be complicated by the new Western programs. Moreover, the Soviets might find it difficult to accept continuation beyond 1985 of the SALT II limitations on new ICBMs, ICBM fractionation, and perhaps total numbers of launchers. These provisions would limit their options for increasing the counterforce capabilities and survivability of their land-based missile forces in response to the US MX/MPS and other programs. We are, therefore, uncertain whether the Soviets would be willing to extend such limits beyond 1985.

12. Economic considerations are also a factor in Soviet planning for strategic forces in the 1980s. Energy, demographic, and productivity problems are adding to Soviet economic difficulties. To help ease these difficulties, the Soviets might consider reducing the rate of growth of military spending. However, the evidence available to us on current and planned Soviet programs leads us to conclude that growth in total defense spending and in spending for strategic programs over the next few years will be at or near the historic long-term rate of 4 to 5 percent a year. If the Soviet leaders should perceive economic pressure so severe that they had to consider a moderation of the rate of growth in their defense spending, we believe they would not single out strategic programs for a major reduction in growth.

13. Several major factors lead us to believe that the Soviets are not likely to alter significantly their commitment to long-term strategic force improvements. These factors include the following:

- Continued progress toward the achievement of Soviet objectives for strategic nuclear forces remains a priority element in leadership planning.

- A cutback in Soviet strategic forces would have only a limited effect on the USSR's most serious economic problems.

- The momentum of Soviet strategic programs would be hard to arrest, particularly in a period of leadership transition.

- New signs of Western determination and the deterioration of detente probably will contribute to continued Soviet determination to seek to shift the correlation of forces in the USSR's favor.

- The possibility, however remote, of large-scale nuclear war will continue to support efforts to improve Soviet war-fighting capabilities.

Thus we believe that, while seeking to slow or halt US and NATO weapon programs, the Soviets will at the same time initiate and continue programs designed to overcome current weaknesses, especially in their strategic defenses, and to give themselves options to counter the prospective Western programs.

B. Main Current Trends in Soviet Programs

14. Much evidence on past and present Soviet strategic programs leads us to believe that the Soviets have been striving to acquire and

maintain strategic forces and supporting elements that, in the event of nuclear war, could:

- Launch crippling counterforce strikes.
- Survive large-scale nuclear attack.
- Be employed flexibly against a wide range of targets.
- Substantially limit damage to the USSR.

15. The number of Soviet weapons with good *counterforce capabilities* is increasing rapidly:

—Conversion of 820 older silos to make them capable of launching ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) will be completed in 1981.

—The latest MIRVed versions of the SS-18 and SS-19, now being deployed, are considerably more accurate than earlier versions of these missiles and have substantial hard-target capabilities.

—Available evidence still points to Soviet programs for five new or modified ICBMs. The characteristics of at least some of them will probably include improved reliability and even better accuracies.

—Flight-testing of follow-ons to the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, however, is not likely to occur for a few years. The Soviets have already incorporated into their current systems major [*less than 1 line not declassified*] modifications that we had expected to appear on the follow-on systems, and they are still working on other modifications.

16. The Soviets are steadily improving the *survivability* of their strategic forces and supporting elements. Recent developments include:

—The much greater hardening of silos as they are converted to accommodate MIRVed ICBMs, and research and testing to make the silos even harder.

—The continued deployment of MIRVed, mobile IRBMs and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] development of two solid-propellant ICBMs, at least one of which could be deployed on mobile launchers.

—The further deployment of MIRVed SLBMs and an increase in the number of SSBNs on patrol or in transit. Additional increases are likely in the 1980s, especially with deployment of the new, large Typhoon submarine and missile.

—The continued expansion and protection of capabilities for command, control, and communications by a combination of hardening, redundancy, and mobility.

17. The Soviets are adding to their capabilities for *flexible employment* of strategic nuclear forces under a variety of circumstances:

—The deployment of MIRVed missiles and the improvement of command and control systems are adding to Soviet targeting flexibility.

—Aerodynamic systems are being retained as part of both inter-continental and peripheral attack forces. Backfires continue to be deployed. A new bomber and cruise missile carrier are under development, but we now doubt that they could be operational until after 1985.

The development of a long-range air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) continues.

—The SS–20 IRBM is adding to Soviet striking power and flexibility for attacking targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. A variant of the SS–20 is being flight-tested. Some older MRBM and IRBM sites have been deactivated, but some of the launch-related equipment and missiles are apparently being transferred to remaining active sites.

—The Soviets are increasing the proficiency of their command and control system [3 lines not declassified]

—The Soviets are improving their ability to launch their missiles on receipt of tactical warning. They are completing large new radars that will improve ballistic missile early warning. Their launch detection satellite program is still in difficulty, however.

18. The capability of Soviet strategic defenses to contribute to *limiting damage* to the USSR remains low despite large, continuing Soviet investments. Weapon systems now being tested should bring some improvement, notably in strategic air defenses.

—In strategic air defense, the Soviets are starting to deploy new versions of existing interceptors, but their low-altitude capabilities will be limited. Modified and new interceptors with lookdown/shootdown capabilities are being flight-tested, and deployment of a new low-altitude surface-to-air missile system is imminent. An airborne warning and control system (AWACS) that is being tested probably will have capabilities over land as well as over water. These systems will have better capabilities against low-altitude bombers, but they probably will have only limited capabilities against cruise missiles. There is as yet no evidence of active development of systems designed specifically to intercept cruise missiles at low altitudes.

—In ballistic missile defense, the Soviets are continuing to develop an ABM system that could be deployed more rapidly than the Moscow system. The R&D program for antiballistic missiles could give them options in the 1980s for upgrading their present ABM system at Moscow or for deploying ABM defenses more widely.

—In antisubmarine warfare (ASW), intensive efforts are under way to improve both acoustic and nonacoustic sensors. However, Soviet towed-array sonar development is not as far along as we had thought. [2 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

—In directed-energy technology, the Soviets are conducting a broadly based research program to investigate applications for strategic defense. They are continuing to develop laser weapon prototypes for testing against aerodynamic vehicles, satellites, and ballistic missile reentry vehicles.

—In civil defense, new evidence and analysis show that the proportion of urban residents that could be accommodated in blast shelters is toward the low side of our previous estimate of 10 to 20 percent. This reinforces our belief that the Soviets would have to rely on city evacuation as their principal means of protecting the urban population.

The Soviets, however, could shelter a large proportion of their political leadership and many key industrial workers.

—The Soviets have operational systems capable of attacking or degrading some US satellites and are probably working to improve their capabilities.

C. Future Soviet Forces for Strategic Attack

Possible Soviet Reactions to MX/MPS

19. *Under SALT II.* While the Soviets will try to halt or severely limit the MX/MPS system, they can also be expected to use the time between now and the middle 1980s to develop counters to both the hard-target capabilities and the survivability features of the US system. One of the first indicators of the Soviets' response is likely to be the missile they choose to flight-test as the one new type of ICBM permitted them under SALT II restrictions. They could select either of two new solid-propellant ICBMs [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a small system that could be deployed on offroad mobile launchers but could carry no more than a few MIRVs, and a medium system that could be fitted with a large single reentry vehicle or with up to 10 MIRVs but, if deployed in a mobile configuration, probably would be restricted to improved roads or special deployment areas. Alternatively, the Soviets could develop a medium-size liquid-propellant ICBM to carry 10 RVs, but such a system could not easily be deployed in a mobile mode and we have no evidence that it is under development.

20. At present, the Soviets are keeping their options open. We assume that, under SALT II limitations, they would choose as their new ICBM a single-RV medium solid system to replace the SS-11, and would deploy it in silos and perhaps on mobile launchers. We think they would also develop—but not flight-test—a MIRV version of this system and a more highly fractionated version of the SS-18. By these actions they could minimize disruptions to their present ICBM programs and be ready to flight-test and deploy ICBMs with greater numbers of RVs if the SALT II limitations expired at the end of 1985. We do not have high confidence that the Soviets will follow this course of action. A 10-RV replacement for SS-17s or SS-19s, or both, seems only a little less likely than a single-RV replacement for SS-11s, especially if the Soviets expected SALT II limitations to be extended beyond 1985 and wanted to maximize their counterforce RVs within these limitations.

21. *Under No-SALT Conditions.* If the SALT limitations on offensive arms were abandoned this year and the Soviets embarked on a major program of force improvement and expansion, they would have more options to respond to the prospect of MX/MPS deployment. They could take full advantage of their large ICBM throw weight and their ongoing R&D programs. Anticipatory actions could be taken gradually,

without disrupting near-term Soviet programs. For example, we would expect the Soviets to deploy 14 RVs on SS-18s after a brief flight test program, and to deploy another version with still more RVs in about 1985. A MIRVed medium solid ICBM could be deployed without having to replace existing SS-17s and SS-19s, which themselves could be upgraded to carry more MIRVs. The smaller solid-propellant ICBM could also be flight-tested and deployed. Mobile ICBM launchers as well as additional SLBM launchers could be deployed without compensatory dismantling. We believe that, through such means, the Soviets would seek to counter the US MX/MPS and other programs as they emerged.

Soviet Intercontinental Striking Forces

22. Our projections of Soviet intercontinental striking forces reflect our judgment that the USSR will continue its historical heavy reliance on ICBMs, secondary reliance on SLBMs, and maintenance of a relatively small force of aerodynamic systems for intercontinental attack. The four projections we display illustrate alternative future Soviet force levels under various assumptions about SALT. The projections are based on observed recent trends and our best estimates of Soviet technological progress, and are made in the light of Soviet objectives for strategic forces as well as US strategic program options. They are not confident estimates of what the Soviets will actually do over a period as long as 10 years ahead, especially in this period of transition in Soviet and US programs.

23. We project two moderate SALT-limited (Mod SAL) Soviet forces, in which we assume that the SALT II Treaty enters into force this year and remains unchanged through mid-1989. In the first force we assume that the Soviets elect as their permitted one new type of ICBM a medium solid-propellant missile with a large single RV, and deploy it in upgraded SS-11 silos and on mobile launchers. The second Mod SAL force illustrates the effects of a Soviet decision to maximize the number of ICBM RVs within SALT II limits, by replacing all SS-17s and SS-19s with a medium solid-propellant system having 10 RVs, deployed in silos and on mobile launchers.

24. We project a third force (termed SAL/No-SAL) which illustrates the Soviet potential to develop and deploy additional forces and to respond to the MX/MPS system if SALT II limitations are in force through 1985, but expire at the end of that year. This projection assumes that the USSR prepares in advance for rapid, subsequent improvements in the counterforce capability and survivability of its offensive forces.

25. A fourth force (Mod No-SAL) illustrates Soviet development and deployment options under circumstances in which the SALT II Treaty is abandoned this year, the SALT process breaks down, and

US-Soviet relations deteriorate still further. In this environment, we believe the Soviets would be motivated to compete more vigorously with the United States by deploying additional improved systems. Further, without SALT II constraints they probably would retain many of the older systems that would have been deactivated under the provisions of the Treaty. The projection assumes that the Soviets would field a large force of highly fractionated ICBMs to increase their striking capabilities, and that they would seek still further to improve the survivability of their forces by deploying larger numbers of mobile ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs.

Static Comparisons of US and Soviet Intercontinental Striking Forces

26. Figure 1 illustrates projected trends in the number of weapons in future Soviet forces and in their explosive power, with and without SALT II limitations. The top two charts compare the moderate SALT-limited Soviet forces, and the SAL/No-SAL force, with a US SALT-limited force that is based on Department of Defense projections. The charts show that the projected Soviet SALT-limited forces would improve relative to the projected US force in the early and middle 1980s, but that the trends would become less favorable to the Soviets in the second half of the decade if SALT II limits remained in effect throughout the period. The charts also show that Soviet forces could match or exceed those of the United States in the late 1980s if SALT II limitations expired in 1985, the Soviets expanded their forces, and the United States continued to develop its forces as currently programmed:

—In online missile RVs and bomber weapons, the present US lead becomes very small by the early 1980s. The United States would regain the lead in the late 1980s under SALT-limited conditions, unless the Soviets deployed 10 RVs on all their MIRVed ICBMs. However, the Soviets could achieve an advantage in the late 1980s if the SALT II Treaty expired in 1985 and the United States did not change its programmed force.

—In online equivalent megatons, the Soviet forces maintain their current lead in each of these assumed circumstances.

27. The bottom two charts in figure 1 illustrate the prospects for Soviet force improvement and expansion under conditions in which SALT II is abandoned and the Soviets begin a buildup this year. In these circumstances, we project that Soviet forces would achieve qualitative and quantitative characteristics that would substantially exceed those that they would be likely to have under SALT II:

—In numbers of online missile RVs and bomber weapons, the Soviets would be able to deploy more highly fractionated ICBMs and SLBMs (for example, a 20-RV SS-18 in 1985) than they could under SALT II. Owing to this greater flexibility, the number of Soviet missile

RVs and bomber weapons grows more rapidly and by 1989 exceeds that of the SALT-limited forces by a substantial margin.

—In online equivalent megatons, the Soviet No-SALT force grows to a level greater than that of the SALT-limited forces. The rate of increase, however, is more gradual than that shown for missile RVs and bomber weapons. This is because highly fractionated payloads tend to have less explosive power than payloads with fewer RVs.

For comparison, the SAL/No-SAL projection is also reproduced on the bottom two charts. It illustrates that by preparing themselves to break out of SALT limitations rapidly upon expiration of a SALT II Treaty in 1985, the Soviets could by 1989 acquire forces which, in these indexes, approach the forces we would expect them to acquire through a more gradual No-SALT buildup beginning this year. If the Soviets were to delay the start of a buildup because of uncertainty over the outcome of SALT II but began it in 1982, for example, the Soviet curves on these graphs would probably be between the SAL/No-SAL and the No-SAL curves.

28. A variety of possibilities exist for more threatening Soviet inter-continental offensive forces. Even under SALT II limitations, the performance characteristics of Soviet weapons might be better, or might be improved faster than our best estimates indicate. If there were no SALT limitations, the Soviets could deploy even more MIRVs and relatively survivable launchers than in our Mod No-SAL projection. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Soviets could substantially exceed our best estimates of deployment and technological achievement in all components of their forces. This would strain Soviet development and production capacity and incur the costs and risks of very fast replacement rates. Projections illustrating the upper bounds of our uncertainties about Soviet technological progress and deployment rates can be found in chapter V in the main text of this Estimate.

Soviet Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack

29. Soviet medium- and intermediate-range forces for strategic attack on the Eurasian periphery have long been superior in numbers and capabilities to comparable Western and Chinese forces. The asymmetry is increasing with the deployment of the mobile SS-20 IRBM and the Backfire bomber. On the basis of limited evidence of Soviet planning in the mid-1970s, and trends in production and deployment since then, we have projected a continued, moderately paced Soviet program to modernize peripheral strategic striking forces. The main features of this projection are:

—Deployment of about 300 launchers for MIRVed, mobile IRBMs by about 1985, and the replacement of the SS-20 with a follow-on missile.

—Deployment of some 200 Backfires to Long Range Aviation by 1989, assuming that Backfire production is limited to 30 per year and that output continues to be shared about equally between LRA and Soviet Naval Aviation.

—Basing of the new weapon systems to ensure coverage of all areas on the Eurasian periphery, with mobile IRBMs divided in about equal thirds among the western, eastern, and central USSR and Backfires oriented primarily to penetrate European air defenses. There is an alternative view that the Backfire has good intercontinental capabilities, and that some portion of the Backfire force would be employed against targets in the United States.⁷

—Some continued deactivations of older MR/IRBM launchers, and retirements of older medium bombers. We are uncertain, however, about whether these aging systems will gradually decline or be retained, in part because the Soviets are probably hedging against NATO force modernization.

30. We have no present basis for estimating how improvements in NATO long-range theater nuclear forces would affect Soviet peripheral attack programs, or what specific arms control proposals the USSR may put forward. The Soviets would have the option of expanding their peripheral attack forces with a higher level of effort, and could take further steps to improve tactical nuclear forces.

D. Counterforce Capabilities and Prelaunch Survivability of Soviet Intercontinental Striking Forces

31. The Soviets expect that intercontinental nuclear conflict would most likely arise out of an intense US-Soviet crisis or confrontation, probably involving a conventional theater war that had escalated. The Soviets generally envisage strategic nuclear operations as complex engagements, rather than as a single all-out exchange. [3 lines not declassified] the Soviets stress employment flexibility and endurance in the development of their strategic weapons and supporting elements. A longstanding aim of the Soviets is to improve the survivability of their command and control system so that it could function even under circumstances in which it had suffered direct, large-scale nuclear attacks.

32. Recent Soviet programs for intercontinental attack forces and supporting elements include features reflecting the stress on flexibility and endurance [6 lines not declassified] Over the years the Soviets have acquired capabilities to employ their intercontinental nuclear forces in initial, preemptive, or retaliatory strikes, and in recent years they have been developing capabilities to launch their forces upon receipt of tactical warning that an enemy attack had been launched. We believe that the Soviet command and control system could support any of

⁷ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. [Footnote is in the original.]

these employment options. We also believe the system would have good capabilities for sustained battle management following an initial nuclear strike, but would be severely degraded if national-level command bunkers and communication centers were destroyed.

Counterforce Capabilities

33. If the Soviets were to launch a strike on the United States, their objective of highest priority would be to reduce the retaliatory capability of opposing offensive forces. The Soviets would target US bomber and SSBN bases, of which there are only a few, as well as US ICBM silos, of which there are about 1,000. In addition, the Soviets will be faced with a large number of MX shelters in the late 1980s.

34. Judging by present trends in the number and capabilities of Soviet ICBM RVs, we believe that from now on the Soviet ICBM force will be capable of destroying most US ICBM silos and still have many warheads remaining for other purposes. An MPS system, however, would tax Soviet counterforce capabilities in the late 1980s. The Soviet choice of which new ICBM to deploy under SALT limitations would influence the number of ICBM RVs available to attack MX shelters, but the more important factor affecting the number is whether or not SALT limitations were in effect. The table below shows our alternative projections of total online Soviet ICBM RVs in 1989, those with hard-target capabilities, and the number on ready missiles in excess of those required to attack silos. While all such excess RVs would theoretically be available to attack MX shelters, it should be noted that the Soviets would also have requirements to attack other kinds of targets and to withhold ICBMs for other purposes. These requirements would reduce the number of ICBM RVs actually available for attacking MX shelters.

35. There is a divergent view that, because of the other Soviet targeting and withhold requirements for ICBM RVs, the number of Soviet hard-target ICBM RVs available for use against the planned US MX/MPS system would be far fewer than the “excess” shown in the table. As a result, the holders of this view believe the table and figure 2 overstate the threat to the planned US MX/MPS system.⁸

⁸ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]

Soviet Hard-Target ICBM Reentry Vehicles in 1989

Moderate Force Projections	Total Online ICBM RVs	Hard-Target-Capable ICBM RVs	Hard-Target RVs in Excess of Those Required To Attack Minuteman Silos
SALT limitations through 1989 New ICBM with single RV	6,200	6,200	4,600
SALT limitations through 1989 New ICBM with 10 RVs	8,600	8,200	6,500
SALT limitations through 1985 Buildup begins in 1986	11,700	11,700	9,900
No SALT limitations Buildup begins in 1980	13,800	13,800	11,400

36. Figure 2 illustrates the number of ICBM RVs remaining on each side if the ICBMs of the Soviet SALT-limited forces were used to attack all US ICBMs and MX shelters. For this purpose, we assume that the Soviets target two ICBM RVs against each US silo and one RV against each MX shelter, and that US ICBMs ride out the attack. The figure shows:

—In the top two charts, if the Soviets elected to deploy a new ICBM with a single RV, a Soviet attack on all US silos and the 4,600 MX shelters currently programmed would leave the US ICBM force with few surviving RVs but, by 1989, the USSR would also be left with few ICBM RVs for other missions.

—In the bottom two charts, if the Soviets elected to deploy a new MIRVed ICBM with 10 RVs, the Soviet attack would leave the USSR with about 2,000 ICBM RVs available for other missions in 1989.

37. If the SALT II limits were to expire in 1985 or if SALT II were abandoned this year, the Soviets would have the flexibility to increase their inventory of ICBM warheads far beyond what would be required to attack all US silos and the 4,600 MX shelters currently programmed. With this US shelter program, the Soviets could have 5,000 to 6,000 ICBM RVs remaining after an attack on US ICBMs in the late 1980s

under these No-SALT circumstances. However, the Soviets probably would expect the United States to increase the number of MX shelters substantially. In this case, Soviet RVs remaining after a Soviet silo/shelter attack would be significantly reduced.

38. We believe the Soviets are now considering some form of advanced guidance system for their future SLBMs, but it is unlikely that MIRVed SLBMs with hard-target capabilities could be deployed before the 1990s. To acquire such capabilities, the Soviets would have to develop guidance techniques employing global positioning satellites or terminal RV homing. This would involve more technical risk and vulnerability to countermeasures than the Soviets have been willing to accept in their SLBM systems to date. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the MX/MPS system might motivate the Soviets to develop such techniques and that, with a high level of effort, they might be able to start deploying SLBMs capable of attacking MX shelters in the late 1980s.

39. The Soviets have ample capabilities to destroy all US SSBN bases as well as the bases of the US bomber force. We have no present evidence that the Soviets are trying to minimize the flight time of SLBMs in order to pose a greater threat to US alert bombers. In view of the dispersal and other measures the United States could exercise, it is unlikely that the Soviets would be able to destroy more than a few of the bombers the United States keeps on alert.

Prelaunch Survivability

40. The overall survivability of Soviet intercontinental offensive forces in the 1980s will remain heavily dependent on the survivability of their fixed ICBMs. Deployment of more SLBM RVs and mobile ICBMs would increase the relatively survivable portion of Soviet forces, but present trends do not suggest a radical shift away from silo-based ICBMs. Figure 3 depicts the threat to Soviet ICBMs posed by current and programmed US SALT-limited forces, assuming that the United States targeted two ICBM RVs against each Soviet silo and that Soviet silo-based ICBMs rode out an attack. The figure shows:

—In the top two charts, if the Soviets elected to deploy a new ICBM with a single RV, some 3,000 Soviet RVs on silo-based ICBMs could be expected to survive an attack by US ICBMs through the middle 1980s. In the late 1980s, however, the number of silo-based RVs expected to survive would be reduced to about 500 because of the increased counterforce capability of the MX.

—In the bottom two charts, if the Soviets elected to deploy a 10-RV new ICBM, the number of silo-based RVs expected to survive in the late 1980s would be only slightly higher.

—In both cases, a two-on-one attack on all Soviet silos would leave the United States with virtually no ICBM RVs remaining until the late

1980s, at which time, it would have unused ICBM RVs available for other purposes.

—Soviet mobile ICBMs would be vulnerable to a US ICBM attack if deployed at fixed support bases like those used for the SS-20 IRBM. Their survivability could be increased if, as we think likely, the Soviets dispersed them in a crisis. The charts show that with dispersed mobile launchers, the Soviets could have as many as 1,500 additional surviving ICBM RVs if the USSR elected a 10-RV missile as its new ICBM and deployed a number of them on mobile launchers. A single-RV new ICBM would not offer this advantage because even a large force of mobiles would carry relatively few RVs.

41. The foregoing charts indicate that in SALT-limited circumstances the Soviets could expect a substantial number of their silo-based ICBM RVs to survive in the early and middle 1980s even if they rode out an attack. Under No-SALT circumstances, the Soviets could MIRV virtually all of their ICBMs, and therefore could expect a somewhat greater number of ICBM RVs to survive a US attack in the early and middle 1980s. In the late 1980s, however, the number of expected Soviet ICBM RV survivors probably would still decline to relatively low levels, unless the Soviets were to change their force mix more dramatically than we believe likely even under No-SALT circumstances.

42. It should also be noted that the highly accurate US bomber and ALCM weapons would pose an additional threat to Soviet silo-based ICBMs. The Soviets would be concerned about this additional capability but would be aware that the US aerodynamic systems would be subject to attrition by Soviet air defenses and that their long flight times would give the USSR more time to decide whether to launch its silo-based ICBMs.

43. With regard to the survivability of the other elements of Soviet intercontinental striking forces, roughly 75 percent of the Soviet SSBN force is normally in port and no bombers are kept on alert. Therefore, both elements are vulnerable to surprise attack. [3 lines not declassified] With [less than 1 line not declassified] warning, the Soviets could put [less than 1 line not declassified] of their modern SSBNs to sea in combat-ready status. At full combat readiness, the survivability of bombers would be increased because they probably would be dispersed and placed on alert.

E. Quasi-Dynamic Analysis of Soviet and US Intercontinental Striking Forces⁹

44. Comparisons of the aggregate size of strategic forces provide important insights into significant trends in US and Soviet

⁹ For the view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military services on the validity and propriety of this analysis, see paragraph 47. [Footnote is in the original.]

intercontinental striking power. Because such comparisons are essentially static in nature, however, they cannot fully reflect differences between the two forces and their capabilities that arise from qualitative asymmetries. These differences can be better illuminated by using an analytical technique—quasi-dynamic analysis—that has been an integral part of this Estimate for the past several years. This analysis addresses the potential of one side's ICBMs to attack the retaliatory forces of the other side and then compares the residual destructive potentials. The respective arsenals are reduced by subtracting those ICBMs needed for the attack and those retaliatory forces destroyed in the attack; the ICBMs of the side attacked are assumed to ride out the attack without being launched. The residuals are on-pad potentials, calculated without considering such factors as specific targeting doctrines, command and control degradation, attrition by air defenses, and other operational variables.

45. The calculations in the analysis do not attempt to simulate actual conflict outcomes. Rather, they seek to display comparative capabilities and limitations in a manner most relevant to nuclear deterrence in its most elementary form—that is, assured destruction. The analysis illustrates the retaliatory destructive potential that a side contemplating an attack would have to expect to survive on the side attacked. It also compares this surviving destructive potential with the destructive potential remaining to the attacking side, a consideration important to both sides.

46. The measures employed in the analysis—lethal area potential and hard-target potential—describe the remaining and surviving potentials of each side to apply a prescribed overpressure over a wide area or to attack representative hardened silos on the other side.¹⁰ The analysis makes no estimate of which of these or other capabilities, or what mix of them, national leaders would elect in retaliatory or second strikes. But the comparison of the US and Soviet potentials does give some feel for the options that would be available to national leaders, and the composition of the residual potentials provides insights about the suitability of the forces for rapid or delayed response.

47. There is a view in the Intelligence Community that the quasi-dynamic residual analysis in this Estimate produces misleading results with respect to trends in the strategic balance, sheds little light on the question of deterrence, and comprises a net assessment from the US perspective which is not a proper function of intelligence. According to this view, only analysis of comprehensive two-sided exchanges can

¹⁰ *The Soviet hard-target potential is gauged against representative US silos hardened to [text not declassified] The US potential is gauged against representative Soviet silos of hardnesses [text not declassified].* [Footnote is in the original.]

convey valid and useful impressions about relative US and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. In this view, such analysis from the US perspective should be accomplished within the Department of Defense with intelligence as a full partner, and should not be included in a National Intelligence Estimate. Consequently, the holders of this view believe that the analysis of residual forces in this Estimate (as summarized in figures 4 and 5) should be removed. Further, the holders of this view believe that the Intelligence Community should focus its efforts on understanding and, if possible, duplicating Soviet analytical techniques for net assessment.¹¹

48. The Director of Central Intelligence believes that it would be a disservice to national decision-makers to produce this Estimate without any interpretation of relative US and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities beyond that shown by static indicators. In his view, the inclusion of quasi-dynamic analysis, despite its limitations, allows the Estimate to reach more comprehensive conclusions about relative strategic capabilities and deterrent potentials and about perceptions of them. He believes that the quasi-dynamic analysis is important to those who see the key ingredient of deterrence as the capability of one side to absorb a first strike and retain enough absolute destructive potential to destroy a broad mix of targets on the other side.

Soviet and US Residual Potentials

49. Figure 4 displays the results of our analysis of residual potentials under a worst case circumstance for the side attacked—that is, a surprise attack when forces are on day-to-day alert. The SALT-limited forces of each side are used. In the US force, 200 MX missiles with 4,600 shelters are deployed between 1986 and 1989. The forked lines on these charts indicate our uncertainty about whether the Soviets will deploy a single-RV or a 10-RV missile as their one new ICBM, and show that the trends would not be very different in either case.

50. The charts illustrate that, under SALT II limits, the potentials of residual Soviet forces—measured either in terms of lethal area potential or in terms of hard-target potential—will improve over the next few years regardless of which side struck first. The Soviets will have a sizable advantage in these potentials in the early and middle 1980s, but US force improvements will erode and even reverse the Soviet gains if SALT II limits extend beyond 1985. By 1989, Soviet residual potentials would revert to levels equal to or less than those the Soviets would have today, while US residuals would grow to levels substantially larger than those available to the USSR. The Soviets could alter these adverse trends if they deployed even larger numbers of mobile ICBMs

¹¹ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]

and SLBMs or established high alert rates for such systems. It would be difficult, however, for the Soviets between now and the late 1980s to change their force mix sufficiently to reverse these trends.

51. Figure 5 compares the composition by major force element of the residual lethal area potentials and hard-target potentials of US and Soviet SALT-limited forces after a surprise attack by the other side:

—The composition of the surviving Soviet potentials reinforces the impression that it is the continued heavy Soviet reliance on silo-based ICBMs that causes the adverse effects on Soviet residuals in the late 1980s if the United States deploys the MX.

—The composition of surviving US forces shows that, despite increasing US ICBM silo vulnerability, US residuals decline only slightly in the early 1980s because ICBMs make up a relatively small portion of US prestrike potentials. Deployment of MX with 4,600 shelters would not significantly increase the surviving US potentials if, as assumed in this analysis, the Soviets were willing to expend large numbers of their ICBMs to attack all MX shelters. The charts show that bombers and ALCM carriers, which must be launched to survive attack and are subject to air defense attrition, would account for a large and increasing fraction of the surviving US potentials.

52. To provide an indication of the urban and industrial destruction that could be achieved by the surviving lethal area potentials of these SALT-limited forces, we have compared them with US and Soviet urban areas. We find that:

—Throughout the 1980s, the area over which surviving US forces could theoretically create overpressures sufficient to destroy reinforced concrete buildings would be equivalent to the [less than 1 line not declassified] square kilometers. Even the relatively few surviving US ICBM RVs would have the potential to destroy a large share of Soviet economic value.

—In the early and middle 1980s, the Soviet surviving lethal area potential would be equivalent to [less than 1 line not declassified] kilometers. By the late 1980s, the surviving Soviet potential would have been reduced to less than one-half of this amount. Even then, however, the Soviet potential would exceed that required to destroy most of the US economic value.

53. We have also examined the surviving hard-target potential of each of these forces in relationship to the missile silos, shelters, and hardened command and control bunkers of the other. We find that:

—Surviving US ICBM warheads would have the potential to destroy only a small number of Soviet ICBM silos, but a large proportion of the Soviet national- and intermediate-level command and control bunkers. Surviving US bomber weapons would have the potential to destroy a substantial portion of Soviet ICBM silos, although they have relatively long flight times and would be subject to air defense attrition.

—Surviving Soviet ICBM warheads, on the other hand, could destroy a substantial number of US silos, as well as US hardened command and control facilities in quick-reaction retaliatory strikes. They could destroy only a small fraction of the US MX shelters available in 1989, however.

54. Finally we have examined the surviving potentials of the SALT-limited forces of each side to destroy nonsilo military targets, which vary widely in area and hardness. Throughout the 1980s under SALT circumstances, each side would have the surviving potential to destroy a large percentage of these targets on the other side. For the United States, the bulk of this potential would reside in either its surviving SLBM warheads or its bomber weapons. For the USSR, the potential would reside in either its surviving ICBM or SLBM warheads.

Implications

55. With regard to absolute residual capabilities the quasi-dynamic analysis indicates that, throughout the period of the Estimate, the SALT-limited forces of each side could devastate the other side in retaliation after absorbing a first strike.

56. With regard to relative residual capabilities:

—The analysis shows that, if they struck first with SALT-constrained forces, the Soviets could have a substantial advantage in residual potentials through the middle 1980s. The United States would begin to narrow the gap thereafter and, in the late 1980s, would achieve residual potentials about equal to those of the USSR. Thus, the United States is at a disadvantage through the middle 1980s and the situation then improves.

—From the point of view of Soviet concern about the possibility of a US first strike, again with SALT-constrained forces, the analysis indicates that Soviet residuals would be the greater in the middle 1980s, but would fall well below those of the United States by the late 1980s.

57. With regard to the very broad trends under SALT II conditions:

—The analysis shows a substantial Soviet improvement in the next few years, reaching a plateau in the early and middle 1980s or peaking in the middle 1980s. It shows a slight US decline in the early 1980s and a sharp improvement in the US position in the late 1980s.

—These trends are caused by the combined effects of heavy Soviet reliance on fixed land-based ICBMs, US force diversity and planned modernization, and SALT II limitations if extended through the decade.

F. Capabilities of Soviet Strategic Defenses

58. In light of the improving Soviet intercontinental offensive capabilities, the extent to which Soviet strategic defenses—air and missile defenses, antisubmarine warfare forces, and civil defense—could reduce the damage to the USSR from US retaliatory strikes is becoming even more important. Currently, Soviet strategic defenses would

be unable to reduce significantly the weight of a large-scale US nuclear attack on the USSR.

Air Defense

59. At present the massive Soviet air defense forces, if undegraded, would probably perform well against aircraft at medium and high altitude, but they have little capability to intercept targets at low altitudes. The graphs in figure 6 reflect our projections that:

—New interceptors, the majority of them equipped with modern lookdown/shootdown capabilities, and a new low-altitude surface-to-air missile system will be deployed in substantial numbers during the 1980s.

—The percentage of the area of the western USSR covered by air defense warning and control systems capable of vectoring lookdown/shootdown fighters will grow gradually. Significant gaps in coverage will remain, however.

—With the deployment of AWACS aircraft in conjunction with longer range interceptors, the Soviets in the middle and late 1980s would be able, for relatively brief periods (during a crisis, for example), to mount forward defenses along the approach routes to the western USSR. Such defenses would be designed to intercept US bombers and to force ALCM carriers to launch their missiles at considerable distances from Soviet borders.

60. We are unable to quantify the attrition that Soviet air defenses would be able to inflict on US low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles, in part because of uncertainties about key technical characteristics of future Soviet systems, and in part because we cannot quantify the effects of important operational factors and interactions that would bear heavily on actual air defense performance. Accordingly, there is a view in the Intelligence Community which holds that graphs showing the gross area of theoretical coverage of air defense systems, particularly when standing alone, can be misleading as measures of Soviet air defense potential. Because such graphs cannot incorporate important deployment and operational considerations, this view concludes that the graphs are not useful.¹²

61. The estimates that follow represent our best judgments about the capabilities of Soviet air defenses against programed US aerodynamic forces over the next decade:

—In the early 1980s, improved Soviet air defense systems will not be available in numbers large enough to markedly improve defense against bombers and cruise missiles at low altitudes.

—In the middle and late 1980s, Soviet air defenses will probably have reduced the USSR's vulnerability to US defense avoidance tactics

¹² The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]

and, if undegraded, will have the potential to inflict considerably higher attrition against US bombers of current types. They will probably have little or no effective capability against in-flight US short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) carried by bombers.

—The Soviets will gradually develop the capability to defend some key areas against currently programmed US cruise missiles. Because of technical and numerical deficiencies, however, their capability to defend against a large force of US cruise missiles will probably remain low.

—In addition, precursor missile attacks, defense saturation and suppression, and electronic warfare would degrade the overall effectiveness of Soviet air defenses.

—Thus, the actual performance of the defenses against combined attacks involving large numbers of US bombers, SRAMs, and cruise missiles will probably remain low during the period of this Estimate.

ABM Defense

62. Soviet R&D activities in ballistic missile defense continue. In our view, these efforts represent hedging against an uncertain future and are aimed at deterring the United States from abrogating the ABM Treaty and developing options for ABM system deployment in the 1980s. There continues to be no evidence to suggest that the Soviets have decided to deploy ABM defenses beyond Moscow.

63. Within the provisions of the ABM Treaty, the Soviets could use the systems they have under development to improve their limited ABM defenses at Moscow. Such improvements could provide better capabilities to defend a few selected targets in the Moscow area, such as command and control facilities, but could not provide more than minimal defense against a large US missile attack.

64. The Soviet ABM R&D program could give the USSR options to deploy additional ABM defenses beginning in the early or middle 1980s. If the ABM Treaty is abrogated, these options would include: further expansion of the Moscow ABM defenses; relatively rapid deployment of an ABM system with aboveground launchers to protect other key area targets; and slower paced deployment of a system with silo launchers for defense of key area targets or for hard point defense of selected military targets. The ABM system available for such deployment in the middle or late 1980s would be able to intercept US missile RVs of all current types, including those accompanied by chaff. The effectiveness of these defenses would depend most importantly on US reactions, such as the deployment of penetration aids and the adaptation of tactics.

65. For the past several years, we have expressed concern that, in addition to ballistic missile early warning (BMEW), the four large radars that are being built along the periphery of the USSR could also have or be given the capability to perform ABM battle management. With such a capability, these radars could constitute long-leadtime preparations

for future ABM deployment. In terms of size and power, they have the inherent potential for ABM battle management.

66. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

67. There is a divergent view in the Intelligence Community that the available evidence is subject to alternative interpretation as to the capabilities and intended use of the new radars, and is insufficient to conclude that they are only for BMEW and space surveillance. According to this view, the fact remains that these long-leadtime items possess a significant potential for future ABM battle management and could provide data accurate enough for such employment.¹³

Antisubmarine Warfare

68. Soviet forces with ASW capabilities are not now an effective counter to US SSBNs. The critical problems confronting the USSR are limitations in sensors and signal data processing. Major R&D programs are under way to develop improved sensors for submarine detection. The number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with improved but still limited ASW capabilities will probably increase from about 25 at present to about 85 in the late 1980s, or to as many as 100 if a number of Y-class SSBNs are converted to SSNs. We believe new classes of Soviet SSNs will incorporate more effective noise reduction methods than those in existing submarine classes. New types of surface ships and long-range patrol aircraft with somewhat improved capabilities for ASW are likely. As a result:

—During the period of the Estimate, the USSR is likely to acquire somewhat better capabilities to detect, track, and attack SSBNs that are operating near the USSR or in confined waters, are leaving ports, or are transiting choke points.

—Despite increasing numbers of ASW-capable forces and improved ASW sensors, we believe the Soviets have little prospect over the next 10 years of being able to detect and track US submarines in broad ocean areas.

—Moreover, longer range US SLBMs are significantly increasing the ocean area within which US SSBNs will be able to operate and remain within missile range of targets in the USSR.

—We therefore believe that, throughout the period of this Estimate, the Soviets would be unable to prevent US SSBNs on patrol in broad ocean areas from launching their missiles.

Directed-Energy Weapons

69. As part of a long-term development effort in technologies applicable to air, missile, and space defense, the Soviets are conducting extensive research in the advanced technologies of lasers, particle

¹³ The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. [Footnote is in the original.]

beams, and nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse generation. The magnitude, scope, and variety of these programs suggest that the Soviets are actively exploring ways by which they might use directed-energy technology to overcome or alleviate major weaknesses in their strategic defenses.

—The Soviets may now have a ground-based laser capable of damaging some satellite sensors and may have a space-based antisatellite weapon under development. With a successful high-priority effort, the Soviets might be able to have ground-based laser air defense weapons ready for operational deployment to strategic air defense forces in the middle-to-late 1980s. The Soviets evidently are also investigating the feasibility of a laser weapon for ballistic missile defense. We believe that such a weapon, if feasible, could not be ready for operational deployment before 1990.

—The Soviets probably have the capability to develop, by the middle 1980s, a ground-based nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon designed to disrupt or destroy the electronic circuitry of enemy delivery systems.

—Soviet research programs applicable to particle beam weapons (PBW) may permit the USSR to determine the feasibility of such weapons several years before the United States. If feasibility is proved, the Soviets probably could begin testing a prototype short-range (about 3 km) PBW system for air defense by about 1990. There is an alternative view that Soviet research in technologies applicable to PBW could be sufficiently advanced to allow the USSR to begin prototype testing by the middle 1980s, if feasibility is proved.¹⁴ All agree that development of long-range PBW weapons would take much longer.

Civil Defense

70. We have reassessed the ability of Soviet civil defenses to reduce casualties from a US retaliatory attack following a Soviet first strike. Casualties and fatalities would vary greatly depending on the extent of civil defense preparations. Our findings indicate that, at present.

—Prompt Soviet casualties would be about 120 million (including 85 million fatalities) in the case of little or no preparation, about 100 million (60 million fatalities) if urban shelters were fully occupied, and about 40 million (15 million fatalities) if both sheltering and evacuation plans had been fully implemented.

—With a few hours warning, a large percentage of the Soviet leadership at all levels of government probably would survive. With several additional hours for preparation, about one-fourth of the work force in key Soviet industries probably would also survive.

—Civil defense could not prevent massive damage to the Soviet economy.

¹⁴ *The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. [Footnote is in the original.]*

71. In the late 1980s, prompt casualties and fatalities among the general Soviet population would be somewhat greater than in 1979. At present rates of shelter construction, the projected increase in shelter capacity would be more than offset by increases in Soviet urban population and by improvements in US forces. Mass evacuation of cities would still be necessary to save a substantial portion of the urban population. An even larger percentage of the leadership and essential personnel will probably have shelter protection, but the Soviet economy will remain about as vulnerable as at present.

72. Given their belief that all aspects of society contribute to a nation's military capabilities, the Soviet leaders probably view civil defense as contributing to their strength in the US-Soviet strategic balance. They almost certainly believe their present civil defenses would improve their ability to conduct military operations and would enhance the USSR's chances of surviving a nuclear war. Our latest analyses of the effects of civil defense, however, provide additional support to our previous judgment that present and projected Soviet civil defense programs would not embolden the Soviet leaders to take actions during a crisis that would involve deliberately accepting a high risk of nuclear war.

73. There is an alternative view that the Soviet Union's capability to protect its extensive leadership infrastructure at all levels, even under conditions of limited warning, enhances its ability to conduct military operations, improves its crisis management, and promotes postwar recovery. The continuing Soviet investment of major resources in the civil defense program clearly demonstrates the confidence the Soviet leaders have in its value. This confidence could contribute to Soviet resolve in a future crisis environment. According to this view, the Soviet civil defense program—through its potential for influencing political perceptions, providing leverage for coercion during a crisis, affecting nuclear exchange outcomes, and contributing to postwar recovery—impacts on both the reality of the strategic balance and on perceptions of the balance in the USSR and elsewhere.¹⁵

¹⁵ *The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Senior Intelligence Officers of the military services. [Footnote is in the original.]*

185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 22, 1980

SUBJECT

Nuclear Employment Policy (C)

The basic strategy document of your Administration, PD-18,² called for a follow-on review of our nuclear employment policy. Two major studies, one on targeting and one on secure reserve forces, were completed in 1978 and presented to the SCC in April 1979.³ Although the SCC accepted most of the recommendations, it also called for additional work. (S)

At the same time, Harold Brown began implementing the SCC accepted recommendations. In January, 1979, as part of his annual Defense Report, Harold laid out publicly the rationale for our evolving employment policy and gave it a name, "countervailing strategy." Together with the Joint Chiefs, Harold has been working out a detailed implementation directive that he would issue. In the past few weeks, the few outstanding issues have been resolved. (S)

Harold and I have discussed next steps, and we believe that it is wise to codify these changes in a Presidential Directive as originally intended by PD-18. The text of such a directive, which would replace the extant NSDM-242, is at Tab A.⁴ Harold has edited it personally and has discussed it with the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it largely concerns military contingency planning. (S)

The directive marks a significant step in employment doctrine. Its main features are:

- Maintenance of a strong thread of continuity with our past deterrence doctrine to include nuclear support for our allies.

- New emphasis on flexibility, which will make us better able to adjust to any surprises that growing Soviet capabilities could present us in operations. This is to be achieved through better staffing capabilities, a gradual increase in reserve forces, and better targeting of mobile and soft military targets as well as C³I.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 37, PD-59: 5-8/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The date is handwritten. Carter wrote next to it: "Zbig J."

² See Document 31.

³ See Document 118.

⁴ Printed as Document 208.

—Renewed emphasis on C³I as a more and more critical element of an effective deterrent capability.

—A requirement for exercises to validate and improve our doctrine and capabilities. Your participation in IVORY ITEM exercises in 1978 gave a much needed check of our plans. The new directive calls for two exercises annually. (TS)

In addition to the requirements for an integrating directive on employment policy within the military services and the intelligence community, there are two other compelling reasons for this document. (S)

First, Harold can use references to it in public and private statements which are intended to complicate Soviet planning and to convince them, and our allies, that we will not be paralyzed in a crisis between cataclysmic options and capitulation. This is particularly critical for the next few years while a number of our strategic programs are not yet fully deployed. (S)

Second, it may help blunt sharp criticism that we are not dealing adequately with the changing requirements for deterrence in the face of growing Soviet forces and capabilities. (S)

As for interagency handling, Harold prefers no further discussion. (See his memo at Tab B). I agree and suggest that we treat it the same way we do the SIOP. It is, after all, sensitive military contingency planning. Furthermore, it contains references to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Cuba, SRV, and North Korea as well as the Soviet Union, and how they relate to the SIOP, information not known in such explicitness outside the DOD and the White House. Harold suggests that we discuss the PD with Ed Muskie and work out an approach for presenting the substance to the allies. (TS)

I propose two alternatives. First, that you sign the PD and instruct Harold to prepare a version for use with both Ed Muskie and Stan Turner. From that version we can develop the briefing approach to the allies. Second, you can hold a short NSC meeting on the sanitized version and then sign the PD. The approach to briefing the allies would be the same. (TS)

RECOMMENDATION

Sign the directive at Tab A and instruct the Secretary of Defense to prepare a sanitized version for interagency use,

OR

Convene a NSC meeting⁵

⁵ Carter struck-through "NSC" and wrote after "meeting:" "to brief me & VP on what is changed re targeting, flexibility, C³I, etc & proposals for briefing others & guidelines for public statements."

Tab B**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)⁶**

Washington, May 20, 1980

SUBJECT

PD on Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy

With your April 22 draft, modified as recorded in Walter Slocombe's May 2 memo for General Welch,⁷ we have, I believe, a text for a good directive on our nuclear employment policy. I think the next step should be for the two of us to discuss it with Ed, given the obvious foreign policy and alliance implications of the issue. I do not, however, think any further interagency discussion is necessary or appropriate, given the nature of the subject and the prior interagency discussion of the underlying issues.

When we discuss the PD itself with Ed, we should also talk about how best to present it to the Allies. One possibility would be a presentation at the forthcoming NPG. We will also need to discuss what (if any) public statement should be made about it.

Harold

⁶ Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

⁷ Not found.

186. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹

Washington, May 29, 1980

SUBJECT

Crisis Management

As you perhaps know, Bill Odom, Bob Gates, and Carl Smith convened to discuss your memorandum of May 7 on improving communications and other support for managing such incidents as the recent rescue mission. The following improvements will be made:

—Two additional secure voice terminals will be installed in the Situation Room. One already exists.

—A program for increasing the number of secure lines into the White House has been in progress for some time. As it is completed in the coming year, the number of secure lines into the Situation Room will increase above the present five by several. We have recently installed a new dial directory with a capacity for four additional lines. In emergencies we can divert circuits to use them now.

On your recommendation that an additional private circuit from NSA be installed in the White House, we do not have the space and personnel to support it in a mode separate from the present terminal in the Situation Room. In crises, therefore, we shall continue to use the present arrangement.

On maps, graphics, and other support, we shall be delighted with any additional resources you are willing to commit to this purpose. A secure video link in the Situation Room Conference Room allows us at present to look at maps, charts, and other graphics in the NMCC. When we have time, however, our procedures call for requests for actual maps and graphics from either CIA or DOD.

On the occasion of the rescue mission² we did not take advantage of the extant facilities in the Situation Room Conference Room, but I believe that was an exception, not the rule. With those capabilities and planned improvements, the next occasion should prove easier to handle.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 15, Crisis Management: 11/78–5/80. Secret. Drafted by Odom.

² Reference is to the failed April 24 attempt to rescue the U.S. Embassy personnel held hostage by Iranian revolutionaries since November 1979.

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)³

Washington, May 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Crisis Management

1. During the long meeting of the NSC the night the rescue mission aborted, vital communication with the Pentagon, State and CIA was carried out by Harold Brown and Cy Vance using the President's secure telephone in the Oval Office and through Bob Gates passing information to me that he had received via the secure telephone in your office. I think you will agree that at a time when we were so dependent on real time information from the Pentagon, CIA and NSA, these arrangements did not serve us well. They were neither efficient nor, as it turned out, particularly accurate.

2. I know that you have had Bill Odom working to improve White House crisis management procedures, particularly with respect to nuclear conflict and other large scale operations. Nevertheless, in keeping with our conversation the week of the rescue attempt, I believe several inexpensive, easy to implement changes can be made to improve substantially communications to and from the SCC and the NSC during crises of a lower order of magnitude—such as the rescue attempt. These might include:

—Installing a secure voice conference call capability in the Situation Room conference room. This would enable all of us to receive information directly and simultaneously from the NMCC, CIA and NSA, thus saving time and improving the accuracy of information received.

—Providing for permanent direct secure voice channels from the Situation Room to the NMCC, the CIA Operations Center, and the State Department Operations Center. These would be helpful at any time, but I think you will agree could prove especially useful during a crisis situation. This would also leave available two or three or more regular secure voice channels for principals or staff to use.

—Installation of another direct link between NSA and the Situation Room. The existing link is used for the transmission of routine NSA traffic. A second channel could be used for passage of information in extremely close hold situations (such as the rescue), bypassing staff

³ Secret. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "WO. Reaction? It think it's worthwhile. ZB. 5-7-80."

both at NSA and, if you deemed appropriate, at the White House as well.

—Arrangements should also be considered to improve CIA support to the Situation Room in terms of rapid provision of maps, graphics and satellite photography.

3. I recommend that you name a small, informal working group to look into these and perhaps other modest changes that might be made to improve communications into and out of the Situation Room during crises. Such a group might include those who are most familiar with the arrangements and could effect the changes without a lot of bureaucratic red tape. Obviously, your representative (presumably Bill Odom) should chair the group; Bob Gates would be my representative and perhaps it would be worthwhile to include Harold's assistant, Carl Smith, and others you might deem appropriate. The group should act, in my view, as quickly as possible. If you think this idea has merit, please ask Bill to be in touch with Bob.⁴

Stansfield Turner

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this paragraph and wrote: "WO proceed. ZB."

187. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 4, 1980

SUBJECT

Missile Warning Incident

I am attaching Graham Claytor's written communication to Senator Stennis and Congressman Price for your information. He has made it brief and usable as a contingency press release if the incident leaks. (See Tab A). (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

You asked two questions yesterday.² We have the answer to the first: are the two computer systems connected? They are, but the connection apparently did not generate analogous behavior by both. That leads to your second question, what triggered the information on the warning display? They do not yet know. An answer may be available in a few days, but the mysteries in this incident, plus recent previous incidents,³ have sufficiently disturbed Defense so that Bill Perry will lead a panel of experts on a major system review that goes far beyond an answer for this case alone.⁴ (S)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense⁵

Washington, June 4, 1980

FACT SUMMARY

Early yesterday morning a technical problem in a computer at North American Air Defense Command caused some erroneous data to be transmitted. As a result some displays at the National Military Command Center and Strategic Air Command Headquarters indicated multiple missile launches against the United States; however, other information available directly from the sensor system failed to confirm that any missiles had been launched. As a precaution and in accordance with standard procedures, certain Strategic Air Command aircraft and Command and Control aircraft were brought to a higher state of readiness. These aircraft were manned and engines started. One Command and Control aircraft in the Pacific took off. There was no change in overall US defense posture and, after an evaluation, all systems were returned to normal.

The cause of the computer discrepancy is under investigation. In the meantime arrangements have been made to insure that at all times a special secure telephone connection is in effect to provide a parallel line of communication from one center to the other, permitting even more prompt override, if necessary, of any false computer driven indications of an attack.

² No other record of Carter's questions was found.

³ See Documents 167 and 171.

⁴ Brzezinski wrote below the last paragraph: "I have asked for a fuller report for you."

⁵ Secret.

Throughout the event on 3 June, the command center personnel at all locations performed well and in accordance with established directions.

188. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, June 4, 1980

FACT SHEET

During the morning of 3 June a missile warning incident occurred which caused certain precautionary measures to be taken within our strategic forces in accordance with standard procedures. The purpose of this fact sheet is to provide information concerning this incident and to outline corrective steps which have been and will be taken.

Technical problems in the computer system that provides information to the National Command System caused erroneous data to be generated which in turn provided indications in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and at the Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters of a missile attack against the United States. However, key missile warning sensor systems, which are connected directly to the NMCC, to the SAC Command Center, and to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) gave no indication of hostile missile activity and, therefore, strong indications of the spurious nature of the data were available. Throughout the incident, the data at NORAD headquarters reflected that all sensor systems were functioning properly and that no missile launches had been detected by these sensors.

The first threat indication was received by SAC directly from the NORAD computer. The indication was a missile warning display of two Sea Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) trajectories indicating the possibility of the missiles being targeted against the United States. Within a short time, this display had increased to a large number of SLBM trajectories. The SAC Senior Controller, acting in accordance with standard procedures, initiated an alarm which caused all SAC alert bomber, tanker, and postattack command and control crews to move to alert

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: 5–7/80. Secret. Drafted by Claytor. Brzezinski sent the paper to Brown under cover of a June 5 memorandum which reads: “Attached is a copy of the fact sheet concerning the June 3 missile warning incident, which the President saw this morning. The President has asked that you receive a copy with his two questions.”

aircraft, start engines, and await further instructions. Commander in Chief, SAC, subsequently directed that the SAC crews shut down engines but remain in their aircraft.

The National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) at Andrews AFB received the initial notification of a possible threat of large numbers of SLBMs and automatically initiated actions preparatory to emergency launch. By the time the NEACP had taxied into position for takeoff, the SLBM threat no longer appeared on the display consoles in the NMCC and the senior watch officer directed the NEACP to hold in place. The Pacific Command Airborne Command Post, however, did launch in response to the indications.²

This incident may appear similar to the false indication of a missile attack which occurred on November 9, 1979.³ However, that event was caused by an inadvertent injection of a test scenario into the NORAD computer system. Extensive corrective actions have been taken to prevent a similar incident, and all testing and corrective work is being transferred to a separate computer system. The cause of the events on 3 June is as yet undetermined. All possibilities are being pursued. A long term effort will be initiated to determine and correct basic problems within the entire system. Until this review is completed, the NMCC, SAC and NORAD Command Centers will be on a special watch condition known as "Voice Tell," which insures that a special secure telephone connection is in effect to provide a parallel line of communications. This will permit information to be passed immediately from one center to the other, overriding if necessary any false computer driven indications of an attack.

Throughout the event on 3 June, the command center personnel at all locations performed well and in accordance with established directives.

W. Graham Claytor

² Carter wrote in the left margin next to this and the following paragraph: "What caused it? Corrective action?"

³ See Document 167.

189. Memorandum From the President's Science and Technology Adviser (Press) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

Activities Report concerning Presidential Directive/NSC-24; Telecommunications Protection Policy (U)

PD/NSC-24² was issued to establish a national policy to guide the conduct of U.S. Government activities in and related to the security and/or protection of telecommunications. Attached is the 1979 report of activities required by PD/NSC-24. (U)

The Soviet Union continues to intercept U.S. domestic microwave telecommunications systems from their Embassy and other diplomatically immune locations in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and New York City. We are also seriously concerned about their intercept activities of U.S. Domestic satellites from their collection site in Cuba and from vessels off each of our coasts operating in international waters. (TS)

You may recall that the U.S. Government instituted a program called DUCKPINS which moved selected leased government circuits from microwave to underground cable facilities. When these targets dried up, *[less than 1 line not declassified]* reported the movement of Soviet targeting to other government agencies, economic targets and Defense contractors. The DOD was alerted and they began looking at possible solutions. (TS)

The fact that Defense contractors were now a prime Soviet target was verified in the 1979 Threat Assessment I asked Stan Turner to conduct,³ the specifics of which were briefed to the subcommittee by Admiral Inman in July 1979.⁴ Defense gave an initial briefing to the subcommittee in August concerning how they would approach a counter-measures program. They very candidly advised that this area would require considerable time and study since a more complex dimension was now added to our protection concerns. I expect Defense to have their protection strategy plan available for review by mid-July and will

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Institutional File, Box 42, INT Documents, #4200s: 7/80. Top Secret.

² See Document 40.

³ Not found.

⁴ No minutes of the meeting were found.

convene the PD/NSC-24 Subcommittee to hear their briefing soon thereafter. After your review of the attached report I recommend you forward the Executive Summary to the President and you authorize distribution to all Subcommittee members. (TS)

Frank Press

Attachment

**Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology
Policy⁵**

Washington, April 15, 1980

[Omitted here is the title page and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Soviet Union is intercepting U.S. domestic microwave telecommunications from diplomatically immune locations in Washington, D.C., New York City and San Francisco. Exploitation of U.S. common carrier domestic satellite communications is also of serious concern. Presidential Directive PD/NSC-24 was issued with the objective of enhancing the protection of United States communications, the intercept and exploitation of which may be useful to a foreign adversary. Primary emphasis was placed on protecting government information of value to the USSR. (TS)

The Presidential Directive assigned Executive Agent responsibilities to the Departments of Defense and Commerce. The Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for Communications Security (COMSEC) to protect government-derived classified information and government-derived unclassified information which relates to national security. The Secretary of Commerce is the Executive Agent for the protection of government-derived information not related to national security and for dealing with the commercial and private sector to enhance their communications protection and privacy capabilities. The State Department, the Manager, National Communications System (NCS), and the General Services Administration (GSA), were also given specific on-going responsibilities. Revised guidance was given to

⁵ Top Secret.

the Executive Agents in a November 26, 1979 Implementation Decision Memorandum to clarify their role relationships.⁶ (U)

MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN 1979

—PROJECT DUCKPINS—A government program to minimize Soviet interception of telephone conversation over domestic microwave radio by transferring selected U.S. government voice circuits from microwave to underground cable facilities in Washington, D.C., New York City and San Francisco. Circuits actually under this protection number 17,347 with another 1,067 on order. A third phase has been initiated by DOD which is responsive to both this program and the SCC–CI guidance of October 22, 1979.⁷ The National Security Agency proposed a cable fix for 22 high priority defense contractors which were designated as “Most Sensitive.” Defense plans to route all of these leased circuits, which carry information of value to an adversary, by cable in the three Protected Communications Zones (PCZs), by the end of 1980. The Agency has also been tasked to brief these high priority contractors on the domestic intercept threat, and provide the Manager, NCS, assistance in circuit identification and selection, necessary for the implementation of protective cable routing. These contractors, however, represent only a fraction of the total problem. In addition to proposing Defense Contractor protection fixes, an overall DOD plan, still in the formative stages, will be forwarded to the Special Subcommittee, for decision and will include a broader, system-wide series of proposals which will in large part deny the Soviets the information they are targeting. (S)

—EXECUTIVE SECURE VOICE NETWORK (ESVN)—The Assistant Secretary of Defense for C³I declared the ESVN fully operational. This network was subsequently renamed the Federal Secure Telephone Service; its capability and electronic cryptographic key distribution was expanded as well as additional secure voice terminals being installed. There are now 249 operational terminals as compared to 90 reported last year. (C)

—GSA BULK PROTECTION PROGRAM—With the assistance and approval of the NSA the General Services Administration has: Closed bids for proposals for FTS voice service to Alaska, Seattle-Anchorage, 72 circuits, Seattle-Juneau, 24 circuits and San Francisco

⁶ Reference is to a November 26, 1979, memorandum from Science and Technology Advisor Press to Secretary of Defense Brown and Acting Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, copying multiple agencies, in which Press delineated lines of responsibilities between the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce in achieving policy objectives as established in PD/NSC–24. (Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room (online), Document CIA–RDP10M02313R000703930012–6)

⁷ Not found.

and Washington, D.C., 192 circuits. The initial implementation plan uses the DOD developed CY-104 systems which bulk encrypts in 24 channel increments. Contract awards on the procurements are planned to begin the second quarter of 1980. Since September 1979, GSA has been using 19 of 24 bulk protected voice channels of the DOD satellite system between Hawaii and California. In addition to the protection, this sharing reduces costs for the circuits by approximately sixty thousand dollars a year. With the cooperation of various international carriers GSA moved 12 circuits normally routed over unprotected satellites between Hawaii and Puerto Rico to the U.S. Mainland to less vulnerable cable routes. (C)

—BRIEFING PROGRAM—Telecommunications carriers and government contractors were to be briefed on the nature of the threat. The National Security Agency has thus far briefed a total of 33 Defense contractors on the domestic intercept threat—sixteen briefings were done in 1979 with additional ones planned for the January–March 1980 time frame. The NTIA conducted a series of unclassified briefings with 12 of the major common carriers. (C)

—SOVIET TARGETING OF U.S. CITIZENS—The 1979 Threat Assessment contained *no evidence* to suggest that private citizens have become targets. (S)

—REAL ESTATE ACQUISITION BY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES—The Real Property Committee, an interagency group chaired by State was established by PD-24 to review and if necessary deny Soviet and communist bloc property acquisitions that present a serious potential threat to U.S. telecommunications security. The committee met seven times; initially in February with Ambassador Leonard of the USUN to ensure that he was fully cognizant of the technical and political background concerning the Soviet interests in New York property acquisitions. On the advice of the FBI and NSA, the Committee interposed no objection to a possible Bulgarian purchase of property for a chancery at the International Center on Connecticut Avenue and Van Ness Street. Since 1973 the State Department had been encouraging the PRC to acquire properties in the open marketplace without a requirement for prior Department approval. On May 10 the Committee discussed a building which the FBI had learned that the PRC planned to acquire, and considered again the question of requiring the PRC to obtain State Department approval before buying.⁸ The Committee concluded that it was insufficiently instructed to make decisions on either the specific building in question or on its future role in the broader question of bringing PRC property acquisitions under U.S. control. Based on this circumstance the PRC Embassy in Washington was advised that

⁸ No minutes of the meeting were found.

the State Department should be kept informed of PRC plans to acquire property. This was reiterated in a diplomatic note of October 26 which stated the necessity to obtain the Department's approval prior to the acquisition or occupancy of diplomatic, consular, or other property in the United States.⁹ The Chinese have advised that in the future it will comply with the request. (TS)

—NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY COMMITTEE—
The publication of NSC/PD-24 rescinded the 1968 NSC United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) directive¹⁰ and necessitated the construction of a supporting interagency advisory committee to replace the former USCSB. The National Communications Security Directive, established the National COMSEC Committee (NCSC) to advise and assist the Executive Agent in formulating and implementing policy and was signed by the Secretary of Defense on June 20, 1979.¹¹ This directive delineates, under the Secretary of Defense, the COMSEC responsibilities of the NCSC, the Director, NSA, and department and agency heads. (U)

—INFORMATION ASSESSMENT (GOVERNMENT)—A series of information assessments were conducted in 1979. Among others, the National Security Agency (NSA) completed a COMSEC threat report for Federal Reserve and Treasury International Communications with Foreign officials. The study was undertaken by the NSA following a formal request from the Federal Reserve Systems Board of Governors. They evaluated the specific threat to the security of voice and printed (TELEX) communications between either the Federal Reserve or Treasury on one hand and foreign governments or central banks on the other. Treasury has initiated several thorough investigations to assess the value of information processed by the department which could benefit an adversary. Vulnerabilities, thought to be non-existent, have been identified, and personnel involved have reacted positively. The level of awareness has been raised significantly. As a direct result of one survey concerning the Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Treasury Financial Communications System they are now in the process of encrypting the system with Data Encryption Standard (DES) based equipment. The Special Project Office of NTIA completed five

⁹ In telegram 282182 to Beijing, October 29, 1979, the Department reported: "By Diplomatic Note dated 10/26/79, the Department approved purchase by the PRC Embassy of real estate located at 5315 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. We also called 'The Embassy's attention to the necessity to obtain the Department of State's approval prior to the acquisition or occupancy of diplomatic, consular or other official property in the United States.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790496-0097)

¹⁰ The text of the August 28, 1968, National Security Council Communications Security Directive is at the National Security Agency website.

¹¹ Not found.

telecommunications and information vulnerability surveys in the Federal civil sector and had three more in progress. Each survey performed by NTIA documents specific findings and offers NTIA's recommendations for corrective action. The eight survey projects involved a range of Federal civil governmental activities including agencies specializing in socioeconomic matters, transportation, scientific matters, law enforcement, a regulatory agency, and an organization involved with national financial activities. Each was an in-depth study of agency telecommunications resources and included interviews with operations, telecommunications, and management personnel. Agencies who have participated in this project have given NTIA "high marks" for their thoroughness, professionalism and excellence of the survey findings and recommendations. (U)

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

DUCKPINS continues to be our most potent countermeasure with a limited in-place bulk encryption effort trailing behind. NSA's bulk protection technology development progresses slowly due to a variety of national network problems which must be overcome. Lack of secure voice terminals continues to hamper fulfilling our end-to-end voice security and protection requirements. Overall progress toward implementing "fixes" to deny the Soviets information or access to information has been undeniably slow. This has been due in part to technology problems and in part to an inability to identify information requiring protection. (S)

As previously reported the difficulty of defining or accurately determining what unclassified information is, or may be useful to a foreign adversary or whether it is, or is not national security related continues to plague us and obscure executive agent responsibilities. This situation is further compounded by the recognition that classes and categories of information can be, and in many instances, are "moving targets." That is, information can rapidly gravitate from one category to another for a host of reasons depending upon national or international conditions. One thing is clear, however, only the originator of the information operating within departmental guidelines can legitimately decide whether his or her information should be protected from interception while in transmission. (U)

The briefing programs by both Executive Agents are noteworthy and continued without abatement. Similarly the information vulnerability studies being done by the NTIA have been extremely successful. All department and agencies should avail themselves of this service. (U)

After discussions with the Director, NSA and Administrator, NTIA, an Implementation Decision Paper was issued in late 1979 in an attempt

to clarify executive agent responsibilities; it has in some respects helped the situation. (U)

PLANS AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1980

—The COMSEC Threat Report program to determine and disseminate foreign SIGINT threats to U.S. telecommunications and the vulnerability analysis program of both U.S. civil and military communications will continue and will provide for the subsequent establishment of COMSEC standards and doctrine. (S)

—The remaining contractors from the list of 22 “Most Sensitive Contractors” will be briefed on the intercept threat to their communications. (S)

—Field trials of the LADNER equipment will be conducted on the terrestrial microwave systems of the Other Common Carriers (OCCs) to verify compliance with a system performance and operating requirements. (S)

—Develop a Federal policy concerning the protection requirements for leased, commercial or government-owned communications satellite circuits. (U)

—COMSEC doctrine will be developed for unclassified DES applications; however, the absence of a comprehensive data base on computer security will make progress both difficult and slow. (C)

—The Phase I PCZ Pilot Program and the FSTS will continue operation and expansion as various implementation levels are approved. (S)

—Procedures to verify compliance of commercial DES equipments with FS-1027 for unclassified national security-related applications should be finalized. (U)

—The position paper on public cryptography will be compiled, coordinated, and submitted. (U)

—The security evaluations of the six DES-based equipments for NTIA will continue and should be completed during 1980. (S)

—Complete the DUCKPINS III Program by December 1980. (S)

—Emphasis will be placed on the bulk protection of FTS circuits transmitted over satellite and terrestrial microwave systems. Commercial cryptography will be used whenever appropriate, available and cost effective. (C)

—Develop an options paper for a Federal policy which authorizes and provides for selected unclassified information which, when so marked, must be protected during electrical transmission. (U)

—Complete arrangements for the sharing satellite capacity on two or more wideband systems which will provide FTS protected service for Guam to Hawaii and Puerto Rico to the CONUS communications. (C)

—Develop a program to facilitate procurement and distribution of all appropriate department and agency secure voice equipment (STU II) which may permit the government to take advantage of large order procurements and resulting economies of scale. (C)

—Initiate procurement actions for commercial cryptographic systems to replace CY-104 systems where cost-effective and technically feasible. The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) Data Encryption Standard (DES) will be used until a certification process is established and other technologies made available. (C)

—Expand the KY-70 to KY-3 interface from two to four ports to improve intersystem communications by eliminating queuing problems. Both should be operational by July 1980. (C)

190. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, June 7, 1980

SUBJECT

False Missile Alert (U)

INTRODUCTION

During the last two weeks we have had three false missile warning incidents, each of which has been isolated to the same component, a dual-channel multiplexer within the NORAD computer system. The first incident on May 28th lasted only 6 seconds and was immediately recognized as an anomaly. No actions were taken. The second incident on June 3rd lasted for about 30 minutes. This is described in detail below. After this incident, a modification to the computer program was installed in order to recognize a repeat of this error and to alert the system. Unfortunately, when a similar error occurred on June 6th, the corrective modification did not immediately identify the error. As a result, SAC did respond to the June 6th incident by alerting air crews and starting engines. However, as in the June 3rd incident, no

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79-8/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "Harold—Mount every effort to correct the system. J."

SAC aircraft were taxied or launched. We have now instituted further corrective actions described below.

These incidents differ from the false alert of November 9, 1979.² They cannot be traced to improper test procedures but are the result of a failure in the computer hardware or software. These incidents therefore weaken further my confidence in the computer system and I consider the situation to be very serious. I have instituted a number of actions designed to reinforce *immediately* the human safeguards, which have worked well, to review critically the computer system, and then to repair the deficiencies.

I remain confident that our system has sufficient safeguards to prevent irreversible actions being taken as a result of inconclusive data. My highest priority is to insure that remains the case. But I am also determined to assure that the experience of repeated false alarms does not cause a real alarm to be ignored.

WHAT HAPPENED?

May 28

—A false BMEWS output of 2020 missiles appeared on the warning display at SAC for 6 seconds.

—At nearly the same time the warning display at the ANMCC showed 9000 missiles for a similarly brief duration.

—Because of the brevity of the display, no alert actions were initiated, but NORAD began a technical investigation of the anomaly.

June 3

—A false indication of 2 threat SLBMs appeared on the warning display at SAC. The count quickly jumped to 200 SLBMs. No other command centers displayed any missile warning.

—In less than 2 minutes SAC alerted its crews to move to their aircraft and start engines. (Note: SAC begins these actions, even when the data is known to be ambiguous, as a precautionary measure to ensure survivability.)

—Six minutes after the first false display SAC began displaying 2020 ICBMs from BMEWS.

—Twelve minutes after the appearance of the first false display at SAC, the NMCC display began to show 200 SLBMs.

—The senior duty officer at the NMCC initiated a missile display conference, and shortly thereafter 220 ICBMs were displayed indicating all had already impacted.

²See Document 167.

—The conference was then upgraded to a Threat Assessment Conference and a NORAD assessment was requested.

—Pacific Command initiated a launch of its airborne command post because a Threat Assessment Conference had been convened.

—NORAD issued an assessment³ that we were not under attack since there were no outputs from the warning sensors (radars and satellites) to produce such displays. These sensor indications are present on the same boards that display the computer outputs; the absence of any sensor indications in these incidents has caused the duty officers in each case to be aware from the beginning that the situation was probably a false alarm.

—Thirty-two minutes after the first false display appeared at SAC, the Threat Assessment Conference was terminated, and one minute later the SAC alert was terminated.

June 6

—A false BMEWS output of 2000 ICBMs appeared on the warning display at SAC. This was followed in a few seconds by false displays of 6 missiles at the NMCC and 2020 missiles at the ANMCC.

—SAC again alerted its crews to move to their aircraft and start engines.

—A Missile Display Conference was convened 2 minutes after the first false display appeared at SAC. NORAD immediately assessed no confidence in the displays and no further alert actions were initiated.

—The SAC alert was terminated 17 minutes after the first false display appeared at SAC.

WHAT CAUSED IT?

—All of the false missile warning displays were caused by a malfunction in a minicomputer at NORAD. Such a minicomputer is used with each channel of the NORAD computer system to transform the missile warning data from the NORAD computers into a form suitable for transmission to the NMCC, SAC and the ANMCC where it is automatically displayed.

—The information reaches the display at NORAD via another route, so no false data ever appeared on the NORAD missile warning display screen.

—When no missile warning data are present, the output of the minicomputer for the operational channel of the NORAD computer should be a string of zeroes. However, in each of the preceding events, the minicomputer associated with channel 8, which was then operating,

³Not found.

spuriously began introducing random 2's into the output message. The result was a display of false missile warning data at the command centers other than NORAD.

—Although after the June 3rd incident an automatic interrupt was installed in an attempt to prevent transmission of spurious data, it did not prevent the June 6th recurrence; consequently, NORAD is now using its back-up computer system to avoid the use of the minicomputer altogether. This is an appropriate temporary expedient, but we need to take much more extensive actions than that.

WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN?

—A team including members of my staff and the OJCS spent June 5th at SAC and NORAD reviewing the incident. The source of the technical problems was verified and the conduct of operations during the incident was reviewed.

—NORAD has been instructed to use a different computer, the Mission Essential Backup Computer, as their primary computer. This computer uses completely different hardware and software from the system which caused the problem. All of the command centers will receive the same information in this mode of operation. NORAD will have the key displays necessary for its mission; however, some of the displays that they use to assist them in detailed attack assessment will not be available.

—All command centers involved in missile attack warning now have special voice circuits continuously operating, over which we quickly identify false displays.

—A special task force has been organized to review in detail the computer and communications systems at NORAD. This team consists of national experts in large scale computer systems. Their objective will be to identify the problems with the present system and recommend corrections and improvements. The task force will have its first meeting next Wednesday and Thursday⁴ at NORAD.

—The JCS is conducting a review of missile warning operational procedures and the CINCNORAD is conducting an internal investigation.

—In parallel I will have my staff conduct a comprehensive review of the entire surveillance and warning system to determine if any basic changes are needed in order to fulfill its mission.

⁴June 11 and June 12.

SUMMARY

In summary, I feel that we have a serious problem with the computer system at NORAD. I intend to devote adequate senior staff attention, manpower, and resources to correction of this problem as soon as possible. However, in spite of this deficiency, I have confidence both that the overall system is designed so that you will get accurate warning information in a timely manner and that there are enough safeguards in the system that the United States would not take any offensive action based on false information.

The command and control of our strategic forces is an essential part of our nuclear deterrent. We must avoid repetition of incidents which weaken our confidence or the Soviets perceptions. Therefore, while we will be brutally honest internally we must pursue our fixes with a minimum of publicity.

Harold Brown

191. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Missile Attack Warning System Deficiencies (S)

As you noted on Saturday,² this latest erroneous attack warning by the NORAD-SAC computer system is creating not only operational problems for us but also public perception and political problems.³ I recommend a number of steps for preempting some of the adverse criticism and also for getting some important things done. (S)

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79-8/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Outside the System. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates Brzezinski saw the memorandum. Brzezinski drew a line from Odom's initials in the heading to the right margin of the memorandum and wrote: "WO, Speak to me. ZB."

²June 7.

³See Documents 189 and 190.

First, a commission to investigate must be set up at once. The JCS and SAC cannot be left to review the problems alone. The Defense Science Board might provide the umbrella. To be compelling to public critics, it cannot be Harold Brown's in-house review. You might consider Schlesinger to head the review. That appointment could achieve two things at once. First, Schlesinger's prestige and Republican background could help turn the matter into a bi-partisan affair. Second, it could take Schlesinger out of the public debate the remainder of the summer. He can be expected to become more vocal against the Administration. (S)

Second, [2 lines not declassified] I am attaching a memo (Tab A)⁴ in which I made the case against this option. [1 line not declassified] Brown, for some reason, [4 lines not declassified] if he knew that we have an [less than 1 line not declassified] option [less than 1 line not declassified] he would give the President fits. He also promised that the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) would be looking into the matter. [1 line not declassified]

Third, the President should sign the targeting PD⁵ [less than 1 line not declassified] soon. [1 line not declassified] The PD, properly backgrounded to the press, should help diffuse the NORAD issue. You will recall that I have frequently referred to the SIOP and the NORAD–SAC plan for war as having many of the characteristics of the German and Russian war plans of 1914. They were based on the assumption that the war would be short. They could not be reversed once commenced. They set in motion enormous forces and actions, the consequences of which planners had only the vaguest notion. And they were not related to the war aims of any party involved. Although we cannot dismantle the SIOP system, we can surely begin serious problems to give us less cataclysmic options. (TS)

Fourth, the SCC on COG/C³I, scheduled for this week, can be both politically and operationally useful in this present situation. Any investigation by an outside commission will soon determine that NCA survivability is doubtful if the present system is stressed by a Soviet strike at our C³I. The COG/C³I study recommendations would launch the first serious program to increase NCA survivability since the 1950s. (TS)

In summary, the President can, in the next ten days, take four significant steps.

- Set up a commission to investigate the NORAD system.
- [1 line not declassified]

⁴ Not found attached.

⁵ See Document 208.

—Sign the targeting PD and begin the backgrounders on the general direction away from a short-warning response to more flexibility.

—Get out a PD on COG/C³I which will expedite programs that will make us able to ride out very large attacks and C³I attacks, and still respond in a coordinated fashion under Presidential control at a time of our choosing, not in the five or ten minutes provided by NORAD. (TS)

If you like this general approach, then we should arrange for Brown to brief the President on the PD by Wednesday at the latest.⁶ [1 line not declassified] The COG/C³I is on track. The investigating commission should be raised with Brown today, and a decision can be taken on how to proceed by Wednesday when the PD is discussed. (TS)

⁶ Denend drew a vertical line to the left of this sentence, extended the line to the bottom of the page, and wrote on June 6: "ZB, I have not heard back from Phil Wise on a briefing time. The P's schedule is really tight this week. Les."

192. Memorandum From Jasper Welch of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 12, 1980

SUBJECT

SASC Action on FY-81 Strategic Programs Budget

In committee action yesterday, the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) made several significant changes in the strategic forces portion FY-81 defense budget. These were:

—Authorizing deployment of 100 existing MINUTEMAN III missiles in MINUTEMAN II silos.²

—Authorized starting the FB-111 stretch program.³

—Restrictive M-X language: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the initial phase of construction shall be limited to 2300 protective shelters for the M-X missile in the initial deployment area."⁴

Comments

If we go forward with deployment of the additional 100 MINUTEMAN III missiles, our MIRVed missile launcher total will reach the SALT II ceiling of 1200 in the spring of 1982 when the third TRIDENT SSBN goes on sea trials (vice December 1984 and the seventh TRIDENT if the MINUTEMAN III level is kept at 550). If the SALT II Treaty is in force at that time, we most probably would choose to remove MINUTEMAN III launchers to stay within the 1200 limit. While in principle this could be done by reconverting them to MINUTEMAN II launchers, there is virtually no possibility that the SCC procedures for converting MIRVed to unMIRVed launchers would permit MINUTEMAN III to II conversions without major changes to the launchers (if this is permitted at all). As a consequence we would almost certainly end up

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 4-9/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Albright and Assistant to the Office of Management and Budget Hubert Harris. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner: "DA, note. ZB." And unknown hand wrote below Brzezinski's note: "6/13/80."

² Aaron underlined "100 existing MINUTEMAN III," drew an arc in the margin to the left of this sentence, and wrote: "Do we *have* to?" An unknown hand wrote below Aaron's note: "(D.A. 7/16/80)."

³ Aaron underlined "FB-111 stretch program."

⁴ Aaron underlined "2300 protective shelters for the M-X missile in the initial deployment area."

dismantling the MINUTEMAN III launchers. Thus, under SALT II, the net effect of the deployment of 100 additional MINUTEMAN III would be (by 1985) the loss of 100 “perfectly good” MINUTEMAN IIs—and an unfortunate loss of 100 in the overall US aggregate at a point when we won’t even be near the 2250 level in terms of operational⁵ systems. While early 1981 action on the SALT II Treaty could reverse the SASC action, it will produce one more argument for the anti-SALT forces in the Senate.

The Senate action promoting FB-111 stretch and the House action promoting B-1 derivatives seems unlikely to produce a conference compromise which would be acceptable to the Administration.

The restrictive M-X language is in fact quite vacuous in content and is not a bad outcome considering what we might have been stuck with. Incidentally, we have the Air Force to thank for continuing to oppose restrictive language and eventually obtaining this thoroughly watered-down version. It is said that OSD was prepared to give up much earlier.

Conclusion

Unless the MINUTEMAN and FB-111 changes are later overturned on the Senate floor or in conference, the Administration is going to be faced with a very tough decision on the DOD Authorization Bill.

⁵ Aaron underlined “the 2250 level in terms of operational.” An unknown hand wrote “7/17/80” below the underlined phrase.

193. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, June 13, 1980

SUBJECT

Actions Taken to Correct Errors Identified by the False Missile Warnings

This memorandum is an update on our actions to identify and correct the false missile alert problem.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79-8/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

As you are aware, the false indications that led to the precautionary measures taken at SAC on June 3 and 6 resulted from a computer malfunction. These false indications were immediately identified by duty officers, who exercised the planned safeguards designed for such a contingency. The corrective actions taken thus far include procedures to strengthen human safeguards as well as technical measures to repair the immediate problem in the computer. The following are specific actions which have been taken in these two categories:

Operational and Procedural Actions

Emergency action procedures have been modified so that any command center can request a Missile Display Conference (MDC). This is the lowest of three levels of conference: Missile Display; Threat Assessment; and Missile Attack. Any potentially threatening warning indication will result in an MDC, and MDCs will be conducted on dedicated secure voice circuits. If any delay occurs, non-secure voice circuits will be used.

Amendments have been made in SAC missile warning procedures on an interim basis pending a complete review of all relevant procedures. No posture change will be made in SAC forces unless confirmed by a NORAD system confidence of "medium" or "high," or the receipt by SAC of sensor data indicating a potential missile attack directly from either our infrared-sensing satellites or our new SLBM warning radar.

The Chairman of the JCS has discussed with me, and then approved, a revised Situation Action display. The revision adds missile count information derived from directly-connected sensor data. The display already has NORAD summary data for each sensor system. Thus, both the NORAD summary (which comes through the computer) and direct (though less detailed) data from the sensors can be compared on one display. Software program development and checkout testing will take approximately three weeks at SAC. Installation at NMCC and ANMCC will require an additional four days. Since NORAD does not have the Situation Action display, installation at NORAD will take significantly longer.

The Chairman of the JCS visited SAC Headquarters and NORAD Headquarters yesterday and today to discuss new procedures and follow-on actions.

Technical/Equipment Actions

The technical problem that generated the false displays occurred in a NOVA 840 minicomputer manufactured by Data General. The specific minicomputer that introduced the problem is four years old and is used in the Communications System Segment (CSS) at NORAD.

NORAD is almost certain they have isolated the problem to a single chip in an interface for the high-speed data lines. Until the fault is positively isolated and corrected, the following interim precautionary measures have been taken:

—A different and separate computer, the Mission Essential Backup (MEBU), is now the primary source of NORAD-processed data.

—The CSS has been taken out of operation. If the MEBU should fail, a different channel of the CSS, and the low-speed teletype data lines (neither of which has experienced problems), will be activated to provide data to the command centers other than NORAD. (NORAD would use all CSS data in this case.)

A task force of highly competent and respected computer experts from the private sector, headed by Bob Evans (Vice President of IBM for Engineering, Programming, and Technology), has been assembled to conduct a thorough review of the computer and communications problems at NORAD. The task force began meeting on Tuesday² and a preliminary report is due this weekend.

I will continue to keep you advised of our progress.

Harold Brown

²June 10.

194. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, June 13, 1980

SUBJECT

False Missile Alerts

I think that the following background information is helpful in providing a context for answering questions about the recent false missile alerts.² (U)

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Secret. A copy was sent to Muskie. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.

²See Documents 190 and 191.

Many times each year there are events which result in a display indicating launch of either a single or of a few missiles. These can be caused by a Soviet test launch of ICBMs or SLBMs, which are observed by our infrared satellites. Occasionally they are caused by errors: electronic interference in one of our radars, which results in a false indication; the reflection of sunlight off the top of high clouds or off the surface of a pond which causes a false target in our infrared satellites; communications error; or computer malfunction. (S)

Moreover, there are about 50–60 Soviet test launches every year. Because of the nature of these events (for example, the tracks are generally in a direction that makes them nonthreatening) they are quickly dismissed during a conference of duty officers at NORAD, SAC, ANMCC and NMCC. A few of them, however, may persist long enough or be of such a nature that SAC takes precautionary actions for survival such as alerting crews or starting engines. (S)

In the 1950s and 1960s we had nuclear-armed SAC bombers on airborne alert. Our strategic warning system is good enough today to allow us time to flush our bombers for survivability, so we now keep them on ground alert. A necessary consequence of this mode of operation, however, is that the alert status of the bomber force must be elevated on any missile warning indication, however unlikely the false alert scenario which generated the warning may turn out to be in retrospect. (U)

Against this background, I recommend that we emphasize the following general points in response to questions about the recent false alerts:

- Because of short times of missile flight, a semi-automated warning system is necessary to integrate and display information from multiple sensors, and provide it quickly to the National Command Authorities for decision. (U)

- The automated parts of our warning system may generate ambiguous or misleading indications from time to time. (U)

- Fully recognizing this possibility, the Defense Department has consequently made human safeguards an integral element of the overall warning system. We are confident that these safeguards will catch all false alerts no matter how they are generated. (U)

- False alerts may occasionally result in some precautionary measures for survivability (but the steps taken to date are far short of the airborne alert of bomber aircraft that was continuously in effect 15–20 years ago). (U)

- There is no chance that any irretrievable actions would be taken based on ambiguous computer information. (U)

- The incidents on June 3 and June 6 were caused by errors generated in a NORAD communications device (minicomputer), which resulted in false indications of a missile attack. The minicomputer is used to transmit data from NORAD's main computer to other command centers. NORAD's main computer receives warning data from sensors such as satellites and radar, which actually monitor missile launches and flights. The sensors themselves never registered a missile attack, nor did the main computer indicate an attack. Consequently, the false indication was recognized by the appropriate people in the military command centers within 2–3 minutes. (U)

- Our response during both incidents was in accordance with planned procedures. What occurred were the initial precautionary measures to prevent our bombers and command aircraft from being trapped on the ground—measures which do not represent even the beginning of a retaliatory attack. Within the first two minutes, SAC alerted its aircraft crews as a precautionary measure and instructed them to start their engines. This procedure is frequently practiced as part of our training. Nothing irreversible was done in our response to the false warning. (U)

- Although we believe the immediate cause of these incidents has been isolated to a particular device, the Department of Defense has assembled a task force of highly respected computer systems and communications experts to conduct a thorough examination of our NORAD attack warning system. (U)

195. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, June 15, 1980

SUBJECT

Update on M–X (U)

I have recently informed you of several changes we have made in the detailed engineering design of the M–X basing arrangement,² while remaining well within the scope of the basing decision you made

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Welch, Box 208, Chron: 6/17–30/80. Secret. Enclosures 1 and 2 were not found attached.

² In the margin to the right of this clause, Carter wrote a question mark and drew an arrow inward.

last September. Because of the intense political interest in M-X and the importance of this system to our future strategic posture, I believe it would be useful to provide you some additional information, and update you on our current activities. (U)

The design upgrades are explained in the letter I sent to Committee Chairmen in Congress on April 29, 1980 (Enclosure 1). Essentially, we changed the missile transporter from an “integral” design, in which the missile and launch equipment are always mounted on the transporter, to a “non-integral” design, in which the missile, launcher, and ancillary equipment roll out of a van-like transporter into a shelter loading dock. This design change has two big advantages: it is cheaper, and it eliminates the requirement for a separate shield vehicle to cover the transporter. The new design cannot dash automatically from one shelter to another, but can dash into a choice of shelters from an alert posture on the road, if we come to believe at some future time that the Soviets have penetrated our screen of location uncertainty. Additionally, the new design is much more amenable to use of mass simulators, which we believe will probably be necessary. (S)

You will note that my letter to Chairman Stennis announced these changes in a low-key way;³ I wanted to let him know that we were doing everything possible to save costs and reduce the complexity of the system, without having the changes seem to amount to a new basing mode, which they do not. At this point, members from the affected states recognized that with the new dash method we could do away with the loop road, and use linear roads if we wished. Because the term “racetrack” had acquired pejorative connotations, it was easier for those members to support us if they could take the credit for “killing the racetrack.” Hence, the big headline in the *Star*. (U)

The land saving made possible through going from loop to linear layouts will probably be about 5%. Together with reduced spacing between shelters, the entire system as now planned will extend over about 20% less land and will require about 1000 miles less of road than originally thought. (U)

As we anticipated, the political opposition to M-X is quite strong and comes from a variety of quarters:

- Those who don’t want any new missile system.

- A small, highly vocal group that may not be totally opposed to new strategic forces, but doesn’t like our basing choice for M-X. Some of these advocate a new submarine-based system because they have no concern about SSBN (or SLBM) vulnerability.

- Those who are greatly concerned about environmental impact in the desert states. These people team easily with the first two groups.

- Some strongly pro-defense people, who believe that the Air Force’s vertical shelter recommendation was the best plan and the

³ Not found.

Administration watered it down. (General Lew Allen has been working hard to defuse this opposition. Enclosure 2 is a letter he wrote about three months ago on these issues. The same letter also anticipated the design change to the non-integral transporter.)

—Last, and perhaps most important, the sincerely concerned citizens of Nevada and Utah. These residents have a long tradition of suspicion of federal activities in their areas. Most people in impacted areas are defense-minded and, to some extent, reluctant to fight defense programs. They are, however, very much concerned about the possible impact of M-X on their lives. They are most worried about the influx of people into their isolated communities; the inevitable change in lifestyle that will result; the possibility of boom-bust problems; and the impact on local mining and agriculture. Understandably, they tend to resolve their dilemma by adopting the arguments of the second and third groups.

I am taking every step possible to alleviate the real adverse effects and to inform the local people honestly of the scope and character of those problems we can't completely eliminate. (The facts are frequently a lot less worrisome than rumors.) (U)

One major activity we are involved in, which you will hear more about in the future, is the "split basing" study to assess the additional costs and problems in locating one half of the system in Nevada and Utah and the other in New Mexico and Texas. I have already stated in some hearings that the extra cost of split basing may be prohibitive (perhaps \$3-4 billion), but the members and Governors from Nevada and Utah insist that a thorough study be made. I recognize that Nevada/Utah elected officials must question this project with sufficient rigor to demonstrate to their constituencies that their interests are being cared for. I have promised an objective and complete analysis. (U)

We have found frequent visits out West by senior civilian officials and Air Force people, who are working there continuously, extremely helpful. A few weeks ago Bill Perry and David Aaron were on a two hour panel debate on M-X that was broadcast nationally on public TV. Since then, Bill has spent additional time in the Southwest, including attending some meetings in very small towns, getting to know the people and hearing their concerns first hand. (U)

I believe that all these activities are paying off. We have developed considerable feel for those actions we might have taken which would be totally unacceptable, and for areas where reasonable accommodations and compromises can be made. We have found, too, that some opposition melts away when our representatives describe to small citizen groups *in situ* the need for M-X, and the extensive analyses leading us to this particular design. We will continue to seek and accept all such educational opportunities as we forthrightly address citizen concerns. (U)

Naturally, many of those issues and others find able spokespersons in Congress, and we have a full plate of ongoing Congressional actions, but we still may need further White House assistance. (U)

The first of two important events in the coming months is publication in July of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in support of the deployment area selection and land acquisition. Following public hearings during the comment period, the final EIS is to be submitted in November, leading to a December decision and subsequent introduction of necessary land withdrawal legislation to Congress. Our schedule requires legislative action by mid-1981 in order to protect our 1986 IOC date. (U)

The second important event is the System Design Review, beginning next month and continuing through September, that will give us a more detailed look at the consequences and benefits of design decisions we have made since you authorized the start of full scale engineering development last September. (U)

In summary, I am pleased with engineering progress on the M-X program and am more confident than ever that we made the right basic decisions last year. We are still facing some battles to obtain a high degree of public and Congressional support, but we have a very vigorous program and I feel the situation is improving. Your continuing support has been most helpful. (U)

Harold Brown

196. Memorandum From Stuart Eizenstat and Steve Simmons of the Domestic Policy Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology (Press)¹

Washington, June 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Study of Accidental War Potential

It was recently reported that for the third time in seven months a computer malfunction signaled erroneously that the Soviet Union was launching a nuclear attack.² Although the computer mistakes were

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. No classification marking.

quickly corrected, it seems to us that such accidental errors are cause for concern. We believe that this latest malfunction provides an opportunity to conduct a quiet but thorough appraisal of the potential for nuclear war being started as a result of technological or human error, our command and control capacity to prevent this from happening, and recommendations which would help ensure that such accidental nuclear warfare never occurs.

This is obviously a national security issue, and thus falls in your area. However, we thought it an important matter to raise with you. Unless you disagree, we would appreciate the opportunity to meet and discuss whether such a study might have merit.

²See Documents 190, 191, and 193.

197. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 114, SCC 322, 06/12/80, Civil Defense. Top Secret. 3 pages not declassified]

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

[*Top Secret. 13 pages not declassified*]

Annex A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council

Washington, undated

[*Top Secret. 2 pages not declassified*]

Annex B**Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹**

Washington, undated

SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT TO U.S. LEADERSHIP

(TS) A critical question in the COG problem is, if the Soviet Union were to attack the United States, would the civilian and military leadership infrastructure be attacked as well? The evidence suggests that they would. Soviet doctrine stresses the importance of effective command and control for the successful conduct of military operations. Accordingly, Soviet military planning emphasizes the neutralization of enemy C³ assets. In the case of a conflict within a theater of operations, there is an extensive body of information regarding Soviet planning for attacks on opposing command posts and communications centers. Targeting of such facilities is accorded the highest priority, equivalent to targeting nuclear weapons of opposing forces. In the case of intercontinental conflict, there is no direct evidence of recent vintage. However, a considerable body of indirect evidence suggests that targeting priorities are similar.

(TS) Although direct evidence of Soviet intentions is not available, it is considered highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would launch a major intercontinental strike against U.S. military forces that would not include strikes against key command, control, and communications centers, including the National Command Authority (NCA). Since the locations of the primary U.S. federal relocation sites are publicly available, it is again considered highly unlikely that these would not be targeted. Thus, it must be assumed that the Soviet Union would apply as many weapons as necessary to ensure the destruction of these key sites. The single warhead versions of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 (in particular, the SS-18) would be the most likely candidates for attacking [1 line not declassified] given our estimate of their damage expectancy.

(S) There is some dated evidence of Soviet intent to use SLBMs against command posts and communications centers. Although current Soviet SLBMs have a much lower damage expectancy than more modern ICBMs, SLBMs have the advantage of shorter flight times, which reduce the amount of warning time available. However, it is not believed that the Soviet Union would consider a “decapitation” attack alone, that is one aimed solely at the NCA command and control, to be

¹ Top Secret.

adequate to attain their war-fighting objectives. Thus, an attack against the NCA would almost certainly be part of a large scale strike against U.S. military forces.

(S) The length of strategic warning of nuclear attack would depend on the circumstances of the crisis leading to the attack. The intelligence community, however, has estimated that war in Europe "would be preceded by a period of extreme tension in a crisis of unprecedented severity." The Soviet Union apparently believes that a period of increased tension will precede any major use of military forces. The intelligence community believes that there is virtually no chance that the Soviet Union would attack NATO countries from a standing start, and the majority view is that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact would take at least eight days of preparation before initiating hostilities in Europe. However, "strategic warning" cannot be regarded as something that can be provided with any degree of precision, since it depends as much on the interpretations and perceptions of the national policy authorities as it does on any array of intelligence evidence.

Annex C

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council²

Washington, undated

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSOR SUPPORT

Over the past several years, a number of studies have been conducted to evaluate various concepts to improve the survivability and endurance of the Presidency in a protracted nuclear conflict. These concepts include:

- Submarine Emergency Alternate Command Post (SEACP);
- Maritime surface vessels;
- Airborne systems, including the NEACP;
- Land-based systems.

All are motivated by the basic need for the Presidency to survive and function over extended periods of time in a nuclear environment.

The following outlines the major conclusions of these efforts and offers some thoughts on directions various basing platforms might go.

² Secret.

SEACP

A recent Navy study concluded that it would be feasible to convert a POLARIS SSBN to perform most of the missions associated with a national-level command post. However, the concept was judged to be deficient in the following areas:

—Safe and timely embarkation of the President (or successor) would present major problems. It would be extremely difficult to effect a timely rendezvous with a SEACP.

—The pre-attack and early trans-attack survival of a submarine command post is dependent upon its ability to remain undetected by the enemy. Its location would be compromised, and its probability of survival reduced, if it were to tie into tactical warning and attack assessment communications networks.

—It is doubtful that submarine communications technology would support the volume of communications traffic which would be associated with the President's functions. Submarines are normally not required to effect a great deal of transmissions; their communications systems are focused on receiving.

—Dedicated submarine platforms are extremely costly.

It was apparent from the study that the SEACP is not a cost-effective platform for Presidential survival. However, submarines do offer potential for other key COG functions, such as the reconstitution of C³I systems which are destroyed during the early stages of a nuclear conflict.

Surface Vessels

Navy, Coast Guard, and even merchant vessels can be configured to carry special communications and support packages for the President. Surface vessels offer advantages in mobility and flexibility. The proliferation of ships in different locations would enhance survival through dispersion. However, surface vessels have some significant shortcomings as well:

—Connectivity with surviving domestic telephone nets would be tenuous from the high seas. The volume of radio communications which would be necessary to support Presidential functions would provide an EM signature which could jeopardize the vessel.

—Dedicated and proliferated platforms would be costly. This was the experience with the NORTHAMPTON, a cruiser formerly dedicated to the COG role.

—Surface vessels are vulnerable to submarine attack, especially if the ship has been identified prior to the conflict as a high-value target. Under those circumstances, such a vessel would probably have a submarine tail at all times.

—There may be come [*some?*] political liability associated with the President leaving the continental United States.

An alternative seaborne concept, of considerably less cost, is to develop our land-based systems such that they are readily deployable on ships, tugs, or barges which could operate on inland waters or in coastal areas. This would provide an additional measure of flexibility and mobility in a COG system.

Airborne Platforms

Our current COG system relies heavily upon airborne assets, [5 lines not declassified]

The [less than 1 line not declassified] also has some major drawbacks:

—[6 lines not declassified]

—C³ and staff configuration are such that the President will probably be unable to execute his functions as Chief of State or Chief Executive, in addition to his requirements to command theater nuclear and conventional forces.

For these reasons, it would be imprudent to rely exclusively upon [less than 1 line not declassified]

As with seaborne platforms, it may be possible to combine a land mobile system with airborne carriers, such as C-130s. Under this concept, the land-based system could embark on aircraft and be moved to various parts of the country, depending upon the attack pattern.

Land Based System

Several land based deployment concepts were also evaluated by the Working Group. For analytic purposes, these deployment modes were treated as discrete sets. Operationally, these concepts could clearly be mixed. (Other somewhat different modes of deployment could evolve and expansions of specific mixtures could be developed in response to a changing threat.)

Detailed analyses were performed on basing modes with (a) dedicated prepared sites and stationary or semi-mobile operation; (b) designated unprepared sites and stationary or semi-mobile operation; and (c) a fully ground mobile concept.

—*Dedicated Prepared Sites.* Sites are selected in low-risk areas and will have fall-out protection, connectivity to the commercial telephone system, life support supplies and access to designated ground vehicles. Since these preparatory steps are austere, some added advanced preparation may be required. Depending on the threat, from 20 to 650 of these sites were used in the analysis. If used in stationary operation, all sites must be equipped with full communications packages. The successor and his team would disperse at random to one of the sites and leapfrog between the sites.

In semi-mobile operations mode, the number of communications packages would be reduced to 2–4 per potential successor. These packages, while not fully mobile, would be moveable and would permit some limited communications while on the move. The successor could move at random between sites using designated vehicles or aircraft.

—*Designated Unprepared Sites.* Again, sites should be located in such buildings as motels, schools, armories or small federal, civil, or military installations.

In the stationary operating mode, a site would be activated at random by dispersing communications and support packages to the site. Successors and their support team would then be dispatched to the activated site in designated vehicles or aircraft.

In the semi-mobile operating mode between 2 to 4 semi-mobile support groups, communications and support packages per successor would move at random between sites. Teams would have limited communications while on the move (in designated support vehicles).

—*Fully Mobile Operations.* Ground-mobile operation can be achieved by having the successor joint a fully-equipped caravan in a relatively low-risk area with little possibility for exposure to fall-out. Three caravans per successor were used in the analysis. The teams relied on fuel and food caches in the area; nevertheless, their endurance would be limited. (Other full mobile deployment modes have been evaluated in previous analyses. Alternates such as submarines, fully airborne and shipborne operations were excluded for reasons of cost, limited communications and reduced endurance.)

Evaluation

The five basing modes were then evaluated on the basis of the following parameters:

—Survivability, which depends on the threat (Soviet weapons availability, yield, and accuracy); the enemy's intelligence capability to detect and acquire an evading successor; U.S. protective measures consisting of hardening; and the extent of location uncertainty which can be introduced through secrecy, proliferation of sites, or mobility.

—Endurance characteristics, requiring the deployment modes to be able to operate essentially self-contained and be able to endure for 30 days during trans-attack. Endurance depends on the availability of essential life support, electric power, and fuel.

—Operability, which is the ability to perform the required functions. (The more mobile a ground-based system, the greater its potential for operability degradation.)

—Costs.

Examining the various basing options, some rough comparisons can be made. From this general assessment, it appears that the designated unprepared semi-mobile mode presents the most cost-effective option. It should be stressed, however, that this is not based upon definitive analysis; it only represents a logical starting point for the iterative development and evaluation processes outlined in the basic paper. The table also does not exclude the possibilities of mixed systems, drawing upon several alternate basing modes to maximize redundancy and dispersion.

CHARACTERISTICS

<u>BASING MODES</u>	<u>Survivability</u>	<u>Endurability</u>	<u>Operability</u>	<u>Cost</u>
<i>Submarines</i>	high	good	poor	high
<i>Surface Vessel</i>	low- moderate	good	poor- moderate	high
<i>[less than 1 line not declassified]</i>	high	poor	moderate	moderate- high
<i>Land-based Dedicated</i>	low- moderate	good	good	moderate- very high
<i>Prepared Stationary</i>	moderate-	good	moderate-	low-high
<i>Dedicated Prepared</i>	high	good	good	
<i>Semi-Mobile</i>	low	good	good	very low
<i>Designated Unprepared Stationary</i>	high	moderate- good	moderate- good	low- moderate
<i>Designated Unprepared Semi-Mobile</i>	high	poor	poor	high

EVALUATION MATRIX

198. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 18, 1980

SUBJECT

Continuity of Government/C³I

The SCC met on June 12 to review the proposals for a new approach to continuity of government and survival of the National Command Authority (see Summary of Conclusions at Tab B). All agencies fully support the recommendations. I have prepared a Presidential Directive which is drawn almost entirely from key language in the recommendations made to the SCC (Tab A).² It spells out national objectives and specific agency responsibilities under the supervision of a White House Steering Group. (C)

This is the culmination of a long effort to improve our continuity of government program and at the same time to remove vulnerabilities to the National Command Authority for control of the military forces. President Kennedy received a report in 1962 pointing out the system's inadequacies but did nothing to improve it. President Nixon received a review, NSSM-58, in 1970 with the same message but failed to act.³ The proposed Presidential Directive, mandating a new concept for survivability and a program office to build and test it, is a step of enormous strategic importance and of historical significance. (C)

An ad hoc group in the Executive Office of the President (NSC, OMB, Hugh Carter, and the Military Office) has carried this project through after the Federal Preparedness Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) each failed to deliver. Defense, State, and the DCI have also been brought together to add the weight that FEMA cannot bring alone to this effort. Because of his strong interest and support, you may want to mention this to Hugh. He has helped my staff keep the momentum, and he will be important in the follow-on work of the White House Steering Group. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 23, PD/NSC-58 [2]. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum Carter wrote: "Zbig, J."

² The draft PD was not found attached. The signed version of PD-58 is printed as Document 201.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972, Document 144.

RECOMMENDATION:

In light of the unanimous recommendation of the SCC, sign the PD at Tab A. (U)

Tab B

**Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination
Committee Meeting⁴**

Washington, June 12, 1980, 4–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Continuity of Government/C³I (U)

PARTICIPANTS*State*

Thomas Tracy, Assistant Secretary for
Administration

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
Robert Komer, Under Secretary for
Policy

Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under
Secretary for Policy Review

JCS

Chairman General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

CIA

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
[name not declassified], COG/C³I Study
Group

OMB

Randy Jayne, Associate Director
Robert Howard

FEMA

Director John Macy
Frank Camm, Associate Director

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hugh Carter
Marvin Beaman

NSC

B. General William E. Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with brief remarks on the background for the subject today, continuity of civil government and survivable military C³I at the national level. The present system has remained essentially unaltered since the 1950s. In the meantime, Soviet capability has made it extremely vulnerable. The paper being reviewed today proposes a new conceptual approach to survivability and recommends steps for implementation. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if there were any comments or reservations on the basic paper and the approach it suggests. All agencies expressed

⁴Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

full approval. Defense and FEMA added that we should move to implement it as rapidly as possible.⁵ (S)

Dr. Brzezinski next turned to three specific and unresolved issues in the procedures and responsibilities for implementation. (C)

1. *Covert Versus Overt Funding*—In the discussion of this budgeting question, DOD and JCS expressed strong support for overt funding. CIA took no position. FEMA and OMB preferred covert funding. Defense expressed concern that a covert approach would force Defense to pay for the entire program because FEMA could not so easily bury the money in its programs. (S)

OMB insisted that security of the program is important and that it should be funded covertly in order to avoid detailed public scrutiny by Congress. Defense pointed out that FEMA can manage “black” programs. Hugh Carter asked which approach would allow the program to be implemented faster. Defense insisted that greater speed is possible through overt funding. (S)

Defense proposed a compromise that the Joint Program Office work out a solution to this funding issue. All agencies agreed. (C)

2. *Joint Program Office*—FEMA originally objected to the concept of a Joint Program Office with Defense as the Executive Agent. By defining more clearly the boundary between Defense and FEMA program responsibilities, compromise language was found to satisfy FEMA. Therefore, the concept of a Joint Program Office was supported by all agencies. (S)

3. *DCI/DOD Division of Management Responsibilities*—Defense and CIA disagreed on the division of program management responsibilities for defining the new system. CIA insisted that the DCI, under Executive Order 12036,⁶ has the program responsibility through the NFIB for survivability of all intelligence systems and communications. Defense argued that the Executive Order gives this authority to the Secretary of Defense. OMB proposed compromise language which retains the present *modus operandi* between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense on other disputed issues in interpreting Executive Order 12036. Thus this issue was set aside. (S)

With the above mentioned changes in the concept paper, all agencies support a recommendation to the President that he direct the implementation of the new approach as it is spelled out in the responsibilities and implementation sections of the paper. (S)

⁵ Attached but not printed is the paper; see Document 197.

⁶ Reference is to Executive Order 12036, “United States Intelligence Activities,” signed January 24, 1978. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 194–214)

**199. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹**

Washington, June 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Update on MX (U)

At my request, Harold Brown has sent you the attached memo² providing 1) an update on the campaign to win improved support for the MX, and 2) a summary of the evolutions in the basing mode design since your decision last September. (U)

Harold's memo seems guardedly optimistic concerning improved public acceptance. It also makes clear that winning acceptance for the MX program is going to require a long and arduous campaign. Two aspects of this campaign that you might also note are:

—Parallel DOD and White House coordinating groups have been set up to insure that the campaign benefits from all perspectives, and we all articulate the same policy.

—In view of the great skepticism being expressed about whether we can complete a competent EIS within this year, we are taking special steps to explain to the public how our EIS process is carrying out its work, and we are planning for a blue ribbon review of the EIS to help establish its credibility. (C)

You will note that Harold's memo does not describe any plans he may have for visiting Nevada/Utah himself, although I have suggested to him that he do this. (U)

Finally, let me add a personal note. We have just been through two very close votes on MX at the Platform Committee. We need, within the party, to do some more missionary work on MX. I will be talking to Jack Watson, Anne Wexler and others about this. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 4-9/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "cc Harold, Zbig—Lew Allen's letter is excellent. Should be distributed to all members of Congress—and to key elements of press & others. J."

² Not found attached. See Document 195.

**200. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, June 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Strategic Balance Charts

The President has asked for clearer charts on the strategic balance and additional charts that portrayed the balance with and without SALT and with and without MX. DoD has cooperated with the DCI in responding to this request. As part of this effort, my staff developed the attached strategic force comparisons that give a clear picture of the strategic balance, the importance of SALT, and the contribution of MX.

In particular, we include the results of various U.S. program responses to the Soviet increases that the Intelligence community projects beyond their SALT-limited forces in the No-SALT case. These projected U.S. program increases are derived from DoD judgments on force-planning, and not from approved levels nor from Intelligence estimates. Thus, they are not suitable for an NIE. But they are critical to an understanding of the issues.

I believe the President will find these comparisons informative and useful in any dealings with Congress.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense²

Washington, undated

STRATEGIC FORCE COMPARISONS

Summary

The charts that follow compare U.S. and Soviet central strategic forces with and without a SALT II agreement. In both cases, the contribution of MX to the strategic balance is highlighted. We have used

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: 5–7/80. Secret.

² Secret.

the “moderate” estimates of Soviet forces contained in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).³ The moderate Soviet force with a new 10–RV ICBM is compared with currently programmed U.S. forces for SALT-limited cases. For the No-SALT cases, projected Soviet forces are compared with two U.S. force alternatives: (1) a minimum U.S. reaction that expands MX and retains all older systems; and (2) a larger U.S. force buildup that includes extensive bomber force modernization.

With SALT

- Our current plans would retain the U.S. lead in warhead numbers and arrest the negative trends in other static indicators such as equivalent megatons and hard target kill.
- When compared with the static indicators, the U.S. position would be somewhat more favorable in the balance of forces that survive an initial counterforce exchange, particularly if forces are on generated alert when the strategic conflict begins.
- The capability of surviving U.S. forces to retaliate against economic and non-silo military targets in the Soviet Union would increase steadily after 1981, due primarily to programmed improvements in the submarine and bomber forces.

Without SALT

- The Soviets are projected to increase their strategic forces substantially if SALT II limits are not observed. In the absence of a U.S. response, the pre-exchange balance indicators would continue their current adverse trend. The post-exchange balance would also shift to the Soviets’ advantage. However, our capability to devastate Soviet economic and non-silo military targets would degrade only modestly from the SALT case.
- The U.S. could add to its planned strategic forces to deny the Soviets a clear advantage in the strategic balance. However, such programs would require substantial new funding for increased strategic forces and production of nuclear materials, just as would the Soviet increases beyond SALT levels.

MX

- Deployment of MX in multiple protective shelters (MPS) would reverse currently unfavorable trends in the strategic balance, with or without a SALT II agreement. In the No-SALT case, however, this reversal would require a larger and more costly MX program.

³ See the attachment to Document 184.

- MX would present the Soviets with a difficult choice between allocating a large number of ICBM warheads against MX shelters or employing them against other valuable targets. MX would also provide a hedge against potential Soviet advances in threats to the submarine and bomber legs of the U.S. strategic triad.

Introduction

The assessments made on the following charts are defined as follows:

Strategic Balance. For each case, two charts assess the balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces at two different stages of hypothetical nuclear conflict taking place between 1979 and 1989:

1. The *pre-exchange* graph shows the ratio of on-line U.S. and Soviet forces before the attack in terms of warheads; equivalent megatons (EMT), which measures the capability to destroy area targets; and hard target kill (HTK), which measures the capability to destroy hard point targets.

2. The *post-exchange* graph shows the ratio of warheads and EMT that can be withheld for use after a Soviet-initiated counterforce exchange in which the strategic forces on both sides and the facilities associated with the operational control and employment of these forces are attacked. (The remaining HTK is not shown because most of the hard targets are attacked in the counterforce exchange.) [6 lines not declassified]

This assessment does not necessarily reflect the way in which the Soviets would use their forces in a nuclear war. We do not adequately understand Soviet strategy, tactics, and objectives in an actual conflict. These may differ from our own. Neither does this assessment reflect the precise manner in which our own forces are targeted today. Moreover, it does not test the endurance of our forces or our ability to command and control them during a nuclear war.

U.S. Retaliatory Potential. For each case, the third chart measures the potential of U.S. forces that remain after the counterforce exchange to attack a comprehensive set of economic and military targets in the Soviet Union. (Missile silos and other military targets explicitly attacked in the previous counterforce exchange are not included.) [2 lines not declassified]

DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES UNDER SALT II

[chart not declassified]

Description: These charts assess the strategic balance and the retaliatory potential of planned U.S. forces under SALT II. (The NIE estimate for a Soviet force with a new 10–RV ICBM is used, since it provides

more capability against MX in shelters. A new 1-RV ICBM is projected as a slightly more likely development.)

Observations:

- The U.S. would retain a lead in pre-exchange (on-line) warheads although this lead would become marginal in the mid and late 80s. The Soviets would continue to lead in the EMT and HTK measures.
- The post-exchange balance is shown with U.S. forces on day-to-day alert and Soviet forces with some SLBMs and bombers covertly generated. The negative trends would be reversed in the mid and late 80s because of programmed U.S. forces. The U.S. advantage in warheads would be greater than in the pre-exchange case. (The balance would appear more favorable to the U.S. if the Soviets were to develop a 1-RV ICBM and forego the 10-RV missile.)
- The retaliatory potential of U.S. forces remaining after the counterforce exchange would increase because of planned modernization of U.S. bomber and submarine forces.

GENERATED ALERT FORCES UNDER SALT II

[chart not declassified]

Description: These charts show the post-exchange balance and U.S. retaliatory potential if the war evolves from a crisis that gives the U.S. and Soviets time to generate their forces and achieve a higher degree of survivability.

Observations:

- The U.S. would enjoy an unambiguous post-exchange advantage in warheads and even pull ahead in residual EMT after 1983. The advantages are due to the large percentage of U.S. capability residing in bomber and SLBM forces, which achieve much higher alert rates when forces are generated.
- U.S. retaliatory potential would also be much higher than in day-to-day alert because of the additional bomber and SLBM forces available on generated alert.

DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES WITHOUT SALT II

Reactive MX Program

[chart not declassified]

Description: [4 lines not declassified]

Observations:

- [2 lines not declassified]
- [2 lines not declassified]

GENERATED ALERT FORCES WITHOUT SALT II

Reactive MX Program

[chart not declassified]

Description: [2 lines not declassified]

Observations:

- *[3 lines not declassified]*

DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES WITHOUT SALT II

Reactive MX Program Plus Bomber Force Expansion

[chart not declassified]

Description: [7 lines not declassified]

Observations:

- *[3 lines not declassified]*

POST-EXCHANGE DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES
WITH AND WITHOUT MX

[chart not declassified]

Description: These charts illustrate some of the contributions of the MX program with or without SALT. (In 1989, the MX system is assumed to consist of 200 missiles and 4600 shelters with SALT; *[less than 1 line not declassified]*)

Observations:

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

201. Presidential Directive/NSC-58¹

Washington, June 30, 1980

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency
The Director, White House Military Office

SUBJECT

Continuity of Government/C³I (U)

I have reviewed the recommendations of the Special Coordination Committee for improving our Continuity of Government system. It is essential that we establish and maintain a capability for the Presidency, under the most stressing conditions, to be able to:

—survive a nuclear attack, even one which involves repeated attacks over a long period of time;

—direct, as Commander-in-Chief, our strategic and theater nuclear forces, and all other aspects of a general war;

—conduct, as Head of State, negotiations with adversaries and with our allies during the conflict;

—control, as Chief Executive, domestic affairs during the conflict and the national recovery after the war has ended. (S)

To support the development of a system to meet these requirements, I direct that the following actions be taken:

1) The concept put forth in the Special Coordination Committee paper on Continuity of Government (Tab A) is approved as the initial direction for program development.² (C)

2) The responsibilities of the various agencies, the development concepts, and the public posture will conform to section VI of the Special Coordination Committee paper. (C)

3) An interagency steering group, chaired by the NSC staff, and consisting of representatives of the White House Military Office, the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 2, PD/NSC 33-63 [2]. Secret.

² Attached but not printed is the paper resulting from the June 12 SCC meeting; see the attachment to Document 198.

Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Directors of Central Intelligence, FEMA, and OMB, will oversee the development and validation of the recommended concepts. (C)

4) A Joint Program Office will be established under the Secretary of Defense. It will work in close cooperation with the Director of FEMA to refine, develop, validate, and implement this concept, responsive to the requirements of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of FEMA. (C)

The Joint Program Office will:

- define overall responsibilities for development, management, and operation of a deployed system;
- prepare a detailed program for use of FY 1981 and FY 1982 funds;
- develop and refine the operational requirements;
- supervise the development of a series of tests and exercises to validate the concept;
- plan for the program to be fully operational to support at least five successors by 1984 and at least ten by the late 1980s;
- submit alternate program plans and budgets, a proposed exercise program, and recommendations concerning the division of funding responsibilities between FEMA and DOD and the degree of program classification to the Special Coordination Committee for review within three months. In the interim, program details will continue to be classified. (C)

5) Consistent with the above guidance, and in close cooperation with the JPO, FEMA will:

- continue to improve, pending development of a new system, the current capability [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to disperse and support [*less than 1 line not declassified*] successors in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] facilities;
- continue to develop procedures and capabilities, in coordination with the Department of Defense, for locating, communicating with, identifying, and authenticating dispersed successors, as a basis for determining legal succession to the Presidency;
- coordinate the efforts of other government agencies to insure that their specific survival plans are compatible with the system for the Presidency. (S)

Jimmy Carter

202. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, July 2, 1980

SUBJECT

False Alerts (U)

I sent you memoranda on June 7 and 13 discussing various aspects of the false missile warning displays which resulted in alerts of Strategic Air Command bomber crews on June 3 and 6.² We have continued investigating those incidents and this memorandum summarizes our present understanding of the cause, enumerates the corrective actions underway, and assesses the public and congressional reactions. (U)

The Cause (U)

NORAD attributes the source of the spurious data to the intermittent failure of a 46¢ micro-electronic integrated circuit (often referred to as a “chip”) in a data communications interface device at the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Colorado. Although NORAD has been unable to get the suspected circuit to fail again under test,³ the NORAD evaluation has been confirmed by an independent task force of highly competent and respected computer experts enlisted from the private sector. (U)

Corrective Actions (U)

This particular electronic fault will be corrected by replacing the suspected integrated circuit; however, to prevent a similar, future hardware failure from causing such an undetected error, we also are

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Top Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “cc Harold, ok J.” Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum to Carter under cover of a July 11 memorandum in which he noted that Brown was “managing a difficult situation as well as can be expected. It is important for you, in my view, to let Harold hold the lead on this problem and keep it at Defense and NORAD, not letting the focus shift to the White House. No investigation will satisfy everyone, and the more information made public about the investigation, the easier it will be for the critics to exploit it imprudently beyond what is sound for national security.” Carter underlined the phrase “Harold hold the lead” and wrote at the top of Brzezinski’s memorandum: “Zbig, I agree. J.” Brzezinski returned Brown’s memorandum under cover of a July 17 memorandum in which he noted Carter’s comments and added: “The President has affirmed his decision for you to hold the lead on any future investigations and corrective actions.” (Ibid.)

² See Documents 190 and 193.

³ Carter underlined the portion of this sentence that reads “has been unable to get the suspected circuit to fail again under test” and drew an exclamation point in the right margin next to it.

proceeding to improve the automatic error-detection and correction capabilities of the NORAD data communications system. Specifically, NORAD will:

- put monitor devices on output lines set to alarm whenever a warning message (whether valid or not) is being sent so as to speed confidence checking
- improve the error-detection routines throughout its computer and data communications system
- make continuous and comprehensive records of system performance to be used to improve its troubleshooting capability
- analyze its computers and communications equipment to find (and fix) other places where a single failure could produce a false missile attack indication.

Until these corrective actions are implemented (about 60 days) NORAD will operate primarily on the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] completely bypassing the equipment that caused the recent incidents. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have assessed that this temporary mode of operations can be tolerated, although it does have certain operational limitations, notably [*1 line not declassified*] The JCS-directed procedural changes to [*3 lines not declassified*] (S)

Congressional Reaction (U)

The Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress were notified of the false alerts less than 24 hours after they occurred. Congressional interest has remained high ever since. We have briefed the House Armed Services Committee and several Senators individually, and we continue to respond to many letters on the subject from members of Congress. Congress seems to have been mostly reassured by our explanations, but continues to express concern about [*9 lines not declassified*]

Press Reaction (U)

Our approach to the news media has followed that which I outlined to you in my June 13 memorandum on false missile alerts. Most of the newspaper stories which appeared immediately after a June 18 press briefing by my Assistant Secretary for Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence, Gerry Dinneen, correctly reflected the points in that memorandum. However, television network follow-up stories appearing June 24–26 have attempted to sensationalize (mushroom cloud) the incidents or to link them to unrelated matters. We continue to receive many press inquiries and requests for interviews on the subject. We will have to continue to emphasize that there is no chance that any irretrievable actions would be taken based on ambiguous computer information, nor do the precautionary survivability measures in any way reduce the absolute human control over nuclear weapons.

Conclusion: A misleading picture is worth, in show business (TV news) much more than ten thousand accurate words.

The Future (U)

In summary, we are diligently pursuing corrective actions for the specific cause of the June 3 and 6 false alerts, just as we addressed the specific cause of the November 9, 1979, event.⁴ Those causes were different, however, and as I reported to you in my June 13 memorandum, I believe we must be prepared for the possibility that another, unrelated malfunction may someday generate another false alert. Although we will make appropriate electronic improvements to minimize the probability of such a false alert, we must continue to place our confidence in the human element of our missile attack warning system. (U)

Harold Brown

⁴ See Document 167.

203. Memorandum From Steve Simmons of the Domestic Policy Staff to the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom)¹

Washington, July 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Accidental Nuclear War Study

Per your suggestion, I have listed possible subjects for examination by an accidental nuclear war study group. I am no expert in these matters, and this list is clearly not complete. Also, significant work must have been done on a number of these items and thus a first chore for the Special Coordinating Committee or other study group would be to prioritize those specific matters it would focus on, and separate out those matters where only background information on what has already been done is necessary.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Administratively Confidential.

MATTERS FOR STUDY

1. Is the nuclear defense computer system adequate? How can malfunctions and false warnings be prevented? When they occur, how can they be detected in the quickest possible manner?

2. Is our capacity to recall or destroy missiles which have already been launched adequate?

3. Do we have adequate ability to protect the President and others in the line of succession as well as provide adequate temporary government facilities in case of an accidental nuclear launch by the Soviet Union? (If only two or three missiles were launched by the Soviet Union and our reaction was not to launch a full scale retaliation believing that this may have been an accident on the Soviet's part, it would be essential for us to have continuing top level focus on this accidental nuclear dilemma.)

4. Is the communications system for the President adequate so that he can be assured of instant update of a nuclear attack-accident situation as well as final authority on whether or not to retaliate?

5. Is our communications ability adequate to contact the Soviet Union and warn them of an accidental mistake as well as provide a way for them to verify that a launch or upgraded state of readiness on our part results from accident? Are hotline facilities adequate?

6. Is there adequate psychological testing and screening of personnel at nuclear missile facilities, radar facilities, and for pilots of nuclear bombers?

204. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Odom) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, July 17, 1980

SUBJECT

Meeting with Eizenstat on WH Study of Accidental Nuclear War

You already, I believe, have heard most of the arguments on this issue. Eizenstat believes it might be helpful politically for the White House to appear in charge and on top of a study and investigation of the chances of nuclear war.² Presumably this is in response to the NORAD false alert problem.³

Information

—DOD has already conducted a large study and several reports have gone to the President on the matter.

—Defense has briefed the press and Congress. The Congressional committee chairmen have been kept well informed from the beginning.

—Hugh Carter and Marty Beaman are strongly opposed to Eizenstat's study proposal. Their reasons include the fact that DOD has already done one and that to initiate such a study now would be to invite political trouble for the President. It would open a Pandora's box.

—I am unaware of any ground swell demand for such a study in the press or elsewhere. Senator Tower is being handled by DOD.

Considerations

—Thus far we have kept this matter away from the White House and in the Pentagon where it belongs. Why shift the focus to the President now?

—No study will satisfy even half its audience. It will merely invite all kinds of additional study issues and increase lack of public confidence.

—For the sophisticated Defense analyst, it could lead to debates about C³I vulnerabilities, debates we cannot win.

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information. Aaron initialed the memorandum next to the heading.

²Not found.

³See Documents 167, 190, and 193.

—The whole business of NORAD, the SIOP, etc. is a great curiosity. Mathematicians, scientists, and quacks will appear in droves to learn more, to provide copious advice, and to turn the system into a circus or analysts' amusement park.

—There may be some good reasons for a study, but they escape me.

—I have already received a press call from *Science* 80 about this study. I warned Simmons that this would happen.

205. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, July 18, 1980

SUBJECT

Significant Actions, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense (July 12–18, 1980)

FY 82 Defense Program: We are well underway in examining individual Service submissions for the FY 82 Defense Budget and the FY 82–86 program, and devising alternative policy and program options. Graham Claytor is chairing, with OMB participation at a senior level, the Defense Resources Board (DRB) review. The DRB objective is to develop an integrated DoD five-year program centering on the 5-year funding profile, provided by OMB, but with a reasonable range of alternative levels in either direction. I will have their recommendations shortly, and by the end of the month I will have made my tentative decisions, subject to my reconsideration soon thereafter in the light of comments from the Service Secretaries and JCS. This timing and that of the OMB “Spring” Review this year would make your consideration of the kinds of defense issues usually presented at OMB Spring Review an unproductive use of your time. Therefore I am working with John White of OMB to structure an alternative approach. It would present a brief written summary of the competing needs of readiness, personnel costs, and hardware within various defense funding levels as constrained by the overall economic and budget forecasts. Before our decisions on programs and budget details are made later this year, I believe we should

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 64, Brown's Weekly Report: 1980. Top Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “cc Harold. J.”

have a meeting with the JCS to hear their views, and an NSC meeting to address the broad national security issues.² (U)

Soviet AWACS Testing: A recent DIA intelligence report³ describes unusual flight tests of what may well be a new Soviet CANDID (IL-76) AWACS. Insufficient hard evidence makes a confident assessment difficult, but—given the obvious Soviet incentive to develop an AWACS—I believe that the flight tests indicate a Russian attempt to detect low-flying aircraft and direct interceptors to those aircraft. Such a step on their part would be consistent with the evolution of Soviet strategic air defenses we anticipated when the B-1 program was cancelled in 1977.

If this is in fact an AWACS test program, the Soviet Union could have a force of 20 CANDID aircraft operational by 1985. We also project at that time a deployment of 400 modified FOXBAT interceptors and the beginning of the new Sukhoi and Mikoyan fighter deployments; these three aircraft can be expected to have a look-down/shoot-down capability. This Soviet force of interceptors and AWACS would be quite effective against penetrating bombers of the B-1 type, but would have limited capability against our ALCMs.

Given the problems of attacking ALCMs, the Soviets are more likely to extend their defense coverage beyond their borders to attack the missile-launching aircraft. Forward defenses, including extended range (1000 nautical mile) interceptors and a force of 50-75 CANDID aircraft, could be expected in the 1990s and would offer significant capability against the B-52 ALCM carrier.

Our most promising response to that Soviet approach is to extend the ALCM range, thereby allowing the carrier to stand off even from extended range interceptors. We have two relevant R&D programs; first, an improved engine that would give the first generation cruise missile 35 percent more range; and second, an improved cruise missile design that achieves greater range by operating at more efficient altitudes. Both improvements could be operational in time to meet this threat if it develops. I will keep you advised as more information on Soviet testing is received and analyzed. (TS)

Legislative Issues: The conference committee on the FY 81 Defense Authorization Bill is scheduled to convene next week. I have already had preliminary discussions with both John Stennis and Mel Price, and will meet with each next week. I will write the conference committee a letter strongly objecting to a number of the proposed add-ons, and pointing out the imbalance created by those and by several of the

² Carter wrote in the left margin next to this paragraph: "ok, if satisfactory to McIntyre."

³Not found.

deletions made either in the Senate or House. I will also meet with Joe Addabbo and Jack Edwards next Tuesday⁴ before their Subcommittee begins its markup of the FY 81 Appropriations Bill. I intend to make a particularly strong plea to them against funding the refitting of the NEW JERSEY and the ORISKANY. (U)

Rapid Solidification Technology (RST): In November 1978 I sent you a memorandum⁵ describing the RST metallurgical process and outlining potential military applications for the late 1980s. Since then we have expanded our program and are encouraged by progress in developing new alloys. In addition, both U.S. and foreign industry have begun aggressive in-house research and development programs. I believe that this emerging U.S. industrial base must be stimulated and encouraged by the government. The DoD program will partially fill this need, but additional government investment in or underwriting of the civil sector would be useful—and contribute substantially to the overall health of the economy. Under Secretary Bill Perry will work with Frank Press to develop an integrated plan of action. (U)

Overseas Medical Research Laboratories: During preparation of the FY 81 budget, OMB directed the closure, or conversion to contract operations, of our eight overseas laboratories. With the assistance of distinguished civilian scientists from industry and academia, we subsequently completed a study that confirms the clear military need for these units. The study⁶ also documents strong U.S. embassy and host government support for current operations, and the infeasibility of contracting for like services. These efforts are a U.S. activity that brings political benefits (on a smaller scale) like those accruing to Cuba from its provision of teachers and physicians in developing countries. I believe the laboratories provide a unique military, scientific, and political return far in excess of their cost, and have asked Jim McIntyre to reconsider the decision in light of current information. (U)

Mobilization and Deployment Exercises: We have now completed an unclassified study of NIFTY NUGGET-78 and REX-78,⁷ the two ambitious mobilization exercises we held in late 1978. There was substantial media interest in the exercises, and we expect considerable interest in the unclassified study. The study contains some very frank and critical comments on our mobilization capabilities as they existed two years

⁴ July 22.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Not found.

⁷ See Office of the Secretary of Defense, *An Evaluation Report of Mobilization and Deployment Capability Based on Exercises NIFTY NUGGET-78 and REX-78*. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1980)

ago.⁸ To try to reduce misunderstanding of these comments, the report will be released following a background briefing to explain that this Administration was the first ever to conduct such a test of our mobilization procedures, and that we have remedial efforts underway to correct the deficiencies observed during the exercises. (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to national security policy.]

Exercise GLOBAL SHIELD: The Strategic Air Command recently completed the largest and most comprehensive Air Force strategic readiness exercise ever conducted. During the nine-day schedule, every facet of SAC's Emergency War Order was realistically tested: [number not declassified] missiles and [number not declassified] aircraft were brought to maximum readiness levels, over [number not declassified] sorties were flown, and an ICBM was launched from Vandenberg AFB, California. The exercise highlighted our ability to generate and maintain strategic weapons systems at heightened alert levels. (S)

Harold Brown

⁸ Carter underlined "as they existed two years ago" and wrote in the left margin next to it: "Emphasize this."

206. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 24, 1980

SUBJECT

OMB Report on FY 82 DOD Budget (U)

As background for the OMB Spring budget review you are scheduled to attend from 2–4 p.m. tomorrow, Jim McIntyre has sent you a memo reporting the status of the FY 82 defense program.² The main message in the memo is a little diffuse, but not really arguable—you are

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 7, Defense Department: 5–7/80. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum. Copies were sent to Brown and McIntyre.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 2 to 3 p.m. on July 25. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary). No minutes of the meeting were found.

going to have to make some very hard choices in finalizing this budget in December. You clearly cannot make these choices now, but having a sense of what they are will be important in the months ahead. (U)

The basic problem is that the required force readiness and RDF capabilities that appear necessary in this new era of Soviet aggressiveness (combined with unforeseen cost increases in some defense programs and in military compensation) cost more than your current fiscal guidance for 82 can hope to support. (C)

OMB's memo suggests too strongly that budget scrubs, particularly in non-major hardware and support equipment area, can go a long way toward solving the funding problem. I doubt it—the requirements are too large, readiness is too strongly related to many of the kinds of non-major hardware and support items OMB refers to, and the long standing funding pressures that have been felt in these accounts have been too high to leave much juice to be squeezed out now. Thus, some combination of the three alternatives given below must be adopted this fall. (S)

The real alternatives are 1) to increase the budget guidance by about \$5B for 1982, and \$50–75B for the 82–86 period, 2) broadly slow the rate of longer term improvements by cutting RDT&E and slowing some major procurement programs and 3) selectively slow down improvements planned for some specific mission areas or theaters, with the most obvious candidate being NATO. (S)

All three alternatives involve changes in our basic defense plans—changes that must be informed and justified with even better intelligence, analyses, and assessments than you have had for making defense budget decisions in the past:

—If we are going to cut back on our previously planned improvements for NATO, we should have identified, at least for ourselves, specific feasible adjustments our Allies can make to take up the slack. We should also carry out a careful analysis of the political effects on Europe of such cutbacks. Cutbacks that are large enough to satisfy our other defense funding requirements could sharply undercut our efforts to lead the alliance toward an improved western military posture.

—We must establish some benchmarks that will allow us to judge whether we have struck the proper balance between readiness-related short term improvements and the longer term improvements that flow from RDT&E and major procurement programs. Cutting longer term procurement in favor of higher readiness, as the services propose to do, may be a reasonable strategy. However, if we do not carefully justify this move, OMB's fears that Congress will simply add back any procurements we cut will be realized.

—We need to reassess the assumptions OMB describes as underlying our defense plans—particularly those justifying improvement

in our force posture at the current “steady pace.” We should audit our defense plans to insure that we are maintaining adequate hedges against the possibility that some of the assumptions underlying our defense planning prove wrong.

—Finally, we must insure that the adjustments we might make in overall priorities for our defense planning, as well as the overall level of defense effort we are making, are consistent with our latest and best understanding of the evolving challenges posed by the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries. Past budget reviews have concentrated too much on the details of our defense programs at the expense of providing information on how well the overall program meets the challenges we are facing. (S)

With continued effort I believe Jim, Harold and I can be ready this fall to provide much of this information to support making the hard choices you must face then. (U)

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) to President Carter³

Washington, July 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Defense Program for 1982

Introduction

Upward pressures for even higher Defense spending will continue. This memo provides you an update of the Defense program status and the major fiscal and programmatic questions which you will have to address in the FY 1982 budget.

In March you approved 1981–85 Defense funding levels that provide cumulative real growth of \$116B in this five year period. This is the largest peacetime commitment to Defense real growth since 1945. Defense spending will remain at just over 5% of GNP. This compares with 8–9% in the mid-1960’s.

Defense plans for the 1982–86 period call for improved capabilities of the current force structure, with some increases in aircraft, ships and theater nuclear forces. Also, military manpower will increase slightly over the same period. Sizable real growth is planned in force readiness

³ Secret. McIntyre did not initial the memorandum.

improvements (operations, maintenance and training) and strategic force investment (principally MX) with relatively less emphasis on general purpose force modernization (development and deployment of new equipment).

The following assumptions underlie Defense 1982–86 force improvement plans:

- Improvements in U.S. force capabilities are needed because of: (a) continued growth of Soviet military power including force projection capabilities; (b) increasing problems faced by the U.S. and its Allies in maintaining secure access to oil and other resources; and (c) likely continuation of an unstable international environment with the potential for sudden crises and conflicts.

- The U.S. can proceed at a steady pace because (a) the risks associated with the current balance are tolerable; (b) the Soviets are not likely to accelerate their rate of force improvements; (c) a major conflict, either strategic or conventional NATO, is unlikely; and (d) planned force enhancements are adequate to respond to the more likely occurrence of non-NATO contingencies.

- Our allies will continue to improve their own forces but will not assume a substantially larger share of overall defense responsibilities than they now have.

- Given political and organizational constraints, large efficiencies in the management of defense programs are not likely to be realized.

You will be making budget decisions this fall that will have a major influence on our future defense capabilities. Overall budget limitations will make it difficult to increase spending beyond your current commitment of more than 4% *real* growth. Since March strong pressures for much larger increases than those planned have arisen:

- Higher than expected inflation in major system costs plus pay and benefit increases for military and civilian personnel.

- An increased emphasis on near-term readiness and rapid deployment force build-up.

- Unforeseen cost increases above inflation for naval, NATO and strategic force initiatives you previously approved.

Possible reductions to stay within your 1982 guidance level for real growth include:

- Slowing the pace of readiness increases.
- Slowing the rate of some modernization programs and major procurements.

- A rigorous “budget scrub” to identify programs which cannot be achieved at previously planned rates or whose benefits have not been clearly established.

Discussion

Five year planning guidance was provided to Defense in the March budget update. Secretary Brown's senior staff have made their initial recommendations to him and his tentative decisions are now being sent to the Services. After a round of appeals, the final program decisions will be issued in August. The fall budget requests of the Services will be based on these decisions.

The essence of the budget problem is that the military departments are planning very substantial increases in funds to improve readiness, to support rapid deployment forces, and to accommodate some recognized cost increases. Given your commitments and the clear need to upgrade our capacities in these areas, it will be difficult to avoid some of these increases. In order to stay within your guidance, the Department will have to propose cuts elsewhere, probably to include deferring a number of acquisitions of large and highly visible weapons systems. Given the congressional and military service support for these systems and the large congressional defense add-ons in 1981, Congress will almost certainly provide funding in 1982 above your current program guidance levels.

Program Status

The military services provided a plan (request) that was roughly within the overall level of your guidance. After a "budget scrub," the defense program should be at about your guidance level. However, in the course of the defense review, a number of high priority potential increases—above the service plan—have been identified.

The following table illustrates the magnitude of possible increases.

Possible above guidance increases
(\$ in billions)

	1981	1982		1982-1986	
		Service Plan	Possible Increase	Service Plan	Possible Increase
Nuclear Forces	14.4	18.0	—	127	16
Navy Shipbuilding (GPF)	5.0	5.2	+1.8	45	7-16
Tac Air Acquisition	5.9	6.0	+7	31	3-10
Readiness	53.4	61.8	+3	278	1-10
RDF	1.6	2.3	+1.0	20	5
Research & Development	16.5	18.2	+7	100	18
Intelligence (NFIP)	5.8	6.4	+4	34	2
Total			4.5 to 5.0		52-77

Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces. These programs increase substantially, from \$14.4 billion in 1981 to \$18.0 billion in 1982, mainly for MX, cruise missiles and the Pershing II and GLCM theater nuclear forces. There are firm Administration commitments to all these programs and they will all be funded within the guidance. It is unlikely that the Defense program review will make any reductions in these forces. The primary budget threat would be a congressional add-on for the B-1 derivative, which could add about \$1 billion in 1982 and \$16 billion through 1986.

Modernization. The current service proposals for 1982 include over \$40 billion in non-strategic procurement programs. This includes all the major equipment and spare parts for our general purpose forces. About half of these acquisition funds are directed toward a variety of smaller hardware items and support equipment. In the past this area has been a primary source of “budget scrub” reductions to bring the Defense program in line with overall fiscal guidance.

The modernization programs for shipbuilding and tactical aircraft are of special concern in shaping the final budget.

- *Navy Shipbuilding (GPF).* Last January you approved a five year shipbuilding plan which provided for a long term force of about 550 ships by 1990. That plan went a long way toward quieting public and congressional concerns over future naval force levels. Even so, the 1981 Congressional Authorization will probably add at least 1 attack submarine, 2 frigates and reactivation of a battleship and aircraft carrier to your budget request based primarily on the perception that additional ships are needed for Indian Ocean deployments. In their effort to stay within your fiscal guidance, Defense may reduce the shipbuilding program. If they do, it will be highly visible. Defense is considering reductions to this plan now, including attack submarines, AEGIS cruisers, and frigates. Your approved plan included 9 combatant ships in 1982. The new Navy plan would reduce that to 6 by deleting 1 AEGIS cruiser and 2 frigates.

- *Tactical Aircraft Acquisition.* The Administration has placed continuing emphasis on modernization and expansion of the tactical air forces. The Air Force has acquired over 1300 new aircraft in the past four years to fill out its force expansion from 22 to 26 active wings. The Navy and Marines have concentrated on modernization and readiness improvements. To stay within guidance, there may be proposals to underfund both Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft procurement, which could translate into uneconomical rates of procurement and program terminations (e.g. for the Air Force A-10 and the Navy/Marine AV-8B). Like the shipbuilding reductions, these will draw fire from Congress which is likely to add more aircraft in any case, as it is now doing in the 1981 Authorization Bill (although all of the adds may not survive the appropriation process).

Readiness. Defense will propose large increases in readiness-related programs including operations and logistics. Since 1979 we have provided annual real growth of about \$2.5 billion in readiness funding. The increases for 1982 could be as high as \$5B. This is in response to widely known problems (e.g. out of service aircraft) and public perceptions of these problems. This is the first year in which Congress has been reluctant to make cuts from Administration requests for operations programs and may even add to the requests. We need to increase readiness. The question is by how much.

Rapid Deployment Forces. The Administration has emphasized the need for a rapid deployment force to counter non-Soviet threats outside NATO and Korea. The Persian Gulf region has been the principal focus of RDF planning since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Initial plans are oriented toward a baseline RDF (3½ divisions) sized to be a trip wire rather than to counter a full Soviet attack. An RDF capable of more effectively countering a Soviet threat would require 6½ divisions. Under current plans support of either size force would require the drawing down of NATO support. Also, the forces required for either the baseline or expanded RDF would be drawn from the existing force structure.

Priority in 1980/81 has been given to improved mobility, especially near term sealift enhancements and long term airlift improvements, needed for any RDF deployment and to improved facilities in the Indian Ocean. Enhancements now under consideration by Defense would improve both the level of support for deployed forces (without drawing down NATO) and facility access in the Persian Gulf. Specific program details still need to be defined and priced.

Several questions need to be resolved including:

—How much effort should go toward an earlier enhancement of the early deploying and sustaining capabilities for the 6½ division force?

—Should NATO designated support be protected?

—Should the RDF be designed to meet Persian Gulf scenarios specifically or to address worldwide contingencies?

—Should some existing ground forces be reconfigured for the RDF to make them easier to move? Forces lighter than those we now have would be more flexible and easier to deploy and sustain, although at the expense of tactical capability.

Research and Development. There has been overall real growth of 12% in R&D from 1978 through 1981. This year's emphasis on readiness and rapid deployment forces is squeezing the R&D budget. Currently, Defense is projecting a constant R&D program in real terms for 1982. Given the large growth in MX development, this implies a real decline for the rest of the R&D program. There will be strong arguments for some real growth.

Intelligence (NFIP). The overall program will increase, from \$5.8 billion in 1981 to \$6.4 billion in 1982, with increased emphasis on processing analysis, non-satellite collection and satellite developments. Congress is likely to endorse the magnitude of our 1981 request with some adjustments within the total. The 1982 level is threatened by program managers' requests substantially over the planning ceiling.

Congressional Action

Both the House and Senate authorization committees have made large add-ons, mainly in acquisition programs, to the 1981 request. We estimate the conference action will result in about a \$6 billion increase (including pay and benefits). Appropriation action, which may not be complete until after November, will probably result in a net increase of as much as \$3 billion above your revised guidance. By raising the 1981 base, Congress will be under pressure to add substantially to the 1982 and subsequent budgets.

Conclusion

The following table shows the effect of recent inflation adjustments and pay increases on the 1981 budget. In addition, it shows the effect of likely congressional add-ons for 1981 and the possible Administration initiatives for 1982.

	Program (\$ in billions)				
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
March 1980 Presidential Guidance	161.8	184.1	206.8	230.5	256.1
Increased pay and inflation	6.8	6.5	7.4	8.6	9.7
Revised Presidential Guidance	168.6	190.6	214.2	239.1	265.8
Possible Administration Increases (discussed above)	—	5.0			
Possible Congressional Increases	3.0	.7			
Budget Threat	171.6	196.3			

You will have to address a number of questions in the Defense budget review late this fall.

- Do our force improvement efforts correctly reflect our priorities among the various mission areas?
- Should some adjustments be made to existing commitments—strategic force modernization, NATO enhancement, rapid deployment forces?
- Should we proceed at a different pace in seeking to improve force readiness?
- Can substantial reductions be made in some acquisition programs?

- What steps can be taken to improve the efficiency of the Defense establishment?
- What will the inflation estimates be and what is the properly budgeted level for the real growth policy?

207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Nuclear Targeting Policy

Today you are meeting with Harold Brown, the Vice President, and me to respond to the request you made at Tab I, page 2,² for a briefing on the proposed Presidential Directive on Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. You asked to know:

- what is changed in targeting, etc.;
- how we propose to brief the allies;
- what public statements are to be made? (TS)

Harold will answer these questions for you. (U)

With the new directive, you will make rather significant and important innovations in improving control and management of our nuclear forces. At the same time, it is not a totally new departure. The basic direction toward more flexibility was set by the Schlesinger effort in 1974 which led to NSDM-242.³ That directive, however, only initiated the process, and it was not very specific about the need for a better staffing capability. Nor did it tie theater forces and other military operations into planning effectively. I have added the emphasis on exercises in the new PD as a result of your own involvement in IVORY ITEM exercises in 1978. They had an enormous educational impact and helped my staff and Harold's design parts of the new PD. That learning process must continue if this new PD is to have its best effect and you are to guide the evolution of the policy. (TS)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 36, PD-1 through PD-63: 1/77-1/81. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² Printed as Document 185. Carter met with Mondale and Brown from 1:30 to 2 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

³ See footnote 2, Document 29.

208. Presidential Directive/NSC-59¹

Washington, July 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (C)

In PD-18,² I directed a follow-on study of our targeting policy for nuclear forces. I have reviewed the results and considered their implications for maintaining deterrence in the present decade, particularly in light of the growing Soviet strategic weapons arsenal and its capabilities. (S)

The most fundamental objective of our strategic policy remains nuclear deterrence. I reaffirm the directive of PD-18 to that effect. The purpose of this directive is to outline policies and actions in the nuclear force employment field to secure that continuing objective. (S)

Our strategic nuclear forces must be able to deter nuclear attacks not only on our own country but also on our forces overseas, as well as on our friends and allies, and to contribute to deterrence of non-nuclear attacks. To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory on any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack. (C)

The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces. Our doctrines for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue specific policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time, from general guidelines established in advance. (S)

These requirements form the broad outline of our evolving countervailing strategy. To meet these requirements, improvements should be made to our forces, their supporting C³ and intelligence, and their employment plans and planning apparatus, to achieve a high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 36, PD-1 through PD-63: 1/77-1/81. Top Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 31.

face of enemy actions. The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements. (S)

Pre-planned options. The Single Integrated Operational Plan will provide pre-planned targeting for strikes against the Soviet Union, its allies and its forces. It should provide for retaliatory strikes that will be effective, even if the Soviets attack first, without warning, and in a manner designed to reduce our capability as much as possible. It will be developed with flexible sub-options that will permit, to the extent that survival of C³ allows, sequential selection of attacks from among a full range of military targets, industrial targets providing immediate military support, and political control targets, while retaining a survivable and enduring capability that is sufficient to attack a broader set of urban and industrial targets. In addition, to the maximum extent possible, pre-planned options will be provided for selection in response to specific, lesser contingencies (including attacks on Cuba, SRV and North Korea as appropriate). [1 line not declassified]. (TS)

While it will remain our policy not to rely on launching nuclear weapons on warning that an attack has begun, appropriate pre-planning, especially for ICBMs that are vulnerable to a preemptive attack, will be undertaken to provide the President the option of so launching. (TS)

Flexibility. In addition to pre-planned options we need an ability to design nuclear employment plans on short notice in response to the latest and changing circumstances. This capability must be comprehensive enough to allow rapid construction of plans that integrate strategic force employment with theater nuclear force employment and general purpose force employment for achieving theater campaign objectives and other national objectives when pre-planned response options are not judged suitable in the circumstances. (S)

To assure that we can design such plans, our goal should be to have the following capabilities on a continuing basis in peacetime, during crises, and during protracted conflict:

- Staff capabilities, within all unified and specified commands which have nuclear forces, to develop operational plans on short notice and based on the latest intelligence.

- Staff capabilities at the seat of Government to support the NCA for coordinating and integrating the nuclear force employment for all commands.

- Intelligence and target development capabilities which permit damage assessment and acquisition of a broad range of targets, fixed and mobile, on a timely basis for military operations. (S)

Reserve Forces. Pre-planned options should be capable of execution while leaving a substantial force in secure reserve and capable of being withheld for possible subsequent use. The forces designated for the

reserve should be the most survivable and enduring strategic systems consistent with the need for a flexible and varied reserve force capable of being effectively employed against a wide target spectrum and withheld if necessary for a prolonged period. The secure reserve force will be increased over the next two years to support a more flexible execution of our countervailing strategy. This will be done according to the Secretary of Defense's guidance. (TS)

Targeting categories. Overall targeting planning appropriate to implement a countervailing strategy will result in a capability to choose to put the major weight of the initial response on military and control targets. Military targets must be selected for the purpose of destroying enemy forces or their ability to carry out military operations. Strategic and theater nuclear forces should to the extent feasible be used in combination with, and in support of, general purpose forces to achieve that objective. (S)

More specifically, the following categories of military targets, with appropriate sub-options for different theaters, should be covered in planning:

- strategic and theater nuclear forces, including nuclear weapons storage;
- military command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities;
- all other military forces, stationary and mobile;
- industrial facilities which provide immediate support to military operations during wartime. (TS)

In addition, pre-planned options, capable of relatively prolonged withhold or of prompt execution, should be provided for attacks on the political control system and on general industrial capacity. (TS)

There must be extensive and effective coverage in the pre-planned options of all categories. Methods of attack on particular targets should be chosen to limit collateral damage to urban areas, general industry and population targets outside these categories, consistent with effectively covering the objective target, and, where appropriate, overall plans should include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage. (TS)

Command, Control and Communications, and Intelligence. Flexibility in contingency planning and in operations will be highly dependent on our C³I capabilities, including their ability to acquire targets, assess damage, and survive attack. Strategic stability in an era of essential equivalence depends as much on survivability, endurance and reconstitutability of C³I capabilities as it does on the size and character of strategic arsenals. (C)

PD/NSC-53³ directs that our C³I programs and our guidance to telecommunications common carriers support the development and maintenance of such capabilities. In addition, PD/NSC-41⁴ directs that we seek greater continuity of government should deterrence fail. Implementation of PD/NSC-53 and PD/NSC-41 must be pursued in parallel with that of this employment directive. (C)

The relationship of acquisition policy to employment policy. Our acquisition programs must be evaluated in terms of their support for the employment policy ordered by this directive. The required flexibility, survivability, endurance, and target destruction capability must be taken into account in developing programs for acquiring nuclear weapons systems, and their supporting C³I systems, needed to support our countervailing strategy. (S)

Implementation. As new targeting capabilities are developed, and as our operational staffing support change to meet the foregoing directives, they must be reviewed and tested to validate their feasibility and soundness. For that purpose:

—At least two exercises involving the National Command Authorities should be conducted each year to evaluate our capabilities and our employment doctrines.

—Continued study and analysis of means to improve and refine our countervailing strategy of general conflict should be conducted by the Department of Defense.

—The results of these exercises, studies and analysis will provide the bases for modification and any further development of employment and acquisition policy.

—A report will be rendered to the President at least annually on our employment plans, including, but not limited to, on the size and capability of the reserve forces, the degree of flexibility available, limiting factors in achieving flexibility, and the status of programs to provide improvements.

—Any change or new pre-planned options will be submitted to the President for his review and approval, in accordance with current procedures. (TS)

NSDM-242⁵ is superseded by this directive. (U)

Jimmy Carter

³ See Document 165.

⁴ See Document 91.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 29.

209. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 2, 1980

SUBJECT

False Alerts (U)

My last memorandum on this subject was on July 2.² In that memorandum I summarized the corrective actions underway to prevent false missile warning displays like those which resulted in alerts of Strategic Air Command bomber crews on June 3 and 6. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an update on the status of those actions. (U)

Subsequent to the June 6 false warning, Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) suspended operation of the NORAD Missile Warning Computer System (427M) as its primary means for providing missile warning data and attack assessment to other US and Canadian command centers. While the factors which contributed to the false alerts on June 3 and 6 are being corrected, NORAD is providing such data to its customers via a completely different computer, the Minimum Essential Back-up (MEBU) computer. (C)

I believe there were three major contributors to the false alert events of June 3 and 6: (1) a physical electronic failure in a circuit board of the 427M system, (2) computer programs which lacked sufficient error detection capability to prevent spurious data from being transmitted to NORAD's customers, and (3) lack of a monitoring system which would permit NORAD personnel—whose mission it is to provide accurate warning data and attack assessment—to examine what they were sending to their customers. All three of these discrepancies require correction, but had any one of them been resolved prior to 3 June, the false alerts either would not have occurred or would have been resolved more expeditiously. (S)

Analysis of the June 3 and 6 events has all but convinced ADCOM and the independent team of computer experts from the private sector that the failure was associated with a specific micro-electronic integrated circuit in a particular data communications interface device at NORAD. Nevertheless, the actual physical phenomenon which caused that circuit to produce the spurious signals on June 3 and 6 is still

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80. Secret. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Carter under cover of an August 6 memorandum. (Ibid.)

² See Document 202.

unknown. There are 552 circuit boards in the 427M which are generally similar in design and fabrication (commercial rather than military quality) to the one that failed on June 3 and 6. These boards, used as interfaces throughout the 427M system, remain the primary vulnerability of the 427M today. Since these boards cannot be quickly redesigned and replaced, it is imperative that we take a very conservative approach to error detection and correction in the system's computer programs. (S)

Error Detection (U)

When the spurious signals were transmitted to NORAD's customers on June 3 and 6, error checking throughout the missile warning system was totally inadequate. Relatively simple error checks in the data stream which would detect random errors were removed and restored by the computer system as data messages were routed through various elements of the system. Although (as a result of changes made since the incidents) such simple error checks are now carried consistently through the 427M system and through the computers at the receiving command centers, these checks are inadequate to prevent bursts of errors from producing false data messages as occurred on June 3 and 6. That is, if the 427M were on-line today and the same failure that occurred on June 3 and 6 were to recur, it is highly likely that some erroneous messages would again be transmitted and appear on the displays of NORAD's customer command centers. (S)

The solution to this problem is the incorporation of a very powerful error-detection technique known as cyclic redundancy codes (CRC) into the computer programs of the missile warning system. Installation of CRC will delay the return to full operation of the more capable 427M for another three months, but I believe it is essential that we do so in order to provide acceptable assurance that bursts of errors caused by circuit failures will not cause false data messages to be sent. (C)

Quality Control (U)

It is the responsibility of the people on duty in the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex (NMC) to provide valid, accurate warning information to the other command centers as well as to provide a NORAD assessment. Yet prior to June 6 the crew on duty in the NMC had no way of inspecting the data they were transmitting to their customers; they had to assume that the data they were seeing displayed were the same as those which were being transmitted to the other command centers. This, we are now well aware, was an erroneous assumption, but the fact that the people most qualified to analyze the data discrepancy on June 3 and 6—the people in the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex—were isolated from observation of the false

data being sent to their customers delayed expeditious resolution on the spot of the false alert which ensued. (S)

To address this problem we are in the process of installing monitoring devices on the data lines exiting the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex. These devices will provide audible and visual alarms to the Systems Controller and the Missile Warning Officer at NORAD whenever a warning message is transmitted to the National Military Command Center or to Strategic Air Command Headquarters. The NORAD Systems Controller and the Missile Warning Officer can then expeditiously examine the validity of such messages and quickly advise the receiving command center should the message be false. (C)

The independent team of computer experts from the private sector concluded, as I had, that it is unlikely that a system as large and complex as the NORAD missile warning system can be made completely failure-proof. Nevertheless, I find some reassurance in the following general conclusion from their report: "The checks and balances and practices are such that the events of June 3rd and June 6th, by themselves, could not have led to an improper use of nuclear weapons." But we need to improve the system and our procedures. We have done so and will make further improvements.³ (S)

Harold Brown

³ Carter wrote below Brown's signature: "The deficiencies were/are serious. J." Brzezinski returned the memorandum to Brown under cover of an August 7 memorandum drawing attention to Carter's comment. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 42, Missile Warning Incidents: 11/79–8/80)

210. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Flap with Muskie Over PD-59²

I do not know if the flap will continue and why Muskie has chosen to carry it on in the media. For your information, here is the background:

1. I have enclosed the text of the memorandum³ which was sent to you with PD-59. One of the alternatives was a NSC meeting which Muskie would have attended.

2. Brown was instructed by you to brief Muskie, and on August 5 I reminded him to do so. He did, but the following day before Brown could show the actual directive to Muskie, both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* broke the story that precipitated Muskie's ire.⁴

3. The development of PD-59 was ordered by you in PD-18⁵ in August 1977. During the next two years, at least three formal SCC meetings were held, and Vance was involved in two and Christopher in one. In addition, at least two internal DOD studies on the subject were initiated in 1977 and circulated to State and the NSC. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense's annual reports to Congress for FY '79, '80 and '81 contained explicit descriptions of the targeting flexibility—the countervailing strategy—embodied in PD-59. These documents were previewed by State. In addition, Brown made a statement to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on June 4, 1980, on the countervailing doctrine.⁶ Muskie's State Department subordinates should have briefed him on its contents prior to the NATO ministerial in Ankara. This was apparently not done.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 35, PD 59: (5/80-1/81). Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Brzezinski's behalf.

² See Document 208.

³ Printed as Document 185.

⁴ Reference is to Michael Getler, "Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War," *Washington Post*, August 6, 1980, p. A10; and Richard Burt, "Carter Said to Back a Plan for Limiting Any Nuclear War," *New York Times*, August 6, 1980, p. A1.

⁵ See Document 31.

⁶ Documentation on the NATO Nuclear Planning Group is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. V, *European Security, 1977-1983*.

4. The SCCs in the spring of 1979 took note of Defense's progress in implementing the results of the targeting study. This past winter, I suggested in a memo to Harold Brown⁷ that we complete the process initiated by PD-18 in a directive which codified what had been done within Defense and the general direction for future development which his countervailing strategy implies. He agreed and suggested that he and I work out a final product prior to any additional interagency review. To my initial draft of a PD, he added considerable detail on the present SIOP, giving it a far more sensitive substance than it originally had.

5. State officials did not participate in the translation of the doctrine into specific SIOP instructions and for very good reasons. These adjustments are extraordinarily sensitive. The tradition of keeping military contingency planning away from our diplomatists except in its general outline is an old and valid one. (S)

The whole thing seems to me more a matter of personal sensitivity than substance, even though Brown was somewhat slow in briefing Muskie after you initiated that approach; however, both of them were on the move and it was not easy for them to get together. Nevertheless, the central point remains valid: the SIOP should not be reviewed or discussed by those not authorized or required to deal with it; only the broad doctrine should be—and Harold's statements of broad doctrine are—on the public record. (S)

⁷Not found.

211. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 26, 1980

SUBJECT

The Carter Transformation of Our Strategic Doctrine

I want to summarize for you the fundamental change occurring in U.S. strategic doctrine over the last three years. You may or may not want to take public credit for it, but you should have a clear view in your own mind of its historic significance. That is being obscured and confused in the public fuss over PD-59,² the last of a series of related directives you have signed. (C)

The Requirement for Change

There have been two previous transformations in our strategic doctrine. The first, "massive retaliation," occurred in the 1950s under President Eisenhower.³ It was designed to deter the Soviets by our large lead in nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. The second, "assured destruction," was sponsored in the 1960s by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as they watched Soviet forces grow and the U.S. lead shrink.⁴ Secretary McNamara designed the concept primarily as a budgetary instrument to decide "how much was enough?" in strategic forces. The doctrinal notion was added by others. They, however, believed the Soviets would stop their buildup at near our force levels. When they did not and when they introduced new qualitative capabilities, the doctrine lost much of its relevance. To revise our doctrine then became a critical although unpopular task in face of the continuing Soviet buildup through the 1970s. You have accomplished this through a number of directives which put much more emphasis on objective capabilities to reinforce the subjective and psychological aspects of deterrence. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 35, PD 59: (5/80-1/81). Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: "Zbig—Good. Share w/VP, Ed, Harold. J." In an August 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Odom discussed "The Differences Between PD-59 and NSDM-242." In a marginal notation on Odom's memorandum, Brzezinski instructed him to use it as a base for an expanded memorandum that Brzezinski would send to Carter. (Ibid.)

² See Document 210.

³ Carter underlined "massive retaliation" and "1950s" in this sentence.

⁴ Carter underlined "assured destruction" and "1960s" in this sentence.

What Has Been Done

Based upon reviews and recommendations from the agencies, in response to conceptualization and coordination by the NSC, you have directed (a) that we maintain “essential equivalence” in general purpose and strategic force levels (PD-18); that strategic defense is part of the overall military balance (PD-41); that national objectives be met for telecommunications to support all levels of conflict (PD-53); that mobilization planning guidance be developed for all agencies, DOD being only one of them (PD-57); that a conceptually new approach be applied to “continuity of government” and maintenance of the National Command Authority under nuclear attack (PD-58); that a significant step be taken in the evolutionary process of our targeting policy (PD-59).⁵ An elaboration of each of these is important to give you a more textured appreciation of the overall policy changes. (C)

PD-18, signed in August 1977, put stress on reversing the conventional force balance adverse trends in Europe, acquiring a U.S. rapid deployment force, and maintaining strategic force “essential equivalence” in face of the continuing Soviet buildup.⁶ It directed a number of follow-on efforts, because, as PRM-10 showed, the implications of “parity” with the USSR were complex and needed several additional U.S. responses. (C)

PD-41, on civil defense policy, signed in September 1978, revived the view that defensive capabilities are part of the strategic balance, even if only a small part.⁷ The idea of “defense” was abandoned in the 1960s after serious attention to it by both President Eisenhower and, for a time, President Kennedy. Studies by CIA corroborated the Soviet open literature about Soviet civil defense capabilities, and a dispersed Soviet population, even partially dispersed, might make a difference of tens of millions of initial survivors. Changes in our targeting could not reduce the difference significantly. (C)

PD-53, national security telecommunications policy, was signed in November 1979.⁸ It set forth, for the first time, national C³I objectives which Defense, as the executive agent of the National Communications

⁵ Carter underlined “essential equivalence,” “telecommunications,” “mobilization planning guidance,” “maintenance of the National Command Authority under nuclear attack,” and “targeting policy” in this sentence. The Presidential Directives are printed as Documents 31, 91, 165, 176, 201, and 208.

⁶ Carter underlined “PD-18,” “reversing the conventional force balance adverse trends in Europe,” “U.S. rapid deployment force,” and “maintaining strategic force ‘essential equivalence’” in this sentence.

⁷ Carter underlined “PD-41” and “civil defense policy” in this sentence.

⁸ Carter underlined “PD-53” and “telecommunications” in this sentence.

System (set up by Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when he found agencies with separate and non-interoperable communications systems, a paralyzing condition for his control), has the responsibility to implement, not only in its C³I programs but also with guidance to common carriers on interoperability and survivability for crisis and war. PD-53 changed fundamentally the objective of telecommunications heretofore: sufficient to communicate an execution message for a retaliatory strike but nothing more for endurance, flexibility, and a prolonged conflict.⁹ (U)

PD-57, mobilization planning guidance, signed in March 1980, tasked the first work on mobilization guidance at the national level since the 1950s.¹⁰ Treated as less than a serious issue, even in the Defense Department until lately, mobilization responsibilities in other agencies, although critical for wartime, had long been a joke. As the Soviet buildup cancelled our superiority, the joke became a dangerous one, undercutting our credibility in the eyes of careful foreign observers. Little concrete result has been achieved to date, but the level of serious interest is surprisingly high after PD-57's emergence. A parallel achievement in manpower mobilization has been the draft registration law. It is a major step. (C)

PD-58, Continuity of Government/C³I, signed this June, initiates a wholly new conceptual approach to making the National Command Authority and the Presidency for civil government survivable under conditions of repeated nuclear attack.¹¹ The existing system built in the 1950s, was judged vulnerable already by 1962 in a report to President Kennedy. President Nixon received a similar report in 1970 but failed to act on it. Neither report offered a solution to the problem of hardsite vulnerability. Until the new system is built and tested, it is doubtful that the U.S. could ride out a well-conceived Soviet attack on our national C³I, carry through to a third or fourth ranking successor if need be, and retaliate in a coordinated manner. Even if we were lucky enough to do that, the staff support for the Presidency to mobilize, control the forces, and govern the civil sector is lacking. PD-58 requires the development of precisely that support. (S)

⁹ Carter underlined "retaliatory strike," "endurance," "flexibility," and "prolonged conflict" in this sentence.

¹⁰ Carter underlined "PD-57" and "mobilization planning" in this sentence.

¹¹ Carter underlined "PD-58," "Continuity of Government/C³I," "Command Authority," and "survivable" in this sentence.

PD-59, the nuclear weapons employment policy directive, completes the series.¹² It is, to some extent, an addition to NSDM-242,¹³ the first effort at “limited” nuclear options taken in 1974 by Nixon and Schlesinger. I want to spell out for you in some detail the differences between the two directives, however, because there are claims already being made that PD-59 is nothing new, just a rehash of NSDM-242. (C)

a. [8 lines not declassified]

b. NSDM-242 put most emphasis on targeting postwar recovery resources, i.e. cities and industry. PD-59 retains this insofar as it retains the SIOP. For all other targeting, and even within the SIOP after economic recovery targets are hit, PD-59 puts the targeting emphasis on these categories: all military, C³I, and war-supporting industry. (C)

c. NSDM-242 treated C³I as needed to transmit “emergency action messages” to our forces, to chat with Moscow via MOLINK, and for diplomacy with other states. PD-59 calls for C³I of a much more flexible and extensive kind: (1) control of both nuclear and general purpose forces operations and (2) a “look-shoot-look” capability to locate new and moving targets rapidly through a prolonged conflict. (C)

d. [6 lines not declassified]

e. NSDM-242 said nothing about “acquisition policy,” only “employment policy.” Programmatically, therefore, NSDM-242 remained a dead letter. PD-59 ties acquisition to employment policy. That means that OMB, Defense, and the DCI must take the new policy into account in their budgets and programs. (C)

NSDM-242 kept the old theoretical baggage, trying to make a limited “retaliatory” or even a first use strike more credible as the SIOP became less credible. Could the U.S. public sit calmly through such LNOs, having not even civil defense protection? NSDM-242 was a misconceived document. It merely exaggerated the flaws of the SIOP. PD-59 is fundamentally different, while not designed to be a “war fighting” doctrine, it takes into account Soviet employment doctrine because, with the Soviet acquisition of such large and accurate forces, that doctrine cannot be ignored if deterrence is to be maintained. To fail to make this change would be to risk drifting into a situation where our doctrine and capabilities could, in a crisis, deter ourselves more than the Soviets. (C)

¹² Carter underlined “PD-59” and “nuclear weapons employment policy” in this sentence.

¹³ See footnote 2, Document 29.

In summary, you have taken a series of steps that add up to a major revision of our strategic doctrine, the third one since World War II. The previous two, like this one, have been driven by Soviet force development. This is the first phase of the task. The second, the programmatic phase, will be a major task of your second-term defense policy.¹⁴ (C)

¹⁴ Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Mondale and Muskie under cover of a September 2 memorandum. It reads in part: "The President asked me to share the enclosed memorandum with you, especially since there is likely to be some public discussion of our current strategic doctrine. In the last three and one-half years, the President has taken a series of steps that add up to a major revision of our strategic doctrine, the third such major revision since World War II. The Administration should obtain more public credit for this than it has so far." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 68, Vice President 1-10/80)

212. Editorial Note

In Presidential Directive/NSC-60, "Nuclear Weapons Deployments," September 26, 1980, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski informed Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones that President Jimmy Carter had approved the Secretary of Defense's Nuclear Weapons Deployment Request for Fiscal Year 1980-1981. The directive also enumerated conditions under which actual deployments might vary; directed the Departments of State and Defense to secure Carter's approval of an Allied consultation strategy before proceeding with the deployments; directed the Departments of State and Defense to coordinate any other deployment level changes and send them to Carter for approval; and outlined additional rules governing the deployments. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State): 11/80)

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Emergency Procedures for Presidential Succession

On John Macy's report of the exercise NINE LIVES last May,² you commented that you would like a "summary of procedures" and that "FEMA inform at least the top five in the chain of succession" about the improved system known as Operation TREETOP. He has responded in a letter at Tab A. The Summary of the Procedures is at Tab B. (S)

No action by you is required. The important points for you to know are:

—John Macy has briefed the top five officials in the line of succession below the Vice President. They have a copy of Macy's letter to you and are aware that you have asked them to be briefed.

—On procedures, you may disperse, whenever you determine that the strategic situation is precarious, five potential successors with small support teams. This allows you to reduce greatly our vulnerability to a surgical strike against the National Command Authority.

—This capability, Operation TREETOP, is only an intermediate step toward the new continuity of government system directed by PD-58.³ (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Macy) to President Carter⁴

Washington, August 19, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

(U) On June 4, I sent an initial report⁵ to you on Exercise NINE LIVES which was conducted during the period May 6–8, 1980, at your

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 23, PD/NSC-58 [2]. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Odom. Carter initialed the upper right corner of the memorandum.

² Not found.

³ See Document 201.

⁴ Secret.

⁵ Not found.

request and in close coordination with the Department of Defense. In your written comment on that report,⁶ you asked that following our review, we provide you with a "summary of procedure" and that we "inform at least the top five in the chain of succession." Our review is now nearing completion and we have progressed sufficiently in our post exercise critique to comply with your request at this time.

(S) The exercise tested several of our contingency plans for national security emergencies including, primarily, those for the dispersal and support of Presidential successors. Surrogates were used for the principals involved and communications security was a paramount consideration. Enclosed is a brief description of the plans which were tested and the procedures associated with each.

(U) With respect to your request to inform at least the top five in the chain, you are advised that all officials in the line of succession, below the level of the Vice President, are briefed by me and my staff on the plans and procedures for emergency dispersal and support shortly after assuming office. I intend to provide each of them with copies of this letter and our final review of the NINE LIVES Exercise.

(S) In general, the exercise was very profitable from the viewpoint of lessons learned. The principal problem areas which deserve our continued attention and near term solutions include:

- Clarification of legal interpretation associated with details of succession to the Presidency. These are being investigated by the Department of Justice.

- Need for greater communications support at various dispersal locations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Defense are investigating means to improve this capability.

- Need for more effective procedures for decisionmaking with respect to timing, successor selection, and dispersal. This is being addressed by the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

- Need for more adequate support of successors when dispersed. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is expanding current plans to provide such support.

- Need to re-evaluate helicopter support for the emergency dispersal of successors during crises periods. This problem is under study by the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

(U) I considered the exercise to be very successful and feel that this kind of joint civil/military exercise greatly enhances our continuity of government capabilities. With your continued support and in

⁶Not found.

coordination with the White House Military Office, the Department of Defense, and the new Joint Program Office on Continuity of Government, I will conduct similar exercises at least semiannually.

(U) The Secretary of Defense has seen this letter and concurs.

Respectfully,

John W. Macy, Jr.

Tab B

**Paper Prepared in the Federal Emergency
Management Agency**

Washington, undated

[Secret. 8 pages not declassified]

**214. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary
of State Muskie and the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, November 7, 1980

SUBJECT

Basic Strategy Issues (U)

I believe that one of the most important legacies we can leave to our successors is some clear advice on the basic strategic issues they will now have to confront. Our views on these issues should also shape our own final budget decisions.

To this end, I would like to discuss the attached paper with you at the next MBB with a view to then providing a paper to the President. For obvious reasons let me request that you give the attached *no* further distribution, and that *no* copies be made.

Harold

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 16, Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf—(12/80). Secret; Sensitive. Sent via Alpha Channel. On November 4, President Carter lost reelection to former California Governor Ronald Reagan.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense²

Washington, undated

BASIC ISSUES AFFECTING STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURE IN THE 80s

I. THE PROBLEMS WE CONFRONT

A. *The "catch-up" problem.* The cost of the Vietnam War (\$236B in FY 80 \$) and its aftermath (a 35% cut in real annual defense spending 1969–75) created a substantial imbalance between a diverted or declining US effort and steady real increases in Soviet defense spending. While real US defense spending 1976–80 increased 10%, this increase was least in the investment sector, where inflation most outran budget predictions of its level. In fact the differential between US and Soviet defense investment runs (according to CIA estimates) about \$240B over the decade of the 70s, as measured in FY 1980 dollars. True, total NATO plus Japanese defense spending is still comparable to that of the Warsaw Pact, because fortunately we have rich Allies and the USSR only poor ones. But in the crucial investment sector the alliance still lags behind—and alliance investment is only partially additive to ours, because of overlap, duplication, and inefficiencies. Yet we must confront this problem squarely in the 80s and address the related strategic issues.

B. *Strategic nuclear parity.* Preserving strategic deterrence naturally takes overriding priority, and will be more expensive than in the recent past even if we can arrange a continuation of the SALT II limits on Soviet forces. We will have to spend a lot more on a strategic arms race if SALT II fails—and modernize forces/strengthen C³ even with SALT II. Nonetheless, the chief strategic consequence of nuclear parity is to compel greater reliance on much more costly conventional forces. In short, nuclear parity requires a better (more favorable to us) conventional balance as well.

C. *The Strategic Vacuum in the Persian Gulf.* Since PD–18 was written the revolution in Iran, invasion of Afghanistan and now Iran/Iraq war have underlined the vulnerability of the oil-rich PG region to Soviet exploitation. Moreover, the President has already made the policy decision to repel such a threat by force if need be.³ This compels us to face

² Secret.

³ Reference is to Carter's January 23, 1980, State of the Union Address, in which he declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." (*Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 138.

up to a whole new requirement—one and two “half-wars” instead of one and one-half.⁴

D. *The “Simultaneity” Problem.* Though DoD is doing its best to meet an added PG/IO requirement, even currently programmed RDF capabilities cannot cope with a *Soviet* threat at levels they could surely mount. Moreover, the forces, lift, and support we would have to employ against this PG/IO lift, and support we would have to employ against this PG/IO threat would be largely at the expense of our NATO and Far East capabilities, at least for the next several years. This raises the question of “*simultaneity*.” We must prudently hedge against the possibility that a direct US/Soviet clash in the PG/IO would escalate into a global conflict, whether or not we chose to escalate. There is a real question about the likelihood—or attractiveness to the Soviets—of mounting simultaneous *attacks*, as opposed to *threats*. If they did attack however, currently programmed US and allied resources would not permit adequate defense of three widely separated theaters simultaneously. We would have to go on the strategic defensive somewhere and perhaps sacrifice territory, as we had to do initially in WW II. Thus we must find strategic avenues for reducing the risks that regional conflict would expand into global war—at times and under circumstances adverse to our vital interests.

E. *Serious economic constraints*, including the impact of the energy crunch and other inflationary/slow growth pressures, severely constrict our ability to generate adequate defense growth—despite growing popular perceptions that such growth is essential.

F. *Differing perceptions of the “threat”* also create serious difficulties for us. Most of our friends simply don’t see the magnitude of the threat as we do, or if they do, quail at confronting it. The political consensus in most of them for greater defense efforts and a more assertive policy is weaker than in the US, particularly among the rising generation. Moreover, much of the world seems to think we’re still as strong as ever, but questions US leadership, while many others think we’ve sunk to second place. In both cases we confront a pervasive “image of the US” problem.⁵

What about the longer term? If we can deter conflict and restrict Soviet expansionism for another decade or so, there is reason to believe that internal Soviet contradictions will progressively limit Soviet ability to keep building up military power. Hence we probably do not face an unending arms race; rather our problem is how to get through a

⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this sentence and an arrow pointing to it.

⁵ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the previous sentence.

dangerous decade with our vital interests intact. During this period we must of course continue our efforts to constrain Soviet power and enhance stability via the SALT process, MBFR and other forms of arms control.⁶

II. BASIC ISSUES OF GRAND STRATEGY

In DoD's view the sheer magnitude of these problems makes clear that a further major evolution of present policies and programs is required, despite the real accomplishments of the last few years. The accelerated DoD programs we believe essential will be presented to a PRC. This paper addresses corollary strategic and policy issues which also bear directly on our national security needs. Indeed there are clear tradeoffs here.⁷ To the extent that the policy initiatives DoD proposes are infeasible or prove unsuccessful, even larger US defense budgets than DoD is proposing will almost certainly be required.⁸

This is because what our friends and allies do for the common defense is fully as important as what we do ourselves. Indeed our own vital interests can only be adequately served, at a cost we can afford, by a "coalition" strategy and posture. Among other things, we cannot successfully defend in WE, SWA, or the FE without extensive participation and cooperation of friends and allies. Thus rational burden-sharing is the *sine qua non* of credible deterrence/defense.

Nor can we afford to address our security needs purely in terms of defense programs. A better dovetailing of US defense, economic, and foreign policies is equally essential, which raises a related set of issues.⁹

We have selected eight key issues for SCC debate and recommendation to the President. What we decide on each of them will affect the others, as well as the size of future US defense programs. Therefore, after considering each issue on its own, we ought to think about the overall situation to see whether our conclusions add up to a viable overall strategy for the 80s, which in turn should drive our security policies as well as programs.

Issue #1—Do the 80s pose a significantly greater danger of major regional or global conflict? This is essentially a matter of subjective judgment. But volatility and change in the so-called Third World (and the opportunities this offers for Soviet or surrogate exploitation), together with growing stresses in Eastern Europe (especially Poland) and post-Tito risks in Yugoslavia, do seem to create greater likelihood of conflicts affecting

⁶ Brzezinski wrote in the right margin next to this paragraph: "containment + decay?"

⁷ Brzezinski underlined "tradeoffs" in this sentence.

⁸ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the previous sentence.

⁹ Brzezinski drew two short lines bracketing this paragraph.

coalition interests in the 80s. Some also argue that there is a “window” of vulnerability—not just nuclear—which Moscow might be tempted to exploit before this gap can be closed. For example, the USSR might feel impelled to create a diversion from its problems in Eastern Europe by pressing forward in Southwest Asia.

Moreover, the threat to vital Free World oil access in the volatile PG/IO region could lead to *direct US/USSR confrontation*—if the Soviets were tempted to intervene forcibly and only the US has much capability for deterring or halting Soviet intervention.

Thus DoD does see a greater likelihood of conflict, which impacts directly on both the size of coalition deterrence/defense effort needed and on relative emphases within it. For example, it bears on the relative weight we give to readiness vs. modernization if resources remain so constrained.

Issue #2—If for several years to come defending our vital interests in the widely separated NATO, Persian Gulf and Far East theaters simultaneously is beyond our capabilities, which should receive priority? And—a different question—where should the greatest resource increment be applied? These issues have grave political as well as military implications. Our strategy has long been based on the premise that holding on to Western Europe, a developed power complex now fully as rich as our own, was first priority. We see no reason to change this judgment.

But the security and economic health of Western Europe (and Japan for that matter) depend on assured access to PG oil. Thus in a real sense defense of the PG/IO is directly linked to that of both other areas of vital interest to us. Moreover, the vulnerability and volatility of the PG region suggest that the risks of conflict may be greatest in this area, where we are currently least well-prepared. The DoD judgment is that the Soviets would see much less risk and almost as great gain in seeking control of Southwest Asia and its resources by combined military action and political pressure than in seeking control of Western Europe by those means. Therefore, DoD believes that Southwest Asia should have priority in our FY 82–86 buildup, (though not necessarily in wartime allocation of our forces).¹⁰

In turn Europe and Japan must be pressed to assume a greater share of the burden of their own defense under a “division of labor” concept (see Issue #4). Moreover, in the Far East theater improving US/PRC/Japan relations offer new strategic options to protect our vital interests and create added constraints on Soviet behavior at little cost to the US (see Issue #4).

¹⁰ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the portion of the previous sentence that begins with “Asia and its resources” and ends with “by those means” and an arrow pointing to it.

Issue #3—How can we best fill the PG/IO power vacuum? If this is our top priority need through the mid-80s, we must develop a more credible surge capability. Given the political and military constraints on deployable Allied power, this has to be primarily a US task—with only modest help from our European or FE Allies.

But within current budget guidelines we could not deploy sufficient force rapidly enough, and support it adequately, to offer much confidence of credible defense if deterrence failed. For example, even under present program guidelines the 3½ division, 4 tacair wing, RDF currently programmed will still lack important elements, especially sufficient lift, support, and munitions—and the basing structure programmed would be marginal. Moreover, DoD believes an adequately supported force of at least 6½ divisions plus seven air wings is needed to pose a credible US ability to counter Soviet intervention should it in fact take place.¹¹ There is also a critical lack of the fast air and sealift needed to surge to the PG in timely enough fashion to maximize deterrence or minimize Soviet gains. Are we willing to pay this price?

Moreover, even if we develop such capabilities, they cannot be used effectively without forward bases in the area. This is the weakest single element of our emerging PG/IO strategy. Because the area countries are so strongly opposed to US bases, we are compelled to build ungarrisoned facilities which they presumably would allow us to use once they perceived an imminent threat.¹² Saudi Arabia is key in this respect—both as the largest oil producer and the geographic locale from which we could most effectively deter or defend against a Soviet move into Iran/Iraq. Since the Gulf states may not let us deploy until the last moment, we also need staging bases in the region (which can serve as less vulnerable rear logistic bases too). Egypt looks like the best bet.¹³

But this uncomfortable dependence on PG/IO states with whom we lack a firm alliance relationship dictates a major effort to improve our relations with them. Here the lack of an Arab-Israeli settlement makes our task more difficult. Israel's efforts to strengthen her own security position risk exacerbating the Arab/Israeli dispute at the very time when we seek to get the Arab states to focus on the Soviet threat. DoD believes it may be necessary to provide such firm security assurances (and sufficient aid) to Israel as to calm her legitimate fears (and

¹¹ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to the portion of this sentence beginning with "believes" and ending with "credible" and an arrow pointing to it.

¹² Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.

¹³ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence and a checkmark in the right margin.

make even clearer to the Arabs our commitment to Israel's security).¹⁴ Such assurances (and aid) may also be indispensable to successful completion of the Camp David process, in terms of autonomy and territory. They would in turn enable us to meet the insistent demand of Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) for "equal treatment" with Israel. DoD sees a resolution of this issue as indispensable to the kind of security relationship without which we simply cannot execute a viable PG/IO strategy.¹⁵

The energy squeeze poses another serious obstacle to closer relationships with key PG oil producers. Their price increase and production policies create economic difficulties which in turn impede our defense efforts, thus adversely affecting the very East/West military balance which in the last analysis protects their security too. Since continuation of such policies could make major defense budget increases impossible, DoD believes it vital for us to attempt to develop a policy which explicitly trades our security umbrella for their granting sure access at reasonable prices to PG oil.

Issue #4—What Far East strategic posture will best relieve Soviet pressure on Europe and the PG/IO, while limiting risks of simultaneous global war? If we must give strategic priority to Europe and now the PG/IO, we face again the old WW II problem of what to do about our Pacific flank. Though neither China, Japan, nor for that matter the US can pose a major offensive threat to the USSR, Moscow exhibits live concern over its own FE flank and is steadily strengthening its forces there. Fortunately Japan's rapid economic development and the growing parallelism of US/PRC strategic interests (China's concern over the Soviet threat is even greater than our own), offer a strategic option for (1) enhancing Soviet concern over a two-front threat; yet (2) forestalling the need for major US defense increases directed specifically at this third theater.

Given our acute need to limit Soviet capabilities against NATO and the PG/IO, and our inability to deal with all three fronts simultaneously, DoD believes that the clearest way to accomplish goals (1) and (2) above is to insist on greater Japanese rearmament and provide China certain carefully calculated defensive weaponry.¹⁶ Something of this sort is probably necessary to improve China's defensibility in any case. Absent this approach we would almost certainly need to carry out a massive US force buildup in the Western Pacific. We also urge that Japan should be pressed to finance more of the US/Japanese defense capability and (indirectly through trade) some of the PRC arms

¹⁴ Brzezinski underlined "to Israel" in this sentence.

¹⁵ Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this sentence. He also drew two short lines in the right margin bracketing this and the previous sentence.

¹⁶ Brzezinski underlined "insist on greater Japanese rearmament" and "certain carefully calculated defensive weaponry" in this sentence.

modernization. This would be in Japan's own strategic interest and would relieve the burden on the US. Moreover, we see little risk that a reluctant Japan will go so far in rearming as to pose again a threat to US strategic interests. Instead they are in the same boat as we are now.

Since it would be difficult for the US to defend South Korea if we were fully engaged elsewhere, [6 lines not declassified] A third part of this strategy would be to use the leverage of our aid to press China to deter any NK attack.¹⁷

DoD stresses a Far East "threat-in-being" concept because both Japan and China probably would prefer to remain neutral as long as possible in any NATO/WP or US/USSR conflict. Nor could we pose a major offensive threat to the USSR in the FE so long as they did so—and maybe even if they joined us. Moreover, Moscow too might prefer to refuse its FE flank until it had won in Europe and/or the PG (which would give it a stranglehold on Japan's oil).

For all these reasons DoD believes that the US must face up to the need for (1) accelerated Japanese rearmament; (2) [1 line not declassified] and (3) the sale of limited defensive arms to China, [less than 1 line not declassified] The chief risk we see is that of provoking the USSR to pre-emptive action.¹⁸ But, we regard this risk as modest so long as US or European arms sales are carefully calibrated to be defensive, and so long as the USSR faces major problems in EE and the PG/IO. We must also weigh against this risk the likelihood that otherwise US defense outlays would have to be further increased in order to cope with the "simultaneity" problem.

Issue #5—How can we best get our friends and Allies to do more for the common defense? This issue has bedevilled US policy since the early 50s. But the loss of US strategic nuclear superiority, increasing Soviet conventional capabilities, European and Japanese economic growth, and now the US need to fill the security vacuum in yet a third theater all compel imparting new vigor to this effort. Even if we wish to do so, we cannot any longer carry so much of the burden of Western defense. Since we prefer to remain the chief Free World nuclear defender (a major call on our resources even in a SALT II regime), it must become a cardinal aspect of US political, economic, and military policy in the 80s to get our Allies—and friends—to contribute a lot more to conventional defense. Moreover, their failure to do so at a time when US defense

¹⁷ Brzezinski underlined "third," and drew a vertical line and a checkmark in the right margin next to this sentence.

¹⁸ Brzezinski drew two vertical lines and an arrow pointing to it in the right margin next to this sentence.

efforts are expanding will set loose divisive US domestic debate which could seriously fray our alliances.¹⁹

This will be an uphill fight. Under pressure of economic difficulties, but in large measure because of political disarray, our European Allies are falling short of even 3% real defense growth. Japan is inching forward only under US pressure.²⁰ Both they, and even more those LDCs of great strategic importance to us (like Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Korea), are weakened by the energy squeeze. Our developed Allies also fail to perceive the threat of growing Soviet capabilities as we do, or quail at confronting it.²¹

An all-out effort to counter these perceptions and galvanize Allied efforts must become a central purpose of the next presidential term. As the leader of the Free World coalition, we must set clear goals and press unremittingly for their achievement, accepting the inevitable Allied recriminations but keeping them from becoming seriously counterproductive. Perhaps the best way to get our NATO Allies to accept 3% real growth for starters is to press them for 5%.²² We must also bring home to them the need for a genuine “division of labor” by actually shifting more US forces now committed to NATO to meet PG/IO commitments.²³

As to Japan, no goal short of 1.5% to 2% of GNP for defense in the 80s offers much prospect of really meeting urgent common needs.²⁴ We have asked Japan for so little for so long that modest incrementalism is all it offers. This will not suffice for the 80s (as was laid out in Issue #4) unless the US is prepared to spend a great deal more.²⁵

Since greater effort by our Allies will be so hard to come by, indirect as well as direct contributions must be sought (the latter are often more palatable). For example, maximum host nation support of all kinds will significantly reduce US defense costs for which we must otherwise program, while involving (in the case of wartime rather than peacetime HNS) only contingent Allied allocation of wartime resources—largely

¹⁹ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this sentence and wrote beside it: “yes.”

²⁰ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence and the portion of the previous sentence that begins with “political disarray” and ends with “defense growth.”

²¹ Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this sentence.

²² Brzezinski drew two vertical lines in the left margin next to this sentence.

²³ Brzezinski drew two diagonal lines at the end of this paragraph.

²⁴ Brzezinski drew a vertical line and an arrow pointing to it in the right margin next to this sentence.

²⁵ Brzezinski underlined “not” and drew a checkmark in the right margin next to this sentence.

civil. We have accomplished much along these lines in the past few years, but tapped only a portion of the potential.²⁶

POL is a good case in point; we must insist that our Allies meet at least our initial wartime POL needs to the fullest extent possible out of their civil stockpiles (just as they plan to meet their own wartime needs). We must also get them to meet as much as possible of the local construction and support needs of our deployed peacetime forces. (Congress will increasingly insist on this).²⁷

Greater European/Japanese military and economic aid to other threatened countries is another indirect way to get more rational burdensharing, which must be geared more directly to collective security concerns.²⁸ The FRG's special relationship with Turkey must be exploited to fill a gap we are unable to fill. To the extent economic aid is fungible,²⁹ it can be used to permit recipients to buy US military equipment (Japanese loans to S. Korea and China could be used for this purpose).

Our oil-rich friends in the PG area must be called on to finance as much as feasible of the security umbrella which only we can provide them. To this end, we should seek direct contributions from them to finance the security needs of less wealthy Allies (e.g. revive Saudi aid to Egypt). We must ask them to finance the facilities we need and stockpile POL for us. Indirectly, they can help us by moderating oil price increases and keeping production high (e.g. Turkey's likely 1980 oil import bill of \$4B will dwarf total OECD aid of \$1.6B).³⁰

Issue #6—How can we best maintain both adequate modernization and a perceived technological edge? In Issue #1 we argued that greater risk of conflict in the 80s dictated greater emphasis on readiness. But over the last three decades our perceived technological superiority, manifest not only in our strategic forces, has probably exerted even greater deterrent impact on Soviet thinking—an advantage we must not lightly cast away. Moreover, defense investment today is what creates usable power tomorrow.³¹

DoD's current guidelines deliberately place R&D and modernization investment behind readiness. But we also must reduce the growing "defense investment gap" between the US and USSR. Instead, during the last three years (FY 79–81) our procurement budget each year has

²⁶ Brzezinski drew a checkmark in the right margin next to this sentence.

²⁷ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this paragraph.

²⁸ Brzezinski underlined "aid" in this sentence and drew a vertical line in the left margin next to it.

²⁹ Brzezinski drew a checkmark in the right margin next to "fungible."

³⁰ Brzezinski drew a diagonal line at the end of this paragraph.

³¹ Brzezinski underlined "greater emphasis on readiness," "probably exerted even greater," and "creates usable power tomorrow" in this paragraph.

had on the average 5% less purchasing power than the FY 77 budget (even FY 78 had only about 1% real growth). This is basically because we have consistently underestimated inflation, especially with respect to major defense procurement—which has run well above the general inflation index.

Hence the issue is whether the US is prepared to make a significant modernization effort or to keep falling behind. DoD does not propose matching Soviet procurements (which we couldn't afford even at 7–8% real annual defense budget growth). What we do propose is exploiting our superior technology in selected key areas such as ASW, antitank weaponry, and other PGMs, Stealth vehicles, and cruise missiles of various kinds. We can also exploit our greater efficiency in defense investment (for example, we see no need to design and build four new ICBMs when one will do the job).³²

We must press our Allies hard along similar lines. By enlightened rationalization/standardization/interoperability policies, and accepting more of a two-way street, we can make Allied defense investment more efficient too.³³

But an indispensable corollary to exploiting our own technology more vigorously is to accelerate our efforts to prevent it from leaking its details to the USSR (which makes enormous efforts to secure those details).³⁴ DoD sees this too as a key element in any viable security strategy for the 80s.

Issue #7—Since quality uniformed manpower will be so tight in the 80s, what relief must we seek? A return to the draft is an obvious answer, but raises so many thorny problems that other measures should be taken first. Clearly, we must pay what is necessary to remain competitive in the labor marketplace, and above all do whatever is necessary to retain trained manpower in key skills. It is the worst false economy to have to spend so much to keep training new people to achieve skills that those leaving already have (for example, it costs over \$600,000 to train an advanced fighter pilot; paying him even \$20,000 more a year to hold him five more years would be far cheaper than having to train another one).

Beyond this, DoD simply cannot afford to use scarce uniformed manpower to do peacetime blue collar jobs which could be done just as well—and more cheaply—by civilians. Substituting civilians for military people was successful in the past; we replaced about 90,000 military

³² Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this paragraph, another one in the right margin, and next to it wrote “wrong.”

³³ Brzezinski underlined “two-way” in this paragraph and wrote in the right margin next to it: “No.”

³⁴ Brzezinski drew a short vertical line in the left margin next to this paragraph.

with civilians during the Vietnam buildup and about 40,000 when we ended the draft. Yet DoD has cut down civilian employment by about 120,000 since 1974, largely through increased efficiencies. We have now reached the point where continuing to cut, instead of building up as a substitute for needed increases in scarce military manpower at a time when defense needs are expanding, will compromise readiness—even if defense spending is increased. In fact, increased readiness and real growth in defense programs require more, not fewer, civilian employees in industrially funded activities such as Navy yards, air rework facilities and laboratories. Arbitrary civilian manpower restraints here are equally counterproductive. DoD's special circumstances demand relief from such limitations (even though they appear politically attractive to both outgoing and incoming administrations).³⁵

Issue #8—Lastly, how can non-Defense agencies best complement DoD efforts? The acute security problems we confront in the 80s dictate a far broader effort than is in DoD's purview. In the largest sense, our foreign and economic policies must take more fully into account national security needs.³⁶ National policies which reduce inflation and promote investment clearly help defense. So too do energy policies which promote conservation, accelerate use of alternate fuels, and hold down energy costs. Such policies will also assist the defense efforts of crucially needed Allies.

In DoD's view our coalition defense and overseas force projection strategy also dictate providing much greater security assistance to friends and Allies in maintaining adequate defense efforts. Such aid is often more cost-effective than building up our own forces to compensate for their weakness. In particular, key countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt need to be strengthened militarily as a key aspect of our PG/IO deterrent strategy. To this end a substantial rise in Security Assistance is indispensable. Since many important client states are unable to meet the financial terms required by current FMS policy, or in some cases, can't pay at all, more flexible terms plus some element of grant aid are equally important.³⁷ State/DoD have prepared proposals for SCC review.³⁸

III. *THE DOD POSITION.* DoD recognizes that its proposals on the above issues add up to a highly ambitious security program for the 80s. But it goes without saying that deterrence is far more desirable and far less costly than conflict, even granting that a credible war-fighting

³⁵ Brzezinski drew vertical lines in the left and right margins next to this sentence.

³⁶ Brzezinski underlined "must take more fully into" in this sentence.

³⁷ Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the previous sentence.

³⁸ Not found.

capability is crucial to deterrence. The sheer magnitude of the security problems we confront is so great that only such far reaching initiatives offer prudent possibilities of limiting the global risks.

There is no realistic prospect of solving these problems solely through the application of more funds. Some of the threats are too immediate for that. Even the longer run concerns cannot be confidently met by expansion of real US defense efforts at increased but feasible rates. Therefore, both in the near term (FY 82 budget) and the medium term (FY 82–86 FYDP) some very difficult choices will have to be made and the non-DoD portions of the program (security and economic assistance, major increases in Allied efforts) will be required.

Put another way, the programmatic corollary to this paper is proposed defense 1982–85 budgets increasing from about \$200 billion to about \$250 billion in today's dollars. But without the measures proposed herein, even defense outlays of this size would not suffice to protect our vital security interests adequately. Nor can we realistically expect that all the measures proposed herein will achieve the full results desired. Thus simple prudence dictates energetic pursuit of the full package. Our security demands no less.

215. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 24, 1980, 2:30–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Basic Strategy Issues

PARTICIPANT

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Clayton
Under Secretary for Policy Robert W. Komer

JCS

Chairman General David Jones

OMB

Director James McIntyre

CIA

Director Stansfield Turner

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC

BGeneral William E. Odom

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened by saying this is not a budget meeting but rather a review of probable geopolitical and strategic challenges which will face the U.S.; it also has relevance for our foreign policy decisions as well because they are interrelated with security. The Defense paper,² on which the meeting is based, is provocative and important. It raises critical issues and offers contingent answers. The answers we give these issues will have both budgetary implications and implications for the strategic legacy left by this Administration. They will also be important for the President to use in constructing his State of the Union Message in which he will offer warnings and conclusions about the decade ahead. (S)

Before the discussion could proceed to the list of eight issues, Secretary Muskie offered the following general objections:

—It has nothing to do with the FY 1982 budget, only implications for FY 1983–86. (McIntyre corrected this observation by noting that the Southwest Asian issue and the “readiness versus modernization” issue are relevant to the FY 1982 budget.) (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) Meeting, 11/24/80. Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the summary: “Susan, file—hold C.” The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

² See Document 214.

—He wondered about the speeches that had been made during the campaign, about the conditions of our national security in light of the assertions in this paper. If the defense is not adequate, as the paper insists, then we did not advocate a proper policy and we have misled the American people. (S)

—The paper says things about our own record for the past four years. It assumes that our Allies in Europe and East Asia must adopt drastic policy changes or the threat won't be met. If the threat is that serious and the Allies won't act, do we have to take up the slack? What are the consequences for Japan if the U.S. suggests that Japan take over the security of Korea? If the Japanese won't be responsive, why raise the issue now? It would be better to do it later and in a slower manner. (S)

—The President's concern with the State of the Union Message is understandable, and there are some valid points in the paper, but the problems relate to a period when we won't have jurisdiction over policy. The paper needs revisions before it can be adopted by the President and the National Security Council. (S)

Harold Brown answered Muskie's remarks about the "terrifying paper" (Muskie denied that he had used these words), a surprising paper, Brown added, in light of what was said during the election campaign. Brown recalled that our warnings during the campaign about the problems in the 1980s, about the importance of our Allies' contributions, about our defense programs going ahead on schedule, and the importance of arms control are very consistent with the thrust of the paper. You say the Allies will not accept it. The future will be terrifying if the Allies do not and we do not carry out our defense programs. Brown added that there has not been time to staff this paper with other agencies, but its issues are primarily defense matters. In any case, we have to leave the next Administration some strategic assessment. (S)

Muskie asked why we must go public with this. Harold Brown said it will not be a public document. McIntyre added that in so far as it is included in the defense report to the Congress on the Five-Year Defense Plan, it will be public. Dr. Brzezinski added that it could be refined in our discussion here to provide points to the President for his State of the Union Address. (C)

Harold Brown and McIntyre entered a short debate on how large a deviation from previous FYDPs is appropriate. McIntyre charged that Defense is "phoneying" the books on the threat and the problems. Brown argued that "real, real growth" to meet inflation may require quite large deviations as compared to "real growth" which has not. Both agreed to defer this debate until the upcoming PRC meeting on the Defense budget. (S)

Komer offered the caveat that we separate tactical from strategic issues. We are not talking about Japan taking responsibility for the defense of Korea now but rather about this policy aim as a strategic objective for the future. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded to Muskie that the paper and the SCC discussion could help the President in considering most of the defense issues. Although some foreign policy issues are included, the paper admittedly does not address the full range of foreign policy problems. (C)

Turner offered the following general comment: he accepts the premises that (1) we cannot meet a Persian Gulf, European, and East Asian war simultaneously, (2) a coalition with our Allies is essential to meet our defense requirements. Because coalitions work only in war-time, U.S. strategy must *not* be dependent upon our allies to protect our vital interests. We need a strategy for a better defense deployment. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski and Brown challenged the soundness of Turner's conclusion by citing the impossibility of defending Europe and Japan without their help. Dr. Brzezinski added that Turner had made one valid point: the Persian Gulf region is an exception; only the U.S. could defend it; we should face up to that now. (S)

Turner accepted Dr. Brzezinski's argument but added that we need more flexibility because our past record of predicting locations of conflicts has been poor. (S)

Harold Brown said that if you look at the U.S./Soviet relationship you see that we play down areas far away from the Soviet Union like South Africa, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. Geography is not against us there, but in Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia/Persian Gulf, the USSR is very close. Thus, we need advanced preparation for those regions. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski closed the general discussion and directed comment to the list of eight issues. (C)

Issue #-1—Do the 1980s pose a significantly greater danger of major regional or global conflict? Dr. Brzezinski asked if this is true, or if there is anyone who disagrees with it. (S)

Muskie raised a question about post-Tito Yugoslavia³ creating a greater danger of a regional conflict. Brown explained that we mean the Soviets might exploit centrifugal forces in that country. Komer added that the National Intelligence Estimate says that the first six months are not likely to be a problem; the real danger will come later; therefore, we should not be surprised that it has been quiet to date. (S)

³ Reference is to Yugoslavian President Josep Bronz Tito, who died on May 4.

Issue #2—If for several years to come defending our vital interests in the widely separated NATO, Persian Gulf and Far East theaters simultaneously is beyond our capabilities, which should receive priority? and Issue #3—How can we best fill the PG/IO power vacuum? (S)

Harold Brown said that some within Defense believe that anything less than enough to meet both the NATO and Persian Gulf theater requirements simultaneously is inadequate. He does not agree with this view, and he cited World War II in which we gave priority first to one theater and then another. Now we must ask what is the ratio of our interests to the risks in each theater. In Brown's view the ratio is higher in Southwest Asia; therefore, it should receive priority in programs. (S)

General Jones acknowledged Brown's point but said that when additional requirements are placed on the military services, they impact on our European and Asian capabilities whether we like it or not. (S)

Muskie said look at it the other way. If all that is necessary to seize the Persian Gulf in order to break the West's hold in Europe, why would the Soviets attack in all three theaters at once? (S)

Brown replied that they would feint in Europe while attacking in the Persian Gulf. (S)

Jones said they would not attack in Europe but would mobilize in order to hold us in position in Europe. In all our present plans the priority commitment of forces is to Europe. (S)

Muskie expressed surprise and asked if we are not already shifting the priority to the Persian Gulf. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski explained that this is our emerging policy, not yet a fully developed one. (S)

Komer explained that the paper is not referring to operational priority but rather budget priority to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. (C)

Muskie said okay, but the issue is the same. Europe won't even live up to the three percent commitment. (C)

Brown then explained that we are moving from a three-and-a-half division to a six-and-a-half division plan for the Persian Gulf. The additional three divisions will have to be taken from forces which now are committed to reinforce NATO. The Europeans will have to take up the slack as we reallocate them. There was a lengthy digression on the significance of this reallocation, when it actually takes place, whether it will put pressure on the Europeans to fill the gap, or whether they will respond the same way they did to the three percent goal. (S)

Muskie argued that the Europeans might be right, that there will not be a simultaneous attack in both theaters. We might take a lesson from the Europeans. Brown argued that the U.S. must lead, not follow

the European example. It is better to lead on the way “up” in force development than on the way “down.” (S)

Issue #-4—What Far East strategic posture will best relieve Soviet pressure on Europe and the PG/IO, while limiting risks of simultaneous global war? Dr. Brzezinski listed the three points of the Defense paper recommendations as:

- Getting the Japanese to rearm faster.
- Getting the Japanese to take security responsibilities for Korea.
- Sale of limited defensive arms to China. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski expressed doubt that this formula is feasible. The Japanese will not respond effectively. (S)

Muskie asked why. The problems are the same that we have with the Europeans! (S)

Brzezinski replied that indeed the argument can be made that the Europeans won't contribute adequately to defense and, therefore, we should also contribute less. This would lead to complete Finlandization of Europe and our inability to defend adequately either in Europe or in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the proper conclusion is that we must continue to press the Allies for more defense effort regardless of their reluctance. (S)

Turner argued that two of the points are paper tigers. First, building up China will take far too long to make any difference in the 1980s. Second, the same is true for Japan. The United States should shift its forces to the two other theaters and ignore East Asia. (S)

Brown conceded some truth to this. In a three front war, East Asia would get last priority. Turner argued that cancellation of our “swing strategy” was a mistake. The Atlantic is critical, and we must be able to draw from the Pacific to win the Atlantic battle. (S)

Brown turned to arms for China and said that we must face up to it. Is it politically feasible to provide weapons or to get the Europeans to do it? (S)

Muskie objected to any increase in military cooperation because it might cause the Soviets to take programmatic actions we do not like. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski put our policy toward China in the following way. We now have the ability to do a number of low key things. There is no need for a new policy. If the Soviets do inflammatory things, make these destabilizing moves such as intervention in Poland, we will have the option of increasing our military operations with the PRC publicly and explicitly as a U.S. reaction to Soviet behavior. (S)

Harold Brown said he liked Dr. Brzezinski's formulation, but the new Administration will have to address some specific issues like fighter aircraft engine improvements for China. (S)

Issue #5—How can we best get our friends and Allies to do more for the common defense? Harold Brown made the only significant comment on this point. The Allies he reports always rebuff us by putting too much pressure on them about defense contributions, but Brown went on to observe, only by chiding them do we get them to act. (S)

Issue #6—How can we best maintain both adequate modernization and a perceived technological edge? Dr. Brzezinski and Harold Brown debated briefly about technology transfers to the USSR. Brown argued that violations to our present policy, i.e. illegal leaks, are more critical than expanding our controls. Dr. Brzezinski found this a surprise. He has seen no study or intelligence to support the conclusion. Harold Brown said that this is Bill Perry's judgment. (S)

Issue #7—Since quality uniformed manpower will be so tight in the 1980s, what relief must we seek? and Issue #8—Last, how can non-Defense agencies best complement DOD efforts? were not discussed [discussed?]. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked how best to present these issues to the President. He suggested that the SCC discussion might introduce them. A National Security Council meeting with the President could follow. (C)

Muskie expressed his reservations about basing the discussion on the Defense paper because he has not been able to staff it within the Department of State. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski, Harold Brown, and Komer pointed out that the issues are primarily Defense issues, not a broad review of our foreign policy review issues. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the agencies, if they desire, put their comments on the paper in written form before an NSC meeting. This would allow State's most thoughtful criticisms and advice to be presented. (C)

Muskie and Christopher agreed to this approach, a National Security Council meeting on the Defense paper combined with written comments from State and the DCI. (C)

216. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, November 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Basic Strategy Issues

Harold Brown submitted a paper outlining nine issues of basic strategy for our national security policy which he asked be discussed at an SCC Meeting.² Attached are the Minutes of that discussion.³ It was the SCC recommendation that an NSC meeting be held on the paper along with comments by the DCI and State. The purpose would be to help you clarify the strategic legacy you want to leave the Reagan Administration as you address the Defense budget decisions. It would also help you decide the major points you will make in your State of the Union Address. (S)

As you will see from the Minutes, Ed Muskie was not happy with the paper, was disturbed about not having it staffed widely in State, and was reluctant to bring it to your attention. Harold, on the contrary, was very anxious to bring it to your attention. I encouraged Muskie to put his views in writing so that they may have the most thoughtful and considered expression. Depending on Muskie's comments, we may need an NSC meeting.⁴ (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 35, PD 59: (5/80-1/81). Secret. Sent for action.

² See Document 214.

³ No minutes of the meeting found. The summary of conclusions is Document 215.

⁴ Carter wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Zbig—I'll wait for Ed's comments. J."

217. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, December 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Defense Strategy Paper

I agree with the central arguments of Harold Brown's paper on U.S. strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union.² My understanding of these arguments is that:

- the danger of conflict is increasing;
- the U.S. must intensify its defense effort;
- the Allies must do more; and
- our economic, energy, and foreign policies should be geared to support our increasingly difficult national security requirements.

However, I believe that in a number of areas these points are carried to far-reaching conclusions unsupported by the analysis.

Before addressing the specific issues Harold raises, here are three broad questions which should be raised:

First, a question of process. I do not believe that Harold's paper contains sufficiently detailed analysis to justify making decisions involving basic security issues and billions of dollars.

Second, the budgetary implications. What is the analytical basis for arriving at a figure of \$250 billion? Where would these funds come from: In an increased deficit? In reductions of domestic programs or foreign assistance? What would be the inflationary impact? The positive as well as negative affects on our industrial base and civilian R&D?

And third, I would like to see closer examination of the view that we may be faced with the prospect of simultaneously fighting one and two half wars. I join with Harold in hoping that any conflict or conflicts with the Soviets could avoid the use of nuclear weapons. We should by all means provide the President with sufficient options to enable him to avoid that dreadful decision. But what is the prospect that three simultaneous wars with the Soviets in different parts of the world could under almost any foreseeable circumstances not lead to a general nuclear war? And if this is so, what are the implications for the force buildup and dispositions Harold suggests?

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Official Working Papers of S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–January 1981, Lot 82D298, Sensitive Dec. 80. Secret. Sent via Alpha Channel. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: "TS + RB drafters. S/P did final."

² See Document 214.

I have the following comments on the eight issues discussed in the paper:

Issue #1

I generally agree with Harold's assessment, and would add that nuclear parity could ease Soviet fears regarding the risks of military adventures and even of engaging U.S. forces.

We should also consider the question Harold raises as to whether readiness should take priority over modernization. I take it from Harold's concerns about increased dangers of war that DOD would favor stressing readiness, but I read elsewhere in the paper that the investment sector is crucial and that we should make every effort to take advantage of our greatest strength: technological innovation and modernization.

Should we be more aggressive in exploring ways of seeking savings in strategic arms for the sake of building up our conventional strength? My sense is that once our new strategic programs begin coming on line in the mid-1980s, including ALCM carriers in the early part of the decade, our strategic position will start improving rather significantly, with the Soviets increasingly at a disadvantage if they cannot or do not do anything about their vulnerable ICBMs.

Issue #2

I agree that we need to continue to strengthen our abilities to react swiftly to a Soviet thrust into the PG/IO areas. I'm less inclined than Harold, however, to think that the Soviets see the stakes for themselves as high in Southwest Asia as in Europe. In the former, they may have an interest in denying us *our* vital interests; in the latter they see their own interests as vital—interests which go first to perserving the *status quo* in Eastern Europe and then to strengthening their position *vis-a-vis* NATO. In setting priorities for the next five years, let's bear in mind that our concerns may well shift back to Europe if we experience further crises there, as well we may.

Moreover, we should consider more closely whether Soviet doctrine and experience would incline them to strike *in force* against Southwest Asia in order to cut the lifeline of the industrial states. Soviet experience in Afghanistan against a weak but determined enemy in a hostile environment may have given Moscow pause in considering a far larger venture in the same region. Would Soviet diversion of substantial forces from their strategic reserve into Southwest Asia lead them to be concerned about their vulnerability on other fronts—except under general war conditions? The threat may for some time continue to be more from weakness and political flux in Iran, and thus Soviet opportunity—at little cost and with no direct aggression—to fundamentally improve its strategic position and influence in the region. This

challenge is difficult for us to meet. Even a major increase in U.S. force capability in the region may not ultimately enable us to meet it.

Issue #3

Facilities may be the weakest link in our strategy for filling the PG/IO vacuum—but we should not discount the fact that men, lift, prepositioned stocks may also be in short supply. Even if facilities are the main problem, we should stick to our strategy of diversification. It makes political—and I would think strategic—sense to do so. If our military doctrines place a premium on large, individual base complexes, we should review those doctrines, or at least their application in this part of the world. Also, the way to get to the modern staging bases that we need is through a policy of gradually increasing our presence and rights throughout the area, rather than a make-or-break effort for a few super-bases.

DOD's idea of trading U.S. security assurances and new assistance to Israel for progress toward a comprehensive peace is worth considering.

But I am doubtful about seeking an explicit security-for-oil bargain with the Saudis. It's been implicit in our policies for some time. But we can't be so sure that the Saudis would so value an explicit security commitment that they would commit themselves to permit sure access to oil at reasonable prices. For they know that we are pursuing our own security interests, and that we will probably act to protect those interests whether or not we make a commitment. They also could doubt the strength of our security assurances if we threaten to go slow on security measures unless oil is guaranteed—with consequent damage to our security position in the area.

Issue #4

I agree with Harold's argument here and throughout the paper that we should (a) force the Soviets in peace and war to spread their defense effort and deployments against all three fronts (Europe, Southwest Asia and East Asia) so that they cannot concentrate against any one (e.g. redeploy from the Chinese border to Europe, and (b) discourage the Soviets from expanding a conflict beginning in one of these areas to the other two. But this strategy raises major problems if it means expanding the geographical scope of Japan's military role and our direct contribution to China's military capabilities.

[2 paragraphs (34 lines) not declassified].

On China, it has been my understanding that they are so far behind the Soviets that the provision of "certain carefully calculated defensive weaponry" would not make an appreciable difference. The Chinese currently tie down about one-fourth of Soviet armed forces and about

the same proportion of their new SS-20 capability. But the major Soviet concern is probably that of being entrapped in the masses of Chinese in the event of war. This is what forces the Soviets to maintain its heavy dispositions in the region. Thus, what we ought to be addressing is whether it is helpful or harmful to worry the Soviets further about the U.S.-Chinese military relationship.

Issue #5

I feel as strongly as Harold does about this. It's crucial for our international security posture, and it's crucial for maintaining domestic support for our foreign policy and defense efforts. I happen not to think it makes sense to raise the NATO spending goal to, say, five percent. Doing so, while the Allies are still at or worse than three percent would tend to show that these goals aren't real. We also face the real problems that the Socialists and other "left" electorate in Europe remain strong. We must press our Allies as firmly as we can but calibrate our pressure carefully so we do not end up with Governments in European capitals even less sympathetic to our objectives. Our interest is to strengthen Europe and our ties with it, and to get the Allies to do what is feasible; we will defeat all our objectives if the focus of foreign policy tension becomes U.S.-European rather than Allied-Soviet.

I'm also beginning to think we should look for some concept other than the "division of labor." It tends to accentuate European views that Europe is or can be an "island of detente" insulated from U.S.-Soviet competition in Southwest Asia. Moreover, I'm not sure the American public will be satisfied—and supportive of our efforts—if the Allies aren't bearing more of the burden and *running the same risks as we* in the Persian Gulf. I agree that we want the Europeans to fill the gap in NATO, but we have to involve them more in Southwest Asia.

Finally, we are unlikely to revive Saudi aid to Egypt absent significant progress on Palestinian issues or an unwelcome Egyptian move back toward the Saudi positions on Jerusalem, etc.

Issue #6

I agree fully both that we make every effort to keep our technological edge and that we tighten up on technology transfer.

Issue #7

I would add here only that for their own reasons, our Allies are likely increasingly to point to the absence of an American draft as undercutting our case that the security situation is getting more acute and requires more sacrifices from everyone.

Issue #8

As Harold notes, we are working on a joint plan on security assistance. Needless to say, State has always sought higher assistance levels than have been approved. Beyond this, while we have sometimes differed with DOD over how to get other governments to act in our interest, State must continue to make every effort to ensure that our foreign policy helps meet our military needs.

**218. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review
Committee Meeting¹**

Washington, December 2, 1980, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Defense Budget

PARTICIPANT*State*

Secretary Edmund Muskie
Reginald Bartholomew, Director,
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown (Chairman)
Dep. Sec. W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
Amb Robert Komer Under Secretary
for Policy
Russell Murray, Asst. Sec. for Program
Analysis and Evaluation

JCS

General David Jones

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner
John Koehler, Dep. to the Director for
Resource Management

OMB

James McIntyre
Edward Sanders, Assoc. Dir. for
National Security and Interna-
tional Affairs

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy
William Ashworth, Asst. Dir.,
Weapons Evaluation and
Control Bureau

OSTP

Benjamin Huberman
John Marcum

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC

General Jasper Welch
General William Odom
Victor Utgoff

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Welch, Box 210, Chron: 12/1–7/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No minutes of the meeting were found.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Harold Brown, as Chairman, asked that the group comment on the Defense paper that provided an estimate of the size and scope of the collective Defense program facing the free world and the United States, as its leader, if current national security guidance is to be followed and its goals achieved.² Brown explained that the purpose of the paper was to set the context for consideration of the Defense budget. (C)

The paper developed estimates of what it will take in ground, air, and naval forces of the U.S. and allies to produce various force level ratios between them and the Pact in critical geographical and functional areas. This also describes what these forces will cost the U.S. and its allies in money and manpower to implement current national security policy. The quantitative estimates are developed for two levels of assurance that the free world's forces are adequate; for two dates, 1987 and 1995, for achieving either level of assurance; and for two levels of contributions by the rest of the free world—one reflecting more equitable sharing of burdens by all nations, and an alternative where other nations continue on their current course. [4 lines not declassified] (C)

Brown first asked Stan Turner for an estimate of Soviet reactions to the various free world build-ups presented. Turner replied specifically with regard to the chart on strategic balance indicators that showed a steady and substantial Soviet advantage from '75 to '81, followed by a significant erosion of that Soviet advantage from '81 to '87. (The indicator in question presented the ratio of residual forces following a Soviet first-strike counterforce and a U.S. retaliation counterforce.) Turner noted that this particular indicator showed a much earlier and more dramatic erosion of the Soviet advantage than other analyses with which he was more familiar. Others agreed with this observation. (S)

Brown replied that this particular indicator is merely one measure. It emphasizes the effects of U.S. advantages, particularly in cruise missiles and SLBMs, and perhaps overemphasizes them. [9 lines not declassified] (S)

General Jones thought the paper useful as a whole but thought that it understated our difficulties in the strategic balance. In particular he thought that looking only at ratios of residual strategic force obscured the heavier weight of the Soviet attack in megatons, assumed away current deficiencies in C³, and assumed that the U.S. five-year program would continue on schedule contrary to what has happened in the past. Russ Murray said that some monies were added in the financial accounting to cover C³ improvements and other modernization, and that needed readiness improvements were funded before

² See the attachment to Document 214.

force structure growth. General Jones replied that in his view the analysis underestimated the resources needed to correct C³ deficiencies and readiness shortfalls. (C)

Harold Brown and Jim McIntyre both noted that difficulties in increasing U.S. military manpower will eventually constrain force structure increases. Russ Murray indicated that the analysis recognized this difficulty and chose programs which minimized the need for additional military manpower. Much of the increase in armored division equivalents, for example, was obtained through modernization rather than increases in numbers of divisions per se. Brown and McIntyre expressed skepticism as to whether further increases in pay could attract commensurate increases in recruits. (U)

In Brown's opinion the key issue raised by the paper is the role of the other free world countries—what can we expect they will do, how should we proceed to encourage them to do more, and what should we do if they fail to respond as we would want them to. [5 lines not declassified] (S)

Jim McIntyre thought the FRG was more apt to react in a way best calculated to protect its East European trade. [7 lines not declassified] (S)

Muskie then asked what we were to do if the Allies in fact do not make an increased contribution. Brown replied that was indeed the crucial question and that in his judgement [11 lines not declassified] (S)

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

(Secretary Muskie left at this point.)

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

Brown then turned to the Nuclear Land Attack Tomahawk program. There is concern that moving to procurement in this program in FY-82 could complicate implementation of NATO's LRTNF program. Brown proposed that by retaining \$3-4 million in RDT&E we could protect a FY-84 IOC and minimize any potential difficulty. This was agreed by all. (S)

Brown raised the question of the proper level of military construction in Southwest Asia for FY-82. Bartholomew voiced concern that the currently proposed levels are systematically below those that we have previously announced to Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and to the United Kingdom for Diego Garcia. Brown replied that the levels proposed were chosen in light of a judgment that the Congress would only finance a limited amount of military construction in Southwest Asia and the reductions from previous goals elsewhere were needed to fund the Ras Banas construction in Egypt. Bartholomew, in response to a question from Brown, expressed confidence that we could have an

access agreement for Ras Banas with Egypt in time for Congressional action in the spring. Welch expressed concern that there was disconnect between what was needed in facilities and what appeared feasible to get Congress to fund. Brown agreed but said we cannot get out of the game and must proceed as best we can. (S)

Brown raised the general issue of funding for joint programs with our European allies, the problem being that we will not be able to provide funds for these programs as expected in all cases. In particular, for Roland he proposed that we request only \$65 million in FY-82 vice the \$355 million planned and defer the rest of the planned program into the out years. It appears as though the FRG may also fall out of the Roland program due to the need to finance cost growth in the Toronado fighter bomber. This proposal was accepted. (S)

Brown pointed out that POMCUS set 7 was being delayed because of a lack of sufficient equipment and that the siting of set 6 was not yet firm, raising the possibility of a delay in that set also. Brown asked whether State was agreeable to defer POMCUS set (pre-positioned Army unit equipment) 7. Bartholomew agreed, stating that that was consistent with the general decision to let capability shortfalls appear in NATO. (S)

With respect to the security assistance enhancement package for Southwest Asia previously recommended by the SCC, it was noted that State has filed its formal support with OMB. McIntyre suggested that OMB chair an inter-agency group to review this issue in detail prior to the scheduled 8 December meeting with the President on the defense and foreign affairs budget. This was agreed. (C)

219. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Special Coordination Committee¹

Washington, December 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Basic Strategy Issues [*portion marking not declassified*]

1. Harold Brown's paper recommending the development of a basic national strategy is a super idea.² [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. The strategy recommended is based on two premises:

a. that the United States has insufficient military power to handle the European, Asiatic, and Persian Gulf theaters simultaneously; and

b. that a coalition strategy is therefore essential to protect even our vital interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The second premise is flawed. Historically, coalitions have been useful primarily in wartime because it is then that the vital interests of the partners coincide. Coalitions have not been useful in developing and executing peacetime strategies. To the extent that NATO has had success in peacetime over the past 30 years, it has only been because NATO policy was so dominated by the policies of the United States that it simply mirrored it. Now that NATO is moving swiftly away from American domination, it will, before long, be a matter of form and not substance as far as peacetime strategy is concerned. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. It is highly unlikely that the members of any coalition would consistently agree that what was vital to the United States was vital to them also, except the defense of their homelands. No one would imagine that the Soviet Union would mortgage its vital interests to the voluntary support of the Poles, for instance. If we are willing to place our vital interests at risk to the cooperation of our allies, the world will simply perceive that we do not place as much value on our vital interests as do the Soviets on theirs. In fact, since our European allies have perceived that the U.S. nuclear umbrella no longer was a sure deterrent to a Soviet invasion, they have been less and less cooperative on Alliance matters. The U.S., by a combination of military strength, non-military leverage and perceived will to act, must reassume that burden of protection of our, and their, vital interest. This does not mean that we should neglect their contributions to protecting our joint interests, but that we cannot

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, (Serial) XX—Sensitive: (11/80–12/80). Secret.

² See Document 214.

afford to let the Soviets perceive that if they could separate us from our allies on issues vital to us we would not stand up to them. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. Where this is of particular import is with respect to vital interests of the U.S. outside of Europe and Japan. What strategy can we have, though, if we do not have adequate military force to handle our vital interests in the three primary theaters simultaneously? We must have a capability to apply the military forces we do have selectively and rapidly wherever they are needed. Complementing this, we should also be able to exercise leverage with our economic power. A strategy built on these capabilities recognizes that the United States is not contiguous to its principal allies (excepting Canada), markets and areas of competition with other nations, and therefore must have the ability to move military forces to areas of immediate or continuing concern and to establish a military presence which can project power, if necessary. At the same time, it recognizes that our economic power can be brought to bear against both the immediate enemy and those who may be providing support to him. Such a strategy acknowledges that we are now unprepared in the Persian Gulf area precisely because of our preoccupation with fixed military strategies in Europe and Asia over the past three decades. [*portion marking not declassified*]

6. A rapidly deployable military strategy comprises more than the present concept of an RDF. It would depend on two types of forces:

a. Land-based air and ground forces that were lightweight and packaged for self-sustaining capabilities.

b. Naval forces to ensure a line of communication, to secure ports and airfields for the introduction of ground and air forces into a hostile environment, and to project power directly ashore with air or ground forces. The ability to project power directly from the sea with carrier aircraft or marine amphibious troops is the preferred mode under this strategy whenever the requirements can be met from the sea alone. When the opposition is too sizeable for that, they can be used forcibly to secure a port of entry for mobile air and ground forces. Otherwise, we are dependent on having made advance arrangements for bases. While bases are desirable, they limit the areas of potential deployment to those in which we have had the foresight and the ability to obtain basing rights. In addition, base rights are too uncertain politically to be an essential ingredient of our strategy for protecting vital interests. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. The ability to project force almost anywhere on the globe is important to us for several reasons:

a. The definition of what will be considered "vital" to us in the future is almost unpredictable. In the past, we have fluctuated from any area where the Soviets were intervening (directly or through surrogates) only to areas where the intrinsic value of individual countries to us appeared to be great. We will fluctuate in the future. In defining

our “vital interests,” we also may need to consider the precedential or “domino” effect of not protecting our interests in some countries of little intrinsic interest. In either case, there may be a wide geographical spread between areas where we wish to project force.

b. It is easy to conceive of conditions in which a rapidly deployable ground force could face superior force, e.g., Iran. The ability to counterattack at some distant point more to our advantage could be important here. “Horizontal escalation” may require that we be able to move ground, air, or naval forces quickly to widely dispersed areas to cut off the supply line from the Soviet Union or its surrogates to governments hostile to us, e.g., points of egress into the open oceans and areas in which they hold advance positions such as Cuba, Libya and Ethiopia. *[portion marking not declassified]*

8. What are the non-military elements of this strategy? It is a recognition that one of our greatest strengths is the potential of our agricultural and industrial prowess to exert influence around the world. It is a willingness blatantly to use our agricultural surpluses and advanced industrial technologies to pressure other nations into conformance with our objectives. It is a capability that neither the Soviets nor most other probable adversaries possess. The negative side of a policy of economic sanctions is that it is difficult to execute, and the results problematic. Experience suggests that positive economic inducements are more likely to be successful than sanctions. A full and coordinated economic strategy has never been attempted. Despite the attendant uncertainties, it is a unique American potential that is worth considerable effort to explore. *[portion marking not declassified]*

9. The attachments discuss some of the specific steps to move into a strategy of mobile military and economic leverage. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Stansfield Turner³

Appendix 1

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, undated

Steps to move to a mobile military strategy for the United States in the 1980s:

1. Establish a sense of strategic priorities:

³ Turner signed “Stan Turner” above this typed signature.

⁴ Secret.

—In peacetime, until there are signs of specific threats elsewhere, the Persian Gulf-Middle East theater should be our first concern for deployment. Any draw-down of forces to provide for this should come from the European theater first and the Pacific second. We bear the exclusive defense burden in the Persian Gulf-Middle East theaters, and our allies in Europe should be made to recognize the impact of our shortfall. Specifically, as many naval forces as necessary would be drawn down from the Mediterranean. This would have minimal impact on the war-fighting capability of NATO. The psychological impact on the Alliance would be alarming, though salutary. Specifically, land-based air, and ground forces presently in Europe would remain there, but only on the assumption that the allies would accede to their rapid deployment to a crisis area when necessary to meet U.S. interests.

—In the event of general war with the Soviet Union, Western Europe would have to call on almost all of our forces from the other theaters (e.g., a return to the Navy's "Swing" strategy). This is similar to our concentrating on one theater strategy of the early years of World War II when our forces were inadequate to do more.

—In the event a vital interest were endangered in any theater, and a decision made to defend it, mobile forces would be concentrated on that problem. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. This strategy would establish extensive bases in both Israel and Egypt as forward staging points for land-based air and ground forces. This reassurance for the security of Israel would be part of the price for Israeli acceptance of the settlement with the Arab world from which we would hope to gain greater access to other facilities in the Middle East area. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. There would be a necessary reorganization of existing U.S. military forces and a remodeling of future forces to fit this strategic concept. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Appendix 2

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁵

Washington, undated

Steps to move to an economic strategy for the United States in the 1980s:

1. The U.S. is totally unprepared to conduct a coherent economic strategy against a specific adversary. The first step in pursuing such a strategy would be to establish a mechanism empowered to coordinate and control economic warfare (including export/import controls,

⁵ Secret.

economic assistance, business relationships, etc.). [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. The use of economic warfare in the near and middle term may be difficult and highly dependent on specific circumstances because our economic leverage is limited. However, in the far term that leverage will be greater because, especially in the agricultural area, scarcities will put a premium on resources and in some cases will mean the difference between survival and starvation. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. Therefore, we should begin now developing both a strategy and the mechanisms to conduct such economic warfare/strategy. [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. Economic benefit offers the greatest incentive to other nations to modify their behavior in ways congenial to our interests. Whether sanctions will work under any circumstances is problematical; any hope of their succeeding depends upon Western and Japanese support. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. Any successful economic strategy will require the explicit exploitation of intelligence to identify opportunities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

220. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, December 17, 1980, 1–2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Basic Strategy Issues

PARTICIPANT

The President	<i>Central Intelligence Agency</i>
The Vice President	Stansfield Turner, Director
<i>State</i>	<i>Office of Management & Budget</i>
Secretary Edmund Muskie	James McIntyre, Director
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher	<i>White House</i>
<i>Defense</i>	Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Secretary Harold Brown	David Aaron
Deputy Secretary W. Graham Clayton	<i>National Security Council</i>
<i>Joint Chiefs of Staff</i>	BGeneral William E. Odom
General David Jones, Chairman	

MINUTES OF MEETING

The President opened the meeting by explaining that he has read Brown's paper² as well as the comments by Muskie and Turner.³ He set them as a point of departure in order not to use the meeting simply for repeating old points. He said he would like to hear stated what different is being recommended for our strategy. He also noted that there are sharp differences between State and Defense. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski proposed that Brown should begin with a brief summary of his paper followed by comments from Muskie and Turner. (C)

The Vice President asked what the final purpose of the paper and the meeting would be. The President answered that he wanted to leave a record of what our defense strategy should be. A Presidential Directive could do this. As he understands the paper, it is obvious that we are doing most of the things that it suggests, i.e. encouraging Japanese rearmament; shifting our military resources emphasis from Europe to the Persian Gulf. The discussion today should be aimed at stating changes that we might want. (S)

¹Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Subject File, Box 33, President's Comments on Memos: Incomplete, 12/21/80–1/13/81. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the minutes: "Zbig—This is approximately correct, although many nuances are wrong. We need a clear, definitive & forceful PD on this subject. J."

²See the attachment to Document 214.

³See Documents 217 and 219

The President went on to say that President Ford and President Nixon had signed many more NSDMs than he has signed PDs. Many of the NSDMs carried over into this administration's policy. We did not rescind them without a considerable review. Therefore, a Presidential Directive might well have a significant policy impact on the next administration. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski further explained that the process of reviewing the NSDMs led to retention of many NSDMs and considerable parts of others. (C)

The President said that he has a responsibility to look at the larger economic requirements above and beyond those mentioned in Brown's paper. He said he has come to believe that the Defense appetite for a larger budget is insatiable. Reagan will be constrained by economic limits when he tries to increase defense spending. The President went on to explain his disapproval of the tendency of our military leaders to castigate ourselves for military weakness. When the Secretaries of the Services and the Chiefs of the Services denigrate our military strength, it creates a generally persuasive conviction by the public, domestic and foreign, that we are weak. The President said that he is not convinced, but the average American certainly believes our defense is weak. When the Chief of Staff of the Army says in testimony to the Congress that the Army is hollow, that has a devastating impact. It hurts us with our allies as well as with the American public. Why should our allies do more if we insist that we are so weak? I know from a closer look at some of these statements that there is balance to them which was not pointed out by the press, but the press won't emphasize the balance, only what is said about our weakness. In town meetings again and again I ran into this belief among the public. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the discussion should address two points. First, the threat that we will face in the 1980s, and second, how we will defend the three strategic zones to which we are now committed. (S)

Harold Brown began his summary, noting that resources are limited, that we have not only traditionally prioritized them in the budget but also prioritized them geographically. The paper assumes that we recognize our interests lie beyond the continental United States—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. There is a natural tendency to prepare to meet military contingencies in all three areas simultaneously. The Soviets, of course, probably will not initiate actions in all zones at once, but the question is left for us to decide where to put the priority. (S)

We have been shifting towards Southwest Asia. A Soviet attack in Europe risks nuclear war. That is well known and generally understood. A Soviet attack in Southwest Asia would less likely risk nuclear

war, but the Soviets might gain a hold on both Europe and East Asia if they could achieve control of the oil resources in the Persian Gulf region. Therefore, this region would be more attractive for a Soviet offensive. Thus it makes sense for us to give it higher priority in building a deterrent capability. (S)

One way to pressure the Europeans and the Japanese to do more for defense is to make our emphasis on Southwest Asia explicit to them and tell them that they must fill the gap we are leaving by shifting the priority on our reserves for deployment abroad. If they don't build up to replace our reserves, then they create greater risks for themselves. (S)

The President said that is a key point—how firmly to push our allies. We could inform them that we reserve the right to move our forces from Europe to the Persian Gulf, make that explicit to them. (S)

Brown replied that this is further than his paper goes. (C)

The President continued that although legally he can pull U.S. forces from Europe, threatening the allies with a greater risk of Soviet aggression, we have not yet succeeded in getting them to do more to defend themselves. Perhaps it would be more proper for the U.S. to say that these troops are subject to call to the Persian Gulf. Therefore, you must do more for your own defense. (S)

Brown said that is very strong, if it is believable, but how believable it is, he doesn't know. If they do not see it as a credible threat, we would be worse off. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the President had made an important point but not one he is sure he agrees with. If our purpose is to defend the Persian Gulf, the Europeans may let us do that while they pursue detente with the Soviet Union in Europe at the expense of defense of Europe. Dr. Brzezinski said that he prefers that Europe be included in helping us defend the Persian Gulf, thereby denying the allies the option to do less in Europe. (S)

The President said that these two points are not incompatible. Europe has been getting worse, not better in the defense area. We have reached the limit with our allies. We have also reached the limit in the forces we can hold for contingency purposes for East Asia and the Persian Gulf as well as in Europe. It is easy for us to tell the Europeans not to slacken their efforts, but it may not have any effect. (S)

The President continued that our primary goal is not to force the Europeans to do more but to defend the Persian Gulf within the resources of this country. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed but insisted that we must also get them to do more. He said he did not know how specifically, but it is essential. (S)

Brown argued that it may be easy for the allies to do more to defend themselves than to contribute more to the defense of the Persian Gulf. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski disagreed. He fears that would lead to more detente, not more defense in Europe. (S)

The President said that he wanted to underscore a second major point. In his State of the Union Message he said that an attack on the Persian Gulf would be met by all means including U.S. military force.⁴ It is obvious that we do not have adequate forces to respond and defeat a Soviet attack in the Persian Gulf. The press was quick to point that out. He said he has made some statements and also authorized Dr. Brzezinski and Harold Brown to make some, pointing out that we would not confine our response to the Persian Gulf alone. We would look for other areas as well. There is no way to defeat the Soviets in the Persian Gulf with conventional forces. We have not made it clear to the world that a Soviet attack there would necessarily lead to a wide conflict, that we would not confine our responses to that region alone. (S)

Brown said that it is hard to find other places to threaten the Soviets where the costs would be as great to them as the loss of Persian Gulf oil would be to us. (S)

The President admitted that it is hard, but the Soviets have vulnerabilities with their allies and with access to the seas. (S)

Brown argued that this is not a credible deterrent unless the threat is of an equal loss. (S)

The President said that this may be so, but that the Soviets will be confronting a broader response. Turner's comments about an economic strategy are good. We have tried that to a degree, not all the way to economic warfare. The President noted that he is not constrained legally in taking economic sanctions. At least this was the case in post-Afghanistan and in connection with Iran. The law gives the President very great power in the economic area. (S)

What has been spelled out as the "Carter Doctrine," the President continued, disavowing any enthusiasm for that label but noting that it has some currency, has not been understood fully in all its ramifications. The press rightly pointed out that we cannot meet the Soviets with conventional forces and match them successfully in the Persian Gulf. (S)

David Aaron asked Brown why he believed nuclear weapons would not be a credible deterrence in the Persian Gulf but would be credible in Europe. (S)

⁴ Carter's 1980 State of the Union address, delivered on January 23, is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980*, pp. 194–200.

Brown responded that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and our force organization in Europe would make resort to their use almost automatic. In the Persian Gulf, where no such infrastructure exists and where no such threat of nuclear weapons use has been made, the threshold is much higher. (S)

Aaron responded that we should make it seem more likely that we would use them in the Persian Gulf. Six and a half divisions are certainly not enough to defend the region. (S)

Brown said that we have about the same force ratio against the Soviets with that many divisions in Iran as we had for a long time in Europe. (S)

The President said that he would make a point entirely for the privacy of this meeting. It is hopeless to believe that we can match the Soviets with conventional forces in Iran. We simply cannot do it. We cannot defend them without the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Brown argued that short of the use of nuclear weapons we might stabilize a conflict in Iran with limited conventional forces. We get oil from Saudi Arabia which might not necessarily be invaded. We could escalate either vertically or horizontally. (S)

The President agreed that we should be prepared for both horizontal and vertical escalation as well as economic sanctions. We must convince the Soviets that we will do more on all fronts, that they will face a worldwide response, that they cannot narrow the conflict to the military front in Iran. (S)

Brown said that the more conventional forces we deploy there, the more credible that worldwide response will be to the Soviets. The President responded by saying that he hates to consider the conventional defense of Iran. He recalled the military options which were planned against Iran last winter—how much air power it took and the operational difficulties [*less than 1 line not declassified*]⁵—the more familiar he became with the military operational difficulties and realities, the more he became convinced that a conventional defense there is beyond our capabilities even if we expanded our forces considerably. (S)

General Jones reviewed for the President briefly a recent JCS discussion of⁵ [*14 lines not declassified*]

General Jones continued that one of the most helpful things we could do would be to have NATO look into an operational buildup in East Turkey. If NATO provides the umbrella for this effort, it might possibly succeed. The President asked if the Turks would permit this. Jones answered that with NATO behind the effort, the Turks are more likely to agree to it. The Turks need the confidence that all of NATO is with

⁵No minutes of this meeting were found.

them. They do not want to risk war with the Soviets outside of NATO in support of our Southwest Asian operations. (S)

The President said he did not want to throw cold water on this idea, but his experience in the past four years leaves doubt about our depending on our allies. To predicate the use of Turkish bases for cross-border operations against the Soviet Union is not a safe assumption. The Turks may never have the temerity to permit us to attack their neighbors from their soil. (S)

Brown said that the Turks have some capability to let us operate early, i.e. before the outbreak of hostilities from their bases. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed with the President that the allies will not be dependable except in the event that their vital interests are directly at stake. He went on to argue, however, that the size of the forces, whether they be six and a half divisions or four divisions, may be less critical to convince the Soviets that we are serious than our unwillingness to commit *some* divisions. The President said he could not agree with this. (S)

Brown explained that more lift is needed, not more divisions. If we had more divisions today we could not get them there in time to make a difference. Added lift is the critical need. (S)

The President said then that he wanted to think out loud and to clear up in his own mind the strategic challenges to be met. He said that because he does not work with these questions daily, he does not have it as firmly in his control as the other members of the NSC who devote more time to the details. He believes we should proceed with the assumption that we will get little help from Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The allies won't help much either, even if the Persian Gulf region is attacked. [2 lines not declassified]

Brown said that lift from Europe requires about the same as lift is required for forces from the United States. If we draw from our forces in Europe for Southwest Asia, it should be a second and later deployment. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said why not say to the Europeans that X plus Y forces are needed for the Persian Gulf. We are providing X and you, therefore, should provide Y for that contingency. If you do not, we will have to take Y from Europe. (S)

Brown said that he feels assured that we might have some French and British ground forces in the Persian Gulf contingency, but we will get nothing from the Germans. If we say we are unwilling to put our ground forces in Southwest Asia without German forces as well, this would not work. (S)

The President asked about including Israeli forces. Brown said maybe, but is it worth the political liability? Israeli forces would not help much against the Soviets. (S)

General Jones said that we don't plan to remove divisions from Europe in any event. They are not trained for it nor are they equipped for it. Our contingency plans and military strategy since World War II have been concerned with war in regions; Europe being the primary region, Korea the second region. Now we have a third region in Southwest Asia. The strategic lift is the same for all three regions. We might take a calculated risk by removing things like bombs and some support equipment from Europe, but not divisions. It is doubtful that that kind of shift from Europe would put much pressure on the allies. (S)

The Vice President asked if General Jones agrees that we will build no more divisions in the United States. Jones answered that there are no plans now to do so. Even if we did, we could not deploy them because of the lack of lift. Another major constraint, he added, is our industrial mobilization weakness. It would require about three years to gear up for increased aircraft production. Tanks, artillery, and aircraft would not be produced in significant numbers for several years. Therefore, the size of our forces could not go up if you gave us all the money we want. (S)

The President said that he does not see from this discussion what we would do differently from what we are now doing in our military strategy. (S)

Jones said that one difference would be to take a global look and plan for contingencies in both Korea and the Persian Gulf, but only one at a time, not both simultaneously. (S)

David Aaron mentioned another difference as preparation for horizontal escalation. General Jones replied that other than some limited naval operations, there is little promise in such an effort. Brown repeated that we cannot find an even swap in horizontal escalation with Iran. (S)

Brown continued that we might make our strategy first priority for Europe, second priority for Asia, and as a third priority, deal with the Far East through building up our relationship with China to include military cooperation. (S)

Turner, noting that the President had asked what he would put in a Presidential Directive that we are not now doing, agreed with Harold Brown and General Jones that lift is the most important thing to emphasize and also an increased priority for Southwest Asia. In a Presidential Directive the President could direct that a new acquisition of forces and training, the emphasis should be on third world contingency. The President asked at the expense of what? (S)

Turner responded, Central Europe. You do not have the option to deal militarily with the Persian Gulf and other non-European areas because of 30 years of tradition of preparing for the defense of Europe. We need to reverse this basic concept in our strategy. We have assumed

that if we build heavy forces for Europe, they will meet any third world contingency. But this has not been a sound assumption. We should instead build lighter and more flexible forces. They would have a major impact. We are putting so much emphasis on Southwest Asia, that I believe that you will want your successor's successor to have the capability to deal with Mozambique, Nicaragua, and any other such contingency, not just reinforcement of Europe. We need to get off the kick that Europe is first priority. (S)

Brown asked Turner what he meant by mobility. Do you mean mobility to get there? Or after they get there? Turner replied that he meant both. Easy lift to the third world but also good mobility after forces arrive. Because we have built the wrong kind of aircraft carriers, that is, large nuclear powered ships, we cannot afford to risk one of them in the Persian Gulf. To lose one there will be a catastrophe. If we had built small carriers, we could put them there. We need smaller and more mobile forces. Brown replied that our forces must be prepared to fight against Soviet forces and, therefore, not simply in Mozambique. (S)

The President returned to what we would want to do differently. He said he thought we were doing most of what Turner suggests. Brown said yes, this is true. We decided last year to put more priority on non-European contingencies. McIntyre recalled the debate last year about our "heavying up" our divisions. The President said that if we have modified our strategy, we need to write that down. If we have not, we need to write down in a Presidential Directive what we are doing. (S)

Brown said that the JCS proposal to move Europe to second priority and to put the emphasis on the Persian Gulf is new. Dr. Brzezinski added that vertical and horizontal escalation are also new. (S)

The President turned to Muskie for his comments. Muskie had two points. First, the paper shows what we have been attempting to do by putting priority on the threat in the Southwest Asia region. Second, it shows that events could affect us very adversely in that region. Now with the crisis in Poland, we are shifting our attention back to Europe. Against this background we must avoid laying down a policy we have not supported and not followed in the past. It is important to spell out what we are doing. We may also indicate future directions and identify underlying risks that we face. But we should not confuse what we have done with the new directions and the attendant risks, especially if we have not addressed those risks with our actions in the past. A second part of a policy could spell out the responsibilities of the allies, what their share of the burden is. We did that to a considerable extent this past year. The allies are very reluctant to make a defense effort outside

of Europe. The President added that they are also reluctant even in Europe. (S)

Brown said that we should avoid a shift in strategy in a new Presidential Directive but that we could codify what we are doing, things we have been doing since 1977. They are fairly clear and straight-forward. First, we have been trying to improve the defense posture in Europe. Second, we have given a higher priority to the Persian Gulf region. Third, we have begun a close relationship with China in an effort to lessen the requirement for U.S. contingency forces earmarked for that region. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski explained to the President that at the SCC meeting on Security Framework yesterday a draft PD had been circulated, one more narrowly focused on the Persian Gulf region.⁶ It sets forth the President's commitment in the State of the Union Address⁷ and elaborates on a strategy for meeting that commitment. In light of the discussion today we could broaden it to deal with strategic challenges of the 1980s. (S)

The President said there were two other points not addressed in Brown's paper which he was concerned about and should be addressed in any directive. The first was about our relationship with the Peoples Republic of China as the next administration might deal with it. We have pursued it on an economic, political, and cultural basis. The new administration might even reverse much of that. We need to emphasize to Governor Reagan what is at stake. But to move another step and to sell military equipment, this we cannot resolve even among ourselves. Brown interjected that we have gone further in that direction than the President suggests. We have not discouraged the French and the British from direct military sales to the Chinese. The President said that indeed we had transferred some computers and dual-use technology which we would not give the Soviet Union. (S)

The second point, the President continued, is to put emphasis on arms control. A point not mentioned in Brown's paper. He went on to say that he has come to doubt that the⁸ MX missile will ever be developed⁹ although it should be. Too many obstacles—environmentalists' concerns, design problems—are being voiced by the critics. We may even become inferior in strategic forces to the Soviet Union as a result. The President said he would like to leave office encouraging the next

⁶ For the summary of conclusions of the December 16 SCC meeting on the Persian Gulf Security Framework, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 97. PD/NSC–63 “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” January 15, 1981, is *ibid*, Document 98.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 214.

⁸ Carter inserted the word “mobile” before “MX missile.”

⁹ Carter crossed out the word “developed” and replaced it with “deployed.”

administration to keep both SALT and the MX deployment. He added that he would never forgive General Haig for coming back from NATO and stabbing us in the back by testifying against SALT. Haig admitted in testimony that he had not even read the treaty. (S)

The President said he would like to leave arms control as a policy for the next administration. We simply cannot go on with arms expenditures. We cannot manage them economically. Jim McIntyre will agree. With minimum social security, housing, and other social programs growing to unsupportable levels, I do not see how we will meet more defense. For us to slough over the arms control alternative for the coming decade is a mistake. We must try to contain the defense costs through arms control. (S)

The Vice President noted that the United States has been humiliated several times in the past four years by third rate powers because the President has so little discretionary resources for military and economic assistance. He needs at least one half billion dollars for this purpose. It will give him the latitude necessary to handle emergencies rapidly. (S)

Brown returned to the President's comments about arms control and emphasized that the paper assumes SALT II limits. The President admitted that he had missed that point. He then reemphasized the two points: our relationship with China and arms control. We have so many advantages with SALT. If we could establish strategic equality with the Soviet Union, we could whip them badly economically, politically, and culturally. They have so many problems which we need to exploit. (S)

Brown said yes, this is true, but as long as they pursue an arms buildup we must keep up with them. The President said that point must be put in the Presidential Directive. (S)

The next administration must understand, the President continued, that the Soviet Union will meet great threats to its own power. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a demonstration of the failure of the Soviet system. As Dr. Brzezinski has pointed out, over a 150 countries in the world have favored our human rights policy. Human rights has placed great strains on the Soviet system. After four, five, or ten years, I don't know what they will do. They don't even equal human rights achievements of Egypt.¹⁰ If we can get by the next five years without war, we will win the peaceful competition. This is my view after four years in this office. Governor Reagan needs to understand this. (S)

Brown said that the United States public also needs to understand this. The President went on to say that to compete with the Soviet militarily¹¹ is to get into the briar patch with them. That competition is not

¹⁰ Carter wrote a question mark in the left margin next to this sentence.

¹¹ Carter inserted the word "only" before "militarily."

good for us. The public won't support it.¹² In a war, the American public would support a military buildup. But we should seek to push the Soviets into the realm of peaceful competition. (S)

One more point the President added is that the Europeans might not even meet three percent increase for defense. He said he is not even confident that LRTNF will be deployed—in Italy for example.¹³ (S)

Warren Christopher observed that energy is overlooked in Brown's paper. Unless we do develop energy independence, we will omit a fundamental building block in our overall strategy. Although this is a military strategy paper, Christopher admitted, the energy element needs to be included. (S)

Turner noted that Governor Reagan does not seem to understand the energy issues, judging from briefings CIA has been giving him. He believes we just have to drill more wells in the United States. (S)

The President added one more point about our military strategy that concerns him. That is our presence in the Caribbean. We have this ninety-man JTF headquarters in Key West. We played around with moving the USS Forrestal into the Caribbean. Should we strengthen our forces there? We need to assess that, he added. (S)

Brown said that the JTF was only a headquarters. We have, however, shifted some of our East Coast training further south toward the Caribbean in order to create a growing presence in that region. We should not, however, divert forces from Europe or Southwest Asia. The President added that we should not divert forces. Rather he is more interested in where our forces in the United States are located and the possibility of relocations in the direction of Key West. He said he would like to create quietly a significant military shift which would then be discovered by the *New York Times* and pointed to as of great significance. It would send a proper signal to Cuba and reassure our friends in the region. (S)

Both Brown and McIntyre commented briefly on the possibility for base consolidation and other CONUS force shifts that might contribute to this effect. The President said he was interested in a symbolic¹⁴ signal, not a major force shift. Claytor pointed out that Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico is a key training area which might be used to contribute to such a signal. The President once again said that he would like the public to know that the United States has quietly moved some of its training to the Caribbean. (S)

¹² Carter amended the sentence "The public won't support it" to read "It will be difficult to sustain public support."

¹³ Carter changed the period after "example" to a comma and added "or even Germany."

¹⁴ Carter crossed out the word "symbolic" and replaced it with "clear."

The President then summed up his evaluation of Brown's paper. Overall, it is good. Its thrust is good. Muskie made an important point about a Presidential Directive reaffirming what we should be doing as distinct from what¹⁵ we have done. It is probably not feasible to include Japanese strategic dependency on the PRC. The President said that he did, however, believe he had been right about withdrawing¹⁶ our forces from Korea in¹⁷ 1977. Everyone in the government was against him, and when the President is alone he cannot act. (S)

General Jones told the President that tomorrow he departs for Jordan and Israel where he intends to try to achieve two things. First, he wants to give them greater confidence about our power in the region, and second, he wants them to understand better our Southwest Asian strategy. (S)

The President noted that apparently the Saudis are satisfied with our response on the F-15s. Jones said that this seems to be the case, but Brown noted that the Sultan said that we owe them a letter on the matter, something we should provide because when Haig comes in he may have political ambitions that will make him less sympathetic to the Saudis. The meeting ended with a chuckle over Brown's comment on Haig. (S)

¹⁵ Carter inserted the word "just" before "what."

¹⁶ Carter inserted the word "phased" before "withdrawing."

¹⁷ Carter inserted the word "beginning" before "in."

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 8, 1981

SUBJECT

Directives on National Strategy

As you directed after the NSC meeting on basic strategy issues,² I prepared two Presidential Directives and discussed them with Harold Brown and Ed Muskie. Harold and I agree on a common draft. Ed prefers different language and substance in a number of places. I have attached a draft that will allow you to make a choice in each case between the NSC/Defense version and the State preferred changes (Tabs A and B).³ If you want to know Ed Muskie's reasons for these changes, you will find them elaborated at Tab C.⁴

I am also attaching a memo to you from Ed (Tab D) in which he objects to the idea of Presidential Directives. When you review it, you may want to reconsider your original decision to issue these directives. I believe, however, that for the collective interest of this Administration and for your interest in particular you ought to have clear legacy of strategic purpose and rationale.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, Office of the Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Subject File, Box 33, President's Comments on Memos: Incomplete, 12/21/80-1/13/81. Secret. The date is handwritten. Carter wrote next to the heading: "Zbig—Proceed. Let Harold & Ed check final texts. J."

² See Document 220.

³ Tab B, attached but not printed, is a draft of PD/NSC-63, "Persian Gulf Security Framework," the final version of which is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 98.

⁴ Tab C, attached but not printed, is an undated paper entitled "Need Changes in the PDs," outlining Muskie's revisions to PD-62 and PD-63.

⁵ Brzezinski wrote at the end of this sentence: "Harold also feels this way."

Tab A

Draft Presidential Directive⁶

Washington, undated

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Office of Management & Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Modifications in U.S. National Strategy

I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/NSC–18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary⁷ to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy,⁸ and to elaborate and codify our progress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Greater Readiness Required

Given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involving key U.S. interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to readiness in defense resource allocations.

Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces

Presidential Directive/NSC–18 put the focus for our general purpose forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in [*the Horn of Africa and*]⁹ Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. [*Moreover, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war and the*

⁶ Secret. Brackets are in the original.

⁷ Carter inserted “through a series of individual directives” after “necessary.”

⁸ Carter changed the comma after the word “strategy” to a period, struck out “and to,” and began a new sentence with the words “This Directive will.”

⁹ Carter deleted the brackets around the phrase “the Horn of Africa and,” and wrote “ok” in the left margin next to it.

*intensifying intra-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the Soviets added opportunities for interference.]*¹⁰

At the same time, our success in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)

Approve State preference (deleting portions underscored in brackets) _____

Approve NSC/Defense preference (no deletions)¹¹ _____

While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program. [*East Asia will have third priority for resources and wartime operations.*]¹² This priority calls for maintaining improved relations with the People's Republic of China, accelerated growth of Japan's defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-Japanese security ties, and improved relations with the ASEAN states. *STATE ALTERNATIVE—ADDITION: . . . ASEAN states, "and greater progress in getting our NATO Allies to bear a larger share of the burden of defense in Europe."*

Approve State preferences (*deleting* portion underscored in brackets and *adding* portion underscored in quotes)¹³ _____

Approve NSC/Defense preference (no changes) _____

Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba's assistance over the past two years has created another area of increased security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Directive/NSC-52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stronger military presence in the region by gradual shifts in our military exercise activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)

¹⁰ Carter deleted the brackets around this sentence and wrote "ok" in the left margin next to it.

¹¹ Carter approved this option.

¹² Carter deleted this sentence.

¹³ Carter approved this option and wrote in the left margin next to it: "Smooth the Transition."

Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies

Because the Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet military power have increased our strategic requirement, we must make more effort and devise better ways of sharing the economic and military burden with our allies. *We must insist that our European Allies take up the slack on the NATO front while we give greater priority to forces and lift for the Persian Gulf.* [We must insist that our European Allies undertake the programs and make available the resources needed to make up for the reduction in U.S. force comments¹⁴ caused by our effort oriented toward the Persian Gulf]. At the same time, our NATO allies, particularly the British and French, should contribute forces to the security framework for the Persian Gulf.

Approve State version (*sentence underscored in brackets*)¹⁵ _____
Approve NSC/Defense version (*sentence underscored in tics*) _____

Germany, other members of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan should contribute non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most important recipients of this economic aid—as well as of military aid from selected donors—would be Turkey and Pakistan.

Our European and regional Allies should provide overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances.

[Our friends and Allies should be called upon to facilitate overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. We should work to improve the prospects for receiving positive responses to our requests for overflight and refueling clearances.]

Approve State version (*paragraph underscored in brackets*) _____
Approve NSC/Defense version (*paragraph underscored in tics*)¹⁶ _____

Arms Control

Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces—strategic and general purpose—and particularly to limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be pursued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

¹⁴ Carter circled the word “comments.”

¹⁵ Carter approved this option

¹⁶ Carter approved this option.

Persian Gulf Security Framework

Presidential Directive/NSC-_____ elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region. (C)

Tab D

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to
President Carter¹⁷**

Washington, January 7, 1981

SUBJECT

Draft PDs on "U.S. National Strategy" and on the "Persian Gulf Security Framework"

I have three reasons for urging most strongly that you *not* issue PDs on "U.S. National Strategy" and the "Persian Gulf Security Framework."

1. When these directives become public, as I believe they inevitably would, the reaction among reporters, members of Congress and the public would almost certainly be strongly negative. It would cloud your last days in office and detract from your farewell address to the nation.¹⁸

—We would be seen by some as simply having neglected to issue appropriate directives at the outset of the Southwest Asian effort of the past year. And obvious questions would be raised about the issuance of orders to the Departments on long-term issues by a President who had only a few days left in office.

—We could be accused by others of a clumsy attempt to force a set of policies on the incoming Administration.

—Instead of leaving office with much-earned credit for having created the security framework, you and your Administration would end up publicly embarrassed.

2. They could have a negative effect on the new Administration's policies.

—The incoming Administration would no doubt feel challenged by these directives, and would move to rescind them as soon as the Administration had something to put in their place—if not sooner.

¹⁷ Secret.

¹⁸ Carter delivered his farewell address to the nation on January 14. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 163.

3. The PDs are loosely drafted. When public, they would irritate our relations with, among others, our Allies (especially in the Pacific) and the Saudis. *For example*:

—We should not single out East Asia as an area where all is well and which can now be made a third priority. This would harm our relations with Japan, China, and other East Asian friends.

—Public reference to Turkey as a potential “threat-in-being” on the flank of Soviet aggression would eliminate what chance there now is of getting the Turks to be more cooperative.

—The formulation “comprehensive, regionwide use of Saudi wealth” would cause us nothing but grief if the Saudis learned of it.

—We would only damage the security framework if it became known that the DCI was organizing a “regional integrated intelligence program.”

I have supplied Zbig with further specific comments on the drafts.

222. Presidential Directive/NSC-62¹

Washington, January 15, 1981

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of The Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Office of Management & Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Modifications in U.S. National Strategy (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 24, PD/NSC-62. Secret. Carter signed the top of the directive. Brzezinski sent the final version of the directive to Carter for his signature under cover of a January 14 memorandum in which he described two slight changes that Brown recommended (changing “maintaining improved” to “continued improvement of” relations with the People’s Republic of China; and adding Australia to the United Kingdom and France as countries to contribute forces to the Persian Gulf security framework) and of which Brzezinski approved. Brzezinski went on to say that “Ed Muskie chooses not to comment on the wording of the directives. He maintains his previous position recommending that the directives not be issued.” (Ibid.)

I set forth U.S. National Strategy in 1977 in Presidential Directive/NSC-18. It remains our strategy, but in light of increased projection of Soviet power which threatens U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, it has become necessary through a series of individual directives to modify emphasis and priority in the strategy. This Directive will elaborate and codify our progress in building a security framework for the Persian Gulf. (S)

Greater Readiness Required

Given the increased risk of major local or regional conflict involving key U.S. interests in the 1980s we must increase the priority given to readiness in defense resource allocations. (C)

Shifts in Priority for General Purpose Forces

Presidential Directive/NSC-18 put the focus for our general purpose forces on Europe but also called for capabilities for contingencies in Korea and the Persian Gulf region. Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan have, in the interim, increased substantially the threat to our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, the chaotic situation following the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran war and the intensifying intra-Arab and Israeli-Arab tensions have increased the instability in the region. This has also increased the risk to U.S. and Allied interests, both directly and by giving the Soviets added opportunities for interference. At the same time, our success in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China has improved our strategic position in East Asia. Given the danger that Soviet success in asserting influence over the oil producing status of the Persian Gulf region could undermine the viability of NATO and Japan, cause enormous economic disruptions in Europe, Japan, and the United States, higher priority must be given to developing adequate strategic lift, general purpose forces and facilities access for Persian Gulf contingencies. (S)

While NATO will retain first call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program. This priority calls for continued improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China, accelerated growth of Japan's defense capabilities as a contribution to U.S.-Japanese security ties, improved relations with the ASEAN states, and greater progress in getting our NATO Allies to bear a larger share of the burden of defense in Europe.² (S)

Soviet projection of power in the Caribbean region with Cuba's assistance over the past two years has created another area of increased security concern. In support of the objectives of Presidential Directive/

² Carter drew a checkmark in the left margin next to this paragraph.

NSC–52, it is necessary to achieve quietly a stronger military presence in the region by gradual shifts in our military exercise activities and basing of U.S. forces in the Southeastern part of the United States and its territories in the region which will be perceived by Cuba and the Soviet Union as evidence of our determination to limit Soviet and Cuban regional influence. (S)

Sharing the Security Burden with Our Allies

Because the Soviet military buildup and the projection of Soviet military power have increased our strategic requirements, we must make more effort and devise better ways to share the economic and military burden with our Allies. We must insist that our European Allies undertake the programs and make available the resources needed to make up for the reduction in U.S. force commitments caused by our effort oriented toward the Persian Gulf. At the same time, certain of our Allies, particularly the British, French, and Australians, should contribute forces to the security framework for the Persian Gulf.³ (S)

Germany, other members of NATO, ANZUS, and Japan should contribute non-military resources such as economic assistance to the security framework. Two countries which flank Southwest Asia and would be most important recipients of this economic aid—as well as of military aid from selected donors—would be Turkey and Pakistan. (S)

Our European and regional Allies should provide overflight, transit and staging for U.S. forces moving to Southwest Asia. Procedures should be established to facilitate overflight and refueling clearances. (S)

Arms Control

Arms control negotiations which promise to constrain Soviet forces—strategic and general purpose—and particularly to limit resources that both sides must commit to the strategic competition will be pursued vigorously. This latter element of our strategy must be exploited to the extent possible for alleviating both the economic burdens of defense and for reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. (S)

Persian Gulf Security Framework

Presidential Directive/NSC–63 elaborates U.S. strategy for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia region.⁴ (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

³ Carter drew a checkmark in the left margin next to this paragraph.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 221.